Chicago Political Stories: Devious, Comical, and Just Plain Memorable

Chicago Political Stories:

Devious, comical, and just plain memorable

By David M. Patt

Copyright 2019 David M. Patt

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever including Internet usage, without written permission of the author.

E-book formatting by Maureen Cutajar

www.gopublished.com

Table of Contents

Preface

1. Introduction: Chicago Basics

Priorities, The Real Issue, Corruption, Da Preecint Captin

2. Tales from the Council

3. Stacking the Deck

Manipulating Maps, Getting on the Ballot (if you can), Who’s on First?, Picking Candidates

4. Electoral Tricks

Avoiding Elections, Shaving the Vote, Cross-Party Deals, Cutting in Line, Double Cross, Friendly Fire, Bulleting, Throwaway Candidates, Fake Transparency, Selling Out, If You Can’t Beat ‘Em…, Decoys

5. Shady Tactics

Vote Fraud, Lies, Intimidation, Takeovers, Making It Official

6. Prejudice

Race, Anti-Semitism, Ethnicity, Religion

7. More Stories That Have to be Told

8. …and, finally

About the Author

Sources

Preface

Chicagoans have been regaled for years with stories about the errant doings of high- ranking government officials and powerful politicians whose questionable dealings tainted major political events. But those activities, while dominating the headlines, were only the tip of the iceberg.

The vast majority of political happenings were lower profile incidents that occurred behind the scenes and usually involved people of little notoriety. Their stories might have been reported inaccurately or not at all, because nobody knew what had really transpired or they just didn’t realize that anything significant had taken place.

Some of these incidents may be thought of as amusing or oddly interesting and not really that important.

But many of them influenced elections and exposed what was really going on in politics and government. An astute observer could not afford to ignore them because they frequently explained what had already happened and indicated what might happen in the future.

I was involved in or witnessed a lot of these events and realized that most people would never know what had been said or done by political operatives or government schemers. They would not have known how those doings affected what they saw or experienced in their communities.

The stories told here – the big ones and the little ones – reveal the actions of the people who played around behind the scenes in political affairs and describe their exploits and their motives.

And they tell how things happened in Chicago.

Introduction: Chicago Basics

Priorities

You have to know how things worked in Chicago for a lot of these stories to make sense. It will help explain why some people did what they did.

The folks who messed around behind the scenes in Chicago politics did that because politics was their business, just like teaching, nursing, or furnace repair were to others. They were not engaged in a noble exercise in civic affairs.

They tried to maneuver themselves into positions that would enable them to reap the political benefits of their actions, whether operating in the open or out of sight.

They sought to acquire and manipulate the resources – primarily jobs, contracts, and money – they needed to accumulate power and to sustain themselves.

They did that by winning control of the government offices that provided those resources and then using them in whatever way they wanted to achieve whatever it was they wanted to achieve – to amass wealth, to provide benefits to friends and relatives, or to build organizations that would perpetuate their efforts. Some just wanted to earn a living.

Low-profile administrative offices, not high-profile policy-making ones, were usually their priorities. Those were sources for jobs and contracts. Some controlled a specific piece of government operations, thus providing opportunities to solicit contributions (or payoffs) from constituents and special interest groups who needed their services. And those positions also served as a stable of sorts for rising political performers who were building their public resumes and needed a place to roost while climbing the ladder of political power.

Different offices offered different types of benefits. State legislators could negotiate with (or shake down) lobbyists, Governors, and other high-level officials, who needed their votes to pass proposed bills. They could also provide access to state government services to voters who supported their candidates or promised to do so.

Aldermen could influence city service delivery to build voter loyalty by ensuring that only those who supported their party’s candidates received service. They could solicit contributions from those who needed or wanted city services. And they could use their power to neutralize community groups so that neighborhood activists would not get in the way of their political dealings.

Some elective offices were thought of by power brokers merely as possessions they could trade with colleagues for other benefits or as goodies when they wanted a little something. So, they tried to win those, as well.

And while politicians still supported candidates for highly visible positions at election time, they weren’t always doing that for the reason voters thought.

Many Democratic Party officials, for example, campaigned for John F. Kennedy for President in 1960 because they hoped to win the allegiance of Catholic voters, then considered a swing constituency, not because they cared whether JFK won.

They talked up Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012 because he was already well-liked and they wanted his backers to cast straight Democratic votes, thus also choosing the more important candidates farther down the ballot. They hoped to attract policy-oriented voters who might not normally have voted in every contest. And campaigning for Obama helped maintain party cohesion in Black wards

Such things as abortion, gun control, and foreign wars had no bearing on the acquisition or use of resources. Pols only addressed those issues when necessary to attract the votes or financial contributions required to win elections so they might then be better positioned to acquire the public and private benefits they desired. And they were often willing to adopt stances on issues that were contrary to their personal beliefs when necessary to win.

At election time, these were the real priorities of the Chicago political players who had the greatest influence in city politics:

The Mayor of Chicago was far more important than all the public officials in the entire United States combined, including the President. The Mayor managed a ten billion-dollar enterprise (2018 figure), hired employees, awarded contracts, dictated legislative direction, influenced public and private officials, brokered city interests, and led public opinion. The Mayoralty was not a stepping-stone to something else. It was the pinnacle of political power.

The Democratic Ward Committeeman was the next most important elected official of them all. That person, chosen by voters in the primary election, was the leader of the political organization in the ward and commanded an army of workers (mostly government job holders) who campaigned for candidates whose election would provide tangible benefits to the organization and its members. The Committeeman decided which candidates to back and how hard to campaign for each, and candidates for higher office relied upon that support to win. Often referred to as the Ward Boss, that person held sole discretion in the distribution of acquired benefits.

County Board President (officially called President, Cook County Board of Commissioners). The Cook County Board managed the second largest governmental entity in the Chicago area, controlling the budgets of many offices, and holding jobs and contracts desired by favor-seekers and politicians. And it was the next best bully pulpit after the Mayor.

Cook County Sheriff and Cook County Clerk of the Circuit Court. Both hired an army of employees who served as loyal foot soldiers for, and donors to, the party (legally, those folks can no longer be forced to do political work – but they do it anyway). Some Sheriff employees also got to carry guns.

Cook County Assessor and Cook County Board of Review. The Assessor could set lower property taxes for big donors and the Board of Review could lower taxes through its appeals process, while at the same time generating legal fees for politically connected attorneys who represented clients seeking property tax reductions.

Cook County State’s Attorney could prosecute, or not prosecute, in accordance with party or faction political needs.

Governor of Illinois. This person held sway over numerous jobs, contracts, and appointive positions, but those had to be shared with politicos in other parts of the state, so it was less beneficial to Chicago pols.

Illinois Secretary of State. Lorded over a plethora of employees, but also had to share this largesse statewide. (This was the office that issued driver’s licenses).

Senators, Congressmen, and state legislators were less important, but not unimportant, as they generally enjoyed more prestige than power and rarely possessed political organizations of their own. Most relied on party troops to win election and to remain in office.

They could help secure federal or state monies for local government projects, vote on laws that benefited their party or faction, publicly support aspiring candidates, and provide a respectable face for their organizations. And their popularity could attract voters to the party ticket at election time. Their legislative records were usually of little importance to the parties, even though they may have mattered a lot to voters.

Congressmen had limited political power. Their districts were drawn by the state legislature and poor relations with that body or its leaders could lead to swift extinction.

In one instance, state legislators of both parties conspired to eliminate the south side district of two-term Democratic Congressman Abner Mikva during decennial reapportionment prior to the 1972 election. Republicans felt he was too liberal and Democrats thought he was too Independent.

Mikva had been a liberal activist in 1948 when he wanted to volunteer to help the Democratic Party elect Adlai Stevenson II as Governor and Paul Douglas as U.S. Senator. He walked into a Democratic Party office and said he wanted to help. The fellow he spoke to asked, Who sent ya?

Nobody sent me, Mikva declared. I just want to help.

Well, we don’t want nobody nobody sent, was the reply.

He eventually found a place where he was wanted, defeating a Machine candidate for a state legislative seat in a Hyde Park-based district on Chicago’s south side in 1956.

He gave it up in 1966 to challenge aging Congressman Barrett O’Hara, the last surviving Spanish-American War veteran in Congress, in the Democratic Primary. He lost but he won with party backing on his second try two years later in an industrial, southeast side district.

When reapportionment approached, the state legislature remapped his home into a predominantly Black district where he had no chance to win re-election and it redrew the remainder of his territory to benefit a conservative, White ethnic Democrat. Their intent was to eliminate him without affecting party alignment.

Unlike most victims of redistricting, Mikva found a way to avoid political death. He relocated to a newly drawn, Republican-leaning district that included suburban Evanston, where his celebrity energized the local Democratic Party, and he lost a close race for another term. He enjoyed the first of three narrow victories in the next election before being appointed a Federal Appeals Court Judge.

The local judiciary served more as a reward for political service than it did for any other purpose, as a loyal judge could thwart legal efforts that might harm the organization or its supporters, issue rulings that benefited them, and do legal favors for litigants. Elected officials, donors, precinct captains, and compliant attorneys were often selected as candidates for judicial positions as rewards for their prior support of organizational electoral efforts, not because of their legal acumen.

Even Republicans could secure judicial spots, provided they forked over the specified amount of campaign contributions to the Democrats who controlled judicial elections. At election time, their names would appear on the Democratic Party line.

Aldermen served as a critical link to voters, managing access to city services in ways expected to solicit their electoral support. Politically, they were merely tools to allow the Mayor to control the legislative part of city government. Their political loyalty was maintained by the chief executive’s strategic distribution of city government benefits.

And most Aldermen followed the directives of their Ward Committeemen. Those who doubled as Committeemen exercised a bit more (informal) political power through their control of local political organizations. But their power usually stemmed from the perks they received from the Mayor, which were more valuable than any they might have acquired elsewhere.

Reformers who posed potent threats to the Party could be eliminated as challengers by being slated for more prestigious, but less powerful offices, or by being named to the judiciary, where they would be buried in political obscurity and were banned from electoral participation.

The Real Issue

Party affiliation did not always define the differences between politicians, and there was more deal-making between the parties than some people would have thought.

There was no Democratic or Republican way to put out a fire, direct traffic, or administer the office of Clerk of the Circuit Court. The parties often battled for the same spoils but framed their efforts in ways they felt would appeal to the constituencies most likely to back them. They made deals with each other when it was beneficial to do so.

Competition was not always between Progressives and Conservatives, either. Adherents of both ideologies could be found in each party.

The real clash in Chicago politics was between private interest and public interest. That’s what almost everything was about, whether it appeared that way, whether the players acknowledged it, and whether the fight was over big issues or trivial ones. That was the reason for so much of the behind the scenes scheming, as some pols sought to advance their personal, political interests.

Private interests were favored by the Regulars, agents of the Regular Democratic Organization and some of the few Republicans in town, who often did business the same way. Those people frequently earned their livings in politics.

They catered to the personal needs of individuals, both legal and extralegal, and utilized their power to benefit themselves, their organizations, their supporters, and potential supporters, often through the awarding of government jobs and the provision of favors. They maneuvered behind the scenes to position themselves to be able to receive and dispense the spoils of victory.

They were often referred to as the Machine because of their effectiveness at organizing and winning election campaigns and controlling the resources of elective offices. Their campaign workers were usually job holders, relatives of job holders, and others who sought