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Kasserine: The Myth and Its Warning for Airland Battle Operations
Kasserine: The Myth and Its Warning for Airland Battle Operations
Kasserine: The Myth and Its Warning for Airland Battle Operations
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Kasserine: The Myth and Its Warning for Airland Battle Operations

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The paper traces the history of air and ground forces during the February 1943 battle of the Kasserine Pass. It briefly outlines the state of training of the Army and its Air Corps and their procedures for battle coordination. The report highlights the antagonisms between air and ground advocates—each attempting to wrest control of air-ground coordination responsibilities—and shows that these antagonisms coupled with the air advocates’ desire for self-determination of air power led to centralized control of tactical air power under the guise of lessons learned in battle at Kasserine.

The paper shows that the close coordination and affiliation developed between air and land forces in World War II apparently has dissipated, and that this dissipation may cause a lack of effective air support to ground forces fighting on the modern battlefield. It suggests that the Air Force is not sufficiently concerned with how, and to what effect its support of the Army will be conducted.
LanguageEnglish
PublisherLucknow Books
Release dateNov 6, 2015
ISBN9781786250797
Kasserine: The Myth and Its Warning for Airland Battle Operations

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    Book preview

    Kasserine - Lt.-Col. Alan M. Russo

    This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHING—www.picklepartnerspublishing.com

    To join our mailing list for new titles or for issues with our books – picklepublishing@gmail.com

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    Text originally published in 1985 under the same title.

    © Pickle Partners Publishing 2014, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

    Publisher’s Note

    Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

    We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

    Kasserine: The Myth and Its Warning for Airland Battle Operations

    By

    Alan M. Russo, Lieutenant Colonel, USA

    TABLE OF CONTENTS

    Contents

    TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

    ABSTRACT 5

    BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 5

    CHAPTER I — INTRODUCTION 6

    CHAPTER II — THE BATTLE FOR THE KASSERINE PASS 8

    CHAPTER III — LESSONS LEARNED FROM KASSERINE 13

    CHAPTER IV — UNITED STATES ARMY AIRLAND BATTLE DOCTRINE 23

    CHAPTER V — CONCLUSIONS 28

    REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 34

    BIBLIOGRAPHY 35

    ABSTRACT

    The paper traces the history of air and ground forces during the February 1943 battle of the Kasserine Pass. It briefly outlines the state of training of the Army and its Air Corps and their procedures for battle coordination. The report highlights the antagonisms between air and ground advocates—each attempting to wrest control of air-ground coordination responsibilities—and shows that these antagonisms coupled with the air advocates’ desire for self-determination of air power led to centralized control of tactical air power under the guise of lessons learned in battle at Kasserine.

    The paper shows that the close coordination and affiliation developed between air and land forces in World War II apparently has dissipated, and that this dissipation may cause a lack of effective air support to ground forces fighting on the modern battlefield. It suggests that the Air Force is not sufficiently concerned with how, and to what effect its support of the Army will be conducted.

    BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

    Lieutenant Colonel Alan M. Russo (U.S., United States Military Academy; M.S., Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute) has served in the United States Army as an Infantry Officer and as an Aviator. He was a platoon leader with the 82nd Airborne Division in the Dominican Republic, and a section leader, platoon leader, and company executive officer flying 0-1 (Birddog) and AH-1 (Cobra) aircraft in Vietnam with the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). Much of his experience in air-ground coordination was learned while commanding a combat aviation battalion in the Federal Republic of Germany. He is a graduate of the Army’s Command and General Staff College. He holds the Silver Star, Distinguished Flying Cross, and the Air Medal. Lieutenant Colonel Russo is a graduate of the Air War College, class of 1985.

    CHAPTER I — INTRODUCTION

    The battles fought by United States’ forces during the North African Campaign of 1942 and 1943, particularly the Battle for the Kasserine Pass of February 1943, were a breaking and testing ground for much of the employment doctrine of those forces during the remainder of the Second World War. One key aspect of that evolving doctrine—and one which persists to this day—involves the command and control of air power: that all elements of air power should be centrally controlled by an air officer serving as the air component commander for the theater commander.

    I will show that such a doctrine for control of air power was not the result of lessons learned during the fight for the Kasserine Pass as the United States Air Force insists. I will suggest that centralized control was a basic tenet of air power advocates of the era and that the announced lesson learned for command and control

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