The Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905
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About this ebook
Geoffrey Jukes
After leaving Oxford in 1953 Geoffrey Jukes spent 14 years in the UK Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Colonial Office, specializing in Russian/Soviet military history, strategy and arms control. From 1967 to 1993 he was also on the staff of the Australian National University, and until his death in 2010 he was an Associate of the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies.
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Reviews for The Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905
14 ratings1 review
- Rating: 3 out of 5 stars3/5This is part of the Osprey “Essential History” series, by military historian Geoffrey Jukes. Osprey is known for small, illustrated paperbacks depicting various military units of history and directed at modelers and miniatures painters; they have now branched out into war and campaign histories.I’ve read one previous work on the Russo-Japanese War (Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear); the Osprey book is much smaller and more directed toward a popular audience, with more illustrations. The illustrations are a mix of contemporary photographs and paintings; these are interesting enough for a history of wartime propaganda (the painting of an angel depositing laurels on the heads of Russian troops marching out of Port Arthur is particularly bizarre). The maps are excellent; Osprey has always used color well and it makes it easier to follow troop and ship movements. On the whole, though, this is not as good as a more formal history. There are a couple of interesting things, though. In my earlier review it was noted that the Japanese had a superior supply system and someone commented that the Russians must have had a truly awful one since many Japanese troops came down with beriberi. As it turns out, Jukes observes this as well but it seems to be more of a lack of nutritional knowledge than lack of food. Foreign observers noted that Russian troops were not provided with food or water on the railroad journey to the front, while the Japanese had set up an elaborate system of dining halls where an entire trainload would stop, be fed, and be on their way. The dining halls even had a sort of trolley system to wheel cartloads of food around. The Russians did a lot more looting for food than the Japanese, which made the Japanese more popular with Chinese civilians and therefore more likely to be provided with logistic and intelligence help (although the Japanese were not the slightest bit averse to expressing displeasure, typically by decapitation, with Chinese who were not cooperative enough).Jukes notes that the Battle of Mukden was the largest land battle that had ever been fought up to that time. I was a little surprised by that but on reflection couldn’t think of another candidate – there were around 300K Russian troops versus 250K Japanese; the Japanese had 15892 dead and 59612 wounded versus about 40000 Russian killed, missing or POW and about 49000 wounded; the casualty lists, then, were larger than the entire active forces in (for example) Napoleonic and American Civil War campaigns.Jukes makes another interesting observation; it’s already been noted that the Japanese were scrupulously correct in their treatment of Russian POWs and wounded. He also notes that foreign observers commented that the Russians were also correct; five field hospitals abandoned in the retreat from Mukden contained 600 Russians and 260 Japanese, who were being treated equally as far as the observers could tell. The interesting thing here is the large number of Japanese wounded in a Russian hospital; this implies that not only were the Japanese not mistreating POWs, their own soldiers must have been somewhat more likely to surrender if there were that many in Russian hands, even wounded ones.As mentioned, lots of color illustrations of dubious value. No foot- or endnotes and the index is small and not very comprehensive. The bibliography is short but includes a recently (2000) republished 5-volume set of reports by British officers attached to the Russian and Japanese armies.
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The Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905 - Geoffrey Jukes
Introduction
Occupying a vast plain without natural defences such as seas and mountains, Russia long equated security with expansion, protecting earlier territorial acquisitions by adding new ones. From the 1850s, prevented from expansion to the west by Germany and Austria-Hungary and to the south by the British and French shoring-up of the Ottoman Empire, the tsars turned their attention to central Asia and the Far East.
The name Vladivostok (‘Rule the East’), given to the settlement established on the Sea of Japan in 1860, was an unequivocal statement of ambition, as were the treaties forced on China in respect of central Asian territories and the Amur river valley from 1860. Kamchatka had been acquired in the seventeenth century and in 1855 so had all bar the most southerly islands of the Kuriles chain, separating the Sea of Okhotsk from the Pacific Ocean. Twenty years later the Kuriles were ceded to Japan in exchange for the large island of Sakhalin.
From 1798, Alaska was Russian, and there was settlement briefly as far south as northern California. Tsar Nicholas I (1825–1856) declaimed that where the Russian flag had been raised, it should never be lowered. This did not prevent his successor, Alexander II, selling Alaska to the USA in 1867, but the sale signified not an end to expansion but the decline of the principal resource (sea-otter and seal pelts) that had brought the Russian–American Company there. Expansion at the expense of the weak central Asian Khanates continued, and acquisitive eyes turned to China’s northern territory, Manchuria, and vassal state, Korea.
Russia was not uniquely expansionist. Darwin’s publication of the Origin of Species in 1859 had an unintended spin-off, Social Darwinism, which justified subjugation of other peoples as fulfilling nature’s laws. Japan, a late entrant to the race for territory, would prove as expansionist as any, and its ambitions would soon clash with those of Russia.
For well over 200 years Japan maintained almost total isolation from the outside world, but in 1855 visits by American and Russian naval squadrons extracted visiting rights to some Japanese ports. Attempts to resist served only to demonstrate the superiority of the foreigners’ military and naval technology, and in 1868 Japan embarked on a thorough programme of modernisation, encapsulated in the slogan ‘Rich country. Strong army’. Individuals were sent abroad, to seek out the best ‘models’, and to learn the appropriate skills.
The model first chosen for the Japanese Army was that of France, but following its defeat by Prussia in 1870/71, Prussian military instructors took over in the late 1870s. The Royal Navy was chosen as the model for the nascent Japanese Navy, and naval officers, including the future Admiral Togo, were sent to England to study and train, while warships were ordered from British shipyards.
Along with this physical modernisation, universal primary education incorporating strong nationalist indoctrination was introduced. So too was a cult attached to the emperor, which claimed he was a direct descendant of the sun goddess Omikami Amaterasu, whose father, Izanagi, and grandson, Ninigi, featured in Japanese creation mythology as respectively creator of Japan and founder of its ruling dynasty. Two other belief systems existed, Buddhism and Confucianism, both ‘imported’ from China in the first millennium. They were not banned, but from 1889 teaching them in schools was forbidden, and Shintoism, considered indigenous, older and the ‘way of the gods’, was proclaimed the state ethic. It taught that those who died in wars returned to fight in spirit alongside their descendants, and that death for emperor and country was the noblest end one could meet. Buddhists could readily see that as guaranteeing reincarnation to a better life, while the Confucian emphasis on loyalty and the idea that rulers enjoyed the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ were consistent with Shintoist concepts of the dead guarding their descendants – and of the emperor as a living god. In this way the three belief systems reinforced each other to inspire an unusually strong national spirit.
The attention of this new Japan turned first to Korea, which had been a vassal state of China since 1644. Its location made it a potential base for an invasion of Japan, but also a bridgehead for Japanese expansion onto the Asian mainland. In 1894/95 Japan fought a victorious war against China, and in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, compelled China to abandon its overlordship of Korea and grant to Japan the Liaotung Peninsula in South Manchuria, including the naval base of Port Arthur.
Russia then acted to deprive Japan of its gains in both Korea and Manchuria. A Russian-supported coup eliminated the Japanese-backed Korean government, and Russia, supported by France and Germany, compelled Japan to return the Liaotung Peninsula to China. This was humiliating enough, but worse was to follow. The Treaty of Shimonoseki had imposed a large indemnity on China, which it could pay only by borrowing abroad. It could secure a loan only with a guarantor, and Russia undertook that role, gaining in return a number of concessions in China, including rights to lay railways and telegraph lines.
In November 1897 the kaiser forced China to grant Germany a 99-year lease of the ports of Kiao-chau and Tsingtao, and the British secured a lease on Wei-hai-Wei, to prevent German domination of Eastern waters. This prompted Tsar Nicholas II’s foreign minister to urge similar action, to counter Britain, then considered Russia’s main rival. Japan was not in his sights, but Nicholas’s response was to order acquisition of the Liaotung Peninsula which Russia had forced Japan to abandon less than two years previously. The Japanese government saw this as both provocative and strategically threatening, so Japan began planning for war with Russia.
Between 1897 and 1903 the Russians built the Chinese Eastern Railway, crossing Manchuria to Vladivostok and shortening the route to that port by about 350 miles compared to the Trans-Siberian Railway. The line was built to the Russian gauge, entirely Russian-administered and guarded. A new, principally Russian town, Harbin, was built to house its headquarters and as a junction with another Russian-built line, the South Manchurian Railway. This ran to the Liaotung Peninsula’s commercial port of Dalny and the naval base of Port Arthur.
Russia sought to exercise economic control over Manchuria, and prevent any other country from doing so. Its General Staff made contingency plans for a war there, but did not contemplate retreats; the military topographical service therefore gave priority to mapping Manchuria south of the Chinese Eastern Railway, but a proposal in 1900 to map North Manchuria as well was not considered important enough to fund. This would put Russia at a serious disadvantage in the war, since most of the fighting was in North Manchuria. The Japanese, by contrast, employed an extensive network of spies. They were mostly Chinese, under the control of Japanese officers disguised as Chinese; and they also included disaffected, mainly non-Russian, citizens of the Russian Empire. They supplied geographical information on all of Manchuria and adjacent areas of the Russian Far East, and the Japanese were careful to pay spies far better than the Russians did, thereby acquiring a useful number of double agents.
Russia’s main base in north-east Asia, Vladivostok, had two disadvantages. First, it was iced-up for three to four months of the year and, second, it was on the enclosed Sea of Japan, with narrow exits that a hostile navy could easily control. The first problem was tackled by steam propulsion and the icebreaker, but the second proved insuperable. The Liaotung Peninsula ports were more attractive, not only because they were ice-free, but also because they gave easy access to the high seas. Basing warships at both Port Arthur and Vladivostok entailed dividing the Pacific Squadron, but Russia’s generals did not think ‘little’ Japan would dare go to war.
In 1899 Great Britain launched the Boer War, and soon found it a far harder proposition than expected. By the end of 1901 it was internationally isolated, and worried that Russia would exploit its difficulties to invade India, or at least challenge its leading position in trade with China. Japan stood equally alone, concerned at Russia’s inroads in Manchuria and Korea and still smarting at Nicholas’s actions over the Liaotung Peninsula. Japanese suspicions intensified when during the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 over 100,000 Russian troops invaded Manchuria to relieve the siege of Harbin, then comprehensively occupied all three Manchurian provinces.
Count Tadasu Hayashi, appointed in 1900 to head the Japanese legation in London, was a longstanding advocate of Japanese military expansion, and favoured an Anglo-Japanese alliance to give Japan some support against the other European powers. The British proved receptive, and a treaty of alliance was signed on 30 January 1902. It bound