A History Of The British Army – Vol. VI – (1807-1809)

 This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHING—www.picklepartnerspublishing.com

To join our mailing list for new titles or for issues with our books – contact@picklepartnerspublishing.com

Or on Facebook

Text originally published in 1911 under the same title.

© Pickle Partners Publishing 2013, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

Publisher’s Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

A HISTORY OF

THE BRITISH ARMY

BY

THE HON. J. W FORTESCUE,

FROM THE EXPEDITION TO EGYPT, 1807, TO THE

BATTLE OF CORUNA JANUARY 1809

VOL. VI

1807-1809

Quae Caret Ora Cruore Nostro?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 2

MAPS AND PLANS 6

BOOK XIII CONTINUED 7

CHAPTER XIV—EUROPE/EGYPT/MEDITERREAN - 1806-1807 7

EUROPE— Napoleon and Prussia, after Jena—War between Russia and Turkey—French Relations with Spain — The Berlin Decrees— Opening of Napoleon’s First Campaign in Poland— Possible Spheres of British Forces—EGYPT—Preliminary Instructions for the Expedition to Egypt—Duckworth’s Naval Demonstration against Constantinople—General Mackenzie Fraser receives the Egyptian Command—Egyptian Politics, 1801-1803—Rivalry between English and French in Egypt to Rise of Mohammed Ali— Disembarkation of the British Force at Alexandria——Missett’s Representations to the General—First British Expedition to Rosetta—Failure and Retreat of the British Troops—Difficulties of Fraser at Alexandria—Second British Expedition to Rosetta—Slow Progress of the Siege—The Detachment at El Hamed—Retreat of Stewart from Rosetta—Destruction of the Detachment at El Hamed— Criticism of the Conduct of the Expedition—Negotiations of Fraser with Mohammed Ali——Castlereagh decides to abandon Alexandria—The British Troops evacuate Egypt—MEDITERRANEAN—Intrigues of the Court of Palermo, 1806 The Mutiny of Albanian Soldiers at Malta Results of the Battle of Eylau—Further Difficulties of Fox with the Court of Palermo—Rout of the Neapolitan Troops at Mileto—Mistaken Policy of Castlereagh in the Mediterranean—Moore succeeds Fox in the Mediterranean Command. 7

1806 7

1807 10

CHAPTER XV — ENGLAND/INDIA/SWEDEN - 1806-1807 29

ENGLAND—The Commander-in-chief’s Memorandum as to Recruiting—Resignation of the Ministry of All the Talents—State of the Forces when Castlereagh took Office—Succession of Misfortunes that fell upon him—INDIA—Sir John Cradock’s Military Reforms in Madras—Dislike among the Sepoys of the new Turbans—Growth of Discontent at Vellore—Mutiny of the Native Garrison at Vellore—The Mutiny put down by Colonel Gillespie and the Nineteenth Dragoons—Extent of the Danger—SWEDEN—Disposition of the French and Russian Troops after Eylau—Unsatisfactory British Alliance with Gustavus Adolphus—Gustavus defies Napoleon—French Troops enter Pomerania to act against Sweden—Swedish Negotiations with England to obtain Money and Men—Cathcart’s Criticism of the proposed Baltic Expedition—Convention between Sweden and Prussia—Further British Negotiations with Gustavus as to a Subsidy—A Convention finally arranged between England and Sweden—Operations of Napoleon, culminating in the Victory at Friedland—The Treaty of Tilsit—Appointment of Cathcart to command the Baltic Expedition—Ominous State of Affairs at Stralsund—EXPEDITION TO COPENHAGEN—Dangers threatening England from Alliance of France and Russia—Instructions for the Expedition against Copenhagen—Jackson’s Mission to the Court of Denmark—Secrecy observed with regard to the Expedition—Condition of Affairs at Stralsund—Surrender of Stralsund to the French—Arrival of the British Expedition at Copenhagen—Character of the British Commanders—The Defences of Copenhagen—Investment of the City by Cathcart’s Troops—Cathcart’s Dislike of his Task—Wellesley’s successful Action at Kiöge—Bombardment of Copenhagen—Capitulation of the City; the Danish Fleet surrendered —Efforts of the British Ministers to retain Zealand—Tortuous Policy of Canning—Cathcart’s Troops embark for England—Criticism of the Government’s Policy 29

1807 29

1806 31

1807 37

CHAPTER XVI — ENGLAND/PORTUGAL/MEDITERRANEAN - 1807 54

ENGLAND—Napoleon’s Wrath at the Seizure of the Danish Fleet—Castlereagh’s Militia Transfer Act—Difficulties in the Replenishment of the Militia—Castlereagh’s Attitude towards the Volunteers—State of Affairs in the Baltic in the Spring of 1808—Relations of England, Sweden, and Russia—PORTUGAL—State of Affairs in Portugal after Tilsit—Napoleon threatens Portugal with War—Resolution of the Regent to emigrate to Brazil—Negotiations of Strangford to stimulate this Resolve—Secret Convention between England and Portugal—Napoleon directs Junot to march upon Lisbon—Negotiations of Napoleon with Godoy for Partition of Portugal—Treaty of Fontainebleau—Quarrels in the Spanish Royal Family—Designs of Napoleon on Spain and Portugal—The Portuguese Regent determines to break with England—Strangford prepares to leave Lisbon—Appearance of a Russian Fleet in the Tagus—Arrival of Sir Sidney Smith’s Squadron in the Tagus—State of Affairs in Lisbon—Sir Sidney Smith threatens to blockade the Tagus—Junot’s March upon Lisbon—Final Negotiations of Strangford with the Regent—Departure of the Prince Regent for Brazil—Sir John Moore at Gibraltar with Reinforcements—Madeira surrendered to the British—MEDITERRANEAN—State of Affairs in Sicily in 1807—Moore’s Plans for Defence of Sicily—Napoleon’s Designs upon Sicily—Sherbrooke succeeds Moore in Command in Sicily—Napoleon’s Plan for the Capture of the Island—Strength of Scilla as a Post of Defence—The French capture Reggio and Scilla—Sir John Stuart appointed to Command in Sicily—Dangerous Weakness of British Troops in Sicily in 1807—Spencer’s Expedition to the Tagus—Castlereagh’s Plan for the Capture of Ceuta—Arrival of Spencer at Gibraltar—Difficulties of Ministers in 1807-1808—Relations of Napoleon with Russia, Austria, and Prussia—The Orders in Council and the Milan Decrees—Quarrel of England with the United States—Dumouriez’s Scheme for a South American Expedition—Further Schemes of the Government for a Descent upon Mexico—Criticism of the Attitude of Ministers 54

1807 54

1808 58

1807 59

1808 71

CHAPTER XVII —SWEDEN/ MEDITERRANEAN - 1808 81

SWEDEN—Designs of Russia and France upon Sweden—The Russians invade Finland—British Help offered to Sweden—Sir John Moore appointed to command the Troops for Sweden—The Cabinet’s Instructions to him—His Complaints as to the Size of the Convoy—Ill-success of Swedish Troops in Norway and Finland—Cool Reception of the British Troops by King Gustavus—Castlereagh’s further Instructions to Moore—Gustavus refuses to allow the British to land—Maladministration in Sweden—Interviews of Moore with King Gustavus—Moore decides to take back the Troops to England—The Cabinet’s Displeasure with Moore—Criticism of the Behaviour of Gustavus—MEDITERRANEAN—Affairs in Sicily during Stuart’s Command—Deterioration of the British Troops in Sicily—Description of Capri—Attack of the French upon Capri —The French capture Anacapri—Lowe besieged in Capri—Surrender of the Island to the French—Consequences of this Disaster in Sicily—Failure of Stuart as a Commander 81

1808 81

CHAPTER XVIII —SPAIN – 1807-1808 97

SPAIN—Dispositions of French Troops for Invasion of Spain—Capture of Pamplona and Barcelona by Treachery—Attempted Flight of Godoy and the Court—Abdication of Charles IV. in Favour of Ferdinand—Napoleon offers the Spanish Crown to his Brother Joseph—Ferdinand journeys to Bayonne to meet the Emperor—Napoleon commands him to renounce his Crown—Insurrection in Madrid suppressed by Murat—Forced Abdication of Ferdinand—Napoleon grants to Spain a new Constitution and King—Sir Arthur Wellesley appointed to command an Expedition to Spain—Provincial Character of the Spanish Rising Asturias begs Aid from England—Dispositions of the French Troops in Spain—Napoleon’s Misconception of the Spanish Rising—Condition of the Spanish Army in 1808—Napoleon’s Plan of Campaign—Moncey’s unsuccessful March upon Valencia—Sack of Cordova by Dupont—Dupont cut off from Madrid—The Capitulation of Baylen—Operations of General Merle in Northern Spain—Successful Defence of Saragoza against the French—Operations of Duhesme in Eastern Spain—Unsuccessful Siege of Gerona—Blake’s Plans of Campaign—Junction of the Forces of Blake and Cuesta—French Victory at Medina de Rio Seco—Entry of the new King Joseph into Madrid—Magnitude of the Spanish Successes—Character of the War 97

1807 97

1808 98

CHAPTER XIX — ENGLAND/SPAIN/PORTUGAL - 1808 115

ENGLAND—Failure of Windham’s Recruiting Schemes—Proposed Creation of a Local Militia by Castlereagh Castlereagh’s Army and Militia Reforms—His Local Militia Act—Military Projects of Ministers in 1808.—SPAIN—Relations of Dalrymple with the Spanish Leaders—Spencer’s Troops aid the Spanish Rising—PORTUGAL—Rebellion of Portugal against the French—Ministers decide to send an Army to Portugal—Sir Arthur Wellesley’s Preparations for the Campaign—Ministers determine to enlarge the Scale of the Expedition—Quarrel of Moore with the Cabinet—Appointment of Dalrymple to the Chief Command in Portugal—Moore’s Interview with Castlereagh—Ministers attempt to force Moore’s Resignation—Criticism of the Cabinet’s Intrigues against Moore 115

1808 115

CHAPTER XX — PORTUGAL - 1808 127

PORTUGAL—Arrival of Wellesley in Portugal—He decides to disembark at Mondego Bay—Junot concentrates his Force about Lisbon—Disembarkation of the British Troops—Formation of the Brigades of Wellesley's Force—March of the British upon Lisbon—Movements of the French General Loison—Description of the Position of Roliça—Numbers of the British and French Forces at Roliça—The Combat of Roliça—Brigades of Anstruther and Acland join Wellesley at Vimeiro—Burrard forbids Wellesley's Advance—Burrard's Unlucky Career—Preparations of Junot to meet the British—Description of the Ground at Vimeiro—Dispositions of the British Troops—The Battle of Vimeiro—Dalrymple forbids a Pursuit of the French—Junot's Overtures for an Armistice—Progress of the Negotiations—Terms of the Convention of Cintra—Surrender of the Russian Fleet in the Tagus 127

1808 127

CHAPTER XXI — PORTUGAL/SPAIN – 1808 151

PORTUGAL—Failure of Dalrymple as Commander-in-chief—Ill-feeling between Wellesley and Dalrymple—Relations of Wellesley and Moore—Castlereagh's further Instructions to Dalrymple—Difficulty of the General in deciding on a Course of Action—Preparations for a British Campaign in Northern Spain—Dalrymple's Difficulties with Portuguese Officials—Establishment of a Regency in Portugal—Dismay in England over the Convention of Cintra—Trial of Dalrymple by a Court of Enquiry—Judgment of the Court—Dalrymple chosen as a Scapegoat—Censure passed upon the General—SPAIN—Results of the Spanish Operations in 1808—Difficulties in the Erection of a Central Government in Spain—British Military Agents despatched to Spanish Provinces—Useless Information of Doyle from Galicia and Madrid—And of Roche and Patrick elsewhere—Premature Insurrection in Biscay—Despatch of Generals Leith and Brodrick to obtain Information—Reports of Stuart from Galicia—Wellesley's Advice to the Government respecting Spain—Spanish Council of War at Madrid—The Spanish Plan of Campaign—Moore appointed to command an Expedition to Spain—The Supreme Junta meets at Madrid—Negotiations of Bentinck with Castaños—Operations of Montijo and Blake in Northern Spain—Dispositions of the Spanish Armies in September 1808—Dispositions of the French in Spain—Operations of French and Spaniards in October—Organisation of the French Army in Spain—Relations of Napoleon with Austria and Prussia in 1808—Treaty of Erfurt between France and Russia—Passage of French Troops from Germany to Spain—Operations of Blake about Bilbao—Defeat of Blake at Zornosa—Romana's Spanish Troops escape from Denmark—Defeat of Blake by Marshal Victor at Espinosa—Soult defeats Belvedere at Gamonal—Retreat of Blake's Army to Leon—Marshal Lannes defeats Castaños at Tudela—Attempts of the Junta to defend Madrid—Napoleon and the French Army occupy Madrid—Uncertainty of the Emperor as to the whereabouts of the British Force—Position of French Troops in Spain, December 1808—Weak Points of the French Forces—Napoleon learns Moore's Plan of Campaign 151

1808 151

CHAPTER XXII — SPAIN - 1808 183

SPAIN—Burrard's Dispositions for a March on Burgos—He is superseded by Moore—Generous Relations of Burrard and Moore—Difficulties of Moore in preparing for the Campaign—Choice of the Route—Question of the Junction of Moore, Baird, and Hope—Dearth of Silver Coin hampers Moore and Baird—Formation and March of the Troops—The Government's Instructions to Baird—His Delays in setting forth—The Galician Junta forbids Baird's Troops to disembark at Coruña—Appointment of Frere as British Minister at Madrid—Baird's Money Difficulties at Coruña—Disembarkation and March of Baird's Infantry—Arrival of Baird's Cavalry at Coruña—He receives Reports of Spanish Reverses—Baird decides to retreat to Vigo—March of Moore through Portugal—And on to Salamanca—Official Report of the General as to the Outlook in Spain—Moore and Frere complain to the Supreme Junta—Moore's Letter to Frere on the State of Affairs—Charmilli appears in Spain—Moore determines to retreat upon Portugal —Discontent of the Army at his Decision—Criticism of Moore's Determination—March of Hope to rejoin Moore—Reasoning of Stuart and Frere against the Decision to retreat—Moore's Interview with the Spanish Deputies—Appointment of Sir John Cradock to Command in Portugal—Character of Charles Stewart, Castlereagh's Brother —His Relations with Moore—Fresh Despatches from Madrid reach Moore—Moore rescinds the Orders for Retreat—Charmilli's Final Interview with Moore—Criticism of Frere's Conduct .—Further Reports from Madrid reach the Army—Skirmish at Rueda—Uncertainty of the British Movements—Berthier's captured Despatch reveals the French Plans—Moore decides to advance against Soult—March of the British northward—State of Romana's Army—His misleading Reports of its Condition—Reorganisation of the British Army—Criticism of the Officers and the Army generally—Movements of Soult's Forces—Cavalry Action at Sahagun—Further Operations of Moore and Soult—Moore receives intelligence of Napoleon's March northwards—He decides to retire upon Astorga 183

1808 183

CHAPTER XXIII — SPAIN - 1808-1809 213

SPAIN—Preparations of Napoleon at Madrid—He directs Ney to march northwards—Napoleon's Passage of the Guadarrama—He receives misleading Reports of the British Movements—His Plans to intercept the British—Retreat of Moore's Army—Napoleon's Preparations for a Battle—Skirmishes between the British and Ney's Corps—Napoleon's vain Pursuit of the British to Mayorga—Misconduct of the British during the Retreat—Passage of the Esla by the British Troops—Cavalry Action at Benavente—Criticism of the Action—Franceschi's successful Operations against the Spaniards—The British and Spanish Forces unite at Astorga—Moore decides to continue the Retreat—Indiscipline in the British Army—Napoleon's Advance to Astorga—He entrusts the Pursuit of Moore to Soult, and returns to France—Moore detaches two British Brigades to march on Vigo—Misconduct of the British at Bembibre—Further Disorder at Villafranca—Paget upholds Discipline in the Reserve—Action at Cacabellos—March of the British to Lugo—Moore's Dispositions for an Action at Lugo—He continues his Retreat—Confusion of the British during the March to Betanzos—Soult pursues the Retiring British—The British march into Coruña—Soult follows close upon them—Preparations of Moore and Soult for an Action—Description of the Ground outside Coruña—Dispositions of the British—Advanced Posts of the British driven back by Soult—The French Dispositions for the Attack—The Battle of Coruña—British and French Casualties in the Action—Soult's Recognition of his Ill-success—Satisfaction in the British Ranks—Death of Moore—Embarkation of the British Troops—Their Arrival in England—Advantages gained by Moore's Campaign—Responsibility of the British Government for its Ill-success—Criticism of Moore's Opening Operations—Adverse French Criticism of Moore's Campaign—Comment upon those Criticisms—Moore's Difficulty in obtaining Information—Disloyalty among his Officers—Misconduct of the Rank and File—Moore's Success in training Troops—His Character—Nora on the British Losses in the Campaign of Coruña 213

1808 213

1809 224

NOTE ON THE RETURNS OF THE LOSSES IN THE CORUNA CAMPAIGN IN MR. OMAN’S HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR, I. 646. 255

MAPS AND PLANS

(All at the end, in the order shown by the numbers.)

Egypt, Alexandria to Rosetta

Vellore

N.E. Zealand, Copenhagen (two Maps on one Sheet)

Roliça

Vimerio

Coruña

Moore’s Campaign, Eastern Sphere

Moore’s Campaign, Western Sphere.

Spain and Portugal (General Map)

(For Europe at the Peace of Tilsit, See Vol. V. Map 17)

BOOK XIII CONTINUED

CHAPTER XIV—EUROPE/EGYPT/MEDITERREAN - 1806-1807

EUROPE— Napoleon and Prussia, after Jena—War between Russia and Turkey—French Relations with Spain — The Berlin Decrees— Opening of Napoleon’s First Campaign in Poland— Possible Spheres of British Forces—EGYPT—Preliminary Instructions for the Expedition to Egypt—Duckworth’s Naval Demonstration against Constantinople—General Mackenzie Fraser receives the Egyptian Command—Egyptian Politics, 1801-1803—Rivalry between English and French in Egypt to Rise of Mohammed Ali— Disembarkation of the British Force at Alexandria——Missett’s Representations to the General—First British Expedition to Rosetta—Failure and Retreat of the British Troops—Difficulties of Fraser at Alexandria—Second British Expedition to Rosetta—Slow Progress of the Siege—The Detachment at El Hamed—Retreat of Stewart from Rosetta—Destruction of the Detachment at El Hamed— Criticism of the Conduct of the Expedition—Negotiations of Fraser with Mohammed Ali——Castlereagh decides to abandon Alexandria—The British Troops evacuate Egypt—MEDITERRANEAN—Intrigues of the Court of Palermo, 1806 The Mutiny of Albanian Soldiers at Malta Results of the Battle of Eylau—Further Difficulties of Fox with the Court of Palermo—Rout of the Neapolitan Troops at Mileto—Mistaken Policy of Castlereagh in the Mediterranean—Moore succeeds Fox in the Mediterranean Command.

1806

Once again we return to Europe at the close of the year 1806, a Europe still ringing with the crash of Prussia’s downfall. On the 22nd of October, eight days after Jena, an emissary from King Frederick William arrived before Napoleon’s headquarters to beg for peace. The Emperor’s terms were hard. Prussia must separate herself from Russia, shut her ports to England, yield to France her possessions west of the Rhine, place Hanover and the Hanse towns at Napoleon’s disposal, hand over Magdeburg to a French garrison pending payment of an indemnity of four millions sterling, and march with France against Russia if the Tsar should invade the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. Frederick William would have accepted these degrading conditions; but his fortresses were throwing open their gates with shameful readiness to the feeblest French detachments, and Napoleon saw no reason why he should not press still harder upon Prussia. The Tsar, as we have seen, had chosen this unfortunate moment to quarrel with Turkey. The disagreement was the work of Sébastiani, who had so alarmed the Turks with the spectre of Marmont’s army, that the Sultan had removed the Russian leaders in Moldavia and Wallachia and replaced them by partisans of the French. The Russian ambassador at Constantinople thereupon announced that the armies of his master would occupy those principalities; and a Russian force shortly afterwards marched into them, entering Jassy on the 14th of November. Here therefore was open war between Russia and Turkey, wherein England as Russia’s ally must necessarily be involved, with the result that the strength which should have been turned against France was likely to be wasted against the Ottoman Empire.

Nothing could better have suited Napoleon; and fate was kind enough to give him still further aid towards the accomplishment of his ends. The overthrow of Prussia had turned every head in Prussian Poland. From Posen to Warsaw the Poles hailed the Emperor as their liberator and rushed enthusiastically to arms. Napoleon was too shrewd to let pass such an opportunity. An independent Poland signified the integrity of Turkey, and that integrity signified the preponderance of France in the Mediterranean. He promptly encouraged the movement, supplying the insurgents with Prussian arms, yet carefully avoiding to commit himself to any definite engagement on their behalf. All was now in good train for his great design, namely the separation of Russia from England, and the isolation of England by a Continental coalition. On the 27th of October he entered Berlin, and girded himself for a succession of heavy blows against his enemies. Prussia was the first sufferer. Napoleon was resolved that she should never trouble him in arms again. Far from granting his former terms, he would not concede even an armistice without occupying all Prussia to the line of the Elbe, as well as her principal fortresses on the Vistula and in Silesia and all the provinces on the right bank of the Oder. The terms were accepted from sheer helplessness by Frederick William’s emissaries on the 16th of November; but the King himself, receiving from the Tsar an assurance of support by an army of one hundred and forty thousand men, made his way to the Russian headquarters at Pultusk and resolved to fight to the end. Hitherto Napoleon had not gone further in hostility against the Royal family of Prussia than to cover the Queen with base insults in his public bulletins. He now prepared a decree for the dethronement of the House of Brandenburg, which he kept in reserve until the right moment for publication.

Spain was the next power to feel the Emperor’s displeasure. Godoy’s overtures to England became known to him at Berlin; and though, in deference to the abject apology of the Prince of the Peace, no serious notice was taken of them, yet from that moment Napoleon vowed to destroy, in his own good time, the Spanish branch of the house of Bourbon. Meanwhile he summoned the Spanish fleet to Toulon, sent five-and-twenty thousand Prussian prisoners to Spain to be subsisted at Spanish expense and, as a measure of prudence, ordered fifteen thousand of the best Spanish troops to march to the Elbe. We shall shortly meet with these troops again, first on the Baltic and later during Sir John Moore’s retreat on Coruña, for they formed the corps which is best remembered by the name of its commander, Marquis de la Romana.

Then came the turn of England. The Fifteenth Bulletin of the Grand Army had announced on the 22nd of October that the time was coming for proclaiming a Continental blockade against her; and on the 22nd of November that thunderbolt was finally launched. The preamble of the celebrated Berlin Decrees was long; its executive clause was brief. The British Isles are declared to be in a state of blockade. All commerce and correspondence with them are forbidden. I have reason to hope that this measure will strike England to the heart, wrote Napoleon on the same day to Cambacérès{1}.He did not apprehend that the weapon would in due time recoil upon himself.

Lastly, Russia was to be severed from England by sheer force of arms. All had gone well with Napoleon in Germany. The Elector of Saxony, bribed by the title of King{2} and by the hope of a share of Poland, entered the Confederation of the Rhine, and bound himself to furnish a contingent of twenty thousand men. The five Dukes of Saxony followed his example. All therefore was quiet in Napoleon’s rear; and with Poland and Turkey to distract Russia on either flank, he could advance with confidence. But the campaign was different from any that the French army had as yet experienced. The land was miserably poor, and the inhabitants were hostile. Intelligence, forage, victuals were alike unprocurable. Manœuvres were quite impossible and marches almost impossible in the sea of mud which covered the country. By great exertions the French army came up with the Russians, and on the 26th of December at Pultusk met for the first time with something that much resembled a repulse. Further prosecution of the campaign was for the present out of the question; and both armies went into winter-quarters.

It now remained to see what help the British could give to their allies in the struggle. There could be no question during the winter of dispatching a British force to the Baltic; and, owing to the call for troops in South America, no great number of infantry could be spared from any quarter. But the little army which had conquered at Maida was still free to take the field. With a considerable reinforcement of cavalry, of which there was plenty to spare in England, and a few more battalions of infantry, it could be raised to a strength sufficient to make a formidable diversion. In Upper Italy there were few French troops, the bulk of them having been drawn off to form Marmont’s army of Dalmatia; and in the Kingdom of Naples there were not above five-and-twenty thousand men, including Neapolitans in the French service. There were two ways in which a British force could have been effectively employed for relief of Russia. If raised to a strength of twenty thousand men, it might have landed at Leghorn, or even further north; in which case Marmont’s corps, which by all accounts was designed to invade Russia from the south, must certainly have been held back to meet it. If limited to ten thousand men, which number was actually ready at Messina, it might have sailed to Constantinople with a powerful fleet, and very possibly have overawed the Sultan into concession of the Russian demands. But the British Ministers, unfortunately, took no such broad view of the duty required of them. Even as Pitt before them, they refused to see that any military operation which did not immediately and directly contribute to the general object of destroying the supremacy of France, was a mere stroke in the air. They were possessed by the idea that Napoleon meditated the occupation of Egypt, and were intent, from sheer jealousy, upon being beforehand with him. They never reflected that his former invasion of Egypt had been the escapade of a desperate man, that it had been a disastrous failure, and that nothing was more to be desired than the squandering of French troops in remote lands, where there was no French fleet to protect them. Hence the Government’s action at all critical moments was apt to be both feeble and futile.

On the 21st of November Ministers sent most secret orders to General Fox at Palermo to the following effect. The preamble stated that the late proceedings of the Porte called for immediate notice. Collingwood had therefore been directed to detach five ships of the Mediterranean fleet for the purpose of taking up an offensive position against Constantinople; and Fox himself was to hold five thousand men in readiness to sail to Egypt as soon as the naval officer before Constantinople should report the outbreak of hostilities. The object of the expedition, however, was the conquest not of Egypt, but of Alexandria only, in order to prevent the French from gaining a new footing, and to uphold the party friendly to the British in the country. The commander of the troops must therefore be a man of talent in political as well as military matters, for his interference in the political dissensions of Egypt would be inevitable. But, so ran the closing sentence of the instructions, the precise line which it will be proper for him to take in the exercise of such interference would be difficult at this time to point out. This clause was exactly in the style of Henry Dundas. The instructions to all intent amounted to this. We send you with five thousand men to Egypt, where your object will be the capture of Alexandria only. You are not to occupy the country, but you are to make British influence preponderant in it. How you are to do so we do not know; but our reason for sending five thousand troops is that we are not disposed to risk more in the pursuit of our object. There could be no more perfect example of the art of misemploying the limited military forces of England.

1807

The instructions to Collingwood did not reach him until the 12th of January 1807, when as soon as possible he despatched Duckworth to Constantinople with eight ships instead of five, requesting the Russian Admiral, Siniavin, who was cruising in the Greek Archipelago, to add to them four more from his squadron. Duckworth’s orders were to demand the surrender of the Turkish fleet, and to enforce, under menace of a cannonade of the city, compliance with the British Ambassador’s demands for the dismissal of Sébastiani and for concession of the claims of Russia. On the 19th of February Duckworth passed up the Dardanelles, and found that the Ambassador had already been compelled to fly from Constantinople. He destroyed a few small vessels of the Turkish squadron with comparatively little loss; and on the 3rd of March, after spending the intervening days in addressing pompous letters to the Porte, he sailed down again. But the forts, which by the energy of Sébastiani had been manned and armed, fired heavily upon his ships as he retired; and the squadron anchored at the mouth of the straits with several vessels much damaged, and over one hundred and sixty men killed and wounded. Here Duckworth met Siniavin, who offered to join him with the whole of his own eight ships; but the British Admiral declined; and therewith the great naval demonstration against Constantinople came to an end. It was a total failure, mainly because the ships were not supported by a military force, though Duckworth cannot be said to have shown either ability or resolution. Its only result was to heighten the fame of Sébastiani, who had stimulated the Porte to resistance, and to revive the lost reputation of the Turks as a fighting people.

On the 18th of February General Fox received news{3} of the flight of the British Ambassador from Constantinople, whereupon he at once embarked a force of six thousand of all ranks{4}, two-Thirds of whom were British and the remainder foreigners in the British service. He would gladly have sent Moore in command of them, but for the fact that he himself was helpless without that officer; and it was extremely unfortunate that he did not. To find a substitute for Moore was not easy; but, in view of Windham’s directions that the commander must be a man of political as well as military ability, Fox selected the most popular officer in his army. This was Major-general Fraser Mackenzie, a frank, straightforward, and honourable gentleman of very good plain sense, but without the slightest knowledge of the higher branches of political or military science. His second in command was Major-general Wauchope, a brave and excellent officer within the narrow sphere of regimental duty, but unequal to greater things, and therefore unable to supplement the defects of his chief. For nearly a month the troops remained embarked, awaiting convoy, until at last on the 5th of March Captain Hallowell of the Tigre arrived at Messina. On the following day the expedition sailed for Alexandria.

The condition of Egypt since the expulsion of the French army by the British in 1801 had grown more and more anarchic. The British Ministers, when they found the country thrown upon their hands, tried in vain to arrange some form of government which would satisfy both the Turks, who claimed suzerainty, and the Mameluke Beys, who were the actual rulers; but, even as the French before them, they found that any arrangement but a restoration of the Beys to their original powers would be fruitless. The Turks, on the other hand, having obtained a footing in the land, were resolved upon solving all difficulties by extirpation of the Mamelukes root and branch. The British Government twice sent General John Stuart to Constantinople to endeavour to mediate between the two parties, before the British army should quit Egypt; but the Porte, being aware that the evacuation must inevitably take place very shortly, was stubborn in resisting all proposals of conciliation. Beys and Turks had come to blows early in 1802, always with advantage to the former; but in August, while Stuart was engaged on his second mission to Constantinople, hostilities were for a short while suspended. Stuart delayed the departure of the last detachment of British troops for some time in order to preserve the means of putting pressure on the Turks; but in October 1802 the position was complicated by the arrival of Sébastiani, whose mission was nominally to inquire why the evacuation had been so long deferred, but really, as was strongly suspected, to re-establish French influence in Egypt.

Meanwhile the civil war was renewed, always with success to the Mamelukes. But their numbers were small and could only be recruited by the importation of slaves, the supply of which could be cut off by the Turks; and they pressed more and more earnestly for British mediation. Stuart never ceased to ply the Turks with suggestions and propositions, dreading always that Sébastiani might succeed where he failed or, still worse, that the Mamelukes might be gained as the friends of the French. The Turkish authorities were immovable; and at last in despair Stuart went to the camp of the Beys and prevailed with them to retire northward from the Delta to Upper Egypt, there to await the issue of the negotiations which the British Ambassador was still prosecuting on their behalf at Constantinople. This done, on the 11th of March 1803 the last of the British troops embarked from Alexandria for Malta; and effective British intervention in the affairs of the country became from that moment impossible.

Upon leaving the country Stuart appointed Major Missett, lately his Military Secretary, to remain in Cairo as British Agent. Missett was described by a brother officer as clever, vain, impatient, and busy with schemes for re-establishing British influence{5}. The description would seem to be accurate, except that his cleverness included no power of judgment, and did not exclude a large element of credulity. Missett had the misfortune to be a cripple, which possibly made his mind the more active and his self-importance the more pronounced, but reduced him to the lamentable necessity of trusting to the reports of agents instead of to his own observation. He had not been long installed before a mutiny of the Albanian troops drove the Turks from Cairo{6}; whereupon the Beys, coming down country, rallied the mutineers to their own standard, captured Damietta and Rosetta, took the Turkish Viceroy prisoner, and reduced Turkish domination to the solitary stronghold of Alexandria. Both parties were now in a position to call in foreign aid, though the Turks, having command of the sea, were still the stronger. Towards the end of July there arrived a new Viceroy, Ali Pasha, from Turkey. He, however, was not more successful than his predecessor, for he suffered himself to be entrapped by the Mamelukes at Cairo, where his force was destroyed and himself after a short captivity beheaded{7}.

The triumph of the Mamelukes seemed thus to be assured, but meanwhile there was a French party and an English party among the Beys themselves; and Missett and his rival M. de Lesseps became preternaturally active in their midst. Lesseps, after informing them that the French fleet in the Mediterranean was positively destined for Egypt, invited them to receive the French troops as friends, since Napoleon desired not an occupation of the country, but merely a convenient passage to India. This overture, which was simply a device of the First Consul to decoy Nelson’s fleet to the eastern Mediterranean, threw Missett into a fever. Through the influence of Stuart, one of the Mameluke leaders, by name Elfi Bey, had been persuaded in the previous year to visit England, where he had been entertained with much attention, and had even been received by the King at Windsor. A man-of-war was provided to take him back to Egypt, where he duly arrived on the 10th of February 1804, together with ten dozen bottles of milk-punch, the purchase of which appears to have been the most solid result of his visit to the West{8}. Missett counted greatly upon Elfi’s reappearance to strengthen his own influence; but to his dismay Osman Bey Bardissi, the leader of the French party among the Mamelukes, attempted to assassinate Elfi as soon as he landed, and forced him to fly for his life into the desert. There followed a period of wild anarchy. The Albanians mutinied against the Mamelukes and drove them from Cairo; Osman and Elfi came to open war; the Bedouins seized the moment for a raid; and all was distraction. Now, however, there emerged the man who in secret was the true spring of all these movements. Whether through the reaction of French revolutionary ideas upon the Ottoman Empire, or through the weakness of the Sultan, there sprang up at this period in almost every Turkish province aspirants to independent rule. Such was, to name one among many, Ali Pasha of Janina in Albania; and such was Mohammed Ali, the Albanian leader in Egypt. He had set Mamelukes and Albanians against Turks, Mamelukes against Mamelukes, and finally Albanians against Mamelukes; and by the end of March Missett reported{9} confidently that he was aiming at independence, with the support, if not actually at the instigation, of Lesseps.

Steadily, though not without occasional checks from the Mamelukes, Mohammed Ali strengthened his position during 1804; and Missett was in despair, for the Albanian leader’s devotion to France would, as he conceived, be fatal to British ascendency. The Mamelukes took the alarm; and Elfi begged for British mediation and for three or four thousand British troops to restore order{10}. Early in 1805 the Porte sent reinforcements to Egypt with the idea of crushing first the Mamelukes and then the Albanians; but Mohammed Ali frustrated all hopes by marching on Cairo, where he besieged the Turkish Viceroy, and was acclaimed by his Albanians as Viceroy in the other’s stead. Hopeless of overthrowing him, the Porte, in July,{11} confirmed him in his new dignity; and Missett, foreseeing that Mohammed Ali would shortly take possession of Alexandria and favour French interests there, urged that a British frigate might be sent to the harbour{12}. Furiously jealous, Elfi Bey then made interest with the Porte for the expulsion of the Albanians and for the redelivery of Egypt to the Mamelukes; and a Turkish fleet and army actually arrived at Alexandria early in August to enforce this policy. Mohammed Ali, strong in the support of the French agent, defied them both. Twelve months later his position was strengthened by a stroke of luck, for the rival Beys, Osman Bardissi and Elfi, died within a few weeks of each other at the end of 1806 and beginning of 1807.

The new Viceroy’s power, therefore, in January 1807 bade fair to be finally consolidated. For four years, upon every change in the very changeable scene of Egyptian anarchy, Missett had begged for British troops to save the situation. The moment chosen by Ministers to despatch those troops was just when a strong man, hostile to British interests, was beginning to hold the country in his hand. The only weak point was Alexandria which, though not in a position to resist Mohammed Ali, was still held by a Turkish Governor and a handful of Turkish troops. However, no sooner did Missett hear that Fraser had sailed from Malta than he hastened to inform the Beys that the government of the country should be restored to them; and this, although he had no instructions to do anything of the kind, and had long before written strongly to the Cabinet that the Mamelukes were not to be trusted{13}. Misfortune dogged the unhappy British expedition from the first. On the night after it left Messina nineteen out of thirty-three sail of transports parted company with headquarters in a gale, and Fraser arrived before Alexandria on the 16th of March in the Tigre with no more than two thousand out of his six thousand men. Hallowell anchored his convoy to westward of the port; and the Governor of Alexandria, though the Turkish garrison numbered but two hundred and fifty men, closed the gates of the city against him. Missett, however, pressed the General to land at once and seize the place before Mohammed Ali’s Albanians could arrive from Rosetta to reinforce it. He represented that the population was favourable to the British, and that the Governor was wavering between the dread of an insurrection and the influence of the French consul, who had sent messengers to summon the Albanians. After some hesitation Fraser decided to accept the risk. A heavy surf was running on the shore, and the expedition had been provided with no special boats for disembarkation; but the energy of Captain Hallowell overcame all difficulties.

On the evening of the 17th a few hundred men were landed a few miles east of Marabout; and on the morning of the 18th the number was increased, with great difficulty and risk, to a thousand, when the surf became so violent as to suspend all further operations. Fraser therefore found himself literally stranded with a mere handful of men. Missett pressed him, none the less, to immediate action, which in the circumstances was probably the wisest course; and on the evening of the 18th Fraser moved towards the city. The Turks opened fire upon him with their old cannon from some ruined fortifications as he advanced; but they were driven away with little difficulty or loss; and the column pursued its way to Pompey’s Gate near the southern angle of the walls{14}. The gate, however, was barricaded; volleys of musketry were discharged from the walls; and there was no sign of assistance from the populace, which had been represented by Missett to be friendly to the British. Fraser, with great good sense, marched round the town and occupied the positions held by Abercromby in the battle of the 21st of March 1801. Throwing troops into the Castle of Aboukir, and stationing others on the cut between Lakes Mahadieh and Mareotis, he barred the two routes by which alone the Albanians could penetrate from Rosetta to Alexandria, and secured a safe disembarkation for the remainder of his army.

Early on the 20th the Apollo frigate, together with the missing transports, anchored in the Bay of Aboukir; and in the course of the day Alexandria surrendered by capitulation{15}.

The object of the expedition was thus ostensibly accomplished; and the arrival of Duckworth’s squadron on the 22nd made security doubly sure. But Fraser was still absolutely without means to decide whether it was his duty to assist the Mamelukes to drive out the Albanians, as Missett had led the Beys to expect. However, his attention was soon distracted by other matters, for on the 23rd he was amazed to hear from Missett that Alexandria was on the verge of famine. There was, according to the Agent’s account, barely a fortnight’s grain for the population within the walls; after the consumption of which the people must starve, and the army must live on salt provisions from the transports. Alexandria, he explained, depended upon the country about Rosetta for cereals, and about Rahmanieh for cattle; wherefore he entreated the General to seize these places without delay, and of course to hold them when taken{16}. In all of his many representations to the Government Missett had made no mention of this circumstance, though if his statement were true in 1807, it must have been equally true in 1803. In actual fact, as subsequent events were to show, it was not true; though it is difficult to say whether Missett alleged it in good faith, in which case he was utterly unfit to be consul, or whether he used this argument, knowing it to be false, as a lever to move Fraser to more extensive operations. From the extremely lame excuse which he offered later on for his mistake, there is every reason to suppose that the latter is the true explanation{17}. But at any rate Fraser’s position was most difficult. He was specially instructed to confine his conquest to Alexandria; and yet the Agent, who from long residence had every means of knowing the truth, insisted that without the conquest of Rosetta and Rahmanieh the retention of Alexandria was impossible. It was true that, according to Missett, the defences of Rosetta were contemptible, and the Albanians a mere savage rabble. But the place was forty miles distant from Alexandria, while Rahmanieh was even more remote; and to hold these two positions as well as the city itself and to ensure the communication between them, was a task beyond the strength of Fraser’s very moderate force.

It was difficult for him, however, not to yield to Missett’s representations. A strong man, such as Moore, would probably either have awed the Agent into the discovery of supplies, or evacuated Alexandria upon the spot; but Fraser most reluctantly gave way, and ordered Meade’s brigade of the Thirty-first and the Chasseurs Britanniques, numbering something under sixteen hundred of all ranks, with two six-pounders and two small howitzers, to march directly upon Rosetta. To command so small a detachment one general officer might have seemed amply sufficient; but Fraser in an evil moment sent Wauchope also to accompany it. Sir John Moore in Sicily when he heard of the expedition saw its faults at once. I wish, he wrote, that instead of sending a detachment of fourteen hundred men to Rosetta and Rahmanieh, Fraser had left a few hundred men to guard Alexandria, Aboukir, and the cut, and marched there himself with the body of his force.{18} But Fraser was unfortunately not a Moore. The little column started on the 29th of March, and on the 31st reached the heights of Aboumandour, which overlook Rosetta. The town was perfectly still; the gates stood open and not a defender was to be seen on the walls. According to Missett’s information the garrison might number five hundred or