Everand Logo

Welcome to Everand!

  • Discover millions of ebooks, audiobooks, and so much more with a free trial

    Only $11.99/month after trial. Cancel anytime.

    An Operational Level Analysis Of Soviet Armored Formations In The Deliberate Defense In The Battle Of Kursk, 1943
    An Operational Level Analysis Of Soviet Armored Formations In The Deliberate Defense In The Battle Of Kursk, 1943
    An Operational Level Analysis Of Soviet Armored Formations In The Deliberate Defense In The Battle Of Kursk, 1943
    Ebook144 pages1 hour

    An Operational Level Analysis Of Soviet Armored Formations In The Deliberate Defense In The Battle Of Kursk, 1943

    By Major Charles L. Crow

    ()

    Read preview

    About this ebook

    This study is an historical analysis of the Soviet operational use of tank and mechanized corps, and tank armies, in the deliberate defense at the Battle of Kursk in 1943. It centers on the question of how effective was the Red Army in employing these units during this momentous battle. Events that shaped the battle and a brief comparison of forces set the stage. A discussion of the actual battle on the Central and Voronezh Fronts is followed by an analysis of the effectiveness of the employment of the operational armored units.

    The battle analysis methodology as promulgated by the Combat Studies Institute at the United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, established the guidelines for the study. Both Western and Soviet sources were utilized. Objectivity and compatibility of all available source material were of paramount importance in establishing the validity and accuracy of various accounts.

    The study concludes the Soviets prepared superbly for the operational battle; however, execution fell short of expectations. Because this was the first time the Soviets used tank armies in battle, an analysis of Kursk serves as an excellent catalyst for subsequent examination of present Soviet defensive doctrine and the use of tank armies in defense.
    LanguageEnglish
    PublisherVerdun Press
    Release dateNov 6, 2015
    ISBN9781786252876
    An Operational Level Analysis Of Soviet Armored Formations In The Deliberate Defense In The Battle Of Kursk, 1943

    Related to An Operational Level Analysis Of Soviet Armored Formations In The Deliberate Defense In The Battle Of Kursk, 1943

    Related ebooks

    Wars & Military For You

    View More
    View More

    Related podcast episodes

    Related articles

    • Article

      Germany

      Apr 18, 2019

      Germany
      7 min read

    • Article

      Taking Riga By Storm

      Apr 25, 2023

      Taking Riga By Storm
      11 min read

    • Article

      On Combat In The East

      Jul 11, 2023

      On Combat In The East
      6 min read

    • Article

      The Royal Tiger’s Last Roar

      May 7, 2021

      The Royal Tiger’s Last Roar
      6 min read

    • Article

      Golan Heights

      Apr 18, 2019

      At 14:05 on 6 October 1973, the Syrian Army unleashed a massive assault on the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. The attack was part of a two pronged assault on Israel, with the Egyptian Army having attacked across the Suez Canal only 15 minutes before

      10 min read

    • Article

      Panzerartillerie Firepower For The Panzer Divisions

      Apr 18, 2019

      Author Thomas Anderson Publisher Osprey Publishing Price £30 As the German Army formed their new doctrine of mobile warfare based around fast moving armoured columns (Blitzkrieg) in the 1930s, it became clear that artillery was going to be a major p

      1 min read

    • Article

      M10 & M10A1 TANK DESTROYER

      Mar 18, 2021

      M10 & M10A1 TANK DESTROYER
      3 min read

    • Article

      Sturmpanzerwagen A7v

      Apr 19, 2018

      Sturmpanzerwagen A7v
      4 min read

    • Article

      Spearhead To The Meuse

      Feb 26, 2020

      Spearhead To The Meuse
      2 min read

    • Article

      Panzer Invasion

      May 14, 2020

      Panzer Invasion
      12 min read

    • Article

      Rest Of The World

      Apr 18, 2019

      Rest Of The World
      7 min read

    • Article

      Hardware Merkava Mk II

      Mar 5, 2019

      Hardware Merkava Mk II
      2 min read

    • Article

      Operation Bodenplatte

      Feb 26, 2020

      Operation Bodenplatte
      2 min read

    • Article

      Hardware IS-2

      Sep 3, 2019

      Hardware IS-2
      2 min read

    • Article

      Cambrai Dawn Of The Tank Age

      Oct 30, 2017

      Cambrai Dawn Of The Tank Age
      13 min read

    • Article

      The Battle Of St Vith

      Feb 26, 2020

      The Battle Of St Vith
      6 min read

    • Article

      Battle For Kharkiv

      Apr 14, 2022

      Battle For Kharkiv
      1 min read

    • Article

      Wellington Rifles

      Jun 14, 2018

      Wellington Rifles
      7 min read

    • Article

      5 Best Books On Waterloo

      Oct 4, 2018

      Many books were released for the bicentennial of Waterloo, but few were as clearly written and as challenging as Glover’s monograph. Highlighting many myths about the battle, the author provides convincing evidence to support his version of the event

      1 min read

    • Article

      The House On Dead Man’s Corner

      Nov 7, 2021

      The House On Dead Man’s Corner
      2 min read

    • Article

      Russia

      Apr 18, 2019

      Russia
      8 min read

    • Article

      A Controversial Question

      Oct 6, 2020

      A Controversial Question
      2 min read

    • Article

      The Volkssturm

      Dec 4, 2020

      The Volkssturm
      5 min read

    • Article

      Emperor Of The North

      Nov 25, 2021

      Emperor Of The North
      11 min read

    Related categories

    Reviews for An Operational Level Analysis Of Soviet Armored Formations In The Deliberate Defense In The Battle Of Kursk, 1943

    0 ratings

    0 ratings0 reviews

    What did you think?

    Tap to rate

    Review must be at least 10 words

      Book preview

      An Operational Level Analysis Of Soviet Armored Formations In The Deliberate Defense In The Battle Of Kursk, 1943 - Major Charles L. Crow

      This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHING—www.picklepartnerspublishing.com

      To join our mailing list for new titles or for issues with our books – picklepublishing@gmail.com

      Or on Facebook

      Text originally published in 1985 under the same title.

      © Pickle Partners Publishing 2015, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

      Publisher’s Note

      Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

      We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

      AN OPERATIONAL LEVEL ANALYSIS OF SOVIET ARMORED FORMATIONS IN THE DELIBERATE DEFENSE IN THE BATTLE OF KURSK, 1943

      By

      Major Charles L. Crow, USA

      TABLE OF CONTENTS

      Contents

      TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

      ABSTRACT 5

      LIST OF MAPS 6

      CHAPTER 1—INTRODUCTION 7

      CHAPTER II—THE STRATEGIC SETTING 13

      CHAPTER III—THE BATTLE 26

      CHAPTER IV—ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE 48

      CHAPTER V—IMPLICATIONS FOR TODAY 56

      CHAPTER VI—CONCLUSIONS 62

      APPENDIX A—NINTH ARMY ORGANIZATION 63

      APPENDIX B—ARMY GROUP SOUTH ORGANIZATION 64

      APPENDIX C—CENTRAL AND VORONEZH FRONTS ORGANIZATION 65

      REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 66

      BIBLIOGRAPHY 67

      DOCUMENTS 67

      Theses and Dissertations 68

      BOOKS 69

      Articles and Chapters 71

      JOURNALS 73

      NEWSPAPERS 74

      REFERENCES 74

      MAP A—Soviet January 1943 Offensive 75

      MAP B—Manstein’s Counteroffensive 76

      MAP C—East Front Situation Prior to Kursk 77

      MAP D—The Kursk Salient, July 1943 78

      MAP E—Soviet Defensive Belts 79

      MAP F—German Unit Missions 80

      MAP G—The Central Front, 5-9 July 1943 81

      MAP H—The Voronezh Front, 4-12 July 1943 82

      MAP I—Soviet Operational Employment 83

      ABSTRACT

      This study is an historical analysis of the Soviet operational use of tank and mechanized corps, and tank armies, in the deliberate defense at the Battle of Kursk in 1943. It centers on the question of how effective was the Red Army in employing these units during this momentous battle. Events that shaped the battle and a brief comparison of forces set the stage. A discussion of the actual battle on the Central and Voronezh Fronts is followed by an analysis of the effectiveness of the employment of the operational armored units.

      The battle analysis methodology as promulgated by the Combat Studies Institute at the United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, established the guidelines for the study. Both Western and Soviet sources were utilized. Objectivity and compatibility of all available source material were of paramount importance in establishing the validity and accuracy of various accounts.

      The study concludes the Soviets prepared superbly for the operational battle; however, execution fell short of expectations. Because this was the first time the Soviets used tank armies in battle, an analysis of Kursk serves as an excellent catalyst for subsequent examination of present Soviet defensive doctrine and the use of tank armies in defense.

      LIST OF MAPS

      MAP

      A. Soviet January 1943 Offensive

      B. Manstein’s Counteroffensive

      C. East Front Situation Prior to Kursk

      D. The Kursk Salient, July 1943

      E. Soviet Defensive Belts

      F. German Unit Missions

      G. The Central Front, 5-9 July 1943

      H. The Voronezh Front, 4-12 July 1943

      I. Soviet Operational Employment

      CHAPTER 1—INTRODUCTION

      On 5 July 1943, Operation Citadel, one of the greatest battles in history, was heralded by the opening salvo of thousands of guns on the Eastern Front in Russia. Hitler had staked the majority of his elite panzer forces on a bid to regain the strategic initiative over the Soviet Union. This battle was to be a beacon for the whole world {1} of the might of the German Wehrmacht; at the same time, Hitler expected to reverse the string of recent German defeats in the east. For his part, Stalin sought to inflict yet another defeat upon the hated German invaders. Based on detailed information supplied from a well-placed source in the German High Command, the Soviets prepared the most elaborate defense in history in the Kursk salient. Following two weeks of battle, the pride of the Wehrmacht and the Third Reich lay decimated on the fields of Mother Russia. The once elite panzer forces, victors over Poland, France, the Balkans, and the initial strike into the Soviet Union, lay in ruin, defeated by the Bolshevik hordes.

      Over two and a quarter million soldiers, six thousand tanks and assault guns, five thousand aircraft and thirty thousand pieces of artillery clashed in what many classify as the death knell of the German forces in the crusade against communism in the east. {2} The Battle of Moscow in December 1941 had demonstrated to the world that the German war machine was not invincible. The Battle of Stalingrad in early 1943 had truly stunned the Germans and had inflicted casualties of staggering proportions on the Wehrmacht. Kursk and the subsequent Soviet offensives insured Soviet victory in the East. The Red Army seized the strategic initiative in July 1943 and never relinquished it. From this time forward, it was the Germans who were forced to react to Soviet initiatives until final defeat in the ruins of Berlin in May 1945.

      Although Kursk has been the subject of numerous studies, we have not exhausted all avenues of investigation of this colossal battle. The staggering magnitude of the Battle of Kursk almost defies the imagination both in numbers of personnel and equipment committed and in results attained when viewed in context. Despite this, there is an appalling lack of knowledge concerning this battle in the west, particularly in the United States Army. The Soviets feel that this battle was the turning point of the war and they harbor deep resentment at the seeming downgrading of this feat of Soviet arms. {3} Kursk offers a multitude of opportunities for study, but one of the most intriguing is the Soviet use of their armored troops. Without discrediting the Soviet infantryman, who covered himself with glory in the battle, it was the armored and mechanized units that struggled and triumphed over the German panzers in the July heat at Kursk in 1943. These were the formations forged in battle the preceding two years against the German Wehrmacht. Now, battle hardened and flushed with victory from Stalingrad, these tankers and mechanized infantry defied Hitler’s finest and overcame tremendous odds.

      Soviet operational employment of armored and mechanized forces throughout the war was part of an evolutionary process. Prior to the German invasion, Soviet military thought had been the catalyst for the development of armored and mechanized corps. When large mechanized and armored units were employed in Spain during the Spanish Civil War, the wrong conclusions were drawn, and the corps organization was dropped in favor of separate armored brigades. German successes, combined with the experience of the Soviet-Finnish war, forced the Soviets to realize that armored and mechanized corps were not only viable, but necessary. Massed armor was to dominate the field of battle.

      Unfortunately, the German invasion caught the Red Army in the midst of a reorganization process. Based on an analysis of German successes in France and as a result of comprehensive wargames finished in January 1941, twenty-nine mechanized corps were to be established. {4} However, lack of equipment, poor command and control capabilities, and inexperienced leadership, in conjunction with unproven doctrine, contributed to the initial failure of these formations. By mid-July 1941, the mechanized corps had been abolished and replaced, by and large, with separate armored brigades. By 1942, tank and mechanized corps were in use again. During this stage of the war, the Red Army had proven itself a deadly adversary. Its armored and mechanized units had begun to assume a definitive form; and, despite faulty employment, these units were becoming a major influence on the battlefield.

      Toward the end of what the Soviets refer to as phase II of the Great Patriotic War, November 1942 to December 1943, the Red Army began forming tank armies. The Soviets had an effective doctrine for employing corps level units, but the method of employment of the new tank armies was still in the infant stage. The Battle of Kursk was to give the Red Army ample experience in employing large armored forces in a deliberate defense against blitzkrieg style tactics. {5}

      This thesis proposes to conduct an operational-level analysis of Soviet armored formations in the deliberate defense during the Battle of Kursk in 1943. Because the battle effectively took place on two distinct fronts, this study will evaluate the use of armored forces in two dissimilar situations. On the northern face of the salient, the German attack was conventional, with infantry preceding the panzers to make a penetration for exploitation by massed armor. In the south, The German commander, Erich von Manstein, employed different tactics. Because of a severe shortage of infantry, the German assault here opened with a massive use of panzers in the first wave in an effort to seek a quick penetration.

      How effective was the Red Army in using its new strength in the deliberate defense? Obviously, the Soviets were the victors in the Battle of Kursk; but did their victory stem from an overwhelming superiority in

      Enjoying the preview?
      Page 1 of 1