Iraq Cradle of Errors

IRAQ

CRADLE OF ERRORS

C. Brandt Smith, Jr.

Smashwords Edition

Copyright 2011 by C. Brandt Smith, Jr.

http://www.brandtsmithconsulting.com

brandt@brandtsmithconsulting.com

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage system without expressed written permission in writing from the author.

Cover Design by TruthMediaDesign, S. Greg Smith and Jarred Butler

Photographs by C. Brandt Smith, Jr.

Figures and Tables by C. Brandt Smith, Jr.

Dedication

To the loves of my life -

Gailia and Amber who lived two years

In Iraq with me and gave me strength

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

CHAPTER 1. HOW DID I GET HERE?

History of Problems

The Leadership Dilemma

Purpose of the Study

Research Rationale

Definition of Terms

Assumptions and Limitations

Nature of the Study

Summary

CHAPTER 2. HISTORICAL CHANGES: AN EMIC AND ETIC VIEW

Background Information about Iraq

Iraq’s Recent History

The British Mandate

Background on Saddam Hussein’s Leadership

Iraqi Ethnicity, Religion, and Cultures

Overview of Authentic Leadership Theory

Overview of Transactional Leadership Theory

Overview of Transformational Leadership Theory

Overview of Servant Leadership Theory

Overview of Laissez-Faire Leadership Theory

Synthesizing the Key Principles

Maximizing Leadership Development through Synthesis

Understanding Social Psychological Processes

Analysis of the Relationship Between Visible Social Characteristics, National and Organizational Performance

The Efficacy of Cultural Diversity, Achieving a Competitive Advantage in an Emerging Democracy

Review of Research Methods Considered

Quantitative Framework

Qualitative Framework

Mixed Methods Approach

A Comparison of the Research Methods

Summary

CHAPTER 3. PATHWAY TO UNDERSTANDING

Exploratory Questions

Research Questions

Research Design

Sample

Setting

Instrumentation/Measures

Data Collection

Data Analysis

Validity and Reliability

Ethical Considerations

CHAPTER 4. PERCEPTIONS REVELED

Exploratory Questions Responses

Research Questions Responses

CHAPTER 5. IMPENDING VIOLENCE AND CHAOS: Drawing Conclusions and Implications From Local National Perceptions of Their Leadership

Assumptions and Limitations

Recommendations for Future Research

Summary and Conclusion

EPILOGUE

REFERENCES

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

PREFACE

As country leader for Millennium Relief and Development Services (MRDS), a non-government organization (NGO), in Baghdad from June 2006 until April 2008, I was an eyewitness to the effects of disparate leadership models in Iraq. Initially, the streets were piled with rubble and burning cars dotted the landscape. Checkpoints were set up at numerous intersections and an eerie nervousness permeated the entire area. I discovered Baghdad to be in a lawless state with little security for the residents. It seemed no one was secure or exempt from the chaos and instability of the sectarian rift. Throughout the initial two years I served as director of MRDS, incidents of chaos and lawlessness were often observed and living conditions were deplorable. These events led me to a strong desire for deeper inquiry. I hypothesized there was a link between current leadership models and continued levels of instability in Iraq. Further observation led me to believe political parties and insurgent groups were benefiting from the lack of sound leadership organization and structure.

I have been a student of leadership principles for many years and had observed some of the best and brightest leaders actively leading their organizations and businesses throughout my long career of living in Taiwan, Thailand and China. I have also been privileged to witness the tribal and parliamentary political leadership of Iraq wrestle with various issues related to their own democratization and stabilization.

In the pages that follow, I do my best to write what I saw and experienced. These lived experiences where further challenged by the fact, I was running an organization during the U.S. military SURGE with my wife and our twelve year of daughter during one of the most incredibly chaotic times in Iraq’s recent history. Our family literally faced all the challenges and violence associated with that time period and lived on the economy with minimal security. I appreciate the opportunity to share my research, insights, thoughts and outcomes with you.

Perhaps the most distressing result of my research relates to the failure of the Government of Iraq to take advantage of the opportunity, the gift of democracy. The average local national believes they are marginalized and have traded one tyrant for a parliament filled with tyrants. Read on…

CHAPTER 1

How Did I Get Here?

Arriving in Baghdad was truly an eye opening experience. My wife and twelve year old daughter stepped off the plane and immediately felt the intense heat of the region hit our faces. We each had two suitcases and our one hand carry to get through customs and immigration. There was no air conditioning inside the airport and I began to wonder, What have I done?

We were met by two friendly Iraqis who worked for Millennium Relief and Development Services. They would become our closest and most trust friends during the next two years. I didn’t know then how valuable they would be to our family. We would be totally dependent upon them for our security, groceries and important relationships.

The drive from the Baghdad International Airport was another moment that caused me to wonder if I had made a wise decision. Roadblocks, burned out cars, demolished buildings and chaos surrounded us. I didn’t think it could get worse, but I was wrong. The first week plunged me into leading community action group (CAG) leadership training workshops under a contract signed with International Relief and Development (IRD) in Baghdad with most of the participants in various stages of grief, anger and frustration.

Most of the Iraqi people attending these workshops were warm and friendly, embracing the methodology being taught. They were desperate for any training opportunity that would possibly put Iraq on the road to recovery. During these first few days I discerned that perhaps a grassroots leadership development program could help the Iraqi people with their country’s leadership needs, and perhaps personal involvement could facilitate in some small way positive changes. I would try to introduce leadership strategies that would enrich understanding, rather than hinder potential advancement and growth as the Iraqi government shifted from a dictatorship to a people centered democratic model of leadership.

The workshop was conducted at a local restaurant on Kindi Street in the neighborhood called al-Harthia. More than once we would be interrupted by sporadic gunfire and an explosion or two. The electricity would constantly go off. With the use of an uninterrupted power supply I was able to keep the laptop and power point projector on and the workshop would continue.

Occasionally someone would come into our meeting and whisper to an attendee, who would then get up and leave the room. When they returned, I would be interrupted with an announcement, Muqtoda al-Sadr’s militia was coming down the street. Everyone was frightened. Our workshop would end and everyone would leave promising to return the next day if possible. This happened frequently during those first few days.

During the first 15 months in Iraq, I observed phenomena through close personal contact, described by Creswell (2003) as the essence of human experiences or lived experiences (p. 15). The feelings of hope were fading and the Iraqis who once saw an opportunity to develop their nation were now leaving by plane and bus loads to any country that would receive them. An outcome of this exodus presented me with numerous opportunities to ask local Iraqi men and women what their thoughts were regarding the effects of the leadership models now in place in Iraq. Their answers were incredible as was their desire to genuinely share their feelings and opinions without fear of reprisal to themselves and their families.

If given an opportunity to speak, would the people of Iraq discuss their personal thoughts about the leadership needs of their country? I believed Iraqi nationals were willing to engage in conversation and were open to discuss their thoughts if provided the opportunity to do so.

My heart has never been as grieved as it was over the people who lived in the city of Baghdad and the surrounding communities and villages all around Iraq. Over the past 19 years, I and my family has lived in several cities around the world. There have been cities with populations of greater than 12 million and cities with populations as few as in the thousands. We have invested our lives learning culture, language, and the local customs. We have always been challenged beyond what most people are willing to endure, but this country was the most challenging.

Living in Baghdad, Iraq’s largest city and the nation’s capitol, was very challenging and even more difficult than anything we have ever experienced. During those first 15 months, I lost dozens of friends due to the violence and chaos that had become commonplace in this dangerous city. I kept track of the deaths of my friends in a small notebook. When my list reached 76 names, I could no longer bring myself to record the names of Iraqis I personally knew who had been killed by assassination, random shootings, and car bombs. It just hurt too deeply to keep recording those names.

When I completed the two years as country director for Millennium Relief and Development Services, our family was emotionally spent. During our last week in Baghdad we survived a five hour gun battle and over one hundred mortars and rockets which landed near our home. It was a difficult final week. As a matter of fact, we had no cell phone connectivity and were cut off from using the internet as well. We literally hunkered down and waited for cell phone and internet services to be restored. Once we were back online and could get messages out, we were instructed to exit Iraq for Jordan.

Leaving proved to be another major hurdle. Our Iraqi co-workers and office managers had to secure a flight out for us. This took an additional three days. Finally, with tickets in hand and our six pieces of luggage packed, we were ready to make our way to the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP).

As news spread through our small community of our departure, neighbors and Iraqi friends came to our home. Our house had been a refuge for hurting people for nearly two years, and now we were leaving. The last night many people stood at our gate and doorway to say their good-bye. They finally went home around midnight. The next morning, more friends were standing at the gate to wave goodbye as we were driven to BIAP. Tears flowed freely as we said our own goodbye.

I knew before I left Iraq I needed to return. I had research to conduct and interviews to complete. As a doctoral researcher, I wanted to begin investigating the effects of current leadership models in Iraqi society and I was compelled to complete my field research. How would I do this? I needed some avenue to get me back into Iraq - without my wife and daughter. They had endured so much and needed some normalcy. I could not provide them what they needed in country. So, with heavy hearts we left and I began searching for opportunities to facilitate my solo return.

If an opportunity developed, I might be strategically placed to conduct field interviews. Then, with knowledge discovered, offer recommendations for consideration by those in the Iraqi and coalition government. Shortly after our return to the United States, I received an email request suggesting I take a position with BAE Systems, Inc. as a social scientist attached to a United States Army Brigade in Iraq. With access to the population, I would be in a position to conduct sociocultural and ethnographic research up close and personal.

This would mean returning to Iraq in a different job, but ideally positioned to seek the answers to my questions in the spirit of unfettered inquiry, as witness to and subject to the same daily problems and security risks as my Iraqi friends and U.S. Military service men and women. After six months training and preparation in Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, I returned to Iraq setting the stage for accomplishing my desired research.

I signed a contract with BAE Systems, Inc. in September 2008 just shy of sixty days of our return to the USA. Soon I was in Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas being trained for my new role, social scientist. After months of training and being stretched once again beyond my skill and previous experience, I was boots on the ground in Iraq by April 2009.

History of Problems

Social anthropologist Boissevain (1974) notes in a situation of conflict, persons will attempt to define the situation and align themselves in such a way that the least possible damage is done to their basic values and to their important personal relations (p. 50). Relationships for Iraqis, like most Arabs, are valued in proportion to their proximity. Iraqis identify first with their immediate family, then with their extended family or clan, then with their village, and then with their tribe, followed by their country and their religious sect. Other anthropologists and social scientists may argue this finding, but after nearly six years in Iraq, I reached the conclusion that family is first.

However, when a nation identifies with their religious beliefs, as do Iraqis, these relationships are often blurred or skewed. Shi’a, Sunni and secular coalitions or political parties are formed around personalities and the Islamic faith. I also discovered Iraq to be a very complicated mix of tribal affiliations and