The Indonesian Army from Revolusi to Reformasi: Volume 3: Soeharto's Fall and the Reformasi Era

THE INDONESIAN ARMY

from Revolusi to Reformasi

Volume 3

Soeharto's Fall and the Reformasi Era

Joseph H. Daves

Copyright © 2014 Joseph H. Daves

Smashwords Edition

All rights reserved.

ISBN: 1492932434

ISBN-13: 978-1492932437

DEDICATION

For my Father, Huber H. Daves, Jan 20, 1917 - Dec 12, 2003,

A Sergeant in the Army Air Corps serving in the China-Burma-India Theater with Chennault's Flying Tigers

For background and introductory comments, please see Volume 1 - The Struggle for Independence and the Sukarno Era and Volume 2 - Soeharto and the New Order

Contents

1 Hubris

2 Mounting Sectarian Violence

3 Krismon

4 The Prabowo-Wiranto Rivalry

5 The Riots

6 Lengser Keprabon

7 The Airplane Designer

8 Demo-Crazy

9 Scorched Earth

10 The Blind Cleric

11 The Ascent of Security First Officers

12 The Maluku Civil War

13 Black Operations in Papua

14 Sukarno's Daughter

15 Genesis of a Domestic Terrorist Group

16 Aceh's Killing Fields

17 The Thinking General

18 The Thread of History

Abbreviations and Glossary

Bibliography

End Notes

1 Hubris

Critics refer deprecatingly to the state over which Suharto rules as the new Mataram, an allusion to the dominant kingdom on Java in the years after 1582 and to the president's success in evoking the atmosphere of a Javanese kraton (palace), in which politics is frequently a matter of court intrigue and in which one powerful prince is played off against another for the greater good of the ruler.[1]

Soeharto built a patrimonial state behind a western-style development façade. Governed by the patron-client relationship, officials were granted position and privilege at the ruler's pleasure, subject to dismissal at any time without reason. The President's family and, to an almost equal extent, those he considered friends, were the first loyalty - even more important than his sacred national development programs. He spoiled and indulged his children - perhaps because of his own impoverished youth or to make up for years of neglect. They displayed brazen greed and received generous concessions, unfair monopoly licenses, soft loans and preferential access to government contracts. The children attracted all sorts of ventures purely because of their proximity to power. As they aggressively expanded their business activities, they came into direct competition with military businesses and generated resentment within the Armed Forces.

As the feudal king, the government was an extension of Soeharto's family. In accordance with the Javanese saying, Mikul Duwur Mendem Jero, meaning carry high the honor and reputation of the family while burying deep anything that would dishonor it, he never tried to restrain the children's excessive and corrupt behavior, even while resentment and criticism grew. Increasingly isolated, the President seemed unconcerned by the damage to his own reputation caused by the rapacious behavior of his children, family and friends. His ties to Sino-Indonesian businessmen, allowing the chosen few to develop huge and immensely profitable conglomerates, came at great expense to his image. By the early-1990s, the public had adopted the acronym KKN (Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme) as a codeword for the systematic state-sponsored larceny that took place under the New Order regime.

Suharto believed his children were entitled to be as privileged as the princes and princesses of the sultans of Surakarta. He did not feel any embarrassment at giving them those privileges, because it was his right as a mega-sultan. He saw himself as a patriot. I would not classify Suharto as a crook.[2] Soeharto maintained the delusion his children had gained success by their own skills rather than special privilege, and that their government-subsidized ventures contributed to his own employment and national development goals. He vigorously defended them. None of my children has been pampered. Not one. And Thank God, so far not one has done anything improper or out-of-bounds of human decency. ... They are actually self-effacing, and I can see that they feel it is difficult being the President's children.[3] They had started reaching adulthood in the early-1980s. None excelled academically, although Soeharto's second daughter, Titiek (Siti Hedijanti Harijadi), graduated from the Economics Faculty at the University of Indonesia and youngest daughter, Mamiek (Siti Hutami Endang Adiningsih), earned a degree from the Bogor Agricultural Institute.

In May 1983, Titiek married the dashing young red beret officer and son of noted economist Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Prabowo Subianto, in an arranged marriage. The huge wedding was held at Taman Mini, which had opened in April 1975 under Ibu Tien Soeharto's nurturing patronage. Although it produced a son, the marriage was troubled and ultimately dissolved after Soeharto resigned the presidency. Titiek's Maharani Paramita Group held stakes in seven private Indonesian banks, plus interests in property, telecommunications and timber. She was a business partner with Prabowo's elder brother, billionaire Hashim Djojohadikusumo, in the $2.5 billion Paiton power project in East Java and a Jakarta shopping mall.

Oldest daughter Tutut (Siti Hardijanti Rukmana), with her husband and sisters, formed Citra Lamantoro Gung Persada in 1983 with extensive interests in oil, petrochemicals, electricity, television broadcasting, aircraft parts, real estate, insurance, banking, trade, plantation crops and timber. She held a 17.5 percent share in the Liem Sioe Liong's Bank Central Asia. With the inside track on government contracts, Tutut established PT Citra Marga Nusaphala Persada in 1987 to capture the lucrative toll road business. Her estimated net worth was $2 billion.

Oldest son Sigit Harjojudanto had many interests - including a 40 percent stake in younger brother Tommy's Humpuss Group, 17.5 percent interest in Liem's Bank Central Asia, vehicle assembly (Astra International) with Bob Hasan, air freight (Bayu Air), and shares in the Freeport McMoRan copper and gold mine in Irian Jaya - although he did not play an active role in any of those enterprises. Bayu Air started by using Indonesian Air Force cargo planes to transport cattle from Soeharto's Tapos family ranch in West Java to outlying provinces. The company logo was simply taped over military markings. Along with the Soeharto foundations and Bob Hasan, Sigit suffered losses after buying into the Kalimantan Busang gold project run by Canadian company Bre-X, which collapsed during March 1997 after proving to be an enormous fraud. An avid gambler, Sigit was a frequent visitor to casinos in London, Atlantic City, Las Vegas and Perth. He lost large sums in the late-1980s before Soeharto forbade further gambling trips abroad.

Second son Bambang Trihatmodjo established the Bimantara Group in 1982 with older sister Tutut's husband, Indra Rukmana, and two friends. With over 100 subsidiaries, Bimantara became Indonesia's largest pribumi-owned business group, enjoying exclusive partnerships with Hughes Electronics, Deutsche Telecom, Siemens, Hyatt and Hyundai; monopoly contracts for water supply, power production and oil tanker fleets; and government-subsidized interests in plastics, electronics, automobiles, shipping, dairy products, plywood, oil and gas, telecommunications, television broadcasting, aircraft leasing, construction, real estate, sugar and palm oil plantations, and food retailing. A 1994 license granted Bimantara a cut from all international telephone tariffs levied by state telecommunications provider PT Indosat. Bimantara reaped tens of millions of dollars without any investment or risk. The government provided huge loans to bail out Bimantara's Chandra Asri petrochemical project, which Bambang held in partnership with Chinese businessmen Prajogo Pangestu (Phang Jun Phen) and Henry Pribadi (Lin Yunhao).

Youngest son Tommy (Hutomo Mandala Putra) studied at the Civil Aviation Academy after completing junior high school in Jakarta and went to the United States to study agriculture, but failed to earn a degree. He embarked on a business career, shamelessly exploiting family connections while displaying a fondness for fast cars, speed boats and movie actresses. Tommy formed Humpuss Group in 1984 with older brother, Sigit, receiving exclusive petrochemical distribution contracts from Pertamina, plus a concession to sell liquid natural gas to Taiwan. Humpuss interests included telecommunications, agribusiness, toll roads, oil and gas, timber, hotels and property development. In partnership with Liem Sioe Liong, in early-1991 Humpuss Group received a government loan and monopoly concession as middleman for clove imports used by domestic kretek cigarette manufacturers, in effect levying a tax on the entire lucrative business. Tommy's clove cartel brought the once thriving kretek industry into chaos, almost bankrupted a major producer, Bentoel, threatened social stability, and hiked prices for millions of kretek smokers.

Tommy started a private airline, Sempati Air, with Bob Hasan in competition with the national airline, Garuda. In a tremendously extravagant display, during November 1993 he bought Italian luxury car manufacturer, Lamborghini. Due the negative public reaction, Tommy later sold his Lamborghini stake to Audi, a subsidiary of German carmaker Volkswagen. Following a bitter public battle between Tommy's Humpuss Group and Bambang's Bimantara over who would be granted license to produce the Timor (Teknologi Industri Mobil Rakyat, Technology Industry People's Car) national car, Soeharto intervened in early-1996 to grant the concession to Tommy. The venture allowed Tommy to import duty-free South Korean Kia Sephia sedans (rebranded as Timor people's cars) until assembly facilities were built in Indonesia. The government backed $700 million in bank loans for the project despite cabinet objections, resulting in huge profits and almost no risk for Tommy. The Timor cars sold for about half the price of comparable domestically-produced models. The arrangement brought a steady flow of profits to Humpuss, while construction of domestic assembly facilities was inevitably delayed.

Youngest daughter Mamiek was the lowest profile and least avaricious of the Soeharto clan. Along with interests in palm plantations, warehouses and transport businesses, in 1995 Mamiek's PT Manggala Krida Yudha conglomerate launched a government-backed $500 million venture to rehabilitate Jakarta Bay's northern shore. Soeharto's grandson Ari Haryo Wibowo (Sigit's son) held a monopoly fertilizer import concession and was involved in trading of electrical goods and brewing. In 1996, public outrage forced Soeharto to withdraw the monopoly right granted to Ari Sigit to collect a tax on beer and alcoholic beverages sold in Bali and several other provinces - and on Ari's brazen scheme to require Indonesian schoolchildren buy an expensive brand of shoes, which his own business was the sole vendor. Ari and his wife were later implicated in distributing crystal methamphetamine and the ecstasy drug trade.[4]

Soeharto's half-brother Probosutedjo shared interests in the clove monopoly with Liem Sioe Liong and Tommy, along with shares in construction, glass-manufacturing, and agro-businesses. He headed the Association of Indigenous Indonesian (Pribumi) Businessmen and Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kadin). Ironically, despite his own ties to prominent Chinese Indonesian businessmen, Probosutedjo loudly criticized the dominant economic position held by Chinese businesses. Sudwikatmono, Soeharto's cousin, received monopoly rights to import and distribute motion pictures. He was a minority shareholder in Liem's Indocement and Indofood businesses and frequently acted as Soeharto's middle man in business transactions.

Soeharto's partnership with Chinese-Indonesian and other minority businessmen, like the Tamil Texmaco tycoon Marimutu Srinivasan, was more deliberate than accidental. Despite their immense wealth, Soeharto knew it would be difficult for the minority moguls to challenge him. His patronage of cukong entrepreneurs came at the expense of the pribumi business community, which Soeharto mistrusted and viewed as a potential political threat to the regime. Hence, the principal pribumi business interests to benefit from the President's patronage were those owned by his own family and friends.

Soeharto's cukong associates included Liem Sioe Liong (Sudono Salim), Mohammad Bob Hasan and Prajogo Pangestu. Known as grandfather among the Chinese community, Liem had known Soeharto since his army days in Central Java, when he was a supplier to Diponegoro Division. Benefiting from government subsidies and contracts, Liem's massive Bogasari mill dominated the domestic flour industry for decades. He founded Salim Group and Bank Central Asia, in which the Soeharto family held significant interests. Favored with lucrative land concessions in Sumatra, Liem was able to expand his empire into timber and palm oil. With more than 200 companies - including Indofood, the world's largest noodle maker - by the late-1980s Salim Group was the largest business in Indonesia and Liem the nation's richest man, with assets estimated at $3.5 billion.

Liem Sioe Liong

Bob Hasan

Presumed by many to be revolutionary hero Major General Gatot Subroto's illegitimate son, Bob Hasan was another of Soeharto's old army chums and his regular golf partner. Hasan chaired the Astra International automobile conglomerate and the Nusamba Group, holding two million hectares of timber concessions (mostly in Kalimantan). He dominated the national forestry industry, including the Indonesian Plywood Association, Indonesian Sawmill Association, Indonesian Rattan Association, and the umbrella Indonesian Forestry Community. Hasan held interests in construction, tin, banking, tea plantations, pulp and paper, shipping and Sempati Air (with Tommy). Through his conglomerate, Bob Hasan managed key assets for the Soeharto foundations.

With the President's patronage, West Kalimantan native Prajogo Pangestu controlled 4.4 million hectares of timber concessions (an area larger than Denmark) and was engaged in ventures with Tutut and Bambang - a huge sugar plantation in Sulawesi, a $1.2 billion pulp and paper plant in Sumatra, and the $1.6 billion Chandra Asri petrochemical plant. With majority ownership by the Soeharto foundations, Bank Duta suffered nearly $500 million in losses from foreign currency trading in 1990. Soeharto's cronies, Liem and Prajogo bailed the bank out (Prajogo's share was $220 million) and, in turn, were rewarded by lucrative contracts intended to assist pribumi businesses. In 1991, Prajogo financed Soeharto's ghost-written autobiography. His cozy relationship with the Soeharto family was resented by pribumi and many ethnic Chinese businessmen.

Foundations and cooperatives provided the framework and cover for the pervasive New Order patronage system. The President's office dispersed funds from its foundations as a patronage tool. Indeed, money was the New Order's primary instrument of power; brute force was used only when money and intimidation were ineffective. With the President's encouragement, foundations and cooperatives proliferated throughout most government departments. In parallel with the graft and corruption among Soeharto's family and friends, military leaders expanded their own foundations to fund military operations and enrich themselves. All had honorable causes but their activities and finances were neither transparent nor accountable, leaving plenty of room for graft.

Notwithstanding Soeharto's assertion he never touched the vast resources of his foundations, funds were freely channeled for purposes other than their declared charters. Despite the extensive KKN, economic progress continued apace during the 1990s, aided by foreign investment in resources and manufacturing, especially in the clothing and textile industries. Oil prices were stagnant throughout the 1990s. Jakarta was strapped with external debt and the banking sector plagued by bad loans. In 1994, Chinese businessman Eddy Tansil (Tan Cu Fuan) was sentenced to twenty years for skimming $420 million from bank loans intended to construct a petrochemical plant. In May 1996, Tansil escaped from Jakarta's maximum-security Cipinang Prison under suspicious circumstances and fled the country.

Soeharto was a man of contradictions. He was a modernizer and a pragmatist who relied on advice from westernized technocrats. Despite the regime's authoritarian nature, he often went to extremes to seek consensus, spending hours with the representatives from various political and social groups. He lived a comfortable but modest lifestyle and had no bad habits or excesses. He was not greedy but indulged and tolerated his children and close friends' excesses. Soeharto entered Gatot Subroto Army Hospital in Jakarta in 1994 for bladder surgery, doctors noted the President (and more obviously, daughter Tutut, who accompanied him) appeared nervous the military doctors might murder him during surgery. Later, when Soeharto needed prostate surgery, he opted to have it done at the privately-run Pertamina Hospital.[5]

Ibu Tien died on April 28, 1996 after a sudden and unexpected heart attack. She was interred at the specially-built family mausoleum, Astana Giri Mangadeg, on Mount Lawu near the Surakarta royal cemetery. Soeharto was deeply affected by her death. It removed the final measure of control over the children's avarice. Two months later, Soeharto left for medical treatment in Germany, later revealed for surgery to remove kidney stones. He returned in July for follow-up treatment. Some suggested the President lost his pulung (divine power) when Tien died. The arranged marriage of Soeharto's youngest son Tommy to a member of the Surakarta Mangkunegara royal family in April 1997 was interpreted by some as an attempt to recoup that pulung.[6]

Soeharto became even more isolated and less approachable. His inner circle shielded him from criticism and the growing dissatisfaction with his children's behavior. Some speculated he would not run for re-election in 1998, but after three decades in power, Soeharto was convinced of his indispensability. In 1995, the German-based Transparency International had ranked Indonesia the most corrupt country in the world. Three years later the World Bank estimated 30 percent of project costs in Indonesia were diverted to corruption. Oldest daughter Tutut, vice-chair of Golkar, emerged as Soeharto's manager and began to play a more prominent political role. She was said to have close ties to the Madurese Army Chief General Hartono (later Home Affairs Minister) although both were married.

The July 27 Affair

A former Sukarnoist bastion, the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) was the largest constituent in the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) coalition when it was formed in 1973 through the forced merger of nationalist and non-Islamic religious parties. Because of Sukarno's tarnished reputation, the purge of Sukarnoists and overt manipulation, the PDI garnered just 8.6 percent of the vote in the 1977 general election and 7.9 percent in 1982. Many Nahdlatul Ulama members defected to the PDI after the Muslim organization withdrew from the United Development Party (PPP) coalition in late-1984. In 1987, the PDI drafted Sukarno's daughter, Megawati Sukarnoputri. The PDI got 10.9 percent of the vote that year; the thirty-nine-year old housewife was awarded a seat in Parliament. In 1992, after the government rehabilitated Sukarno, the party employed the former President's image during the campaign and earned a more respectable 14.9 percent.

Dyah Permata Megawati Setyawati Sukarnoputri, known as Megawati to most Indonesians, was Sukarno's oldest daughter with his second wife, Fatmawati. She led a sheltered childhood at the Merdeka and Bogor Palaces until her father was deposed when she was eighteen. Twice she started a college degree but finished neither time. She was married three times. Her first husband was an Air Force pilot, Surendro, whose aircraft went down in the vicinity of Biak, Irian Jaya in 1970, his body never recovered. Her second marriage to an Egyptian diplomat in Jakarta, Hasan Gamal Ahmad Hasan, was annulled after several months. In 1973, at age twenty-four, she married Taufik Kiemas, an activist in the secular-nationalist National University Student Movement (GMNI). Hailing from Palembang, South Sumatra, Taufik was thirty years old and owned a chain of petrol stations. Megawati settled into life as a housewife. Together they had three children.

With urging from party chairman Soerjadi, Taufik Kiemas joined the PDI. The two were GMNI alumni and friends. Taufik later encouraged Megawati to join the party; she reluctantly agreed. Naturally shy, her principal assets were her father's famous name, and her husband's astute business and political acumen. Two other Sukarno children joined the PDI, Megawati's older brother, Guntur, and younger sister, Rachmawati. They were more aggressive and outspoken, but not as popular as the modest and demure Megawati. While she lacked her father's political savvy and oratorical skills, after an uncertain start, Megawati stirred the public imagination with calls for "reformasi. She was cautious not to criticize the military: As long as ABRI [the Armed Forces] continues to side with and struggle for the interests of the people, why should dwifungsi be questioned?"[7]

Megawati and Taufik Kiemas

By the early-1990s, Megawati had become the PDI's rising star. She received tacit support from secular-nationalist military leaders like Benny Moerdani, Try Sutrisno and Edi Sudrajat, frustrated by Soeharto's alliance with modernist Islam and support for the Islamist officers associated with B.J. Habibie and the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, ICMI). Moerdani, in particular, was sympathetic toward Megawati. He had met her as a young woman when he received a medal from her father, President Sukarno.[8]

Soeharto instructed then-Armed Forces Commander Try Sutrisno, Chief of Staff for Social-Political Affairs (Kepala Staf Sosial Politik, Kasospol) Lieutenant General Hariyoto Pringgo Sudiro and ABRI Strategic Intelligence Agency (Badan Intelijen Strategis, Bais) Chief Major General Arie Sudewo to keep tabs on Megawati. After consulting Benny Moerdani, they assigned three red beret officers, ostensibly to befriend the PDI leader and monitor her activities - Jakarta Commander Major General Abdullah Mahmud Hendropriyono (of Lampung renown), Army Special Forces (Komando Pasukan Khusus, Kopassus) Commander Brigadier General Agum Gumelar (doubling as Bais Internal Affairs Director) and Hendropriyono's Intelligence Assistant in the Jakarta Command, Colonel Zacky Anwar Makarim. Moerdani asked Hendropriyono and Agum Gumelar to protect Megawati since Soeharto would like to get rid of her.[9] She developed friendly relations with all three officers, along with Hendropriyono's two Operations Assistants, Colonel Endriartono Sutarto (later Armed Forces Commander) and Colonel Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (later President).

Benny Moerdani

A.M. Hendropriyono

PDI Chairman Soerjadi waged an aggressive fight during the 1992 campaign, barely staying within acceptable bounds. Despite Golkar's once more dominant performance, Soerjadi's call for term limits and more than one presidential candidate, allegations about government corruption, and his campaign slogan - anybody but Soeharto - angered the President.[10] In May 1993, General Feisal Tanjung succeeded ABRI Commander Try Sutrisno, who became vice president. Soeharto instructed Feisal and Kasospol Hariyoto to unseat Soerjadi during the July PDI National Congress in Medan. Despite Soerjadi's popularity, they backed former student leader Budi Hardjono. When apparent Hardjono would not be elected, the government-controlled board and its supporters boycotted the final session. Security forces dispersed the gathering before a chairman could be elected.

The government refused to recognize Soerjadi and appointed a twenty-three-person board to run a new PDI congress during December in Surabaya. Military leaders pressured PDI regional councils to come up with an alternate candidate. That strategy backfired when the Jakarta PDI branch nominated Megawati, a move party chapters around the country quickly endorsed.[11] After consulting the President, Home Affairs Minister Lieutenant General Yogie Memet announced the government had no objection to Megawati's candidacy. Concurrently, ABRI Commander Feisal Tanjung, Kasospol Hariyoto and Memet's men sought to disrupt the Surabaya Congress. They warned about the return of the Old Order Marhaenist ideology and openly backed anti-Megawati elements in the PDI.

Agum Gumelar

Zacky Anwar Makarim

Faced with a certain Megawati victory absent massive intervention, Soeharto instructed Lieutenant General Hariyoto not to oppose her election, although he indicated the PDI leadership might have to be changed later. The government imposed restrictions. After several meetings with Hariyoto, Megawati agreed to eschew Soerjadi's aggressive campaign tactics, vet all PDI candidates with Hariyoto and Bais Chief Major General Arie Sudewo, and drop those on the party list considered to be leftists. She was elected PDI chairperson during the closing session on December 4. In a symbolic and highly publicized encounter, Soeharto's eldest daughter Tutut met Megawati on December 15 at Sukarno's gravesite in Blitar.[12]

The government refused to recognize Megawati's election, as it had with Soerjadi five months earlier. Home Affairs Minister Yogie Memet announced a final decision on the PDI chair would be made during a National Consultation (Musyawarah Nasional, Munas) on December 22. Stacked with pro-government delegates, the Jakarta meeting deadlocked. On instructions from Lieutenant General Hariyoto and Major General Arie Sudewo, red beret officers Hendropriyono, Agum Gumelar and Zacky Anwar took charge of the gathering. With their backing, Megawati was unanimously elected. The Jakarta press openly praised Jakarta Commander Hendropriyono and Kopassus Commander Agum Gumelar for supporting Megawati.[13] Just four days later, on December 26 Hendropriyono was photographed with his arm around Megawati during the Jakarta Command's forty-fourth anniversary celebration, an obvious irritation to the President.[14]

The Megawati Affair was later characterized as a Benny Moerdani-Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) conspiracy. Moerdani and his secular-nationalist allies had been rumored to favor the PDI since the late-1980s because of Sudharmono's elevation to the vice presidency, Golkar's progressive greening and civilianization, and the government's Islamist direction. The general and his CSIS associates were believed to have channeled funds to Megawati and her supporters.[15] It was no secret Moerdani and his allies (who included Vice President Try Sutrisno, Defense Minister Edi Sudrajat, Kasospol Hariyoto Pringgo Sudiro and Bais Chief Arie Sudewo) were unhappy with Information Minister Harmoko's election to Golkar General Chairman just two months before the PDI Munas.

Hariyoto and Arie Sudewo's failure to block Megawati's election was perhaps a calculated move, although it appears the two generals misread statements from Home Affairs Minister Yogie Memet and other officials. "Blatantly blocking Megawati's leadership would have run counter to the then prevailing atmosphere of keterbukaan [openness]. The officers involved were unwilling to attempt this, at least in the absence of clear instructions from Suharto. In the final analysis, what ensured that Megawati became PDI leader was her grassroots support and her supporters' refusal to succumb to customary forms of intimidation. The military role was primarily a reaction to these phenomena."[16]

According to Agum Gumelar's later (perhaps revisionist) account, his superiors ordered him to secure (mengamankan) the PDI Munas with the implicit understanding Megawati's election would pose a threat to the New Order government. Agum maintains he ignored those orders and told his subordinates to allow the festival of democracy to proceed without interference. After Megawati was elected, Agum discussed the matter with his boss, Arie Sudewo, who said, no problem even though it was clear Cendana was unhappy.[17] Gumelar confided to friends that he had received a blunt message from Soeharto's eldest son, Bambang, to support Megawati's election since she was a simple and stupid woman,[18] suggesting perhaps it was Bambang Soeharto who misunderstood his father's intentions rather than the military officers who assisted her.

Soeharto and ABRI Commander Feisal Tanjung wasted no time in punishing those they felt were responsible for the PDI debacle. The ABRI Commander sacked the Protestant Kasospol Hariyoto in January, after only eight months at his post. The Madurese National Resilience Institute (Lemhannas) Governor Lieutenant General Raden Hartono, a favorite of B.J. Habibie and ICMI, succeeded Hariyoto, who became an advisor to Defense Minister Edi Sudrajat and joined the National Harmonious Brotherhood Foundation (Yayasan Kerukunan Persaudaraan Kebangsaan, YKPK), a secular-nationalist group that criticized the government's authoritarian measures against the pro-democracy movement. On January 25, on the President's orders, Bais was restructured and replaced with the smaller, less powerful Armed Forces Intelligence Agency (Badan Intelijen ABRI, BIA). Major General Arie Sudewo continued to head BIA and succeeded ABRI Intelligence Assistant Major General Bantu Hardjijo in conjunction with the reorganization. A 1963 Military Academy graduate, Sudewo was prematurely retired seven months later. South Sumatra Sriwijaya Regional Commander Major General Syamsir Siregar succeeded Sudewo in both posts.

Feisal Tanjung

Hartono

On Colonel Prabowo Subianto's advice, in September 1994 Soeharto elevated BIA Director D (Counterintelligence) Brigadier General Subagyo Hadisiswoyo to succeed Agum Gumelar after just fourteen months as Kopassus Commander. Subagyo belonged to Prabowo's anti-Moerdani clique. As a red beret major, he had participated in the celebrated March 1981 Woyla take-down mission in Bangkok, ironically under Benny Moerdani and Lieutenant Colonel Sintong Panjaitan. In 1986, on recommendation from then Armed Forces Commander Moerdani and Kopassus Commander Brigadier General Sintong Panjaitan, Subagyo was assigned to the Presidential Security Guard, where he was responsible for President Soeharto's security detail; he held that post for eight years. Prabowo became Subagyo's Kopassus Deputy although, in practice, he dominated Subagyo and ran day-to-day operations at the elite unit.

Agum Gumelar was banished to Medan as chief of staff in the North Sumatra Bukit Barisan Regional Command. A 1968 academy graduate, the Sundanese Gumelar was son-in-law to New Order power broker, former Tourism, Posts and Telecommunications Minister Lieutenant General Achmad Tahir. A self-admitted gang leader, Agum Gumelar had been somewhat of a jago (fighting cock or strongman) figure during his youth.[19] Like Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, he met his future wife, Linda Amalia Sari, while he was a cadet and her father was Military Academy Governor. As a young red beret officer, Agum Gumelar was Ali Moertopo's adjutant. With his patronage, in 1975 Agum was awarded a lucrative posting as deputy head of the Indonesian Trade Representative (Kadin) office in Taiwan, Jakarta's unofficial diplomatic conduit to Taipei. During five years in Taipei, he learned to speak Mandarin Chinese and amassed substantial wealth.

Returning to Jakarta in 1980, Agum Gumelar served successive tours as an intelligence officer under Benny Moerdani in the Operational Command to Restore Security and Order (Kopkamtib), the National Intelligence Coordinating Body (Bakin), the Special Operations Troop Command (Kopassandha) and the Jakarta Military Command. He was a Kopkamtib-Bakin intelligence officer during the 1983-1985 Petrus murder squad campaign and accumulated combat experience during counterinsurgency operations in West Kalimantan and East Timor. A rising star, after a short tour as the Lampung Resort Commander in South Sumatra, he returned to Jakarta in July 1993 with a promotion to brigadier general and concurrent postings as Bais Director A (Internal Affairs) and Kopassus Commander.

Agum Gumelar's transfer to Medan took place after he had argued during a commanders meeting that it was wrong to consider Megawati, Abdurrahman Wahid and the Petition of Fifty group as state enemies. Prabowo apparently asked Soeharto and ABRI Commander Feisal Tanjung to replace him. The two red beret officers had a longstanding rivalry. During his tenure at Kopassus, Gumelar had repeatedly clashed with Prabowo, his subordinate Kopassus Training Center Commander. Disheartened, he considered the posting to Medan as punishment and blamed his red beret rival for his banishment.[20] His wife (Lieutenant General Achmad Tahir's daughter and a Golkar representative in Parliament) and children stayed behind in Jakarta. After nearly two years in Medan, Agum Gumelar was promoted to major general in August 1996 and moved to Ujung Pandang (Makassar) as the Sulawesi Wirabuana Regional Commander. He did not return to Jakarta until May 1998, just before Soeharto resigned.

A 1967 academy graduate and 1980 alumnus from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, A.M. Hendropriyono achieved notoriety as the Lampung Army Resort Commander in February 1989, when he ordered troops to attack a group of fundamentalist Muslims, resulting in several dozen deaths. A sophisticated and ambitious officer, Hendropriyono was moved to Jakarta in February 1991 with a promotion to brigadier general as Bais Director D. With patronage from the President and fellow red beret Colonel Prabowo, he was promoted again in April 1993 to the prestigious post as Jakarta Commander. "Pak Hendro" was named Jakarta Man of the Year in 1994 for his aggressive crackdown on petty crime and corruption. During the cleanup campaign, Hendropriyono's troops arrested Pemuda Pancasila leader Yorrys Raweyai on charges of gambling and murder - despite the gangster's known ties to the Soeharto family. (Yorrys was acquitted after evidence disappeared and witnesses retracted sworn statements.)[21]

Notwithstanding his popularity among Jakarta residents, Soeharto punished Hendropriyono, not only for his role in the Megawati Affair, but for failing to prevent East Timorese protestors from jumping over the fence into the U.S. Embassy compound, where they sought political asylum during the November 1994 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Jakarta. He was temporarily parked in the ABRI parliamentary faction and then sent to Bandung in early-1995 as the Army Doctrine, Education and Training Command (Kodiklat) Commander,[22] a post he held until March 1998, when Soeharto appointed him Transmigration Minister in the short-lived Seventh Development Cabinet. Chief of Staff in the Jakarta Command, Brigadier General Wiranto, a former presidential adjutant, succeeded Hendropriyono as Jakarta Commander.

In February 1995, General Feisal Tanjung sacked ABRI Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General H.B.L. Mantiri, a Protestant and Edi Sudrajat loyalist. He was replaced by Diponegoro Commander Major General Soeyono, another former presidential aide. Several regional commanders with ties to Edi Sudrajat and Benny Moerdani were also replaced. After just ten months as the Bali-Nusa Tenggara Udayana Regional Commander, in February 1994 Protestant Major General Theo Syafei was sidelined as the Armed Forces Staff and Command School (Sesko-ABRI) Commander and shifted into the ABRI parliamentary faction a year later. The Javanese Muslim East Java Brawijaya Regional Commander Major General Haris Sudarno was sidelined into the ABRI faction in March 1995, after less than two years in Surabaya. The same month, Major General Muzani Syukur became Army Inspector General, considered a dead-end job, after less than two years as Siliwangi Commander. In April, after just seventeen months as the North Sumatra Bukit Barisan Commander, Major General Albertus Pranowo took over the rather inconsequential Armed Forces Council for the Management of Armed Forces Members Seconded to Civilian Positions (Babinkar).

The third red beret involved in the Megawati Affair, Colonel Zacky Anwar Makarim, a career intelligence man associated with Prabowo, did not suffer significant career damage. Zacky and Prabowo had served together during counterinsurgency campaigns in East Timor and Aceh. After the Megawati Affair, Zacky returned to BIA with his first star as Director A (Internal Affairs), replacing the exiled Brigadier General Agum Gumelar. He helped organize the July 1996 military operation to clear Megawati supporters from the Jakarta PDI headquarters. Four months later, Zacky became Army Security Assistant with promotion to major general and was appointed to head the retooled Armed Forces Intelligence Agency (BIA) in August 1997, although by then he had fallen from Prabowo's circle of friends.

Renewed enthusiasm for Sukarno and Megawati's growing popularity went hand-in-hand. Tens of thousands of Indonesians visited Sukarno's grave in Blitar on his birth and death anniversaries in nostalgia for the Great Leader. Megawati avoided directly challenging the government but developed grassroots support across the country. Her photograph appeared in newspapers and on magazine covers. Fearing Sukarno's ghost had returned to take revenge, Soeharto and his New Order insiders remained apprehensive toward the PDI leader, who possessed only modest political talents but carried her father's symbolic mantle. It was clear Megawati's popularity might challenge Golkar if left unattended, especially if she joined forces with the equally popular Nahdlatul Ulama Chairman Abdurrahman Wahid. Soeharto was reluctant to act directly against her. Instead, he sought to indirectly depose Megawati, as he had done to Soerjadi.

The government once more refused to recognize Megawati as the PDI chair, leaving the party in limbo. The government characterized her as a dangerous radical who, like her father, would promote a communist resurgence. Golkar and the regimist Center for Policy and Development Studies (CPDS) orchestrated a vicious media campaign, alleging her supporters (even husband Taufik Kiemas) had ties to the defunct Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The transparent vendetta against the meek and docile Megawati backfired; her popularity swelled transforming her into a hero of the pro-reform movement.[23] Under government pressure, the small League of Upholders of Indonesian Independence (IPKI) faction (formerly known as the Veterans Party, comprising mostly retired Sukarnoist military officers) withdrew from the PDI coalition. Despite Megawati's uncertain status and a new government ban prohibiting use of photographs or posters bearing a person's image (aimed at preventing the PDI from using Sukarno's portrait), the PDI made further gains in the 1994 mid-term elections.

Soeharto and his advisors decided Megawati must be removed before the 1997 parliamentary elections. During June 1996, just two months after Ibu Tien's death and immediately following his own emergency kidney stone surgery in Germany, the President instructed Home Affairs Minister Yogie Memet and Armed Forces Commander Feisal Tanjung to mount an operation to depose her. Memet later revealed the covert operation was codenamed Red Dragon (Naga Merah). Lacking a viable alternative, ousted PDI Chairman Soerjadi suddenly didn't look so bad. Soerjadi was a pragmatist. Earlier in his career, the PDI leader had been associated with Ali Moertopo's Special Operations (Opsus) unit, Benny Moerdani and the CSIS. Newly-appointed Kasospol Lieutenant General Syarwan Hamid persuaded Soerjadi to challenge Megawati. Feisal Tanjung arranged a lunch between the President and Soerjadi to cement the reconciliation and plans to engineer his reinstatement as PDI Chairman. The regime promised Soerjadi funds and a security umbrella.[24]

Yogie Memet, Feisal Tanjung and Syarwan Hamid organized another extraordinary PDI Congress June 20-22, 1996 in Medan. Megawati and mainstream PDI leaders boycotted the gathering, seen for what it was - a crude power grab. Similar tactics had been employed against Abdurrahman Wahid during the Nahdlatul Ulama congress six months earlier. Rather than fight, Megawati and her supporters chose to stay away. Adi Sasono's Center for Information and Development Studies (CIDES) and Sofyan Wanandi's CSIS (unlikely partners) helped fund and organize the Medan congress. (Wanandi was apparently trying to regain influence with Soeharto.)

Kasospol Lieutenant General Syarwan Hamid was the regime's new fixer. Following methods pioneered by the late Ali Moertopo - coercion, bribery and intimidation - he and his minions worked diligently to line up support behind Soerjadi. Feisal Tanjung and Syarwan Hamid both attended the breakaway congress and employed Pemuda Pancasila thugs to figuratively and literally twist delegates' arms. A few nationalist officers associated with Benny Moerdani kept Megawati informed about the regime's actions but were unable to influence events. Soerjadi was duly elected in accordance with the government script. Dozens of Megawati supporters were injured in clashes with security forces outside the congress.[25]

Megawati enjoyed substantial popular support and, following the flagrantly rigged Medan congress, growing sympathy. Most saw her ouster as another example of heavy-handed government intervention to neutralize the political opposition. Megawati declared Soerjadi's election invalid and maintained she was still the party's true leader. She refrained from calling millions of supporters into the streets, instead filing a lawsuit against the government charging Yogie Memet and Feisal Tanjung had manipulated the unofficial PDI Congress to divide the party and remove her from PDI leadership. Many Megawati supporters acted anyway.

After two days of massive protests, on June 22 party members and about 200 students moved into the PDI headquarters on Jalan Diponegoro in Central Jakarta to block Soerjadi from taking office. The interlopers refused to leave and launched a free speech forum (mimbar bebas) outside the building. The PDI headquarters soon became the center for a grass-roots anti-government movement. Crowds gathered at the site daily to hear increasingly bold activist-speakers hurl invective at the government and the military. The strident speeches and daily demonstrations embarrassed the government by drawing attention to the regime's deliberate interference in internal party affairs, along with a plethora of New Order injustices. Those involved ignored warnings from military leaders to shut down the forum.

Amid of the free speech marathon, in the Petition of Fifty tradition, on July 1 the National Harmonious Brotherhood Foundation (YKPK), led by pro-Moerdani Generals Bambang Triantoro and Charis Suhud, issued a statement of concern over authoritarianism and the nation's deteriorating social and political situation. Twenty-four public figures, including retired military officers and civilian activists, signed the petition entitled Return to the Nation's Glorious Ideals, which was presented to Speaker of Parliament Lieutenant General Wahono, himself a former YKPK member. Wahono, Defense Minister Edi Sudrajat, General Abdul Haris Nasution and other retired officers applauded the YKPK declaration but, in a swipe at the group, Soeharto scornfully suggested the words of some retired officers were inconsistent with their earlier actions while on active military service. Former Home Affairs Minister General Rudini added his voice to the chorus of dissent, publicly complaining about ABRI's neglect of the retired officer community. Rudini went on to play a key role in the post-Soeharto era as a member of the pro-reform National Front (Barisan Nasional).

U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher visited Jakarta on July 23 and endorsed demands for greater liberty and freedom of expression. ABRI parliamentary faction member Major General Theo Syafei, a Protestant red beret officer associated with Benny Moerdani and Edi Sudrajat, particularly known for his anti-ICMI views, privately encouraged Megawati and her supporters. It was not the first time Syafei had crossed swords with the regime. As Bali-Nusa Tenggara Udayana Regional Commander in late-1993, he had angered Soeharto family members by siding with Balinese leaders to oppose construction of a tourist resort by crony pribumi capitalist Aburizal Bakrie beside Tanah Lot, one of Bali's most sacred Hindu temples.

Theo Syafei was sidelined in February 1994, after just ten months as regional commander, with a promotion to command the Armed Forces Staff and Command School (Sesko-ABRI) Commander in Bandung. Construction of the luxury resort resumed a few months later, after a harsh military crackdown on Balinese protesters.[26] In June 1995, Theo Syafei was shuttled aside into the ABRI faction. Feisal Tanjung dismissed him from Parliament in August 1997 and left him without official position after Syafei endorsed the so-called Golput (Golongan Putih, White Group) protesters who encouraged people to vote with blank (i.e., white) ballots during general elections - interpreted as tacit support for Megawati.

According to later testimony by then-ABRI Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Soeyono, President Soeharto ordered an end to the occupation at PDI headquarters during a meeting on July 19, 1996 at his Cendana residence. Nothing was in writing. Disagreement persists whether Soeharto actually ordered the attack or simply let it be known by perintah halus (vague verbal instruction) he wanted the problem solved. Feisal Tanjung, Syarwan Hamid, Army Chief Hartono, Jakarta Commander Major General Sutiyoso, National Police Chief General Dibyo Widodo, Jakarta Police Chief Major General Hamami Nata and Soeyono were present. After the meeting, Syarwan Hamid directed ABRI Intelligence Assistant-BIA Chief Major General Syamsir Siregar, Jakarta Commander Sutiyoso and Hamami Nata to develop a plan. BIA Internal Affairs Director Brigadier General Zacky Anwar Makarim and Sutiyoso's chief of staff, Brigadier General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (later president) helped plan the operation to clear the building.

Rather than employ uniformed security forces, the decision was made to use preman (hoodlum) proxies to give the impression Soerjadi's supporters had acted to regain control over the party headquarters. With help from Pemuda Pancasila leader Yorrys Raweyai (closely associated with Kopassus Commander Prabowo and the Soeharto family), BIA and the Jakarta Command recruited an estimated 1,200 preman for the operation, putting them through basic military drills near Cibubur, on the road to Bogor south of Jakarta. At the Jakarta Garrison on July 22, Soerjadi met with Yudhoyono, Zacky Anwar and their subordinates. Zacky gave Soerjadi's PDI deputy for the operation, Alex Siregar, 20 million rupiah (about $8600) as a down payment on a total 179 million rupiah BIA had allotted for the operation. Originally set for July 23, the raid was delayed four days because the plan had leaked to Megawati supporters. The operation would take place early Saturday morning, July 27, to avoid disrupting weekday commerce or the ASEAN Summit in Jakarta which would conclude on Friday. Brigadier General Yudhoyono faulted BIA for the leak and placed the revised operation under the Jakarta Command's direct control.[27]

Defense Minister Edi Sudrajat, Coordinating Minister Lieutenant General Soesilo Soedarman and Bakin Chief Lieutenant General Moetojib asked to the President to call off the operation on the grounds it could worsen the national political and security situation. Soeharto ignored their advice. Moetojib privately expressed remorse for Megawati's unfair treatment.[28] On July 25, Soeharto met Soerjadi and told him the bald devils (setan gundul, a colloquial expression for seemingly innocent but evil actors) were using the PDI for their purposes.[29] The same day, citing a request from Soerjadi, Jakarta Commander Sutiyoso announced he would shut down the free speech forum if it continued to disturb law and order. On Friday, July 26, Lieutenant General Syarwan Hamid warned the forum's anti-government speeches had exceeded the bounds of free speech.

Friday night about 100 Pemuda Pancasila thugs and 100 recruits from other preman groups led by Yorrys Raweyai and his assistant, Yan Rumbia, along with about 100 army troops (mostly Prabowo's Kopassus commandos in civilian clothing) staged in the basement of the army-owned Artha Graha Building in South Jakarta, headquarters for the Army Kartika Eka Paksi Foundation. Participants were given red PDI tee-shirts intended to give the impression it was an internal party affair. They were armed with bricks, sticks and Molotov cocktails, but no firearms. Other preman and Soerjadi supporters in similar attire joined the attackers at the PDI headquarters.

Major General Sutiyoso later maintained he had warned Megawati in advance about the plan to vacate the building. President Soeharto had let it be known he did not want the building attacked while she was present. Chief of Staff for the Jakarta Garrison Colonel Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin said Sutiyoso was excited and screamed at his staff to commence the attack immediately before Megawati arrived.

Sutiyoso

Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin

Hundreds of poor residents from kampung neighborhoods poured into the area, pressed the police barricades and, when the police attempted to disburse them, hurled rocks and bottles at the security men. The confrontation escalated into a full-scale riot. Mobs destroyed a police post and set fire to a bank building. Police reinforcements used tear gas, batons and water cannons on the crowds. Around noon, security forces opened fire with live ammunition, killing at least three persons and injuring dozens more. Sutiyoso issued shoot-on-sight orders as looting and vandalism continued for two days. According to the preliminary investigation report released by the National Human Rights Committee (Komnas-HAM) on August 31, five people were killed, 149 hospitalized and twenty-three persons missing, along with hundreds of thousands of dollars in property damages.[30] It was the worst violence in Jakarta since the Malari riots twenty-two years earlier.

A Neo-Communist Witch Hunt

Military and government officials portrayed the July 27 Affair as the latest in a series of neo-communist threats to national stability and unity. BIA Internal Affairs Director Brigadier General Zacky Anwar Makarim had been involved with Megawati's election as PDI chair two-and-one-half years earlier. Now he supervised the round-up of more than 200 Megawati supporters and pro-democracy activists, some who were later unaccounted for and presumed dead. Following a meeting with the President on July 29, ABRI Commander Feisal Tanjung and National Police Chief Dibyo Widodo charged the illegal People's Democratic Party (Partai Rakyat Demokratis, PRD) had engineered the riots. It was a close replay of government actions to scapegoat the banned Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) and Masjumi following the January 1974 Malari riots.

A group of leftist students led by Budiman Sudjatmiko had established the PRD in May 1994 as a nongovernmental group involved primarily in labor organization. The small socialist fringe group had gone public with its manifesto as part of the Free Speech Forum on July 22, just four days before the government operation.[31] Kasospol Syarwan Hamid (a mastermind of the military operation) arrogantly declared, I can tell they are communists simply from the way they sing.[32]

The campaign to crush Megawati and her supporters was framed in the context of a government struggle against neo-communist troublemakers. Officials blamed the PRD for a range of anti-government demonstrations and disturbances across the country in the months leading up the riots. They suggested the PRD had sinisterly infiltrated the PDI and used it as a compliant vehicle for its own radical purposes - and made unsubstantiated claims that one-quarter of PRD members were the children of former PKI members, along with allegations the party had received foreign funding and encouragement from the Australian Labor Party and Amnesty International.

Even though the PRD was small and lacked a political base, the government labeled it the new PKI and warned the group's underground network was planning to provoke further unrest. The regime linked the PRD to Catholic liberation theology and, by innuendo, to the marginally Catholic former Armed Forces Commander Benny Moerdani and his supporters. Feisal Tanjung suggested a rainbow alliance of pro-democracy activists, including radical groups like the PRD, and certain retired officers were working together to undermine Pancasila and 1945 Constitution.[33]

The government campaign against the PDI also exploited the Islamic community. Lieutenant General Syarwan Hamid and other regimist officers had mounted a full-scale lobbying campaign with Muslim groups starting well before the July 27 assault. A week before the operation, he met with sixty-one pro-government youth organizations, the majority Islamic groups, condemning the free speech forum and warning about the danger from malicious organizations without form (Organisasi Tanpa Bentuk, OTB). Again on July 30, following the assault and riots, Syarwan Hamid met Islamic youth groups, including the Nahdlatul Ulama Pemuda Ansor and Pemuda Tarbiyah (a national Islamic education youth movement). They condemned the PRD and proclaimed their readiness to combat latent communism.

Regimist Muslims, Indonesian Islamic Proselytizing Council (Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia, DDII) leader Husein Umar and Indonesian Committee in Solidarity with the Muslim World (Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam, Kisdi) Chairman Ahmad Sumargono, added their voices to those alleging communist provocation and denouncing the PRD. Muhammadiyah Chairman Amien Rais chastised Megawati and gave qualified support to regime claims about communist involvement. Other Muslim groups - Pemuda Muhammadiyah, the Muslim Student Association (HMI) and the government-sponsored Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) - followed suit by endorsing the crackdown on suspected provocateurs.[34]

In early-August, PPP Chairman Ismail Hasan Metareum endorsed the military operation against Megawati's supporters. On August 11 more than 10,000 Muslim demonstrators staged an anti-communist rally at Senayan Stadium in South Jakarta and voiced support a government ban on the PRD as a communist organization. Nahdlatul Ulama Chairman Abdurrahman Wahid refused to condemn the PRD and stood alone in criticizing the government vendetta against Megawati. When the regime renewed media attacks against the Nahdlatul Ulama leader, Wahid angrily charged that Adi Sasono and Eggi Sudjana from the government-backed CIDES think tank had orchestrated the smear campaign. Wahid and Sasono exchanged public barbs. The government attacks on Wahid and unofficial sanctions on Nahdlatul Ulama businessmen took a heavy toll and threatened to undermine Wahid's leadership. After the heavy-handed government operation to remove Megawati from PDI leadership, Wahid expected an equally blunt attack on his own position as Nahdlatul Ulama Chairman.[35]

ABRI launched an anti-communist witch hunt, Operation Hantu PKI (PKI Ghost), to root out the alleged underground PRD network. Dozens were arrested. PRD Chairman Budiman Sudjatmiko and other party members went into hiding. Sudjatmiko was arrested in early-August at the home of Jesuit Father Ignatius Romo Sandyawan Sumardi, who ran a Catholic human rights advocacy group. Sudjatmiko was convicted on subversion charges and sentenced to thirteen years in prison.[36] Other PRD members and regime critics, like labor leader Mochtar Pakpahan, were also charged in the aftermath of the July 27 Affair. Fourteen were convicted and sentenced to prison terms of eighteen months to thirteen years. The PRD was driven underground but continued to operate on many university campuses.[37]

On August 16, unknown assailants in Yogyakarta severely beat Harian Bernas reporter Fuad Muhammad Sjafruddin (known as Udin). Udin had written several investigative reports about corruption and bribery involving skimming of anti-poverty funds by Bantul Bupati Colonel Sri Roso Sudarmo and other local officials, including President Soeharto's step-brother Noto Suwito. Udin had been threatened before the attack. He died three days later in the hospital. As in the Marsinah case three years earlier, military and government officials were suspected. After ignoring court summons for several years, during May 2005 Yogyakarta policeman Edy Wuryanto was sentenced to twenty months for destroying evidence in the case.

During his August 17 Independence Day speech, Soeharto congratulated the military on its response to the July 27 incident and warned of a communist resurgence. He disingenuously declared, Forcing one's own desires or forcing change by means of violence, destruction and burning of buildings and public facilities is the action of anarchy; it is not democratic and it is not responsible. Any government bears responsibility to protect society from anarchy, wherever it comes from and whatever it is based upon. That is why the security tools of the state acted strongly in overcoming the recent disturbance of 27 July in the capital. That disturbance was not closely connected with democracy. Those who incited and carried out the disturbance must bear responsibility for their actions before the law.[38]

The government's focus on the neo-communist threat deflected attention from the real issue - the government's blatant meddling in PDI internal affairs and clumsy efforts to topple Megawati as party leader. Evidence gradually surfaced that the Jakarta Command had organized the assault, apparently on the President's orders, prompting Islamic groups to demand a fresh inquiry into the 1984 Tanjung Priok massacre.[39] Dozens of troubled youth came forward, claiming they were tricked into participating in the operation, maintaining they had not been paid the money promised by Soerjadi. The preliminary Komnas-HAM report released on August 31 blamed the riots on government intervention during the Medan PDI Congress and asserted Soerjadi supporters, elements from the security apparatus and paid criminals had been involved in the PDI operation.[40]

The President rewarded those involved in the operation. Less than a month later, Jakarta Chief of Staff Bambang Yudhoyono was promoted to South Sumatra Sriwijaya Regional Commander; he was assigned as ABRI Assistant for Social-Political Affairs less than a year later, and received his third star in March 1998 in the important post of ABRI Chief of Staff for Social-Political Affairs. Former Soeharto adjutant Brigadier General Wiranto succeeded Yudhoyono as chief of staff in the Jakarta Command. Zacky Anwar Makarim was promoted to Army Security Assistant in November 1996 and moved again nine months later to head the Armed Forces Intelligence Agency. Jakarta Commander Sutiyoso was elevated to become Jakarta Governor in late-1997. Wiranto was the new Jakarta Commander. Red beret Colonel Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin (a former Soeharto bodyguard) moved up to chief of staff and later advanced to become Jakarta Commander. Pemuda Pancasila leader Yorrys Raweyai was appointed to the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). With Feisal Tanjung, Hartono, Wiranto and Subagyo and Sjafrie all holding key positions, it looked more and more like an affair of family and friends.

A major rotation (mutasi) followed the July 27 Affair, even though Feisal Tanjung had pledged no reshuffles before the general elections. Among the casualties were Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Soeyono and BIA Chief Major General Syamsir Siregar. Both were blamed for not anticipating and preventing the riots. A former presidential adjutant, Soeyono had disapproved a request from Jakarta Commander Sutiyoso for 500 million rupiah (about $200,000) for the July 27 operation and later angered Soeharto by suggesting in a magazine interview that senior officers disagreed over military involvement in the PDI takeover. Soeyono was hospitalized during the incident, following a motorcycle accident in North Sulawesi.[41] He was replaced by Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad) Commander Lieutenant General Tarub on August 15 while Army Security Assistant Major General Farid Zainuddin, Army Chief Hartono's associate, succeeded Syamsir Siregar at BIA on November 10. Soeyono took a less powerful post as Secretary General in the Defense Ministry; Siregar retired.[42]

In addition to Benny Moerdani and Edi Sudrajat, secular-nationalist officers like Bakin Chief Moetojib, Speaker of Parliament Wahono and former Army Chief and Home Affairs Minister General Rudini Puspohandojo, along with cabinet ministers Moerdiono, Sarwono Kusumaatmadja and Siswono Yudohusodo, felt the government had gone too far. In a Javanese sense, it was vulgar, far in excess of the actual threat Megawati posed to the government.[43] Wahono and Rudini suggested the repressive measures and invocation of a neo-communist threat were counterproductive, a deviation from Dual Function doctrine, and only served to turn the public against the Armed Forces. ABRI should limit repressive behavior if it expected to sustain public support for its social-political role, they asserted. Benny Moerdani privately complained Prabowo was trying to make the Special Forces into the Iraqi secret service.[44] Even former Kopkamtib Commander Admiral Sudomo (then serving as Supreme Advisory Council Chairman) criticized the clumsy operation as a serious government blunder.

The PDI operation aggravated the split between regimist and secular-nationalist officers. Vice President Try Sutrisno and Defense Minister Edi Sudrajat were gone following the March 1998 presidential election, while regimist officers Feisal Tanjung and Hartono moved into the cabinet as Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs and Home Affairs Minister, respectively. The new rivalry was between younger officers - presidential son-in-law Kopassus Commander Prabowo Subianto, representing the regimist faction, and former Soeharto adjutant Wiranto as de facto leader for the secular-nationalist group. The two generals were fierce competitors, more for personal than ideological reasons. Soeharto encouraged their rivalry and the Army's division in a continuation of his tried-and-true, divide-and-rule strategy.

In June 1997, the President appointed Wiranto to replace General Hartono as Army Chief. Wiranto succeeded Feisal Tanjung as ABRI Commander in February 1998 and the following month added the cabinet portfolio as Defense and Security Minister - while Prabowo became Kostrad Commander. Just as Sukarno's balancing act between the Army and the PKI had finally failed, Soeharto's crass exploitation of the internal army rift led to his own downfall in May 1998 as the increasingly dangerous competition between Prabowo and Wiranto erupted violently into the streets of Jakarta and other Indonesian cities.

Soeharto accrued short-term benefits from the July 27 Affair. Megawati had been neutralized, Soerjadi was discredited and the PDI fared poorly in the polls. Yet the assault on the PDI made the regime appear desperate and signaled that Soeharto, at age seventy-five, was not prepared to yield power. It hardened resolve within the pro-democracy movement. The change in attitude was apparent in the growing resentment toward Soeharto's children, who had accumulated large fortunes through blatant corruption, collusion and nepotism. Megawati's ouster marked a turning point for the reformasi movement and the beginning of the end for Soeharto, who stepped down under public pressure twenty-two months later, amid economic collapse, massive student-led pro-democracy protests and riots.

Megawati kept her silence throughout the July 27 Affair and its aftermath. She pragmatically disassociated herself with the PRD and falsely claimed she had never met its leader, Budiman Sudjatmiko.[45] Despite her silence, most Indonesians viewed Megawati sympathetically as a victim of government malice. She was a tragic figure. The July 27 operation and subsequent crack-down boosted her popularity even though it did not help the PDI in the 1997 elections. Many erstwhile PDI supporters defected to the PPP as the only credible opposition party. Even after she became vice president in October 1999, Megawati went to great lengths to distance herself from the July 27 Affair and refused to attend annual activities commemorating the tragedy, evidently to avoid antagonizing military leaders.

In response to public demands for justice in the July 27 Affair and support from President Abdurrahman Wahid, the police reopened the case in October 1999. Six high ranking officers were summoned for questioning - former ABRI Commander General Feisal Tanjung, National Police Chief Dibyo Widodo, Jakarta Commander Lieutenant General Sutiyoso (by then Jakarta Governor), Jakarta Police Chief Major General Hamami Nata, BIA Chief Major General Zacky Anwar Makarim and Chief of Staff in the Jakarta Command Lieutenant General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (then serving as Mines and Energy Minister). Yudhoyono admitted his part in the operation, apparently to prevent political opponents from using the issue against him. He claimed he had played a peripheral role in the affair. He was involved in the planning the attack and subsequent efforts to restore order. In the post-Soeharto period, Yudhoyono became a leading voice in the Armed Forces for reform. Megawati obviously forgave him since she reinstated the reformist army officer as Coordinating Minister for Security and