Indochina Monographs Series

Includes over 10 maps and illustrations This monograph forms part of the Indochina Monograph series written by senior military personnel from the former Army of the Republic of Vietnam who served against the northern communist invasion. “During the war years, the Republic of Vietnam and the United States pursued a common goal; their armed forces fought against the same enemy, under the same campaign plan, with the same weapon systems, and in the same environment. The strategic approaches to fighting this war, however, evolved through several stages depending on the enemy’s kind of warfare and force structure; so did the tactics designed to counter his large-unit and guerrilla activities. This monograph endeavors, therefore, to trace back and evaluate our strategic alternatives at each stage of the war and the evolving tactics employed, with particular emphasis on the period of American withdrawal and reduced support. In the preparation of this monograph, I have expressly confined my discussions of strategy to its military aspect. While this conforms to the limited scope of a military subject, the encompassing nature of strategy, especially one conceived to face the enemy’s approach to total war, implies that for a better understanding of military strategy, the interplay of social, political, and economic factors should also be brought in as a backdrop. Therefore, wherever appropriate, I have found it necessary to place strategic discussions in the total war context.”-Author’s Introduction.

Includes over 30 maps and illustrations This monograph forms part of the Indochina Monograph series written by senior military personnel from the former Army of the Republic of Vietnam who served against the northern communist invasion. “The United States advisory mission in South Vietnam encompassed many fields of endeavor and affected almost every level of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. It was a demanding exercise of professional duties and a unique human experience for the American adviser who had not only to struggle with problems of environment and culture differences and face the complexities and hazards of the war, but also devote his time and energy to supplement our Vietnamese experience with US Army professionalism. The total effort by US advisers contributed directly and immeasurably to the development and modernization of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. To the Vietnamese officers and men who benefited from his expertise and experience, the US adviser was both a mentor and a Samaritan. Regardless of his level of assignment or branch of service, he could be subsumed by a common trait: a sincere desire to help and devotion to those he advised. Whatever his approach to advisory duties, he always performed with dedication and competence. For nearly two decades, these qualities were the hallmark of the US adviser in South Vietnam. To analyze and evaluate the United States advisory experience in its entirety is not an easy task. It cannot be accomplished thoroughly and effectively by a single author since there were several types of advisers representing different areas of specialty but all dedicated to a common goal. Therefore, each member of the Control Group for the Indochina Refugee Authored Monograph Program has made a significant contribution as we presented the Vietnamese point of view.”-Author’s preface.

Includes over 10 maps and illustrations This monograph forms part of the Indochina Monograph series written by senior military personnel from the former Army of the Republic of Vietnam who served against the northern communist invasion. “The war in Vietnam was often called an intelligence war. The challenges and responsibilities placed on the South Vietnam—United States—Free World intelligence community were great and constant. During this long war the entire intelligence program improved each day as our data base expanded, as more was learned about the elusive enemy, personnel were trained, and new procedures and techniques were tested and found effective. The most rewarding experience in intelligence activities during the Vietnam war was the very close cooperation and coordination between American and Vietnamese military intelligence personnel and systems. It was this cooperation that helped RVNAF military intelligence upgrade and become self-reliant during the post-cease-fire period. This monograph attempts to record all the facts concerning intelligence activities, its organizations and coordination procedures, its successes and failures during the period from 1965 to the final days of the Republic of Vietnam. In this attempt, one of the difficulties I faced was the lack of documentation to help make my work more accurate and more substantial. To overcome this shortcoming, I have interviewed several former colleagues of mine, American and Vietnamese, all of them highly experienced with intelligence activities in Vietnam. Apart from their invaluable contributions, most of the writing was based on my personal knowledge and experience.”-Author’s Preface.

Includes over 50 maps and illustrations This monograph forms part of the Indochina Monograph series written by senior military personnel from the former Army of the Republic of Vietnam who served against the northern communist invasion. “For several years Cambodia, under the leadership of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, had condoned the use of part of its territory by the Vietnamese Communists for infiltration routes and logistic bases. These bases supported enemy activities in South Vietnam’s Military Regions 3 and 4 and a significant part of Military Region 2 but were protected because of Cambodia’s declared neutrality. However, the change in government on 18 March 1970 provided South Vietnam and the United States the opportunity to neutralize and disrupt much of the enemy logistic system across the border. Sanctioned by the new Cambodian government and approved by the Presidents of the Republic of Vietnam and the United States, South Vietnamese and U.S. forces launched combined operations into Cambodia’s border area from 30 April to 30 June 1970. As the Assistant Chief of Staff J3 of the Joint General Staff, RVNAF, I participated in the combined planning for these historic operations with military representatives from Cambodia and the United States and then monitored the operations constantly for the Chairman JGS. In conducting my analysis I have relied on my personal involvement and observations as J3 and interviews with former members of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.” -Author’s Introduction.

This monograph forms part of the Indochina Monograph series written by senior military personnel from the former Army of the Republic of Vietnam who served against the northern communist invasion. “The Kingdom of Laos, because of geographical location, was destined to play a major role as North Vietnam endeavored to expand her area of influence throughout Indochina. This is especially true of the Laotian Panhandle which borders both South Vietnam and Cambodia. Following the March 1970 coup in Cambodia, the closure of the port of Sihanoukville to the Communists and the increasing effectiveness of navy Market Time barrier operations, southern Laos became even more important to the enemy for the movement of supplies and men to support Communist activities in South Vietnam and Cambodia. This monograph reviews and analyzes Royal Lao Government military operations and activities in the Laotian Panhandle. I have devoted special attention to the significance of the panhandle for enemy military operations in South Vietnam and Cambodia, the initiation of conventional warfare in southern Laos, lessons learned during the employment of regular and irregular forces and developments following the 1973 cease-fire. As author, I am fortunate to be able to draw on my personal experience as Commanding General of Military Region 4 from 1 July 1971 until my exodus 13 June 1975.”-Author’s Preface.

Includes over 30 maps and illustrations This monograph forms part of the Indochina Monograph series written by senior military personnel from the former Army of the Republic of Vietnam who served against the northern communist invasion. “In 1968, a U.S. presidential election year, Communist North Vietnam initiated the Tet Offensive, striking at almost all major cities and towns of South Vietnam. This general offensive was eventually defeated by the collective efforts of the Republic of Vietnam, United States and Free World Assistance forces. Four years later, in 1972—again a U.S. presidential election year—North Vietnam threw its entire military might behind an invasion to conquer the South. This time, however, South Vietnam had to fight for survival with only logistics and combat support provided by the United States. Almost all U.S. and Free World Military Assistance combat forces had been withdrawn when the first attacks began on 30 April 1972. By all standards, the Easter Offensive of 1972 was one of North Vietnam’s most significant initiatives during the Vietnam War. This all-out effort involved eventually in excess of ten divisions on each side and affected the lives of well over a million South Vietnamese people. During the eight long months of fierce fighting, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces put Vietnamization to a severe test. During the period of the Easter Offensive, I had the privilege of participating in some of its major battles, first as IV Corps and then as I Corps commander beginning in early May 1972. I visited many of our combat units as they fought the North Vietnam Army and commanded the RVNAF counteroffensive to retake Quang Tri City. My critical analysis of the enemy 1972 Easter Invasion, therefore, is based almost exclusively on my own personal observations, impressions and interviews with Vietnamese who were directly involved.”-Authors’ Preface.

Includes over 25 maps and illustrations This monograph forms part of the Indochina Monograph series written by senior military personnel from the former Army of the Republic of Vietnam who served against the northern communist invasion. “A significant aspect of the South Vietnamese counter-insurgency effort was the employment of several differently organized military and paramilitary forces, each in a different role. Among them, the Territorial Forces, which made up more than one half of the total RVNAF strength, deserved particular interest because of their vital role in pacification. Pitted against Communist local force and guerrilla units, the Territorial Forces fought a low-key warfare of their own at the grass roots level far removed from the war’s limelight. Their exploits were rarely sung, their shortcomings often unjustly criticized. But without their contributions, pacification could hardly have succeeded as it did. To evaluate the performance of the Territorial Forces, this monograph seeks to present the Vietnamese point of view on their roles and missions, development, training, employment, and support as they evolved during the war. More emphatically, it also attempts to analyze their problems and to determine if, in their actual condition, the Territorial Forces were effective enough as antithesis to Communist insurgency warfare.” -Author’s Preface.

This monograph forms part of the Indochina Monograph series written by senior military personnel from the former Army of the Republic of Vietnam who served against the northern communist invasion. “The Vietnam War was an unusual and complex experience. Directed and sustained by Communist North Vietnam under the label of national liberation, it combined the elements of insurgency and conventional warfare. It began with guerrilla tactics but developed into and concluded with open invasion. Basically, however, it remained an ideological conflict whose ultimate outcome depended on popular participation and support. The requirements to fight this war were multiple and challenging. Counterinsurgency demanded that we mobilize our resources to strengthen the regime, protect the people and obtain their allegiance, root out the enemy infrastructure, and extend our armed forces to maintain security over the national territory. All this had to be done in the midst of mounting political dissent and social divisiveness. To meet the threat of large-scale conventional attacks, we had to contend with enemy sanctuaries in neighboring countries, the inhospitable terrain of our extensive borders, and uninterrupted infiltration. However, our efforts were greatly restrained by limited forces and prevailing policies. To analyze critically the chain of events which shaped the final outcome of the war in order to learn from our failures and successes, we have drawn primarily on our first-hand knowledge of major events and our personal involvement in the conduct of war efforts. We hope that in addressing the Salient points raised in all previous monographs of this series with fresh insights, our work will be able to provide a critical, comprehensive view of the war experience on the South Vietnam side.”-Author’s Preface.

This monograph forms part of the Indochina Monograph series written by senior military personnel from the former Army of the Republic of Vietnam who served against the northern communist invasion. During the Vietnam conflict, the long and destructive war, Communist subversion, an unstable economy, several changes in government and the extended presence of Free World Military Forces combined to accentuate the basic weaknesses of South Vietnamese society: divisiveness and infighting. To evaluate the effect that South Vietnamese society had on the conduct of the war, this monograph seeks to present the Vietnamese point of view on the joint U.S.-RVN efforts to build a strong and viable South Vietnam, the impact of U.S. aid and the American presence on the South Vietnamese society, the most significant social problems that South Vietnam faced during and as a result of the war, and finally the viability of the U.S.-supported regime and its leadership. To provide this in-depth analysis we, the authors, have drawn primarily on our own experience as major witnesses of South Vietnam’s politico-social tragedy and participants in the war effort. Constructed from the combined vantage points of our positions, one in the field and exposed to the rural scene and the other in the very heart of the urban mainstream, this work thoroughly reflects the insider’s viewpoint and intimate knowledge of South Vietnamese political and social life.

This monograph forms part of the Indochina Monograph series written by senior military personnel from the former Army of the Republic of Vietnam who served against the northern communist invasion. War and politics posed many challenges to South Vietnam’s military leadership. Unlike his counterpart in some countries, the Vietnamese military commander was not simply a leader of men in combat. Depending on the level of command, he had to play his part in national politics, be himself a grass roots politician, or engage in political warfare. To achieve success, he was often expected to possess several qualities not always required of a professional military leader. The requirements of leadership, therefore, sometimes transcended the conventional framework of accepted rules and principles. Given these requirements and the fallibility of human nature, it had not always been easy to evaluate the total performance of our leadership. The dilemma we faced was that while professional competence during actual combat was a critical criteria, we could not tolerate deliberate aberrations in moral and social codes. In my analysis of the successes and failures of our leadership, I have endeavored to be fair and objective. If I seem to be laudatory of some officers while critical of others, it is not my intention to embarrass any individual. Performance has been the sole basis for all of my evaluations.

Includes over 30 maps and illustrations This monograph forms part of the Indochina Monograph series written by senior military personnel from the former Army of the Republic of Vietnam who served against the northern communist invasion. Pacification is the military, political, economic, and social process of establishing or re-establishing local government responsive to and involving the participation of the people. It includes the provision of sustained, credible territorial security, the destruction of the enemy’s underground government, the assertion or re-assertion of political control and involvement of the people in government, and the initiation of economic and social activity capable of self-sustenance and expansion. Defined as such, pacification is a broad and complex strategic concept which encompasses many fields of national endeavor. As a program implemented jointly with the U.S. military effort in South Vietnam, pacification appears to have involved every American serviceman and civilian who served there, many of whom indeed participated in conceiving the idea and helping put it to work. In the attempt to present every relevant aspect of the GVN pacification effort, I have mostly relied on my personal experience as one of the many architects who helped draw part of the blueprint and oversaw its progress, and complemented it by conducting interviews with responsible officials and studying available documentation.