CONSERVATION IN SOUTHEASTERN PERUVIAN AMAZON: TWO APPROACHES

RENZO GIUDICE

Thesis submitted for the degree of MSc by Research

University of East Anglia School of Biological Sciences September 2009

This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognize that its copyright rests with the author and that no quotation from the thesis, nor any information derived therefrom, may be published without the author's prior, written consent. !

SUMMARY Human population growth, immigration, and the development of infrastructure threaten the integrity of southeastern Peruvian Amazon and its forest ecosystems services. The present work presents two studies that explore two different approaches to support ongoing conservation efforts in the region. First, using the theory of common pool resources I analyzed the functioning of a common property regime that allows a group of individuals to use and govern a forestry resource in a sustainable, efficient, and equitable manner. Key attributes of the resource and its units, users, and the governance system, as well as of the social and economic contexts, were identified to facilitate this functioning. As results indicate, the strengthening of common property regimes for managing natural resources could prove useful for resolving people-park conflicts and maximizing benefits from the flow of natural resources out of protected areas into buffer zones. Second, I developed a spatially explicit model based on (1) the effect of population growth and secondary roads on deforestation rates and (2) DINAMICA, a stochastic cellular automata model that simulates deforestation based on a set of spatial variables. The model successfully allowed defining a baseline projection of the amount and location of expected deforestation. This baseline is necessary for establishing RED projects (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation) and negotiating the corresponding carbon credits. Considering the relatively high potential revenues (up to US$1612.4M) that would be eventually obtained, a regional RED project could compensate the opportunity costs of preserving large tracks of forests within the region.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First of all, to Dr Douglas W. Yu, my competent supervisor, for his constant support and patient dedication to teach me how to correct and improve my work. Some of his advices were not only utterly helpful for designing my research, analyzing results, and writing the thesis, but also for life. To my friend and colleague Chris Kirkby, for the long hours of important discussions on the development of the deforestation model and the use of DINAMICA. To Dr Britaldo Soares-Filho, who kindly welcomed me at the Centro de Sensoramiento Remoto at the Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais where I developed part of the deforestation model and to his team, especially to Rafaella Almeida Silvestrini and Hermann Rodrigues, who patiently taught me how to improve my use and understanding of DINAMICA. To Dr Rob Williams from the Frankfurt Zoological Society, for his motivation and invaluable help provided to undertake the research at Boca Manu.

To my family, for their unconditional and infinite support in all conceivable aspects. For patiently dealing with my stressful and irritable days. Not a single piece of this work would have been possible without their encouraging motivation. To Mickelly, my partner in love, life, and friendship, without doubt this work is product of her effort too.

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To Andrea Santy and the Russell E. Train Education for Nature Program at World Wildlife Fund, for providing the Fellowship to attend University of East Anglia. To the University of East Anglia, for providing an International Scholarship to reduce tuition fees.

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Table of Contents!
Chapter 1: Tropical biodiversity protection from a harbor gang: a case study of the riverine tree capture system in Manu National Park, Peru............... 1 SUMMARY .................................................................................................. 1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 3 Methods......................................................................................................... 9
Study site and brief history ................................................................................ 9 Interviews & Questionnaires ........................................................................... 12 Total trees captured.......................................................................................... 14 Costs, revenues, and profits ............................................................................. 15 The effect of assigning single sales categories to appropriators .................... 18

Results ......................................................................................................... 19
The history of the tree capture activity........................................................... 19 Users and the appropriation of floating trees ................................................. 19 Organization of the tree capture activity ........................................................ 22 Population growth and its consequences ........................................................ 25 A new institutional setting.............................................................................. 29 Evolution of the rotation system..................................................................... 31 Perceived benefits and costs of the rotation system ....................................... 32 Rule breaking, sanctions, and monitoring ...................................................... 33 Financial Benefits.............................................................................................. 35 The number and volume of captured trees between 2005 and 2007 .............. 35 The value of logs, lumber, and boats for 2006-2007 season .......................... 37

Discussion.................................................................................................... 38
Common property regimes and the Boca Manu system ............................... 39 Factors favoring the emergence of a CPR regime ......................................... 43 Monitoring and sanctioning ............................................................................. 48 A demographic challenge to the future of the Boca Manu CPR .................. 50

Conclusions ................................................................................................. 50 Acknowledgements..................................................................................... 52 References ................................................................................................... 54 Figures and Tables ..................................................................................... 59 Appendix 1 .................................................................................................. 74 Chapter 2: Modeling the effect of population growth and secondary road expansion along the new Interoceanica Sur highway of southeastern Peruvian Amazon........................................................................................................ 85 SUMMARY ................................................................................................ 85 Introduction ................................................................................................ 88 Methods....................................................................................................... 93
Study area and context ..................................................................................... 93

Model development........................................................................................... 95 General approach............................................................................................ 95 Relationship between population, population growth and deforestation rates ........................................................................................................................ 96 Deforestation allocation................................................................................ 102

Results ....................................................................................................... 126

Total deforestation .......................................................................................... 127 Deforestation within PAs................................................................................ 128 Tambopata National Reserve (TNR)............................................................ 129 Bahuaja Sonene National Park (BSNP) ....................................................... 130 Amarakaeri Communal Reserve (ACR)....................................................... 130 Manu National Park (MNP) ......................................................................... 131 Deforestation within FCs................................................................................ 131

Discussion.................................................................................................. 132 Acknowledments ...................................................................................... 138 References ................................................................................................. 139 Figures and Tables ................................................................................... 147 Appendix 1 ................................................................................................ 193

VI

CHAPTER 1

TROPICAL BIODIVERSITY PROTECTION FROM A HARBOR GANG: A CASE STUDY OF THE RIVERINE TREE CAPTURE SYSTEM IN MANU NATIONAL PARK, PERU

RENZO GIUDICE1, DOUGLAS W. YU1,2

1 2

School of Biological Sciences, University of East Anglia, Norwich, Norfolk NR47TJ, UK State Key Laboratory of Genetic Resources and Evolution; Ecology, Conservation, and

Environment Center (ECEC), Kunming Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Science, Kunming, Yunnan, 650223, China

SUMMARY Human population growth, immigration, and the development of infrastructure threaten the integrity of natural protected areas in tropical regions. We reconstructed the history and functioning of a communally regulated riverine tree-capture system on the border of Manu National Park, Peru, and analyzed it using the theory of common pool resources. Our thesis is that the 'roving bandits' of the pre-park era have developed into a 'harborgang', with potential protective benefits for the park itself. A shared past and successful history in managing a common resource, local arenas for harvesting and conflict resolution, state-level recognition, a small number of participants, the existence of mutual monitoring and sanctioning, and a set of rules that limit access and govern behavior have all facilitated the emergence and evolution of a common management regime and increased efficiency and equity. We suggest that the strengthening of common

property regimes for managing natural resources could prove useful for resolving people-park conflicts and maximizing benefits from the flow of natural resources out of a protected area into buffer zones.

Keywords: Amazon, common property management regimes, common pool resources, people-park conflicts, Boca Manu

INTRODUCTION To social scientists, an institution is a set of rules and norms that organizes activities and interactions among individuals by affecting the type of information they can access and the kinds of incentives they face (Ferris & Tang 1993; Smith 2002; Dietz et al. 2003). Rules are understood as prescriptions that require, forbid, or permit specific actions and are commonly known and used by a group of individuals to achieve order and predictability within particular situations (Ostrom 1986), whereas shared individuals perceptions of what actions are proper or not are defined as norms (Crawford & Ostrom 1995; Smith 2002). Among institutions, common pool resource (CPR) institutions deal with the issue of how individuals organize their activities so as to avoid or mitigate the negative outcomes (such as resource depletion and rent dissipation) of independent action, when trying to maximize their own private benefits. CPRs are natural or man-made resources that are sufficiently large so that it is costly to exclude many potential users, and where one individuals use of the resource subtracts from its use by others (Ostrom 1990).

The process and consequences of organizing these institutions are understood as collective actions, in which a group of individuals decides to coordinate behavior to achieve a collective benefit (Ostrom 1990; Smith 2002). In the past, however, it was assumed that individuals were unable to establish CPR institutions and therefore avoid the consequences of selfinterested behavior (Hardin 1968). Under this assumption, the only viable solutions to CPR problems were thought to be nationalization or privatization (Ostrom 1990; Quinn et al. 2007). The theoretical argument 3

that the lack of either state or private ownership always implies open access (i.e. no limits on the use of resources) and leads inexorably to the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968), contributed to this assumption (Ostrom 1990).

However, much empirical as well as experimental research has proven the contrary. Groups of individuals do engage in collective action to restrict access to the commons by establishing rules for appropriation, monitoring, and punishment activities, rules that apply to both the resource and the institution itself (Ostrom 1990; Berkes 1992; Ostrom et al. 1994; White and Runge 1995; Agrawal 2002; McCay 2002; Cardenas 2004; Quinn et al. 2007; Bowles 2008) (see http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/: accessed: February 15, 2009). Much progress has been made in identifying the types of rules, resources, and resource users that are associated with successful collective actions (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 1994; Agrawal 2002), but the debate continues about the characteristics of the resource, its users, and the context that influence the likelihood of success in collective management (Agrawal 2002) and about why and how collective action institutions initially emerge and survive across time (White & Runge 1995; McCay 2002).

Much of the work trying to answer the question of how individuals engage in creating and evolving collective actions has been based on the rational choice theory of human behavior (Ostrom 1990; White & Runge 1995). Each individual is assumed to have an internally consistent value system, to be able to calculate the consequences of their choices, and to choose what is best for their own interest (Dixit & Skeath 2004). If this is so, then each 4

individual should always weigh his or her private costs and benefits and choose accordingly whether to cooperate or defect in a CPR situation (Ostrom 1990). Ostrom (1990) uses a broad conception of rational action to describe changes in human behavior that will lead to coordinated actions and bases her individual internal choice model on four variables: expected benefits, expected costs, internal norms, and discount rates. The norms are affected by the shared norms held by others regarding specific types of situations (Ostrom 1990; Crawford & Ostrom 1995). Similarly, the context around any particular situation affects individuals internal discount rates (Ostrom 1990). Ostrom (1990) adds however that not all situations admit the assumption of purely rational choice; in complex situations, individuals are engaged in a trial and error process to improve the understanding of how their actions affect costs and benefits.

The emergence of a collective action is also affected by the interdependence of individuals who share a CPR (Ostrom 1990), thus forcing individuals to act strategically. If individuals instead act independently, scarcity will likely be the result, causing total net benefits to be less than those they would have achieved had they coordinated their actions (Ostrom 1990). The use of contingent strategies and reciprocity has therefore been recognized as factors that favor the evolution and survival of cooperation. It is known that when individuals learn that others are willing to collaborate for the good of all, they also act cooperatively (Ostrom 1990). Individuals are also known to undertake costly actions consistent with social norms, expecting that someday these banked favors will be reciprocated (White & Runge 1995). However, a theoretical explanation about the likelihood of success in 5

collective actions lacks (Ostrom 1990). As an interim step to filling this theoretical gap, Ostrom (1990) proposed a list of design principles to describe the core conditions facilitating the achievement of institutional robustness in CPR regimes. These principles, although probably not sufficient in themselves to determine success (Morrow & Hull 1996; Agrawal 2002), have been used to describe and analyze the rules and relative performance of many CPR regimes (Morrow & Hull 1996; Quinn et al. 2007).

Another interesting approach is used by White and Runge (1995), who present a conceptual framework to explain the emergence of collective action based on individual choices that are strongly embedded in particular socio-cultural and physical systems. Under this approach, existing interactions, such as conflicting claims over the resource and an unequal distribution of benefits among individuals, define the status quo, which, together with the socio-physical context, determine the factors affecting three phases in the emergence of collective action. These three phases are: (1) the challenge to the status quo and proposal of a collective action, (2) individual choices to either defect or cooperate, and (3) the emergence and evolution of action. A challenge to the status quo emerges because a current situation is perceived to be inefficient, unfair, or both, and it involves an act of either an endogenous or exogenous political leadership, which favors the creation or redistribution of rights and duties (Guttman 1982). In the second phase, individuals effectively cast votes to determine their cooperation or defection, and in the third phase, collective action can emerge, conditional on the voting result (White & Runge 1995). These three phases are recursive 6

and iterative, determining whether individuals will cooperate or defect and determining the consequences of these individual choices. Similar to Ostrom (1990), cooperation is contingent, in that individuals will probably not undertake a coordinated action unless they believe that others will also engage in the collective action (White & Runge 1995).

Important remarks about the emergence of CPR institutions are also made by McCay (2002), who states that institutions for managing commons tend to arise in situations where conflicting claims to CPR exist and where it is perceived that there is a risk that access will be lost or that the resource will deteriorate. He also argues that when trying to understand different scale linkages among social groups, more attention should be given to the fact that external forces could play an important and positive role in institutional changes, such as those provided by governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Ostrom 1990; Morrow & Hull 1996). Finally, McCay (2002) points out that in order to reduce the negative effects of free riders, which reduce the number of cooperators and increase their costs, institutional changes are best taken incrementally, starting small and cheap.

Using the above framework of collective actions for managing common pool resources, I present and analyze the emergence and evolution of a common-pool resource management regime in southeastern Amazonian Peru. The forests lining the Manu watershed rivers in Manu National Park in Peru provide floating trees of valuable timber species to a group of individuals who collect and sell these trees. The trees fall into the rivers because of riverine erosion, and the floating trees constitute the common 7

pool resource units of interest. Tree-capture activity began 45 years ago, before the establishment of Manu Park in 1973, and at its inception, behaved as a classic, open-access, free-for-all commons. Over the intervening years though, many institutional changes have taken place, and today, there is a closed list of authorized users who take turns to capture trees, thus increasing profits and equitability.

I describe here how these changes came about, with reference to previous work on the theory of the commons (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom 1992; Schlager & Ostrom 1992; Ostrom et al. 1994; White & Runge 1995; Agrawal 2002; Ostrom et al. 2007), and I present cost and benefit data from the 2006-2007 season regarding the number, volume, and species of trees captured as well as three final products, raw logs, lumber, and boats, that are produced with the captured trees. With this information, we derive some insight into how the capture system has over time changed the efficiency and equity of benefits distribution among users.

We believe that a theoretical analysis of how collective actions for managing CPRs emerge and survive in the long run, as presented through this case study, is of interest for practical conservation action, at least for the Manu Park administration. Our thesis is that CPR institutions are useful for managing and maintaining a flow of benefits from protected areas to neighboring local human populations. Recognizing the conditions and preconditions for successful CPR institutions could guide the decisions of protected area managers who wish to avoid undermining such collective actions, as well as suggesting new arrangements that could improve their 8

functioning, especially in the face of increasing human population growth rates at the edges of protected areas (Wittemyer et al. 2008).

Immigration towards protected area edges has been suggested as being the cause of this trend (as opposed to endogenous population growth), driven in part by an increasing scarcity of ecosystem services far from protected areas (Wittemyer et al. 2008). If this is true in the Peruvian Amazon, then we should expect further immigration on the borders of Manu Park, since deforestation, and, thus, deterioration of ecosystem services, is increasing outside of protected areas in the region (Oliveira et al. 2007). As has been shown, human populations bordering protected areas frequently have negative impacts on biodiversity (Luck 2007). The state alone is unlikely to be able to prevent immigration to and incursion of protected areas, but we will suggest here that established common pool resource management regimes will be able to, especially if they are supported by state (or even in opposition to the state, see Ascue & Paricahua 2009). CPR regimes by definition enforce limits on access to public resources, thus benefiting the members of the CPR and also resulting in protective benefits for the resource, in this case, protected areas. In the Peruvian Amazon at least, we suggest that such a set of institutions could forge stewards in local populations who will look after environmental and economic sustainability at the edges of protected areas.

METHODS Study site and brief history The study area is located on the eastern border of the 1.7M Ha Manu 9

National Park (hereafter, MNP), located in southeastern Amazonian Peru, in the Department (province) of Madre de Dios (Fig. 1). MNP covers the watershed of the Manu River, which constitutes the core area of a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Biosphere Reserve, and is a World Heritage Site. Rainfall is seasonal (ca. 2100-2600 mm rain/yr), and the region is characterized by extensive tropical rainforest, with a pronounced dry season from July to September (see also, MacQuarrie 1992).

Two settlements, Boca Manu (12.266 S; 70.912 W) and the Isla de los Valles Native Community (12.263 S; 70.917 W), are located just outside MNP, at the mouth of the Manu River (Fig. 1). A Dominican Christian mission originally established Boca Manu as San Luis del Manu in 1908 (MacQuarrie 1992) in the middle of the rubber boom era (ca. 1895-1917), followed by depopulation after the collapse of rubber prices in 1921. In the 1950s, Boca Manu was resettled by timber and animal pelt traders. Sawmills were set up on the lower Manu River to exploit cedro (tropical cedar, Cedrela odorata L.) and caoba (tropical mahogany, Swietenia macrophylla King) (Fig. 1).

The subsequent establishment of MNP in 1973 resulted in the expulsion of hunters and sawmills from Manu, although Boca Manu was not completely abandoned, and a group of Piro-speaking Amerindians, or Yines as they call themselves, who had lived within Manu during the Rubber Boom and later worked for hunters and timber traders, moved downstream and established at both settlements. At this time, inhabitants of the area, including 10

colonos (Andean settlers), ribereos (settlers from other Amazon regions within Peru), and Amerindians started to sell timber from naturally fallen trees that were captured as they floated down the Manu River. Some inhabitants of Boca Manu learned to build outboard motor canoes from the timber, eventually supplying boats to a diverse set of buyers, from researchers and tourism operators to regional gold miners and timber traders. More recently, shops, gas stations, and a couple of hotels have been established at Boca Manu to service the local ecotourism industry, and a local airstrip, previously used for timber shipments and oil-exploration activities, is now used to receive tourists. There are also several public services, such as the primary and secondary schools, a healthcare post, a police office, and government offices.

There are profound cultural and economic differences between the two settlements. Most of inhabitants of Boca Manu (ca. 33 families, 160 persons) are mestizo colonists, people of mixed Amerindian, Andean and ribereo descent, while the inhabitants of Isla de los Valles (23 families embodied in three large groups, 85 persons) are primarily a group of Pirospeaking people of mixed descent (mainly Yine), plus some Matsigenka (Machiguenga) Amerindians and Andean colonists (the Rojas family). Inhabitants of Boca Manu are mostly engaged in commerce and tourism while the inhabitants of Isla de los Valles concentrate on subsistence farming, hunting, fishing, and the collection of non-timber forest products. Inhabitants of both settlements engage in selective timber extraction from local standing forests. Asset poverty, in the form of chainsaws, boats, and boat motors is common in Isla de los Valles, while in Boca Manu it is 11

difficult to find a household lacking either of those.

Interviews and Questionnaires Open-ended interviews and structured questionnaires (Appendix 1) were used to acquire background information on the individuals who engage in the capture of floating trees (appropriators), the financial costs and benefits of capturing, transporting, and transforming the trees into final products, and the organization of the tree-capture system. The interviews sought qualitative information about the history and structure of the organization: when and how it was established, the current appropriation and sanctioning rules, and how the system evolved from a first-come-firstserve to a rotation system for capturing trees. The interviews also tried to define attributes of the resource, users, and the context that have contributed with the emergence, evolution, and survival of the common property regime.

Permission for the research project was granted in March 2007, during RGs first visit, by the Junta Directiva (board of directors) of the Asociacin de Artesanos Recolectores de Troncas Ecolgicas de Boca Manu e Isla de los Valles (Association of Craftsmen Gatherers of Ecological Trees in Boca Manu and Isla de los Valles), which is the legal entity embodying its 46 members, hereafter referred to as the Association. Between March and September 2007, I explained my research project individually to most of the members of the Association, and I conducted open-ended interviews prior to the questionnaires in order to gain confidence with the interviewees. Most interviews took between forty minutes and an hour and questionnaires took 12

thirty minutes with each member. With some interviewees, volunteered information caused interviews to take longer. In total, 15 subjects from Boca Manu (13 males, 2 females, mean age 47.3, SD = 15.4), and 12 subjects from Isla (10 males, 2 females, mean age 40.0, SD = 13.51) were interviewed, out of a total of 46 Association-registered members (R. Catpo & A. de la Cruz, unpublished). Nine members were absent during the study, and the rest declined to be interviewed. I also conducted informal conversations with two retired appropriators and with park guards at the Limonal guard post, where the tree-capture activity takes place (Fig. 1). The names of these 27 interviewees have been anonymized.

A second visit to the field was necessary in March 2009 to gather more data on the evolution of the management system and to acquire information directly from the previous Minutes Books where the Association keeps a register of their meetings and internal and external agreements, mainly those with the MNP administration.

Finally, fifteen other persons who have been involved with or aware of the management system in one way or another were interviewed either to confirm statements or to acquire more information about the past and present functioning of the system. These included the 2007 administrative head of MNP (hereafter referred to as the park chief, after the Spanish term jefe del parque), previous MNP chiefs, other MNP administration members and park guards, anthropologists who have conducted research in the area, the staff of NGOs, and one previous member of the Agriculture Ministry Office. 13

Total trees captured The number, volume, and species of captured trees were obtained from a register at Limonal guard post. Park guards, usually assisted by appropriators, record this information after capture and once the flooding event has passed so as to make this task easier and safer, and in the meantime, the appropriators usually secure their trees to the riverbanks, carving their initials for later identification. Park guards measure the trees for maximum and minimum diameters and length and apply the Tabla Oficial de Cubicacin de Madera Rolliza (Official Table for Measuring Round Wood) (INRENA, unpublished) to determine round and board feet volumes (1m3 of round wood = 220 board feet of sawn wood, 52% yield). Identification of the commercial tree species is determined from bark color, texture, and wood color. Many of the park guards and appropriators have worked as loggers somewhere else, so this task is considered straightforward.

As might be expected, the records are incomplete. Sometimes, appropriators remove trees without recording the capture, which potentially allows those appropriators to re-enter the rotation system immediately (see Results). Thus, the total volume recorded is always an underestimate. Secondly, only in the 2006-2007 season was the record system expanded to include dates, volumes, and appropriator names. These data are necessary in order to calculate the variable capture costs and to estimate the distribution of revenues. Thus, we present results from October 2006 through April 2007 on the number, volume, and species of trees registered as captured by 41 14

users during the 2006-2007 season. We also present total volumes captured from January 2005 through April 2007. Unfortunately, given the informal nature of the economy at Boca Manu, there are no statistics on tree capture rates, costs, or financial returns before 2006, which precludes us from comparing current estimates of profitability and distributional equity with the situation that obtained when tree capture was an open-access system. However, our interviews allow us to make some qualitative historical comparisons.

Costs, revenues, and profits Appropriators do not keep individual records of the final-product fates of their captured trees: raw logs, boards, and boats. However, based on interviews, we assigned each appropriator (n = 27) to the final-product class that constituted ! 50% of their stated sales in previous seasons. We then calculated the costs, revenues, and profits for each appropriator for each product class, which means that we assume that each appropriator sold all his/her captured trees as only one class of product. At the time we conducted the research, not all the wood had been sold, so real sales could not be obtained for the whole 2006-2007 season. We therefore assumed remaining sales and prices were the same as the previous sales. For those present at the study area but who could not be interviewed (n = 14), classification was based on direct observations of their activities and verbal information gathered from other appropriators, park guards, and villagers.

To estimate the costs of production, appropriators (n = 27), together with two shop owners, provided a list of inputs and tools, together with prices 15

and depreciation lifetimes, for each activity (e.g., chainsaws) (Table 2). When there was more than one price for each item I averaged these. All prices were converted from Peruvian Nuevos Soles to US Dollars by using the mean of the exchange rates of the last days of all months from October 2006 to April 2007 (US$ 1.00 = S/3.199), available on a Peruvian government website (SUNAT 2009) http://www.sunat.gob.pe/cl-atittipcam/tcS01Alias, accessed: 15 February 2009).

In addition, appropriators provided the required quantities of tools, inputs, and labor regularly used to produce each final product class from captured trees (e.g., chainsaw removal of branches and roots to produce raw logs). We averaged the input estimates across appropriators and multiplied by each inputs average price. In addition, some appropriators provided total cost estimates for specific production stages, such as sawing 1000 board feet, which were used when not enough information for the whole production stages costs were available. When unpaid labor was employed, such as with kin relations, we used 2007 local wages (US$6.25/day).

For the case of boats, a detailed list of tools and inputs is presented in Table 2 and is based on two days of direct observation and interviews with one boat-seller while he was building two 15-m long boats. However, boats vary in size (9 to 20 m) and in design, depending on the intended cargo (e.g. timber or tourists), which causes production costs to vary. Furthermore, some boat producers stated that prices could vary for the same boat design, depending on the buyers perceived wealth (e.g. boats for tourism are more expensive than those for gold miners). Boat producers did not record the 16

sizes and designs of their boat sales, so we applied the costs and prices of the most frequently used design and size (15 m) to all boats produced. A further complication is that each boat hull (the casco) is made from a fourth of a hollowed-out trunk of the tree species Hura crepitans (Eurphorbiaceae), known locally as catahua. Boat producers together captured only seven catahuas (totaling 10,661 board feet (b.f.)) during the 2006-2007 season, which was not enough to use all the cedro they captured (58 trees; 69,400 b.f.) to build boats. This means that the rest would have to have been purchased from other appropriators or from nearby villages, where one could go and buy a standing catahua tree. The cost of a hull is therefore different depending on whether boat builders used their own captured catahuas or purchased them. If captured, the hulls cost is based on capture plus transformation costs. The cost of the captured catahua volume for each individual is an average cost of all his/her captured board feet during the season. This is calculated by dividing all 2006-2007 seasons captured costs by each individuals own total captured volume. On the other hand, a purchased catahua's average cost is US$ 138.06 (SD = 40.05, n = 6), which is then divided by 4 to get the cost of the necessary volume (~1,272 b.f.) to construct a hull.

Finally, for producers of boats (n = 9), raw logs (n = 15), and lumber (n = 17), individual costs are determined by the number of days spent waiting at Limonal for floating trees. We calculated a mean visit of 3.00 (SD = 0.83, n = 27) days, based on the interviews, which was used to calculate an opportunity cost of wage labor. Revenues are a function of the number of captured trees and their volumes, assuming that no cavities were found 17

within the trunks. The number of captured trees by each appropriator is a function of the number of trees that float down the river (which in turn is a function of riparian forest dynamics) and of the system for assigning those trees to appropriators. Total revenues were derived by multiplying the number of final products by their local average prices (raw logs: US$ 0.22/b.f. (SD = 0.07, n = 14), boards: US$ 0.39/b.f: (SD = 0.03, n = 14), and boats US$ 1,354.59 for 15m boats, (SD = 90.24, n = 3)). Total and per capita profits were calculated by subtracting total costs from total revenues.

For all these calculations, we only include first-order transactions in order to avoid double counting. That is why we did not take into account the revenue that any board seller made by selling boards that were sawn from a log purchased from one of the raw-log sellers. This simplification is equivalent to assuming that all the production was sold to outsiders or to other villagers but not to another appropriator (a zero multiplier).

The effect of assigning single sales categories to appropriators As explained above, the individual revenues that we estimated are the potential revenues assuming appropriators sold all their wood as one class of final product. For example, based on interview results, we identified nine boat-building specialists in Boca Manu. For these individuals, we assumed that all trees captured were used to build and sell boats. This is a reasonable assumption because boats add the most profit value to the wood, so we are assuming that profit is maximized and that other inputs are not limiting (e.g., nails, labor, etc.). Also, the identified lumber specialists do not have the skills to build boats, and we observed that sellers of raw logs lack 18

chainsaws and other materials.

There are, nonetheless, other possible uses for the captured trees, for example, as furniture or house building material or as informal currency in exchange for rides to Limonal or as payment for chainsaw use. These uses are not recorded in any detail by the appropriators, nor were formal records kept of sales in the 2006-2007 season. Thus, our revenue and profit estimates should be treated with caution.

RESULTS The history of the tree capture activity In this section we present the important events and context that led current appropriators to develop a collective institution for managing the tree capture activity, as well as how the MNP administration has been involved. We also provide a qualitative and a quantitative analysis of the effects of the current tree-capture system. Lastly, we describe how sanctioning and monitoring are undertaken by the appropriators to regulate the system.

Users and the appropriation of floating trees In the early 1960s, the forests lining the Manu River constituted an openaccess resource for loggers and hunters, whose exploitation levels were likely locally unsustainable (MacQuarrie 1992, see Methods). During these years, settlers and natives, who had been working for sawmill owners or pelt traders, also collected floating catahua, cedro, and caoba trees, an activity that required the ability to identify the valuable trees out of the myriad that floated down and paddle a dugout canoe alongside and pull the trees to the 19

riverbank, where a handsaw was used to trim the roots and branches (C. Romn, personal communication, May 22, 2007). Sales of these captured trees supplemented the incomes of both groups and provided the raw material for dugout canoes. In the same decade, some of the collectors learned to build up the sides of dugout canoes with planks to build boats that could take outboard motors (Fig. 2).

Despite this income source, by the late 1960s most of the Yine had nonetheless moved away from the mouth of the Manu River, establishing themselves upstream on the Alto Madre de Dios River (Fig. 1) in what is now called the Native Community of Diamante (Federacin Nativa del Ro Madre de Dios y sus Afluentes (FENAMAD), unpublished data 1998). The Yine moved because of constant flooding of their farms and because of territorial conflicts with the colonos. Thus, by virtue of their proximity to the mouth of the Manu River (Figs. 1 & 3), the settlers, who founded the village of Boca Manu and a single, extended Yine family, the Valles, gained privileged access to the floating trees. In addition, inhabitants of Boca Manu invested in boat motors (16 hp, two-stroke engines known locally as 'pekepekes'), which increased their advantage in capturing trees, whereas the inhabitants of Diamante did not (A. Smith, pers. comm., April 3, 2009). The loss of access to the floating trees led to disputes and fights between the inhabitants of the two villages, and, eventually, to the theft of secured trees, by both sides (A. Castillo, pers. comm., February 12, 2009; A. Smith, pers. comm., April 3, 2009). This state of affairs continued for many years.

In 1973, Manu National Park was established (Decreto Supremo - D.S. N 20

0644-73-AG-DGFF), and the forest upstream of the Panagua tributary on the Manu River (Figs. 1) became closed to loggers and hunters. In 1980, the lower Manu River was designated as a Reserved Zone (Resolucin Suprema - R.S.- N 0151-80-AA-DGFF) (Figs. 1 & 3) and also closed to settlement, logging, and hunting. A Reserved Zone is a temporary land-use designation under Peruvian Protected Areas Law that is designed to restrict settlement and habitat conversion while decisions are made on a parcel of land's permanent designation, such as national park status (Article 59, D.S. 0382001-AG). Floating-tree capture continued in the Reserved Zone.

In the early 1980s, park authorities began to require participants to register their activities by applying for an annual tree-capture permit which, at the time, was issued free of charge by the Agriculture Ministry Office (Agencia Agraria) in the town of Salvacin, 70 km from Boca Manu (Fig. 1), and to pay a harvesting fee (Pago por derecho de aprovechamiento) that was based on the tree species and volumes captured. The permits allowed the users to legally transport and sell their wood outside Boca Manu (Gua de Transporte Forestal, D.S. N 161-77-AG, Article 130; C. Romn, pers. comm., May 22, 2007). This was in the interest of the users, as all sawmills in Manu had been evicted, and trees had to be transported downstream 160 km to the town of Laberinto or 245 km to the city of Puerto Maldonado to be sold (Fig. 1) (L. Kalinowski, pers. comm., July 17, 2007).

In the late 1980s, in response to ongoing conflict between the inhabitants of Boca Manu and Diamante, park authorities finally assigned different treecapture zones to each group (A. Garca, pers. comm., March 17, 2009; J.C. 21

Flores, pers. comm., March 23, 2009; A. Smith, pers. comm., April 3, 2009), based on the proximity of the settlements to the rivers (M. Challco, pers. comm., April 14, 2009). Thus, the Valles and the settlers, who lived closer to MNP, were given exclusive permission to capture trees inside the Reserved Zone, from the mouth of the Pinqun Tributary to the mouth of the Manu River, and the Diamantinos were given permission to capture trees downstream of this, starting from the mouth of the Manu River (A. Garca, pers. comm., March 17, 2009). Diamantinos have peacefully complained to park authorities about this unequal zoning ever since, but park authorities have never re-granted park access rights to the Diamantinos, arguing that they have sufficient natural resources in the forests bordering the Diamante community (M. Challco pers. comm., April 14, 2009). This argument appears to be correct, as the Diamantinos have never escalated their grievance to a major conflict.

Organization of the tree capture activity Since they won exclusive permission to enter the Reserved Zone, the inhabitants of Boca Manu and the Isla de los Valles have engaged in various costly activities to restrict and regulate the appropriation of floating trees within their tree-capture zone, so as to secure the benefits for themselves and their descendants, and to increase the fairness in the distribution of trees.

Over the 1980s and early 1990s, this group of families formed an unofficial association whose main objective was to capture and sell floating trees for the benefit of their families and support of their children 22

(C. Romn, pers. comm., May 22, 2007). The group periodically met to coordinate tree capture activity, as well as to elect a president and vicepresident, who were responsible for requesting permits and dealing with park authorities when necessary. It was during this era that the group began to restrict the number of people who were allowed to capture trees. In 1987, for example, the association voted that only settlers who had lived in Boca Manu or the Isla for at least three years could join the association, or face eviction from the tree capture zone by members of the group (M. Blanco, pers. comm., March 6, 2009; C. Romn, pers. comm., March 7, 2009; R. Rivera & L. Meza, pers. comm., March 8, 2009). Children of association members were given the automatic right to join once they reached eighteen years of age (C. Romn, pers. comm., March 7, 2009).

In 1993, prompted by the chief of MNP, the appropriators took the decision to formalize their existence by registering as a Peruvian legal entity known as a Private Association (Asociacin Privada, Superintendencia Nacional de Registros Pblicos - SUNARP, Acta de Constitucin, unpublished data April 19, 1993), under the name of Asociacin de Artesanos y Moradores de Boca Manu de Madre de Dios (Tomo 3, Folio 181, N01, Registros Pblicos - Madre de Dios, Puerto Maldonado, 29 April 1993). To pay the registration fee (US$ 9.36) and travel costs of the president and secretary to the provincial capitol, Puerto Maldonado, the Association members collectively captured and sold a cedro tree.

Although the relevant forestry law (D.L. 21147 and D.S. 161-77-AG) did not require that users form a Private Association to be allowed to capture 23

floating trees, the group's motive for this act was derived from their perception that by forming a Private Association, the MNP's administration would be legally bound to continue granting them exclusive access rights to the tree capture zone (J. Garca, pers. comm., March 6, 2009; B. Lau, pers. comm., May 12, 2009). As a former Association president put it: "once we got registered there was no longer any chance of us being blocked by anyone to continue capturing trees" (J. Garca, pers. comm., March 6, 2009). This was an overly simplistic view, although not entirely incorrect.

In the Peruvian Civil Code, a Private Association enables a group of individuals to enter into a contract as a collective unit instead of as individuals entering into multiple contracts, and the Association is (and all its members are) then subject to legal prosecution in the event that any individual member breaches the contract terms. The benefit to the Association for taking on collective responsibility is that it reduces complexity, allows collective bargaining, and makes some contracts more likely to be agreed. For example, in 1997, the Association signed a contract to exclusively sell all their wood to a single intermediary (J. Garca, pers. comm., March 6, 2009). More importantly, the states Agencia Agraria was able to issue only one permit to the Association, rather than individual permits (B. Lau, pers. comm., May 12, 2009), and the MNP administration could then rely on the members of the Association to design its own systems for monitoring and sanctioning rule breaking rather than having to monitor many individuals (A. Castillo, pers. comm., February 12, 2009). This shifts some of the burden of proof and monitoring to the Association. For example, if illegal logging occurs where the Association operates as part of 24

its activities, and if preventing illegal logging is part of the contract signed with the park, the park administration can hold the Association responsible rather than having to try to determine individual guilt. Association members are of course more likely to be able to find violators, as they have more information about the activities of their members. As a result, contracts between the park and the Association are made more robust.

It is worth mentioning that a settler-Yine-mixed family, the Rojas-Valles, opposed the registration of the Association, arguing that the familys ancestral use of resources and territory, considering its Yine descent, should have given them exclusive appropriation rights. The head of the family, Mr. Rojas, threatened to form a separate association (J. Garca & E. Salas, pers. comm., March 6, 2009), but the MNP rejected this proposal on the grounds that two associations would engage in conflict (J. Garca, pers. comm., May 16, 2007). In subsequent years, Mr. Rojas has led the Valles to boycott the Association (R. Rivera, pers. comm., March 6, 2009) and repeatedly violated the parks restrictions, for which he was once sent to prison for some months, after he entered the park and logged over 20 cedar trees in the mid 1990s (A. Castillo, pers. comm., June 15, 2007).

Population growth and its consequences During the 1990s, the number of appropriators increased from around nineteen to 41. Fourteen Rojas and Valles family members reached eighteen years old, and eight immigrants claimed appropriation rights after completing three years of residence. This increase in numbers resulted in disputes and fights during tree capture, as observed by the MNP's chief at 25

this time (A. Castillo, pers. comm., February 12, 2009).

Two problems arose from the increased number of appropriators: inefficiency and inequity. First, more members naturally decreased per capita captures and profits, not only because of the effectively fixed resource size (as noted by eight interviewees) but also because capture costs increased (as twelve interviewees stated). Although the number of floating trees predictably peaks at every flood surge (Fig. 4), only a few of the trees that float out of the park belong to one of the valuable timber species. Tree size is also variable, and appropriators have only scant minutes to scan the bark and a few centimeters of exposed wood to determine species identity, often in the dark and rain. Thus, as two appropriators (J. Garca and E. Campos) recalled, during this era, there was a high degree of uncertainty over whether an investment of time and petrol to go capture trees would be repaid, since tree capture was conducted on a first-come-first-serve system. There was also a non-trivial risk of injury. Thus, as one member recalled, on more than half of the times he went to Limonal in that era, he did not capture any trees because too many other users had gotten there first (T. Ruesta, pers. comm., September 9, 2007). As a result, as the number of members increased, the number of visits that resulted in no captured trees also increased, each exacting a minimum cost. In addition, the more intense competition provoked more violent confrontations. The result of this increased cost and risk was to dissuade many Association members from participating, leaving the trees to a small group of members (~10) who lived closer to the mouth of the Manu River (the Rojas) or who were risk-takers (as fifteen interviewees stated). Finally, the skewed distribution of tree 26

captures was exacerbated by the unequal distribution of peke-peke motors amongst the members.

A key intervention from the MNP administration was therefore necessary during the mid-1990s, as an increasing number of unsettled and disorganized users threatened the MNP's integrity; with reduced financial returns from tree capture, some users might have found it worthwhile to breach the capture-zone limit for collecting trees, or even to log, hunt, or fish within the park. Initially, in 1994, appropriators were required to register at the guard post and queue, so that appropriation would follow the order of arrival, and each appropriator was limited to one tree per turn (J. Garca, pers. comm., March 3, 2009; Reglamento para el Manejo de Troncas en la Zona Reservada del Manu, Jefatura del Parque Nacional del Manu, unpublished data 1999). Secondly, MNP authorities relocated the tree capture zone downstream twice, finally establishing it at the new Limonal guard post in 1996 (Fig. 3), where the appropriators could be monitored more easily and transport costs minimized.

Although this measure reduced priority disputes, queuing by itself did not resolve the equity problem, as the same few members dominated the queue (J. Campos, pers. comm., June 4, 2007 & March 8, 2009). Finally, at an Association meeting on 29 April 2004, a key step was taken when the Associations president, J. Campos, proposed that all Association members follow a fixed order of turns (Second Minutes Book, page 6, unpublished data, April 29, 2004). This way, risk would be reduced by reducing physical interference and unnecessary visits (J. Campos, pers. comm., March 8, 27

2009). When at the top of the list, a member is given right of first refusal for all floating trees, and if he or she rejects a tree, the right to that tree is transferred down the queue. Enforcement would be undertaken by the President of the Association and a designated fiscal (an elected member) (Article 28 Association's Statute, unpublished), and list-jumpers would be suspended or evicted, depending on the frequency of violations, while park guards would be tasked with maintaining order at the access point and continuing to prevent outsiders from entering into the park.

In his interviews (June 4, 2007 & March 8, 2009), the Association's thenpresident, J. Campos, stated that he was motivated by his belief that it was unfair that only a few users were capturing all the trees. Another member separately pointed out that Campos lives far from the mouth of the Manu River (about 10 km downstream on the Madre de Dios River) and was disadvantaged by the first-come-first-serve system, since he usually arrived later than the others (M. Valds, pers. comm., July 5, 2007). At the same meeting, another member (R. Rivera, 29 April, 2004) proposed that no additional members be allowed in the Association, except for descendants at the age of eighteen (Second Minutes Book, page 7, April 29, 2004). Both changes to the Association's statutes were unanimously approved by the attendees (33 out of a total of 40 registered members, Second Minutes Book, page 8), and the changes were registered in the Public Registers Office, paying a fee of 32.00 Nuevos Soles (US$ 9.70, December 3, 2004).

Not surprisingly, this decision was protested by the Rojas-Valles family (Second Minutes Book, page 28), which would as a result capture fewer 28

trees (J. Campos, pers. comm., March 8, 2009). During the following months and again in 2007, they threatened to form their own independent association, arguing for exclusive rights to the tree resource, given their ancestral use of the territory (Second Minutes Book, page 31; A. Osorio, pers. comm., June 22, 2007; J. Garca, pers. comm., March 6, 2009; H. Morales, pers. comm., July 7, 2007). These initiatives have naturally been opposed by both Boca Manu and many residents of the Isla de los Valles (J. Garca, pers. comm., March 6, 2009; M. Valds, pers. comm., July 7, 2007), and, more importantly, the MNP administration has stated that it will not allow two associations to operate in the park, threatening to allow a private company to undertake collection if the Association splits (A. Osorio, pers. comm., June 22, 2007).

A new institutional setting In parallel, two important institutional changes occurred in the early 2000s. Firstly, in 2001 a new Protected Areas Law (Reglamento de la Ley de reas Naturales Protegidas, D.S. N 038-2001-AG) transferred responsibility for forestry products within natural protected areas from the Agencia Agraria to a new institutional body, the Direccin General de reas Naturales Protegidas (DGANP) (later called the Intendencia de reas Naturales Protegidas - IANP). Secondly, the Reserved Zone was finally incorporated into the MNP proper in 2002 (D.S. N 045-2002-AG). As a result, the tree capture activity became subject to a new series of requirements applicable to national parks (Article 106, D.S. N 038-2001-AG and Procedimiento 113, D.S. N 013-2002-AG, Texto nico de Procedimientos Administrativos del Instituto Nacional de Recursos Naturales - TUPA-INRENA). 29

Under Peruvian law, appropriators of natural resources from protected areas (as opposed to Reserved Zones) must formally request capture authorization, pay a harvesting fee based on the volume and species to be captured (e.g. ~US$8.6/m3 for cedar), and pay an annual tax equivalent to US$ 62.00 to the MNP administration (values current as of 2004). In addition, a management plan must regulate the activity (Plan de Manejo de Aprovechamiento) (Procedimiento 113, D.S. N 013-2002-AG), which must take place within a Special Use Zone (a management status within the protected areas Plan Maestro, which allows the sustainable use of resources within an otherwise strictly protected area (Articles 102, 103, 105, 106, D.S. N 038-2001-AG). The capture authorization would result in a certificate from the MNP attesting to the legal and sustainable origin of the wood, which would allow appropriators to sell their trees on the legal market at a higher price than on the black market, where they had been forced to sell their trees after the Agencia Agraria stopped issuing permits in 2001.

In 2004, the Association and the MNP administration discussed the possibility of granting an exclusive, 20-year capture permit (Second Minutes Book, pages 16 & 18), and it was within this context that the Association instituted the rotation system and the limits on new members. It appears that the incentive of a long-term agreement prompted appropriators and their leaders to incur the costs of reorganizing the activity (J. Campos, pers. comm., March 8, 2009).

30

A management plan draft was eventually produced in 2006 (Plan de Manejo Forestal para el Aprovechamiento de rboles arrastrados por el ro Manu, Catpo & de la Cruz, unpublished 2006) with the aim of providing general guidelines for the management of the activity. However, as of this writing, the MNP administration has not yet created the Special Use Zone, and the management plan has not yet been approved by the IANP (which itself has in 2009 been placed under the new Ministry of the Environment and renamed as the Servicio Nacional de reas Naturales Protegidas SERNANP).

Evolution of the rotation system Despite the lack of progress on the legal front, the Association's 47 members (as of 2009) largely follow the rotation system set up in 2004, with the innovation that the original list has evolved into two simultaneous lists, one for small trees (<1,000 board feet = 4.53m3 of round wood, 52% yield) and one for all larger trees, rotating in opposite order. The idea of two lists was suggested by the MNP administration (A. Oroz, pers. comm., February 11, 2009) and approved by the majority of present members (18 out of 25) in an Association meeting on January 25th, 2006 (Second Minutes Book, page 57).

If an appropriator does not appear for his turn, then that is understood as a refusal and the appropriator gives up the turn. As a result, on days when few appropriators are present in the queue and multiple commercial trees appear, individual appropriators can capture multiple trees in a single flooding episode (between one and three days). Exceptions can be made for illness or 31

other justified absence, and with the approval of the Board of Directors of the Association, a lost turn can be recovered. In addition, if an appropriator exercises his large-tree turn but subsequently discovers that the tree is less than 1,000 board feet (e.g. due to internal cavities), the Board of Directors can decide to give the appropriator a new large-tree turn.

It appears that the two-list system simplifies mutual monitoring. The appropriators who wish to concentrate their effort on large trees follow that list, and appropriators who wish also to capture small trees can often capture several, using the turns that are given up. As a result, the capture of small trees tends to be quite disorganized, as the list order is not followed. There is also strategic behavior and risk-taking behavior. Appropriators regularly reject trees over 1,000 board feet, sometimes even trees over 2,000 board feet (Limonal Guard Post Chief, pers. comm., September 9, 2007), waiting for a chance to capture a bigger tree. In part, rejecting large trees can be strategic if the next person is kin and is present for his small-tree turn, in which case, the rejected tree can be claimed by the kin (E. Campos, pers. comm., May 17, 2007). It is worth noting that error is also important, as at night there is uncertainty about the real volume of the tree (R. Rivera, pers. comm., May 25, 2007).

Perceived benefits and costs of the rotation system Thirteen appropriators (Boca Manu (7) and Isla de los Valles (6)) out of fifteen who freely commented on the functioning of the system, volunteered in interviews that the rotation system reduced costs by reducing uncertainty and the possibility of violent confrontations. One of the appropriators noted 32

that before the introduction of the rotation system, he captured nothing in more than half his visits, but with the new system, he only goes when his turn is near, avoiding unnecessary waiting (T. Ruesta, pers. comm., September 9, 2007). It is, however, difficult to determine whether the rotation system has increased distributional equity among members; only twelve out of 22 interviewees stated that they perceived an increase in equity (see Fig. 5). However, eight of the ten appropriators who did not agree that equity has been increased are from the Valds family, who also complain that they lack boats and motors to go to Limonal. One of the Valles appropriators (pers. comm., May 18, 2007) also noted that he lacks a chainsaw and that ropes for tying the captured trees are expensive in the Boca Manu shop. This lack of appropriate infrastructure is reflected in the lower capture rates during the 2006-7 season; Valles family members captured on average significantly fewer trees than members from Boca Manu and the Rojas family (Fig. 6). Nonetheless, all participants captured at least one tree during the 2006-2007 season (Fig. 5), which, according to five interviewees, did not occur before the establishment of the rotation system in 2004.

Rule breaking, sanctions, and monitoring Nine appropriators volunteered that the tree-capture zone limit (the Limonal guard post) is often trespassed by list members, especially at night when park guards are absent. Also, appropriators sometimes hide captured trees to pick up later, so that when appropriators arrive for their turns, the previous appropriators can claim that they are still waiting to exercise their turns (E. Campos, pers. comm., May 17, 2007). It was not possible to estimate 33

quantitatively the degree to which appropriators cheat in these two ways, especially since the rotation lists are not strictly followed.

Appropriators who are caught violating the Association rules face graduated sanctions ranging from verbal warnings to eviction from the Association (Association statutes, Articles 10 & 15). However, interviews revealed many complaints about the capacity of the Association's executives to enforce the rules. Twenty appropriators out of 27 stated that sanctions are not applied. As a response to the perceived lack of rule enforcement, thirteen appropriators freely commented that they believe that the park guards should get involved in the monitoring and sanctioning of the activity more profoundly. Some of them (5) stated that park guards were often not present during the capture events, which facilitates opportunistic behavior. However, Association records (Second Minutes Book, page 83) and interviews reveal five instances in which appropriators were sanctioned in the recent past (2004-2006), two of whom were even expelled after repeatedly committing serious infractions, such as stealing others' captured trees. The other three were suspended for times periods between three flood surges to an entire rainy season for having transgressed the capture zone limit. It is worth noting that most interviewees (21 out of 27) answered that they are informed when other appropriators break rules, which suggests that there is a great deal of mutual monitoring and gossip. Nonetheless, almost half of the interviewees (13) stated that they themselves never accuse cheaters. One appropriator explained that this would cause social conflict among them, which is not desired among members because other day-to-day interactions would be affected and therefore they avoid this situation (R. 34

Rivera, pers. comm., March 8, 2009).

The Association Board of Director's president and fiscal (prosecutor), who are elected by all members every two years, are responsible for monitoring and sanctioning member's behavior according to the Association's Statute (Articles 23b, 28b, & 28c), but they are not required to be present at Limonal for every flooding episode. Nonetheless, mutual monitoring during the capture activity is facilitated by the fact that it occurs in a small area (ca. 152 ha) (Fig. 3), where tree capture is made easier by a slower current and the presence of low-flow areas where trees can be manipulated and secured (A. Castillo, pers. comm., February 12, 2009). Thus, a member can be accused by another member of having committed a fault, and the Board of Directors will present the case to all members who vote on a sanction.

Financial Benefits In this section, we present the total number of trees, volume, and species captured between 2005-2007. We then calculate the financial benefits from sales of these trees as raw logs, lumber, or boats during the 2006-2007 season.

The number and volume of captured trees between 2005 and 2007 The total number of cedro and catahua trees captured between 2005-2007 and their total volume are presented in Table 3. Most of these were captured after the beginning of the rainy seasons, which typically starts in November (Fig. 4). The short timeline precludes us from concluding that volumes recorded here are consistent across years, bearing in mind that the 2005 data 35

does not include the whole season. For instance, twelve appropriators believe the river carries fewer trees in recent years than during the 1990s, though seven others suggested that this appearance of a reduction is due to the increased number of appropriators.

Regardless, it is still interesting to note that the 2006-2007 total cedro volume captured (190,222 b.f. or 448.64 m3 of sawn wood) is equivalent to 8.6% of the 2007 cedro production out of all terrestrial forestry concessions in Madre de Dios (5,215.9 m3 of sawn wood, taken from 1270,468 ha of concessions, or 14.89% of Madre de Dios area) (see INRENA 2008). One reason for the high productivity out of MNP is that cedro is present at high density in successional zones on the Manu River (ten trees per ha along the Manu River from the mouth to 64 km upstream) (see Flores & Lombardi 1990), whereas cedro has been extirpated along rivers outside of protected areas, and densities in primary forest are lower. Profitability at Boca Manu is probably also higher, due to considerably lower transport and search costs.

As mentioned above, although all appropriators captured at least one tree during the 2006-2007 season, an unequal distribution of captures still remains (Fig. 5). The top 10% of members (4) captured 53 trees, or 26.9% of the total captured, whereas the bottom 10% captured only 2% of all trees (n = 4), representing an estimated Gini coefficient of 0.42 (higher values indicate more inequality).

36

The value of logs, lumber, and boats for 2006-2007 season Estimated total revenues and profits gained from transforming and selling the trees captured during the 2006-2007 season were US$ 126,377 and US$ 74,751, respectively. Regarding the possibility of a 20-year contract between the Association and MNP administration (see A new institutional setting) we calculated the profit net present value (NPV) for 20 years using a discount rate of 10%, and obtained a NPV of US$ 636,397.40.

Per capita revenues and profits gained from transforming and selling the trees by each class of producers are shown in Figures 7 & 8. The boat producers gained by far the largest revenues and profits, followed by the lumber producers first and then by the raw logs producers. Estimated annual, per capita worked days for each class of producers were: 139, 16, and 7 days, respectively, resulting in a daily salary of US$ 40.92, US$ 53.38, and 86.53 for boats, raw logs, and lumber producers, respectively. As a rough comparison the nominal daily salary of workers in Puerto Maldonado in 2007 was only US$ 8.25 (based on the monthly salary of S/. 792.1, see Webb & Fernndez 2008). This amount could be used as a proxy for the opportunity cost of the tree capture activity and thus reflect its relative financial importance. Nonetheless, the estimated Gini coefficient of 0.62 for the total profits represents yet an even larger unequal distribution among all producers than that estimated for the distribution of captured trees. This fact can be explained by the higher profit margins of boats, versus lumber and raw logs. Thus, even though the seventeen lumber sellers captured most of the trees in 2006-2007 (73, compared to 65 and 60 for the fifteen boat and the nineteen raw logs producers, respectively), it was the 37

boat builder 'guild' that by far earned the largest total profit (Fig. 9).

Moreover, per capita profits of boat builders were more evenly distributed (Gini coefficient = 0.28) than those of the other classes of producers (lumber producers Gini coefficient = 0.40 and raw logs producers Gini coefficient = 0.63). We reiterate that these estimates are underestimates, as not all trees are captured and that there is additional error since not all trees had been sold at the time of our study (see METHODS).

DISCUSSION Many events and contextual factors influenced the transition of the Boca Manu tree capture system from an open access situation into a common property regime, benefiting the appropriators and potentially the MNP. The establishment of the MNP and the consequent expulsion of loggers and hunters in 1973 made inhabitants of nearby settlements dependent on riverine tree-capture as one of their main economic activities. Appropriators from Boca Manu and the Isla de los Valles then restricted access to the resource in 1987 by gaining exclusive rights to capture trees in the best capture zone. In 1993, the group became a Private Association to facilitate the signing and enforcement of agreements between the Association and the park administration, regarding the appropriation of trees within the Manu River. By late 1990s, the Associations members had increased from nineteen to 41, resulting in conflicting claims over the trees and reduced per capita captures and profits. As a solution, the Association devised in 2004 a prearranged list of turns to capture trees and further restricted the access to the floating trees by allowing only members descendants to enter the 38

Association. The rotation system appears to have reduced costs and allowed all appropriators to capture at least one tree during a season, thus increasing efficiency and equity in the distribution of trees. Mutual monitoring of members behavior and the occasional imposition of sanctions appear to contribute to the maintenance of the rotation system and access rights. The value of the trees captured is considerable: during the 2006-2007 season the Association captured 190,222 b.f. of cedro, and per capita revenues and profits gained from transforming and selling the trees were: (1) US$ 873.24 and US$ 628.77, respectively, for raw logs producers; (2) US$ 1,643.53 and US$ 828.99, for lumber producers; and (3) US$ 9,482.12 and US$ 5,691.92, for boats producers. Estimated per capita worked days for each class of producers were: 7, 15, and 139 days, respectively, resulting on a daily wage of US$ 86.53, US$ 53.38, and US$ 40.92 for raw logs, lumber, and boats producers, respectively. In contrast, the 2007 Puerto Maldonados nominal daily salary for workers was only US$ 8.25.

I now examine the Boca Manu system using the theory of collective action for governing common pool resources (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom 1992; Schlager & Ostrom 1992; Ostrom et al. 1994; White & Runge 1995; Agrawal 2002; Ostrom et al. 2007).

Common property regimes and the Boca Manu system We start by differentiating between a renewable CPR system (MNP's riparian forest) and the CPR units themselves (the trees). The former is a stock that is capable, under favorable conditions, of producing a flow of resource units without harming the stock, as long as the withdrawal rate is 39

less than the natural rate of replenishment (Ostrom 1990). It is also important to distinguish between the nature of the resource itself, as determined by its exclusion and subtractability attributes (i.e. commons are costly excludable, and rival: one individuals appropriation subtracts from what is left to others), and the property regime, the kind of arrangements created by humans to regulate the use and tenure of the resource, such as private or common property. Overlooking this difference has previously caused common pool resources to be confounded with common property resources, a concept which in turn was confused with open access conditions: the absence of rules to regulate its use (Dietz et al. 2002). Thus, in the Boca Manu system a group of individuals has established a common property regime to use the resource units of a common pool resource.

Having said so, riparian tree capture in itself is as sustainable an activity as can be imagined, since the stock is untouched by humans. Thus, our theoretical interest in this system lies less in how the appropriators have limited their extraction rate to sustainable levels, since that is enforced by the existence of the MNP, and more in (1) how the appropriators have organized to limit access to the capture zone and to distribute benefits and in (2) the evolution of the relationship between the MNP and the appropriators. As such, our observations are most applicable to situations where conservationists are interested in people-park conflicts and in managing the flow of benefits from a protected area to bordering human populations. Our thesis is that the 'roving bandits' of the pre-MNP era have developed into a 'harbor-gang' (sensu Acheson 1975; Berkes et al. 2006), with potential 40

protective benefits for the MNP itself.

Collectively managing the distribution of benefits of a heterogeneously distributed (temporally or spatially) resource, known as an assignment problem (Ostrom et al. 1994), is not a simple task to solve (see Berkes 1992). In fact, designing mechanisms to allocate a seasonal and sporadic flow of trees among users has been the fundamental management problem that has faced the appropriators.

McCay (2002) has suggested that the emergence of collective action for managing a commons is, at least initially, driven more by limiting access than by limiting extraction rates and that "indigenous conservation" can be thought of as "indigenous conflict management." This appears to be the case at Boca Manu, since conflicting claims over the floating trees, especially those between the Diamantinos and the Boca Manu group during the early years, and, later, among the Association's members, appear to have provided the major incentive behind the formulation of operational rules to limit access of outsiders and to regulate behavior among members. In both cases, users perceived a risk of losing access to a valuable resource to competitors (McCay 2002). This system therefore resembles previous research on seatenure institutions in fisheries where the zero-sum nature of fisheries sustains management regimes that limit access to fishing grounds (Berkes 1992). It is important to recognize that in the Boca Manu system, actions to limit access were carried out not only by the resource users but also by the MNP administration, so as to thwart possible threats to its integrity. In this way, the MNP has represented an external force that has contributed 41

important institutional changes, as has been observed elsewhere (see Ostrom 1990; Morrow & Hull 1996).

The MNP administration also contributed importantly to the introduction of prearranged rotation rules, such as the rotation list, which appears to have reduced some of the inequality among appropriators (see also Berkes 1992; Ostrom et al. 1994). Thus, although it has been recognized that central governments should not undermine local authority to devise their own CPR institutions (Ostrom 1990), it is important to recognize the potential positive interventions that protected areas administrations can undertake. In fact, we believe that the MNP's imposition of queuing in the 1990s might have facilitated the evolution of prearranged rotation rules and thus to mitigate the assignment problem of unequal distribution of trees. Thus, it is useful not to dismiss the political leadership that government authorities possess to exert positive changes and to support CPR regimes (see McCay 2002), especially in rural areas of developing countries where access to assistance programs for managing natural resources is difficult or the management itself has been dominated by government property regimes alone. Therefore, the gate for an exogenous intervention that could lead to improvements in traditional management systems must be left open and exercised, considering the fact that successful interventions could increase social benefits and reduce threats to common pool resources. In the future, finally ratifying the management plan and therefore changing the status of the parks tree-capture zone into a special use zone would increase the value of floating trees, as the trees would be able to gain legal status, allowing appropriators to sell them at a better price (almost three times the current 42

price). Higher profits could imply a higher incentive for protecting the stock from which CPR users benefit. Moreover, legitimatization of the common property regime would reduce perceived risks, which in turn could potentially reduce appropriators' discount rates so as to enforce long-term measures to manage and continue managing the CPR.

Factors favoring the emergence of a CPR regime At this point it will be useful to consider and relate two frameworks for analyzing the emergence and evolution of the Boca Manu common property regime: (1) White and Runges (1995) three-phases framework (referred to as W-R framework hereafter) (see INTRODUCTION), and (2) Ostroms (1990, p. 90) eight design principles which she derived from analyzing a set of long-enduring CPR institutions and were proposed as conditions helping to account for their success.

The W-R framework makes clear the importance of local leaders in challenging the status quo, proposing new strategies and agreements to implement them. An important example is Campos's proposal of the rotation system. Campos's motives, as well as those of the members who supported his measure, appear to have been rational, because the cost of organization (e.g. travel to Puerto Maldonado and registration in SUNARP) appear to have been less than the benefits. (However, we cannot quantify what we might call the 'social costs' of gathering community consensus and possibly dealing with rivals). Ensuring that the net benefit of collective action remains positive will be an important consideration when fees for collections and permits are reactivated in the future. Maintaining an elected 43

Board of Directors is fundamental for allowing local leaders to design and propose potential improvements to the CPR regime.

The subsequent phase in W-R framework determines whether participants will cooperate or defect. Such a decision is in turn affected by individual expected costs and benefits (Ostrom 1990; White & Runge 1995). For example, Association members must decide whether to follow the list order or not. Complying increases total benefits as it reduces risk (especially from fights) and collection costs, whereas defecting offers the potential for higher private benefits but could lead to suspension or expulsion by the Association and possibly by the MNP administration itself. The process of weighing these is facilitated by having had previous financial experience (Morrow & Hull 1996). We suggest that the experience of engaging in a market economy since the era of timber and pelt extraction has facilitated the process of balancing the potential costs and benefits of following Association rules. Moreover, past experience of successful collective action, such as obtaining exclusive withdrawal rights and the registration process, is also likely to have promoted the acceptance of new rules Baland and Platteau (1996).

Finally, in W-R frameworks third phase, collective actions are expected to emerge and survive only when a 'critical mass' of users understands the potential gains from action. Thus, although the Rojas family was against the rotation system, the majority of members, regardless of whether from Boca Manu or from the Isla de los Valles community, perceived the new system as fair and accepted it. 44

White and Runge (1995) state that each phase is affected by socio-cultural and biophysical contexts. Ostroms design principles help to identify those contexts. Ostroms design principles are: (1) clearly defined boundaries; (2) congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions; (3) collective-choice arrangements; (4) monitoring; (5) graduated sanctions; (6) conflict-resolution mechanisms; (7) minimal recognition of rights to organize; and (8) nested enterprises.

Principle (1), clearly defined boundaries, is present in the Boca Manu system in two ways. The tree-capture zone (Fig 3) is clearly delimited by the MNP, and the membership of the Association is known to all. This factor has facilitated the establishment of new rules, and thus the evolution of action (W-R frameworks third phase), because the appropriators can identify the beneficiaries of coordinated actions (Ostrom 1990). In addition to this condition, however, users must be capable of enforcing internal and external rules and their exclusive access rights to secure resource tenure (Acheson 1975; Morrow & Hull 1996). The Association now has a record of sanctioning internal rule breakers, and it is evident from their previous competitive interactions with the community of Diamante that they have been able to evict non-members from the tree capture zone. This aspect is relevant to that of protecting not only the resource units from intruders but also the stock itself, i.e., the park. Therefore we propose that the Association has the potential to become a steward of the MNP, protecting the parks main entrance from incursions such as miners and loggers.

45

Design principle (2) is present regarding the congruence between rules and local conditions. Ostrom (1990, p. 92) refers to the local conditions as the specific attributes of the particular resource. In Boca Manu, the turn and two-list systems try to cope with the temporal variability in the provision of the resource. Sporadically flooding episodes occur only during the rainy season (5-6 months a year) and tree sizes varies considerably (see Table 3). As such, with the rules in use each appropriator has a high degree of certainty about when to go to the tree capture zone to capture at least one tree. More over, the two lists copes with tree volume variability giving the chance to each appropriator to capture one big and one small tree. These attributes help the appropriators decide when to go to the capturing zone and thus decide whether to cooperate or defect (W-R frameworks second phase). On the other hand however, the congruence between appropriation and provision rules is not present. Provision of trees, that is, the resource flow from the stock, is not dependent on appropriators behavior but on environmental variability and on the MNP administration (i.e. monitoring and protecting the stock), thus the Association lacks provision rules.

Design principles (3), (6), and (7) are also present in the Boca Manu system and have affected all three phases of W-R framework. The opportunity to conduct regular meetings in which all appropriators have the right to discuss the functioning of the capture activity and can participate in modifying the rules in use (design principle (3)) played a major role in the Boca Manu system as it allowed the proposal, acceptance, and evolution of operational rules (all W-R frameworks three phases). The fact that individuals who face repeated CPR dilemmas can communicate with each other has been 46

recognized, in both empirical and experimental settings, as an important factor allowing resource users ...(1) to calculate coordinated yield improving strategies, (2) to devise verbal agreements to implement these strategies, and (3) to deal with non-conforming players.... (Ostrom et al. 1994, pp. 167; see also Bowles 2008). Since the Associations members are repeated game players, as they live in the same extended community and are dependent on the resource for many seasons into the future, they have had the incentive to gather and discuss problems to be able to find viable solutions. As we have related above, these solutions have been implemented in the form of operational rules.

Low-cost local arenas, design principle (6), such as the Association's regular meetings and those called by the MNP administration, facilitated the creation of a consensus in the face of conflicting claims, such as that presented by the Rojas, and thus affecting W-R frameworks third phase. It appears that the MNP administration can continue to provide more help in this, such as by sponsoring information-sharing workshops, so as to continue to improve the Boca Manu CPR regime (see Ostrom 1990). We believe this should be a priority in park administration's activities as well as in those of conservationists NGOs, in addition to focusing on resource use restrictions, at least for the case of long term established bordering human populations.

Design principle (7) was also present. The Association has the right to devise its own internal rules, and this right has not been challenged by the park administration or any other governmental authority. 47

Finally, design principle (8) is present in Boca Manu too. Ostrom (1990, p. 90) states that for CPR institutions that are part of larger systems, appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises. The Association is nested within the larger system of the Peruvian protected areas and forestry legislations. As such, the institutional changes that took place in the early 2000s (see A new institutional setting) prevent the Association from further obtaining the tree capture authorization, forcing appropriators to sell their products in the black market. There appears to be a contradiction in this situation since at the Association-MNP administration level the Association is recognized and authorized to capture trees but considering the Peruvian legislation they do not comply with all requirements and, thus, are not allowed to legally transport and sell captured trees. This situation produces an incomplete system (Ostrom 1990) and we speculate that this situation could be affecting the likelihood of cooperation (W-R frameworks second phase), as low black market earnings motivates appropriators to capture more than one tree during their turn so as to fulfill their income requirements.

Monitoring and sanctioning Monitoring and sanctioning, design principles (4) and (5), have been previously termed "the crux of the problem" (Ostrom 1990, p. 94), because they determine the expected costs and benefits that individuals face and therefore determine whether individuals will follow the rules of the CPR 48

(W-R frameworks second phase) (Ostrom 1990, Ostrom et al. 1994). What factors facilitate monitoring and sanctioning in Boca Manu, given "the normal presumption [...] that participants themselves will not undertake mutual monitoring and enforcement because such actions involve relatively high personal costs and produce public goods available to everyone" (Ostrom 1990, pp. 95)? One of the most important factors appears to be the small area in which the trees are captured (see Agrawal 2002), which allows mutual monitoring. In addition, all the users live in the same extended community, which allows quick dissemination of rule-breaking behavior, and thus legitimizes sanctions. The number of users is also small, but the importance of this factor to the functioning of CPR regimes is contested (Varughese & Ostrom 2001).

In essence, the clear delimitation of the tree capture zone has allowed the Association to act like a 'harbor gang' (Acheson 1975) and protect its resource units and the resource stock from 'roving bandits' (Berkes et al. 2006) who might trespass MNP boundaries. This possibility is becoming more likely now that road construction in Madre de Dios is increasing immigration by reducing transport costs and accelerating the rate of land use change by harvesting activities such as illegal logging and gold-wash mining (Dourojeanni 2006; Mendoza et al. 2007). Elsewhere, we have described such potential protective externalities from local resource users as conservation wagers: known, small, but growing biodiversity costs that are paid for the possibility of a much larger conservation benefit some undefined time in the future (Shepard et al. 2009). Here, the biodiversity cost is effectively zero, given that the resource units are floating tree trunks. 49

A demographic challenge to the future of the Boca Manu CPR For Boca Manu, as elsewhere (Wittemyer et al. 2008), population growth is occurring at the edges of protected areas, and the sustainability of the current CPR would appear threatened as more inhabitants of Boca Manu reach eighteen years of age. Although it is not clear that a larger number of resource users tends to be less likely to successfully manage a CPR (Varughese & Ostrom 2001), we believe that in the Boca Manu system, population growth poses a threat because of the decreasing per-capita benefits. Examining how the local and MNP institutions adapt to this change will be of real research interest.

CONCLUSIONS The Boca Manu system exemplifies a particular common pool resource regime in which, although the stock is not affected by the harvesting of resource units, an institution has emerged and developed to act as a harbor gang (Acheson 1975) that appears to reduce intra-group conflict, distribute benefits, and increase profits. Moreover, the Boca Manu CPR potentially can lead to increased protection of the park itself, since the Association is already set up to exclude outsiders from the tree-capture area, which happens to be the only riverine entrance to the park.

The perception that access to the common property, floating trees, was at risk appears to have been an important reason for why collective action emerged and progressed in Boca Manu, as has been previously suggested for other systems (McCay 2002). In addition, the past common history of 50

initial appropriators, during the pre-MNP era, has likely allowed natives and settlers to communicate among themselves to pursue the common good. This attribute has survived until today and has been reinforced by the park administration, which, without challenging the right of appropriators to devise their own rules, has repeatedly participated in meetings with the Association's members seeking to contribute with the improvement of the system's functioning. This type of joint participation, one in which a harbor gang is allowed to decide how to internally regulate its actions and is officially recognized, can act as a model for negotiations between protected area administrations and adjacent populations. However, at least some level of shared monitoring must remain.

Nevertheless much remains to be done and we believe there is potential for improvement. First, as we have seen, a skewed distribution of benefits still remains, though this is apparently not so much because of cheating going on in the system but because as a consequence of the asset poverty among the Valles family and a much higher value of boats compared to the other final products. Causes for the former observation remain to be studied but if the process of complying with the official rules to capture floating trees within protected areas is completed, all the users will be allowed to sell their captured trees and lumber at a legal, higher price, which would at least improve welfare generally.

Finally the potential endogenous threat from an increased number of users should be urgently treated as this could deteriorate the functioning of the system. As a possible solution we propose that the Association should avoid 51

increasing the capture effort and seek to promote the employment of otherwise new eighteen years old members in trades such as carpentry using not only commonly utilized tree parts but also, and especially, wood debris such as roots and branches, which are otherwise almost always discarded. Difficulties in the development of such a project abound, such as the capital constraint and high transportation costs from and to Boca Manu for the connection to markets. Nevertheless such an initiative should take advantage of the already existing institutions to build upon them.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We are grateful to the Asociacin de Artesanos Recolectores de Troncas Ecolgicas de Boca Manu e Isla de los Valles members and its 2007 and 2009 Board of Directors for having voluntarily allowed one of us (RG) to conduct research in their settlements and for having shared information in interviews and questionnaires, as well as for having granted access to the Associations Minutes Books. We especially would like to thank Wilson Valles, Wilfredo Valles, Ricardo Guerra, Jorge Sarmiento, Manuel Moreno, Eugenia Soto, Albertina Chura and Juan de Dios Carpio for hospitality and cooperation. We also thank all persons and researchers who had previously worked in the area and contributed with valuable information. Research funding was provided by the Russell E. Train Education for Nature Program and the Frankfurt Zoological Society, which additionally provided logistical support. We thank INRENA and the Manu National Park administration, especially Amilcar Osorio, Angela Oroz and Carlos Nieto, for research permissions, sharing information, and logistical support. We also thank

52

CREES Foundation, Blanquillo Lodge and SAS Travel for logistical support.

53

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FIGURES AND TABLES

Figure 1. Map of Manu National Park and location of (1) Limonal guard post, (2) Boca Manu, (3) Isla de los Valles and (4) Diamante. See also Figure 3.

59

a)

b)

c)

Figure 2. Photos showing the current production of boats by building up the sides of dugout canoes with planks (a, b). Sits and a roof are also built (c). An outboard or peke-peke motor is usually attached to the rear of the boat.

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Figure 3. Location of the tree capture zone and the Limonal guard post within the MNP. (Modified from Catpo & de la Cruz 2006).

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Figure 3. Monthly total volume (board feet) of cedro (Cedrela odorata) and catahua (Hura crepitans) reported to have been captured at the tree capture zone between January 2005 and April 2007. Data corresponds to the register at Limonal guard post, Manu National Park (1 m3 of sawn wood = 424 board feet). A precipitation line trend reported from the Cocha Cashu Biological Station is also presented. (Provided by CCBS staff).

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Figure 5. Bars showing total number of trees (198) captured and registered at Limonal guard post by each Associations member (41) between October 2006 and April 2007.

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Figure 6. Means and 95% confidence intervals bars are of mean number of trees captured by the appropriators from Boca Manu, the Valles families, and the Rojas families during the 2006-07 season (ANOVA: F2,38 = 5.169, p = 0.01). Bars sharing a superscript are not significantly different (p > 0.05) using the LSD posthoc test.

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Figure 7. Means and 95% confidence intervals bars of per capita revenues earned by each class of producers. (Kruskal-Wallis: !2 = 22.428, df = 2, p < 0.001). Medians are US$ 5,532.87, US$ 378.32, and US$ 645.18, respectively.

65

Figure 8. Means and 95% confidence intervals of per capita profits earned by each class of producers. (Kruskal-Wallis: !2 = 20.849, df = 2, p < 0.001). Medians are US$ 9,482.12, US$ 288.92, and US$ 1,298.45, respectively.

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Figure 9. Estimated total revenues (white) and profits (black) generated with cedro trees captured between October 2006 and April 2007 for each class of product: raw logs, lumber and boats. Estimates are calculated after assigning each of the 41 producers (15 raw logs; 17 lumber; and 9 boat producers) to the product class that made up the majority of their revenues. Prices: Raw Logs, US$ 0.22/board feet; lumber, US$ 0.39/ b.f.; and 15m boats, US$ 1406.69/each.

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Table 1. Tools, inputs, and labor used to capture trees and saw lumber, and their 2007 prices and costs at Boca Manu. All prices and costs are presented in US Dollars after converting Nuevos Soles into US Dollars using a rate of 3.199 Nuevos Soles per one US Dollar. 1 m3 of sawn wood is equivalent to 424 board feet (b.f.) of sawn wood. Activity Capturing trees Tools 5 Kg. of rope 1 Machete 1 Hammer 1 Flashlight 1 Boat 1 Motor (peke peke) Inputs 5 gl. of gasoline 1/6gl. of oil 4 Eyebolts Unit price 2.19/Kg. 4.69/unit 4.69/unit 9.38/unit 312.60/unit 468.90/unit Unit price 4.02/gl. 6.25/gl. 1.56/unit Depreciation 1 Season 1 Season 1 Season 1 Season 1825 days 1825 days Expenditure unit Visit to Limonal Visit to Limonal Captured tree Season/Daily cost 10.95 4.69 4.69 9.38 0.17 0.26 Cost per visit/tree 20.1 1.04 6.24

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Table 1. Continue Labor and others 2 persons/day Trimming roots and branches Transport outside MNP Sawing trees Inputs 3.5 gl. of gasoline 1gl. of used oil Labor 1 person/day Sawing the wood Total
* This relationship was obtained from six lumber producers during the interviews.

Unit price 6.25/person 9.38/log 10.27/log Unit price 4.02/gl. 1.88/gl.

Expenditure unit Person Captured tree Captured tree Cost per 650 b.f. 14.07 1.88

Cost per capture 12.5 9.38 10.27 Cost per board foot

6.25/person 53.14/650 b.f.*

12.5 53.14 81.59 0.12

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Table 2. Tools, inputs and labor used to build one 15-meter boat and their 2007 local prices (Boca Manu). Items and prices were provided by one boat producer and corroborated by another two and two local shop owners. All prices and costs are presented in US Dollars (US$ 1.00 = S/. 3.199). (1 m3 of sawn wood = 424 board feet of sawn wood).

Tools Hand adze Big adze Saw Big plane Small plane Square Spokeshave Chisel Hammer Level

Price 2.19 4.69 4.06 11.88 9.38 2.50 2.50 2.19 4.69 4.69

Lifetime (days) 365 365 365 365 365 365 365 365 365 365

Daily cost 0.006 0.013 0.011 0.033 0.026 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.013 0.013

Used days 15 19 15 19 15 19 15 15 15 15

Final cost 0.09 0.25 0.17 0.63 0.39 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.20 0.20 70

Table 2. Continue Chainsaw Chainsaw file Board puller Total Inputs Cedro boards Catahua Tar 3 Nails 4 Nails 1 Nails Rope Jute Unit Board foot Board foot Block (~7 Kg.) Kg. Kg. Kg. Kg. Meter Quantity 1021 1272 2.5 7 7 10 2 5 Unit price Variable Variable 15.63 2.19 2.19 3.13 0.63 1.56 1,563.00 2.5 109.41 1825 365 1825 0.86 0.007 0.06 19 19 1 16.34 0.13 0.06 18.79 Final cost Variable Variable 39.08 15.33 15.33 31.30 1.26 7.80

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Table 2. Continue Gasoline Used oil Total Labor Sawing 2,293 b.f. Building the boat Total Days 7 11 Daily wage 6.25 6.25 Workers 2 2 Gallon Gallon 19 5 5.94 1.56 112.86 7.80 Variable Final cost 87.50 137.50 225.00

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Table 3. Total number, total volume, mean tree volume, and volume ranges of cedro and catahua trees captured between 2005 and 2007. Season 2005 (Jan Apr) Species Cedro Catahua Total trees 89 4 Total volume (b.f.) 94,537 19,409 Mean tree volume (b.f.) 1,062.21 (SD = 1,024.47) 4,852.25 (SD = 4,057.31) Volume Range (b.f.) [Max Min] [4,545 128] [10,367 1,800]

2005 2006 (Nov Mar)

Cedro Catahua

159 4

183,779 12,029

1,160.12 (SD = 889.35) 3,007.25 (SD = 1,748.71)

[4,886 210] [5,175 918]

2006 2007 (Oct Apr)

Cedro Catahua

187 11

190,222 22,610

1,026.86 (SD = 800.79) 2,055.45 (SD = 1,206.76)

[4,293 12] [5,007 1,016]

Total

Cedro Catahua

435 19

468,538 54,048

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APPENDIX 1 QUESTIONNAIRE Questionnaire number: Date:

I. 1.

Appropriator identification Has ID: Yes No

2. Place of birth: 3. Age: 4. House is at: Boca or Isla de los Valles 5. Number of family members: 6. Family members within the members list

7. How many family members participate and collaborate during your capture turn: 8. Since when do you participate in the capture activity: 9. Main use you give to the capture wood: Build and sell boats:.............1 House building:....................3 Furniture production:.........2 Handcrafts production:......4

Sell swan wood (lumber):....................................................................5

Sell raw logs (timber):.........................................................................6 Others: II. Economic activity: II.1 Benefits 10. What are the price of one board foot (b.f.) and its most profitable use (raw logs, lumber, boats, others)? Species Caoba (Kao) Cedro (Ce) Catahua (Kt) Others 11. How many floating trees (and volume) did you capture in the last flooding event, and in previous ones? Price (S/. Nuevos Soles) Most profitable use

1(#/V) Kao Ce Kt Other

2 (#/V)

3(#/V)

4(#/V)

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11.1 How many did you use to capture before the turn system was established? (More) (Less) (Same)

12. How many boats did you build and sell with the trees you captured in the last flooding event and previous ones (only for I.10: 1)? 1(#/price) 2 (#/price) 3(#/price) 4(#/price)

Before the turn system: (more boats) (same)

(less boats)

13. From that wood (volume) that you captured in the last flooding event and previous ones, how much did you saw and sell (only for I. 10: 5)? 1(V/price) Kao Ce Kt Other Before the turn system: change) Approximated volume (b.f.) per year before the turn system: 2 (V/price) 3(V/price) 4(V/price)

(More volume)

(Less volume)

(No

14. From that sawn wood did you keep any (volume) for self use (only for I.10: 5)?

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1(V) Kao Ce Kt Other

2 (V)

3(V)

4(V)

15. How many raw logs did you sell from those you captured in the last flooding event and previous ones (only for I.10: 6)? 1(V/price) 2 (V/price) 3(V/price) 4(V/price)

Kao Ce Kt Other Before the turn system: (More)

(Less)

(No change)

15.1 How many did you approximately sell per month before the turn system?

16. Did you sell all the captured trees from the last flooding event or did you keep some (how many)? (All) (Half) (Less than half) (None)

II. Costs 17. Do you share the necessary materials to capture floating trees with any other member (with how many)? Yes No Number:

18. Do you own a boat for capturing trees? Own 19. Do you own a chainsaw? Own Lend Hired (price): Lend Hired (price):

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20. Do you provide receipts when you sell boats? Yes No

21. How many days, petrol and oil (lubricant) did you spend to capture trees during the last flooding event and previous ones: 1 Days Petrol Oil 22. Do you buy petrol and oil at Boca Manu? (Yes) (No) 2 3 4

23. Before the turn system did you spend: More days: (Less days) days)

(Same

24. How many days, petrol and oil (lubricant) did you spend to transport the captured trees from the last flooding event and previous ones: 1 2 3 4

Days Petrol Oil Before the turn system you spent: (More days) (Same)

(Less days)

25. How many days, petrol and oil (lubricant) did you spend building boats with the captured trees from last flooding event and previous ones?

78

Days Petrol Oil Before the turn system did you spend days?

(More) (Less) (Same) number of

26. How many days, petrol and oil (lubricant) did you spend sawing the wood you capture in the last flooding event and previous ones for selling it? 1 2 3 4

Days Petrol Oil Before the turn system did you spend: (More) (Less)

(Same) number of days?

27. Have you bought captured wood (volume) by other appropriator during the last flooding event and previous ones? 1(V/price) Kao Ce Kt Other
r: round logs; a: sawn wood

2 (V/price)

3(V/price)

4(V/price)

What do you use it for? (Building boats) (Building house) (Selling lumber) (Furniture) (Handcrafts)

79

28. What other economic activities do you undertake when you are not engaged in any log capture and/or processing activities: (Mining) hunting) (Tourism) (Commerce) (Handcrafts) (Others) (Agriculture) (Timber) (Fishing and

III. Organization Access rights 29. Who are the persons allowed to capture floating trees? List members Others Do not know

30. Do you agree with allowing new persons into the list? Yes No Do not know

Appropriation rules 31. Do you agree with the turn system for capturing floating trees? Yes No Do not know

32. Do you agree with the amount of floating trees each appropriator is allowed to capture in his/her turn? Yes No Do not know

Collective choice arrangements 33. Do you participate in the Association meetings? Always Few times Never

80

34. Last time you had a complaint or accusation, did you communicated it to the Board of Directors? Yes No Notes:

35. Have any of these complaints or accusations been resolved either by all list members voting to sanction it or other method? Yes Monitoring 36. (Without providing names) Have you ever witnessed another user committing a fault such as trespassing the Limonal guard post limit for capturing the floating trees? Yes No No Notes:

37. Have you ever accused another user for committing a fault? Always Rarely Never

38. Have you ever helped the park guards to control the capture activity? Always Rarely Never

39. Have you ever helped the park guards to measure the captured trees to estimate their volume? Always Rarely Never

81

40. Have you ever accompanied the park guards during their patrolling and monitoring of riparian forests to audit their condition? Frequently Rarely Never

Graduated sanctions 41. Have you ever been informed when another user committed a fault? Always Rarely Never

42. Do you agree to forbid one user from further capturing if he/she has committed the same faults again and again? Yes No

43. Are there any temporally suspensions for committing a fault? Yes No Period of time:

INTERVIEW

1. How was the Association formed? Who organized it; who developed the idea of the turn system; what is your opinion about this system? Do you think that the rules in use (turns, amounts, etc.) that have been established are fair, why?

2. What are the most serious problems or constraints that reduce your benefits; are these problems related to the MNP administration or to other

82

appropriators or both? Which are the agreements that are not respected or enforced. Which are the most common faults that have been committed by appropriators in the past (provide examples)?

3. What is your opinion on the case when Mr. Rojas and sons entered the MNP and log several standing trees; were they sanctioned; were those trees seized, has this kind of event happened again ever since? How are faults, disputes, offences, etc. usually resolved?

4. Are there more or less trees floating down the river than in previous years? Do you consider that floating tree numbers are enough for the amount of boats and lumber that are demanded? If not, what measures would you suggest to improve this situation? Do you think that the fact that MNP protects the forests assures the provision of floating trees that you later capture?

5. Is the tree capturing activity, and later transformation and selling, your main income source; do you think that this activity is profitable? What other economic activities do you undertake?

6. If you were told that you could no longer capture the floating trees within MNP or these trees were suddenly disappeared, what other economic activity would you do?

83

7. How do you see the capture activity in the next 10 years; do you think your children will continue with this? Do you think new people will enter into the list or would you totally prohibit new members? How would you enforce this?

8. What is your opinion on the proposal to extend the road from Shintuya to Boca Manu and then to Colorado? Which will be the advantages and disadvantages for you?

84

CHAPTER 2 MODELING THE EFFECT OF POPULATION GROWTH AND SECONDARY ROAD EXPANSION ALONG THE NEW INTEROCEANICA SUR HIGHWAY OF SOUTHEASTERN PERUVIAN AMAZON

RENZO GIUDICE1, CHRIS KIRKBY1, DOUGLAS W. YU1,2, RAFAELLA SILVESTRINI3, BRITALDO SOARES-FILHO3, HERMANN RODRIGUES3
1 2

School of Biological Sciences, University of East Anglia, Norwich, Norfolk NR47TJ, UK State Key Laboratory of Genetic Resources and Evolution; Ecology, Conservation, and

Environment Center (ECEC), Kunming Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Science, Kunming, Yunnan, 650223, China
3

Centro de Sensoramiento Remoto, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Av. Antnio Carlos

6627, Belo Horizonte 31270-900, MG, Brazil

SUMMARY Deforestation rates in southeastern Peruvian Amazon have been historically low due to its relative remoteness and isolation from major roads. This situation is changing in the face of the current construction and paving of the Interoceanica Sur highway, which extends Brazils Trans-Amazon highway (BR-230) into Peruvian territory, passing through one of the most diverse and rich ecosystems in the world and is regarded as the major driver of current deforestation in the region. As a means to contribute with ongoing efforts to offset the negative effects deforestation has on ecosystem services and in the face of a post-Kyoto agreement on reducing emissions from deforestation (RED), we developed a spatially explicit deforestation model to simulate the pattern and extent of

deforestation in the region between 2000 and 2035. The simulation process is comprised of two steps. The first generates five different deforestation rates growth trends which represent five scenarios: low population growth/construction or extension of secondary roads, low population growth/construction and extension of secondary roads, high population growth/no construction or extension of secondary roads, and high population growth/construction and extension of secondary roads, plus a control scenario in which, on the contrary to the first four scenarios, the deforestation rate remains constant at historical levels. These scenarios seek to provide the first set of deforestation baselines for the region. The second step involves a geo-referenced stochastic cellular automata model, DINAMICA EGO, which simulates deforestation based on the scenarios rates and on the distribution of spatial variables that independently affect the deforestation risk across the landscape. We identified that a maximum of 1,056,521 ha (11.4% reduction) of primary forest could be lost due to the effect of the high population growth/construction and extension of secondary roads scenario. If a regional RED project is implemented to reduce the effect of secondary roads, RED credits could generate a NPV of up to US$1,597.4M. The Tambopata National Reserve, in turn, is the protected area within the study area mostly affected, and could loose up to 14,006 ha (5.3% reduction), whereas forestry concessions could loose up to 134,841 ha (9.97% reduction). The model demonstrates how data on, human settlements, historical population growth, land-use legislation, and a set of spatial variables can be used to evaluate the effect different scenarios could have on the landscape dynamics and as such provide a useful information tool for decisionmaking processes, and governments and civil society. 86

Keywords: Amazon, modeling deforestation scenarios, Interoceanica Sur highway, IIRSA, RED, DINAMICA EGO, Peru.

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INTRODUCTION Deforestation has profound ecological and socio-economic effects on tropical forests and upon their inhabitants. It enhances aridity and desertification, modifies the water cycle and regional climate, and produces fragmentation and loss of habitat and species, among others (Millenium Ecosystem Services 2005; Magrin et al. 2007).

As a consequence of current increased rates of deforestation (Magrin et al. 2007), the ability of forests to deliver benefits, such as clean air, drinking water, food, timber, and non-timber products, is being reduced and destroyed (Millenium Ecosystem Services 2005). Such benefits sustain or enhance human welfare (Fisher et al. 2008) and are not only critical for current and future sustainable local and regional livelihoods but also for the global community (Balmford & Whitten 2003).

In particular, the ability of Amazon rainforests to store carbon is viewed as a crucial means to mitigate global warming by reducing and limiting the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere (Santilli et al. 2005; Killeen 2007; Magrin et al. 2007; Strassburg et al. 2009). In fact, the estimated amount of carbon stored in Amazon trees, 119 28 Pg (Petagrams) (Houghton et al. 2001), represents 1.5 decades of current global carbon emissions (Soares-Filho et al. 2006). This large carbon stock coupled with historical and current rates of emissions (Strassburg et al. 2009) supports the initiative to implement, under a post-Kyoto agreement, a scheme to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) (UNFCCC 2006; Nepstad et al. 2007; Parker et al. 2008; 88

Pedroni et al. 2009). Although implementation methodologies are currently still being debated (Pedroni et al. 2009; Strassburg et al. 2009), (REDD is not only viewed as a relatively low cost means to mitigate global warming through the reduction of carbon emissions (Angelsen 2008; Strassburg et al. 2009) but also as a means to reduce poverty in developing countries through payments to local people to avoid deforestation (UNFCCC 2006; Peskett et al. 2008).

Therefore, the Peruvian Amazon, the second largest portion of the Amazon basin (68.7 M ha) containing an estimated 8,763 M tC (Strassburg et al. 2009) and widely considered as one of the most biodiverse and still well preserved primary forest regions in the world (Myers et al. 2000), has a major conservation value.

Historical deforestation rates in Peru have been relatively low annual rate between 1990-2000 was only 0.1, compared to those of some of its Amazonian neighbors such as Brazil or Ecuador (0.6 and 1.7, respectively) totaling almost 3M ha by 2000 (FAO 2009). More recently, the estimated annual net rate between 1999 and 2005 was 64,700 ha, from which, only a small fraction (1-2%) occurred within protected areas (Oliveira et al. 2007). It has been argued that the land-use policy, specially that considering the governmental establishment and extension of natural protected areas, indigenous reserves, and forestry concessions, together with remoteness were effectively protecting the Peruvian Amazon (Oliveira et al. 2007).

Nonetheless, the deforestation process takes place at different time and space scales, responding to the local and regional socioeconomic and biophysical 89

characteristics and contexts, as well as to each areas interrelation with distant factors (e.g. global markets) (Geist & Lambin 2001; Wood 2002).

As such, the Southeastern region of the Amazonian Peru is witnessing a relatively more accelerated increase in forest damage compared to other regions (Instituto Nacional de Recursos Naturales (INRENA), et al. 2005, 2006; Centro de Datos para la Conservacin Universidad Nacional Agraria La Molina (CDC-UNALM) et al. 2007; Oliveira et al. 2007).

The current construction and paving of the Interoceanica highway, one of the main IIRSA (Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America) projects, extends Brazils Trans-Amazon highway (BR-230) into Peruvian territory and is regarded as the major driver of current deforestation in the region (Dourojeanni 2006; Soares-Filho et al. 2006; Killeen 2007; Mendoza et al. 2007; Oliveira et al. 2007).

As it has been described before, opening access through the construction of roads to previously isolated areas such as that of the southeastern Amazonian Peru is one of the primary determinants in forest conversion (Chomitz & Gray 1996; Kaimowitz & Angelsen 1998; Geist & Lambin 2001; Alves 2002; Soares-Filho et al. 2004, 2006; Dourojeanni 2006; Perz et al. 2007)

Moreover, the construction of an official road promotes the expansion of secondary roads, which are constructed by non-state, 'unofficial' actors and thus are more difficult to monitor and control in relation to environmental impacts 90

(Perz et al. 2007). These roads further connect remote areas with the official road, thus increasing the pressure on the forests to be logged or converted into cropland (Chomitz & Gray 1996; Perz et al. 2007).

In addition, the construction of major roads such as the Interoceanica highway, promotes immigration into newly accessible areas (Laurance et al. 2001; Alves 2002; Soares-Filho et al. 2004; Dourojeanni 2006). In fact, the Interoceanica has already promoted human immigration to the area, mostly from Andean peoples (Dourojeanni 2006; Oliveira et al. 2007), who are engaging themselves in unsustainable activities such as the removal and destruction of large tracks of forests adjacent to rivers so as to extract mineral gold from alluvial sediments, as well as in illegal logging and contributing with the expansion of the agricultural frontier (Dourojeanni 2006; Killeen 2007).

Thus, we use a spatially explicit deforestation model to forecast the pattern and extent of deforestation in the southeastern Peruvian Amazon from 2006 to 2035, with special attention to deforestation inside natural protected areas, indigenous territories, and forestry concessions.

The model we present incorporates spatial variables, both biophysical (e.g. swamps) and political (i.e. land tenure), and uses DINAMICA EGO, a stochastic cellular automata model previously used to simulate deforestation in the Amazon basin (Soares-Filho et al. 2002, 2004, 2006), to project the future allocation of deforestation.

91

Future deforestation rates are projected as a function of two different humanpopulation growth trends (high and low) and two functional relationships between human population sizes and deforestation rates (exponential and logistic), so as to define four different deforestation scenarios, plus a control scenario (historical trend), altogether representing the range of effects that the eventual expansion of the secondary road network could have on the deforestation process.

Although the effect of local human population growth relative to other drivers of deforestation is widely debated, its effect on tropical forest cover reduction is undisputed (Meyer & Turner 1992; Geist & Lambin 2001), and, thus, we assume a positive correlation between them.

It is our aim to contribute with the efforts to offset the negative effects that deforestation will have on ecosystem services by providing stakeholders and politicians with a visual tool to guide their decisions when balancing environmental conservation and development.

In particular, this tool should help in the process of establishing RED projects (deforestation only, since we do not measure degradation) and negotiating the corresponding carbon credits, which require the definition of a baseline projection of the amount and location of expected deforestation (UNFCCC 2006; Angelsen 2008). Based on the concept of additionality and current expectations (Angelsen 2008; Strassburg et al. 2009) it is likely that RED credits (and REDD credits in general) will be paid to preserve only forest cover that would have 92

been lost in the absence of RED projects. Thus, if the baseline projection were based only on Peru's overall, historical deforestation rates, which are low, Peru would be unlikely to receive enough RED funding to compensate the opportunity costs of future forest conversion. However, historical rates do not take the effect of the Interoceanica highway and secondary roads into account, so we provide these four scenarios as the first set of baseline projections for the region. METHODS Study area and context The study area is located in southeastern Amazonian Peru, within the Tropical Andes biodiversity hotspot (Myers et al. 2000), and extends over a 10.8M ha area and over an altitudinal range of 130-5500 m, incorporating the Department of Madre de Dios and portions of the Departments of Puno and Cusco (Fig. 1). The study area covers all or part of six state-protected areas (from North to South: Alto Purs National Park (37%), Manu National Park (100%), Megantoni National Sanctuary (65%), Amarakaeri Communal Reserve (100%), Tambopata National Reserve (100%), and Bahuaja Sonene National Park (75%)), two reserves for isolated indigenous peoples, hereafter referred to as Territorial Reserves (Kugapakori Territorial Reserve (20%), and Madre de Dios Territorial Reserve (100%)), and one large state-leased conservation concession (Los Amigos Conservation Concession (100%)). In turn, these areas lie within two of the three protected-area complexes (Vilcabamba-Manu and Tambopata-Piln Lajas) that make up the Vilcabamba-Ambor Conservation Corridor (VACC) (Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund - CEPF 2005). The VACC stretches from the Vilcabamba mountain range in southern Peru to Ambor National Park in central Bolivia (Fig. 2), covering 30M ha of one of the biologically richest and 93

most diverse habitats on the planet (Myers et al. 2000; CEPF 2005). The VACC, a bi-national trans-boundary conservation strategy with financing for conservation and development projects provided by bilateral and multilateral donors, seeks to maintain and enhance the connectivity within and between the protected area complexes and to protect part of the southern half of the Tropical Andes hotspot from the negative impacts that human activities, such as gold mining, uncontrolled logging, road and dam construction, and population growth are imposing on biodiversity in the region (CEPF 2005; Dourojeanni 2006; Killeen 2007).

Bisecting the VACC between the two protected area complexes, and traversing the study area, are sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Interoceanica Sur highway (IOS), a westerly extension of the Trans-Amazon highway (Brazils BR-230) that will connect major Brazilian cities and industrial centers with Pacific Ocean ports in Peru, thus reducing transportation costs of Brazils agricultural and manufactured exports on route to the Far East, particularly China and Japan. These sections are expected to be the major driver of deforestation and concomitant biodiversity loss, as well as social degradation in the region (Dourojeanni 2006). The IOS is one of the principal projects of the Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA) (see Dourojeanni 2006; Killeen 2007), a consortium of twelve South American countries that promotes the development of transport, energy and telecommunications infrastructure (http://www.iirsa.org//Institucional_ENG.asp?CodIdioma=ENG; accessed July 9, 2009). The three sections are currently being paved and are scheduled for completion in 2011 at a cost of at least US$ 892M (see Dourojeanni 2006; Bank 94

Information Center 2009 (http://www.bicusa.org/es/Article.11327.aspx, accessed July 22, 2009); Diario Gestin, June 2009 (http://gestion.pe/noticia/280423/IOSsur-entregada-primer-trimestre-2011, accessed July 23, 2009)).

Model development General approach The simulation process of cumulative annual deforestation across the landscape is comprised of two main steps. The first involves a scenario-generating model that calculates annual deforestation rates and deforested area (in hectares) based on human population growth levels in the study area. It estimates the expected annual deforestation rate and deforested area for each of the 30 years (20052034, inclusive) of each scenario, based on projections of historical deforestation rates from the five years between 2000 and 2004 and associating these rates to population growth rates. By altering population growth rates upwards, an expected result of paving the IOS, we generated four distinct scenarios over the 35-year study period by crossing two deforestation rates (Low and High) with two functional relationships between population growth and deforestation rates, exponential and logistic. The first one represents no further expansion of the secondary road network, whereas the second considers the expansion. Thus our five scenarios are defined as follows: low population growth/no construction or extension of secondary roads (ScenarioLow,No2ndaryRoads), low population growth/construction and extension of secondary roads (ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads), high population growth/no construction or extension of secondary roads (ScenarioHigh,No2ndaryRoads), and high population growth/construction and extension of secondary roads (ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads), plus a control scenario 95

(ScenarioCtrl) in which, on the contrary to the first four scenarios, the deforestation rate remains constant throughout the simulation process. We assumed no re-growth of forest following deforestation as we are only interested in primary forest, which takes considerably longer than 35 years to regenerate.

The second step involves passing each years deforestation to DINAMICA EGO version 1.2.3 (hereafter DINAMICA), a geo-referenced stochastic cellular automata model that simulates land-cover change, in this case deforestation (from forest to deforested) based on the spatial distribution of static variables (such as land tenure categories and biophysical attributes) and dynamic variables (such as distance to deforested) that independently affect the deforestation probability (risk) at every point across a landscape (Soares-Filho et al. 2002, 2004, 2006; Almeida 2003; Silvestrini 2008).

Relationship between population, population growth and deforestation rates Human population growth We calculated human population growth trajectories for the study area between 2005 and 2035. The study area contains 536 population centers, of which 310 (57%) are in Madre de Dios, 119 (38%) in Cusco, and 27 (5%) in Puno (Appendix 1). These centers represent 100%, 2.73% and 0.27% of all centers to be found in the Departments of Madre de Dios, Cusco and Puno, respectively (INEI 1994). The centers that correspond to Cusco are those associated with twelve districts: Yanatile, Quellouno, Challabamba, Paucartambo, Kosipata, Camanti, Marcapata, Cusco, San Jeronimo, San Sebastian, Santiago, and Wanchaq districts, while those in Puno correspond to only two districts: 96

Ayabaca and San Gabn. The population centers in Madre de Dios are distributed across all of its eleven districts: Tambopata, Inambari, Las Piedras, Laberinto, Manu, Fitzcarrald, Madre de Dios, Huepetuhe, Iapari, Iberia, and Tahuamanu. We included parts of Cusco and Puno (and their respective population centers) in the study area because (1) sections 2 and 4 of the IOS pass through them (Fig. 1), (2) they contain tropical forest, (3) we wanted to include the city of Cusco, as it exerts a deforestation pressure in all three departments via the demand from its population for agricultural and timber products, and (4) because we wanted to include all of the Manu National Park (MNP, located in both Cusco and Madre de Dios) and Bahuaja Sonene National Park (BSNP, located in both Puno and Madre de Dios). Most of the BSNP (821,233 out of 1,091,416 ha, 75.2%) lies within 50 km of the IOS, regarded as the area of influence of major highways in the Amazon basin (Laurance et al. 2001; Dourojeanni 2006).

Data on the number of inhabitants in each populations centre in 2005 was obtained from a GIS shape-file constructed by the Peruvian governments Ministerio de Educacin (Ministry of Education) and kindly provided to us by the Centro para la Sostenibilidad Ambiental CSA (Center for Environmental Sustainability) at the Universidad Cayetano Heredia, Lima, Peru.

There were six population centers in Puno that had no data for 2005. For these, we estimated their populations by growing their 1993 census counts (Npop ctr,1993) as follows:

97

(Npop ctr,1993) (! district)12 = Npop ctr,2005

where ! is the annualized population growth rate between 1993 and 2005 of the district in which each center is located, and was calculated as:

!district = (Ndistrict,2005 / Ndistrict,1993)1/12

Both population center and district population data were acquired from INEIs webpage (1993 Population Census: http://iinei.inei.gob.pe/iinei/RedatamCpv1993.asp?ori=C; 2005 Population Census: http://iinei.inei.gob.pe/iinei/RedatamCpv2005.asp?ori=C; both accessed June 17, 2008). After calculating these six population estimates and adding them to the previously acquired ones, we obtained a total population estimate of 3,401people in 2005 for the Puno portion of the study site.

Similarly, there were 84 population centers in Cusco and 77 in Madre de Dios that were missing population data for 2005. We used the same procedure outlined above to estimate their respective 2005 population sizes, giving a total of 342,789 and 92,024 people for Cusco and Madre de Dios, respectively.

Thereafter, we grew each Dept.s 2005 population until 2035, using Punos and Cuscos mean, district-level annualized population growth rates, which were calculated using only the districts within the study area, and using the Dept.-wide growth rate for Madre de Dios for the 1993-2005 inter-census period (see Table 1). 1993 and 2005 populations for the Madre de Dios department were also 98

acquired from the INEI website (http://www.inei.gob.pe/; accessed June 17, 2008).

Finally, we summed the calculated populations in our study area for each year between 2005 (438,214 inhabitants) and 2035 (795,345 inhabitants). These numbers were used in our two low-deforestation scenarios (ScenarioLow,No2ndaryRoads) and (ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads), and reflect a situation in which immigration is kept at a minimum, even after the IOS has been paved. In contrast, our high-deforestation scenarios (ScenarioHigh,No2ndaryRoads) (ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads), used the mean, district-level annualized population growth rates observed between the 1981 and 1993 censuses (Table 1), which were acquired following the same procedures as above. For the case of Madre de Dios, we used its total population growth rate during the same era. Population data from the 1981 census were obtained from http://iinei.inei.gob.pe/iinei/RedatamCpv1981.asp?ori=C (accessed June 19, 2008). The 2035 total estimated population for the study area is 1,338,877 inhabitants.

We created the two high-deforestation scenarios because from 1985 to 1990, the administration of then-President Garcia instituted a series of agricultural subsidies in the form of land titles and easy credit that promoted immigration and caused a rapid expansion of the agricultural frontier in the Tambopata Province of Madre de Dios (Alvarez & Naughton-Treves 2003). In fact, averaged population growth rates in all three Departments were higher in 1981-93 than in 1993-05 (Table 1). The new IOS can be seen as another subsidy for the 99

agricultural sector of Madre de Dios, which in turn should increase current population growth and deforestation rates.

Deforestation rate scenarios We then calculated deforestation rates as two functions of the estimated human population growth rates to define our scenarios. Firstly, the historical deforestation rate, used in the initial simulation between 2000 and 2005, was calculated by using DINAMICA to compare the 2000 and 2005 land-cover raster images of our study area (100m x 100m resolution), which were originally produced and classified from Landsat TM+7 and CBERS satellite images (see Model calibration and parameterization below). The annualized rate is "2000-05 = 0.001512 (Step 1 below). We then generated two functional relationships between human population size and deforestation to project growth in the deforestation rate from 2005 to 2034.

Exponential: The historical deforestation rate (") was increased annually, from 2005 to 2034, by the population growth rate (!) of the previous year i: "i+1 = "i !i, where !i = (Ni+1 /Ni). Because the population size (N) is growing exponentially (Fig. 3), this kind of relationship also produces exponential growth in the deforestation rate for both (ScenarioLow,No2ndaryRoads) and (ScenarioHigh,No2ndaryRoads), (Fig. 4 & 5). (ScenarioLow,No2ndaryRoads) produces a deforestation rate of 0.002743 for the last year (2034), equivalent to an 81% increase in the historical deforestation rate (0.001512) (Fig. 4), generating a net forest decline of 630,006 ha by 2035, or 6.8% out of the initial total forest cover of (9295,926 ha) in 2000 (Fig. 6). In contrast, (ScenarioHigh,No2ndaryRoads) 100

produces a final deforestation rate (2034) of 0.004319, a 186% increase on the historical rate (Fig. 5) and a net forest decline of 780,888 ha (8.4%) (Fig. 7).

Logistic: An upper asymptote was set at the previously calculated final deforestation rate (2034) in both low and high-deforestation situations, defining (ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads) and (ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads), respectively (Fig. 4 & 5). The deforestation rate approaches the asymptote logistically, following:

"i = 0.0027/[1+(0.813 e -0.25 * i)], for (ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads), and

"i = 0.0432/[1+(1.857 e -0.25 * i)], for (ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads).

The deforestation rates therefore increase more quickly early in the projection, relative to the exponential function, which is meant to reflect a rapid increase in deforestation after paving of the IOS and the extension of secondary roads (Chomitz & Gray 1996; Perz et al. 2007). We obtained a net forest decline of 735,203 ha (7.9%) for (ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads) and 1056,521 ha (11.4%) for (ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads) (Fig. 6 & 7).

Constant: In (ScenarioCtrl), the 2000-2005 historical deforestation rate remains constant from 2000 to 2035 to compare with the other scenarios. This trend produces a net deforestation of 479,468 ha (5.2%) by 2035 (Fig. 6 & 7).

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Deforestation allocation The scenario-generating model was linked to DINAMICA by passing the generated deforestation rates and taking into account the initial landscape distribution of land-cover classes to run the model from 2000 to 2035. First, however, DINAMICAs algorithms must be calibrated and parameterized using the period of time between the real landscapes, that is, 2000-2005.

DINAMICA simulates cell state transitions (e.g. from forest to deforested) determined by discrete-step-generated transition probability maps (Soares-Filho et al. 2002, 2004). These maps are produced based on (1) a set of spatial variables, by calculating their weights of evidence a Bayesian method for modeling spatial data , corresponding to the transition of interest (Goodacre et al. 1991; Almeida 2003; Soares-Filho et al. 2004; Silvestrini 2008) and (2) a map of changes between an initial and final real landscapes (Fig. 8). As such, DINAMICA was used to simulate the allocation of the deforestation in our study area, based on a set of land use and biophysical variables, such as protected areas, slope, and distance to rivers. Each time step corresponds to one year.

Model calibration and parameterization (2000-2005) An initial simulation process was undertaken to calibrate the model over the 2000-2005 period in order to obtain a 2005 simulated landscape as similar to the real 2005 landscape as possible and to parameterize DINAMICAs algorithms for our study area. We used fifteen spatial variables, which we describe below.

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Real landscapes First, we produced two raster-format, real landscapes from 2000 and 2005 (initial and final), of 100m x 100m resolution, 4087 columns, and 2932 rows (119,830.84 Km2). There are five land-cover classes, (1) forest, (2) deforested, (3) water bodies, and (4) non-forest (including built infrastructure and mountain ecosystems). These landscapes were clipped, reclassified, and rescaled from the classified 2000 and 2005 land-cover raster images (30m x 30m pixel resolution) that were originally produced and classified from Landsat TM+7 and CBERS satellite images by the Instituto Nacional de Recursos Naturales (INRENA), the Frankfurt Zoological Society (FZS), and the Centro de Datos para la Conservacin Universidad Nacional Agraria La Molina (CDC-UNALM) (INRENA et al. 2005, 2006; CDC-UNALM et al. 2007) and provided to us by the CDC-UNALM.

The original landscapes had a set of nineteen different land-use and land-cover classes, which were grouped and reclassified using ArcGIS 9.2s spatial analyst function into our five classes (Fig 9). All anthropogenic classes (fallow fields, cattle pasture, burnt ground, agriculture, agropecuaria (areas in which it was not possible to differentiate cattle pasture from agriculture and involved different proportions of both), mining, patio de trozas (forestry areas in which logs are hauled to and stored until transported to sawmills), and secondary forests) were reclassified as deforested land cover. All infrastructure classes, (roads, urban areas, and landing strips) were reclassified as infrastructure. Rivers, riverbanks, and lakes were reclassified as bodies of water. Highland pastures and mountains were reclassified as non-forest. Forested land remains as such. Finally, we 103

reclassified most clouds and their shadows as forested, since most clouds were surrounded by primary forest. Clouds above other classes were reclassified into these other classes.

Both initial and final landscapes obtained were modified to present the same number of cells per class in the 2000 and 2005 images for all classes except, as expected, forested and deforested lands. This modification is needed to avoid DINAMICA generating impossible or irrelevant transition rates. For example, the original CDCs images presented non-forest classes growing and reducing in extent in different areas. Since we do not expect mountains to displace forests, we attribute the differences between the 2000 and 2005 original images to errors in classification. Similarly, 2000 and 2005 infrastructure was unified in extent and location because we were not interested in projecting the growth of the road network in this way. Instead, we generated scenarios of road growth independently (see below).

Spatial static and dynamic variables Fifteen spatial variables, grouped into three broad classes, (1) biophysical, (2) infrastructure, and (3) land tenure were considered for the simulation process (Table 2). CDC, CSA, the Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental (SPDA), and the Amazon Conservation Association (ACA) provided vectorized land covers for these classes, which were then transformed into raster format with 1ha resolution, using ArcGIS 9.2 and stored within a raster cube dataset, called the static variables map (Fig 8). This process is necessary because DINAMICA only supports raster maps for spatial data (Soares-Fihlo et al. 2008). In addition, all 104

raster maps must have the same number of cells, that is, the same number of rows and columns, and must be tied to the same coordinate space and registration point (Fig. 10) (Soares-Fihlo et al. 2008). Lastly, spatial extent and resolution must coincide with those of the real landscapes.

All three broad classes were chosen on the basis of (1) previous research about the effect that they have on deforestation processes (Kaimowitz & Angelsen 1998; Geist & Lambin 2001; Soares-Filho et al. 2004, 2006) and (2) current influence on the study areas deforestation process (INRENA et al. 2005, 2006; Dourojeanni 2006; CDC-UNALM et al. 2007), and (3) availability. All fifteen variables but one are static variables (Soares-Fihlo et al. 2008) because their attributes remain unchanged through this initial process. That other variable, distance to deforested, is dynamic because DINAMICA updates it for each cell in each time step, according to the evolving land-cover simulation. This layer map represents the frontage Euclidean distance between a pixel and the closest deforested one (Soares-Fihlo et al. 2008).

In addition, nine of the original land covers provided had to be transformed. Four of these (rivers, IOS, secondary roads, and population centers) were transformed into continuous distance to feature maps (i.e. distance to rivers, distance to IOS, distance to secondary roads, and distance to population centers) using DINAMICAs algorithms for calculating distance to feature map (Soares-Filho et al. 2008). This algorithm calculates a map representing the Euclidean distance in meters between a cell and the closest cell representing a feature.

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Conservation and tourism concessions were merged into one layer map. The slope layer map was derived from a CDC Digital Elevation Model (DEM) and converted into a slope using ArcGIS 9.2 spatial analyst. Four forest types (INRENAs Forestry Map: http://www.inrena.gob.pe/biblioteca/data_de_biblioteca/docs/mapas_ peru_ambiental/biblidigital_0107.htm; accessed June 13, 2008) were merged and re-categorized into two new types based on each types likelihood of being flooded (Phillips et al. 1994). Thus the new types were defined as follows: flooded forest type is composed by lower floodplain humid forest and meander plain forest (llanura mendrica); terra firme forest is composed by upper and middle floodplain humid forests. The rest of the forest types, lower slope humid forest, upper slope humid forest, mountain humid forest, and bamboo (Guadua spp.) forests remained unchanged.

Finally, we used the population centers spatial distribution layer map and each centers estimated 2000 population to derive a 2000 population attraction map, which is an interaction potential map. This map represents a gravitational model between non-null cells, whose values (the centers populations) represent the gravitational masses and null cells (the rest of the map). For each null cell (i), the interaction potential (pi) is the sum of each centers population (j) divided by the distance to it (dist (i,j)):
pi = " valuei j =1 dist (i, j )
n

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Thus, the urban attraction map constitutes a fuzzy representation of population density across the landscape, providing a mechanism by which deforestation is made to gravitate towards population centres based on their population size, on the assumption that larger centres exert a greater deforestation pressure on neighbouring forest than do smaller ones.

The 2000 population size for each population center (Npop ctr, 2000) is estimated using each centers 1993-2005 population growth rates (! pop ctr) or each districts 1993-2005 growth rate (! district) where the missing data centers were located (see Human Population Growth above).

Following, we interpolated all estimated Cusco, Puno, and Madre de Dios 19932005 centers or districts population growth rates to calculate each centers year 2000 population using:

(Npop ctr,1993) (! pop ctr/district)7 = Npop ctr,2000

Building the model The calibration and parameterization process comprises six steps, which are based on the ten steps of the land use and land cover change simulation model of Soares-Filho et al. (2008). We used these steps to calibrate, run, and validate our calibration and parameterization process. Each step is executed by an independent model, which were constructed using DINAMICAs interface and algorithms.

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DINAMICA considers as initial inputs the map for 2000 (the initial landscape) and the 2005 map (the final landscape). DINAMICA does not handle class names such as forest or deforested. Thus, all land cover classes form both maps have the same number identifier.

Identifier -99 0 1 2 3

Land cover class Null Value Bodies of water Deforested Forest Non-forest

First step: the transition matrix By comparing the initial (2000) and final (2005) landscapes, DINAMICA calculates the historical multiple-step transition matrix. The matrix describes a system that changes over discrete time increments (e.g. a year), in which the value of any variable (such as the deforested area) in yearn is the sum of the variables value in yearn-1 plus its value multiplied by the transition rate (SoaresFilho et al. 2004).

In our case, the transition matrix presented the forested-to-deforested (2 # 1) transition, which is just the deforestation rate, since no other transition was modeled. The multiple-step matrix calculates deforestation rates for each year between 2000 and 2004 and is calculated as follows:

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Rate2 "1 =

n 2,2005 #1 n 2,2000

! landscapes forest area (9,225,880 ha) and n2,2000 the where n2,2005 is the final

initial landscapes forest area (9,295,926 ha). Thus, the annualized deforestation rate is 0.001512 or 0.15%.

Second step: categorization of continuous variables In this step, DINAMICA calculates ranges to categorize continuous spatial variables, such as distance to rivers, slope, etc. DINAMICA requires all variables to be presented as categorical maps in order to determine the deforestation probability maps (see Soares-Filho et al. 2008) and calculates ranges according to each spatial variable data structure, which we describe below.

First, the minimum increment (I) in the graphical interface of each variable (e.g. 100 meters for the distance to feature maps, one degree for the slope map) is specified and input into DINAMICAs Determine Weights of Evidence Ranges algorithm (Fig 11). The increment is used to build n incremental buffers comprising intervals from xminimum to xminimum + nI (e.g. 0-100, 0-200, etc. for the distance to feature maps). Thus, each n defines a threshold, dividing the layer map into two classes, b (one buffer) and b (the rest of the map).

! Second, the number (n) of pixels classified in each land-cover class, denoted by

the variable A, and the number of deforested pixels within each buffer (b) are 109

counted and used to calculate each buffers weight of evidence (Wb+) (Goodacre et al. 1991; Almeida 2003; Soares-Filho et al. 2004, 2008), given by:
" n ( Ab | DeforestedPixel % + W b = ln$ ' # n ( Ab | DeforestedPixel &

! weight of evidence coefficient for buffer b of one variable (A), where Wb+ is the n ( Ab | DeforestedPixel) stands for the number of variable As pixels within

buffer b that overlap with deforested pixels and n ( Ab | DeforestedPixel) , stands

!

for the number of variable As pixels within buffer b that overlap with nondeforested pixels.
!

The weight of evidence coefficient represents the tendency of finding one deforested pixel given the presence of the evidence A (e.g. protected areas) also termed the explanatory variable (Almeida 2003). Higher positive coefficient values denote a stronger positive association between the explanatory variable and the presence of deforested pixels.

Third, a sequence of An values are plotted against An*exp(W+) (Fig. 12). Breaking points for this graph will be determined by applying a linegeneralizing algorithm (see Soares-Filho et al. 2008). This algorithm contains three parameters: (1) minimum distance (mindx) interval along the x axis, minimum delta in Figure 11, (2) maximum distance (maxdx) interval along the x axis, maximum delta in Figure 11, and (3) tolerance angle. A new breaking point is placed whenever the distance between two points on the x axis $ mindx or when the angle between the two arrows (v and v) linking the current point to the 110

last one and the last one to the previous one, respectively (Fig. 12), exceeds the tolerance angle (Soares-Filho et al. 2008). Thus, fewer points will be determined as both the tolerance angle and the mindx are increased, and vice versa.

Finally the number of categories, that is, the range intervals, is defined by linking the breaking points with straight lines (Fig 12).

Categories comprise a lower inclusive and a higher exclusive boundaries, denoted as, for example, [0-100) meters.

Third step: calculation of weights of evidence coefficients Now DINAMICA calculates the weights of evidence coefficients for each variables category (k) based on:
Wk
+

" % n ( Ak | DeforestedPixel) ' $ = ln . $ n A | DeforestedPixel ' k # &

! those categorical variables presenting a binary map, B, defining In addition, for

the presence or absence of one land tenure or biophysical attribute, such as protected areas or palm swamps, DINAMICA calculates the weights of evidence coefficient for that whole particular binary pattern, as follows:
" % n ( B | DeforestedPixel) ' $ W = ln $ n B | DeforestedPixel ' # &
+

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and determines whether there is a significant association between these and the deforested areas. If no significant association is found, the variable has to be removed.

The spatial association between the binary pattern and the deforested pixels is measured by the contrast, C, given by C = W+ W-, where W- is given by:

# n B | DeforestedPixel W = ln% % n B | DeforestedPixel $

"

( (

)& ( )( '

! the absence of the binary pattern. and B stands for

Thus, for those cases when the deforested pixels overlap with the presence of the binary pattern more often than would be expected by chance, W+ will be positive and W- will be negative (see Goodacre et al. 1991). In other words, W+ is positive when the number of deforested pixels overlapping with the presence of the binary pattern is larger than that of non-deforested pixels with the patterns presence. And W- is negative when the number of non-deforested pixels overlapping with the absence of the binary pattern is larger than that of deforested pixels with the patterns absence. Thus, the larger the value of C, the stronger the influence a significant variable will have on a deforested pixels location.

DINAMICA determines whether the magnitude of C is large enough to be statistically significant by estimating the variance of the contrast given by: 112

s 2 (C ) =

1 1 1 1 + + + . area( B " D) area B " D area B " D area B " D

! As explained in Goodacre et al. (1991), if |C | is normally distributed around

zero, then the null hypothesis that there is a lack of spatial association can be rejected if |C | > 1.96 sI with 95% probability. (See Goodacre et al. 1991 for further details)

DINAMICA applies this protocol to the above-categorized variables as well, by treating each category at a time as B and combining the areas of the rest of categories to treat them as B . In this case, if one category turns out to be nonsignificant it has to be removed.

!
The way in which non-significant categories can be removed is by reducing the initial number of categories DINAMICA produces for each continuous variable (see step 2), which tend to reduce the overall number of non-significant categories. For example, when we increased the tolerance angle from five to seven for the distance to the IOS variable, the number of categories was reduced from 195 to 77, while the number of non-significant ones was reduced from 67 to fourteen. These are finally deleted by joining their both upper and lower adjacent significant categories.

For example, if the significant [100-200) meters category is followed by a nonsignificant [200-500) category, which in turn is followed by a significant [500113

1000) one, the second one is deleted and only two categories, [100-500) and [500-1000), remain. Then, the original coefficient of the [100-200) category is assigned to the new built category, that is, to the [100-500).

Finally, although some categories will be statistically significant, they might not represent the observed trends that relate one given variable with the location of deforested pixels.

As an example of how to solve this inconsistency, the following protocol, applied to the distance to population centers, is presented.

The weights of evidence coefficients (W+) obtained for this variables categories presented a clear tendency denoting higher coefficients for categories representing closer distances to centers, as might be expected (Fig. 13a). Nevertheless, two categories, [23.4-27.2) and [100.4-121.5) (in km) represented exceptions to the observed trend.

Using ArcGIS 9.2, we reclassified the maps distance categories to visually represent the significant categories DINAMICA calculated and laid the map of changes, that is, the deforestation occurred between 2000 and 2005, on top of this.

When we scrutinized these maps (Fig 14), we observed that these two categories, although farther away from centers, presented relatively more deforested pixels

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than some categories located closer to centers and, thus, obtained higher (although still negative) weight of evidence coefficients than the latter.

Clearly, the observed deforested patches must be product of other factors rather than to the distance to centers variable. These factors might be distant seasonal grazing areas observed to the south of the Megantoni National Sanctuary to the west of our study area (INRENA et al. 2006), natural forest clearings, or even errors in the original classification.

Therefore, we manually modified the trend by assigning new lower coefficients to each of these two categories (Fig 13b). These were calculated as the average between both the upper and lower adjacent categories coefficients.

The same protocol was used for the rest of variables presenting similar inconsistencies to obtain their final weights of evidence coefficients (Fig. 15).

This analysis identified the variables distance to deforested areas, distance to the Interoceanica, distance to secondary roads, and distance to population centers to be the strongest predictors of deforestation and demonstrated the importance of protected areas and territorial reserves on deterring deforestation (Fig 13 and 15).

Fourth step: correlation test As we have explained, DINAMICA calculates the weight of evidence coefficients for each explanatory variable and assumes these are independent 115

before integrating their effect into one deforestation probability map. As such, in this step, DINAMICA determines the correlation between variables using a set of statistical tests (see Soares-Filho et al. 2008) from which we apply the Joint Information Uncertainty test (Almeida 2003). The test determines the association between two maps based on a 0 to 1 scale, in which higher values denote a higher correlation.

We decided to use a value of 0.5 as a threshold (exclusive) for determining independence, since it has been stated (Almeida 2003) that such a threshold value suggests less association between two variable maps. We found that none of the used variables was correlated (Table 3), and thus we retained all variables within the analysis for building the deforestation probability map.

Fifth step: running the simulation In this step DINAMICA runs a deforestation simulation (see Soares-Filho et al. 2008) using the inputs and algorithms presented in Figure 16. The output from one time step constitutes the input for the subsequent. Similarly, iteration subproducts are used as inputs during the same iteration to obtain final outputs.

The model uses the real initial landscape (2000), the spatial variables (stored in the static variables map) and their weights of evidence coefficients, and the transition matrix, as inputs to run and iterate five times (i.e. five years; defined within the repeat box, Fig. 16) to produce (1) distance to deforested maps (the dynamic variable), (2) transition probability maps, and (3) simulated landscape maps, one for each time step. 116

During each iteration, the first and second outputs constitute sub-products that will be used as inputs to obtain each of the simulated landscape maps, which in turn constitute the initial landscape maps for the second iteration and subsequent ones (this is allowed by the Mux categorical map algorithm, by creating a loop, Fig. 16).

The distance to deforested maps are updated according to the evolving distribution of deforested pixels in each step, starting with that of the 2000 real landscape and subsequently using the following simulated landscapes produced.

In turn, transition probability maps are determined as a function of each explanatory variables (static and dynamic) influence on the spatial probability of occurring a deforested pixel. Therefore, given a set of spatial variables (A, B, C,,N), the probability of one pixel at location (x,y) being deforested is determined by:

P ( DeforestedPixel | A " B " C " ... " N )( x,y ) =

#k=1 Wk + ( x,y ) #k=1 Wk + ( x,y )

n

1$ e

!
where Wk+(x,y) is the weight of evidence coefficient for category k of one variable A, in the case of categorized variables (e.g. distance to rivers), or simply the coefficient for the binary pattern of categorical variable A (e.g. protected areas), at location (x,y) and is given by:

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" % P ( Ak | DeforestedPixel) ' $ W k ( x ,y ) = ln $ P A | DeforestedPixel ' k # &

+

! and stored within the weights of evidence coefficients input file. Therefore, as

DINAMICA iterates, the distance to deforested maps will allow the model to automatically update the probability maps.

In turn, the transition matrix is used to determine the net number of pixels to be deforested during each step. It is important to note that during the calibration and parameterization process the transition matrix remains constant, whereas during the next simulation process it is dynamic, based on the corresponding scenarios.

Using the calc change matrix algorithm, DINAMICA transforms the historical annual deforestation rate, stored in the transition matrix, into the number of pixels to be deforested by multiplying the deforestation rate by the total number of possible changes, that is, the remaining forest.

The total number of cells to be deforested is then divided into two fractions by the modulate change matrix algorithm, which is set to determine the percentage of the total number of changes that will be executed by the expander and patcher algorithms. Both are concerned with the landscape change dynamics, though the first one determines only the expansion of previous patches of deforestation, whereas the second generates new deforestation patches alone (see Soares-Filho et al. 2002 for further details). The idea of splitting the total number of executed changes between both algorithms and into varying proportions 118

allows us to approximate and calibrate the simulated landscapes to the real structure of a landscape.

The size of expansion fringes and new patches follow a lognormal probability distribution (Soares-Filho et al. 2002). Thus, both algorithms require specifying the parameters of this distribution by a mean and variance patch size. Higher values of mean patch size imply a less fragmented landscape and higher values of variance patch size imply a more heterogeneous landscape (the opposite applies). In addition, a patch isometry number must be defined. This parameter varies from 0 to 2 and patches assume a more isometric (circular) form with higher values and a more linear form otherwise (Soares-Filho et al. 2002).

Once all parameters are set, DINAMICA is run to produce the five simulated landscapes (2001-2005) and their associated probability maps.

Sixth step: validation In this step we validate the model by comparing the 2005 simulated landscape with the real 2005 one. The method we apply is the fuzzy similarity analysis, which compares two maps of changes (in our case, maps of deforested pixels alone) (Silvestrini 2008; Soares-Filho et al. 2008). The first map represents the observed changes between the 2000 and 2005 real landscapes and the second, those between the 2000 real landscape and the 2005 simulated one.

The method compares the number of deforested pixels within the first map with that of the second, that fall within a central cell neighborhood. This 119

neighborhood is defined by a set of cell window sizes of 1x1, 3x3, 5x5, etc. We decided to use a range of window sizes from 1x1 to 11x11 cells, representing areas of one to eleven hectares (or 0.01 to 1.21 km2), respectively. Using a constant decay function, if a deforested pixel is found within the window, regardless of whether it is located exactly in the central cell of the window (for those larger than 1x1), that is, in the same x,y coordinates of both maps, a similarity fit of 1 is assigned. On the other hand, if no deforested pixel is found within the window, a zero fit is assigned. Once each window size has convoluted over the whole map of changes, a mean similarity index for each window size is calculated as the sum of ones divided by the number of deforested pixels. Thus, the closer this quotient is to one the higher the fuzzy similarity between the real and the simulated landscape is. As would be expected, larger windows relax the comparison, increasing the goodness of fit between the two maps. Finally, this method applies a comparison in two ways, that is, it analyses the difference in the location of pixels in the first map relative to that in the second and vice versa, ultimately choosing the lowest calculated mean index fit for each window (see Soares-Filho et al. 2008).

To define the mean and variance size of new expansion fringes and patches for the expander and patcher algorithms, respectively, we first calculated the size of each new deforested patch (including both expansions and patches) observed between the real landscapes of 2000 and 2005. Following, we divided each patch size by five, so as to obtain a proxy for the yearly expansion of new patches. We obtained a mean and variance patch size of 1 and 8 ha, respectively. We then ran the model several times so as to obtain the best possible model fitness after 120

changing the isometry and the modulate change matrix parameters, finally setting these at 1.5 and 0.8, respectively. We obtained the fuzzy similarity presented in Figure 17, which achieves an 80% similarity at a window size of 11x11. We considered this similarity to be satisfactory based on previous results obtained using DINAMICA (see SoaresFilho et al. 2006) and thus, used the set parameters in the next simulation process.

Simulation of future deforestation (2000-2035) A second process was undertaken to simulate the cumulative annual deforestation across the landscape between years 2001 and 2035. This process starts again with the real 2000 landscape as the initial landscape and iterates five times until the 2005 simulated landscape is produced but then deviates from the previously set parameters at time step 2005-2006 to introduce the effect of each of the five deforestation scenarios (Low,High/No,Yes2ndaryRoads and control) and carries on until 2034-2035. Each of the first four scenarios includes a different set of new dynamic variables, transition matrices, and weights of evidence coefficients from time step 2005-2006 onwards.

Similarly as in the calibration and parameterization process, the distance to deforested dynamic variable, probability maps, and simulated landscapes for each time step are produced, where the latter represent the input for each subsequent time step. Each model was set to iterate 35 times in total, that is, from 2000 to 2035.

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New dynamic variables Population attraction and distance to secondary roads were turned into partially dynamic variables as their layer maps are updated for every five-year period, from time step 2005-2006 onwards, in order to replace those of each previous five-year period during the whole simulation process. In other words, both variables remained unchanged within the five years of each five-year period but were then updated from one period to the other. Reasons for updating these two variables as well as the way in which each is constructed are explained below.

Population attraction As we expect centers population to grow or decrease in time, we also expect that they will exert different deforestation pressures on neighborhood forests in the future. Thus, to model this effect, we created six new population attraction layer maps based on the projection of each centres population size. These six maps correspond to the first year of every five-year period between 2005-2010 and 2030-2035 (i.e. 2005, 2010,,2030).

Projected population sizes were estimated for each of these years (Npop ctr, (5) year), between 2010 and 2030 (inclusive) (we already had their 2005 population sizes, see Human Population Growth) based on:

(Npop ctr,2005) (! pop ctr/district)5 = Npop ctr,2010

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(Npop ctr,2010) (! pop ctr/district)5 = Npop ctr,2015

and so on, where (! pop ctr/district) stands for each centers 1993-2005 population growth rate or each districts 1993-2005 growth rate where the missing data centers are located (see Human Population Growth).

Projected populations were used to construct the new population attraction layer maps following the same protocol as before (see Spatial static and synamic variables).

Distance to secondary roads The construction of an official road (Perz et al. 2007) such as the IOS, promotes the development of a secondary road network to link timber, agriculture, and mining activities, among others, to the main road and then to regional markets (Perz et al. 2007). In fact, the IOS has already promoted the extension of roads into previously isolated areas (Kirkby et al. in manuscript).

Therefore, using ArcGIS 9.2, we manually generated new secondary roads and extend existing ones to create six new distance to secondary roads layer maps, each corresponding to the first year of every five-year period between 2005-2010 and 2030-2035 (i.e. 2005, 2010,,2030).

We based the secondary road extensions on (1) our own knowledge about the most plausible paths and directions (mainly to gradually connect population centers) and (2) two road projects that have been proposed by the Regional 123

Governments of Madre de Dios and Cusco and are currently being evaluated by the Peruvian Economy Ministry (Ministerio de Economa) for approval (road Nuevo Edn-Boca Manu-Boca Colorado and road Patria-Quincemil, respectively, Fig. 18) (see http://ofi.mef.gob.pe/bp/ConsultarPIP/frmConsultarPIP.asp?accion=consultar&tx tCodigo=95220, accessed July 14, 2009; http://ofi.mef.gob.pe/bp/ConsultarPIP/frmConsultarPIP.asp?accion=consultar&tx tCodigo=107575, accessed July 14, 2009). These two roads, if finally approved, will be due on 2011 and 2013, respectively, and have as their main objective to connect some of the two Depts most isolated areas to the IOS.

New dynamic trasition matrices Beginning in time step 2005-2006, the historical deforestation rate was increased according to the functional relationships (exponential or logistic) previously established for each scenario (see Deforestation rate scenarios) and projected until time step 2034-2035 (Table 4).

As such, four dynamic transition matrices area assigned to each of the four scenarios and one matrix, whose rates remain constant throughout the simulation process, corresponds to the control (Table 4).

New weights of evidence coefficients In addition to the scenario-generating model, one further manipulation of parameters was used to reflect the effect of the paving of the IOS in the

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allocation of deforestation, specifically regarding the extension of the secondary road network.

The weights of evidence coefficients obtained during the calibration and parameterization process (see Third step) were manually changed for (ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads) and (ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads), so as to reflect a greater deforestation pressure in the vicinity of newly created roads. For (ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads), we increased both coefficients for the distance to secondary roads categories of [0-800) and [200-2800) meters from 2.64 and 1.88, respectively, to 6 and to 8 for (ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads).

We changed the coefficients of these two scenarios because, as might be recalled, it is the logistic relationship that represents the extension of secondary roads (see Deforestation rate scenarios). On the other hand, the rest variables coefficients were left unchanged. For the land tenure variables this effectively implies that we assumed a similar level of governance into the future, especially regarding the conservation status of protected areas and territorial reserves.

Building the models Models were built maintaining the same structure as our Fifth step model, though in this process they were set to iterate 35 times, one new algorithm (For) was introduced to upload the new static variable maps for every five time steps, one for each five-year period between 2005-2010 and 2030-2035, and the new transition matrices were included (Fig. 19).

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In addition to all the previously used static variables, each new static variable map contains now one of the new six population attraction layer maps, which were introduced in each static variable map according to the corresponding periods. For example, the 2005 population attraction map is introduced into the static variable map used in period 2005-2010 (i.e. the year of the population attraction map must coincide with the first year of the current five-year period).

On top of this inclusion, the models executing (ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads) and (ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads), additionally receive the six new distance to secondary roads layer maps. Each distance to secondary roads was assigned to each static variables map in the same way as before. Furthermore, these two models receive the new weights of evidence coefficients.

Finally, each of the four models executing (ScenarioLow,No2ndaryRoads), (ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads), (ScenarioHigh,No2ndaryRoads), and (ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads), receive its corresponding new dynamic transition matrices, while (ScenarioCtrl), receives the constant trend. Each set of matrices is stored in a lookup table algorithm, which replaces the transition matrix table in Figure 16.

RESULTS The model was run for five scenarios, (1) low population growth/no further construction or extension of secondary roads (ScenarioLow,No2ndaryRoads), (2) low population growth/construction and extension of secondary roads (ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads), (3) high population growth/no construction or 126

extension of secondary roads (ScenarioHigh,No2ndaryRoads), and (4) high population growth/construction and extension of secondary roads (ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads), (5) plus a control scenario (ScenarioCtrl) in which, unlike the first four scenarios, the deforestation rate remains constant at the 2000-2005 historical level throughout the simulation process.

The projected new (added between 2000-2035) and total (new + deforestation before 2000) deforestation for the five scenarios are presented in Table 5. Figures 20-24 present the simulated landscapes for years 2020 and 2035, depicting the distribution of the projected total deforestation for each scenario. Tables 6-12 summarize the projected new and total deforestation inside the protected areas (PAs) and forestry concessions (FCs), for each scenario.

Total deforestation We project that after 35 years (2000-2035) total forest cover in the region will decline from 9,295,926 to 8,816,458 ha (a 5.2% reduction) for ScenarioCtrl, and to 8,665,920 (6.8% reduction), 8,560,723 (7.9% reduction), 8,515,038 (8.4% reduction), and 8,239,405 ha (11.4% reduction) for ScenarioLow,No2ndaryRoads, ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads, ScenarioHigh,No2ndaryRoads, and ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads, respectively.

In the DINAMICA runs, future deforestation was concentrated near previously deforested areas (<1.6 km from each previous time-steps total deforested pixels), the Interocenica Sur highway (IOS) (<17 km), existing and new secondary roads (<10.5 km), and population centers (<6.7 km) with large 127

populations (e.g. Puerto Maldonado). As a result, by 2035 the connectivity of the Vilcabamba-Ambor Conservation Corridor (VACC) will be seriously compromised in all five scenarios, since most of the new deforestation is concentrated near the IOS, thus, further bisecting the VACC. On the other hand, deforestation was lower inside PAs and indigenous territorial reserves (TRs). This result is a direct consequence of the weights of evidence coefficients obtained during the calibration process (2000-2005) and as modified for the secondary road scenarios. Recall that using the same coefficients through to 2035 means that we have assumed a similar level of governance into the future, especially regarding the conservation status of PAs and TRs.

The main differences among the simulated landscapes is how far the new deforestation extends across the study area. As such, ScenarioLow,No2ndaryRoads and ScenarioHigh,No2ndaryRoads produced a much more localized deforestation pattern, mainly near the IOS and population centers, than ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads and ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads, which, by design, spread new deforestation across the landscape, following the path of extended secondary roads. ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads and ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads therefore resulted in more deforestation near and, in some cases, inside PAs and FCs, as we describe below.

Deforestation within PAs Overall, we do not expect much deforestation to occur inside Madre de Dios protected areas. No forest decline was produced inside Alto Purus National Park, Kugapakori Territorial Reserve, Megantoni National Sanctuary, and Madre de Dios Territorial Reserve, whose total deforestation remained constant at the 128

trivial levels of 12, 21, 20, and 7 ha, respectively, in all scenarios. Overall, the model estimated that after 35 years, the total area of PAs (5,059,143 ha) loses 6,181 ha from its initial 4,896,970 ha forest cover (a 0.13% reduction) in ScenarioCtrl, and 8,111 (0.17% reduction), 14,066 (0.29%), 10,885 (0.22%), and 23,577 ha (0.13%) in ScenarioLow,No2ndaryRoads, ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads, ScenarioHigh,No2ndaryRoads, and ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads, respectively. Tables 6-10 present the projected total and new deforestation in 2035 inside Tambopata National Reserve, Bahuaja Sonene National Park, Amarakaeri Communal Reserve, and Manu National Park.

Tambopata National Reserve (TNR) The TNR is closest to the IOS, and a large number of population centers surrounds it (30), including Puerto Maldonado (Fig. 1). Thus, this PA suffers the largest amount of deforestation (Table 6).

As expected, the largest total and new deforestation within the TNR was produced by ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads (Table 6), concentrated in two areas, to the north of the reserve, near Puerto Maldonado (Fig. 25), and near new and expanded secondary roads on the Malinowski river, a zone devoted to mining (Fig 26). It is interesting to note that although ScenarioHigh,No2ndaryRoads generates more total deforestation than does ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads, for the whole study area (Table 5), ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads produced more deforestation inside the TNR, especially near the Malinowski River. This is a consequence of the secondary roads (Fig. 27).

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Bahuaja Sonene National Park (BSNP) BSNP suffers less total and new deforestation compared to the TNR (Table 7). Only ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads and ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads substantially increased new deforestation within the BSNP, although it remains low in both cases (228 and 214 ha, respectively). Only the western tip of the park, near the IOS, is where deforestation invades the BSNP (Fig 28).

This result represents the fact that most of the BSNP inside the study area remains relatively isolated from the IOS and secondary roads.

Amarakaeri Communal Reserve (ACR) ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads generated the largest new deforestation (2,767 ha) inside the ACR as a consequence of its higher deforestation rates, compared to the other scenarios, and because of the construction of the Patria-Quincemil road (Table 9). This road generated most of the new deforestation near and inside its southeastern boundary, north of Quincemil town and the Interoceanica (Fig 29).

Although the new road bisects the ACR, new deforestation occurs only within the southeastern boundary and not all along the road itself, as might be expected. This is because the internal area of the ACR is largely uninhabited and distant from the IOS, population centers, and mining concessions. Therefore, probabilities inside the ACR remained low, even after the road effect is taken into account, as is shown in the 2035 deforestation probability map (Fig 30).

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In contrast, although the Nuevo Edn-Boca Manu-Boca Colorado road is not inside the reserve, it would seriously threaten the connectivity of the ACR with other areas, such as Manu National Park, as this road allocates new deforestation between these two PAs (Fig 29).

Manu National Park (MNP) All five scenarios produced a relatively similar forest decline within the MNP (< 0.5%) (Table 10). ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads produced a slightly larger net deforestation (6,194 ha) in 2035, compared to the other scenarios (Table 10), and allocated new deforestation inside the MNP near the town of Patria and within the parks southern tip (Fig. 31). In addition, ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads and ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads, both representing the construction of the road Nuevo Edn-Boca Manu-Boca Colorado, allocated much more new deforestation to the southeastern end of the park than did either ScenarioLow,No2ndaryRoads or ScenarioHigh,No2ndaryRoads (Fig. 31 & 32). The effect of the road is the same as in the case of the ACR, as the connectivity between the park and the ACR is reduced.

Deforestation within FCs After the 35-year period, FCs (1,374,552 ha) lose more forest than do PAs (Table 12). ScenarioCtrl generated a 21,181 ha forest decline (1.57% reduction) from the initial 1,352,896 ha forest cover. ScenarioLow,No2ndaryRoads, ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads, ScenarioHigh,No2ndaryRoads, and ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads respectively generate 42,209 (3.12% reduction), 79,000 (5.84%), 57,606 (4.26%), and 134,841 ha (9.97%) in new deforestation. 131

Concessions located north and south of the Inambari River were the most strongly affected by the allocation of new deforestation. Without secondary roads, deforestation was concentrated south of the Inambari, nearer the IOS (Fig 33), and with secondary roads, deforestation spread to the north of the Inambari (Fig. 34).

DISCUSSION Deforestation in southeastern Amazonian Peru is and has been driven by statesponsored incentives, such as easy access to agricultural credit, and, more recently, by road construction and market-based incentives like high gold prices (Alvarez & Naughton-Treves 2003; Dourojeanni 2006; Killeen 2007). These incentives promote immigration of Andean people towards the eastern lowlands of the Madre de Dios department, most of whom come from the neighboring Cusco and Puno departments (Dourojeanni 2006). Traditionally, immigration has prompted forest clearance for the production of crops and cattle, and more recently, for lucrative, alluvial gold mining (Dourojeanni 2006; Killeen 2007). The paving of the Interoceanica Sur highway (IOS) is now and will further promote these changes when completed in 2011, as the IOS reduces costs of transportation and encourages the creation of new secondary roads (Kaimowitz & Angelsen 1998; Dourojeanni 2006; INRENA 2006; Killeen 2007; Oliveira et al. 2007).

The effects that increased population size and the extension of secondary roads will have on deforestation rates was considered by the scenario-generating 132

model, which sought to represent our current knowledge of the regions dynamics. We necessarily made several assumptions, which we discuss here.

First, we assumed that population growth (immigration and organic growth) and deforestation rates are positively correlated throughout the simulation process, thus, implying that population growth is the main cause of deforestation in our model. Population growth is considered a fundamental driver of deforestation (Geist & Lambin 2001, Killeen 2007), for example, by increasing the demand for agricultural and forest products and by increasing the number of gold miners (Geist & Lambin 2001, Perz 2002, Killeen 2007).

Second, we assumed that the population within the study area maintains a positive and increasing growth rate throughout the simulation process, that is, from 2000 to 2035. We based this assumption on the fact that (1) the Madre de Dios department contains the lowest population density of all Peruvian departments (1.3 ind./km2 as of 2007, INEI 2007) and, thus, could potentially support a sustained population growth rate and (2) future development projects sponsored by the IIRSA or governmental initiatives, such as highways, hydrovias (river dredging projects to allow large boats to pass), and energy projects, will further increase immigration rates (see Killeen 2007).

Third, we assumed that the higher population growth rate used to develop the high deforestation scenarios is the same as the one observed between 1981 and 1993. We used this rate because from 1985 to 1990, the administration of thenPresident Garcia instituted a series of agricultural subsidies in the form of land 133

titles and easy credit that promoted immigration and caused a rapid expansion of the agricultural frontier in Madre de Dios (Alvarez & Naughton-Treves 2003). Thus, we expect a similar effect by the construction of the IOS, which could be seen as another subsidy for the agricultural sector and others.

Fourth, we represented the effect that new secondary roads have on deforestation rates by a logistic trend in the deforestation rate growth. A logistic trend produces a rapid increase in deforestation rates early in time, a consequence that has been reported after new roads are laid (Killeen 2007).

The DINAMICA software package provided a useful tool to represent the effect different scenarios would have on the patterns of deforestation. As observed in the results, DINAMICA allocated more deforestation in the simulated landscapes of high deforestation scenarios than the low deforestation ones and more deforestation near secondary roads in scenarios contemplating the extension of roads. This was possible because DINAMICA allowed us to introduce new dynamic deforestation rates and modified weights of evidence coefficients for the distance to secondary roads variable.

It is important to note, however, that we assumed that the rest of variables coefficients remain constant into the future. Nevertheless, coefficients related to specific variables such as PAs may vary with changes in policy. In fact, such considerations could be taken into account when developing new scenarios.

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Similarly, the mean size and variance of new expansion fringes and patches, as well as the isometry parameter, were assumed to be equal for both expander and patcher algorithms and were calculated on the assumption that the deforestation pattern was homogenously distributed per year (we divided the mean patch size between 2000 and 2005, one step, by five). These parameters were based on the calibration process results, and we obtained a relatively good model fitness (~80%). Nevertheless, we recommend that in the future, the size of new patch expansions of deforestation should be empirically determined, on a yearly basis.

The scenarios developed here aim to provide a set of projected deforestation paths to support the establishment of RED projects in southeastern Peruvian Amazon. Projected paths are necessary in order to answer the counterfactual question of what would deforestation be without the RED project, and thus, set the reference level to which the additionality performance of the project can be measured (Angelsen 2008) and to set the level at which the RED project is expected to reduce deforestation rates. Most RED proposals to the United Nations Frameworks Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have chosen the historical deforestation rates as their reference level, also referred to as the business as usual (BAU) baseline (Angelsen 2008, Parker et al 2008). However, past deforestation is not always an accurate predictor of future deforestation (Angelsen 2008) and thus, the historical deforestation rate could underestimate the expected BAU baseline.

Southeastern Peruvian Amazon is a region with a historically low deforestation rate (0.1% between 2000-2005) and a high percentage of land under forest cover 135

(~95%) (Soares-Filho et al. 2006, Oliveira et al. 2007). This suggests that the regions forest cover dynamics is situated at an early stage of the forest transition (Angelsen 2007) and thus, is expected to have accelerating deforestation rates in the future (Angelsen 2008). Regions such as this should consider higher rates of deforestation when setting their BAU scenarios (Angelsen 2008).

Our results clearly indicate that ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads generates the highest deforestation rates. Thus, if we considered this scenarios projected deforestation path as the regional BAU baseline and that of ScenarioHigh,No2ndaryRoads as the realized path of a regional RED project that is designed to mitigate the effect of secondary roads, then the difference between these two paths (the area below the latter scenarios projected deforestation path minus the formers, see Figure 7) would be the avoided deforestation eligible for RED credits.

Considering these two scenarios, total avoided deforestation between 2012 (the year in which a post-Kyoto agreement will come into force) and 2035 would sum 223,071 ha. Setting the average amount of carbon stored in the above biomass at 172 tC ha-1, based on a carbon storage study undertaken at the Los Amigos Conservation Concession (LACC) of Madre de Dios (Winrock 2006) and two possible carbon prices, one set fix at US$5.63/tCO2 (see Strassburg et al. 2009) and one variable price, evolving as a function of time: US$21/tCO2 in year 2012, rising to US$30/tCO2 in 2020-2029, and to US$49/tCO2 by 2030-2035 (Environmental Defense Fund 2008) we estimated the present value of revenue (PVR"=10%,23-years) to be US$380.6M and US$1612.4M, respectively. Both results are much greater than the PVR"=10%,23-years derived from the average revenues per 136

used area of agriculture (PVR = US$41.8M), cattle and poultry (PVR = US$22.0M), and timber (PVR = US$13.4M), in the region (Kirkby et al. in manuscript). This indicates a relatively low opportunity cost to implement a regional RED project, and thus, would make it economically efficient, though transaction costs remain to be considered.

We present these estimates as a source of initial argumentation and further research motivation for building the case of RED credits in the region. Several conservation non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the Madre de Dios Regional Government are already initiating the process of developing RED initiatives. A such, their efforts require a simulation system that can help them to set the projected deforestation trends to support their eventual RED credits claims.

Moreover, our model could help these institutions to understand and visualize deforestation patterns and their relation with threats such as mining, population growth, and the expansion of the agriculture frontier, so that they can plan their future conservation interventions.

Finally, we would like to add that DINAMICA analyses are an 'ongoing process' of gathering and organizing information so as to allow improvements on designing and parameterizing the models. As such the underlying purpose of this study has been to gather the bulk of the original data for demography, human settlements, historical population growth, and a set of spatial variables to

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introduce on a first DINAMICA analysis. We expect to continue improving the model as new variables and parameters will be added.

ACKNOWLEDMENTS We are grateful to the Centro de Datos para la Conservacin Universidad Nacional Agraria La Molina (CDC-UNALM) for kindly providing most of the spatial data used in this study, especially the classified satellite images of 2000 and 2005, which are product of their previous and ongoing work in the region. Without its contribution this study could not have been undertaken. We would also like to thank the Centro para la Sostenibilidad Ambiental Universidad Peruana Cayetano Heredia (CSA-UPCH) for providing population centers data. Other important spatial data was provided by the Amazon Conservation Association (ACA) and its Peruvian Office Asociacin para la Conservacin de la Cuenca Amaznica (ACCA), Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental (SPDA), Eddy Mendoza (Conservation International Peru), and Gary Geller (JPL-NASA, for access to ASTER and LANDSAT imagery), whose contribution is gratefully acknowledge. The Rufford Small Grants for Conservation provided the necessary funds for covering the expenses of one visit to the Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais and to buy a computer, which was used to run the models.

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FIGURES AND TABLES

Figure 1. Study area showing protected areas, territorial reserves, Los Amigos Conservation Concession, and sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Interoceanica highway (IOS).

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Figure 2. Vilcabamba Amabor Conservation Corridor and the study area (black square) (Modified from Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund 2005).

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Low 1,600,000 1,400,000 1,200,000 1,000,000 800,000 600,000 400,000 200,000 0

High

Inhabitants

Years

Figure 3. Low and high population growth rates for the study area between 2005 and 2035.

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Exponential

Logistic

Constant

0.0030 0.0025

Deforestation rate

0.0020 0.0015 0.0010 0.0005 0.0000 1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

Year

Figure 4. Deforestation rate growth trends between 2000 and 2034 for ScenarioLow,No2ndaryRoads (exponential), ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads (logistical), and ScenarioCtrl (constant).

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Figure 5. Deforestation rate growth trends between 2000 and 2034 for ScenarioHigh,No2ndaryRoads (exponential), ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads (logistical), and ScenarioCtrl (constant).

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Figure 6. Forest cover area (ha) for ScenarioLow,No2ndaryRoads (exponential), ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads (logistical), and ScenarioCtrl (constant).

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Figure 7. Forest cover area (ha) for ScenarioHigh,No2ndaryRoads (exponential), ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads (logistical), and ScenarioCtrl (constant).

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Figure 8. Schematic view of the weights of evidence method to produce a transition probability map.

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Figure 9. 2000 real landscape showing the four categories: bodies of water, deforested, forest, and non-forest (includes non-forest ecosystems, the Interoceanica Sur highway, and secondary roads).

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Figure 10. A cube raster data set. (Modified from Soares-Filho et al. 2008)

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Figure 11. DINAMICAs algorithm determine the weights of evidence ranges and required parameters.

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Figure 12. Plot of An against An*exp(W+) showing how the tolerance angle (ta) is conceived (Modified from Soares Filho et al. 2008).

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a)

b)

Figure 13. Weight of evidence coefficients (W+) for the variable distance to population centers. a) All significant categories (24) are presented. b) Categories that did not follow the observed trend ([23.4-27.2) and [100.4-121.5), in km) were assigned new coefficients.

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Figure 14. Distance to population centers significant categories map, overlapped with the map of deforestation occurred between 2000 and 2005 (black).

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Figure 15. Weights of evidence (W+) graphs for the variables: (1) distance to the Interoceanica highway; (2) population attraction (interaction potential); (3) distance to secondary roads; (4) distance to rivers; (5) slope; (6) distance to 2000s deforested land; (7) forest type: HF-lh Lower hills humid forest, FF Flooding forest, TF Terra firme, HF-hh Upper hills humid forest, HF-m Mountain Humid forest, and BF Bamboo forest; and (8) Biophysical and Land tenure: TR Territorial Reserves, PS Palm swamps, PA Protected areas, BN Brazil nut concessions, CT Conservation and Tourism concessions, F Forestry concessions, M Mining concessions, and NC Native communities.

161

Figure 16. DINAMICAs model used to run the simulation of deforestation between 2000 and 2035.

162

100 80

Similarity (%)

60 40 20 0 1 9 25 49 81 121

Window size (ha)

Figure 17. Model fitness based on the fuzzy similarity method for 2005.

163

730'0"W

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TRANSPORTES:
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Figure 18. Peruvian Ministry of Transportation and Communication (Ministerio de Transportes y Comunicaciones) maps showing the proposed roads Nuevo Edn-Boca Manu-Boca Colorado (top) and Patria-Quincemil (bottom).

160'0"S

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Capital Departamental Capital Provincial Capital Distrital Aerdromo Pueblo Puente Ponton Puerto Mina Abra

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( ! ! CCARHUAYO S # ( ( # ( ! ( # ( ! (S ! ( ! ! ( ! MARCAPATA # PANTIPATA CAICAY ! # MALLMA S ( ! # # OCCOPATA ( ! ( ! ( HUACARPAY S ! ( ! # ( ! ( ! ( ! ( ( ! ( ! OCONGATE ANCASCHACA S S # # PUNA CANCHA ( ! YANAMA # ! # SUMARO ! S # SALLAC # ( ! ( ! ( ! LUCRE ( CHINCHAYPUJIO ( ! S # ( ! ( S # S # ! ( ! ( ! YANACANCHA ( ! CARRETERA INTEROCEANICA ( ! S # CHANCA ( YAURISQUE ! ( ! ( LLANAMAYO ! # ( S #! ( ! S # ( ! ( ( ! (! ( ! ANDAHUAYLILLAS! ( ! ( ! # S # ( ! (! ( CCATA ( ! ( ! (! ! S # L ! ( HUANOQUITE # ! TRAMO 1 TINQUI ( ! (! ( ! HUANCANCALLA ( (! ! ( ! ( ! ( ! ( / ! ( ! ( ! ( ! MARAMPAQUI ( ! URCOS ( ! MAYUMBAMBA L ! S # ( ! ( ! ABRA HUILCACUNCA ( ! ( # (S ! MAUCALLACTA U ( ! ( ! ! HUANCCARA ( ( ! ( S # ( ! ( ! ( ! ( ( (! ! L! S # ! TOCTOHUAYLLA S # S # SAN JUAN DE S # (( UPINA ! L ( ! ( ! ( QUIHUARES ! ( ! # PACCARITAMBO ! / ! ! U JALACOCHA S # TTIO ! ( ! (# ( ( NAYHUA S ! ( ! RONDOCAN C # ! PARURO (! ( ! ( ! ( ( ! H ( ! S # # PIRQUE S ( ! ( A ! ( ! ( ! 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S # ( ! ( ( SANTA ! CHECCAPUCCARA TOTORA ( ! (! ! (# ( ! ( ! ! ( ! SAN PEDRO ( ! ( SAN PABLO ( ! # ( S # ( ! ( ! ( ! ( ! (! ! S # CHARAMURAY S #! CONGOA ( ! ( ! ( ! ( ( ! ! / ( ! S # FERROCARRIL DEL SUR PATAQUEA ( ! ( ! ( ! ( ! ( ! ( ! ( ! ( ! SICUANI ( ! ( ! ONCOYO ( ! YANAOCA ( ! ( ! ( ! ! ( ! ( ! ( ( ! ! ( ! ! ( # ( COLQUEMARCA ! ! ( CHAPIC ( (! ! / S ( ( ! CHAMACA ( ! (! ! # ( ! PALPA PALPA S ( ! ( ! ! ( ! # (! ( ! ( ! ! ( ! ( ! ( ( ! ( ( ! S # CAPILLANI ( ! # (! ! (( ! ( (! ! ( LIVITACA # ( ! QUIOTA # (! ! ( ! CHACTUYOC ( ! # ( ( ( ! ! ( ! ( ! (! ! PAYAHUARNI ( ! S # ( ! S # ( ! ( ! ( ! MAQUEIRO S HUAMPATURA ( ! S # ( ! ( ! S # LLUSCO # (! ! ( LA COMPUERTA ! ( LA PERLA ! ! (MARANGANI ( ! ( ( PISQUICCOCHA ! # ( ( S ! ( ( ! # # S #! ( ! ! ( ! ! VILUYO S Lag. ( ! CARRETERA PATAHUASI - YAURI - SICUANI QUEHUE ! ( S ! ( ( # ( ! ( ! # ULLUCANE S # LUTO ( ! ( ! Cooccota ! ( ! ( ( ! ( ! ( ! TRAMO: EL DESCANSO - LANGUI ( #! ( ! ( ! LANGUI LLINQUI S S # ( ! ( ! ( UCHUCCARCCO ! TOCTO ( ! 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130'0"S

CARRETERA CUSCO - QUILLABAMBA TRAMO: ALFAMAYO - QUILLABAMBA

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PROYECTO 2009

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164

Figure 19. DINAMICAs model used to run the simulation calibration and parameterization process of deforestation between 2000 and 2005.

165

2020

Puerto Maldonado

2035

Puerto Maldonado

Figure 20. Simulated landscapes for years 2020 and 2035 based on ScenarioLow,No2ndaryRoads.

166

2020

Puerto Maldonado

2035

Puerto Maldonado

Figure 21. Simulated landscapes for years 2020 and 2035 based on ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads.

167

2020

Puerto Maldonado

2035

Puerto Maldonado

Figure 22. Simulated landscapes for years 2020 and 2035 based on ScenarioHigh,No2ndaryRoads.

168

2020

Puerto Maldonado

2035

Puerto Maldonado

Figure 23. Simulated landscapes for years 2020 and 2035 based on ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads.

169

2020

Puerto Maldonado

2035

Puerto Maldonado

Figure 24. Simulated landscapes for years 2020 and 2035 based on ScenarioCtrl.

170

Figure 25. Simulated landscape for year 2035 presenting the effect of ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads within the north area of the Tambopata National Reserve near Puerto Maldonado (PEM).

171

Figure 26. Simulated landscape for year 2035 presenting the effect of ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads within the north area of the Tambopata National Reserve near the Malinowski River.

172

Figure 27. Simulated landscapes for 2035 presenting the effect of ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads (top) and ScenarioHigh,No2ndaryRoads (bottom) inside the Tambopata National Reserve. Note that more deforestation is located inside the reserve near the Malinowski River in ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads than in ScenarioHigh,No2ndaryRoads.

173

Figure 28. Simulated landscapes for year 2035 presenting the effect of ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads (top) and ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads (bottom) on the most western boundary of the Bahuaja Sonene National Park near the Interoceanica highway.

174

Figure 29. Deforestation produced by ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads in 2035 around and inside the Amarakaeri Communal Reserve (ACR). Note how deforestation invades the ACR from south to northwest, as it starts to follow the path of the would-be constructed road Patria-Quincemil.

175

Figure 30. Deforestation probability map for the last model iteration (20342035). Areas depicted by their original cover classes (bodies of water, deforested, forest, and non-forest) do not have a probability as their corresponding weights of evidence coefficients were all negative.

176

Figure 31. Simulated landscapes for year 2035 presenting the effect of ScenarioHigh,No2ndaryRoads (top) and ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads (bottom). Note the difference in the amount of total deforestation located between Nuevo Edn and Boca Manu towns.

177

Figure 32. Simulated landscapes for year 2035 presenting the effect of ScenarioLow,No2ndaryRoads (top) and ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads (bottom). Note the difference in the amount of total deforestation located between Nuevo Edn and Boca Manu towns.

178

Figure 33. Simulated landscapes for year 2035 presenting the effect of ScenarioLow,No2ndaryRoads (top) and ScenarioHigh,No2ndaryRoads (bottom) on the forestry concessions to the north and south of the Inambari River and near the Interoceanica highway.

179

Figure 34. Simulated landscapes for year 2035 presenting the effect of ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads (top) and ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads (bottom) on the forestry concessions to the north and south of the Inambari River and near the Interoceanica highway.

180

Table 1. District total population and population growth rates between 19811993 and 1993-2005 for the study areas districts. District-level average growth rates (*) are given for Cusco and Puno Departments. Total Dept. population growth rate is given for Madre de Dios. Total Population Department Cusco District Quellouno Yanatile Challabamba Kosipata Paucartambo Camanti Marcapata Cusco San Jernimo San Sebastin San Tiago Wanchaq Total Ayapata San Gabn Total Tambopata Inambari Las Piedras Laberinto Manu Fizcarrald Madre de Dios Huepetuhe Iapari Iberia Tahuamanu Total 1981 5,663 2,947 8,832 1,513 4,481 91,042 9,093 15,978 51,901 35,803 227,253 3,403 2,100 5,503 20,341 1,716 2,526 1,467 139 1,890 812 3,013 1,103 33,007 1993 11,197 8,158 8,621 3,873 11,028 2,175 4,805 93,187 15,166 32,134 73,129 51,584 315,057 4,864 3,554 8,418 34,329 3,909 4,514 3,986 1,559 458 8,999 2,811 841 3,858 1,744 67,008 2005 16,469 9,520 9,600 4,610 14,168 1,700 5,141 103,836 28,855 85,472 66,277 54,524 400,172 6,820 4,243 11,063 51,384 4,888 6,072 4,954 2,500 1,062 5,605 8,130 791 4,868 1,770 92,024 Population growth rate (! ) 81-93 93-05 0.033 0.013 0.036 0.009 0.023 0.015 0.019 0.021 0.031 -0.02 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.009 0.044 0.055 0.06 0.085 0.029 -0.008 0.031 0.005 0.028* 0.018* 0.030 0.029 0.045 0.015 0.038* 0.022* 0.045 0.042 0.071 0.019 0.050 0.025 0.018 0.005 0.040 0.104 0.073 0.139 -0.039 0.003 0.021 0.039 0.061 0.093 -0.005 0.020 0.001 0.027

Puno Madre de Dios

181

Table 2. List of used spatial variables and sources. Class Biophysical Variable Type of forest Palm swamps Distance to rivers Slope Distance to deforested Distance to Interoceanica Sur (IOS) highway Distance to secondary roads Distance to population centers Population attraction Protected areas Territorial reserves Conservation and tourism state leased concessions Brazil nut concessions Forestry concessions Mining concessions Source CDC CDC and digitalized by us CDC/modified (distance to feature) CDC/modified (from DEM) Internally modeled CDC/modified (distance to feature) CDC/ACA/modified (distance to feature) CSA/modified (distance to feature) Built by us CDC CDC SPDA/modified (merged) CDC CDC CDC

Infrastructure

Land tenure

182

Table 3. Weights of evidence correlation between selected variables. Values below 0.5 indicate non-correlation.
Weights of evidence correlation First variable Distance to deforested areas Second variable Palm swamps Protected areas Brazil nut concessions Conservation and tourism state leased concessions Forestry concessions Mining concessions Native communities Distance to Interoceanica Sur (IOS) highway Distance to secondary roads Distance to population centers Distance to rivers Population attraction Slope Territorial reserves Forest type Protected areas Brazil nut concessions Conservation and tourism state leased concessions Forestry concessions Mining concessions Native communities Distance to IOS Distance to secondary roads Distance to population centers Distance to rivers Population attraction Slope Territorial reserves Forest type Brazil nut concessions Conservation and tourism state leased concessions Forestry concessions Mining concessions Native communities Distance to Interoceanica highway Distance to secondary roads Distance to population centers Distance to rivers Population attraction Slope Territorial reserves Forest type Joint Information Uncertainty 0.00472543 0.0565405 0.0172925 0.00612854 0.014214 0.0169147 0.0171398 0.188054 0.200927 0.284913 0.0787644 0.153539 0.0280562 0.0230479 0.0972614 0.00254837 0.00308716 0.0103458 0.00003409 0.0200761 0.0107076 0.00473998 0.00517067 0.00374398 0.000668577 0.00297491 0.00397451 0.00384616 0.0121914 0.0277034 0.0187988 0.104698 0.0317904 0.00847395 0.136166 0.121351 0.0643427 0.0165442 0.0231282 0.0108901 0.0726453 0.112044

Palm swamps

Protected areas

183

Brazil nut concessions

Conservation and tourism state leased concessions Forestry concessions Mining concessions Native communities Distance to Interoceanica highway Distance to secondary roads Distance to population centers Distance to rivers Population attraction Slope Territorial reserves Forest type Forestry concessions Mining concessions Native communities Distance to Interoceanica highway Distance to secondary roads Distance to population centers Distance to rivers Population attraction Slope Territorial reserves Forest type Mining concessions Native communities Distance to Interoceanica highway Distance to secondary roads Distance to population centers Distance to rivers Population attraction Slope Territorial reserves Forest type Native communities Distance to Interoceanica highway Distance to secondary roads Distance to population centers Distance to rivers Population attraction Slope Territorial reserves Forest type Distance to Interoceanica highway Distance to secondary roads Distance to population centers Distance to rivers Population attraction

0.00210212 0.0246246 0.00297434 0.0100887 0.0355496 0.0249492 0.0265256 0.00866169 0.0231623 0.0265332 0.0210322 0.0592534 0.00998791 0.000100237 0.00206442 0.00885476 0.00595784 0.00478807 0.00135641 0.0126993 0.00413541 0.00873868 0.00908538 0.0027809 0.0109765 0.043994 0.0389101 0.0133934 0.0115526 0.0253859 0.0290724 0.0307643 0.0254409 0.00271211 0.0270089 0.0171244 0.0242998 0.00338408 0.0237914 0.00112657 0.0121274 0.0189239 0.0124747 0.0175026 0.0160917 0.00368005 0.0213602

Conservation and tourism state leased concessions

Forestry concessions

Mining concessions

Native communities

184

Slope Territorial reserves Forest type Distance to Interoceanica highway Distance to secondary roads Distance to population centers Distance to rivers Population attraction Slope Territorial reserves Forest type Distance to population centers Distance to rivers Population attraction Slope Territorial reserves Forest type Distance to rivers Population attraction Slope Territorial reserves Forest type Population attraction Slope Territorial reserves Forest type Slope Territorial reserves Forest type Territorial reserves Forest type Forest type

0.00232386 0.0120074 0.0212814 0.314009 0.229994 0.0998564 0.173516 0.0432058 0.0515385 0.149466 0.224567 0.100577 0.162667 0.051018 0.0581368 0.133197 0.100008 0.205297 0.0379071 0.0429492 0.119848 0.0769434 0.0247381 0.00430606 0.0581421 0.112092 0.0393911 0.217188 0.018503 0.173833 0.0362614

Distance to secondary roads

Distance to population centers

Distance to rivers

Population attraction

Slope Territorial reserves

185

Table 4. Deforestation rates growth trends for each scenario.

Deforestation rates (" )

ScenarioLow,
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034
No2ndaryRoads

ScenarioLow,Y
es2ndaryRoads

ScenarioHigh,N
o2ndaryRoads

ScenarioHigh,Y
es2ndaryRoads

ScenarioCtrl
0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512

0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001541 0.001572 0.001603 0.001635 0.001668 0.001701 0.001735 0.001770 0.001805 0.001841 0.001878 0.001916 0.001954 0.001993 0.002033 0.002074 0.002116 0.002158 0.002202 0.002246 0.002291 0.002337 0.002384 0.002432 0.002482 0.002532 0.002583 0.002635 0.002689 0.002743

0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001646 0.001774 0.001896 0.002008 0.002110 0.002202 0.002284 0.002355 0.002417 0.002470 0.002515 0.002554 0.002586 0.002613 0.002635 0.002654 0.002670 0.002682 0.002693 0.002702 0.002709 0.002715 0.002720 0.002724 0.002727 0.002730 0.002732 0.002734 0.002735 0.002736

0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001560 0.001610 0.001662 0.001716 0.001772 0.001830 0.001891 0.001955 0.002021 0.002089 0.002161 0.002236 0.002313 0.002395 0.002479 0.002568 0.002660 0.002756 0.002857 0.002962 0.003071 0.003186 0.003306 0.003432 0.003563 0.003701 0.003845 0.003995 0.004153 0.004319

0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001512 0.001766 0.002032 0.002301 0.002567 0.002820 0.003054 0.003266 0.003452 0.003613 0.003749 0.003862 0.003954 0.004030 0.004091 0.004139 0.004178 0.004209 0.004233 0.004252 0.004267 0.004278 0.004287 0.004295 0.004300 0.004305 0.004308 0.004311 0.004313 0.004314 0.004316

186

Table 5. Projected total and net deforestation within the study area for the five Scenarios between 2000 and 2035.
Net change (ha) 2035 -630006 -735203 -780888 -1056521 -479468 Net change (%) 2035 6.8 7.9 8.4 11.4 5.2

Study area Scenario

Land cover (ha) 2000 Forest Deforested Forest Deforested Forest Deforested Forest Deforested Forest Deforested 9295926 246834 9295926 246834 9295926 246834 9295926 246834 9295926 246834 2035 8665920 876840 8560723 982037 8515038 1027722 8239405 1303355 8816458 726302

ScenarioLow,No2ndaryRoads ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads ScenarioHigh,No2ndaryRoads ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads ScenarioCtrl

187

Table 6. Projected and net deforestation inside Tambopata National Reserve for the five scenarios.
Tambopata National Reserve (277727 ha) Scenario Land cover (ha) 2000 Forest Deforested Deforested 266728 950 266728 950 266728 950 266728 950 266728 950 2035 261803 5875 256826 10852 259941 7737 252722 14956 263072 4606 Net change (ha) 2035 -4925 -9902 -6787 -14006 -3656 Net change (%) 2035 1.8 3.7 2.5 5.3 1.4

ScenarioLow,No2ndaryRoads

ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads Forest ScenarioHigh,No2ndaryRoads

Forest Deforested Deforested

ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads Forest ScenarioCtrl

Forest Deforested

188

Table 7. Projected and net deforestation inside Bahuaja Sonene National Park for the five scenarios.
Bahuaja Sonene National Park (817824 ha) Scenario Land cover (ha) 2000 Forest Deforested Deforested 786202 3 786202 3 786202 3 786202 3 786202 3 2035 786181 24 785974 231 786166 39 785988 217 786190 15 Net change (ha) 2035 -21 -228 -36 -214 -12 Net change (%) 2035 0.003 0.029 0.005 0.027 0.002

ScenarioLow,No2ndaryRoads

ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads Forest ScenarioHigh,No2ndaryRoads

Forest Deforested Deforested

ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads Forest ScenarioCtrl

Forest Deforested

189

Table 8. Projected and net deforestation inside Amarakaeri Communal Reserve for the five scenarios.
Amarakaeri Communal Reserve (402486 ha) Scenario Land cover (ha) 2000 Forest Deforested Deforested 391385 76 391385 76 391385 76 391385 76 391385 76 2035 391300 161 391139 322 391156 305 388618 2843 391367 94 Net change (ha) 2035 -85 -246 -229 -2767 -18 Net change (%) 2035 0.022 0.063 0.059 0.707 0.005

ScenarioLow,No2ndaryRoads

ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads Forest ScenarioHigh,No2ndaryRoads

Forest Deforested Deforested

ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads Forest ScenarioCtrl

Forest Deforested

190

Table 9. Projected and net deforestation inside Manu National Park for the five scenarios.
Manu National Park (1696435 ha) Scenario Land cover (ha) 2000 Forest Deforested Deforested 1632318 3228 1632318 3228 1632318 3228 1632318 3228 1632318 3228 2035 1629242 6304 1628645 6901 1628505 7041 1625732 9814 1629830 5716 Net change (ha) 2035 -3076 -3673 -3813 -6586 -2488 Net change (%) 2035 0.19 0.23 0.23 0.40 0.15

ScenarioLow,No2ndaryRoads

ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads Forest ScenarioHigh,No2ndaryRoads

Forest Deforested Deforested

ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads Forest ScenarioCtrl

Forest Deforested

191

Table 10. Projected and net deforestation inside Forestry Concessions for the five scenarios.
Forestry concessions (1374552 ha) Scenario Land cover (ha) 2000 Forest Deforested Deforested 1352896 2912 1352896 2912 1352896 2912 1352896 2912 1352896 2912 2035 1310687 45121 1273896 81912 1295290 60518 1218055 137753 1331715 24093 Net change (ha) 2035 -42209 -79000 -57606 -134841 -21181 Net change (%) 2035 3.12 5.84 4.26 9.97 1.57

ScenarioLow,No2ndaryRoads

ScenarioLow,Yes2ndaryRoads Forest ScenarioHigh,No2ndaryRoads

Forest Deforested Deforested

ScenarioHigh,Yes2ndaryRoads Forest ScenarioCtrl

Forest Deforested

192

APPENDIX 1 Population Population 2000 2005 39 37 123 102 44 58 84 3 95 31 16 872 292 45 174 159 48 61 113 3 84 33 8 883 320 74

Code 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

Easting Northing Department 346254 8506363 Puno 358549 354796 349309 353666 350961 352898 358297 346165 346580 347203 358230 355948 8530321 Puno 8522944 Puno 8515558 Puno 8537868 Puno 8540824 Puno 8515262 Puno 8527601 Puno 8508024 Puno 8510279 Puno 8510308 Puno 8532076 Puno 8533991 Puno

Province Carabaya Carabaya Carabaya Carabaya Carabaya Carabaya Carabaya Carabaya Carabaya Carabaya Carabaya Carabaya Carabaya

District San Gaban San Gaban San Gaban San Gaban San Gaban San Gaban San Gaban San Gaban San Gaban San Gaban San Gaban San Gaban San Gaban

Population centre Arica Carmen Challhuamayo Chaquimayo Chaspa Alto Chaspa Bajo Cuchillune Cuesta Blanca Esperanza Lanlacuni Lanlacuni Bajo Lechemayo Chico Lechemayo Grande

193

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

350515 365208 344029 346046 352071 359097 359603 349546 350406 360907 344682 356665 360136 343466 167445 163574

8542541 Puno 8514105 Puno 8502596 Puno 8505711 Puno 8540118 Puno 8518050 Puno 8532076 Puno 8514550 Puno 8515470 Puno 8511880 Puno 8503872 Puno 8525851 Puno 8529322 Puno 8500935 Puno 8592776 Cusco 8600518 Cusco

Carabaya Carabaya Carabaya Carabaya Carabaya Carabaya Carabaya Carabaya Carabaya Carabaya Carabaya Carabaya Carabaya Carabaya Calca Calca

San Gaban San Gaban San Gaban San Gaban San Gaban San Gaban San Gaban San Gaban San Gaban San Gaban San Gaban San Gaban San Gaban Ayapata Yanatile Yanatile

Loromayo Mancayoc Mayhuanto Paqui Llusi Puerto Leguia Puerto Manoa Salimayo San Gaban San Juan Bajo San Trifon Sangari Tantamayo Yahuarmayo Quilla Bamba Aguaypille Ccochachayoc

46 5 39 8 24 393 88 136 58 7 14 78 72 41 17 15

163 4 42 8 15 549 114 140 44 7 8 155 106 48 18 16

194

30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

172496 179674 173540 164727 171618 164699 185501 163601 191129 173732 179758 178026 162723 167445 173814 172661

8594023 Cusco 8579621 Cusco 8593162 Cusco 8596123 Cusco 8590389 Cusco 8594698 Cusco 8568713 Cusco 8598778 Cusco 8568770 Cusco 8584059 Cusco 8576733 Cusco 8578265 Cusco 8596348 Cusco 8593967 Cusco 8583183 Cusco 8592581 Cusco

Calca Calca Calca Calca Calca Calca Calca Calca Calca Calca Calca Calca Calca Calca Calca Calca

Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile

Ccorihuairachina Ccorimayo Cedropata Chaquimayoc Chaupiurca Chintapata Chullo Chunchusmayo Churuyoc Estrella Floridayoc Hualla Huaynapata Inca Andenniyoc Killapata La Merced

3 115 4 18 14 17 60 8 12 6 48 390 90 18 8 39

3 66 5 20 11 18 64 3 10 10 34 416 68 19 8 31

195

46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61

175317 155941 166209 162228 179720 181204 185291 180872 170520 161844 161213 175473 170986 181997 176230 163519

8585424 Cusco 8601589 Cusco 8593613 Cusco 8607359 Cusco 8572659 Cusco 8584213 Cusco 8573154 Cusco 8579256 Cusco 8606403 Cusco 8601861 Cusco 8597166 Cusco 8582549 Cusco 8592363 Cusco 8576819 Cusco 8575905 Cusco 8597803 Cusco

Calca Calca Calca Calca Calca Calca Calca Calca Calca Calca Calca Calca Calca Calca Calca Calca

Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile

Lacco Lechemayo Llactapata Llactapata Baja Matipata Mendosayoc Mesapata Mesapata 3 Miraflores Naranjayoc Pacchac 1 Pacchac 2 Pallar Pucara Quellomayo Rataratayoc

2 2 18 10 17 130 26 44 116 18 21 50 20 37 63 9

2 2 15 5 12 139 14 47 125 14 22 53 21 68 54 13

196

62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75

166676 182508 170437 164370 169394 179285 181165 164288 180447 129366 149105 132770 150451 158714

8594179 Cusco 8575547 Cusco 8595336 Cusco 8597186 Cusco 8593755 Cusco 8578555 Cusco 8572063 Cusco 8594206 Cusco 8576115 Cusco 8624755 Cusco 8613599 Cusco 8623612 Cusco 8608266 Cusco 8604389 Cusco

Calca Calca Calca Calca Calca Calca Calca Calca Calca La Convencin La Convencin La Convencin La Convencin La

Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Yanatile Quellouno Quellouno Quellouno Quellouno Quellouno

Retiro del Carmen 2 San Antonio San Jose San Miguel Sarahuasi Suyo Torocmayo Villoc Pampa Vista Florida Amancaes Bellavista Calangato Chaupichullo Chunchusmayo

44 80 26 3 14 254 24 51 53 131 247 97 9 14

47 58 28 3 12 271 23 54 42 128 327 113 10 17 197

Convencin 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 139249 152592 155447 153663 149188 149901 129915 154773 142928 145838 8618325 Cusco 8606530 Cusco 8604242 Cusco 8608288 Cusco 8612041 Cusco 8611552 Cusco 8624200 Cusco 8608329 Cusco 8614965 Cusco 8614086 Cusco La Convencin La Convencin La Convencin La Convencin La Convencin La Convencin La Convencin La Convencin La Convencin La Quellouno Quellouno Quellouno Quellouno Quellouno Quellouno Quellouno Quellouno Quellouno Quellouno Esmeralda Huaynapata Kcarun Lacco 1 Mesapata 1 Monte Cirialo Pampa Blanca Quellomayo Quellouno Rosario 75 85 14 10 103 30 137 36 64 36 82 94 16 12 121 35 125 49 56 41

198

Convencin 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 146003 134335 191422 194507 192773 193448 197501 193937 185383 193940 196204 193642 195919 195851 8619047 Cusco 8619687 Cusco 8562917 Cusco 8565079 Cusco 8562784 Cusco 8566142 Cusco 8559099 Cusco 8563386 Cusco 8558613 Cusco 8561509 Cusco 8566136 Cusco 8560511 Cusco 8564736 Cusco 8564261 Cusco La Convencin La Convencin Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Quellouno Quellouno Challabamba Challabamba Challabamba Challabamba Challabamba Challabamba Challabamba Challabamba Challabamba Challabamba Challabamba Challabamba Sacramento Victoria Bombon Chilcayoc Chimor Churuyoc Jesus Maria Lali Pachamachay Pipobamba Pucara Solan Televan Utucany 85 50 267 55 331 44 39 120 214 31 33 189 155 243 100 85 258 57 321 61 14 126 123 37 23 200 148 254 199

100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115

194507 190905 215407 235279 235930 244088 244866 233640 219456 195208 233919 232156 246316 230837 217718 232590

8565079 Cusco 8557525 Cusco 8539068 Cusco 8560290 Cusco 8560691 Cusco 8573663 Cusco 8555821 Cusco 8570440 Cusco 8544436 Cusco 8579119 Cusco 8567897 Cusco 8558906 Cusco 8572365 Cusco 8558608 Cusco 8541654 Cusco 8559169 Cusco

Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo

Challabamba Challabamba Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata

Yuracmayoc Yuractoruyoc Acjanaco Agua Santa Asuncion Atalaya Bajo Quero Bienvenida Buenos Aires Callanga Castilla (Tono Bajo) Chontachaca Coloradito Consuelo Esperanza Fortaleza

8 112 9 97 93 103 26 11 3 186 89 99 40 6 0 43

8 77 10 104 86 180 28 10 4 200 77 85 31 5 0 49

200

116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131

238692 239787 248570 239378 236120 237177 244854 217841 239145 235210 239429 245547 246803 249057 246530 225662

8562571 Cusco 8570901 Cusco 8569921 Cusco 8561261 Cusco 8561763 Cusco 8564898 Cusco 8573229 Cusco 8543503 Cusco 8571781 Cusco 8566749 Cusco 8552926 Cusco 8565176 Cusco 8563462 Cusco 8568524 Cusco 8567035 Cusco 8565609 Cusco

Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo

Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata

Lastenia Maria Mirador Mistiana Montanesa Patria Pelayo Pillahuata Pillcopata Primavera Progreso Queros (Huachipaire) Rio Blanco Rio Carbon Sabaluyoc San Miguel

18 3 6 30 19 1019 52 2 1361 15 7 34 22 56 94 28

19 4 6 41 57 1240 49 1 1463 14 7 32 22 64 76 38

201

132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147

221555 238027 222598 237659 234456 233930 221098 226755 241125 242129 239027 239120 233457 218988 340349 325303

8550269 Cusco 8567812 Cusco 8553891 Cusco 8561722 Cusco 8574242 Cusco 8560015 Cusco 8550186 Cusco 8565782 Cusco 8554616 Cusco 8567185 Cusco 8564745 Cusco 8573336 Cusco 8561727 Cusco 8526209 Cusco 8541985 Cusco 8540844 Cusco

Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo Paucartambo

Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Kosipata Paucartambo

San Pedro Santa Alicia Santa Isabel Santa Rosa Santa Rosa de Huacaria Sector Eva Suiza Tono Alto Trabajo Tupac Amaru (Ubaldina) Ubaldina Villa Carmen Yupurqui Paucartambo Asnamayo Chico Balceadero

2 37 6 5 117 44 4 67 17 298 15 13 35 3282 10 10

2 44 6 7 113 43 5 72 18 277 17 10 29 4234 9 0

Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti

202

148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163

345371 298195 317406 300743 300798 300012 328956 323614 329842 305025 307444 331649 329950 345052 348220 322875

8548570 Cusco 8524628 Cusco 8538022 Cusco 8527358 Cusco 8526418 Cusco 8524637 Cusco 8537155 Cusco 8542003 Cusco 8538413 Cusco 8528454 Cusco 8532654 Cusco 8540451 Cusco 8541419 Cusco 8542268 Cusco 8541364 Cusco 8541830 Cusco

Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti

Boca de Kitari Cadena Ccapacmayo Ccollamayo Chonta Puncu Choque Llusca Chunchusmayo Collpamayo Comandante Coperma Cruz Pata Esperanza Fortaleza Garrafon Chico Garrafon Grande Huacyumbre

6 8 10 4 2 12 15 3 2 24 6 16 10 5 20 79

5 12 9 4 1 13 10 2 3 20 5 14 5 4 21 68

203

164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179

304541 295493 305381 349415 342546 307493 324445 294242 305901 325778 296534 319464 344138 344174 307006 348558

8527157 Cusco 8522382 Cusco 8537524 Cusco 8541257 Cusco 8538171 Cusco 8543587 Cusco 8541245 Cusco 8520638 Cusco 8530015 Cusco 8541994 Cusco 8523031 Cusco 8543939 Cusco 8531488 Cusco 8543756 Cusco 8534032 Cusco 8541309 Cusco

Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti

Huaropascay Huaynapata Huinchomayo Inambari Jujununta Choquetamura Kitare Limonchayoc Mandor Maniri Media Luna Moroto Munaypampa Nujununta Oro Mayo Oroya Otorongo Chico

3 10 10 33 1 10 82 17 2 5 3 3 1 3 9 5

3 8 9 30 1 7 129 26 1 4 1 2 1 3 11 4

204

180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195

348521 318300 343581 310567 348932 311224 306085 295380 346978 318407 325346 309773 308321 348750 347764 297611

8541556 Cusco 8540077 Cusco 8534284 Cusco 8535229 Cusco 8541574 Cusco 8539444 Cusco 8547382 Cusco 8514748 Cusco 8541227 Cusco 8544330 Cusco 8539681 Cusco 8536735 Cusco 8535795 Cusco 8541464 Cusco 8541264 Cusco 8523441 Cusco

Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti

Otorongo Grande Palcamayo Palmira Pan de Azucar Pinhalchayoc Pipitayoc Pobre Mayo Poyonco Puente Golondrina Puerta Falsa Quebrada Seca Quincemil Sacracumbre San Agustin San Jose San Jose

7 12 1 5 31 10 5 1 7 19 5 949 9 7 6 10

5 15 1 5 28 9 4 1 5 30 4 920 8 5 3 12

205

196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211

333566 294810 294251 293619 302596 332078 308627 318848 299757 324408 311279 309097 345400 328124 303975 307189

8539839 Cusco 8514486 Cusco 8516968 Cusco 8514989 Cusco 8527331 Cusco 8539702 Cusco 8547655 Cusco 8539237 Cusco 8524628 Cusco 8541948 Cusco 8537356 Cusco 8545973 Cusco 8551718 Cusco 8541830 Cusco 8527751 Cusco 8531887 Cusco

Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti

San Lorenzo San Melchor San Miguel San Pedro Saniaca Santa Elena Santa Isidora Santa Marta Sausipata Tigrimayo Tocoro Cumbre Tunquimayo Villa Alegra Villanubia Vitobamba Yanamayo Chico (Caserio)

141 5 75 31 4 18 13 10 5 6 5 15 3 9 12 9

150 5 99 28 3 14 10 9 3 5 6 17 3 6 15 4

206

212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227

305071 309087 306280 293926 294423 292987 295239 294057 294102 294258 293904 295261 294526 294971 177515 309191

8530846 Cusco 8540348 Cusco 8544252 Cusco 8513558 Cusco 8510176 Cusco 8500420 Cusco 8501156 Cusco 8507174 Cusco 8506572 Cusco 8500754 Cusco 8512046 Cusco 8506572 Cusco 8500130 Cusco 8503964 Cusco 8503803 Cusco

Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Camanti Quispicanchis Marcapata Quispicanchis Marcapata Quispicanchis Marcapata Quispicanchis Marcapata Quispicanchis Marcapata Quispicanchis Marcapata Quispicanchis Marcapata Quispicanchis Marcapata Quispicanchis Marcapata Quispicanchis Marcapata Quispicanchis Marcapata Cusco Cusco Fitzcarrald

Yanamayo Grande (Casero) Yanamayo Grande (Minero) Yanaurco Capire Chaupichaca Chiari Chilechile Culebrayoc Iscaybamba Limac Punco Mamabamba Mancara Raqchipata Ttio Cusco Barraca (Puerto Azul)

4 42 4 61 36 7 45 23 14 101 59 18 65 70 289939 39

1 38 4 45 26 2 36 19 13 151 64 10 63 73 326405 75

8635956 Madre de Dios Manu

207

228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243

292155 287534 292166 231009 265039 211476 186761 332355 320134 349078 335982 347964 340734 323955 333611 346640

8643182 Madre de Dios Manu 8636045 Madre de Dios Manu 8643471 Madre de Dios Manu 8691514 Madre de Dios Manu 8614357 Madre de Dios Manu 8702071 Madre de Dios Manu 8698288 Madre de Dios Manu 8578806 Madre de Dios Manu 8561447 Madre de Dios Manu 8556608 Madre de Dios Manu 8582075 Madre de Dios Manu 8557883 Madre de Dios Manu 8559431 Madre de Dios Manu 8565463 Madre de Dios Manu 8562683 Madre de Dios Manu 8551462 Madre de Dios Manu

Fitzcarrald Fitzcarrald Fitzcarrald Fitzcarrald Fitzcarrald Fitzcarrald Fitzcarrald Huepetuhe Huepetuhe Huepetuhe Huepetuhe Huepetuhe Huepetuhe Huepetuhe Huepetuhe Huepetuhe

Boca Manu Diamante Isla de los Valles Maizal Nuevo Eden Tayacome Yomibato Alto Pukiri Bamberme Boca Punkiri Boca Toacabe Caychihue Barraca Caychiwe Choque Huaypetuhe Kimbiri

124 248 60 37 50 130 182 67 85 188 66 291 663 447 2777 49

201 232 62 52 67 142 231 105 132 178 103 619 901 530 3998 46

208

244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257

344583 345976 325748 349523 349750 355979 346999 335979 345723 347222 327815 340629 337886 314328

8552805 Madre de Dios Manu 8549290 Madre de Dios Manu 8565351 Madre de Dios Manu 8542919 Madre de Dios Manu 8541671 Madre de Dios Manu 8571715 Madre de Dios Manu 8550236 Madre de Dios Manu 8559697 Madre de Dios Manu 8547091 Madre de Dios Manu 8545349 Madre de Dios Manu 8571006 Madre de Dios Manu 8601698 Madre de Dios Manu 8596859 Madre de Dios Manu 8626104 Madre de Dios Manu

Huepetuhe Huepetuhe Huepetuhe Huepetuhe Huepetuhe Huepetuhe Huepetuhe Huepetuhe Huepetuhe Huepetuhe Huepetuhe Madre de Dios Madre de Dios Madre de Dios

Kimiri Israel Libertad Machiche Puente Inambari Puquiri Sachabacayoc Santa Ines Tazon Chico Tazon Grande Tranquera (Barranco Chico) Bajo Colorado (Playa oculta) Bajo Pukiri (Delta 3) Blanquillo

209 33 350 42 226 100 7 117 16 16 148 97 89 23

199 51 652 77 135 143 30 76 26 26 376 121 65 16

209

258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267

381863 349059 338997 335387 334825 334201 335531 361047 310985 294726

8606886 Madre de Dios Manu 8604910 Madre de Dios Manu 8598155 Madre de Dios Manu 8590793 Madre de Dios Manu 8587283 Madre de Dios Manu 8584614 Madre de Dios Manu 8591426 Madre de Dios Manu 8604926 Madre de Dios Manu 8570695 Madre de Dios Manu 8587686 Madre de Dios Manu

Madre de Dios Madre de Dios Madre de Dios Madre de Dios Madre de Dios Madre de Dios Madre de Dios Madre de Dios Madre de Dios Madre de Dios

Boca Amigo Boca Colorado Boca Pukiri Centro Pukiri (Comunidad Pukiri) Delta 1 Delta 2 Delta 4 Guacamayo Huasoroquito Ishiriwe

124 841 107 132 1484 112 123 118 110 58

96 1075 88 108 1218 92 101 54 69 80

210

268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277

378421 343022 343022 367104 359190 342989 326699 320970 351043 334859

8605056 Madre de Dios Manu 8608368 Madre de Dios Manu 8608368 Madre de Dios Manu 8603949 Madre de Dios Manu 8605687 Madre de Dios Manu 8611543 Madre de Dios Manu 8590373 Madre de Dios Manu 8560854 Madre de Dios Manu 8568417 Madre de Dios Manu 8596908 Madre de Dios Manu

Madre de Dios Madre de Dios Madre de Dios Madre de Dios Madre de Dios Madre de Dios Madre de Dios Madre de Dios Madre de Dios Madre de Dios

Malvinas Mirador Chico Mirador Grande Nuevo San Juan Pacal Guacamayo Palometayoc Puerto Luz Punkiri Chico Puquiri San Jose de Kerene

120 7 20 4 146 12 344 227 973 197

109 6 53 3 114 10 455 547 1492 238

211

278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291

374250 369161 320280 351521 242486 248053 240733 257314 242407 247437 240668 244945 257955 243299

8611355 Madre de Dios Manu 8608417 Madre de Dios Manu 8566436 Madre de Dios Manu 8604097 Madre de Dios Manu 8586280 Madre de Dios Manu 8572616 Madre de Dios Manu 8579566 Madre de Dios Manu 8607600 Madre de Dios Manu 8588760 Madre de Dios Manu 8588221 Madre de Dios Manu 8581884 Madre de Dios Manu 8576025 Madre de Dios Manu 8602766 Madre de Dios Manu 8594636 Madre de Dios Manu

Madre de Dios Madre de Dios Madre de Dios Madre de Dios Manu Manu Manu Manu Manu Manu Manu Manu Manu Manu

San Juan Chico San Juan Grande Setapo Viejo Aeropuerto Adan Rayo Alto Carbon Amazonia Bonanza Cabo de Hornos 1 Cabo de Hornos 2 Erika Gamitana Itahuania Jose Olaya

42 629 123 3 35 43 2 15 14 4 5 135 154 5

0 609 204 0 24 51 2 11 17 5 8 135 179 6 212

292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307

243136 242147 258831 193925 244682 243442 240633 249368 243586 243723 245500 241762 250485 269909 243553 241843

8597172 Madre de Dios Manu 8584348 Madre de Dios Manu 8609094 Madre de Dios Manu 8608117 Madre de Dios Manu 8589387 Madre de Dios Manu 8589367 Madre de Dios Manu 8586588 Madre de Dios Manu 8578922 Madre de Dios Manu 8578056 Madre de Dios Manu 8579972 Madre de Dios Manu 8598345 Madre de Dios Manu 8590522 Madre de Dios Manu 8598346 Madre de Dios Manu 8626602 Madre de Dios Manu 8597246 Madre de Dios Manu 8577572 Madre de Dios Manu

Manu Manu Manu Manu Manu Manu Manu Manu Manu Manu Manu Manu Manu Manu Manu Manu

Llactapampa (Palotoa) Los Aguanos Mamajapac Mameria Mansilla I (M.) Mansilla II (Nueva M.) Mascoitania Pacasmayo Pampa Arizona Salvacion Santa Cruz Santa Elena Shintuya Shipetiari Teparo Grande (CCNN) Tropical I

156 78 34 90 132 76 1 20 11 547 112 7 228 86 87 21

230 78 42 110 145 93 1 24 13 786 129 6 245 120 101 11

213

308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323

236697 243916 440571 423438 445803 446950 442688 430771 421429 449596 442363 453189 425475 441102 423438 445883

8576858 Madre de Dios Manu 8582418 Madre de Dios Manu 8740491 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8752015 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8740004 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8750183 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8750948 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8755890 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8739555 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8748774 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8740709 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8736107 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8745227 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8739372 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8752014 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8747106 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu

Manu Manu Iberia Iberia Iberia Iberia Iberia Iberia Iberia Iberia Iberia Iberia Iberia Iberia Iberia Iberia

Tropical II Yunguyo Iberia Arrozal Bello Horizonte Carachamayo Chilina Vieja Flor de Acre Grupo ocho La Republica Maria Cristina Miraflores Nueva Alianza Oceania Pacahuara Ponalillo

7 43 3621 24 14 5 45 62 12 47 12 17 91 13 183 10

8 30 3915 12 7 5 34 72 13 52 6 15 100 15 496 0

214

324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339

422258 444421 438277 447690 418756 420732 436870 438404 434176 440898 437530 461473 474304 473886 471732 451662

8715770 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8746023 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8738254 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8745318 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8787598 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8787325 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8790126 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8770714 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8782227 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8759456 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8777514 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8738534 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8711799 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8711368 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8733423 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8743356 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu

Iberia Iberia Iberia Iberia Inhapari Inhapari Inhapari Inhapari Inhapari Inhapari Inhapari Tahuamanu Tahuamanu Tahuamanu Tahuamanu Tahuamanu

Portillo San Antonio Abad San Francisco de Asis Tropezon Alto Belgica Belgica Inhapari Noaya Nueva Esperanza San Isidro de Chilina Villa Primavera Abeja Alerta Alerta Alto Peru La Merced

75 23 55 20 17 64 444 24 66 78 74 43 598 2 5 23

52 16 14 28 17 61 533 24 55 50 44 45 611 2 0 14

215

340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355

466770 468787 478564 464920 464916 477397 424199 490866 472231 351584 355661 396686 401135 364600 352396 408156

8698192 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8722502 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8696221 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8733683 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8733997 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8708360 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8727351 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8684265 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8705712 Madre de Dios Tahuamanu 8551691 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8554053 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8574078 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8560263 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8576270 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8554053 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8577137 Madre de Dios Tambopata

Tahuamanu Tahuamanu Tahuamanu Tahuamanu Tahuamanu Tahuamanu Tahuamanu Tahuamanu Tahuamanu Inambari Inambari Inambari Inambari Inambari Inambari Inambari

La Novia Maranguape Nuevo Pacaran San Lorenzo San Lorenzo San Pedro Santa Maria Shiringayoc Villa Rocio Mazuko Alto Dos de Mayo Alto Libertad Azul Bello Porvenir Dos de Mayo El Progreso

207 7 86 179 17 81 76 257 83 1712 77 125 66 45 120 31

233 12 101 158 17 122 85 263 107 1920 59 110 72 32 124 34

216

356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371

394441 384065 387053 392229 387582 357727 370408 391448 422156 350109 368716 375752 379519 352405 349487 354191

8585598 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8561093 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8576153 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8561110 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8561091 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8572698 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8576433 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8574521 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8576322 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8549674 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8585188 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8572009 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8572511 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8572712 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8552687 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8551560 Madre de Dios Tambopata

Inambari Inambari Inambari Inambari Inambari Inambari Inambari Inambari Inambari Inambari Inambari Inambari Inambari Inambari Inambari Inambari

Jayave Kotsimba La Distancia Malinosqui Manuani Malinosqui Nueva Esperanza Nueva Generacion Nueva Arequipa Padre Hermogenes Palmera Ponal Primavera Alta Primavera Baja Puerto Carlos Puerto Mazuko Quebrada Seca

163 84 22 254 45 25 22 77 11 76 124 101 84 17 185 7

177 111 24 176 66 27 24 60 12 60 136 96 80 12 206 8

217

372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387

364325 370227 358448 385258 402498 349965 410158 353727 387053 442294 419100 426297 432516 419553 395325 441535

8571381 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8572009 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8570970 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8584323 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8573893 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8549237 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8575776 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8560949 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8576153 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8587873 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8593178 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8595137 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8593506 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8593399 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8601127 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8602415 Madre de Dios Tambopata

Inambari Inambari Inambari Inambari Inambari Inambari Inambari Inambari Inambari Laberinto Laberinto Laberinto Laberinto Laberinto Laberinto Laberinto

Santa Rita Alta Santa Rita Baja Santa Rosa Sarayacu Sol Naciente Tazon Union Progreso Villa Santiago (Arazaire) Virgen de la Candelaria Aguas Blancas Amaracaire Boca Union Catarata CCNN Boca Inambari Cinco Islas Copamanu

98 129 309 207 26 15 129 119 117 2 51 187 5 150 40 33

82 107 411 248 29 16 166 117 86 2 77 225 6 165 60 54

218

388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403

433585 439993 430943 413461 413005 435550 390113 409784 413745 451330 449457 441449 413495 441023 445449 428415

8586516 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8590263 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8595853 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8598277 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8588772 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8586534 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8604868 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8601177 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8593334 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8595783 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8590755 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8588177 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8600592 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8606635 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8590339 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8593319 Madre de Dios Tambopata

Laberinto Laberinto Laberinto Laberinto Laberinto Laberinto Laberinto Laberinto Laberinto Laberinto Laberinto Laberinto Laberinto Laberinto Laberinto Laberinto

Florida Alta Florida Baja Fortuna Alto Laberinto Horacio Cevallos Huacamayo Chico Huantupa Huitoto Lagarto (Base Naval) Lago Inambarillo Las Mercedes Los Cedros Manantiales Nueva Alianza Pastora Grande Progreso Verde Puerto Aguila

201 86 151 50 38 14 33 93 259 157 20 21 104 183 25 26

177 75 178 149 117 15 30 115 154 139 16 12 114 233 27 30

219

404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418

435937 436749 427978 441763 438317 402384 443542 411072 410158 427966 446992 483907 471248 491107 452148

8594034 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8585932 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8581617 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8599703 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8589080 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8602873 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8592431 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8599481 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8575776 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8582278 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8593910 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8646304 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8642525 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8614664 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8601105 Madre de Dios Tambopata

Laberinto Laberinto Laberinto Laberinto Laberinto Laberinto Laberinto Laberinto Laberinto Laberinto Laberinto Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras

Puerto Rosario de Laberinto Residentes Cusqueos San Juan Santa Rosa Santo Domingo Shiringayoc Vuelta Grande Tahuantinsuyo Tumi Union Progreso Virgenes del Sol VRH de la Torre 1 de Mayo Aguajal Aguajalito Aguas Negras

1805 25 147 75 152 70 112 137 130 132 95 50 2 15 11

2069 27 169 63 166 67 84 149 170 128 92 50 1 17 11

220

419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434

486887 481387 476609 494692 485300 475940 484941 501901 489768 481171 481907 483179 479006 472487 473126 463995

8660084 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8622839 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8608761 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8669857 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8607277 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8618019 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8616631 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8617471 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8643143 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8616608 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8616521 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8677846 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8660362 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8683803 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8638202 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8662625 Madre de Dios Tambopata

Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras

Alegria Alto Loboyoc Andres A Caceres Bajo Alegria Bajo Madre de Dios Bajo Piedras Bello Horizonte Boca Gamitana Botijon Cachuela Margen Izquierda Cachuela Oviedo Cafetal Carmen Rosa Colpac Colpayoc Filadelfia

649 105 150 118 100 86 207 75 22 67 72 75 13 43 93 22

732 76 174 53 93 120 80 87 25 74 64 59 15 49 98 25

221

435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450

485568 489673 469894 521420 485712 446862 487252 451472 488335 486643 492536 490187 463436 486009 486638 477399

8670855 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8626197 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8647496 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8628610 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8623265 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8666135 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8632106 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8661384 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8614265 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8680977 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8610077 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8614625 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8683402 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8651053 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8627277 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8681265 Madre de Dios Tambopata

Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras

Fray Martin de Porras Gamitana La Florida Lago Valencia Loboyoc Loreto Los Angeles Lucerna Madama Mavila Micaela Bastidas I Micaela Bastidas II Miraflores Monterrey Nueva Alianza Nueva Esperanza

143 13 13 152 35 32 34 48 30 205 9 143 63 108 40 26

141 13 22 178 76 67 18 43 66 920 13 162 71 154 33 22

222

451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466

473358 498678 484231 491979 483291 478731 481906 458268 466593 482531 485758 473060 502530 500856 492536 484530

8678132 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8673451 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8646354 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8668854 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8642673 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8619644 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8608453 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8685840 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8660403 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8635401 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8615202 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8622340 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8682545 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8671360 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8610077 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8614162 Madre de Dios Tambopata

Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras

Nueva Visita Nuevo San Juan Pampa Hermosa Pinhal Planchon Puerto Arturo Rimac o Parque del Triunfo San Antonio San Carlos San Francisco de Asis San Isidro San Jose de Centro Piedras San Juan de Aposento Santa Julia Santa Rosa Santa Teresa

60 76 7 47 556 148 625 9 31 108 17 11 43 13 43 79

74 67 8 36 638 101 821 5 35 103 30 58 40 12 28 73

223

467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481

484226 470620 508708 469718 456530 484324 501272 479918 472586 453427 480518 473463 456869 482579 485694

8631446 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8646160 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8660752 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8656398 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8686462 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8619459 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8660084 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8607218 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8603907 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8600172 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8619254 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8610254 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8611722 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8602486 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8606646 Madre de Dios Tambopata

Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Las Piedras Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata

Sudadero Tipishca Triunfo Varsovia Venecia Victoria Virgen del Carmen Puerto Maldonado Aguajal Aguas Negras Alta Cachuela Alta Pastora Alto Chorrillos Alto Loero Bajo Madre de Dios Izquierda

239 7 46 59 2 72 45 39820 285 32 78 55 59 105 107

290 16 33 80 1 81 24 56026 349 18 74 69 52 18 77

224

482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497

476073 451546 469871 472489 419107 479232 475683 475284 462469 454717 471538 473163 479078 462173 489414 441241

8601501 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8581489 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8626814 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8617924 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8655527 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8614316 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8608144 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8599470 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8609123 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8577373 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8603176 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8610407 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8613545 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8599332 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8606087 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8649015 Madre de Dios Tambopata

Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata

Bajo Tambopata Baltimori Boca Pariamanu Boca Piedras Cachuela Trigoso Centro Cachuela Centro Pastora Chonta Chorrillos Condenado El Castanhal El Pilar El Prado Fitzcarrald Fundo Concepcion Huascar

68 52 51 25 5 151 57 62 47 14 63 88 141 93 20 7

64 33 79 21 6 143 53 48 20 9 40 66 165 52 12 9

225

498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513

475186 495198 479780 487607 496381 477355 478460 466925 494994 482817 471992 379042 464046 480000 476917 524180

8592530 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8612344 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8603571 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8600515 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8615105 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8606824 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8609276 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8582356 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8605775 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8600030 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8602747 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8679698 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8594009 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8605884 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8614522 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8616485 Madre de Dios Tambopata

Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata

Infierno Isla Rolin Izuyama Jorge Chavez Juan Velasco La Joya La Pastora La Torre Lago Sandoval Loero Lomas Monte Salvado Monte Sinai Nuevo Sol Naciente Otilia Palma Real

321 65 104 104 2 872 436 52 16 184 431 78 40 37 162 221

319 53 124 88 3 1221 473 32 9 170 529 138 28 45 149 260

226

514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529

458892 459838 392447 536858 462523 471946 477877 460258 460850 456554 445554 534827 460990 466291 456450 461595

8617597 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8618634 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8668230 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8617455 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8613809 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8603458 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8609930 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8648586 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8579628 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8597459 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8602678 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8615696 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8602585 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8597166 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8615275 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8611649 Madre de Dios Tambopata

Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata

Palmichal Playa Alta Puerto Nuevo Puerto Pardo Puerto Union Quinhones Rompeolas Sabaluyoc Sachavacayoc San Bernardo San Jacinto Sonene Tnte. Alejandro Acevedo Tres Estrellas Tres Islas Tupac Amaru

107 9 29 44 53 122 114 104 57 223 366 87 105 24 220 84

131 47 35 48 40 150 112 125 36 230 476 93 136 14 218 64

227

530 531 532 533 534 535 536

411062 482164 481752 477019 485301 475580 481751

8668650 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8614625 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8612002 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8595842 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8616168 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8609636 Madre de Dios Tambopata 8601284 Madre de Dios Tambopata

Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata Tambopata

Zapayal Cachuela Cachuela Baja Cascajal Km 11 Pastora Baja Tambopata

2 75 100 200 45 150 100

2 72 96 192 43 144 96

228