Nyaya Sutras of Gautama Text

THE
SACRED BOOKS OF THE HINDUS
Translated by various Sanskrit Scholars.
KDITBD BY
Major B. D. BASU, I.MS.

(Retired.)
VOL. VIII.
THE NYAYA SUTRAS OF GOTAMA
PTJBLISHRD
BY
SUDHINDRANATHA vasu
FROM THE PACINI
OFFICE, BHUVANHS'WAEI As'RAMA, BAHADURGA.VJ
Hllababao
FrINtbjI*?&, Apurva Krishna
Bosb at the Indian Press
1913
/}-
THE
NYAYA SUTRAS OF GOTAMA
TRANSLATED BY
MAHAMAHOPADHYAYA SATlSA CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA,

M.A,, PH.D.
Principal, Sanskrit Collbge, Calcutta
PUBLISHED BY
THE PACINI OFFICE, BHUVANE&'WARI ASRAMA, BAHADDRGANJ

HUababafc
Printed by Apurva Krishna Bosb at the Indian Press
1913
) )
) )
.TABLE OF CONTENTS.
INTRODUCTION
...
BOOK
The Sixteen
Release
categories
...
I,
CHAPTER
I.
( Jrori )
2
(
Means
of
knowledge
(
vm
2 2
Perception
Inference
(
**m
defined
...
wyra
(
defined
...
3
3
Comparison
wi )
defined
(
Word
Soul
or verbal testimony
(
swe ) defined
4 4
5 5 5 5
5
Objects of knowledge
(
it?
to^ )
( (
defined.
Body
Sense
*fa
defined
tf^) defined
(
(
Element
Qualities
^n
)
)
)
defined
of earth etc. ...
jt
Intellect (
5%
)
defined
6 6
Mind
(w
(
(
defined
)
Activity
sifn
)
defined
and explained
...
6
7
Fault
$ra
defined
(
Transmigration
Fruit
( (
fawra
defined
7 7 7
<w
defined defined defined
Pain
%:*
(
Release
wn^ )
)
7 7
Doubt
W
(
defined and explained
Purpose
>i%wi ) defined
8
(
Example or
familiar instance
)
fgffl )
TenetJjJ^nw
defined
8
9 9
A dogma of alTthe Schools ( fl5flfaiHi A dogma peculiar to some School ( nfim^%RT A hypothetical dogma ( fwf%*n - ...
)
An
implied
dogma
pm%^T)
(
10
Members
of a syllogism
wm
Proposition ( ifnw
JO 10
II
Reason (^3)
...
Homogeneous or
affirmative reason (
(
*nc%
Beterogeneous or negative reason
QWfy
)
"
Page.
11
11
Example
wp^w
...
...
...
...
...
-Homogeneous or affirmative example ( swtfquw )... Heterogeneous or negative example (<$Wqrfw ) ...
Application, affirmative and negative
(
... ...
...
... ...
12
w
... ... ...
...
12
12 13
Conclusion
( firon )
... ...
... ... ... ...
Confutation
ni
(
Ascertainment
f^h
...
...
13
BOOK
J Discussion (Wf)
... ...
...
I,
CHAPTER
... ... ... ...
II.
... ... ...

...
... ... ...
... ...
14
15 15
Wrangling ( I a Cavil ( fair )

b
ct
)
...
...'
...
Fallacies of reason
trwmi
15
15
The erratic ( *R*rc ) ... ... The contradictory ( fi^w ) ... ... The controversial or equal to the question The reciprocal or unproved ( otwi ) The mistimed ( *raiiftn ) ... ... Quibble (wi) ... ... ... j
. . .
... ...
(
...
... ... ...
...
...
16
mwn )
...
...
16
16
...
... ...
... ...
...
... ...
17 17
17
... ...
Quibble in respect of a term
( wjjra )
(
...
)
Quibble in respect of a genus

Futility (wfii)...
srnpwm
... ... ... ...
... ... ...

...
...
..."
.
18
1*
Quibble in respect of a metaphor

>
( B'rorcwi )
...
...
... ...
19
An
occasion for rebuke
finjwra
...
20
BOOK
Doubt
(
II,
CHAPTER
I.
iw ) examined
objects of
)
...
...
...
... ... ... ... ...
..
22
The means and

Perception
(
knowledge
( wtfift* )
( uro-JPta )
...
...
examined
...
...
24
29 31 31
*m
examined
...
... .,. ...
... ... ...
Special kinds of knowledge
...
The relation of perception and inference The whole ( wn% ) and its part ( wra )
Inference
( <5*ni )
HMWu^wq
...
... ...
32
33 34 35 3
examined
(
...
...
The time present, past and future

Comparison (vtm
)
^fam,
...
wfai, *wroi )
... ...
examined
... ... ...
examined
(
Word
or verbal testimony
*** )
...
examined
...
...
TheVeda(%*)*examined
Injunction (6l)
... ...
...
...
...
... ...
...
...
...
Persuasion
Praise
1*35
...
... ...
*.,.
C^)
...
...
...
.
...
39 41 41 41 41
41
Blame (finp) ... Warning ( i^ft )
...
... ...
...
...
...
...
...
to
Prescription
s*row
(
)
)
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
41 41
Reinculcation
wpmf
Tautology
( yw* )
... ...
...
...
... ...
42 42
The Medical Science
wj^j
...
BOOK
Means of knowledge
(
II,
CHAPTER
...
...
...
II.
itm
examined
...
...
...
...
...
43
Rumour
($firo)...
(
... ... ... ...
...
...
... ...
43
Presumption
Probability
(
wfafft
)
...
...
... ...
43
43 43
46
51
q*m
(
...
... ...
...
Non-existence
iwrc
) (
...
...
...
.The nature of sound

Otherness
(
*i*0
examined
...
...
...
...
...
... .
w*
...
...
Letters, their modifications
and substitutes
...
... ...
( rtfi"mt
... ... ...
54
59
59
Word(iO
Individual
... ...
... ... ...
... ...
... ...
( "tftt )
...
...
Form(wfii)
...
...
...
...
59 59
Genus
wtft )
...
BOOK
Sense
(
(
III,
CHAPTER
I.
ff*5* ) is
jrfK ) is
not soul
(
Body
not soul
(
wnj to^ )
(
...
...
...
...
...
...
83
...
... ... ... ...
63
Duality of the eye
*:
...
...
...
...
55
66 67
Remembrance ( t*rfn ) ... Mind ( 1*: ) is not soul ( vm\ The soul ( vmi ) established
...
...
... ...
...
... ... ...

... ...
...
...
...
...
...
68
7?
The body ( ito ) is earthy ... The eye- ball ( <mm. ) is material The senses ( <frat ) are material ( ^rfiw ) The eye ( **: ) and its ray ( *ftn: ) The senses ( tffs* ) are more than one ... Touch (W5) ... five ( vftfi& ) The senses are The qualities of the elements ( 5B3* )
...
...
... ... ...
...
.
70
72
...
...
...
.
...
...
...
...
72
75
...
...
... ...
...
..
75
77
...
...
...
...
78
HOOK
Intellect or
III,
CHAPTER
11.
knowledge
Knowledge is The nature of
58 is not not momentary knowledge*( vn )

(
...
-
eternal
...
...
...
...
83
qq
...
... ...
...
...
...
...
gg 92
94
Recollection (^fii)
...
...
...
...
...
Desire and aversion
imifr )-
...
The mind
( <ra: ) is
not the seat of knowledge
...
...
...
Q$
Page.
.'(*wt) and its causes Knowledge ( pt ) is not a natural
...
...
...
...
...
...
-
gg
99
quality of the body

(
Non-siraultaueouanesB of knowledge
m flpwg
i
...
...
... ...
...
...
... ...
jQg
193
The mind
Desert
(
*m:
) is
)
atomic
w$
...
...
f$5Jnra
producing the body
...
103
BOOK
Activity
(
IV,
CHAPTER
...
1.
wrfn
) ...
... ...
...
...
...
Faults ($ro)
...
... ... ...
jOg 10g
Stupidity
.
^f )
( fcrvira )
... ...
..,
...
... ...
10g
J09
Transmigration
Entity does not arise from non-en tit.y (1
smrai^ Hi%7rin:
...
.
HO
ll2
God
(**<:
...
(
...
...
Production from no-cause

All are not non-eternal
All are not eternal
(
(
wfiifcruh ir^Tfrfri:
...
...
U2
113
jj^
jjj-
îRmi^ )
...
1 s^' ft&i\ ) All are not distinct ( t &' ^j )

Self -existence
(
...
...
wnraftfg )
(
and
relative non-existence
)
...
w^rowi
\yj
No
fixity of
(
(
number
^w-fliRjfg
...
...
jig
... ...
...
...
Fruit
w
g:s
(
)
)
examined
...
Ug
122 123
123
Pain
examined
(
Release
wrt ) examined
...
...
Debts and troubles
"m ita
...
BOOK
IV,
CHAPTER
)
...
II.
The rise of true knowledge ( aKwrr^reofn Ths whole and if.s nnrtsf wwidiauEw 1
...
127 jgw
.
Atom(5)
The
... (
...
...
i i
...
130
igj
non-reality of things
(
iranr q m
)
r^Hnw fitt:
...
...
.
False apprehension
Meditation
( *nfa: )
ftîwfN:
...
igg
...
(
...
igg
Discussion, wrangling and cavil
tn<*w<4lwi: )
...
igg
BOOK
Futility
V,
CHAPTER
...
I.
(wft)
...
...
(
...
...
...
Balancing the homogeneity
sw^to^
(
) ...
)
..
.
... ...
._
_
140 1^1
141
Balancing the heterogeneity Balancing an addition
$f*%n
( wwfcaro )
... ...
...
1^2
Balancing a subtraction (tm^ra)

Balancing the questionable
(
>^
^
j^g j^g
144
v&Ftt
(
...
...
...
...
Balancing the unquestionable
wafarar
)
)
...
...
<a
Balancing the alternative
fiwwww
...
...
lil
.*
Page.
Balancing the reciprocity

Balancing the co-presence
imm
... ...
... ...
...
...
...
...
...
...
145
147
( mfi*ror )
Balancing the mutual absence ( wwfSw ) Balancing the infinite regression ( *nfpm
Balancing the counter-example
(
...
...
148
149 149 150 152 153 153 155
156
)
)
... ... ... ...

...
...
...
alaggpww
)
...
...
.
Balancing the non-produced Balancing the doubt

(
( )
wyq ffwwi
)
... ... ... ...

.
biwit
(
... ...
...
Balancing the controversy

Balancing the non-reason
(
jwwwi
)
...
mfypm
(
...
i
... ...
...
Balancing the presumption
wWtnw
...
Balancing the non-difference (
wWwu
.,
... ...
Balancing the demonstration

Balancing the perception
Balancing the non-eternal
(
( m!rwii )
...
...
...
157 158 159
sMrKi<u )
(
...
...
...
... ... ...
...
...
Balancing the non-perception

(
wjwfinwi
)
...
Jifiww
... ... ... ...

...
... ...
...
160
161
\Q2
Balancing the eternal

Balancing the
effect (
ftwOTi)
)
...
...
wfoir
(
...
....
Admission of an opinion
Six-winged disputation
(
wjit
...
...
... ...
134
166
*3.qftnr )
...
BOOK
Occasions for rebuke
(
V,
CHAPTER
... ... ...
II.
ftnfwi
(
...
...
...
167
i(J7
Hurting the proposition

Shifting the proposition
"iffim^ )
... ...
...
... ...
... ...
...
...
( xfiwtTC )
(
168
169
Opposing the proposition

Shifting the reason
ifiwWnr
)
'
...
. .
Renouncing the proposition ( tfiiwni )

( ^wm
... ...
...
... ...
159 igg
...
...
Shifting the topic (wiHnc^)
... ... ...

...
...
...
...
179
The meaningless (fita*) ... The unintelligible ( *fiwm* ) The inopportune ( vitmm )..
.
... ...
...
..
... ...
...
170
171 171
...
... ...
...
Saying too
Repetition
Silence
(
little ( *yi )
(
...
...
... ...
... ...
... ...
...
17^
J72 272 173
Saying too much

(
wftw )
...
...
jtopi )
)
...
... ... ...
vryim )
...
...
...
...
... ... ...
Ignorance
(wt
Non-ingenuity (wifiiw)
"
...
173 jy4
174
l*
Evasion (TO*)...
...
... ...
'"
Admission of an opinion ( "Wijw ) ... Overlooking the censurable ( ffiwftfrw ) Censuring the non-censurable
Fallacies of a reason
(
....
^
...
...
tiktfbmfm
...
...
...
''' ...
(*ww )
274 yjg 17B
...
INTRODUCTION
I.-GOTAMA THE FOUNDER OF NYAYA PHILOSOPHY.
Panini, the celebrated Sanskrit grammarian,
flourished
who
5i
is
supposed
to
have
about 350
B. C.,
i
derives
the word
pSneI
0rd " Nyfiya X "
"Nyaya"f from
the root "
"
which conveys the

go.
same meaning as
signifying logic
is
"gam" to
therefore etymologically identical
with
"Nyaya" as "nigama" the
conclusion of a syllogism.
the
Logic
is
designated in Sanskrit not only by

indicate diverse " Hetu-vidyii called "X or " Hetu-
word "Ny&ya" but
also
by various other words which
aspects of the science. For instance, it is S&stra " the science of causes, " Anviksiki " the science of inquiry, " Pramsina-Sastra " the science of correct knowledge, "Tattva-Sastra " the " '" the science of reasoning, " Viida'rtha 'science of categories, " Tarka-vidyft
the science of discussion and " PhakkikS-iSastra " the science of sophism, Nyftya-sutra
-ii
is
-
the earliest
.., - ..
work extant on Nyaya Philosophy.
...I..I..I
i
,,
,-
-, ,,,
-i-
n . ..
II
II.
-il
ii
.1
* Pauini is said to
dynasty about 850
B.
have been a disciple of Upavaraa, minister of a King of the Nanda C,, as is evident from the following
:
(Kathfisarit-sSgara, Chapter IV., verse 20).
Dr. Otto Bochtlingk observes : " We need therefore only make a space of flfty years between each couple of thorn, in order to arrive at the year 850, into tno neighbourhood of which date our grammarian is to be placed, according to the Kathfisarife-sagara.*' Qoldstucker's Panini, p. 85.
(Pacini's
Astadhyayi
3-8-122.)
Jft&'Sr fond
!$rro?
%fow& 3t wnwwfr foi^T ftnyret q*^fo ^qwl strHvift
(Lalitavistara,
Chapter XII.,
p. 179, Dr.
Rajondra Lai Mitra'a edition).

I
wwfrf%^ ^V'ttRRwfr&ijitfcfwrr:
(Aniarakosa, svargavarga, verse, 165).
The Nyaya or logic
is
said to have been founded
by a sage named
^SacffiKoSS
AiSfapftda or Dirghata-
Gotama.* He is also known as Gautama, Aksap&daf and Dlrghatapas4 The names Gotama and Gau-
tama point
to
the
family to which he belonged.

of long penance.
while the names Aksapada and Dtrghatapas refer

respectively to his meditative habit
and practice
In the Rigveda-samhita as well as the Sathapatha-Brahmana of the

_. . mn 4 The family of Gotama.
white Yaiurveda we find mention of one Gotama J
who was
Nodhah,
j|
son of
Hahugana and
,,_,',
priest of the
Royal
family of Kuru-srmjaya for whose victory in battle he prayed to Indra.
son of Gotama, was also called Gotama
who composed
;
several
new hymns in honour of India.

Gotama
are designated
Gotamasah
The sages sprung from the family of and Agni, fl who were very intelligent
i
*g^ m
$j<A\i*m
Urn <mt&
wfâ^
w&t$k
niTgf%:
w.
11
(Naisadhacharitam
17-75.)
(Padtnannrana, Uttarakfanmla, Chapter 203.}
*nff*rflfcri**vifflifti
(Skanda-purana, Kfilika Khaiida, Chapter XVII.)
tT3W?
jrî
Jpfirm wire
*to* sut^t 3rn5
(Udyotakara's Nyayaviirtika, opening lines). In the Sarvadarsanasanigraha Nyfiya philosophy is called the Aksapfida system.
|
Kalidasa's
Rnghuvamsam
11-88.
<rf: TO 35 Hf^r *t ^r^t'sejtk^ sgî aîRf an^ra^f^Kiwidfi, Aran s I *t%jrm
tntf
5erca*TRf
3*r^?r
sw srrfanwfrfo aw * f* ^swiif gW|?i *mft^

i
11
(Rigveda-samhita, Manitala
1,
(Sukta 81,
mantra
8,
b'fiyana's
commentary).
(Satapatha Brfihmana of the white Yajnrveda, Kfimla

recension.)
1,
Adhyftya
4,
Madhyandinfya
(Rigveda-samhita, Manilala
1,
Sukta
68,
Mantra
18.)
(Rigveda-samhita, Mandala
1,
Sukta
01,
Mantra
10).
(Rigveda-samhita, Mandala
1,
Sukta
77,
Mantra
6).
IU
pleased with their adoration, gave them cattle and rice in abundance;'
It is related that
Gotama, once pinched with
thirst,
prayed for water of the
Marat-Gods,
who
out of mercy, placed a well*
before
him transplanted
well not only
from elsewhere. quenched his
The water gushing out copiously from the

but formed
itself into
thirst
a river,
the source of which
was the
seat of the original well. of Gotama Gotama while in
In the Rigveda-samhita the descendant's

noticed are also called
aCherS
as
already
later
Vedic
oaUed
Gauta m a
of the
literature
they arc called

of the
Brahmana Gotama familyt among the

viz.,
The VaAsaSamaveda mentions four members teachers who transmitted that Veda to
Gautama.
Radba-Gaulama, Galr-Gautama, Sumanta-bfibhravaGautama and Samkara- Gautama and the ChAndogya TJpauisad of the same Veda mentions another teacher named Hiiridrumata-GautamaJ who
posterity,
the
was approached by Satya-Kaina Javala to be his teacher. The Gobhila Grhya Sutra of the Samaveda cites the opinion of a Gautama who held
that during the winter season there should be three oblations offered to the
*ftw* 33?ssrt* a*n fi&ufa'^|8&
j"iwflR <i"ai$
(Rigveda-samhita, Maiulala t, Sukta S3, Mantra 11.) Sayana in commenting on Rigveda sariilritu, Maiulala
observes
1,
SQkta
77,
Mantra
10,
The well
4,
(ufcsadkl)
is
alluded to in the Rigveda,
Maiulala
1,
SQkta
88,
Mantra
thus:
moft
jht:
<ti?
a wrgftnf fa?
mwfctf'
%tt
Samavediya Vainsa-Brahmana, Khaiida
2,
Satyavrata Samasvatuis edition

i
p. 7.)
&m%
rreraT3[
*i#t man: (Samavediya Vamsa-Brahmana, Khantla
fiizm,
gn^
2).
{Samavediya Vamsa-Brakmana, Khanda
3.)
* w xfa^m
farafefara sura*'
*
wra%
rwT*gtaf
4,
*m*saftifo[ n
(Chandogya Upanisad, Adbyaya
Khanrla
4).
$S$T
WW Jwl^'llfcUlA'
wn famkmri
(Gobhila
ii
pP&
II
II
II
ii
II
Grhya Sutra
8-10.)
It.)
dead ancestors. Another Gautama was the author of the Pitrmedha Sutra* which perhaps belongs to the Samaveda. The Brhad&ranyaka t of the white Yajurveda mentions a teacher named Gautama, while in the Kafchopaniâd of the Black Yajurveda the sage NaciketasJ who conversed with
Yama on
generic
tbe mystery of
life,
is
called
name
is
as his father is also called
Gautama which evidently Gautama in the same work.

is
is
Gautara
the
mentioned
to
sutra||
as a
teacher in the Kausika
sutra of tho
Atharvaveda while
another
Gautama
attributed the authorship of
Gautama Dharma
an authoritative work on the sacred law.
not take any notice of one Gautama^f who, at the bidding mother as stated in the Mahabhtirata, cast into the Ganges his old and blind father Dirghatamaa who was however miraculously saved. The Ramayana mentions a Gautama** who had his hermitage in a
of his
We need
grove at the outskirts of the city of Mithilft where

Gautama, husband
of Ahalya.
ne ^ ve(*
w ^^
his
w ê
Ahalya.
It is
well-known how
Ahalya for her
flirtation
with Indra, was cursed by
her lord to undergo penance and mortification until

r,
* Aa inc<> m P ,et e manuscript of tlio l>it rinedha Sfltra is coutained in the Library of the i Calcutta e Sanskrit College, bub the work was printed iu America several years ago.
t *i\M\a ^ran:
im
^ u
(Brhadavanyaka, Adhyaya
4.)
srgr
X&* a ^'
in
"^
srawftr pr'
Jira?
5).
m^
wm
*m <mh
i
*rafi-r
m^n
it
$ n
(Kathopanisad, Valli
^ jujb" mfoi^ jRfta

(Kathopanisad, Valli
5.)
^ wgf
3
swf
src
%$
Vide Weber's History of Indian Literature, p. 153. ||The text of the Gautama Dharaa-sfltra has been printed several Minos in India while an English translation of it by Dr. G. Buhler has appeared in the Sacred Books of the East Series.
ansr^ ^f%g; srrsr:

*
qalf
*? fsterar
ti
^
||
jpn^
srararara
niawfi^ JifmrT:
?repr:
||
(Mahabharata, Adiparva Adhyaya

**ftmrerrq?Pi
104).
gw nsw ew
ft* far?
remmfrgrcr
gfa6fa(
WlWfjt fautorar: g!*fo
g^j n u
II
(Ramfiyana, Adikfinda, Sarga
48).
(*>;)
her .^mancipation at
tlie
happy advent of Rfima.
yana, while repeating the same account, places the hermitage of
The Adhy&tma R&m4U Gautama*
and our great poet K&lid&6a follows the RamSyanic legend describing Gautama* as Dirghatapas, a sage who pracof the
;
on the banks
Ganges
tised long penance.
The V&yupurana describes a sage named AksapadaJ as the disciple of a Brahmana named Soma Sarma, who was Siva Aksap&da. incarnate and well-known for his practice of austerities
at the shrine of
Prabhasa during the time of J&tukarnya

is
Vyasa.
This Aksapada mentioned along with KanAda
evidently no
other pereon than
As
to the origin of the
applied to
Gotama or Gautama who founded the Nyaya philosophy. name Aksapada (" having eyes in the feet ") as Gautama, legend has it that Gautama was so deeply absorbed
one
clay
in philosophical contemplation that
during his walks he
fell
unwittingly into a well out oE which he was rescued with great difficulty.
God
therefore mercifully
provided him with a second pair of eyes in his
feet to protect the
sage from further mishaps.
Another legend which
(Adliyattna
Kamayara, adik&rula, adhyaja
6).
& %% gafokv^ftr:
^nswu^srcraf *rahi ^|
jwr?ra fofra
11
gT-
W ^g: f%5f fofswftaftf

WfWI^ym^Mf:
II
\ii
II
(Raghuvaiiwa, Sarga
11).
snp^S v <mm
JWikA4nwi
%# atora:
^wfasyr!
u
mom
*o*
u
)iirrenr
*%*w- wn? 3*$! mt
sr
11
*o|
11
(Vayupiu-ana, Adbyaya 23).
<rarat
n#r totû
nt
^ spurn
?f
cwi^ jfir ^mftrttwri
(Nyayakoja, 2nd edition, by M. M, Bbitoacftry* JhMakikar, Bombay).
vl
represents Vyass, a disciple of Gautama, lying prostrate before his master
upon him, not with his natural eyes, but with anew pair of eyes in his feet, may be dismissed with scanty ceremony as being the invention of a later generation of logicians, anxious
until the latter condescended to look
to humiliate Vyilsa for vilification of the
Nyaya system
in his
Mahabharata
and Vedanta
sfitra.
The people
Loeal tradition.
of Mithila.
(modern Darbhanga in North Behar) ascribe Nyaya philosophy to Gautama, husband of Ahalya, and point out as the place of his birth a village named Gautamasthana where a fair is held
the foundation of
of.
month of Chaitra (March-April). Darbhanga and has a mud-hill of considerable height (supposed to be the hermitage of Gautama) at the ba.se of which lies the celebrated " Gautama-kunda " or Gautama's well the water whereof is like milk to the taste and feeds a perennial rivulet
every year on the 9th day of the lunar
It is situated
28 miles north-east
called on this account Ksirodadhi orKhiroi (literally the sea of milk).
Two
miles to the east of the village there
is
another village
named
Alfalya-
sthana where between a pair of trees
lies
a slab of stone identified with
Ahalytl in her accursed state. In its vicinity there is a temple which commemorates the emancipation of Ahalya by Rama Chandra. The Gautama-kunda and the Ksirodadhi river, which ai"e still extant at Gautama- sthana verify the account of Gotama given above from the Rigveda while the stone slab and the temple of Rama at Ahalya-sthana
are evidences corroborative of the story of Ahalya as given in
the Rfuna-
There is another tradition prevalent in the town of Chapra that Gautama, husband of Ahalya and founder of the Nyaya philosophy, resided in a village now called Godna at the confluence of the rivers Ganges and Sarayfi where a Sanskrit academy called Gautama Thomson Psithasala
yana.
has been established to commemorate the great sage. It seems to me that Goutama, son of Rahugana, as mentioned in the Rigveda, was the founder of the Gautama family from The founder of which sprang Gautama, husband of Ahalya, as narrated
Pbll0S01
'
hy
WM^fled.
*
in
the
Ramdyana.
It
is
interesting
to
note that
Satananda6 son of Gautama by Ahalytl, is a priest in the royal family of Janaka much in the same way as Goutama, son of
wm^sw^w glrf|?OTf%f^H
UHlfW
ifllHI*w(l
(R4mftyan, Sdikapda, Sarga
50).
JHWHl
îffcflt
(Uttara
Rama
oharitam).
*"
Bahugana is a priest in the royal family of Kurusrfijaya. The fields waving with paddy plants which greet the eyes of a modern traveller near and round Gautama-sthana bear testimony to Agni'e gift of rice and cattle in abundance to the family of Gautama. The Nyaya philosophy was, on the authority of the tradition prevalent in Mithila, founded by Gautama husband of Ahalya. The same Gautama has been designated as Aksapada in the Vayu PurAoa already referred to. Aksapada has been identified
by Anantayajvan* with the author of the Pitrinedha Sutra as well as with that of the Gautama Uharma sutra, and it is possible that he is not other than the Gautama referred to in the Kautftka sfitra of the Atharva Veda. The other Gautamas mentioned in the Briihmanas, Upanisads etc., appear to be the kinsmen of their illustrious name-sake.
The Iiamayana,
His residence.
as
..
we have
.
found, places the hermitage of Gautama,
of Ahalya, at Gautama-sthana twenty-eight , , , _ ., , ., , , ,, miles north-east of Darbhanga while the Adhyatma

it
husband
Ramayaoa places
Sarayu
off
on the banks of the Ganges

to
at its confluence
with the
the town of Chaprft.
The VayupurAna
fixes the residence of
AksapMa, supposed
Girnar in Kathiawar
be identical with Gautama, at Prabhasaf beyond

the sea-coast.
To reconcile these conflicting statements it has been suggested that Akgap&da otherwise known" as Gotama or Gautama was the founder of the Nyaya philosophy, that he was
oji
born at Gautama-sthana in Mithila on the river Ksirodadhi, lived for
some years at the village now called Godna* at the confluence of the Ganges and Sarayu until his retirement into PrabhAsa the well-known sacred place of pilgrimage in Kathiawar on the sea-coast.
*To the Gfhya Sutras of the Samavcda probably belong also Gautama's Pitrmedhasutra (Cf. Uurnoil, p. 57 the commentator Anantayajvan identifies the author with AksapSda the author of the NySya-sfttra;, and the Gautama-dharma-sutra. Weber's History of Indian Literature, p. 85. t Prabhasa washed on its western side by the river Sarasvati and ropnted as the residence of Krisiia, is mentioned in the Sriinad Bhagavata thus :
;
(Bhagavata, fcSkandha
II,
adhyaya
wsrractf
6.)
fah *rai f&jtn
swrtr
qmvfa
m sms m*&&
srafî:
11
it
(Bhagavata, Skandha II, adhyaya 80). Prabhasa was situated boyoud the rock of Girnar in Kathiawar where we come across all the edicts of As'oka as well as an inscription of Rudradfima supposed to be the first inscription in Sanskrit dated about 100 A. D. which mentions Chandra Gupta and As'oka by names. There are also some inscriptions in Gupta characters, and there is no doubt that Prabhasa situated on the Sarasvati acquired celebrity in very odd times. This Prabhasa is not to be confounded with another town called PrabhAsa in Kusambi near Allahabad on the Jumna where there i an inscription, dated about the 2nd century B. C, of Asadasena, a descendant of Sonakayana of Adhiccbatra, (vide Dr. Fuhrer'a Pabhosa inscriptions in Epigraphia Indica, Vol. II, pp. 242-248.)
via
The Satapatha Brahmana mentions Gautama along with Asurayana

and the Vayupurana (already quoted) states that Aksap&da, alias Gotama or Gautama, flourished Jatukarnya Vyasa. Now, Jatukarnya, according to the
Ynjfiavalkya
during the time of
Madhukanda
and
Kinda
of
the
Satapatba Brahmana*
(Kanva recension) was a pupil of Asurayana and Yaska who are supposed to have lived about 550 B. C. This date tallies well with the time of another Gautama who, together with Aranemi, is described in the Divyavadanaf, a Buddhist Sanskrit work translated into Chinese in the 2nd century A. D., as having transmitted the Vedas to posterity before they were classified by Vyasa. It does not conflict with the view that Aksapada is identical with Gautama author of the Gautama Dharma-Sutra which is " declared to be the oldest of the existing works on the sacred lawj." Aksapada-Gautama, founder of the Nyava Philosophy, was almost a contemporary of Buddha-Gautama who founded Buddhism and Indrabhuti Gautama who was a disciple of Mahavira the reputed founder of
Jainism.
means of knowledge (Pramana) into perception, inference, comparison and word found in the Jaina Prakrta scriptures such as the Nandi-Sutra, Sthanahga-Sutra and Bhagavatifourfold division of the
* Fide Weber's History of Indian Literature, p. 140. In the Madhyandiniya reconsiou of the Katapatha Brahmana a teacher intervenes between Yaska and Jatukarnya, viz. Bhfiradvfija. Cf
The
(Satapatha Brahmana, Madhyandiniya recension, Kantla 14, ndhyaya 5.) | The 83rd chapter of the Divyfivadanr, called Mfitanga Sutra, in Chinese Mo-tan-nuein, was translated into Chinese by An-shi-kao-cie of the Eastern Han dynasty in A. D. 148-170. (Vide Bnnjin Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka). In it we read :
wpr ^rart iwsrw: ?*%&
itfjli+w ^rafq;
sttoRi
9r
^:
liftt^TS^-
XXXIII). Buhler observes .-These arguments which allow us to place Gautama before both I Bandhayana and Vflsl$ tha are, that both these authors quote Gautama as an authority Those facts will, 1 think suffice to show that tbe Gautama Dharraa Sutra on law doclarod to be the oldest of the existing works on the sacred law." (Buhler'a may be safely
(Divyfivadfina, Chap.
Qantama, Introduction, pp.
XL1X and
wid
LIV,
S. B. B. series).
q*n#
wg*tnfr 3ri
(tthanlnga-Sutra, Page 809, published by Dhanapafc Sing),
S^tra compiled by Indrabhfiti-Gautama finds its parallel in the NyayaSutraof Aksapada-Gautama leading to the conclusion that this particular
was either borrowed by Indrabhuti from Aksapada or was the common property of both. Tn the Pali and Prakrta scriptures Gautama is called Gotania,, and a Pali Sutta mentions a sect called " Gotamaka/*
doctrine
who were
the
followers of Gautama, identified perhaps
with the founder of
Ny&ya Philosophy. The Pali Canonical scriptures such as the Brahmajala Sutta, f Udaua etc., which embody the teachings of Buddha, mention a class of Sramanas and Brahmanas who were " takki " or
"
takkika"
(logiciaus,
and " vimamsi"
(casuists)
and indulged
to
in " takka"
(logic)
and vimamsa (casuistry), alluding perhaps Aksapada-Gautama described as " Gotamaka."
the followers of
The Kathavatthuppakarana
+,
a Pali work of the Abhidhammapitaka,
composed by Moggaliputta Tissa at the third Buddhist Council during the reign of Asoka about 255 B. C, mentions " patifma " (in Sanskrit
"pratijfta," proposition),
(in
"Upauaya"
(application of reasons),
etc.,
"Niggaha"
Sanski'it
" Nigraha,"
humiliation or defeat)
technical terms of
Nyaya philosophy or
has not made any actual reference to

of its technical terms warrants us to in
to
which are the Logic. Though Moggaliputta Tissa Logic or Nyaya, his mention of some
that, that
suppose
philosophy existed
some shape
in India in his time about
255 B. C,
These facts lead us
conclude that Gotama, Gautama or Aksapada, the founder of Nyaya Philosophy, lived about the year 550 B, C.
* Vide Prof. T. W.
pp. 220-222.
It ia
Rhys David's Introduction

:
to
tho Kassapa-Sihanada Sutta,
observed
Gofcra,
its
"
Tho only alternative
referred to as having had a
that some Brahmana, bolouging to the Gotama community of Bhiksus named after him."
is
here
(Brahmajala Sutta
1-82,
edited by
Rhys Davids and
carpenter).
(Udana, p.
t
10.
edited by Paul Steinthal, P. T. 8. edition).

"
The terms
" PaJiiSfia " (pratijna, proposition) and " niggaha
(nigraha, defeat) occur
in
the following passages :
<s
m mt wn tara
" is the
qrfesrra $f ifearawrr fcr Rrrcrtaff

p. 3).
(Kathavatthuppakarana, Siamese edition,
" Niggaha-Catukkam name of a section of the first chapter of the Kathavatthuppakarana while *' Upanay a-Catukkam " is the name of another section of that work.
it. nyAyasOtra the first work on nyaya philosophy. To Gotama, Gautama or Aksapada, of whom a 6hort account has
._
'
The
earliest contnbu-
.,
heen given above,

,
tion to the Sutra

aphoristic style
the
ISyaya-autra
*,,
is
attributed
the authorship of
the
earnest
i-
work on
in
Nyaya
or
Philosophy.
Sanskrit literature
the
Stitra
was presumably inaugurated at about.550 B. 0., and the Nyaya-Sutra the author of which lived, as already stated, at about that
must have been the first* contribution to that literature. The " Sutta" or Sutra section of the Pali literature reads very much like a body
time,
of
sermons bearing no
affinity
is
with the Sutra works of the Brahmanas.

five
The Nyaya-Sutra
, , The gradual development of the Nyaya,
divided into
1
books,
i
each containing two

It is
_.
chapters called ahnikas or Diurnal portions. x

believed that
Aksapada
finished his
work on Nyaya
it
in ten lectures corresponding to the Ahnikas referred

to above.
We do
not
know whether
the whole of the NyAya-Sutra, as
exists
was the work of Aksapada, nor do we know for certain whether his teachings were committed to writing by himself or transmitIt seems to me that it is only the first book ted by oral tradition only.
at present,
of the
that
Nyaya Sutra containing a brief explanation of we aro justified in ascribing to Aksapada, while
the
16 categories
the second, third
and fourth books which discuss particular doctrines of the Vais'esika, Yoga, Mlmamsa, Vedanta and Buddhist Philosophy bear marks of different hands and ages. In these books there are passages quoted almost verbatim from the Lanka vatara-Sutra t, a Sanskrit work of the Ybgucara Buddhist Philosophy, from the Madhyamika Sutra of NngArjunaJ and from the Sataka of Arya Deva works which were composed in the early
centuries of Christ.
rejoinders
The
for
fifth
book treating of the varieties of
futile
and occasions
rebuke was evidently not the production of
Aksapada who dismissed those topics without entering into their details. The last and most considerable additions were made by Vatsyayana otherwise known as Paksila Svami, who about 450 A D, wrote the first regular commentary, " Bhasya", on the Nyaya Sutra, and harmonised the different and at times conflicting, additions and interpolations by the ingenious introduction of Sutras of his own making fathered upon Aksapada.
* Kapila
to Asuri
is
stated in the Samkbya-Karika, verse 70, to have taught his philosophy
Kapila therefore proceeded Aksapada by at least three generations. Kapila's Philosophy is believed to have come down by oral traditions and was not) perhaps committed to writing in his life-time. Hence the Nyaya-Sutra has been stated tc be the first work of the Sutra period. t Vide Nyaya Sutra 4-2-26, which quotes the Lankgvatara Sutra (dated about 800 A.D.) t Vide Kyaya-Sutra 2-1-80, 4-1-80, and 4-1-48, which criticise the Madhyamika Sutra. | Vide Nyaya-Sutra 1-1-48 which criticises Sataka of Aryadeva.
who is mentioned in the fcatapatha Brahmana as a teacher. Asurfiyana and Yaska who followed Asuri were the teachers of JatOkarnya, a contemporary of Ak?apada-
Gautama.
<*>
The Ny&ya-SOtra
Commentaries on the
Nyaya-satra.
has, since its composition,

is
enjoyed a very great

,
.t
popularity as
, nes that have / from time to time, centred round A few of the commentaries are mentioned below
evident from the numerous com men ta.
.1
...
it.
TEXT.
1.
Nyfiya-Sutra by Gotama or Aksapada (550 B. C.)
Commentaries.
2. S.
Nyaya-Bhtisya by. Vfitsyayana (450 Nyaya- Vfirtlka by Udyctakara.
A D.)
4. 5.
Nyaya-Yfirtika tatparya-lika by Vficaspati Mis'ra.
Nyaya-Yartika-tatparyacika-parN'uddhi by Udayana.
Pari-iuddiprakasa by Vardhamfina.
6.
7.
8.
Vardhamanendu by Padmanabha Misra. Nyfiyfilaukara by fcrikantha.

Nyayalaiikara Vrtti by Jayanta.
10.-
Nyaya
liianjari
by Jayanta.
11. 12.
13. 14. 15. 10.
III.
Nyfiya-Vrtti by Abhayatilakopfidhyfiya.
Nyaya- Vrfcti by Visvan&tha, Mitabhasini Vftti by Mahadeva Vedfinti.
Nyayaprakasa by Kes'ava Misra. Nyayabodhint by Govardliana.
Nyaya Sutra Vyakhya by
Mathurfinfltha.
RECEPTION ACCORDED TO THE NYaYA PHILOSOPHY.

and Kausitiki Brahmana that Philosophy (Adhy&t,a-VidyA) received its first impetus frora the Ksatriyas (members of the military caste) who
"
.
It
appears from the Chandogya-upanisad, Brhadaranyaka-upanisad
JS&s&JSfflz;
military caste.
carried
it
to great perfection.
an assembly of th?Kiiru-'Pi\ncalas consoled a

* Kausitaki-BrShmana 2-1, 2; 10, 4. Brihadaranyaka 2-1-20, 2-!!-6. (Chandogya 8-14-1 5-11, 24 ; 1-8,9
;
King Ajfttas&tru m B rah m ana named ^vetaketu,
1-9-3, 7-1-3,
and
5-11.
(Chandogya-upanisad
5-3).
Professor P. Denssen observes : In this narrative, preserved by two different Yedic schools, it is expressly declared that the knowledge of the Brahman as fit man, the central doctrine of the entire Vedanta, Is possessed by the King ; but, 011 the contrary, is not possessed by the Urahmaiia "famed as a Vedie scholar." Philosophy of the Dpanishacls, pp. 1718. Again, he remarks : Wo are forced to conclude, if not with absolute certainty, yet with a very high degree of probability, that as a matter of fact the doctrine of the Attnan standing as it did in such sharp contrast to all the principles of the Yedie ritual, though the original conception may have been due to Brahmauas, was taken up and cultivated primarily not in Bra h maim but in Ksatriya circles, and was first adopted by the former in later times' Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 19.
KJHiW'd' WW I fajJMUMH* *** ' cFWlfa *f cRi^T 3TS SfT These four pregnant expressions (Mahfivakya) originated from the Brabmanas, whence it'raay be concluded Nirguna-Brahma-Vidya or knowledge of absolute Brahma was confined among them. It was the Saguaa-Brahma-Vidyi or knowledge of Brahma limited by form and attributes that is s*id to have been introducted by the Kiatriyas,
I I
-
Wi
xii
son of Aruui of the Gautama family, that he had no cause of being sorry
for his inability to
explain
to
certain
doctrines of Adhyiitma-Vidyft which

It
were known only
the
Ksatriyas.
may
be observed that Mahavira
and Buddha who founded

universal religions based
Ksatriyas.
respectively
Jainism
and
Buddhism
two
not
on philosophy or Adhyatnw-Vidyii were also

to
Kapila
is
reputed
be the
first
Brahmana who propounded

the
a sytem of philosophy called SAmkhya,
but his work on
subject
having come down

ascertain
to us in its original
it
form we are not in a position to
what
it
relation
bore to the Vedax or what kind of reception
was
the
given to
by the orthodox
Brihmanas
to
We know
for certain that
most powerful Bnihmana who undertook

Nyaya-Sutra.
lie
study and
teach
philosophy
openly was Gotama, Gautama or Aksapada the renoyfned author of the
which
the
at its
founded a rational system of philosophy called " NyAya" inception had no relation with the topics of the Vedic Samhita
and Brahmana.
scriptural
viz.,
At
this stage the
dogmas.
Nyaya was pure Logic unconnected with AksapAda recognised four means of valid
the
reliable assertion.
at its early stage
it
knowledge,
perception, inference, comparison and word of which
last signified
knowledge derived through any
Tins being the nature of Nyaya or Logic

0t g recefvedwU,h favon"
was
not.
received with favour by the orthodox
community
of
so-
BrAhmanas who anxious
to establish
an organised
ciety, paid their soleattention to the Samhitas
and Brah-
manas which
nothing to do
treated of rituals, ignoring altogether the portions which had with them. The sage Jaimini * in his MtmAmsa-Sfitra
dis-
tinctly says that the
actions,
Veda having for its sole purpose the prescription of those parts of it which do not serve that purpose are useless.''
We
are therefore not surprised to lind
Mann f
enjoining ex-communication
the
upon those
Valmiki
members
of the twice-born caste
who disregarded
Vedasand
Dharma-Sutras relying upon the support of

in his
Iletu-iSnstra or Logic. Similarly
Ramayana
discredits those persons
of perverse intellect
who indulge in
of the
the frivolities of Anviksiki the science of Logic regardless

follow
works of sacred law (Dharma-sAstra) which they should

sraraw
BfiTT'fersnt
as
?tn^ffl[ wa^tfrrra;
(Mimiimsa-SOIi'a).
(Maim, adliyaya
2,
verso
11).
fl<i-ftf<&*1f strai (%*$*
sw?f% $
ii
\\
it
(Rainayaiia, Ayodhyfi Kftmla, Sarga 100).
their guide.
Vyasa
in the Mahabhfirata,*
Santiparva,
to
relates the doleful
story of a repentant
carried on debates
Brahmana who, addicted

all
Tarkavidya (Logic)
divorced from
a
jackal
faith
in
the
Vedas and was

penalty.
on-
that account, turned into
in
his next birth as a
In
another passage
Vyasa warns the followers of the Vednnta Philosophy against communicating their doctrines to a Naiy&yika or Logician. VyasaJ does not care even to review the NyAya system
of
the
$antiparva,t
in the
Brahma-sutra seeing that

related in the
it
has not
been
recognised
by any
study
worthy sage.
of
Stories of infliction of penalties on those given
to the
Nyayaare
Naisadha-carita'l we lind Kali satirising the founder of as " Gotama " the " most bovine " among sages.
Skanda Purana,and other works; and in the Nyaya Philosoph}'
d&M
<R3rfaf f%: *snrara jto
fg&
11
11
(Mahabharata. Santiparva, adhyrtya

In the tiandharva tanfcra lind
180.)
(Quoted
in
IVaimfosi nit antra'.
h ^k^vsfs^Kvn
?i*N Ftegpur
^
ii
II
?*
II
iMaliiiliharaia,
HfinUparva adbyaya
24).
J'snrf^r? \*i wtiiQ^ i
iMa
tWdarita sutra
2-2).
sw-ftsn
gf%fw?ra srrnf^f *frfr^B[fH

I
gsrsjTg^Hhs^T wRiftncMafei!
wN>rnmi
m *m
fift*?
*>fawRi
11
(Skanda 1'urana, Kalikftklmnila, adhyftya
17;,
Hg^ is
rNw
ftnsrrara
mwH
gfa
Hpgfar
fl:
||
3H*W*I WT
xiv
Nyaya reconciled with

criptuiai dogmas.
Gradually however this system of philosophy instead of relying entirely upon reasoning came to attach clue weight
.
to the authority
.,
ot
,,
the A'ectas,
t.
and
later
on after
its reconciliation with them, the principles of Nyaya were assimilated in other systems of philosophy such as the Vaideîka,* Yoga, Him&msa.t Sariikhyalj: etc
Henceforth
Nyaya as an approved
branch of knowledge.
the
of
Nyaya
m
was regarded
as an
approved branch
.
learning.
Thus the
t
i
prescribes a .course of training in

for the
Gautama-Dharma-sfltra, ,>t t Logic (Nyaya)

King and acknowledges the

is
utility of
Turku
or Logic in the administration of justice though in the case of conclusions
proving incompatible ultimate decision

to persons versed in the Vedas.
directed to be
made by
reference
is to
Manujl says that dharma or duty
be
ascertained
by
logical
reasoning not opposed
to the injunctions of the
Vedas.
He recommends Logic
to
(Nyaya) as a necessary study for a King
and a logician
Yajna-valkya^J
be an indispensable member of a legal assembly counts " Nyaya " or Logic among the fourteen principal
sciences while Vyasaj| admits that he was able to arrange and classify the
* Vais'esika-stitra 1-1-4, 2-1-15, 2-1-16-. 2-1-17, 2-2-17, 2-2-82, 8-1-15, 9-2-3, 8-2-4.
(Jayantirayaiia Tarkapancanan's edition).
t
Mimamsa-sutra
1-1-4, 1-3-1,
1-3-2,
1-3-3,
1-1-14,
1-4-35,
1-5-8,
3-1-17, 3-1 20, 4-3-18,
6-1-0, 10-3-86.
{ Samkhyi-Butra 1-60, 1-101, 1-106, 5-10, 5-11, 5-12.
Yoga-sutra
1-5, 0.
snrnftmd a$fs*g7W
for*g*i
wmtf m%n
fosrftrcrar
#firai?f **:
(Gautamadhurroa-sutra, adhyaya
11),
(Maun, adhyaya
12,
verse
106).
(Mann, adhyaya
7,
verse
43).
(Mann, adhyaya
12,
verso 111).
*S[T:
WtlfSlf
fount
l*jfo
^ ^3^ ST
II
,
sariihita,
(Yajnavalkya
adhyaya
1,
verso
3),
(Mahabharata quoted by Visvanatha
in his Vrltti
on Nyaya-sutra
1 1-1).
xv
Upanisads with the help of the Anvik$ikt' or Logic. In the Padma-purana* Logic is included among the fourteen principal branches of learning promulgated by God Visnu, while in, the Matsya-purana,t Nyaya-vidya
'
together with the Vedas
is
said
to
have emanated from the mouth of
Brahma
himself.
In fact so Avide-spread
is full of
was the study of Nyaya that
the Mahabharata
references to that scienceis
In the Adiparva of the Mahabharata Nyaya} or Logic
mentioned and
the
along with the
Veda and Cikitsa

is
(the
science of medicine),
filled
hermitage of Kas'ynpa
a proposition,
described as being
with sages who were

of
to
versed in the Nyaya-tattva (logical truths) and

objection and
conclusion.
kuew the true meaning The Santi-parva refers

scripture
numerous
tenets of
Nyaya supported by reason and

sacrificial
while the
Asvamedha-parvajl describes the

by logicians (ITetu-vadin)
ground as being resounded who employed arguments and counter-argu-
jfatat
miteiw^ Mfyj^ q *n*ran

i
(Padma-purana, uidc Muir's Sanskrit text Vol. HI,

t
p, 27).
Wtf^d^ ZWPft ^P?^T

tftarcn
f^f%:^rITt
it
samff^n
=5j
swmim+^dr
(Matsya-puraria 3-2).
$3$*
WT
3FH f^HI;jMllfodH
II
II
(Mahabharata. Adiparva, adhyaya
1).
^H^'sgnjrfg^prawnff g^qi?T:
11
11
f^wnlf^fear 3rw*wl<rcTw:
înT'll^lRl^l"^
n
I
II
MW^df
I&
4j*4^<jaj
^Ri+r<<u^f*i:
ii
(Mahabharata, Adiparva, adhyaya
70).
twiwttiiwfgih* a^Tiwanj
II
s* u
310).
(Mahabharata, Santiparva, adhyaya
(Mahabharata, Ativamedhaparva, adhyaya,
88),
xvi
one another. In the Sabhsi-parva* the sage Narada is described as being versed in Logic (Nyayavid) and skilful in distinguishing unity and plurality* (" aikya " and "nftnatva") conjunction and co-existence (" isariiyoga " and " samavaya "), genus and species (" parApara ") etc, capable of deciding questions by evidences (Pramana) and ascertaining the validity and invalidity of a ii ve-menibered syllogism (Pancavayava- va kya).
merits to vanquish
was in course of time deservedly high esteem. If it were allowed to Tho course of Nyaya. follow its original course unimpeded by religions dogmas it would have risen to the very height of perfection. Nevertheless the principles of Nyaya entering into the different systems of philosophy gave them each its proper compactness and cogency just as Bacon's Inductive Method shaped the sciences and philosophies of a It is however to be regretted that during later age in a different country. the last five hundred years the Nyaya has been mixed up with Law (smriti>, Rhetoric (alaftkara), Vedanfa, etc., and thereby has hampered the growth of. those branches of knowledge upon which it has grown up as
In
fact
the
Nyaya
(Logic)
held in very
a sort of parasite.
Sanskrit College, Calcutta. The 7th November, 1913,
) >
gATJg CHANl)RA VIDVABHUSANA.
fyw^HMMM WWWntalH?'
"wwfi&wnj: iwHti$dft&q:
II
II
ii
w n
i
ifrgpywq ?iww
CTftreRFWEI "3
u<u$i*fan.
^Tsfq
gg*T#:
II
II
(Alalia IWiArata, 8al>haparra,
adhyaya
o).
THE NYAYA-S0TRAS.
Book
I.
Chapter
1.
W^^ftd^(t^n4H^9i^TfrfPril^'ifWH*l <M*IMI-
ftr^TOTf^m:
1.
11*1*1*11
felicity
is
by the knowledge about the true nature of sixteen categories, viz., means of right knowledge (pratnana), object of right knowledge (praattained
Supreme
meya), doubt (samsaya), purpose (prayojana), familiar instance

(drstanta), established tenet (siddhanta),
members
(avayava),
confutation (tarka*),
(vada),
ascertainment
(nirnaya),
discussion
wrangling
(jalpa), cavil (vitanda), fallacy (hetvabhasa),

(jati),
quibble (chala), futility

(nigrahasthana)
Knowledge about
and
occasion
for
rebuke
the true, nature of sixteen
calegoties
critical
'("
means true
"
knowledge
of the " enunciation," " definition "
and "
examination
" of the categories. Book I (of the NyAya-Satra) treats of " enunciation and " definition," while tlie remaining four Books are reserved for " critical
examination."
The attainment
four things,
viz.,
of
knowledge
m
of
supreme felicity (1) that which is fit
is
preceded by the
to
be abandoned
___
{viz.,
The English equivalent for " tarka " is variously given as " confutation," " argumentation ," " reductio ad absurdum," "hypothetical reasoning," etc.
*
t
Vatsyayana observes
(Nyayadara'ana, p.
0,
Bibliotheca Indica Series).

2
pain), (2) that
BOOK
etc.), (3)
I,
CHAPTER
is
T.
which produces what

of destroying
6t lo be abandoned
is
fit
(viz.,
misappre-
hension,
complete destruction of what
and
(4)
the
means
what
is
fit
to
abandoned be abandoned (viz., true

to be
knowledge*).
2.
Pain, birth, activity, faults and misapprehension

in the reverse order,
on the successive annihilation of these

there follows release.
Misapprehension, faults, activity, birth and pain, these in their uninterrupted course constitute the " world." Release, which consists in
the soul's getting rid of the world,
is
the condition of supreme felicity
marked by perfect, tranquillity and not tainted by any defilement. A by the true knowledge of the sixteen categories, is able to remove his misapprehensions. When this is done, his faults, rig., affection, He is then no longer subject to any aversion and stupidity, disappear. activity and is consequently freed from transmigration and pains. This is effected and supreme felicity secured. is the way in which his release
person,
3.
Perception, inference, comparison
and word (verviz.,

viz.,
bal testimony) these are the

perception
(pratyakKii,
means of right knowledge.

Pauddhas admit
two,
viz.,
[The Carviikiis admit only one means of right knowledge,

the
Vaiseîkas and
perception
ception,
and inference
(aminmna), the Kunkhyas admit three,

testimony
is
per-
inference and
verbal
(iignma
or sabda) while the

viz.,
Naiyayikas whose fundamental work
the Nyiiyn-sutra admit, four,
perception, inference, verbal testimony and comparison (upaniAna).
The
Prublmkrras admit a
(abhfiva)
fifth
menus
of right
knowledge called presumption

viz.,
arthupatti), the Bhattas and VcdAntins admit a sixth,
non-existence
and the Pauranikas recognise a seventh and eighth means of right knowledge, named probability (sambhava) and rumour (aitihya)].
^Ni^ #
"ST^T**" \\\\\m\
(Nyayadareana, p.
2).

THE
4.
fcYAYA-StTTR AS."
that
knowledge which arises from the contact of a sense with its object and which is determinate, unnameable and non-erratic.
Perception
is
Determinate.
This epithet
is
distinguishes perception from indetermi-
nate knowledge; as for instance, a

ascertain whether there
man
dust.
looking from a distance cannot

a thing
smoke or
that
Unnamenble.
bears.
Signifies
lias'
the knowledge
of
derived
through perception
Non-erratic.
no connection
with the
name which
in
the
thing
Tn
summer
the sun's
rays
coming
contact
with
earthly heat quiver and appear to the
eyes of
men
as water.
The know-
ledge of water derived in this way

[This aphorism
is
is
not perception.
To
:
eliminate such
cases the epithet non-erratic has been used.
may
also he translated as follows
Perception
knowledge and which arises from the contact of a sense with its object and which is non-erratic being either indeterminate (nirvikalpaka as " this is
something") or determinate vsavikalpaka as "
this is a
Brahmana
")].
5.
Inference
is
knowledge which
is
ception,
'
and
is
is
of three kinds, viz., a priori,

'
preceded by pera posteriori and

of
commonly
A
priori
e. </.,
seen.
the knowledge of ellect
derived from the perception
its
cause,
one seeing clouds infers that there will be rain.

is
A posteriori
of
its effect,
e. g.,
the knowledge of cause derived from the
perception
one seeing a river swollen infers that there was rain. [' Commonly seen is the knowledge of one thing derived from the perception of another thing with which it is commonly seen, e. g., one
'
seeing a beast possessing horns,
infers that
it
possesses also a
tail,
or
one seeing smoke on a

interprets as the
hill infers that
there
is lire
on
it].
VYitsy&yana takes the last to be " not commonly seen " which he
knowledge of a tiling which is not commonly seen, e. g., observing affection, aversion and other qualities one infers that there is a
substance called soul.
6.
Comparison
is
the knowledge of a thing through
its similarity to
another thing previously well known.
BOOK
A man
I,
CHAPTER
I.
hearing from a forester that a 60s gaoaens is like a cow Having recollected resorts to a forest whtre he sees an animal like a cow.
what he heard he
institutes a comparison,
is
by which he
bos gavaeus.
arrives at the con-
viction that the animal which he sees
derived through comparison.

separate means of knowledge,
Sonic
for
hold
that
knowledge comparison is not a

This
is
when one
notices the likeness of a
cow
reply
in a
it is
strange animal one really performs an act of perception.
In
urged that we cannot deny comparison as a separate means of knowledge, for how does otherwise the name bos gavaeus signify the
bos gavaeus.
general notion of the animal called
That (he name

is
bos
gavaeus signifies one and

result
all
members
of the hos gavaeus class
not a
of perception
bnt the consequence of a distinct knowledge called
comparison.
7.
Word
( verbid
testimony)
is
the instructive asser-
tion of a reliable person.
reliable person is
one
is
may be a
lisi,
Arya or mleccha,
who
as an
it.
expert in a certain matter
willing to communicate his experiences of
[Suppose a young man coming to the side of a river cannot ascertain whether the river is fordable or not, and immediately an old experienced man of the locality, who has no enmity against him, comes and tells him that the river is easily fordable the word of the old man is to be accepted
:
as a
means
of right
knowledge called verbal testimony].
8.
It is of
two kinds,
viz.,
that
which refers
to matter
to
matter
is
which
seen.
is
seen and that which
refers
which
nob
The first kind involves matter which can be actually verified. Though we are incapable of vcrifiying the matter involved in the second kind, we can somehow ascertain it by means of inference.
[Mattel'
strength
is
which is seen, e.g., a physician's assertion that physical gained by taking butter].
is
[Matter which
not seen,
e.g.,
a religious teacher's assertion that one
conquers heaven by performing horse-sacrifices].
Wfi<*j
"S^R"
lit I* llll
THE NYAYA-SUTBAS.
ft
9.
Soul,
body, senses, objects
of sense,
intellect,
mind,
activity, fault, transmigration, fruit,
pain and release
are the objects of right
knowledge.
particularity,
The
quality,
objects of right knowledge are also enumerated as substance,

generality,
action,
intimate relation
[and
non-
existence
which are the
technicalities of the Vaidesika philosophy].
<î3[qMqHtfd ;:TOraigr "sm**t

ll*l*l*H
10.
fat?**"
?ftr
Desire,
aversion,
volition,
pleasure,
pain and
intelligence are the

called soid].
marks
of the soul.
[These abide in the soul or rather are the qualities of the substance
11
Body
is
is
the site of gesture, senses and sentiments.

it
Body
desirable
the site of gesture inasmuch as

to avoid
strives to reach
what
is
and
what
ill,
is
hateful.
It
is
also
the site of senses for
the latter act well or
according as the former
is in
good or bad order.

also
Sentiments which comprise pleasure and pain
are
located in the
body which experiences them.
gPTOsrei^Ênfilr "<fewftr
12.
^SjJNr* ii*i*i**h
Nose, tongue, eye, skin and ear are the senses produced from elements.
Nose
is of
the
same nature as
earth,
tongue as water, eye as
light,
skin as air and ear as ether.
tfranroteit 4i3<ihiHiAGi \*nfa" n *i*i** u

13.
Earth, water, light, air and ether
these
H*
are the
elements.
iRTO*q w8*Ml "uflMlRjjW *&&*

s
I* 1**11
14.
Smell, taste, colour, touch and sound are objects

etc.
of the senses and qualities of the earth,

Smell
is
is
the object of nose and the prominent quality of earth, taste

is
the object of tongue and quality of water, colour

is
the object of eye and

of air,
quality of light, touch

is
the object, of skin and quality
and sound
the object of ear and quality of ether.
BOOK
I,
CHAPTER
I.
15.
Intellect,
apprehension and knowledge
Tthese
are not different from one another.

[The term apprehension {upalabdhi) is generally used in the sense According to the Sankhya philosophy, perception (pvatyaltsa).
(buddhi),
of
intellect
which
is
is
the
first
thing evolved
out of primordial
matter (prahriti),
consists in
altogether different from knowledge (jiiana), which

of
the
reflection
external
objects
on the son\ (puruqa) the
abode of transparent consciousness.]
16.
The mark
of the
of
mind
is
that there do not

at a time.
arise
(in the soul)

It is
more acts
knowledge than one
impossible to perceive two things simultaneously.

the mind.
Perception
its
does not arise merely from the contact of a sense-organ on
object,
but
is
it
requires also a conjunction
of
Now, the mind, which
an atomic substance, cannot be conjoined with more than one sense-
organ at a time, hence there cannot, occur more acts of perception than one at one time.
17.
Activity
is
that
which makes the
Aôice.
mind
and body begin
their action.
There are three kinds of action, viz., vocal, mental and bodily, each of which may be sub-divided as good or bad. Bodily actions which are bad are (1) killing, (2) stealing, and (3)
:
committing adultery.
Bodily actions which are good are
:
(1)
giving,
(2)
protecting,
and
(3) serving.
Vocal actions which are bad are :-(1) telling a

language,
(3) slandering,
lie, (2)
using harsh
and
(4)
indulging in frivolous
(1)
is
talk.
Vocal actions which are good arc:
speaking the truth,

pleasant,
(2)
speaking what
sacred books.
is
useful,
(3)
speaking what
:
and
(4)
reading
Mental actions which are bad are
(1) malice,
(2) covetousness,
and
(3) scepticism.
Mental actions which are good are
(1)
compassion,
(2)
refraining
from covetousness, and
(3)
devotion.
THE NYAYA-SttTMS.
18.
Faults have the characteristic of causing activity.

and stupidity.
The
faults are affection, aversion,

:
^HÎtI "^TOTO:" lltmHH

19.
Transmigration means
is
re-births.
deaths.
Birtli
is
Transmigration
while death
the scries of births and
the
connection of soul with body, sense-organs, mind, intellect, and sentiments,

is
the soul's separation from them. II! It
snf%^5ff^TTS^: "qRPF
20.
faults.
Roll
Fruit
is
the
thing produced by activity and
Fruit consists in the enjoyment of pleasure or suffering of pain.
and faults end in producing pleasure, which and pain, which is fit only to bo avoided.
All
activity
is
acceptable,
^HH^j f
21.
Pain
"j:*** "
^fcf 11*1*1**11
Pain has the

is affliction
characteristic of causing uneasiness.

to
may also be translated as follows:

Pillll is the
which every one desires
avoid.
The aphorism
mark of hindrance
to the soul.
22.
Release
is
the absolute deliverance from pain.

is
A
pains.
soul which is
no longer subject to transmigration

is
freed from all
Transmigration, which consists in the soul's leaving one body

the
and taking another,
cause of
The
soul attains
release as soon as there
sequently, of pleasure and pain.
undergoing pleasure and pain. is an end of the body, and, conThose are mistaken who maintain that
its
all
release enables the soul not only to get rid of

eternal pleasure, for pleasure is as
pains but also to attain
impermanent as pain and the body.
Doubt, which is a conflicting judgment about the precise character of an object, arises from the recognition
23.
of properties
common
to
many
objects, or of
properties not
BOOK
to
I,
CHAPTER
I.
any of the objects, from conflicting testimony, and from irregularity of perception and non-perception.
Doubt
(1)
tall
common
is
of five kinds according as
Recognition of
common
properties
it is
it
arises
e.g.,
from
seeing in the twilight a
object
we cannot
decide whether
man
or a post, for the property
of tallness belongs to both.

(2)
Recognition of properties not

it is
common e.g., hearing a sound, one
questions whether
neither in man,
eternal.
(3)
eternal or not, for the property of
beast, etc.,
soundness abides that are non-eternal nor in atoms which are

merely by study one cannot decide
it
Conflicting testimony,
exists, for
e.g.,
whether the soul
one system of philosophy affirms that

it
does,
while another system states that

(4)
does not.
e.g.,
Irregularity of perception,
really exists,
we
perceive water in the tank
where
it
it
but water appears also
to exist in the
mirage where
actually
really does not exist.
question
arises
it
whether water
is
perceived only
when
it
exists or
(o)
even when
does not exist.

e.g.,
Irregularity of non-perception,
it
we do
not perceive water in

it
the radish where
really
exists, or
on dry land where

is
does not exist.
question arises, whether water
not perceived only
when
it
does
not exist, or also
when
it
does
exist.
24. to act.
Purpose
is
that with an eye to
which one proceeds
Purpose refers
to the
thing which one endeavours to attain or avoid.

for the purpose of cooking his food].
[A man
collects fuel
m m mi A
25.
familial' instance is the thing

to the general proposition "
is
about which an
smoke and smoke
is
ordinary
man and
an expert entertain the same opinion.

wherever there
fire
[With regard
there is fire "
the familiar instance
a kitchen in which
abide together, to the satisfaction of an ordinary

investigator.]
man
as well as an acute
<\**
fW*U T*yH WH (h\
"
frl :
fct<3M :"
*l
II
THE NYAYA-StTTRAS.
26.
An
established tenet
is
dogma
resting on the
authority of a certain school, hypothesis, or implication.
WR(
M
27.
*v
II
The tenet is of four kinds owing to the distinction between a dogma of all the schools, a dogma peculiar to some school, a hypothetical dogma, and an implied dogma.
lit
W '
I
28.
A dogma of all the schools is a tenet which is not

is
opposed by any school and

Tho
five
claimed by at least one school.

light, air
elements
(viz.,
(viz.,
earth, water,
and
ether), the
etc.,
five
objects of sense
smell, taste, colour, touch

all
and sound),
are tenets
which are accepted by
the schools.
II
UUH
29.
is
II
A dogma
peculiar to
some school
is
a tenet
which
accepted by similar schools but rejected by oppocome

into existence
site schools. " A thing cannot

peculiar
out of nothing "

is
this
is
dogma
oC the
S-lnkhyas.
[The eternity of sound
a peculiar
dogma
of the Mimamsakas],
II
%i \\ \*
30.
" There
II
A
is
hypothetical
dogma
is
tenet
which
if
âccepted leads to the acceptance of another tenet.

a soul apart from the senses, because
it
can recognise one
and the some object by seeing and touching." If you accept this tenet you must also have accepted the following: (1) That the senses are more than one, (2) that each of the senses has its particular object, (3) that the soul derives its knowledge through the channels of the senses, (4) that a substance which is distinct from its qualities is the abode of
them,
etc.
10
BOOK
T,
CHAPTER
I.
II
UU^
31.
II
All
implied
dogma
is
a tenet which
is
not
explicitly
declared as such,
whether sound
"
but which follows from the

it.
examination of particulars concerning

The
that
it
discussion
is
eternal or non-eternal
is
presupposes
is
a substance.
That sound
a substance"
is
here an implied
dogma.
that
sense-organ, but
it is so].
[The mind has nowhere been stated in the NyAya-sutra to be a the particulars examined concerning it it follows from
Mftîl^lîîM^^ HH
I
Pl "greqWT:" a syllogism)
II
I)
U*
II
32.
The members
(of
are proposition,
reason, example, application,

[1.
2. 3.
and conclusion.
This Because Example. Whatever

Proposition.
hill is fiery,
Reason.
it is
smoky,
is
smoky
is fiery,
as a kitchen,
4.
Application. So
Conclusion.
lay
is this hill (smoky),

is fiery].
:
5.
Therefore this hill

five
Some
1 (a)
down
more members as follows

fjijiiAs
\).
Is this
hill fiery in all
Inquiry as to the proposition
its parts,
or in a particular part ?
{o,)
Questioning the reason
'saihssaya).
That which you
call
smoke
may
be nothing but vapour. 3

(a)
Capacity of the example to warrant

true that
the conclusion vâkya-
smoke is always a concomitant of fire? In a kitchen prftpti). Is it. there are of course both smoke and fire, but in a red-hot iron-ball there is
no smoke.
4
sists
(a)
Purpose
for
drawing the conclusion (prayojana).

such that one can approach
it,
Purpose conin order

to
in the determination of the true conditions of the
hill,
ascertain
whether
it, it.
it is
or such that one
should avoid
ence towards
or such that one should
maintain an attitude of indiffer-
4
tant of
(6)
Dispelling
all
questions
tsamsayavyudf.sa).
is
It is
beyond
all
questions that the

fire.
hill is
smoky, and that smoke
an invariable'concomi-
the nyAya-sctras.
N43.
Sound
ii
A
is
proposition
is
the declaration of
a proposition.
what
is to
be
established.
non-eternal this
is
34. to
The reason
is
the
means
for establishing
what
is
be established through the homogeneous or affirmative character of the example.

Proposition.
Reason.
pot.
Because
Sound
" pot "
is
non-eternal,
it is
produced,
is
Example (homogeneous). Whatever
produced
is
non-eternal, as a
The example
the reason,
vis.,
possesses the
" being produced,"
same character as is implied in inasmuch as both are non-eternal.
35.
ter.
Likewise through heterogeneous or negative charac-
Proposition.
Reason.
Because
Sound
is
non-eternal,
it is
produced,
Example (heterogeneous).
duced, as the soul.
Whatever
viz.,
is
not non-eternal
is
not pro-
The example
which
is is
" soul "
possesses
a diameter heterogeneous to
that
implied in the reason,
" being produced,"
inasmuch as one
eternal
and the other non-eternal.
36.
familiar
homogeneous (or affirmative) example is a instance which is known to possess the property to
this property is in-
be established and which implies that

variably contained in the reason given. Proposition Sound is non-eternal,
Reason Because it is produced, Homogeneous example Whatever
is
produced
is non-eternal,
as a
pot.
#
non-eternality
Here "pot" is a familiar instance which possesses the property of and implies that whatever is " produced " is attended by
(non-eternality).
the
same property
12
BOOK
I,
CHAPTER
I.
37.
flftmhw "frufrrct" mu* A heterogeneous (or negative) example

instance which
is
is
familiar
known
to
be devoid of the pro-
perty to be established and which implies that the absence of this property is invariably rejected in the reason given.
Proposition
Sound is non-eternal,
it is
Reason
as the soul.
Because
is
produced,
Heterogeneous example
Whatever
is
not non-eternal
is
not produced,
Here the soul

it
a familiar instance which

if
is
known
to
be devoid of
'being
the property of non-eternality and implies that
anything were produced,

i.e.,
produced
would necessarily be deprived of the quality of eternality, and eternal are imconipatible epithets.
' ' '
38.
Application
is
a winding up. with
reference to
the example, of what
is to
be established as being so or
(I) affirmative
not
so.
Application
the example
is
of two
kinds:
is
and
(2) negative.
affirmative application,
is
which
expressed by the word "so," occurs
The when
of
an affirmative character.
which
is
expressed by the phrase " not so," occurs
The negative application, when the example is of
a negative character. Proposition
Reason
Example
Because Whatever
Sound
is
non-eternal,
it is
produced,
is
produced
is
non-eternal, as a pot,
Affirmative application.
Conclusion.
Therefore sound
Sound
is
it is
So
is
sound (produced),
is
non-eternal.
Or:
Proposition not eternal,
Reason-VBecause
produced,
eternal is not produced, as the soul,
is
Example
Whatever
is
Negative application. Sound

Conclusion.
not so
{i.e.,
sound
is
Therefore sound
i:
not produced),
is
not eternal.
VyfoiwfiMw g**R
'^mm num.
THE NYAyA-SCTHAS.
39.
13
Conclusion
is
is
the re-stating of the proposition

after the
after the reason has

Conclusion
been mentioned.
reason
the confirmation of the proposition
and the example have been mentioned. Sound is non-eternal, Proposition

Reason
Example
So sound (produced), produced. Conclusion. Therefore sound

Application
is
Because Whatever
it is
produced,
is
produced
is
is
non-eternal, as a pot,
It
II
40.
Confutation, which
is
is
carried on for ascertainis
ing the real character of a thing of which the character

not known,
reasoning
1
which reveals the character by
showing the absurdity

Is
of all contrary characters.
the soul eternal or non-eternal ?
soul, viz.,
whether
it is
Here the real character of the eternal or nou-etornal, is not known. In ascertain:
ing the character we reason as follows
If the
soul
were non-eternal
actions, to
it
would be impossible transmigration, and

absurd
:
for
to
it
to enjoy the fruits of its

final
own
undergo
is
attain
release.
But such a conclusion

to the soul
:
such possibilities are known to belong

is
therefore,
we
must admit that the soul
eternal.
41.
Ascertainment
is
the removal of doubt, and the
determination of a question, by hearing two opposite sides.

if certain statements are advanced to two parties, but opposed by the other party. His doubt is not removed uutil by the application of reasons he can vindicate either The process by which the vindication is effected is called of the parties.
person wavers and doubts

of
him by one
ascertainment.
Ascertainment
in
is not,
however, in
perception
all
cases preceded
by
doubt, for instance,

directly.
the case
of
things are ascertained
tures,
So also we ascertain things directly by the authority of scripor through discussion. But in the case of investigation, doubt must
"precede ascertainment.
$fcr
iWh HJfcwsndrt^
Rrrarcpr**
wh-'iiwiww
sr<nnnffc*n
Mite

1*
fiOOit
I,
CHAPTER
Chapter
It.
Book
I.
II.
1.
Discussion
is
the adoption of one of two opposis
ing sides.
What
is
adopted
analysed in the form of

of
is
five
members,
tion,
and defended by the aid
right knowledge, while its opposite
any of the means of assailed by confuta-
without deviation from the established tenets.
[A dialogue or disputation (katha) is tlie adoption of a side by a dis-. its opposite by his opponent. It is of three kinds, viz., discussion which aims at ascertaining the truth, wrangling which aims at gaining victory, and caoil which aims at finding mere faults. A diseutient is one who engages himself in a disputation as a means of seeking the
putant and
truth].
Au
instance of discussion
is soul. is
is
given below :-
There Opponent There

Diseutient Diseutient
no
soul.
Soul is existent (proposition).

Because
it is
an abode of consciousness (reason).

not existent
is
Whatever
is
not an abode of consciousness,
as a hare's horn (negative example).
Soul
is
not so, that
is,
soul
is
an abode of consciousness
(negative application).
Therefore soul
is
existent (conclusion).
Opponent-r-Soul
Because, etc.
Diseutient
is
non-existent (proposition).
The
scripture which
is
a verbal testimony
declares the
existence of soul.
Opponent
If there were no soul, it would not be possible same object through sight and touch. hend one and the Opponent
Diseutient
to
appre-
Diseutient
tenets
The
doctrine of soul harmonises well with the various

viz.,
which we hold,
adtti.
that there are
eternal things, that everybody.,
enjoys pleasure or suffers pain according to his

fe** there is
own
actions, etc.
There-

THE NYAYA-StJTRAS.
[The discussion
will
15
if
be considerably lengthened
the opponent
of scripture,
happens to be a Buddhist who does not admit the authority and holds that there are no eternal things, etc.].
2.
Wrangling, which aims

futilities,
at gaining victory, is the
defence or attack of a proposition in the manner aforesaid
by quibbles,
rebuke.
and other processes which deserve

*"'
A
tory,
wrangler
is
one who, engaged
in a disputation,
aims only
at
vic-
being indifferent whether the arguments which he employs support
his owji contention or that of his opponent, provided that he can
make out
a pretext for
bragging that he
lias
taken an
.active
part in the disputation.
3.
Cavil
is
a kind
of
wrangling which consists in

anything,
mere attacks on the opposite side. A caviller does not endeavour to establish
but confines
himself to mere carping at the arguments of his opponent.
4.
are the erratic, the contra-
dictory, the equal to the question, the unproved,
and the
mistimed.
Wfcdftw "<ûhk :
5.
ii
i\ hi
i
The
erratic is the reason which leads to
more
conclusions than one.
An
instance Of the erratic

is
is
given below
Proposition
Erratic reason
sound eternal, Because intangible,

it is
Example
Whatever
is
is
intangible
is
eternal as atoms.
Application So
Conclusion.
sound (intangible),
is eternal,
Therefore sound
16
BOOK
Proposition
I,
CHAPTER
:
II.
Again
Sound
is
is
non-eternal,
it is
Erratic reason.
Because
is
intangible,
is
Whatever intangible non-eternal, as So sound (intangible), non-eternal (intangible). Conclusion. Therefore sound
Example.
intellect,
Application.
is
Here from the reason there have been drawn two opposite conclusions,
viz.
:
that sound
is
eternal,
and that sound

it is
is
non-eternal.
The reason
or
middle term
is erratic
is
when
not pervaded
by the major
the
terra, that is,
when
there
no universal connection between
major term and
middle term, as pervader and pervaded. Intangible is pervaded neither by 'eternal nor by 'non eternal.' In fact there is no universal connection between intangible and " eternal or non-eternal.'
'
'
'
'
'
ftwi!*ttH*3^ flf^ft "ftf^:"

6.
lit
\ *
i
ii
The
contradictory
is
the reason which opposes
what
is to
be established.
Proposition.
A pot
is
is
produced,
it is
Contradictory reason.
Because
eternal.
is
Here the reason

never produced.
contradictory
because that which
eternal
is
U t
vs
7.
Equal to
the question
is
the reason which proit
vokes the very question for the solution of which employed.

Proposition.
was
Sound
is
is
non-eternal,
Reason which
equal to the question
Because
it is
not possessed of
the attribute of eternal ity.
'Non-eternal'
etemality.'
is
the
same as 'not possessed

is
of
the attribute of
is
In determining the question whether sound

is
non-eternal
the reason giv&
that
sound
non-eternal, or
in other
words the reason
begs the question.
8.
The unproved
is
the reason
which stands
in
need
of proof in the
same way
as the proposition does.
THE NYlYA-StTTRAS.
Proposition
if
Shadow
is
a substance.
Unproved reason. Because it possesses motion. Here unless it is actually proved that shadow possesses motion, we cannot accept it as the reason for the proposition that shadow is a substance. Just as the proposition stands in need of proof so does the
reason
itself.
Tt is
possible that the motion belongs to the person

is called
who
causes that obstruction of light which
shadow.
50.
The mistimed
is
is
is
the reason
it
which
is
when
the time
past in which
it is
might hold good.
Proposition
Mistimed
Sound durable. reason Because
adduced
9.
manifested by union, as a colour.
The colour
of a juris manifested
when
the jar comes into union with
a lamp, but the colour existed before the union took place, and will continue to exist after the union has ceiised.
is
Similarly, the
manifested wlion the
drum comes
to
into union with a rod,
must, after the analogy of the colour, be presumed to

the union took place,
sound of a dram and the sound have 'existed before

has ceased.
and
continue to exist
sifter
the union
is
mistimed, because the manifestation of sound does not take place at the timo when the drum comes into union with the rod, but at a subsequent moment when the
is
Hence sound
durable.
The reason adduced here
union has ceased.
In the case of colour, however, the manifestation takes
Because the time of their manifestation is different, the analogy between colour and sound is not complete, therefore, the reason is mistimed.
place just at the time
when
the jar
comes
into union with the lamp.
Some
interpret
is
the
aphorism as follows:
in
reason which
adduced
a wrong order
is
The mistimed is the among the five members

But
this
for instance, as, if the
reason
stated
before the proposition.

is
a word bears its legitimate connection with another word (in a Sanskrit sentence) even if
for
interpretation, according to Vatsyayana,
wrong
they are placed at a distance from each other, and, on the other hand, even the closest proximity is of no use if the words are disconnected in their
sense.
Moreover, the placing of
in
the Nyaya-sutra as
members in a wrong order is noticed a nigrahasthdna (occasion for rebuke) called
apr&pta-h&la (inopportune).
^^faqidlv4fc^^M T^l "9i^" nmuoii

tion
Quibble is the opposition offered to a proposiby the assumption of an alternative meaning. 10.
51.
* (Quoted
by Vatasyayana in the Nyaya-bhajya,
p. 260).
1*857
IS
BOOK
I,
CHAPTER
It
II
*.
II
52.
It is of three
kinds,
viz.,
quibble in respect of
res-
a term, quibble in respect of a genus, and quibble in 11. pect of a metaphor.
snv
m
53.
* 1*
1
Quibble in respect of a term consists in wilfully taking the term in a sense other than that intended by a speaker who has happened to use it ambiguously. 12.
A
.
speaker says
" this
boy
is
nava-liamhala (possessed of a
new
blanket)."
quibbler replies
" this
boy
is
not.
certainly
nava-Jtambala
(possessed of nine blankets) for he has only one blanket.
Here the word nava which is ambiguous was used by the speaker in the sense of "new," but has been wilfully taken by the quibbler in
the sense of "nine."
-*1^<HHJ"
54.
miM
Quibble
in respect of a
genus
consists in assert-
ing the impossibility of a thing which is really possible, on the ground that it belongs to a certain genus which is
very wide.
13.
"this Brahmana
"
is
speaker says:
possessed of learning and
conduct."
An
objector replies
is
it
is
impossible, for
how can
it
be inferred
that this pBfson
Brahmana.
of learning
There are
possessed of learning and conduct because he is a little boys who are Briihmanas, yet not possessed
and conduct. Here the objector is a quibbler, for he knows well that possession of learning and conduct was not meant to be an attribute of the whole class of Brahnianas, but it was ascribed to " this " particular Brahmana
THE NYAYA-StTTRAS.
enough in the world to render pursue studies and acquire good morals.
19
it
who
lived long
possible for
him
to
H \\
Quibble in respect of a metaphor consists in denying the proper meaning of a word by taking it literally while it was used metaphorically, and vice versa. 14.
55.
speaker says
" the scaffolds cry out."

it is
An
objector replies: "
impossible for scaffolds to ciy out for they
are inanimate objects."
Here the objector is a quibbler, for he knew well that the word scaffold was used to signify those standing on the scaffolds.
56.
It
is
may be
said
that,
quibble in respect of a
metaphor
first
in reality quibble in respect of a term, for the
is
not different from the second.
15.
57.
But
it is
not
in
so, for
there
is
a distinction between
meanings in the case
'
them. 16. Words are taken

'
their direct
'
(literal)
of
quibble in respect of a term
while they are taken in their direct
(literal)
as well as indirect (secondary)
meanings in the case of
quibble in
respect of a metaphor.'
you do not admit that one is different from another simply because there is some similarity between them, then we should have only one kind of quibble. 17.
58.
If
'
quibble in respect of a metaphor' were not different from quibble in respect of a term,' then these two also would not be different
If
'
from
quibble in respect of a
all of
genus
'
because there
is
some
similarity
among
them.
This
is
absurd, hence the three kinds of quibble
are different
from one another.
20
59.
BOOK
I,
CHAPTER
II
Futility consists in offering objections founded

18.
it
on mere similarity or dissimilarity.
disputant says
" the soul is inactive because
is
all-pervading
as ether."
His opponent replies

larity
to
"
if
the soul
is
inactive because
is
it
it
bears simiit
ether as being all-pervading,
why
not active because
bears similarity to a pot as being a seat of union ?"
The reply
is futile,
because
it
overlooks the universal connection
between the middle term and the major term which is existent in the arguments of the disputant, but wanting in the arguments of the opponent. Whatever is all-pervading is inactive, but whatever is a seat of union
is
not necessarily active.
Or again
Disputant
is
Sound non-eternal because unlike ether a product. Opponent sound non-eternal because as a product disit is
If
is
it
is
similar to ether,
why
it is
not eternal because as an object of auditory

overlooks the universal
perception
it is
dissimilar to a pot ?
is futile
The reply
because
it
disconnection
between the middle term and the absence of the major term. There is a universal disconnection between " a product " and " not non-eternal," but there is no such disconnection between " an object of auditory perception" and "not eternal."
occasion for rebuke arises when one misunderstands or does not understand at all. 19.
60.
An
If
a person
ignorance,
begins to argue in a way which betrays his utter or wilfully misunderstands and yet persists in showing that
he understands well, it is of no avail to employ counter arguments. He is quite unfit to bo argued with, and there is nothing left for his opponent but to turn him out or quit his company, rebuking him as a blockhead
or a knave.
An
insfSnce of occasion for rebuke

is
Whatever
not quality
is
substance.
Because there is nothing except colour, etc. (quality). A person who argues in the above way is to be rebuked as a fool, for his reason (which admits only quality) opposes his proposition (which admits both quality and substance),
THE NYATA-SttTRAS.
Another instance
Disputant
21
Fire
is
not hot.
Opponent But
says
the evidence of touch disproves such a statement.
"0 learned audience,

It
is
Disputant, in order to gain the confidence of the assembled people,

listen, I
do not say that
fire is
not hot,"
etc.
only meet that the opponent should quit the

in this way.
company
of
man who argues
61.
Owing
to the variety of kinds, there is multipli-
city of futilities
and occasions
for rebuke.
20.
for
There are 24 kinds of
futility
and 22 kinds of occasion

I
rebuke
which
will
be treated respectively in Chapter
and Chapter
II of
Book V.

22
BOOK
Book
II,
CHAPTER
Chapter
I.
II.
I.
* it
ui
62.
cognition
Some say that doubt, cannot of common and uncommon
arise
from the reproperties whether

is
conjointly or separately.
Conjointly.
1.
It
ia
said that doubt about
an object
of
tall
never pro-
duced
if
both the
common and uncommon
properties
the object are

object
at
recognised.
For instance, if we see in the twilight a moves we do not doubt whether it is a man or a post.
it is
which
Wo
onco decide
in
that
a man, for though tallnoss
is
a property poss3Ssed
by man and
a post.
post, locomotion is a property
which distinguishes a
is
common man from
Separately.
Likewise doubt about an object

common
said never to be pro-
duced
it
only the
instance, if
we
see a tall
or the uncommon properties are recognised. For object in the twilight, we have no reason to doubt
whether
in
Tallness is certainly a property possessed it is a man or a post. common by man and post, but the tallness of a man is not identical
:
Now the knowledge of simiit merely resembles it. between the tallness of a man and that of a post presupposes a knowledge of the man and the post, of which the two kinds of tallness are attributes. If there is already a knowledge of the man and the post,
with, that of a post
larity
there cannot be any doubt about thein, for knowledge

of doubt.
ia
the vanquisher
f^5T^T^T5^^TfW^^r?TT^
63.
It
is
ii
further said that doubt cannot arise either
from conflicting testimony or from the irregularity of perception and non-perception. 2.
tenfold
64.
*T*srfcnr^:
*
is,
In the case of conflicting testimony there

side).
according Ub them, a strong conviction (on each

:
3.
Suppose a disputant (NaiyAyika) says there is soul. His opponent (Buddhist) replies there is no soul. The disputant and his opponent are quite sure that their respective statements are correct. Hence there is no doubt, but on the contrary
:
fhers is conviction, in the
minds
of both.
THE NYAYA-StFTRAS.
23
65.
rity
of
Doubt, they say, does not arise from the irregulaperception and non-perception, because in the
4. irregularity itself there is regularity. An irregularity may be designated as such with reference
to
some-
thing
else,
but with reference
to itself it is
a settled
fact.
If the irregularity
is settled in itself, it is
regular and cannot cause doubt.

it
On
the other
its
hand, if the irregularity is not settled in itself,

character and cannot cause doubt.
is
devoid of
own
66.
less
Likewise there
is,
they say, the chance of an end-
doubt owing
to the continuity of its cause.
5.
for instance,
Recognition of properties
common
to
many
objects
to
is,
a cause of doubt.
The common properties continue
exist
and hence
there will, they say, bo no cessation of doubt.
67.
In reply,
to
it is
stated that the recognition of proobjects, etc., are certainly causes of
perties
common
there
is
:
many
doubt
doubt.
if
objects
no reference to the precise characters of the there is no chance of no-doubt or of endlessfrom

the recognition of
6.
It is
admitted that doubt does not arise

properties
conjointly.
common and uncommon

of
forth the objection that doubt is not
Aphorism 2-1-1 brings produced even by the recognition

It is
common
tall
or
uncommon
properties alone.
said that
while
we
see
object in the twilight, we at once think of a man and a post, both which are tall. Thus there is knowledge rather than doubt about the man and post suggested by the tall object. The present aphorism
of
dismisses the objection by stating that there

distinctive)
is
certainly a
common
(non-
knowledge about a man and a post suggested by the tall object, but there is no precise (distinctive) knowledge about them. Precise knowledge (that is, knowledge of the precise character which distinguishes a man from a post) being absent, doubt must arise. Similar arguments will apply to doubt arising from the recognition of non-common
properties alone.
BOOK
It
CHAPTER
I.
Aphorisms 2-1-2 and 2-1-3 raise the objection that doubt does not arise from conflicting testimony, as the disputant and his opponent are both confident of their respective contentions. The present aphorism disposes of the objection by pointing out that in the case of conflicting
statements one
deration,
is
led to believe that
both statements are worth consiinto the precise characters of
but
is
unable
to penetrate
the
statements.
Hence though the disputant and his opponent remain fixed, the umpire and the audience are thrown into doubt by their conflicting
statements.
Aphorism
settled
in
2-1-4 raises the objection that
doubt cannot
arise
from
is
the irregularity of perception and

itself.
non-perception as the irregularity
that the irregularity cannot

irregulai'ity
The present aphorism meets the objection by stating be concealed by mere verbal tricks. The though settled in itself does not lose its own character un til
it
the objects which cause
are removed.
rise to the fear that there is the possibility of
is
Aphorism 2-1-5 gives
an
endless doubt inasmuch as the cause
continuous.
The present aphor-
ism removes the fear by stating that though materials of doubt, such as
common
them.
properties, etc., continue to exist,

is
we do not always recognise
Unless there
recognition of the
common n *
properties, etc
there
cannot be doubt.
hra
wqaTWM*
68.
there
is
Examination should be made room for doubt. 7.
of each case
where
It
has been stated that knowledge about the true nature of the catetheir enunciation, definition,
all,
gories consists in the true knowledge of
and
examination.
In case of well-known facts admitted by
there should be
no examination.
for
We
are to examine only those cases
where there
doubt.
The author
explains, therefore, first the nature of
room doubt, and

is
then proceeds to examine the other categories, lest there should be any
room
for
doubt in them.
69.
Perception and other means of knowledge, says

at all the
an objector, are invalid as they are impossible

three times.
8.
at the present,
According
nor posterior
to the objector, perception is impossible
past and future times, or in other words, perception can neither be prior
to, to,
nor simultaneous with, the objects of sense.
TftE NYAYA-SOTkAg.
g$
u *
s.
II
70.
Tf
perception occurred anteriorly
it
could not, he
its object.
says,
have arisen from the contact of a sense with
-9,
With reference
If
to the
perception of colour, for instance,
it is
asked
whether the colour precedes perception or the perception precedes colour. you say that perception occurred anteriorly or preceded the colour, you
oiz.,
must give up your definition of perception, from the contact of a sense with its object.
that perception arises
TSTTfer^
71.
* STRRP^:
is
SJ&IT1%: R
supposed
to
||
If perception
occur posteriorly
you cannot, he continues, maintain the conclusion that objects of sense are established by percei)tion. 10.
knowledge are stated by you to be perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. All objects of right knowledge are said to be established by them.
:
The objection stands thus
Tho
means
of right
The
objects of sense, for instance, are supposed to be

is
ception: colour
said
to
conclusion will have to

posteriorly to the objects.
by perbe established by visual perception. This be abandoned if you say that perception occurs
established
ii
j
If
1 3
n
its
72.
perception were simultaneous with
object
there would not,
says the objector, be any order of succesis
sion in our cognitions as there
no such order in their

colour and smell exist in a flower
corresponding objects.
11.
e.g.,
Various objects of sense can exist at one time,
at tho saine*time. If we hold that perception is simultaneous with its object we mast admit that the colour and the smell can be perceived at tho same tiino, that is, our perception of colour must be admitted to be simultaneous with our perception of smell.
This
i
is
absurd because two acts of perception, nay, two cognitions cannot take place
26
BOOK
II,
CHAPTEH
I.
at ,the same time. As there is an order of succession in our cognitions, perception cannot be simultaneous with its object. The aphorism may also be explained as follows :
In knowing a colour
we
perform,
we may
say,
two kinds of know-
ledge simultaneously,
viz.,
perception and inference.

the
colour,
As soon
results
comes
in
contact
with
perception
as our eye which does
not, however, enable us to
be aware of the colour. The colour is brought home to us by inference which, we may say, is performed simultaneously
Now, says the objector, perception and inference being two different kinds of knowledge cannot be simultaneous, as the mind which is an atomic substance cannot be instrumental in producing
with the perception.
more than one kind
of
knowledge v
'<-5
at a time.
11.
perception and other
of
73.
In reply,
it is
stated that
if
means
is also
of right
knowledge are impossible, the denial
them
impossible.
12.
of the matter to be denied, the denial is inoper-
Owing
ative.
to absence
74.
Moreover, the denial

all
to
itself
cannot be established,
iiyou deny
Jf
means of right knowledge.

establish
13.
{e.y., denial), you can do so only means of right knowledge, viz., perception, inferIf you deny them there will be left nothing ence, comparison, etc. which will lead you to the establishment of the thing. Hence you will not
you are
anything
by one or more
of the
be able
to establish the denial itself.
ckwiuA
75.
wr
^sh^srsrfrfor: n *
you say that your denial is based on a certain means of right knowledge, you do thereby acknowledge the
If
validity of the means.
14.
it is
Suppose you deny a thing because
not perceived.
You do
there-
by acknowledge
that perception is a
means
of right knowledge.
Similarly
inference, etc., are also to be
acknowledged as means of right knowledge.
THE NYAYA-StTTRAS.
27
76.
be denied.
is
The means of right knowledge cannot, therefore, They are established in the manner that a drum
its
proved by
There
is,
sound.
15.
says Vatsyilyana, no fixed rule that the

of right
knowledge should precede the objects

ceed thora or be simultaneous with
means of right knowledge or should sucof precedence

its
them.
The order
:
is
never uniform.
Look
at the
analogous cases
drum
is
precedes
sound,
fire.
and illumination succeeds the sun, while smoke
synchronous with
77.
The character of an object

is
it
of right
knowledge
re-
sembles that of a balance by which a thing

Just as a balance
an instrument
is
measured object when

senses, etc.,
itself
is weighed. 16. measuring weight bat is a weighed in another balance, so the

for
arc said to be instruments of right knowledge from one point
and objects of right knowledge from another point of view. The eye, for instance, is an instrument of perception as well as an object of So also the means of right knowledge may, if occasion arises, perception.
of view,
be also regarded as objects of right knowledge.
78.
If
an object
of
right knowledge,
continues the
objector, is to be established
this latter
needs also to
right knowledge.
The objection stands thus You say that an object of right knowledge is to be established by a means of right knowledge. I admit this and ask how you establish Since a means of right knowledge the means of right knowledge itself. may also be regarded as an object of right knowledge, you are required to establish the so-called means of right knowledge by another means of
:
by a means of right knowledge, be established by another means of
17.
right
knowledge and so
on.
means of right knowledge does not require another means of right knowledge
79.
Or,
he
continues,
if
for
its
establishment,
let
an object of right knowledge
28
BOOK
II,
CHAPTER
I.
be also established without any means of ri^nt knowledge.
18.
A means of right
object of
If
knowledge stands
in to
the same category as an

establish
right
knowledge,
of
the
means
right
you are knowledge is

if
either of them.
,
accepted as
self-established,
the object of right knowledge must also, according to the objector, be
accepted as self-established.
etc., will
In such a contingency perception, inference,
be superfluous.
80.
It is
not so
the
means
of right
knowledge are
19.
established like the illumination of a lamp.

It
is
A lamp illumines a jar and our eye illumines the lamp. Though sometimes the lamp, and sometimes the eye, that illumines, you are
to
bound
admit a general notion of illuminator.
Similarly you must admit
a general notion of the means of right knowledge as distinguished from

that of the objects of right knowledge.
The means
will not, of course,
be regarded as such when included under the category
of
an
object.
[The aphorism is also interpreted as follows: Just as a lamp illumines itself and the other objects, the means of right knowledge establish themselves and the objects of right knowledge. Hence perception establishes itself and the objects of sense].
Not?. Objections raised in aphorisms 8, 9, 1.0, 11, 1U, 17 unci 18 emanated from the Buddhist philosophy. The reply given in aphorisms 12, 13, 1.4, 15 iind IS), represents the views of Brahmnnic philosophers who regard perception as a real act and objects as self-existent oiitities. According to the Buddhist philosophers, however, neither percepThey acquire an apparent or conditional tion nor objects havo any self-existeuee. existence in virtue of a certain relation which exists between them. Cause and effect, long and short, prior and posterior, etc., are all relative terms. The whole world is a network of relations. The relations themselves are illusory as the objects which are related have no self-existence. Hence the world is an illusion or has a mere conditional existence. But whore there is conditionally there is no truth. Truth and conditionality are incompatible terms. That which neutralises all relations is the void or absolute which lies beyond the conditional world. To speak the truth, the world is an absolute
nothing though it has a conditional existence. Vide my Translation of the Madhyamika aphorisms in the Journal of the Uiuldhist Text Sooioty, Calcutta, for 1895, 1896, 1897, 1898
and
1899.
M^^<H^^
81.
;iMMf?d<HHM^^HIdl
IH
*
of.
II
An
objector
may
say that
tlie
definition
per-
ception as given before
is
untenable because incomplete.
-20,
THE NYlYA-StTTRAS.
contact of a sense with
its object.
29
Perception has been defined as knowledge which arises from the
This definition
of perception.
is
said to be defective
because
it
dees not notice the conjunction of soul with mind, and of

sense,
mind with
which are causes
82.
is
Perception,
it is
said,
cannot arise unless there

arises
conjunction of soul with mind. 21. From the contact of a sense witli its object no knowledge
it is said,
unless,
there is also conjunction
of soul
with mind.
A sense
coming in contact with its object produces knowledge in our soul only if Hence the conjunction of soul the sense is conjoined with the mind.
with mind should be mentioned as a necessary element in the definition
of perception.
83.
Were
it so,
we
reply, then direction, space,
time
and
ether, should also be
perception.
enumerated among the causes of
22.
Direction, space, time and ether are also indispensable conditions in
the production
of
knowledge.
But even the objector does not

the causes of perception.
feel the
necessity of enumerating these
among
point out, has not been excluded from our definition inasmuch as knowledge is a mark of
84.
The
soul,
we
the soul.
23.
Perception has been described as knowledge, and knowledge implies Consequently in speaking of knowledge the the soul which is its abode.
soul has, by implication, been mentioned as a condition in the production
of perception.
85.
The mind
too has not been omitted
from our
definition
inasmuch as we have spoken of the non-simul-
taneity ôf acts of knowledge. 24. Perception has been defined as knowledge. An essential characteristic of knowledge is that more than one act of knowing cannot take place This characteristic is due to the mind, an atomic substance, at a time.
30
which
is
BOOK
IT,
CHAPTER
I.
conjoined with the sense,
when knowledge
is
produced.
Hence
in speaking of knowledge
we have by implication mentioned the mind as
a condition of perception.
86.
The
contact of a Bense with
its
object
is
mention-
ed as the special cause of perception. There are many kinds of knowledge, such
etc.
25.
as perception, recollection,
Conjunction of soul with mind

all
is
a cause which operates in the

its
production of
object
is
kinds of knowledge, while the contact of a sense with
which operates only in perception. In our definition of perception we have mentioned only the special cause, and have omitted the common causes which precede not only perception but also other
the cause
kinds of knowledge.
87.
tainly the
The contact of a sense with its object is cermain cause as perception is produced even when
one
is
asleep or inattentive.
it,
26.
Even a sleeping person hears

open to
to
it.
the thundering of a cloud

if
if
his ear
is
and a careless person experiences heat
his skin is exposed
[Aphorisms 25 and 26 are omitted by Vatsy&yana, the earliest commentator, but are noticed by Udyotakara, Vuchaspati, Vitfvanutha and
other subsequent annotators].
Isrn^ft <iMftdtii<uwi
88.
By
the senses and their objects are also distin-
guished the special kinds of knowledge.

viz.,
27.
of perception,
The special kinds by sight, hearing,
of
knowledge arethe
five varieties
smell, taste
and touch.
These are distinguished
by the senate in whose spheres they lie or by the objects which they Thus the visual perception is called eye-knowledge or colourillumine.
knowledge, the auditory perception knowledge, the olfactory perception knowledge, the gustatory perception
knowledge,
is
is is
called ear-knowledge or soundcalled nose-knowledge, or
smell-
called tongue-knowledge or taste-
fcnowledge and the tactual perception
is called
skin-knowledge or touch-
THE NYAYA-SCrTRAS.
31
89.
It
may be
is
objected that the contact of a sense

it is
with
its
object
not the cause of perception, as
in-
efficient in
some
instances.
28.
its
An
may
objector
may
say that the contact of a sense with
object is
not the cause of perception, as not see colour though

it
we
find that a person listening to a eye.

If the
song
comes in contact with his [Vatsyilyana interprets the aphorism as follows

:
conjunction
of soul with
mind
is
is
not accepted as the cause of perception, a well-known

viz.,
conclusion
-will
be debarred,
the
mark
of the
mind
is
that only one act
of knowledge
priate,
is
possible at a
time.
This interpretation, here inapprothe Asiatic

that the
based on the Bh*Uya-commoutary published by

I
Society of Bengal in 1865.

real Bh&sya-eouamentary of
fully
agree with those

is
who hold
VntsyAyana
not yet available to us.]
90.
It is
not so because there
is
pre-eminence of some
to
particular object.
It is
29.
a song
admitted that a person while listening

it
may
not see
colour though
comes
to
in contact
with his eye.

its
Yet the instance does not

is
prove that the contact of a sense with

tion,
object
not the cause of percep-
for it
is
be understood that his intent listening prevents him

colour.
from
seeing
the
In
other
words,
the
is
auditory
perception
supersedes the visual perception, because the song

the colour.
more
attractive than
[Vatsyayana interprets the aphorism thus The conjunction of soul with mind is not rendored useless, even if thcro is predominance of
:
the senses and their objects.

asleep or inattentive,
it is
If
perception
is
is
produced when a person
is
because there
then the predominance of his

is
sense
and
its
-
object though even then there
a faint conjunction of soul
with mind.
This interpretation
It is
available to us.
based on the Bhasya-commentary as ingenious but out of place here].

is
91.
it
Perception,
it
may be
urged,
we
is
inference because
illumyies only a part as a
mark
of the whole.
30.
We
it.
are said to perceive a tree while

tree, as
really perceive only a part of
This knowledge of the

it is,
a whole, derived from the knowledge a case of inference.
of a part of
according
to the objectors,
32
BOOK
II,
OHAPTEfe
1.
92.
But
this is not so,
for perception is admitted of
at least that portion
which
it
actually illumines.
31.
The objectors themselves admit that a part is actually perceived. Hence perception as a means of knowledge is not altogether denied and it
is
accepted as different from inference.
93.
Moreover, the perception
is
not merely of a part,
for there is a whole behind the part.
32.
A
part implies the whole,
The perception
of which
it is
of a part does not exclude perception of the whole

If
a part.
person you are said to touch the person.
you touch the hand, leg or any other limb of a Similarly, if you perceive a part
of a thing you are said to perceive the thing.
and perception
of a part implies perception of the whole.
There is, some say, doubt about the whole, because the whole has yet to be established. 33.
94.
The
objectors say that parts alone are realities and that there
is
no
whole behind them.

green in other parts.
qualities
A
If
tree,
for instance,
is
yellow in some parts and

the contradictory
the tree was one whole, then
of yellowness
simultaneously.
and greenness could not have belonged to it Hence the parts alone must, according to them, be
regarded as
real.
95.
If there
were no whole there would,

all.
it is
replied,
be non-perception of
intimate relation.
denied.
34.
would be perceptible
if
All signifies substance, quality, action, generality, particularity and
None
it
of.
these
the whole were
Sujyjose that the parts alone are real.
Then
since a part is not
of fixed dimeusiou,
into further parts
may
itself
be divided into parts, these latter again

until
we reach the atoms which are the and so on ultimate parts. Now the atoms which possess no bulk are not perceptible. Similarly, the quality, action, etc., which inhere in the atoms are also not Consequently if we deny that there is a whole neither the rjerceptible.
'
'
substance nor quality,
etc.,
would be perceptible.
TfiE NtltA-StTRAS.
33
96.
etc.
There
is
a whole because
we can
hold,
pull,
35.
If there
'
were no whole we could not have held or pulled an entire thing by holding or pulling a part of it. We say, one jar,' one man,'
'
etc.
This use of one

'
'
would vanish
if
there were no whole.
97.
The
illustration
not hold good, for
from an army or a forest does atoms cannot be detected by the senses.
36.
any one were to say that just as a single soldier or a single tree may not be seen from a distance bat an army consisting of numerous soldiers or a forest consisting of numerous trees is seen, so a single atom may not be perceptible but a jar consisting of numerous atoms will be
If
perceptible,
and these atoms being
called
'
one
jar,'
the use of
'
one
'
will
not vanish.
The analogy, we
reply,
does not hold good because the
soldiers and trees possess bulk and so are perceptible, whereas the atoms do not possess bulk and are individually not perceptible. It is absurd to argue that because soldiers and trees are perceptible in the mass, atoms are perceptible in the mass also to avoid this conclusion we must admit
:
the existence of a whole beyond the parts.
98.
Inference, some say,

it
is
not a means of right

e.g.,
knowledge as
misleads, &c.
If
errs in certain cases,

is
banked, when something
when a river is damaged and when similarity
37.
we infer that there has been rain, if we see eggs, we infer that there will be rain and if we hear a peacock scream, we infer that clouds are gathering. These infersee a river swollen
off their
we
the ants carrying
ences, says an objector, are not necessarily correct, for a river
may
be
swollen because embanked, the ants

nests have
may
carry off their eggs because their
been damaged, and the so-called screaming of a peacock may
be nothing but the voice of a man.
^^Wiîi^^
99.
It is
ft
^W^N ^
i
it
id
ii
not
so,
because our inference
is
something else than the part, fear and likeness.
based on
38.
34
BOOK
The
II,
CHAPTER
by rain
;
I.
swelling" of a river caused
is different
from that which
from the embankment of a part of it the former is attended by a great rapidity of currents, an abundance of foam, a mass of fruits, leaves,
results
wood,
rain
etc.
is
The manner
different
in
which ants carry
off
their
eggs just before
quite
nests are damaged.
The
from the manner in which they do so when their ants run away quickly in a steady line when
rain
is
imminent but
fear
makes them
fly in
disorder
when
their nests are
damaged. The screaming of a peacock which suggests gathering clouds is quite different from a man's imitation of it, for the latter is not natural.
If in
such cases any wrong inference
is
drawn, the fault
is
in the person,
not in the process.
100.
There
is,
some
say,
no present time
because
will yet
when
which
a thing falls
it
we can know
only the time through

it
has fallen and the time through which
fall.39.
Inference has reference to three times.
In the a priori inference
we
pass from the past to the present, in the a posteriori from the present to
commonly seen from the present to the present. It The reason is, therefore, proper that we should examine the three times. which leads sonic people to deny the present time is that when a fruit, for instance, falls from a tree we recognise only the past time taken up by the fruit in traversing a certain, distance and the future time which will yet
the past and in the
' '
be taken up by the
time.
fruit in traversing the remaining/listance.
There
is
no
intervening distance which the fruit can traverse at the so-called present
Hence they say there
is
no present time.
ii
rflfaaroTwt
101.
is replied,
3îwRT*n% fl^^R^rct
is
v
will,
it
If
there
no
present
time
there
be no past and future times because they are

it.
related to
is
i^.
40.
that
The past
which succeeds
which precedes the present and the future is that Hence if there is no present time there cannot be any
past or future time.
102.
The
past and future cannot be established
mer^ mutual reference.
by a
41.
THE NYAYA-StTTRAS.
If the past is defined as that
is
35
which
is
not the future and the future
defined as that which
is
not the past, the definition would involve a

to
fallacy of
mutual dependency. Hence we must admit the present time which the past and future are related.
aR&rrcrai%
103.
u^Th^hiîî^mm^:
mum
ii
were no present time, sense perception would be impossible, knowledge would be impossible. 42.
If there
you deny the present time there cannot be any perception which is present in time and in the absence of perception all kinds of knowledge would be impossible. Hence the present time is established by confutation or the principle of reduetio ad abaurdum.
If
illumines only what
104.
We
can know both the past and the future for
we can
made.
conceive of a thing as
43.
is
made and
as about to be
The present time
indicated by what continues, the past
by what
has been finished and the future by what has not yet begun.
105.
Comparison, some
it
say, is not a
means
either
of right
knowledge as
On
caunot
be established
complete or considerable or partial similarity.

the ground of complete similarity
through
4.
we never say " a cow is like a cow," on the ground of considerable similarity we do not say that " a buffalo is like a. cow," and on the ground of partial similarity we do not say that "a mustard seed is like Mount Meru." Hence comparison is regarded by some as not a means of right knowledge, for it has no
precise standard.
106.
son
is
This objection does not hold good, for compariestablished through similarity in a high degree. 45.
The
similarity in a high degree
exists
between such well known
objects as a
cow and a bos gavaeus,
etc.
?<&
BOOK
II,
CHAPTER
I.
107.
inference,
Comparison, some say,

for both seek
to
is
not different from
means
of the perceived.
to
establish the unperceived

sight
by
46.
first
We
similarity
recognise a bos gavaeus at
through
its
special
of a previously unperceived object derived
a cow which we have often perceived. This knowledge through its similarity to a peris, it
ceived object
has been said, nothing but a case of inference.
not in a bos gavaeus unperceived that we find the real matter of comparison. 47. The matter of comparison is similarity, e.g., between a cow and a boa gavaeus. The bos gavaeus in which we notice the similarity is first perceived, that is, on perceiving a bos gavaeus we notice its similarity to a
108.
It is
cow.
Hence comparison supplies us with knowledge

it
of a perceived thing
through its similarity to another thing also perceived.

distinguishes
This characteristic from inference which furnishes us with knowledge of an unperceived thing through that of a thing perceived.
109.
parison
It is
is
no non-difference inasmuch as comestablished through the compendious expression

There
is
is
"so."48.
not true that comparison
established
is
identical with inference because the
former
is
is
a cow, so
' '
a bos gavaeus
it
use of so
makes
through the compendious expression "so." 'As this is an instance of comparison. This clear that comparison is a distinct means of right
'
knowledge.
Verbal testimony, say some, is inference because the object revealed by it is not perceived but inferred. 49.
HO.
Inference gives us the knowledge of an unperceived object through the knowledge of an object which is perceived. Similarly, verbal testimony enables tie Tto acquire the knowledge of an unperceived object
THE NYAYA-StTTRAS.
through the knowledge of a word which
is
37
perceived.
The
verbal
testi-
mony
is,
therefore,
is
supposed by some
to be inference, as the object
revealed by both
unperceived.
111.
In respect of perceptibility the two cases are
not, continues the objector, different.

object through an object which
of the object
50.
In inference as well as in verbal testimony

is
we pass
to
an unperceived
perceived.
In respect of perceptibility
through which we pass, the. inference does not, continues the objector, differ from the verbal testimony.
UWNW
112.
II
R lH
tt N
There
is
connection.
moreover, adds the objector, the same

is
1 a certain connection between a sign

it
(e. g., fire),
Just as in inference there

there
(.?,,
smoke/ and the thing signified by

is
so in verbal testimony
it.
connection between a word and the object signified by

not different from verbal testimony.
So
inference, says the objector, is
113.
In reply
matter signified
on the by a word because the word has been used

say that there
is
we
reliance
by a
reliable person.
52.
In reference to the objections raised in aphorisms 49 and 50 we gay that we rely on unseen matter not simply because it is signified by words
are, some say, nymphs, Uttaraknrus, seven islands, ocean, human settlements, etc We accept them as realities not because they are known through words, hut because they are spoken of by persons who are reliable. Hence verbal testimony is not inference. The two agree in conveying knowledge of an object through its sign, but the sign in one is different from the sign
but because they are spoken by a reliable person.
There
paradise,
in the other.
In the case of verbal
testimony the special point
is to
decide whether the sign (wordj comes from a reliable person.
Aphorism 51 speaks of a certain connection between a word and the object signified by it. The present aphorism points out that the We acknowledge that a word indicates connection is not a natural one. a certain object, but we deny that the object is naturally or necessarily connected with the word. Hearing, for instance, the word " cow," we
'
38
BOOK
H,
it,
CHAPTER
I.
think of the animal signified by
nevertheless the
word and the animal

In the case of
are not connected with each other by nature or necessity.

natural and necessary.
inference, however, the connection between a sign (e.g., smoke)
and the
in
thing signified
(e. g., fire) is
Therefore the connec-
tion involved in inference
is
not of the
same kind as that involved
verbal testimony.
MHlJJJdi^MH^
114.
in
M ^
I
II
There
is,
in
the case of verbal testimony, no
perception of the connection. 53. The connection between a sign and the thing
is
signified,
which
is
the
For instance, the inference basis of inference, is obvious to perception. " the hill is fiery because it is smoky " is based on a certain connecthat
tion
between smoke and
fire
which
actually
perceived in a kitchen or
the objects signified
elsewhere.
The connection between a word and
which is the basis of verbal testimony, is not obvious to perception. word Uttarakuru, for instance, signifies the country of that name, but connection between the word and the country is not perceived, as Hence verbal testimony is beyond our observation. latter lies
inference.
by it, The
the
the
not
no natural connection between a word and the object signified by it, as we do not find that the words food, fire and hatchet, are accompanied by the ac54 tions filling, burning and splitting.
115.
There
is
If
a word were naturally connected with the object signified by

fire
it,
then by uttering the words food,

our mouth
filled
up (with
food),
and hatchet we should have found burnt (with fire) and split (by a hatchet).
But such
is
is
never the case.
a word and the object signified by

r
Hence there is no natural connection between it, and consequently verbal testimony
not inference.
is
an objector, be denied that there a fixed connection between words and their meanings. 55.
116.
It cannot, says
'
word denotes a particular meaning, e.g., the word cow A denotes the animal of that name, but it does not denote a horse, a jar or any other thing. There is, therefore, in the case of verbal testimony, a
particular
THE NYlYA-StTRAS.
fixed connection
30
between a word and

\b
its
of inference a fixed connection between a sign
meaning as there is in the case and the thing signified. Hence
verbal testimony
considered by the objector to be a case of inference.
117.
We
reply
is
it
is
through convention that the
understood. 56. The connection between a word and its meaning is conventional and not natural. The connection though fixed by man is not inseparable and*
connot therefore be the basis of an inference.
meaning
of a
word
There is no universal uniformity of connection between a word and its meaning. 57.
118.
The
e.g.,
risis,
the
word " yava
aryas and mlecchas use the same word in different senses, " is used by the Sryas to denote a long-awned grain
but by the mlecchas to denote a panic-seed. So the connection between a word and its meaning is not everywhere uniform and consequently verbal testimony cannot be considered as inference.
119.
The Veda, some
say, is unreliable as
it
involves
the faults of untruth, contradiction and tautology. 58. The Veda, which is a kind of verbal testimony, is not, some say a means of right knowledge. It is supposed by them to be tainted with
the faults of untruth,
contradiction and tautology.
For
instance,
the
Veda
son
is
affirms that a son is
produced when the

is
sacrifice for the
sake of a
performed.
It often
happens that the son
not produced though the sacrifice

in the
has been performed.
There are many contradictory injunctions

clares " let one sacrifice
fice
Veda,
"'
e.g.,
it
de-
when
the
sun has risen," also
let
one
sacri-
" let the
when, the sun has not risen," etc. first hymn be recited thrice," "
There
let
such tautology as the last hymn be recited

is
thrice," etc.
120.
The
s6-called untruth in the
Veda comes from
some defect
in the act, operator or materials of sacrifice.
59.
40
BOOK
It.
CrIAfcTEft
I.
Defect in the act consists in sacrificing not according to rules, defect

in the operator (officiating priest) consists in hid not being a learned mail,
and defect in the materials

not fresh, remuneration
is
(to
consists in the fuel being wet, butter being
the officiating priest) being small, etc.

if
son
sure to be produced as a result of performing the sacrifice Therefore there is no untruth in the Veda. defects are avoided.
these
121.
Contradiction would occur
if
there were altera-
tion of the time agreed upon.

has agreed upon doing
60.
if
Let a person perforin sacrifice before sunrise or after sunrise

it
he
at either of the times.
Two
alternative courses
being open to him he can perforin the sacrifice before sunrise or after sun-rise according to his agreement or desire. The Veda cannot be charged
with the fault of contradiction
if it
enjoins such alternative courses.
122.
of
There
is
no tautology, because re-inculcation
is
advantage. 61.
Tautology means a useless repetition, which never occurs in the
If there is
Veda.
any repetition there
it is
either for completing a certain
number
" thrice
of syllables, or for
first
" Let the
hymn
explaining a matter briefly expressed, etc. be recited thrice," " let the last hymn be recited
such instances embody a useful repetition.
qmfiwim ûfawm
123. tion of
ii
it*
And because
to
there
is
necessity for the classifica-
Vedic speech.
necessary
62.
ii
It is
divide the Vedic speech into classes based on
special characters.
ft^^miîwnftWMn^
124.
of injunction, persuasion
1*
ii
The Vedic speech being divided on

and re-inculcation.
Veda
are (1)
viz.,
the principle
63.
(2) ritual.
The two main

sive
divisions of the
hymn and
The.ritual portion admits of three sub-di visions,
injunctive,
persua-
and
re-inculcaiive.
THE KYlYA-StTEAS.
(ft ft:)
125.
41
I
fa*m:
II
<
II
An
in junction is that
a certain course of action [as
which exhorts us to adopt the means of attaining good],

:
64.
Tlie following is an
injunction
" Let
perform the
fire-sacrifice."
This
is
a direct
him who command.
desires paradise
126.
Persuasion
speech
is
effected
through praise, blame,
warning; and prescription.

Praise
extolling
its
is
65.
"
which persuades lo a certain course of action by

e.g.,
consequences,
is
By the
Sarvajit
it
sacrifice
gods con-
quered
all,
there
nothing like Sarvajit
sacrifice,
enables us to obtain
is
everything and to vanquish every one, etc."
Here there
such
a
no direct comthat
mand but
persuaded
the Sarvajit sacrifice

to
is
extolled in
way
we are
perform
it.
Blame is speech which persuades us to adopt a certain course of action by acquainting us with the undesirable consequences of neglecting " One who perforins any other sacrifice neglecting the Jyotiijtoma it, e. g., Here one is persuaded to perform the falls into a pit and decays there."
Jyotistonia BAcrilica the neglect of which brings about evil consequences.
Warning is the mentioning of a course of action the obstruction of which by sora.3 particular person led to bad consequences, e.g., on pre-. senting oblation one is to take the fat iiret and the sprinkled butter
afterwards, but alas
!
the Charaka priests
first
took
the sprinkled
butter
which was, as it were, the life of fire, etc Here the foolish course of action adopted by the Charaka priests should serve as a warning to other priests
who ought
to
avoid the course.
Prescription implies the mention, of
some thing as commendable on

the
account of iu antiquity,
e.g.,
"By
this
Brahuianas recited the
Sama hymn,
etc."
fafaftfl^TgT^
127.
(wg^rrc:)
is
ii
* it
U
first
is
ii
Re-inculcation
the
repetition of
that
which
or
has been enjoined by an injunction. 66. Re-inculcation may consist of (1) the repetition
(2) the repatitiou of
of an injunction,
tint
which has
bsen enjoined.
The
called
verbal re-inculcation and the second objective re-inculcation.
la the Veda
42
BOOK
II,
CHAPTER
I.
there is re-inculcation as in ordinary use there
is repetition.
" Non-eternal,
not eternal"
this is a verbal repetition. "Non-eternal, character of extinction " this is objective repetition.
possessing the
There is, some say, no difference between re-inculcation and tautology, as there is in either case a repetition
128.
of
some expression already used.

Re-inculcation
is
67.
it
supposed by some to be a fault inasmuch as does not, according to them, differ from tautology.
^sr^^q^^m^T?TTfasN:
129.
n *
*q
There
is
difference, becaitse
e.g.,
re-inculcation
faster.
serves
some useful purpose,
command to go
on,
68.
Tautology consists of a useless repetition but the re-petition in the

case of re-inculcation
is useful, e. g.,
"go
go on"
signifies "go faster."

and medical
jwiflfrMw
130.
Jw ra
wjRTOwniijiimwi^ iiidkui
is
The Veda
reliable like the spell
science, because of the reliability of their authors.
G9.
The
spell counteracts poison, etc.,
correct remedies.
their authors,
and the medical science prescribes The authority which belongs to them is derived from
sages,
the
who were
reliable persons.
The sages them-
had an intuitive pejception of truths, (2) they had great kindness for living beings and (3) they had the desire The authors (lit., the of communicating their knowledge of the truths. seers and speakers) of the Veda were also the authors of the spell and
selves were reliable because (1) they
medical science.
Hence
is
like the spell
be accepted as authoritative.
because eternal,
untenable.
and medical science the Veda must The view that the Veda is authoritative
THE NYAYA-SOTRAS.
Book
ii-^-Chapter
ii.
43>
131.
Some
say that the means of right knowledge
are
more than
In
four,
because rumour, presumption, probavalid.

the
bility
and non-existence are also

Book
I,
1.
chapter
to
I,
aphorism
viz.,
3,
means
of right
knowledge
have been stated

verbal testimony.
be four,
perception, inference, comparison and
Some
say that there are other means of right knowledge
such as rumour, presumption, probability and non-existence.
an assertion which has come from one to another without any indication of the source from which it first originated, e.g., in this
is
Humour
fig tree there live goblins.
Presumption
another thing
:
is
the deduction of one
thing from the declaration of

'
from the declaration that unless there is cloud there there is rain if there is cloud.' [A more is no raiu' we deduce that familiar instance of presumption is this the fat Devadatta does not eat
e.g.,
' :
during the day time.

for
it is
More the presumption

if
is
that he eats in the night

all].
impossible for a person to be fat
he does not eat at
Probability consists in cognising

of another tiling
in
the existence of a thing from that

e.g.,
which
it
is
included,
cognising the measure of
an d(}haka from that of a droiâ of which it is a fourth part, and cognising the measure of a prastha from that of an arjhaka of which it is a
quarter.
Of two opposite things the non-existence

existence
of
of one of
establishes
the
the
the other, ey.,
the
non-existence
rain
establishes
combination of wind and cloud.
When
there
is
a combination of wind
and cloud, drops
of water cannot fall in spite of their weight.
TR^FfTWT^S^fr^T:
132.
is
II
1*
II
This,
included in
no contradiction since rumour verbal testimony, and presumption, probabiis
we reply,
lity
and non-existence are included in inference.
2.
Those who maintain that rumour, presumption, probability and non-existence are valid, do not really oppose our division of the means
of right
knowledge
into four, viz., perception,
inference,
comparison and
verbal testimony.
U
Rumour
and
is
BOOK
a special kind of
is
it.
II,
CHAPTER
II.
partakes of the general characteristics of verbal testimony
Presumption
tance, the fat
explained as the knowledge of a thing derived

it
through the consideration of
from the opposite standpoint.

:
For
here
ins-
Devadatta does not eat during the day time

is
the
presumption
night has
deration
that he
eats in
the night.
is
The
fact of his eating in the
not been expressly stated but

that
ascertained from this consithe
a person
who docs not
eat during
day
cannot be
like
stroug unless he eats in the night.

inference passes from
It is
evident that presumption

olie
a perceived
thing to an unperceived
because
they are in some way connected.

Probability
is
inference
because
it is
it is
the cognizance of apart from
knowledge of a whole with which

Non-existence
is
inseparably connected.
as
it
inference inasmuch
the
really
infers
the obs-
truction of a cause from
non-existence of
its effect
through a certain
connection,
viz., if
the obstruction occurs the effect cjiunot occur.

etc.,
Hence rumour,
are not independent
but, are included in the four
means of right knowledge enumerated in Book I, Chapter], aphorism 3.
133.
Presumption, some
say, is not valid
because
this
it
leads to uncertainty.
" If there
said to
is
3.
will
no cloud
if
there
is
be no rain"
from
we are
it
presume that
there
a cloud there will be rain.

rain.
But
often
happens that a cloud is not followed by always lead to certainty.
So presumption does not
134.
to
We
4.
is
reply
if
there
your supposing that
to
any uncertainty it is due be a presumption which, is not

is
really so.
'
" If there
entitled to
if
no cloud there will be no rain."
From
this
we
are
presume that if there is rain there must have been cloud. you pretend to presume that " if there is a cloud there will be But raiu" your so-called presumption will be an invalid one.
135.
it
The
objection
itself,
we
say, is invalid
because
5.
THE
" Presumption
is
NYAYA-StfTRAS.
it
45
to
not valid because
leads
uncertainty"
this
In it there are two points for consideration, viz., is your objection. (1) the validity of presumption and (2, the existence of presumption.
Your objection refers to one of the points, t>iz., the validity of presumption. So you do not deny the existence of presumption. In some instances,
however, your objection
may
is
refer
to
more points than one.

in
itself,
is
In fact
the nature of your objection

it
not definite
or
in
other words,
Hence, your objection
invalid.
136.
Or,
if
that be
valid, then our
presumption
is
not invalid.
6.
will
Perhaps you
objection.
say that your objection
is
valid
because you can
ascertain in each case
Similarly,
we
whether one or more points are referred to by the shall say that our presumption is not invalid
is
because wo can ascertain in each case whether the presumption

of leading to more conclusions than one.
capable
Hence
if
you say that your
objection
is
valid,
wc
shall say that our presumption is also valid.

11
JTroTsrsrmnpf gtarfci:
137.
of right
t
is
Some say
it.
that non-existence
is
not a
means
is
knowledge because there
known by
no object which
7.
138.
an object
objects.
we reply, serves to mark out unmarked by the mark which characterises other
Non-existence,
8.
Suppose a person wants to bring a pot which is not blue. The absence of bluenesH is a mark which will enable him to mark out the particular pot he wants to bring and to exclude the other pots which Thus an object may be known through the non-existence are blue.
(absence) of its mark.
139.
a mark
is'
you say that the non-existence (absence) of impossible where there was no mark at all, it is,
If
so,
we
because the non-existence (absence) possible in reference to a mark elsewhere. 9..
reply, not
is
46
BOOK
We can,
was previously
"Not-blue"
is
II,
CHAPTER
A
It.
says an objector, talk of a

existent (present).
mark being
In reply
non-existent (absent)
if it
pot is said to be not blue only
in reference to its
so.
being blue previously.
we say
that
it
is
not
no doubt
possible only in reference to " blue " but
that blueness
may
exist elsewhere.
For instance, we can talk of

is
this
pot being not-blue, in -contrast to that pot which
blue.
140.
Though a mark may

say,
distinguish the
object
which
is
marked, the non-existence (absence) of the mark

distinguish
cannot,
some
the
object
which
is
not
marked.
10.
is
A
how can
blue pot
distinguished by the blueness which
we, says the objector, distinguish an
But is its mark. unmarked object by the
non-existence (absence) of the
mark which
it
does not possess ?
141.
This
is
not
so,
because the non-existence (ab-
sence) of a
mark
serves as a
mark
in relation to the pre-
sence of the mark.
11.
is
We
can
speak of a pot being not blue in relation to one which

positive
Hence though not-blueness is not a blue. (negative) mark in relation to blueness.
mark
it
serves as a
ST^%Hrefcra%r
142.
ir
viz.,
m^
12.
Moreover we perceive non-existence as a mark

antecedent non-existence
antecedent to the production of a thing.

There are two kinds of non-existence,
and subsequent non-existence. When we say that there will be a jar, we perceive the mark of non-existence of the jnr in the halves which are destined to compose it. This is antecedent non-existence. Similarly, when we say that a jar has broken, we perceive the mark of non-existence of the This is subsequent non-existence. jar in the parfi* which composed it.
fcrifc^^pfft
143.
^
is
PiiiftM%:
wmx
ii
^ a
doubt about the nature of sound because there are conflicting opinions supported by conflicting
reasons.
There
13.

THE NYAYA-StTRAS.
Some say
eternal,
47
it is
that sound
is
a quality of pther and that
all-pervading,
and capable of being manifested.

manifested.
Others say that
sound
is
like
smell, etc., is a quality of the substance in
which
it
abides,
and
capable
of being
Sound
is
said
by others
to
be a quality of ether
and destruction like knowledge. Others again say that sound arises from the concussion of elements, requires no abode, and is subject to production and destruction. Hence there arises
and
to be subject to production
doubt about the true nature of sound.
^lfe*WI?P^*^
144.
f*|3ratRTCT^r
II
9*
II
and
14.
is
Sound is not eternal because it has a beginning cognised by our sense and is spoken of as artificial.
is
Sound
non-eternal because
e. g.
it
begins or arises from the concustree, etc.
sion of two hard substances

for the non-eternality of
an axe and a
that
it is
Another ground
Moree.g.,
sound
is
cognised by our sense.

artificial
over
we
attribute to
sound the properties
of an
object,
we
if
speak of a sound being grave, acute,

it
etc.
This would be impossible
had been
eternal.
Some say
manifestation of
that
it,
the so-called that

is,
beginning of a sound ,is merely a sound does not really begin but is merely
In reply we say
manifested by the concussion of two hard Substances.

that the concussion does not manifest but produces
sound.
You cannot
suppose the concussion
to be the
manifester and sound the manifested
unless you can prove that the concussion
and sound are simultaneous.

heard at a great distance even
But
tile
proof
is
impossible as a sound
is
after the concussion of the substances
has ceased.
So sound
is
not mani-
fested by the concussion.

is
It is,
however, legitimate to suppose that sound

heard at a great distance.
produced by the concussion, and that one sound produces another sound
last
and so on until the
sound
is
i*i
in
i.
argument because the non-existence of a jar and the genus of it are eternal, and eternal things are also spoken of as if they were artificial. 15. /
145.
will not accept this
Some
Some say
eternal.
that
!
it is
not true that whatever has a beginning
is
non-
Look
the non-existence 'destruction) of a jar which began
wheu
48
the jar was broken
is
is
BOOK
non-eternal
:
H,
-CHAPTER
II.
Whatever is cognised by on unsound argument. When, for instance, we perceive a jar we perceive also its genus (i.e., jaruess) which is eternal. It is further said that we often attribute to eternal
eternal (indestructible).
tliis is
our sense
also said to
be
things the properties of an

of ether as
artificial object,
e.g.,
we speak
of the extension
we speak
of the extension of a blanket.

it
i
r \ \% n rTTSPfTTTpffcrfaR^T feWTT^sqfjRR: 146. There is, we reply, no opposition because there

i
is distinction
between what
is really
eternal
and what
is
partially eternal.
16.
That which
is
really eternal belongs to the three times.

of a jar
But the nonit
existence (destruction)
does not belong to three times as
was
impossible before the jar was broken.

tion) of a jar
Hence the non-existence

not really eternal.
(destruc-
which
lias
a beginning
is
147.
It is
only the things cognised by our sense as
belonging to a certain genus that must, we say, be inferred

to be non-eternal.
17.
The
objectors have said that things cognised

e.g.,
by our sense are not
necessarily non-eternal,
as
we
perceive a jar
we
also
perceive
its
genus jar-uess which is eternal. In reply we say that not all things cognised by our sense are non-eternal, but only those that belong to a
certain genus.
jar, for instance, is non-eternal
because Ave perceive

is
it
as belonging to the genus jar-ness.
But jar-ness which
cognised by
our sense
is
not non-eternal because
it
does not belong to a further genus

is
named jar-ness-ness. Similarly, sound is non-eternal because it nised by our sense as belonging to the genus called sound-ness. The aphorism may also be interpreted as follows: Sound
cog-
is
non-
eternal because
We
a series
it is inferred to advance in a series. do not say that whatever is cognised by our sense
is
non-eternal
our intention
is to
say that things cognised by our sense as advancing in
am non-eternal.
Sound
is
cognised in that manner

is
(i.e.,
sound
advances like a wave) and hence sound
non-eternal.
148.
We
further say,
that only artificial things are
designated by. the term extension.
18,
THE NYAYA-StJTRAS.
When we
49
speak of the extension of ether we really mean that the extension belongs to an artificial thing which has for its substratum the Hence we do not in reality attribute to eternal things the properties ether.
of artificial objects.
149.
Sound
it.
is
non-eternal because neither do
we
perceive
If
it
before pronunciation nor do
we
notice any veil
which covers
19.
sound were eternal it would be perceived before pronunciation. You cannot say that sound really existed before pronunciation but was covered by some veil, for we do not notice any such veil.
150.
The
veil,
some
If
say,
really
exists
because
do not perceive the non-perception thereof.

The
objectors say
:
20.
it is
we
you deny
the
veil
the veil
because
it
not perceived,
perceived.
we deny the non-perception of The denial of non-percoption

perception, or in
because
is
also not
is the same as the acknowledgment of other words, the veil is acknowledged to be existent.
Mil
*t
151.
If
you assert non-perception

is
of the veil
though
not per-
the non-perception
tors, assert
not perceived we, continue the objecit
the existence of the veil though

of the veil
is
ceived.
21.
You admit non-perception

(non-perception).
veil
though you do not perceive it Similarly, we, the objectors admit the existence of the
it.
though we do not perceive
152.
This,
we
reply, is
no reason, because non-per-
22. ception consists of absence of perception. Our non-perception thing fit to be perceived. A veil is a
of
it
On the other hand, the non-perception of a veil is indicates its absence. Hence non-perception of the non-percepperceived. not a thing fit to be
tion leads us to nothing real.
50
BOOK
II,
CHAPTER
II.
153.
Some
say that sound

is eternal.
it is
is
eternal because
it is
23. intangible. Ether which is intangible

ing to some, be eternal because
Sound must
similarly, accord-
intangible.
154.
Action
This we deny, because action

is
is
non-eternal.
24.
non-eternal though,
it is
intangible.
Hence
intangibility
does not establish eternality.
T^g
155.
Pl^JÎ^ *
II
Vt
is
II
An atom,
on the other hand,
eternal though
not intangible.
Tangibility
is
25.
not incompatible with eternality,
e.g.,
atoms
are
tangible yet eternal.
SFSRHT^ H
156.
Sound, some
say,
is
eternal
because of the
traditionary teaching.
26.
knowledge to his pupils by
In fact the traif
A
means
preceptor could not ha"e imparted
of sounds if these were
perishable (non-eternal).
ditionary
teaching would, according to the objectors, be impossible
the sounds were non-eternal.
157.
This
is,
we reply, no reason because sound
is
not
perceived in the interval.
27.
'
Suppose a preceptor delivers certain sounds (in the form of lecwhich are received by his pupil. The sounds are not audible '.in ture) the interval between the preceptor giving them and the pupil receiving them. They would never he inaudible if they were eternal.
3WlMHl<*i|frt^:
158.
II
*q
II
This, say the objectors, is no argument because

:
28. there is the teaching. If the sounds as soon as they came out of the The objectors say were destoyed and did not reach the pupil, there could not. be preceptor
THE NYAYA-StTRAS.
any- teaching
carried
on.
'
8%
sound
But there
it is
is
the
teaching,
hence
does not perish or in other words
eternal.
159.
In whichever of the two senses
it is
accepted
pupil's
imitat-
29. the teaching does not offer any opposition. " teaching" maybe interpreted either as (I) the The word receiving the sounds given by his preceptor, or as (2) the pupil's
ing the sounds of his preceptor as one imitates dancing.
interpretations
Neither of these
In consonance
would support the eternality of sound.

interpretation
with the
first
the preceptor
produces another sound
reaches the pupil.
coming out of and so on until (he last sound This would make sound non-eternal. It is obvious
shall
we
say
that
the sound
that the second interpretation similarly proves the non-eternality of sound.
160.
it is
Sound, continue the objectors,
is
eternal because
capable of repetition.
That which
is
30.
ia
capable of repetition
persistent or
not perishable,
e.g.,
one and the same colour can be repeatedly looked at because it is persistent. One and the same sound can similarly be repeatedly uttered,
it is
hence
persistent or not perishable.
161. It is, we reply, not so because even if sounds were " other" (different), repetition could take place. 31.
Repetition does
possible even
sacrifices
if
not prevent perishableuess because repetition is the things repeated are " other" or different, e.g., he
thrice, etc.
twice,
he dances
Here the two
sacrifices are different
and yet we use the repetitive word

are different
twice, similarly
the three dancings
and yet we use the
repetitive
word
'
thrice.'
162.
Some say
is
that there is
ness because what
no such thing as othercalled " other" in reference to some

itself.
other is^not other in reference to
32.
if
We
"other"
is
maintain that repetition
is
possible even
the things repeated

'
are " other" or different.
Our
position is said to be untenable

is
the term
described as unmeaning, as nothing
other than
itself.
BOOK
II,
CHAPTER
II.
In the absence of otherness there would, we reply, be no sameness because the two exist in reference to
163.
each other.
If there
33.
viz.,
lead us to absurdity as
ableness.
will
was no otherness there would, be no sameness. This would it would disprove both persistency and perishHence we must admit otherness, and if there is " other" there
repetition
is
be no flaw in our expression,
possible even
if
things
were " other" or different.
lMUIehl'MJ||!M<HS:
ihiîwi
we
perceive
Sound, some say, no cause why it should perish.

164.
to
is
eternal because
34.
Whatever is non-eternal is destroyed by some cause. Sound is said have no cause of destruction, hence sound is held by some to be not non-eternal, {i.e., is regarded as eternal).
But by the same argument we are afraid that non-perception of the cause of inaudition would mean
165.
constant audition.
If
is
35.
is
non-perception
cease to hear because
we do
But such a conclusion
establish non-existence we should not not perceive any cause of our not hearing. absurd.
to
sqTmi%
166.
-ni^m<h*Q<*itii<m^!(i:
position,
* iî
is
n
is
Your
is
we
further
say,
untenable
because there
no non-perception, on the contrary there
perception, of the cause of inaudition.
36.
Suppose that a sound is produced by an axe striking against a tree. This sound will perish after producing another sound which will again perish giving rise to another and so on until the last sound is destroyed
by some
perish.*
obstacle.
In
fact,
Hence there
there
is
is
every sound that is produced is destined to no non-perception of the cause of inaudition, on

of
the contrary
is
perception
such a cause.
Consequently sound
not eternal.
THE NYAYA-StTTRAS.
53
There is, we again say, no non-perception because the sound [of a gong] ceases on the contact of our
167.
hand [with the gong].

You cannot
of sound,
37.
is
say that there
non-perception of the cause of cessation
because we actually perceive that by the contact of our hand
we can
stop the sound of a gong.
168.
We
call a
if
thing eternal (persistent)
if
it
conit
tinues to exist, and
we cannot
perceive any cause
why
should cease.
perceived.
38.
its
Sound does not continue to exist and Hence sound is not eternal.
cause of cessation
is also
169.
That the substratum of sound
is
intangible
is
no
counter-argument.
Sound has not
viz.,
39.
for
its
substratum any of the tangible substances,

for
it is
earth, water,
fire
and
air,
found to be produced even where

is
these do no exist.
is
For instance, sound

taste,
produced
devoid of smell,
colour and touch
in a vacuum which which are the qualities of

in
tangible substances.
The reason why the sound produced

is
a vacuum
does not reach our ears
that
there
is
no air
to
carry
it.
Hence the
substratum of sound
Jt is
is
an intangible substance,
it
viz., ether.
a peculiarity of sound that

substance
(e.g.,
cannot co-abide with colour,

is
etc.
tangible
earth)
which
the abode of smell
may
also
be the abode of colour, taste or touch.
But the substance, in which

qualities.
sound abides, cannot be the abode of any other

This peculiar substratum
called ether.
This distin-
guishes the substratum of sound from the subtrata of other qualities.

is
having an intangible substratum is no bar to the noneternality of sound. Sound, though its substratum is the intangible ether,
fact of
is
The
prodiiced by the contact of two'hard substances.
One sound produces

owing
another sound (or a certain vibration) which again causes another sound
(or vibration)
to
some
obstacle.
and so on Sound
until the
last
sound
(or vibration) ceases
is therefore non-eternal.
54
BOOK
II,
CHAPTER
II.
170.
Sound cannot be supposed

tangible substance
If
to
co-abide with
taste,
other qualities, for there are varieties of

In each
there
is
it.
40.
only one kind of smell,
touch or colour.
these qualities
we suppose
tangible
that sound
Ave
in a
substance,
abides with one or more of must admit that sound is of
one kind only.
and even
tfie
But sound is of various kinds such as grave, acute, etc. ; same sound may vary in degrees according to the nature of the
meets.
obstruction
it
This proves that sound

substance.
It
does not abide with other

that sound is not
qualities in a tangible
further proves
unalterable or eternal.
Also signifies that this aphorism
is
to
be considered along with

of
aphorism 2
given.
2 8C in
which a reason for the non-etcrnality
sound
is
171.
From
' '
the
injunction
substitute there arises doubt. 41. The word dadhi conjoined with the word
yatra
'
'
about modification and

'
atra
'
becomes
in
'
dadh-
by the rule of Sanskrit grammar.

'
Looking
at 'dadhi-atra'
and
y Here some say that i undergoes modification as y while others say that y comes as substitute for i. Consequently we are thrown into doubt whether letters really undergo modifications or take up substitutes.
i
dadhyatra
we
notice
that there is
in
the former and
the latter.
Sl^fcrf^l^t
172.
If
ftchK&ld*
II
R'l
II
underwent modification an increase of bulk in the original material would be attended by an in42. crease of bulk in the modification.
letters
accept the theory of modification the letter y which originated from the short i must be supposed to be less in bulk than the y which
Jf
we
originated from
the
the long
I.
But in
concluded
reality the
in both the cases is of
same bulk.
Hence
it is
that letters
do not undergo modi-
fication
but take up other
letters as substitutes.
^WtifoflM^3ffhKiq *Aa :
i
H *
*
to,
*\
n
be-
173.
The foregoing argument, some
say,
is futile
cause we find modifications less than, equal

than, the original material.43.
and greater
THE NYAYA-SttTRAS.
The bulk
which
which
is its
it is
55
to
of the modification does not, in all cases, correspond

e.g.,
the bulk of the original material,
thread
is
of less bulk than cotton
original material, a bracelet is equal
in bulk
to
the gold of
made, and a banyan tree
is
greater in bulk than the seed from

of modification
which
is,
it
springs.
Hence the argument against the theory
according to the objectors, baseless.
HI^W^Hl
174.
It is,
fa+KfW<JT3[
11
II
I reply,
not so because I spoke of those

different materials.
its
modifications
which originated from

may
materials are different
44.
A
But
if
modification
the
original
not 'correspond in bulk to

their
original material.
modifications are exi
pected to be different.
are expected
to
Here
or
being different from
their modifications
t.
be
different.
i
*.
But y issues from
as well as
Hence
is
not a modification of
3o-*lft+ft
175.
letter
iN^^fWRfa^q:
is,
II
?K
II
There
its
says an objector, difference between a

is
and
modification as there
and
(or %)
its
modification.
between a substance
between the
letter
*
45.
is is
According
to the objector there
difference
difference
and its modification y as there cotton and its modification thread.

5T
between the substance
f^TWJ<TC%:
II
*
is
94
II
176.
In reply I say that
it
not so because the
character of a modification does not exist here. 46. A modification must be of the same nature with its
material,
original
latter.
though the former may not correspond
in
bulk to the
bracelet is no doubt a modification of gold or silver but a horse is not a modification of a bull. Similarly y which is a semi-vowel is not a modii)
fication of i (or
which
is
full vowel.
facfrKmidHmaHiltTl :
177.
II
s*
SV9
||
thing which has undergone modification does not agajn return to its original form. 47.
Milk modified into curd does not again attain the state of milk. having reached the condition of y may again revert to its original from. Hence y is not a modification of *.
But
i.
56
BOOK
tj4*U?<flHt
178.
II,
CHAPTER
:
IX.
3KHrikfe
say that this
II
II
Some
is
untenable because golden
ornaments may again be converted into their original forms.
48. A
again
golden bracelet
be modified
is
converted
into
mass of gross gold which

objector relying on
may
into
a bracelet.
The
the
analogy of golden ornaments says that in the case of letters the theory of
modification does not suffer by
i
reaching the condition of y and again
returning to
its
original form.
I
ufahKKUl g^MIqftft*l<Jlll *
179.
fications
II
The analogy, we
say, is inapt because the
modi-
of
gold (called ornaments) do not relinquish the
nature of gold.
49.
into
A
own
mass of gold when made
ornaments does not relinquish

into y loses its
its
nature.
But
when converted
own
nature.
Hence
the analogy is unsuitable.
180.
in the
There
is,
according to the objector, no inaptness
analogy as the modification of a letter does not relinquish the general notion of letters. 50.
Just as gold
is
modified into a bracelet without relinquishing the

i
general notion of gold, so the letter
undergoes modification as y without
relinquishing the general notion of letters.
> UWMld> wWl'fi * MM*t|

181.
II
*t
II
A
i
quality belongs,
we reply,
to a thing possessing
itself. -^-51.
a general notion but not to the general notion
a modification of a ring inasmuch as both of them are gold which possesses the general notion of goldnesH. The letter y cannot
bracelet
be a modification
basis another
of the letter
because they have not as their
common
lettfcr
which possesses the general notion of

-l
l
letterness.
fa^
,182.
ft<tiKHflk*k!>
If the letter
wmm< IU U
II
and
if it
were eternal it could not be modified, were impermanent it could not abidelong enough to
fKurmsy the material for modification.^52
THE NYAYA-SttTRAS.
On
into y,
pi
i
the supposition of the letters being eternal
cannot be modified
i
and on tbe supposition of their being impermanent

it
must perish
before
can be modified into
y.
siftfor: n *
183.
*** n the letters be eternal their modification,

as
Though
says an objector, cannot be denied,
some
of the eternal
things are beyond the grasp
of the
senses while others
possess a different character. 53. Just as some eternal things (as ether J are supersensuous while others (such as cowhood) are cognisable by the sense, so some eternal things as
ether
may be unmodifiable
while others as letters
may
be susceptible to
modification.
M<Wi|lBl<a
184.
* *#HftqMUWftMMRl
Even
if
II
II
the letters are impermanent their modi-
fication, like their perception, is,
possible.
if
according to the objector,
54.
you say that letters are impermanent you admit that they abide long enough to be capable of being perceived. Why then cannot they abide long enough to be capable of being modified ?
Even
srftfor: n *
185.
**
n
that our position
is
In reply
is
we say
unassailable
no eternalness where there is the character of modification and because your so-called modification presents itself at a time subsequent to the destruction of
because there
the original material.
55.
if
you say that they are eternal When a thing is modified it assumes another nature, abandoning its own. Again, the letters cannot be modified if you say that they are impermanent because there is no time
The
letters
cannot be modified
is
because modification
the reverse of eternalness.
for *
(of*
dadhi) to be modified into y
when
at
q.
(of atra) follows.
The sound
(continuesly)
'dadhi*
is
produced (pronounced) at the
first
during the second moment and perishes
moment, exists the third moment.
The sound
58
(atra)
is
BOOK
II,
CHAPTER
at the second
II.
produced (pronounced)
moment,
exists (continues)
during the third moment and perishes at the fourth moment. Now, i (of dadhi) cannot be modified into y until a (of atra) has come into existence.
But a comes into existence at the third moment when i has already perished. So on the supposition of impermanency of letters, modification
is
impossible.
186.
Letters are not modified because there is
no
fixity as to the original
material of their modification.

is
is
56.
the
In the case of real modifications there

original materials,
versa.
e.g.,
a fixity as regards their
milk
the original material of curd but not vice

e.g., i is
In
the case of letters, however, there is no fixed rule,

of
original
material
in
dadhyatra (dadhi +atra) but y
is
the original
of modi-
material of tin vidhyati (vyadh+ya+ti).

fication is not really applicable to letters.
Hence the operation
187.
Some
say that there

is fixed.
is
the absence of fixity itself

I
is
no lack of
57.
fixity
because
pect of letters there

fication.
sometimes modified into y and y sometimes into i. So in resis no fixity as to the original materials of their modiThis much, however, is fixed that there is no fixity, or in other
fixity is fixed.
words, the absence of
Hence the
contends that there

tion.
is
fixity at least
objector, who is a quibbler, as to the negative aspect of modifica-
ftwiftqHfaflMKfHqil PmUNISlR fo II * By saying that the absence of fixity 188.

l
U Uq
is
II
fixed
its
you cannot
set aside
our reason, because the
fixity
absence are contradictory terms. 58. Our reason is that in respect of letters there is no fixity as to their You contend that though there is no fixity, the absence oi , modification. fixity is fixed. Our reply is that though the absence of fixity is fixed it
does not establish fcxity as a positive
fact,
and
because
fixity
is
incompatible
with the absence of
fixity.
Wirc:
mm m
ii
"
THE NYAyifcStTBASi
i89.
5ft
There
is
an apparent modification of
letters in
the case of their attaining a different quality, taking up substitutes, becoming short or long and undergoing diminution or augmentation.
59.
A
of
letter
is
said to attain a different quality when, for instance, the

is
grave accentuation
given to what was acutely accented.
letter accepting a substitute
we may mention gam
as
As an instance becoming gaech.
A long vowel is sometimes shortened, e.g., nadi (in becomes nadi. A short vowel is lengthened, e.g., 'muni (in the vocative Diminution occurs in such cases as 'as+tas* case) becomes 'mune. ' In devanfmi (deva+am) na is an augment. stas. becoming
the vocative case)
'
'
'
'
'
190.
affix, e. g.
The letters ended with an affix form a word.

:
60.
Words are of two kinds nouns and verbs. Ramas (Rf-ina+su) while a verb ends in a
ti).
noun ends
e.g.,
in a sup
tin affix,
bhavati
(bhfi
doubt what a word (noun) really means as it invariably presents to us an individual, form and genus. 61.
191.
There
is
The word cow reminds us

'
'
of an individual (a four-footed animal),

is
its
form (limbs) and
real
genus (cowhood). Now, it is asked what signification of a word (noun) an individual, form or genus?
its
the
^VTRf s^clTl^TWfo:
192.
II
Some
it is
say that the
* * ** II word (noun) denotes

I
I
indivi-
dual because use "that,"
only in respect of individuals that "collection," "giving," "taking,"

* ;
ber," "waxing," "waning," " propagation." 62.
colour,"
we can "num"compound" and
That cow is going "here the term " that " can be used only in reference \p an individual cow. Similarly it is only in respect of individuals that
"
we can use the expressions "collection of cows ""he gives the cow, " "he takes the cow, " " ten cows, " " cow waxes, " " cow wanes," " red cow, " " cow-legs " and " cow gives birth to cow,
SO
BOOK
Hi
CHAPTER
II.
word (noun) does not denote an individual because there is no fixation of the latter. 63.
193.
Unless we take genus into consideration, the word cow will denote any individual of any kind. Individuals are infinite. They cannot be
distinguished
from one another unless we refer some of them to a certain

to another
genus and others
genus and so on.

called horse.
In order to distinguish a
called
cow-individual from a horse-individual,
we must admit a genus
cow distinguished from a genus
194.
Though a word does not

it
literally
bear a certain
meaning
wood,
is
used figuratively to convey the same as in
the case of
Brahmana, scaffold, mat, king, flour, sandalGanges, cart, food and man in consideration of
place,
association,
design,
function,
measure, containing,
vicinity, conjunction, sustenance

If
and supremacy.
64.
'
word does not denote an individual how is it that we refer to an individual cow by the expression " that cow is feeding"? The answer is that though the word cow may not literally mean an individual we may refer to the same figuratively. There are such instances as : Feed the staff' means 'feed the Brahmana holding a staff,'' the scaffolds shout' means " men on the scaffolds shout ,' he makes a mat means he aims at making a mat,' 'Yatna' (chastiser) means 'a king,' a bushel of 'flour' means flour measured by a bushel, 'a vessel of sandal-wood' means 'sandalwood placed in a vessel,' 'cows are grazing on the Ganges means 'cows
the
'
'
'
'
'
'a black cart' means a cart marked with blackness, food means life and this person (Bharadvaja) is a clan means this person is the head of a clan.'
are
' ' '
grazing in the vicinity of the Ganges,

'
'
'
'
'
^l^^d^^^Tê ^^^^M^
195.
II
i*
II
Some
is
say that the word (noun) denotes form by

recognised.
'
which an entity
65.
is
We
alleged by
use such expressions as
this
cow
'
and
'
this is
a horse *
it
only with reference to the forms of the cow and the horse.
Hence
is
some that
the word denotes form,
THE NYArA-StTRAS.
61
;U
* 1.*
196.
II
Others say that the word (noun) must denote genus, otherwise why in an earthenware cow possessed of
individuality and form do
we not find immolation,
etc.
66.
We
real
can immolate a real cow but not an eartbfinware cow though
the latter possesses individuality and form.
The distinction between a cow and an earthenware one is that the former comes under the genus cow but the latter does not. Hence it is urged by some that a word (noun) denotes genus.
197.
is
In reply
we
say that
it is
not genus alone that

of
meant by a word (noun) because the manifestation genus depends on the form and individuality. 67.
The genus abides

recognised except by
its
in the
individual and the individual cannot be
form.
form and individual, or

tion of a word.
in
Hence genus has reference both to the other words, the genus alone is not the significa-
oWHfr RMIdq g
j
198.
q<sHJ:
of a
II
*
69.
43
II
The meaning
(noun) signifies
word (noun)
is,
us, the genus,
form and individual.

all
according to
is
The word
to one of them.
the three though prominence
given
For the purpose of distinction the individual is prominent. Tn order to convey a general notion, pre-eminence is given to the genus. In practical concerns much importance is attached to the form.
As
a fact the word (noun) ordinarily presents to us the form, denotes the
individual and connotes the genus.
* * oqt^&ufa^Nlgpft *|f%: 199. An individual is that-which has

II
I
(&
II
a definite form
as
and
is
the abode of particular qualities. 69. An individual is any substance which is cognised by the senses
taste, smell, touch,
a limited abode of colour,

velocity or elasticity.
weight, solidity, tremulousness,
WTfrfrFSlffafafreqT
I)
\o
II
'
fig
BOOK
200.
II,
CHAJTEÎL
is
...'.'
called
..
.,,,...
The form
is
that which
tlws|ol^b^
the genus.
79.
for instance, is recognised
The genus, cowhood

formless substance.
tion of the dewlap which is a form.
We
by s certain coUoca. cannot recognise the gen u< of ft
201.
Genus
is
that
whose nature
is to
produce the
Seeing a cow someCowhood is a genus which underlies all cows. of cows {i.e., derive knowledge of where we acquire a general notion
cowhood).
same conception.
71.
This general notion enables us on
all
subsequent occasions to
recognise individual cows.
Book IIL Ohapteb

j
I.
^H^fol^lifal fatqi^ \ 1. A sense is not soul because we

II
\
II
can apprehend
an object through both sight and touch.

" Previously I saw the jar aud now I touch it " such expressions will be meaningless if "I " is not different from eye which cannot touch
:
and from skin which cannot distinct from the senses.

5T
2.
see.
In other words, the
"I"
or soul
is
faN<Jo<M^Ml^
is,
II
VI
^H
is
This
some
say, not so
because there
a fixed
relation
between the senses and their objects.

is
Colour, for instance,
an exclusive object
It. is
is
of
the eye, sound of

that,
the ear, smell of the nose, and so on.
the eye
according to
the objectors, appreheuds colour, and there
no necessity for assuming
a soul distinct from the eye for the purpose of explaining the apprehension of colour.
3.
This
is,
tence of soul
There
is
no opposition because the inferred from that very fixed relation.

reply,
batwoan
tlia
we
exis-
fixe. I rolatfo'n
sensas an
their objects, eg.,
between the eye and colour, the ear and sound, and so on. It is the eye and not the ear that can apprehend colour, and it is the ear and not the eye that can apprehend sound. If a sense were the soul it could apprehend only
one object, but " I " can apprehend many objects, that is, " I " can see colour, hear soun I, an I s) on. Hanoa the "I" or soul which confers unity on the various kinds of apprehension is different from the senses each of which cau apprehend ouly one object.
4.
If the
sins as soon as
body were soul there should be the body was burnt.
release
from
froui
no soul beyond his body he should be freed body is destroyed. But in reality sins pursue him subsequent lives. Hence the body is not soul.
sins
If a person has
when
the
in his
H$$
BOOE
The aphorism admits
If the
III,
OflA^fSfi
I.
of another interpretation
:
no
sin
body were
soul there could arise
from
killing living beings.
Our body varies in dimension and character with every moment. The body which exists at the present moment is riot responsible for the sin which was committed at a previous moment inasmuch as the body which committed the sin is now non-existent. In other words, no sin
would attach
to
the person
who
killed
living beings
if
the soul were
identical with our transient body.
rTWR:
5.
<Hl<H*Sw|sftr rtfvMÎ^
\\
V.
II
There would, says an objector, be no sin even
if
the body
eternal.
endowed with a soul were burnt
for the soul is
sins
In the previous aphorism it was shown that the commission of would be impossible if we supposed the body to be the soul. In the
it is argued by an objector that we should be incapable committing sins even on the supposition of the soul being distinct from onr body, for sucli a soul is eternal and cannot bo killed.
present aphorism
of
*
6.
fnFsqfepra$^TTgr u ^
11
In reply
we
say that
it is
not so because
we
are
capable of killing the body which

of the soul.
is
the site of operations
we can kill the body which is Hence we are uot incapable of committing sins by killing or murder. Moreover, if we do not admit a permanent soul beyond our frail body we shall be confronted by many absurdities
the soul
is
Though
indestructible
the seat of
its
sensations.
such as " loss of merited action " (krita h&ni) and " gain of unmerited
action " (akritabhy/igama).
A man who
life
not suffer
its
consequeuces in this
to his next life he will not suffer
has committed a certain sin may and unless there is a soul continuing them at all. This is a "loss of merited
suffering the consequences of action
of unmerited
life.
action,"
Again,
we
often find a
this life.
man
which he neverMid in
action " unless
This would be a "gain
we
believed that his soul did the action in his previous
is
a soul beyond the sense] because what seen by tha.left eye is recognised by the right.
7.
,
[There
is

THE NYSyArSUTRAS:
A
thing perceived previously by the
left
m
is
eye
if
recognised
now by
$he right eye.

with the
nition
left
This would, have been impossible
the soul were identical
eye or the right eye on the principle that the seat of recog-
must be the same as the seat of perception. Consequently we must admit that there is a soul which is distinct from the left and right eyes and which is the common seat of perception and recognition.
8.
Some say
that the eyes are not
two
the conceit of
duality arises from the single organ of vision being divided
by the bone
The
If
of the nose.
:
objectors argue as follows
the eyes were really two,

to
vis.,
right and
left,
we would have been
bound
perception and recognition.
admit a soul distinct from, the senses as the common seat of But there is only one eye which is divided
of
by the bridge
the nose
perception and recognition.
and which porforma the two functions of Hence there is, according to the objectors,
no soul beyond the
eye.
ît?rr^ fMHnftareniNra^
9.
im
fc
11
The
of
eyes,
we
reply,
are
really
two because the
destruction
other.
If
one does not cause the destruction of the

was only one, then on the destruction
total blindness.
the organ of vision
of that
one
{i.e.,
one eye) there would bo
WtW4Hliftu|cKJegM|Q<{3:
10.
This
is,
some
say,
H 1 \ no argument for the destruc\\

'
tion of a part does not cause the destruction of the whole.
The
of
it
-Just as a tree does not perish though a branch has been destroyed, so there may not be total blindness though
objectors say
:
one eye (apart of the organ of vision) has been destroyed.
ilftl-dftflMUMftflq : \\\
11.
\%
II
This
is,
we
reply,
no opposition
branch
to
our argument
inasmuch as your
The
illustration
illustration is inapt.
of a tree
and
its
is
not quite apt for a tree-
does not exist in
its
entirety but assumes a mutilated condition
when
m
a-bwmch
the
left
BOOK
of
it
HI,
CHAPTER
full
I.
is
cut
off.
The
right eye, on the other hand, remains in
a perfect condition and performs the

eye
is
function of an eye even
when
destroyed.
12.
The
soul is distinct from the senses because
there
is
an excitement of one sense through the operation

see an acid substance,
virtue
of
of another sense.
When we
other words,
water overflows our tongue.
In
in
the operation of our
visual sense there is an
excitement in the sense of
taste.
This would be impossible unless there
was a soul
distinct
its
from the senses.

;
The
soul seeing the acid substance

of the acid properties
remembers
properties
and the remembrance
excites the sense of taste.
some say, not so because remembrance lodged in the object remembered.

13.
It
is,
is
Remembrance, according
to
the objectors,
is
lodged in the tiling
remembered and does not necessarily presuppose a
soul.
d tHMq*MMIS|flflq :
l
II
\%
II
14.
This
is,
we
reply,
no opposition because rememone can remember
brance
is
really a quality of the soul.

is
Remembrance
based
on perception, that
It
is,
only that thing which one has perceived.

the colour of a thing
often happens that seeing
we remember its smell. This would be impossible remembrance was a quality of a sense, eg., the eye which has never if smelt tlte thing. Hence remembrance must be admitted to be a quality
of a distinct substance called soul which
of colour
is
the
common
seat of perceptions
and smell.
\\
^ft^MN qjfofaqma
15.
Also because the things remembered are innuwe could remember innumerable But none can remember more things than one at a time.
in things,
to be
merable. If memory were lodged

things at a time.
Hence memory must be supposed called soul (endowed with a mind).
a quality of a separate substance

THE
NYAtA.SttTEAS,
some say, no soul other than the mind because the arguments which are adduced to establish the
16.
There
is,
" soul" are applicable to the mind.
The substance
of the objection is this
apprehend an object by both the eye and the skin. It is true that the acts of seeing and touching the object by one agent cannot
be explained unless we suppose the agent to be distinct from both the eye
We can
and the skin

with the mind.
(i.e.,
from the senses),
let
however the agent be
identified
17.
Since there
it is,
is
a knower endowed with an instruui!$nt

reply, a
of
knowledge
we
the
name
To
"
mind"
to that
mere verbal trick to apply which is really the " soul."

etc.,
explain the acts of seeing, touching,

its
you admit an agent
distinct
from the senses which are called
instruments.
The sense
or
instrument by which the act of thinking is performed is called the " mind." The agent sees by the eye, hears by the ear, smells by the nose, tastes by the tongue, touches by the skin and thinks by the " mind."
Hence we must admit the agent call the agent as " mind," you
designate the instrument.
position.
(soul) over
and above the mind.

to invent
will
If
you
to
will
have
another
name
affect
This verbal trick
not, after all,

it
our
Moreover, the mind cannot
be the agent as
is
atomic in
nature.
An atomic
agent cannot perform
the acts of seeing, hearing,
knowing, feeling,
etc.
18.
Your conclusion
is
moreover opposed
soul.
If
tQ inference.
We
admit a mind apart from the
you deny anyone of them
or identify one with the other, an absurd conclusion will follow. Unless you admit the mind you will not be able to explain the internal perception. By the eye you can see, by the ear you can hear, by the nose- you can By smell, by the tongue you can taste and by the skin you can touch.
what sense do yon carry on internal perception, viz., thinking, imagining, Unless you admit the mind for that purpose your conclusion will etc. ?
be opposed to inference.
...
19.
(The soul
is to
be admitted) on account of joy, fear

child from
the
and grief arising
in
memory
and
of things
previously experienced.
new-born child manifests marks of
joy, fear
grief.
This
is
we suppose that the child perceiving certain things The in this life remembers the corresponding things of the past life. things which used to excite joy, fear and grief in the past life continue to do so in this life. -Tho memory of the past proves theprevious birth as
inexplicable unless well as the existence of the soul.
WFfta4M*fl*Hfa*IWTlft*irc
20.
It is
fl^Std are like those of
II
\ \\
*o
||
objected that the changes of countenance in a
expanding and closing up in a

:
lotus. -
The
by
objection stands thus

is
Just as a lotus which

itself,
devoid of
memory expands and
closes
up
so a child expresses joy, fear and grief even without the recollec-
tion of the things with
which these were associated
in the previous life.
21.
This
is,
we
reply, not so
because
heat,
the
cold,
changes in
rain and
inanimate
season.
things are
caused
by
The changes
heat and cold.
of
expansion and contraction in a lotus are
caused by
Similarly the changes of countenance
in a child
must be
of
caused by something.
What
is
that
thing ?
It
is
the
recollection
pleasure and pain associated with the things which are perceived.
iî^Krvqrî^n^ SF*nfi*rNT^ ^
22.
\\\\
A child's desire for milk in

it
this life is
caused by the
life.
practice of his having drunk
in the previous
A child jttet born drinks the breast of his mother through the remembrance that he did so in the previous life as a means of satisfying hunger. The child's desire for milk iu this life is caused by the remembrance of his experience in the previous life. This proves" that the yhild's soul, though it has abandoned a previous body and has accepted a new one, remembers the experiences of the previous body.
23.
Some deny
the, above
by saying
that a new-born iron
child approaches the breast of his mother just as an
approaches a loadstone (without any cause).

The
objection runs thus
:
Jufit as an iron
approaches a loadstone by
itself,
so does a child
approach the breast of his mother without any cause.
R* II 5TTO5T Srf^mRTr^ II ^ \\ we reply, not so because there This is, 24. approach towards any other thing.
I
is
no
no cause which makes an iron approach a How do you then explain loadstone, or a child the breast of his mother. only a loadstone but not a clod of earth and a that an iron approaches child approaches only the breast of his mother and not any other tliiifgir
say that there
is
You
Evidently there
is
some cause
to regulate these fixed relations.
ftd<HiMndni^
25.
We
find that
is
none
is
H \ ** ii \ born without desire.

i
Every creature
the
born with some desires which are associated with

life.
things enjoyed
by him in the past

is
In other words, the' desire

in
proves the existence of the creature or rather of his soul

lives.
the
previous
Hence the soul
eternal.
20.
Some say
that the soul is not eternal because
it
may
be produced along with desire as other things are produced along with their qualities.
The
so

jar,
Just as a
the
soul,
when
it is
it is
produced,
is
is
distinguished by
its
colour, etc.,
when
is
produced
marked by
in
its desire, etc.
Hence the
or,
desires
do not pi*e-suppose the soul

not eternal.
l
the previous lives
in
other
words, the soul
?
27.
&h^MWi 4HU<(lHlH M M
This
is,
II
we
reply, not so because the
desire
in
new-born child is caused by the ideas left the things he enjoyed in his previous lives.
The
other words, the soul is eternal.
in his soul
by
desire implies that the soul existed in the previous lives or, in
fp
BOQ&'lft
CHApOTtl
28.
Our body
is
earthy
because
it
possesses the
special qualities of earth.

la other worlds there are
airy or ethereal.
beings whose bodies are

is
watery,
five
fiery,
Though our body

to the
composed
of all
the
it.
elements
we
call it
earthy owing
preponderance of earth in
29.
In virtue of the authority of scripture too*

is
That our body
earthy
the
is
proved by our scripture.
In.
the section
texts as
on " Dissolution
into
primordial matter,"
there are such
May
the eye be absorbed into the sun,
may
the
body be absorbed into the"
earth, etc.
The sun
is
evidently the source of the eye and the earth of
the body.
II
30.
It is
doubtful as to
whether a sense
is
material
there
is
or all-pervading because there is perception

(contact with) the eye-bull
when
and there
to
is
perception even
when
the eye-ball is far off. The eye-ball is said by some

inasmuch as
its
be a material (elemental) substance
function
is
limited
by
its
contact.
A thing
is
seen
when
is
it
has contact with the eye-ball but

In other
its
it is
uot seen
when
the eye-ball
not connected.
words, che eye-ball, like any other material

its
substance, exercises
function only in virtue of

is
contact with
things.
Others hold that the eye-ball
a non-material all-pervading substance
much as contact The

in as
it
can perceive
things with which
it
has not come in

it
eye-ball
does not touch the things which

arises
sees from
is
a distance.
Hence the question
as
to
whether the eye-ball
a, material or an all-pervading substance.
ttWIpWUItil
31.
It is
II
\\ l* \\ ">
is
contended that the eye-ball

it
not a material
could have appre-
substance because
If the eye-ball
can apprehend the great and the small

it
had been a material substance
hended only those things which coincided with itself in bulk. But we find it can apprehend things of greater and smaller bulk. So it is
Contended that the eye-hall
is
not a material substance.
^M^fti^^tM N îl^ ^ \
32.
*. I
1H U
(The Naiyayika's reply to the above is that) it is by the contact of the ray that the things, great and small, are
apprehended. The Naiyayikas say being A material substance
small will
riot
that even on the
supposition of the eye-ball
the apprehension
by
is
it
of the great
and the
be impossible.
Their explanation
that
though the eye-
ball itself does
not coincide with things which are greater or smaller in

the eye-ball reach the things in their
bulk, yet the rays issuing from

entire extent.
Hence in
spite of the eye-ball

it to
being a material substance
there is no impossibility for
apprehend the great and the small.

II
d<4<Mk)g:
33.
\\
II
Contact
is
not the cause because

with a thing
we do not
per-
ceive the ray.
The contact
of a ray
is
not the cause of apprehension
of the thing because we perceive no ray issuing from the eye-ball.
^rf^mR^T 5RW dl 4M <H RWTT^:

34.
||
^ \%
^J
II
That we do not apprehend a thing through percep-
no proof of non-existence of the thing because we may yet apprehend it through inference.
tion is
The ray
But
it is
issuing from the eye
is
not perceived as
it is
supersensuous.
established by inference like the lower half of the earth or the
other side of the moon.
scsÔTvt^T^rafivri^m:
35.
ii
<
vmi
it
And
perception depends upon the special cha-
racter of the substance
and
its qualities.
A substance
unless
is
it
possesses magnitude,
or a quality unless
possesses obviousness
not perceived.
From
the absence of magnitude
and obvious colour the ray
of the eye-ball is not perceived.
36.
colour
is
perceived only
when
it
abides in
many
things intimately and possesses obviousness. The sun's ray is perceived as it possesses an obviousness
But the ray of the
eye-ball is
in respect of
it
colour and touch.

in
not perceived as
is
obvious neither in respect of colour nor in respect of touch.
m
37.
%om in, oha^wj

And
i.
the senses subservient to the purposes of

,
man
have been
The
set in order
is
by
his deserts.
:
order referred to
as follows
The eye emits ray which does not
possess the quality of obviousness
and cannot consequently burn the thing it touches. Moreover, had there been obviousness in the ray it would have obstructed our vision by standing as a screen between the eye and the thing. This sort of arrangement of the senses was made to enable man to attain his purposes according to
his merits and demerits.
38.
The
senses are material substances inasmuch as
they invariably receive obstruction.*

Nothing can
stance.
offer obstruction to
a non-material all-pervading subetc.,
The
senses receive obstruction from wall,
and are therefore
material substances.
^P<S^^13+UII^Mh(^tI[^MqiI^: \\\\\ IHII

39.
Some say
that the ray of the eye (possesses obviit) is
ousness of colour but
not perceived just as the light of
a meteor at midday
The
sun.
is
not perceived.
light of a meteor though possessing obviousness of colour is not

it
perceived at midday because

Similarly,
it is
is
then overpowered by the light of the
some
say, the
ray of the eye possesses obviousness of

its
colour but
not perceived during the day time on account of
being
overpowered by the light of the sun.
**raT^q<JT^:
40.
It is,
||
\\%Wo
II
we
reply, not so because
even in the night

would have
the ray of thfreye
is
not perceived.
it
Had
the ray of the eye possessed obviousness of colour

it
been perceived during the night when

light of the sun.
cannot be overpowered by the
As the ray
of the eye is not perceived

it
even during the
night we must conclude that
does not possess obviousness of colour.
No.
88 appears to be a part of the commentary ot.Vatsyayana.
THE
mmmOTRABJ
78
41.
The ray
its
it
of the eye
is
not perceived in conseits
quence of
nal light.
unobviousness but not on account of
total
*
absence because
In the eye there
colour.
object.
reaches objects through the aid of exterray which does not however possess an obvious
is
Had
the eyo possessed
no ray
it
could not have perceived any

it,
Since the eye perceives objects,
it
possesses ray in
and since
it
requires the aid of external light (such as the light of the sun) to perceive
them
it
follows that the ray does not possess the quality of obviousness.
This aphorism answers the objection raised in 3-1-33.
wffeqr^ ^rTfrwrr^
42.
ii
\\%m
II
And
its
the invisibility of the ray of the eye cannot
being overpowered (by an external light such as the light of the sun) because the overpowering is possible
only of a thing which possessed obviousness.
It is
be due to
only a thing which possesses obviousness or manifestation that
can be overpowered or obscured.
But how can we throw a thing into
obscurity which never possessed manifestation ?

that the ray of the eye is not perceived on
We
cannot therefore say

its
account of
having been
overpowered by an external
light.
43.
it
There must be ray in the eye
of
man
cats*
as
we
see
in the eye of animals that
move about
in the night.
possess ray
We
man.
see that animals
wandering by night, such as
in their eyes.
By
this
we can
conjecture that there is ray in the eye of
44.
Some
say that the eye can perceive a thing even

it
without Tcomirig in contact with

as things screened from us
crystal are seen.
by means
of its rays just
by
glass, mica,
membrane
or
m
The
material substances.
BOOK
in,
CHAPTER
to
I.
objection raised in this aphorism controverts the
Nyaya theory
of contact (in pratyaka)
and seeks
prove that the senses are not
45.
The foregoing objection

is
is
not valid because
we
cannot perceive what
screened from us by walls.
The eye cannot really perceive a thing without coming in contact with it by means of its rays. For instance, a thing which is screened from us by a wall is not perceived by our eyes.
46.
There
is
a real contact because there
is
no actual
obstruction (caused by glass, mica,
membrane
or crystal).
There being no
The ray
glass,
issuing from the eye can reach an

etc.,
external object through
mica,
which are transparent substances.
obstruction caused by these substances, the eye comes really in contact
with the external object.
47.
A ray
of the
sun
is
not prevented from reaching

is
a combustible substance though the latter

crystal.
screened by a
a ray
This
is an.
example which supports the theory of contact,
vis.,
issuing from the eye passes actually through a crystal to an object lying
beyond
it,
%^^W5R7fT^
48.
It is,
II
ÎSS
||
some
say, not so
because the character of
one presents
The
If
itself in
the other.
:
crystal,
a ray issuing from the eye can reach an object screened by a why can it not reach auother object which is screened by a wall?
itself in
According to the objector the property of the crystal presents

wall.
the
lunmn
49.
In reply
we
say that the perception of a thing
screened by arcrystal takes place in the same manner as that
THE JTTAtA-SOTRAa
of a form in a mirror or water
75
owing
to the possession of
the character of transparency.
The form
of a
face
is
reflected
on a mirror because the

on a crystal
latter
inas-.
possesses transparency.
Similarly, a thing is reflected
much
as the latter
is
transparent.
wall which does not possess trans-
parency can
reflect nothing.
It is therefore entirely clue to
the nature of
the screens that
we can
or cannot perceive things through them.
50.
It is
not possible to impose injunctions and pro-
hibitions
on
facts
which are perceived or inferred

to
to
be of
some
fixed character.
crystal
and a wall are found respectively
be transparent and
non*transparent. It is not possible to alter their character by saying " let the crystal be non-transparent " and " let the wall be transparent."
Likewise, a ray of the eye in passing to a thing
is
obstructed by a wall
but not by a crystal. This is a perceived fact which cannot be altered by our words. Hence the theory of contact remains intact.
titroiiWittii
51.
Since
many
things occupy
many
places and since
one thing possessing different parts occupies many places, there arises doubt as to whether the senses are more
also
than one.
whether there are as many senses as there are sensuous functions or whether all the functions belong to one sense
There
is
doubt as
to
possessing, different parts.
^JM&UldL H^mÛ
52.
is
Some say
that the senses are not

(skin).
to
many
as none
of
them
The
independent of touch
eye, ear, nose
and tongue are said
touch (skin; which pervades them, tlfat is, touch f skin), all others being merely its parts.
be mere modifications of there is only one sense, viz.,
m
:
tOOS
III,
OHAFlpt t
^>fai|i>tl<I^M<|J> :M^lt1^tt53. It is, we reply, not so because the objects
of other
senses are not perceived by touch (skin).*

had been only one sense, viz., touch (skin) then it could have seen colour, heard sound and so on. But a blind man possessing Hence it is concluded that senses the sense of touch cannot see colour.
If there
are many.
54.
Perception of various objects of sense
is
comparin
able to that of smoke by a special part of touch. Just as smoke is perceived by a special part of touch located
eye, so sound, smell etc., are perceived
the
by special parts of touch specially
located.
55.
This
is,
according to us, absurd as

is
it
involves
contradiction.
It
has been said that touch
the only sense by the special parts of
which special functions are performed.

then the senses are many.
the nature of senses, then
it is
Now
it
is
asked whether the

If
special parts of touch do not partake of the nature of senses.

If
they do,
to
on the other hand they do not partake of be admitted that colour, sound, etc., are
not cognisable by the senses.
56.
Touch
is
not the only sense because objects are

viz.,
not perceived simultaneously. Had there been only one sense,

ing, tasting
etc.,
touch,
it
would have in condifferent func-
junction with the mind produced the functions of seeing, hearing, smell-
simultaneously
But we cannot perform
tions at once.
This proves that the senses are
many
the
mind which
is
an atomic substance being unable to come in contact with the different senses at a tkme*annot produce different functions simultaneously.
57.
Touch cannot be the only sense prohibiting the

.
functions of other senses, f

* This
f This
is not really an aphorism but a part of the commentary of V&tsy&yana, seems to be a part of the Commentary of VAtsyAyana,
Touch can perceive only those objects* which

But
it
are near (contaguous)

fact
cannot perceive objects .which are far
off.
Asa
This
is
we can
per-
ceive colour
and sou ad from a great
distance.
certainly
not the
function of touch but of some other sense which can reach distant objects.
58.
Senses are
five
five
because there are

viz.,
five objects.
There are
(savour)
objects,
colour,
sound, smell (odour), taste
tongue and skin.

five objects.
and touch which are cognised respectively by the eye, ear, nose, There are therefore five senses corresponding to the
59.
Some say
that the senses are not five because there
are
more than
The
five objects.
objects of sense are said to be
many such
as good
smell, bad
taste,
smell, white colour, yellow colour, bitter taste, sweet taste,
pungent
there
warm
touch, cold
touch
etc.
According
to the objector
must be
senses corresponding to
all
ihese objects.
Fviîiioq(rAch(^Mi<fiwinM^r; imituThere is, we reply, no objection because odour 60.

(smell) etc. are never devoid of the nature of
odour (smell)
etc.
Good odour, bad odour, etc. are not different objects of sense but they all come under the genus, odour. It is the nose alone that cognises all sorts of odour good or bad. Similarly all colours white, yellow, blue or green are cognised by the eye. In fact there are only five objects which are cognised by the five senses.
61.
Some say
that
there is only one sense as the so-
called different objects of sense are not devoid of the character of
an object.
objection raised in this aphorism
so-called
is
The The
as follows
different objects, viz., colour,
sound, smell (odour),
taste (savour)
in each of them being an As they all possess the common characteristic of being an objectofsense.it is much simpler to say that the object of sense
and touch agree with one another
object of sense.
is
only one.
If there is only
one object of sense, the sense must also
be one only.
78
BOOK
Ul,
CHAPTER X
62.
It is,
we
reply, not so because the senses
possess
five-fold character
corresponding to the characters of know-
ledge, sites, processes, forms
and materials
The
(a)
must be admitted to be five on the following grounds : The characters of knowledge There are five senses correspondsenses
ing to the
five characters of
knowledge,
viz.,
visual,
auditory,
olfactory,
gustatory and tactual.

(6)
The
sites
The
senses are five on account of the various sites
they occupy.
The
visual sense rests
on the eyeball, the auditory sense
on the
on the nose, the gustatory sense on the tongue, while the tactual sense occupies the whole body. (c) The processes There are five senses involving five different
ear-hole, olfactory sense
e. g., the visual sense apprehends a colour by approaching through the (ocular) ray while the tactual sense apprehends an object
processes,
it
which
is in association
with the body, and so on.

are
of
different
(d)
The forms The senses
forms,
is
e.g., the
eye
partakes of the nature of a blue ball, and the ear

ether, etc.
(e)
not different from
The materials The

the ear
is
senses are
made up
of different materials
the eye
is fiery,
ethereal, the nose is earthy, the totigue is watery,
and the skin (touch)
is airy.
with the elements in consequence of the possession of their special

identical
qualities.
63.
The
senses are essentially
The
water and
savour
five senses, viz., the eye,
ear,
nose,
tongue and skin (touch)

viz.,
fire,
are essentially identical with the five elements,

air
ether,
earth,
(taste)
whose special qualities, viz., colour, sound, smell and tangibility are exhibited by them.
(odour),
lity
Of odour (smell), savour (taste), colour/ tangibi(touch) and sound those ending with tangibility belong
64.
:
to eaxtt. rejecting
each preceding one in succession they
belong respectively to water, belongs to ether.

The earth
colour and tangibility.
fire
and
viz.,
air
the last (sound)

savour
possesses four qualities,
odour
(smell),
(taste),
In water there are three

colour and tangibility are
qualities, viz.,
savour,
colour and tangibility
known
to
of fire while tangibility and sound belong respectively to
be the qualities air and ether.
65.
An
objector says that
it is
not so because an
element
quality.
is
not apparently found to possess more than one

of the objeotion is that
viz.,
The substance
by the
one
nose.
the earth does not possess

(smell)
four qualities but only one quality,
quality,
odour which is apprehended Water does not possess three qualities but possesses only viz., savour (taste) which is apprehended by the tongue.
Similarly the other elements do, each of them, possess only one quality.
66.
The
objector further says that the qualities be-
long to the elements, one to one, in their respective order

so that there is non-perception of other qualities in them.
The substance of Odour (smell) is

other three qualities,
the objection
is this
the only quality of the earth.
Consequently the
the only quality
viz.,
savour
(taste),
it.
colour and tangibility alleged to
belong to the earth, are not found in

of water,
Savour
(taste) ia
hence the other two qualities, viz., colour and tangibility alleged Colour is the only quality of fire, to belong to water are not found in it. and hence the other quality, viz., tangibility alleged to belong to fire is
not found in
of ether.
it.
Tangibility
is
of course the quality of air
and sound
through their commixture, continues the objector, that there is the apprehension of more than
67.
it is
And
one- quality.
The objector further says as follows :-rThe earth possesses only odour (smell), and
ia also
if
sometimes savour
'
'taste)
found there
if
is
because the earth
it
"'.-.
is
then mixed with water.

"
.';::-:
W
Similarly
if
BOOK
it.
III,
CHAPTERit is
there is odour (smell) in water
because the earth

:
is
mixe<|
with
fire
68.
stor^t uûi^û
is,
Of the elements one often interpenetrated by others.
according to the objector,

:
The objection is explained as follows The earth is often interpenetrated by

consequently found to possess savour
(taste),
water,
fire
and
air
and
is
colour and tangibility besides

etc.
odour
(smell).
Similar
is
the case with water
69.
It is,
we
reply, not so because there is visual per-
ception of the earthy and the watery.
The Naiyayikas meet the foregoing

qualities,
objections
by saying that the

fire
earth really possesses four
water three,
two,
air
one,
and ether
one.
Had
the earth possessed only odour (smell) and the
would have been impossible for us We are competent to see only to see the earthy and watery things. those things which possess colour, and if the earth and water had not possessed colour how could we have seen them ? Since we can
water only savour
(taste)
then
it
and the watery it follows that they possess colour. If you say that the earth and water are visible because they are mixed with the fiery things which possess colour, why then the air and v ether are also not visible? There is no rule that it is only the earth and water that can be mixed with fiery things but that the air and ether cannot be
see the earthy
so mixed.
Proceeding in this way we find that the earth
etc.
do not
each possess only one quality.
70.
Owing
is
to the
element, a sense
predominance of one quality in an characterised by the quality which prein
dominates in Us corresponding element. The nose is characterised by odour (smell) which predominates
its
corresponding element the earth; the tongue

its
is
characterised
by
savour (ta^jhwhich predominates in

the eyejs characterised
corresponding element the water;

its
by colour which predominates in

the skin (touch)
is
correspondtangibility
ing el^lnt the
fire
characterised
a,ix
by
^hicli libides in.;0
corresponding element the
while ;$he ear
THE NY&Y&SUTBAS;
characterised by sound which is the special quality of
its
S|
corresponding
element the ether.
71.
sense as distinguished from

its fineness.
its
corresponding
the
element
is
determined by
(e. g.,
A sense
earth) is able
the nose) which is the fine part of an element

(e.g.,
(e. g- t
to
perceive a special object
odour)
owing
to the
act-force (sansk&ra,
fecmna) of the person possessing the sense.
sense
cannot perceive more than one object because it possesses the predominant quality of an element, e. g., the nose possesses only odour which is
the predominant quality of the earth, the tongue the savour of water, the
eye the colour of
fire,
and so
on.
72.
sense
is
really called as
such when
it
is
at-
tended by its quality. Some may say why a senso (the nose for instance) cannot perceive The reply is that a sense consists of an element its own quality (odour). with its quality. It is only when a sense is attended by the quality endowed
that
it
can see an object.
Now
in perceiving
an object the sense

quality
it is
is
attended by
tended.
the quality but in perceiving its
own
its
not so at-
Consequently a sense cannot perceive
own
quality.
73.
Moreover an object
is
never perceived by
itself.
An eye can see an external object but it cannot see same principle a sense cannot perceive its own quality.
itself.
On
the
74.
It
is,
some
say,
not so because the quality of
sound
is
perceived by the ear.

The
:
cannot perceive
is its
It is not true that a sense
its
own
quality.
The
ear,
for instance, can perceive sound which
own
quality.
75.
The perception
of
sound furnishes a contrast to
thats of other qualities and their corresponding substrata.
The
nose,
tongue, eye and skin can respectively smell earth, taste
wjêr, see colour and
touch air only
Own
qualities, viz,
it
odour (smell), savour

hears
But an ear when

the ear
inference
when they are attended by their (taste), colour and tangibility. sound is not attended by any quality. In fact
itself.
is identical
with the ether and hears sound by
By indirect
we can prove
that sound is the special quality of the ether
Odour
is
the predominant quality of the earth, savour of water, colour of

:
the eye, and tangibility of the skin (totich) quality of the remaining element,
viz.,
Sound must
therefore be the
the ether.
Book
III,
Chapter
II.
WUuwiwiiidL
76.
mm
n \
ii
Since the intellect resembles both action and

is
ether there
nent.
doubt as
to
whether
it is
transitory or perma-
1.
intellect bears
Inasmuch as the
tory like an action or
likeness
to
both action and ether

it is
in respect of intangibility, there arises the question whether
transi-
permanent
like the ether.
We
find in
the intellect
the function of origination and decay which marks transitory things as "I well as the function of recognition which marks permanent things.
knew
the tree," "
know
it
"
and "
" I
I shall
know
it
"
these
are expresindicate our
sions which involving the ideas of origination
and decay
knowledge
it
to
be transitory.
who knew
the tree yesterday
am knowing
again
to-day "
this
is
continuity indicates our knowledge
an expression which involving the idea of to be permanent. Hence there is
doubt as
to
whether the
intellect
which exhibits both kinds
of
knowledge
is really transitory or
permanent.
77.
Some say
that the intellect
is
there
is
recognition of objects.
permanent because
2.
The Samkhyas maintain

before
is
the permanency of the intellect on the ground
of its capacity for the recognition of objects.
thing which was

is
known
known again now

only
if
is, if
this sort
of
knowledge
called recognition.
knowledge which existed in the past continues also knowledge is persistent or permanent. Recognition would have been impossible if knowledge had been transitory. Hence
It is possible
at the present, that
the
Samkhyas conclude
that the intellect
which recognises objects
is
permanent-
smutwî^:
78.
II
II
The foregoing reason

it
is not,
we
say,
valid inas-
much
...-
as
requires proof like the very subject in dispute.3.
Whether the intellect is permanent or not this is the subject The Samkhyas affirm that it is permanent and the reason adduced by them is that it can recognise objects. The Naiyayikas dispute
in dispute.
not only the conclusion of the Samkhyas but
also,
their reason.
They
#
so.
book
Knowledge cannot be
but
If
it
tit
oamiR; &
it is
say that the intellect does not recognise objects but

attributed to an
to
the soul that does
unconscious instrument, the
intellect,
must be admitted
is
be a quality of a conscious agent,

its
the soul.
knowledge
is
not a quality of the soul, what else can be
quality?
How
the soul to
be defined?
viz.,
There
is
therefore no proof as
to the validity of the reason,
that the intellect recognises objects.
Jf
3WW<t
is
it
II
* 19-11
of
79.
intellect
Knowledge
neither a
mode
the permanent
nor identical with
because various sorts of know-
ledge do not occur simultaneously.

The Samkhyas
intellect
is
4.
affirm that
it
knowledge
is
a mode of the permanent

to
from which
is
not different.
Knowledge, according
them,
nothing but the permanent intellect modified in the shape of an object

is reflected
which
on
if
it
through the senses.

as a
The Naiyayikas oppose

permanent
this
view by saying that

not different from
it,
knowledge
mode
oi"
of the
intellect is
then we must admit various sorts of knowledge to be

fact various sorts
permanent.
that
is,
But as a
is
knowledge are not permanent,
we
cannot receive various sorts of knowledge simultaneously.

not identical with the permanent intellect.
Hence knowledge
80.
And in
the cessation of recognition there arises
5. the contingency of cessation of the intellect. If knowledge as a mode of the intellect is not different from
it,
then
the cessation of
recognition
which
is
a kind of knowledge should
be
followed by the cessation of the intellect.

of the
Samkhyas
that the intellect
is
This will upset the conclusion permanent. Hence knowledge is not
identical with the intellect.
*fllfo4l*g<|il4ihltyll. U
81.
\ *
I
"I
<
II
The reception
of different
sorts
of
non-simultaneoSis owing,
according to us, to
knowledge is our mind com-
ing in contact with different senses in succession.

The NaiySyikas say
intellect
6.
that
if
knowledge as a mode
it,
of the
permanent
variety of
iforta
had been knowledge nor origination and cessation of it. The different of knowledge da not occur simultaneously because they are produced,
identical with
then there would have been neither a
the NY^t^tmi&a
according to the Naiy&yikas, by the mind which
is
&r
atomic in dimension
coming in contact with the senses in due succession.
STSRsrfJrfJH^
82.
faw^3TTO$fT^
(or
is
II
R
of
VS.
II
The
7.
recognition
knowledge)
cannot take place when the mind

object.
the eye
different
an object drawn away by another

the
is
We
cannot hear a sound by our ear
when
mind conjoined with

that
is
drawn away by a colour. This shows from the intellect, and that the mind which
knowledge
is
atomic in dimen-
sion serves as an instrument for the production of knowledge.
* *k<mMI<l
83.
II
c;
II
cannot be conjoined with the senses 8. in succession because there is no motion in it.
The
intellect
The mind which, according to the Naiy&yikas, is atomic in dimension can move from one sense-organ to another in succession to produce
different
kinds of knowledge.
This
is
impossible
is
intellect which,
according to the Samkhyas,
in the case of the not only permanent but
also all-pervading
possess the tendency

succession.
and as such cannot change its place, that is, does not to be conjoined with the different sense-organs in
is
In fact there
other two so-called
internal senses
only one internal sense called the mind, the intellect (Buddhi) and self-conceit
(AhaipkSra)
is
being superfluous.
It is not
all-pervading,
visual,
and knowledge
not
its
different kinds
mode. Knowledge classified as which belong to the soul.
olfactory etc. is of
Wift+M^n^H^TW-^^lRmR:
84.
II
9
to
II
A conceit
of difference
is
said
arise in
the
intellect in the
same way
crystal.
9.
as the appearance of difference in *
As a
single crystal appears to assume the different colours of different

it,
objects which are reflected on
so the intellect though one appears, according to the SSmkhya, to be modified into different sorts of knowledge
different objects reflected
i
under the influence of
on
it
through the senses.

||
"sr
It
is,
V^N
we
dl
II
*o
85.
reply,
not
so because
there
is
nq
.-10,
8a
boWsij,
The Sarnkhya
mmm^m
The
various
says that the -variety of knowledge arises from tfif
same
intellect
appearing to be modified by the various objects whiebafij
reflected
on
it
through the senses.

is,
modes which the
intelieot
undergoes, that
apparent.
the various kinds of knowledge are not real but only

is
The NaiyAyikas dispose of this view by saying that there

is,
no proof as to the unreality of the modes, that

knowledge inasmuch as
they are found
order in consequence of the contact of senses
versa.
the various kinds of
to originate
and cease
in
due
pica?
and
their objects
and
86.
tal
It is said to
be absurd even in the case of a crys-
being replaced by newer and newer ones which grow

to all individuals
up owing
being momentary
seems
to
11.
The Sarnkhya says
that as a crystal
it,
be modified by the
colours which are reflected on
so the intellect seems to be modified

it
by
the objects which are reflected on

is,
through the senses.
In reality there
according to the Sarnkhya, neither any modification of the crystal

intellect.
nor that of the
This theory has in the preceding aphorism

arid
is
,been. controverted
by the Naiyayikas
in the present
aphorism
including
opposed by the Buddhists.
According tothe
latter all things,
even our body, are momentary.
thing which exists at the present

at.
moment grows up
is
into another thing

of
the next
no wonder that in the course
moments
there should
moment so that there grow up crystals

Hence the conclusion
is,
ol different colours or intellects of different modes. of the
Samkhyas
that a crystal
remains unaltered
according to the
Buddhists, untenable.
87.
Owing to
the absence of any absolute rule
we
shall give our assent according to the nature of each occur-
rence
12^
It is not true
that in every case
there are at each

increase
growths.
Our body no doubt undergoes
moment hewer and decrease buill

xulr
piece of stone or a crystal does not, so that the doctrine of growth applies to the first case but not to the second. Hence there is no general
;ljhAt
a thing at the lapse 6f a

its place.
moment should be
replaced
by
which fflpwa-ui^B
THE NYAYA-StTTRAS:
88.
cause of
is
no absence of link as we perceive the growth and decay 13.

There
is of a thing is the increase of
its
The growth
before
it
parts
while the decay
An ant-hill gradually increases in dimension growth while a pot decreases in dimension before We never find an instance in which a thing* it reaches its final decay. any connecting link for another thing which decays without leaving grows in its placo. There is in fact no linkless growth or linkless decay.
the decrease of them.
attains its full
tJUPmRT *IW^Mdf5v|cKi^jfiJqM
fl^MMfrT:
89.
II
\*
II
The growth
is
of
newer
crystals in the place of
an
comparable, according to some, to the growth of curd in the place of milk the cause of whose decay is not 14. perceived
old one
The Buddhist
says that there are
things which
grow and decay
without the gradual increase and decrease of their parts. Of such things we do not find the cause of the first growth (origination) and the last
decay (cessation), that is, there is no link between the thing which ceases and another thing which grows in its place. The milk, for instance, ceases without leaving any connecting link for the curd which grows in
its place.
Similarly
new
crystals
grow
to take
the place of an old one
which decays without leaving any mark. The ciystal which exists at the present moment is not the same one that existed at the previous moment. There is no connection whatsoever between thera.
fa^ J) ii^îiprr gq^>^ :

90.
n u
final
There
it is
decay as
no non-perception of the cause of cognisable by its mark 15.

is
say that it is not true that we do not perceive the milk which is the cause of the first growth of the curd. final decay of the The .mark etteuding the final decay of milk (that is, the disappearance of sweet flavour) is the cause of the destruction of the milk, and that attendâg^the first growth of curd (that is, the appearance of acid flavour) So through the mark we really perceive is the cause of its production.
The Naiyayikas
88
BO0K
III,
CHAPl'lft
m
Bat there
is
the cause of decay of milk and
growth, of card.
no
sîoh
mark
perceptible in the case of a crystal which at the lapse of a
moment
is said to
be replaced by another crystal of a different character.
91.
"but
There
is, it is
alleged,
no destruction of the milk

16.
not destroy-
only a change of
its
quality
The Samkhya says
that the milk as a substance is
ed to produce another substance called curd. In reality a qualityof the milk, viz., sweet flavour, is changed into another quality, via., acid
flavour.
92.
Seeing that a thing grows from another thing

infer that the latter thing is
whose parts are disjoined, we

destroyed
17.
Seeing that a thing grows after the component parts of another

thing have been disjoined,
destroyed.
we
infer that the latter thing has really
been
The
curd, for instance, is not produced until the

destroyed.
component
parts of the milk have been
This shows that the growth of
curd follows the decay of milk.
93.
There will be an uncertainty of conclusion on the

is
assumption that the cause of destruction
perceived in
some cases and not perceived

you perceive ^he cause
jar,
in others
18,
In the case of a jar being produced out of a piece of clay you say
and production of the but in the case of the curd growing out of milk you say that you do
of destruction of the clay
'.
not perceive the cause of destruction of the milk and production of the curd.
This sort of perception in certain cases and non-perception in. others will
lead to an uncertainty of conclusion.
As a
fact in every
case there is/
perception of the ..cause of destruction.
Milk, for instance, is
whew
there
i^^-QO%tacV of $n ac *d substance,
94.
Knowledge belongs neither

it
to the sense nor to
the object because

thereof.
If
continues even on the destruction
19.
knowledge had been a quality of the sense, it could not continue after the sense has been destroyed. But knowledge in the form of memory Hence the is found actually to abide even after the sense has perished.
sense is not the abode of knowledge.
Similarly
it
may be proved
,
that
knowledge does not abide in the
object.
95.
It
is
does not also belong to the
mind the
existence
of
which
inferred from the knowables not being perceived
simultaneously. 20.
As two or more things cannot be known (perceived) simultaneously, to be concluded that the mind which is an instrument of our knowis
it
is
If we supposed this mind to be the abode we could not call it an instrument in the acquisition of the of knowledge same ; and knowledge as a quality of an atom would in that case become imperceptible. An atomic mind as the abode of our knowledge would stand moreover in the way of a yogi perceiving many things simul-
ledge
atomic in dimension.
taneously through
many sensuous
bodies formed by his magical power.
Even if knowledge were a quality of the soul it would, says some one, give rise to similar absurdities. 21.
96.
which is all-pervading .were the abode of knowledge, there would be the simultaneous perceptions of many things in virtue of different sense-organs coming in contact with
If
The
objection stands thus:
the soul
the Boxd simultaneously.
But two or more things are never perceived

bouI.
simultaneously
that
is,
the soul cannot therefore be the abode of knowledge)
knowledge cannot be a quality of the
There is, we reply, non-production of simultane* ;otts cognitions on account of the absence of contact of the mind with many sense-organs at a time.-2^
97.
sooit iii,
The Naiyayikas say
chams&
m
an object unless
is
that the soul cannot perceive
the latter comes in contact with a sense which
conjoined with the
mind. Though many objects can come in proximity with their corresponding senses simultaneously, the mind which is atomic in dimension can come in conjunction with only one sense at a time. Hence two or
more things are not perceived simultaneously although the perceives them is all-pervading.
soul which
98.
is
This
is
held by some to be untenable as there

of
no ground for the production

The
is
:
knowledge.
23.
It
has been argued by the NaiySyikas
that there
absence of production of simultaneous cognitions on account
An opponent takes of the lack of contact of the senses with the mind. " production " and says that knowledge cannot be exception to the word
said to be
eternal.
produced
if
it
is
regarded as a quality of the soul which
is
fiRT^rcwrgq^^^R
99.
If
aftrerersrsrf : iiîrsii
knowledge
is
supposed to abide in the soul
there
is
the contingency of its being eternal as there is
perceived no cause of its destruction. 24. Knowledge can never be destroyed if it is supposed A quality may be destroyed in two ways (1) of the soul.
to
be a quality
either
by the
as the
destruction of its abode, (2) or by the production of an opposite quality in

its
place.
In the case of knowledge neither of these
is possible
soul, which is its

its-
abode
it
is
eternal
and as we
if
place.
Hence
follows that
is
no opposite quality taking kuowledge is a quality of the soul it is

find
it is
eternal.
But as knowledge
not eternal
not a quality of the soul.
100.
is,
Cognitions being found
to
be non-eternal there
we
reply,
1
destruction of one cognition
by another
like
that*of a sound.
25.
We
realize
that cognition
(knowledge)
is
not eternal
when we
time there arises in us a certain kind of cognition observe (knowledge) and at the next time that cognition (knowledge) vanishes
that at one
giving rise to another kind of cognition (knowledge).
It
has been asked
how
cognitions undergo destruction.

it is
Our reply
is
that one cognition

is
vanishes as soon as
replaced by another cognition which
opposed
THE NYlYA-SratAS.
to
it
just as a sound-wave is destroyed
by another sound-wave which takes
its place.
101.
Since recollection (memory)
is
produced, accord-
ing to some, by the conjunction of the mind with a certain

part of the soul in which knowledge (impression) inheres, there is no simultaneous production of many recollections.
26.
knowledge be a quality of the soul there is the possibility of many recollections being produced simultaneously inasmuch as the many
If
impressions deposited in our soul by our past perceptions are liable at once to be revived and developed into recollections by the mind whose contact
with the soul always remains constant.

possibility
Some
say that there
is
no such
of simultaneousness because recollections are produced accord-*
ing to them, by the mind coming in contact

soul in which particular impressions inhere.
with particular parts of the
As
the
mind cannot come
in
contact with all parts of the soul simultaneously, the
many
impressions
deposited in different parts of the soul are not revived and developed into
recollections at once.
JTT^T:
102.
*fa#ren?*TTO: IIÛIV
is,
II
This
the body that

It
we reply, not so because the mind has its function. 27.
it is
within
has been said in the preceding aphorism that recollections are produced by the mind coming in due order in conjunction with particular
parts of the soul in which impressions inhere. This is, according to the Naiyayikas, untenable because the mind cannot come in conjunction with
the soul except in the body, and
if
the conjunction takes place in the body
then there remains the possibility of simultaneous recollections.
*n^l^J: \\\W\*
103.
to
II
This
is,
some
say,
no reason because
it
requires
be proved.
28.
admit that the conjunc-
soul only within the limit of the body.
The, Naiyayikas say that the mind comes in conjunction with the Some oppose this by saying that
until they receive sufficient proof they cannot
tion takes place only in the body.
104.
It
is,
we
reply, not unreasonable because a per-
son
is
found to sustain his body even while he performs an
act of recollection.
If
29.
we suppose
that a recollection is produced
by the mind coming in
conjunction with a particular part of the soul outside the body,
we cannot
account for the body being sustained during the time

tion
is
when
the recollec-
performed.
an
effort
which
is
The body in order that it may be sustained requires supplied by the mind coming in conjunction with the
is
eoul.
Now
the effort which arises from the conjunction

for sustaining,
will
of two kinds,
viz., (1)
the effort
and
(2)
that for impelling (setting in

first
motion).
The body
to
be devoid of the
it
kind of
effort if
we suppose
the
mind
wander away from
for
conjunction with the soul.
105.
This
is,
some
say,
not so because the mind
moves
swiftly.
30.
Some meet the objection raised in the preceding aphorism by saying that the mind while producing a recollection by its conjunction with the. soul outside the body can, on account of its swift motion, come back at
once to the body to produce the
effort
required for the sustenance of the
same.
?r
wTOHifawidi
is,
ii
\w\\
i)
106.
It
we
reply, not so because there is
no fixed
rule as to the duration of recollection.

on the ground that the mind,
the
if it is to
31.
sufficient
The NaiyAyikas oppose the view expressed in the foregoing aphorism

body,
it
bo that
may may
be conjoined with the soul outside take a pretty long time to produce a recollection there,
not
come buck
to the
body with
it.
quickness to
produce the
effort
required for the sustenance of
no peculiar conjunction of the soul with the mind either in virtue of the former sending the latter in search of what it wishes to recollect or through the latter being cognizant of what is to be recollected of
107.
is
There
through larb^r&aness. 32.
suppose the soul to send the mind to recollect a particular thing we encounter the absurdity of admitting that the soul already
II
yrfc
possesses the
memory
shall
of what
to
it is
going
to
recollect.
If
on
the other
hand we suppose the mind

recollection,
;
wo
reality
it
is
not so.
own accord for a particular have to assume that the miud is the knower but in Wo cannot even hold that the mind comes in
of its
move out
conjunction with the soul arbitrarily for in that case there will remain
no order then as
to the occurrence of the objects of recollection.
108.
This
is,
some
say, parallel
to
the particular
conjunction which occurs in a

hurts his foot.
If a
man who
while rapt in
mind
33.
mind comes
instantly in conjunction
man
while looking eagerly at dancing hurts his foot with a
thorn, he feels pain because his
with his soul at the foot which has been hurt. Similarly the peculiar conjunction referred to in the foregoing aphorism takes place, according to some, through the mind being cognizant of what is to be recollected.
109.
Recollections are not
simultaneous owing to
opera-
the non-simultaneousness of the efforts of attention,

tions of stimuli etc. -34.
A recollection
the soul in which
is
produced by the mind coming
in
conjunction with
of recollection
impressions inhere.
The production
"also presupposes efforts of attention, operations of stimuli etc.
As
these
do not occur simultaneously there
is
no simultancousness of
recollections.
110.
[It
is
not true
that] there
is
possibility
of
simultaneousness in the case of recollections
which are
independent of the
case of
efforts
of
attention etc., just as in the
cognitions
derived
from impressions of equal
vividness not dependent on stimuli. 35. z* way Some say that recollections which are not dependent on the
of attentiop etc.,
is
efforts
may be simultaneous
But
this
like
several
cognitions or acts of
knowledge that are produced from impressions

the aid of external stimuli. view
of equal vividness without untenable because neither
$be recollections nor the several acts of knowledge are simultaneous.
The
U
acts of
'
BOOK
ni,
CHAPTER
IT.
knowledge though derived from impressions of equal vividness, will appear in succession according to the amount of attention paid to them, and the recollections though not dependent on the efforts of
attention will appear one after another in proportion to the strength of
stimuli that revive them.
111.
Desire and aversion

r
belong to the soul inasits
much
as they are
the causes of
doing an act or forquality of the soul (Purusa)
bearing from doing the same. 36. The Ssiihkhyas say that knowledge is a
while
desire,
aversion,
volition,
pleasure aud pain are the qualities of
the internal sense (the mind).
This
is,
according to the Naiy&yikas,

it
unreasonable because a person does an act or forbears from doing
on
account of a certain desire for or aversion againBt the same. The desire
and aversion again are caused by the knowledge of pleasure and pain Hence it is established that knowledge, desire, aversion, volition, pleasure and pain have all of them a single abode, that is,
respectively.
they are the qualities of a single substance called the soul.
112.
It cannot,
âversion belong to
some say, be denied that desire and the body inasmuch as they are indicated
activity.
by
activity
and forbearance from

activity
37.
and forbearance from activity are The C&rvakas say that the marks respectively of desire and aversion which again are the effects Now the body which is made of earth etc., is the abode of knowledge.
(field;
of activity

desire, aversion etc.
activity.
Hence
it is
also
the
abode of knowledge,
113.
This
38.
is,
we
reply, unreasonable because activity

the like.
activity
are found
in the
axes and
Just as an axe, which

other times not to split
aversion, so the
it,
is
found sometimes to split a tree and at

of knowledge, desire of earth etc., is
is
not a receptacle
is
body which
made
and not an abode of
knowledge
in
it.
etc.,
though we may
find activity
and forbearance from activity
unreasonable also on account of the non"perception of knowledge in pots and the like. 39.
114r.
It is
In a pot there
different earthy parts
is
activity
indicated
by the conglomeration
is
of
while in sands there
forbearance from activity
indicated by the disruption of the parts from one another.
Yet there
.
is
is
no knowledge, desire or aversion
in a pot or
sand.
Hence the body
not the seat of knowledge, desire or aversion*
115.
The
regularity
and irregularity of possession
demarcate the soul and matter.
40.
A
activity
material thing
when
it
by nature inactive but becomes endowed with is moved by a conscious agent. There is no such irreguis
larity or uncertainty as to the possession
of
activity
etc.,
by
the soul.
Knowledge,
desire,
aversion, etc., abide in the soul through
ah intimate
connection, while these belong to matter through a mediate connection.

etc., if we assume atoms a conglomeration of which forms the body. Those who suppose the body to be the seat of knowledge cannot admit the efficacy of deserts and can offer no consolation to sufferers.
We
cannot account ior the function of recognition

to abide in the material
knowledge
not the seat of knowledge on account of reasons already given, on account of its being
116.
is
The mind
subject to an agent and owing to
its
incapacity to reap
the fruits of another's deeds. 41. The mind cannot be the seat of knowledge because it has already been shown in aphorism 1.1.10 that desire, aversion, volition, pleasure and pain are the marks of the soul. Had the mind been the abode of knowledge it could have come in contact with the objects of sense independent of
any agent. Since it cannot do so it is to be admitted to be a material thing Serving the purpose of an instrument in the acquisition of knowledge. If you say that the mind itself is the agent you will have to admit that it is not an atom but possessed of magnitude like the soul so that it can apprehend knowledge etc-,, which are its qualities. In order to avoid the
fftmultaneousness of
be necessary to assume an internal sense of an atomic dimension like the mind as we understand it. These assumptions will lead you to accept in some shape
perceptions
it
many
will further
9t
book in>
cHAftmm
the tenets of the Naiyayikas. On the supposl^bn of the mind (or body) being the seat of knowledge and consequently of merits and demerits! it will be possibe for work done by a person not to produce its effects on him after death and it may even necessitate a person to suffer for work* ttot done by him. Hence the mind is not the seat of. knowledge, desire,
aversion, volition, pleasure
and pain.
117.
qualities of
Knowledge etc., must be admitted to be the soul by the principle of exclusion and on
account of arguments already adduced.Knowledge

stance
is
is
42.
That subit
a quality which inheres in a substance.

It
neither the body nor the sense nor the mind.
must therefore
is
be the
soul.
The body cannot be

is
the abode of knowledge because
material substance like a pot, cloth etc.
Knowledge cannot belong
to the
sense as the latter
an instrument like an axe.
Had
the sense been the
abode of knowledge there could not be any recollection of things which were experienced by the sense before it was destroyed. If knowledge quality of the mind many perceptions could be simultaneous. were a
But
but
this
it is
is
impossible.
the soul which
is
Hence the abode of knowledge is not the mind, permanent so that it can perceive a thing now
in the past.
as well as
remember one perceived
118.
Memory belongs
to the
the character of a knower.
soul which possesses
43.
it
.The soul is competent to recollect a thing because knowledge of the past, present and future.
possesses the
119.
tion,"
Memory
is
awakened by such causes as attensigns,
context, exercise,
of
marks, likeness, possession,'
relation
refuge and
refugee,
immediate subsequency,
employment, opposition, excess, receipt intervention^ pleasure and pain, desire and aversion,, fear, >entrea^ja^^ ^flection and merit and .demerit.-44.
jkeparation, similar
THI^H^M1BA&
I&
it
A.Uentionen&b\ea,f/4o' fix the mind on one object by checking from wandering away to any other object.
Context-iB the connection of subjects such as proof, that which is to be proved etc.
Exereise-îs the constant repetition which con-firms an impression.
Signmay be
ted, or (4)
(1)
connected, (2) inseparable (intimate), (3) correlaopposite e. g. smoke is a sign of fire with which it is
t
connected
horn
is
a sign of a
cow from which
it is
inseparable
;
an arm
tion.
is
non-existent
a sign of a leg with which it is correlated and the is a sign of the existent by the relation of opposi-
Mark
a mark on the body of a horse awakens

which
it
the
memory
of
the
stable in
was kept.
Likeneaa -r-as the image of Devadatta drawn on a board reminds us

of the real person. Possession
such
as a property awakens the
memory
of the
owner
and
vice versa.
Refuge and refugee

in a
such as a king and

as
wife.
his attendants.
rice
Immediate subsequency
Separation
sprinkling the
and pounding
it
wooden mortar.
as of husband and
Similar employment--as of fellow-disciples.

Opposition
as between a snake and ichneumon.

been or
awakening the memory of that which exceeded. Receipt reminding us of one from whom something has
Excess
will
be received.
Intervention
such as a sheath reminding us of the sword.

pain reminding
us of that which caused them.
Pleasure dnd
Desire and aversion

Wear-
reminding us of one whom we liked or hated.

it, e. g.,
reminding us of that which caused Entreaty-reminding us of that which

for.
death.
was
wanted
or
prayed
Action
such as a chariot reminding us of the charioteer.

as recollecting a son or wife.
is
life,
.
Affection
Merit and demerit through which there
recollection pi the
pauses of joy and sorrow experienced in a previous
120.
Knowledge perishes
instantly because all actional
are found to be transitory,
45.
like
Does knowledge perish instantly

liko a pot ?
a sound or does
it
continue
its
Knowledge perishes
as soon as
it is
produced in virtue of
being an action.
In analysing an action; such as the falling of an arrow,

arrow undergoes a series of movements in the course of
Similarly in examining an act of knowledge
we
its
find that the
falling
on the ground.
we
find that a series of steps are
production.
undergone by the act in the course of its These steps perish one after another in due succession.
that
say,
Hence'
it
is
clear
knowledge
"
I
is
transitory.
If
knowledge were
permanent we could
am preceiving
Since
is
a pot" even after the pot has
been removed from our sight.
we cannot use such an expression
we must admit
that
knowledge
not permanent but transitory.
knowledge were permanent it would always be perceptible so that there would be no recollection. 46.
121.
If
If there is
knowledge
it is
perceptible and as long as there is percep-
tion there is
no
recollection.
Hence on
total
the supposition of knowledge
being permanent there would be a
absence of recollection.
122.
An
opponent
fears that
if
knowledge
were
transitory
is
no object could be known
distinctly just as there

flash, of
no distinct
lightning.
apprehension of colour during a
47.
:
The
it
fear of the opponent arises thus
If
knowledge were transitory
could not at a
not apprehend the infinite

object'
moment apprehend an object in its entirety, that is, could number of its properties at once. Hence the could oWy be known indistinctly. Asa fact, however, we can
Hence knowledge
is
know
things distinctly..
not transitory.
'
123.
From
the
ieply, to admit J,hat
argument advanced you have, wewhich you went to disprove. 48,
In the previous aphorism the opponent feared that if knowledge were transitory no object could be apprehended distinctly. The Naiyayika removes the fear by saying that objects are apprehended indistinctly not
knowledge but on account of our apprehend* ing only their, general qualities. The knowledge which takes cognizance of objects as possessed of both the general and special qualities is distinct
owing to the
transitoriness of
but that which concerns
itself
only with the general qualities

:
is
indistinct,
The very illustraThe aphorism may be explained in another way tion cited by you, viz., that there is indistinct apprehension during a
flash of lightning leads
you
to
admit the transitoriness of knowledge which
you went
to disprove.
124.
Although
knowledge
it
is
transitory
is
.
there
is
distinct apprehension through
as there
one through the
series of
momentary rays
of a lamp.
49.
Though
is
the series of rays emitted

is distinct.
by a lamp are transitory the
apprehension through them
Similarly though our knowledge
transitory there is no obstncle to our apprehension being distinct.
125.
ties
From our
to
perceiving in a substance the quali-
of itself as well as of others there arises, says
an oppo-
:_
nent, a doubt as
our body
aa well as
is
whether the knowledge perceived in a quality of its own. 50.
In water
we perceive warmth which
liquidity which is one of its

is
natural qualities
therefore
an adventitious one.
One may
ask as to whether the knowledge perceived in our body is a natural quality of the latter or is a mere adventitious one.
!l|Nî4|inf4lj(Ml4hn<II^RI^tll
126.
[Knowledge
is
not a natural quality of the body,

etc.
because
it
furnishes a contrast to] colour
which as
natural qualities of the body do exist as long as the latter

'continues.
51.
is
Knowledge, according to the Naiyayika,

tie body because
it
not a natural quality of
may
not continue quite as long as the body does,

etc.
BtttTsuch ia not the case with colour
which ae natural qualities of
W
127.
qualities
It
book m, cm&Mû.
it.
the body do always exist with

tious quality of the body.
Hence knowledge
is
merely an adventi-
It
is,
says an opponent, not so
because other
produced by maturation do arise.- 52;

its
has been stated that a substance and
natural qualities co*exisfc
with each other and that knowledge not being always co-existent w'rth the
body
is
not a natural quality of the
latter.
An opponent
qualities
in order to main-
tain that a substance
and
its
natural
are
not
necessarily
is
coexistent cites the instance of a jar whose natural colour
blue but
which assumes a red colour through maturation in
fire.
128.
This
if
is,
we
is
reply,
no opposition because matura-
tion occurs
A
is
jar
production of opposite qualities. 53. which was blue may through maturation become red but it
there
is its
never totally deprived of colour which

totally devoid of
it.
natural quality.*
is
But a
is
body (dead) may be

natural quality of
knowledge which
therefore not a
In the case of maturation moreover a quality
replaced by an opposite one with
which
it
cannot co-abide
e. g.,
the
blueness of a jar
may
through maturation assume redness but cannot*coIn the case of the
abide with the same.
replaced by an opposite quality.

of the body-
body however knowledge is not Hence knowledge is not a natural quality
4l4UqiP)MI4 IWtlWII
129.
[Knowledge, says an opponent,

it
tries
it
is
a natural
quality] because
pervades the whole body.54.

to
The opponent
body because the numerous parts
of the
prove that knowledge
is
a natural quality'
.
pervades, according to him, the whole body and

it.
of
But
this,
according to the Naiylyika,
is
un-
reasonable as
that
is,
it
leads to the assumption of numerous seats of knowledge,
souls in thj
body destructive of
all
order and system as to the
feeling of pleasure, pain etc.
130.
as
it is
[Knowledge does not pervade the whole body] not found in the nair> nails etc 55,
in
Knowledge does not pervade the whole body, e. &, it is not found the hair, nails etc. It cannot therefore be a natural quality of the
This aphorism
It is
body.
be explained as follows: not true that a substance should be entirely pervaded by

also
may
its
natural
qualities.
Colour, for instance,

etc.
is
a natural quality of the body
but
it
does not pervade the hair, nails
131.
The body being bounded by touch

says an
(cuticle)
there
is,
opponent, no possibility of knowledge
abiding in the hair, nails etc. 56. The hair, nails etc. are not, according
body as they are not bounded by touch
quently abide in them.
to the
opponent, parts of the
(cuticle).
Knowledge Cannot conse:
The aphorism may also be interpreted as follows The body being bounded by touch (cuticle) there
colour abiding in the hair, nails etc.
is
no possibility of
132.
Knowledge, we
reply, is not a quality of the
body because
of the same.
of its difference
from the well known
qualities
57.
:
The Naiyayika says The qualities of the body

cognised by them,
of the
e.g.,
are of two kinds, viz
(1)
those which are
cognised by the external senses,

gravity.
it
categories as
is
e.g., colour, and (2) those which are not Knowledge does not come under either uncognizable by the external senses and is at
the same time cognizable on account of our being aware of the same.
The aphorism may also be explained as follows: The qualities of the body are cognized by the external
is
knowledge
not so cognized.
senses but Consequently knowledge cannot be a

.
quality of the body.
133.
This
is,
says the opponent, not so because of
the mutual difference in character of the colour, etc.- 58'. The opponent argues':
'
If
differ*
you say that knowledge is not a quality of the body because it in character from other well known qualities. of the same, I should
'
:'say that the well
k$own
qualites themselves differ
from each other,

is not.
e.g.,
the colour
is
cognized by the eye bat the touch

is
You cannot on
is not.
this ground say that colour
a quality of the
body but touch
134.
There
is,
we
reply no objection to colour, etc.,
being qualities of the body because these are cognized by

the senses. 59.
The
are all
colour,
etc.,
may
differ
from touch
etc. in
respect of certain
viz.,
aspects of their character but they
all
agree in one respect,
that they
cognizable by one or another of the external senses.
But know-
ledge
is
not so cognized and cannot therefore be a quality of the body.
?THT#N*JT^ IR:
135.
II
<o
||
The mind
is
one on account of the non-simul-
taneousness of Cognitions.
If there
60.
cognitions could be produced simulat once the
were more minds than one, they could come in contact with
many
senses at a time so that
many
taneously.
As many cognitions are never produced

to
mind
must be admitted
be one.
:
* -gwft*BMhMifr
136.
It is,
m
certain
says an opponent, not so because
we do
cognize The
many
acts simultaneously.
61.
teacher while
objection stands thus:-
-A
walking on
a road holds a waterpot in his hand.

fear, looks at the read, recites
Hearing wild sounds he, out of

this instance
etc.,
a sacred text and thinks of the nearest place

to
of safety.
The
teacher
is
supposed in
perform visual
This
perception,
auditory perception, recollection,

if
simultaneously.
would be impossible
there were only one mind.
/WIMiM^TliM^Mil^WFa^
137.
reply,
II
**
is,
II tfoe
~
The
appearance of simultaneousness
due to* the mind coming in contact with different senses in rapid succession like the appearance of a circle of
firebrand. 62.
nuous
circle,
*
Just as a firebrand while whirling quickly appears to form a conti-
mind moving from one sense to another in rapid: succession appearato come in contact with them simultaneously. Hence 7
so the
THE ttÂ^tfTtiAS.
in reality
*<&
the cognitions produced by the contact appear to be simultaneous though
they are successive.
138.
is
And on account of the
aforesaid reasons the

could
mind
an atom.
If the
63.
of
mind were possessed
magnitude
it
come
in contact
with
many
senses at a time so that
many
cognitions could take place
simultaneously.
is
Since this has been found to be impossible the
mind
an atom.
St$*d4i<dl4l*TTl<MlTl: H
139.
The body
is
produced as the
fruit of
our previous
deeds
(deserts).
64.
of elements
Our present body has been made up

fruits of merit
endowed with the
and demerit
of our previous lives.
^jteft
140.
q^mjTORt diMUMn
The formation
:
ii
vi **n
says
etc.
of our
body
of elements,
an opponent, resembles that of a statue of stone,

The objection stands thus
clay, etc.,
Just
65/
as a statue is formed of stone,
which are deviod of
which are not endowed

demerits.
deserts, our body has been made up of elements with the fruits of our previous merits and
* sT^rcnrar^
141.
It is,
ii
66. requires proof. To prove that our body

deserts, the
we
reply,
not so because the statement

formed of elements which are devoid of
is
opponent
is
cites the
to
instance of a statue
made up
of clay or
stone,
which
supposed
replies
bear no connection whatsoever with deserts.
example cited requires to be verified for clay etc. are made of atoms which have actually a reference to desert as they comport themselves in such a way as to work out the designs of
The Naiyayika
that the very
Retributive Justice.
Hl^ftlfafa-^HrH irTTft^T:
142.
14
IM
t*S
II
Not
so because
of its production.
father and mother are the cause
67.
1&
The
father
BOOK
the
lit
CHAl^rpt
ft.
formation of our body cannot be compared to that ofa clay-
statue because
body owes
its
is
origin to fhe sperm
and blood
of our
and mother while the statue
produced without any seed at
all.
143.
So too eating
is
a cause.
68.
The food and drink taken by the mother turns into blood which develops the embryo (made up of the sperm of the father) through the
various stages of formation of the arbuda (a long round mass) mdihsa-pe&t
(a piece of flesh),
pefcut
kalala (a round lump), hawlard (sinews), Hrctfy (head),
(hands),
pfcto (legs), etc.
Eating
is
therefore a cause of production
of
our body but not
of a clay-statue.
srraft
îPnwi<t
there
is
ii
<*
n
*
144.
And
desert because of uncertainty even
in the case of union.

All unions between
tion of a child (body).
to
69.
husband and wife are not followed by the producof the child
its birth.
Hence we must acknowledge the desert
be a co-operative cause of
îl<MfaWto^RI ^^qfrrfafaTT
145.
of the
^4
il
*iw-
it
Desert
is
the cause not only of the production
body but
also of its conjunction with a soul.

etc.,
70.
Just as the earth,

to produce his body,
independent of a person's desert are unable
so the
body
itself
as a seat of particular pleasures
and pains
is
unable
to be connected with a soul without the intervention
of the desert of the latter.
146.
By
this
the
charge
against
inequality
is
answered. 71. Some persons
are found to possess a healthy

is
body while others an

This
unhealthy one; a certain body
beautiful
is
while another ugly.

to
inequality in the formation of the
body
due
the desert acquired
by
the persons in their previous lives.
The aphorism may also be interpreted as follows : By this the charge against uncertainty is answered. 146.
It is
71.
due entirely
to the
is
interference of the
desert that the union
between husband and wife

a child (body).,
not always followed by the
production of
'imwWîîm^^
147.
m?
soul and the
And
the separation between the
body
is effected
by the termination of the deserts.

of the
72.
separation
It is
in virtue of its deserts that a soul is joined

it
with a particular
the
body and
is
by the exhaustion
deserts
that
between the two takes place.
The
soul cannot be separated from the
body
and
until
it
attains perfect
knowledge through the cessation of ignorance
lust.
148.
If the
body was attached

the
to a soul
only to re-
move
the
inexperience of the latter,
then the same inex-
perience would recur after
soul had
been emanci-
pated (released). 73. An opponent: says that

and that the body which
is
there
is
no necessity
for
is
admitting the desert
made up of elements
connected with a soul

its distinction
only to enable the latter to experience objects and realize
from matter (prakriti). As soon as the soul satisfies itself by the experience and attains emancipation (release) it is separated from the body
forever.
*The Naiyayika asks:
"Why
is
not the soul, even after emits
ancipation (release), again connected with a body to regain
experiential
is
power?"
Since the opponent does

the connection.
not admit desert there
nothing
else to stop
149.
to
It is
not reasonable, because the body
is
found
be produced in case of both fulfilment and non-fulfilment
of its ends.
74.
it
was stated that the body was produced only to enable the soul to experience objects and to realize its distinction from matter (prakriti). In the present aphorism the Naiyayika points
out the worthlessness of the statement by showing that the body is produced irrespective of the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of its ends, that is, it is produced in case of the soul experiencing objects and realizing
its
In the previous aphorism
distinction from
matter as well as in the case when the soul remains

its failure to realize its
enchained on account of
distinction
is
from matter.
In a certain school of philosophy the desert

quality of the atoms and not of (he soul.
supposed to be a
In virtue of (he desert atoms
:"
im
BOOK
lit,
CHAPfEft
If.
are said to combine together into a body (endowed with a mind) to enable
the soul to experience objects, and realize
its
distinction
from matter,
it
This school of philosophy
fails
to
is
explain
why
the soul after
has
attained emancipation (release)
not
again
connected
with a body
inasmuch as the atoms composing the body are never devoid
?R: <W$faftH^N #ft*ng5ft : II ^ 150. And there will be no cessation

tion
if it is
of deserts,
II
of the conjunc-
caused by the desert of the mind. 75. Those whp maintain that the desert is a quality of the mind cannot explain why there should at all. be a separation of the body from the
mind which
is eternal.
If it is said that the
very desert which connected

it
the body with the mind does also separate
therefrom,
we
shall
be
constrained to admit an absurd conclusion that one and the same thing
is
the cause of
life
and death.
PMrWUftST
151.
ilUHUI-JMMxl: U ^
be eternal.
II
Owing
find the
is
to there
being no reason for destruction
we should
If the
body
find
to
to
76.
body
supposed
of deserts,
its
we should not
be produced from elements independent any thing the absence of which will cause
Tn the event of the destruction being arbitrary, there will be no fixed cause to effect emancipation or rebirth thereafter as the elements will always remain the same.
destruction.
îgWHd Tfoq^^ *ST<1

152.
(release)
is,
II
V9V9
||
The disappearance
according to an
of the
body in emancipation
the
opponent, eternal like
blackness of an atom. 77. Just as the blackness of an atom suppressed The opponent says through contact with fire does not reappear, so the body which by redness
:
has once attained emancipation (release) will not reappear.
5n^fn=qnwsr^WR[ n
153.
TMiis is,
n
it
we
reply,
not so because
would lead
according to
us
to
admit what was undemonstrable.

in the
78.
is,
The argument employed
previous aphorism
the Naiyayika, futile for it atom is suppressed by redness through contact with
that the blackness is altogether destroyed,
cannot be proved that the blackness of an

fire
for
it is
possible

THE NtlYArSOTfim
The aphorism may. also be interpreted
153.
XW
:
as follows
it
This
is,
we
reply, not so, because
would lead us
to
acknow-
ledge the consequence of actions not done by us.
78.
The absence
of such
Unless we acknowledge deserts there will be no principle governing

the enjoyment of pleasure and suffering of pain.
principle will be
scripture.
repugnant
to
all
evidences
perception, inference
and
m
Book IV. Chapter
I.
snftnWhurH
1.
\\
Activity, as
it is, lias
been explained.
aphorism
1.
The
definition of activity is to be found in
1-1-17.
2.
So the faults. 2.
definition of faults
lias
The
faults
been given in aphorism 1-1-18.
The
which co-abide with intellect in the soul are caused by activity, pi-oduce rebirths and do not end until the attainment of final release
(apavarga).
rTgpkPW *Fli[WfTOFcRWWTrT
3.
II
8 \\
II
The
faults are divisible
in three
groups, as all
of
them are included

The
Affection
in affection, aversion
viz.,
and stupidity.
3.
faults are divided in three groups,
alfection, aversion
and
stupidity.
and covetousness. and implacability. Stupidity includes misapprehension, suspicion, arrogance and carelessincludes lust,
avarice,
avidity
Aversion includes anger,
envy,
malignity, hatred
ness.
4.
It
is,
some
say,
not
so,
because they are the

is
opposites of one single thing.
4.
The
affection,
objection
stands thus:
There
The
no
distinction
between
aversion and
viz.,
stupidity, as all of
them are destructible by one

three,
single thing,
destructible
perfect knowledge.
in so far as they are
by one single
thing, are of a uniform character.
5.
,erratic.
This reason, 5.
that there is
Ave reply, is
not good,
because
it is
To prove
stupidity,
no distinction between
This reason
to
is
affection, aversion
and
the opponent has advanced the reason
that all the three are
destructible
by one single
thing.
it
declared by
cases,
e.
the Naiyav
yika to be erratic, because

black, green, yellow,
does not apply
all
g the blue,
brown and other colours, although they are different from one another, are destructible by one single thing, &., contact vn$h
fa?.
%qf
6.
*ftf : qTfl^flHi<8^dQ<M%?
II
Mill
because in
Of the
three,
stupidity is the worst,

is
the case of a person
who
not stupid, the other two do not

aversion
come
into existence.
6.
viz.,
There are three
faults,
affection,
it is
and
Stupidity, of
which the
last is the worst,
because
only a stupid person
who may
be influenced by affection and aversion.
7.
There
is
then,
says an opponent,
a difference
inter-
between stupidity and other faults owing to their

relation of cause
the other two faults,
and
effect.
7.
The opponent argues as follows: Since stupidity is the cause of it must be different from them. In fact there cannot be the relation of cause and effect between two things which are not
different
from each other.

5T
^M^^HUN^T^T^TTl^T
It
is,
II
II
8.
we
reply, not so,
because faults as already

homogeneous with or
defined include stupidity.

Stupidity
is
8.
it
indeed a fault because
is
possesses the character of the
same
as defined in aphorism 1-1-18.
Pi[^TAmfr!^MM%Sr4^^lrft^RR5Tfrl^^: S \ III 9. And there is, we reply, no prohibition for homoII

I
geneous things
effect. 9.
It is
to
stand
in
the
relation
of
cause and
not proper to exclude stupidity from the faults on the mere

to
ground that they stand
each other in the relation of cause and
effect.
In fact the homogeneous things such as two substances or two qualities
may stand
of cause
to
each other in the relation of cause and

its
effect,
e. g.,
in the
case of a jar being produced from
two halves we notice the relation
and
effect
between the jar and the halves which are homogeneous
with each other.
EwPuq^
10.
frsrarafefe:
is
II
go
11
Transmigration
possible
if
the soul
is
eter-
nal 10,
110
BOOK
IV, Off APTJfc
I>
Transmigration defined in 1-1-19 belongs to the gout and not to the body. The series of birtbs and deaths included in it is possible
only
with
if
the soul is eternal.
If the soul
viz.,
were destructible.it would meet

destruction
of actions
it
two unexpected chances,
done by
it
(krita-hani)
and suffering from actions not done by
(akritabhyagama).
o^rhlîrbMf
11.
MWNS IU mW g
f
II
tt
\\
II
There
is
evidence of perception as to the produc-
tion of the distinct from the distinct.

It is
11.
found that
jars,
etc.,
which are
distinct are
is
produced from
produced from
earth, etc.,
which are also
distinct.
Similarly our body
the elements.
12.
It is,
some
say, not so,
duced from another jar.
because a jar
is
not prothe
is
12.
is
The objection stands thus: You cannot say that there

production of a distinct thing from another distinct thing,, not produced from another jar.
e. g.,
a jar
There is, we reply, no prohibition for a jar being produced from a distinct thing. 13. A jar may not be produced from another jar but it is certainly
13.
produced from another distinct thing, viz., from its bowl-shaped halves. There is therefore no bar against the production of the distinct from the
distinct.
14.
Some say that
there
tion.
is
from non-entity, as no manifestation unless there has been destrucit
entity arises
14.
sprout cannot come into existence, unless the peed from which
comes has bee!* destroyed.
This shows that there
is
no manifestation
of effect without the destruction of its cause.
4ii4Nii4si4ta*
15.
It is,
imYi
tn-n
we>reply, not so, because such an expression,
inconsistent as
it is,
cannot be employed.
15.
the m&&m?Bm
To
say that a thing comes into existence
is
its
m
by destroying another
for
if
thing which
cause, is a contradiction in
teruris,
that which,
according to you, destroys the cause and takes the place thereof, was not existent prior to the destruction, then it cannot be said to be a destroyer,
and
if it
existed prior to the cause, then
it
cannot be said to come into
existence on the destruction thereof.
16.
There
is,
says
the objector, no inconsistency,
because terms expressive of action are figuratively applied

to the past
and
future.
16.
The
which
objector says as follows:
There
is
no impropriety
in the
statement that a thing comes into existence by destroying another thing

is its
cause, for terms expressive of action are figuratively
employed
to denote that
which
is
not existent
now but which
existed
in the past or
will exist in the future,

to
its
be born.
cause "
e. g., he congratulates himself on the son that is In the sentence " a sprout comes into existence by destroying
the term expressive

*
of destruction
is
figuratively
applied to
the sprout that will come into existence in the future.
for&ftsfa*T%:
is,
ii
a it
ii
17.
It
we
reply, not so, because nothing is produc-
ed from things destroyed.
17.
already destroyed.
A
we can
entity.
sprout does not spring from a seed

lay
Hence,
down
the
general rule that entity does not arise from non-
su ftlfwMRfty
18.
$
if
i/t
i.
\*
ii
There
is
no objection
destruction
is
pointed
out only as a step in the processes of manifestation. 18;

In connection with earth, water, heat
tion of its old structure
etc.,
a seed undergoes destrucstructure.

is
and
is
endowed with a new

It is in this
sprout
cannot grow from a seed, unless the old structure of the seed
destroyed
and
a.
new
structure is formed.
is
sense allowable to say that
preceded by destruction. This does not preclude a seed frotn being the cause of a sprout. But we do not admit an unqualified assertion that production springs from destruction or entity arises from
manifestation
non-entity.
'
'
tlf
BOOK
IV,
CHAPTER
Ii
19.
God, says some one,
is
the sole cause of fruits,
because man's acts are found occasionally to be unattended
by them.
exertions,
19.
Seeing that
man
does not often attain success proportionate to his
some one
infers that these are entirely subservient to
God who
alone can provide them with fruits.

5T
flWWtffl lfr 4WrP|W4%:

This
is,
II
*o
II
20.
some are
afraid,
not
so,
because in the
absence of man's acts there is no production of fruits. 20. If God were tho only source of The fear referred to arises thus
:
fruits,
man could
attain
them even without any

: II
exertions.
*MilR<MH^d
21.
Since fruits are
* It I \\ II awarded by God, man's
acts,
we
21. conclude, are not the sole cause thereof. Man performs acts which are endowed with fruits by God. The acts become fruitless without His grace. Hence it is not (rue that man's acts produce fruits by themselves. God is a soul specially endowed with qualities. He is freed from misapprehension, carelessness, etc., and is enriched with merit, knowledge
and concentration, lie possesses eight supernatural powers (such as the power of becoming as small as an atom) which are the consequences of his merit and concentration. His merit, which conforms to his will, produces merit and demerit in each person and sets the earth and other elements in action. God is, as it were, the father of all beings. Who can demonstrate
the existence of
Him who
transcends the evidences of perception, inference
and scripture
wftffrât ^renrerfrT: *qd*3hW*llfadHI<t U

22.
etc.,
'-7-22-
sum
II
From an
ftay
observation of the sharpness of thorn,
some
The
that entities are produced
from no cause.
objectors argue as follows
Thorns
are by nature sharp, hills

so.
beautiful,
and stones smooth.
None has made them
Similarly our
bodies, etc., are fortuitous effects which did not spring

is,
from a cause, that
were not made by God.
tab mxtm&mm
23.
Entities cannot be said to be produced from nois,
cause, because the no-cause

of the production.
according to some, the cause
23.
An
Some
opponent has said that entities are prod need from no-cause.
point out
that the use of the fifth case- affix in connection
it is
critics
with no-cause indicates that
the cause.
II
P<fi{T>iftfixl^<^<^N^Mrd^r:
24.
ft
*ft
II
The
aforesaid reason presents
no opposition, be-
cause cause and no-cause are two entirely different things.
24.
less
Cause and no-cause cannot be identical, e. g., a jar which is watercannot at the samo time be full of water. The doctrine involved in
aphorism does not
differ
this
from the one explained
in 3-2-70
according to
which our body cannot be made up independent
of our desert (Karma).

II
MoJHfiw^fti Rh Rl wlh*H<
25.
All, says
ft
**
II
some
one, are non-eternal, because they
possess the character of being produced and
destroyed.
25.
AH
which
is
things including our body which
is
material and our intellect
immaterial are non-eternal inasmuch as they aro subject to the
law of production
and destruction.
All things which are produced and
destroyed are non-eternal.
HlffteMlfikq^Htl
26.
II
ft
H
is
II
These are, we reply, not 26. eternalness being eternal.
so,
because of the nonit
If non-eternalness
pervades
all
things you must admit

at least
to
be
eternal.
viz.,
Hence,
all are
not non-eternal, for there

is eternal.
one thing,
non-eternalness which
a*l^s*tfto1ift
27!
Rnnwi^ftHnmct iift.it
which dies out
.11
Some hold
fire
non-eternalness to be not eternal on

after the combustibles
the analogy of a
have perished.27,
The objection
is
explained as follows :-~Justa& a

it
fire
dtes out as
soon as 'the things which caught

disappears as soon as
non-eternalness
is all
have perished, so the non-eternalness non-eternal things have passed away. Hence,
not eternal.
ftti*Hiwu<gqil
28.
q^q^fN^^R^RT^
is
II
uc H
There
no denial
of the eternal, as there is a
regulation as to the character of our perception. 28. Whatever is perceived to be produced or destroyed is non-eternal and that which is not so is eternal, e. g., there is no perceptual evidence
as to the production or destruction of ether, time, space, soul, mind, Consequently these are generality, particularity and intimate relation.
eternal.
ssf
29.
P^^qs^rf^r^T^
Some say
II
tt
I.
ir
that all are eternal, because the five
elements are so. 29. The elements which
are the material causes of all
things are eter-
nal, consequently the things.themselves are eternal.
i^ftlfaHUIsH<*!fJM<Hofr :
30.
II
\*
we
II
These
are,
we
perceive
30. the causes of production and destruction. because wo find them to bo produced All things are non-eternal and destroyed. Whatever is produced or destroyed is non-eternal.
fl&Td^MilMKilftfor: It S \ \\ II This is, some say, no refutation, because the 31. character of the elements is possessed by the things which
I
are produced-or destroyed.
31.
A
II
The
objector says as follows:
thing which
element, possesses the character of the element.

eternal, the thing also
made up of an Since the elements

is
must be
so.
H^(rld<*K*!j)M<j^:
32.
l|l \*
II
Tnis
is,
we
reply,
no opposition, because we
perceive production and the cause thereof.
32.
An
identical,
effect inherits
e. g. t
ether
is
cause but the two are not the cause of sound, although the former is eternal
its
the character of
and the
latter non-eternal.
pioduce&which convince us of their non-eternal ness. If production is regarded as a mere vision of a dream, then the whole world is ho better than an illusion which can serve no practical purpose. If all things were eternal, there could be no effort or activity on our part to attain any object Hence all are not eternal.
Moreover,
actually perceive that things are
,
we
*5?F*OT3<R%:
.33.
II
SI \\ \\
II
If all
things
were eternal there would be no

:
regulatiori of time.
33.
Some say
But
that things are eternal, because they existed even before
they were produced and will continue even after they are destroyed.
this view, contends the NaiyAyika, is absurd.
It
destroys
all
regu-
lations with regard to time, for if all things were perpetually existent, there could not be any use of such expression as " was produced" and " will
be destroyed," which presuppose a thing which was non-existent into existence or one which is existent to lose its existence
to coino
34.
Some
say that
all
are
aggregates because each

parts, such
34. consists of several marks. A jar, for instance, is an aggregate consisting of several
as bottom, sides, back,
taste, colour, touch, etc.
etc.,
is
and several
qualities,
such
as,
sound.-smell,
its
There
not a single entity devoid of
several
parts or qualities.
[This refers to the Buddhist doctrine which denies a substance apart
from
its qualities
writings of
and a wholo apart from Nftgarjuna*, Arya Deva f and
its
parts as
is
ovident from
the
others.]
a<hwnh:sw fore
(Mftdhyamika
Sfltra.
'Eftrcf
tsm n
edition.)
Chap.
I,
page 84; Prof. Pousstn's,
qrenfW*&frq tot *fr * fold

(Madhyamika
Sfltra,
11
tfi u
Chap.
I,
page 71
Poossin's edition.)
*w
$r silrsrer
^ v
ft srra$
i$w fawn
(&taka quoted
in the
t(&i *rgr
Madhyamika VritM,
p. 71.)
m
35.
BOOK W, CHAPTER
I.
These
are,
we
reply, not so
because by several
marks one
qualities
single entity is constituted.
35.
we must admit an
entity
The Naiyayika
says that there is certainly a substance apart from its

its parts,
e.g.,
and a whole apart from

its several
called jar as the substratum of its several qualities, such as colour, smell,
etc.,
and
parts such as bottom, sides, back, etc.

this
[The Buddhists* oppose

independent of
its qualities
view by saying that the substance
and the whole indopendont of its parts admitted by the Naiyayikas are opposed to i-eason and cannot be accepted as realities though there is no harm in acknowledging them as " appearances "f for
the fulfilment of our practical purposes.]
36.
There
is,
moreover, no opposition on account of
the very distribution of the marks.
36.
conclusion
is
The NaiyAyika
owing
to
says as follows:
in
Our
unassailable
for instance,
it
the
marks abiding
viz.,
one single
entity.
jar,
possesses two marks,
tangibility
and colour, by each of which
can
be identified.
If there
were no jar beyond
its tangibility
1
and colour we could not

touched yesterday."
use such expression as " I see the jar which
To
enable us to ascertain the identity there must bo a substance called jar beyond its tangibility and colour which are two distinct qualities belonging
to the
same substance.
The opponent has
said that " all are aggregates."
Whence, we ask,
does the aggregate arise if there are no units? The very reason given that " each consists of seve/al marks " presupposes an " each " or unity
or entity beyond the marks or aggregate.
jfirf^r: q*raf :
wwUm^ h T *rmr>
I.
*wmn*twij<m*aM<i*wmrKii
(Madhyamikil Vfltti, Chap.
p.
Poussln's edition.)
{Mtdhyamikft Vfitti, p.
70,
Chap.
Pougsin's edition,)

THE ra&SOT&&S:i
'
37.
All
are non-entities
because the entities are
non-existent in relation to one another.
37.
la the expression " a horse is not a cow " there is the non-existence " of " cow " in the " horse " and in the expression " a cow is not a horse there is the non-existence of " horse " in the " cow." As a fact every
thing
is
non-existent in so far as
it is
not identical with another thing.
38.
It
is,
we
reply, not
so because the entities are
existent in reference to themselves.
38.
:
A
thing.
cow
is
a cow though
it is
it
is
not a horse
a thing
it is
is
existent in
reference to itself though
non-existent in so far as
not another
39.
Some
say, that entities are not self-existent inas-
much
as they exist in relation to one another. The objection is oxplained as follows

:
39:
A
and
thing
is called
;
short only in relation to another thing which is long,
vice versa
the long
and short are
inter-related.
[This refers to the
according to which
self-existent.]
all
" Madhyamika Buddhist doctrine*of " relation things are inter-dependeut and nothing is
40.
it
The
doctrine,
we reply,
is
unreasonable because
hurts
itself.
40.
;
If the
long and short are inter-dependent then neither of them
can be established in the absence of the other if neither of them is selfexistent, then it will be impossible to establish the inter-relation ; and in the absence of all relations the doctrine of the opponent will fall to the
ground.
[The Madhyamikas say that there
is
no realityt underlying any
(Madhyamika Satra, Chap. XV,
p. 08
B. T. Society's edition.)
swnra: wfa^srsT anj Trig ftifir u Chap. I. 24 (Arya Ratnakara Satra quoted in MidhyamikA VfM*i.
fiwfii
B. T. Society's
edition.)

rfi
errtity,
noowvr,
camm*
and that the entities exist only by virtue of their mutual relations which are mere illusions. Viewed from the standpoint of absolute truth the world is void, iSdnya,* but measured by the standard of "relation "or "condition "it possesses an apparent existence which serves all our
practical purposes.]
41.
Neither
through
the
reason being given nor

is
through the reason being omitted there

of the fixity of
the establishment
number. 41.
that there
is
Some
say,
only one thing
<
Brahma) pervading
all
,
the so-called
varieties.
Others say, that things are of two kinds, viz

Certain philosophers find
the eternal and the non-eternal.

via.,
three things
the knower, knowledge and the knowable, while others treat of four
things, viz., the agent of knowledge, means of knowledge, object of knowledge and act of knowledge. In this way the philosophers indulge themselves in a fixed number of tilings. The Naiyayikas oppose them by saying that there is no reason to establish the fixity of number. The fixed number is the Sadhya or that which is to be proved and the reason is
which is to prove it. Now is the reason included in the Sadhya or excluded from it ? In either case the fixity of number will be unfixed.
that
If,
on the other hand, the reason no means

to establish the
is
not different from the S&dhya, there
is
Sadhya.
42.
part of
some say, not the number. 42.

This
is,
so,
because the reason
is
The
fixity
objection is this
The number
identical with, the
of things
is fixed,
and there
is
on the score of the reason being included
no disturbance of the in, excluded from, or

the
number
for the reason is a part of
number and
as
such
is
hot different from
it.
43.
is
^The reason, we
reply, is not valid because there
no part available for the purpose.-43.
MAdhyamik* JiMira, Chap. XV,
p.
98
The opponent has argued that the number is fixed and that the reason is only a part of it. The Naiy&yika counterargues that the number
cannot be fixed until the reason
is
fixed
and it
will
be absurd to fix the

asserted by the
until the
number with an unfixed reason. The reason which is opponent to be a part of the number will remain unfixed
itself is fixed.
number
The
es of
doctrine of the fixity of number, opposed as

inference
it is to
the evidenc-
perception,
and
scripture,
is
a false doctrine which
cannot refute the variety of things established through the speciality

of their characters.
If there is
an agreement as to the number of things
on the ground of
be abandoned.
their general characters,
and
difference
is
on the ground
admittedly to
of their special characters, then the
doctrine of fixity
W*i
44.
*Mk<A ^
There
4t<HpM^:*a*T
: II
91
uw
44.
II
arises
doubt as to the fruit which

interval.
its effect
is
produced either instantly or after a long
Seeing that some action such as cooking produces

effect until
imme-
diately while another action such as ploughing does not bring about
any sometime has passed away, a certain person asks whether

fire will
the fruit of maintaining the sacred

after
be produced immediately or
a considerable lapse
5T
of time.
it is
CRT* qKMMflM+frq <4 l<t 11*1* 19 *U fruit, we reply, is not immediate because enjoyable after a lapse of time. 45.
45.
The
The fruit of maintaining the sacred

which
is
fire is
the attainment of heaven
not possible until the time of death when the soul departs from
our body.
hMI<rft<llftuift?3AHIW<l
46.
It
* III cannot, says some one, be produced

I
\m\
lapse of time because the cause has disappeared.
after a
46.
The The
to
objection is this
fruit (viz., the attainment of heaven) cannot be

(viz.,
produced after
fire)
our death because the action
maintaining the sacred
calculated
produce the
fruit
was destroyed before our death.

iii i
srr^q^îpsR^ ^ng[
This
fruit,
iron
47.
before
it is
produced, bears analogy
to the fruit of
a tree.-t47.
m
tf ulst "as
BftOK TV, CtfAVf^L

a
tree,
I.
whose roots are now nourished with water, will be

fire
able to produce fruits in the future, so the sacred
which
is
maintained
now wiU enable
the maintainer
to
attain
heaven after
death.
The
doctrine involved here has been explained in aphorism 3-2-64.
48.
tion,
is
Some say
that the fruit,
anterior to its produc-
neither existent nor non-existent nor both, because
existence
and non-existence are incongruous.

any
the
effect) anterior
48.
The
one thing
fruit (or
to its
production was not nonso
existent because
is
material
causes
are
regulated
that
each
not
produced from
each
other
thing
promiscuously.
its
We cannot suppose
an
its
the fruit to have been existent prior to
production
because a thing cannot be said to come into existence

existence.
if it
had already
to
The
fruit
was not both existent and non-existent prior
production because existence and non-existence are incompatible with
each other.
[This aphorism refers to the
Madhyamika Buddhist philosophy

it is
which maintains that the
effect,
is
before
produced,
is
neither existent
nor non-existent nor both, as
evident from the writings of Nagarjuna*
and Arya Devaf.]
49.
It is,
we
reply, a fact that the fruit before
it
was
produced was non-existent because

tion
we
witness the produc-
and destruction.
49.
it
When
a jar
is
produced we find that
was non-existent prior
to
the production.
h 4MWKMN
fora^T 3*
*r
fa
îMmMifym
'
II
*ra:
wraiths gwft
Mffli tfpsni ww fafa $ Wfl

;
ii
(NagArjuna's Mftdhyaniika Sutra, Chap. VII, p. 61
I
|VMJIVWfit
ymwgftfatft
TO 1^ H fa*Kl
ii
9 vis* "w^
(itya Deva'a Sataka quoted in the Mldbyamlka VfittJ, Chap.

edition.)
I,
p. 4
B.
T. Society's

THE Nf It A&OTRAS:
mi
50.
That
it
was non-existent, |is establhthec^lby our
understanding.
It
is
50.
when a thing is non-existent that we can apply ourselves it by means of suitable materials. A weaver, for instance, sets himself to work for a web which is non-existent but which, he knows, he can make by means of threads.
only
to
the production of
51.
is
Some say
that the analogy to the fruit of a tree

is
ill-founded because a receptacle

It
awanting.
51.
has been stated that the fruit obtainable from maintaining the
bears analogy to the fruit of a
tree.
sacred
fire
An opponent
finds fault
is
with the analogy by showing that the tree which produces fruits now
the same tree which was previously nourished with water, but the body
which
is
alleged to attain heaven after death

fire.
is
not the same' body which

different their analogy
maintained the sacred
The two bodies being
to the tree is ill-founded.
52.
The foregoing objection, we

is
reply, is unreasonable
because the soul

It
is
the receptacle of happiness.

fire
52.
not our body that maintains the sacred

is
or attains heaven.
In reality the soul

ness in heaven.
the receptacle for both these acts.

fire is identical
The
soul
which
the
maintained the sacred
with the soul which enjoys happiis
Consequently a receptacle
is
not awanting and
analogy to the tree
not ill-founded.
53.
The
soul,
some
say, cannot
be the receptacle for

a son, a wife, cattle,
the fruits which are
mentioned,
viz.,
attendants, gold, food, etc.
The objection
soul.
is this
If the fruit consists
merely of happiness
it
wife,
But the soul cannot be the receptacle for such cattle, etc. which are mentioned in the scripture.
can be lodged in the fruits as a son, a
im
The
BOOKv IV,
Ctt
APTE&
54.
it is
fruit,
we
reply,
is. attributed
to
them because
name
fruit
produced through their conjunction.

In reality the fruit
is
54.
to
happiness.
is
We
attribute the
a son, a wife,
etc.,
because happiness
produced through them.
55.
Birth
is
a pain
because
it
is
connected with
various distresses.
Birth
is
55.
be a pain because
it
stated to
signifies
our connection with

various distresses.
the body, the senses and the intellect which bring us
The body
is
the abode in which pain resides, the senses are the instruis
ments by which pain
experienced, and the intellect
is
the agent which
produces in us the feeling of pain.

body, the senses and the intellect
is
Our
birth as connected with the
necessarily a source of pain.
56.
intervals.
Pleasure
is
not denied because
it is
produced at
56.
We
cannot altogether deny the existence of pleasure which often
arises amidst pains.
57.
This
is,
we
reply,
no opposition because
disojie
tresses
do not disappear from a person who enjoys
pleasure and seeks another.

The substance
57.
:
of the Naiyftyika's reply is this
Pleasure
itself is
to be regarded as pain because oven a person who enjoys pleasure is tormented by various distresses. His objects may be completely frustrated only partially, and while he attains one object he cannot resist , or fulfilled
the temptation of pursuing another which causes
him uneasiness,
58.
only
And because there another name for pain.
is
conceit of pleasure in
58.
what
is
Some persons thinking
that pleasure is the
summum bonum
are
addicted to the world which causes them various distresses through birth,
infirmity,
disease, death,
etc.
connection with the undesirable, separation

It
is
from the desirable,
therefore clear that one
who pursues
is
pleasure does in reality pursue pain, or in other words, pleasure
synonym
for pain.
^fllifrg lTqa^W^rt' n** II 2 It I Vi II 59.. There is, some say, no opportunity for us to attain release because of the continual association of our debts,
troubles and activities.
59.
:
The we
are born
The scripture declares that as soon as we incur three debts which we must go on clearing oil until
;
the time of our decay and death
nions, while activities pursue us throughout
and troubles are our constant compaour life. There is then no
opportunity for us to attain release.
The
three debts are
Debt
to sages (ttishi-rina) which can

life.
be cleared
off
only by under:-"
going a course of student
Debt to gods (Deva-rina)

performing
sacrifices.
from
which we can be freed only by
Debt
to our progenitors (Pitri-rina)which cannot
be cleared
off
except by begetting children.

Activity has beeti defined in 1-1-17
and
1-1-18.
*
60.
If
u*
literal
an expression
it
is
inadmissible in
its
sense
we
are to accept
praise.
in its secondary
meaning
blame or
60.
is
to suit
born he incurs three debts" this expression, is to be taken in its secondary meaning, was., "as soon as a person enters the life of a householder, he incurs three debts the clearing off of which brings him credit."' The expression " until the time of our decay and death " signifies that " as long
"As soon as a person

it is
inadmissible as
in its literal sense,
as
we
do.not arrive at the fourth stage
mendicant."
are to adopt the life of a If the scriptural texts are interpreted in this way, it belife
when we
comes clear that our whole

off of
does not pass away in the mere clearing
our debts.
Ml
BOOK
IV,
CBAPTEl
!.
61.
An
it.
injunction must be appropriate to
its
occasion
just as a topic
must be appropriate
is to
to the treatise
which
deals with
61.
deal with
its
treatise
on Logic which
own
special problems
cannot be expected to treat of etymology and syntax which form the

subject of a separate treatise.
sacred book which professes to deal
with the
life of
a householder can appropriately bestow every encomium

text extols
on him.
A certain Vedic
to
karma by saying
that immortality is
attained by the force of one's
own
acts,
while another text lays
down
as a
compliment
knowledge
other
asceticism
that immortality
cannot be attained except
through renunciation.
of
to
it.
Some
text declares emphatically that
Brahma alone
that one can attain
by the immortality, there is no

it is
way
There are again certain texts which attach an equal

is to
importance to study, sacrifice and charity each of which
be performat
ed by us at the different stages of our

extolling the life of a householder can,
life.
Hence a
text
which aims
without creating any misapprethe time of our decay and death.

II
hension in us, lay down that as Boon as we are born we incur three debts
which we must go on clearing
off until
q*H<lMWIdHJS|[tl*N ;
62.
KH
II
There
is
no lack
(to
of opportunity for our release

off
because the sacrifices
be performed for clearing
our
62. debts) are trusted to the soul. A Brahman, while old, should refrain from all searches after sons, wealth and retinue. Sruti (Veda) instructs him to retire from the world
when he has
to clear off
sacrificial
fire
trusted to his soul the sacrifices which he used to perform
his debts.
in
By
so doing he will imagine that his soul is the
Freed from
all
which his physical actions are offered as oblations. debts, he will live on alms and find an ample opportunity
.for effecting
his
own
release.
of Itihasa,
As regards the division of life into four Furaga and Dharma Sfistra.
stages, there is the authority
gjs*r *uii*)
63.
foumMwwI
is
im
who
<vhsound
As
there
is
no
distress in a person
ts
asleep and sees no dream, so there

troubles in one
no association of
who
attains release.
63.

the ttt&M^^RAa
A person who
release, is freed
m
very
has,
all
through the knowledge of Brahma, attained

last, pleasure, pain, etc.
from
bonds of
{The word
Mem
{here rendered as trouble) is a technical term
extensively used in the Buddhist Sanskrit and Pali literature to signify

depravity, defilement, corruption or passion.
is
Klesa, called in Pali kileso,

re-births.
the cause of
all sinful actions
and consequently of
Arhatship
ten
consists in the annihilation of Mesa.

l&ilems, of
which
five are
prominent.
The P&li Pifcakas enumerate The ten kUesas are

:
&T (greed), $1% (hatred),

(heretical
Vfifcftffil
ftifcr
(stupidity),
flptr (pride), ftsfe
view),
A&ft^SI
(doubt), 4ftm{ (sloth),
33FWRL (arrogance),
(shamelessness) and
H^Wq[ (recklessness).
six
The Buddhist Sanskrit books enumerate

upaMestM.
Mesas and twenty-four
(l)harmasamgraha LXVII,)
sigftr *5ri%5*i$
sin
cram" u
BlcT$t ftrBJTOBT
fcl
II
(Dharmasamgraha LXIX.)
The word Mesa used

(
in the
4-1-65 evidently conveys the
Nyaya Sutra 4-1-59, 4-1-63, 4-1-64 and meaning of moral depravity. Hina-klesa
fNlff
used in 4-1-64 rings in
my
ears as a phrase borrowed
from
the Buddhist philosophy.]
*
64.
Sift: SlfaWMfil ilH&tlW The activity of one who has got
II
111 *
**
||
does not tend to obstruction.

Activity does not present
64.
to
rid of the troubles
any obstacle
release (apavarga)
in
respect of a person
stupidity.
who
is
freed from the troubles of lust, hatred
and
In his case activity produces neither merit nor demerit, and consequently no re-birth.
T$Wtoti: m+tiPNw*ltt
There is, some these are natural.65.
65.
say,
II
II
no end of troubles because
The
it is
objection raised here is this
None can attain
release because
impossible to get rid of troubles which are natural (beginningless).
66.
Even
the natural, says

that
like
tion.
the non-existence
some one, are non-eternal was antecedent to producis
66.
objection raised in the previous aphorism
:
The
answered by some
one as follows
A
but
it
non-existence antecedent to production
is
natural (beginningless)
disappears as soon as the production takes place.
Similarly the
troubles are natural (beginningless) but they terminate as soon as release

is attained.
jar before
it is
produced
is
non-existent.
It
called antecedent non-existence.
This non-existence is has no beginning but it has an end
for it disappears as soon as the jar is produced.
The
troubles like the
antecedent non-existence are beginningless but not endless.

is, an existent thing that can be called cannot apply the epithets " eternal " and " non-eternal " to non-existence except in a figurative sense.}
[It
is
only an existence, that
eternal or non-eternal.
We
^qWdl^PM?M&l
67.
II
.1
||
Or
non-eternal like the blackness of an atom.

is
67.
An
it is
earthy atom, which

kiln.
naturally black, changes
its
colour
when
baked red in the
Likewise the troubles which are natural
disappear as soon as release is attained.
H HfrflftfilTMW
68.
It is,
<HH<flH H, M *
I
<*
we
reply, not so because affection etc. are
caused by misapprehension.
The
Naijfgyika says :-r-There
that a thing
68.
is
no necessity for us here
to
admit
which
is
natural (beginningless)
may
not be endless.
The
troubles are not in fact natural (beginningless) because they are caused by activity which springs from our affection, aversion and stupidity. These
feet are generated
by our misapprehension.
The
troubles not being

release.
natural, there is
no lack of opportunity for us to attain

Book
Chaptfr
IV.
II.
^n^WthhI ^^^Ri^ffnîftr:
69.
it
Through knowledge about the true nature of the

is
is
causes of faults, there

Egotism
" I am," entertained
a stupidity of the form "
cessation of egotism 1. I am." It consists of the notion

is
by a person who
devoid of
self.
It disappears as
soon as we attain knowledge about the true nature of the faults which are
caused by
all
objects such as body etc. enumerated in aphorism
faTOT: SfM*<m II *l II The colour and other objects, when regarded as 70. good, become the causes of faults 2.
jfafaftw
W^ft
1 I 9.
It is
only
when we look upon colour

it
or any other object as a source

affection, aversion or stupidity.
I
I
of enjoyment that
becomes a cause of our

II
dftlfiH^sM^fiWR:
71.
The
faults
R 8 ^ II are caused through a conception
3. the whole apart from its parts. The faults are produced if a man or woman looks upon each other
of
as a whole,
viz.,
as a male or female
with
all his or
her paraphernalia of
teeth, lips, eyes, nose, etc., together with their secondary
marks
are
shunned
all
if
he or she looks upon each other by pzrts only,

frail.
viz.,
and they upon
his or her hair, flesh, blood, bone, nerve, head, phlegm, bile, excrement
etc.,
of
which are
The
notion of the whole engenders lust while
that of the parts produces equanimity.
We
the standpoint of evil
e. g.
the rice boiled with
must regard every thing from poison is looked upon by
a wordly
man
ftî
72.
JW&fW^ mm
Owing
to the
as rice and
by an
ascetic as poison.
11
* n
exist-
apprehension and non-apprehension
being each of two kinds, there arises a doubt as to the ence of a whole apart from its parts. 4.
There are two kinds
apprehension of
water
is
of apprehension,
viz.,
real
and
unreal.
The
and
an
water in a tank is real while that of
mirage as a mass of
viz.,
unreal.
The non-apprehension
while
that of
is
also of two kinds,
real
unreal.
The non-apprehension
of a hare's
horn (which
is
non-existent) is a
is
real, non- apprehension
the ether (which
existent) is
unreal non-apprehension. both real and unreal there arises a doubt as to whether there
17
The apprehension and non-apprehension being

is
really a whole
m
part from
its
sooE i%
parts.
mmmm
\i
apart from its part^ oar apprehension may be unreal. IE we do not apprehend a whole, our non-apprehension too may be unreal.
If
we apprehend a whole
* ii a*sforo: l$)g&iRi44i<i ii a i There is no room for doubt with regard to the 73. existence of a whole already established through arguments.
5.
No
2
I
one has yet
set aside
the arguments employed in aphorism

its parts.
34 to establish a whole apart from ^ywûPi rrff *

74.
mm
-II
There
is,
says some one,
* t ii no room for doubt even

tt
I
with regard to the non-existence of a whole on account of 6. the impossibility of the whole residing any where.
In the preceding aphorism the NaiyAyika has said that there is no doubt a3 to the existence of a whole apart from its parts as demonstrated 134. In the present aphorism his opponent says that in aphorism 2
there
is
no doubt as
to the non-existence of a
whole apart from
its
parts
because neither the whole can reside in

former.
its
parts nor the latter in the
One
affirms that
there is a whole while the other affirms that

is
there is no whole.
In either case there
no room
for doubt.
:
^^^^TTl^^WT^RWTWmsTOTW
75.
its
There
is,
* I vs II says the objector, no whole because

II
I
parts reside in
it
part does not occupy the whole in

;
neither totally nor partially. its totality owing

neither does
it
7.
to the differ-
ence of their dimensions
occupy the whole partially
because the part can reside neither in
itself
nor in another part.

i
^3 ^n%^Pi5?mnr:
76.
s 11 h $ * Also because the whole does not, continues the

i
objector, reside in its parts.
8.
The whole does not

of the
its
reside in each of its parts separately
on account
difference of their dimensions.
Neither does
it
it
reside in
some
of
parts collectively because in that case
loses its connection
with the
other parts.
^ 5(T3q^tftsf%:
77.
II
II
Owing
is
to
the lack of
residence,
its
affirms
the
objector, there
no whole apart from
parts.
9.
The whole does not

is
exist 88 the relation between
it
and
its
parti
not that of the container and the contained.

5T
^NiMWHl H
And
No one
*l *'!"! U
78.
the parts are not the whole.-r-10.

says that the thread
is
The
is
is
-
objector says that the relation between the whole and its parts
not that of identity.

the house.
the
web
or the pillar
wft*H 3i*iMi^*M>w)*i
79.
4MM3w ft miuii
There
is,
we
reply,
owing
to the impropriety in
in reference to
what
its
is one.
no room for the question " the use of the term " variety
11.
raised the question as to whether
In aphorism 4
the whole occupied
of the
27 an opponent
parts totally or partially.
The Naiy&yika
disposes
question by saying that there is no room for it because the terms " totally " and " partially " cannot be applied to " one."' The term " totally " is employed only in the case of several things of which no one
left
has been
out while the
word "
left out.
partially " refers to an aggregate of
which some parts have been
Now, neither the term " totally " nor the term " partially " is applicable to what is " one ", that is, to a " whole." In the case of a whole the employment of language implying
variety is unjustifiable.
W*HM<n*lf%*|g:
80.
II
\\
is
II
The
question,
if
we
further reply,
unreasonable
one part could be the residence of another part, it would not be the residence of the whole. 12. When we speak of a whole residing in its parts we must not under-
because even
stand that the term residence refers to any space, in fact

relation of refuge
is
.
it refers to
the
and refugee.
of the
refuge
is
that with
it
which the refugee

exist.
inseparably connected and without which
can never
Hence
there is
no impossibility
whole residing in
its parts.
sfarcifl
aftR+l^f^^MoiP**:
.
II
tVH
The perception of a " whole " bears analogy to 81* that of a collection of hairs by a person affected with a dim*
ness of
sight 13.
Hfr
tfast as
BOOK TV", CHAPTER
H,
a person of dim sight cannot perceive hairs separately but can perceive them in a mass, so we cannot perceive the atoms separately but can perceive them in a mass in the form of a jar or the like.
82.
its
sense
is
its
inoperative in reference to
what
is
not
object because
restricted
to
acuteness or dullness of apprehension
is
its
own
it
object which
it
cannot trans-
cend.
is
14.
eye,
The
whether
is
acute or dim, cannot apprehend a sound.

All senses have
Similarly the ear, sharp or dull, caunot see a colour.

their special
objects to
which their operation
is restricted.
An atom
which
supersensuous, cannot be apprehended by any of our senses
no
matter whether these are acute or dim.

collection also
is
Each hair being
perceptible, its
capable of being perceived whereas the atoms being
imperceptible their collection canuot be perceived.

the collection of atoms in the shape of a jar or the
As we can perceive like, we must admit

its
that the collection or the whole

(the atoms).
is
a reality independent of"
parts
The whole and its parts should in that case be supposed to continue up to the time of annihilation. 15.
83.
Even
tion at the
if
we admit
the existence of a whole and
its parts,
we cannot
to
suppose them to continue for ever because they are subject

time of annihilation.
parts again have their parts
destruc-
A whole has got which do not cease until
its
parts
tliey
and the become non-
existent at the time of annihilation.
'*
84.
wflM pwMi g
i
ii
m*
there
it
ii
TJjere
is,
we
reply,
no annihilation because there

will
are
atoms. 16.
There
will never
come a time when
be an utter annihia thing which
lation, for things will
even then continue to exist in the state of atoms.

is,
An atom is
a thing of the smallest dimension, that
is
not capable of being of smaller dimension,
THE NYStA^PMt^S^
til
qt^rsg&n
85.
.* "x
is
An atom
17.
is
is
that
which
not capable of being
divided.
An atom
not divisible into further parts.
[Two atoms make a dvyaytaka (tlyad) and three deyamhas make a tryasarequ (triad). All things which we perceive are composed of tryasrerjtus. An atom (auu) is finer than a doyanuka and the latter finer
than a tiyasarevu.]
^raro^f^T^^qqfa:
86.
-i
There
is,
snch a thing, as
that
is,
it is
an impossibility of 18. divided throughout by ether.

atom as a whole which has no
into
parts,
is
says some one,
The Naiyayika
defines the
a thing which
not divisible
further parts.
is
Someone
controverts the definition by saying that an atom
not devoid of parts
because
it is
intersected by ether within
and
icithout.
87.
Else there would not be the omnipresence of
the ether. 19. The ether would not be

within the atoms.
called omnipresent
if it
could not reside
rfWTW:
88.
II
*
is
Ro'll
There
no
" within" or
" without" of an eter-
nal thing.
The terms
are
applicable only to factitious
things inasmuch as they imply constituents other

those which are seen.
than
20.
is
The word " within" refers to that constituent of a thing which is enclosed by another constituent thereof while the word " without" refers
to that constituent
which encloses another constituent, but
not enclosed
by it. These terms cannot be applied to eternal things such as atoms which do not possess constituents some of which may enclose the rest.
ad^n^ftwro flslmsgji
89.
nt
ir
The
ether is omnipresent because of the univer-
sality of its conjunction
which
is
a cause of sound.
-21.
Owing
to
Boutfd
being produced
If
everywhere
it
is
inferred tHife
^
the ether is omnipresent.
ether there would be no sound
a certain place were devoid of contact with there. There is in fact a conjunction of
ether everywhere.
90.
it is
The ether possesses three properties

it
viz.
that
not repelled, that
pervading. 22. The ether is not

it
does not obstruct and that

because
it it
it is all-
repelled
does not possess any form,
does not obstruct because

it is
is
intangible,
and
it
is
all-pervading
because
omnipresent.
4iR*Hdl3f
91.
mqHlMMTk<W*fa re:
are,
II
R^
II
There
says some
is
one,
parts in an
atom
also
because a thing that
endowed with a form must
possess a collocation of parts. 23. The objection stands thus An atom is divisible into parts because
:
it
possesses a form, that
is,
it is
of a limited dimension.
The
ether, soul, space
and time being of unlimited dimensions are
not divisible into parts.]
#fortaq%3r u 9
92.
*? u
An
atom, continues the objector, must possess

it is
parts because
capable of being conjoined with another

:
atom. 24. The objection is this The fact that atoms possess
Only in some of
its parts.
the quality of conjunction proves that
they have parts, because an atom can come in conjunction with another
W^tmiR^ WWl^^
I
^v
T:
It
VI *K
11
93.
Tile doctrine of the indivisibility of atoms cannot,
we
reply,
rise to
If
be refuted because such a refutation would give a regreasm ad infinitum which is not proper.;-25.
is divisible into parts, you will have to admit that those parts again are divisible into further parts. This would give rise .*$ regreasut dd infinitum which ehould, if possible, be
you say that an atom

$y0ideci:.
were indefinitely divisible we should find alarg thing and a small one to be of equal dimensions as both possess an infinite'
:
If all things
number of parts. A thing although itself, There must remain a particle,

even at the time of annihilation.
indefinitely
viz,
divided should not lose
an atom which should not perish
Md^-KNlôift^^g ^"JMsrf*^:
94.
II
VM
II
Things, some say, do not possess a reality

just as there is
22.
if
they
are separated from our thoughts,

in a
no reality
web
separated from
is
its
threads.
The objection
as a
it is
this :
Tilings do not possess a reality independent of our thoughts just
web does not

aphorism
possess a reality
independent of
its
threads.
Hence
our thoughts alone that are

refers
to
real,
the external things are all unreal.

of
[This
the
doctrine
the
Yogacara
Buddhist
philosophy explained in the Lankavatftra Sutra].*
oqi
95.
^teH^ g;
we
if
II
*V9
II
The
reason,
reply, is not
good as
it
hurts
itself.27.
The Naiyayika says

do not possess a
is
that his opponent's reason, viz, that things
reality
they
are separated
from
our thoughts,
if things are capable of being separated from our thoughts they cannot be said to be unreal, and on the other hand
self-destructive because
if
things are unreal
they are
incapable of being separated from our

contradiction
thoughts.
The opponent commits a
by saying that things
are unreal and at the same time by going to separate
them from our
thoughts.
rKTT
96.
Mq^l^qm^ll^
is,
||
*q
II
There
its
we
reply,
no separate perception of a
refuge and
refugee.
28.
l
tctt^toiis mfomnj frswrerar
$ftrcrp
m
A web
them.
BOOK
IV,
its
chapter
n.
being the refuge of
threads, the perception of
the^prêr
includes that of the latter so that there are no separate pereBpjjrpna/pj

If our thoughts were the refuge of external things', then there Would be no separate perceptions of them. But the oppênt?s%argttVment viz., that "if things are separated from our thoughts," makes
it
manifest that our thoughts are not the refuge of external things.
97. And things are established by evidences,^2ty The reality of things is proved by evidences such as perception. Every thing requires an evidence for its establishment. The very assertion that "things are not real if they cannot be separated from our thoughts" must be based on an evidence if it is to commend itself to our acceptance. Hence we cannot deny things if they are established by evidences.
98.
The
non-reality of things
that " there is
is
is
demonstrated neither
by evidences nor without them.

The proposition
way.
If
30.
If
you say that there

viz, that,
nothing" cannot be proved in any an evidence to prove it, you hurt your
again you say that there
?
own
.is
proposition,
there is nothing.
no evidence, how do you then establish your proposition
99.
ledge,
The concept of the means and the objects of knowsays some one, bears analogy to that of things in a
dream.
31.
the objects of
The means and
knowledge are as delusive as things
appearing in a dream.
[The aphorisms 4-2-31 and 4-2-32 evidently refer to the Buddhist doctrine of "non-reality " expounded in the Arya-Upali-priccha, Samadhiraja-sutra,
Arya-gagana-gaiija-sutra, Madhyamika-sutra,
Arya-ratnavali,
Lalitavistara-sutra and other

*
Mahayana
works.'
15
*FST TlfVJ
11T
?5Rit
T 1bINPC*
,
Ijtll I
ll
qfrWHRffft
*n*
ffOT *?$
^qifW^
(Madhyamika-Satra, Chap. VII.)
*&q weipfyt
ntfa*T
ifo
mm
tsjfifcf
iwj
mm
Vftlfct Slftl
fa*?**
(Arya-TJpftlipriccha, quoted in
i
(Quoted in MadhyamikA VvittI, p. 57). M. V. 88)

(Arya-samidhiraja-Biia$Vpitti,
mtnrnnf
nn^H^^f^vâfvrairnfî^nn!
tlmka quoted
in
Madhyamika
Chap. XXI.)
the mmmtjums.
m
I"*
I
MMH H*^^y ftwilhN*i

ICKX
It
hibited in jugglery, etc.
II
A*
may, continues the objector, be likened to
jugglery, Ihe city of the celestial quiristers or a mirage. 32. The means and the objects of knowledge are as unreal as things ex-
34MHI4fofit: H *
101.
**
II
This cannot, we reply, be proved, as there
is
no
reason
for, it.
33.
in
There is no reason that the concept of the means and the objects of knowledge should bear an analogy to the concept of things in a dream
but not to that of things
in our wakeful state,
our wakeful
state.
If you, to
prove the un-
reality of things in a dream,
adduce the reason that these are not perceived

to prove the reality of the means and adduce the reason that these are perceived in
we would,
the objects
of knowledge,
state.
our wakeful
*qfikifgml
102.
*w&WSrr:
II
II
The concept of things in a dream arises same way as remembrance and imagination. 34.
in the
of
The things that appear in a dream are not unreal. We can conceive them in a dream just as we can do in our wakeful state. Our concept of things in the dream is due to our memory and imagination. It is by a reference to- the knowledge in our wakeful condition, that we ascertain our knowledge in the dream to be unreal. But in the
viz.,
event of there being only one condition,
that of wakefulness, the ana*
logy to the dream would not be appropriate.
ti{9fMft:ii a
103.
u
is
Our
false
apprehension
destroyed by a know-
ledge of the truth, just as our concept of objects in a dream comes to an end on our awaking. 35.
In the case of jugglery, the city of the celestial quiristers and
"that" when we mistake a post for a man. The objects of the apprehension are, however, not unreal, inasmuch as they arise from our memory and imagination,
it is false,
the mirage, ur apprehension, if to what is " not that " just as
consists of our imputing
18
m-
book iv, chaiptwii;

JyQglery- (inaya) consists of a false aMprehensloix J.^)daced in others
of materials similar to those originally
by an artificer through the use announced by him.
Just as our concept of objects in a dream passes away as soon as we are awake, so also our false apprehension of objects disappears as soon as we attain a true knowledge of those objects.
104.
There
is
therefore no denial of false knowledge,

is
inasmuch as we perceive that there knowledge .36

It
a cause for that

is
has already been shown that our concept of objects in a dream
unreal, inasmuch as
we do
not actually perceive them at that time, but

unreal,
that the objects of the
dream are not

In
inasmuch as they
itself
I
arise
from
our memory and
imagination.
fact,
the objects that give rise to false
knowledge are never unreal, although the knowledge

II
may be
I
false.
dTclMÎM^l^ fa ^l^?ft*?IMMfrl : 9 * And false knowledge involves a 105.

and appearance of its object. :'.:. When we mistake a post for
V*
II
two-fold
character on account of the distinction between the essence
37.
a man, our knowledge assumes the " that is man." Our knowledge of the post,, in so far as it is called form " that " is a true knowledge^ but in so far as it is described as " man "
is
a false knowledge.
This
falsity of
of certain properties
common
to the post
knowledge is due and the man.

II
to our recognition
KHlftWftNI*IWI<t
106.
9
38.
The knowledge
is
of truth
a special practice of meditation.

Meditation
the
soul's
is
rendered habitual by
union with the mind abstracted from the
senses whose contact with objects does not produce' any perception.
The
knowledge of the truth

this' meditation.
is
rendered habitual by the repeated practice of
HWfii&MSINÎdL
107.
HI'ÎU
.11
Meditation, some say, is not
practicable
by
reason of the predominance of certain external
olyects.''--39.
There are innumerable obstacles to meditation, e, g., hearing the thundering noise of a cloud, one is prevented from practising meditation;
108.
And by
etc.
thirst,
reason of our being impelled to action

heat and cold, disease,
etc.,
by hunger,
40.
sometimes prevent
Ranger and
as from practising meditation.
109.
fruits of
It arises,
we
reply,
through possession of the
our former works.

life.
41.
We acquire
a habit of practising meditation in consequence of our
good deeds of a previous
110.
We
are instructed
forest, a
practised
to
practise meditation
in
such places as a
by any
obstacle.
cave or a sand-bank.
42.
The meditation
in these places is not seriously disturbed
sroîfs
111.
<afcr srcifp t
Such
possibilities
? may
u
** h
occur even in release.
43.
Even a person who has attained violence of an external object.
release
may be
disturbed by the
112.
It is,
we
knowledge must
spring up only in a body already in the state of formation.

violent external object produces knowledge only in a body which has been formed, in consequence of our previous deeds and which is endowed with senses, etc.
44. A
snwwnraif
113.
\\
mil
**
ii
And
there
is
absence of a body in our release.
45.
Onr.merits and demerits having already been exhausted,
get a
we cannot
body
after
we have
:
attained release.
Release
is
the perfect freedom
from
all sufferings
it
consists in a complete destruction of all the seeds,
and seats of
suffering.
&S
BOOK
IV,
CflATMH.
For that purpose there should be a purifying of our soul by abstinence from evil and observance of certain
114.
by following the gleaned from the Yoga institute46.

duties as
well as
spiritual
injunctions
In order to attain release we must practise meditation after our soul
has been purified by our abstinence,

the
etc.
The
injunctions gleaned from
Yoga
institute refer
to penances,
the controlling of our breaths, the
fixing of our mind, etc.
115.
To
secure release,
it is
necessary to study and
follow this treatise on knowledge as well as to hold discussions with those learned in that treatise. 47.
by the Yoga institute caunot be we have already acquired a true knowledge of the categories explained in the Nyaya fkstra. It is therefore very useful to study the Nyaya $astra and to hold discussions with persons
properly assimilated
unless
The
spiritual injunctions furnished
learned in the iSastra.
116.
One should
enter upon discussions with unenvi-
ous persons, such as disciples, preceptors,
and seekers of the aummum bonum.

The
desire victory.
fellow-students
48.
epithet " unenvious " excludes those
who do not seek truth but Discussion has been defined in aphorism 2r~l.
ultaflflHIlft *T *wlMui *lffl&

i
II
-|
S*.
||
117.
Incase
of a
necessity for the search of truth,
discussion
may be
held even without an opposing side.49
A
nation
person desirous of knowledge
by simply expressing
may submit his views for examihis curiosity for truth without an attempt
to establish the views.
Wranglings and cavils may be employed to keep up our zeal for truth just as fences of thorny boughs 50. are used to safe-guard the growth of seeds.
118.
Certain talkative people propound philosophies which are mutually
opposed, while others violate
all
sense of rectitude out of a bias for their
own
tfnd
side.
Seeing
that
these people
are not freed from faults,

cavils
have not attained true knowledge we may, in our disputation against them,
employ wranglings and

profit or
which do not iu themselves deserve any
encomium.
Book V, Chapter
I.
s?ôn%^^T
Futilities
(2) (4)
are
as
follows :-<D' Balancing

(3)
the
homogeneity,
balancing the heterogeneity
balancing
an addition,
questionable, (6)
halancmg the balancing a subtraction, (5) balancing balancing the unquestionable, (7)
(8)
the alternative,
the co-presence, (10)
t*toing balancing the reciprocity, (9) babalancing the mutual absenee, (11)
balancing the counterlancing the infinite regression, (12) (14) balancing example, (13) balancing the non-produced, controversy, (16) balancing the doubt, (15) balancing the the presumption, (18) balancthe non-reason, (17) balancing balancing the demonstration, ing the non-difference, (19) perception, (21) balancing the non(20) balancing the non-eternality, (23) balancperception, (22) balancing the the effect. 1. ing the eternality and (24) balancing
in general terms which is a fallacious argument, has been The twenty four kinds of futility enundefined in aphorism 1-248. characters defined in due course. The fallacious ciated here will each be exposed in separate aphorisms. twenty four kinds will also be
Futility,
of the
an argument based on a homogeneous one offers an opposition based.on or heterogeneous example the opposition will .be called the same kind of example, " balancin^tbe hejerp^ ^balancing the homogeneity" or
2.
If against
neity.''Tr2?
Balancing the Mmo<^neiiy.-^-A certain person, to prove the noneternality of sound, argues as follows :*
Sound
is non-eternal,
it is
because
a product,
like a pot.
A certain other person offers the following futile opposition :-rSound

is eternal,
it is
because
incorporeal,
like the sky."
The argument,
ducts.
viz.,
sound
is
non-eternal,
is
based on the homosaid to be based on

of
geneity of sound with the non-eternal pot on the ground of both being pro-
The
opposition,
vis.,
sound
is
eternal,
is
the homogeneity of sound with the
eternal sky 'on the alleged ground

futile
both being incorporeal.
This sort of opposition,
as
it is,
is
called
" balancing the homogeneity" which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of the homogeneity of examples employed by them.
Balancing the heterogeneity.
A certain person,
:
to
prove ihe non-eter-
nality of sound, argues as follows
Sound
>"-'
is
non-eternal,
because
it is
a product,
is
whatever
is
npt non-eternal
not a product,
as the sky.
certain other person offers a futile opposition thus
Sound
is eternal,
it is is
because
incorporeal,
is
whatever
not eternal
not incorporeal,
as a pot.
The argument, viz., sound
is
non-eternal,
is
based on the heterogeneity
of sound from the not-non-eternal sky
The
opposition,
viz.,
sound
is eternal, is said to
which are mutually incompatible. be based on the heterogeto
neity of sound from the not-incorporeal pot which are alleged
be incalled
compatible with each other. This sort of opposition, futile as
it is, is
"balancing the heterogeneity" which aims at showing an equality of

the arguments of two sides in respect of the heterogeneity of examples
employed by them.
That is, we say, to be established through cowhood (or cow-type). 3,

3.
like a
cow

142
BOOK
The Naiyayika
says:
is
V,
CHAPTER
I.
If the opposition
referred to in
the previous
aphorism
to
be valid
it
or heterogeneous, exhibiting a universal connection between

the predicate such as
must be based on the example, homogeneous tlie reason and

oi;
we discern between a cow and cowhood
a universal
disconnection between the reason and the absence of the predicate such as
we
discern between a cow and absence of cowhood. In the argument " sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot" the homogeneous
example "pot" exhibits a universal connection between productivity and non-eternality, all products being non-eternal but iu the opposition "sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal, like the sky" the homogeneous example sky does not exhibit a universal connection between
incorporeality
and eternaJity because there are things, such as

but not eternal.
intellect
or knowledge, which are incorporeal
A similar
obser-
vation is to be made with regard to the opposition called " balancing the In the opposition " sound is eternal, because it is incorheterogeneity."
poreal,
whatever
is
not
eternal
is
not
incorporeal,
as
a pot "
the
heterogeneous example pot does not exhibit a universal disconnection between incorporeality and absence of eternality because there are things, such as intellect or knowledge, which arc incorporeal but not
eternal.
4.
The
subject and example alternating their charac-
ters
or both
standing
in
need
of
proof,
there
occur
(futilities
called) " balancing an addition" " balancing a " balancing the questionable," " balancing subtraction." the unquestionable" " balancing the alternative " and
" balancing the reciprocity."
4.
Balancing an addition. It agaiust an argument based on a certain

character of the example one offers an opposition based on an additional character thereof the opposition will be called " balancing an addition."
certain person,
:
to
prove the
non-eternal,
non-eternality
of sound,
argues
as follows
Sound
is
because
it is
a product,
like a pot.

the Iw&^tms;
A
m
:
it
Sound
is
non-eternal (and corporeal),

it is
because
a product,
is
like a pot (which
non-eternal as well as corporeal).

is
The opponent
must
also
alleges that
it
:
if
sound
non-eternal like a pot,
be corporeal like
non-eternal.
not corporeal let it be also not of futile opposition is called " balancing an This sort
if it is
addition " which aims at showing an
equality of tbe arguments of two
sides in respect of an additional character (possessed
by the example and
attributed to the subject).
Balancing a subtraction.
certain character of
If
against an
offers
the
example one
it,
argument based on a an opposition based on

be called " balancing
another character wanting in
the opposition will
a subtraction."
certain
:
person, to prove
the non-eternality
of sound,
argues
as follows
Sound
is
non-eternal,
because
it is
a product,
like a pot.
A certain
other person offers the following futile opposition
Sound
is
non-eternal (but not audible),
because
it is
a product,
like a pot (which is non-eternal
but not audible.)

it
The' opponent alleges that
if
sound
;
is
non-eternal like a pot,

if
cannot be audible, for a pot
is
not audible
and
sound
is still
held to
is
be
audible, let it
be also not non-eternal.
This sort of futile opposition

at
called " balancing a subtraction "
which aims
the arguments of two sides in respect of
showing an equality of a certain character wanting in
the example (and consequently also in the subject),
Balancing the questionable.
If
one opposes an argument by main-
taining that the character of the example is as questionable as that of the subject, the opposition will be called " balancing the questionable."
certain person,
:
to
prove the non-eternality of sound, argues
as follows
Sound
is
non-eternal,
because
it is
a product,
like a pot.

144
BOOK
V,
CHAPTER
I.
A certain other person offers a futile A pot. is non-eternal,

because
it is
opposition thus
a product,
like sound.
The opponent
question,
alleges that
if
the non-eternality of sound is called in
why
is
not that of the pot too called in question, as the pot
and sound are both products ? His object is to set aside the argument on the ground of its example being of a questionable character. This sort of futile opposition is called " balancing the questionable" which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect
of the questionable character of the subject as well as of the example.
Balancing the unquestionable.
If
one opposes an
is
argument
by
alleging that the character of the subject

of the example, the opposition
tionable."
will
as unquestionable as that
be called
"balancing the unquesargues as
A certain person,
follows:
to prove the
non-eternality of sound,
Sound
is
non-eternal,
because
it is
a product,
like a pot.
pot
is
non-eternal,
it is
because
a product,
like sound.
The opponent
be unquestionable,
alleges that
is
if
the non-eternality of a pot
is
held to
why
not that of sound too held to be so, as the pot
and sound are both products ? unnecessary on the ground of

character.
His object
its
is
to
render the argument

" balancing the
subject being of an unquestionable

is
This
sort of
futile
opposition
called
unquestionable "
which aims
at
showing the equality of the argu-
ments
of
two sides in respect of the unquestionable character of the

of the subject.
example as well as
Balancing the alternative.
If
buting alternative characters to tion will be called " balancing Jhe alternative."
one opposes an argument by attrithe subject and the example, the opposinon-eternality of sound, argues as
A
follows
certain person, to prove the
:
Sound
is
non-eternal,
because
it is
a product,
like a pot.

THE NXAYA-SUTRAS.
A
certain other {ferson offers a futile opposition thus
'""Sound is eternal
:
M5
and formless,
is
because
it is
a product,
like a pot
(which
non-eternal and has forms;.
The opponent
is
alleges that
is
the pot
yet one has form and the other
formless
and sound are both products, why on the same principle

:
not one (the pot) non-eternal and the other (sound) eternal ?
is
This sort
of futile opposition
at
called
of the
" balancing
the alternative " which aims

of two sides in respect of
showing an equality
arguments
the
alternative characters attributed to the subject and example.
Balancing the reciprocity.

" balancing the reciprocity."
If one opposes an argument
by alleging
a reciprocity of the subjoct and the example, the opposition will be called
A
follows
:
non-eternality of sound, argues as
Sound
is
non-eternal,
it is
because
a product,
like a pot.
pot
is
non-eternal,
it is
because
a product,
like sound.
The opponent
Sound
is to
alleges that the pot

its
and sound being both products,
one requires proof for
non-eternality as
much
as the other does.
be proved non-eternal by the example of a pot and the pot This leads is to be proved non-eternal by the examples of sound. to a reciprocity of the pot (example) and sound (subject) resulting in
conclusion as to the eternality or non-eternality of sound. This sort' of futile opposition is called " balancing the reciprocity " which
no
definite
brings an argument to a stand-still by alleging the reciprocity of the

subject and the example.
f^^^
5.
M 4^?^q^^Ki^^W^fc^^: III * 1*11 This is, we say, no opposition because there is a

I
between the subject and the example although the conclusion is drawn from a certain equality of their cha*
difference
racters.
5.
futilities called "
The Naiyayika says : The
balancing an addition,"
"balancing a subtraction," "balancing the questionable," "balancing
3A&
on the
BOOK
false
V,
CHAPTER
I.
the unquestionable" and "balancing
the alternative" are all based
supposition of a complete equality of the subject and the.

there is
example.
Though
no denial
of
an equality of the subject and

is
the example in certain characters, there
indeed a great difference
between them in other characters.
Sound
is
non-eternal,
because
it is
a product,
is
like a pot.
In this argument although there
an equality of "sound" and
"pot " in respect of their being both products, there is a great difference between them in other respects. A cow possesses some characters in common with a bosgameus but there is no complete identity between them. No body can commit the futilities mentioned above if he bears in mind the equality of the subject and the example only in those characters which
are warranted
by the reason (middle term). In the case of the futility called " balancing an addition " it is clear that the equality supposed to exist
between the pot and sound in respect of corporeality is not warranted by the reason (viz. being a product), because there are things, such as Similarly intellect or knowledge, which are products but not corporeal. futility called "balancing a subtraction," the reason with regard to the
(viz.
being a product) does not justify an equality of sound and pot in As regards the futilities called respect of their being not audible. " balancing the questionable " and " balancing the unquestionable," we
cannot ignore the difference between the subject and the example without putting an end to all kinds of inference. The futility called " balancing the alternative " introduces an equality between the pot and sound
in respect of a character (viz. being eternal)
which
is
not warranted by
the reason
viz.
being a product.
6.
And
because the example happens to surpass the

*
is
subject.
futility called " balancing the reciprocity "
The
based on the
false supposition that the example stands exactly on the same footing as rût that one surpasses the other is evident from aphorism the subject,
1-1-25 which states that the example does not stand in as to its characters.
need of proof
Sound
is
non-eternal,
because
it is
a product,
like a pot,

THE NYSl^SPTEAS.
In this argument sound (the subject) may not be known by some to be non-eternal but a pot (the example) is known by all to be a product " Balancing the reciprocity " is therefore a fallaas well as non-eternal.
cious argument.
an argument based on the co-presence of the reason and the predicate or on the mutual absence of them one offers an opposition based on the same kind of co-presence or mutual absence, the opposition will, on account of the reason being non-distinguished from or being
7.
If against
non-conducive to the predicate, be called " balancing the

Co-presence " or " balancing the mutual absence."
Balancing the eo-presenee.
7.
If
against an argument based on
the
co-presence of the reason and the predicate, one offers an opposition based
on the same kind of co-presence, the opposition will, on account of the reason being non-distinguished from the predicate, be called " balancing
the co-presence."
A
follows
:
certain person, to prove that there is fire
in
the
hill,
argues as
The
hill
has
it
(ire,
because
has smoke,
like a kitchen.
A certain
other person offers a futile opposition thus
The
hill
has smoke,
it
because
has
fire,
like a kitchen.
the predicate.
is
The arguer has taken the smoke to be the reason and the fire to be The opponent raises a question as to whether the smoke
is
present at the same site which

If
occupied by the
lire
fire
or
is
absent from
site,
that site.
the
smoke
is
present with
at
the same
there
remains, according to the opponent, no reason from the predicate.
criterion to
distinguish
as
the a
The smoke
is,
in
his opinion,
much
reason for the fire as the fire for the smoke. This sort of futile opposition is called " balancing the co-presence " which aims at stopping an
argument On the alleged ground of the co-presenccof the reason and the
predicate,
BOOK
V,
m
tion based on the
CHAPTER
I.
Balancing the mutual absence.
If
against an argument based on
th mutual absence of the reason and the predicate, one offers an opposi-
same kind
of
mutual absence, the opposition
will,
on
account of the reason being non-condncive to the predicate, be called

" balancing the mutual absence."
A
follows:
certain person, to prove that there is fire in
the
hill,
argues as
The
hill
has
it
fire,
because
has smoke,
like a kitchen.
The
hill lias
it
smoke,
fire,
because
has
like a kitchen.
The opponent asks

because
it
" Is the
smoke
to
be regarded as the reason

?"
is
absent from the site of the
fire
" Such a supposition

the predicate
is
indeed absurd."
not within
establish
The
it,
reason cannot
just as a
establish
without
is
being connected with

its
lamp cannot exhibit a thing which'

could be as
reach.
latter,
If a
reason unconnected with the predicate could

fire
the
then the
much
the reason for the
smoke as the smoke

to a close
This sort of futile opposition is called for the fire. " balancing the mutual absence " which aims at bringing an argument on the alleged ground of the mutual absence of the reason and
the predicate.
Mdl ft f^Mfa ^TT^tefr ^Tfa^TRSrfry^: II * 1*1 * II This is, we say, no opposition because we find the 8. production of pots by means of clay as well as the oppression of persons
by
spells.
8.
potter cannot produce a pot without getting clay within his
reach but an exorcist can destroy persons by administering spells from
a distance. Hence it is clear that a thing is accomplished sometimes by the cause being present at its site and" sometimes by being absent from " Balancing $he co-presence " and " balancing the mutual absence" it.
which attach an undue importance

sites,
to
the proximity or remoteness of
are therefore totally fallacious arguments.
MU$^fa^M<^V
II

THE NYlYA^tiTRASv
9:
110
one opposes an argument on the ground of the example not having been established by a series of reasons or on the ground of the existence of a mere counter-example,
If
the opposition will be called
" balancing the infinite regres*

9.
sion" or " balancing the counter-example."

Balancing the infinite regression.
A
:
certain
person, to prove the
non-eternality of sound, argues as follows
Sound
is
non-eternal,
it is
because
a product,
like a pot.
A
If
is
how
This
sound
is
proved
to be non-eternal
by the example
of a pot,
the pot again to be proved as non-eternal ?

is to
The reason which proves
the non-eternality of the pot
be proved by further reasons.
gives rise to an infinite regression which injures the proposition "sound is non-eternal " not less than the proposition " sound is eternal." This " balancing the infinite regression " sort of futile opposition is called
which aims
which
is
at stopping
an argument by introducing an
infinite regression
said to beset the example.

the.
Balancing
counter-example.
A certain person,
:
to
prove the non-
eternality of sound, argues as follows
Sound
is
non-eternal,
it is
because
a product,
-
like a pot.
Sound
is eternal,
like the sky.
The opponent
example of a
of the sky ?
pot,
If
alleges that
it
if
sound
is
held to be non-eternal by the

is set aside, let
why
should not be held to be eternal by the example
the example of the sky
the pot too be set aside.
This sort of
futile opposition is called
the example of " balanc-
ing the counter-example " which aims
at
setting aside
an argument
by the introduction
of a counter-example.
II
sr^^R^Wf^TRrrf^f^T:
.
11
II
10.
The example does

its
not,
we
say, require a 'series of
reasons for
establishment just as a lamp does not require

its illumination.-? 10.
a series of lamps to be brought in for

ISO
"
SQO& X
The Naiyayika says
:
CHAÎM
It
An
ordinary
reasons
example
is
a thing the characters of which are well-known to an
man as well as to an expert. to reveal its own character or to

which
it
does not require a series of

sub-
reveal the character of the
ject with
stands in the relation of
In this respect
it
homogeneity or heterogeneity. resembles a lamp which illumines itself as well as the

its
things lying within
reach.
Sound
is non-eternal,
it is
because
a product,
like a pot.
In this argument the pot

it
is-
the example which
is
so well-known that
requires no proof as to
its
being a product or being non-eternal.

" balancing the infinite regression
Hence the opposition

is
called
not founded on a sound basis.
11.
The example, we
say, cannot,
reasonable only because a counter-example

the reason.
be set aside as unis advanced as
11.
:
The Naiyayika says The opponent must give a

should be taken as specially should not be taken as such.
special reason
why
the counter-example
fitted to
lead to a conclusion, and the example
Until such a special reason is given, the counter-example cannot be accepted as leading to a definite conclusion.-
In fact a mere counter-example without a reason (middle term) attending it cannot be conducive to any conclusion. Hence we must rely on an
example attended by reason but not on a counter-example unattended by

reason.
Sound
is eternal,
like the sky.
This opposition which is founded on a mere counter-example therefore to be rejected as unreasonable.
is'
one opposes an argument on the ground of the property connoted by the reason being absent from the thing 4B.oted by the subject while it is not yet produced, the op12.
If
position will be called "balancing the non-produced."

THE NYiraWSUTBia
W
non-eternal,
A certain person,
follows:
to
prove that sound
is
argues as
Sound
is
non-eternal,
it is
because
an
effect of effort,
like a pot.
Sound
is eternal,
it is
because
a non-effect of
effort,
like the sky.
vis.,
.The opponent alleges that the property connoted by the reason, being an effect of effort, is not predicable of the subject, viz.,
it
sound ^while
eternal,
it
is
not yet produced).

eternal.
Consequently sound
is,
is
not non-
must then be
There
according to the opponent,
an apparent agreement between the two sides as to the sound being noneternal on account of its being a non-effect-of-effort.
This sort of
futile
opposition
to
is
called
" balancing the non-produced "
which
pretends
show an equality
of the
to
arguments of two sides assuming the thing

be as yet non-produced.
denoted by the subject
no opposition against our reason so well predicable of the subject which becomes as such
13.
This
is,
we
say,
only
when
it is
produced.
13.
The Naiyayika disposes of- the futile opposition called " balancing the non-produced "by stating that the subject can become as such only when it is produced, and that there is then no obstacle to the property
of the reason
being
predicated
is eternal,
it,
of
it.
The
it is
opposition,
vis.,
" sound
(while non-produced)
carries
because
not then an effect of effort,"

the sound to be the subject
is
no weight with
it is
since
we do not take
it is
before
produced.
is
Sound, while
non-eternal.
produced,
certainly an effect
of effort
and as such
*pf:
14.
,
II
tl
19
II
one opposes an argument on the ground of a doubt arising from the homogeneity of the eternal and the
If
non-eternal consequent on the example

so
and
its
genus
(or

152
BOOK
V,
CHAPTER I
type) being equally
objects of perception, the opposition
will be called " balancing the doubt."
14.
A
follows
certain person,
:
to
prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as
Sound
is non-eternal,
it is
because
like a
a product,
pot.
:
Sound
is
non-eternal or eternal (?)

it is
because
an object of perception,
like a pot or pot-ness.
The opponent
as pot-ness
alleges that
sound
is
homogeneous with a pot as well

;
but the pot inasmuch as both are objects of perception being non-eternal and pot-ness (tbe genus of pots or pot-type) being eternal there arises a doubt as to whether the sound is non-eternal or eternal. Thi sort of futile opposition is called " balancing the doubt " which aims at rejecting an argument in consequence of a doubt arising from
the homogeneity of the eternal and the non-eternal.
unit
15.
inn
no opposition because we do not admit that eternality can be established by the homogeneity with the genus a doubt that arises from a knowledge of the homogeneity vanishes from that of the heterogeneity, and that which arises in both ways never ends. 15.
This
is,
we
say,
The Naiyayika
saj's
Sound cannot be
said to be eternal on the
mere ground of
but
it
its
geneity with pot-ness (the ges of pots
or pot- type)
homomust be
pronounced to be non-eternal on the ground of its heterogeneity from Though on the score of the same in respect of being a product. homogeneityVe may entertain doubt as to whether sound is eternal
but on the score of heterogeneity we can pronounce it undoubtedly to be non-eternal. In this case we must bear in mind that we cannot ascertain the true nature of a thing unless we weigh it in
or
non-eternal,
* The term sdmauya in the sense of "general evidently taken from the Vaiaesika philosophy.
notion, genus
or type "
was

THE NYAYA-80TRAS.
respect of
things.
If
its
153
homogeneity
with as well as heterogeneity from other

to its true nature, that
even then there remainB any donht as

never end.
doubt
will
16.
which
is
"Balancing the controversy" is an opposition conducted on the ground of homogeneity with (or
heterogeneity from) both sides.
16.
A
follows
:
certain
person,
to
prove the non-eternal ity of sound, argues as
Sound
is
non- eternal,
it is
because
a product,
like a pot.
Sound
is eternal,
it is
because
audible,
like soundness.
sound is non-eternal, oaunot be proved because the reason, viz., audibility which is homogeneous with both sound (which is non-eternal) and soundness (which is
alleges that the proposition,
viz.
The opponent
provokes the very controversy for the settlement of which it was employed. This sort of futile opposition is called " balancing the controversy " which hurts an argument by giving rise to the very controversy
eternal),
which was
to
be
settled.
II
V9-.A
pro-
we say, no opposition because it vokes a controversy which has an opposing side. 17..
17.
This
is,
The Naiy&yika says:
The
opposition called " balancing the con-
main argument because it leads to a which suppprfea one side quite as strongly as it is opposed controversy
troversy " cannot set aside the
by
the other side.
3*Mifa3W<isWH
18.*
II
%*
II
which
is
"Balancing the non-reason" is an opposition based on the reason being shown to be impossible
at all the three times.
18.

154
BOOK
A
certain
:
V,
CHAPTER
1.
person, to prove
the non-eternal ity of sound, argues as
follows
Sound
is
non-ejernal,
it is
because
a product,
like a pot.
Here "being a product"

eternal "
is
the
reason or sign for " being non-
which
is the predicate or significate.

:

is
The reason or sign

significate.
(a)
impossible at
all
the three times because
it
cannot precede, succeed, or be
simultaneous
with
the predicate
or
The
reason (or sign) does not precede the predicate (or signiits
ficate)
because the former gets
name only when
it
establishes the latter.
It
is
impossible for the reason to be called as such before the establishof the predicate.
{b)
ment
The
reason (or sign) does not succeed the predicate (or significate)
if it latter
because what would be the use of the former

(c)
existed already.
The reason
(or sigu)
and the predicate
(or significate)
cannot
exist simultaneously
for
they will
then be reciprocally connected like

"
is
the right and left horns of a cow.
This sort of
futile opposition is called "
balancing the non-reason
which aims
impossible at
at
all
setting aside an
argument by showing that the reason
the three times.
19.
There
is,
we
say,
no impossibility
is
at the three
times because the predicate or significate

19. the reason or sign. The knowledge The Naiyayika says
:
established
by
of the
knowable and the
establishment of that
which
is
is
which must precede that which

established.
be established take place from reason to be known and that which is to be

to
Mftflmy4M %:
20.
Mfdôq Mfofrft
i
(I
II
which
It
is
There is, we further say, no opposition of that to be opposed, because 'the opposition itself is
all
impossible at
the three times.

which
is to
20.
being impossible for the opposition to precede, succeed or be

that
aiinultiineous with
be opposed, the opposition
itself is
invalid
and consequently the
original
argument holds good.
THE NYiYAÔTEAS.
155
Wqh^RT: S|^M^(^^fqfi|^l(
21.
If
II
%%
II
one advances an opposition on the basis of a
presumption, the opposition will be called " balancing the presumption. "
follows
21
A certain person,
:
to
prove the non-eternality of sound,

non-eternal,
it is
argues as
Sound
is
because
a product,
like a pot.
Sound
is
presumed
it is
to
be eternal,
because
incorporeal,
like the sky.
The opponent
duct), it
alleges that
if
sound
is
non-eternal
on account of
its
homogeneity with non-eternal things

account of
its
(e.g.
in respect of its
being a prois
may be concluded by presumption

homogeneity with eternal things
This sort of futile opposition
that sound
{e.g.
eternal
in respect of its called
on being
incorporeal).
is
"balancing the
presumption "
which aims
at
stopping an argument by setting presump-
tion as a balance against
it.
22
would,
If
things unsaid could

say, arise a
come by presumption,
the
there
we
possibility of
opposition itself
being hurt on account of the presumption being erratic and conducive to an unsaid conclusion. 22.
Sound
is eternal,
it is
because
incorporeal,
like the sky.

If
reason,
by presumption we could draw a conclusion unwarranted by the we could from the opposition cited above draw the following
conclusion:
Sound
is
presumed
it is
to
be non-eternal,
because
a product,
like a pot.

156
BOOK
by
the
V,
CHAPTER
itself.
I.
This would hurt the opposition
In fact the presumption as

If
adduced
opponent
its
is
erratic.
one says that "sound

",
is
non-eternal because of
homogeneity with non-eternal things

is
the pre-
"sound is eternal because of its " and viae versa. homogeneity with eternal things There is no rule that presumption should be made in one case and not in the case opposed to it and in the event of two mutually opposed presumptions no definite conclusion would follow. Hence the opposition called " balancing the
sumption that naturally follows
that
;
presumption "
is
untenable.
23.
If the
subject and, example
are treated as non-
different in respect of the possession of a certain property
on
account of their possessing in
common
the property con-
noted by the reason,

are mutually
it
follows as a conclusion that all things
non-different in respect of the
possession of
:
every property on account of their being existent

of opposition is
this sort
called " balancing the non- difference."

to
23.
A
follows
:
certain person,
Sound
is
non-eternal,
it is
because
a product,
like a pot.
A
If
tho pot and sound are treated as non-different in respect of nontheir
eternality in consequence of
both being products,
it
follows as a
conclusion that
all
things are mutually non-different in respect of the
being existent. no difference existing between the eternal and the nonTherefore, This sort of opposition is called eternal, sound may be treated as eternal. " balancing the n^n-diiference " which aims at hurting an argument by assuming all things to be mutually non-different.
possession of every property in consequence of their
24.
This
in
possessed
we say, no opposition because the property common by the subject and the example
is,
THE NYAYA-SOTBAS,
157
happens in certain instances to abide in the reason while in

other instances not to abide in Sound is non-eternal,
because
it is
it.
-24.
a product,
like a pot.
Here the pot and sound possessing in common the property of being
a product are treated as non^different in respect of the possession of noneternality. On the same principle if all things are treated as non-different
in consequence of their being existent,
we would
like to
know
:
in what
respect they are non-different.
If
they are treated as non-different in
respect of liOn-eternality, then the
argument would stand thus
All things are non-eternal,
because they are existent,

like(?)
all things" being the subject, there is nothing which may serve as an example. A part of the subject cannot be cited as the example because the example must be a well-established thing while the subject is a thing which is yet to be established. The argument, for want of an example, leads to no conclusion. In fact all things are non-eternal since some at least are eternal. not In other words, nonleft
In this argument "
eternality abides in
existent things.
some existent things and does not abide in other Hence all things are not mutually non-different and the
is
opposition called " balancing the non-difference"
unreasonable.
^Vf^chKlihMMTi^MMRlHHi
25.
If
II
V.
^V.
II
an opposition
is
offered
by showing that both
the demonstrations are justified by reasons, the opposition

will be called " balancing the demonstration."
25.
of
A
-follows
:
certain
person
demonstrates
the non-eternality
sound as
Sound
is
non-eternal,
it is
because
a product,
like a pot.
certain other person offers
an opposition by the alleged demons:
tration of the eternality of
sound as follows Sound is eternal,

because
it is
incorporeal,
like the sky.
demonstration supports the non-eternality of sound while that in the second demonstration supports the eternality
in
The reason
the
first

158
BOOK
.
Yj
OflAPTEB 1
f sound, yet both the demonstrations are alleged to be right. The opponent advanced the second apparent demonstration as a balance
against the first to create a dead lock. " balancing the demonstration."
This sort of opposition
is
called
26.
This
is,
we
:
say,
no opposition because there
is
an admission of the first demonstration. The Naiyayika says The opponent having asserted that both
justified
26.
the demonstrations are
first
tration
by reasons, has admitted the reasonableness of the which supports the non-eternality of sound. If
demonsdenies
to avoid the
incompatibility that exists between the two demonstrations, he

the reason which supports non-eternality
now
we would ask why does he jam''
deny the other reason which supports the eternality of sound, for he can avoid incompatibility by denying either of the reasons. Hence the opposition called " balancing the demonstration " is not well-founded.
^fts^^^TWRS^q^FHTfM^^^H:
27.
If
II
*V
II
on the ground tha*t we perceive the character of the subject even without the interan opposition
is offered
vention of the reason, the opposition

the perception." 27.
Avill
be called "balancing
argues as
A
follows

:
Sound
is
non-eternal,
it.
because
is
a product,
like a pot.
A
that
of
^the
it is
Sound can be ascertained to be non-eternal even without the reason a product, for we perceive that sound is produced by the branches
broken
trees
perception "
by wind. This sort of opposition. is called " balancing which aims at demolishing an argument by setting up
it.
an act of perception as a balance against
** u M<4ure rcwft aOTfo^terRfar: u * \ This is, we say, no opposition because that 28. character can be ascertained by other means as well. 28.
i
The Naiyayika
because
it is
says that the argument, viz., "

like
sound
is
non-eternal,
a product,
a pot," implies that sound
is
proved to be
"
THE NYAYA-8TJTRAS.
*iion-eternal
159
It
through the reason that

etc.,
it is
a product.
does not deny

to
Qthejt
means, such as perception
which also may prove sound
be
non-eternal.
Hence the opposition called " balancing the perception
does not set aside the main argument.
srfercw u *
29.
If
**
ii
against an argument, proving the non-existence
of a thing
by the non-perception
thereof,
one
will
offers
an
opposition aiming at proving the contrary by the non-percep-r

the non-perception, the " balancing the non-perception."
tion of
opposition
that
be called
29.
there
In
veil
is no veil aphorism 2-2-20
In aphorism 2-2-19 the Naiyayika has stated
which covers sound
for
we do not perceive such a

If
his opponent has stated that there is a veil because
we do not perceive
its
the
non-peroeption thereof.
the non-perception of a thing proves
non-
existence, the non-perception of the non-perception must, in
the opinion
of the opponent, prove the existeuce of the thing. " balancing the non-perception" which is called
This sort of opposition
aims at counteracting
it.
an argument by setting up
non-perception as a balance against

II
^gqn^H+^l3M<H*v|<î:
30.
V.
\*
II
The reasoning through non-perception

sound, because non-perception
is
is not,
we
say,
merely the negawhich

is
tion of perception.
30.
says
:
The Naiyayika
of non-perception
Perception
is
refers to that
existent
while non-perception to that which
non-existent.
The non-perception
which
signifies a
mere negation
of non-perception cannot
be interpreted as referring
to an existent thing. Hence the opposition called " balancing the non-perception" is not well-founded.
31.
There
is,
moreover, an internal perception of the
existence as well as of the non-existence of the various kinds

of knowledge.
31.
There are internal perceptions of such forms as" I am sure," "I am not sure," " I have doubt," " I have no doubt" etc., which prove that we can perceive the non-existence of knowledge as well as the existence
81

160
thereof.
BOOK
V,
CHAPTER
itself is
I.
Hence the non-perception

falls to the
perceptible,
and as there
is
no non-perception
non-perception"
of non-perception, the opposition called " balancing the
ground.
'HI*
32.
If
UH
II
one finding that things which are homogeneous
possess equal characters, opposes an argument

non-eternality to all things, the opposition " balancing the non-eternality.' 32.'
by attributing
will
be called
A
follows
:
certain person, to prove
the nou-eternality of sound, argues as
Sound
is non-eternal,
it is
because
a product,
like a pot.
A
If
sound
is
is
non-eternal on account of its

it
a pot which
non-eternal,
will follow as a
being homogeneous with consequence that all things
are non-eternal because they are in
some one or other respect homogeneous

all
with the pot a consequence which will render

for
inferences
impossible
want of heterogeneous examples. This sort of opposition is called " balancing the non-eternal" which seeks to counteract an argument on the alleged ground that all things are non-eternal.
*?TWI?tfa& srf^rftrfe: MfaVq<Him+qf^

* It
33.
I
II
\\
II
unfounded because nothing can be established from a mere homogeneity and because there is homogeneity even with that which is oppossay,
is
The
opposition,
we
ed.
33.
The Naiyayika
says
the character of a thing from

:
We cannot
ascertain
its
mere homological
geneity with another thing
in doing so
we must consider the
connection between the reasou and the predicate.

is
non-eternal
not merely because

is
it is
Sound, for instance, homogeneous with a non-eternal
a universal connection between "being proa duct" and "being non-eternal." Hence it will be unreasonable to conclude that all things are non-eternal simply because they are homopot but because there
THE NYiYA-SCTBAS.
geneous with a non-eternal pot in some one or other respect. Similarly a mere homogeneity of all things with the eternal sky in some one or The opposition other respect, does not prove all things to be eternal. " balancing the non-eternal " is therefore not fonnded on a sound called
basis.
^r
^sx^ ^r snssrerrewT^ s^rnro ^^fer tgm'^wrmrfrarff^: * \ \*

||
i [
||
no non-distinction, because the reason is known to be the character which abides in the example as conducive to the establishment of the predicate and because it is applied in both ways. 34.
34.
There
is,
we
say,
The Naiy&yika says

all
that
we
are
not justified in concluding that
things are non-eternal because there is no character in respect of which " all things " may be homogeneous with a pot. In order to arrive
at a correct conclusion
character of the
we must consider the reason as being that example (and consequently of the subject) which bears
with
the
a universal connection
character of the predicate.
possesses no such character in
common
with "all things."
The pot The reason
moreover
ways.
is
applied in the homogeneous as well as in the heterogeneous
We
cannot draw a conclusion from a mere homogeneity of the
The opposition called subject with tho example in a certain respect. " balancing the non-eternal " is therefore tmreasonablo.
fa^44fe^MKft^pM^MMTlW<*l*W:
35.
If
II
V.
^K
II
nality to all
one opposes an argument by attributing eternon-eternal things on the ground of these being
will be called "balanc-
eternally non-eternal, the opposition
ing the eternal."
35.
to
A certain
follows
:
person,
Sound
is
non-eternal,
it is
because
a product,
like a pot.
A certain
other person offers a futile opposition thus
:You
say
sound always or only sometimes ? If the non-eternality exists always, the sound must If the nonalso be always existent, or in other words, sound is eternal. eternality exists only sometimes, then too the sound must in the absence
that sound is non-eternal.
Does
this non-eternality
exist in
BOOK
V,
m
is
CHAPTER
I.
of non-eternality be pronounced to be eternal.
This sort of opposition which counteracts an argument by called "balancing the eternal"
setting
up
eternality as a balance against
it.
gfcfasjmre:
36.
II
V.
is,
\\
say,
II
This
is
opposed
no opposition because the thing always non-eternal on account of the eternality of
we
36. the non-eternal. The Naiyayika says : By speaking of eternality of the non-eternal you have admitted sound to be always non-eternal and cannot now deny its non-eternality. The eternal and non-eternal are incompatible with each other by admitting that sound is non-eternal you are precluded from asserting that it Hence " balancing the eternal " is not a sound opposiis also eternal.
:
tion.
M^H+l^fo+^l**l^*W:
37.
If
II
V.
^vs
||
one opposes an
argument by showing the
diversity of the effects of effort, the opposition will be called " balancing the effect." 37.
A
follows
:
certain
person
to
Sound
is
non-eternal,
it is
because
an
effect of effort.
:

effect of effort is
found to be of two kinds, vis. (1) the producwhich was previously non-existent, e.g. a pot, and tion of something (2) the revelation of something already existent, e.g. water in a well. Is sound an effect of the first kind or of the second kind ? If sound is an
effect of
The
the
first
kind
it
will
be
non-eternal
but
if it
is
of the
second
kind
it will
be
eternal.
Owing
to this
diversity
is
of the
effects of effort,
it is not possible to conclude that sound opposition is called " balancing the effect."
non-eternal.
This sort of
*lWfor^ 5WHI^^4^M^fcM<W<aflM<j3:
i
38.
Effort,
I
II
II
did not give rise to the second kind
of
efect, because there
was no cause of non-perception.
38.
The Naiy&yika answers

as follows:
the opposition called " balancing >he effect"
by our effort because we are it existed already. That sound did not exist previously is proved by our non-perception of the same at the time. You cannot say that our non-perception was caused by a veil because no veil covered sound. Hence sound is an effect which is not revealed but
that sound is revealed
We cannot say
unable to prove that
produced.
39.
The same
A
defect,
we
say, attaches
to the opposi-
tion too.
39.
certain person argued
:
Sound
is
non-eternal,
it is
because
an
it
effect of effort.
would not be meant a thing revealed. The Naiy&yika observes that if an argument is to be set aside owing to an ambiguous meaning of the word " effect ", why is not the opposition too set aside on the same ground ? The reason in the argument is as erratic as that in the opposition. Just as there is no special
non-eternal
if
certain other person opposed

"effect "
saying that sound
ground
to
suppose that the "
effect " in the
produced and
that the
not revealed," so also there is
argument signified " a thing no special ground to suppose
word in the opposition signified "a thing revealed and not produced." Hence the opposition called "balancing the effect " is selfdestructive.
oJ5Nn
40.
If a special
ii
a
to
ii
Thus everywhere.
meaning
is
40.
the opposition, the
to
be attached
same
meaning
will
have to be attached to the original argument.
In this
respect there will be an equality of the two sides in the case of opposition such as " balancing the homogeneity " etc.
of all kinds
Slfrf^rftsrfrl^
41.
MWh<fl*milN
||
*?
||
Defect attaches to the opposition of the opposiit
tion just as
attaches to the opposition.

person to
41.
A
follows
:
certain
prove the non-eternal ity of sound, argues as
Sound
is
non-external,
it is
because
an
effect of effort.
IM
A certain
offers
BOOK
an opposition thus
:
V,
CHAPTER
that
I.
other person, seeing
the effect
is
diverse kinds
it is
Sound
(Here "effect "
is eternal,
because
an
effect of effort.
may mean "a thing
revealed by effort.")
The arguer replies that sound cannot bo concluded to be eterjial because the reason " effect " is erratic (which may mean " a thing produced by
effort.")
again to say that sound cannot also be concluded to be non-eternal because the reason " effect " is erratic (which may
rises
The opponent
mean a thing
revealed
by
effort).
So the defect which
is
pointed out in
the case of the opposition,
may
also be
pointed out in the case of the
opposition of the opposition.
sifter srfhwpgjfar srt^rfirarfa^ sftht *ta-
sra#
*Rnprr
If
II
9*
II
one admits the defect of his opposition in consequence of his statement that an equal defect attaches to the opposition of the opposition, it will be called " admis42.
sion of an opinion."
52.
down a
viz.
certain person lays
proposition which
is
opposed by a certhat the
tain other person.
The
first
person, viz. the disputant charges the opposition

the opponent, with a defect
e.g.
made by
reason
the second person,
is erratic.
The opponent
it
instead of rescuing his opposition from the
defect with
which
has been charged by the disputant, goes on chargthe

is
ing the disputant's opposition of the opposition with
same
defect.
The counter-charge which
the opponent
brings in this way
interpreted
by the disputant to be an admission of the defect pointed out by him. The disputant's reply consisting of this kind of interpretation is called " admission of an opinion."
"
mjwkwimT *N
43.
fftrn
hi
*\n
when
the
" Admission of an opinion " also occurs
disputant instead of employing reasons to rescue his side from
has been charged, proceeds, to admit the defect in consequence of his statement that the same defect belongs to his opponent's side as well.
it
the defect with which
105
THE NYlYA-SUTRAS.
Six-uringed disputatioti (Satpaksi katha).
Disputant
to
prove the non-eternality of sound says

is
Sound
non-eternal,
it is
because
an
effect of effort.
This
is
the
first
wing.
Opponent
opposition thus
seeing
:
that the effect is of diverse
kinds, offers
an
Sound
(Here "
revealed by
effect "
is eternal,
it is
because
an
effect of effort.
means a thing which already
existed
and
is
now
effort).
This is the second wing.
Disputant
seeing that the reason " effect "

:
is erratic,
charges the
opposition with a defect thus
Sound
is
not eternal,
because it is an effect of effort. (Here the reason " effect " is erratic meaning
(I) either
a thing that
did not previously exist and

existed and
is
is
now produced
(2)
or a thing that already

This
is
now
revealed by
effort).
the third wing.

is
Opponent
finding
is
that the
reason
"effect,"
which
erratic,
proves neither the eternality nor the non-eternality of sound,

counter-charge against the disputant thus
:
brings a
Sound
also not non-eternal,

it is
because
an
effect of effort.
He
alleges
that
the
defect (oiz. the erraticity of the

is
reason) with
which his opposition (ou. sound

the opposition of the opposition
eternal)
is
charged, also attaches to

{viz.
made by the
disputant
This
sound
is
not
eternal or non-eternal).
is
the fourth wing.
Disputant
finding that the counter-charge brought against him

:
amounts
to his
opponent's admission of self-defect says

that " sound
is
The opponent by saying

has admitted that
it is
also
not non-eternal
"
also not eternal.

is, it
has proved the charge, that

the disputant's opinion.
In other words the counter-charge has indicated that the opponent admits
This
is
the
fifth
wing.
Opponent iindiug that the disputant instead of rescuing his argument /rom the counter-charge has taken shelter under his opponent's
admission of the charge says
also not
:
The disputant by saying

admitted that
it is
that
"sound
is also
not eternal"
if
has
non-eternal.
In other words,
the Counter-
10
BOOK
V,
CHAPTER
1.
charge proves the charge, the reply to the counter-charge proves the counter-charge itself.
This
is
the sixth wing.
The first, third and fifth wings belong to the disputant while the second, fourth and sixth to the opponent. The sixth wing is a repetition The sixth of the fourth while the fifth wing is a repetition of the third. wing is also a repetition of the meaning of the fifth wing. The third and fourth wings involve the defect of " admission of an opinion." All the wings except the first three are unessential. The disputation would have come to a fair close at the third wing if the disputant had pointed out that the word "effect" had a special
meaning';
viz.,
a thing which did not previously exist but was produced.

the opponent instead of stopping at
The disputant and

limit has carried
is
the proper
further wing
on their disputation through six wings beyond which no possible. After the six-winged disputation has been carried on, it becomes patent that neither the disputant nor the opponent is a fit person to be argued with.

THE NYAYA-SOTRAS;
Book
srftrfrrfrft :
m
I
V.
Chapter
II.
m[Wi-<-k srf^rrfWhr: srfi^n^n#
VMiH^W
*tfW%
flTST
fa< *k H fta
Ml4^l^M M*N
s^T-
aHfrbH^îq*U^HHMfo*T
II
WW"
*WIJ*U
fa^fTORTH
*
for
II
1.
1.
The occasions
rebuke
are
the following
tion, 3.
Hurting the proposition, 2. Shifting the proposiOpposing the proposition, 4. Renouncing the pro5.
position,
7.
Shifting the reason,
6.
Shifting the
topic,
The meaningless, 8. The unintelligible, 9. The incoherent, 10. The inopportune, 11. Saying too* little, 12. Saying
too
16.
much,
13.
Repetition, 14.
17.
Silence,
18.
15.
Ignorance,
Admission of an opinion, 19. Overlooking the censurable, 20. Censuring the non-censurable, 21. Deviating from a tenet, and 22. The semblance of a reason. 44.
Evasion,
Non-ingenuity,
The definition of " an occaaion for rebuke" has been given in aphorism 1-2-19. " An occasion for rebuke" which is the same as " a ground of defeat", " a place of humiliation" or "a point of disgrace" arises generally
in connection with the proposition or any other part of an
argument and
may
implicate
any disputant whether he
is
a discutient, wrangler or
caviller.
M^^kd ^Rfvi^TT^rggT'^ ^rd^l^lft

2.
in one's
11*1 t '* II " Hurting the proposition" occurs when one admits own example the character of a counter-example.
:
I
45. A
disputant argues as follows
Sound
is
non-eternal,
Because
it is
cognisable by sense, cognisable by sense

is
Whatever
is
non-eternal
as a pot,,
Sound
22
is
cognisable by sense,
is
Therefore sound
non-eternal.
168
BOOK
V,
CHAPTER "It
by
A certain other person offers an opposition thus : A genus (e.g., potnesa or pot-type), which is cognisable
is
sense,
is
found to
be
eternal,
why
cannot
then the sound which
also
cognisable by sense, be eternal ?
The disputant being thus opposed says : Whatever is cognisable by sense

Sound
is
is eternal
as a pot,
is eternal.
Therefore sound
By
thus admitting in his example (pot) the character of a countertype,),
example (genus or
non-eternal).
he has hurt his own proposition

hurts his proposition in this
(viz.
sound
is
person
who
way
deserves
nothing but rebuke.
*rTTO
II
M
is
II
3.
" Shifting the proposition " arises

it
when a
proposi-
tion
being opposed one defends
by
importing a
new
character to one's example and counter-example.46.
certain person argues as follows
Sound
non-eternal,
it is
because
cognisable by sense
like a pot.
certain other person offers an opposition thus
Sound
is eternal,
it is
because
cognisable by sense like a genus (or type).
The first person in order to defend himself says that a genus (or type) and a pot are both cognisable by sense, yet one is all-pervasive and hence the sound which is likened to a pot is nonthe other is not so
:
all-pervasively non-eternal.
The defence thus made involves a change of proposition originally laid down was Sound is n5n-eternal, proposition now defended is 'while the Sound is non-all-pervasively non-eternal.
:
:
proposition.
The
A
in as
person
who shifts
his proposition in this
way
is
muph
as he has not relied
upon
his original reason
to be rebuked and example.
4.
" Opposing
its
the
proposition "
occurs
when
the
proposition and
reason are opposed, to each other.

is distinct f rora,quality,
is
47.
Substance
because^lt is perceived to be non-distinct from colour etc.
la this argument
it is to
be observed that from colour
if
etc.
substance
distinct
which constitute the from quality, it must is non-distinct from colour etc., is opposed quality. The reason viz. substance A person .who substance is distinct from quality. to the proposition, viz.
also be distinct
thus employs a reason whtch opposes his proposition
is to
be rebuked as
fool.
5.
A proposition being
it
opposed
if
one disclaims
import,
will
be called " renouncing the proposition."

:
certain person argues as follows
its
48.
Sound
is
non-eternal,
it is
because
:
A certain other
person offers an opposition thus
meaning
of
Just as a genus (or type) is cognisable by sense and is Jiot yet noncognisable by sense and isôt yet non-eternal. The eternal so a sound is
first
person, as a defence against the opposition, disclaims the

:
his proposition thus " Who says that
sound
is
non-eternal ?
This sort of denial of the import of one's own proposition is called " renouncing the proposition " which rightly furnishes an occasion for
rebuke.
*.
I*
II
6.
" Shifting the
reason" occurs
when
the reason of
a general character being opposed one attaches a special character to it. 49.
A certain
follows
person, to prove the
argues as
:
is
Sound
non-eternal,
it is
becanse
cognisable by sense.

tin
BOOK
V,
CHAPTER
its
II.
certain other person
says that sound cannot be proved to be
non-eternal through the mere reason of
being cognisable by sense, just
as* genus
and
is
(or
type)
such as pot-ness
(or pot- type^ is cognisable
by sense
viz.
not yet non-eternal.

first
The
person defends himself by saying that the reason,

is to
being cognisable by sense,
be understood as signifying that which
comes under a genus (or type) and is as such cognisabJe by seuse. Sound comes under the genus (or type) "soundness" and is at the same but a genus or type such as pot-ness or pottime cognisable by sense type does uot come under another genus or type vsuch as pot-ness-ness or pot-type-type } though it is cognisable by sense. Such a defence, which
;
consists in shifting
one's reason,
rightly
furnishes an
occasion for
rebuke.
U^dKW^Mfri^H^l^^-d^
7.
II
V.
vs
||
an argument which setting aside the real topic introduces one which is irrelevant. 50.
" Shifting the topic" is
A
follows
:
certain
person,
to
prove
the
eternality
of sound,
argues as
Sound
"'
is
eternal (proposition),
it is
because
intangible (reason).
of
Being opposed by a certain other person he attempts, in the absence any other resource, to defend his position as follows
:
Iletu,
which
is
the sauakrit equivalent for "reason,"
is
a word derived
from the root "hi" with the suffix "tu". A word, as a part of a speech, may be n noun, a verb, a prefix or an indeclinable. A noun is defined as etc. etc.
The defence made in this way furnishes an instance of tlnwigh non-relevancy. The person who makes it deserves rebuke.
defeat
^chHftfoNfa<^ 5TCt
8.
II
II
"The meaningless"
person,
to
is
an argument which
eternality
of sound,
is
based
51.
on a non-sensical combination of letters into a
series.
A
follows
:
certain
prove the
argues as
^
is eternal,
Sound
because
k, c,
like jh,
and p are j, v, g, d and bh, gh, <Jh and dh.

$, t
d,
As the letters k, c, t etc. convey no meaning, the person who employs them in his argument deserves rebuke.

TrlE NY&YA-SOTRAS.
iUj.
KMUII
9.
"
The
unintelligible" is an argument,
which
al-
though repeated three times, is understood neither by the audience nor by the opponent. 52.
certain person being
opposed by another person and finding no
means of self-defence, attempts to hide his inability in disputation by using words of double entendre or words not in ordinary use or words
very quickly uttered which as such are understood neither by his opponent This sort of nor by the audience although they are repeated three titues.
defence
is
called " the unintelligible"
which rightly furnishes an
occasion,
for rebuke.
The incoherent" is an argument which conveys no connected meaning on account of the words being strung
10.
"
together without any syntactical order.
53.
certain
person being opposed by another person and finding no

:
other means of self-defence, argues as follows Ten pomegranates, six cakes, a bowl,
sweets.
goat's skin
and a lump
of
This sort of argument, which consist of a series of unconnected words, is called "the incoherent" which rightly presents on occasion
for rebuke.
^q*ftq^f^^TORr*>n5rat
11.
m
of
fire,
it n
"
The inopportune"
is
an argument the parts of

precedence.
which are mentioned without any order
54.
:
certain person, to prove that the hill has
argues as follows
The hill has fire (proposition \ Whatever has smoko has fire, as a kitchen (example). Because it has smoke (reason). The hill has fire (conclusion). The hill has smoke (application ).\ This sort of argument is called " the inopportune" which rightly Since the meaning of an argument is presents an occasion for rebuke. affected by the order in which its parts are arranged, the person who
overlooks the order cannot establish* his conclusion and
is
therefore
rebuked.

4|.r
BOGS
CHAPTER It
^HH^dftHM^H
12.
If
gpL.ll HI
VI J*
its
II-
called "
an argument lacks even one of saying too little." 55.
parts,
it
is
The following is an argument which contains all its five parts: The hill has fire (proposition), 1. Because it has smoke (reason), 2. All that has smoke has fire, as a kitchen (example), 3. 4. The hill has smoke (application),
5.
Therefore the
the five parts or
hill
has
fire
(conclusion).
members are essential, a person scolded as " saying too little." even one of them should be
As
all
who omits
Saying too much " is an argument which consists 56. of more than one reason or example.
13.
"
A certain
And
person, to prove that the hill has

fire
fire,
argues as follows
The hill has

Because
it
(proposition),
has smoke (reason;,

it
because
has light (reason),
like a kitchen (example),
and like a furnace (example), In this argument the second reason and the second example are
redundant.
A
is to
person,
who having promised
to
argue in the proper way (accordreason or example
ing to the established usage), employs more than one be rebuked as " saying too much."
14.
" Repetition " is
an argument in which (except in
the case of reinculcation) the
over again.
:'
word or the meaning

is
is
said
57.
Repetition of the
word
Sound
non-eternal,
sound
is
non- eternal.
Repetition
of the meaning Sound is non-eternal, echo is perishable, what is heard is impermanent,
etc.
A
:
person
who
unnecessarily commits repetition
is to
be rebuked
as a fool. Reinculcation has been explained in aphorism 2-1-66.
THE NYA-St)TRAS.
1$
15.
In remeuleation there
as a special
repeated.
meaning
58.
hill
is
no repetition in as much deduced from the word which is

is
The
has
it
fire
(proposition),
Because
has smoke (reason \
All that has
smoke has
fire
as a kitchen (example),
The
hill
has smoke (application''

fire (conclusion).
Therefore the hill has
In this argument the " conclusion " is a mere repetition of the " proposition " and yet it serves a special purpose.
16.
" Repetition " consists also in mentioning a thing
by name although the thing has been indicated through

presumption.
59.
character of a product
:
"A
thing possessing the
is
non-eternal
"
this
"
is
a mere repetition of the following

thing
not possessing the character of a
product
is
not non-
eternal."
Win
\v
ii
"Silence" is an occasion for rebuke which arises when the opponent makes no reply to a proposition although it has been repeated three times by the disputant
17.
within the knowledge of the audience.
60.
if
How
tains
can a disputant carry on his argument

stolid
his
is
opponent maintherefore
to
an attitude of
silence?
The opponent
be
rebuked.
srf^frrasTTfrm u
18.
\
the
* i* * n
non-understanding
of a
" Ignorance "
is
proposition.
61.
betrayed by the opponent
it
Ignorance
is
who does not understand a
proposition although
has been repeated three times within the know-
174
ledge of the audience.
BOOK
V,
CHAPTER
II.
Plow can an opponent refute a proposition die meaning of which he caunot understand ? He is to be rebuked for his
ignorance.
^KîM^MfrliM frnTT
19.
II
M
is to
ft
II
" Non-ingenuity "

reply.
consists in
one's
inability
to
hit
upon a
62.
down
a proposition.
If his
A
stands
it
certain person lays
opponent under-
and yet cannot hit upon a reply, he
be scolded as wanting
in ingenuity.
3RF*r sqre^Tg; <NMlftdt<0 ft%<*:

20.
II
II
" Evasion " arises
if
one stops an argument in
the pretext of going
away
to attend another business.
63.
A
finds
it
certain person having
commenced a disputation
its
in
which he
stops
impossible to establish his side, stops
further progress by
saying that he has to go away on a very urgent business.

the disputation
evasion.
in
this
He who
way courts
defeat
and humiliation
through
^q^î^Miifn<M<M^^ N&i^ Hdi^

i
mm m
"You
II
21.
"
The admission of an opinion

exists in one's
" consists in charg-
ing the opposite side with a defect by admitting that the
same defect
own side.
64.
certain person addressing another person says:

thief."
are a
The other person
replies
" You too
are a thief."
This person, instead of removing the charge brought against him, throws the same charge on the opposite side whereby he admits that the
charge against himself is true. This sort of counter-charge or reply is an instance of " admission of an opinion " which brings disgrace on the
person
who makes
it.
for^snrora^Tforf q^fteiftRRjrîi *
:
22.
" Overlooking the censurable "
consists in not
rebuking a person who deserves rebuke. 65. It is not at all unfair to censure a person who argues
furnishes an occasion for censure.
not confess his short-coming,
it
is
in a way which Seeing that the person himself does the duty of the audience to pass a
IftE ttTAYA-StJTitA&
Vote
,,ql
Hi
Aensui on him. If the audience failed to do their duty they would earn rebuke for themselves on account of their "over-looking the
censurable."
23.
" Censuring
the
non-censurable"
if
consists
in
rebuking a person who does not deserve rebuke.
66.
A person
brings discredit on himself
he rebukes a person
who does
not deserve rebuke.
f^^kd*{^^lPr<|l ir^h'MIITH^l^fedlkd:
:
I!
VU ^
II
24.
A person who
the
after accepting
a tenet departs
is
from
it
in
course
of
his
disputation,
guilty
of
" deviating
from a tenet."
67.
(
A certain person promises to carry on his argument in consonance with the Sankhya philosophy which lays down that 1 what is existent
)
never becomes non-existent, and

existence etc.
activity
(2)
what
the
certain other person opposes

if
would be impossible
comes into him by saying that all human thing now non-existent could not
is
non-existent never
come
and that no activity would cease if what is existent now could continue for ever. If the first person being thus opposed admits that existence springs from non-existence and nonexistence from existence, then he will rightly deserve rebuke for his deviation from the accepted tenet.
into existence in the course of time
25.
"
The
fallacies of a reason" already explained
also furnish occasions for rebuke. 68. 1-2-4 it is evident that the fallacies are mere From aphorism semblances of a reason. A person who employs them in a disputation do
certaiidy deserve rebuke.
do
There are infinite occasions for rebuke of which only twenty-two have been enumerated here.
Alphabetical Index to the SutraS.

PAGE
'(l^li^WK'HimiS'WRNI^
PAGE
WJMITf
iii
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II
32
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51
2 77
1 67
106 126
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173
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tft
Index of
Words
Page.
in
English.
Page.
Akrit&bhyagaraa
All-pervading
Alteration
...
...
110 40 40
142
17
Abhava Abode Abode of
...
...
...2,
117
6
20, 70, 132

... ...
... ...
particular qualities
...
Alteration of time
Absence Absence of link

Abstinence
112, 137
... ...
Alternating character
Alternative
87
Absence of perception
...
... ...
... ...
49 138
80 13
9
Analogy
Annihilation
17, 113, 119, 121

...2,
...
...
Absurd
Absurdities
...76,86
... ...
Ant
hill
130 87
'2,3
Antecedent
46,126
...
Absurdity
Acceptance
Anumana
Apavarga
...
... ...
...7,125
...3,34,
...
.
Act
Act force
Action
Activities
...
...
8,39
81
posteriori
Apparently
79
5, 6, 32,
...
11, 50, 83,

...
96
Apparent modification
Appearance
59 136
116
123
1.18
Activity
2, 5, 6, 7, 94,
108, 123, 125

...
Appearances
Appearance
Application
of difference
Act of knowledge
Acts
...
...
... ...
112 130
Acuteness
Acuteness or
...
Apprehension
6, 71, 79, 98,

...
85 10,12 127, 130
dullness of
ap-
prehension ... 130 ... Admission of an opinion 164, 167, 174 ... 13 Adoption ...
A A
priori
priori inference
... ...
...
34
124
Appropriate
...
Adultery
... ...
...
Approach Apraptakala
Arbitrariness
Advantage
Affection
...
40
11, 12
...
"9 17 92
104
J
2, 3, 7,
...
96, 108, 126
Affirmative
Arbuda Argument
Argumentation
...
47, 50, 52, 147, 150

...
Affirmative application
Affirmative example
Affix
...
...
...
...
12
11
Arguments
Arrogance
Artha-patti
Artificial
...
... ...
20,67,96,128
**
...
...
...
59
2 118 115
9,
Agama
2, 43,
44
2
...
Agent of knowledge Aggregates ...

Air
...
...47,48
...
...
Arya
...
...
79
Aryade&
Aryas...
... ...
....
Airy
...
...
...
... ...
70 2
Aitihya
8
Ascertainment
115,120 39 ... 1, 13
; )
Page*
Page.
Adhaka
Asleep
Asolute rule
...
...
...
43
Balancing the homogeneity
140, 141
...
... ...
... ...
124
86
17
Balancing
gression
the
infinite
...
re-
...
...140,149
Assumption
Assent
Assertion
Association
...
...
Balancing
absence
the
...
mutual
...140,148
86
3,
... ...
Balancing the non-difference 140, 156
60,123
...
...
Balancing the non-eternality 140, 160

Balancing the non-perception 140, 159
Association of troubles
124
Assumption
...
88
95
Balancing the non-produced 150, 170 Balancing the nou- reason ...140, 153 Balancing the perception ...140, 158 Balancing the presumption
Atom
Atomic mind
50, 103, 106, 126, 131

...
...
Atomic dimension Atomic substance
89
6,
140,455
140, 143
...
29
Balancing the questionable
Atoms
Attach
8, 15,
...
130
15
1
Balancing the reciprocity ...140, 145

Balancing the subtraction ...140, 143
Balancing the unquestionable 140, 144
Attainment of supreme
Attendants
Attention
felicity
...
121
93, 96
Beginning
Beginningless
...
...
...
47 126
31 2
27, 122
...
Audience
Auditory
Auditory perception
...
24
Bhasya-eommentary
Blmttas
Birth
...
... ...
...
20,78
20, 30, 31
...
Augmentation
Authority
59
Blackness
...
...
126
9, 15,
...
70
42
Blame
Blanket
... ... ...

...
...
... ...
41,123
18
Authors
Avayava
Aversion
1, 10, 2, 3, 5, 7, 94,
... ...
129
108
Block-hoad
Bodily actions
20
6 65
...
Awaking Awanting
135
121
Body
Bone
5, 63, 64. 70,

...
100, 10 1, 137
B
Balancing the addition
Balancing the alternative
Balancing in co-presence
pie
. .
Bosgavaeus
...
... ...
...
...
4,
36
Bragging
140, 142
Br&hmana
Breast
15 3,18,60
140, 144
140, 147
69
2 6
...
Balancing the counter-exam

.140,
Buddhas Buddhi
Buddhist
Literature
149
15,22,86
125
Balancing the controversy

Balancing the doubt
140, 153
Buddhist Sanskrit and Pali
Balancing the demonstration 140, 157

.140,152
140, 162
Bulk
54
38
Balancing the
effect
Burning
Balancing the eternal
161
Balancing the eternality
140
Capacity
Balancing the heterogeneity 140, 141
10,83
. .
"
iii
>
Page.
Collocation of parts
Page.
Carelessness
112
15 2
132
102, 127
Carping
Cftrvakas
Categories
Cattle
Colour
5, 9,
7,
30, 59, 71, 78, 98, 101
1,24
121
8, 23, 104, 112,
1
Combustibles
113
Command
Commixture
42
79
Cause
Cause and
14,
127
...
effect
...
.
109
Common
"
22
3,34
Cause of destruction
Cause of growth and decay. Cause of in -audition ...

.
90 87
52
127
157
Commonly
seen
Comparison
2, 3, 4, 25, 35,
...
...
36
22
Common
properties
Cause of production
Causes of faults
...103,113
...
Compendious expression Complete destruction
36
2
... ...
Cave
Cavil
Caviller
...
...
...
...
Compound
Compassion
Conceit
...
59
...
1,
14, 15,
...
139
15
...
...
65,85,122
...
...
Censuring
able
Cessation
the non-censur- ...

,.
Conceit of difference
Conceit of duality Conceit of pleasure
85 65 122
135
...167,175
...106,127
... ...
...
...
Cessation of egotism
127
Concept Concept of means

Conception
Conciousness
Concentration
...
...
. . .
Cessation of recognition
Cessation of the intellect
...
...
84 84
1,17
9
134
6
...
...
62,127
... ...
Chala
...
...
Channels
Character
...
...
112
"
7, 11, 12, 13, 23, 54, 71, 75,
Conclusion 10, 12, 13,
15, 20, 67, 88,
78,96, 101,113,136
Characterised
... ... ...
145
80
'
Concomitant
Conditions
...
...
10 10
18
Character of an object
Character of a modification
77
55
...
...
...
Conduct
Confirmation
Conflicting
Conflicting
... ...
... ...
...
Character of perception Character of transparency
...
114
...
...
13
...
75
41
22
7
Charaka
... ...
...
..
judgment
Change
88
102 135
Conflicting testimony Conflicting opinions
22
Circle of fire brand
...
...
46
46
City of the celestial quiristers...
Conflicting reasons
...
Confutation
Conjointly
...
1,13,35
...
Classification of
Vedic speech
... ... ...
40
148 104
...
22
Clay
Clay statue
Co-abide
Cognisable
...
Conjunction
6, 29,. 31, 60, 90, 92, 93,
...
104, 106,122, 131
54
76,87 47
Connection
...
3, 20, 37, 38,

...
39
'
Connoted
Consciousness
...
.,...
Cognised
Cognitions
...
150 14
78,73
25, 26, 90, 93, 102
Consequence
iv
Page.
Page.
Defilement
Definite
Constant audition
Constituents
..
82
131
2,125
...
form
61
Contact
3, 25, 30, 71,
73
81,89
..
Definition
...1,24
Contentious
23 96 23
Deliverance
7
...
Context
Continuity
..
Demarcate
Demerits
Demonstration
Denial
95
72,
...
125 157 125
Contingency
Contradiction
...
84,90
31, 40, 76 If
,
114, 136
...
Contradictory
...
16,
58
16
Depravity
Desert
Contradictory reason
104,105,106
...
Contrary
Controversy
..
13,22
153
Design
Desire
60
96
5,68,69,94
...
Convention
Conviction
.. ..
39
Desire and aversion
22
147
Destruction
2, 9, 19, 48, 57, 65, 88,
Oopresence
89, 90, 106,
Corresponding element
Corresponding substrata
Corruption
80
81
125
Determinate
Determination
Deva-rina
110,111,114,120 3
10,
...
..
13
..
123
6
Countenance
Counter argument
..
68
53
49, 150
Devotion
Dharma
Dialogue
Sastra
...
...
124
14
Counter exam pie

Course
Covetousness
. .
2
6
Diminution
... ... ... ...
59
129
19
Dimness
Direct
Direction
Cow
...
..
4
141
1
Cowhood
Critical examination
29
106
Disappearance
Disconnection
Disciples
...
Crystal
...
73,
7-1[,
85,
86 87
...
...
20
138
Curd
Cuticle
..
101
Discussion
Disjoined
I, 10, 14,
138
D
Dadhi
Deaths
..
Disputant
... 88 20,22,24 ...
54
7
Disputation
Dissimilarity
14
...
...
20
Debt Debt
Debt
to
Gods
..
123 123 123
Dissolution
Distinct
70
to progenitors
to sages
:?.
...
...-no
122, 124
... ...
..
Distress
Debts
...
123
Distribution
Divisible
116
108
Decay
Declaration
83,87
4
95, 103
i
Doctrine
Deeds
Defect
...
Dogma
Doubt
1, 7,
'
14,132 ... 9, 10
39,40
..
22, 23, 32, 54, 59, 119,
Defence
15
125, 127, 151, 152
.(
'*
Page.
Page.
Dream
Drst&nta
124, 134, 185

1
Evidence Examination
110, 134
1,10,24
10, 12, 13, 142,
... ...
... ...
...
Drum
Duality
...17,27
...
...
Example
Excess
145
Dullness
65 130
17
96
Durable
Duration
...
...
Excitement Exclusion
Exercise
66
96 96
92 3
Dust
Existence
Existent
...
...
Duties
138
131
49 63, 109, 127 120 ...

...
...
Dvyanuka
...
Extension
Expanding
48 68
4
E
Ear ... Earth x Earthenware Earthy
Effect
3,
...
Experience
5,81
...
...
5,9
61
Expert Expression
Expressive of action
External light
...
...
...
4,8
110
Ill
...70,80
109, 102
...
...
... ...
73
136
External objects
Efforts of attention
93
127
Eye
Eyeball
...
... ...
...
5,8
70 30
Egotism Element Emancipation Endless doubt

Enjoyable
Entreaty
5, 9, 78, 79, 80,

...
103
Eye knowledge
105, 106
...
...
...
23
i17
Factitious
Fallacies
...
131
15
Entity 28,60, 110, 111, 112, 116, 117

...
...
...
96 1,24
3,
15,
...
175
147
1
Enunciation
Epithet
...
... ...
Fallacious
argument
...
12
Fallacy
False apprehension False knowledge
...
...
Equal
to the question
...
Erratic
15,
...
16 108
...
135 136
1
Essence and appearance

Established tenet
136
Familiar instance
Fault
Faults Faults of untruth
. .
...
1,9
118
5
2, 7,
Establishment
Eternal
...
...
108, 127
...
8, 10, 13, 15, 47, 50,
51, 53,
39
57, 64, 69, 90, 106, 109, 113, 114,
Fear
Felicity
...68,96
...
131, 157, 161
1,2
139
70 60
Eternal ness
Eternality
... ...
...
57 12, 16, 152

...
...
Fences
Fiery
Figuratively
Filling
...
...10,
...
...
Eternity
Ether
Ethereal
83, 5, 9, 20, 29, 53, 79, 129,

*
132
...
...
Five
Fire brand
8,
70
38 38, 79, 113 102 ...
Evasion
...
167,174
Fineness
...
81
.. .
vi
'
Page.
j
Page.
Fire
sacrifice
...
...
41
Growth
...
87 78 30
Five elements
114 77
77
Gustatory
Gustatory perception
...
...
Five objects
Five senses
Fixation
... ...
.
60
75
H
Habitual
Hatchet
Haii...
...
...
Fixed character
Fixed connection Fixed relation
Fixity
...
...
136
. .
38 63
38
100
121
...
58
118
Happiness
Horse
Hatred
sacrifices
...
...
Fixity of
number
...
4
...
...
Food
Forbearance
38, 121
...
125
94
94
Heat
Heretical view
68
125
11,
Forbearance from activity

Forest
Forester
...
...
...4,137
Heterogeneous
Heterogeneous exam pits
Heterogeneity
12
Form
Formation
Fortuitous
...
4 59 61,62,78
...
12,140
152, 153
...
137
Hetvabhasa
1,
15
effects...
5, 7, 13, 95,
,
...
112
137
Hina klesa
... ...
125 137
Fruit
...
103 112, 119, 103 105

7fi,
Hunger
Homogeneity Homogeneous
...15J, 15<J, 153,

... ... ...
...
160
11
Fruit of previous deeds

Fulfilment
...
...
Function
Futile
Futilities
... 1
60,
...
91
Homogeneous example Homogeneous things

Hurting the proposition
Hypothesis
Hypothetical
140
109
167
20
140
146
5, 21,
1,
9
9
Futility
20,
Future
34, 111
Hypothetical
dogma
9
1
Hypothetical reasoning
G
Ganges
General nation
Generality
...
... ...
60
152
Ideas
Identical
I
...
.
69
78,
...5,32
84
Genus
Gesture
Glass
18,
l
.
17,
59, 61,
Ignorance
Illumination
Illusion
. . .
20, 167,
173
62,
170
5
28, 149
... ... ...
28
... ...
73
God
Gold
Imagination
135
119
...
112
127
Immediate Immediate subsequency

Immolation Impelling
56, 121
...
...
...
96
61
Otd
Good
Greed
Grief
...
...
...
125
Ground...
68 90
Impermanent
Implication
....
56
>
Page.
...
Page.
Interval Intervention
...
...
Implied dogma
Impossibility
...
9,
10 93
50, 122
...
18, 128,
...
... ...
...
131
96
5,32
71
Impressions
Intimate relation
Intimately
Invalid
...
...
... ...
...
Impropriety
Inactive
129
20
123
68
45 10 8
13
Inadmissible
Invariable
Investigator
...
...
Inanimate
Inandition
Incapacity
19,
...
. .
... ...
52
95
Ill
Investigation
Invisibility
Inconsistency
...
Iron
Iron ball
Irregularities
...
73 69
sk'Jtii
Incoherent
167, 17
...
...
10
Incompatible
50 120
110
10
19
3
22
95
7
Incongruous
Inconsistent
Indifference
Irregularity
23, 24,
...
...
...
... ...
Irregularity of perception
Itihasa
...
124
Indirect
Indeterminate
Individual
Individuality
Indivisibility
Indivisibility of
J
Jalpa
1
59, 60, 61,

...
86
61
132
Jar
Jati
Jijfiasa
... ... ...
17, 47,
1,
...
62,
...
110 140
10
6 7
atoms
...
132 104 105
Inequality
...
...
Jflana
Inexperience
Inference
Judgment
Jugglery
Jyotistoma
2,3,25,28,31,
33, 67, 71
...
135
41
...
...
Infinite regression
140, 141)
Injunction
Innumerable
Inopportune
Inquiry
Instance
Instructive assertion
...
.
40,41,75, 124 ... 67

17,
K
Kalala
...
>
104
104
14
125
6
130, 157 171

...
Kandara
...
10
12
Karma
Katha
Kileso
...
81, 124
... ...
1, 8,
...
4
...
...
Instrument
67 67
Killing
Instrument of knowledge
Intangible
Intellect
Kitchen
Kleda
. .
8,10
15, 16, 50,
53
... ...
125
5, 6, 7, 16, 83,
84,85
Intelligence
5
...
...
....
Knave Knower Knowledge
20
67,
96
1,
2,
3, 6, 9,
24, 29, 35,
Internal-perception
159
67, 78, 84, 89,
90, 91 , 96, 97, 101,
Interpenetrated
Interrelation
...
80
109
109
127, 136, 137
Knowledge
Kritabani
of truth
135
Interrelation of cause
and
effect
...
110
viii
L
Page.
Lalitavistara Sutra
...
Page.
Mica
Milk
'...
...
73
87 9
134
149 133
Lamp
Larikavatttra Sutra
17, 28, 99,

...
Mim&m
Mind
Mirage
Mirror
Sakas
5,
...
6,
10,
29,
67,
90, 92
Light
Likeness
5, 9, 72,
... ...
73 96
87
8,135
...
...
78
Link
Letter
Misapprehension
2,
112, 126
55,
...
... ...
56
69
Mistimed
15,17
...
...
...
Loadstone
Mistimed reason
Mleccha
Modification
17
4,
Locomotion
Lotus
..
22
39
68
54, 55, 57,

...
58
M
Madhyamika
sophy
Buddhist,
philo... ...
...
...
Modification and substitute
54
86,99
163
Momentary
Mother
120 134
71
...
Motion
17,85
...
Mfidyamika Sutra
Magical power
Multiplicity
89
21
Magnitude
...
. .
Mahayana works
...
...
134 104
6
Mutual absence
Mutual
140, 147
...
Mamsa
Malice
pe*i
difference...
101
Manifestation
17,
61,73,110,111
116
N
N&garjuna
Nails
115,
...
Mark Mat
Material
6, 45, 87, 96, 115,

...
120
60
78
39, 54, 70,
Naiy&yika
Natural Natural connection
Natural quality
...
2,
22, 80, 83,

...
...
...
100 94
125
Material substance
...70,72
4, 6,
...
Matter
95
38
99
77
Maturation
100
136
Maya
Meaningless
...
Nature
Nature of sound
...
1, 6,
...
167, 170
...
1
46
Means Means
knowledge of right knowledge

of
118
,
Navakambala
Necessity
...
...
18
2,
26
138
4,
Measure
Medical Science
Meditation
. .
... ...
60
42
Negative Negative application
...
...
12
12
136, 137
...
Newborn
Night Nigraha sthana
Nirnaya
Nirvikalpaka
...
...
...
69
73
Members Membrane Memory

Merit
1,
10
73
.'*
.
.
...
...1,17
68,96
74, 112, 125
...
r
3
...
...
Merit and demerit
96 19 19 72
No-cause
Non-difference
113
161 147
Metaphor
Metaphorically
...
17,
... ...
36,157
...
Non-distinction
...
Meteor
Non-distinguished
...
"
(ix
Page.
Page*
Non Non Non Non
erratic
...
Nonentity
eternal
...
3 110,111,117
...
Occurrence
Odour
Olfactory
Olfactory perception
...77,
...
... ... ...
78
8, 10, 1 1, 12, 13, 16, 48,
78
50, 90, 113, 126, 151, 162
SO
181
eternalness
eternality
... ...
...
113 158
Omnipresence
11,
One
Operation
Operations of stimuli Operations of the Soul
129
Non-existence
2, 43, 45, 47, 48, 7 1
64,66,93
...
126, 128, 159
93 64
Nonexistent
Nonfulfilment
...
117,120
...
...
.105
Operator
... ...
39 22 48
Non
Non
ingenuity
...
...
167, 174
...
Opponent
Opportunity
14, 20,
Non-material
perception
72
Oppression of persons by spells

... ...
22, 28, 29, 32, 49,
124
52,87,159,162
Nonperception of knowledge in
pots
...
...
...
Opposing the proposition
167, 169
Opposition 17, 20, 48, 51, 63, 96, 114,
95
145
Non-produced
...
...
150 89
134
Organ of vision
Origination
...
...
65
Non production ... Non reality ... Non simultaneous Non simultaneousness Non simultaneousness
nitions
...
... ...
-
...
,...
...
"Other"
Otherness
83 51
51
...
84
...
...
93, 102
Overlooking the censurable 167, 174
of cog...
...
102 29
75
Non Non
Nose
simultaneity...
Pada
Pain
Part
... ...
..,
...
104
122
41
transparent
...
2, 5, 7,
...
...
...
5,65
Paradise
...
" Not commonly seen
...
32, 127,
...
... ...
128
NyAya Sutra
...
2,10,17,138
Partially Partially eternal
128 48 35
5,32
132
O
Object
3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 30, 66, 76,
Partial similarity
...
...
Particularity
81, 83, 85, 89, 136
Parts
127,128,129
...
.,
Objection
...
...23,35
118, 134
...
Parts in an atom
x ftSt
...
Object of knowledge
Object of right knowledge
Objects of sense
...
34, 111
...
Pauranikas
Perception
Obscurity
...
...
...
5,76,77, ... 73
...
...
2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 13, 22, 24, 25,
28,30,32,38,57,70,71,74,76,
Observance
Observation.
138
81,110,114,133,158,159
Perception of sound
Perfect tranquillity
...
...
112
8!
2 50 83
Obstruction
...
...
72,125
71,72,73 20, 167
Obviousness
Perishable
...
...
...
Occasion for rebuke
1,
Permanency
...
y
Pag*.
Prohibition
...
...
Page.
Persistent
....
53,83,08
...
...
Permanent
Person
Persuasion
intellect
84
122
Promiscuously
Pronunciation
Proof...
...
75,110 120 49
"...
40, 41
...
...
Pervades
Philosophy
Physician
Pitri riaa
100 8 4
Propagation
... ...
...
16,83,85 59 ...
...
Proper
Properties
132
7, 8, 22,
...
Pleasure
Pleasure and
pain...
5, 7,
...
123 122
Property
Proposition
...
23 8,11,150
167
8,10,11,12,13,15,16,
124 138 94
96
119
Ploughing
Possession
...
PurSna
Purifying
...
75, 78, 95, 96, 137 16, 95, 198
... ...
...
Pot
...
Purpose
1,8,10,72
...
Prabhakaras
Practice
...
...
Purusa
6,
68
136
Qualities
Practicable
Praise.
41,123
6
1
1
5, 9, 54, 69, 70, 71, 79, 99,
Prakriti
Pramana Prameya
Pratyaksa
2, 6,
...
... ...
102, 112
Qualities of earth...
...
70
145
Quality
74
5, 32, 59, 66, 79, 99,

...
...
Quality of soul
Prayojana
Preceptors Predicable
Predicate
1,10 138
151
89
81
Quality of sound
... ...
...
...
...
Question
8
'10
Questioning
147, 154
...
Quibble
80, 136
...
Predominance
...
1, 15, 17,
18
Predominant quality
Pre-eminence
Prescription
... ...
... ...
...
-
81
31
... ... ...
41 34
Radish
...
Present timo
Rain
...
... ...
68 93
72
133
Presumption
Previous
Pride...
life
2,43,44,155
68,69 ... 125
... ... ...
...
...
Rapt
in
mind
Ray
...
70, 71,
...
...
Reality
Primordial matter
Principle
...
Principle of injection
Probability
...
...
6,70 96 40
2,
Really eternal
...
48
Reason
Reason
10, 1
1,
12, 13, 16, 83, 91, 118,
135, 147, 154

.,,
43
78
46, 118
... ...
Processes
Reasoning
Rebirth
...
...
Produced
Product
...
113, 119
...
125
f
...
20
Rebuke
Receipt
Receptacle
...
... ...
Production 46, 90, 103, 104, 110, 111,
112,113,114,120,126,148
1,15,17,20,21 ... 96 121 .;.
il-)
Page.
Page.
Receptacle of happiness
...
121
Sankhya Philosophy
Sftnkhyas
2, 9, 83,
...
... ...
Reception
.
...
...
Recognition
7, 8, 22, 23, 83, 84,

...
84 85
94
10
81
41
Recognition of objects
Recollection
...30, 91,
...
83 92, 93, 98
...
.. ...
Samsaya Samiaya vyudasa Samskara

Sarvajit sacrifice
Satisfaction
i,io
Recklessness
125
Reductio ad absurdum
Reflection
...
...
1,35
6
97
8
...
Satpakf katha*
... ...
164
Refuge
129,133
...
Savikalpaka
3
78
Refuge ad refugee
Refutation
...
Savour
Saying too
little
...
...
...
...
114
132
167, 172
167, 172
Regressus ad infinitum
Regularity
...
...
...
Saying too much

Scaffolds
23,95
114, 115
40, 41, 42, 172
...
Regulation
Reinculcation
Relation
Scepticism
...
...
School
109
Screened
Scriptures
13,
...
Relation of refuge ad refugee
...
96
18,60 6 9 ... 73 14, 15, 70

...
...
Release
Reliable
2, 5, 7,
...
63, 123, 124, 137

...
...
Search of truth Season
138
Reliable person
Reliability
... ... ...
42 4
68
95
123
121
Seat of knowledge
... ...
..:
...
...
42 37 135
132
Secondary meaning
Sacred
fire
Reliance
Remembrance
Repelled
Repetition
...
66,
Seeds
Self existent
...
...
139
117
Renouncing the proposition 167, 169

...
...
Sense
70,
3, 5, 9, 30, 47, 51, 63, 65, 66,
41, 51, 167, 172, 17.3

...
72, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 85, 89,
Residence
128, 129
13, 26, 27,
4,
... ... ... 2,
130
Sense organ
...
...
Right knowledge
Rifi
...
1, 2,
...
43 39 33
6, 7, 10,
...
89
35
Sense perception
Risi rina
...
123
Sensuous bodies
Sentiments
Separately
... ...
...
...
...
89
5,7
22
River
...
...
...
Rumour
43
...
Separation
...
... ... ... ... ...
...
7, 97,
...
... ...
105
Sivah
104
7
Sabda
...
...
2 6
Series Series of reasons
Sacred books
Sacrifice
...
149
39,
...
124 118
Several marks
...
...
US
17
Sadhya
Sakya prapti
i
Shadow
Shamelessness
...
,..
Saraadhiraja 3utra
10 134
5
...
125
Shifting the proposition

Shifting the reason
Shifting the topic
167, 168
Sambhava
Sameness
"
*
...
167, 169
?*
52
167,170
Page.
Page.
Statue of stone
Stealing
*#
...
SiddhAnta
Significate
...
...
103
... ...
154
63
154
... ...
6
Ill
Sight
...
Step
...
Sign
...
96,
Study
Stupidity
...
Silence
167,173
...
2,7, 108,109,125
...
Similarity
3,19,20,33,35
24,93
... ...
Subject
Simultaneous
Suhject in dispu te
Simultaneous cognitions
Simultaneously
...
89
Subservient
2,142,145,146 ... 83 72,112

71
84
91
Snbstance
Substitute
3, 5, 9, 10, 32, 55, 59,
Simultaneous productions
Sin
...
...
...
54
81
63,64
...
Substrata
... ...
...
...
Single entity
116 108
64 78
1
Substratum
Succession
53
Single thing
Si re of operations of the soul
...
...
...
84
2
Successive annihilation
...
Sites
...
...
Summer
...
...
3
138
Sixteen categories
Summum bonum
Sun
...
...
Six-winged disputation
164, 166
...
...
3
71
Skin
Sloth
...
5
...
Supersensuous
...
...
...
...
125
Smell
5, 9, 3, 8,
...
... ...
70
76
10
16
Supreme felicity Supremacy

Sustaining
...
... ...
...
Smoke Smoky
Solution
...
1,2 80 92 60 10
Sustenance
Syllogism
...
i
... ...
Son
Soul
... ...
...
121
System
3, 5. 8, 11, 20, 22, 29, 63,
66, 67, 69, 91, 92,
95, 96, 104,
T
Tactual
...
109, 121, 124, 138,
...
78
Soul
is
receptacle
...
of
happi...
Tactual perception
...
...
80
59
ness
121
Taking
Tallness
Sound
5,8,9,10,11,12,17,27,46,
50, 51, 53, 78, 8]
,
90, 131
...
Tangibility
,..
8 28 O
1
5,
Soundness
Space
i..
8,
53
29 40 78
76
Tank
...
...
Tarka...
Taste...
..
Speech
Special qualities
Special part of toiyh
...
...
...
...
Tautology
... ...
...

39, 40,
...50,
At
51
Teaching
Technicalities
Special practice of meditation,

Spell
...
136
42,
5
1, 9,
. ...
148 138
3o
Tenet...
10
Spiritual injunction
...
*
Term
...
>
17, 19
Splitting
Termination
106 105
Statements
State at formation
...
22
137
Termination of deserts
...
...
Testimony
2, 4, 8,
28
"
m
'
>
Page.
- That
...
'-
Page.
i
59
150
112
133
Uninterrupted :ourse
...
Thing Thing denoted Thorn Thoughts Time ... Tongue Touch

Touching
Total absence
Totally
.75,88
...
... ... ...
Union
Universal
Universality
...17,
...
2 20 20
Off
...
...

Ill
Universal uniformity
'
29
5 101 9
Unlimited dimensions
...
...
... ...
132
...
5, 26, 63, 75, 76,
Unmarked Unnameable
Unobviousness
45
3
78
36 16
155 155
...
...
...
...
73 128 2
Un perceived
Unproved
Unreasonable
...
...
...
Tranquillity
. .
...117,121,129,150

Transcend
Transitory
...
.
130 83, 98, 99

...
Unsaid
Untenable
.,..
Unsaid conclusion
...

...
Transmigration
* ...
&
5, 7, 13,
...
... ... ...
109
...
... ...
90
39
125
6
ft
Transparency
Treatise
75
6
Untruth
Upakleia
Transparent consciousness
...
...
124
138
119
Upalabdhi
...
... ...
...
Treatise on knowledge
Upamana
Uttara Kurus
Tree
...
... ...
...
37
Trick...
67
Troubles
...
123, 124, 125

*
V
Vacaspati

True knowledge True nature
...
30 58
1
...1,127
Trusted to the soul
...
124
131
Vacuum Vada ...

Vaieesikas
...
...
it
...
Tryasarenu
Twilight
* .
...
... 8,
...
22
Vaisesika Philosophy
Valid...
Validity

5
43, 83,
...
Type
...
...
170
118 26 MB
10
U
Udyotakara
... ...
... ...
Vanquisher
... ... ... ...
...
30
Vapour
Varieties
...
...
...
Umpire
Unassailable
24
57
...
54
129
Variety
...
Unattended
Uncertainty
112
Vatsayana
1, 3, 17,
27, 30, 31
...39,
...
...44,
... ...
88
22
Veda
...
42
2
Uncommon
properties
... ...
...
Vedantin
Verbal
Verbal testimony
Undemonstrable
Understanding
Uneasiness
106
121
7
2, 4, 25,
...
2J
...
...
...
88
67
Verbal trick
Vicinity
Unenvious persons
Uniformity
Unintelligible
...
...
... #
138
uv
it
60
49
...
Veil
...
167, 171
Vision...
65
Page.
Visual
...
Page.
... ...
78
80
"Within"
Wife...
... ...
131?
Visual perception
...31,
...
121
131
'
VisVanatha
30
1
"Without"
...
...
...
Vitanda
Vividness
Vocal actions
...
WordWorld
Wrangler
Wrangling
4,38,59
...
...
93
6 6
...
...
2
15
Voice
... ...
...
1, 14, 15,
139
Volition
W
Warning
Water...
...
...
Y
Yoga
41
3,5, 8,9,75,79
...70,
institute
-::-.'
138
Yogacara Buddhist philosophy
133
Yogi
...
...
89
Watery
80
oy
"Yava"
W
139
Waxing
Web
... ...
...
133
Zeal for truth
Z
...
Whole
32, 127, 128, 129
...
WORD INDEX TO THE NYAYA
StitfRA.
Page,
TOtHfrp WsSaRTT
WCt9'iv.
iii.
ii.
2. 74.
1.
...
... ... ...
...
..
...
105
43.
... ... ...
... ...
2.
20.
35
131
U$*T
iii.
2. 78.
...
...
...
...
...
106
<HtflHW*mHl iil
V^ttiv. 1.27.
2. 41.
...
94
li3
vm&
(*
ii.
1. 12., iii. 2. 6.
iii.
... ...
^nencvmîii. 1.73.,
2.4.
35,84 81,84
92 167,173
130
33 6
mPTTftp
iii.
2. 32.
...
...
...
...
v. 2. 1., v. 2. 18.
2. 25.,
iii.
-.
iii.
nq
ii.
1. 31.,
iii. 2.
63.,
2.
77., iv. 1. 67., iv. 2. 16.
50, 70, 103, 106, 126,
WqpiHii.
**I^T%
ii.
1. 36. 2.
... ...
... ...
...
64.
... ...
7, 23, 23,
*?n
ii.
1. 15., ii. 1. 17.

i.
15
27, 27
35, 152
*fcrcr
1. 22.,
ii-
ii.
1. 5., ii
1. 6., ii. 1. 44., v. 1.
<wreNraw*
HWflJi. 2. 9.
I- 5.
...
...
23
17
nfe^tn^v.
nftrcra
iii.
1. 6.
146
96
2. 44.
i.
gQwiMHI
2. 13.
i.
18
18
^RmmH^HII^
fritowsrcsT
i.
2. 13.
1. 16.
...
...
... ... ...
H#?rh.l.41,iv.
2. 4.
34,111
Jhr^WH^ U.
34<lUt>Hf
ii.
1. 36., ii.
2.53.
...
JJ ...33,57 55
2. 44.
*Wi.
1. 5.
WpshlWîii.
1. 25.
...
mÂ
iv.*l. 63.
124 167
...
wgrei^v.
flglLI^Wiq,
2. 2.
i.
4
1. 8.
...
*y-l-15WftptffaaiRlii.
1.
50.
...
...
...
...
...
...
27
37 g6
9
**$ iii.
*fere*
2.
44.
1., v. 2.
...
...
...
...
...
Hftrtf v. 2.
i.
13.
1.
167, 172
...
1. 26.,
1.
i.
27,
i.
1.
30.
... ...
...
...
8, 9,
...
*RwKm iv.
llfa?Bi.
1.
61.
... ... ...
...
... ... ...
124
"fa^SIi. 1.24.
28.
... ...
...
8
9
1
... ...
UftpW*
i.
1. 1.
... ...
%5r
iii. 1.
62.
...
...
...
... ... ...
... ...
78
139
WTOSrWiv.
2.50.
...
HWmromii.
1. l.,ii. 1.
...
2,
ii.
1. 6.
...
22,22,23
...
*mm
iv. 2.
1.
ii.
46.
31.
2.
...
... ...
...
138
*n?RHv.
...
ii.
...
... ...
...
159
*wmwnj
<Hl?W>iUll
28,
2. 29.
...
...
...50,51
...
irgsiftraîii.
2. 14.
...
...
87
iv. 2. 14....
...
... ... ... ...

...
... ...
130 52
51
IRWRn ii.
*M^*Umii
2. 33.
2. 32.
... ... ...
...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
...
SRRlsnUii.
... ... ... ...
v. 2. 1.
...
...
167
*Wlto:
. 2. 36.
2-
...
52
IWltî".
iWîii.
iRflrcrar
23,
v. 1. 9.
... ...
90,148
...
... ...
2. 35. v. 2. 22.
iii.
... ...
93
...
...
174
73
II^flwRhfl*
1.
41.
WW-gqTWR^v.
1. 15.
...
...
...
... ... ...
...
...
152 6 6
44
VR$
i.
1. 15.
1. 15. 2. 4.
...
...
wwfiwrcni. VRfrraV ii.
...
... ...
...
...
...
...
... ... ...
...
VTOtrai
ii. 1.
23.
...
...
ii.
...
... ... ... ...
29
132
IWWT iv. 2.
WraWWRjU.
*HTOlfoiii.
25,
...
2. 52.,
2.
63.
...
:..
...56,60
...
2. 45....
2.
... ... ... ...

...
98
IWHHlRlWmiii.
<fnffRHffa$
ii.
47.
..*
...
... ...
93
2. 54.
#*imAl*
ii.
1-
41,
iv. 1. 16.
...
...
...
...
34>
...
57
vrftsnct v 2. 22.
-174
&
Y
Page.
VpnmWn v. 2. 23.
vfkm
ft?f iv.
1.
. .
175
113
v. 1. 1., v. 1. 14.
...
..
140,151
...
25.
...
...
ufoSE*
HftWiTf
iii.
2. ,25, v. 1
iv.
...
32.
...
90,160
wPRBtfiv. 1.27.,
iv. 1. 26.
1.66.
... ...
...
...
...
113,126
...
...
113
wftwarmii.
2. 24., iv. 1. 26.
Uftsmnn^v. 1. 35., v. 1. *#K* v. 1. 35., v. 1. 36.

wfrRH&
ii.
36.
50, 113 161,162
...
... ...
...
... ...
161,
...
2. 52.
...
...
162 56
126
Hftsra^
wftRETCBH
ii.
2. 15., iii. 2.
... ...
77,
iv. 1.
... ... ...
...
66.
...
... ...
...
47, 106,
... ...
v. 1. 32.
1.
160
uftBwiv.
vftfaTCRp
23.
H3 H3
.
iv. 1. 22., iv. 1. 23.
...
112, 113
...
nftfireftT: iv. 1. 24.
... ...
...
...
...
*1&*1W
ii.
2. 58.
...
...
...
58
194
Vfamt
ii.
2. 57., iii. 2.
1. 57.,
ii.
77
iii.
...
58,
ufrqwîi.
vfcrit
ii.
2. 56., iii. 2. 31.,
2.
69,
v. 2.
24,
...39, 58,
92, 104, 175

2.
57.
...
... ... ... ...
... ...
...
...
...
... ... ... ...
... ...
...
...
58 95
122
119
Ill
rir(3ifr
iii.
2. 40.
...
...
w&!%:
*ftw4Yl*
iv. 1.
57. 46.
nftwrffc:
iv. 1.
iv. 1. 17.
1.
...
...
..
... ...
VlgqBftr Hi.
22.
... ... ...
..
155
H^WI^
4lg*IK<U
v. 1. 22. 1.
...
155
73
173
106
WgHfTîii.
v.
iii.
41.
...
...
...
...
...
...
2 17.
2. 75.
...
...
...
...

ngsfc^t
ug^jfti
..
v. 1. 1.
i.
...
ii.
...
...
.<. ...
140 89
134
lljwftl
1.
16,
2.
1.
20,
iii.
2. 22.
2. 30.
iv. 2.
iii.
...
...
6, 28,
*3<TOf%
ii. ii.
21,
iv. 1.
iii.
4i,iv.
1. 2.
49, 118,
Hgqqfa: mqijrch
6,
1.
1.
ii.
45, 42w
50, 46,
v. 1.
18,
v.
iv.
1.
17.
...
35, 75, 131, 153
ii.
2.
76,
1.
...
33,
iv. 1.
60,
iv. 2.
iv. 2. 11., iv. 2.
25,
20,
v. 1. 24.
35, 55, 106, 115, 123, 128,
129, 132, 154, 156
HS'WfaPEPH v
>
I- 12'
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"
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.;.-:';:/
Pagd.
49, 49, 159
7, 49,
Hg^wfal^ ii.
W3qsrfta
i.
2. 20.,
ii.
2. 21., v. 1. 29. v. 1. 38.
...
...
...
...
1. 23., ii. 2. 21.,
102
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2.26.
ii.
2.
37.,
...
iii.
1.
34.,
...
iii.
1.
41.,
iii.
1. 66., iii. 2. 15., iv.
...
53,71,73,79,87,133
...
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iii. 1.
39., iv. 2. 26.

...
...
72,
...
133 159
wgqgfaraw
v. 1. 29.
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ii.
ii.
1. 49., ii. 1.
ii.
53.,
ii.
1. 54., ii.
2. 19.,
ii.
ii.
2. 20., ii. 2. 22.,

iii. 1.
iii.
2. 27.,
iii.
2. 34.,
iii.
ii.
2. 35.,
ii.
2. 36.,
2. 20.,
2. 38.,
40.,
iii. iii.
1.
45.,
1. 65.,
2. 18.,
iii.
iii.
2. 24.,
2. 39.,
2.
55.. v. 1. 29., v. 1. 30.
...
36, 38, 38, 49, 49, 49, 50, 52, 52, 52, 53, 72, 74, 79, 88, 89, 90, 95, 100, 159,
159
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iv. 1. 4.
...
...
...
...
...
... ...
110
41
H3**RHii.
1.
66.
iii.
...
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1. 19.,
2. 64., iv. 1. 59., iv. 2.

... ...
41.
...
68, 103, 123, 137

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ii.
...
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...
...
ii.
... ...
ii.
59 173 2
3,
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1. 49., ii. 2. 17.,
iii.
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...
31, 33, 36, 48,

2. 2.
l. 50.
iii.
... ...
...
88
...
...
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58

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THE

SACRED BOOKS OF THE HINDUS

Translated by various Sanskrit Scholars.

Major B. D. BASU, I.MS.

THE NYAYA SUTRAS OF GOTAMA

Bosb at the Indian Press

NYAYA SUTRAS OF GOTAMA

MAHAMAHOPADHYAYA SATlSA CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA,

THE PACINI OFFICE, BHUVANE&'WARI ASRAMA, BAHADDRGANJ

defined defined defined

defined and explained

Beterogeneous or negative reason

... ... ... ...

... ... ...

... ... ...

Wrangling ( I a Cavil ( fair )

... ... ...

Quibble in respect of a term

Quibble in respect of a genus

... ... ... ...

... ... ...

Quibble in respect of a metaphor

occasion for rebuke

... ... ... ... ...

The means and

Special kinds of knowledge

The time present, past and future

Blame (finp) ... Warning ( i^ft )

The Medical Science

... ... ... ...

.The nature of sound

Letters, their modifications

... ... ...

Duality of the eye

... ... ...

Knowledge is The nature of

58 is not not momentary knowledge*( vn )

Desire and aversion

not the seat of knowledge

.'(*wt) and its causes Knowledge ( pt ) is not a natural

quality of the body

producing the body

... ... ...

Entity does not arise from non-en tit.y (1

Production from no-cause

1 s^' ft&i\ ) All are not distinct ( t &' ^j )

Debts and troubles

Discussion, wrangling and cavil

Balancing the homogeneity

Balancing the heterogeneity Balancing an addition

Balancing a subtraction (tm^ra)

Balancing the unquestionable

Balancing the alternative

Balancing the reciprocity

... ... ... ...

Balancing the non-produced Balancing the doubt

... ... ... ...

Balancing the controversy

Balancing the presumption

Balancing the non-difference (

Balancing the demonstration

157 158 159

Balancing the non-perception

... ... ... ...

to sut^t 3rn5

<rf: TO 35 Hf^r t ^r^t'sejtk^ sg^i a^iRf an^ra^f^Kiwidfi, Aran s I t%jrm

ftw 33?ssrt* a*n fi&ufa'^|8&