The Invasion of the Crimea: Vol. IX [Sixth Edition]: Its Origin, and an Account of its Progress Down to the Death of Lord Raglan

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Text originally published in 1877 under the same title.

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THE INVASION OF THE CRIMEA:

ITS ORIGIN, AND AN ACCOUNT OF ITS PROGRESS DOWN TO THE DEATH OF LORD RAGLAN

BY

A. W. KINGLAKE

SIXTH EDITION

VOL. IX

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS. 3

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS TO VOL. II. 4

CHAPTER I. 7

THE NEW FRENCH COMMANDER AND THE PROSPECTS OF VIGOROUS ACTION WHICH HIS LEADERSHIP SEEMED TO BE OPENING.—THE STRENGTH OF THE BELLIGERENTS.—THE PROBLEM AWAITING SOLUTION.—THE RESOLVES OF PÉLISSIER.—THE IMPENDING STRIFE BETWEEN HIM AND THE EMPEROR. 7

I.—Pélissier. 7

II—Accord between Pélissier and Lord Raglan,—Full discretion demanded,—Prospect of the two generals being able to act in full concert,—Concord also to be expected with the Sardinian contingent,—And with Omar Pasha. 8

III.—Strength of the Allies,—Of the Russians. 9

IV.—The problem to be solved by the Allies. 10

V.—Pélissier’s resolves,—Prospect of violent strife between Louis Napoleon and Pélissier. 11

CHAPTER II. 15

NEW COUNTER-APPROACHES AND CONSEQUENT FIGHTS ON THE WESTERN FLANK OF SEBASTOPOL. 15

I.— The Cimetière Ridge,—Measures for securing it taken by the French and the Russians. 15

II.—Todleben’s project,—And Khrouleff’s,—Both the projects adopted,—And executed in the night of the 21st, resulting in,—The Cimetière, counter-approach,—And the Bay-head entrenchment. 15

III.— Pélissier,—His resolve to attack the counter-approaches on the night of the 22nd,—Preparation on both sides for the night encounter. 16

IV.—Strength of the troops about to be engaged,—Attack and capture of the Bay-head counter-approach. 16

V.—The Cimetière counter-approach,—Auxiliary cannonade of the Central Bastion,—Attack and first capture of the Cimetière counter-approach,—Its recapture,—Third capture of the Cimetière counter-approach,—Fourth capture of the Work,—Fifth attack on the Work,—And its recapture by the French. 17

VI.—Course afterwards taken by the French. 18

VII.—Signals from the Volokoff tower—Their effect on Prince Gortchakoff’s determination,—His decision,—Night of the 23rd; the Cimetière counter-approach carried by the French,—And transformed into a siege-work,—Losses on each side. 19

VIII.—Ground on which the sacrifices made by Pélissier were justified. 19

CHAPTER III. 21

PÉLISSIER FIRMLY PURSUING HIS CHOSEN PLANS OF ATTACK IN DEFIANCE OF LOUIS NAPOLEON. 21

Impending strife between Louis Napoleon and Pélissier,—The Emperor,—Pélissier,—Marshal Vaillant,—Pélissier’s determination to renew the attack upon Kertch,—General Niel at the Conference,—His written protest,—21st May. Pélissier to Minister of War,—22nd May. Same to same,—Louis Napoleon to Pélissier,—Louis Napoleon again to Pélissier,—Pélissier to the Minister of War,—Louis Napoleon to Pélissier,—Pélissier to the Minister of War,—Position and lamentations of General Niel,—Niel’s entire loss of power,—Antagonism between Louis Napoleon and Pélissier,—Pélissier’s five resolves,—Louis Napoleon opposed to each of them,—Pélissier’s resistance,—His method,—Occupation by the Allies of fresh ground towards the Tchernaya,—Pélissier having his way,—Allusion to the Directory of 1796-97 and the great Buonaparte. 21

CHAPTER IV. 27

THE RENEWED EXPEDITION TO KERTCH, WITH ITS SEQUEL IN THE SEA OF AZOFF, AND ON THE CIRCASSIAN COAST. 27

I.—Relevance of some previous statements to the subject of this second Expedition,—Composition of the armada,—Its course,—The strength of Baron Wrangel,—The predicament in which he was placed,—His resolve,—The power to which he succumbed,—Baron Wrangel’s retreat,—Unopposed landing of the troops,—Sir George Brown’s measures on shore,—Baron Wrangel’s destruction of his Coast batteries,—Retreat of Russian troops,—Destruction of food by Baron Wrangel,—The squadron of Kertch,—M’Gillop’s exploits,—The fate of the squadron,—The allied navies,—Their operations,—Channel into the Azoff found and buoyed,—Miranda reaching the entrance of the Sea of Azoff,—Advance of the land forces through Kertch,—To Yeni Kalé,—The General and the Admirals meeting,—Disorders that followed the invasion,—The limited authority of Sir George Brown,—Kertch,—Its prayer to Sir George,—His rejection of their entreaties,—Disorders on the march,—And in Yeni Kalé,—Cessation of all misconduct of the English troops,—Measures taken by Sir George for the maintenance of discipline,—Their result, The Tartars in Kertch destroying and plundering,—The measures taken by Brown and by the people of Kertch,—Failure of the measures taken,—Continued disorders in Kertch,—The committers of outrage,—Further continuance of the disorders in Kertch,—Lord Raglan’s indignation,—His approval on 31st May of Brown’s measures,—His completed criticism averted,—Sir George not blameable for omitting to repress the disorders of the French,—Because virtually unable to do so,—Comment on Sir George’s course of action with respect to the disorders in Kertch,—Friendly disposition of some of the Tartars,—Sufferings entailed on the sick and wounded Russians by the pillaging of the hospitals,—Letter on their behalf from Baron Wrangel,—First results of the Kertch expedition,—The main object gained. 27

II.—The Allied Admirals entering the Sea of Azoff,—Captain Lyons of the Miranda then taking the command of the united flotilla,—Nature of the operations undertaken in the Sea of Azoff,—Fate of the four surviving warships of the Kertch squadron,—Unchallenged mastery of the Allies in the hitherto ‘closed’ sea,—Access thus obtained to the interior provinces of Russia,—As, e.g., to the country of the Don Cossacks,—The seat of industry that Lyons disturbed,—His task not one leading to battle,—His task against vessels found at sea,—And those that had fled towards land,—26th May. Operation off the Spit of Berdiansk,—The wrecks of the four war-steamers that had escaped from Kertch,—27th May. Off the town of Berdiansk,—28th May. Lyons engaging the port of Arabat,—Plan of summoning the authorities,—The rejections they elicited,—These compared with the acts of the authorities professing defiance,—Operations at Genitchi, 29th May,—1st to 3rd June. Operations at Taganrog and the mouths of the Don,—The good seamanship manifested by the French and the English,—5th June. Operations at Mariampol,—Operations at Gheisk, 6th June,—9th June. Operations on the shore of Kiten Bay,—Losses of the Russians,—Of the Allies,—Causes of their immunity,—The object of the Allies,—This in great measure baffled,—Greatness of the havoc,—Many of the destroyed vessels Greek,—The bearing of this circumstance on the Czar’s sense of dignity,—The moral stress put on Russia by taking the Sea of Azoff,—Did the Czar’s incapacity to defend his subjects tend at all to shake their old loyalty? 40

III.— Attack on Soudjak-Kalé and Anapa recommended,—Troops despatched for the purpose,—Fall of Soudjak-Kalé,—Desire to attack Anapa,—This forbidden by Louis Napoleon,—Pélissier’s determined resistance to the prohibition,—Lord Raglan’s censure on the French Emperor,—Fall of Anapa,—The enemy’s forced abandonment of the whole Circassian coast,—Troops left to guard the Straits,—The rest brought back. 50

IV.— A contrast,—General results of the Kertch expedition,—These not attained by surprise,—Nor (in the main) by defaults of Russian commanders,—The phenomenon (so far) left unexplained,—The true explanation,—Lyons the originator and eager advocate of the Expedition,—Carrying with him Admiral Bruat and Lord Raglan,—Pélissier,—His propulsion of the measure against the will of his Emperor,—Effect of the success on the mind of Louis Napoleon,—On the camps of the Allies,—On the Russians,—The stress it put on their Czar. 51

CHAPTER V. 55

OPENING OF THE THIRD BOMBARDMENT.—VICTORIOUS ASSAULTS OF ALL THE COUNTER-APPROACHES BY FRENCH AND ENGLISH TROOPS.—CONCLUSION OF THE THIRD BOMBARDMENT. 55

I.—Resolve of Pélissier and Lord Raglan to attack the counter-approaches in the Karabelnaïa,—Their concord,—The shield this afforded against Louis Napoleon’s interference,—The vain resistance of Niel,—The French Emperor’s prohibition,—Persistence of Pélissier,—The contemplated attack. 55

II.—Resources and preparatives of the garrison,—Resistance to Todleben,—Its consequence. 57

III.—Bombardment of the 6th of June,—Pélissier warmly greeted by the English troops,—Significance of their cheers,—The bombardment continued at night,—Bombardment of the 7th of June,—Effect of the bombardment,—The fire of the English guns,—Crippled state of the enemy’s works concerned in opposing the French,—The less injured state of those opposing the English,—The time for the bayonet come. 57

IV.—Plan and preparatives for the assault. 59

V.— Attack and seizure of the two White Redoubts,—Seizure and abandonment of the Zabalkansky battery,—The Russians throwing forward two battalions of their Moroum regiment,—Movement by Colonel d’Orion under Bosquet’s orders,—His overthrow of the two Moroum battalions,—400 Russians surrendering,—French soldiery far out in front,—Fruitless advances of Russian troops,—Their reported achievements. 59

VI.—The Kamtchatka Lunette to be attacked by the French,—5.30 P.M. The French troops harangued by Bosquet,—Their advance in a state of warlike effervescence,—The Vivandière,—The Lunette attacked by the French,—Their first capture of the Work,—Their impetuous advance on the Malakoff,—Their retreat when attacked in strength by General Khrouleff,—Khrouleff’s recapture of the Kamtchatka Lunette,—General Bosquet’s measures,—Second and definitive capture of the Lunette by the French,—The Malakoff judged by Todleben to be in imminent danger. 64

VII.—‘The Quarries,’—The enemy’s measures of defence,—The great and exclusive advantage about to be enjoyed by the enemy, Lord Raglan’s dispositions for the attack,—Advance of our storming parties,—Their seizure of the Work,—Capture of the collateral entrenchments,—Flight of the defenders, pursued by our troops,—Our men in the extreme front,—The tasks yet awaiting our people,—Major Armstrong,—Colonel Campbell’s command,—Colonel Grant’s meeting with Colonel Tylden,—The great strain put on the powers of those who remained,—Colonel Tylden,—Thornton Grant,—Elphinstone,—Captain, now General Viscount Wolseley, G.C.B.,—Contests maintained by infantry between two opposite batteries,—Boudistcheff’s attack,—Alternations,—The English driving the Russians back into their fortress,—Attack made by the Volhynia regiment,—Its progress,—And final discomfiture,—Conditions under which our troops fought,—Colonel Shirley,—Another Russian column advancing to attempt the recapture,—Prostrate state of most of our men,—Show of resistance attempted by some officers and men,—Its effect,—The Russian column faltering and coming to a stop,—And falling back,—The English at break of day still retaining their hold,—The share Fortune had in bringing about this result,—Execution meanwhile of the needed works,—Colonel Campbell,—Captain Wolseley. 67

VIII.—Killed, wounded, and missing,—Spoils. 74

IX.—The Allies on their advanced front,—Change experienced by the garrison and inhabitants. 74

X.— Continuance of the Third Bombardment,—The losses it caused. 75

CHAPTER VI. 76

THE SIEGE AND DEFENCE CARRIED ON TO THE CLOSE OF THE FOURTH BOMBARDMENT. 76

I.— Continued strife between the French Emperor and Pélissier,—Louis Napoleon unaware of the way in which his plan had collapsed,—How the Emperor (against his own wishes) prevented all recourse to field operations,—Course taken by Pélissier. 76

II.—The affliction endured by Pélissier,—Its apparent effect on his judgment during nearly eight days,—Changes during the interval undergone by Pélissier’s mind,—10th of June; full accord between Pélissier and Lord Raglan,—Pélissier discarding the idea of assaulting the town front,—His removal of Bosquet from command in the Karabelnaïa. 79

III.—Designed movement on the Tchernaya,—Main design of the Allies against the Karabelnaïa,—Their plan of a preliminary bombardment. 81

IV.—The fourth bombardment,—Reply of Russian batteries,—This regarded by the besiegers as weak,—The effect like that of a stratagem,—The Allies lulled into a faith that Sebastopol was ready to fall,—Exultant opinion in camp,—The force of this belief,—Its impact on the troubled mind of Pélissier,—Lord Raglan sharing the belief of the camp,—But not moved towards changes of plan,—Morning of Sunday the 17th,—Pélissier at the English headquarters,—Concerted plans of the two commanders. 82

V.— Pélissier’s sudden change of purpose,—Not imparted at the time to Lord Raglan,—Its purport,—Its bearing,—Question why Pélissier thus acted,—His change imparted to our Chief Engineer,—And by him to Lord Raglan,—Lord Raglan’s determination. 84

VI.—Night of the 17th of June. 84

VII.—Movements of English and French troops,—These movements descried by the enemy,—Bombardment at night by vertical fire,—The enemy repairing and even augmenting his batteries. 86

CHAPTER VII. 88

EIGHTEENTH OF JUNE.—ABORTIVE ATTACKS OF THE ALLIES ON THE KARABELNAÏA DEFENCES.—THE VICTORIOUS OPERATION EFFECTED BY GENERAL EYRE. 88

I.— The infantry of the garrison preparing to fulfil its task,—The garrison made aware of the besiegers’ designs,—And preparing accordingly. 88

II.—Pélissier’s dispositions. 88

III.—Post chosen by Lord Raglan,—Midnight at the French headquarters,—Pélissier’s personal movements,—What he saw and heard before sunrise. 89

IV.— General Mayran’s premature attack,—His death.—Repulse of the column. 89

V.—Pélissier vainly launching his signal,— General Brunet’s attack,—His death,—Repulse of the troops. 92

VI.—General d’Autemarre’s attack,—French troops breaking into the fortress,—The endeavour to reinforce them,—This checked. 92

VII.—The bearing of the hindrance encountered by d’Autemarre on Lord Raglan’s course of action,—Motives tending to govern Lord Raglan’s decision,—His resolve. 94

VIII.—Measures for assaulting the Redan,—The two columns under Campbell and Yea,—Sir George Brown in the immediate command,—But Lord Raglan present in person. 95

IX.— The column led by Campbell,—No means enabling the column to reach its chosen point of attack,—Advance of the covering party, the Engineers, and the bearers,—But not of the ‘main column,’—The fire encountered,—The ladder-party,—Gerald Graham and the sailors,—Murray mortally wounded,—Interposition of Colonel Tylden,—Resulting in a move towards the salient of the Redan,—Intensity of the fire confronted by Tylden,—Who was quickly struck down,—Course taken by Gerald Graham,—Disappearance of the Rifles,—Non-appearance of the ‘main column,’—What remained in this part of the field,—The ladder-party brought under shelter,—The ‘main column,’—The obstruction diverting it from the assigned course,—Course taken by the column,—Its actual and relative position when emerging,—Campbell’s previous words to Graham,—His vain expectation of a fight,—Todleben’s policy,—General Campbell killed,—Colonel Shadforth killed,—Courses that might be taken by the 57th men,—The Artakoff Battery,—The Riflemen quitting their ground.—And forming up with some men of the main column and others,—The united force moving against the Artakoff Battery,—Their subsequent course,—Lord West acceding to the command,—The resources at his disposal,—His reluctance to believe that he was powerless to execute an attack,—His direction to Gerald Graham,—State and strength of the ‘ladder-party,’—The ladder-party under Graham,—The admiration and approval bestowed on Graham and the sailors,—The sole means at Lord West’s disposal,—His vain efforts,—Orders sought and obtained,—From Sir George Brown,—The accidents which marred the advance of the column saved our troops from great sacrifices,—Losses. 96

X.—An impatient lieutenant of Sappers,—Allusion to his subsequent career. 103

XI.— Troops assembled and launched for attack on the eastern flank of the Redan,—Composition and number of force under Yea,—Strength of the column moving with him,—Advance of the column,—The works it confronted,—The fire incurred by this column,—The remains of the Riflemen coming up to the Abattis,—And clinging to the ground they had won,—Under a searching fire,—‘The Engineer officer’ at the Abattis,—The state of the ‘ladder-party,’—Duty of ‘the Engineer officer,’—Approach of Colonel Yea,—Is accosted, but killed,—Captain Jesse, too, accosted and killed,—A like fatality overtaking others—Order given by ‘the Engineer officer,’—What to expect from the despatch of fresh troops,—The duty of an officer in command,—But on whom had the command devolved?—A’Court Fisher,—The course he took,—Withdrawal of the remains of the troops,—Just praise bestowed by the authorities on A’Court Fisher,—The loss of Colonel Yea,—And of other officers and of men,—Advance and subsequent retreat of the supports. 104

XII.—Fire drawn on our trenches,—And especially on the spot where Lord Raglan was posted,—His directions to the staff,—His commanding Engineer torn from his side,—Others stricken,—The conditional measures. 109

XIII.—The bombardment ordered by Lord Raglan,—Its effect,—Losses resulting from the assaults on the Redan. 110

XIV.—Prospect opened by the success of the fire from the siege-guns,—Lord Raglan and Pélissier in communication,—The two chiefs together,—Messages from d’Autemarre. 110

XV.—Continued operations of d’Autemarre’s troops. 111

XVI.—Pélissier,—His resolve to abandon the struggle. 112

XVII.—The movement on the Tchernaya. 113

XVIII.—The attack led by General Eyre. 113

XIX.— Losses sustained in the engagements of the 18th of June. 116

XX.— The high merit of the Russian defence,—Prince Gortchakoff’s statements. 117

XXI.— Pélissier’s explanations,—The real cause of his failure,—Todleben’s comments. 118

XXII.—Costliness of General Eyre’s victory in proportion to the advantages gained. 119

CHAPTER VIII. 120

SEBASTOPOL AFTER THE ENGAGEMENT.—GENERAL TODLEBEN WOUNDED.—HIS DEFENCE OF SEBASTOPOL. 120

I.—The veil between warring armies,—Between Sebastopol and its besiegers,—The garrison. Its achievement,—Its actual state of feeling towards the close of the engagement,—The Czar’s infantry in grave need of encouragement,—Whence apparently the fabrication of the 18th of June,—Thanksgivings,—Just right of the garrison to indulge in self-gratulation. 120

II.—Todleben wounded,—And removed from Sebastopol,—The part he still took,—The way in which, until wounded, he had brought his power to bear,—The difference caused by his removal,—No thanksgivings thenceforth for the Russians,—But approaching defeat in the field,—The position of Todleben in Sebastopol,—And in the war generally. 122

III.—The glory attaching to the early defence of Sebastopol,—This kept veiled from the Russians themselves,—Words recalling the early defence of Sebastopol,—Inferences to be drawn from the early defence of Sebastopol,—Defence of Sebastopol after the 17th of October,—Todleben,—His superlative part in the war,—The maxim twice over refuted by the early defenders of Sebastopol,—His personal glory dissevered from the subsequent reverses of Russia. 125

CHAPTER IX. 130

PÉLISSIER AFTER HIS DISCOMFITURE. 130

The distressing position in which Pélissier stood,—Increased means of acting against him acquired by the Emperor,—Pélissier’s strength in adversity,—The resources he disclosed,—Opportune and successful endeavours of the English Government to check the Emperor’s interposition,—Bosquet brought back to his former command on the Heights,—And his opinion adopted by the Chief,—His resolve,—And brought to bear with effect,—Danger of the strife between Louis Napoleon and Pélissier,—The happily exerted qualities of Marshal Vaillant,—The power he wielded over the Emperor,—His tone towards Pélissier,—Success of Vaillant’s efforts to prevent a rupture,—His endeavours to solace and pacify Niel,—Long concealment of the truth by the French Government,—Pélissier,—His distinct individuality,—His great worth as a statesman upholding the great Alliance,—And resisting his Emperor’s interference in the conduct of the war,—As a commander in war. 130

CHAPTER X. 137

LORD RAGLAN: HIS (OF LATE) SMOOTH RELATIONS WITH THE HOME GOVERNMENT.—THE AFFLICTION HE SUFFERED FROM THE DISAPPOINTMENT AND LOSSES SUSTAINED ON THE 18TH OF JUNE.—HIS VITAL STRENGTH APPEARING TO GIVE WAY.—HIS GRIEF AT THE LOSS OF GENERAL ESTCOURT.—A SLIGHT AILMENT AFFECTING THE CHIEF. 137

I.—The Home Government co-operating harmoniously with Lord Raglan. 137

II.—Lord Raglan afflicted by the disappointment and losses sustained on the 18th of June,—Lord Raglan’s vital strength seeming to give way,—The strain that had been put upon him,—What within less than a year he had endured and achieved,—Yet this only one epoch in a glorious life,—The belief that care had been sapping his vital strength,—The change in his outward appearance. 139

III.—Lord Raglan afflicted by the death of General Estcourt. 144

IV.—23rd June. Lord Raglan unwell,—But not prevented from transacting laborious business,—And not confined to his house. 144

CHAPTER XI. 146

CONTINUING SIEGE OPERATIONS. 146

The French sapping more closely up to the works in the Karabelnaïa,—And preparing to establish new batteries on ground commanding the Roadstead,—The English strengthening their hold of ground captured by Eyre,—And afterwards handing it over to the charge of the French,—Continuance of the mining and counter-mining operations,—The moral effect attributed by the Russians to their vigorous counter-mining. 146

CHAPTER XII. 148

LORD RAGLAN’S INSISTENCE ON CHANGES IN THE PLAN OF THE SIEGE. 148

Memorandum of the 21st of June,—Sent to the French Headquarters,—Objections to plans involving attacks on the Great Redan,—More especially if the Flagstaff Bastion were not to be also assailed,—Assaults on the Redan from a distance out of harmony with the new French design,—Words from Lord Raglan showing the course he meant to take,—The Conference of the 24th held,—Two of the subjects known to have been there brought forward,—The grounds for anxiety they must have seemingly given,—What passed at the Conference?—Abrupt ceasing of the light shed till now by Lord Raglan’s despatches,—The position of England in conference of an anxious kind with the Chief of 100,000 men,—Signs that Lord Raglan was prevailing,—Niel’s Note of the 26th of June,—The real conclusion deducible from Niel’s answer of the 26th of June,—Continuance for some days of the better siege prospects opened to our army,—Presumption that in this matter Lord Raglan must have seen his way,—Circumstances now enabling Lord Raglan to act on Pélissier cogently,—Circumstances tending to show that Lord Raglan in this matter had before him a fair prospect of success,—But not (in his place) any other. 148

CHAPTER XIII. 153

THE DEATH OF LORD RAGLAN. 153

The last despatch of Lord Raglan,—His illness,—His faintly uttered words to General Airey,—His last hours and death,—Expression of his countenance after death,—Generals and Admirals next day in the chamber of death,—Pélissier’s agony of grief,—Official announcements and condolences,—Private letter of condolence from the Queen to Lady Raglan,—The void caused by Lord Raglan’s death,—This acutely felt by the officer who succeeded to the command,—Immediate evil to our army resulting from Lord Raglan’s death, 294 Abrupt abandonment of the negotiation he had opened with Pélissier,—Loss of weight in Anglo-French council, resulting from the death of Lord Raglan,—The sorrow of our troops,—The example of Lord Raglan chosen as a guide,—Grief of Admiral Lyons and our seamen,—Feeling of the Sardinian army,—And of Omar Pasha,—Pélissier’s celebrated General Order,—Feeling of the French army generally towards Lord Raglan,—The mortal remains of Lord Raglan conveyed with military honours to the Bay of Kazatch. 153

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER. 164

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS TO VOL. II.

MAP I. SEBASTOPOL, WITH THE EASTERN COUNTER-APPROACHES.

MAP II. SCENE OF THE FIGHT MAINTAINED BY PÉLISSIER AFTER ACCEDING TO THE SUPREME COMMAND.—THE COUNTER-APPROACHES TOWARDS THE CEMETERY DOWN TO THE 22ND OF MAY.

MAP III. THE KERTCHINE PENINSULA.

MAP IV. THE SEA OF AZOFF, AND NEIGHBOURING LANDS.

MAP V. THE ENGAGEMENT OF THE 7TH OF JUNE.

MAP VI. ABORTIVE ATTACKS OF THE 18TH OF JUNE ON THE KARABELNAÏA ENCEINTE.

MAP VII. THE RUSSIAN POSITION ATTACKED AND CARRIED BY GENERAL EYRE, ON THE 18TH OF JUNE.

CHAPTER I.

THE NEW FRENCH COMMANDER AND THE PROSPECTS OF VIGOROUS ACTION WHICH HIS LEADERSHIP SEEMED TO BE OPENING.—THE STRENGTH OF THE BELLIGERENTS.—THE PROBLEM AWAITING SOLUTION.—THE RESOLVES OF PÉLISSIER.—THE IMPENDING STRIFE BETWEEN HIM AND THE EMPEROR.

I.—Pélissier.

ON the 19th of May, the command of the now great French army was assumed in due form by Pélissier. This short, thick-set, resolute Norman had passed his sixtieth year; but the grey, the fast whitening hair that capped his powerful head, and marked the inroads of Time, wore a strange, wore an alien look, as though utterly out of true fellowship with the keen, fiery, vehement eyes, with the still dark and heavy moustache, with all the imperious features that glowed, or seemed to be glowing in the prime, or fierce midday of life. His mighty bull-neck, strongly built upon broad, massive shoulders, gave promise of hard, bloody fights, gave warning of angry moods, and even of furious outbursts.

He however, it seems, could at pleasure unleash or control his fierce rage, thus treating wrath as a power that he knew how to wield, and not suffering the strong, useful demon to have a real mastery over him. He was capable of choosing and loyally pursuing a policy. He had Norman-like gifts that well fitted him to throw his antagonists in many a wrestle for power, and to make him a chief strong in war. His accustomed manner of speech, though so forcible, and so freely unbridled as to be in a sense dramatic, was after all—not a mask, but—the genuine, though boisterous utterance of a violent, absolute man. When first meeting in conference one who, though only then commanding a corps, still expended a huge force in speech, Lord Raglan was apparently startled, if not even a little repelled, and could not help telling his Government that Pélissier ‘talked a good deal’; but he even then said, that the general so eager to speak seemed also eager to act, and he happily found before long that the Norman was ‘as good as his word.’

In one respect, it is true, Pélissier’s demeanour and speech tended strongly to mislead an observer; for, whether owing to whim or to exuberant strength, he greatly liked putting on what—apparently by a sort of convention—is accepted as the ‘roughness of camps,’ though all the while in reality he was a man of high cultivation, and, moreover, one versed in those duties—the duties, I mean, of ‘staff’ service—which try the brainpower of officers engaged in the business of war. With the aid of such training as this, he had become fully capable of having or quickly acquiring the kind of statesmanship needed by one in the exalted position of commanding a splendid French army assembled in the enemy’s presence, and, for instance, understood, to begin with, how best to maintain honest concert with the English allies at his side.

Without speaking except by mere reference of his achievements in Algeria, or recurring by more than allusion to even the caves of the Dahra, or repeating what already we have seen of his victorious self-assertion maintained against what was then lawful authority, one can say of this