10 Philosophy as Rigorous Science* TRANSLATED BY QUENTIN LAUER From its earliest beginnings philosophy has claimed to be rigorous science. What is more, it has claimed to be the science that satisfies the loftiest theoretical needs and renders possible from an ethico-teligious point of view a life regulated by pute 12- tional notms. This claim has been pressed with sometimes mote, sometimes. less energy, but it has never been completely abandoned, not even during those times when interest in and capacity for pure the- ory were in danger of atrophying, or when teligious forces restricted freedom of theo- retical investigation Duting no petiod of its development has philosophy been capable of living up to this claim of being rigorous science; not even in its most recent period, when—despite the multiplicity and contradictory character of its philosophical orientations—it has fol- owed from the Renaissance up to the present an essentially unitary line of development. Teis, in fac, the dominant characteristic of ‘modern philosophy that, rather than surren- der itself naively to the philosophical im- pulse, it will by means of crtieal reflection and by ever more profound methodological investigation constitute icself as rigorous sei- cence. Bue the only mature fruit of these ef forts has been to secute frst the foundation and then the independence of rigorous nat- “Edmund Huser, “Philosophy 25 Rigorous Sei: ‘nce, in Phenomenology and the Criss of Philosophy, teandaced by Quentin Lauer(New York Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 7117. Reprinted by permision of Harper 4 Row, Publishers, Ic, English ransacion copyright © 1963 by Quentin Lanes tural and humanistic sciences along with new purely mathematical disciplines. Philosophy itself, in the particular sense that only now thas become distinguished, lacked as much as ever the character of rigorous science, The very meaning of the distinesion remained without scientifically secure determination ‘The question of philosophy's relation to the natural and humanistic sciences—whether the specifically philosophical element of its work, essentially related asitis to nacure and the human spirit, demands fundamentally new attitudes, that in turn involve funda- mentally peculiar goals and methods, whether as a result the philosophical rakes us, as it were, into a new dimension, or whether it performs its function on the same level asthe empitical sciences of nature and of the human spirit—all cis is to this day disputed. It shows that even the proper sense of philosophical problems has not been made scientifically clear. ‘Thus philosophy, according to its histori cal purpose the loftiest and most rigorous of all sciences, representing as it does human- iy’s imperishable demand for pure and ab- solute knowledge (and what is inseparably cone with that, its demand for pure and ab- solute valuing and willing), is incapable of assuming the form of rigorous science. Phi- losophy, whose vocation is to teach us how to carry on the eternal work of humanity, is urterly incapable of teaching in an objec- tively valid manner. Kant was fond of saying that one could not learn philosophy, but only to philosophize. What is that but an admission of philosophy’s unscientific chat- 166PHILOSOPHY AS RIGOROUS SCIENCE acter? As far as science, real science, ex- tends, so far can one teach and learn, and this everywhere in the same sense. Certainly scientific learning is nowhere a passive ac- ceptance of matter alien to the mind, In all cases itis based on self- activity, on an inner reproduction, in their relationships as {grounds and consequences, of the rational insights gained by'creative spirits. One can- not learn philosophy, because here there are no such insights objectively grasped and ‘grounded, or to put it in another way, be- cause here the problems, methods, ‘and theories have not been clearly defined con- ceptually, their sense has not been fully clarified. 1 do not say that philosophy is an imper- fect science; I say simply that itis not yet a science at all, that as science it has not yet be- gun. As criterion for this, cake any portion “however small—of theoretical content that has been objectively grounded. All sci- ences are imperfect, even the much-admired exact sciences. On the one hand they are incomplete, because the limitless horizon of open problems, which will never let the tive toward knowledge rest, lies before them; and on the other hand they havea va- riety of defects in their already developed doctrinal content, there remain evidences here and there of a lack of clarity or perfec tion in the systematic ordering of proofs and theories. Nevertheless they do have a doc- trinal content that is constantly growing and branching out in new directions. No reason- able person will doubt the objective truth or the objectively grounded probability of the ‘wonderful theories of mathematics and the natural sciences. Here there is, by and large, ‘no room for private “opinions,” “notions,” ot “points of view.” To the extent that there are such in particular instances, the science in question is not established as such bu is in the process of becoming a science and is in general so judged.* ‘The imperfection of philosophy is of an ‘entirely different sore from that of the other sciences as just described. It does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in par ticular instances, imperfect doctrinal sys- tem; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, every position isa matter of individual conviction, 30 167 of the interpretation given by a school, of a “point of view.” Te may well be that the proposals pre- sented in the world-renowned scientific ‘works of philosophy in ancient and modern times are based on serious, even colossal in- tellectual activity. More chan that, it may in large measure be work done in advance for the future establishment of scientifically sttiet doctrinal systems; but for the mo- ‘ment, nothing in them is recognizable as a basis for philosophical science, nor is there any prospect of cutting out, as it were, with the critical scissors here and there a fragment of philosophical doctrine This conviction must once more be ex- pressed boldly and honestly, and precisely in this place, in the first issue of Logos, whose aim isto testify to a significant revo- lution in philosophy and to prepare the ‘ground for the furare philosophical “sys- tem.” For with this blunt emphasis on the ‘unscientific character of al previous philoso- phy, the question immediately arises ‘whether philosophy is to continue envision- ing the goal of being a rigorous science, whether it can or must want to be so. What is this new revolution supposed to mean to us? Some sort of departute from the idea of 4 rigorous science? And what meaning should be given tothe “system” for which we yearn, which is supposed to gleam as an ideal before us in the lowlands where we are doing our investigative work? Is it to be a philosophical “system” in the traditional sense, like a Minerva springing forth com- plete'and full-panoplied from the head of some creative genius, only in later times to be kept along with other such Minervas in the silent museum of history? Oris ito bea philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work of genera- tions, really begins from the ground up with a foundation free of doubt and rises up like any skillful construction, wherein stone is set upon stone, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights? On this ques- tion minds must part company and paths must diverge. ‘The revolutions decisive for the progress of philosophy are those in which the claim of former philosophies to be scientific are discredited by a critique of their pretended168 scientific procedure, Then atthe helm is the fully conscious will to establish philosophy in a radically new fashion in the sense of rig- orous science, determining the order in which tasks are undertaken. Ficst of all, thought concentrates all its energy on deci- sively clarifying, by means of systematic ex- amination, the cgnditions of strict science that in former philosophies were naively overlooked or misunderstood, in order thereafter to attempt to construct anew a structure of philosophical docrine. Such a fully conscious will for rigorous science dom- inated the Socratic-Platonic revolution of philosophy and also, atthe beginning of the ‘modern era, the scientific reactions against Scholasticism, especially the Cartesian revolution. Its impulse carries over to the sgreat philosophies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; it renews itself with ‘most radical vigor in Kant’ critique of rea~ son and stil dominates Fichte’s philosophiz- ing. Again and again research is directed toward true beginnings, decisive formula- tion of problems, and correct methods. Only with romantic philosophy does a change occur. However much Hegel insists on the absolute validity of his method and his doctrine, still his sytem lacks a critique of reason, which isthe foremost prerequisite for being scientific in philosophy. In this connection it is clear that this philosophy, like romantic philosophy in general, acted in the yeats that followed either to weaken of to adulterate the impulse toward the con- stitution of rigorous philosophical science. ‘Concerning the latter tendency to adul- terate, itis well known that with the prog- ress of the exact sciences Hegelianism gave tise to reactions, asa result of which the nat- utalism of the eighteenth cencuy gained an overwhelming impetus; and with its scepti- cism, which invalidated all absolute idealiy and objectivity, it has largely determined the Weltanschauung and philosophy of the last decades. On the other hand, a5 a tendency to weaken the impulse toward philosophic sci- ence Hegelian philosophy produced after- effects by its doctrine on the relative justifi- cation of every philosophy for its own time =a doctrine, itis tre, that in Hegel's sys- tem, pretending to absoluce validity, had an 31 LHUSSERL ON SCIENCE AND PHENOMENOLOGY cotitely different sense from the historic one aueributed to it by those generations that had lost along with their belief in Hegelian philosophy any belief whatever in an abso- Jute philosophy. As a resule of the transfor- mation of Hegel's metaphysical philosophy of history into a sceptical historicism, the es- tablishment of the new Weltanschauung philosophy has now been essentially deter- mined. This latter seems in out day to be spreading rapidly, and what is more, war- ring asit does for the most part against natu- ralism and, when the occasion offers, even against historicism, ithas not the least desite to be sceptical. To the extent, however, that i does not show itself, at least in its whole intention and procedure, any longer domi- nated by that radical will to scientific doc- ttine that constituted the great progress of ‘modern philosophy up to Kant's time, what [said regarding a weakening of philosophy's scientific impulse referred particularly to it. ‘The following arguments are based on the conviction that the highest interests of hhuman culture demand the development of 1 tigorously scientific philosophy; conse- quently, if2 philosophical revolution in our times isto be justified, it must without fail bbe animated by the putpose of laying 2 new foundation for philosophy in the sense of strict science. This purpose is by no means foreign to the present age. It is fully alive precisely in the nacuralism that dominates the age. From the start, naturalism sets out with a firm determination to realize the ideal ofa rigorously scientific reform of phi- losophy. Iteven believes atall times, both in its earlier and in its modetn forms, that it hhas already realized this idea. But all this takes place, when we look at it from the standpoint of principle, in a form that from the ground up is replete with erroneous the cory; and from a practical point of view this ‘means growing danger for our culture. Itis important today to engage in a radical crit cism of nacuralistic philosophy. In particu- lar, there is need of a positive criticism of principles and methods as opposed to a purely negative criticism based on conse- quences. Only such a criticism is calculated to preserve intact confidence in the possi ity of a scientific philosophy, a confidence threatened by the absurd consequences of a