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G.R. No. 153176 March 29, 2004 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,vs. HON. ZEIDA AURORA B. GARFIN, FACTS: On June 22, 2001, private respondent was charged with violation of the "Social Security Act,". That on or about February 1990 and up to the present, in the City of Naga, Philippines, within the functional jurisdiction of SSS Naga Branch and the territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, while being the proprietor of Saballegue Printing Press, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally refuse and fail and continuously refuse and fail to remit the premiums due for his employee to the SSS in the amount of (P6,533.00), representing SSS and EC premiums for the period from January 1990 to December 1999 (n.i.), and the 3% penalty per month for late remittance in the amount of ELEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY-THREE PESOS and 28/100 (P11,143.28) computed as of 15 March 2000, despite lawful demands by letter in violation of the above-cited provisions of the law, to the damage and prejudice of the SSS and the public in general. The case was raffled to Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City. Accused Serafin Saballegue pleaded not guilty to the charge and the case was set for pretrial.5 Three days thereafter, the accused filed a motion to dismiss6 on the ground that the information was filed without the prior written authority or approval of the city prosecutor as required under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court. After considering the arguments raised, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss in its first questioned Order dated February 26, 2002, to wit: After considering the respective arguments raised by the parties, the Court believes and so resolves that the Information has not been filed in accordance with Section 4, par. 3 of Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal ProcedureRule 112, Section 4 x x x x x x No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy. Expresio unius est exclusio alterius. The Information will readily show that it has not complied with this rule as it has not been approved by the City Prosecutor. This Court holds that the defendants plea to the Information is not a waiver to file a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. By express provision of the rules and by a long line of decisions, questions of want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. ISSUE: Whether the approval of the city or provincial prosecutor is no longer required. HELD: No. Under Presidential Decree No. 1275. The Regional State Prosecutor is clearly vested only with the power of administrative supervision. As administrative supervisor, he has no power to direct the city and provincial prosecutors to inhibit from handling certain cases. At most,

he can request for their inhibition. Hence, the said directive of the regional state prosecutor to the city and provincial prosecutors is questionable to say the least. Petitioner argues that the word "may" is permissive. Hence, there are cases when prior written approval is not required, and this is one such instance. This is too simplistic an interpretation. Whether the word "may" is mandatory or directory depends on the context of its use. We agree with the OSG that the use of the permissive word "may" should be read together with the other provisions in the same section of the Rule. The paragraph immediately preceding the quoted provision shows that the word "may" is mandatory. It states: Sec. 4, Rule 112. x x x Within five (5) days from his resolution, he (investigating prosecutor) shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action. (emphasis supplied) In sum, we hold that, in the absence of a directive from the Secretary of Justice designating State Prosecutor Tolentino as Special Prosecutor for SSS cases or a prior written approval of the information by the provincial or city prosecutor, the information in Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597 was filed by an officer without authority to file the same. As this infirmity in the information constitutes a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured, the respondent judge did not err in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.

[G. R. No. 156982. September 8, 2004] NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, FACTS: Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created on March 25, 1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is tasked to receive, process and review amnesty applications. It is composed of seven members: a Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex officio members.[1][6] ISSUE: Whether honoraria may be validly granted to the representatives of ex-officio members HELD: No. The COA is correct that there is no legal basis to grant per diem, honoraria or any allowance whatsoever to the NAC ex officio members official representatives. The Constitution mandates the Commission on Audit to ensure that the funds and properties of the government are validly, efficiently and conscientiously used. Thus, Article IX-D of the Constitution ordains the COA to exercise exclusive and broad auditing powers over all government entities or trustees, without any exception:

Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the government, which are required by law of the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto. (2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, inexpensive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.Section 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. (Emphasis supplied). The representatives cannot be considered de facto officers because they were not appointed but were merely designated to act as such. Furthermore, they are not entitled to something their own principals are prohibited from receiving. Neither can they claim good faith, given the express prohibition of the Constitution and the finality of our decision in Civil Liberties Union prior to their receipt of such allowances. WHEREFORE the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. [G.R. No. 143964. July 26, 2004] GLOBE TELECOM, INC., vs. THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, COMMISSIONER JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO FACTS: Globe and private respondent Smart Communications, Inc. (Smart) are both grantees of valid and subsisting legislative franchises,[13]authorizing them, among others, to operate a Cellular Mobile Telephone System (CMTS), utilizing the Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) technology.*14+Among the inherent services supported by the GSM network is the Short Message Services (SMS),*15+also known colloquially as texting, which has attained immense popularity in the Philippines as a mode of electronic communication. On 4 June 1999, Smart filed a Complaint[16]with public respondent NTC, praying that NTC

order the immediate interconnection of Smarts and Globes GSM networks, particularly their respective SMS or texting services. The Complaint arose from the inability of the two leading CMTS providers to effect interconnection. Smart alleged that Globe, with evident bad faith and malice, refused to grant Smarts request for the interconnection of SMS.*17+ On 19 July 1999, NTC issued the Order now subject of the present petition. In the Order, after noting that both Smart and Globe were equally blameworthy for their lack of cooperation in the submission of the documentation required for interconnection and for having unduly maneuvered the situation into the present impasse, NTC held that since SMS falls squarely within the definition of value-added service or enhanced-service given in NTC Memoradum Circular No. 8-9-95 (MC No. 8-9-95) the implementation of SMS interconnection is mandatory pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) No. 59. The NTC also declared that both Smart and Globe have been providing SMS without authority from it, in violation of Section 420 (f) of MC No. 8-9-95 which requires PTEs intending to provide value-added services (VAS) to secure prior approval from NTC through an administrative process. Yet, in view of what it noted as the peculiar circumstances of the case, NTC refrained from issuing a Show Cause Order with a Cease and Desist Order, and instead directed the parties to secure the requisite authority to provide SMS within thirty (30) days, subject to the payment of fine in the amount of two hundred pesos (P200.00) from the date of violation and for every day during which such violation continues.*24+ Globe filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[25]to nullify and set aside the Order and to prohibit NTC from taking any further action in the case. It reiterated its previous arguments that the complaint should have been dismissed for failure to comply with conditions precedent and the non-forum shopping rule. It also claimed that NTC acted without jurisdiction in declaring that it had no authority to render SMS, pointing out that the matter was not raised as an issue before it at all. Finally, Globe alleged that the Order is a patent nullity as it imposed an administrative penalty for an offense for which neither it nor Smart was sufficiently charged nor heard on in violation of their right to due process.[26]The Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order on 31 August 1999. ISSUE: Whether NTC may legally require Globe to secure NTC approval before it continues providing SMS; HELD: No. Every party subject to administrative regulation deserves an opportunity to know, through reasonable regulations promulgated by the agency, of the objective standards that have to be met. Such rule is integral to due process, as it protects substantive rights. Such rule also promotes harmony within the service or industry subject to regulation. It provides indubitable opportunities to weed out the most frivolous conflicts with minimum hassle, and certain footing in deciding more substantive claims. If this results in a tenfold in administrative rules and regulations, such price is worth paying if it also results in clarity and consistency in the operative rules of the game. The administrative process will best be vindicated by clarity in its exercise. In short, the legal basis invoked by NTC in claiming that SMS is VAS has not been duly established. The fault falls squarely on NTC. With the dual

classification of SMS as a special feature and a VAS and the varying rules pertinent to each classification, NTC has unnecessarily complicated the regulatory framework to the detriment of the industry and the consumers. But does that translate to a finding that the NTC Order subjecting Globe to prior approval is void? There is a fine line between professional mediocrity and illegality. NTCs byzantine approach to SMS regulation is certainly inefficient. Unfortunately for NTC, its actions have also transgressed due process in many ways, as shown in the ensuing elucidation. In summary: (i) there is no legal basis under the PTA or the memorandum circulars promulgated by the NTC to denominate SMS as VAS, and any subsequent determination by the NTC on whether SMS is VAS should be made with proper regard for due process and in conformity with the PTA; (ii) the assailed Order violates due process for failure to sufficiently explain the reason for the decision rendered, for being unsupported by substantial evidence, and for imputing violation to, and issuing a corresponding fine on, Globe despite the absence of due notice and hearing which would have afforded Globe the right to present evidence on its behalf. Thus, the Order effectively discriminatory and arbitrary as it is, was issued with grave abuse of discretion and it must be set aside. NTC may not legally require Globe to secure its approval for Globe to continue providing SMS. This does not imply though that NTC lacks authority to regulate SMS or to classify it as VAS. However, the move should be implemented properly, through unequivocal regulations applicable to all entities that are similarly situated, and in an even-handed manner. Concurrently, the Court realizes that the PTA is not intended to constrain the industry within a cumbersome regulatory regime.[102]The policy as pre-ordained by legislative fiat renders the traditionally regimented business in an elementary free state to make business decisions, avowing that it is under this tmosphere that the industry would prosper.[103]It is disappointing at least if the deregulation thrust of the law is skirted deliberately. But it is ignominious if the spirit is defeated through a crazy quilt of vague, overlapping rules that are implemented haphazardly. By no means should this Decision be interpreted as removing SMS from the ambit of jurisdiction and review by the NTC. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. YAZAKI TORRES MANUFACTURING vs. COURT OF APPEALS GR. NO. 130584; JUNE 27, 2006 FACTS: The Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) is the government agency tasked with the administration of the PAG-IBIG[2][2] Fund (Fund) created under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1530, signed into law on June 11, 1978. The Fund has been intended for housing purposes to be sourced from voluntary contributions from its members. On December 14, 1980, P.D. No. 1530 was amended by P.D. No. 1752 providing that membership in the Fund is mandatory for all gainfully-employed Filipinos. On June 17, 1994, P.D. No. 1752 was amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7742 which took effect on January 1, 1995. Under the new law, the coverage of the Fund extends to all

members of the Social Security System and Government Service Insurance System, as well as their employers. However, membership is voluntary for employees earning less than P4,000.00 a month. Employees who are non-members of the employers private plan at the time of the certificate of waiver or suspension of coverage is granted shall continue to be mandatorily covered by the Fund and their employer is required to set aside and remit to the Fund the employee contributions together with the employer contributions. Yazaki Torres Manufacturing, Inc., petitioner herein, a corporation organized under Philippine laws, applied for and was granted by the HDMF a waiver from the Fund coverage for the period from January 1 to December 31, 1995. The HDMF found that petitioners retirement plan for its employees is superior to that offered by the Fund. Such waiver or suspension may be granted by the Fund on the basis of actual certification that the waiver or suspension does not contravene any collective bargaining agreement, any other existing agreement or clearly spelled out management policy and that features of the plan or plans are superior to the Fund and continue to be so. Provided further, That the application must be endorsed by the labor union representing a majority of the employees or in the absence thereof by at least a majority vote for all the employees in the said establishment in a meeting specifically called for the purpose; Provided furthermore, That such a meeting be held or conducted under the supervision of an authorized representative from the Fund. The certificate of waiver or suspension of coverage issued herein shall only be for a period of one (1) year effective upon issuance thereof. No certificate of waiver issued by the President of the Fund shall have retroactive effect. Application for renewal must be filed within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the existing waiver or suspension and such application for renewal shall only be granted based on the same conditions and requirements under which the original application was approved. ISSUE: Whether the HDMF exceeded its authority when it amended its original Rules and Regulations. HELD: No. The legislative power is granted pursuant to Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution which provides: SEC. 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum. The legislative power has been described generally as the power to make, alter, and repeal laws. The authority to amend, change, or modify a law is thus part of such legislative power. It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society. However, the legislature cannot foresee every contingency involved in a particular problem that it seeks to address. Thus, it has become customary for it to delegate to instrumentalities of the executive department, known as administrative agencies, the power to make rules and regulations. This is because statutes are generally couched in general terms which express the policies, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and manner of carrying out the law are left to the administrative agency charged with its implementation. In this sense, rules and regulations promulgated by

an administrative agency are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law.[3][9] Hence, in general, rules and regulations issued by an administrative agency, pursuant to the authority conferred upon it by law, have the force and effect, or partake of the nature, of a statute. The law delegated to the HDMF the rule-making power since this is necessary for the proper exercise of its authority to administer the Fund. Following the doctrine of necessary implication, this grant of express power to formulate implementing rules and regulations must necessarily include the power to amend, revise, alter, or repeal the same. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION vs. GMA NETWORK GR. 164026; December 23, 2008 FACTS: On August 19, 1995, the petitioner, GMA NETWORK, INC., (GMA, for brevity), a domestic corporation, filed an application for collective approval of various amendments to its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws with the respondent Securities and Exchange Commission, (SEC, for brevity). The amendments applied for include, among others, the change in the corporate name of petitioner from Republic Broadcasting System, Inc. to GMA Network, Inc. as well as the extension of the corporate term for another fifty (50) years from and after June 16, 2000. Upon such filing, the petitioner had been assessed by the SECs Corporate and Legal Department a separate filing fee for the application for extension of corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of its authorized capital stock plus 20% thereof or an amount of P1,212,200.00. On September 26, 1995, the petitioner informed the SEC of its intention to contest the legality and propriety of the said assessment. However, the petitioner requested the SEC to approve the other amendments being requested by the petitioner without being deemed to have withdrawn its application for extension of corporate term. On October 20, 1995, the petitioner formally protested the assessment amounting to P1,212,200.00 for its application for extension of corporate term. On February 20, 1996, the SEC approved the other amendments to the petitioners Articles of Incorporation, specifically Article 1 thereof referring to the corporate name of the petitioner as well as Article 2 thereof referring to the principal purpose for which the petitioner was formed. ISSUE: Whether imposition of fees and charges on the basis of a memorandum circular was valid HELD: No. Republic Act No. 3531 (R.A. No. 3531) provides that where the amendment consists in extending the term of corporate existence, the SEC shall be entitled to collect and receive for the filing of the amended articles of incorporation the same fees collectible under existing law as the filing of articles of incorporation.*4+*8+ As is clearly the import of this law, the SEC shall be entitled to collect and receive the same fees it

assesses and collects both for the filing of articles of incorporation and the filing of an amended articles of incorporation for purposes of extending the term of corporate existence. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature, or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. A related factor which precludes consideration of the questioned issuance as interpretative in nature merely is the fact the SECs assessment amounting to P1,212,200.00 is exceedingly unreasonable and amounts to an imposition. A filing fee, by legal definition, is that charged by a public official to accept a document for processing. The fee should be just, fair, and proportionate to the service for which the fee is being collected, in this case, the examination and verification of the documents submitted by GMA to warrant an extension of its corporate term. Rate-fixing is a legislative function which concededly has been delegated to the SEC by R.A. No. 3531 and other pertinent laws. The due process clause, however, permits the courts to determine whether the regulation issued by the SEC is reasonable and within the bounds of its rate-fixing authority and to strike it down when it arbitrarily infringes on a persons right to property. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY vs. SEGUNDA ALMEIDA GR. No. 162784, JUNE 22, 2007 FACTS: On June 28, 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to Margarita Herrera several portions of land which are part of the Tunasan Estate in San Pedro, Laguna. The award is evidenced by an Agreement to Sell No. 3787.[5][1]By virtue of Republic Act No. 3488, the LTA was succeeded by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). On July 31, 1975, the DAR was succeeded by the NHA by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 757.[6][2]NHA as the successor agency of LTA is the petitioner in this case. The records show that Margarita Herrera had two children: Beatriz Herrera-Mercado (the mother of private respondent) and Francisca Herrera. Beatriz Herrera-Mercado predeceased her mother and left heirs. Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971. On August 22, 1974, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child of the late Margarita Herrera executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she is the only remaining relative, being the sole surviving daughter of the deceased. She also claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of the late Margarita Herrera. The Deed of Self-Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated October 7, 1960, allegedly executed by Margarita Herrera.

The said document was signed by two witnesses and notarized. The witnesses signed at the left-hand side of both pages of the document with the said document having 2 pages in total. Margarita Herrera placed her thumbmark[7][5]above her name in the second page and at the left-hand margin of the first page of the document. During trial on the merits of the case assailing the Deed of Self-Adjudication, Francisca Herrera filed an application with the NHA to purchase the same lots submitting therewith a copy of the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by her mother. Private respondent Almeida, as heir of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado, protested the application. The Court of Appeals ruled that the NHA acted arbitrarily in awarding the lots to the heirs of Francisca Herrera. It upheld the trial court ruling that the Sinumpaang Salaysay was not an assignment of rights but one that involved disposition of property which shall take effect upon death. The issue of whether it was a valid will must first be determined by probate. Petitioner NHA elevated the case to this Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the Resolution of the NHA and the Decision of the Office of the President have attained finality, and if so, whether or not the principle of administrative res judicata bars the court from further determining who between the parties has preferential rights for award over the subject lots; HELD: YES.Res judicata is a concept applied in review of lower court decisions in accordance with the hierarchy of courts. But jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of administrative res judicata:the rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers . . . It has been declared that whenever final adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata.*8+*20+ To be sure, early jurisprudence were already mindful that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually understood as courts without unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof and that the more equitable attitude is to allow extension of the defense to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been conferred. In Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals,[9][21] the Court held that the rule prescribing that When the petitioner received the Sinumpaang Salaysay, it should have noted that the effectivity of the said document commences at the time of death of the author of the instrument; in her words sakaling akoy bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay Hence, in such period, all the interests of the person should cease to be hers and shall be in the possession of her estate until they are transferred to her heirs by virtue of Article 774 of the Civil Code which provides that: Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.[10][33]

By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the original applicant has already passed away. Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971.[11][34] The NHA issued its resolution[12][35] on February 5, 1986. The NHA gave due course to the application made by Francisca Herrera without considering that the initial applicants death would transfer all her property, rights and obligations to the estate including whatever interest she has or may have had over the disputed properties. To the extent of the interest that the original owner had over the property, the same should go to her estate. Margarita Herrera had an interest in the property and that interest should go to her estate upon her demise so as to be able to properly distribute them later to her heirsin accordance with a will or by operation of law. The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property. Margarita Herrera had an existing Contract to Sell[13][36] with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita Herreras demise, this Contract to Sell was neither nullified nor revoked. This Contract to Sell was an obligation on both partiesMargarita Herrera and NHA. Obligations are transmissible.[14][37] Margarita Herreras obligation to pay became transmissible at the time of her death either by will or by operation of law. If we sustain the position of the NHA that this document is not a will, then the interests of the decedent should transfer by virtue of an operation of law and not by virtue of a resolution by the NHA. For as it stands, NHA cannot make another contract to sell to other parties of a property already initially paid for by the decedent. Such would be an act contrary to the law on succession and the law on sales and obligations.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of the National Housing Authority is DENIED. MAYOR FELIPE K. CONSTANTINO, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN SEPT. 13, 2007; G.R. No. 140656 FACTS: That on or about February 28, 1996, in Davao City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Felipe K. Constantino, a public officer, being then the Mayor of the Municipality of Malungon, Sarangani Province, committing the crime herein-charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage of his official functions, with evident bad faith, manifest partiality or through gross inexcusable negligence, and conspiring and confederating with accused Norberto N. Lindong, President and Chairman of the Board of the Norlovanian Corporation, Davao City, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a Lease Agreement for the rental of various heavy equipments (sic) for a period of six (6) years for and in consideration of the sum of PESOS: TWO HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED ELEVEN and 11/100 (P257,111.11) per month or a total consideration of PESOS: EIGHTEEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED ELEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINETY-NINE and 92/100 (P18,511,999.92) and a guaranty deposit of PESOS: ONE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND (P1,780,000.00) contrary to the express mandate of Resolution No. 2, series of 1995, of the Municipal Planning and Development Council implementing Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 198, series of 1995 and Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 21 dated February 22, 1996 authorizing the Municipal Mayor of Malungon to enter into an agreement for the purchase of heavy equipments (sic) on a five-year term basis for and in consideration of the amount of PESOS: TWO MILLION TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P2,200,000.00) per year or a total consideration of only PESOS: ELEVEN MILLION

(P11,000,000.00), thus, giving said Norlovanian Corporation, which was fully paid for the Guaranty Deposit and was actually paid heavy equipment rentals for the period March 5 to May 6, 1996 in the aggregate sum of PESOS: TWO MILLION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTYSEVEN THOUSAND NINETY and 91/100 (P2,177,090.91), unwarranted benefits and advantage and causing undue injury to the government. Constantino and Lindong were found guilty.

MAGALLANES vs. SUN YAT SEN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL. GR. NO. 160876; JANUARY 18, 2008 FACTS: On May 22, 1994, respondents terminated the services of petitioners. Thus, on August 3, 1994, they filed with the Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch No. X, National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Butuan City, complaints against respondents for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, payment of backwages, 13th month pay, ECOLA, separation pay, moral damages, and attorneys fees. Likewise, on August 22, 1994, petitioner Cotecson filed a separate complaint praying for the same reliefs. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED with respect to petitioners Cotecson, Bacolod, and Magallanes, the questioned Resolutions of the NLRC dated February 20 and April 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE as to them. The Decision dated July 3, 1995 of the Labor Arbiter is hereby REINSTATED as to the said petitioners except as to the award of moral and exemplary damages which is hereby DELETED. However, the Court of Appeals (Special Sixteenth Division) ruled that in lieu of reinstatement, petitioners Cotecson, Bacolod, and Magallanes shall be entitled to separation pay equivalent to one month salary and backwages computed from the time of their illegal dismissal up to the time of the promulgation of its Decision. With respect to Bella Gonzales and Grace Gonzales, the Court of Appeals found that that they have not acquired the status of regular employees having rendered only two years of service. Consequently, their dismissal from the service is valid. Under the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, only full-time teachers who have rendered three (3) years of consecutive service shall be considered permanent. ISSUE: Whether the issuance by the NLRC of the Order dated March 30, 2001, amending the amounts of separation pay and backwages, awarded by the Court of Appeals (Sixteenth Division) to petitioners and computed by the Labor Arbiter, is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. HELD: NO. This case involving a labor dispute has dragged on for over a decade now. Petitioners have waited too long for what is due them under the law. One of the original petitioners, Judith Cotecson, died last September 28, 2003 and has been substituted by her heirs. It is time to write finis to this controversy. The Labor Code was promulgated to promote the welfare and well-being of the working man. Its spirit and intent mandate the speedy administration of justice, with least attention to technicalities but without sacrificing the fundamental requisites of due process.[19][7] We sustain petitioners contention that the NLRC, in modifying the award of the Court of Appeals, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Quasi-judicial agencies have neither business nor power to modify or amend the final and executory Decisions of the appellate courts.

ISSUE: Whether judgment by an administrative body may be disturbed by a judicial tribunal.

HELD: Yes. Although the instant case involves a criminal charge whereas Constantino involved an administrative charge, still the findings in the latter case are binding herein because the same set of facts are the subject of both cases. What is decisive is that the issues already litigated in a final and executory judgment preclude by the principle of bar by prior judgment, an aspect of the doctrine of res judicata, and even under the doctrine of law of the case, the re-litigation of the same issue in another action.[15][47] It is well established that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them.[16][48] The dictum therein laid down became the law of the case and what was once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision continues to be binding between the same parties as long as the facts on which the decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. Hence, the binding effect and enforceability of that dictum can no longer be resurrected anew since such issue had already been resolved and finally laid to rest, if not by the principle of res judicata, at least by conclusiveness of judgment.[17][49] It may be true that the basis of administrative liability differs from criminal liability as the purpose of administrative proceedings on the one hand is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime.[18][50] However, the dismissal by the Court of the administrative case against Constantino based on the same subject matter and after examining the same crucial evidence operates to dismiss the criminal case because of the precise finding that the act from which liability is anchored does not exist. It is likewise clear from the decision of the Court in Constantino that the level of proof required in administrative cases which is substantial evidence was not mustered therein. The same evidence is again before the Court in connection with the appeal in the criminal case. Ineluctably, the same evidence cannot with greater reason satisfy the higher standard in criminal cases such as the present case which is evidence beyond reasonable doubt.

Under the principle of immutability of judgments, any alteration or amendment which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the NLRC directingthat the monetary award should be computed from June 1994, the date petitioners were dismissed from the service, up to June 20, 1995 only, is void. Petition granted

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ENO FISHPOND CORP. GR. NO. 154475; SEPT. 30, 2005 FACTS: On March 13, 1979, the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), an agency under the Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to Fishpond Lease Agreement FLA No. 2132, leased unto respondent Cabral Fishpond Industry Corporation (Cabral Corporation) a 50-hectare fishpond located at Sitio Pinamuc-an, New Washington, Province of Aklan. On June 25, 1979, in yet another Fishpond Lease Agreement (FLA NO. 2126), BFAR leased to the same corporation another 50-hectare fishpond also located in the same sitio. At the time the two (2) aforementioned lease agreements were executed, seventy-five (75%) percent of the capital stock of the lessee corporation was owned by the late Marcelino Cabral, husband of respondent Editha Cabral. In an intestate proceedings brought before the Regional Trial Court at Iloilo City to settle the intestate estate of Marcelino Cabral, the intestate court awarded to Editha her husbands shareholdings in Cabral Corporation. On April 29, 1998, Editha, by way of a deed of assignment, assigned to Paterno Belarmino her 75% shareholdings in Cabral Corporation. Editha also executed a deed of confirmation authenticating the deed of assignment she had earlier executed in favor of Belarmino. On June 10, 1998, Cabral Corporation whose President at that time was Edithas daughter Marjorie Galsim, assigned the corporations leasehold rights over FLAs No. 2126 and 2132 to respondent Eno Corporation, a corporate entity controlled by Maceja Ong Oh, another daughter of Editha and a sister of Marjorie. The conveyance was embodied in a Deed of Assignment[2]executed on June 10, 1998 by Cabral Corporation thru its President Marjorie Galsim. ISSUE: Whether the issue of the validity or nullity of the Deed of Assignment an intra-corporate dispute and, therefore, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission? HELD: In order that the Securities and Exchange Commission can take cognizance of a case, the controversy must pertain to any of the following relationships; (a) between the corporation, partnership or association and the public; (b) between the corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners, members or officers; (c) between the corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar as its franchise permit or license to operate is concerned;

and (d) among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves. The parties in D.A. Case No. 99-439-F were Eno Corporation which is a stranger to Cabral Corporation and Editha Cabral who was a stockholder of said corporation. A dispute between these two parties cannot be categorized as intra-corporate dispute because the parties did not fall under any of the relationships mentioned above. Another point. It is procedurally absurd that Editha Cabral as a petitioner herein should assail the jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture considering that she invoked that jurisdiction by filing her letter-protest against Eno Corporations application which resulted in the administrative case. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION vs. SECRETARY MOCHAEL DEFENSOR; GR. NO. 163980; AUGUST 3, 2006 FACTS: Prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, a number of presidential issuances authorized the creation and development of what is now known as the National Government Center (NGC). On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826, reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over 440 hectares as a national government site to be known as the NGC. On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137, excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein. In view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded by Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former President Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993, authorizing the vertical development of the excluded portion to maximize the number of families who can effectively become beneficiaries of the governments socialized housing program. On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207. Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to secure the land tenure of the urban poor. Toward this end, lands located in the NGC, Quezon City shall be utilized for housing, socioeconomic, civic, educational, religious and other purposes. Sec. 3. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center Site to Bona Fide Residents. Proclamation No. 1826, Series of 1979, is hereby amended by excluding from the coverage thereof, 184 hectares on the west side and 238 hectares on the east side of Commonwealth Avenue, and declaring the same open for disposition to bona fide residents therein: Provided, That the determination of the bona fide residents on the west side shall be based on the census survey conducted in 1994 and the determination of the bona fide residents on the east side shall be based on the census survey conducted in 1994 and occupancy verification survey conducted in 2000: Provided, further, That all existing legal agreements, programs and plans signed, drawn up or implemented and actions taken, consistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby adopted.

Sec.4. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center Site for Local Government or Community Facilities, Socioeconomic, Charitable, Educational and Religious Purposes. Certain portions of land within the aforesaid area for local government or community facilities, socioeconomic, charitable, educational and religious institutions are hereby reserved for disposition for such purposes: Provided, That only those institutions already operating and with existing facilities or structures, or those occupying the land may avail of the disposition program established under the provisions this Act; Provided, further, That in ascertaining the specific areas that may be disposed of in favor of these institutions, the existing site allocation shall be used as basis therefore: Provided, finally. That in determining the reasonable lot allocation of such institutions without specific lot allocations, the land area that may be allocated to them shall be based on the area actually used by said institutions at the time of effectivity of this Act. ISSUE: Whether an IRR issued by an administrative office may be reviewed by Courts HELD: Yes. Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasijudicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. True, this Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly with it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, so warrant. A direct invocation of the Courts original

jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entitys or persons jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[20][21] Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasilegislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners allegation that respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED. RUIVIVAR vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN GR. No. 165012; SEPT. 16, 2008 FACTS: On May 24, 2002, the private respondent filed an Affidavit-Complaint charging the petitioner before the Ombudsman of serious misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a public official, abuse of authority, and violations of the Revised Penal Code and of the Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.[21][6] The private respondent stated in her complaint that she is the President of the Association of Drug Testing Centers (Association) that conducts drug testing and medical examination of applicants for drivers license. In this capacity, she went to the Land Transportation Office (LTO) on May 17, 2002 to meet with representatives from the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and to file a copy of the Associations request to lift the moratorium imposed by the LTO on the accreditation of drug testing clinics. Before proceeding to the office of the LTO Commissioner for these purposes, she passed by the office of the petitioner to conduct a follow up on the status of her companys application for accreditation. While there, the petitioner -- without provocation or any justifiable reason and in the presence of other LTO employees and visitors -- shouted at her in a very arrogant and insulting manner, hurled invectives upon her person, and prevented her from entering the office of the LTO Commissioner. The

petitioner also accused the private respondent of causing intrigues against her at the DOTC. To prove her allegations, the private respondent presented the affidavits of three witnesses. The Ombudsman furnished the petitioner a copy of the Complaint-Affidavit and required her to file her counter-affidavit. In her Counter-Affidavit, the petitioner denied the private respondent's allegations and claimed that she merely told the private respondent to bring her request to the LTO Assistant Secretary who has the authority to act on the matter, not to the DOTC. The petitioner also claimed that the private respondent also asked her to lift the moratorium and pressured her to favorably act on the private respondents application for accreditation. To prove these claims, petitioner presented the affidavits of her two witnesses. The Ombudsman called for a preliminary conference that the parties attended. The petitioner manifested her intent to submit the case for resolution. The Ombudsman then directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. Only the petitioner filed a Memorandum where she stressed that the complaint is not properly substantiated for lack of supporting affidavits and other evidence. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for certiorari under rule 65 is the proper and only available remedy when the penalty imposed in an administrative complaint with the office of the ombudsman is considered final and unappealable. HELD: No. The appropriate remedy, under the circumstances, is not the appellate remedy provided by Rule 43 of the Rules of Court but a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of these Rules. Moreover, The exhaustion principle applies when the ruling court or tribunal is not given the opportunity to re-examine its findings and conclusions because of an available opportunity that a party seeking recourse against the court or the tribunals ruling omitted to take. Under the concept of due process, on the other hand, a violation occurs when a court or tribunal rules against a party without giving him or her the opportunity to be heard.] Thus, the exhaustion principle is based on the perspective of the ruling court or tribunal, while due process is considered from the point of view of the litigating party against whom a ruling was made. The commonality they share is in the same opportunity that underlies both. In the context of the present case, the available opportunity to consider and appreciate the petitioners counterstatement of facts was denied the Ombudsman; hence, the petitioner is barred from seeking recourse at the CA because the ground she would invoke was not considered at all at the Ombudsman level. At the same time, the petitioner who had the same opportunity to rebut the belatedly-furnished affidavits of the private respondents witnesses was not denied and cannot now claim denial of due process because she did not take advantage of the opportunity opened to her at the Ombudsman level. Under these circumstances, we cannot help but recognize that the petitioners cause is a lost one, not only for her failure to exhaust her available administrative remedy, but also on due process grounds. The law can no longer help one who had been given ample opportunity to be heard but who did not take full advantage of

the proffered chance. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition. [G.R. No. 123048. August 8, 2000] YOLANDA FLORALDE, vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: On April 23, 1994, petitioners employees of the ATI charged respondent Paulino W. Resma with grave misconduct in office (sexual harassment) in three separate complaints filed directly with the Civil Service Commission. On August 30, 1994, the Commission gave due course to the complaints and formally charged respondent with grave misconduct requiring him to submit his answer with the affidavits of his witnesses, and placed him under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days effective upon notice. On September 9, 1994, respondent filed his answer to the complaints. He specifically denied all the accusations against him and asked for the dismissal of the complaints. On September 20, 1994, the Commission resolved to conduct a formal investigation of the case. At the hearing, petitioners affirmed the contents of their affidavits and gave the specific dates during which the sexual harassment took place. Petitioners categorically narrated the various incidents of sexual harassment, and they were subjected to extensive cross-examination. On the other hand, five witnesses testified for the respondent including himself. In essence, they testified that the sexual harassment could not have occurred.On February 17, 1995, the Commission convinced that the complainants had proven the guilt of the respondent with substantial evidence, issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of grave misconduct and meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties.[22][3] On March 6, 1995, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the Commission erred because the decision was not supported by evidence. On April 18, 1995, the Commission denied the motion for reconsideration. On June 16, 1995, respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via petition for review. After due hearing, on September 22, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision which REVERSED and SET ASIDE the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission. ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission on the ground that the same were not supported by substantial evidence. HELD: Yes. As to the issue of whether the resolution of the Civil Service Commission is supported by substantial evidence, we find that, in fact, preponderant evidence supported its findings. "In determining where the preponderance or the superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts on which they are testifying, the nature of such facts, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also

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their personal credibility as far as the same may legitimately appear at the trial. The Court may also consider the number of witnesses, although the preponderance is not necessarily with the greatest number." "By preponderance of evidence, is meant that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. "The concept of preponderance of evidence refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth." Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission. "Well-settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that the findings of fact of an administrative agency must be respected, as long as such findings are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or preponderant. It is not the task of an appellate court to weigh once more the evidence submitted before the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency in respect of sufficiency of evidence."[23][17] WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals. In lieu thereof, the Court REVIVES and AFFIRMS the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission [A.M. No. 05-12-757-RTC. March 7, 2006] RE: SEXUAL HARASSMENT COMMITED BY JUDGE REXEL M. PACURIBOT, RTC, BR. 27, GINGOOG CITY FACTS Two (2) women filed separate complaints for sexual harassment against Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot. The first is Sherlita O. Tan, Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City and the other is Johanna M. Villafranca, Clerk II, Gingoog City Parole and Probation Office. Both are married. Ms. Tan's ordeal started in August 2004 when she refused an invitation from Judge Pacuribot to have dinner. On October 4, 2004, Judge Pacuribot sent her a text message saying that his blood pressure went up because she refused to go out with him. On October 20, 2004, Ms. Tan was attending a wedding at Pryce Plaza Hotel in Cagayan de Oro when Judge Pacuribot called her on the mobile phone asking when she will be back in Gingoog City. She said that she will leave immediately after the wedding and she will just take a taxicab to the Agora Terminal. Judge Pacuribot said that she would fetch Ms. Tan from the hotel. Ms. Tan declined the offer but Judge Pacuribot angrily insisted on the ground that he was already waiting outside the hotel. Ms. Tan, who was now scared, went out and got in the car. However, instead of bringing Ms. Tan to the terminal, Judge Pacuribot brought her to a motel. When she protested (sic) Judge Pacuribot harshly told her to -"Shut up! As if you are a virgin!" Judge Pacuribot and Ms. Tan left the motel but instead of going to the terminal, he brought her to the Discovery Hotel saying that it would be better for Ms. Tan to sleep there instead of traveling alone. Judge Pacuribot left Ms. Tan alone in the room because he had to attend a Masonic Conference. She however could not leave because she did not have enough

money to pay the balance of the hotel bill. At around 7 a.m. of the following morning, Judge Pacuribot arrived. Ms. Tan's ordeal started all over again. Back in the office, the harassment continued. Whenever Ms. Tan would go inside Judge Pacuribot's chamber, the latter would grab her blouse, mash her breast, kiss her, touch the crutch (sic) of her pants, pull the string of her panty and kiss her neck while saying that she smelt so sweet. Judge Pacuribot got angry when Ms. Tan refused to answer his text messages and insinuated that this will have an adverse effect on her performance rating. Ms. Johanna M. Villafranca, on the other hand, was initially the recipient of amorous text messages from Judge Pacuribot with invitations for dinner. Ms. Villafranca was wary of these invitations because both of them are married. She refused all of these invitations but Judge Pacuribot was persistent forcing her to request for a transfer, which was however denied. In the last week of February 2005, she got a call from Judge Pacuribot who was furious. According to him, he was an honorable person and yet Ms. Villafranca refused his invitations. Consumed by fear, she finally relented and accepted a dinner invitation on February 22, 2005. While inside his car, Judge Pacuribot displayed his firearm, which was allegedly for security purposes. It nevertheless intensified Ms. Villafranca's fear. Instead of going to a restaurant, Judge Pacuribot drove to a drive-in motel. From that day, Judge Pacuribot constantly demanded that Ms. Villafranca send him text messages and letters expressing sweet nonsense to feed his ego and any failure or refusal would be met by a threat to divulge the incident in the motel. Then Judge Pacuribot started demanding food from Ms. Villafranca, which the latter was supposed to bring to his boarding house. If she refused, Judge Pacuribot would threaten to tell damaging stories to her mother-in-law with whom she had a strained relation and to show the picture he took on the cell phone. Because of these threats, Ms. Villafranca was forced to bring some food to Judge Pacuribot. When Judge Pacuribot sensed that she was not going to file an annulment case, he drafted a document wherein it was stated that Ms. Villafranca and her husband supposedly agreed that they may freely co-habit with a third person. Judge Pacuribot, using threats of physical and social harm, forced Ms. Villafranca and her husband to sign the document. When Ms. Villafranca still did not file the annulment case, Judge Pacuribot slapped her and hit her head with a clenched fist. Again he placed a kiss mark on her neck and when her husband saw it, he beat her up. When Judge Pacuribot knew of the beating, he forced Ms. Villafranca to file a rape case but she refused. The complainants filed their complaints personally before the Office of Deputy Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock. Although Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca knew each other professionally, their meeting at the said office was purely coincidental and they had no idea that the other was likewise the victim of Judge Pacuribot. Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca tearfully related to Deputy Court Administrator Christopher Lock their harrowing experience at the hands of Judge Pacuribot. ISSUE: Whether complaints of sexual harassment against Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals should be excluded from the jurisdiction of the CODIs.

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HELD: Yes. In fine, the referral of Ms. Sherlita Tan's sexual harassment complaint against Judge Rexel Pacuribot to the CODI of the RTC of Gingoog City for investigation, report and recommendation, contravenes Section 3 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and limits, nay, weakens this Court's constitutionally mandated disciplining authority over Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, besides exposing the courts to ridicule and derision. It is hereby Resolved, that in accordance with Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution vesting this Court with the power of administrative supervision over all courts and personnel thereof, inclusive of which is the authority to discipline Judges and Justices, complaints of sexual harassment against Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals should be excluded from the jurisdiction of the CODIs. Accordingly, Section 8 of A.M. No. 03-03-13-SC, the Rule on Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment Cases and Guidelines on Proper Work Decorum in the Judiciary is hereby amended to read as follows:Sec. 8. Jurisdiction, powers and responsibilities of the CODIs. - The CODIs shall have jurisdiction over all complaints for sexual harassment committed by officials and employees of the Judiciary, except those against Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, which shall fundamentally adhere to the proceeding laid down in Section 3 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended. CODIs shall: (a) Receive the complaint, investigate its allegations, and submit a report and recommendation to the proper court or authority, as provided for in Section 18 of this Rule; x x x x. [Emphasis supplied.] With respect to all the other recommendations of the OCA, finding them to be in accord with existing laws, the same are hereby APPROVED. In particular, Judge Rexel Pacuribot is immediately SUSPENDED until further notice from this Court. He is likewise DIRECTED to comment on the complaints of Mesdames Tan and Villafranca within ten days. The complaint, however, of Ms. Sherlita Tan should be docketed as a regular administrative matter to be consolidated with that of Ms. Johanna M. Villafranca's for proper disposition in line with the foregoing discussion.