Afghanistan: Sly Peace in a Failed State

AFGHANISTAN

Sly Peace in a Failed State

AFGHANISTAN

Sly Peace in a Failed State

MUSA KHAN JALALZAI

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Contents

Introduction

Chapter 1 Compromise, Consensus-Building and Trust: Missing Ingredients in Afghanistan’s Peace Negotiations

Chapter 2 The Afghan Peace Process: Strategic Policy Contradictions and Lacunas

Chapter 3 Revival of Peace Initiatives in Afghanistan: Implications for India

Chapter 4 Transformative President Najibullah and the National Reconciliation Policy Objectives, Operations and Obstacles

Chapter 5 Perils of US-Taliban Peace Negotiations

Chapter 6 Russia’s Afghan Policy in the Regional and Russia-West Contexts

Chapter 7 The Fatemiyoun, Zainabyoun, ISIS and the Future of Civil War in Afghanistan

Chapter 8 IS Penetration in Afghanistan-Pakistan: Assessment, Impact and Implications

Chapter 9 Afghanistan Teeters on the Brink

Chapter 10 Taliban, Insecurity and Peace Process in Afghanistan

Chapter 11 Challenges and Prospects for Daesh in Afghanistan and its Relations with the Taliban

Chapter 12 State-Building, Interventions and their Impact on Formal and Informal Institutions: Paradox of Contestation and Cooperation in Post-2001 Afghanistan

Chapter 13 Fragile Future: The Human Cost of Conflict in Afghanistan

Postscript

Annexures

Notes to Chapters

Bibliography

Index

Introduction

Non-Committal Peace and Untrustworthy

Negotiations in Afghanistan

I belong to no religion. My religion is love. Every heart is my

temple, and, do you know what you are? You are a manuscript of a

divine letter. You are a mirror reflecting a noble face. This universe

is not outside of you. Look inside yourself; everything that you

want, you are already that."

– (Maulana Jalaluddin Rumi).

Peace and war are two different artifacts. In war, truth is the first casualty. What is horrific about war is that men who have no personal dissension are trained to murder one another in cold blood. The late Martin Luther King once said; peace is not merely a distant goal we seek, but a means by which we arrive at that goal, and darkness cannot drive out darkness; only light can do that. Hate cannot drive out hate; only love can do that. Afghanistan has been rummaged by both war and peace, and stuck in an uninterested cycle of violence since 1980s. The imposed proxy war has shattered the lives of Afghan civilians. The United States and its NATO allies kill Afghans; test their sophisticated and nuclear weapons, destroy their economy, health, and national critical infrastructure with impunity. The US drumbeat and rumbling of an elusive peace is nothing more than witticism, and a funny story to wheedle regional states, and the Afghans as well. In May 2019 per se, more than 2,000 innocent civilians including children were killed.

Professor Brahma Chellaney has fairly said: The U.S.-led global war on terrorism has failed–and that is because it has focused on eliminating terrorists and their networks, not on defeating the jihadi ideology that inspires suicide attacks. Analyst Dr. Jonathan Schroden, Directs the Center for Stability and Development, (21 March, 2019) spotlighted some legitimate concern of Afghan civil society about the disproportionateness of elusive peace negotiations, and perceptions of so-called stabilization process: While there have been numerous attempts at negotiations throughout the war in Afghanistan, these talks have made by far the most progress to date. They have also engendered the most hand wringing, concern, and push back. Some of the worries surrounding these talks stem from legitimate concerns, such as the rights of women and minorities- concerns that the Taliban have occasionally sought to allay.¹

Afghan civil society is also deeply upset with disunity and detachment of Taliban groups-those who are tied to regional states agendas. This detachment has also left negative impacts on their fighting capabilities and public support. Regional states, the United States, NATO, Russia, China, Iran and Pakistan are active stakeholders who want peace on their own terms, while Taliban is not an independent entity to decide the future of Afghanistan, or outline long-term peace proposals. Journalists Fritz Schaap and Sergio Ramazzotti in their (Spiegel Online, January 29, 2019) investigative report noted signs of disunity among Taliban for any possible peace agreement: The disunity among the Taliban is problematic for any possible peace agreement, because it’s unlikely that every group would lay down their weapons. Many commanders have economic interests, and even if Pakistan, under pressure from the U.S., were to force Taliban leadership to strike a deal, it’s not a given that Pakistan would exert the same pressure on field commanders.²

On 28 May 2019, a group of Afghan politicians led by former President Hamid Karzai and members of the Taliban led by the Deputy Leader Mr. Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar attended a ceremony in Moscow on 100 years of Afghanistan-Russia diplomatic relations. Addressing the ceremony, Taliban’s Deputy Leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar said the Islamic Emirate wants peace, but the hurdles on the way of peace should be removed. The Islamic Emirate is firmly committed to peace, but to determine peace, first we need to address the barriers on the way of peace and that means the end of the occupation of Afghanistan, Baradar added. His address of course uncovered blank-walls and palisades established by stakeholders. Hosting Taliban delegates and Afghan politicians in an effort to promote itself as a peacemaker in Afghanistan, Russia called for the complete withdrawal of international forces from the war-ravaged country. Russia supported Taliban’s standpoint. Taliban rejected the calls for a ceasefire which was the main demand by Afghan politicians who publicly raised the demand. The second day of the meeting also focused on peace and ceasefire. Backing their Deputy leader’s stance, a Taliban spokesman told reporters that; ceasefire is not possible in presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan. How a ceasefire will be possible when the country is ‘occupied’?

War is at boiling point in Afghanistan that left much of the population traumatized. Women and children are especially affected. Today, Afghans do not fear only bombs and bullets fired by US and Afghan forces in night, they also fear ground attack night raids, in which US-Afghan Special Forces killed, and humiliated girls and women. The Islamic Terrorist State of Khorasan (2014) emerged with new fighting capabilities, blood-spattering culture of war, and looting and plundering strategies. Russia and Central Asia face unsurpassed challenges as the glares touching their doors.³ in 2018, the ISIS was crushed and threatened at the very heart of its territory by the concerted efforts of Russian and Syrian security forces, but it reemerged in a new form in Afghanistan.

On 13 April 2019, Press TV reported that the US army allowed Daesh fighter to enter Afghanistan, where reports estimated around 10,000 members of the Takfiri terrorist group reached Central Asia’s borders.⁴ The United States shamelessly used nuclear explosive bomb (Mother of Bomb) in Jalalabad on the pretext to eliminate bases of terrorist Islamic State, but things evolved differently. The World’s most acknowledged research organization (Global Research), on 03 August 2017 published article of an Afghan analyst Mr. Masud Wadan, in which the US army war crimes in Jalalabad province were spotlighted. Mr. Masud Wadan interviewed families, doctors and local tribal leaders who explained details of hazardous chemicals into the air by the US army that caused cancer, respiratory and digestive problems. However, investigations, according to Mr. Masud Wadan found that the US army also used short-range Nuclear Missiles, which prompted precarious diseases:

In an interview, an Afghan environment protection expert explained that MOAB-like bombs expose hazardous chemicals into the air that causes cancer, respiratory and digestive problems, and deformities in babies, strokes, high blood pressure and weakened vision. It severely contaminates food and water that even stay afloat to affect next generation. A psychologist, Jaffar Ahmadi, described that such blasts spawn psychological disorders and fear among the affected population. The stricken people, he says, feel petrified and insecure. According to data, MOAB annihilates living things within a range of five km and its effects persist in air for decades. It also robs away oxygen for inhalation in a matter of several km from epicenter. The Kabul-based Group ventured into villages where MOAB-hit people had a ton of words to utter. A resident of Asad Khil village, Ghazeer, said that the bomb has born health hazards. He told Killid group: My Children are scared to sleep at night. Our skin is itching; small spots have appeared on the bodies of all people here. Our throats hurt. We are scared. Another interviewee from the same village, Noor Bibi told the media group that the fierce explosion has almost blinded her. She acknowledges that: The bomb turned people blind and deaf. I can’t see anything, my skin is itching, my four grandchildren have chest problems and they also complain about their eyes. Sometime later, investigations found that the US had used short-range nuclear missiles. It left behind scores of creepy instances such as a drop in animal breeding in the area, a dramatic fall in agricultural products, and a few goats gave birth to defective babies."⁵

This is now understandable from the fact that the suspected ties between Daesh terrorist group and the US military in Afghanistan is nothing new. Former President Hamid Karzai told Al Jazeera in 2017 that the US army was colluding with Daesh in Afghanistan and helping it to cement its grip on areas in the Eastern parts of the country. In my view, under the full [US] presence, surveillance, military, political, intelligence, Daesh has emerged, he said. And for two years, the Afghan people came, cried loud about their suffering, of violations. Nothing was done. Press TV noted. Researcher and analysts, Helena Norberg-Hodge explained war crimes of the ISIS in Syria and Afghanistan:

For people in the modern world, (Local Futures/ISEC November 3, 2015) there may be nothing more difficult to comprehend than the group calling itself the Islamic State, or ISIS. The beheadings, rapes, and other acts of cruelty seem beyond understanding, as does the wanton destruction of priceless ancient monuments. Perhaps most mystifying of all is the way ISIS has been able to recruit young men—and even some young women—from the industrialized west, particularly Europe: the conventional wisdom is that the cure for ethnic and religious violence is ‘development’, education, and the opportunities provided by free markets. This seems not to be the case.⁶

The Islamic State recruited young fighter from different nationalities in Afghanistan, and Central Asia, and tested their resolve in fighting against Taliban and the Afghan security forces. In his Defense Post analysis, Mr. Pawel Wojcik (31 July 2018) supports Helena’s perceptions of the terrorist state, and argues that Daesh recruited Kurdish jihadists in Afghanistan:

One of the most interesting aspects of the ISIS recruitment effort is the role of Kurdish jihadists. One of militants involved in a deadly April 29 attack in Kabul was identified by ISKP as Qaqa al-Kurdi, a 29-year-old man of Kurdish origin. Most jihadists ISKP transfers to the Afghan capital are called Khorasani or by names more closely identifying their ethnic background (Tajiki, Uzbeki) or Pakistani tribal agencies in majority Pashtun regions (Bajouri). The Kurdish role in Islamic State Central has always been significant, with multiple video recordings of Kurdish-speaking jihadists inviting others to join ISIS.⁷

However, on 15 March 2019, Sputnik News reported the Daesh plan to control Northern Afghanistan, recruit new fighters, and adorn them with sophisticated weapons for fighting against the Central Asian states. Russian intelligence has already ventilated about the intentions of the terrorist state: The Daesh terror group has picked Northern Afghanistan as the new centre of its so-called caliphate, first Deputy Director of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), General Sergei Smirnov, told reporters following a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (SCO RATS) council.⁸ Moreover, General Sergei Smirnov also warned that the ISIS gradually controls parts of Northern Afghanistan: Terrorist groups have significantly stepped up sabotage and terrorist activities and strengthened their positions in the northern areas of Afghanistan. Armed incidents on the border have become more frequent, Gen. Smirnov said.⁹ Major source of revenue of Daesh is drug cultivation and trafficking in Afghanistan. Decades of conflict have rendered Afghanistan politically and socially, and fractured its population profoundly and violently. The elections of yesteryears also sparked violence by the Taliban and Islamic State.¹⁰

For Russia and China, one of the leading security challenges is the aggravation of war in Afghanistan where crisis phenomena continue to grow. The most violent threat is posed by the exponentially growing influence of Taliban and the ISIS Khorasan groups in Central Asia and Chinese Muslim province. More than 18 years into the battlefield in Afghanistan, US intelligence has only been marginally relevant to the fight against Taliban (Major General Michael T. Flynn-2010). They focused on information collection but failed to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which the US and NATO allies’ agencies operated. They arrested countless people like farmers, shopkeepers, religious clerics and political workers, put them in prisons, and humiliated, but failed to stabilize the country.¹¹

Pajhwok Afghan News Agency (22 May 2019) noted important points of UN Migration Agency about displacement of Afghans during the past 6 years. "One in three Afghans has migrated or been displaced in the past six years, says the International Organization for Migration (IOM). A Displacement-Tracking Matrix report on Tuesday said the organization had covered 11,443 communities in 390 districts of all 34 provinces of the country.¹² Since 2012, 3.2 million Afghan migrants and refugees returned to their homeland-around 95 percent from Iran and Pakistan. The remaining five percent came back mainly from Europe and Turkey. Many of the returnees (15% or 49,000) settled in Nangarhar".¹³ During the last six-year, 3.5 million Afghans were internally displaced due to conflict, violence, human rights violations or natural disasters.¹⁴

On 26 September 2018, Russian Television reported head of anti-Terrorism Centre in Central Asia (CIS), General Andrei Novikov’s statement about the Caliphate plan: In a meeting of counter-terrorism chiefs of the security and intelligence services of the CIS, Novikov said that Daesh militants are also trying to activate sleeper cells in that area. Kyrgyz Deputy Prime Minister Zinisz Razakov also warned that terrorist threats in Central Asia and the CIS will generate long-term conflicts".¹⁵ However, in May 2019, Alexander Bortnikov, Chief of the main Russian intelligence agency FSB, in Tajikistan warned that; some 5,000 fighters of an ISIS extremist group affiliate gathered in areas bordering on former Soviet states in Central Asia-most of them fought alongside ISIS in Syria. Bortnikov, in comments carried by Russian news agencies, called for tighter border control to prevent a spillover.¹⁶

In his Global Risk Insights analysis, senior analyst Jeremy Luedi noted Tajikistan’s fear of Daesh and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. He also noted that the IMU pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and trying to recruit more fighters from various Central Asian states: While the Afghan-Tajik border presents the greatest security challenge, the situation in neighboring Uzbekistan holds important lessons, and warnings for Tajikistan. Like in Tajikistan, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) emerged out of resistance to a long-time leader and vehement anti-Islamist, in this case Islam Karimov. Likewise the IMU has long had cross-border dealings with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Despite this, the leadership of the IMU pledged loyalty to ISIS, with IMU emir Usman Ghasi aligning the group with Daesh in June 2015. This move caused a split in the IMU, with a splinter group retaining the IMU name, and reaffirming its allegiance to the Taliban. The existence of Jamaat Ansarullah, a Tajik IMU splinter group further connects events in Uzbekistan and Afghanistan to Tajikistan.¹⁷ More than 12,000 Daesh fighters were operating in some Northern Province of Afghanistan in 2018- In 2017, Russian Special Services uncovered 56 sleeper cells, detained 1,018 militants, eliminated 78 terrorists, and banned 17,500 people suspected of having ties to terrorist organizations from entering the country. Uyghur Muslims are also fighting in the ranks of ISIS and pose a threat to China. On 28 January 2019, Russian Interior Minister, Igor Zubov stated that large-scale provocations were being prepared in the area in order to trigger a humanitarian crisis and destabilize the situation near the Russian southern border.¹⁸

The exponentially growing threat of Islamic State in Central Asia created uncertainty in the region. Russian army and intelligence are fighting it on different fronts. Sputnik in 2017 reported: The spread of Daesh (ISIS/ISIL) in Afghanistan poses a serious challenge to Central Asian states and southern Russia. Speaking to Sputnik, Afghani observers shared their views on the current situation in the country and the prospects for eliminating the terrorist group in the region. After the defeat of the Daesh (ISIL/ISIS) in Syria and Iraq, the terrorist group moved to Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and even, according to some reports, to Bangladesh, Abdul Kader Mesbah, an Afghani political analyst at Balkh University told Sputnik Afghanistan.¹⁹ The final demise of the Islamic State, the disappearance of its territorial base and pressure of various coalition forces in Iraq and Syria forced them to flee to Afghanistan.²⁰

Dr. Karmon Ely’s paper noted jihadist attacks in Central Asia, in which extremist organizations of the region helped Daesh in targeting civilian and government installations. On 03 April 2017, terrorists attacked St. Petersburg metro-killing 15 and injured 45 people: On 3 April 2017, an explosive device contained in a briefcase detonated in the Saint Petersburg Metro, killing 15 people and injuring at least 45 others. A second explosive device was found and defused. Authorities in Kyrgyzstan informed that the suspected perpetrator, Akbarzhon Jalilov, was an ethnic Uzbek born in the southern city of Osh (Fergana Valley, Kyrgyzstan) but was a citizen of Russian Federation and had lived there since the age of 16. Chinara Esengul, an expert on radical Islam based in Kyrgyzstan, said that according to official figures, about 850 people from Kyrgyzstan have joined the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. There are hundreds of thousands of Central Asian emigrants living and working in the Russian Federation". In Afghanistan, Daesh has become stronger and its military is operating in various provinces.²¹ Analyst Gulmurod Khalimov and John Mark Pommersheim further highlighted these facts in their recent paper with a different perspective:

On January 28th the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Russia Igor Zubov reported that unknown helicopters transported ISIS militants from Pakistan on the border with Tajikistan towards the southern borders of the Russian Federation. Probably, large-scale provocations are planned there in the hope of extrude a large number of refugees, with all consequences, towards Russia," specified the Deputy Minister.¹⁶ Earlier, in July 2018, the ambassador of Russia in Afghanistan Aleksandr Mantytsky brought similar information to the public: The US transferred militants from Syria and Iraq to Afghanistan by helicopters that were without identification marks.²² And in October 2018 the Tajik Akhbor website reported that the Minister of War of ISIS Gulmurod Khalimov moved to Afghanistan and prepares an invasion of Tajikistan. The former Colonel of the Tajik OMON Khalimov in the spring of 2015 joined ISIS and in 2017 led the defense of Mosul. He received training at anti-terrorist courses in the US, in particular in training camps of the American Blackwater PMC, and is considered to be a master of guerrilla warfare. According to estimates, the number of militants of Khalimov reaches 6,000 people. He is the commander of the Vilayet Khorasan – an ISIS branch in Afghanistan and Pakistan".²³

On 02 May 2019, Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrullah in his speech on the occasion of the commemoration of the martyrdom of Commander Mustafa Badreddine, known as ‘Zulfiqar’, who was killed in Syria in May 2016, warned that Daesh was making things worse with the support of US and Israel. Hizbullah Leader said: "How were they able to capture nearly 40% of the territory of Syria? We talk about 40 to 45% of Syria; and at the same time, Daesh controlled half or more than half of Iraq, a whole number of Iraqi provinces. They arrived at the gates of Karbala and the gates of Baghdad. He said. He said where Daesh come from, and who transported its fighter to Syria, who gave them money, and protected them:

And what is Daesh? What is its ideology? It is the Wahhabi ideology that is shaped in Saudi Arabia, in the Saudi Universities, in the Saudi religious schools, in Saudi mosques, and that was propagated around the world with Saudi money (originally to thwart Khomeini’s revolutionary Islam), by decision and at the request of the United States, as recognized by both the Americans and the Saudis. Before the confession of Mohammad Bin Salman about this fact, there was a video recording of Hillary Clinton where she acknowledged this, namely that it is the US who asked Saudi Arabia to support, propagate and disseminate the Wahhabi ideology worldwide. Where does the ISIS ideology come from, Saudi Arabia, at the request of whom? The United States, who facilitated this, the Americans and their allies? Who funded it, Saudi Arabia; and the ISIS fighters? Where did they come from, (They were brought) from all around the world; O my brothers and sisters, most of the suicide bombers in Syria and Iraq were Saudi nationals. And there were other nationalities as well. And they were brought to these cities (of Syria and Iraq).......Daesh today has a role to play in Afghanistan, killing the Afghan people, and spreading more death and chaos in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has become a base for spreading Daesh in Central Asia. And this is what the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defense Minister denounced yesterday and today. So who transferred Daesh to Afghanistan?²⁴

Mr. Hasan Nasrullah also highlighted fatalities inflicted by Daesh group on civilians in Iraq and Syria, and uncovered the US nefarious design in Central Asia and Afghanistan. He also mentioned of Afghanistan where Daesh kill and behead innocent civilians in towns and cities. Dr. Saipira Furstenberg (2019) in her paper revealed the abrupt emergence of Daesh in Central Asia, its networks and military capabilities. The Islamic State carried out several attacks across Central Asia and Russia, and now invites local extremist organizations to join it in the fight against Russia. The group, according to some reports started recruiting jihadists from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Chechnya:

"The spate of attacks by Central Asians overseas in 2017 and the specter of ISIS emerging in the region after the attack on four foreign cyclists in Tajikistan in July 2018, have generated alarm about Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL) and other jihadist groups in a region with historically very low levels of terrorist attacks. Analysts have sought to identify ‘root causes’ in the region such as the rise of radical or non-traditional Islam, increasing poverty since the end of the Soviet Union coupled with domestic authoritarianism and repression. However, such observations although important need to be unpacked as the reality is more complex.......In Tajikistan the regime banned the only legal Islamic political party (IRPT), in Central Asia in September 2015, naming them as a ‘terrorist organization’. Similarly, in Kazakhstan, the regime has designated Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan, a political opposition movement led by former regime insider, Mukhtar Ablyazov, as an extremist organization. Further, as the Central Asia Political Exiles Database demonstrates, the regimes target political enemies by labeling them as ‘terrorists’. A similar rationale is applied in the regime’s abuse of the Interpol’s notice system to persecute national human rights defenders, moderate Islamic believers, civil society activists and critical journalists. The state of Islamic threat in Central Asia: assessing the threat of terrorism from Central Asia.²⁵

In 2018, Islamic State attacked foreigners in Tajikistan, where the group had established a strong network of recruiting jihadist groups and invited local influential leaders to join its ranks. Analyst Damon Mehl in her paper noted these realities and highlighted the exponentially growing threat of Daesh: In July 2018, four Western cyclists were killed in an attack conducted by five Tajikistani nationals south of Dushanbe, Tajikistan..........These factors include an established Central Asian Islamic State node in Afghanistan subordinate to Islamic State Khorasan, the Islamic State’s loss of physical territory in Syria and Iraq, and the prospects for those still alive among an estimated 1,300 to 2,0003 Tajikistan citizens who have been fighting there to return home or flee to other battlefields, such as Afghanistan. Other factors fuelling the threat are reports of the Tajikistan government’s continued repression of political rivals and likelihood of military operations in the Gorno-Badakhshan region—actions that could serve to galvanize opposition against the Tajik government and, in turn, be exploited by jihadis to rally support for resources and fighters. Additionally, Tajik jihadis have increased their stature among global terrorist groups over the past two decades, thus making assistance from larger terrorist organizations or a renewed jihadi focus on Central Asia increasingly probable.²⁶ The Islamic State networks in Tajikistan are strong and well-organizes.²⁷ The group has found access to local communities to recruit them for the future jihad against Russia. The Islamic State has already trained more than 2,000 Tajik citizens who later on fought in Syria, and now returning to their country gradually.

Musa Khan Jalalzai

June, 2019, London

Chapter 1

Compromise, Consensus-Building

and Trust: Missing Ingredients in

Afghanistan’s Peace Negotiations

Marzia Meena

¹

Conflicts have unique regional, historical and cultural contexts. Past peace negotiations from other countries can provide a roadmap for Afghanistan. Shared strategies inform us about the processes, protocols, and practices that achieve results, including trust-building and the abandonment of strategies that have failed to achieve the promise of peace. The governments of Colombia and El Salvador engaged strategies to attain peace amidst counterinsurgency efforts. In El Salvador, the peace process ended the war in 1992 through a political solution (a peace accord). Salvadoran insurgents demobilized and became a legal political party, while the government agreed to make changes in the social and political structures of the country, answering the key motivating demands that gave rise to the insurgency in the first place. A similar process achieved results in Colombia. Both cases offer insights into peace negotiations relevant to Afghanistan.

Negotiations have been ongoing in and outside Afghanistan since 2001. Mutual distrust between the Afghan government and the Taliban (the main anti-government element) has contributed to the failure to deliver results. Mediation has been generally weak and under-supported despite strong interests from regional and international partners. Attaining peace in Afghanistan has proven to be extraordinarily difficult. Afghan stakeholders and many international actors have differing interests. Multi-stakeholder approaches have unique challenges. The examples of El Salvador and Colombia demonstrate that various groups and players can work together to achieve real peace when insurgents lay down arms and become legal political entities in representative democracies. Both show that the process of seeking peace, rather than a singular focus on a final peace agreement itself, enhances trust, even with set-backs. This is particularly relevant to Afghanistan.

Overview and Methodology

This paper analyses the Afghan peace process with an objective of identifying ways to make it more effective. The analyses, observations and recommendations are compiled from research activities that include interviews, secondary literature, and an assessment of local views, coupled with a review of the history of the conflict and past efforts at achieving peace. Interviews with a former White House and US Department of Defense official involved in Afghanistan’s war and the reconstruction since 1980s contextualized the history of international activities and captured current thinking about Afghanistan. Interviews with select government officials, including both Afghan and former US officials who were previously involved in the peace process in Afghanistan, were undertaken. Ten interviews were completed between May 2017 and September 2017 to inform future peace negotiations.

Prescriptive-thinking

1. To be successful, the Afghan government must attract genuine, authentic support from Afghanistan’s citizenry, which enhances democratic ideals and ensures longer lasting peace with wider support.

2. Support must be attained from the wider international community and regional participants. Pakistan has influenced previous outcomes and fuelled the intransigence of Afghanistan’s insurgency with political support, safe havens, money, weapons and ammunition.

3. To merely label Pakistan as a spoiler is also wrong—the country is motivated by its own political and economic needs, which offers insights into how to motivate positive involvement as a negotiating channel with the Taliban. ²

4. The Taliban’s key leaders are based in Pakistan and maintain open relationships with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), a staunch supporter and funder of the Taliban since its inception . ³ This provides the ISI with significant influence. ⁴

5. Alternative approaches based on trust-building can open the path to reconciliation. Trust is strongest when it builds slowly over time, proving each side as reasonable and predictable. Understanding the reasons for the present lack of trust is critical to peace.

6. Mediators can help parties to work together by allowing them to tell their stories and explain how they feel, which generates understanding and empathy, and breaks down barriers. ⁵

7. Cessation of hostilities and voluntary partial disarmament can build trust, even if it is not usually a precursor to (but rather one of the outcomes of) negotiations. The benefits outweigh the risks. Positioning the Taliban to demand reciprocity and reducing pressure for outside military intervention. If peace is achieved, it is self-validating. If the talks fail, the Taliban could rapidly rearm anyway . ⁶ The principle that the conflict is best fought on political, rather than military grounds should inform the parties. To transform an insurgent group into a political participant in the governance of Afghanistan, the Afghan constitution should codify negotiated changes that address the Taliban’s demands.

8. The achievements of the Afghan constitution should not be readily sacrificed. Any debate to overturn some of the structures and rights of the democracy, by necessity, will be public, making any erosion of Afghanistan’s democracy unlikely. These achievements are embedded in the national consciousness. The bullet is not more powerful than the vote.

9. The international view calls for the participation from all the factions of the Taliban and warlords, including those who served as spoilers in the past and those who profit from the conflict. This includes the Haqqani Network, the Quetta Shura, and the Peshawar Shura. There is still value in continuing the discussion even if some refuse to participate. ⁷

10. Negotiations may take place behind closed doors, but true peace can only be achieved in the bright light of day. Final agreements must be made public to enhance Afghanistan’s democracy. ⁸

11. Negotiations with the Taliban must be without preconditions.

Factors Undermining Afghanistan Peace Process: Mutual Mistrust

Distrust is an obstacle to sustainable peace. Trust builds confidence, increases the willingness to compromise, and avoids the security dilemma. It helps participants accept the outcomes. A successful peace process requires that the protagonists are willing to negotiate in good faith, and that the negotiators are committed to a sustained process.⁹ In Afghanistan, mistrust abounds; the parties have not negotiated sincerely. Bad faith and the absence of positive intent compromise the peace process. The scale of the violence and atrocities in Afghanistan have fostered fresh hatred and broken relationships, even where good relations had previously prevailed. The Taliban continue to conduct indiscriminate attacks, including killing civilians, torture, and destruction of houses rape and other forms of sexual violence and displacement of civilians.¹⁰

Furthermore, the Taliban is divided, diminishing trust between the Taliban and its own representatives and limiting good faith. Examples of this include Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, a former head of the Taliban’s political office in Doha, Qatar; and Sohail Shaeen, the spokesperson for the Taliban’s Qatar office, were the Taliban leaders whose names were removed from a UN sanction list in 2010 as an early step towards confidence-building in the peace process. The international community and neighboring countries can assist in creating an effective peace process.¹¹ This includes offering incentives to participate and altering the risk—benefit analysis, encouraging the Taliban to come to a unified position. Pakistan’s military and intelligence services provide the Taliban sanctuary and support, contextually related to its rivalry with India. The Taliban is an instrument for achieving this objective.¹² Negotiations require Pakistan’s support; and if that involvement is excessive, India, Russia, and Iran may engage countermeasures.

Pakistan’s participation may not be positive unless mediators recognize the country’s security, political and economic needs. Carrots and sticks may encourage Pakistan to cease political and military support for the insurgency. Additionally, a diminution of India’s presence in Afghanistan and a commitment to geopolitical nonalignment may assist.¹³ Finally, Pakistan only supports the insurgency in as much as it does not see open politico-diplomatic avenues to achieve its goals and despite great cost to its own national budget and even greater political costs vis-à-vis the international community.

Weak Mediation

Mediation provides opportunities to build trust and lays the groundwork for negotiations. Mediators can play a key determining role in the success or failure of any negotiation. However, in the past, there have been instances where mediation efforts have sometimes helped induce failure, owing to mediators pursuing their own national or other goals. External pressure does not always promote peace; it can even guarantee failure. Afghanistan’s conflict is made possible by external assistance, weapons, and intelligence support. Some factions seek to derail and complicate the peace process, and skew outcomes to their own benefit. Negotiations are neither Afghan-led nor Afghan-owned. Former Afghan President Hamid Karzai flagged this at the 2010 London Conference. Mediators