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The End of Modern History in the Middle East
The End of Modern History in the Middle East
The End of Modern History in the Middle East
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The End of Modern History in the Middle East

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Bernard Lewis looks at the new era in the Middle East. With the departure of imperial powers, the region must now, on its own, resolve the political, economic, cultural, and societal problems that prevent it from accomplishing the next stage in the advance of civilization. There is enough in the traditional culture of Islam on the one hand and the modern experience of the Muslim peoples on the other, he explains, to provide the basis for an advance toward freedom in the true sense of that word.
LanguageEnglish
Release dateSep 1, 2013
ISBN9780817912963
The End of Modern History in the Middle East
Author

Bernard Lewis

Bernard Lewis (born May 31, 1916) was born in London. He is the author of forty-six books on Islam and the Middle East, including Notes on a Century: Reflections of a Middle East Historian; The End of Modern History in the Middle East; and The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror. He also wrote three major syntheses for general audiences: The Arabs in History; The Middle East and the West; and The Middle East. Lewis is the Cleveland E. Dodge Professor Emeritus at Princeton University.

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    The End of Modern History in the Middle East - Bernard Lewis

    EAST

    CHAPTER ONE: The End of Modern History in the Middle East

    ACCORDING TO A CONVENTION commonly agreed upon among historians, the modern history of the Middle East begins at the turn of the nineteenth century, when a French expeditionary force commanded by General Napoleon Bonaparte invaded and conquered Egypt and stayed there until it was forced to leave by a squadron of the Royal Navy commanded by Admiral Horatio Nelson. This was not the first Western advance against the previously dominant power of Islam. But it was the first incursion from the West into the heartlands of the Islamic world.

    Bonaparte's arrival and still more his departure demonstrated two important facts: that even a small Western force could conquer, occupy and rule one of these heartlands without serious difficulty and that only another Western force could get them out.

    This began a period during which ultimate power over, and with it responsibility for, what happened in this region resided elsewhere; when the basic theme of international relations and of much else in the Middle East was shaped by the rivalries of non–Middle Eastern states. These rivalries went through several successive phases—interference, intervention, penetration, domination and, in the final phase, sometimes reluctant, sometimes relieved departure. From time to time the actors in the drama changed and the script was modified, but until the final phase the basic pattern remained the same. In that final act of this drama, the two external superpowers whose rivalry dominated the Middle East were the Soviet Union and the United States. In their purposes and their methods, they were very different, both from their predecessors and from each other.

    Future historians of the region may well agree on a new convention of periodization—that the era in Middle Eastern history that was opened by Napoleon and Nelson was closed by George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev. In the crisis of 1990–91 precipitated by Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, neither of the two superpowers played the imperial role which tradition and popular expectation assigned to it; the one because it could not, the other because it would not.

    Moscow, once so great a force in Middle Eastern affairs, could neither restrain nor rescue Saddam Hussein. Washington, having freed Kuwait from occupation and Saudi Arabia from the threat of invasion, had accomplished its war aims and unilaterally declared a cease-fire, leaving Saddam's regime intact and permitting him, with only minor impediments, to crush his domestic opponents and in due course resume his policies.

    As long as the Soviet Union existed, and as long as the Cold War was the main theme of foreign policy, American presence in the Middle East was part of a global strategy designed to cope with a global confrontation. With the ending of that confrontation, such a strategy became unnecessary. No discernible strategy has yet emerged to replace it.

    The breakup of the Soviet Union brought another important consequence—the emergence of eight new sovereign independent states in Transcaucasia and Central Asia. Two of these, Georgia and Armenia, are Christian; the rest, Azerbaijan, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are predominantly Muslim. All these countries are part of the historic Middle East, linked to it by a thousand ties of culture, language and history. The Tajik language is a form of Persian; the other five Muslim states use languages related to Turkish. The Turks, Persians and Afghans show increasing interest in their newly liberated kinsfolk across the former Soviet frontier. They are also interested in those other Muslim peoples—Tatars, Bashkirs, Chechens, Circassians and others, who remain within the Russian federation. The same interest is beginning to extend to the Muslims of Chinese Central Asia, notably the Uyghurs, a Muslim people speaking a Turkic language.

    The emergence of a world of Turkic states, like the Arab world that emerged from the breakup of the British and French empires, will be increasingly important in the decades to come and will have a significant effect on the Middle East to which they are now returning. But there are differences between the two cases. With a few exceptions, notably, Algeria and Aden, British and French rule in the Arab world was indirect and of brief duration. The Transcaucasian and Central Asian territories were annexed by the czars and retained by the Soviets under a thin veneer of federalism. Their experience of imperial rule was in many ways profoundly different from that of the Arabs. Their efforts to disentangle themselves from the embrace of their former masters offer some similarities to the early stages of Arab independence. But they are dealing with Moscow, not with London or Paris; with a land-based power, not a maritime and commercial ascendancy. The course and perhaps the outcome of their struggle for true independence will surely reflect these differences.

    In that historical interlude between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the terror attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, Russia was out of the game and likely to remain so for some years to come; America was reluctant to return. This meant that in many significant respects the situation reverted to what it was before. Outside powers had interests in the region, both strategic and economic; they could from time to time interfere in Middle Eastern affairs or even influence their course. But their role was no longer to be one of domination or decision.

    Many in the Middle East had difficulty in adjusting themselves to the new situation created by the departure of the imperial powers. For the first time in almost 200 years, the rulers and to some extent the peoples of the Middle East are having to accept final responsibility for their own affairs; to recognize their own mistakes and to accept the consequences. This was difficult to internalize, even to perceive, after so long a period. For the entire lifetimes of those who formulate and conduct policy at the present time and of their predecessors for many generations, the vital decisions were made elsewhere, ultimate control lay elsewhere, and the principal task of statesmanship and diplomacy was as far as possible to avoid or reduce the dangers of this situation and to exploit such opportunities as it might from time to time offer. It is very difficult to forsake the habits not just of a lifetime but of a whole era of history. The difficulty is much greater when alien cultural, social and economic preeminence continues and even increases, despite the ending of alien political and military

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