Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
CIVIL PROCEDURE
CASE DOCTRINES
FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF LAW
BUTOY S. LOFRANCO
TRANSCRIBED BY
2011 EDITION
BUTOY 2011
NEVER
THERE
TAKE
SHORTCUTS .
IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR HARDWORK.
- B.S.L -
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
DOCTRINES UNDER JURISDICTION TO RULE 38: COMPILED BY OMAR DISPO
DISCLAIMER: This compilation is primarily intended for those law students reviewing in civil procedure. Components of this work is purely based on the authors view a propos the principles and set of guidelines laid down in settled jurisprudence. No part of this compilation is proposed to replace the doctrines established by other students, law professors or other entities. Unauthorized reproduction is prohibited.
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RULE 1 TO 5
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ALDAY V. FGU INSURANCE KOREA TECH V. LERMA MERCADO V. CA ST LOUIS UNIV. V. COBBARUBIAS PROTON PILIPINAS V. BANQUE NATIONALE RELUCIO V. LOPEZ G&S TRANSPORT V. CA CABUTIHAN V. LANDCENTER DE CASTRO V. CA LOTTE PHIL. V. DELA CRUZ DELA CRUZ V. JOAQUIN ORQUIOLA V. CA PEOPLE V. CA CHINA BANK V. OLIVER PACIFIC V. SCHONFELD G.R. NO. 138822 | JANUARY 23, 2001 G.R. NO. 143581 | JANUARY 07, 2008 G.R. NO. 169576 | OCTOBER 17, 2008 G.R. NO. 187104 | AUGUST 3, 2010 G.R. NO. 151242 | JUNE 15, 2005 G.R. NO. 138497 | JANUARY 16, 2002 G.R. NO. 120287 | MAY 28, 2002 G.R. NO. 146594 | JUNE 10, 2002 G.R. NO. 115838 | JULY 18, 2002 G.R. NO. 166302 | JULY 28, 2005 G.R. NO. 162788 | JULY 28, 2005 G.R. NO. 141463 | AUGUST 6, 2002 G.R. NO. 132396 | SEPTEMBER 23, 2002 G.R. NO. 135796 | OCTOBER 3, 2002 G.R. NO. 166920 | FEBRUARY 19, 2007
RULE 6 TO 9
29 30 31 32 33 BENGUET EXPLORATION V. CA MANILA BAY YACHT CLUB V. CA BIESTERBOS V. CA OAMINAL V. CASTILLO ASIAN CONSTRUCTION V. CA G.R. NO. 117434 | FEBRUARY 9, 2001 G.R. NO. 110015 | JULY 11, 1995 G.R. NO. 152529 | SEPTEMBER 22, 2003 G.R. NO. 152776 | OCTOBER 8, 2003 G.R. NO. 160242 | MAY 17, 2005
RULE 10 TO 14
34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 VERGEL DE DIOS V. CA REMMINGTON INDUSTRIAL V. CA ANTONIO V. CA VALMONTE V. CA VILLAROSA V. BENITO MILLENIUM INDUSTRIAL V. TAN RAMOS V. RAMOS TEH V. CA SANTOS V. PNOC EXPLORATION MASON V. CA SPS JOSE V. SPS BOYON DOLE V. QUILALA MANOTOC V. CA PASCUAL V. PASCUAL G.R. NO. 80491 | AUGUST 12, 1992 G.R. NO. 133657 | MAY 29, 2002 G.R. NO. 133657 | MAY 29, 2002 G.R. NO. 108538 | JANUARY 22, 1996 G.R. NO. 136426 | AUGUST 6, 1999 G.R. NO. 131724 | FEBRUARY 28, 2000 G.R. NO. 144294 | MARCH 11, 2003 G.R. NO. 147038 | APRIL 24, 2003 G.R. NO. 170943 | SEPTEMBER 23, 2008 G.R. NO. 144662 | OCTOBER 13, 2003 G.R. NO. 147369 | OCTOBER 23, 2003 G.R. NO. 168723 | JULY 9, 2008 G.R. NO. 130974 | AUGUST 16, 2002 G.R. NO. 171916 | DECEMBER 4, 2009
RULE 15 TO 19
48 49 50 HEIRS OF VINZONS V. CA LEDESMA V. CA UY V. CONTRERAS G.R. NO. 111915 | SEPTEMBER 30, 1999 G.R. NO. 96914 | JULY 23, 1992 G.R. NO. 111416 | SEPTEMBER 26, 1994
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51 52 53 54 55
G.R. NO. 142556 | FEBRUARY 5, 2003 G.R. NO. 150611 | JUNE 10, 2003 G.R. NO. 153828 | OCTOBER 24, 2003 G.R. NO. 91486 | JANUARY 19, 2001 G.R. NO. L-48769 | FEBRUARY 27, 1987
RULE 21 TO 32
56 57 58 59 DASMARINAS INC. VS. REYES INSULAR LIFE V. CA ALLIED V. CA PEOPLE V. WEBB G.R. NO. 108229 AUGUST 24, 1993 G.R. NO. 97654 | NOVEMBER 14, 1994 G.R. NO. 118438 | DECEMBER 4, 1998 G.R. NO. 132577 | AUGUST 17, 1999
RULE 33 TO 38
60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 MENDEZONA V. OZAMIS MESINA V. MEER BERNARDO V. CA RADIOWEALTH V. VICENTE GARCIA V. CA PEOPLE V. LI KA KIM (AKA ED) MERCURY V. CA PHILPHOSPHATE V. CIR FERNANDEZ V. CA HUNG HYUNG PARK V. EUNG WON CHOI G.R. NO. 143370 | FEBRUARY 6, 2002 G.R. NO. 146845 | JULY 2, 2002 G.R. NO. 119010 | SEPTEMBER 5, 1997 G.R. NO. 138739 | JULY 6, 2000 G.R. NO. 117032 | JULY 27, 2000 G.R. NO. 148586 | MAY 25, 2004 G.R. NO. 138571 | JULY 13, 2000 G.R. NO. 141973 | JUNE 28, 2005 G.R. NO. 131094 | MAY 16, 2005 G.R. NO. 165496 | FEBRUARY 12, 2007
RULE 39
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 BAEZ V. BAEZ FAJARDO V. QUITALIG SANTOS V. COMELEC RCBC V. MAGWIN MARKETING CITY OF ILIGAN V. PMGI VILLARUEL V. FERNANDO MORTA V. BAGAGAN SERRANO V. CA DARMOURED SECURITY V. ORPIA PEREZ V. CA PANOTES V. CTDC STRONGHOLD INSURANCE V. FELIX G.R. NO. 133628 | JANUARY 23, 2002 A.M. NO. P-02-1535 | MARCH 28, 2003 G.R. NO. 155618 | MARCH 26, 2003 G.R. NO. 152878 | MAY 5, 2003 G.R. NO. 145260 | JULY 31, 2003 G.R. NO. 136726 | SEPTEMBER 24, 2003 A.M. NO. MTJ-03-1513 | NOVEMBER 12, 2003 G.R. NO. 133883 | DECEMBER 10, 2003 G.R. NO. 151325 | JUNE 27, 2005 G.R. NO. 157616 | JULY 22, 2005 G.R. NO. 154739 | JANUARY 23, 2007 G.R. NO. 148090 | NOVEMBER 28, 2006
RULE 40 TO 56
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 DURISOL V. CA JMM PROMOTIONS V. CA REXLON V. CA TRES-REYES V. MAXIMS TEA HOUSE LAND BANK V. DE LEON ALFREDO V. BORRAS PEOPLE V. CORPUZ PAL V. CA AUGUSTO V. RISOS QBE INSURANCE V. RABELLO LPBS COMMERCIAL V. AMILA ESTINOZO V. CA MARMO V. ANACAY G.R. NO. 121106 | FEBRUARY 20, 2002 G.R. NO. 139401 | OCTOBER 2, 2002 G.R. NO. 128412 | MARCH 15, 2002 G.R. NO. 140853 | FEBRUARY 27, 2003 G.R. NO. 143275 | MARCH 20, 2003 G.R. NO. 144225 | JUNE 17, 2003 G.R. NO. 148198 | OCTOBER 1, 2003 G.R. NO. 127473 | DECEMBER 8, 2003 G.R. NO. 131794 | DECEMBER 10, 2003 A.M. NO. P-04-1884 | DECEMBER 9, 2004 G.R. NO. 147443 | FEBRUARY 11, 2008 G.R. NO. 150276 | FEBRUARY 12, 2008 G.R. NO. 182585 | NOVEMBER 27, 2009
RULE 57 TO 61
95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 MANGILA V. CA CHUIDIAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN DU V. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE DM WENCESLAO V. READYCON TRADING IDOLOR V. CA GUSTILO V. REAL ALEMAR V. NLRC LAGROSAS V. BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB G.R. NO. 125027 | AUGUST 12, 2002 G.R. NO. 139941 | JANUARY 19, 2001 G.R. NO. 156580 | JUNE 14, 2004 G.R. NO. 154106 | JUNE 29, 2004 G.R. NO. 141853 | FEBRUARY 7, 2001 A.M. NO. MTJ-00-1250 | FEBRUARY 28, 2001 G.R. NO. 114761 | JANUARY 19, 2000 G.R. NO. 168637 | SEPTEMBER 12, 2008
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103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112
AGUILAR V. MANILA BANKING LARROBIS V. PHIL. VETERANS BANK OROSA V. CA SMART V. ASTORGA SERVICE WIDE SPECIALIST V. CA HAO V. ANDRES DE ASIS V. CA PEOPLE V. MANAHAN LOPEZ V. CA MONTEFALCON V. VASQUEZ
G.R. NO. 157911 | SEPTEMBER 19, 2006 G.R. NO. 135706 | OCTOBER 1, 2004 G.R. NO. 111080 | APRIL 5, 2000 G.R. NO. 148132 | JANUARY 28, 2008 G.R. NO. 110048 | NOVEMBER 19, 1999 A.M. NO. P-07-2384 | JUNE 18, 2008 G.R. NO. 127578 | FEBRUARY 15, 1999 G.R. NO. 128157 | SEPTEMBER 29, 1999 G.R. NO. 148510 | JULY 21, 2004 G.R. NO. 165016 | JUNE 17, 2008
RULE 62 TO 65
113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 ETERNAL GARDENS V. IAC WACK WACK GOLF V. LEE WON MESINA V. IAC VELARDE V. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY TAMBUNTING V. SUMABAT ALMEDA V. BATHALA MARKETING MERALCO V. PHIL. CONSUMERS LAPID V. LAUREA LACSON V. SECRETARY PEREZ LICAROS V. SANDIGANBAYAN UP BOARD V. LIGOT-TELAN TUASON V. RD OF CALOOCAN SECURITY BANK V. INDIANA TORRES V. AGUINALDO KORUGA V. ARCENAS G.R. NO. 73794 | SEPTEMBER 19, 1988 G.R. NO. L-23851 | MARCH 26, 1976 G.R. NO. 70145 | NOVEMBER 13, 1986 G.R. NO. 159357 | APRIL 28, 2004 G.R. NO. 144101 | SEPTEMBER 16, 2005 G.R. NO. 150806 | JANUARY 28, 2008 G.R. NO. 101783 | JANUARY 23, 2002 G.R. NO. 139607 | OCTOBER 28, 2002 G.R. NO. 147 780 | MAY 10, 2001 G.R. NO. 145851 | NOVEMBER 22, 2001 G.R. NO. 110280 | OCTOBER 12, 1993 G.R. NO. 70484 | JANUARY 29, 1988 G.R. NO. 146197 | JUNE 27, 2005 G.R. NO. 164268 | JUNE 28, 2005 G.R. NO. 168332 | JUNE 19, 2009
RULE 66 TO 71
128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 MENDOZA V. ALLAS CALLEJA V. PANDAY AVELINO V. CUENCO GENERAL V. URRO/ARROYO AGAN V. PIATCO REPUBLIC V. GINGOYON ASIAS EMERGING DRAGON V. DOTC CITY OF MANILA V. SERRANO NAPOCOR V. CA BARANGAY SAN ROQUE V. HEIRS OF PASTOR UNION BANK V. CA ARDIENTE V. PROVINCIAL SHERIFF, RD OF QC BPI FAMILY V. SPS VELOSO HEIRS OF TEVES V. CA JAVELOSA V. CA REFUGIA V. CA JASON V. YGAA DALUMPINES V. CA SILVERIO V. CA MELCHOR V. MELCHOR YASAY V. RECTO HEIRS OF JBL REYES V. DEMETRIA ET. AL. ESPAOL V. FORMOSO SISON V. CAOIBES MONTENEGRO V. MONTENEGRO G.R. NO. 131977 | FEBRUARY 4, 1999 G.R. NO. 168696 | FEBRUARY 28, 2006 G.R. NO. L-2821 | MARCH 4, 1949 G.R. NO. 191560 | MARCH 29, 2011 G.R. NO. 155001 | MAY 5, 2003 G.R. NO. 166429 | DECEMBER 19, 2005 G.R. NO. 169914 | APRIL 7, 2009 G.R. NO. 142304 | JUNE 20, 2001 G.R. NO. 106804 | AUGUST 12, 2004 G.R. NO. 138896 | JUNE 20, 2000 G.R. NO. 133366 | AUGUST 5, 1999 G.R. NO. 148448 | AUGUST 17, 2004 G.R. NO. 141974 | AUGUST 9, 2004 G.R. NO. 109963 | OCTOBER 13, 1999 G.R. NO. 124292 | DECEMBER 10, 1996 G.R. NO. 118284 | JULY 5, 1996 A.M. NO. RTJ-00-1543 | AUGUST 4, 2000 G.R. NO. 139500 | JULY 27, 2000 G.R. NO. 143395 | JULY 24, 2003 G.R. NO. 150633 | NOVEMBER 12, 2003 G.R. NO. 129521 | SEPTEMBER 7, 1999 A. M. NO. CA-01-32 | JANUARY 23, 2002 G.R. NO. 150949 | JUNE 21, 2007 A.M. NO. RTJ-03-1771 | MAY 27, 2004 G.R. NO. 156829 | JUNE 8, 2004
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JURISDICTION
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the rule on substantial compliance may be availed of. This is so because the requirement of strict compliance with the rule regarding the certification of non-forum shopping simply underscore its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded, but it does thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.
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THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY V. ATIENZA G.R. NO. 154599 | JANUARY 21, 2004
Rule on Hierarchy of Courts. The concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which the application therefore will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. The hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (Inferior) courts should be filed with RTC, and those against the latter, with the CA. A direct invocation of the SCs original jurisdiction to issue the writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is an established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of the Courts docket. Forum Shopping; Exist if elements of Litis Pendentia are present. Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or when a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. For litis pendentia to exist, the following requisites must be present: (1) Identity of parties, or at least such parties as are representing the same interest in both actions; (2) Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; (3) Identity with respect to the two (2) preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case. Requisites for filing of a Writ of Certiorari. Writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
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MANILA BANKERS V. NG KOK WEI G.R. NO. 139791 | DECEMBER 12, 2003
Limitations of the Petition under Rule 45. The jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings being assailed are not supported by evidence on record or the impugned judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.
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that this Court was aware of when it expressly provided the remedy under the Rules. Such disruption is therefore an element that has been weighed and factored in and cannot be per se a basis to deny execution pending appeal.
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RULE 1 TO 5
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PROTON PILIPINAS V. BANQUE NATIONALE G.R. NO. 151242 | JUNE 15, 2005
DE
PARIS
Correct payment of prescribed docket fees. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, which vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
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The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Additional filing fees; Constitute a lien on the judgment. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
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Neither a misjoinder nor a non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court, on motion of any party or on the courts own initiative at any stage of the action. The RTC should have ordered the joinder of such party, and noncompliance with the said order would have been ground for dismissal of the action. Payment of docket fees based on the assessed value of the real estate; Does not apply to an action of specific performance. We hold that the trial court and respondent used technicalities to avoid the resolution of the case and to trifle with the law. True, Section 5, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court requires that the assessed value of the real estate, subject of an action, should be considered in computing the filing fees. But the Court has already clarified that the Rule does not apply to an action for specific performance, which is classified as an action not capable of pecuniary estimation. Allowable period to pay the docket fees of an initiatory pleading. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
LOTTE PHIL. V. DELA CRUZ G.R. NO. 166302 | JULY 28, 2005
Rule on indispensable party; Joinder in an action. An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is 'the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case. Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. Non-joinder of indispensable party; Not a ground for dismissal. Non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action and the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiff's failure to comply therefore. Domingo v. Scheer.
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buyer for value if he pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. The determination of whether one is a buyer in good faith is a factual issue which generally is outside the province of this Court to determine in a petition for review. An exception is when the Court of Appeals failed to take into account certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. The sale to petitioners was made before Pura Kalaw Ledesma claimed the lot. Petitioners could reasonably rely on Mariano Lisings Certificate of Title which at the time of purchase was still free from any third party claim. Hence, considering the circumstances of this case, we conclude that petitioners acquired the land subject of this dispute in good faith and for value. Raising issues for the first time on appeal. As a general rule, raising issues for the first time on appeal can not be done. Fair play, justice, and due process dictate that parties should not raise for the first time on appeal issues that they could have raised but never did during trial and even during proceedings before the Court of Appeals. Nevertheless, we deem it proper that this issue be resolved now, (3 decades of litigation) to avoid circuitous litigation and further delay in the disposition of this case. On this score, we find that petitioners are indeed builders in good faith. Necessary parties; Necessity of notice. A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land he is building on is his, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title. As earlier discussed, petitioner spouses acquired the land in question without knowledge of any defect in the title of Mariano Lising. Shortly afterwards, they built their conjugal home on said land. It was only in 1998, when the sheriff of Quezon City tried to execute the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-12918, that they had notice of private respondents adverse claim. The institution of Civil Case No. Q-12918 cannot serve as notice of such adverse claim to petitioners since they were not impleaded therein as parties.
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Party in interest; Indispensable party. An indispensable party is a party in interest, without whom no final determination can be had of an action. It is true that mortgagor Oliver One is a party in interest, for she will be affected by the outcome of the case. She stands to be benefited in case the mortgage is declared valid, or injured in case her title is declared fake. However, mortgagor Oliver Ones absence from the case does not hamper the trial court in resolving the dispute between respondent Oliver Two and petitioner. Indispensable party; Distinct and divisible interest. In Noceda vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 313 SCRA 504 (1999), we held that a party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible from the interest of the other parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which does complete justice to the parties in court. In this case, Chinabank has interest in the loan which, however, is distinct and divisible from the mortgagors interest, which involves the land used as collateral for the loan. Non-joinder of indispensable party; Not a ground for dismissal. Non-joinder of parties is not a ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be added by order of the court, either on its own initiative or on motion of the parties. Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no error when it found no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court for denying Chinabanks motion to dismiss and, instead, suggested that petitioner file an appropriate action against mortgagor Oliver One. A person who is not a party to an action may be impleaded by the defendant either on the basis of liability to himself or on the ground of direct liability to the plaintiff.
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RULE 6 TO 9
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genuineness and due execution of the instrument it means nothing more than that the instrument is not spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its face from the one executed. If the authenticity and due execution of a document is duly proved, it extends only to extrinsic validity (formal/legal requirement) of the document and not the truth of the contents of the document, which is the intrinsic validity (substance). The records of the case clearly shows that the document were contested. Hearsay evidence has no probative value. Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule.
MANILA BAY YACHT CLUB V. CA G.R. NO. 110015 | JULY 11, 1995
SC is not a trier of facts. Well-settled is the general rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law; findings of fact of the latter are conclusive.
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prejudiced the adverse party and have not deprived the court ot its authority. Conceived in the best traditions of practical and moral justice and common sense, the Rules of Court frown upon hairsplitting technicalities that do not square with their liberal tendency and with the ends of justice unless something in the nature of the factors just stated intervene.
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RULE 10 TO 14
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not represented by counsel. At the time the amended complaint was filed, the defendant was not yet represented by counsel, which entered its appearance only after the private respondent had filed his amended complaint.
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substituted service in accordance with Rule 14, 8 or by publication as provided in 17 and 18 of the same Rule. On the other hand, if the action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not essential for giving the court jurisdiction so long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. If the defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the country, summons may be served extraterritorially in accordance with Rule 14, 17.
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actually served. The question is whether it is allowable to merely infer actual receipt of summons by the corporation through the person on whom summons was served. We hold that it cannot be allowed. For there to be substantial compliance, actual receipt of summons by the corporation through the person served must be shown. Where a corporation only learns of the service of summons and the filing of the complaint against it through some person or means other than the person actually served, the service of summons becomes meaningless. This is particularly true in the present case where there is serious doubt if Lynverd Cinches, the person on whom service of summons was effected, is in fact an employee of the corporation. Except for the sheriff's return, there is nothing to show that Lynverd Cinches was really a draftsman employed by the corporation. Receipt by petitioner of the summons and complaint cannot be inferred from the fact that it filed a Motion to Dismiss the case. Respondent casts doubt on petitioner's claim that it came to know about the summons and the complaint against it only after it learned that there was a pending foreclosure of its mortgage. There is nothing improbable about this claim. Petitioner was in default in the payment of its loan. It had received demand letters from respondent. Thus, it had reason to believe that a foreclosure suit would be filed against it. The appellate court was, therefore, in error in giving weight to respondent's claims.
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(on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner) and ordered the issuance of an alias summons to the latter.
SPS JOSE V. SPS BOYON G.R. NO. 147369 | OCTOBER 23, 2003
Personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former cannot be made promptly can the process server resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof of service of summons must: (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the defendant. It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officers return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective. Failure to exert efforts to locate defendant, and lack of proper explanation. The Return of Summons shows that no effort was actually exerted and no positive step taken by either the process server or petitioners to locate and serve the summons personally on respondents. At best, the Return merely states the alleged whereabouts of respondents without indicating that such information was verified from a person
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who had knowledge thereof. Certainly, without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of summons. In Madrigal V. CA, this Court held that the impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted service should be explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal service failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officers Return; otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld. It bears stressing that since service of summons, especially for actions in personam, is essential for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the resort to a substituted service must be duly justified. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.
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Substituted service of summons; Served at residence. If the substituted service will be effected at defendant's house or residence, it should be left with a person of 'suitable age and discretion then residing therein. A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons. Discretion is defined as 'the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed. Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such person must know how to read and understand English to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time for the person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the 'relation of confidence to the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient's relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons. Service of summons; Duty of sheriff. In the case of Venturanza v. Court of Appeals, it was held that x x x the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by the sheriff is not applicable in this case where it is patent that the sheriffs return is defective (emphasis supplied). While the Sheriffs Return in the Venturanza case had no statement on the effort or attempt to personally serve the summons, the Return of Sheriff Caelas in the case at bar merely described the efforts or attempts in general terms lacking in details as required by the ruling in the case of Domagas v. Jensen and other cases. It is as if Caelas Return did not mention any effort to accomplish personal service. Thus, the substituted service is void. In the case Umandap v. Sabio, Jr., it may be true that the Court held that a Sheriffs Return, which states that despite efforts exerted to serve said process personally upon the defendant on several occasions the same proved futile, conforms to the requirements of valid substituted service. However, in view of the numerous claims of irregularities in substituted service which have spawned the filing of a great number of unnecessary special civil actions of certiorari and appeals to higher courts, resulting in prolonged litigation and wasteful legal expenses, the Court rules in the case at bar that the narration of the efforts made to find the defendant and the fact of failure written in broad and imprecise words will not suffice. The facts and circumstances should be stated with more particularity and detail on the number of attempts made at personal service, dates and times of the attempts, inquiries to locate defendant, names of occupants of the alleged residence, and the reasons for failure should be included in the Return to satisfactorily show the efforts undertaken. service. What then is a reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a personal service in order to demonstrate impossibility of prompt service? To the plaintiff, reasonable time means no more than seven (7) days since an expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, reasonable time means 15 to 30 days because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to require the sheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriffs Return provides data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the succeeding month. Thus, one month from the issuance of summons can be considered reasonable time with regard to personal service on the defendant.
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summons on defendant, and those resulted in failure, would prove impossibility of prompt personal
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RULE 15 TO 19
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Referral to the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat should be made prior to the filing of the ejectment case under PD 1508. Legal action for ejectment is barred when there is non-recourse to barangay court. The Complaint for unlawful detainer, docketed as Civil Case No. 2137, should have been coursed first to the barangay court. Petitioners cannot rely on the barangay conciliation proceedings held in the other cases and consider the same as compliance with the law.
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Identification of accused; Police line up. The Court has held that there is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification. Even without a police line-up, there could still be a proper identification as long as the police did not suggest such identification to the witnesses.
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respondents had to prove was that the trial court had no jurisdiction; that they were prevented from having a trial or presenting their case to the trial court by some act or conduct of petitioners; or that they had been denied due process of law. Thus, the Court of Appeals need only to resolve the issues of lack of jurisdiction, existence of extrinsic fraud, and denial of due process of law. Failure to comply with the rules on publication; newspaper of general circulation. While the service of summons by publication may have been done with the approval of the trial court, it does not cure the fatal defect that the Metropolitan Newsweek is not a newspaper of general circulation in Quezon City. The Rules strictly require that publication must be in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such time as the court may order. The court orders relied upon by petitioners did not specify the place and the length of time that the summons was to be published. In the absence of such specification, publication in just any periodical does not satisfy the strict requirements of the rules.
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RULE 21 TO 32
DASMARINAS INC. VS. REYES G.R. NO. 108229 AUGUST 24, 1993
Depositions taken from witnesses outside the Philippines. The deposition-taking in the case at bar is a "departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge;" but the procedure is not on that account rendered illegal nor is the deposition thereby taken, inadmissible. It precisely falls within one of the exceptions where the law permits such a situation, i.e., the use of deposition in lieu of the actual appearance and testimony of the deponent in open court and without being "subject to the prying eyes and probing questions of the Judge." This is allowed provided the deposition is taken in accordance with the applicable provisions of the
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Rules of Court and the existence of any of the exceptions for its admissibility e.g., "that the witness if out of the province and at a greater distance than fifty (50) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is OUT OF THE PHILIPPINES, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or . . . that the witness is unable to attend to testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment, etc." (Sec. 4 Rule 24, supra, emphasis supplied) is first satisfactorily established. Deposition; Purpose. Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in some suit or proceeding in court. Depositions, and the other modes of discovery (interrogatories to parties; requests for admission by adverse party; production or inspection of documents or things; physical and mental examination of persons) are meant to enable a party to learn all the material and relevant facts, not only known to him and his witnesses but also those known to the adverse party and the latter's own witnesses. In fine, the object of discovery is to make it possible for all the parties to a case to learn all the material and relevant facts, from whoever may have knowledge thereof, to the end that their pleadings or motions may not suffer from inadequacy of factual foundation, and all the relevant facts may be clearly and completely laid before the Court, without omission or suppression. Depositions are principally made available by law to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts; they are not therefore generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. The deponent must as a rule be presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules of evidence. Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out during a trial or hearing, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground that it is hearsay; the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time that his testimony is offered. It matters not that that opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during the taking of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for cross-examination must be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during the trial or hearing. Commission and Letters Rogatory; Definition. A commission may be defined as "(a)n instrument issued by a court of justice, or other competent tribunal, to authorize a person to take depositions, or do any other act by authority of such court or tribunal" (Feria, J., Civil Procedure, 1969 ed., p. 415, citing Cyclopedic Law Dictionary, p. 200). Letters rogatory, on the other hand, may be defined as "(a)n instrument sent in the name and by the authority of a judge or court to another, requesting the latter to cause to be examined, upon interrogatories filed in a cause pending before the former, a witness who is within the jurisdiction of the judge or court to whom such letters are addressed."
Interrogatories to Parties; Failure to Appear or Serve Answer. Sec. 5. Failure of party to attend or serve answers. If a party or an officer or managing agent of a party wilfully fails to appear before the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper notice, or fails to serve answers to interrogatories submitted under Rule 25, after proper service of such interrogatories, the court on motion and notice, may strike out all or any part of any pleading of that party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a judgment by default against that party, and in its discretion, order him to pay reasonable expenses incurred by the other, including attorney's fees.
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The matter of how, and when, the above sanctions should be applied is one that primarily rests on the sound discretion of the court where the case pends, having always in mind the paramount and overriding interest of justice.
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Written interrogatories; Time limit. The time within which to file and serve written interrogatories is explicitly fixed by the rules, that is, in civil cases before responsive answer is filed with leave of court or without leave of court after the filing of responsive answer; and in criminal cases before the setting of the arraignment and pre-trial conference. The admissions made in the verified answer to the written interrogatories may already be considered during the pre-trial conference and would definitely aid the parties for purposes of a plea-bargaining. Rules on evidence; Power of the court to stop further evidence. RULE 133, SEC. 6. Power of the court to stop further evidence. - The court may stop the introduction of further testimony upon any particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full that more witnesses to the same point cannot be reasonably expected to be additionally persuasive. But this power should be exercised with caution. (emphasis and italics supplied.) Needless to state, the trial court can not be faulted with lack of caution in denying respondents motion considering that under the prevailing facts of the case, respondent had more than ample opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense. Certainly, a party can not feign denial of due process where he had the opportunity to present his side. It must be borne in mind in this regard that due process is not a monopoly of the defense. Indeed, the State is entitled to due process as much as the accused. Furthermore, while a litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is a truism that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. The use of discovery procedures is directed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. The deposition taking can not be based nor can it be denied on flimsy reasons. Discretion has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law. There is no indication in this case that in denying the motion of respondent-accused, the trial judge acted in a biased, arbitrary, capricious or oppressive manner. Grave abuse of discretion x x x implies such capricious, and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act all in contemplation of law.
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RULE 33 TO 38
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Advanced years or physical infirmities does not presume incapacity to enter into contract. It has been held that a person is not incapacitated to contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities. Only when such age or infirmities impair her mental faculties to such extent as to prevent her from properly, intelligently, and fairly protecting her property rights, is she considered incapacitated. The respondents utterly failed to show adequate proof that at the time of the sale on April 28, 1989 Carmen Ozamiz had allegedly lost control of her mental faculties. Requisites for new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence. A motion for new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence is properly granted only where there is concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (a) the evidence had been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not have been discovered and produced during trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material and not merely corroborative, cumulative or impeaching and is of such weight that if admitted, would probably alter the result. Lack of diligence in procuring newly discovered evidence. It has been held that a lack of diligence is exhibited where the newly discovered evidence was necessary or proper under the pleadings, and its existence must have occurred to the party in the course of the preparation of the case, but no effort was made to secure it; there is a failure to make inquiry of persons who were likely to know the facts in question, especially where information was not sought from co-parties; there is a failure to seek evidence available through public records; there is a failure to discover evidence that is within the control of the complaining party; there is a failure to follow leads contained in other evidence; and, there is a failure to utilize available discovery procedures. Thus, the testimony of Judge Durias cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence to warrant a new trial.
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Relief from Judgement; When and where to file. Under the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition for relief must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other proceeding to be set aside and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioners good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. Most importantly, it should be filed with the same court which rendered the decision. As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the previous rule as it now allows the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court which decided the case or issued the order to hear the petition for relief. Under the old rule, petition for relief from the judgment or final order of municipal trial courts should be filed with the regional trial court. Petitioners argue that apart from this change, the present Rule extends the remedy of relief to include judgments or orders of the Court of Appeals since the Rule uses the phrase any court. We disagree. The procedural change in Rule 38 is in line with Rule 5, prescribing uniform procedure for municipal and regional trial courts and designation of municipal/metropolitan trial courts as courts of record. While Rule 38 uses the phrase any court, it refers only to municipal/metropolitan and regional trial courts. The procedure in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court are governed by separate provisions of the Rules of Court and may, from time to time, be supplemented by additional rules promulgated by the Supreme Court through resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals allow the remedy of petition for relief in the Court of Appeals.
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abuse thereof amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which is not present in the instant case, the trial courts denial of prior leave to file demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss may not be disturbed. However, any judgment of conviction by a trial court may still be elevated by the accused to the appellate court.
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but not of the papers in opposition thereto. Thus, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court should take that view of the evidence most favorable to the party against whom it is directed, giving such party the benefit of all favorable inferences. That one may surmise from plaintiff's showing that defendant is unlikely to prevail upon a trial is not a sufficient basis to assume that the allegations of defendant are sham, frivolous or unsubstantial. If the defense relied upon by the defendant is legally sufficient and does not appear patently sham, the motion for summary judgment should be denied.
PEOPLE V. LI KA KIM (AKA ED) G.R. NO. 148586 | MAY 25, 2004
The requisites of newly discovered evidence in order to justify a new trial are that - (a) the evidence is discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and of such weight that, if admitted, would likely change the judgment. Not one of the requisites mentioned is attendant. Appellants passport could have easily been presented and produced during the trial. Then, too, the presentation of appellants passport, would hardly be material to the outcome of the case. Appellant was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as being the perpetrator of the crime. Most importantly, appellant even identified himself as Li Ka Kim at the trial and not as Huang Xiao Wei, that bolsters the conclusion that appellant deliberately concealed his true identity in the nefarious enterprise.
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If the State expects its taxpayers to observe fairness and honesty in paying their taxes, so must it apply the same standards against itself in refunding excessive payments. When it is undisputed that a taxpayer is entitled to a refund, the State should not invoke technicalities to keep money not belonging to it. No one, not even the State, should enrich oneself at the expense of another. Sec. 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides as follows: SECTION 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration - Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move for the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said party: 1. Fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights; or 2. Newly discovered evidence, which could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result. It is true that petitioner could not move for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence because in order to have a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, it must be proved that: 1. the evidence was discovered after the trial; 2. such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; 3. it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and 4. it is of such weight that if admitted, will probably change the judgment. This does not mean however, that petitioner is altogether barred from having a new trial. As pointed out by Judge Acosta, the reasons put forth by petitioner should fall under mistake or excusable negligence. The mistake that is allowed in Rule 37 is one which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. Negligence to be excusable must also be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which the rights of an aggrieved party have probably been impaired. the test of excusable negligence is whether a party has acted with ordinary prudence while transacting important business. In this case, it cannot be said that petitioner did not act with ordinary prudence in claiming its refund with the CTA, in light of its previous cases with CTA which did not require invoices and the non-mandatory nature of the CTA circular. It is borne by the records however that in its first motion for reconsideration duly filed on time, petitioner had already prayed that it be allowed to present and offer evidence deemed lacking by CTA in its Decision of 11 August 1998. Thus, while it named its pleading as a Motion for New Trial only in its motion dated 25 January 1999, petitioner should not be deemed to have moved for new trial only at such time.
FERNANDEZ V. CA
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HUNG HYUNG PARK V. EUNG WON CHOI G.R. NO. 165496 | FEBRUARY 12, 2007
Criminal Procedure; Demurrer to evidence. When a DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE is filed without leave of court, the whole case is submitted for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution as the accused is deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. At that juncture, the court is called upon to decide the case including its civil aspect, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been waived or reserved. If the filing of a separate civil action has not been reserved or priorly instituted or the enforcement of civil liability is not waived, the trial court should, in case of conviction, state the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any. For in acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action where 1. the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; 2. the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and 3. the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. The civil action based on delict may, however, be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. In case of A DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce countervailing evidence if the court denies the demurrer. Such denial bears no distinction as to the 2 aspects of the case because there is a disparity of evidentiary value between the quanta of evidence in such aspects of the case. In other words, a court may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and
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at the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not insufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence. On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence. For if the court grants the demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally proceeds. The only recognized instance when an acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect is when there is a finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Absent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue. If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
RULE 39
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In said case, the two issues raised by therein petitioner that may allegedly be the subject of multiple appeals arose from the same cause of action, and the subject matter pertains to the same lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. Hence, splitting the appeals in that case would only be violative of the rule against multiplicity of appeals. The same holds true in an action for legal separation. The issues involved in the case will necessarily relate to the same marital relationship between the parties.
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particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. Forum-shopping is considered a pernicious evil; it adversely affects the efficient administration of justice since it clogs the court dockets, unduly burdens the financial and human resources of the judiciary, and trifles with and mocks judicial processes. The most important factor in determining the existence of forum shopping is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs. Remedial Law; A valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal requires that it should be based "upon good reasons to be stated in a special order." The following constitute "good reasons" and a combination of two or more of them will suffice to grant execution pending appeal: (1.) public interest involved or will of the electorate; (2.) the shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office; and (3.) the length of time that the election contest has been pending (italics supplied). To deprive trial courts of their discretion to grant execution pending appeal would, in the words of Tobon Uy v. COMELEC, bring back the ghost of the "grab-the-proclamation-prolong the protest" techniques so often resorted to by devious politicians in the past in their efforts to perpetuate their hold to an elective office. This would, as a consequence, lay to waste the will of the electorate. Election Procedure; Between the determination by the trial court of who of the candidates won the elections and the finding of the Board of Canvassers as to whom to proclaim, it is the courts decision that should prevail. In the case of Ramas V. COMELEC, All that was required for a valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal was that the immediate execution should be based "upon good reasons to be stated in a special order." The rationale why such execution is allowed in election cases is, as stated in Gahol v. Riodique, "to give as much recognition to the worth of a trial judges decision as that which is initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation by the board of canvassers."
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is so indifferent, irresponsible, contumacious or slothful as to provide substantial grounds for dismissal, i.e., equivalent to default or non-appearance in the case, the courts should consider lesser sanctions which would still amount to achieving the desired end. In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or of a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense rather than wield their authority to dismiss.
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In the present case, there was no proof that petitioner suffered serious injustice to exempt him from the general rule that the negligence of the counsel binds the client. Petitioner did not even attempt to refute the respondents allegations in the petition for mandamus and damages. Furthermore, petitioner cannot now complain of the OSGs errors. Petitioner should have taken the initiative of making periodic inquiries from the OSG and the appellate court about the status of his case. Litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case. To agree with petitioners stance would enable every party to render inutile any adverse order or decision through the simple expedient of alleging negligence on the part of his counsel. The Court will not countenance such ill-founded argument which contradicts long-settled doctrines of trial and procedure.
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been exercised. The purchaser is entitled as a matter of right to consolidation of title and to the possession of the property. Justice is done according to law. As a rule, equity follows the law. There may be a moral obligation, often regarded as an equitable consideration (meaning compassion), but if there is no enforceable legal duty, the action must fail although the disadvantaged party deserves commiseration or sympathy. The summary decision of the trial court and the alias writ of execution against the respondent is not unjust and unreasonable. Based on the facts of the case, The Spouses Geli reneged on their undertaking, by not paying the GSIS with the proper balance. In addition, Emilio Geli and the respondents did not inform the CA and the petitioners that Emilio Geli had paid the amount of P67,701.84 for the account of the petitioners. The respondents even allowed their appeal to be dismissed by the CA, and the dismissal to become final and executory. The petitioners were impelled to spend money for their counsel and for sheriffs fees for the implementation of the writ of execution and the alias writ of execution issued by the trial court. In the meantime, the respondents remained in possession of the property from 1969, when the said deed of absolute sale with partial assumption of mortgage was executed, up to the present, or for a period of 34 years without paying a single centavo. For the Court to allow the respondents to benefit from their own wrong would run counter to the maxim: Ex Dolo Malo Non Oritur Actio (No man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing). Equity is applied only in the absence of and never against statutory law or judicial rules of procedure.
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various rights at the same time, such as when the act constitutes a violation of separate and distinct legal obligations. The violation of each of these rights is a cause of action in itself. These causes of action that are distinct and independent, although arising out of the same contract, transaction or state of fact may be sued separately, and recovery on one is not a bar to subsequent actions on the others. New legal theories do not amount to a new cause of action so as to defeat the application of the principle of res judicata. In Siegel v. Knott, it was held that the statement of a different form of liability is not a different cause of action, provided it grows out of the same transaction or act and seeks redress for the wrong. Two actions are not necessarily for different causes of action simply because the theory of the second would not have been open under the pleadings in the first. A party cannot preserve the right to bring a second action after the loss of the first, merely by having circumscribed and limited theories of recovery opened by the pleadings in the first. Remedial Law; Non-division of the grounds for recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to place in issue in his pleading, all the issues existing when the suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is bound to set forth in his first action every ground for relief which he claims to exist and upon which he relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in successive action to recover for the same wrong or injury. A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable, must present to the court, either by the pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds upon which to expect a judgment in his favor. He is not at liberty to split up his demands, and prosecute it by piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds upon which a special relief is sought and leave the rest to the presentment in a second suit if the first fails. There would be no end to litigation if such piecemeal presentation is allowed. Remedial Law; The Evidence Test Rule. The ultimate test to ascertain identity of causes of action is whether or not the same evidence fully supports and establishes both the first and second cases. Absolute identity of parties is not a condition sine qua non for the application of res judicata. It is sufficient that there is a shared identity of interest. The rule is that, even if new parties are found in the second action, res judicata still applies if the party against whom the judgment is offered in evidence was a party in the first action; otherwise, a case can always be renewed by the mere expedience of joining new parties in the new suit. Remedial Law; Two concepts of res judicata. Section 49(b) of Rule 39 enunciates the first concept of res judicata, known as bar by prior judgment or estoppel by judgment, which refers to a theory or matter that has been definitely and finally settled on its merits by a court of competent jurisdiction without fraud or collusion. Section 49(c) of Rule 39 enumerates the concept of conclusiveness of judgment. This is the second branch, otherwise known as collateral estoppel or estoppel by verdict. This applies where, between the first case wherein judgment is rendered and the second case wherein such judgment is involved, there is no identity of causes of action. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issues be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the
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determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit; but the adjudication of an issue in the first case is not conclusive of an entirely different and distinct issue arising in the second. In order that this rule may be applied, it must clearly and positively appear, either from the record itself or by the aid of competent extrinsic evidence that the precise point or question in issue in the second suit was involved and decided in the first. And in determining whether a given question was an issue in the prior action, it is proper to look behind the judgment to ascertain whether the evidence necessary to sustain a judgment in the second action would have authorized a judgment for the same party in the first action.
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RULE 40 TO 56
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designated trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for original registration but also over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising from such applications or petition.
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TRES-REYES V. MAXIMS TEA HOUSE G.R. NO. 140853 | FEBRUARY 27, 2003
Exception to the Rule that the SC is not a trier of fact. The issue of whether a party is negligent is a question of fact. As a rule, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and this applies with greater force in labor cases. Hence, factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, particularly when they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter and if supported by substantial evidence, are accorded respect and even finality by this Court. But where the findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are contradictory, as in this case, the reviewing court may delve into the records and examine for itself the questioned findings. Rules of procedure in labor cases should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. In labor cases, rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. They are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and where their strict application would result in the frustration rather than promotion of substantial justice, technicalities must be avoided. Technicalities should not be permitted to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties. Where the ends of substantial justice shall be better served, the application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed.
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findings. In this case, there is no reason to deviate from the findings of the lower courts. The facts relied upon by the trial court and appellate courts are borne out by the record. We agree with the conclusions drawn by the lower courts from these facts. Civil Law; A contract is perfected once there is consent of the contracting parties on the object certain and on the cause of the obligation. In the instant case, the object of the sale is the Subject Land, and the price certain is P15,000.00. The trial and appellate courts found that there was a meeting of the minds on the sale of the Subject Land and on the purchase price of P15,000.00. This is a finding of fact that is binding on this Court. We find no reason to disturb this finding since it is supported by substantial evidence. Civil Law; The Statute of Frauds applies only to executory contracts and not to contracts either partially or totally performed. Thus, where one party has performed ones obligation, oral evidence will be admitted to prove the agreement. In the instant case, the parties have consummated the sale of the Subject Land, with both sellers and buyers performing their respective obligations under the contract of sale. In addition, a contract that violates the Statute of Frauds is ratified by the acceptance of benefits under the contract. Godofredo and Carmen benefited from the contract because they paid their DBP loan and secured the cancellation of their mortgage using the money given by Armando and Adelia. Godofredo and Carmen also accepted payment of the balance of the purchase price. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years. The ten-year prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. However, if the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does not run against him. In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible. An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. Neither is the action barred by LACHES. We have defined LACHES as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable time, to do that which, by the exercise of due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either had abandoned it or declined to assert it. Respondents discovered in January 1994 the subsequent sale of the subject land and they filed this case in March 1994. Plainly, they did not sleep on their rights.
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or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case. The exception obtains in this case. An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. Settled is the rule that the existence of the corporate entity does not shield from prosecution the corporate agent who knowingly and intentionally causes the corporation to commit a crime. The conviction of appellant must rest not on the weakness of his defense, but on the strength of the prosecutions evidence. In the appreciation of evidence in criminal cases, it is a basic tenet that the prosecution has the burden of proof in establishing the guilt of the accused for the offense with which he is charged.
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human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard for all the circumstances. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. And this because its business is mainly with the traveling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Failure of the carrier to observe this high degree of care and extraordinary diligence renders it liable for any damage that may be sustained by its passengers. As the lower courts have found, evidence positively show that petitioner has accommodated waitlisted and non-revenue passengers and had overbooked more than what is allowed by law, to the prejudice of private respondents who had confirmed tickets. Overbooking amounts to bad faith and therefore petitioner is liable to pay moral damages to respondent Judy Amor.
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case against Rizal Surety, opted instead to file an urgent motion for the lifting of the notice of garnishment] specially so in this case where QBE failed to show that respondents acts were motivated by malice or bad faith. As officers of the Court, however, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are bound to discharge their duties with utmost care and diligence, particularly in implementing the orders of the court, for if they err, they will affect the efficacy of the process by which justice is administered.
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x x x However, the court may dismiss the petition if it finds the same patently without merit or prosecuted manifestly for delay, or if the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration. In such event, the court may award in favor of the respondent treble costs solidarily against the petitioner and counsel, in addition to subjecting counsel to administrative sanctions under Rules 139 and 139-B of the Rules of Court. x x x The Court may impose motu propio, based on res ipsa loquitur, other disciplinary sanctions or measures on erring lawyers for patently dilatory and unmeritorious petitions for certiorari.
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RULE 57 TO 61
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preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. Thus, absent words that show the parties intention to restrict the filing of a suit in a particular place, courts will allow the filing of a case in any venue, as long as jurisdictional requirements are followed. Venue stipulations in a contract, while considered valid and enforceable, do not as a rule supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, they should be considered merely as an agreement on additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. In the instant case, the stipulation does not limit the venue exclusively to Makati. There are no qualifying or restrictive words in the invoice that would evince the intention of the parties that Makati is the only or exclusive venue where the action could be instituted. We therefore agree with private respondent that Makati is not the only venue where this case could be filed.
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purchaser took the property subject to such attachment lien and to all of its consequences, one of which is the subsequent sale on execution. The preference created by the levy on attachment is not diminished even by the subsequent registration of the prior sale. In Capistrano v. PNB, if the attachment or levy of execution, though posterior to the sale, is registered before the sale is registered, it takes precedence over the latter. The rule is not altered by the fact that at the time of the execution sale the Philippine National Bank had information that the land levied upon had already been deeded by the judgment debtor and his wife to Capistrano. The auction sale being a necessary sequel to the levy, for this was effected precisely to carry out the sale, the purchase made by the bank at said auction should enjoy the same legal priority that the levy had over the sale in favor of plaintiff. In other words, the auction sale retroacts to the date of the levy. Were the rule otherwise, the preference enjoyed by the levy of execution in a case like the present would be meaningless and illusory. Good faith: Defense in registration of attachment. It is settled that a person dealing with registered property may rely on the title and be charged with notice of only such burdens and claims as are annotated thereon. This principle applies with more force to this case, absent any allegation or proof that Stronghold had actual knowledge of the sale to petitioner before the registration of its attachment. Thus, the annotation of respondents notice of attachment was a registration in good faith, the kind that made its prior right enforceable.
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Hence the existence of a right violated, is a prerequisite to the granting of an injunction. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Failure to establish either the existence of a clear and positive right which should be judicially protected through the writ of injunction or that the defendant has committed or has attempted to commit any act which has endangered or tends to endanger the existence of said right, is a sufficient ground for denying the injunction. The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated. It is to be resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. Where the parties to the new obligation expressly recognize the continuing existence and validity of the old one, where, the parties expressly negated the lapsing of the old obligation, there can be no novation. The Kasunduang Pag-aayos which is quoted earlier does not support petitioners contention that it novated the real estate mortgage since the will to novate did not appear by express agreement of the parties nor the old and the new contracts were incompatible in all points. In fact, petitioner expressly recognized in the Kasunduan the existence and the validity of the old obligation where she acknowledged her long overdue account since September 20, 1994 which was secured by a real estate mortgage and asked for a ninety (90) days grace period to settle her obligation on or before December 21, 1996 and that upon failure to do so, she will execute a deed of sale with a right to repurchase without interest within one year in favor of private respondents.
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Jurisprudence has established that a stay of execution may be warranted by the fact that a petitioner corporation has been placed under rehabilitation receivership. However, it is undisputed that on March 5, 1997, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued an order approving the proposed rehabilitation plan of petitioner and placing it under liquidation pursuant to Presidential Decree 902-A. Subject to the control of the SEC, the liquidator, Ledesma, Saludo & Associates, was ordered to "wind up the affairs of the corporation, continue to manage the corporation for purposes of liquidation in order to protect the interest of its creditors and avoid dissipation, loss, wastage, or destruction of the remaining assets and other properties of the corporation and to ensure orderly payment of claims against such corporation in accordance with applicable laws." Thus, petitioner pointed out that the SEC's order suspending all claims against it pending before any other court, tribunal or body was pursuant to the rehabilitation receivership proceedings. Such order was necessary to enable the rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its powers free from any judicial or extra-judicial interference that might unduly hinder the rescue of the distressed company. Since receivership proceedings have ceased and petitioner's rehabilitation receiver and liquidator, Ledesma Saludo & Associates, has been given the imprimatur to proceed with corporate liquidation, the cited order of the Securities and Exchange Commission has been rendered functus officio. Thus, there is no legal impediment for the execution of the decision of the Labor Arbiter for the payment of separation pay.
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The doctrine of law of the case is akin to that of former adjudication, but is more limited in its application. It relates entirely to questions of law, and is confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings in the same case. The doctrine of res judicata differs therefrom in that it is applicable to the conclusive determination of issues of fact, although it may include questions of law, and although it may apply to collateral proceedings in the same action or general proceeding, it is generally concerned with the effect of an adjudication in a wholly independent proceeding. To elucidate further, res judicata or bar by prior judgment is a doctrine which holds that a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and for the same cause. The four requisites for res judicata to apply are: (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment or an order on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.63 The fourth requisite is wanting in the present case. There is only one case involved. There is no second independent proceeding or subsequent litigation between the parties. The present petition concerns subsequent proceedings in the same case, with petitioners raising the same issue long settled by a prior appeal.
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under the facts and circumstances of this case. Consequently, this Court is not estopped from reviewing the conclusions reached by the court a quo. Civil Law; Good faith as a defense in awarding moral damages. To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately, knowing that the charges were false and groundless. Such was not the case when the instant complaint was filed. The rule has always been that moral damages cannot be recovered from a person who has filed a complaint against another in good faith. The law always presumes good faith such that any person who seeks to be awarded damages due to acts of another has the burden of proving that the latter acted in bad faith or with ill motive. Anent the award of exemplary damages, jurisprudence provides that where a party is not entitled to actual or moral damages, an award of exemplary damages is likewise baseless.
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The replevin in this case has been resorted to in order to pave the way for the foreclosure of what is covered by the chattel mortgage. The conditions essential for such foreclosure would be to show, firstly, the existence of the chattel mortgage and, secondly, the default of the mortgagor. These requirements must be shown because the validity of the plaintiffs exercise of the right of foreclosure is inevitably dependent thereon. Since the mortgagee's right of possession is conditioned upon the actual fact of default which itself may be controverted, the inclusion of other parties, like the debtor or the mortgagor himself, may be required in order to allow a full and conclusive determination of the case. When the mortgagee seeks a replevin in order to effect the eventual foreclosure of the mortgage, it is not only the existence of, but also the mortgagor's default on, the chattel mortgage that, among other things, can properly uphold the right to levy the property. The burden to establish a valid justification for such action lies with the plaintiff. An adverse possessor, who is not the mortgagor, cannot just be deprived of his possession, let alone be bound by the terms of the chattel mortgage contract, simply because the mortgagee brings up an action for replevin. When there is doubt as to the right of possession on the part of the applicant in a complaint for replevin and damages, the absconding debtor-mortgagor must be impleaded. In case the right of possession on the part of the plaintiff, or his authority to claim such possession or that of his principal, is put to great doubt; it could become essential to have other persons involved and impleaded for a complete determination and resolution of the controversy. In the case under scrutiny, it is not disputed that there is an adverse and independent claim of ownership by the respondent as evinced by the existence of a pending case before the Court of Appeals involving subject motor vehicle between the same parties herein. That petitioner could not locate the mortgagor, Leticia Laus, is no excuse for resorting to a procedural shortcut. It could have properly availed of substituted service of summons under the Revised Rules of Court. If it deemed such a mode to be unavailing, it could have proceeded in accordance with Section 14 of the same Rule. Indeed, petitioner had other proper remedies, it could have resorted to but failed to avail of. For instance, it could have properly impleaded the mortgagor. Such failure is fatal to petitioner's cause.
DE ASIS V. CA
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LOPEZ V. CA
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As filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. Petitioners were able to prove that Laurence needs Vasquez's support and that Vasquez is capable of giving such support. Dolores testified that she spent around P200,000 for Laurence; she spends P8,000 a month for his schooling and their subsistence. She told the lower court Vasquez was earning US$535 monthly based on his January 10, 2000 contract of employment with Fathom Ship Management and his seafarer information sheet. That income, if converted at the prevailing rate, would be more than sufficient to cover the monthly support for Laurence.
RULE 62 TO 65
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WACK WACK GOLF V. LEE WON G.R. NO. L-23851 | MARCH 26, 1976
Interpleader; Separate suit and Final judgment. If a stakeholder defends a suit filed by one of the adverse claimants and allows said suit to proceed to final judgment against him, he cannot later on have that part of the litigation repeated in an interpleader suit. In the case at hand, the Corporation allowed civil case 26044 to proceed to final judgment. And it offered no satisfactory explanation for its failure to implead Tan in the same litigation. In this factual situation, it is clear that this interpleader suit cannot prosper because it was filed much too late.
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It is the general rule that before a person will be deemed to be in a position to ask for an order of interpleader, he must be prepared to show, among other prerequisites, that he has not become independently liable to any of the claimants. It is also the general rule that a bill of interpleader comes too late when it is filed after judgment has been rendered in favor of one of the claimants of the fund, this being especially true when the holder of the funds had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and had an opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit in which the judgment was rendered. United Procedures Pipe Line Co. v. Britton, Tex. Civ. App. 264 S.W. 176; Nash v. McCullum, Tex. Civ. 74 S.W. 2d 1046; 30 Am. Jur. p. 223, Sec. 11; 25 Tex. Jur. p. 56, Sec. 5; 108 A.L.R., note 5, p. 275. Interpleader; Protection against multiple actions. The remedy by interpleader is afforded to protect the party from the annoyance and hazard of two or more actions touching the same property or demand; but one who, with knowledge of all the facts, neglects to avail himself of the relief, or elects to take the chances for success in the actions at law, ought to submit to the consequences of defeat. To permit an unsuccessful defendant to compel the successful plaintiffs to interplead, is to increase instead of to diminish the number of suits; to put upon the shoulders of others the burden which he asks may be taken from his own.
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VELARDE V. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY G.R. NO. 159357 | APRIL 28, 2004
A decision that does not conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution and the law is void and deemed legally inexistent. To be valid, decisions should comply with the form, the procedure and the substantive requirements laid out in the Constitution, the Rules of Court and relevant circulars/orders of the Supreme Court. Under the law, an action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is to interpret or to determine the validity of the written instrument and to seek a judicial declaration of the parties rights or duties thereunder. The essential requisites of the action are as follows: (1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for judicial determination. Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are a patent nullity and must be struck down as void.
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Declaratory relief; Definition. Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute, and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute. Corollary is the general rule that such an action must be justified, as no other adequate relief or remedy is available under the circumstances. Declaratory relief; Requisites. Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows: 1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; 4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.
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Action for declaratory relief may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, contract etc., to which it refers. The purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, contract etc. for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof. The petition gives a practical remedy in ending controversies which have not reached the stage where other relief is immediately available. It supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to repudiation of obligations, invasion of rights, and the commission of wrongs. Here, private respondents brought the petition for declaratory relief long after the alleged violation of P.D. No. 551. A lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, especially of this Court, for to do so will negate the principle of hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review. A final judgment, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world. Thus, it is the duty of the lower courts to obey the Decisions of this Court and render obeisance to its status as the apex of the hierarchy of courts. "A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation." "There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings," as eloquently declared by Justice J. B. L. Reyes.
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LACSON V. SECRETARY PEREZ G.R. NO. 147 780 | MAY 10, 2001
Extraordinary remedy under Rule 65; Directly filed to the SC. Petitioners' contention in LACSON Petition, DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO Petition, and LUMBAO Petition that they are under imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. Such an individual may ask for a preliminary investigation under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, where he may adduce evidence in his defense, or he may submit himself to inquest proceedings to determine whether or not he should remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in court. Further, a person subject of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities within the periods provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, otherwise the arresting officer could be held liable for delay in the delivery of detained persons. Should the detention be without legal ground, the person arrested can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary detention. All this is without prejudice to his filing an action for damages against the arresting officer under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Verily, petitioners have a surfeit of other remedies which they can avail themselves of, thereby making the prayer for prohibition and mandamus improper at this time.
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Undue delay in deciding a case amounts to grave abuse of discretion. The Sandiganbayan's inordinate delay in deciding the subject criminal case prejudiced the right of petitioner to a speedy disposition of his case. Such undue delay can be characterized as no less than a grave abuse of discretion, resulting in manifest injustice on the part of petitioner. In view of these circumstances, the case falls squarely into the established exception and will justify this Court's action of substituting the discretion of respondent with that of its own.
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with the rule on a statement of material dates in the petition may be excused since the dates are evident from the records." The more material date for purposes of appeal to the Court of Appeals is the date of receipt of the trial courts order denying the motion for reconsideration, which date is admittedly stated in the petition in the present case. The other material dates may be gleaned from the records of the case if reasonably evident. Thus, in this case the Court deems it proper to relax the Rules to give all the parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses.
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RULE 66 TO 71
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While a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 would ordinarily be inappropriate to assail an interlocutory order, in the interest, however, of arresting the perpetuation of an apparent error committed below that could only serve to unnecessarily burden the parties, the Court has resolved to ignore the technical flaw and, also, to treat the petition, there being no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy, as a special civil action for certiorari. Not much, after all, can be gained if the Court were to refrain from now making a pronouncement on an issue so basic as that submitted by the parties. Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to quo warranto cases against persons who usurp an office in a private corporation. As explained in the Unilongo v. CA case, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 of the present Rules no longer contains the phrase "or an office in a corporation created by authority of law" which was found in the old Rules. Clearly, the present Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799. It is, therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 which applies to the petition for quo warranto filed by respondents before the trial court, and not Rule 66, since what is being questioned is the authority of herein petitioners to assume the office and act as the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated.
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Petition for quo warranto; requirement of right to office. The petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding who seeks reinstatement to an office, on the ground of usurpation or illegal deprivation, must prove his clear right to the office for his suit to succeed; otherwise, his petition must fail. From this perspective, the petitioner must first clearly establish his own right to the disputed office as a condition precedent to the consideration of the unconstitutionality of the respondents appointments. The petitioners failure in this regard renders a ruling on the constitutional issues raised completely unnecessary.
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The proffered value stands as merely a provisional determination of the amount of just compensation, the payment of which is sufficient to transfer possession of the property to the Government. However, to effectuate the transfer of ownership, it is necessary for the Government to pay the property owner the final just compensation. Appointment of commissioners. It must be noted that Rep. Act No. 8974 is silent on the appointment of commissioners tasked with the ascertainment of just compensation. This protocol though is sanctioned under Rule 67. We rule that the appointment of commissioners under Rule 67 may be resorted to, even in expropriation proceedings under Rep. Act No. 8974, since the application of the provisions of Rule 67 in that regard do not conflict with the statute. As earlier stated, Section 14 of the Implementing Rules does allow such other incidents affecting the complaint to be resolved under the provisions on expropriation of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Even without Rule 67, reference during trial to a commissioner of the examination of an issue of fact is sanctioned under Rule 32 of the Rules of Court. Insufficient Ground for Inhibition of Respondent Judge. The disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his/her judicial power and should not be allowed on the basis of mere speculations and surmises. It certainly cannot be predicated on the adverse nature of the judges rulings towards the movant for inhibition, especially if these rulings are in accord with law. Neither could inhibition be justified merely on the erroneous nature of the rulings of the judge. We emphasized in Webb v. People: To prove bias and prejudice on the part of respondent judge, petitioners harp on the alleged adverse and erroneous rulings of respondent judge on their various motions. By themselves, however, they do not sufficiently prove bias and prejudice to disqualify respondent judge. To be disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. Opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings, although erroneous, as long as they are based on the evidence presented and conduct observed by the judge, do not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. As a general rule, repeated rulings against a litigant, no matter how erroneous and vigorously and consistently expressed, are not a basis for disqualification of a judge on grounds of bias and prejudice. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. Although the decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judge's integrity, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself would be insufficient to establish a case against the judge. The only exception to the rule is when the error is so gross and patent as to produce an ineluctable inference of bad faith or malice.
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advantageous proposal within the prescribed period. Hence, when the original proponent is able to timely match the lowest or most advantageous proposal, with all things being equal, it shall enjoy preference in the awarding of the infrastructure project. It is without question that in a situation where there is no other competitive bid submitted for the BOT project that the project would be awarded to the original proponent thereof. However, when there are competitive bids submitted, the original proponent must be able to match the most advantageous or lowest bid; only when it is able to do so, will the original proponent enjoy the preferential right to the award of the project over the other bidder. It is already an established fact in AGAN V. PIATCO (2004) that AEDC failed to match the more advantageous proposal submitted by PIATCO by the time the 30-day working period expired on 28 November 1996;8 and since it did not exercise its right to match the most advantageous proposal within the prescribed period, it cannot assert its right to be awarded the project. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Corona and Velasco. Mr. Justice Renato C. Corona submits that the original proponent of an unsolicited proposal for a (Build Operate Transfer) BOT project, under Section 4-A of Republic Act No. 6957, as amended, is entitled to the award of the project in at least three circumstances: (1) no competitive bid was submitted; (2) there was a lower bid by a qualified bidder but the original proponent matched it; and (3) there was a lower bid but it was made by a person/entity not qualified to bid, in which case, it is as if no competitive bid had been made. Both Justice Corona and Mr. Justice Presbiterio J. Velasco, Jr., in their dissenting opinions, conclude that AEDC is entitled to the award of the NAIA IPT III project as the original proponent thereof because the third circumstance is extant in this case.
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However, when the defendant claims that his land suffered damage because of the expropriation, the dismissal of the action should not foreclose the defendant's right to have his damages ascertained either in the same case or in a separate action. NPC must Pay Just Compensation for the Entire Property. Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case restores possession of the expropriated land to the landowner.42 However, when possession of the land cannot be turned over to the landowner because it is neither convenient nor feasible anymore to do so, the only remedy available to the aggrieved landowner is to demand payment of just compensation. In this case, we agree with the trial and appellate courts that it is no longer possible and practical to restore possession of the Property to Pobre. The Property is no longer habitable as a resort-subdivision. The Property is worthless to Pobre and is now useful only to NPC. Pobre has completely lost the Property as if NPC had physically taken over the entire 68,969 square-meter Property. In United States v. Causby, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that when private property is rendered uninhabitable by an entity with the power to exercise eminent domain, the taking is deemed complete. Such taking is thus compensable. In this jurisdiction, the Court has ruled that if the government takes property without expropriation and devotes the property to public use, after many years the property owner may demand payment of just compensation. This principle is in accord with the constitutional mandate that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Entities cannot trifle with a citizen's property rights. The power of eminent domain is an extraordinary power they must wield with circumspection and utmost regard for procedural requirements.
BARANGAY SAN ROQUE V. HEIRS OF PASTOR G.R. NO. 138896 | JUNE 20, 2000
An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for public use. The subject of an expropriation suit is the governments exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class cases, besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed to be more within the competence of courts of first instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the time that the first organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction.
UNION BANK V. CA
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OF
QC
It is a well-settled rule that statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with, and that even slight deviations therefrom will invalidate the notice and the sale at least voidable. The issue of lack of publication of notice cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. In the case of Go v. Court of Appeals, as in the present case, despite the fact that the mortgagees pleaded as a defense in their Answer the "receipt of the notice of the sale which was published in a newspaper of general circulation, the issue of lack of publication of the notice of foreclosure was never raised in issue by the mortgagors. Indeed, as correctly held by the respondent Court, the issue of lack of publication of the notice of foreclosure of the mortgage was raised only on appeal. Petitioner does not represent that he directly attacked in his complaint in Civil Case No. 8920 the validity of the foreclosure because of such lack of notice. His own Statement of the Facts and of the Case in the instant petition makes no reference to such lack o notice as one, or even just as a basis for any, of his causes of action in the complaint. He sought the cancellation of the contract of mortgage because he allegedly never received the amounts indicated in the promissory notes. Of course, nullity of the mortgage due to absence of consideration is leagues apart form the nullity of the foreclosure of a mortgage because of non-publication of the notice of foreclosure.
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Furthermore, Article 1616 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides: The vendor cannot avail himself of the right to repurchase without returning to the vendee the price of the sale x x x. It is not difficult to understand why the redemption price should either be fully offered in legal tender or else validly consigned in court. Only by such means can the auction winner be assured that the offer to redeem is being made in good faith.
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property and seeking annulment of mortgages did not preclude the filing of an ejectment case against
Pendency of an action for annulment is not a defense against an action for ejectment. The pendency of an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance (which necessarily involves the issue of ownership) may not be successfully pleaded in abatement of an action for ejectment, the issue in the latter being merely physical possession. To be sure, private respondents most effective remedy was to file a separate action for unlawful detainer against petitioner.[17] They cannot ask for a writ of possession from the RTC where the case for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale is pending because after the mortgagee was able to consolidate his title on the land and a new title issued in his name, petitioner was able to obtain an Order[18] from the RTC directing the mortgagee (predecessor-in-interest of private respondents) to desist from further enforcing the foreclosure proceedings.
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An action for unlawful detainer is different from a forcible entry case in that the former involves an act of unlawfully withholding the possession of the land or building against or from a landlord, vendor or vendee or other person after the expiration or termination of the detainers right to hold possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied, and neither is prior physical possession of the property by the plaintiff necessary; whereas in the latter, the main issue is one of priority of possession. Inferior courts have jurisdiction to resolve the question of ownership raised as an incident in an ejectment case where a determination thereof is necessary for a proper and complete adjudication of the issue of possession. Certain guidelines, however, must be observed in the implementation of this legislative prescription, viz.: 1. The primal rule is that the principal issue must be that of possession, and that ownership is merely ancillary thereto, in which case the issue of ownership may be resolved but only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession. Thus, as earlier stated, the legal provision under consideration applies only where the inferior court believes and the preponderance of evidence shows that a resolution of the issue of possession is dependent upon the resolution of the question of ownership. 2. It must sufficiently appear from the allegations in the complaint that what the plaintiff really and primarily seeks is the restoration of possession. Consequently, where the allegations of the complaint as well as the reliefs prayed for clearly establish a case for the recovery of ownership, and not merely one for the recovery of possession de facto, or where the averments plead the claim of material possession as a mere elemental attribute of such claim for ownership, or where the issue of ownership is the principal question to be resolved, the action is not one for forcible entry but one for title to real property. 3. The inferior court cannot adjudicate on the nature of ownership where the relationship of lessor and lessee has been sufficiently established in the ejectment case, unless it is sufficiently established that there has been a subsequent change in or termination of that relationship between the parties. This is because under Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. 4. The rule in forcible entry cases, but not in those for unlawful detainer, is that a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property and whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right through an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. Corollarily, if prior possession may be ascertained in some other way, then the inferior court cannot dwell upon or intrude into the issue of ownership. 5. Where the question of who has prior possession hinges on the question of who the real owner of the disputed portion is, the inferior court may resolve the issue of ownership and make a declaration as to who among the contending parties is the real owner. In the same vein, where the resolution of the issue of possession hinges on a determination of the validity and interpretation of the document of title or any other contract on which the claim of possession is premised, the inferior court may likewise pass upon these issues. This is because, and it must be so understood, that any such pronouncement made affecting ownership of the disputed portion is to be regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not bar nor prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land.[26] Moreover, Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer
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shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Justice and equity does not favor the use of procedural technicalities in Summary cases. There have been cases where persons who have failed to adduce any legal ground for their continued stay on property belonging to another have nonetheless managed to stave off eviction for several years through the improper use of procedural technicalities. Conformably, if we were to allow the dismissal of an ejectment case for the reason that the question of ownership is incidentally involved in determining the question of possession, we are in effect providing the defendants in ejectment cases with the opportunity to prolong their occupancy of premises, over which they have ceased to have any valid possessory right, during the time that an action for recovery of ownership, which involves a more tedious and lengthy court proceeding, is actually pending in court. It is indeed ironic that a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case which is intended to be disposed of in summary fashion has oftentimes proved to be the most cumbersome and difficult to decide. It is thus about time that this situation be remedied if only to contribute to the solution of the worsening problem of court congestion, by refusing to edify these cases by giving them a full-blown treatment in all the courts in the judicial structure, and thereby save the courts the expenditure of precious time and energy which could otherwise be devoted to more significant and vital litigations. Occupation by mere tolerance. A person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate the same upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. The status of petitioners is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner.
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Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings designed to provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of the property involved. In giving recognition to the action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession. It is undisputed that private respondent ESTOYA is already 68 years old and had been in actual possession of a portion of Lot 725 since birth.
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Distinction between an action for forcible entry and illegal detainer. (1) In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege and prove that he was in prior physical possession of the premises until deprived thereof, while in illegal detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession; and (2) in forcible entry, the possession by the defendant is unlawful ab initio because he acquires possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, while in unlawful detainer, possession is originally lawful but becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right of possession under his contract with the plaintiff. In pleadings filed in courts of special jurisdiction, the special facts giving the court jurisdiction must be specially alleged and set out. Otherwise, the complaint is demurrable.
HEIRS OF JBL REYES V. DEMETRIA ET. AL. A. M. NO. CA-01-32 | JANUARY 23, 2002
The Court of Appeals has no authority to issue immediate execution pending appeal of its own decision. Discretionary execution under Rule 39, Section 2(a), Revised Rules of Court, as amended, applies to a judgment or final order of the trial court, upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing. The Court cannot permit any act or omission, which yanks public faith away from the judiciary, for a judges utter lack of familiarity with the rules undermines public confidence in the competence of the courts. In fact, the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that judges must be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. He must have the basic rules at the palm of his hand and be proficient in the interpretation of laws and procedural rules.
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In order to discipline a judge, it must be clearly shown that the judgment or order is unjust as being contrary to law and that the judge rendered it with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. Judges cannot be subjected to liability civil, criminal or administrative for any of their official acts, no matter how erroneous, so long as they act in good faith. It is only when they act fraudulently or corruptly, or with gross ignorance may they be held criminally or administratively responsible. An erroneous decision or order is presumed to have been issued in good faith in the absence of proof to the contrary. Justice Malcolm aptly described ideal judges as men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate to the other two departments of government. Those who wield the judicial gavel have the duty to study our laws and their latest wrinkles. They owe it to the public to be legally knowledgeable for ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice.
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I can do all things through Jesus Christ who strengthens me. Phil 4:13
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