Aff K Toolbox Michigan 7 Week Juniors 7WEEK JUNIORS AFF K TOOLBOX Before using this file.

you should know: The realism work was put out in a separate file (which you will have access to on the cd .we will send this work out to the individual labs electronically .While some is repetitive with the seniors lab. there is also other literature included (like Murray) We did not put out answers to every criticism written at camp. since the criticisms all came with answers . However. we did put out additional evidence to most of the criticisms. which you should use as supplements to your answer files Many of the cards can be used to answer multiple Ks (ex.Truth existstgood. pragmatism. etc) .Familiarize yourself with the file so you can find answers to all the ks Pragmatism Solvency .Best Action ....................................... 1 Pragmatism Solvency .Best Action (Need nation-state action)2 Pragmatism Solvency .Best Action (Need nation-state action)3 Pragmatism Solvency .Alt can work within kamework ....... 4 Pragmatism Solvency .Critical Theory Alone Fails .............. 5 Pragmatism Solvency .Moral Purity Alone Fails ..................6 Pragmatism Solvency .Disengagement + war and tyranny .7 AT: Pragmatism .Key lo the Feminist Movement ................ 8 State Good .................................................................... ........... 9 State Good .................................................................... ......... 10 State Good .................................................................... .........I1 State Good -Zizek................................................................12 State Good -Zizek (AT: Cooption) ...................................... 13

Util Good -Morality Hurts Policymaking ............................14 Util Good -Ok to Use People as Means to an End .............. 15 AT: Framework -Debate Good ............................................16 AT: Framework -Debate Good ........................................... 17 AT: Framework -Debate Good ............................................18 AT: Framework -Debate Good ............................................19 AT: Framework -Debate Good ................................. .........20 AT: Methods K -No Alt ................................................21 AT: Postmodernjsm K -Postmodernism Fails .....................22 AT: Postmodernism K -Permutation Solvency ................... 23 AT: Podemodernism K -Permutation Solvency .................. 24 AT: Postmodernism K -Modernism Good ..........................25 AT: Postmodernism K -Cultural Relativism TI ................... 26 AT: Postmodernism K -Cultural Relativism TI ................... 27 Postn~odemism K -KDestroys Coalitions (Krishna) ..........28 AT: Truth Ks -Truth Good ..................................................29 AT: Truth Ks -Truth Good .................................................30 AT: Truth Ks -Truth Good .................................................31 AT: Truth Ks -K of Truth Bad ............................................32 AT: Truth Ks -Truth Good .................................................33 AT: Fear of Death -Love and Fear Compatible ...................34 AT: Fear of Death -Love = destructive (Fear key) ..............35 AT: Fear of Death -Love = Bad (Fear Key to Peace) ..........36 AT: Fear of Death -Mobilizes people/compassion ..............37 AT: Fear of Death -Mobilizes people/compassion .............. 38 AT: Fear of Death -Fear Key to Value to Life ....................39 AT: Fear of Death .Fcar Key lo Valuc to Lifc .....................40 AT: Fear of Death- Key to Human Survival .........................41 AT: Fear of Death .Fear Key to Leadership .........................42 AT: Fear of Death .Key to Prevent State Annihilation ........47 AT: Fear of Death .Plan Solves ...........................................44 AT: Fear of Nukes .Plan Solves Numbing ...........................45 AT: Fear oi'Nukes .Key to Peace and Survival ...................46 AT: Fear oiNukes .Key to Peace and Survival ...................47 AT: Fear or Nukes .Pcace and Survival ...............................48 AT: Fear or Nukcs .Pcace and Survival ...............................49 AT: Fear of Nukcs .Disarm Bad (Weapons key to pcacc) ...50 AT: Fear of Nukes .Key to Denuclearize .............................51 AT: Nuclearism -Permutation Solvency ..............................52 AT: Nuclearism -Alternative + More Numbing .................5.3 AT: Nuclearism -Images of Nuclear Discourse Key ............54 AT; Nuclearism- Nuclear weapons are morally acccplable ...55 AT: Chaloupka -Krishna evidence ....................................... 56 AT: Non-violcncc -Alternative + Holocausl ......................57 AT: Non-violence -Alternative + Genocide .......................58 AT: Non-violence -Alternative Increases Violence .............59 AT: Non-violence -Alternative Increases Violence .............60 AT: Non-violence -Alternative Increases Violence .............61 AT: Non-violence -Violence Key to Peace ..........................62 AT: Non-violence -Alternative Unnecessary (Violence not a threat)

AT: Non-violence .Alternative Impossible (nonviolence relies on violence) ............................................................... ................. 64 AT: Non-violence -Love = Impossible ................................65 AT: Non-violence -Perm Solvency ......................................66 AT:Kappeler -Permutation Solvency ...................................67 AT: Cuomo -Negative Peace Key to Positive Peace ............ 68 AT: Cuomo -Permutation Solvency .....................................69 AT: Terror Talk -Alternative -3 Terrorism.......................... 70 AT: Terror Talk -Alternative + Terrorism..........................71 AT: Terror Talk -Language Key to Win WOT ....................72 AT: Terror Talk -'Freedom Fighters' Worse .......................73 AT: Images of Suffering -Images good ................................74 AT: Language K -Suppression of language bad ..................75 AT: Language K -Suppression of language bad ..................76 AT: Language K -Censorship Bad .......................................77 AT: Language K -All Fails ..................................................78 AT: Identity Politics -Essentialist ........................................79 AT: Borders K -Borders key to peace .............................81 AT: Borders K -Borders key to ethnic cleansing .................82 AT: Borders K -Preserves Liberty .......................................83 AT: Santos -Alt Fails ...........................................................85 AT: Santos -86 Alt Fails ........................................................... AT: Santos -Alt Fails ...........................................................87 AT: Biopower -Alt fails .......................................................88 AT: Biopower -Alt Fails (Biopower Can Be Good) ............89 AT: Biopower -Alt Fails (Biopower Can Be Good) ............90 AT: Biopower -Key to Democracy ......................................91 AT: Biopower -Key to Democracy ......................................92 AT: Biopower -Key to Democracy ......................................93 AT: Biopower -Key to Democracyy ....................................94 AT: Biopower -Key to Value to Life (AT: Bare Life) .........95 AT: Biopower -AT: It's Racist ............................................96 0

Aff K Toolbox Michigan 7 Week Juniors AT: Biopower .AT: It's Racist ............................................97 AT: Foucalt .Permutation Solvency ....................................98 AT: Foucalt .Permutation Solvency ....................................99 AT: Foucalt .No Link + Essentialism ...............................100 AT: Foucalt .Alt Fails = Essentialist.................................101 AT: Foucalt .Alt + SuKering...........................................102 AT: Foucalt .Alt = Con~radictory.....................................103 AT: Foucalt .No Alternative ...........................................104 AT: Foucalt .No Alternative ............................................. 105 AT: Foucalt .No Alternative .............................................106 AT: Foucalt .No Alternative (Nihilism) ............................107 AT: Kritiks of Rights .State Action Key ...........................108 AT: Agamben .Alt Fails ..................................................1 10 AT: Aganiben .Alt + Violence (Ignores Suffering) ......... 1 I I AT: Apamben .All No Rights (Rights Good) ............... 112 AT: Agamben .All destroys democracy and rights ...........113 AT: Agamben .Alt + collapse the state ............................1 14 AT: Agamben .Singularity destroys politics ..................... 115 AT: Agamben .Alt fails .....................................................1 16 AT: Agamben .AT: Humanitarianism .........................1 17 AT: Calculations Bad .Calculations Good ........................ 1 18 AT: Calculations Bad .Calculations Good ........................1 19 AT: Otherization .Plan key prevent extermination ........... 120 AT: Otherization .Responsibility to Other Exists ............. 121 AT: Empire . AT: Badiou .Plan solves the criticism ................................161 AT: Badiou .Human rights good ........................................ 162 AT: Badiou .No Link .....................................................163 AT: Badiou .Doublebind.................................................... 164 AT: Badiou .I/L to Lacan ...................................................165 AT: Badiou .Alternative fails ............................................. 166 AT: Badiou .Alternative fails .................... .........................167 AT: Badiou .Alternative fails .............................................168 AT: Normativity .Normativity Good .................................169

AT: Normativity .Normative Thought Inevitable ..............170 AT: Normativity .Normative Thought Inevitablc ..............171 AT: Normativity .Alternative Fails ...................................172 AT: Normativity .Alternative Fails ....................................173 AT: Normativity .Alternative Fails ....................................174 AT: Normativity .Alternative Fails (Ommission) ..............175 AT: Normativity .Schlag ignores oppressed voices .reifies oppression ......................................................................... ....................176 AT: Normativity .Alternative = Inaction ...........................177 AT: Normativity .Nihilistic and Self-Fulfilling Prophecy .178 AT: Empire .Must Work Through The Empire (your alt fails)179 AT: Empire .Must Work Through The Empire (your alt fails)l80 AT: Empire .Plan = key (US better alt to Empire) .............181 AT: Empire .Alternative + Terrorism ..............................182 Alternative + Terrorism ...................... ..... 183 AT: Deconstruction K .Permutation Solvency .................. 122 AT: Otherization .Responsibility to Other Exists ............. 123 AT: Lacan .Essentialism ................................................... 124 AT: Lacan .Esscntialism .............................................. 126 AT: Lacan .Esscnlialisrn .................................................127 AT: Lacan .Essentialism ...................................................128 AT: Lacan .Essentialism.................................................129 AT: Lacan .AT: Lacan is not Essentialist .......................... 130 AT: Lacan .Conservatism.................................................. 13 1 AT: Lacan .Conservatism.................................................. 132 AT: Lacan .Conservatism.................................................. 133 AT: Lacan .Violence ......................................................... 134 AT: Lacan .Violence .......................................................135 AT: Lacan .Alternative Doesn't Solve Case .....................136 AT: Stavrakakis .Permutation Solvency ........................... 137 AT: Psychoanalysis .Action Key ......................................138 AT: Psychoanalysis .Alternative Fails ..............................139 AT: Utopias Bad .Utopias Good ..................................... 140 AT: Utopian Fantasies Bad .Utopias Good ....................... 141 AT: Traverse the Fantasy -Utopias Good ........................... 142 AT: Traversing thc Fantasy .Fantasies Good .................... 143 AT: Traverse thc Fantasy .Fantasies = Incvitable (alt fails)145 AT: Traversing the Fantasy .Fantasy deslroys symbolic order146 AT: Traversing the Fantasy .Leads to bare life ................. 147

AT: Zizck .A1 t +Violence ................................................ 148 AT: Zizck .A1 t + Violence............................................... 149 AT: Zizck .Alt Violence.......................................... 150 AT: Zizek .A1t + Violence...........................................15 1 AT: Zizck .Alt Fails .......................................................... 153 AT: Zizek .Alt Fails ..........................................................154 AT: Zizek .Alt Fails ..................................................... 155 AT: Zizek .Alt Fails (Reinscribes Capitalism) .................. 156 AT: Zizek .Perm Solvency ................................................ 157 AT: Deleuzc and Guattari .Alt Fails .................................. 158 AT: Badiou .Permutation Solvency .................................. 159 AT: Badiou .State Key ......................................................160 AT: Empire .Alternative Violence ................................184 AT: Empire .Alternative + Violence ................................185 AT: Empire .Alternative Justifies Holocaust .....................186 AT: Empire .Globalization Good .....................................187 AT: Empire .Globalization Good .......................................188 AT: Empire .Globalization Key to Democracy ..................189 AT: Empire .Capitalism Good (their alt = utopian) ...........190 AT: Empire .US leadership good (all fails) .......................191 AT: Empire .US action solves crisis management (MNCs)192 AT: Empire .Alternative Fails (Lack of empiricisdproof 193 AT: Empire .Alternative Fails (Multitude Bad) .................194 AT: Empire .Alternative Fails (Multitude Bad) .................195 AT: Empire .All + Suffering (No rule of law) .................196 AT: Empire .Imperialism Inevitable ..................................197 AT: Empire .Imperialism Inevitable ..................................198 AT: Empire .Capitalism Inevitable ....................................199 AT: Empire .Capitalism Inevitable ....................................200 AT: Empire .No Tech Revolution ......................................201 AT: Empire .AT: Sovereignty Links .................................202 AT: Empire .AT: Nation-Slate Links .................................203 AT: Empire .Borders Links ...............................................204 AT: Empire .MNCs ...........................................................205 AT: Empire .AT: Biopower Impact ...................................206 AT: IR Fem .Focus on identity + exclusion .....................207 AT: IR Fem .Focus on identity + exclusion .....................208 AT: IR Fem -Focus on identity + Exclusion (shatters movement) ......................................................................... ...................-209 AT: IR Fem .Focus on identity + Exclusion (shatters movement) ......................................................................... ....................210 AT: IR Fem -ReiSy Difference Falsely (Alt Fails) .............211 AT: IR Fem -Makes Discipline Meaningless (Alt Fails) ...212 AT: IR Fem -Ignores Suffering of Men .............................213 AT: IR Fem -Alt Fails ........................................................214

AT: IR Fem -No Gender Bias ............................................215 AT: IR Fem -Permutation (Realism) ..................................216 AT: Anthropoccntrism -Anthro Romance nature = extinction

Aff K Toolbox Michigan 7 Week Juniors ......................................................................... ...................217 AT: Anthropocentrism -Anthro key to action/ecological conscience (alt fails) ............................................................218 AT: Anthropocentrism -Anthro kcy to protect environment/ecological conscience (alt fails) .....................219 AT Anthropocentrism -Anthro Won't Hurt the Environment220 AT: Anthropocentrism -Humans and Nature are not zero-sum221 AT: Anthropocentrism -Perm Solves Bcst ........................222 AT: Global -local: Permutation Solvcncy .........................223 AT: Global -local: Global Action Good ............................224 AT: Global -local: Global Action Good ............................225 AT: Global -local -Alt Ignores Human Rights .................226 AT: Global -local: No Alternative .....................................227 AT: Global -local: Checks on globalization now (no need for global state) .................................................................. ....... 228 AT: Nietzsche Nihilism -Replicates Status Quo Problems229 AT: Nietzsche/Nihilism -Results in No Valuc to Life....... 230 AT: NietzscheNihilism -Justifies Holocaust ....................231 AT: Nietzsche/Nihilism -Justifies Holocaust .................... 232 AT: Nietzsche/Nihilisrn -Leads to Classism ..................... 233 AT: NietzscheNihilism -Justilles Terrorism .................... 234 AT: Nietzsche/Nihilism -Root of all violence ...................236 AT: Nietzsche /Nihilism -Leads to Violence ..................... 237 AT: NietzscheNihilism -AT: Christianity ........................238 AT: Nietzsche/Nihilism -Alt Fails ....................................239 AT: Nietzsche/Nihilism -Alt Fails ..................................... 240 AT: Nietzsche/Nihilism -Alt Fails (Power Relations) ....... 241 AT: Nietzsche/Nihilism -Alt Fails (Superman) ................. 242 AT: Hiedegger -Alt Fails ................................................. 243 AT: Hiedegger -Alt Fails ................................................... 244 AT: Hiedegger -Alt SufferingExtinction .....................245 AT: Hiedegger -Alt Fails (justifies Holocaust) ..................246 AT: Hiedegger -Alt Fails Cjustitics Holocaust) .................247 AT: Hiedegger -He's a Nazi .............................................248 AT: Hiedegger -Humanism Good .....................................249 AT: Hiedegger -Humanism Good .....................................250 AT: Hiedegger -Humanism Good ..................................... 251 AT: Spanos -Alt Fails ........................................................252 AT: Spanos -Alt Fails ..................................................... 253 AT: Baudrillard -No Alt ...................................................254 AT: Baudrillard -No Alt ...................................................255 AT: Baudrillard -Alt reintrench modernism ...................... 256 AT: Baudrillard -Alt ignores exploitation and destruction 257 NEG -INDICTS OF RORTYIPRAG ................................ 258

NEG -INDICTS OF RORTYIPRAG ................................ 259

Pra~matismSolvencv -Best Action Pragmatism is best -solves the case and achieves the benefits of the alternative Gayman 99 (Cynthia, Penn State Journal of Speculative Philosophy, http://muse.jhu.edu!journals/journal~ofspeculativc~philosophy/v0 13113.2gayman.html) However, even as postmodernism can challengc the positive values inherent in pragmatic method--meliorism, reconstruction, community, instrumentalism, pluralism--since even careful incluirv can he subverted bv domination, pragmalisn~ challenges postmodernism ncssimism: the privileging of "on~ositionalilv and difference . . .commits 'the fallacv of scleclivc emphasis' detailed by Dewey." As Stuhr remarks. "This is a seductive error, offering us. now fortified by an appreciation of difference, the easy solace of traditional idealism: self-transformation and self-transcendence (and becoming other than what one is) through self-understanding and self-awareness"(108). Pragmatism would argue against arbitrary and Calsc self-assertion as the only hope against domination and totalization. for the lact of social constitution of selves does not prccludc recognition of or respect for-. Instead, sociallv constructed selves can ioin together as a pragmatic communitv of inquirers who refuse to support inhumane social practices, thereby de-structuring institutional domination and creating the communallv recognized value of individual human dipnltv. Stuhr thus conjoins deconstructive critique with pragmatic instrumentalism, whose means are political and moral action. [End Page 1481 In Stuhr's view, pragmatism and postmodernism together constitute a theoretical and practical challenge to beliefs and practices in view of a reconstructive vision of the future. But on what basis will such a future be envisioned? Is self-conscious critique an adequate basis for determining which forms of social domination arc more or less harmful? Does such critique indicate whose interests a desired end best serves or how a chosen means of action can be determined as moral? If answers to such questions remain provisional, lor no absolulc iustifcation exists for any particular action. this is not to say "there is sufficient reason for doinp nothing at all" (1 14). On the contrary, "because there is no reason lo think fuller individualitv and fuller communitv are impossible, therefore there is sufficient reason for undertaking the reconstruct~on of experience bv means of intellipent criticism--criticism that is always partial, persmctival, and urovisional" (114).This cmbrace of life's inherent contingency makes Stuhr's pragmatism a hard philosophy, for no ground of certainty provldes rest for thc birth and nurturance of the real. But perhaps even the urge to philosophize is born less of wonder than of fear. As Dewey recognized, "the quest for ccrtainty" leads epistemological and moral inquiries to discover ordcr in the nature of experience or find structure intrinsic to human understanding.

But if reality is less assured and more contextuallv determined, if it demands more courage in the face of the ever-not-quite, this does not mean that the truth of human meaninas and moral values are relative to mere agreement or are a matter of social and political expediency. The hard philosophy of gcncaloplcal prarrmatism demands that inquiry be directed to open-ended truths or truths-inprocess, to the complexities of everyday experience, and to a neverending critical assessment of choices finalized or mistakes made.

Pra~matisrn Solvencv -Best Action (Need nation-state action) We can agree with their criticism privately and use it to inform our own interactions with others, but doing this on a national level is the equivalent of the abandoment of democratic politics, Claiming a national identity within the nation-state is the only way to achieve structural change. Rorty 98 (Richard, Stanford Philosophy Professor, Achieviltg Our Country, pp. 94-7) These futile attempts to vhiloso~hize one's wav into polit-ical relevance are a svmptom of what happens when a Left re-treats l'rom activism and adopts a s~cctatorial approach to the problems of its countrv. Disengagement from practice pro-duces theoretical hallucinations. These result in an intellec- tual environment which is, a.Mark Fxlniundson says in his book Nightmare on Main Street. Gothic. The cultural Left is haunted bv ubiquitous specters, the most frinhtening of which is called "vower." This is the nanw of what Umund- son calls Foucault's "h:~unting ilpncy. which is everywhere and nowhere, as evanescent and insistent as a resourcerul spook.""' In its Foucauldian usap, ~IIC tern1 "power" denotes ;~n agency which has left an indelible slain on every word in our language and on every institution in our swiety. It is always already there. and cannot hc spotted coming or going. One might spot ;I corpowte bagman arriving at a congressman's office. and perhaps block his entrance. But one cannot block off pnwer in the Fouauldian sensc. Power is as much inside one as outside one. It is nearer than hands and fcet. As Ed-niundson says: one cannot "confront power; one can only encounter its temporary and generally unwilling agents . . .[it] has capacities of motion and tmnsformation that make it a pretemitural force."" Only internunable individual and sn-rial self-analysis. and perhaps not even that, can help us es- ape from the infinitely fine meshes of its invisible web. The ubiquity of Foucauldian power is reminiscent of the ubiquity of Satan. and thus of the ubiquity ororiginal sin- that diabolical stain on every hunlan soul. I argued in my first lecture that the repudiation of the concept of sin was at the hear! of Dewey and Whitmn's civic religion. I also claimed that the American Left.in its horror at the Vietnam War, rein-vented sin. It reinvented the old religious idea that son= stains an: ineradicable. I now wish to say thal. in committing itself to what it calls "theorv." this Left has gotten something which is entirelv too much like religion. For the cultural Left has come to bclicve that we must place our country within a theoretical frame of reference, situatc it within a vast quasicosmological perspcctive. Stories about the webs of power and the insidious influ- ence of a hegemonic ideologv do for this Left what stories

about the Lamanites did for Joscph Smith and what stories about Yakkuh tlid for Elijah Muhallunad. What stories about blue-eyed devils mto the Black Muslims. stories about hegemony and power are to many cultural leftists-the onlv thing thev reallv want to hear. To step into the intellectual world which some of these leftists inhabit is to move out of a world in which the citizens of a democracy can ioin forces to resist sadism and selfishness into a Gothic world in which democratic politics has become a farce. It is a world in which all the day lit cheerfulness of Whitrnanesque hypersccularisrn has been lost, and in which "libcralism" and "humanism" are synonyms for naivcte-for an inability to grasp the full horror of our situation. I have argued in various books that the philosovhers most often cited bv cultural leftists-Nietzsche, Heidegncr, Fou-cault, and Derrida-are Iarrelv rinht in their criticisms of Enlightenment rationalism. I have argued further that tra- ditional liberalism and traditional humanism are cntirelv compatible with such criticisms. We can still be old- fashioned reformist liberals even if, likc Dewey. we give up the corres~ondence theorv of truth and start treating moral and scientific beliefs as tools for achieving grcater human happiness, rather than as representations of the intrinsic na-turc of rcalitv. We can be this kind of liberal even after we turn our backs on Dcscartes, linguistify subjectivity, and see everything around us and within us as one more replaceable social construction. 1 have also urged that insofar as these mtimetaphysi-cal. anti-Cartesian philosophers offer a quasi-religious fornl of spiritual pathos, they should bc relegated to private life and not taken as guides to political deliberation. The notion of "infinite resvonsibility," formulated by E~nnianuel kv-inas and sometimes dcployed by D~rrida-as well as Dm-rida's own frequent discoveries of imvossibility, unreachability, and unrepresentability-may be useful to some of us in our individual quests for private mrfection. When we take un our public responsibilities, however, the infinite and the unrepresentable are merely nuisances. Thinlunn of our re- sponsibilities in thesc terms is as much of a stumbling-block to cfrcctive political organization as is the sense of sin. Em-vhasizing the im~ossibilitv of mcaning, or ofjustice. as Der- rid3 sonletinies does, is a templation to Gothicize-to view democratic politics as ineffectual, because unable lo co~c with vreternatural forces. Whitman and Dewey, 1have argued, gave us all the ro- mance. and all thc spiritual uplift. we Americans nced to go about our public business. As Edrnundson remarks. we should not allow Emerson, who was a precursor of both Whitman and Dewey, to be displaced by Poe, who was a prc- cursor of hcan. For purposes of thinking about how to achieve our countrv, we do not need to worrv about the cor- reswondence theory of truth, the grounds of normativitv, the im~ossibilitv of iustice. or the infinite distance which scpa- rates us from the other. For those purposes. we can givc both religion and philosophy a pass. We can just ~wt on with trying to solve

what Dewey called "the problems of mcn." To think about those problcms means to refrain from thinking so much about otherness that we hegin to acquiesce in what Tndd Gitlin has ci~lled, in the title of a recent book, "thetwilight of common dreams." It means deriving our moral identity, at least in part, fI-om our citizenship in a dcm-ocratic nation-state, and from leftist attempts to fulfill the promise of that nation.

Pra~matism Solvencv -Best Action (Need nation-state action) Focusing on national politics as citizens is vital to engaging society and achieving structural changethe appeal to the nation is the only way the left can remain relevant Rorty 98 (Richard, Stanford Philosophy Professor, Achieving Our Corrt~rry,pp. 98-101) The cultural Left often seems convinced that the nation-slate is obsolete. and that there is therefore no point in at- tempting to revive national politics. The trouble with this claim is that the government of our nation-state will be, for the Sorcsccabie future, the only agent capable of making any real difference in thc amount of selfishness and sadism inflicted on Anlericans. It is no comfort to those in danger of being immiserated bv globalization to he told that, since national governments are now irrelevant. we must think up a replacement for such governments. The cosmopolitan super-rich do not think any replacements are nccded, and they are likelv to prevail. Bill Readii~gs was right to mythat "the nation-state 1ha.s wsascdl to be the elemenlal unit olespiralism.' hnl it rrmeins the entiry which Iimkes decisinla ahour a~clal knrlits. and thus ah>ul sctiial justice." 'Ihc cuncnl leftist hhit or litking Ihe bng view md loolii~lg bryond natir>nhoc~d tlo n glohnl polity IS as uselcss BF win faith in Marx's philosophy of hill~ry, for which it has become n suhsriiutc. Doth an: rqudly irrele.rall1 to the qitrslio~tof'how lo prevent the mmer$eoce of he~rd~tnty st that rccmergncr. Wkn we think atm~ut thcsc lulter questions. wc kgin t caslrr. or ofhr~u I;, prevcnl tight-wing popolisls from taking i~dvnntagc of r~nlmnl realize that one of thc essential transformations which the cultural Left will have to undergo is the shedding of its semi-conscious antiAmericanism, which it carried over from the rage of the late Sixties. This Left will have to stop thinking up ever more abstracl and abusive names for "the svstem" and start trying to construct inspiring images of the country. Only by doing so can it bepin to form alliances with ~eopleoutside the academy-and, specifically, with the labor unions. Outside the academy, Americans still want to feel patriotic. They still want to feel part of a nation which can take control of its destiny and make itself a better place. Lfthe Left forms no such alliances. it will never have any effect on the laws ol'the United States. To form them will re- quire the cultural Left to forget about Baudrillard's account of America as Disneyland-as a country of simulacra-and to start proposing changes in the laws ol'a rcal country, inhabited bv real people who are enduring unnecessarv suffering, much of which can he cured by governmental action.'%othing would do more tiresurrect the American Left than agreement on a concrete political platform, a People's Charter, a 1is1 of specific reforms. Thc existcncc of such a list- endlessly ~eprinted and debated, equally familiar to professors and production workers. imprinted on the mcmory both of professional people and of those who clan the professionals' toiletsmight revitalize leftist The problems which can he cured by

governmental action. and which such a list would canvass, are mostly those that stem from selfishness rather than sadism. But to bring about such cures it would help if the Left would channc thc tone in which it now discusses sadism. The pre-Sixties reformist Left, insohr as it concerned itself with oppressed minorities. did so by proclaiming that all of us-hlack. white. and brown-are Americans. and that we should respect one another as such. This strategy gave riseto the "platoon" movies, which showed Americans of various ethnic hack- grounds fighting and dying side by side. BY contrast, the contemporam cultural Left urges that America should not be a melting-pot, because we need to respect one another in our differences. This Left wants lo preserve otherness rather than ignore it. -RE dulinction ktwcen the old strategy and rk IIEW is inipnnanl. Thc choke ktwwn [hem makes lhr dilfrlc~ice hrlmeen whll 'I'ndd Oill~n calls "ct~mmon dreams" and whet Arthur Sclllwingcr calls "dihunilin~ Ammica." To mkc pride in king black or pey is an cnlircly rcason;~blc rcspnsc to the sndislic humilist~nn to which one hs been suhjzcled. Rut irsotx ns this pride prewnts somc<loe from olso taking pride ill heiny an hrnerican cititen, from thinking of h$ nr her country as capable of reform. or from heing ahk to join with rt~tiphts or whites in refv~~nisl do onr diflerence.9 mattcr. crmpmd iniliati%cs. it is a political d~saster. The rklorical question of Ihe "plaluun" niovic.+"Wh.~t wilh our cnrnmonality as fellow Americans:'"Jid not ct~mmc~Kl in which a per- son's dilterence wouW h. pridc in d~llcrence, ht11 nchher did it ctrnllemn it. Tkintent of posing that question was to help us hecome ;I rn~~ntry largely ncglccted hy nlhen, tlnlesr the pemn inqucstmn wished call attenii~~ 10 it. If the cultural Left insists on its D~eSenl Strategydn asking US to respect One another in our difSercnccs rather than asking us to cease noticing those differences-it will have to find a new way of creating a sense of commonality at thc level of national politics. For only a rhetoric of commonality can forge a winning maioritv in national elections. I doubt that any such new way will be found. Nobody has vet suggested a viable leftist alternative to the civic religion of which Whitman and Dewey were prophets. That civic religion centered around taking advantage of traditional pridc in American citizenship bv substituting social justice for individual freedom as our country's principal goal. We were sup- posed to love our countrv because it showed promise of being kinder and more generous than other countries. As the blacks and the gays. among others, were well aware, this was a counsel of perfection rather than dcscription of fact. Rut YOU cannot urge national political renewal on the basis of descriptions of fact. You have to describe the countrv in terms of what vou passionately hope it will become, as well as in terms of what you know it to be now. You have to be loval lo a dream country rather than to thc one to which you wake up every morning. Unless such loyalty exists, the ideal has no chance of becomino actual.

Pra~matism Solvencv -Alt can work within framework Idealism still has a place within pragmatics -it just needs to be accompanied by political action Haber 2005 htt~://www.haberarts.c~~m/rorty.htm, "men and utopias" Her final point leaps on certain connotations of utopian, but not Rorty's connotations. Is a utopia, literally, a "nowhere"? It may have become one for Suprematism and the arts under Stalin, but Rortv does not oppose utopias to political don-fighting. Surely he would see King's "I Have a Dream" speech as politics at its best. and so would I. Surely he would find debates about whether the Democrats have an independent vision to be eminently practical. A pragmatist might see talk about rights as misleading from time to time, since these fictions based on political and social structures are not facts of nature. That only means, however. that rights are fair, utopian claims with a potentially revolutionary impact. Mam may have attacked utopian socialism in the name of dialectical materialism, but Marxism attracted adherents based on hopes for the future.

Pragmatism Solvencv -Critical Theorv Alone Fails Critical theory alone has nochanceofacbing social changeFestensteia, 1997 D.M~tthew,LecturerinPolitics, University of Skflidd, PhDErom Cambridge University in 1994, andtaught at Hd1 Unkrsity from 1994-1999, bfes~, "fragmatismand Potitical Thewy; FromD~WY toRortyn, Poliv PRSS,pg. 1761 .picmrdi@y hecumidemthat the ..a . thisexpanded ~s~&~,bmtted.ilOdt~enwith Failure to advocate concrete reforms paralyzes progress Rorty 98 (Richard, Stanford Philosophy Professor, Achieving Our Country, pp. 78-80) The academic. cultural Left approves-in a rather distant and lofty way-of the activities of these surviving reformists. But it retains a conviction which solidified in the late Sixties. It thinks that the system, and not iust the laws, must be changed. Rcl'ormism is not good enough. Because the very vocabulary of liberal politics is infected with dubious pre- suppositions which need lo be exposed, the first task of the Left must be, just as Confucius said, the rectification of names. The concern to do what the Sixties called "naming lhc system" takes precedence over reforming the laws. "The system" is sometimes identilied as "late capitalism," but the cultural Lcl'l does not think much about what the al-ternatives to a market economv might be, or about how to combine political freedom with centralized economic deci-sionmakinq. Nor does it spend much time asking whether Americans arc undertaxed, or how much of a welfare state the country can afford. or whether the United States should back out of the North American Free Trade Agreement. When the Right ~roclaims that socialism has failed, and that ca~italism is the only alternative, the cultural Left has little to say in re~ly. For it prefers not to talk about money. Its prin-ci~alenemy is a mind-set rather than a set of economic arrangements-a wav of thinkin. which is, su~posedlv, at the root of both selfishness and sadism. This way of thinking is sometimes called "Cold War ideology," sometimes "tech- nocratic rationality," and sometimes "phallogocentrism" (the cultural Left comes up with fresh sobriquets every year). It is a mind-set nurtured by the patriarchal and capitalist in- stitutions of the industrial West, and its bad cfi'ccts are most clearly visible in the United States. To subvert this way of thinking, the academic Left be- lieves. we must teach Americans to recognize otherness. To this end, leftists have helped to put together such academic disciplines as women's history, black history, gay studies, Hispanic-American studies. and migrant studies. This has led Stefan Collini to remark that in the United States, though not in Britain, the term "cultural studies" means "victim stud- ies." Collini's choice of phrase has been resented. but he was making a good

point: namely, that such programs were cre-ated not out of the sort of curiosity about diverse forms of human life which gavc risc to cultural anthropology, but rather from a sense of what America needed in order to make itself a better place. The principal motive behind the new di-rections taken in scholarship in the United States since the Sixties has been the urge to do something for people who have been humiliated-to help victims of socially accept-able forms of sadism by making such sadism no longer ac-ceptable

Pra~matism Solvencv -Moral Puritv Alone Fails Democracy requires compromise-insisting on moral purity means nothing gets done-both top-down and bottom-up approaches to politics are necessary Rorty 98 (Richard, Stanford Philosophy Professor, Achieving Our Country, pp. 52-4) I can sum up hy saying tlmt it would he a good thing if the next genemtii of American letlists found as little resonance in the ttanas of Karl Marx and Vladinur llyich Lenin as in those of Herhert Spencer and Benito Mussolitti. It would be an even better thing if the natnes of Ely and Croly. Dreiser and Dehs, A. Philip Randolph and John L. Lewis were nwn: familiar to these leftists than they were to the studenls of the Sixties. For it would be a big help to American efforts for so-cia1 iustice if each new generalion were able to think of itself as participating in a movement which has lasted for more than a century, and has served human libertv well. 11 would help if studettts hrcanle 11s fa~niliar with the Pullmntt Strike. the Great Coaltield War."md the passage of the Wagttcr Act as with the march tiom Selma. the Berkeley ticc-spccch dcnlonstntions. and Stol~wa11. Each new generation ofstu- dents ought to think dAmerican leftism as having a long and glorious history. Thev should be able to see. as Whitman and Dewey did, the ~trilmlc for social iustice as central to their country's moral identity. To hrinp this ahout, it would help if American leftists stopped asking whether or not Walter Resther's attempt to hourgeoisify the auto workers was objectively reactionary. It would also help if they emphasized the similarities rnthcr than the diiferctscs hetween Malmltn X and Bayard Rustin. &tween Susan B. Anthony and Emnu Goldnun. hetwecn Catharine MacKintton and Judith Butler. The sectarian divisions which plagued Marxism are manifestations of an urge for purity which the Left would be bcttcr off without. America is not a morally purc country. No country ever has been or ever will be. Nor will any country ever have a morally purr, homogeneous Left. In dcmocralic countries you ~ct things done by compronlising your principles in order to form alliances with noups about whom vou have gave doubts. The Left in America has made a lot of QromeSS bv doing iust that. Theeknest the I~R ever came ntaking over the government was in 1912, when a Whilman enthusi;~st. E~lgelte mb,ran for prcsidcnl and got almost a m~llion roles. These votes were cast by. ns Daniel Bell pots it, "as uc- stable a compound as was ever mixed in the modem hislory ofpolitical ckmistry." This compound mingled rt~e 11s low waees and miserable working co~ldilions with, as Bcil says. "the puritan conscicncc ol mrllionike socialists, the boyish romanlicism ofa Jack

London. the pnk Christian piety of a Cieorge Herran. ...the reckless bragp;docio of a Wild Bill' Haywood. ...thc icpid social-work impul~e uf do-ycxlers. ...the flaming discontent of the dispossessed farmers. the inaniculate ;md amorphouE desire lo 'bebng' of the immi- grant workers. the iconoclastic idolMaking of tk literary raiKnls. . ..nlK1 rnore."14 Tlmlsc dispusscsscd fiumwx wcrc nftcn racist, oatirisl, ar*l sadistic. Thc milliunaie sucialiscs, nrhlss robhr barons though they were, newrtkless nt up the fuund:~tions which sponsored the research which helped get lefibl leei5lotion passed. We need to get rid of the Marxist idea that only bottom-up initiatives, conducted by workers and peasants who have somehow been so freed from resentment as to show no trace of preiudice, can achieve our country. The his-tory of leftist politics in America is a story of how top-down initiatives and bottom-up initiatives have interlocked. Topdownlertisl iniliatives cnm from people whn have enough swurrty. moncy. and p~wcr Ihcm.uAvcs. but never-theless wcrrry about the tale of people who have less.Exam-plrs 01 such initiatives are rnuckr,lkinp exposes hg $~ur&dists, novelists. and scholar-for cxample. Ida Tx hll on Slan- dxd OiL Upton Sinclair an immisrant workers in the Chicago sl3ughrerhouser. Noam I:homsky on lk Stale ~~pmment's lies and the New York Times's omissions. Other ex- nmplcs are the Wagner a111 Norria-Lagoxdia Acts, t~lvcls 01 social pm~st like Pmpkoithe Abyss atd SuuliL*migan, the closink ol ~miversity cdmpuses aller the Ameriwn invesion of CamhHfio.und the Supreme Coull's desisiohs in Brwn v. Dud oft~itration and Romcr v. Evans. Bottom-up lenist inilialives come trnm people whn have little security. money. or pnwer and who rebel agiltnsl the ctnlair tre.ilmen1 which tky. or others like them. are rcceiv-in$. Exantples are the Pullman Strike. Marcus (iarvey's block nation;dist movement. the Ornerd1 Mou~rs sitiluwn slrike of 1036, the Mont~omery bur bycotr. thc crcalaln uftllr Misskippi Recdom Oemocntic Pony. the creation olCesar Chavez's United Fmn Workcn. and thc Stoneu*all "riot" (the beginning of Ihc gay rights movement). Although thcsc two kimlraf initiatives reinfbrd each other, tk popk a1 the k>ttom tmk thr tisks. suflcred the hcatinss. madc all the hig mcrilicrs. and were somelimes murdered. Rut their heroism mishl have been fruitless if leisure6. educated, rclativcly risk-free pcopk hd no1 joined the struggle. Those braten to death by thc goon spds ad thc lynch mobs might have died in vain if the .ufc and sectuc hd no1 knt a hand.

Pra~matism Solvencv -Disen~a~ement+war and tvrannv Political disengagement doesn't mean the national public sphere goes away, it means it will be dominated by the far-right and collapse into fascism, causing wars and tyranny Rorty 98 (Richard, Stanford Philosophy Professor, Achieving Our Country, pp. 87-94) Iitk hlrmation 01 hercditluy cnatcscontinucs unimpeded. and if the pressures of globalization create such castes WI only in ~kUnitcxi States ~IIIin all the old democracies. we shall end up in an Orwellian world ~nSUCII :Iw(nld. IIKL I~uY mwpmlionai arwkogue or nig roth her, w any ofticla1 cnoxianllqrus 10tn~sx.HUI there H~IIbe an analogue ~t Ule Irma' P:iny-mmcfy. thc irlcmal~~nr.~l. mmkc all Iiai~~~pntont Tlle analope tlf Orwcll's Ohnu My will he alucatul. mmlmnhlg oft rmxnlopdirm pn>fcr;sionals-Lind's "nvcrclam" lhc msmopolilanauper-rich. 'Ihcy u,~ll &cisi<ms. prolllu llkc you 2nd nlc. Tk)tll 01 l~rrplu a~l ~cclass litcus uili helo llnliesure tllal the decalom, marl? hy (IrInner Pmy ancarrled oul SIUOOIIII~ rellaivcly etfixiemly. 11 \v111 ht ~n th* lnlerm dIhe tntmliorwl mpr-rich to k~xp ixrr;pTtxlS an1 happy. fix Ihcy ncrrl prrvlc w.la,ron prclcltd to Irthe pulilic-dl chss rrf rxllol lllrindiv~dual nndun.aalcs. For Itx sakeor lurpinpthe prnl~,lcr quln. the supcr-rich will have lo keepup lllcpwcnse U~AI mtiuml puItIics might solllcdly sukr 3 d!(larnce. Slncc mlllolluc dwisium XC IIk-ir prn~ptivc.lI?c? will crroaragc p>liliciam, UIUIhml~Ihr l.ci1 ;md tlx RiplU. to~idrrv in cullurrl issus.7 nlrlilllwill k10 hccp llr.nlimbnr lllc pr11I1% CISC~IILTC-1 k~p llr. olxl LIEhdlalllLX wa~&s wpulmlon hollnn~75 permai Anx~ic~sa perrcnlNIIIC wi~hmlmc an11 rcTlgims I~oslilittes. am1 will1 ikhntes ahcmt sexual mm If the prolcs can be distracted rrom rhcir own despair by ntdia-CWJIC~ psucdi,-evcnts. ioclud"~? t he occasional brief and bloody war. the super-rich will havc lilllc lo fear. ~ontcmp~alion or th pnssihk wurkl invites two tesponsc< from the Lell. The first isto imisl that (be inequalities between nalnms lleed to hc miligatod-nd, Bparticular. Ihal the Northern Hemisphcrc must shm its we;dlh with the Soothern. Thc second is to insist that the primary responsibility of each democratic nation-state is to ils own least advanlagcd citizens. Thew two responses ohviou~iy collflicl wllh mcli ollrr. In particular. the lint rrspmse sugesls that the old dern(rcracies shoukl open rhcir bc~rdcrs. whcrus the

second sug~esls lhar lhcy shoukl c11i.w 1tcm.X Thc first rcspnnse comes naturally 10 mdemk lenists. who hve illways hn intaatinnnlly minded. .iw second response comes naturall~ to members of trade unions, and lo the marginally employed people who can most easily be recruited into right-wing populist movements. Union memh Inthe unitedstilta: h;l\~afatchedfactu) aherfactuyclose, only tomn In SlilWIiis. n~dl:urdor Merim. I1 IS m)wondcr that Ury see Ihe rebuk oi lmcrnalioml tee wade as pmsperlly fcor namgrrs and SI~EMIOI~~IS. 3 heller LamLud nf living lor warkenin &Yelopin! crmmier and a my umch worse sfand& nf li\'lnp fm American workers. I1 wuld bem>wonder dthcy sawr thr Ammican leliist inlellipcneia ason Ulr same side of he unn;dgus andslwkholducas sharing thesame class ~nluests. For wemellcuuals, wlw are moslly acadenlicx are ourselvesquite well insulared. ai Iwrl in Ux shat run. froti1 the effects olglobalilauon. TCsr;lke Ulinp wwse ur. ohm s-m nlcxc inlcrfitul In hr wtnkws ui Ule (kvrluping world thn in the haor our rellow citizim. Many uritm on soc~uewnomicpulicy hve ~~d~h;l~the~~di~~ali~~~democracies are heading into a Weimar-like period, onc in which populisl movements arc likely to overturn constitutional governments. ~dwardI.UIIW~L, Tor example. has suggestrd tb~ fascism may be the American future. T~Cpoint or his htuk Endnnget~d Amcrican Drrnm is that mcmhcrs of labor unions, and unurpanivrl unskilled workers, will a~oner ~rlaterreali7.e that their pnvernmenl is not even Irving ro prekent unges Imm sinking or to prevent jobs fnlm heins erponed. .Around the same lime, fhcv wlll miliw the1 suburban wh~tci.ull;uworken--rhcmselvcs dcswratclv afi;lid of kine downsi/cd-an: not wine a) bl lhernsclvcs be taxed tu urnvide social benefits lor elvow else. A1 that ~inLsomething will crack. The nonsuburban electorate hill becide that the system has failed and start looking around f0r.a strongman to Vote for-someone will ;ISSUE them ~ht, once he iselected. the smug bureaucnts. tricky lawycrs, ovrrpaid hund salemen, and posmwdcmist protessnrs will no longcr be calling the shots. A wnmio like that ot Sinclair lawis' novel It Cari'r Hopprn Hcre may then he plnyed oul. For omsuch n strongmnn takcs oflice. mbotly an prdict what will happen. In 1932. moa of the prdictions maJc ahout what would happen if Hindenhurgnnmal Hillerchancellorwere WMIY oremptimistic. One thing that is very likely to happen is that the gains made in the past forty years by black and brown Americans, and by homosexuals, wiH be wiped out. ~oc~~lmcontempt for wumen wiilcnme hxlt into fashion. TIE wu~s.'niggei7md"kike" will once again he heard tn

the workplace. All the sadism which the academic Left has tried to make unacceptable to ils students will come flooding back. AII theresentment which badly educatcd Amerifilns teei ahuut having thcb manners dictslrd tu them by cuUrgr graduates will find all uotlel. But such a renewal of sadism will nut alter the eltects of selfishness. For after my imagined strongman takes charge, he will quickly make peace with the international superrich, iust as Hiller made with thc ~crman industrialists. He will i~iwkctheglo~in~~memi~~olthe~~lf~mt~~p~~~~ke mililary adventures which will generate short-term prosperitv. He will bc a disaster for the country and the world. Peoole will wondcr wh" there W* SO little re5islance to hi< evilable rise. Where. thpy will ~li,was the American Left? Why w.ls it only rightists llkc Buchanan whn spoke In the wclrhu!.s ahjut the consrx]tlmcca ol gl$rb;iliztlon? Why could ntrt the Lm chanm.1 themounrine rxge ol Ihe newly dispossesed? 11 w often said Ihi~l we Amerrms. 111 thc cl~d uiLe twentieth century. no longer havc a LcIi. Since llobody dcnics the existolu- of ahat Ihave call~d the cultural Left, this muunls to an admiuaion that thal eft unable to engage in .. national VO~I~ICS.11 is nor the xu, ofth~ 10 with thc consequences u(ploh;~liz;llion. T,, gel the countly R) da~ Lett would how to Lcnwhich call b~ wilh thus consequences. the pre.w~ cr~lturni li-anslhrm ilwlf hy upening relations with the rcsduc of Ihc okl rcfnrmisl lril,and in naniculnr with the labor unions. It would have to talkmuch more abut munev. even at llle cost of talkin2 kss abo111 stigma. Ihave two suggestions about h~w firs1 is thnl the Left should put a moratoriumOn theory. rr should its phi~o~*y Iuhin. .111e second is UIX the ISR shw~dtry 10 to efftct this tnnsttion .IW t~liiclt n~(kl~m wlul relnains of our pride in heins A~nericnm. It slwuld ask llcpxblic a, conndrr huw Ihe ccnmtry of Lincoln and Wlullsan migllt kachieved In supponof my first sugesion. Inmecite a p;lsr;lEefrom Dewey's Reconsrntcrio,l m Pltii~~sf~pl~? 11~ ~cwinng '~~ntiiui~lunlism tak This diclmomy seriously sutler froma in which he cxprrsses his cxapenuon ~ilh son of stasle dehalc m,w anan<kTllhruhrw01 versus coz?mmnilari;mnisn)." Ikwoy Ihwphl thl all $ircussiom whicl~ mmmcln dcicct. 'Ilry are an ~onu~Ilerl h,llrIrlgic of general miom urnter whch bpcilv siluaunns arc lo hc hrough. Whal rvam 1s llfhl up>n lhis m thal group dimfi>iduals. ll~ rx *s ccme hunnn king. chis or tlnl spa-ial

lnsrltutionmsocial ~IT~~IXC~K'III.Firsucll a Iwic n( iwir,. ll~rradilionallv accmted leic suhnilules asfussion oldie nleaninc ofcuncems and Uleir dtalecrid relauolslum with nnc amher. lkwrv w rinlu lo he eracnenlrd hv . .. . . , . s~r~o(nl~llc~lthm?mnmcI&1~1Ia~\lr.\clofnhsUac11on Hzuas (wn.: w11e.l 11e mrnl un lo 3~ 11131~siel*I~ll&!IILS lcxcl 15 ~qn'ally a 88yl11j.1 IIUIICUICI. UIC SUWIICSIt*.JI!+UI:IIUI IUII~(c! I~LLuJIUSI~~I~.L~UII~LIItIw L~IUIIIIJ~ICXI IS, WIYCII $4-' 9 1.w sucll ;lscfflls atn~u lhanon llrR,.l 'rtrsonzn~pitmry ~caho~~,< lit81 IIK )OIII 1ht.l ofah~h\trd~.~~(ln. IU~Y.~,\C IIIC <lrtl.r YLII b~ tllcrc runalnon nn ~l~vlrh l?ll wt.nm lo ~.rnh ~UEIIIT 1l3cIIL~U t~ ~~11hlbltc.~l UI~ llr nk~,. Surm!Jinp,wlnllvel sourCUr!Cc?Iuill ammNs. UE nmladcll vow criliiluc. Wlmw OR' I~dov'l acndLI~~ic savs thnl wnlc IwiCllal becn "i~ildcourtelv theurirctl." rcnu =In hr rmlv cmain thnl twm rlr. is eulne lo drat in cimR UI l~ltlsts pr<xiuchl a few vt? grml hrnks. Tlkq lmvc also protluced many Ihrmsoruis 1)ihlts wldch remaern scholastic plulnsoplwlng a1 11s wms. llw amhors of lhnc wrmedlv ".whersivc" hook huwstlv helieve tllal tls ucsemma hunun . .. .. . lilwly. BIIIit is almost impossible to clamber back down from their books to a level of abstraction on which one mibht discuss the merits of a law, n trcaty. sv;mdid;~tr or a political strategy. ~venthough what these uolhurs btthcorizc.. is often mmethinp very concrcte and ncar at hand-a curcnt TV show, smedia cclrhnty. a rcccnt X~II~~I-they ofler ~hc nmsl ohm1 and han~enexpI:matiun* im~cinablc. Thesc rulile attempts to philosophize one's way into political rekvance are a svmptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a s~ectatorial anproach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations. These result in an intellec- tun1 environment which is. as Murk kimundaon saya in his h~lk Niphlmnreon Main Street. Gothic. The cr~ltt~nl LcR LF haunled hy hiqu quit nus specter. Ibmat Irightenin: of whsh IS called "pciwcr." This is the rtlme of UJBIEdrnund- son cdls Fouwul's "haunting agcncy. which is everywhere and nowherc. as evanescent and insistent a resourceful spook""

AT: Pra~matism-Kev to the Feminist Movement Pragmatic focus on the future is essential to the feminist movement Haber 2005[John, http://www .haberarts .com/rorty.htm, "men and utopias"] Rorty's critics have long refused him the right to assert any politics at all, beyond the freedom to philosophize. They have called his implicit ethics "the leisure of the theory class," and its genteel liberalism seems to wallow in academic privileges. Anv statement of fact or value, Rorty explains. is relative to how people Iive and who they are. How then can he do better than a ringing affirmation of the present or else ethical relativism? The choices sound equally passive and complacent because they are. One thing that makes his dilemma so interesting is that it parallels the challenges to a man in feminism. Any man certainlv can be, and often is, denied the label feminist. Whether he speaks against women or pretends to speak for them, he is enacting a ritual of male oppression. The very metaphor with which I began, that of opening territory, implicates me in American male myths. And is it anv easier for a woman to create a feminist proiect? If she promotes nonsexist standards, she may reinterpret woman as Dart of some essential humanity. at least as men have defined it. She then gives in to the depressing kind of work "adults," especially men. now do-with the added disadvantage that the roles were created with someone else in mind. On the other hand, if she reserves for women an essential femininity. she reinterprets woman again, this time basically as mothering. Either way, she sanctions the marginal status so long assigned to women. Perhaps only a woman's artistry and desire could get around the paradox. Rorty would get around these obiections by leaping directly into the future. Ethical claims, he would still insist, must be relative to ethical standards, but not necessarily to existing standards. The solution, one might say, is already implied in the word movement: to move thinking toward a future in which new ethical claims make more sense.

State Good Making demands on the state is critical to progressive changes. History proves that non-statist movements, such as their alternative, are total failures. Grossberg, Professor of Communications at the University of Illinois, 1992 [Lawrence, We Gotta Get Out of This Place, p. 390-391] But this would mean that thc Len could not remain outside of the systems of governance. It has sometimes to work with, against and with in bureaucratic svstcms of governance. Consider the case of Amnesty International, an immesely effective organization when its major strategy was (similar to thal of the Right) exerting pressure directly on the bureaucracies of specific governments. In recent years (marked by the recent rock tour), it has apparently redirected its energy and resources, seeking new members (who may not be committed to actually doing anything; mernebership becomes little more than a statement of ideological support for a position that few are likely to oppose) and public visibility. In stark contrast, the most effective struggle on the Left in recent times has been the dramatic (and, one hopes continuing) dismantlinn of apartheid in South Africa. It was accom~lished bv mobilizing pooular pressure on the institutions and bureaucracies of economic and governmental institutions and it depended on a hinhlv sophisticated organizational structure. The Left loo often thinks that it can end racism and sexism and classism by changing ueople's attitudes and evervdav practices (e.g. the I990 Balck boycott of Korean stores in New York). Unfortunately, while such struneles may be extremelv visible. they are often less effective than attempts to move the institutions (e.g.,banks, taxing structures, distributors) which have put the economic realtions of bleack and immigrant populations in place and which condition people's evervdav practices. The Left needs institutions which can operate within the system of governance, understanding that such institutions are the mediating structures bv which power is actively realized. It is often by directing opposition anainst specific institutions that power can be challenned. The Left assumed for some time now that, since it has so little access to the apparatuses of agency, its only alternative is to seek a public voice in the media through tactical protests. The Left does in fact need more visibility, but it also needs greater access to the entire range of apparatuses of decision making power. Otherwise the Left has nothing but its own self-ri~hteousness. It is not individuals who have produced starvation and the other social disgraces of our world, although it is individuals who must take resvonsibilitv for eliminating them. But to do so, they must act with organizations, and within the systems of organizations which in fact have the capacity (as well as responsibility) to fight them. Denying the centrality of the state destroys all hope of changing it. We must analyze state policy in order to understand it and reorient it Krause & Williams, 1997 Prof. Political Sci. at Geneva Graduate Institute of Int'l Studies and Asst. Prof. Political Sci, at

University of Southern Main [Keith and Michael, Critical Security Studies, Pg, XV-XVI] These (and other) critical perspectives have much to say to each other in the construction of a critical theory of international relations and, in turn, lo contemporary security studies. Whilc elcments of niany approaches may he found in this volume, no one perspective dominates. If anything, several of the contributions to this volume stand more inside than outside the tradition of security studies, which reflects our twofold conviction about the place of critical perspectives in contemporary scholarship. First, to stand too far outside prevailing discourses is almost certain to result in continued discivlinary exclusion. Sccond, to move toward alternative conceptions of security and security studies, one must neccssarily reopen the questions subsumed under the modem conception of sovereignty and the scope of the political. To do this, one must take scriouslv the prevailinn claims about the nature of security. Many of the chapters in this volume thus retain a concern with the centrality of the state as a locus not only of obligation but of effective political action. In the realm of organized vioiencc, states also remain the preeminent actors. The task of a critical. approach is not to deny the centrality of the state in this realm but, rathcr, to understand morc fully its slructurcs, dynamics. and possibilities for reorientation. From a critical perspective. state action is flexible and capable of reorientation, and analyzing state ~olicv need not therefore he tantamount to embracing the statist assum~tions of orthodox conceptions. To exclude a focus on statc action iiom a critical perspective on the grounds that it plays inevitably within the rules of existing conceptions simply reverses the error of esscntializing the state. Moreover. it loses the possibilitv of intluencing what remains the most structurally capable actor in contemporary world politics.

State Good Failure to understand the state and interact with it guarantees our destruction Spanier, Ph. D. from Yale and teacher at the University of Florida, 1990 [John, Games Nations Play, Pg. I 151 Whether the observer personally approves of the "logic of behavior" that a particular framework seems to suggest is nor the point. It is one thin^ to say, as done here, that the state svstem condemns each state to be continually concerned with its Dower relative to that of other states, which, in an anarchical system. it regards as potential a=essors. It is quite another thing to approve morally of power politics. The utilitv of the slate-system franlework is simply that is points to the "essence" of state behavior. It does not pretend to account for all factors, such as moral norms, that motivatc statcs. As a ncccssarily simplified version of reality, il clarifies what most basically concerns and drives states and whal kinds of behavior can be cxpectcd. &,as observers. may deplore that behavior and the anarchical system that produces it and we may wish that intcrnational politics wcrc not as conllictual and violent as the twentieth century has already amply demonstrated. We may prefer a system oiher that onc in which slates are so committed to advancing their own national interests and protecting their sovereignty. Ncvertheless. however much we niay deplore the current svstem and prefer a more peaceful and harmonious world, we must lirst understand the contemporary one if we are to learn how to "manage" it and avoid the catastrophe of a nuclear war. Ignoring the state prevents mediation needed to save millions Hill, Professor of IR at LSE, 2000 [Christopher, Confronting the Political in International Relations. cd. Ebata] -The ineluctable tendency of thosc who wish to regulate the state to a position of lesser importance in international relations is that or downgrading politics. This is often not intentional; thosc falling into Martin Wight's 'revolutionist' category, after all, might see the politics of international class struggle, of center-priphery relations, or between clashing civilizations as rather more substantial that the politics of conventional interstate relations. But generalizations of such high order of magnitude are difficult to cash in, in terms of cases. choices and mobilisable ~olilical forces. They tend to remain at the systemic level, with a strong element of determinism and the identity of the central actors never being quite clear. The idealists, who make up one part of this group, are by definition calling for a new kind of politics and it is hardly fair to expect them to describe in detail what it might look like. Still, it is clear that iust as the inlcrnational law and institutions school of the 1920s became increasingly remote from the compellin~ poljtical action arising of the clhical ~zlohalists can find it difficuli to go beyond handwritinp from a distance. Although it is true, as Steve Smith has argued, that thelr central point is to challenge the conventional view of politics (i.e. as what policy-makers do). it remains true that if you

inherently distrust or demote the importance of states and government. it is then difficult to give convincing guidance on how matters are to be carried forward in the face of such dangerous problcms of foreign policv as China's relations with Taiwan or the Arab- Israel dispute. Problems of this kind- and no-one could dispute their si~niticance for the lives of millions- in practice require a lead from states, combing amongst themselves and with other actors, if anv progress is to be madc.

State Good O~lyby workiq tkmqh the state an critics1 theories tcbicve any sochl ehragr,it wins legEtimacy which eaables ittobe justifimbk toall Festcostein, 1997 wr. Matthew. Lcchanin Politics.University ofShefield, PhD frcnn Cambridge Umversity in 1994.and taught at Hull University from 1994-1999, Pmfessor, "Tragrnatlsmand Political Theory: From Dewey toRorty", Polity bcss, pp 153-1643 isbecause New social theories must be embeddedwithin the deeieian maltingbedy -this is the om@ way to matesocia! movements Fpstenstein, 1W7[Dr. Matthew, Lecturer in Politics,UniversityofSheffield,PhDfrom Cambridge Univmity in 1994, andtaught Hull Udversiry &om 19941999,frof'essor, "Pragmatism and Polid Theory: From Dmy toRorryn, Polity Ms, pg. 180-1811 Combhh~**ate action with dtical tbmwy ea.laes ittobeviewed damocrratie by rll -thk askey to -r percention asleRitirnacy by t* imporCrat social movemen& Festemstein. 1997m.Matthsw. tea-in Politics, PfrD.from Cambridge University in f 994. and taught at 1999,hf-r, "Pragrnatisn andPoliticalTheory:Frm Dewey to -.. =deeperr-4:-m-sebvnm This ties the A~-Tfrtre. ileg;itirnacy. o):lesdnorrns_tclwhs,~,Ld defiberaticrns which take the-~h -v irttoe~mideraNdguides theirzstitutiondizationof those conditions necessary for pubkic discourse, in guaramteeirrg rights such as &e legal proteetior\.of free speech But institutid ax-rangernentsarenotsufficientfortheproductiarrof ademorraticafly ~~ e outcome-tForexannple,giventhepluralismwhichtfnbenrrats emphasizes,isitsensibletoexpectcitLzerrswhohavedifferimg motat and political outlooks and snre given full range to express these d-ences regularly ro arrive at a r-ed consensus about the roman good? The response offered is that the face of such sociely which prereqitbite UdveRity ofShameid. Hull University Emm 1994w",pp 164-1651Pmlity P-,

dongside arange of other disamm

State Good -Zizek Subversive strategies fail-it's better to read the letter of the law against itself and work within the system ~iiek,Institutefor Social Sciences at the University of Ljubljana, 1998 [Slavoj, "Why does the law need an obscene supplementi?" Law and the Postmodern Mind, p. electronic] When, in the late eighteenth century. universal human rights were proclaimed, this universality, of course, conccalcd lhc Tact that thcv privile~e white. mcn of property; however. this limitation was not openly admitted, it was coded in apparently lautological supplementary qualifications like "all humans have rights, insofar as they truly are. rational and free." " which thcn implicitl~ cxcludcs the nlentallv ill. "savages," criminals. children. women.'. . So, if, in this situation, a poor black woman disregards this unwrittenimplicit, clualification and demands human rights, also for herself, she iust takes the letter of the discourse of rights "more literally than it was mcant" (and thereby redefines its universality, inscribing it into a different hegemonic chain). "Fantasy" designarcs preciselv Lhis unwritten framework that tells us how are we to understand the letter of Law. The lesson of this is that-sometimes, at least-the truly subversive thing is not to disregard the explicit letter of Law on behalf of the underlying fantasies, bul to stick to this letter asainst the fantasy that sustains it. Is-at a certain level, at least-this not the outcome of the long conversation bctwccn JoscpT K. and the pricst that follows the priest's narrative on the Door of the Law in The Trial?-the uncanny effect of this conversation does no1 reside in the fact that the reader is at a loss insofar as he lacks the unwritten interpretive code or frame of reference that would enable him to discern the hidden Meaning, but, on the contrary, in that the priest's interpretation of the parable on the Door of the Law disregards all standard frames of unwritten rules and reads the text in an "absolutely literal" way. One could also approach this deadlock via. Lacan's notion of the specifically symbolic mode of deception: ideology "cheats ~reciselv by letting us know that its propositions (say. on universal human rights)' are not to be read a la lettre, but against the background of a set of unwritten rules. Sometimes, at Icast, the most effective anti-ideological subversion of the oflicial discourse of human rights consists in reading it in an excessively "literal" way, disregarding the sci of underlying unwrittcn rules. The need for unwritten rules thus bears witness to, confirms, this vulnerability: the svstem is compelled to allow for possibilities of choices that must never actually take place since they would disintegrate the system, and the function of the unwrittcn rules is preciscly to prevent the actualization of these choices formally allowed by the system. One can see how unwritten rules are correlative to, lhc obverse of, the empty symbolic gesture andlor the forced choice: unwritten rules prevent the subject from effectively accepting what is offered in the empty gesture, from taking the choice literally and choosing the impossible. that the choice 01' which destroys the system. In the Soviet Union of the 1930s and 1940s to take the most extreme example, it was not only prohibited to criticize

Stalin, it was perhaps even more prohibited to enounce publicly this prohibition, i.e.. too statc that one is prohibited to criticize Stalinthe system nccded to maintain the appearance that one is allowed to criticize Stalin, i.e., that the absence of this criticism (and the fact that there is no opposition party or movement, that the Party got 99.99% of the votes at elections) simply demonstrates that Stalin is effectively the best and (almost) always right. In Hegelese, this appearance qua appearance was essential. Thisdialeclical tension between the vulnerability and invulnerability of the Svstem also enables us to denounce the ultimate racist andlor sexist trick, that of "two birds in the bush instead of a bird in hand": when women demand' simple equality, quasi-"feminists" often pretend lo offer them "much more" (the role of the warm and wise "conscience of society." elevated above ihc vulgar everyday competition and struggle for domination ...)-the only urowr answer to this offer, of course, is "No. thanks! Better is the cnemv oT the Good! We do not want more, iust equality!" Here, at least, the last lines in Now Voyager ("Why reach for the moon, when we can have the stars'?") are wrong. It is homologous with the native American who wants to become intemated into thc ~rcdominant "white" society. and a ~olitically correct progressive liberal endeavors to convince him that, he is thereby renouncing his vcry unique prerogative, the authentic native culture and tradition-no thanks, simple equality is enough, I also wouldn't mind mv Dart of consumcrisl alienation! ... A modest demand of the excluded group for the full participation at the societv's universal rights is much more threatening for the system than the apparentlv much more "radical" reiection of the predominant "social values" and the assertion of lhc superiority of one's own culture. For a true feminist, Otto Weininger's assertion that, although women are "ontologically false," lacking the proper ethical stature, they should be acknowledged the same rights as men in public life, is infinitely more acceptablc than the false elevation of women that makes them "too good" for the banality of men's rights.

State Good -Zizek (AT: Coo~tion) The fear of cooption prevents from changing the system for the bettertransgressions, like their alternative, only reinforces the system iiiek, Institute for Social Sciences at the University of Ljubljana, 1998 [Slavoj, "Why docs the law need an obscene supplement?" Law and the Postmodern Mind, p. electronic] Finally. the point about inherent transgression is not that every opposition, every attempt at subversion. is automatically "coopted." On the contrary, the. very fear of being coopted that makes us search for more and more "radical." "vure" attitudes, is the supreme strategy of suspension or marginalization. The point is rather that truc subversion is not always where it seems to be. Sometimes, a small distance is much more explosive for the system than an ineffective radical rciection. In rclinion. a small heresy can be niorc thrcateninn than an outright atheism or passagc to another religion; for a hard-line Stalinist, a Trotskyite is infinitely more threatening than a bour~eois liberal or social democrat. As le Carre put it, one true revisionist in the Central Committee is worth more than thousand dissidents outside it. It was easv to dismiss Gorbachev for aiming only at improving the system, making il more efficienl-& nonetheless set in motion its disintegration. So one should also bear in mind the obverse of the inherent transgression: one is tempted to paraphrase Freud's claim from The Ego and the Id that man is not only much more immoral than he believes, but also much more moral than he knows-the System is not only infinitely more resistant and invulnerable than it may appcar (it can coopt ap~arently subversive strategies. thev can serve as its support). it is also infinitely more vulnerable (a small revision ctc, can have large unforeseen catastrophic conse~uences). Or, to put it in another way: the paradoxical role of the unwritten supcrego injunction is that, with regard to the explicit, public Law, it is simultaneously transgressive (superego suspends, violates, the explicit social rules) and more coercive (superego consists of additional rules that restrain the field of choice by way of prohibiting the possibilities allowed for. guaranteed even, by thc public Law). From my personal history, I recall the moment of the referendum for the independence of Slovenia as the exemplary casc of such a forced choice: the whole point, of course, was to have a truly free choice-but nonetheless, in the pro-independence euphoria, cvcry argumen~ation for remaining within Yugoslavia was immediately denounced as treacherous and disloyal. This example is especially suitable sincc Slovenes were deciding about a matter that was literally "transgressive" (to break from Yugoslavia with ils constitutional order), which is why the Belgrade authorities denounced Slovene referendum as unconstitutional-one was thus ordered to transgress the Law ... The obverse of the omnipotence of the unwritten is thus that, if one innores them. they simply cease to exist, in contrast to the written law that exists (functions) whether one is aware of it or not-or, as the priest in Katka's The Trial put it, law does not want anything from you, it only bothers you if vou vourself acknowledge it and address yourself to it with a demand ...

Util Good -Moralitv Hurts Policvmaking Morality undermines policymaking -it hinders good judgment by making us blind-sighted Isaac, 2002 (Jeffrey C.. Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, "Ends, Means, and Politics," DISSENT, Spring) <Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of volitics. Power is the ability to cfl'cct outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part. involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To ac- complish anvthinn in the ~oIitical world. one must attend to the means that are necessarv to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop. and to cxcrcise, power. To say this is not to say that uowcr is bcvond moral- ity. It is to sav that power is not reducible to moralitv. As writers such as Niccolo Machjavelli, Max Wcbcr, Rcinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding conccrn with moral goodness undercuts volitical responsibil- ily. The concern may be morally laudable, re- tlecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suf- fers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not en- sure the achievement of what one intcnds. Ah- iuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morallv comuromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail imvotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean con- science of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and iniustice, moral purity is not simvly a form of powerless- ness; it is oftcn a form of comvlicitv in inius- tice. This is whv, from the standpoint of poli- tics-as opposed to rcligion-pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically re- pudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent iniustices with any cf- fect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions: it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action. that is most simil'icant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pur- suit of "good that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and histori- cally contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this iudgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It vromotcs arrogance. And it undermines wlitical effectiveness.>

Util Good -Ok to Use Peo~le as Means to an End In times such as the pre-9/11 world, it is life-threatening to not use people as a means to an ends Isaac, 2002 (Jeffrey C., Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Dcmocracy and Public Life at lndiana University, "Ends, Means, and Politics," DISSENT. Spring) <What would it mean for thc Ameri- can left right now lo take seriously the centralitv of means in politics? First, it would mean talnq seriouslv the s~eciiic means cm~loved by the September 11 attackersterrorism. There is a tendency in some quarters of the left to assimilate the death and destruct~on of September 11 to more or- dinary (and still dcplorablc) injustices of the world system-the starvation of childrcn in ATrica, or the repression of peasants in Mexico, or the continued occupation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel. But this assimilation is only possible by ignoring the specific modalities of September 11. It is true that in Mexico. Palestine, and elsewhere. too many innocent people suffer, and that is wrong. It may even bc true that the experience of suffering is equally terrible in each case. But neither the Mexican nor the Israeli government has ever hijacked civilian airliners and deliberately flown them into crowded office buildings in the middle of cities where innocent civilians work and live, with the intention of killing thousands of people. Al-Qaeda did precisely Lhis. That does not make the other injustices unimportant. It simply makes them different. It makes the September 11 hijackings distinctive. in their defining and malevolcnt pur- pose-to kill people and to create terror and havoc. This was not an ordinary injustice. It was an extraordinary injustice. The prcmisc of terrorism is the sheer su~erfluousness of hu- man life. This premise is inconsistent with civi- lized livinp anywhere. It threatens people of everv race and class, everv ethnicitv and reli- gion. Because it threatens everyone, and threat- ens values central to any dcccnl concevtion of a pood societv, it must be fought. And it must be fought in a way commensurate with its malevolence. Ordinary injustice can be remedied. Terrorism can only be stopped. Sccond, it would mean frankly acknowledging something well understood, often too ea- gerly embraced, by the twentieth century Marxist left-that it is often politically necessary to employ morally troubling means in the name of morally valid ends. A just or even a better socicly can only be realized in and through political practice; in our complex and bloody world, it will sometimes be necessary to respond to barbarous tyrants or criminals, with whom moral suasion won't work. In such situalions our choice is not between the wrong that confronts us and our ideal vision of a world beyond wrong. It is between the wrong that confronts us and the means-perhaps the dangerous means-wc have to employ in order to oppose it. In such situations there is a danger that "realism" can bccomc a rationalc for the Machiavellian worship of power. But equally great is the danger of a righteousness that trans- lates. in cfl'ccl, into a refusal to act in the face of wrong. What is one to do? Proceed with cau- tion. Avoid casting oneself as the incarnation of pure goodness locked in a Manichean struggle with evil. Be wary of violence. Look for alternative means when they are available, and support the development of such means when they are not. And never sacrifice demo- cratic freedoms and open debate. Above all, ask

the hard questions about the situation at hand, the means availablc, and the likely ef- fectiveness of different strate,' vies.>

AT: Framework -Debate Good Policy discussion, specifically the advocacy of specific policy options is the hallmark of the critical thinking skills that allow us to become more affective real world activists. Keller, Whittaker, and Burke, 2001. [Thomas E., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, James K.. professor of Social Work, and Tracy K., doctoral studcnt School of Social Work. "Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge thmugh active learning, "Journal of Social Work Education, SprlSummcrJ Policv practice encompasses social workers' "cfforts to influence the development. enactment. implcmcnlation. or assessment of social volicics" (Jansson, 1994, p. 8). Effective policv mactice involves analytic activities, such as dclining issues. gathering data, conducting rcscarch. identifying and prioritizing policv options. and creating policy proposals (Jansson. 1994). It also involves persuasive activities intended to influence opinions and outcomes, such as discussing and debating issues, organizing coalitions and task forces, and providing testimony. According to Jansson (1 984, pp. 57-58), social workers rely upon five fundamenlal skills when pursuing policy practice activities:Cl * value-clarification skills for identifying and assessing the underlying values inherent in policy positions;U * conceptual skills for identifying and evaluating the relative merits of different policy options;fl * interactional skills for interpreting the values and positions of others and conveying one's own point of view in a convincing manner;r * political skills for developing coalitions and developing effective strategies; and0 * position-taking skills for recommending, advocating. and defending a particular volicv. U Thcse policv vractice skills retlect the hallmarks of critical thinking (see Brookiield, 1987: Gambrill, 1997). The ccnlral activities of critical thinking are identifying and challenging underlvine. assumptions. exploring alternative wavs of thinking and acting. and arriving at commitments after a period of questioning. analvsis, and reflection (Brooklield, 1987). Significant parallels exist with the policv-making process--identifying the values underlying policv choices, reconnizin~ and evaluating multiple alternalives, and taking a position and advocating for its adoption. Developing policy practice skills seems to share much in common with develoving cavacities for critical thinking. Role-playing debates promote prepare us for real world activism by giving us a better understanding of how policy works, making us affective agents to achieve change. This allows us as individuals to become actors who could indeed transform international politics. Joyner 1999 [Christopher, Professor international Law @ Univcrsity of Georgetown, "Teaching International Law: Views from an international relations political scientist"].

The debate exercises carry several specific educational obiectives. First. students on each team must work together to refine a cogent argument that compellingly asscrls their legal position on a foreign policv issuc confrontinr! the Un~ted States. In this wav, thev gain greater insight inlo the rcal-world legal dilemmas faced by ~olicv makers. Second, as they work with other members of their team, they realize the comdcxitics of applying and in~plementing international law, and the difficulty of bridg~ng the gaps between United States pol~cy and international lcgal principles. either hv reworking the formcr or crcativelv reinterpreting the latter. Finallv, research Sor the debates forces students to become familiarized with contemporary issues on the Unitcd States f0reir.n volicv agenda and the role that international law plavs in formulating and executing these policies. The dcbatc thus becomes an excellent vehicle Sor pushing students beyond stale arguments over principles into the real world of policv analysis, volitical critiaue, and legal defense.

AT: Framework -Debate Good Debate is key to cognitive thinking and education on real world topics-switch side debate is especially critical to education. Muir, 1993(Star A, Department of Communications at George Mason University, "A Dcfcnse of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate", Philosophy and Rlzetoric, Vol. 26, No. 4, pg. 282-285) The debate over moral education and values clarification parallels in many ways the controversy ovcr switch-side debate. Where values clarification recognizes no one set of values, debate forces a questioning and exploration of both sidcs of an issue. Where cognitive-development emphasizes the use of role playing in the inception of moral judgment, debate rcquires an empathy for alternative points of view. Where discussion provides an opporlunitv for expressions of personal feelings, debate i'osters an analvtic and explicit approach to valuc assessment. Freelev describes the activitv this way: Educational debate provides an opportunity for students to consider the significant uroblems in the contcxt of a multivalued orientation. They learn to look at a problem from many points of view. As debaters analvzc thc potential affirmative cascs and the potential negative cases, including the uossibilitv of negative counterplnns. Lhcv being to realize thc complexitv of most contemporarv uroblems and to aoureciate the worth of a multivalucd orientation; as thev debate both sides of a proposition under consideration, thev learn not onlv that most uroblems of contemporary affairs havc more than one side but also that even one side of a proposition embodies a considerable range of values. The comparison between moral education and debate is useful because it contextualizes the process of moral dcvclopment within an educational setting. Several objections have been raised about the practice of moral education, and these objections have direct relevance to the issue of switch-side debate. A view of debate as a form of moral education can be developed bv addrcssinrz questions of efficacv, ol'isolation from the real world. and of relativism. The first issue is one of effectiveness: Do clarification activities achieve the espouscd goals? Social coercion and peer pressure, for example, still occur in the group setting, leaving the individual choice of values an indoctrination of sorts.27 Likewise, the focus of clarification excrciscs is arguably less analytic than expressive. less critical than emolivc.28 The expression of individual preferences may be guided by simple reaction rather than by rational criteria. These problcms arc minimized in the debate setting, especially where advocacy is not aligned with personal belief. Such advocacy requircs cxplicit analysis of values and the decision criteria for evaluating them.

In contemporarv debate, confronted with a case they believe in, debaters assigned to the negative side have several options: present a morass of arguments to see what arguments "stick," concede the problem and offer a "counter~lan" as a better way of solving thc problem, or attack the value structure of the affirmative and be more effective in defending a particular hierarchy of values. While the first option is certainlv exercised with some freauencv, the second and third ovtions arc also ofen used and are of critical imvortance in the development of cognitive skills associated with moral judgment. For example, in attacking a case that restricts police powers and upholds a personal right to privacy, debaters might question the reasoning of scholars and justices in raising privacy rights to such significant heights (analyzing Griswold v. Connecticut and other landmark cases), offer alternative value structures (social order, drug control), and defend the criteria through which such choices are made (utilitarian vs. dcontological premises). Even within the contcxt of a "see what sticks" paradigm, these arguments require debaters to assess and evaluate value structures opposite of their own personal feelings about their right to privacy. Social coercion, or peer pressure lo adopt certain valuc structures, is minimized in such a context because of competitive pressures. Adopting a value just because everyone else does may be the surest way of losing a dcbatc. A second obiection to debate as values clarification, consonant with Ehninger's concerns about gamesmanship, is the separation of the educational ~rocess from the real world. A significant concern here is how such learning about morality will be used in the rest of a student's lil'c. Some critics question whether moral school knowledge "may be quite separate from living moral experience in a similar way as proliciency in speaking one's native language generally appears quite scparate from the knowledge of formal grammar imparted by school." Edelstein discusses two forms of segmentation: division bctwecn rcalms of school knowledge (e.g., history separated from science) and between school and living experience (institutional learning scparatc from evcryday life). Ehninger's point, that debate becomes a pastime, and that apulication of these skills to solving real problems is diminished if it is viewed as a game, is largelv a reflection on institutional segmentation. The melding of different areas of knowledge, however. is a particular benefit of dcbatc, as it addresses to~ics of considerable importance in a real world setting. Recent college and high school topics include cncrgy policy, prison reform, care for the elderly, trade policy, homelessness. and the right to privacy. These topics are notable becausc they exceed the knowledze boundaries of particular school subiects, thev reach into issues of evervdav life, and thev are broad enough to force studcnls to address a variety of

value appeals. The explosion of "squirrels," or small and specific cases. I11 the 1960s and 1970s has had the effect of opening up each topic to many different case approaches. National topics are no longer of the one-case varicly (as in 1955's "the U.S. should recog nize Rcd China"). On the privacy topic, for example, cases include search and seizure issues, abortion, sexual privacy, tradeoffs with the first amendment, birth control, information privacy, pornography, and obscenity. The multiplicitv of issues pavs special dividends for debalcrs required to defend both sides of manv issues because the value critcria change from round to round and evolve over the year. The development of flexibility in coping with the intertwining ol' issues is an essential component in the interconnection of knowledge, and is a maior rationale for switch-side debate.1

AT: Framework -Debate Good Switch side debate is key to becoming an informed citizen-focus on technique and strategy is the only way to gain education and become involved in the real world. Muir, 1993(Star A, Department of Communications at George Mason University, "A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate", Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 26, No. 4, pg. 285-286) The isolation of debate from the real world is a much more potent challenge to the activity. There are indeed "esoteric" techniques, special temiinologies, and procedural constraints that limit the applicability of debate knowledge and skills lo the rest of thc student's life. The first and most obvious rejoinder is that debate puts students into greater contact with the real world bv forcing, them to read a great deal of information from popular periodicals. scholarly books and iournals, government documents. reports, newsletters, and daily newspapers. Debaters also frequentlv seek out and auery, administrators, policymakers, and public personae to gain more data. The constant consumption of material by, from, and about the real world is significantly constitutive: The information grounds the issues under discussion, and the process changes the relationship of the citizen to the public arena. Debaters can become more involved than uninformed citizens because they know about important issues. and because they know how to find out more information about these issues. Switch-side debating is not peripheral to this value. A thorough research effort is guided in large part by the knowledge that both sides of the issues must be covered. Where a particular controversy might involve affirmative research among conservative sources. the negative must research rhe liberal perspective. Where scientific studies predominate in justifying a particular policy, research in cultural studies tiny he necessary to counter the adoption of thc policy. Debating a ban on the teaching of creationism in public schools, lor exanlplc, forces research on the scientific consensus on evolution, the viability of theological grounds for public policy. and a consideration of the nature of science itself. A primary value of switch-side debate. that of cncouraginu research skills is fundamentallv an attachment to the "real world." and is enhanced by reauiring debaters to investigate both sides of an issue. A second responsc 10 the charge of segmentation is the proclivity of debaters to become involved in public volicv and international affairs. Although thc stereotype is that debaters become lawyers, students seeking other professional areas also see value in the skills of debate. Business management. government. politics, international relations, teaching, public policy, and so on, are significant career options for debaters. In surveys, ex-debaters frequently respond that debate was the single mosi educational activity of their college careers. Most classes provide information, but debate compels the use, assimilation, and evaluation of information that is not required in most classrooms. As one debate alumnus writes: "The lessons learned and the expericncc gained have been

more valuable to me than any other aspect of my formal education. "31 It is no wonder, then, that surveys of Congress and other policy-making instilutions reveal a high percentage of ex-debaters. The'argument that debate isolates participants from the "Real world" is not sustained in practicc when debaters trained in research, organization, strategv. and technique are consistentlv effective in integrating these skills into success on the iob.1 Debate is key to forming effective public decisions and tying education to the real world. Muir, 1993(Star A. Department of Communications at George Mason University, "A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate", Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 26, No. 4, pg. 286-287) A third point about isolation from the real world is that switch-side debate develops habits of the mind and instills a lifelong pattern of critical assessment. Studcnts who havc debated both sides of a topic are better voters. Dell writes. hecause of "their habit of analyzing both sidcs before forming a conclusion. "33 O'Neill. laycock and Swles. responding in pan to Rooscvelt's indictmtlt. iterated the basic position in 1931: Skill in the use of facts and inferences available may be gained on reither side of a question without regard to convictions. Insmction -md practice in dehnte should give young men this skill. And where these matters are properly handled. stress is no1 laid on getting the .speaker to think rightly in regard to the mrits of either side of these questions-but to think accurately on both sides. Reasons for not taking a position counter to one's heliefs (isolation from the "realworld." sophistry) are largely outweighed hy the henetit of such nxntal habits throughout an individual's life. The jargon, strategies, and techniques tmy he alienating to "outsiders." but they are also paradoxically integrative as well. Playing the game of debate involves certain skills, including research and policy evaluation, that evolve along with a debater's consciousness pf the complexities of moral and political dilemmas. This conceptual development is a basis for the formation of ideas and relational thinking necessary for effective public decision makinp making even the game of debate a significant beneiit in solving real world problems. Switch side debate allows us to debate issues, not necessarily endorse them-this gives us space to experiment with different ideas. Muir, 1993 (Star A, Department of Communications at George Mason Univcrsity, "A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary

Debate", Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 26, No. 4. pg. 288) The role of switch-side debate is especiallv important in the oral defense of arguments that foster tolerance without accruing the mord complications of acting on such heliefs. The forum is therefore unique in providing dehnters with attitudes oTtolennce without committing them to active moral irresponsibility. As Freeby notes. debaters are indeed exposed to a multivdued world, both within and between the sides of a oiven topic. Yet this exposure hardly commits them to such "mistaken" values. In this view, the divorce of the game from the "real world" can be seen as a means of paininn perspective without obligating students to validate their hypothetical structure through immoral actions.

AT: Framework -Debate Good Debating fosters tolerance for opposing views by forcing us to debate both sides of an issue. Muir, 1993(Star A, Department of Communications at George Mason University, "A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate", Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 25, No. 4: pg. 288-289) Values clarification, Stewart is corrcct in pointing out, does not mean that no values are developed. Two verv important valuestolerance and fairness-inhcre to a sianilicant dcmcc in the ethics of switch-side debate. A second point about the charge of relativism is that tolerance is related to thc development of reasoned moral viewpoints. The willinpness to recoanize the existence of other views, and to grant alternative positions a dcmce of crcdibilitv. is a value Sostcrcd by switch-side debate: Alternately debating both sides of the same question ... inculcates a deep-seated altiludc of lolcrance toward differing points of view. To bc forccd to dcbatc only one sidc lcads lo an egoidcntiflcalion with that side .... The other side in contrast is seen only as something to be discredited. Arguing as nersuasivclv as one cane for completelv onposing views is one wav of giving recognition to the idea that a strong case can generally be made for the views of earnest and intelligent men, however such views may clash with one's own . . .. Promoting this kind of tolerance is perhaps one of the greatest benefits dcbating both sides has to oftkr. The activity should encourage debating both sides oi'a topic, reasons Thompson, because debaters are "more likely to realize that propositions are bilateral. It is those who fail to recognize this fact who: become intolerant, dogmatic, and bigoted. "While Theodore Roosevelt can hardly be said to be advocating bigotry, his efforts to turn out advocates convinced of their rightness is not a position imbued with tolerance. At a societal level. the value of tolerance is more conducive to a fair and open assessment of competing ideas. John Stuart Mill eloquently states the case this way: Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right. ... the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race .... If the opinion is

right, they arc deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of the truth, produced by its collision with error. At an individual level, tolerance is related to moral identity via empathic and critical assessments of differing perspectives. Paul posits a strong relationship between tolerance, empathy, and critical thought. Discussing the function of argument in everyday life, he observes that in order to overcome natural tendencies to reason egocentrically and sociocentrically, individuals must gain the capacitv to engage in self-reflective Questioning, to reason dialogicallv and dialecticallv. and to "reconstruct alien and opposing belief svstems em~athically. "Our system of beliefs is. by definition, irrational when we are incapable of abandoning a belief for rational reasons; that is. when we egocentrically associate our beliefs with our own integrity. Paul describes an intimate relationship between private inferential habits, moral practices, and the nature of argumentation. Critical thought and moral identity. he urges, must be predicated on discovering the insights of opposing views and the weakness of our own beliefs. Role plaving, he reasons, is a central element of anv effort to ~ain such insight.] Switch side debate prevents relativism while respecting different beliefs. Muir, 1993 (Star A? Department of Communications at George Mason University, "A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate", Plzilosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 26, No. 4, pg. 287-288) The first response to thc chargc of relativism is that switch-side debale respects the existence of diverrrent beliefs, but fbcuses attention on assessing the validity of opposing belief systems. Scriven argues that the "confusion of pluralism, of the proper tolerance for diversity of ideas, with relativism-the doctrine that there are no right and wrong answers in ethics or religion-is perhaps the most serious ideological barrier to the implementation of moral education today." The process of ethical inquiry is central to such moral education, but the allowance of just any position is not. Here is whcrc cognitive-devclopmcnt diverges from the formal aims of values clarification. Where clarification ostensibly allows any value position, cognitive-development progresses from individualism to social conformity to social contract theory to universal ethical principles. A pluralistic pedanoev does not imply that all views are acceptable: It is morally and pedagogically corrcct Lo teach about ethics, and thc skills of moral analvsis rather than doctrine. and to set out the arguments for and against tolerance and pluralism. All of this is undone if you also imply that all the various in compatible views about abortion or pornography or war are equally right, or likely to be right, or deserving of respect. Pluralism reauires respecting the right to hold divergent beliefs; it implies neither tolerance of actions based on those beliefs nor respectino the content of beliefs.

AT: Framework -Debate Good Switch side debate fosters moral responsibility and reaps the educational benefits of debate-sounding persuasive is not enough. Muir, 1993(Star A, Department of Communications at George Mason University, "A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate", Philosophy ad Rhetoric, Vol. 26, No. 4, pg. 29 1-292) Firm moral commitment to a value system, however, along with a sense of moral identity, is founded in reflexive assessments of multiple perspectives. Switch-side debate is not simply a mallcr oT spcakinv persuasively or organizing ideas clearly (although it does involve these). but of understanding and mobilizing argumcnls to make an effective case. Proponents of debating both sides observe that the debaters should prepare the best ~ossible case they can, given thc facts and intormation available to them. This process. at its core, involves critical assessment and evaluation ot arguments; it is a process of critical-thinking not available with manv traditional teaching mcthods. We must progressively learn to recognize how often the concepts of others are discredited by the concepts we use to justify ourselves to ourselves. We must come to see how often our claims are compelling. only when expressed in Slur own egocentric view. We can do this if we learn the art of using concepts without living in them. This is possible only when the inlellectual act of stepping outside of our own systems of belief has become second nature, a routine and ordinary responsibility of evcryday living. Neither academic schooling nor socialization has yet addressed this moral responsibilitv, but switch-side debatino fosters this type of role playing. and generates reasoned moral positions based in part on values of tolerance and fairness . Yes, there may be a dangerous sense of competitive pride that comes with successfully advocating a position against onc's own views, and there are ex-debaters who excuse their deceptive practices by saying "I'm just doing my job." Ultimately, howcvm, sound convictions are distinguishable from emphatic convictions by a consideration of all sides of a moral stancc. Moral education is not a guaranteed formula for rectitude. but the central tendencies of switchside debate are in line with convictions built on empathic appreciation for alternative points of view and a reasoned assessment of arguments both pro and con. Tolerance, as an allernative to dogmatism, is preferable, not because it invites a relativistic view of the world, but because in a framework of equal access to ideas and equal opportunities for expression, the truth that emerges is more defensible and more iustiliable. Morality, an emerging lbcal point of controversy in late twentieth-century American culture, is fostered rather than hampered by empowering students to form their own moral identitv.1 Imagining what someone else would do is the epitome of switch side debate-it's key to critiquing our assumptions. Muir, 1993(Star A, Department of Communications at George Mason University, "A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary

Debate", Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 26, No. 4, pg. 292-293) The values of tolerance and fairness, implicit in the metaphor of debate as a game, are idealistic by nature. They have a much greater chance of success, however. in an activity that requires students to examine and understand both sides of an issue. In hls descript~on of debat~ng societies, Robert Lours Stevenson questions the prcvalcncc of unreasoned opinion. and summarizes the judgment furthered in this work: Now, as the rule stands, you are saddled with the side you disapprove, and so you are forced. by regard for your own fame, to argue out, to feel with. to elaborate completely, the case as it stands against vourself; and what a fund of wisdom do you not turn up in this idle digging of the vineyard! How many new difficulties lakc form before vour m!How many superannuated arguments cripple finally into limbo, under the glance of your enforced eclcclicism! . . . It is as a means of melting down this museum of premature petrifactions into living and impressionable soul that we insist on their utilitv.")

AT: Methods K -No Alt BycfaMmgthat AFF flawed methodolegits or repteseobtionscomefirst and not atlowingthc policy advaatages to be weighed precludesatternatiremlnlveacy Festenstein, f 997 m.Manhew, Ltcturerin Politics, University of SiuWeld PhDfram Cmbtidge University m 1994, and taught at Hull University from 1994-1999, Professor, "wk and Political Theory: From Dewey to R~rry'',Pality Press, pp 162-631 ive ddiiation.Where thiscannot $e had,adecisionmustbemade by majority ruld Claims that oar flawed metbodokrgyor representations comefirst in the ntuad maots a *medcrnoerartic debate when all opposingviews are considered equally undemocraticdebate dcstmys any hope of alternative soheucy Fwtenstein, 1997 [T)r. Matthew, Lecturer in Politics,University of Skefl5eld,Phil hrn Cambridge Universityin 1994, and taught rrt Hull UnivMsity fRHn19941999,Professor, "Pragmatism aod Political.Theory: From Deweyu,Rorty", Polity Press, pg. 1771 Ivie secondclaim expresses 'episten\l'bgical justificationt of dm-CY: engageinpoliticsissaidtobetha --

Postmodern theory is ineffective in promoting resistance and makes any resistance impossible Norris 1992 (Christopher, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wales in Cardiff, "Uncritical Theory: Poslmodernism, Intellectuals, and the Gulf War", pg 3 1) Of course I am not suggesting -absurdly -that this trahison des clercs is a direct result of over-exposure to post-structuralist ideas. or that a better understanding of the philosophic issues would automalically produce the desired change of attitude. Still, it shouldbe cause for somc rueful reflection on the part of lefr-wing intellectuals that 'thcorv' (or so much of what nowadays passes for advanced theoretical wisdom) has shown itself not onlv ill-equipped to mounl anv kind of effective critical resistance. but also quite capable of lending support to neo-pragmatist or consensus-based doctrines which would render such resistance strictly unthinkable. Nor is this in any way surprising, given its pervasive anti-realist drift, its rejection of truth-claims or validity conditions of whatever kind, and its attitude of thoroughgoing Nietzschean contempt for the values of 'liberal-humanist' thought. Merelv to use concepts such as conscience, rood faith. resuonsibilitv, or ethical iudnmcnt in the presence of right-thinking orthodox post-structuralisls is to find oneself treated with pitying fondness as a relic of that old 'Enlightenment' discourse. For if-as their argument standard goes -the autonomous subiect has now been dispersed in lo a range of plural, ~olvmomhous 'subiect-~ositions' inscribed within lannuane or existing solclv as figments of this or that constitutive discourse, then of course there is no Question of those values surviving as anvthinn but a species of chronic self-delusion, a form of 'imaginary' specular investment whose claims have long since been deconstruclcd through the insights of psychoanalysis, structural linguistics, Foucauldian discourse-theory etc." Thus ~hc socalled 'postmodern condition' applies just as much lo issucs of ethics and politics as to matters of an epistemological import. That is to say, thcrc is no getting outside the 'discourse' -or the existing range of discursive subject-positions -whose limits are inescapably (in Wittgenstein's phrase) 'the limits of our world', and which therefore set the terms for any meaningful debate about truth, reality, or ethical values.

AT: Postmodernism K -Permutation Solvencv A complete rejection of modernism is politically debilitating. We must synthesize modern and postmodern theory to develop a strategy with the potential for progressive change. Best and Kellner 01 (Steve and Douglas, Associate Professor of Philosophy at University of Texas-El Paso; and Professor of Philosophy at UCLA, "Dawns, Twilights, and Transitions: Postmodcrn Theories, Politics, and Challenges," Democracy & Nature, Mar. Vol. 7. No. 1, http:Nwww.democracynature.org/dn/ vol7hes1-kcllnerpostmodernism.htm) Our contemporary situat~on thus finds us between the modem and the postmodern, thc old and the new, tradition and thc contemporary. the global and the local, the universal and the particular, and any number of other competing matrixes. Such a complex situation prc~luces feelings of vertigo, anxiety, and panic, and contemporary theory, art, politics and everyday life exhibit signs of all of these symptoms. To deal with these tensions, we need to develou new syntheses of modern and postniodern theory and politics to negotiate the novelties and intricacies of our current era. Indeed. both modern and postniodern positions have strengths and limitations, and we should seek a creative combination of the best elements of each. Thus. we should combine modern notions of solidaritv, alliances, consensus, universal rights. macropolitics and institutional struggle with uostmodern notions of diffcrencc, plurality, multiperspectivalism, identity, and micropolitics. The task today is to construct what Hegel called a "differentiated unity." where the various threads of historical development comc together in a rich and mediated way. The abstract unity of the Enl~ghtenment,as expressed in the discourse of rights or human nature, produced a false unity that masked and suppressed diffcrcnces and privileged certain groups at the expense of others. The postmodern turn, conversely, has produced in its extreme forms warring fragments of difference. exploding anv possible context for human community. This was perhaps a necessary development in order to construct needed differences, but it is now equally necessary to reconstruct a new social whole, a progressive communilv in consensus over basic values and goals, a solidarity that is richly mediated with differences that are ar~jculated without being annulled. Thus, one of the main dramas of our time will be which road we choose to travel into the future, the road that leads, in Martin Luther King's phrasing, to communitv, or the one that verges toward chaos. Similarly, will we take the course that leads to war or the one that brings peace? The one that establishes social justice, or ever grosser forms of inequality and poverty? Will wc slay on the same modem path of irrational growth and development, of the further expansion of a global capitalist economy (the world ol' NAFTA and GATT) that has generated seeming permanent economic, of social, and environmental crisis, or will we create a sustainable society that lives in balance with the natural world'? Will wc chart a whole new ~ostmodern path. blind to the vromssive heritage of the vast, with all its attendant snares and dangers:' Or will we stake out an alternative route, radicalizing the traditions of modcrn Enlightenment and democracy. guided by the vision of a future that is iust, egalitarian. participatory. ecological. healthy, happy, and sane? The future will

depcnd on what choices we make, hence we must intelligently and decisively develop a new politics for the future. In this way, we can begin to develop a politics of alliance and solidarity equal to the challenges of the coming millennium. We must combine the modern and the postmodern to solve for the shortcomings of each Best & Kellner, Department of Philosophy at University of Texas-El Paso, 1998 [Steven & Douglas, http://www2.cddc.vt.edu/illuminationslk~.htm, "Postmodern Politics and the Battle for the Future"] The postmodern turn which has so marked social and cultural theory also involves conflicts between modem and postmodern politics. In this study, wearticulate the differences between modern and postmodern politics and argue against one-sided posilions which doamaticall~reicct one tradition or the other in favor of partisanship for either the modcrn or the vostmodern. Arguing for a politics of alliance and solidarity, we claim that this vroiect is best served bv drawing on the most progressive elements of both the modern and postmodern traditions. Developing a new politics involves ovcrcoming the limitations of certain versions of modern politics and postmodern identity ~c)litics in order to develop a politics of alliancc and solidaritv equal to the challenges of the coming millennium.

AT: Podemodernism K -Permutation Solvencv The plan and alternative can be combined -forming coalitions through an ethic of love is critical to liberation Cook 92 (Anthony, Associate Professor at Georgetown Law School, "A Diversity of Inlluence: Reflections on Postmodernism," New Eng. L. Rcv. 751) We must also rcsist, I believe, nonracist forms of separatism that refuse to open themselves to the commonalitv of our experienccs. Instead. from a position of racial strength, pride and assuredness. rooted in a knowledge of our place in and contributions to history and humanity, wc must seek coalitions with others for purposes of transforming conditions of suffering that disproportionatclv impact blacks but that traverse race and ethnic boundaries as well. If my assessment is correct, King provides powerful insights into how we might accomplish this delicate balancing of ends. In summary, King's commitment to humility and love broadened, without sacrificing his vision of a transformed America. As one can gather from his struggle to come to grips with and embrace many of Black Nationalism's concerns, there was real listening going on -as Frank Michelman puts it, an openness to modulation through dialogic encounter. His orientation and attitude lead me to believe that such a balanced and sensitive reckoning would have been no less forthcoming in the wake of feminist, gay rights and church laity critiques of hierarchy that followed his death. A commitment to humilitv and love, as I have defined these terms, is vital to a critical ~ostmodernism that remains committed to Justice, vet acknowled~es that its conception of Justice can onlv be partial and incomplete. Such an intellectual and critical predisposition avoids the Derridaian varalvsis of analvsis engendered bv a facile commitment to endless theoretical deconstructions of binary opposites. Moreover, its search for and linking of various stories of historic subordination --the intellectual and existential quest to grasp the otherness of self and the contcxt of being --avoids an unhealthy Foucaultian insularilv. It is onlv in this wav, I believe, that activist minded scholars can succcssfullv harness the forces of ~oslmodernism in the struggles lor human liberation.

AT: Postmodernism K -Modernism Good We shouldn't abandon modern strategies of liberation. Coalitions and alliances are necessary to challenge domination. Best and Kellner 01 (Steve and Douglas. Associate Professor of Philosophy at University of Texas-El Paso; and Professor of Philosophy a1 UCLA. "Dawns, Twilights, and Transitions: Postmodern Theories, Politics, and Challenges," Democracy & Nature, Mar, Vol. 7, No. 1, http:Nwww.democracynature.org/dnl vol7lbesl~kcllner~postmodernisn1.htm ) The emphasis on local struggles and micropower, cultural politics which redefine the political, and attempts to develop political ibrrns relevant to the problems and developments of the contcmporary agc is cxtremely valuable, but there are also limitations to the dominant forms of postmodern politics. While an emphasis on micropolitics and local strungles can be a healthy substitute for excessively utopian and ambitious political projects,-one should not lose sight that core sources of political vower and oppression are precisely the big targets aimed at by modern theory. including capital, the state, imperialism, racism, and patriarchy. Taking on such maior tarzets involves coalitions and mullifront struggle. olicn requiring a politics of alliance and solidarity that cuts across grouv identifications to mobilize sufficient power to struggle against, say, the evils of cavitalism or the state. Thus, while today we need the expansion of localized cultural practices. they attain thcir real significance onlv within the struggle for the transformation of society as a whole. Without this svstenuc emvhasis. cultural and idcntitv volitics remain confined to the margins of society and are in danger of degenerating into narcissism. hedonism, aestheticism, or personal therapy, where they Dose no danger and are immediately coopted bv the culture industries. In such cases, the political is merely thc personal, and the original intentions of the 1960s goal to broaden the political field are inverted and perverted. Just as economic and political dcmands have their referent in subjectivity in everyday life. so these cultural and existential issues find their ultimate meaning in the demand for a new society and mode of production. Yet we would insist that it is not a suestion of micro vs macropolitics, as if it were an eitherlor proposition, but rather both dimensions are important for the struggles of the present and future. Likewise, we would argue that we need to combine the most affirmative and negative perspectives, embodying Marcusc's declaration that critical social theory should be both more negative and utopian in reference to the status quo.i[xii] Thcrc arc certainly many things to be depressed about is in the negative and cynical postmodernism of a Baudrillard, yet without a positive political vision merely citing the negative might lead to avathv and depression that onlv benefits the existing order. For a dialectical politics. however, positive vision of what could be is articulated in coniunction with critical analysis of what is in a multiverspectivist approach that focuses on the forces of domination as well as possibilities of emancipation.

But also a mistake, we believe, to oround one's politics in either modern or postmodern theory alone. Against one-sided positions, we advocate a version of reconstructivc poslmodernism that we call a politics of alliance and solidarity that builds on both modern and postmodern traditions. Unlike Laclau and Mouffe who believe that postmodern theory basically provides a basls for a new politics, and who tend to reject the Enlightenment per se, we believe that the Enlightenment continues to provide resources for volitical struele today and are skeptical whether nostmodern theory alone can provide sufficient assets for an emanci~atory new politics. Yet the Enlightenment has its blindspots and dark sides (such as its relcntlcss pursuit of the domination of nature, and naive belief in "progress," so we believe that aspects of the postmodern critiquc of Enlightenment are valid and force us to rethink and reconstruct Enlightenment philosophy for the present age. And while we agree with Habermas that a reconstruction of the Enlightenment and modernity are in order, unlike Habermas we believe that postmodcrn theory has important contributions to make to this project. Various forms of postmodern politics have been liberatory in breaking away from the abstract and ideological universalism of the Enlightenment and the reductionist class politics of Marxism, but they lend to be insular and fragmentinp focusinn solely on the experiences and political issues of a given group, evcn splintering further into distinct subgroups such as divide the feminist community. Identity politics are oflen structured around simplistic binary oppositions such as Us vs. Them and Good vs. Bad that it people against one another, making allianccs, consensus. and compromise difficult or imvossible. This has been the case, for example, with tendencies within radical feminism and ecofeminism which reproduce essentialism by stigmatizing men and "male rationality" whilc exalting women as the bearers of pcaceful and loving value and as being "closer to nature."ii[xiii] Elements in the black nationalist liberation movement in lhc 1960s and thc early politics of Malcolm X were exclusionist and racist, literally demonizing whitc people as an evil and inferior race. Similarly, the sexual politics of some gay and lesbian groups tend to exclusively focus on their own interests, while the mainstream environmental movement is notorious for resisting alliances with people of color and grass roots movements.

AT: Postmodernism K -Cultural Relativism T/ A. Cultural relativism cedes politics to the far right. Antonio 2000 (RobertJ., Professor of Sociology at University of Kansas, "After Postmodernism: Reactionary Tribalism," JSTOR) Even Fukuyama warned that prosaic economism and cultural relativism make neoliberal regimes vulnerable to attack from the far right (1992.jp. xxii-xxiii. 181-244, 300-39). Discussing Fukuyarna, Allan BIvom held-that if "an qltema~ive is sought there is nowhere else to seek it. I would-suggest lhat fascism has a future, if not thc future" (1 989, p. 21 ). When belief in modernization was strong and the memory of fascism was vivid, protofascism was usually seen as an irrational reflex or symptom of a collective character disorder. However. New Right critiques of the culturally frag~nenting. depoliticizing impacts of neoliberalism and posttmnlemi7ation arc sophisticated and innovative and deserve serious consideration. In light of today's escalatino forms of bloodv retribalization (e.g.. Kosovo and Eas~ Timor) anddeepening economic and cultural crises in important regions (e.g.. Russia). claims that such radical right views may become more widely vopular do not seen1 so far-fetched. Rogt~Eatwell attaches special sigtiticance to resurgent radical conservative theories and European New Right theories. He stores that the most promising form of neofascist rodicdism in terms of burying the past is the ancmpt to rehabilitate thc German conservative revolutionaries. like Ernst Jtingcr .. . and key intellectuals who supported fascism, like Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger. . . . The Frcnch Ncw Right, in particular ils key theorist Alain de Bcnoist, has turncd to the conservative revolutionaries and Schmitt for much of its inspiration, particularly to their ideas on thc impomce of re-creating national identity. fitwell 1997, p. 360) Although still obiectionabk in "polite company." ktwell warns, neohscist theories off a countervision that could become much more widely embraced. especially in an economic downturn. TheEuropean New Right claims to fuse ~hc radical antiliberal facets of left and right into a new, vihrant "Third Way." For example, New Right opposition to African, Middle Eastern, or Asian immimation stresses the evils of cavitalist globalization. resistance to cultural homogenization.&defense of cultural identity and difference. Their pleas for "ethnopluralism" transmute plans to repatriate immigrants into a left-sounding anti-imperialist strategy championing the autonomy of all cultural noups and their righl to exert sovereigntv in their living space. Claiming to counter "antiwhite racism," they argue that multiculturalism scrvcs global capitalism's merciless leveling and that only exciusionary l~~onoculture

nurtures gcnuinc cultural diversity. They also pose "green" agendas to protect thcir homelands from overpopulation. overdevelopment, and other ravages of the neoliberal "New World Order" and latest and most exploitative phase of Enlightenment.16 They often deploy New Age spiritualism, inscribed in pagan or early Christian symbols, to foster reenchantment and remythologization. Following the New Left and today's postmodernist cultural left. the New Right stress the ascendancy of cultural politics. Reshaping radical conservatism for postmodern times. they employ cultural studies' favorite forerunner theorist. Antonio Gramsci. an icon of their fusion of left and right and use his idea of "cultural hegemony" against the Liberal left (e.g.. Sunk 1990. pp. 14.29-41). Eatwcll holds that the New Right's "ideological core" is little changed from first-gcnmtion radical conservatism's "holistic-national radical Third Way" (1997. p. 361; emphasis in original). Recently resurrected and appropriated by the New Right, the original Weimar-era a~vroaches kar the imprint of radical tribalism.17 Followino, Nietzschean antisociology, they charged that modem theorists elevate "decadent" values into guiding ideals and that their universalist grand narratives of modernization produce pernicious leveling of cultural ~articularity. They were influenced strongly by Nietzsche's antiliberalism and total i-ritique of modernity, bur they reformulated his ideas into nationalist visions that he reiected. hverting the idea of a pmgressivc shift from homogenous tribes, rooted in-"ethnos," to plural modem societies, based on 'demos," radical conservatives held that modem theory afims normatively an actual descent-from animate cultural diversity to souless universal technocracy Thev contended that modern democracv's melding of diverse ethnic groups into a mass "societv" destrovs their distinctive cultural identities.18 h their-view, it dissolves cultural community into atomized, selfish. impersonal-econonlic relations. Radical conservatives decried liberal-left efforts to impose formal and substantive eaualitv, holding that allegedlv suv~ressed natural inequalities ought to be cultivated and emvloyed within the ranks of the domestic ~ociopolitica~ order. Overall, they envisioned an "organic"-hierarchy of corpcrmte goups and loyal subjects, regimented in a pseudo-communal way under natural leaderships.19 Heidegger hcld that "Eumpe lies in a pincers between Russia and America, which are metaphysically the same": that is. their economism and

instrumenlalism muses a "darkening of the world" or "always-the-sameness" (1961, pp. 36-39). h his view. the hegcmonic modem emphasis on technical rationality turns peoplc into a tinlid, powerless. mediocre, nihilistic mass or a totally homogenized technolngical civilization devoid of cultural creativity Heidegger and other radical conservativcs contended that capitalism and socialism are both rooted in the West's characteristic universalis tic rationalism. Still manifesting this exhausted cultural complex, they held, left-wing "revolution" cannot forge a genuinely new culturc. They still considexd conununis~~l an especially dangerous and formidable cnemy, fearing that its antiliberal communalism, statism, and intcmationalism could forge the solidarity and discipline that are lacking in liberal democracy They belicvcd that the lefi could grab political power, hut that would merely harden the grip of bankrupt Western civilization. They thought that communism's instrumentalist, egalitarian ntionali7ation would suppress all opposition and be the bane of all culture. Radical conservatives hoved that radical segments of the cultural left, sharing their virulent hatred of liberal institutions and belief that bourgeois culture was totallv spent, would ioin a "revolution from the right" aimed at demolishing sociocultural modernity and putting modern technology in the service a truly new cultural complex. Radical conservatives saw the political suectrum as a sharvly bowed horseshoe; the extreme left occupies an opposite. but proximate end of the continuum. Thev hoped that left radicals would give uv on their failed revolution and make the short ium~ to the extreme right. closing the "ends of a horseshoe" and encircling the common liberal enemy (Kolnai 1938, pp. 113,235).

AT: Postmodernism K -Cultural Relativism T/ B. This causes worse forms of racism and domination. Antonio 2000 (Robert J., Professor of Sociology at University of Kansas, "After Postmodernism: Reactionary Tribalism," JSTOR) The recently revived European New Riaht repeats many of the first generation's positions, bur it refashions the old ideas to fit culturally postmodernized scuings and to divorce its agenda from the former fascist regimes and from the Holocaust. T~C lcading theorist of thc French New-Right. Alain dc Benoisl, provides an exemplary version of "postmodernism 'of the right,"' trumpetino radical conservatism to the Derridian-soundinn tune of the "right to difference," mixing Schmitl wilh Gnmsci, and blurring left and right (Taguicff 193-93a. p. 103).22 Like others of the New Right. however, he reiects multiculturalism and hkes a Schmiltian view-of European identities. f-& says he wants to protect conlincntal cthnopluralism and to preserve the local cultures of Europe's diverse ethnic and linguistic groups, empowerin2 them ~oliticallvas autonomous regional entities in a larner inlperial unit. In his view. only federated "organic-communities" can resist global neoliberalistn and its seductive U.S.-spawned consumerism and mass media. Following Schmitt, Benoist advocates nurturina local homogeneity to fight capitalism's universal homogenization, but he applauds active civic life. pubtic discussion. dkct dc~acncy. and North American communitarisni. His scathing broadsides against lihen~l individualism have a clear affinity for the Sandel-Bcllnh-Taylor-Euioni-Macl~~tyre critiques of fictional monads that are supposedly ahk to choose. act, and franr identity independent of communaltics ("unencumbered selves"). His incisive attacks on neoliheral globalization and Hayekian econontics are quite scholarly and sophisticated. converging with work by the most able lcft liheral theorist%. Rejecting 1x Pen's Front National and openly racist nationalism, he claims to embncc NSM "politics of recognition." Believing thc nation-state and left politics to be exhausted. Belmist contends that mw assertions of collective identity and "proliferation of networks and multiplic;~tion of 'tribes'" offer alternatives to liheral kft lcvcling (1993-946. pp, 195. U)3-4: 1993-94a. pp. 95-97; 1995. 1997. 1996a. 19966, 19986.. 1998c., 1999). Benoist's direction is visible in his friendlv references to Schmitt and other radical conservatives and in his equation of modern democracv with extreme domination and exhaustion (i.e.. total atomization, instrumentalkation, and homogenization). Sccing capitalist globali,ation as the cause of tcday's Third World diaspora, he holds that receiving states, countries of origin, and transplanted people themselves would all benefit from the repatriation of immigrants. He claims that such a nlovc is thc only way to preserve difference and foster a heterotopia of autonomous cultures or Schmittian pluriverse: only ho~nogenous ethnically unified communities are capable of susbining the type of collective identities needed to resist molibcralisrn's grim reaper. Like Schmitt. Henoist stresses incommensurable culture. rather than biological difference. He rejects

traditional racisnl and espouses cultural relativism and tolerance. hut hc argues that cultural differences cannot be mediated communicatively or regulated by common nom.23 His selfdescribed "postmodern" move is supposed to counter the West's hegemonic rationalism and cultural imperialism. especially the allegedly corrosive force of its universal human rights and abstract notions of ecrualitv (which he argues serve liberal economism and homogenization). I& treats democratic universalism and egalitarianism as protototalitarian tendencies, and he suggests that Statinismand Nazismare rooted in lihenl democratic culture's evaporation of particularity and that they provide a staging pint fnr an orgi~icist illversion of modem democracy. Benoist's convergence with ~ostmodernism's politicized strong program is transparent. except that following more consistentlv the logic of radical vers~ectivisn~'~ break with thc communication model, he argues that cultural divcrsitv can never be preserved in a multicultural society (Benoist 1993-941. 1993-916. 199s; Taguieff 1993-94: Sunk 1990. pp. 125-5 1 ). Benoist claims to chan~pion the "direct democracy" oflhe ancient Greekpolis. buf like earlier radical conservatives, hc laves vague the actual mchanisms of political rule. He does imply. hourever, that they would invert liheral democracy. Praising the Greek polis for averting liberal fragmentation and paralysis and. thur. being "a community of citizens." Benoist sees "ancient democracv" as "genuine democracy." He attributes its cultunl and political integration to the convergence of "demos and ethnos"; that is. citizenship was based nn "common ancestr)." orthe "reverse" of liberal orders where equal rights derive from "the natural qualrty of all." He is aware that citizens of "ancicnt dcmocracv" were usuallv a hereditary status order of landed and militarized propertvholders that relied on ruthless extraction from unfree slave and serf strata and that did not extend equal rights to women. Seeing such dominance and subordination as a natural facet of organic varticularity, he asserts that "a certain hierarchical structure" does not diminish the democratic status of such regimcs. His idea of ancicnt "liberty" inverts today's liberal democratic usages of the term. Rather than "emancipation from the collectivitv.' he argues, ancicnt liberty affirmed the individual's bond to the communitv and stressed "inheritance" and "adherence." Accordingly, he held that the "'liberty' of an individual-without heritage, i.e., of a deracinated individual, was completely devoid of any meaning."He also states casually that "slaves were excluded from voting not because they were slavcs, but because they were not 'citizens' [i.e., not n~emhers of one of the polis's constituent phtries or clans]." In his view. the most vital facet of the polis was its exclusion of outsiders. Conversely. today's hegemnic principles of universal citizenship and humn equality preclude his preferred "aristodemocracy" (Benoist 1991). Benoist praised ancient imperial regimes br similar reasons as the polis; they recognized indjviduals only through their

membership in legally empowered corporate groupings or status orders (religions, ethnic groups, conrmunities. ;idnations). By contrast to the modern nation-state's principle of voluntary association and countervailing power oTit~dividual rights, ancient groups were compulsory and had sweeping powcr over their flocks. For today. Beiioist advises, "Imperial principle above, dimct dcinocracy below" (Renoisl 1993-94a. p. 97). His hoped~for federated European monocultures. where political rights would be tied to ethnos. would empower compulsory groupings, forging commusitarianism with an iron glove (Walzer 1997, pp. 14-19). Theundemocratic features of the prenmdern pnlis. the empire, and the feudal state disappear in Benoist's rendering. Ignoring pervasive force and dependency, he praises their "democratic" facets. "spiritual character," solidarity, and inteption ofthe "one and the many" (all emanating from the centrality of "ethnos" and participation limited by status-group membership) (Benoist 1993-946). He redefine$ "direct democracy" as hierarchical monoculture. which overcomes today's nomutivc emphases on universal citizenship. cqual participation, and iadividual frredom. Posed as a revolutionary "alternative" to mass democracy and liberal institutions, his position. like earlier radical conservative arguments for "organic dernocncy," points toward protofascist pseudoco~nniunily rather fhdn self-governing Gemeinschaft. This direction is manifested in his unproblematical description of the Weimar radical conservative Ernst Junner's "democracy of the state," or hierarchical order, based on "Prussian principles of command." where "libertv and obedience are one" (Bcnoist 1998a. 1998&).24 Eqoating modem denlocracy with spiritless med~ncrity, decadence, and deracination. Benoist postures when he expresses appreciative vicws of North American communitariai~s, who he must know aim toenlivzo the very types of representative democracy and liberal institutions that he despises. Claiming that everyonc prctciids to suppi>rt democrdcy today, Benoist employs the term for his own purposes (1991. p. 26). His effort to locate himself as an "organic con~munitarian" who embraces "community" and "difference" manifests the pstmodern split of signifier and signified (Benoist 1993-943). Pitting "community" and "ethnos" against "society" and "demos." radical conservatives brrak with modem theory or the sociological presuppositions of modem democracy. They see the "universe of the particular." orself-enclosed collective identities. as the only bulwark i~gunst homogenization. Against universalism and humn rights, tky hold that divergent cultures cannot reach shred understandings or he judged hy common standards. Their radical verspectivism parallels the essentialist standpoint philosophies of posrmodernism's politicized strong promam. However. they propose an exclusionary monoculture that follows consistcntly from their

break with the communication model. Their inherently conflictive-view of intergroup relations treal power-knowledge and dominance-subordinalion as allpervasive defining forces among the tribes. Most important, they transform the ideals of freedom and autonomv from qualities of individual citizens to attributes of a unitarv, collective political subiect. The radical conservative strateav of strengthening the political center and empowering groups over individuals is posed. todav, as therapy for the homelessness, fragmentation, and unconstrained, nihilistic individualismthat allegedly inhere in the neoliberal political economic regime and in cultural postmodernization. However. the total state lurks behind their critique.

Postmodernism K -K Destrovs Coalitions (Krishna) Total critique destroys coalitions and the possibility of progressive social change. Krishna 93 (Sankaran, Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii a1 Manoa. Alternatives, Summer, p. 400-401, "The Importance of Being Ironic: A Postcolonial View on Critical International Relations Theory) The dichotomous choice presented in this excerpt & straightforward: one either indulges in total critique, delegitimizing all sovereign truths, or one is committed to "nostalgic," essentialist unities that have become obsolete and have been thc grounds for all our oppressions. In offering this dichotomous choice, Dcr Derian replicates a move made by Chaloupka in his equally dismissive critique of the move mainstream nuclear opposition, the Nuclear Freeze movement of the early 1980s. that, according to him, was operating along obsolete lines, emphasizing "facts" and "realities," while a "postmodern" President Reagan easily outflanked them through an illusory Star Wars program (See KN: chapter 4) Chaloupka centers this difference between his own supposedly total critique of all sovereign truths (which he describes as nuclear criticism in an echo 01' literary criticism) and the morc partial (and issue based) criticism of what he calls "nuclear opposition" or "antinuclearists" at the very outset of his book. (Kn: xvi) Once again, the unhappy choice forced upon the reader is to join Chaloupka in his total critique of ail sovereign truths or be trapped in obsolete essentialisms. This leads to a disastrous politics uitling ~zrouus that have the most in common (and need to unite on some basis to be effective) against each other. Both Chaloupka and Der Derian thus reserve their most trenchant critique Ibr political groups that should, in any analysis. be regarded as the closcst to them in terms of an oppositional politics and thcir desired futures. Instead of finding ways to live with these differences and to (if fleetingly) coalesce against the New Right, this fratricidal critique is uoliticall~ suicidal. It obliterates the sDace for a political activism based on provisional and contingent coaiitions, for uniting behind a common cause even as one recomizes that the coalition is com~rised of noups that have very differing (and possibly unresolvable) views of reality. Moreover, it fails to consider the possibility that there may have been other, more compelling reasons for the "failure" of the Nuclear Freeze movement or anti-Gulf War movement. Like many a worthwhile cause in our times, they failed to garner sufficient support Lo intluence state policy. The resuonsc to that need not be a totalizing critique that delegitimizes all narratives. The blackmail inherent in the choice offered by Der Derian and Chaloupka, between total critique and "ineffective" partial critique, ought to be transparent. Among other things, it effectively militates against the construction of provisional on strategic essentialisms our attempts to create mace for activist politics. In the next section. I focus more widely on thc gcnre of critical international theory and its impact on such an activist politics.

AT: Truth Ks -Truth Good Postmodern rejections of truth fail--Only rational knowledge can advance the causes of minority groups and overthrow the traditional order Sokal, Professor of Physics at New York University, 1996 (Alan D., "Transgressing thc Boundaries: An Afterword", http://~~~.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/afterword~v 1a/afterword~v1a~singlcliIc.html) But why did I do it? I confess that I'm an unabashed Old Leftist who never quite understood how deconstruction was supposed to help thc working class. And I'm stodgy old scientist who believes, naively, that there exists an external world, that therc exist obiective truths about that world. and that my iob is to discover some of them. (If science werc merely a negotiation of social conventions about what is agreed to be "truc", why would I bother devoting a large fraction of my all-too-short lik to it? I don't aspire to be the Emily Post of quantum field theory.3) But my main concern isn't to defend science from the barbarian hordes of lit crit (we'll survive just Gne, thank you). Rather, my concern is explicitly uolitical:to combat a currcntlv fashionable postmodernist~postst~cturalist/socialconstructivist discourse --and morc generally a penchant for subiectivism --which is, I hclieve, inimical to the values and future of the Left.4 Alan Ryan said it well: -It is, for instance, pretty suicidal for embattled minorities to embrace Michel Foucault. let alone Jacques Derrida. The minority view was always that power could be undermined by truth ...Once you read Foucault as saying that truth is simply an effect of vower, you've had it. ...ButAmcrican departments of literature. history and sociology contain large numbers of self-described leftists who have confused radical doubts about obiectivitv with volitical radicalism. and are in a mess.5 Likewise, Eric Hobsbawm has decricd the rise of"postmodernist" intellectual lashions in Western universities, particularly in departments of l~terature and anthropology, which imply that all "facts" claiming obiective existence are simply intellectual constructions. In short, that there is no clear difference between fact and fiction. But there is, and for historians, even for the most militantly antipositivist ones among us, the abilitv lo distinguish between thc two is absolutelv fundamental.6 (Hobsbawm goes on to show how rigorous historical work can refute the fictions propounded by reactionary nationalists in India, Israel, the Balkans and elsewhere.) And finally Stanislav Andreski: So long as authority insuires awe, confusion and absurdity enhance conservative tendencies in society. Firstly, because clear and logical thinlung leads to a cumulation of knowledgg (of which the progress of the natural sciences provides the best example) and the advance of knowledge sooner or later undermines the traditional order. ConSused thinking, on the other hand, leads nowhere in particular and can be indulged indefinitely without producing any imvact upon the world.2

We must base evaluations of truth and logic on their own meritsunderlying ethical questions have no bearing on scientific and rational questions of being Sokal, Professor of Physics at New York University, 1996 (Alan D., "Transgressing the Boundaries: An Afterword", http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/soka~afterword~v 1 alafterword-v1 a-singlefile.htm1) For example, Harding(citing Forman 1987) points out that American research in the 1940s and 50s on auantum electronics was motivated in large part by potential military applications. True enough. Now, quantum mechanics made possible solid-state physics, which in turn made possible quantum electronics (e.g. the transistor), which made possible nearly all of modem technologv (ex. the comvuter).8 And thc computer has had applications that are beneficial to society (c.g. in allowing the postmodern cultural critic to produce her articles more efficiently) as well as applications that are harmful (c.g. in allowing the U.S. militan to kill human beings more efficiently). This raises a host of social and individual ethical questions: Ought socicty to forbid (or discourage) certain avvlications of computers? Forbid (or discourage) research on computers per se? Forbid (or discourage) research on quantum electronics? On solid-state physics'! On quantum mechanics? And likewise for individual scientists and technologists. (Clearly, an affirmative answer to these questions becomes harder to justify as one goes down the list; but I do not want to declare any of these questionsa prion' illegitimate.) Likewise, sociological questions arise. for example: To what cxtent is our (true) knowledge of computer science, quantum electronics, solid-state physics and quantum mechanics --and our lack of knowledge about other scientific subiects. ex. the global climate --a result of ~ublic-policy choiccs Savoring militarism'? To what extent have the erroneous theories (if any) in computer science, quantum electronics, solid-state physics and quantum mechanics been the result (in whole or in part) of social, economic, political, cultural and ideological factors, in particular the culture of militarism?9 These are all serious auestions. which deserve careful investigation adhering to the highest standards of scientific and historical evidence. Bur they have no effect whatsoever on the undrrlving scientific questioas: whether atoms (and silicon crystals, transistors and computers) really do behave according to the laws of quantum mechanics (and solid-state physics, quantum electronics and computer science). The militaristic orientation of American science has quite simply no bearing whatsoever on the ontological question, and only under a wildly implausible scenario could it have any bearing on the epistemological question. (E.g. if the worldwide community of solid-state physicists, following what they believe to be the conventional standards of scientific evidence, were to hastily accept an erroneous theory of semiconductor behavior because of their enthusiasm for the breakthrough in military technology that this theory would make possible.)

AT: Truth Ks -Truth Good The notion that claims of absolute truth lead to totalitarianism is false-our framework does embrace some truths contingently, but also allows for skepticism about those truths Fierlbeck -1994 [Katherine, Associate Professor of Political Science at Dalhousic University, Review Author -Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences: Insights, Inroads, and Intrusions, History and Theory. Vo133, No 1, February, p. 107-1 131 But the acceptance of "ultimate unknowability" is even more relevant within the context of normative issues than it is within that of mere explanation.[5] The claim to be able scientifically to determine what ".justice" is, argues Lyotard, exacerbates the likelihood of political terror, as those who promulgate such an "accurate" and incontestable account of justice have a seemingly powerful justification to suppress any competing accounts. In this way, some postmodernists have linked scientific methodologv with the political inclination to totalitarianism: for both assume that there is, ultimatclv, only one correct answer.[6] By refusing the metaphysical mindset that the One Great Truth must be "out there," asserts Lyotard. the possibility of populations accepting a total~tarian regime decreases. But this refusal does not oblige us to embrace a starkly relativist position, for the argument is not that "there are all sorts ofjustice" which we cannot compare and evaluate, but rather that "there is a necessity that we keep discussion as to the nature of the just open."[7] To accuse "liberalism" of encouraging the likelihood of totalitarianism because of its links with Enlightenment rationalism is, or course, a verv selective reading of liberalism. While one must admit that liberalism has almost as many shapes and permutations as does post-modernism itself, it is also fair to suggest that the usual understanding of liberalism is grounded firmly upon John Stuan Mill's classical declaration that political freedom is essential because no one person's opinion is infallible. "Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion," wrote Mill, "is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action: and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right."[8] While modern scientific methodolony and thc political protection of individual autonomy mav both havc had a common genesis within the Enlightenment era, there is sim~lv no persuasive evidence that an alarmin4 causal link between them will allow the former to extinguish the latter. Skepticism and maematism are invaluable attributes, bolh intcllcctually and polilically. And, to the extent that post-modernism presents itself as a sober challenge to the excesses of melaphysical assumptions (a challenge that rcquires us to explain whv theoretical reasoning [empiricism, rationality, universalism, causality] is an apt or accuratc means to investigate human life), post-modernism can cnrich thc study of who we arc, and why wc arc that way. And it can restrain the political abuses of power which are built upon thc ovcrwhelminn authoritv ofrcason. But skepticism and pragmatism arc not unique to posl-modernist thought; thev are freauentlv to be found within many variants of "liberalism" itself (such as that of Hayek). From a very cynical point of view. it might seem that post-modernism becomes more compelling the better it can misrcprcsent the "liberal" character of modern

Western thought, culture, and political organization. Defending truth claims is less dangerous than attacking them -policy solutions are necessary to achieve progress and prevent policy paralysis Fierlbeck -1994 [Katherine, Associate Professor of Political Science at Dalhousie University, Review Author -Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences: Insights, Inroads, and Intrusions, History and Theory, Vol 33, No 1, February, p. 107-1131 In many respects, even the dismally skeptical post-modernists are too optimistic in their allegiance to post-modern ideas. As many others have already pointed out, post-modernism offers little constructive advicc about how lo rcorgani~e and rcinvigoratc modcrn social relations. "The views of the post-modern individual," explains Rosenau, "are likely ncithcr to lead to a post-modern society of innovative production nor to engender sustained or contained economic growth." This is simply because "these arc not post-modcrn priorities"(55). Post-modernism offers no salient solutions; and, wherc it does, such idcas havc usually been reconstituted from ideas presented in other times and places.[9] What we need are specific solutions to specific problems: to trade disputes, to the redistribution of health care resources, to unemployment, to spousal abuse. If one cannot prioritize public policv alternatives, or assign oolitical responsibilitv to address such issues, or even say without hesitation that wealthy nations that steadfastly ignore pockets of virulent poverty are immoral, then the worst nightmares of the most cvnical postmodernists will likelv come to life. Such an overarching refusal to address these issues is at least as dangerous as any overarching affirmation of beliefs regarding wavs to go about solving them.Post-modernism suffers from --and is defined by --too much indeterminacy. In order to achieve anything, constructive or otherwise, human beings must attempt to understand the nature of things. and to evaluate them. This can be done even if we accept that we mav never understand things completely, or evaluate them correctly. But if paralysis is the most obvious political consequence of vost-modernism, a graver danger lies in the reiection of the "Enlightenment ideals" of universalitv and impartiality. If the resounding end to the Cold War has taught us anything, it should be that the opposite of "universalism" is not invariably a coexistence of "little narratives": it can be, and freauently is. some combination of intolerance. local preiudice, suspicion, bigotry. fear. brutality, and ~ersecution. The uncritical affiliation with the community of one's birth, as Martha Nussbaum notes, "while not without causal and formative power, is ethically arbitrary. and sometimes ethically dangerous --in that it encourages us to listen to our unexamined preferenccs as if they werc ethical laws."[10]

AT: Truth Ks -Truth Good Logic and reasoned skepticism are key to social changeRejection of all truth claims fosters irresponsibility that allows individuals to deny real events like the Holocaust Sokal, Professor of Physics at New York University, 1996-(Alan D., 'Transgressing the Boundaries: An Afterword, ht~p://www.physics.nyu.cdu/~aculty/sokal/afterword~v 1a/afterword~v1a~singlcfiIc.html) Andrew Ross has drawn air analogy between the hierarchical taste cultures (high. ~iliddlebrow and popuklr) familiar to cultunl critics. and the demarcation betwccri scicrxc and pseodoscience.l0 At a sociological level this is an incisive observation: but at an ontological and epistemulogicsl level it is simply seen= to recognize this, bccause he immediately S;1VS: I do not want to insist on 3 literal interpretation of this analogy ... A more exhaustive ueatnlent would take account of the local. qualifying differencrs hetween the maim of cultunl taste arid Ulat of scicncc [!I. hut it would run up. finally. against the standorrbelween llle empiricist's claim that tion-context-dependent heliefs exist and that they car1 hr true. and the coltvralist's claim that hclicfs are only socially accepted as tme.U~~t such epistemological agnosticism SimplY won't suffice. at least not for peoplc who aspire to make social change. Deny that non-context-dependent assertions can be true, and YOU don't just throw out Quantum mechanics and molecular biology: you also throw out the Nazi gas chambers. the American enslavement of Africans, and the fact that today in New York it's raining. Hobsbawm is right: facts do matter, and smle racts (like the first moo cited here) matter a vat deol. Sljll, Ross is correct that. at a sociological level, maintaining the demarcation line betwccn science and pseudoscience serves --urnotlg orher thi~jis--to maintain the social power of thosc who, whether or not they have formal scientific credentials. stand on science's sidc of the line. (It has ulso served to increase the man life expectancy in the United States from 47 years tn 76 ycars in less than a century.m ROSSnotes that Cultural critics have, for some time now, been faced with the taskof exposing similar vested institutional interests in the debates about class, gender, race. and sexual preference that touch upon the demarcations between taste cultures, and I see no ultimate reason for us to abandon our hard-earned skepticism when we confront scicnce.u Fair enough: scientists arc in fact the first to advise skepticism in the face of other people's (and one's own) truth claims. But a souhomoric skepticism, a bland (or blind) agnosticism, won't get you anywhere. Cultural critics, like historians or scientists, nccd an informedskepticism: one that can evaluate evidence and logic, and come to reasoned (albeit tentative) iudgments based on that

evidence and 10,eic. At this point Ross may object that I am ri@ing the power game in my own favor: how is he, a professor of American Studies, to compete with me, a physicist, in a discussion of quantum mcchanics?l4 (Or even of nuclear power --a subject on which 1 have no expertise whatsoever.) But itequally true that I would bc unlikely to win a debate with a professional historian on the causes of World War I. Nevertheless. as an intelligent lay Derson with a modest knowledge of history, I am capable of evaluating the evidence and logic offered by competing historians, and of coming to some sort of reasoned (albeit tentative) iudnment. (Without that abilitv, how could any thoughtful person iustifv being politically active?) The rejection of objective reality fosters irresponsibility and forecloses possibilities for social changeonly truth claims allow us to combat the dominant ideologies of elites Sokal, Professor of Physics at New York University, 1996("A Physicist Experiments With Cultural Studies" http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokalAingua~franca~v4/lingu~~fr~nca~v4 .html) Why did I do it? While my method was satirical, my motivation is utterly serious. What concerns me is the proliferation. not iust of nonsense and slo~u~ @IJ thinking per se. of a particular kind of nonsense and sloppy thinkinn: one that denies the existence of obiective realities, or (when challenged) admits their existence but downplays their practical relevance. tits hest, a journal like Social Tcxt niscs important qucstioris that nu scientist should ig~iorc --questions. for example, ahout how corponie itnil pclvernment funding influence scicntific work. Uiifortunately. epistemic relativism does little to further thediscussion or these matters. m short. my concern over the svread of subicclivist thinking is both intellectual and eolitical. Indlectuall~, the problem with such doctrines is that they are false (when not simplv meaningless). There is a real world; its properties are not merely social constructions; facts and evidence do matter. What sane person would contend otherwise? And yet, much contemporary academic theorizing consists precisely of attempts to blur these obvious truths --the utter absurdity of it all beina concealed through obscure and pretentious language. Social l'eil's acqtance of my article exemplifies the intellectual amopnce of Theory --meaning postmodernist literary theory -canied to its logical extreme. No wonder they didn't bother to consult aphysicist. If all is discourse and "text." then knowledge of the real world is superfluous; even physics becomes iust another branch

of Cultural Studies. If, moreover, all is rhetoric and "language games." then inlcrnal logical consistency is superfluous too: a patina of theoretical sophistication serves equally well. Incomprehensibilitv becomes a virtuc; allusions, metaphors and puns substitute for evidence and Ionic. My own article is, if anything, an extremely modest example of this well-established genre. Politically, I'm angered because most (though not all) of this silliness is emanating from the self'-proclaimed Left. We're witnessing here a profound historical volte-face. &most of the past two centuries, the Left has been identified with science and against obscurantism; we have believed that rational thought and the fearless analysis of obiective reality (both natural and social) are incisive tools for combating the mystificalions promoted bv the powetiul --not to mention being desirable human ends in their own right. & recent turn of many "vroeressive" or "leftist" academic humanists and social scientists toward one or another form of epistemic relativism betrays this worthy heritage and undermines the already fragile prospects for progressive social criticlue. Theorizing about -"the social construction of reality" won't help us find an effective treatment for AIDS or devise strategies for preventing global -w Jor can we combat false ideas in history, sociology, economics and politics if we reiect the notions of truth and falsitv.

AT: Truth Ks -K of Truth Bad Postmodern rejections of rational thought create the conditions for oppression and undermine possibilities for progressive social critique Sokal, Professor of Physics at New York University, 1997 (Alan, "A Plea for Reason, Evidence and Logic" -http:Nwww.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/nyu~forum.html) I didn't write the parody for the reasons you might at first think. My aim wasn't to defend science from the barbarian hordes of lit crit or sociology. I know perfectly well that the main threats to science nowadays come from budget-cutting politicians and corporate executives, not from a handful of postmodernist academics. Rather, my goal is to defend what one might call a scicnlilic worldview -defined broadly as a respect for evidence and logic, and for the incessant confrontation of theories with the rcal world; in short, Tor reasoned argument over wishful th~nkine, suverst~tion and demaaoauerv. And mv motives for trying to defend these old-fashioned ideas are basicallv political. I'm worried about trends in the American Left --particularly here in academia --lhalat a minimum divert us from the task of formulating a prooressive social critique, by leading smart and committed people inlo trendy but ultimateiy empty intellectual fashions. and that can in fact undermine the prospects for such a critiaue. by vromoting subjcctivisl and relativist philosophies that in my view are inconsistent with producing a realistic analysis of societv that we and our fellow citizens will find compelling. David Whiteis, in a recent article, said it well: Too many academics. secure in their ivory towers and insulated from the real-world consequences of thc idcas thev espouse, seem blind to the fact that non-rationality has historically been among the most powerful weavons in the ideological arsenals of ovpressors. The hvpersubiectivitv that characterizes postmodernism is a verfect case in point: far from being a legacy of leftist iconoclasm, as some of its advocates so disingenuously claim, in fact ...plays perfectly into the anti-rationalist --really, anti-thinking --bias that currently infects "mainstream" U.S. culture.Along similar lines, the philosopher of science Larry Laudan observed caustically that the displacement of the idea that facts and evidence matter bv the idea that everything boils down to subiective interests and perspectives --second only to American political campaigns --the most vrominent and pernicious manifestation of antiintellectualism in our time. (And these days, being nearly as anti-intellectual as American political campaigns is really quite a feat.) Now of course, no one will admit to bein against reason, evidence and logic --that's like being against Motherhood and Apple Pie. Rather, our vostmodernist and poststructuralist friends will claim to be in favor of some new and deeper kind of reason. such as the celebration of "local knowledges" and "alternative wavs of knowing" as an antidote to the so-called "Eurocentric scientific methodology" (you know, things like systematic experiment, controls, replication, and so forth). You find this magic phrase "local knowledges" in, for example, thc articles of Andrew Ross and Sandra Harding in the "Science Wars" issue of Social Text. But are "local knowledges" all that meal? And when local knowledges conflict. which local knowledges should we believe? In many parls or

the Midwest, the "local knowledges" say that you should sDray more herbicides to get bigger crops. It's old-fashioned obiective science that can tell us which herbicides are poisonous to farm workers and to people downstream. Here in New York City, lots of "local knowledges" hold that there's a wave of teenage motherhood that's destroying our moral fiber. It's those boring dala that show that the birth rate to teenage mothers has been essentially constant since 1975, and is about half of what it was in the good old 1950's. Another word for "local knowledaes" is preiudice. The left needs to evaluate both ethical and rational interests to achieve true political change-A narrow focus on postmodern interests is profoundly irresponsible Sokal, Professor of Physics at New York University, 1996-(Alan D., '"Transgressing the Boundaries: An Afterword". http:Nwww.physics.nyu.edu/facultylsokal/afterword~v1dafterword-v 1 asinglefile.htm1) As Ross has noted1 8, many of the central political issues of the coming decades --from health care to global warming to Third World development --depend in part on subtle (and hotly debated) auestions of scientific fact. But they don't depend only on scicntilic fact: thev depend also on ethical values and --in this journal it hardly needs to be added --on naked economic interests. No Lcft can be effective unless it takes seriouslv suestions of scientific fact and of ethical values and of economic interests. The issues at stake are too important to be left to the capitalists or to the scientists --or to the postmodernists. A quarter-century ago, at the height of the U.S. invasion of Vietnam, Noam Chomsky observed that: George Orwell once remarked that political thought. especially on the left, is a sort of masturbation fantasy in which the world of fact hardly matters. That's true, unfortunately, and it's part of the reason that our societv lacks a genuine, responsible, serious left-wing movement. 19 Perhaps that's unduly harsh. but there's unfortunately a significant kernel of truth in it. Nowadays the erotic text tends to be written in (broken) French rather than Chinese, but the real-life consequences remain the same. Here's ~lhn in 1992, concluding his wry RJTIJ analysis of Amcrican intcllcctual fashions with a lament that the number of people who combine intellectual toughness with even a modest political radicalism is pitifullv small. Which. in a country that has George Bush as President and Danforth Quayle lined up for 1996. is not very funnv.20 Four years later, with Bill Clinton installed as our supposedly "progressive" president and Newt Gingrich already preparing for the new millennium, it still isn't funny.

AT: Truth Ks -Truth Good There is no way to criticize standards or discourses without using Enlightenment thought Fierlbeck -1994 [Katherine, Associate Professor of Political Science at Dalhousie University, Review Author -Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences: Insights, Inroads, and Intrusions, History and Theory. Vol33, No 1, February, p. 107-1131 The problem that arises, of course, is how to critique the accepted standards of criticism convincingly without compromisinq one's claim that such standards arc incomplete, misleading, and tyrannical. This dilemma, according to the crilics of posl-modernism, leads either to overreaction or to incoherence, and occasionally to both. To reiect modem standards of rationality in an allcmpt to prevent particular wrceptions from bccoming dominant (and dominating) accounts of how things are. suggcs~ thcsc crilics, is not only to throw out the baby with the bathwater, but to discard the tub as well. One is left with very little. And, as post-modern writers cannot use a standard framework of argumentation to persuade their readers, they retreat into literary contortions which, they hope, will oblige the reader actively to engage with the text in order to determine its significance. Those who are cynical about thc post-modern project have argued that this license to obfuscate merely encourages untalented writers and confused thinkers to producc exasperatingly impenetrable prose.

AT: Fear of Death -Love and Fear Com~atible Love and fear are compatible -Fear is necessary to protect loved ones Sandman and Valenti 86 (Peter and JoAnn, Professor of Human Ecology at Rutgers and Preeminent Risk Communications Expert published over 80 articles and books on various aspects of risk communication, Scared stiff -or scared into action. ,Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,January 1986, pp. 12-16, http:Nwww.psandn~an.corn/arti~Ies/scarstif.htn~) Love Anger without love soon becomes sterile or uncontrolled, while love without anger can still inspire a movement. But there is no need to choose; love and anger are compatible. Nothing could better symbolize anger than the powerful bolt-cutters with which the Greenham Common women routinely destroy the fence surrounding the cruise missile site. Nothing could better symbolize love than the webs of twine and ribbon and memorabilia with which they decorate the same fence. We suspect it is this combination -the anger not rancid, the love not languid -that has captured the imaginations of peace activists around the world. Love is compatible with fear as well. As we suggested earlier, some evidence indicates that people are more affected by fear avpeals targeted at their loved ones than bv those aimed at themselves. Ironically, one of the classic studies from the early 1960s tried to persuade citizens to support community fallout shelters; strong fear appeals threatening family safety worked better than threats to the individual.(l7) But love is not compatible with psychic numbing. Just as numbness interferes with the ability to love freely, so active love drives away the numbness. Antinuclear activists almost universally report that they remain active less for themselves than for those they love, and that without love they could not stay with the fight. This is not to suggest that these activists are more loving than their neighbors, only that their love helps them stay active and that their activism is a powerful expression of love. It is relevant that the children of activists are far more confident of their futures than most children.(l8) Just as activists rely on love to keep them going, one can mobilize the uninvolved bv talking about the people, places, and values one holds dear and encouraging listeners to do the same. Something or someone to fight for is as indispensable to activism as something or someone to fight against.

AT: Fear of Death -Love =destructive (Fear kev) Love is a lust for possession and destruction Derrida 97 (Jacques, Philosopher and director of studies at the hole des Hautes ~tudes en Sciences Sociales The Politics of Friendship, 1997,pg 64-65.) This 'disappropiation' would undoubtedly beckon to this other 'love' whose true name, savs Nietzsche in conclusion, whose 'iust name' is friendship (Ihr rechter Name is Freundschaft). This friendship is a species of love, but of a love more lovino, that love. All thc names would have lochange for the sake oicoherence. Without bcing able to devole to it the careful reading it dcscrves. let us recall that this little two-page treatise on love denounces, in sum, the right to property. This property right is the claim (revcndeication) of love (at least, of what is thus named). The vindicative claim of this right can be deciphered throiighout all the appropriative maneuvers of the strategy which this 'love' deplovs. It is the appropriating drive (Trieh) par excellence. 'Love' wants to posses. It wants the possessing. It is possessing -cupidity itself (hadsucht); it alwavs hopes for new property: and even the verv Christian 'love of one's neighbor' -charity perhaps -would reveal onlv a new lust in this fundamental drive: 'Our love of our neighbor -is it not a lust for new possessions? This question is double important. In contesting the Christian revolution of love as much as the Greek ~hiloso~hical concept of friendship and iust as the norms of iustice that dewnd on them -its target is the verv value of proximitv, the neiohbor's ~roximitv as the ruse of the proper and of aporopriation. The gesture confirms the warning accomvanving the discourse on 'good friendship': not to give in to proximitv or identification, to the Susion or the permutation of you and me. But. rather to place. maintain or keep an infinite distance within 'good friendshiip'. The verv that love -this which is thus named, 'love between the sexes', egotism itself, jealously which tends onlv twoards possession -is incapable of doing. Violence is inevitable -only through our abilities to use moral outrage, fear and action can we hope to contain it Adams 86 (David, Professor of Psychology at Wesleyan University and Director of the Unit for the Inlcrnational Year for the Culture of Peacem Role of Anger in the Consciousness Development of Peace Activists: Where Physiology and History, International Journal oi Psvchophysiolog~,Volume 4. page 157-164 1986, http://www.culture-of-peace.info/psychop.html.) To summarize the argument of this paper, we may chart a series of transformations that have occurred during the course of evolution which have enabled the offense behavior common to all mammals to serveamong its many functions-a smcial function in human historv. The first transf'ormation involves a new set of motivating stimuli for offense which consists of certain actions of the target,

rather than more endurin~ attributes of that animal. Second, and still at the level of' primate evolution, there is a process of internalization by which the young animal learns which actions are to be punished. and bv which the adults guidc their own punishing anner. Third, at the level of human society. there develops the ability to conceptualize institutions and social svstems and to respond to their actions with punishment and anger. lust as one might respond to the immoral actions of another individual. And, iinallv, there is the ability to incorporate this moral outrage into a complex vattern of consciousness development, including action. affiliation and analysis by which individuals become powerful forces in history.

AT: Fear of Death -Love = Bad (Fear Kev to Peace) Anger is a necessary prerequisite towards peace -it is responsible for consciousness development and collective action Adams 86 (David, Professor of Psychology at Wesleyan University and Director of the Unit for the International Year for the Culture of Peacem Role of Anger in the Consciousness Development of Peace Activists: Where Physiology and History, International Journal of Psvcho~hvsiology,Volume4, page 157-164 1986, h~p://www.culture-of-pcace.info/psychophysiology/tit1e-page.html.) In general, one can conclude that anger is an early and important step in the consciousness development of peace activists. The anger is a response to perceived social iniustice. It is an expression of moral outrage and it depends upon prior accluisilion of social values and knowledge. Anger leads to action, which is the following step in consciousness development. Later, as consciousness development proceeds to stem of'aftiliation and analysis, the anger does not disappear .Instead. the individual episodes of anger and action are replaced bv collective anger and action against the perceived source of iniustice. It is important to recognize that anger and violence are not the same. In fact, the tactical use oi-non-violence may draw upon and harness the collective anger of participants. The quotes above from Gandhi illustrate this. In drawing upon Gandhi's philosophy, Martin Luther King Jr. (1 958) put it this way: 'Non-violent resistance is not a method for cowards: it does resist. ..this is why Gandhi often said that if cowardice is the only alternative to violence, it is better to fight. ..while the non-violent resister is passive in the sense that he is not physically aggressive toward his opponent, his mind and emotions are always active.' Turning now from my own findings to those of other investigators, we find further evidence that strengthens and elaborates the hvwthesis that anger plays a critical role in consciousness development. Jerome Frank,the eminent psychiatrist and peace activist, carried out a questionnaire study in the 1960's on the origins of peace activism. Among his findings were the fact that 96% respondants said that the precipitating event that made them active included moderatc or very strong emotional reactions, often anger. According to Frank (1965), they used words like 'outrage, furious, incensed, damned annoyed', to describe the feeling which was directed against the country's leadership or against groups whom they had mistakenly expccted to be promoting peace. Anger is Key to peace movements, only moral condemnation is effective atspurring peace movements Adams 86 (David, Professor of Psychology at Wesleyan University and Director of the Unit for the International Year for the Culture of Peacem Role of Anger in the Consciousness Development of Peace Activists: Where Physiology and History, International Journal oiPs~choohvsiology,Volume4, page 157-164 1986,http:Nwww.cuItureof-peace.inf~~Ipsych~e.htm1.)

In a dialectical view of history, the role of the individual actor may be seen in terms of his response to historical contradictions. In this case we may speak of the contradiction of war and peace. The contemporary peace activist is raised in an educational. religious political system that claims to oppose war. Havin~ accluired and adopted these values, the peace activist reacts with anyer whcn he or she perceives the nation and its leaders are engaging in practices that threaten to provoke or maintain a policy of war. The Individual activist, in his moral reactions, retlects the historical contradiction. Evidence suggests that it is precisely those members of a society who have most stronglv acauircd thc moral values of the society who become the most anmy and active to resolve thc contradictions. And further, we may supposc that the more the society tries to suppress his activity. the more the activist is confirmed in his outrage against the societv's iniustice. Repression may, at least in some cases. feed the flames of discontent. In the historical context, anger mav be characterized as the personal fuel in the social motor that resolves the institutional contradictions that arisc in the course of history. Perhaps the best known illustration of this in our own cultural history is the anger of Jesus and the Old Testament prophets. The vrophets, like the peace activists of our own day. woint to moral standards which they learned from the society and condemn the practices of the society in the light of those standards.

AT: Fear of Death -Mobilizes ~eo~le/com~assion Fear spurs compassion, mobilizing people to protect and give meaning to life Greenspan 2003 (Miriam Greenspan -Pioneer in thc Area of Women's Psychology -2003 ("An Exccrpt from Heahng through he Dark Emotions: Thc Wisdom of Grief, Fear, and Despair by Miriam Greenspan," www.s~iritualitvheaIth.corn/newsh/exc~5513.html) "Fear is a very powerful emotion. When you fecl fear in your body. it's hel~ful to relate to it as an cncrgv that can be mobilized for -life. It may ftel like a constriction in your chest, throat, or abdomen. Breathe through it without judgment and allow yourself to feel it as a very strong force. If you pray for help, you can hcpin to expand this energy we call 'fear' and use it for healinp and transformation. "In this regard, we can take our model from the hcrcws of Flight 93 who. realizing that they wcrc bound for death, stormcd thc plane and brought it down without hitting a civilian targel. One cannot even imagine being able to do this without fear. Fear l'or the lives of others was the energy that mobilized them to do something meaningful with their last moments of life. Some of these people said good-bye to their husbands and wives and wished thcm happiness before they left this earth. They had found some peace In their last moments. peace in the midst of turbulence. And thcy found it through their last wish. which thev heroically put into action: to help others live. "Perhaps there is nothing that can redeem the dcd but our own actions for the good. This is a time to find out what we want to do for the world and do it. And, as every trauma survivor knows, this is the way to make meaninp out of oain, perhaps the most effeclive wav: to draw something good out of evil. The hcroes of September I1 point us to thc choice we each have: to help create a state of global peace and iustice that we. like thev. will not see before we die. It is in giving ourselves to this vision, out of love for this world that we inhabit together, that we stand a chance of transcending the human proclivity lo damage life. And that we honor those we have brought into this world and who must inherit it. . . . "Our only protection is in our interconncctedness. This has always been the messagc of the dark emotions when they are experienced most deeply and widely. Grief is not just "my" grief; it is the grief of every motherless child, every witness to horror in the world. Despair is not just "my" despair; it is everyone's despair about life in the twentyfirst century. Fear is not just 'my' fear; it is everyone's fear -of anthrax. of nuclear war. of truck bombs, of airplane hiiackings, of things falling avart. blowing up,sickening and dving. "If fear is only telling you to save your own skin, there's not much hope for us. But the Sac1 is that in conscious fear. there is a potentially revolutionary power of compassion and connection that can be mobilized cn masse. This is the power of fear. Our collective fear, which is intelligent, is tclling us now: Find new ways to keep this global village safe. Find new forms of international cooperation that will root out evil in ways that don't create more victims and more evll. Leap out of the confines of national egos. Learn the ways of peace. Find a ceremony of safety so that not iust you and I but all of us can llvc together without fear." Fear is necessary to mobilize people into action

Pittock 84 (A Barrie-, Post-Retirement Fellow with the Climate Group at CSIRO Atmospheric Research and a Contributing Author for the Intergovernmental Plane on Climate Change, Sept., Scientists Against Nuclear Arms Newsletter, "Comment on Brian Martin's 'Extinction Politics"', www.uow.edu/au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/84sanap.pdf) In my experience most people already feel rather helpless to influence the political process -what they need in order to act politically is the motivation of feeling personally threatened or outra~ed to the point of anger, plus a sense of hope which we in the peace movement must provide.

AT: Fear of Death -Mobilizes ~eo~le/com~assion Fear is natural, we can only hope to use in a constructive way Greenspan 2003 ( Miriam, Pioneer in the Area of Women's Psychology. The Wisdom in the Dark Emotions, Shambhala Sun http://www.shambhalasun.co~~i/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id= 162S&Itenud=244, online) Emotions like grief, fear and despair are as much a part of the human condition as lovc, awe and joy. They are our natural and inevitable responses to existencc, so long as loss, vulnerability and violcncc come with the territory of being human. These are the dark emotions, hut by dark, I don't mean that they are bad, unwholesome or pathological. I mean that as a culture we have kcpt these emotions in the dark'shamcl'ul, secret and unseen. Emotion-phobia dissociates us from the energies of these emotions and tells us they are untrustworthy, dangerous and destructive. Like other traits our culture distrusts and devalues -vulnerability, for instance, and dependence -emotionality is associated with weakness, women and children. We tend to reoard these painful emotions as sims of psvchological fragility, mental disorder or spiritual defect. We suppress. intcllectualize, iudge or denv them. We may use our spiritual beliefs or practices to bypass their reality. Few of us learn how to experience the dark emotions fully -in the body, with awareness'so we end up expericncing their energies in displaced, neurotic or dangerous forms. We act out impulsively. We become addicted to a variety of substances and/or activities. We become depressed. anxious or emotionally numb, and aborted dark emotions are at the root of these characteristic psychological disorders of our time. But it's not the emotions themselves that are the problem; it's our inability to bear them mindfully.

AT: Fear of Death -Fear Kev to Value to Life Fear of Death is key to Value to Life and lending meaning to existence Arthur 2002 (Kate, Doctoral Candidate at University of St. Michael's College, Terror of Death in the Wake of September the f 1th:Is This the End of Death Denial?, November 14th. Probing the Boundaries: Making Sense of Dying and Death Conference Brussels) This insight from a simpler time in America is more than a quaint remnant of a pastoral sensibility of the past. It is a truth that the people of our world must integrate into daily living. We can think of the dust as the transient things of the world. and the Spirit is that part of us that trusts in the Eternal. For me, the overcoat of clay is the memory of all departed souls. I recognize that many people are unwilling 10 recover mcaning from the horror of terror. But the eventual challenge is to find meaning in death. and plum our innate spiritual resources to move from despair and Sear into hope. We can retrieve a sense of living in the presence of death that evokes ultimate meaning, mystery and wonder evoked by the poctry of Emily Dickinson. Change, loss and mutability are present everywhere, in eventhing we do. Two pionccrs in palliative care, Dr. Dcrek Doyle and Dr. Elisabeth Kiibler-Ross, speak of the increased s~irituality among people who work with the dying. Bv being ever mindful of death in life, we can djscover or recover a sense mvsterv. The great religions have urged contemplation of death in life as a means to spiritual wholeness. Instead of being abolished from life. death is universally integral to religious observance. If the raithful embrace death in life then they are more able to accept the exigencies of life. dcalh and transcendence. Death in life lends symbolic meaning to the conundrums of human existence. What man shall live and not see death? says the Hebrew text Psalm 98:48. Dying yet we live, is the central message of the Christian Gospel of St. Paul (2 Corinthians 6:9). The Buddhist Samyutta Nikaya says For the Born, there is no such thing as not dying. The Muslim Holy Book The Koran counsels keeping death in perspective and the materialism of this world in perspective: Every soul shall have a taste of death (al-Irnran 3:185). Greeley and Hout (1999) say as

many as 80 percent of Americans believe in "life after death." Equal numbers also claim to be relib' ~10US. Alvarado et. al. (1995) found that strong religious conviction accompanied by belief in an afterlife is associated with decreased anxiety and depression related to death. Death does now occupy a prominent place in the public domain. Annie Dilliard thinks that, on the brink of death, the dying pray not "please" but "thank you" as a guest thanks his host at the door. "Falling from airplanes" she says, "the people are crying thank you, thank you, aH down from the air" (Dilliard, page 270). This is not denial, but a deeply held sensibility of religious consolation and gratitude for life lived in the presence of death. Fear and Knowledge of Death is key to value to life Russell 1903(Bertrand, founder of analytical philosophy and Nobel laureate in literature, "A free man's worship, 1903, http:Nwww.positiveatheism.org/hist/n~ssell1 .htm) But the bcaury of Tragedy does hut make visible a quality which, in more or less obvious shapes, is present always and everywhere in life. In the spectacle of Death. in the endurance of intolerable pain, and in the irrevocableness of a vanished past, there is a sacredness, an overpowering awe. a feeling of the vastness, the depth, the inexhaustible mvstcrv of existence, in which, as bv some stranpe marriage of pain, the sufferer is bound to the world bv bonds of'sorrow. In these moments of insight, we lose all eagerness of temporan desire, all struggling and striving for pcttv ends, all care for the little trivial things that, to a superficial view, make UD the common life of dav by day; we see, surrounding the narrow raft illumined by the flickering light of human comradeship. the dark ocean on whose rolling waves we toss for a brier hour; from the =eat night without, a chill blast breaks in upon our refuge; all the loneliness of humanity amid hostile forces is concentrated upon the individual soul, which must struggle alone, with what of courage it can command. against the whole weight of a universe that cares nothing for its hopes and fears. Victorv, in this struggle with the powers of darkness, is the true baptism into the glorious company of heroes, the true initiation into thc overmastering beauty of human existence. From that awful encounter of the soul with the outer world. enunciation, wisdom. and charity are born; and with their birth a new life begins. To take into the inmost shrine of the soul the irresistible forces whose puppets we seem to he--Death and change, the irrevocableness of the past, and the ~owerlessness of Man before the blind hurrv of the universe from vanity to vanity--to feel these things and know them is to concluer them.

AT: Fear of Death -Fear Kev to Value to Life Fear of death is key to value to life -recognizing death is inevitable allows us to create a world of love Kelsang 99 (Geshe, internationally renowned teacher of Buddhism (, htt~:Nwww.thama.com/backmound/fear-of-death-htm) A healthv fear of death would be the fear of dving unprenarcd, as this is a fear we can do something about, a danger we can avert. It' we have this realistic fear, this sense of danger. we arc encouraged to prepare l'or a peaceful and successful death and are also inspired to make the most of our very precious human lifc instcd of wasting it. This "sense of danger" inspires us to make pre~aralions so thal we arc no longcr in the danger we are in now. for example by practicing moral discipline, purifying our negative karma, and accumulatino as much mcril, or good karma, as possible. We put on a seal belt out of a sense of danger of the unseen dangers of traffic on the road. and that seat belt protects us liom going through the windshield. We can do nothing about other traffic, but we can do something about whether or not we go through thc windscreen if someone crashes into us. Similarly, we can do nothing about the fact of death, but we can seize control over how we prepare for death and how we die. Eventually, through Tanlric spiritual practice, we can even attain a deathless body. In Living Meaninnfu11y. Dying Joyfullv. Geshe Kelsang says: Dying with regrets is not at all unusual. To avoid a sad and meaningless end to our life we need to remember continuallv that we too must die. Contemplating our own death will inspire us to use our lilt wisely bv developing the inner rcl'ugc ol'spiritual realizations; otherwise we shall have no ability to protect ourself from the suffcrinos of death and what lies beyond. Moreover, when someone close to us is dying, such as a parent or friend, we shall be powerless to help thcm because we shall no1 know how; and we shall experience sadness and frustration at our inability to be of genuine help. Preparing for death is one of the kindest and wisest things we can do both for ourself and others. The fact of the matter is that this world is not our home. We are travelers, passing through. We came from our previous life, and in a few years, w a few days, we shall move on to our next life. We entered this world empty-handed and alone, and we shall leave emptyhanded and alone. Everything we have accumulated in this life. including our very body, will be left behind. All that we can take with us from one life to the next are the imprints of the positive and negative actions we have created. If we i~nore death we shall waste our lifc working for things that we shall onlv have to leave behind, creating manv neoative actions in the process. and having to travel on to our next life with nothing but a heavv burden of negative karma. On the other hand, if we base our life on a realistic awareness of our mortality, we shall regard our spiritual develooment as far more important than the attainments of this world, and we shall view our time in this world vrincioally as an opportunitv to cultivate positive minds such as patience, love, compassion, and wisdom. Motivated by these vlrtuous minds we shall ucrform manv positive actions. thereby creating the cause for future happiness. When the

time of our death comes we shall be able to pass away without fear or regret. our mind empowered by the virtuous karma we have crcated. The Kadampa Teachers say that there is no use in being afraid when we are on our deathbed and about to die; the time to fear death is while we are young. Most people do the reverse. While they arc young Lhey think, "I shall not die". and they live recklessly without concern for death; but when death comes they arc terrified. If we develop fear of death right now we shall use our life meanin~fullv bv engaging in virtuous actions and avoiding non-virtuous actions, thus creating the cause to take a fortunate rebirth. When death actuallv comes we shall feel like a child returning to the home of its Darents. and pass away ioyfully, without fear. Fear of death is key to purpose in life Greenspan 2003 ( Miriam, Pioneer in the Arca of Women's Psychology, Thc Wisdom in the Dark Emotions, Shambhala Sun htt~://www.shambhalasun.com/indcx.php?om content&task=vicw&id=1625&lte1nid=244, online) Every dark emotion has a value and purpose. There are no negative emotions; there are onlv negative attitudes towards emotions we don't like and can't tolerate, and the negative consequences ol' denying thcm. The emotions we call "negative" are energies that get our attention, ask for expression, transnut inlormation and impel action. Grief tells us thal wc arc all interconnected in the web of life, and that what connects us also breaks our hearts. Fear alerts us to vrotect and sustain life. Despair asks us to grieve our losses, to examine and transform the meaning of our lives, lo repair our broken souls. Each of these emotions is purposeful and useful -if we know how to listen to them.

AT: Fear of Death-Kev to Human Survival Rational fear is good -only through fear can we prevent a WMD catastrophe and environmental degradation Greenspan 2003 (Miriam, Pioneer in the Area of Women's Psychology, Excerpt from Healing Through the Dark Emotions: The Wisdom or Grief, Fear, and Despair, Chapter Seven -From Fear to Joy, http://www.miriamereenspan.comkxce~tdcl~avterSe~~~nEx.l~tn~) While it would be comforting to think that all phobias and fears are irrational. obviously lhis is not the case. The threats to survival in our era are numerous. Global warming, environmental pollution, nuclear and biochemical disasters. and terrorism are not individual but global threats. But this doesn't mean thcy don't affect us as individuals! In relation to these threats, it has become almost impossible to experience fear in the old individualized way that we once did when being chased by a wild boar. Our fears arc rational. largely transvcrsonal, and overwhelming;. They arc also largely denied. In this unprecedented world context, fear is continuallv triggered and benumbed. Isolatcd in our own skins, without a conlmunity in which our fears can be shared, validated, and addrcsscd, the authendc experience of fear in our time has become almost imvossible. We can't heal what we don't fccl. The alchemy of fear is out of reach until we can learn, like Jack, how to feel our fear. When we don't know the contours of our fear, when we can't experience it authentically or speak about it openly, we are more likely to be afflicted with anxieties and phobias, panic, obsessive-compulsion, psychosomatic ills, and all kinds of controlling, destructive, and violent behaviors. Those of us who don't know how to feel our wav through the real fears that haunt us; or who are not threalcncd by the immedialc. in-your-face fears that plague millions of ~eople on earth-fears of starvation, war, homelessness. disease. pervasive violence-have replaced thc alarm of authentic fear with the host of "anxiety disorders'' that have become epidemic in our lime. Fear of Death is key to human survival -confronting death is key to state and individual existence Beres 96 (Louis Rene, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University, Feb., htti~:l/www.frccman.orgl~nonline1 feb961 beresn.htm)

Fear of death, the ultimate source of anxiety, is essential to human survival, This is true not only for individuals, but also for states. Without such fear, states will exhibit an incapacity to confront nonbeing that can hasten their disappearance. So it is today with the State of Israel. Israel suffers acutely from insufficient existential dread. Refusing to tremble before the _growing vrospect of collective disintegration -a forseeable prospect connected with both genocide and war -this state is now unable to take the necessary steps toward collective survival. What is more, because death is the one fact of life which is not relative but absolute, Israel's blithe unawareness of its national mortality deprives its still living days of essential absoluteness and growth. For states, just as for individuals, confronting death can ~ivethe most positive reality to life itself. In this respect, a cultivated awareness of nonbeing is central to each state's pattern of potentialities as well as to its very existence. When a state chooses to block off such an awareness, a choice currently made by the State of Israel, it loses, possibly forever, the altogether critical benefits of "anxietv." Fear is key to value to life, survival and transcending evil Greenspan 2003 (Miriam, Pioneer in thc Area of Women's Psychology, Healing Through the Dark Emotions: The Wisdom of Grief, Fcar, and Despair, Excerpt of Chapter Three -How Dark Emotions Become Toxic, htl~:N~w~.n~inam~reens~nn.codcxcer~tslcl~a~terThreeEx.html) Grief, few. and despair arc primary human emotions. Without them, we would he less than human. and less likely to survive. Grief arises because we are not alone, and what connects us to others and to the world also breaks our hearts. Grieving our losses allows us to heal and renew our spirits. Fear alerts us to protect our survival, extending beyond our instinct for self-preservation to our concern for others. Despair asks us to find meaning in the midst of apparent chaos or meaninglessness. Making meaning out of sufferinn is the basis of the human capacitv to survive evil and transcend it. The pur~osefulness of these dark emotions is evident when we can experience them mind~ullv, tolerate their intense energies. and let them be. Unfortunately, we don't learn how to do this in a culture that fears and devalues them. Emotion-vhobia toxifies dark emotions, leaving our hearts confused and numb, depressed and anxious, isolated and lonely. In emotion-phobic culture, we internalize the idea that befriending what hurts will hurt us, whereas suppressing and avoiding it will make us feel better. We only end

up feeling worse. The cultural baggage we carry weighs us down. a major impediment to the art of emotional alchemy. But we weren't born with our bias against the dark emotions. We can change what we believe and how we react to grief, fear, and despair. We can transform the way we experience these emotions and bcgin to taste the freedom and power of letting our emotions be.

AT: Fear of Death -Fear Kev to leaders hi^ A. Fear sustains US leadership Krauthammer 01, (Charles, Contributing Editor to WeeklyStandard "The new world order -after 11 September," Dec 2, 11/12/2001, Volume 007, Issue 09 http://www.weeklystandard.comlContent/Public/Articles/000/000/000/456zfyg d.asp) The assumption after September 11 was that an aroused America will win. If we demonslrate lhal wc cannot win, no coalition with modcrntc Arabs will long survive. But much more depends on our success than iusr the allcgiancc ol'lhat last piece ofthe geo~olitical puzzle, thc lslarnic world. The entire new world alignment is at stake. States line up with more powerful states not out of love but out of fear. And respect. The fear of radical Islam has crcated a new, almost unprecedented coalition of interests among the Great Powers. But that coalition oi' fear is held togethcr also by resvect for American power and its ability to provide safety under the American umbrella. Should we succeed in thc war on terrorism, first in Afghanistan. we will be cementing the New World Order --the expansion of the American svhcrc of vcace to include Russia and India (with a more neutral China) --iust now beginning to take shave. Should wc fail. it will bc sauve aui peut. Other countries --and not just our new allies but even our old allies in Europe --will seek their separate veace. If the guarantor of world wace for the last half century cannot succeed in a war of self-defense against Afghanistan( !), then the whole post-World War I1 structure --oven borders, open trade, open seas, open societies --will begin to unravel. B. Inset Leadership Impact

AT: Fear of Death -Kev to Prevent State Annihilation Only by recognizing the possibility of total annihilation can states survive, the thought of total existential elimination must be at the forefront of the all nations' minds Beres 96 (Louis Rene. Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purduc University, Feb., http:Nwww.freemnn.ora/m online/ feb961 beresn-htm) Nowhere is it written that Israel is forever, or that presumptions of collective immortality are purposeful to Israel's security. Stepping into imaginations of death in order to prevent annihilation, Israel must quickly discover, in the immanent abyss of nonbeing, the course of direction toward life. Drawing upon the anxiety of death's immanence in the life of everv nation, the People of Israel could nurture the Angst that is now antecedent to national endurance. Israel cannot afford to be "liberated" from existential anxiety. It must, instead, feel that the Third Temple Commonwealth is problematic, that collective extinction represents the end point of the same continuum that contains collective vitality, and that preservation as a state cannot be detached from reasonable intimations of disappearance. Left uncontrolled, anguish can become an unbearable hindrance, but disregarded entirely, it can become the source of unalterable despair.

AT: Fear of Death -Plan Solves The plan solves for your fear of death arguments -by embracing an ethic of universal sympathy we can come to terms with our own death by alleviating the suffering of others -Schulz, professor of philosophy at Tubigen University, 20m (Walter, Continental Philosophy Review 33, p. 483-485) It is significant 1h:~l the death ofolhc~s B Ihcrnll?ed ~xilhcr hy Schckr rnr hy Hcidcpgcr ;uulSanrc.'l'k%? thinkers hcgin lheir annlyscs ufdcalh alw;lys binthr sclr that is in cxh cilsc minc oa an isoldled indivjdanl The meaninf thll the tknlh of crthcn h:n Iir mc is nut regxdai hy them. TI+ccnLcri11g of the dcalh pmbbm in Ihr que.;th~n of c~w's own dcath may hE conditioned hy the hegen11)ny nftk principlc nl inlcriority in the cpnch of Chrblhm melnphysics. whose ~~111:~rirrcl fcvm iscxbtcn~ial philost>phy:Shis is faaieally a cnnstrietiw ~ftb pmhkmaric. T~US. One may not. when One Wants to com~rehend the whole problem of death, look only ahcad lowards one's own death. However, it is -this shall once more be expressly exhibited -iust as necessarv, to YO against thc othcr cxtreme which confronts us in modern sociological observations of images of death. Its characteristic is thal it thcmalizcs only death, more exactly: the dying of others. This modern approach blocks -so wc think -from its point of view the complex of questions in an almost stronger way than Lhc existentialist perspective, insofar as here the fact is excluded -along with disregarding his own death -that man is a selfunderstanding and as such fears death. In opposition to the one-idedness of both -either thematizing only my death or observing only the dying of others -one ought to treat the phenomenon of death dialecticallv; that is, to refer tothe racls. that mn -fvllowing Kierke~~ud ir himself and the same timc hb species. In The Conwp of Anxiety Kielhegnard hrcs.~pht to our attention Ihc meaninl: 01 Ulis co~~~plcx to history. Every individual for himself wkes as his point of departure his history and advances the history in rclal~cu~ ol Ihc species whsh. howevcr. represents its own dimension. This means thal the individual can jusl as lalle be released from o111venal h~rtory as the latlcr call hc rclc;wed from Ihc i~ldividual. wherrhy lhr individual's hbtory and Ihe history ofthe swcics can cxhibit not only d~lfrrenl tedncies. hilt also both nwke ii possihk Lo experience in relation to om: rnother a different evaluation: mw can 1t1.w omelf in univercal h~rtnry or overemphasize oac's ow11 singulilrily. This dialectical approach, which has still in no way been philosophically estimated in its universal meaning, now -in our context we are here pulling together our argumentation -mv death as an individual and death in ncncral, which occurs to the human species,

1, My death appears to me as the essential, and at the same time I do in fact know that my death is only a special case of death in general. This dialectic. iiom which a mediation appears possible hetween existential introspection and sociological extrospection, becomes first concretc through the insertion of a mediating determination between my death and death in general. This mediating determination is the death of other men or women, which, existentially and sociologically regarded, can in fact become relevant for me in thoroughly different degrees and under the most differentiating respects. NO~CoIttmetivee c~eremi~latio~lsdyingness in ~cflcral. Ihc donth ot'othe~s and lily deillh -mr.howrvcr. p~aivd Rlr themselves. rillher all of llletn are lo he med~atnl wlih the other. The structure of this mcdiatioo shall hc nladc lnorc chxr by way ofemple in lhr hrrvily rrquiml here. Thc general dcterminnlnn oldyinpncss and lrans~toriuess kcumcs for me fist ami ti~remsr tangible ;udconcrete in the death ufothers. b kctmes in no way supemuc~us through phis concretisn!ion. 11 rclllaills ~sscntial 3sP h;~ck~mt~txl delenninalnn, and thal means it indicates the passibilitg of my dcath. l'hc obscn~atiun ordcalh more emcfly. the dyklg of orhers. ir certainly the r>nIy real experience nideaih. Bat in Ihhs exInep%Zian the pnsrihk ~reluliv~l to tny bath amcs into play and plays along ulwilys ah.wdy more cw less concralal. kese the olher arxl myself arc subjugated lo the same esliny of dying. Vicr vcm: lhc passins into hath or more simply said: thr thou~ht. I myself must die, wh~ch comes over the aeing human being kcnms a little more lolcmble in dinlectiwlly bu~king iwny frcm myself. 1ht mans in vies nf lhe universal lo1 ofdying lhnt it.wI1 only appcars In stark reality, "when wc su~ally see humans dying aml observe the tlnwnlly change fnlm life to dmtlr" in order to cite an mlerprelal~on of Max Schur on Preod's scntcllce from the work "Rcflcclions ups Wilraud ~e~th-: Thisdinlcctic -~n "Human beings actually die, not only a few, rather a11 of them, each and evcrv one of us, when it is his turn." whtch 1 look away from mysclftc olhen or frcrm olbrs lo myself, unitin?. us undrr the universal in1 of lnnsitnriness -is no solution In the pmblem of dfoth. no1 even a rccip agalnsl tk fcx nfdmth. Bul the possibility of21 resign& acqubsur thm siamisopprite ho~h lendencirfi 111 morktodny -the stn~ggle against violent death over against the help for the dvin~ -indicates certainly here that they can be taken up in their positivity without falling into the illusion that death can be abolished and that the fear of death is an archaic remnant and in itself irrational. Both these tendencies find their foundation in the thought of a universal symuathy that

binds me to all things living. This sym~athv actualizes itself as sympathy, which means as a return behind selfishness in all its forms. This return is identical with thc immediate recognition that the other is eaual to me insofar as he is also a living thing, which must expire and become nothing. This connectedness between human beings that reveals itself in the light of the common determinateness of death retains in its around -that is, in the thought of universal transitoriness -the form of negativity. But it also refers to the fact that the individual docs not have to stare spellbound at his own imminent end. Rather -if surely also to a small degree only -the individual is able to think bcvond his &ath in view of the task common to everyone, reducing suffering within the world in thc face of death.

AT: Fear of Nukes -Plan Solves Numbing Advocating a plan to address harms of nuclear war overcomes the problem of numbing Sandman and Valenti 86 (Peter and JoAnn, Professor of Human Ecology at Rutgers and Preeminent Risk Communications Expert published over 80 articles and books on various aspects of risk communication, Scared stiff -OT scared into action, ,Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 1986,pp. 12-16, http://www.psandman.com/articles/scarstif.htm) WHEN THE MOVEMENT against nuclear weapons celebrates its heroes. a place of honor is reserved for Helen Caldicott, the Australian pediatrician who revived Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) in 1978 and made it the vehicle for her impassioned antinuclear crusade. In countless communities since then, Caldicott has brisklv narrated the devastation that would result if a small nuclear warhead exploded right here and now. Thousands of activists trace their movement beginnings to a Helen Caldicott speech, wondering if it wouldn't help reverse the arms race just to make everyone sit through that speech -and each week hundreds of activists do their best to give the speech themselves. Nonetheless, PSR Executive Director Jane Wales, while acknowledging a huge debt to Caldicott, said in 1984 that the time for the "bombing runs" (as insiders call the speech) was past. "We knew it was past when someone interrupted the speech one evening. actually interrupted it, and said, 'We know all that, but what can we do?"' In a 1985 newsletter, similarly, Sanford Gottlieb of United Campuses to Prevent Nuclear War warned that many students were "being numbed by the emphasis on nuclear blast, fire and radiation" in courses on nuclear war and were therefore "feeling -more impotent and depressed than before the class began."(l) Perhaps the first broad awareness that shock therapy may not be the best therapy came, ironically, in 1983in the weeks preceding the broadcast of the television film The Day After, when Educators for Social Responsibility and others worried that the program might do children more harm than good. The Day After turned out to be less frightening than expected, but other films (Threads, Testament, and Caldicott's own The Last Epidemic) raise the same worry -and not just for children. In the following analysis of the fear of nuclear Armageddon and its implications for antinuclear advocacv, we will argue that most people are neither apathetic about nuclear war nor actively terrified of it but rather. in Robert Jay Lifton's evocative phrase, "psychicallv numbed"; that it is ineffective to frighten audiences who have found a refuge from their fears in numbness; and that there exist more effective keys to unlocking such paralysis. THE CENTRAL ENIGMA of antinuclear activism is why everyone is not work in^ to prevent nuclear war.

Activists who can understand those who disagree about what should be done are bewildered and frustrated by those who do nothing. Such inaction is objectively irrational; as Caldicott asked in a 1982 cover article in Family Weekly, "Why make sure kids clean their teeth and eat healthy food if they're not going to survive?"(2) Advocates of all causes chafe at their neighbors' lack of interest. When the issue is something like saving whales or wheelchair access to public buildings, the problem is usually diagnosed as apdthy. Psychiatrist Robert Winer armes that the same is true of the nuclear threat, which most of us experience as remote. impersonal, and vague. For Winer, "one of the ~enuinely tragic aspects of the nuclear situation is that immediacy may be given to us onlv once and then it will be too late to learn."(3) There is obviously some truth to this view. When asked to describe their images of nuclear war, people do tend to come up with abstractions -and those with more concrete, immediate images are likely to be antinuclear activists.(4)

AT: Fear of Nukes -Kev to Peace and Survival In a world of Nukes, only fear can motivate people to act for peace Russell 67 (Bertrand, founder of analytic philosophy and Nobel laureate in literature, 1967.http://www .humanities.mcmaster.cd%7Erussell/bressay.htm,online) What can ~rivatc persons do meanwhile? They can agitate. by pointing out the effects of modern war and the danger of the extinction of Man. Thev can teach men not to hate peoples other than their own, or to cause themselves to be hated. Thev can value, and cause others to value, what Man has achieved in art and science. They can emphasize the suverioritv of co-operation to com~ctition. Finally, have I done anything to further such ends? Something perhaps, but sadly little in view of the magnitude of the evil. Some few people in England and the U.S.A. I have encouraged in the expression of liberal views, or have terrified with the knowledge of what modern weapons can do. It is not much, but if evervbodv did as much this Earth would soon be a paradise. Consider for a moment what our planet is and what it might be. At present. for most, there is toil and hunger, constant danger, more hatred than love. Therc could be a happy world, where co-operation was more in evidence than competition, and monotonous work is done by machines, where what is lovely in nature is not destroyed to make room for hideous machines whose sole business is to kill, and where to promote joy is more respected than to produce mounlains of corpses. Do not say this is impossible: it is not. It waits only for men to desire it more than the infliction of torture. Fear of nuclear weapons has prevented their use -deterrence has checked conflict Rajaraman 2002 (Professor of Theoretical Physics at JNU, 2002 [R., "Ban battlefield nuclear weapons," 412212, The Hindu. http:llwww.hinduonnet.com/thehindu12002OO422OO4 1OOO.htni[ There were a variety of different reasons behind each of these examples of abstinence from using nuclear weapons. But one major common factor contributing to all of them has been an ingrained terror of nuclear devastation. The well documented images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the awesome photographs of giant nlushroom clouds emerging from nuclear tests in the Pacific and the numerous movies based on nuclear Armageddon scenarios have all contributed to building up a deep rooted fear of nuclear weapons. This is not limited just to the abhorrence felt by anti-nuclear activists. It permeates to one extent or another the psvche of all but the most ~atholoeical of fanatics. It colours the calculations. even if not decisively, of the most hardened of military strategists. The unacce~labilitv of nuclear devaslalion is the backbone of all deterrence strategies. There is not just a fear of being attacked oneself, but also a strong mental barricr against actually initiating nuclear attacks on enemy populations, no matter how much they mav be contemplated in war games and strategies. As a result a taboo has tacitly evolved over the decades preventing nations, at least so far, from actually pressing the nuclear butlon cven in the face of serious military crises.

AT: Fear of Nukes -Kev to Peace and Survival Fear of nuclear war is good -it's key to stopping the use of nuclear weapons and creating a more peaceful society Futterman, 1991 (JAH, Livermore lab researcher, 1995,Mediation of the Bomb, online, http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nukeO I could say that if I didn't do it, someone else would, but that answer was rejected at Nuremberg. (It's also a better reason to leave the weapons program than to stay.) Lcontinue to support the u business with my effort for many reasons, which I discuss throughout this piece. But mostly, I do it because the fear of nuclear holocaust is the only authority mv own country or any other has respected so far when it comes to nationalistic urges to make unlimited war. As William L. Shirer states in his preface to The Rise and Fall of the Third Reiclz (Touchstone Books, New York, 1990), "Adolf Hitler is probably the last of the meat adventurer-conquerors in the tradition of Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon, and the Third Reich the last of the empires which set out on the path taken earlier by France, Rome and Macedonia. The curtain was rung down on that phase of historv. at least. bv the sudden invention of the hydrogen bomb, of the ballistic missile, and of rockets which can be aimed to hit the moon." Now this contrasts with the argument of those who would "reinvent government" by putting up bureaucratic roadblocks to maintaining the reliability of the US nuclear arsenal through research and testing. They reason that if the reliability of everyone's nuclear arsenals declines, everyone will be less likely to try using them. The problem is that some "adventurer-conqueror" may arise and use everyone's doubt about their arsenals to risk massive conventional war instead. An expansionist dictatorship might even risk nuclear war with weapons that are simpler, cruder, less powerful, much riskier (in terms of the possibility of accidental detonation) but much more reliable than our own may eventually become without adequate "stockpile stewardship."U But the inhibitory effect of reliable nuclear weapons goes deeper than Shirer's deterrence of adventurerconquerors. It changes the way we think individually and culturally, preparing us for a future we cannot now imagine. Jungian psychiatrist Anthony J. Stevens states, [151 "~i~tory would indicate that people cknot rise above their narrow sectarian concerns without some overwhelming paroxvsm. It took the War of Independence and the Civil War to forge the United States, World War 1to create the League of Nations, World War I1 to create the United Nations Organization and the European Economic Community. Only catastrophe, it seems, forces people to take the wider view.

Or what about fear? Can the horror which we all experience when we contemplate the possibility of nuclear extinction mobilize in us sufficient libidinal energy to resist the archetypes of war? Certainly, the moment we become blase about the possibilitv of holocaust we are lost. As long as horror of nuclear exchange remains uppermost we can recognize that nothing is worth it. War becomes the impossible option. Perhaps horror, the experience of horror, the consciousness of horror, is our only hope. Perhaps horror alone will enable us to overcome the otherwise invincible attraction of war." Thus I also continue engaging in nuclear weapons work to help fire that world-historical warning shot I mentioned above, namely, that as our beneficial technologies become more powerful, so will our weapons technolonies, unless genuine peace precludes it. We must build a future more peaceful than our past, if we are to have a future at all, with or without nuclear weapons -a fact we had better learn before worse things than nuclear weapons are invented. If you're a philosopher, this means that I regard the nature of humankind as mutable rather than fixed, but that I think most people welcome change in their personalities and cultures with all the enthusiasm that they welcome death =thus, the fear of nuclear annihilation of ourselves and all our values may be what we require in order to become peaceful enough to survive our future technolonical breakthroughs.Jl6J In other words, when the peace movement tells the world that we need to treat each other more kindly, I and my colleagues stand behind it (like Malcolm X stood behind Martin Luther King, Jr.) saying, "Or else." We provide the peace movement with a needed sense of urgency that it might otherwise lack.

AT: Fear of Nukes -Peace and Survival Fear motivates people to pursue constructive means to sustain peace and prevent large-scale catastrophe Lifton 01 (Robert Jay, Distinguished Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at John Jay College, Illusions of the second nuclear ape, World Policv Journal. New York: Spring 2001. Vol. 18,Iss. 1 ; pg. 25, 6 pgs) The trouble is that in other ways the dangers associated with nuclear weapons are greater than ever: the continuing weapons-- centered policies in the United Stales and elsewhere; the difticulties in controlling nuclear weapons that exist under unstable conditions (especially in Russia and other areas ol' the former Soviet Union);2 and thc earcrness and potential capacity of certain nations and "private" groups to acouire and possibly use the weapons. In thal sense, thc nuclear quiclism is perilous. Or,to put the matter another way, we no longer manifest an appropriate demee of fear in relation to actual nuclear danger. While fear in itsclf is hardly to be recommended as a guiding human emotion, its absence in the facc of danger can lead to catastrophe. We human animals have built-in fear reactions in response to threat. These reactions help us to protect ourselves-to step back from the path of a speeding automobile, or in the case of our ancestors, from the path of a wild animal. Fcar can be transmuted into constructive planning and policies: whether for minimizing vulnerability to attacks by wild animals, or for more complex contemporarv threats. Through fear, ordinary people can be motivated to pursue constructive means for sustaining peace, or at least for limiting the scope of violence. Similarly, in exchanges between world leaders on behalf of preventing large-scale conflict, a tinge of &-sometimes more than a tinge- can enable each to feel the potential bloodshed and suffering that would result from failure. But with nuclear weapons, our psychological circuits are impaired. We know that the weapons arc around-and we hear talk about nuclear dangers somewhere "out there" -bul our minds no longer connecl with the dangers or with the weapons themselves. That blunting of feeling extends into other areas. One of the many sins for which advocates of large nuclear stockpiles must answer is the prevalence of psychic numbing to enormous potential suffering, the blunting of our ethical standards as human beings. In the absence of the sort of threatening nuclear rhetoric the United States and Russia indulged in during the 1980s, we can all too readilv numb ourselves to evervthing nuclear, and thereby live as though the weapons pose no dan~er, or as though they don't exist. To be sure, we have never quite been able to muster an appropriate level of fear with respect to these weapons-one that would spur us to take constructive steps to remove the threat. We have always been able to numb ourselves in this regard. which must be seen as a basic human response to a threat that is apocalyptic in scope and so technologically distanced as to be unreal. But there were at least brief moments when we would awaken from our nuclear torpor. Now there is little but torpor. The weapons have been accepted as belonging on our planet no less than we do, as if they were part of nature-like great trees or mountains that are old, established, immovable-rather than technological instruments of genocide that we ourselves have created.

AT: Fear of Nukes -Peace and Survival Deterrence is needed to maintain peace -your alternative does nothing Futterman, 1991(JAH, Livermore lab researcher, 1995,Mediation of the Bomb, online, http:Nwww.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke0 But this situation is different -we now confront potential enemies with enough force to convince them that they have no hope of seizing control of the world in the first place. So I help maintain that deterrence, a paradoxical, insufficient. but necessary part of making peace. I do other parts in my spare time. Still, there is the notion that because I did research related to nuclear weapons, I deserve a greater portion of guilt for what happens if they are used. Let me point out that even the anti-nuclear activistscontribute to the nuclear weapons business, because thev make war on nuclear weapons instead of making, peace. They are shooting the bearer of the bad news that we can't make global war safely anymore. It's as if thev want war to be safer, so that humanitv can continue as before, making wars that only kill some of us. I hand them back the guiltm some of them wish to hand me. 1n particular, I sometimes consider those who engage in anti-war or antinuclear actions (including some scientists who eschew defense research for moral reasons) without ever doing any actual peace-making to be in the same category that Dante seems to have placed Pope Celestine V. Celestine apparently abdicated the papacy out of fear that the worldliness that one must take on as Pope would jeopardize his salvation. Of him and his kind Dante says, [211 "...These are the nearly soulless, whose lives concluded neither blame nor praise. They are mixed here with that despicable corps of angels who were neither for God nor Satan, but only for themselves. The High Creator scourged them from Heaven forits perfect beauty, and Hell will not receive them since the wicked might feel some glory over them." In other words, I think that those who engage in peace protests without engaging in the enfranchisement of the disenfranchised, the empowerment of the powerless, and the deterrence of the willfully destructive may be servin~their own desire to be morally pure, more than the cause of peace. Instead of acknowledging the difference between forcefullv confronting a bully and being one. they advocate passivity, which just encourages the bully.

AT: Fear of Nukes -Disarm Bad (Wea~onskev to ~eace] Disarmament won't solve, only empowerment will solve war, nukes are just a side effect Futterman, 1991 (JAH, Livermore lab researcher, 1995,Mediation of the Bomb, online, http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptoriuminukeO Internationally, peace requires empowerment of some groups that seem eager to earn the hatred of the civilized world -like the Palestinians. Now that nuclear deterrence and economic necessity have combined to bring about more freedom, empowerment, and therefore peace in Europe, the Middle East is one of the next hot-spots for triggering a nuclear war. In order to have peace, the world must empower the Palestinians to determine their political and economic destiny, while at the same time it must deter them from warring with Israel. Such empowerment and deterrence will require the active involvement of the Islamic nations who thus far have been unwilling to empower the Palestinians to engage in much beyond stonethrowing and terrorism. May the Palestinians awaken to how they have been used by their brethren. So we need to make peace, at home and abroad. Before you demonstrate to make vour town a nuclear-free zone or to stop nuclear testing, F121 consider what vou can do to enlarge someone's freedom, or to help them obtain the power to determine a better life for themselves. In other words, rather than fight against nuclear weapons or even against war, try making peace. Meanwhile, 1do what I can to make waging unlimited war dangerous, and preparation for it expensive. I can provide palliative treatment, but you, physicianslpatients, must heal yourselves. Or to put it more bluntlys long as we continue to express our human nature in disenfranchising, disempowering ways, we will cling to armament -nuclear or worse -to distance ourselves from our own nearness to war. Weapons Testing and Prolif are necessary to develop smaller, safer nuclear weapons, without testing we'd still be pointing massive bombs at each other Futterman, 1991 (JAH, Livermore lab researcher, 1995. Mediation of the Bomb, online, http://www.dogchurch.og/scriptoriuminukcO NOW, regardless of the possibility that the present world without nuclear weapons may be unstable against conventional world war. They are also oblivious to the idea that even a nuclear test ban can carry some risk to future generations. If the comprehensive test moratorium of the early sixties had held. we would have more multi-megaton weapons and more total megatons of explosive capability in the US and CIS arsenals than we do todav. In other words, the

world grew technicallv safer from nuclear winter during the cold war because of continued nuclear testing of new nuclear designs. Moreover, consider the devices that are incorporated into nuclear weapons to prevent their unauthorized use: how can we trust that they actually can prevent such use without testing them? Now the proliferation of nuclear weapons may make it necessarv for us to develop ways to detect1231 and flexible responses to deter nuclear terrorism (including ways to disable terrorist nuclear explosives). I would hesitate to preclude such development given the present state of the world.

AT: Fear of Nukes -Kev to Denuclearize We need fear of nuclear weapons to break down nuclearism and denuclearize Lifton 01 (Roben Jay, Distinguished Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at John Jay College, Illusions of the second nuclear age, World Policy Journal. New York: Sprinn 2001. Vol. 18, Iss. I; pg. 25,6 pgs) Looking psychologically and hislorically, then, at our second nuclear age, we can come to what I bclievc to be a siniplc sct of conclusions. Wc need to replace vsvchic numbinn with awareness, and to expose and counter the ncw versions of nuclearism as well as the older oncs. We need to robe ever more deeply the trickle-down effects of existing weapons, including cspccially their ps~cholonical cfrects. And we need to take stew, as citizen activists and concerned intellectuals, lo dcnuclearizc the world. Wc nccd to start here at home and renounce our weapons-centered superpower status, therebv freeing ourselves to pursue saner. life-enhancing proiects. We ought ti) heed the words of Seneca, the Roman philosopher and dramatist: "Power over life and death--don't be proud 01' it. Whatever othcrs fear from you, you'll be threatened with."

AT: Nuclearism -Permutation Solvency The permutation to do the plan while rethinking solves best-their own author says that there is no single truth. Engaging in political action and recognizing the power of the human race allows us to resist nuclear aggression. Lifton and Markusen in '90 (Robert Jay and Eric, Professor of International Relations at Princeton University and Assistant Researcher at thc University of New York, The Genocidal Mentality, pg. 278-279) [Species awareness means awareness of human choice: "This is not the End of Time-unless we choose to make it so. We need not accept the death sentence . . . .We are not ~owerless." By choosing instead a human future, we are-in the words of the Polish Solidarity leader Adam Michnik-"defending hope." And "hope is important. Perhaps more important than anything else." Hope is greatly enhanced-as is the acceptance of individual mortality-by the sense of reasserting the immortality of the species. The task is intensified by the psychological upheavals we can expect in connection with the millennia1 transition of the year 2000. Whatever the millennia1 imagery, we must recognize that the hopeful future is not an apocalv~tic heavenly peace but rather expanded awareness on behalf of human continuity. This adaptation will not eliminate people's need to define themselves in relation to otherness, but it can begin to subsume that otherness to larger human commonality. It must include struggles against widespread oppression and drastic human inequities by invokinqthe kind of "originality in political action" that has taken place in the Solidarity movement in Poland-and in related movements in Hungary, East Gemany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria-and was so cruelly frustrated in the student movement in China: "Political action that enlarges, rather than blights or destroys, human possibilities." This species-oriented approach would ''defy the given models of defiance." No one can claim knowledge of a single. correct path. Rather. there must be endless combinations of reflection and action and. above all. the kind of larger collective adaptation we have been discussing. At the same time, we must remain aware of persisting genocidal arrangements and expressions of genocidal mentality. We cannot afford to "stop thinking." Nor can we wait for a new Gandhi or Saint Joan to deliver us. Rather, each of us must ioin in a vast ~roject-political, ethical, ps~chological--on behalf of perpetuating and nurturing our humanity. We are then "people getting up from their knees" to resist nuclear oppression. We clear away the "thick glass" that has blurred our moral and political vision. We become healers, not killers, of our species.1

AT: Nuclearism -Alternative +More Numbing We do not really know the impact to nuclear war- denying that destruction can occur through the criticism furthers numbing Lifton and Markusen in '90 (Robert Jay and Eric. Professor of International Relations at Princeton University and Assistant Researcher at the University of New York, The Genocidal Mentality, pg. 203) Dissociation is called forth to cover over and deny ignorance. Not only are we much more imorant about what we call nuclear war than we care to admit, but "we don't know how much we do or do not know about it." Since, as the Israeli philosopher Avner Cohen points out, "we do not really know how to conceive of nuclear warfare as a concrete actuality, how it could be properly kept under control and how it might be brought to termination," it is less than responsible to claim how such an event could be "managed, controlled or concluded." But all evidence suggests that '"0 matter what nuclear war might be, it would not be the kind of rule-governed practice" often assumed on the basis of vast wars. And while the principle of deterrence has a long history in political and military practice going back to the time of the Greek city-states, the consequences, should deterrence fail and the deterrer act on his threat, were always limited: after the war and destruction, there would be recovery and resumption of life. Precisely the present absence of those limits "should deterrence fail," the uncertainty or unlikelihood of anv significant amount of human life remaining, radically distinwishes nuclear deterrence from that tradition. Dissociation, especiallv in the form of psychic numbing. helps blur that distinction by denving not only our ignorance but also what we can be expected to know.

AT: Nuclearism -Imapes of Nuclear Discourse Kev Images evoked by nuclear discourse serve as a way to tame the forces of nuclear power. Cohn in '97 (Carol. Research Fellow at the Center for Psychological Studies, "Slick'cms, Glick'ems, Christmas Trees, and Cookie Cutters: Nuclear Language", Bulletin of At the Atomic Scientists. June 1987, p. 17-24, http://www.buildfreedom.com/l1/tl07aa.shtml) I These domestic images are more than simply one more way to remove oneself from the grisly reality behind thc words; ordinary abstraction is adequate to that task. Calling the pattern in which bombs fall a "footprint" almost seems a willl'ul distorting process, a playful, perverse refusal of accountability--because to be accountable to reality is to be unable to do this work. The imazes evoked bv these words mav also be a wav to tame the uncontrollable forces of nuclear destruction. Takc fire-breathing dragons under the bed, the one who threatens to incinerate your family, your town, your planet, and turn it into a pet you can pat. Or domestic imaperv may simply serve to make everyone more comfortable with what they're doing. "PAL" (pcrrnissivc action links) is the carefully constructed, friendly acronym for the electronic system designed to prevent the unauthorized firing of nuclear warheads: Thc president's annual nuclear weapons stockpile memorandum, which oullincs both shorl and long-range plans for production of' new nuclear weapons, is benignly referred to as "the shopving list." The "cookic cutler" is a phrase used to describe a particular mcdel of nuclear auack.1

AT: Nuclearism- Nuclear weaDons are morallv acce~table Nuclear weapons are designed to deter wars -they are morally acceptable because they secure the world. Gusterson in '93 (Hugh, Associate Professor of Anthropology and Science Studies at MIT, Adjunct Fellow at Harvard University's Center for Psychology and Social Change, "Ethnographic Writing on Militarism", Journal of Conterr~porary Etlznology, April 1993, vol. 22, no. 1, p.72) [How can the anthropologist and the political citizen learn to live together in thc same person in such a situation? How, for example, should one wrilc about an interview subject like Lester,3 who told me that, although his university colleagues tried to talk him out of working at a nuclear weapons laboratory, their objections did not trouble him'! He believes that it is more ethical to work on nuclear weapons than on less destructive conventional weapons because nuclear weapons are designed to deter wars rather than to fight them. He says that he could never work as a lawyer defending murderers or other criminals but feels morally comfortable with his work as a nuclear warhead designer, and even wonders if it might be morally reprehensible not to work on nuclear weapons because, as he sees it, they make the world more stable. Lester is puzzled by those who cannot see that nuclear weapons make us safer by making war unthinkable. Like most of his colleagues, he is confident that nuclear wcapons can be controlled by humans, that technological progress is unavoidable and beneficial, and that nuclear wear>ons are the embodiment of a transcendent rationality, which alone can discivline the dark impulses leading humans to make war. Evcrything in his life, where he sees the atom bent to the cxpcrimental will of human rationality on a daily basis, confirms those beliefs. Lester does not worry that the United States will misuse the hydrogen bombs he designs, bombs he describes as "no more strange than a vacuum cleaner. You don't feel a fear for them at all." 'in fact, he sees weapons technology as "beautiful." "How do I explain that?" he asked me. "To me, a spectrometer is a very pretty thing ... and you feel badly that it's going to be destroyed [in a nuclear test]."]

AT: Chalou~ka-Krishna evidence Chaloupka's total critique destroys coalitions and the possibility of progressive social change, Krishna 93 (Sankaran, Professor of Political Scicncc at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, Altcrnativcs, Summer, p. 400-401, "The Importance of Being Ironic: A Postcolonial View on Critical Intcmational Relations Theory) The dichotomous choice presented in this excerpt straightforward: one either induloes in total critiaue, delegitimizing all sovereign truths, or one is committed to "nostalgic," essentialist unities that have become obsolete and have been the nt-ounds for all our onvressions. In offering this dichotomous choice. Der Derian re~licates a move made hv Chalounka in his eauallv dismissive critiauc of the move mainstream nuclear onnosition. the Nuclear Freeze movement of the earlv 1980~~ that, according to him, was operating along obsolete lines. emphasizing "facts" and "realities," while a "postmodern" President Reagan easily outflanked then1 through an illusc)ry Star Wars program (See KN: chapter 4) Chalou~kacenters this difference between his own su~~osedlv total critiaue of all sovereirrn &uths (which he describes as nuclear criticism in an echo of literarv criticism) and the more nartial (and issue based) criticism of what he calls "nuclear o~nosition" or "antinuclearists" at the very outset of his book. (Kn: xvi) Once again. the unha~~v choice forced uDon the reader is to ioin Chalou~ka in his total critiaue of all sovereign truths or be trau~ed in obsolete essentialisms. This leads to a disastrous politics uittinc ZrouDs that have the most in common (and need to unite on some basis to be effcctivc) against each other. Both Chalounka and Der Derian thus rcscrvc thcir most trenchant critiauc for nolitical grouns that should. in any analvsis. be regarded as the closest to them in terms of an op~ositional politics and their desired futures. Instead of finding ways to live with these differences and to (if tleetingly) coalesce against the New Right, this fratricidal critique is politicallv suicidal. It obliterates the space for a political activism based on provisional and contingent coalitions, for uniting behind a common cause even as one recoanizes that the coalition is comprised of soups that have very differing (and possibly unresolvable) views of reality. Moreover, it fails to consider the possibility that there may have been other, more compelling reasons for the "failure" of the Nuclear Freeze movement or anti-Gulf War movement. Like many a worthwhile cause in our timcs, they failed to gamer suflicicnt support to influence state policy. The response to that need not be a totalizing critique that delegitimizes all narratives. The blackmail inherent in the choice offered by Der Derian and Chaloupka, between total critique and "ineffective" partial critique, ought to be transparent. Among other things, &effectively militates against the cons~uction of provisional on strategic essentialisms our attempts to create space for activist politics. In the next section, 1focus more widely on the gnrc of critical international theory and its impact on such an activist politics.

AT: Non-violence -Alternative 3+Holocaust Non Violence would have had no chance to stop the Nazis. Denmark's strategy wouldn't have worked on a global scale -a 1000 year Reich would of resulted Futterman, 1991 (JAH, Livermore lab researchcr, 1995,Mcdialion of the Bomb, online, http://www.do~church.org/scriptorium/nuke0.html) The Nazis, who with their "Master Race" ideology admitted only so-called "Aryans" to the category of human, provide an example counter to that of the British. There were some successful acts of non-violent confrontation against the Nazis, like King Christian of Denmark's public declaration that he would wear the yellow star if it were introduced in his country. He did so in response to the Nazi practice of ordering Jews to wear yellowstarred armbands so that the Nazis could more easily isolate them from their surrounding society. That many Danes followed their king's example helped camouflage many Jews until they could escape to Sweden in fishing boats. aNow this resistance worked partly because the Nazis considered the Danes to be "Aryans" like themselves. Had the Poles tried the same thing, the Nazis would have been perfectly happy to use the event as an excuse for liquidating more Poles. Rather than awaken the Nazis' moral sense, non-violent confrontation on the part of the Poles would probably have enabled the Nazis to carry out their agenda in Poland more easily. The other reason these acts succeeded was that overwhelming violence of the Allies had stretched the Nazi forces too thin to suppress massive action by a whole populace, and eventually deprived the Nazis of the time they needed to find other ways to carry out their "final solution." In other words, non-violence resistance alone would have been very slow to work against the Nazis, once they had consolidated their power. And while it slowly ground away at the evil in the Nazi soul. how many millions more would have died, and how much extra time would have been given to Nazi scientists trying to invent atomic bombs to 20 on those V-2 rockets? The evil of Nazism may well have expended itself, but perhaps after a real "thousand-year Reich," leaving a world populated only by blue-eyed blondes. In other words, if the world had used non-violence alone against the Nazis. the results may have been much worse those of the war.m

AT: Non-violence -Alternative + Genocide Non-violence fails and makes us complicit with genocide-their alternative devalues life and leads to more conflict and millions of deaths Ketels, Associate Professor of English at Temple University, 19% (Violet B.. "'Have1 to the Castle!' The Power of the Word," 548 Annals 45, November, Lexis) Havel stresses the potential of truth and humane values to transform human consciousness incrementally over time. We must constantly work forevery good thing and strugglc against violence. But Havel is tough-minded. his vision comprehcnsive and realistic. Violence may he unavoidable in the face of totalitarian savagery. Still, it must remain a nicans of last resort. Repeatedly, he warns that violence breeds violence. Havel is not, however. a pacifist, as that tcrm applies to Quakers or others who organize peace movements. 1140Although thc regime Havel and his fellow dissidents rcsistcd for niorc than thirty years accused them of terorist tiactics and plots, they conscientiously sought legill justification for their resistance. using the letter even of unjust laws to manifest support for the principle of legality. Their attitude was "fundamentally hostile to the notion of violenl change--simply because it places its faith in violence." Havel writes in one place. He immediately restates the point, however, in a powerfully sipificant parenthesis: "the 'dissident' altitude can only accept violence as a necessarv evil in extreme situations, when direct violence can only be met by violence and where remaining passive would in effect mean supporting violence." n41 He recalls us to the tragic biindness of European pacifism that hclped to preparc the ground for World War 11. He points to the fact that the Czechs sent troovs to the Persian Gulf and stood willing to contribute to a U.N. force in the former Yugoslavia. But he is at pains to condemn violence used as a quick fix to change politiwl systems-the sacrifice of human beings hm and now for "abstract political visions of the future." The problems in human society "lie far too deep to be settled through [*55]mere systemic changes. either governmental or technological." n42 Havel writes and thinks out of a unique humanist tradition that has been continuous in Czcch history. He has specifically idcntificd with thc humanism of the founder of the Czech statc. Tomas Masaryk, who regarded "ethical. acsthctic and scientific categories" as "no less real than bread and butter." Masruyk felt the need for a social revolution "more moral and less materialistic than that envisaged by the Marxisls." Like Havel, he hoped to avoid violence, but he does not rule it out altogether. His language is as circumspect as Havel's: We must consistently rejecl every act of violence: otherwise we shall never be able to disentangle

ounelves from violencc. We may, should. must protect, defend ourselves. In extreme cases with the sword. But even in self-defense we must restrain ourselves from new, active acts of violence. n43 Inan address prcparcd for delivery at a 1985 peacc conference, Havel explains the reticence of Europeans to join Western peace movements as rooted in the skepticism of those who have already been burned by succumbing to other forms of utopianism, specifically the Stalin-Leninist variety, which grotesauelv deformed its utopian ~rinciples as soon as it got power. The very word "peace" has heen drained of all content bv the European experience of "peacc in our timc." n44 The Wcstern version of peace sounds fa too much like appeasement. Havel speculates whether World War 11, with its nlillions of corpses. could have been avoided if the Western democracies had stood up to Hitler forcefully and in time. He ascribes to the Czech people as a whole the firmly rooted idea that the inability to risk, in cxtremis, even life itself to save what gives it meaning and a human dimension leads not only to the loss of meaning but finally and inevitably to the loss of life as well--and not one life only but thousands and millions of lives. n45

AT: Non-violence -Alternative Increases Violence Nonviolence is code for appeasement, history proves that EVEN RHETORICAL stances against the use of force can embolden aggressors Sowell,Author, September 23,2001 (Thomas, http:Ncapmag.comlarticlePrint.asp'?ID=1108, Acc 7-14) Although most Americans seem to understand the gravity of the situation that terrorism has put us in --and the need for some serious military response, even if that means dangers to the lives of us all --there are still those who insist on posturing, while on the edge of a volcano. In the forefront are college students who demand a "pcaccful" rcsponse to an act of war. But there are others who are old enough to know better, who are still repeating the pacifist ~lalitudes of the 1930s that contributed so much to bringing on World War -11. A former ambassador from the weak-kneed Carter administration says that we should look at the "root causes" behind the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. We should understand thc "alienation" and "sense ofgricvancc" against us by various people in the Middle East. It is astonishing to see the 1960s phrase "root causcs" resurrected at this late date and in this context. It was precisely this kind of thinking. which sought the "root causes of crime" during that decade, creating soft policies toward criminals, which led to skyrocketing crime rates. Moreover, these soaring crimc rates came right after a period when crime rates were lower than they had been in decades. On the international scene, trying to assuage aggressors' feelings and look at the world from their point of view has had an even more catastrophic track record. A typical sample of this kind of thinking can be found in a speech to the British Parliament by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in 1938: "It has always seemed to me that in dealing with foreign countries we do not give ourselves a chance of success unless we try to understand their mentality, which is not always the same as our own, and it really is astonishing to contemplate how the identically same facts are regarded from two different angles.' Like our former ambassador from the Carter era, Chamberlain sought to "remove the causes of strife or war." He wanted "a general settlement of the grievances of the world without war." In other words, the British prime minister approached Hitler with the attitude of someone negotiating a labor contract, where each side gives a little and everything gets worked out in the end. What Chamberlain did not understand was that all his concessions simply led to new demands from Hitler --and contempt for him bv Hitler. What Winston Churchill undcrslood at the time, and Chamberlain did not, was that Hitler was driven by what Churchill called "currents of hatred so intense as to scar the souls of those who swim upon them." That was also what drove the men who drove the planes into the World Trade Center. Pacifists of the 20th century had a lo1 of blood on their hands for weakening the Western democracies in the face of rising belligerence and rnilitarv might in agmessor nations like Nazi Germanv and imperial Japan. In Britain during the 1930s, Labor Party members of

Parliament voted repeatedly against military spending, while Hitler built up the most powerful military machine in Europe. Students at leading British universities signed pledges to refuse to fight in the event of war. All of this encouraged the Nazis and the Japanese toward war against countries that they knew had greater militarv potential than their own. Military potential only counts when there is the will to develop it and use it, and the fortitude to continue with a bloody war when it comes. This is what lhcv did not believe the West had. And it was Western vaciiists who led them to that belief. Then as now, pacifism was a "statement" about one's ideals that paid little attention to actual conseauences. At a Labor Party rally where Britain was being urged to disarm I!!! ]"as an example to others," economist Roy Harrod asked one of the pacifists: "You think our example will cause Hitler and Mussolini to disarm?'The reply was: "Oh. Roy, have you lost all your idealism?" in other words, the issue was about making a "statement" --that is, posturing on the edge of a volcano, with World War I1 threatening to erupt at any time. When disarmament advocate George Bemard Shaw was asked what Britons should do if the Nazis crossed the channel into Britain, the playwright replied, "Welcome them as tourists." What a shame our schools and college neglect historv, which could save us from continuing to reveat the idiocies of the past, which are even more dangerous now in a nuclear age. Nonviolence risks appeasement which results in more conflict Rummel, 1981-(R.J., professor of political science at the University of Hawaii, The Just Peace, http://www.hawaii.edulpowerkil1s/TJP.CHAP 1O.HTM) Violent conquest is usually wrong (thc Just Package). Forcibly imposing one's values and goals on another, aside from its general immorality, can create smoldering resentment, ,gievance, and hostility that later may burst into greater conflict and violence. Nonetheless, in some excevtional conflict situations, the only resolution possible or desirable may he through consuest: a test of strenHh and the unambiguous violent defeat of the other side--as of Hitlcr's Germany. To believe that conflict should always be resolved through negotiation, mediation, and compromise invites an aggrcssor to assume that what is his is his, but what is yours is negotiable. Resisting aggression forces a test of interests. cavabili~ics, and will--if the aggressor so wants it. And this may be a faster, ultimately less conflictful, less violent way of resolving conflict than conciliation or appeasement. In resisting aggression, gauge different power responses. Do not automatically respond to aggression in kind. The most effective response is one which shifts power to bases which can be employed more effectively, while lessening the risk of violent escalation. And respond proportionally. To meet aggression in equal measure is legitimate, while overreaction risks escalation to a more extended and intense conflict, and underreaction ap-wars weak and risks defeat and repeated a~rrression.

AT: Non-violence-Alternative Increases Violence You can't imagine the world as peaceful -this self deception begets more violence Laren, October 4,2001 (Carter, http:!/capmag.comlarticle.asp'?ID= 1128) Pacifists would argue that they are idealists. as if being an idealist meant being excused from having to defend those ideals. Considcr an individual engaged in the following line of reasoning: "It would be ideal if all pcoplc knew how to perform open- heart surgery, so I an1 going to behave as if everyonc is a hear1 surgeon. I am an idealist." Although this may bc idealism. it is also idiocv (and selfdestructive). Pacifists think that bv urctcnding [hat violcncc doesn't exist, eventually it won't. This is not iusr sillv: it is a vicious. deadly lie. Aggression cannot be defeated hy rewardino it. Organizers of "Don'[ turn tradgedy [sic] into a war" rallies across the country would have Americans believe that the proper responsc to the murder of thousands of innocent lives is a candlelight vigil and impromptu poetry readings. This is mass suicide. It is an invitation to the Hillers, thc Slalins, the Auilas, and the Bin Ladens of the world lo slaughter the American pcoplc and to gut thcir corpses. Implicit in the pacifist's drivel is the implication: "may the worst man win." Only two types of people can accept a philosophy like this: a fiend or a fool. A fiend hates everyone, including himself, and so doesn't care if the "worst man" wins. A fool believes that if he smiles sheepishly at Adolf Hillcr. Hitler will suddenlv change his mind and decide to take-uv knitting. Thev are both wrong, and they are both evil. [because in both cases such a uolicy can only lead to thc dcstruction of the good. To Promote this evil in the wake of the recent terrorist attacks. pacifists have added a few extra deceptions to their arsenal. One of these is the equation of war and racism. "War and Racism are Not thc Answer," reads an anti-war poster at a San Francisco university. This statement blatantly implies that those who support war against terrorist-harboring nations are racist. It relies on the insecurity of the reader by convincing him to oppose war for fear of being (unjustly) labeled "racist." A war against the Afghan, Iranian, and other terrorist-suvvorling governments does not constitute racism. It constitutes self-defense. Racism is clearly wronp but pacifism doesn't hold a monopoly on that idea. Pacifism in the face of violence appeases evil Root, Staff Writer, 2001(Damon, http://www.objectivistcenter.orgjarticl~sm.asp,Ace: 7-14) In 1941, with Hitler's war machine furiously hacking Western civilization to bits, George Orwell famouslv observed that "obiectivelv, the pacifist is pro-Nazi." Todav. as Islamic fascists like Osama bin Laden, A1 Oaeda and the Taliban struggle to bring thc world under another yoke of vicious, anti-Semitic totalitarianism, our own anti-war activists inform anvone who will listen that "an eve for an eve makes thc world go blind." Since these folks would apparently rathcr see Islamic fascism run free than havc America vigorouslv engage her enemies. let's

consider iust what sort of world the modem pacifist is oblectivelv in l'avor of. Afghanistan, under the Taliban, is literally a hell on earth. Women and girls are deprived of everv imaginable civil, social, political^ and economic liberty. Their humanity itself is under brutal attack. everv minute of everv dav. According to Human Rights Watch. Taliban officials 'bcat women on thc strcets for dress code violations and for venturing outside the home without the company of a close male relative.' Amnesty International rcports that 'women who wear nail vanish could havc thcir fingcrs choppcd off' Forbidden to speak with or visit any male who is not a close relative (including doctors and dentists), women and girls regularly go without basic medical aliention. In addition. the Taliban have banned music. films, television, playing cards. and other forms of entertainment. Musical instmn~ents and books have been seized and burned. Civil liberties like freedom of speech and religion are repressed by force. For example. the punishment for converting to Christianity or Judaism, professing these religions, or distributing thcir litcrature. is death. Amnesty International describes how two men convicted of sodomy "were placed under a wall of dried mud which was bulldozed upon them." In Kabul, an unrnamed man convicted of premarital sex received 100lashes with a leather strap. Had he been manied, "the punishment would have been death by stoning," the repor( states. With each passing day, sirnilar accounts of rnisogyny and oppression come pouring in. Kiln Candy. President of the National Organization for Wonien, observes that "when such extremism is allowed to flourish anywhere in the world, none of us is safe." Confront the nloral relativists who infest our college campuses and progressive institutions with these unspeakable events, howevt~, and they respond with juvenile slogans like "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." In New York City, popular graffiti artist and left-wing dissident DeIA Veca has a statement hanging in his gdlery that reads "Osama. whether right or wrong, is a fighter for freedom." Following the logic of this idiocy, we should elevate Hitler's holocaust and South Africa's apartheid into noble ideals simuly because some illiterale thugs were willing to shed blood on their behalf. Thankfully, we do nothing of the sort. Just what sort of freedom do people like De La Vega think bin Laden and the Taliban are fighting for? Freedom to throw acid in the faces of unveiled women? Freedom to torture and murder gays, Jews, and atheists? Anyone suggesting a similarity between the values of Martin Luther King and Mullah Omar ought to put down the placard, quit the protest, and hide their head in shame. The Islamic fascisls have brought nightmare to life in their own lands, while their ideology calls for its export. To profess pacifism in the face of such horror is to appease evil itself.

AT: Non-violence-Alternative Increases Violence Even non-violent movements inevitably become totalitarian and violent-the leaders cannot control the masses. Steger 'w-(Manfred B., Professor in the Department of Politics and Government at Illinois State University, Gandhi's Dilemma: Nonviolent Principles and Nationalist Power, 2000) Urging all Indians to crown the swadeshi campaign by publicly burning their foreign-made clothes. Gandhi spoke in glowing terms of the "inspiring sight" of large piles of garments going up in smoke: "And as the flames leapt up and enveloped the whole pyramid [of clothes], there was a shout of joy resounding through the air. It was as if our shackles had bccn broken asunder. A glow of freedom passed through the vast concourse. It was a noble act nobly performed."62 Yet, the flames ol' swadeshi kindled by thousands of ordinary Indian also symbolized, like no other satyagaha action, the fundamental tension at the core of Gandhi's nonviolent nationalism. For the Ma-hatma, the burning clothes manufactured in England convcyed India's econonuc, political, and spiritual emancipation from the threads of oppression. He viewed these spectacles as symbols of the nonviolent purification of a corrupted civilization and its materialist culture, and, therefore, the pur~ation of a tainted Indian identity. For others-including some of Gandhi's closest associates and friends, like Charlie Andrews-the flames of swadeshi signified a rather violent act of self-definition that seemed to be an ominous sign of things to come: the obliteration of the Other bv nationalist passions set ablaze. Indeed, the first indication that Gandhi was incapable of controlling the nationalist passions of the masses set free during the noncooperation campaign came as early as April 1921, when a sub-inspector of police and four constables were killed in an act of mob violence provoked by the trial of Khilafat workers in the city of Malegaon. Gandhi chided the perpetrators for having "put back thc hands of the clock of progress," and reminded them that, "Nonviolence is the rock on which the whole structure of non-cooperation is buiIt."63 Yet another incident took place in Bombav on November 17, 1921, the dav the Prince of Wales arrived there for an official visit. Violent attacks were launched bv Hindu and Muslim noncooperators upon Parsi and Christian Indians who had voluntarilv taken part in the Prince's welcome. The violencc escalated as manv non-cooperators looted shops and burned clothes. Soon these actions expanded to the torching of entire buildings and the beating of government officials, ultimatclv leadinp, to the deaths of several policemen and demonstrators. When, after three days of violence, the passions had finally cooled down, fifty-eight Bombay citizens had been killed and nearly four hundred had been iniured.64 The masses empirically morph non-violent movements into violent ones Steger '00-(Manfred B., Professor in the Department of Politics and Government at Illinois State University, Gandhi's Dilemma: Nonviolent Principles and Nationalist Power, 2000)

Gandhi accepted personal responsibility for these atrocities. declaring that he had been "more instrumental than anv other in bringing into being the spirit of [violent1 revolt." Confessing that he had been incapable of maintaining "sufl~cient control over the veovle to keep their violence under check," he vowed to observe henceforth every Monday a twenty-four-hour penitential fast until swaraj was attained. Reflecting on the events in Bombay, he recognized the magnitude of his dilemma: "If I can have nothing to do with the organized violence of the Government, I can have less to do with the unor~anized violence of the people. I would prefer to bc crushed between the 1~0.~65 Indeed. it began to dawn on him that, instead of embracing his idea of swaraj as a process of moral regeneration involving both sell' and nation, the masses seemed to be much more excited about the wospect of expelling the British from Indian soil bv anv means necessarv. Although Gandhi had always insisted on maintaining the nonviolent character of the noncooperation campaign, his own instrumentalist tendencies. together with his apocalyptic language, had sowed some of the verv seeds that bloomed into the masses' limited and woefullv inadequate interpretation of the movement's primary obiective.66 As Nehru put it years later, "Gand-hiji was delightrully vague on the subject [of swaraj], and he did not encourage clear thinking about it either."67 Anti-political movements inevitably give way to elitist and authoritarian violence and intolerance Steger '00-(ManSred B., Professor in the Department of Politics and Govcrnmcnt at Illinois State University, Gandhi's Dilemma: Nonviolent Principles and Nationalist Power, 2000) While justifiably exposing the instrumentalism of power politics, such moralizing forms of politics also tend to aid the formation of an undemocratic, elitist political culture that serves as the fertile soil for much less tolerant social forces. The authoritarian tendencies of antipolitical politics become especially transparent in the intolerant idiom of radical cultural nationalists who inscribe notions of patriotic duty and purity into the construction of the ideal national citizen and Lhe ideal leader. Even Gandhi Kied with such authoritarian notions when he imagined the creation of a nonv~olent army of disciplined mtyagrahis who would acquire political legitimacy through virtuous acts of "terrible selfdlscipline. self-denial and penance." Exercising their authority "as lightly as a flower," they would hclp India fulfill its true destiny as the world's first nonviolent nation without engaging in conventional power' politics and without recmting the morally corrupt institutions of modem politics. Gandhi's dream of merging moral charisma and political power

explicitly drew on the Platonic notion of a dictatorship of the virtuous few who were best equipped to establish a just political order. Such rare "prophets" or "supermen" would "realize the ideal of ahimsa in its fullness." and ultimately redeem "the whole of society." However, as the violent history of Indian nationalism has shown, this highly idealized construction of a politics of purity spearheaded by leaders of superior moral fiber has also proven itself incapable of producing exclusivist sentiments and heinous acts of communal violence.

AT: Non-violence -Violence Kev to Peace True peace necessitates some unavoidable violence -violence is key to dignity and other virtues Rummel, 1981-(R.J.,professor of political science at the University of Hawaii, The Just Pcacc, httu:Nwww.hawaii.edu/~owerkil I dTJP.CHAP 1O.HTM) Such are major subprinciples of peacemaking. Conflict engages what the parties want and can and will do in a situation in which relevant status quo expectations are disrupted. Situational perceptions, expectations. interests, capabilities, and will are the elements of the conflict--and of peacemaking. Material things--land, people, wealth, ports, borders--are merely the tools or objects of conflict. And material conditions, such as the topography of a country or a mountainous border between states, only frame and physically limit conflict. The essence of conflict is an opposition of minds. The arena of conflict is the mental field. The principles and rules for its resolution are psychological. Now, peacemaking is not necessarily the best and most immediate response to contlict. Doubtlessly, some contlicts are unnecessary, some needlessly intense and long-lasting. But some also arc a real and unavoidable clash, thc only means through which one, as a partisan, can protect or further vital interests and achieve a more satisfactory and harmonious just pcace. For example, war against Hitler's Germany from 1939 to 1945 cost millions lives. but it vrevented the grcater misery, the terror. the executions, the coldblooded murders which probably would have occurred had Hitler consolidated his control oS Europe and subiuaated the Soviet Union. We always can end a conflict when wc want by surrender. But some idcas arc more important than vcace: Dignitv. Freedom. Securitv. That is, peace with iustice--a iust peace. There is another relevant qualification. The term "peacemaking" is well established, and I used it accordingly. Unfortunately, the verb "make" can imply that peace is designed and constructed, as a house is planned and erected brick by brick or a road cngincered and built. This implication is especially seductive in this age when society is seen as manmadc (rather than having evolved),9 and many believe that communities should be cenlrally planned and managed. But peace is not constructed like a bridge. Peace emerges from the balancing of individual mental fields. What the leaders of a group or nation honestly believe, actually want, truly are willing to get, are really capable of achieving are unknown to others--and perhaps only partially to themselves. Nonetheless only they can best utilize the information availablc to them to justly satisfy their interests. For a third party to try to construct and enforce an abstract peacc imposed on others is foolhardy. Such a peace would be uncertain, forestall the necessary trial-and-error balancing of the parties themselves, and pcrhaps even create greater conflict later. The best peace is an outcome of reciprocal adjustments among those involved. At most, peacemaking should case the process.

A final qualification. PaciCists believe that violence and war cannot occur if people laid down their arms and refused to fight. But this ignores unilateral violence. Under threat, a state or government may try to avoid violence by submission. The result may be enslavement. systematic execution, and elimination of leaders and "undesirables." The result in^ genocide and mass murder may ultimatelv end in more deaths than would have occurred had oeoule fought to defend themselves. I agree that in some situations nonviolence may he an effective strategy for waging conflict,lO as in the successful Black civil rights demonstrations of the 1960s in America: or thc successful nonviolent, civil disobedicncc movement for Indian independence from Britain begun by Mahatma Candhi in 1922. In somc situations refusal to use violence may avoid unnecessary escalation and ease peacekeeping. However, there are also conflicts, especially involving actual or votential tyrants, despots, and other such oppressors, in which nonviolence cannot buy freedom from violence by others or a iust resolution of a dispute. Then a down payment on such a peace requires public display of one's capability and a resolve to meet violent agmession in kind.

AT: Non-violence -Alternative Unnecessarv (Violence not a threat) The vast majority of violence poses no threat of nuclear annihilation; therefore, its potential is not a reason to default to non-violence. Marty, 1971-(WilliamR., Professor of Political Science. Mepbis State University, The Journal Politics, Vol. 33, No. I, Feb, p. 19-20, istor) Dcfcndcrs of nonviolence sometimes level a final crushing charge against violcncc-that it is, in an age of nuclear weapons, a sure path to annihilation. Dr. King, for example, argued that our choice is no longer nonviolence or violence, rather it is nonviolence or noncxistence.17 The only new element in this argument for nonviolence is the threat of nuclear annihilation. That threat, presumably, makes total commitment to nonviolence both necessary and possible. In fact, howcvcr, certain tvpes of violence pose no threat of nuclear warfare. hence the horrors of nuclear warfare provide no reason or incentive to give up these tvpcs of violence: other tvpes of violence pose a real threat of nuclear warfare, but the dangers involved in abandoning conventional weapons will seem greater and more immediate, hence conventional violence is unlikelv to be abandoned; and, finally, realistic plans for comrnunitv order and nuclear disarmament. the most likelv path to survival, depend, at least potentially, upon violent enforcement. For lhcse reasons. the call to total commitment to nonviolence in order to avoid total nuclear annihilation is neither rationally necessary nor psychologicallv likelv to be adopted. Each of the listed objectives deserves elaboration. First, certain types of violence pose no threat of nuclear annihilation. The man or woman who kccps a weapon in the home to deal with intruders (burglars, sex criminals, rioters) may be unwise for several reasons, but not because his or hcr weapon poses a threat of nuclear warfare. Whether this person uses a weapon against an intruder, or resists nonviolently, or submits, will have no clTcct on whether nuclear war is waged between nations. though it will have considerable effect on his or her personal safety. To ask this person to disarm in order to avoid nuclear warfare is as ridiculous as it would be to ask city officials having no say whatever in the decision to wage nuclear warfare to disarm their police in order to avoid nuclear annihilation. Even on a national and international level there are tvpes of violence that pose little threat of nuclear warfare. In Chad and Sudan, for example, there has been guerrilla and civil warfare for vears, but the threat of nuclear warfare resulting from these conflicts is small or nonexistent because nuclcar weapons don't cxist in those nations and because nations with nuclear weapons have no incentive to intervene that is worth a nuclear confrontation. In these cases the threat of nuclear warfare is inadequate as an incentive to adopt nonviolence because no apparent thrcat of nuclcar warfare exists. In sum, from the individual to the international level, there are types of violence that pose no real threat of nuclear warfarc, and certainly are not perceived by those employing them as threatening nuclear warfare; hence thcv have no incentive to adopt nonviolence as an alternative to nuclear warfare. In other cases, such as the continuing crisis in the Middle East. the possibility of nuclear warfare is real, but the threat is unlikely to cause renunciation of violence because other dangers seem greater and more immediate. To Israel the dangers of adopting nonviolence

in the face of Arab hatred and calls for national extinction seem greater than the dangers of nuclear warfare resultinr! from armed defense. The Israelis are unlikelv to make a total commitment to nonviolence in all circumstances despite a real threat of nuclear confrontation. The same situation occurs in Vietnam. There was at least a remote chance of nuclear confrontation in Victnam at one time, but that did not provide adequate incentive to any of the involved parties, from the Vjet Cong to the United States and Russia, to renounce all types of violence, though it did produce some restraints on United States and Russian intervention. Again, when thc danger of death is alreadv swat bv conventional means, and when abandonment of conventional weapons apmars as suicidal, thcn the threat of nuclear warfare will he inadecluate as an incentive to renounce all tvpes of violence. An appeal to the North Viclnamesc and Viet Cong, or to the Saigon government, or to both, to abandon violence in order to avoid the possibility of nuclear war would be fruitless.

AT: Non-violence-Alternative Im~ossible (nonviolence relies on violence) Even nonviolence relies on the threat of violence to be successful Futterman, 1991 (JAH, Livermore lab researcher, 1995,Mediation of the Bomb, online, http://~~~.do~church.or~/scriptoriumlnuke0.html) Even when non-violence does succeed, it does so by rallying the majority of the po~ulation toward whom it is directed to stop the direct perpetrators of iniustice by force -the force of law in the form of the police, the prisons, and the polls -force that necessarily includes the threat of violence. In other words, non-violent resistance harnesses (or co-opts), rather than eliminates violence. In fact, non-violence is sometimes even helped by the threat of violence to achieve its obiectives. The nonviolence of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was complemented bv the willingness to use "any means necessarv" of Malcolm X. These two men were sending white America the same message concerning justice and racial equality. Tf whites failed to respond to the message stated gently. whites would be given the opportunity to respond to it stated violently. It took both statements to achieve the progress made thus far.

AT: Non-violence-Love = Im~ossible Not all violence is bad- it is impossible to approach everyone with an ethic of love Laren, October 4,2001 (Carter, http://capmag.comlar~icle.asp'?lD='1128) Another pacitist deception is the love-hate alternative. Pacilisls often assume that a Derson must either "love" evervone or "hate" everyone. In a fit of confused self- righteousness, thev then proceed to denounce "hate" and appoint themselves as champions of "love." "Lovc is stronger than hate," reads a university-sponsorcd banner condemning US retaliation. What pacifists do not chose to {or cannot) understand is that one cannot truly love everything and everyone. Love is based on a value-structure: one loves someone in relation to how one's own values are reflected in that person. A man who tried to love everyone indiscriminately would place himself in the following predicament: he must feel emotions towards Joseph Stalin that are similar to the emotions he feels for his spouse. If he ever rcachcs such a deranged state, it is certain that whatever emotion he is feeling, jl is most definitely not love. It is acceptable and Droner to hate Joseph Stalin. Adolf Hitler. and the terrorists who leveled the World Trade Center: those people were evil. They do not deserve the same emotion due a spouse or a friend. Stay away from a person that claims to "love" everyone; thev necessarilv stand for nothino and value nothing. Such wonle are incapable of loving anyonc at all.

AT: Non-violence-Perm Solvencv Even Gandhi admitted that there are good aspects of warriors that must be integrated into a non-violent movement. Steger '00-(Manfred B., Professor in the Department of Politics and Government at Illinois State University, Gandhi's Dilemma: Nonviolent Principles and Nationalist Power, 2000) While Gandhi had not yet arrived at a polished formulation of his philosophy of nonviolence, he had nonetheless expressed the moral core of his satyapraha method as early as 1896: "Our method in South Africa is to conquer this hatred by love. At any rate. that is our goal. We would often fall short of that ideal, but we can adduce innurnerablc instances to show that we have ackd in that spirit. We do not attempt to have individuals punished but, as a rule, patiently suffer wrongs at their hands."7 Hence, he admitted that his decision to participate in the Boer War was precipitated by a painful "inner struggle"-another indication that he was fully aware of thc existing tension between his willingness to support the British war effort and his moral principles. Still, at the time. he believed that he had no right to enforce his individual convictions during a national crisis: As a Hindu, I do not believe in war, but if anything can even partially reconcile me to it, itthe rich experience wc gained at the front. It was certainly not the thirst for blood that tmk thousands of men to the battlefield. If 1 may use a most holy name without doing any violence to our feelings, like Arjun[a], they went to the battlefield, because it was their duty. And how many proud, rude, savage spirits has it not broken into gentle creatures of God?8 Thus, at the dawning of the new century, Gandhi offered two distinct rationales for his decision to support war. On a philosophical level, he argued that considerations of civic duty and patriotic loyalty outweighed moral concerns about the violence employed in warfare. If one demanded the full rights of British citizenship, Gandhi reasoned, one had to be prepared to accept the corresponding oblieation to defend the nation in a time of need. Even though he acknowledged that justice seemed to bt: on the side of the Boers, he insisted that British subjects ought not disavow their patriotic duty and cut the ties of allegiance that bound them to the empire. In addition, Gandhi highlighted war's potential for bringing out positive qualities in humans, ~articularlv the virtues of comradeship, heroism. courage. and "manhood." He did so not only to put to rest false rumors about Indian cowardicc, but also to stress the importance ofdevelovin~ these virtues as the building blocks of a moral character. As Peter Brock notes, Gandhi's mature expression of satyagraha would ultimately champion a techniquc that sought to preserve the "good" virtues of the warrior-particularlv courage and discivline-while eliminating the violent aspects of warfare. Non-violence is far from inconsistent with national service-Gandhi encouraged it Steger '00-(Manfred B., Professor in the Department of Politics and Government at Illinois State University, Gandhi's Dilemma: Nonviolent Principles and Nationalist Power, 2000)

And ycl, ul Ik orithrwk nf Ilw Great War in 1914. Gundhi again mahal to llle defense af lhc cmpirc, making thc same old arguments in sllppon nithc Britiqh wucc. Ha!ing.iusl lefi Sourh Afin niter eighl years ol kalli~~~ hikhly puhlic~zcd wlyiprah cnmpnig~w on kh;lll'nf his Idhn const~loencies. k dccided to stop o\.er m London on his way back hum lo Indi in orderal Ineel with his ,wlili&iI gum Gokhak.. who was I~II awing 1:ump. 111 his 1.ondon recepiinspech given a fcw days nRa. tile Ulitisli Ccbratiun orwar, Gandhi emphasized once again the importance of remaining loyal to the empire, telling his mostly Indian audiencc that their su~vort for the British war effort constituted "a sacred matler of duty." m aic~tcrolsuppnrha~ tw~rc Ilx signalurcs or nwr fifiy pruminent Ilxlians residinz in I.nndon. Gandhi assured the Undersecretary of S~tc for India Ihal. "We,the underslpmd haw alirr mature deliberatio% decidul for thc .& oilhc Motherhd unl the~mp"~ to place our services unconditionally, during this crisis. at the disposal of the authorities. We advisedly use the word 'unconditionally' as we believe that, in a momcnl like this. no service that can be assigned to us can be considered to be beneath our dignity or inconsistent with our sclf-respect " 17 Even Gandhi often combined political goals with ethical concerns Steger '00-(Manfred B., Professor in the Department of Politics and Government at Illinois State University, Gandhi's Dilemma: Nonviolent Principles and Nationalist Power, 2000) Fondhi's olfer wasnotnnexapgeratioll. In order to achieve his political ohiective, he was even willing to oersonallv spearhead an ambitious recruiting camvaign to enlist Indian volunteers for the British armed forces. His engagement, therefore, no longer represented a case of supporting noncombatant war service desipncd losave livcs nn the linni. Inslead, his new csmpaignexplicilly sought to pnlvidt. a new supply of ~ndion Lmcrps to replenish the depleted Li~itkh army. Conrtituling a "stmngc phenomenon in one who ptcnchcd ntsl-violence." Gi~ndhi's recruiting aai~~ities were once agin greeted by il vncifcrous chorus of pecirit dissenten.2' Much to thck surprise. however& Mahatma still maintained that he had remained committed to his ~hilosophv of nonviolence. Arguing that he was not personally

killing or iniuring an~onc-"friend or foew-he pointed to the possibility of Indian soldiers practicing on IIE Bumpem rrorlc. "ma1 rhimsi~" ILI consisted orreceiving ralhr~ than giving blows: "Ifour soldiers go and aacd belore them [(iermml weaponless and will not use explosives uml say. We nil1 die of your hlows', thn. I nm sure our Govemmncot w~ll win the wnr at oncc."28 At thc same time, hc was wcU aware of the Bcl Ihit such acti~n wi~s al1nns1 I;lnlamoimt to suicide. leading either to the death of the Indian ramits serving in the Hritmh army sl the hi~mk ool'thc Germans ur lo their cenain nrilhh CU~UI-a1 for insuhnrdinolion. Once again dressing up political motives in ethical garments. Gandhi had set himself the task of squaring the -circle. AS kler ~m~kasks. "HOWwas he ever to succeed in combining recruitment of his fellow countrymen for the most destructive war the world had so far seen with continued devotion to the doctrine of nonviolence?"29

AT:Ka~~eler-Permutation Solvencv There's no forced choice, we can endorse policy advocacy and fiat while acknowledging that violence is an issue of agency. Kappeler 95 (Susanne, Associate Professor at Al-Akhawayn University. The Will to Violence: T17e politics of personal behavior, Pg.8) Moreover, uersonal behavior is no alternative to Lpolitical action'; there is no auestion oL'cilhcr/or. MYconcern, on the contrarv. is the connection between these recognized L'orms of violence and the forms of evervdav behavior which we consider 'normal' but which bctrav our own will to violence- thc connection. in other words, between our own actions and thosc acts of violence which are normallv the focus of our political critiques. Precisely because there is no choice between dedicating oneself either to 'political issues' or to 'personal behavior', the question ofthe politics ofnersonal behavior has (also) to be moved into the ccntrc of our politics and our critique.

AT: Cuomo -Negative Peace Kev to Positive Peace Preventing nuclear war is the absolute prerequisite to positive peace Folk, Professor of Religious and Peace Studies at Bethany College, 1978 [Jerry, "Peace Educations -Peace Studies Towards an Integrated Approach," Peace & Change, volumc V, numbcr 1, Spring, p. 581 Those proponents of the wsitive peace approach who rcicct out of hand the &of researchers and educators coming to the field from the perspective of ncgative veace too easily fornet that thc prcvcnlion of a nuclear confrontation of global dimensions is the prerequisite for all other veacc research. education, and action. Unless such a confrontation can he avoided there will be no world left in which to build positive vcace. Moreover, the blanket condemnation of all such ncgalivc peace oriented research, education or action as a reactionary attempt to support and reinforce tk status quo is doctrinaire, Conflict theory and resolutio~i. disarmament studies. studies of the international syslcm and of internalional organizations. and integration studies are in themselves neutral. Thcv do not intrinsically support either the status quo or rcvoiutionary efforts to change or overthrow it. Rather they offer a body of knowledge which can be used for either purpose or Ibr somc pumose in between. It is much more logical for those who understand mace as positive peace torate this knowledge into their own framework and to utilize it in achieving their own purDoses. A balanced peace studies program should therefore Offer the student exvosurc lo the questions and concerns which ucct~py those who view the field essentially from ~hc point of view of negative peace. Negative peace is a precondition for positive peace. Violence is sometimes necessary to achieve these goals Sandole, Professor of Conflict Resolution and International Relations at George Mason University, 1996 [Dennis J. D., "Conflict Resolution," usinfo.state.~ov/iournals/itps/l296/iipe/pi19sand.h~m, USIA Electronic Journals, Vol. 1, No. 19,Dec.] Negative DcaCc, however. does not go far enough; it'J one pna --albcit, oftcn an e~sential part --oflarger process that is nrely attempted --and if atlemptcd. mly achieved -hy traditional diplon~aey. The remaining pm consists of "positive DeaCe": thc elimination of thc underlying svuchml causes and conditions that have given rise to the violent conflict which negative peace processes seek to contain. To put it simply, negative peace deals with symptoms of underlying prc>blems --"putting out fires" -while vositivc peace deals with the underlying. "combustible" problems thcmsdvcs. Why doesn't traditional dipbmcy dcal with positive peace,? One reason is that diplomats are trained in dispute settlement --rcaching agreements about how to establish negative peace -without, god intentions to the contrary. necessarily addressing the underlying problenls that gave rise to tlx: disputes that are heing settled. Hence. negotiations lo end wz~rs or to control or

reduce mments. rcsulting in treaties or other agreements, are efforts to halt or managc actual or threatened violence resulting fmm conflicts without necessarily dealing with their underlying. dccp-rooted causes and conditions. [CONTIMES ...J The stage has been set for this: NATO, under U.S. Icadership, established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1991 and the Pmnmhip for Pcacc in 1994. to reach out to, and collaborate with, its former Warsaw Pact adversaries. These developments are a powerful sign that the Cold War is over and therefore, by implication, that nations an: undergoing a shift fmm a nam>w world view based on national security to a comprehensive one hased on conunon security. Hence. the Uniteci States and its securily partners are conceptually able to move beyond negative into positive peace. What this wiil entail in Bosnia is for the United States and its NATO and other partners to remain there long enough to ensure that negative peace holds. At the same time, they should work with intcmational govmrnental and nongovernmental (including conflict resolution) organizations. and with the conflicting pmies, to pursue, achieve, and maintain positive peace. With secure neeativc peace as a point of departure. positive peace in Bosnia bcgins with the reconstruction ofthe country. But lest the United st?tes and its pantiers rept the failure of the European Union to achieve positive pence in the Hosniml city of Mostar through substantial investments in rebuilding Mostnr's infnsrmcturc, this reconstruction must reflect a comprehensive peacebuilding strategy --reconciliative as well as physical -over a period of time. Some fr;lmeworks that could he uzeful in guiding U.S.-led activities in this regard are:

the "eontingcncy model" of Ron Fisher and lnmleigh Ke;ishly, which mitches an intervention with the intensity of a given conflict, and then hllows up with other interventions designed to move the parties toward positive peace; the "multi-track fn~iwwork" of IMTD's Amhassador John McDonald and Louise Diamond, which combines the resources of nongovernnlental conflict resolution pmctitioners with those oi the business and religious comniunities, media. fundcrs, and others as wcll as governmental actors. in the pursuit of positive peace: and my own design for a "new Europun and security system" which combines elements of these and othcr hmcworks within the context orthe OSCE. There is a working hypothesis implici~ in all this: by expanding their options to include cooperative Drocesses geared to positive pcacc as well as comvetitive processes associated with negative peace. the United States and its partners will enhance their prospects for success in

dealing with the deep-rooted intrastate ethnic and other conflicts that seem to be the dominant form of warfare in the posl-Cold War world. Intervening in such conflicts may mean "taking casualties," particularly in cases where onc party is attempting to impose a genocidal "final solution" on another, as in Rwanda or Bosnia. In such situations. the use of an appropriate amount of force to achieve negative peace may be a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of positive peace. We should not. in such cases. allow the U.S. experiencein Somalia to prevent US from acting. Genocide in Rwanda or Bosnia does, sooner or later, affect the interests of the United States aud others. Thc use of such extreme violence to "resolve" conflicts anywhere in thc world is not only nnrally reprehensible, but constitutes a model for othcrr, to emulate, perhaps increasing the costs of dealing with it later on. The implicit emphasis here on early warning and early action is part of the gist of conflict resolution: being proactive instead of reactive. A proactive approach to problem solving worldwide is in the U.S. national interest. This means. among other things, pursuing a bipartisan U.S. foreign policy to avoid the necessity of having to issue unrealistic timelines in any future deployment of forccs, plus paying the massive U.S.debt to the Uniled Nations so that the United States can more credibly and effectively lead in the debate over U.N.reform as well as in efforts to craft effective international responses to problems worldwide. Effective international responses imply working synergistically with other regional international organizations --including the Organization of African Unity, thc Organization of American States. and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations --to facilitate dealing with local problems. as well as working with the OSCE. NATO, the Europm Union (EU) and NGOs engaged in conflict resolution, in dealing with Bosnia and other conflicts in Europe. The United Statcs --where conflict resolution ismosl advanced as an applied field --cannot afford not to lead on this onc: the "political will" of others and our common security depend on it.

AT: Cuomo -Permutation Solvencv Absolutist rejections are ultimately unproductiv+we must embrace the differences in philosophy in order to achieve common goals Folk, Professor of Religious and Peace Studies at Bethany College, 1978 [Jerry. "Peace Educations -Peace Studies : Towards an Integrated Approach," Pcace & Changc, volume V, number I? Spring, p. 591 The conllicting positions held by various researchers. educators. and activists in thc peace studies Iicld can be seen as complementary rather than contradictory. Tensions. disagreements, and argumcnts of considerable intensity are unavoidable and indccd desirable in this as in other fields of endeavor. Such dialcctical tensions ensure a dcpth and breadth ol'pcrccption which one position alone could not produce. Truth is often paradoxical, and thcrcl'orc a dialcctical approach to it is most appropriate. Antagonisms insure that the dialectic is kept alive. They introduce a third dimension intoo~,~ premature closures, understanding of truth and prescrvc it from petrification and sterility. ~het~for~. mutual excommunications, and fixations on a particular but incomplete positionor approach should be avoided. On the other hand, there map indeed he kiiinge grOUps or persons in the field who. by the ullimat~ and legalistic c~mmitment to a particular approach or ideology and the absolute rejection of any other ideas OIappmches, call their legitimacy as peace researchers, educators or activists into question. An absolutistic commitment to the status quo would be one example. Absolutistic and rigid commitmcnls to the capitalist Marxist or liheral democratic systems might be another. Rigid and thnatic loyalty to a particular revolutionary or reformist tradition or to the reformist or revolutio~mry tradition itself would be a third. None of the approaches or positions with regard to peace studies which this paper discusses. however. are identical with any of these. ideological orientations. Moreover, it is time particularly in the peace sh~dies field, thatthe ultimate value commitments of individuals and groups be given more weight than their politics and philosophical preferences. The preference of one individual orpoup for Marxist socialism might be based on precisely the avalue comnlitments which have led another to vrefer liberal democracv. In summary, a well-balanced peace studies progmm ought to involve researchers. educator and activists. A( a11 three levels. it ouoht to include some uarticipants who approach the field primarily from the standpoint of negative peace and others who approach it using primarily the positive peace paradigm. Among the latter group some should be highly sympathetic to the radical revolutionary tradition and others mre in sympathy with the reformist approach of lihenl democracy. Moreover. th~~l~gh

the sauctm and interactionsof the program not only the tension and conflicts but also the positive interrelationships between tkse various groups & tO become visible. A prognm smctured according to such principles would admittedly be difficull to construct and even mow difficult to administer. It would, however, he more th11t merely comprehensive. It would be a microcosm of the world and therefore a laboratory in which to experiment with the actual building of creative peace among groups and individuals of the most divergent persuasions.

AT: Terror Talk -Alternative -3 Terrorism Referring to terrorists as anything else legitimizes their actions St. Petersburg Times, 2003 (Philip Gailey. "Word choice matters in Mid East Reporting." August 31, Lexis) Thc madness in the Mideast is all of those things and more, and the words you find in Webster's don't begin to describe just how horrible the terrorism and the military retaliation that follows each suicide bomber's success is in the daily lives of the Israelis and the Palcstininns. When a Palestinian suicide bomber recently boarded a bus in Jerusalem and blew 20 nlcn. women and children to bits, mosl ol'the wire service reports 1 saw. including one from the Associated Press. said the carnage was the work of Palestinian "militants." By that standard, 1 supDose Osama bin Laden is a militant, as was Mohammed Atta, who led the 911 1 terrorist attacks that killed more than 3,000 people in New York and Washington. And President Bush's war on terrorism is really a war on militancy. For mc, it's not a hard call. Acts of terror are committed by terrorists, and the horrific bus attack on Israeli civilians, like the dozens of suicide bombings that preceded it, was an act of cold, indiscriminate terror. So why do so many news organizations insist on describing terrorists as militants? I don't think militants set out to deliberately kill children. Dr. Bruce Epstein wonders if the St. Petersburg Times is part of the problem, intentionally or not. In a recent letter, this Pinellas County physician complained that newspapers appear to want to "legitimatize" Palestinian terrorists by describing them as militants. I happen to believe the Palestinian cause -an independent and free Palestinian state -is legitimate and that the Palestinian people do have lepitimale grievances over the Israeli occupation. That said, I believe Epstein raises a fair question about news coverage of Mideast violence. He objected in particular to a recent headline in the Times on a story about the assassination of a senior leader of the Islamic Jihad, a terrorist group -"Militant's death sparks vengeance threats." He later noticed another headline -"Dealer sympathized with terrorists." That headline was on a story about the arrest of a man in the New York area who was trying to sell surface-to-air missiles to terrorists (they turned out to be undercover agents) to bring down U.S. commercial airliners. Epstein writes: "In my mind, this double standard is both appalling and disturbing. If Americans are killed in a terror attack, the killers are called terrorists. If Jewish Israelis are killed in a terror attack, the killers are called militants. . .. By us in^ the word "militant' to describe a terrorist. the Times le~itimizes the terrorist. When the Times substitutes the word "militant' for terrorist, the newspaper conveys to its readers that these Palestinian (terrorist) groups are legal, legitimate and even moral." Contrary to what Epstein and other readers suggest, the Times has no such motive or policy. It needs a policy on how to distinguish a militant from a terrorist, and newsroom editors are in the process of drafting one, as are editors at olher newspapers around thc

country. Thc Orlando Sentinel has been getting similar complaints from readers, and earlier this year its style committee reviewed the use of militanl and terrorist and came up with this standard: "Use caution when using these terms (militants, terrorists), which can show bias toward one side in a conflict. Generally. "bon~bers', "attackers', or "suicide bombers' are preferred terms." Manning Pynn, the Sentinel's public editor, recently wrote that despite the style committee decision, the paper will continue to use "militant" to describe Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, both of which are on thc State Department's list of terrorist organizations. "The term "terrorist' certainly expresses judgment: 11 imputes to the person or organization being described the motive of trying to instill I'car. "Militant' seems to me much more neutral." Pynn wrote. Foolish me. I thought instilling fear is exactly what Hamas and Islamic Jihad mean to do when thev send their suicide bombers into markets, restaurants and buses to kill and terrorize Israeli civilians. I'm all for fair and balanced reporting (I hope the Fox cable news network doesn't slap me with a lawsuit for trademark infringement). but I also believe that words do matter. And if the word "lerrorism" is to have any real meaning. then blowing up a bus crowded with women and children must be condemned for what it is an act of terrorism.

AT: Terror Talk -Alternative 3Terrorism Refusing to call terrorists "terrorists" emboldens their acts of unjustifiable violence against civilians. HonestReporting.com,2004 ("Calling Terror by its Name," March 16, www.honestreportin~.com/art~cles/reports/Callin Terror Bv Its Name.asp) <For over three years, in continual updates and through TcrrorPetition.com, HonestReporting has led the campaign to insist that news outlets call Palestinian terror "terror." Now, as the scourge of Islamic terrorism continues to spread throughout the ~lobe, it is more important than ever that Israel's struggle against Palestinian terror be ~roperlv identified as part of the larger battle lo preserve civil. democratic societv against militant Islam. Uelinition of lerroristn: Though a number of definitions exist. the United States Government's definition has gained broad acccptancc: Title 22 of the US Code, Secf on 2656f(d): The term "terrorism" means premeditated. politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents. usually intended to influence an audience. The term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving the territory or the citizens of more than one country. The term "terrorist group" means any group that pracqices, or has significant subgroups that practice. international terrorism. Under this definition, the US State k~artment and Canadian governinen1 deiine Hamas and lslamic Jihad ,asterrorist organizations. and outlaw all financial or logistical support for their activities. Even Y asser Anfat, writing in The New York Times on February 3, 2002, described Palestinian altacks against Isaeli civilians as "terrorist ." Media use of term "terrorism":Media outlets however. especially in news reports, will oftentinles shy away from the use of the term "terrorism" when describing deliberate attacks on civilians worldwide. This, in the effort to maintain journalistic neutrality, which somejoumlists believe is jeopardized when using the pejorative term "terrorism." HonestReportingls position is that a deliberate attack against a civilian target, anywhere in lhc world. is most accuratelv referred to as a "terrorist attack," for two fundamental reasons: It has become common English usapc 10 use "terrorism" to describe these horrific events (as per the definition above). therefore is the most accurate term available. The post-911 1 poljtical climate is characterized by a stru~de between radical Islamic moups and western democracies. The repeated

Islamist targeting of innocent western civilians to further jihadist goals is understood by the great majority of world to lie beyond the pale of legitimate political struggle. The term "terrorism" is therefore necessarv to differentiate between this whollv illenitimale method of warfare and legitimalc methods, as defined by the Fourth Geneva Convention. When media outlets refuse to use the lcrm "terrorism" to describe what are clearlv terrorist acts, thev both depart from common usage, and in effect (if not in intent) embolden those who use the mass murder of civilians to further their ideological goals. And since the language of news coverage has an exlrcmelv powerful effect on popular ovinion, this refusal to call terror "terror" confers a degree of ledtimacv to the horrific acts, in the minds of millions of media consumers. 1)ouhle standards in mdia coverage: As Ho~stReporting has rcpeatetlly dwarnented, while media outlets often use the accurate term "terrorism" in olher world contexts. when it comes to I'aleslinian temlrist attacks on lsnelis the term is rarcly used. This double standard is particularly evident when comnparing temrist attacks in Israel and elsewhere that occurred nearly simultar~eously, or in very similar physical circumstances. A few recent examples: In the beginning of Auril. 2003 an hqi army officer killed tive A~ri~n soldiers by blowing himself up inn taxi. In Netanya that week. a Palestinian ignited his explosive belt at the cntnnce to a cafe, injuring50 Israelis. The Associated Press listed thr hqi atack antongother historical "terror attacks against the U.S.military." but AP covcrap of the Netanya hlast referred to the bomber as a Palcstinia~~ "militant." -In Mav. 3003the New York Tinles launched a new, special section of thcir news sile called "ThreaLr and Responses: Targeting Terror." Rcccnt deadly terror attacks in Chechnya. Saudi Arahia and the Philippines were included. but ahsolurely m reference was nude to two terrorist attacks in Israel during that period. In Octohcr. 22003 suicide bombers killed a nu~nher of American soldiers in Iraq, and 19Isnelis in a Haifa cafe. The San Jose Mercury News reported on hq: "Suicide homhcrs unleashed a wave of terror in thc Iraqi capital Monday ..."Hut in 1sr;lt.l. the Mercury News reported no "terror." Editors' positions: 011 Jan. 4.2004. the executive editor of the Miami Hcrald expressed his paper's cominitnant to call terror "temr," despite the overriding conccrll for evenhandedness: It's Henld policy to use the mnst tleulral language available ill a given situation. Wc. too, label those who fight for a cause as militants. But unlike some of our colleagues. We See a line where a militant becomes a terrorist and we don't shy away from thc latter word. When a suicide bomber blows up a bus carrvinq innocent civilians, it's an act of terrorism, not militancv.

The Herald is the latest in a slring of papers to recently address this issue head-on, however belatedly. Here's an ovcrview of the positions that omhudsmen and editors at various papers have expressed (Note panicularly the disti~~ction between al Qaeda and Hams that the Orlando Sentinel. Boston Glohe and Washington Post attempt to rake): 'l'he quite similarclainx by the Orlando Sentinel, Boston Glohe. and Washington Post demand attention, since hoth allempt to justify the nonuse of thc term "anorism" in the specific context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. %st: editors posit that since Palestinian terrorist groups such as ad Islamic Jihad arc "resisting occupation," "a1 war." and have "nationalistic ambitions," the term "terrorism" may not apply to their actions -even brutal attacks on Israeli civilian buses and restaunnls. At thr same tim. the editors are willing to acccpt Ikuse of the rerm to descrihe ill Qaeda terrorist acts. Their logic is faulty for a number of reasons: Palestinian Arab terrorisn~ against Jews -in the decades before and after 1948 -long preceded the 1967 war that created the disputed tor "occupied) temtories. Hamas and Islamic Jihd have repeatedly clarified. in official documci~ts arid stoteients, thnt their goal is not the creation of an independenl Palestinian stale. hut rather the genocidal elimination of a11 Jewish presence in theregion. = Palestinian terrorist groups have strong affiliations with plohal Islamist terrorist pups and regimes. and arc not merely "mgiot~al" in sew. F.ven in the context of warfm. delihente atlacks against civilian targets are illegal under the Fourth Gencva Convention. and therefore demand being &scribed as tenorism. Conclusion: The latest wave of Palestinian terrorism. including over I200 suicide bon~hinns since September 2WO. his caused the brutal murder of 664 Isncli civilian lives. Israeli policy and don regarding the Palestinian people and leadership must he underslood in the context of this unprecedented assault on a Western democracy. As the West unites against barbaric Islantic terrorism that now n1.w haunts continenla1 Europe, it is essential that Isncl's struggle against Palestinian terror be propcrly idcntiiicd as part of this larger battle (which many nowv consider nothing less than World War 111). When news outlets differentiate between attacks in Israel and those elsewhere, thev expose an editorial decision that Palestinian attacks are not part of that lar~er battle between Islamist terrorists and democratic civilizalion, but rather. more iustified acts of nationalistic "resistance." This iournalistic act is factually wrong, morallv danecrous, and a far cry from "neutral reporting.">

AT: Terror Talk -Laneua~eKev to Win WOT Labeling terrorist as such is key to fighting the war on terror Ganor, 2001 (Boaz, Director of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism "Defining Tcrrorism," http:Nwww.ict.org.iI/articlesldefine.htm,May 16) Wc face an essential need to reach a definition of terrorism that will eniov wide international agreement. thus enabling international owrations against terrorist organizations. A definition ol' this type must rely on the same principles already agreed upon regarding conventional wars (between states), and extrapolate from them regarding non-conventional wars (betweean organization and a state). The definition of terrorism will be thc basis and the operational tool for exvandinp the international community's ability to combat terrorism. It will enable legislation and specific punishments against those perpetrating. involved in, or supporting terrorism, and will allow thc l'ormulation of a codex of laws and international conventions against terrorism. terrorist organizations. states sponsoring terrorism, and economic firms trading with them. At the same time, the definition of terrorism will hamper the attempts of terrorist organizations to obtain public legitimacy, and will erode suv~ort among those segments of the vopulation willing to assist thcm (as opposed to guerrilla activities). Finally, the operative use of the definition of terrorism could motivatc terrorist or~anizations, due to moral or utilitarian considerarions, to shift from terrorist activities to alternative courses (such as guerrilla warfare) in order to attain their aims, lhus reducing the scope of international terrorism. The struggle to define terrorism is sometimes as hard as the struggle against terrorism itself. The present view, claiming it is unnecessary and well-nigh impossible to agree on an objective definition of terrorism, has long established itself as the "politically correct" one. It is the aim of this paper, however, to demonstrate that an objective, internationally accepted definition of terrorism is a feasible goal. and that an effective struggle against terrorism requires such a definition. The sooncr the nations of thc world come to (his realization. the better.

AT: Terror Talk -'Freedom Fi~hters'Worse Calling terrorists 'freedom fighters' is wrong-terrorists are different, since they kill civilians. Ganor, 2001 (Boaz. Director of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism "Defining Terrorism." http:Nwww.ict.org.il/articlesldefine.htm, May 16) The foreign and interior ministers of thc Arab League reiterated this position at their April 1998meeting in Cairo. In a document entitled "Arab Strategy in the Struggle against Terrorism," they emphasized that belligcrcnt activities aimed at "liberation and self determination" are not in the category of terrorism, whereas hostile activities against regimes or families of rulers will not be considered political altacks but rather criminal assaults.(7] Here again we notice an attempl to iustifv the "means" (terrorism) in terms of the "end" (national liberation). Regardless of the nature of the operation, when we speak of "liberation from the vokc ol'a foreign occuuation" this will not be terrorism but a legitimate and iustificd activitv. This is the source of the clichd. "One man's terroris( is another man's iiecdom fighter," which stresses that all devends on the wrs~ective and the worldview of the one doing the delining. The former President of the Soviet Union. Leonid Brezhnev, made the following statement in April 1981,during the visit of the Libyan ruler, Muamar Qadhafi: "Imperialists have no regard either for the will of the people or the laws of history. Liberation struggles cause their indignation. They describe them as 'terrorism'."[81 Surprisingly, many in the Western world have accepted the mistaken assumption that terrorism and national liberation arc two extremes in the scale of legitimate use of violence. The struggle for "national liberation" would appear to be the positive and justified end of this sequence, whereas terrorism is the negative and odious one. It is impossible, according to this approach, for any organization to be both a terrorist group and a movement for national liberation at the same time. In hiling to understand the difference between these two conceuts. many have. in effect, been caught in a semantic trap laid bv the terrorist organi~ations and their allies. They have attempted to contend with the clichks of national liberation by resorting to odd arguments, instead of stating that when a grouu or organization chooses terrorism as a means. the aim of their strugto justify their actions (see below). Thus, for instance, Senator Jackson was auoted in Benyamin Netanyahu's book Terrorism: How the West Can Win as savingZ The idea that one person's 'terrorist' is another's 'freedom fighter' cannot bc sanctioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionaries don't

blow up buses containing non-combatanls; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't set out to capture and slaughter schoolchildrcn; terrorist murderers do . . .It is a disgrace that democracies would allow the treasured word 'freedom' to be associated with acts of terrorists.[9]

AT: Ima~esof Suffering -Images ~ood A lack of images of suffering allows states to carry out atrocities. The presentation of suffering is vital to bearing witness to it and preventing its repetition Kleinman and Kleinman -1996 [Arthur, Maudc and Lillian Presley Profcssor of Medical Anthropology and Professor of Anthropology at Harvard, Joan, Research Association at Medical Anthropology Program at Harvard. 'The appeal of experience; the dismay of imagcs: cultural appropriations of suffering in our times," Daedalus v125.nl (Wntr 1996): pp1(23)] It is necessarv to balance the account of the globalization of commercial and ~rofessional images with a vastly different and even more dangerous cultural process of appropriation: the totalilarian state's erasure of social experiences of sufferinn through the supuression of images. Here the possibility of moral appcal through images of human miscry is prevented. and it is their absence that is the source of existential dismay. Sllch ir thc caw wilh the maswe slmrvatim in Cllilra trom 1959 to 1961. This stoi~~ MII moned ;II the time evcn thnuxh lntrre 1ha11 Ihinv million Chinese did m the aftermath of Ihe nlinoos policics nf thc Cinal lrilp w:n fi~rward. the perverbe cffecl oi Man'h ~mpt~ssibiedrcam ol ft~rchl$ immediate indostrialii~tiun II~p%.wnts. Accounts ofthis, thi. wt~rid's most devaslatmg bminc. wcrc tolnlly suppresshl: ntl stoms or pict~lrcs Ol lhc starvine or Ihe dead were published. An inlernnl rcpn on the famine WLLSmade by an invcstigali~lg Ir;Lm Ibr the CenIr;ll Commitlee of the Chinese Commllnist l'uny. 11w\.w based on a dzl;lM smy of an extremely pnnr re!iun of Anwci Pmvincc lhol W:I$ particularly hrurally ~Cfcclul. The rep~flincludes this numhine, statemnl hg Wei Wu-Ji.a I<ral yasant k;l&frum Anwei: Origisally there were S.(HX) peoplc in oilrcommooe. now only 3.2lX1 remain. When the Japanese ~ovdki wc did ml lose this many: we at Ldsl cnuW olve ou~xclvcs by nlnning awi~y! This year there's no cscapc. We die shul up ill uur own hoilses. Of my 6 hmily memhcr?., 5 arc alrcady dead. and I am len to stnrre. and I'U no1 br ahlr 11) sta\*e off dealh fur long.(lO) Wei Wu-ji a~nlinued: Wang lia-fcng tiom West Spring,? Counly reported that cm oIr;lting human mall were discoverrd. Zhang Sheng-jiu said. "Only an evil mati ccvlrld do such a thinp!" Wang Jia-feng said. "In IW. lkrc wcrc 20 in our hcrosehohl, Ien of tkm did k?t year. My son tokf hi? mother 'l'U die of huligcr in n Icw di~ys."' And indeed he did.01) Thc ~~pofl alsu includes a graphic imngc by Li Oin-ming. lrom Wudian County. Shi~nwanp Brigade: In 1959. we were peschcdulcd In deliver 58.000 jin ol gclin to the Stante, but only 35.ODO jiwere h\rstcd. hence we only tunlcd ovcr 33.000 ji,which IrR 2,O(X) jin for the commune. We really have nothins to eal. l'hc pe3salils eat hemp Imves. anylhing tkg can posvihly eat. In my last repn after I wrolc. "We hnve nothing to eat." the Parly Ldd me they wanted to remove my mmc from tk Pany Roster. Oul of a populatioll of 7.80. 170

died. In ourthmily of five. Iuur of ur have died leaving only my$elI. Should I my that I'm not broken hearted?(32) Chcn Zhang-)y. (Rm G~~anyu lenible Counly, otIiered Ihr invesligalorx ~hk Last spring the phenumennn ofcannibalism appeared. Si~re ComradeCbo Wochu couki no1 come up with any good wnys of pn~hihiling it. he pul oul the order lo sccrctly mprison thi~sewho seemed to heal dellh's dcmrs~ combat thc rumors. He secretly imprisolxd (13 peopk from tbc entire wuntry. Thing-three died in prison.(33) The uffwial qwn is thomush addelaiki. It Q cl;lssifd neiho. restricted usc only. To dklrihile il iu to mvd state secrets. Prescntcd publicly 11 would have beto. eqxcinlly if il had brrn puhlishcd in the 191iOs. a ti~ndamclltal criliqur uf the Gwt Leap. and a mural and political delegilimalivn of the Chinese C:ommu~st Party's claim lo huvr improved the life of pmr pawnls. Even lodny thc authorilies regard it as dangervus. The official silence is another form of appropriation. It prevents public witnessing. It forges a secret history, an act of political resistance through keeoing alive the memory of things denied.34 The totalitarian state rules by collective forgetting. by denying the collective cx~erience of suffering. and thus creates a culture of terror. Thc absent image is also a form of political approuriation; public silence is perhaps more terrifying than be in^ overwhelmed hv public images of atrocity. Taken together the two modes of appropriation delimit the extremes in this cultural process.(35) Representations of suffering are vital to identifying human needs and necessary social action Kleinman and Kleinman -1996 [Arthur, Maude and Lillian Preslcy Professor of Medical Anthropology and Professor of Anthropology at Harvard, Joan. Research Association at Medical Anthropology Program at Harvard, 'The appcal of experience; the dismay of images: cultural appropriations of suffering in our times," Duedulus v 125.111 (Wntr 1996): ppl(23)l Our critique of appropriations of suffering that do harm does not mean that no appropriations are valid. To conclude that would be to undermine any attempt to respond to human misery. It would be much more destructive than the problem we havc identified; it would paralvze social action. We must draw uvon the images of human suffering- in order to identify human nccds and to craft humane responses.

AT: Lanpuape K -Su~~ression bad of lan~ua~e The refusal to reappropriate exclusionary language is politically paralyzing dogmatism Butler, Chair of the Rhetoric Department at U.C.-Berkley, 1997 [Judith, Excituble Speech, p. 1621 Such dogmatism amears as well in the effort to circumscribe speech that iniures, excites, threatens, and offends. Whether it is the censorship of particular kinds of representation or the circumscri~tion of the domain of public discourse itself, the effort to tighten the reins on speech undercuts those political impulses to cxvloit speech itself for its insurrectionary effects. The intellectual opposition to questions that destabilize a sense of reality seems a mundane academic case in point. To question a term, a term like "the subject" or "universality," is to ask how it plays, what investments it bears, what aims it achieves, what alterations it undergoes. The changeable life of that term does not preclude the possibilitv of its use. If a term becomes suestionable. does that mean it cannot be used any longer. and that we can only use terms that we alreadv kizo~, /?owto muster? Why is it that posing a question about a term is considered the same as enacting a prohibition against use? Why is il that we sometimes do feel that if a term is dislodged of its prior and known contexts, that we will not be able to live, to survive, to use language. to speak for ourselves'? What kind of guarantee does this effort to refer the speech act back to its originating context exercise, and what sort of [error does it forestall? Is it that in the ordinary mode, terms arc assumed, terms like "the subjcct" and "universality," and the sense in which they "must" be assumed is a moral one, taking the form of an imperative, and like some moral interdictions, a defense against what terrifies us most? Are we not paralyzed bv a fear of the unknown future of words that keew us from interrogating the terms that we need to live, and of taking the risk of living the terms that we keep in question? Regulating speech makes re-appropriating speech impossible -only by using language can resignification occur Fleche 99 (Anne, Assistant Professor of English at Boston College, "Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative," http://n~u~.jhu.edu/journals/theatrejourna1/~05 1 /51.3tleche.html) Excitable Speech might seem surprising to readers of Butler's previous work. Having argued, in Gender Trc~uble and Bodies Thai Matter, that bodies and subjects are constructed in the cultural forn~s that adiculate them Butler now argues that to speak is not suite the same as to act. For Butkr tllc conservative conflation of speech and act is neither performative nor, in her sense of the word. constructionist. because it argucs for a notion of free speech that presumes an unconstrained. sovereign subject.

Butler considers this problem and its possible remedies in her analyses of Supreme Court decisions. anti-pon~ography arguments, and the policy against homosexuals in the military. In every instnnce, she complicates the relation of speech to act, by introducing fantasy, linguistic instability. and temporelity, arguing against censorship and thc lcgal redress of hate speech and for its critical re-articulation. 'I'he key move in thc analysis comes in the opening chapter. "OnLinguistic Vulnerability," where Huller deconstructs the relation of the body to speech. Workjng from texts by Toni Momson and Shosha~uklmm. Huller argues that language and the body are neither saictly separable nor simply the same, but speak together, ils it were. to produce the effect known as the social speaking suhject. Thus verhal threats. for example, are also, in some way. bodily ones: "[Tlhe body is the blindspot of speech, that which acts in excess of whit is said. but which also acts in and through whit is said" (1 I). Once the bodylspeech relation is decorlstructed, censorship, wilh its assulnptlons of causality between word and act, becomes even more troubling. Butler finds pron"sc in this problem arguing that, because speech threatens. delivers and delays, it owns up a future of options. It is the gap between spccch and conduct she wants to emphasize. In theatrical ternis. this is the gap in which Brecht sees the actor intervening--in his vicw pcrfomance is not referential, hut a social gst, playful and capahlc of change. Indeed Butler's notion of performativity, sometimes understood as the ability of language to uroduce what it names, is nearly the oppositc of refe~ntiality: it is an effect of representation that cannot wholly be conlrolled. Performativity is what gives a future to the name in name-calling. In the process of coming out, for examvle. homosexuality is named but never fully deiined: while coming out "rcnders homosexuality discursive," Rutleremphasizes, "it does not render discourse referential . . ..I111 is important not to close the gap between the performalivc and the referential" (125). To close this gar, is to leave no remedv for hate speech short of state intervention, and the state IS certainly not neutral. Butler pints out that the Supreme Court has tended to protect racist hchavior as speech. while resnictingpornographic literature. In censoring prnopnphy, the coun appears to agree with feminist arpmnts that pornographic representation is a discrinlinatory act. Siniiiarly, the policy against gays in the military assumes that to identifv oneself as a homosexual is to act upon another person in a homosexual way. to make such an identification "contagious," as Butler puts it. And yet, in a case of cross burning, the Supreme Court found that when he burned a cross in front of a black family's house, a white teenager was expressing a "viewpoint" in the "free marketplace of ideas" (s3).These decisions imply that lan~uage should not have power to do what it says, but that the state. in regulating sveech, should. When speech becomes injurious act in some cases and remains free sveech in others, it is clear that a theory of speech. and not a lezal remedy, is what is most urgently needed.

Consequently. Butler opposes linguistic determinism and the "antiintellectualism" of the academy's efforts to return to "direct" speech. Language is politically and socially useful, she argues, precisely to the extent that it is "excitable"--by which she means "out of controln. in play, "perforn~ativc:" "lndccd, the actlike character of certain offensive utterances may be precisely what keeps them from saving what they mean to say or doing what it is they say" (72). Language is neither fully social nor fully semantic but socially performed and cited. inlerpellating a body and a social self while cxcluding "impossibte" bodies, selves and spcech. In a brief reference to the argument elaborated in her book The Psychic Life of Power (also 1997). Butler Counters the legal arguments for restricting hate swech with Foucault's "less legal" notion of power as an effect, produced through multiple forces. Foucault's idea of power eliminates the sovereign. accountable sublject (or state) thal speech regulation seeks to restore. It is Dower, Butler argues, that makes speech into censorship. by lepislating what counts. Thus, not all social forms are simvlv censored. tainted or unusable: the terms of legibility vroduce the possibility of breaking silence. of thwarting exclusion. and of acting "with authority without being authorized" (157), as in the civil disobedience of Rosa Parks. [~ndPage 3481 Rather than offer prescriptions. Butler uses her own writing to illu~lratethe power of resi~nification. In her rhetorical readings of Supreme Court decisions, for exonple, thejustices' words become surprisingly rich and suggestive. She is herself an expert resignifier. Resignifying words, Butler acknowledges. does not tnkc away their hurt. She does think that sometin~s people should bc prosecuted for injurious speech and that universities might need to regulate speech--hut should do so only when they have "a story to tell" about its ham~hleffects. she is not opposed to all speech regulation. BUI Excitable Speech asks whether regulation makes it easier or harder to rca~pro~riatc speech, and why we fear zo take the exciting risk of language, where a threat might also he spromisc.

AT: Lan~ua~e Su~~ression bad K -of lan~ua~e Suppressing language because it is offensive preserves its injurious meaning -only by using the language can space be opened to reconstruct a more humane meaning Kurtz and Oscarson 03 (Anna and Christopher, Members of National Council of Teachers of English Conference on College. Composition and Communication, "BookTalk: Revising the Discourse of Hate," ProQuest) However, Butler also argues that the daily, repeated use of words owns a space for another, more empowering kind of performance. This alternative performance. Butler insists, can be "the occasion for something we might still call agency, the repetition oS an original subordination for another pumose. one whose future is partially open" (p. 38). To think of words as having an "open" future is to recognize that their authority lies less in their historical than in their present uses; it is to acknowledge that vcople can revisc the meaning of words even as we repeat them; it is to embrace the notion that the instability of words opcns the possibilitv that we can use them to (rekonstruct a more humane future for ourselves and others. Because words can be revised, Butler contends that it would be counterproductive simplv to stop using terms that we would deem injurious or oppressive. For when we choose not to use offensive words under anv circumstance, we preserve their existing meanings as well as their power to injure. If as teachers, for instance, we were simply to forbid the use of speech that is hurtful to LCBT students we would be effectively denying the fact that such language still exists. To ignore words in this way, Butler insists, won't make them go away. Butler thus suggests that we actually use these words in thoughtful conversation in which we work through the iniuries they cause (p. 1.02). Indeed, Butler insists that if we are to reclaim the power that oppressive speech robs from us, we must use, confront. and interrogate terms like "queer." We must ask how such terms affect both the speaker and the subject, what the purpose of their use is, and how their meaning can be altered to empower those whom thcy name. Thus, as Butler helps us see, language is violence, but only if we allow it to be. She encourages us to believe that words can take on new meanings-ones which forbid slasis, challenge our habits, and open the possibility that teachers and students might be ablc Lo creatc spaccs for learning in which everyone feels safe. Regulating language destroys the hope of true emancipation. We must be able to resignify derogatory terms to defuse their injurious abilities Disch 99 (Lisa, Associatc Professor of Political Theory at the University of Minnesota, "Judith Butler and the Politics of the Performative," jstor) Judith Butler's longstanding political concern has been to discern what in the structure of subjectivity makes it so difficult to shift from

moralized to politicized mobilization and so easy to fall into identity politics and the politics of scapegoating. In The Psychic Life of Power, she analyzes the psychic and social process of subject formation to disclose the investments that stand in the way of "the development of forms of differentiation lthat could] lead to fundamentally more capacious, generous, and 'unthreatened' bearings of the self in the midst of community" (CR, 140). In Excitable Speech, she rebuts the work of the theorists who introduced hate speech into the legal arsenal. Whereas they share her premise that we are linguistic beings. Butler charges that in advocating speech codes, censorship, and other regulatory approaches to linguistic iniurv, hate speech theorists destroy "something fundamental aboul language and, more svecilicallv. about thc subicct's constitution in language" (ES, 27). Butler proposes to counter iniurious speech with "subversive resignification": thc insubordinate use of a deroeatorv term or authoritative convention to defuse its power to iniure and to expose "prevailing forms oSaulhority and the exclusions bv which they proceed" (ES, 157-58). These two books are especially important Sor answering the charge that poststructuralist critics of humanism demolish political agency when they take issuc with autonomy. Butler's theory of "insurrectionary" speech acts opens up the possibilitv of an agencv that does not fantasize "the restoration of a sovereign autonomv in speech" but, rather, plavs our dependency on sanctioned forms of address into an evervdav resistance (ES, 145,15). Insurrectionarv sveech does considerable theoretical work to break the impasse between autonomv and determinism that stalls many discussions of political agency in "uostliberaton, times" (The Psychic Lfe ofpower [PLl, 18). And although this contribution is significant, it may strike some readers as incomplete. Butler is more attentive to examples where dominant institutions (such as the courts and the military) have subversively resignified potentially insurrectionary initiatives (such as hate speech) than she is to instances where performative agency has transformed the status quo. Even if Butler's own examples do not establish it as such, I will argue that the "politics of the performative" is a politics of insurrection. First, I offer a brief summary of Butler's concepts "heterosexual matrix," "heterosexual melancholy," and "gender performativity," as these are indispensable to appreciating her recent writings.

AT: Lanpuape K -Censorshir, Bad Censorship will be coopted by conservative elements to destroy minority rights -instead language should be used to subvert the conventional meanings of the words Nye 99 (Andrea, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin Whitewater, "Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performativc; In Pursuit of Privacy: Law. Ethics, and the Rise of Technology," Jstor) Excitable Speech and In Pursuit of Privacy will appeal to very different audiences. Judith Budw is a theorist's theorist whose mastery of the co~nplex intellectual gyrations of poststructunlisni and postmnodemis~n will he daunting to all but an initiated few, while Judith Wagner kCew is a legal scholar who uses tnditional reviews of case law and standard tcchniqucs of rational argument to make her point. Nevertheless, they ask the same important question-In promoting the rights of women. to what extent should feminists call for statc action'? -and they give the same negative answer: Not very far at all. Butler's concern is with recent cont~r)versies surmunding regulation of "hate language." specifically tlecisions that hlwadly interpret the "fighting word?' doctrine, which niakes certain uses of speech unprotected under the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. She argues against Catharine ~acKinnon's claim that pornography is subject to governnlent intervention becausc it is action that effectively silences women. DeCew. on the other hand, defends a broad view of the "right to privacp that protects not only private information but also individual decision making fro111 state interference. Their methods in nuking these points could not be more different. Butlcr works meticulously through a dense thicket ofthe analytic speech act thcory of John Austin. the stluctunlist and poststmctunlist theories of Jacques krrida and Piem Rourdieu, psychoanalytic constructions in the style of Sigmund Freud and Jacques hcan, and German critical theory to conclude that state regulation of hate language should be resisted. Once the state has the power to legislate what can be said and not said, she argues, that power will be coopted bv conservative elements to defeat liberal causes and minority rights. State power will also curtail the fi-eedom of speech of ~rivate individuals that is the very basis for effective antidotes to derogatory name calling. DeCew, however, painstakingly reviews the legal and philosophical history of privacy rights as well as current debates about its scope and status before she takes on the question of whether feminists have any interest in preserving a private sphere. For IkCew. too, a major target is MacKinnon, specifically her argument that leaving alone the privacy of home and family means leaving men alone to abuse and dominate women.

DeCew argues that decisions that protect the use of sexually explicit materials in the home, consensual sex pnctic~s in private. and personal decisions about abortion arc in the interest of women as well as men, even though in some cases, such as wife beating. there may be overriding considerations that justify state intervention. Both authors argue persuasively for a more careful locjli at the dangers lurking behind calls for state action. For Butler, the danger is that the state becomes arbiter of what is and is not permissible speech, allowing rulings that the erection of burning crosses by the Ku Klux Klan is protectcd speech but that artistic expressions of gay sexuality or statements or gay identity arc actions rather than s~eech and so arc not protected. The danger DeCew sees is that once the right to privacy is denied or narrowly defined, the state can. on the grounds of immodity, move into women's p~monal livcs to intcrfcre with sexual expression, whether homosexual or heterosexual. or with the right to choose an abortion established in Roe v. Wade. Both DeCew and Butler. however, provide alternative rc~ncdies for the admitted harm that state action is intended to redress. For DeCew, the right to privacy is not absolute; like freedom. it can be ovemdden by other rights -thus thc state can intervene in domestic abuse cases because of the physical harm being done. Butler's remedy for harmful hate language is more deeply rooted in postmodern theories of the speaking subject. Given the postmodern view that the subiect can never maeisteriallv use a language with fixed meanings according to clear intentions, it is always possible to subvert the conventional meanings of words. What is said as a derogatory slur-"nigger." "chick." "spic." or "gay," for example -can be "resiaified." that is. returned in such a manner that its conventional meaning in practices of discrimination and abuse is subverted. Butler gives as examples the revalorization ol terms like "black" or "gay." the satirical citation of racial or sexual slurs, reappropriation in street language or rap music, and expressions of homosexual identity in art depicting graphic sex. These are expressions that any erosion in First Amendment rights might endanger.

AT: Lan~ua~e-Alt Fails K Criticisms of language fail. We cannot objectively determine whether certain words are good or bad. We can only use language as a tool -not as an accurate picture of the world. Rorty 82 (Richard, Professor of Philosophy at Stanford, "Consequences of Pragmatism," http:Nwww.marxists.org/reference/subjec~ndex.htm) This Davidsonian way of looking at language lets us avoid hvpostatising Language in the wav in which the artesian e~istemological tradition. and particularly the idealist tradition which built upon Kant, hvpostatised Thought. For it lets us see language not as a tertium quid between Subject and Object, nor as a medium in which we trv to form ~icturcs ofrealitv. but as part of rhe behaviour of human beings. On this view, the activity of uttering sentences is one of the things wople do in order to cope with their environment. The Deweyan notion of language as tool rather than picture is right as far as it goes. Bul we must be careful not to phrase this analogy so as to sugnesl that one can separate the tool, Language. from its users and inauire as to its "adequacy" to achieve our purposes. The latter suggestion presupposes that there is some wav of breaking out of lanouagc in order to compare it with something else. But there is no wav lo think about either the world or our purposes except hv using our language. One can use lanmage to criticise and enlarge itself,as one can exercise one's body to develop and strengthen and cnlargc it, but one cannot see language-as-a-whole in relation to something else to which it applies, or for which it is a means to an end. The arts and the sciences, and philosophy as their selfreflection and integration, constitute such a process. of enlargement and strengthening. But Philosophy, the attempt to say "how language relates to the world" by saying what makes certain sentences true, or certain actions or attitudes good or rational, is, on this view, impossible. It is the impossible attempt to step outside our skins-the traditions, linguistic and other. within which we do our thinking and selfcriticism-and compare ourselves with something absolute. This Platonic urge to escape from the finitude of one's time and place. the "merelv conventional" and contingent aspects of one's life, is responsible for the orininal Platonic distinction between two kinds of true sentence. BY attacking this latter distinction, the holistic "oranmaticisina" strain in analytic philosophy has helped us sec how the metaphvsical urge -common to fuzzy Whiteheadians and razor-sharp "scientific realistsv-works. It has helped us be sceptical about the idea that some particular science (say ~hvsics) or some particular lilerarv genre (say Romantic poetry, or transcendental philosophy) gives us that species of true sentence which is not iust a true sentencc. but rather a piece of Truth itself. such sentences my be vcry useful indeed. hut there is not going to bc a Philosophical explanation of this utility. That explanation. like the original justification of the assertion ofthe sentencc. will hc a parochial matter-a comparison of

the sentence with alternative sentences formulated in the same or in other vocabularies. But such comparisons arc thc business of, for example. the physicist or the pel. or perhaps ofthe philosopher -not of the Philosopher, the outside expert on the utility, or function. or metaphysical status of Languagc or ofl'hought. The Wittpenslei~l-Sellm-Quine-Davidsonattack on distinctions hetween classcs of sentences is the special contribution of analytic philosophy to the anti-Phto~st insistence on the uhiquity of language. 'This insistence chnncterises hoth pragnntism and recent "Continental" philosophising. Here are some examples: Man makes the word, and thc word omnq nothing which the man has not m~de it mean. and that only to some other man. But sincc can think only hy means of words or other external symbols. these might turn around and say: You mean nothing which we have not reught you, and then only so far as you address som word as the interpretan1 of your thought. . . . . . .the word or sign which nnn uses is the man himelf Thus my language is the sumtotal of myself; for thc mn is thc thought. (Peuce) Peirce goes very far in the direction that I hnve called the deconstruction of the transcendental sigrifred, which, al om timc or another. would place a reassuring end to the reference from sign to sign. (Derrida) .. . psychological nominnlisn~ according to which all awareness of sorLF, resemblances. Facts. etc.. in short all awareness ofilhstract entitiesindecd, all awarcness even of particulars-is a linguistic affair. (Scllars) It is only in language that one can mean something by somethine (Wittpenstein) Human experience is essentially linguistic. (Gadamer) . . . man is in the process of perishing as thc being of language continues to shine ever brighter upon our horizon. (Foucault) Speaking about language turns language almost inevitably into an object . . .and then its reality vanishes. (Heidegger) This chorus should not, however, Icad us to think that something new and exciting has recentlv been discovered about Language-e.g., that it is more prevalent than had prcviouslv been thought. The authors cited are making only negative points. They are saving that attempts to get back behind language to something which "grounds" it. or which it "expresses," or to which it might hope to be "adequate," have not, worked. The ubiquity of language is a matter of language moving into the vacancies left bv thc failure of all the various candidates for the position of "natural starting-points" of thought, starting-points which are prior to and independent of the Wa!, Some culture speaks Or spoke. (Candidates for such starting-points include clear and distinct ideas, sense-data, categories of the pure understanding, structures of prelinguistic consciousness, and the like.) Peirce and Sellars and Wittgenstein are saying that the regress -of interpretatio~~

cannot he cut off by the sort of "intuition" which Cartesian cpiste~nology took for grdnted. Gndamer .and Derrida are saying tbt our culture has been dominated by the notion of a "mnscendenral signified" which. hy cutting off this regress, would hring us our from contingency and conscntion and into tbe Truth. Foucault is saying that we are gradually losing our grip on the "metaphysical comfort" which that Philosophical tradition providedits picture of Man as having a "douhlc" (thc soul, the Noumenal Self) who uses Reality's own language rather than merely thc vocabulary of a time and a place. Finally. Heidegger is cautioning that if we try to make language into a new topic of Philosophical inquiry we shall simply recreate thehopeless old Philosophical punks which we used lo raise about Beiig or Thought. This last point amounts to saying h~t what Gustav Bergmnn called "the linguistic turn" should not be scen as the logical psitivists saw it-as enabling us to ask Kantian questions without having to uespass on the psycholo@sts' turf hy talking. with Kant, about "experience" or "consciousness." T~AL was, indeed. the initial motive for the "turn."" hut (thanks to the holismand prag~~latiso~ofthe authors I have dted) analytic philosophy of language was able to transcend this Kantian motive and adopt a naturalistic. behaviouristic attitude toward language. This attitude has led it to the same outcome as the "Conlincntal" reaction against the traditional Kantian problematic, the reaction found in Nietzsche and Heidegger. This convergence shows that the traditional association of analytic philosophy with tough-minded positivism and of "Continental" philosophy with tender-minded Platonism is completely misleading. The vragmaticisation of analvtic philosophy gratified the logical positivists' hopes. but not in the fashion which they had envisaged. it did not find a way for Philosophv to become "scientific," hut rather found a way of setting Philosophy to onc side. This post-positivistic kind of analytic philosophy thus comes to resemble the Nietzsche-Heidegger-Derridatradition in beginning with criticism of Platonism and ending in criticism of Philosophy as such. Both traditions are now in a period of doubt about their own status. Both are living between a repudiated past and a dimly seen post-Philosophical future.

AT: Identitv Politics -Essentialist Kritiks of identity are essentialist and flawed Robinson and Tormey, Professors of Politics at Nottingham University, 2003 (Andrew and Simon, "Zizek is not a Radical," http://homepage.ntlworld.com/simon.tormey/articleslZizeknoh.adical.pdt') cZizek's popularity results largely from the apparent way out that he provides from the cul-desac in which radical theory, and in particular radical postmrdern theory. has found ilsclf. Zizek is of course not thc first author to attack 'postmodernists', poststructuralists and post-Marxists on grounds of their tack of radical ambition on the terrain of politics. To takc a couple of examples from anlongst the many, Sharon Smith asserts that 'Itlhc politics of identity do not offer a way forward for thosc genuinely interested in transfornung society. ... The emphasis on lifestyle ... is thc guarantee that such movements will remain middle class'.4 Murray Bookchin similarly argues that subjectivist claims about 'thc 'impossibility' of formulating an -ob.iective criterion' ol' rationality or good are 'an indulgence we can ill afford' -the 'condition of the world is far too desperate'.5 These critiques, howcvcr, arc rooted in an 'old' left prone to essentialism, unfounded 'obiective' claims and simplifying vulgarisations -prcciselv the reasons for the popularity of 'postmodern' approaches. Obiections to spurious daims about an 'obiective' answcr to thc present problems, to class and other reduc~ionisms which risk perpetuating voicelessness, and to dogmatism and theoretical rigidity are often well-founded, even if those who make such criticisms apDear disturbingly 'liberal' in their orientations. Thus, left activists genuinely interested in confrontine the liberal capitalist status cluo find themselves trapped between politicallv radical but theoretically flawed leftist orthodoxies and theoretically innovative but volitically moderate 'post'theories.>

AT: Borders K -Borders Inevitable and Kev to Peace Borders are inevitable- Iraq, Kosovo, and others prove that sometimes borders are the only option. Preventing cross border aggression is a much easier than deterring a domestic insurgency Downes, 2k6 (Alexander Downes. Assistant Professorof Politiul Science at Duke. Morc Borders, Less Conflict?: P:utition as a Solution to Ethnic Civil Wars, httri://musc.i hu.edu&un~als/sais review/v076/16.1 downcs.hIm1) <Partition: The Future of Iraq Despite international attcmpts to encourage power-sharing and federalism as a means to preserve a united Iraq. a partition of the countrv into three stales-a Kurdish state in the northeast, a Shi'ite state in thc south, and a Sunni state in the northwest-is probably unavoidable for the same rcasons it is unavoidable in Kosovo. The history of violence and repression has made it hard for Iraq's ethnic groups to trust each other. The Kurds suffered such brutality that they insist on maintaining their own armed forces and prefer an independent Kurdish state to remaining part of a united Iraq. The Sunni Arabs-the dominant and privileged group under Saddam Hussein's regime-have suffered a major status reversal and are now marginalized. The Sumi-based insurgency that has raged since Saddam's downfall in 2003 signals not only many Sunnis' attachment to and reverence for Saddam, but also their mistrust and suspicion of Iraq's Shi'ites and Kurds. The 2005 constitution was negotiated mostly without Sunni input and over their vehemcnt objections. Unsurprisingly, Sunnis voted overwhelmingly against the document. Last-minute pronlises by Shi'a and Kurdish leaders that would allow the constitution to be renegotiated following new parliamentary elections are small consolation to Sunnis, who will always compose a small minority of the country's elected representatives and thus will wield little power. The constitution's federal provisions represent Shi'ite leaders' recognition that the Kurds insist on near total autonomy-and thus that the Shi'ites should form their own Scdewl bloc as well. Given the ~owcrful centrifugal forces at vlav, this process will lead to the eventual partition of Iraq. This result is not surprising. The basic logic for why Iraq would tall apart was laid out nearly 10 years ago in an article by Daniel Byman.28 In this article, Byman argued that the legacy of bitterness and mistrust engendered by Saddam's use of massive violence against the Kurdish and Shi'ite [End Page 581 communities would make it nearly impossible for those groups ever to trust the Sunnis again, or to entrust their security to institutions they did not control. Byman cites Michael Ignatieff's argument that "Genocide and nationalism have an entwined history. It was gcnocide that convinced the Jews . . .that thev were a people who would never bc sali: until they had a nation-state of their own. As with the Jews, so with the Kurds. ..for a people who have known genocide, there is onlv one thing that will do: a nation-state of their own."29 These two communities are regionally concentrated in areas they view as homelands, increasing their ability and willingness to fight for secession and making partition relatively feasible to implement. Given each noup's inability to relv on the others' benign intentions. the fact that each group is armed. and the likelihood that ccntral power-

sharing institutions will generate deadlock rather than consensus. it is likelv that federalism will promote separation rather than unity and lead to partition. Byman's conclusion in 1997 still rings truc: "Iraq ...is a state that deserves to collapsc and be partitioned."30 Thc Kurds, of course, will be delighted at the prospect of achieving statehood, and the Shi'ites will accept the break-up of Iraq, as they will obtain the largest piece of territory as well as copious reserves of oil. The Sunnis-the group that stands to lose the most tcrrilory and natural resources-are also the group with the least capability to revcrse partition. The insurgency is based in the areas that would becomc part of a Sunni state; thus it would lose steam once foreign occupation forces depart. Once new borders and states arc created. the problem would become one of deterring and preventing cross-bordcr ageression. This would be easier than quelling a domestic insurgcncv with strong social support and a task that Kurdish and Shi'ite forces-aided by smaller external forces-should bc able lo perform. >

AT: Borders K -Borders kev to Reace When we eliminate borders, it makes all conflicts civil wars, which makes a peace an impossibility. Kosovo proves that partition is key to stability in any region. Downes, 2k6 (Alexander I>ownes, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duke, More Bordcrs. Less Conflict:': Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Civil Wars. http://~~iusc.ihu.t.duli~~t~~nals/sais reviewlv026/?-6.ldownes.html) <The conventional wisdom among scholars and policymakcrs opposes solving cthnic conflicts by drawing new borders and creating new states. This view, however, is flawed because lhc proccss of fighting civil wars imbues thc belligerents with a deep sense of mistrust that makes sharing power after the conflict difficult. This is especially true in ethnic civil wars. in which negotiated powersharing agreements run a high risk of failing and leading to renewed warfare. In light of these problems. this article argues that partition should be considered as an option for ending severe ethnic conflicts. The article shows how failure to adopt partition in Kosovo has left that province in a semi-vermanent state of limbo that only increases the maioritv Albanian oovulation's desire for independence. The only route to long-term stability in the region-and an exit for international forces-is through partition. Moreover, the article suggests that the United States should recognize and prepare for the coming partition of Iraq rather than pursuing the futile endeavor of implementing power-sharing among Iraq's Shi'ites, Kurds, and Sunnis.> Kosovo proves that borders are key to prevent wars Downes, 2k6 (Alexander Downes, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Dukc, More Borders. Lcss Conflict?: Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Civil Wars, httpY/n~uw.~ihu.du/~iournals/snis review/vO26/26.1 downcs.htn~l) Trepidation over Kosovo's future status makes both ethnic communities reluctant to part with their weapons. According to a report by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency, "Faced with an uncertain future and constant wondering about whether conflict will ensue once again. ~eo~le mav want to keep weapons to provide vrotection and security if the situation once again becomes precarious."20 Comments by both Serbs and Albanians confirm this motivation. According to an Albanian tour guide in Drenica, for example, "Nobodv knows if another war is going to happen or not. If they don't give us indevendence, that might mean that the Serbian forces will be allowed to come back-and most people here don't want to be caught empty-handed when that happens." Serbs. for their part,

believe that self-help is the only way to safeguard themselves from vengeful Albanians. As one Serb from Gracanica commented, "We believe that none of the security forces operating in Kosovo at the moment are able to fully protect the Serbs, so we have to look out for ourselves."21 Partition allows for more security than power sharing or dissolving borders. Downes, 2k6 (Alcxnndcr Downcs. Assistant Profcssor of Political Scicnce at Duke, Mon: Borders. Less Conflict?: Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Civil Wars. I~t~://muse.iliu .edulioumillslsais ~view/v026/26.ldownes.h~ml) <In this article, I arguc thal partition--defined as separation of contending ethnic groups and the creation of indcpcndent statcsshould be considered as an alternative to power-sharing and regional autonomy as a means to end civil wars. Partition does not require groups to disarm and make themselves vulnerable to devastating betrayal. Nor do formerly warring groups have to cooperate and share power in joint institutions. Partition also satisfies nationalist desires for statehood and fills the need for security. In cases of severe ethnic conflict, when perceptions of the adversary's malign intentions are so entrenched as to impede any agreement based on a single-statc solution, partition is the preferred solution. > Empirically proven- power sharing doesn't solve, partition is key to peace Downes, 2k6 (Alexander Downes, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duke, More Borders, Less Conflict?: Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Civil Wars, h~tp://muse.~h~~.edu~ioumaldsais reviewlv036/26. Idownzs.htnd) <The poor record of negotiated settlements in ethnic civil wars that leave borders intact. whether or not they are facilitated by thirdparty intervention, suggests that a new approach might be necessary: one based on partition rather than power-sharing. In this model, third parties would intervene not to turn back the clock to the pre-war situation, but to inflict a decisive defeat on one side or the other. This would reduce the likelihood lhat the defeated partv would think it could gain anything bv resorting to war in the future. In those cases where a third party intervenes on behalf of ethnic rebels, military victory will result in partition. Partition can only lead to veace. however, if it is accompanied by cthnic separation. Intcrvcncrs should work to make surc lhat thc states are as ethnically homogeneous as possible so as to reduce the likelihood of future cleansing, rebellions by the remnant minority for union with its brethren in the other state, or war to rescuc "trapped" minorities. Finally, both sides should bc militarily capable of defcndina themselves, and the borders

between them should be made as defensible as possible to discouraoc aggression. either by following natural terrain features or by buildinw demilitarized zones or other barriers.[End Page 541>

AT: Borders K -Borders kev to ethnic cleansing Borders are key to prevent ethnic cleansing Downes, 2k6 (Alexander Downs, Assistant Pmfessor of Politicul Science at Duke. More Borders. Less Contlict?: Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Civil Wars. htto:llmuse.ihu.e~l:du/ioumnls/sais ~eview/vO~6/2h.ldownes.html) <Recently, however, scholars have begun to challenge this single-statesolution orthodoxy, arguin~instead that dividin~ states and creating new borders may be a way to promote peace after ethnic civil wars. One view, [End Pagc 491 represcnted by Chairn Kaufmann, stresses that elhnic civil wars cannot end until contendin9 grouvs are separated into homogeneous ethnic enclaves. When groups are internlingled. each side has an incentive to attack and cleanse the other. Once separation is achieved. these incentives disappear. With the necessary condition for peace in place, political arrangements become secondary. Unless ethnic separation occurs. Kaufmann argues, all other solutions are fruitless because ethnic intermingling is what fuels conflict.3>

AT: Borders K -Preserves Liberty Borders preserve liberty better than a world without borders Moriss 2k4 (Andrew P. Moriss, Professor of Business Law and Regulation at Case Western Reserve University, Borders and Liberty, http://20r).217.49.168/vnews.~hp?nid=608l, July 2004) <Even though borders can be an excuse for reducing libertv, a world with lots of borders is nonetheless a far friendlier world for liberty than one with fewer borders. They promote comuetitjon for people and money. which lends to restrain the state from zrabbing either. Borders offer chances to arbitrage regulatory restrictions, making them less effective. Without borders these constraints on the growth of the state would vanish.> Competitions between states motivates governments to preserve liberty Moriss 2k4(Andrew P. Moriss, Professor of Business Law and Regulation at Case Western Reserve University, Borders and Liberty, http://209.217.49.168/vnews.vhp?nid=608l,July 2004) National borders are also important sources of libertv. The Mcxican border, ibr example, offers a choice between a drug-regulatory regime that requires a doctor's prescription for most pharmaceuticals and one that does not. The streams of visitors to towns such as Algodones, Baja California, are not merely seeking lower prices. Some are seeking medicines unapproved in the Unitcd States; others are looking for medications for which they have no U.S. prescription, whether for recreational (such as Viagra) or medical (antibiotics) use. Mexico does not offer the pro-plaintiff tort doctrines of U.S. product-liability law, has lowcr barriers to entry for pharmacists, and a wide-open market for pharmaceuticals that includes openly advertised pricc competition. U.S. residents near the Mexican border thus have a choice of regulatory regimes for their medicine that thosc of us who live farther away do not. Border-region residents can buy medicines either with the U.S. bundle of qualities, restrictions, and rights, or the Mexican bundle. From the level of traftic of elderly visitors I've seen at the border crossing, it appears thc Mexican bundlc is more attractive for many. Borders are thus friends of libertv in two important ways. First, without borders we would not have the competition among iurisdictions that restricts attempts to abridge liberty. The impact of borders goes beyond those who live near them. Pharmacists try Lo prevcnl the free sale of prescription drugs, bul they would be much more successful if Mexico did not offer an alternative for a1 least somc consumers. It is the margin that matters, and so free availability of pharmaceuticals in Mexico benefits even those of us who live in Ohio. Jurisdictions thus compete to attract veople and capital. This com~etition motivates governments to act to preserve liberty. Famously, for example, states compete for corporations. with Delaware the current market leader. Delaware corporate law offers companies the combination of a mostly voluntary set of del'ault rules and an expert decision-making body (the Court of Chancery). As a result, many corporations, large and small, choose to

incorporate in Delaware, making it their legal residence. (Their actual headquarters need not be physically located there.) Corporations get a body of liberty-enhancing rulcs; Dclaware gets tax revenue and employment in the corporateservices and legal fields.> Borders are critical to a free society Moriss 2k4(Andrew P. Moriss, Professor of Business Law and Regulation at Case Western Reserve University, Borders and Liberty, http://209.2 17.49.168/vnews.p11p?nid=608I, July 2004) <Borders play a critical role in our lives. Some of the borders that matter to us arc ones we establish oursclvcs: this is my house and property; that is your house and property. Bv choosing what is mine and using the legal system to mark it off from what is yours, 1 create a border. While not quite as invulnerable as suggested by the maxim "A man's home is his castle," my properly gives mc a firm border against you. Borders come from property rights and are essential to a fiee society.> Borders allow citizens to live in a setting that resembles the society they desire Moriss 2k4(Andrew P. Moriss, Professor of Business Law and Regulation at Case Western Reserve University, Borders and Liberty, htte://209.217.49.1 68/vnew~.php?nid=6081, July 2004) <The second way that borders further liberty is that they allow diversity in law and other community norms. letting each individual find the setting that most resembles the type of society he or she desires. Everyone in Ohio need not agree on how to organize town activities: I can live in a township with few taxes and few services, and my more left-winr colleagues at the university who prefer a more interventionist society can live in Cleveland Heights, a suburb with an agmessive central-planning mentality and high taxes.>

AT: Borders -Borders Not Destructive Cross Border competition is not destructive Moriss 2k4 (Andrew P. Moriss, Professor of Business Law and Regulation at Case Western Reserve University. Borders and Liberty, http:fl209.2 17.49.168/vnews.~hp'~nid=608 I, July 2004) <Statists are correct that competition among iurisdictions will make clear the costs of the policies they promote. They are wrong when they sugpest that cross-border comvetition is destructive of the aualitv of life, however. The former divide between East and West Berlin is a fine example of the impact of cross-border comparisons. East Germans could see the difference in outcomes between the two societies, and East Germany had to resort to increasingly costly and desperate measures lo prevent its citizens from voting against communism with thcir ftet. The example oSWest Germany did not erode the socialist regime by "unfairly" competing against it. West Gcrmans had a higher standard or living and more freedom. Competition between the two Germanvs exposed the cost of East German policies.>

AT: Santos -Alt Fails Santos conception of the evils of modernity are too simple in their dualism, which replicates the most pernicious aspects of the system he critiques. Pieterse, 2001 (Jan Nederveen, Associate Professor of Sociology at the Institute of Social Studies at the Hague, "Emancipation and Regulation: Twin Pillars of Modernity:,", European Journal qf Social Theory 4(3),pg. 28 1-282) [The findings Santos arrives at concerning the shortcomings of neoclassical cconomics arenot as noteworthy as the way he arrives at them. His treatment suffers from problems of scale and perspective and at times comes across as too coarse-grained. For instance, what is 'mainstream economics"? Neoclassical economics, rational choice. ncw institutional economics, institutional analysis? As to 'modern science', what about new science such as quantum physics and chaos theory'? That is this critique of smallscale modeling in science itself uses small-scale models of economics and science to the extent that several insights are too general to be penetrating. This critique of representation comes with two other arguments-a discussion of regulation and emancipation, and a pleas for a new common sense, although there is no necessary connection between them. Regulation and emancination are presented as the 'twin pillars of modernity', as capabilities and forms of knowledge. This is a sequel to Santos's Toward a New Common Sense (1995). This too opened with the idea that modernity is 'based on two pillars, the pillar of regulation and the pillar oS emancipation.' So here we enter modernity by passing between two pillars. Let us pause right away. What kind of space do we enter bv passing between two pillars? A templc--and variations such as a courthouse, church, library--a demarcated, sanctified space. The nearest reference to two pillars in the literature is the Temple of Solomon with its twin pillars Jachin and Boaz. This metaphor has becn used over and over again. from thc Qabala to Freemasonry and alchemy to Goethe ('7wei Seelin'). In other words, this is a classical, premodern metaphor for modernity. Accordingly, modernity is marked off as an imaginarv space, a building, and set apart from detail and intricacy. from the rumour of agcnts, voices, dreams and proiects, in a word, a small-scale model abstracted from history. This means taking a normative view of modernity, as against, for instance, an instilutional view (the nation state, capitalism, etc.) or a historical view. Other normative angles are also absent (Parsons's universalism, Habermas's Enlightenment, etc.). Which episodes, movements, transformations would exemplify this? History is only cursorily present in this argument (e.g. capitalism, colonialism). Without 'examples' the argument remains ungrounded. untestable. hovering outside time and space. This is a plea not for empiricism but for effective communication (the reader thinks this is about A but the author thinks of B). The representation in terms of duality is fundamentally static. From Heraclitus to Hegel, along with other folks, the common epistemological device has becn dialectics, so where is dialectics in this argument -i.e. regulation prompting emancipation, emancipation turning into regulation, and so Sorlh? Then,

what is now presented as a problem ('the regulation that does not emancipate does not even regulate', etc.) is not a problem at all, bur ralhcr a solution. A depiction in which not merely two ~rinciples are privileged. but only two remain is not a felicitous representation of modernity . This is small-scale sociololzv at its most extreme. It gives us very little to work with. The treatment is schematic. not occasionally so but as a matter of stvle and method. All the problems discussed In the critiaue of small-scale revresentation recur in this argument on regulation and emancipation-vagueness (neglecting details and contrast'). false contemporaneitv, exclusion of other knowledlzes. Thus, a probing critlquc of small-scale economics (i.e. modeling devoid of detail) comes with an exercise in small-scale sociology and the very epistemolo~ical blinders that are so patiently laid bare in relation to economics are. In the same breath avplied with abandon in socio1ogy.l Santos is wrong-we must develop a curious mentality and revive cooperation to achieve change. Carap, 2001(Joiio, Director of the Science Department at the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, "Ceremonial Inadequacy: In Search of a New Enlightenment", European Journal of Social Theory 4(3),pg. 289-290) [Again, they can only be containcd in the context of a new narrative. Here, too, Santos points his finger cleverlv to solidaritv. to conceiving the other as a producer of knowledge. According to what modern biology teaches us. each maior step in the history of life in the universe -and eight such steps have been identified so far, from replicating molecules to primate societies (Maynard Smith and Szathmary, 2000) -has been the outcome of cooperation. It rcsults from a cooperative cffort between different species that henceforth behave and reproduce like a new one. This is the same as statins that hierarchical behaviour onlv brings 'more of the same'. whereas cooperation is a mechanism for generating complex behavior, eventually leading to emerging vroverties and sustainable action. The time is riw for develovinrz an attitude of curious pcrspcctivc. of overaling simultancouslv at different scales. We humans were born on the Earth. Let us not turn this bluc planet into a senscless aaveyard.1

AT: Santos -Alt Fails Santos contradicts himself-he concludes that regulation kills emancipation, but that a new common sense is possible. Pieterse, 2001 (Jan Nederveen, Associatc Professor of Sociology at the Institute of Social Studies at the Hague, "Emancipation and Regulation: Twin Pillars of Modernity?', European Journal of Social Theory 4(J), pg. 282-284) [That regulation consumes emancipation is a familiar argument. When the dust of rebellion or revolution settles, another order comes into bcing and ideals slip out of the window. According to the right, the violence of revolution only brought unnecessary bloodshed; according the left, it is the myth of Sisyphus revisited (Camus, Foucault, etc.). Both views are deeply conservative and pessimistic. My own view (discussed in several publications) is that power (domi nation. oppression, rule, hegemony, etc.) gnJ emancipation (empowerment, participation. social transformation towards justice, etc.) are deeply interdependent and mutallv implicated. The cxercise of power evokes resistance" resistance mows into crnpowerment. empowerment becomes emancipation. and emancipation changes the rules of power. This is the definition of cmancipadon: unlike 'resistance', 'protest', 'participation', 'empowerment', emancipation changes the rules of the game. Thus. constellations of power (e.g, imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialjsm) evoke and shape emancipation while emancipation movements influence and redirect the exercise of power. A new regulation comcs about to forestall upheaval or revolution. to close loopholes, rebuild legitimacy, reclaim heaemonv. For example, in ninetccnth-century Europe national capitalism engendered the organized working class, and to forestall the growing forcc of trade unions and labour parties. the welfare state was born. That is, a more inclusive, more just mode of regulation developed. Thc objectives of emancipatory movements were translated into a new form of regulation -not fully, not all the objectives, but significantly enough LO change the character of power and widen the standards of Icgilimate authority (universal suffrage, welfare state. Fordism). This too came with a downside (labour aristocracy, working-class embourgeoisement, the chauvinism of prosperity, etc.). Yet, major emancipatory objectives were met in the form of a different mode of rcgulation. This also implies that equaling modernity and capitalism is not helpful, for the question is what kind of capitalism? In other words, that emancipation yiclds regulation is not its betrayal but its fulfillment. Emanci~ation is not a utopian shortcut. It is a historical process whose logic is thal each form of emancipation by definition constitutes new form of regulation. which over timc turns out to be a new form ofopprcssion, which in turn evokes resistance, so the cycle begins anew, and so forth. Now we have enlcred the epoch of global capitalism in which strug~les are local (Chiapas, Ogoniland, etc.), re~ional, (Nice) and global (in Seattle, Washington DC,Prague, Davos, Porto Alegrc. etc.). We have entered another space and another cycle and the drama of regulation (World Bank, IMF, WTO) and emancipation (labour standards, NGOs, global civil society, etc.) unfolds anew. What is at stake now is

world-scale regulation (a new financial architecture, environmental regulation, etc.). In Santos's argument. regulation cannibalizes emancipation while ultimately, as part of a new common sense, emancipatory knowledae is to take the reins from regulatory knowledge. This yields the third argument, the plea for a new common sensc. The problem is that in one domain, regulation and emancipation, Santos displays extreme pessimism. while in another, a new common sense. he disnlavs extreme optimism. There is no emotional continuity between these perspectives, lest we assume that extreme disaffection in one sphere is the raison d'etre for extreme optimism in another. In this sphere, there is but a string of normative clauses to guide us: solidarity. prudence, a decent life. Sounds good, but if matters have been so dreadful all along, how on earth would we get there? Would not prudence suggest (a) a finer rcading of the relationship between regulation and emancipation, and (b) of the relationship between common sense and science, so that (c) a new common sense would not have to drop out of the sky, Madc in Utopia? 'Whether it is possible to know by creating solidarity' is an interesting question. Can a critique be both penetrating and compassionate? Indeed, would not the tcst of a new common sense be that it informs a new regulation that is based on more inclusivc values'?] Alt can't solve-it is too weak to overcome the epistemological breaks in knowledge. Wagner, 2001 (Peter, Professor of Social and Political Theory at the European University Institute in Florence, "Epistemology and Critique", European Jounlal of Social Theoq 4(3),pg. 284) [The opening passage about Thorstein Veblen in Boaventura de Sousa Santos's article is breathtakingly brilliant. It is not so much the idea of going back to Veblen for a discussion about the relation between economics and the other social sciences, or about the epistcrnology of the social sciences in general, that strikes one as original. Rather, the force lies in the sudden move -after the author already a~peared to have his reader prepared for a criticlue of economics from a historical-institutionalist pers~ective-against Veblen whose important insights did not prevent him from advocating a 'dclirious racial anthropology' as an alternative. The strjke hits. Is it not indecd thc case that too many scholars in the social sciences spcnd their Lime elaborating sophisticated critiaues, while their own alternatives remain weaker and are often as much. if not morc, subject to valid obiections as the approaches they criticize-if they are spelled out in any detail at all? Boaventura de Sousa Santos himself does aim at dcvclopinp altcrnativcs while at the same trying to avoid Veblen's fate-with

success, I dare say, since it is difficult to envisage--even a hundred years from now-that somebody could call his constructive ideas 'delirious'. In meat sympathy with his nroiect of an epistemology of seeing and the rewarding richness of its presentation here. it seems worth pointing to a basic tension in it, a tension which I think necds to bc resolved to pursue the proiect further.1

AT: Santos -Alt Fails Alt can't solve-the obstacles to knowledge and solidarity are too strong to overcome. Wagner, 2001(Peter, Professor of Social and Political Theory at the European University Institute in Florence, "Epistemology and Critique", European Journal of Social Theory 4(3),pg. 286-287) [The lack oC ambivalence with regard to the first break is repeated in the programme of the second break. At least in the strong reading of his proposal, Santos succumbs to the time-honoured inclination of rather markedly outlining a not-yet-existing alternative that solves all problems. an alternative in which knowledge and solidarity become one. But a quick historical observation suggests that he may be running into a trap that he himself set. Is such a conception not precisely revivin~ the Enlightenment dream ofa sclfregulatinr societv .a dream about which one can iustifiablv say that at least in some of ils versions it has been converted from hcinq emancipatorv to bcinc regulatorv, and now in the sense of regulation by some imposed on others, and not as self-renulation? Why should we assume that something similar could not again be the case if we follow that same route again? In Santos's own, fruitful terms. the problem here is that one should not move from the absolute reign of experience over ex~ectation, or from total indifference Wrience and expectation, towards a similarly unconstrained reign of expectation over experience. That is a recipe for disillusionment, at best, and was historically a recipe for disaster. The challenge of knowledge rather is to find the situationwiseavvrovriate relation of expectation to experience. Santos rightly underlines that there is conflict and struggle in the social world, and there is indeed no need to remain silent about this feature only because Carl Schmitt has emphasized it. However, even if we could assume that friend and foe could be clearly identified, there is a strugrzle not merely between reaulatc~s and emancipators. If this were the case, then the struggle would be over once that fight was won. Taking Schmitt (and others, such as Hannah Arendt or Claude Lefort) seriously means to accept that. under conditions of modernity, there will always be contestation, always struggle between different perspectives, And then there cannot be knowledge that is unequivocally associated with emancipation and solidarity. Rather. even among those who support those goals, there will be variety of wrspectives and, thus, a 'constellation of knowledges' will emerge that does not settle a dispute, but vrovidcs it with resources for reasoning. Against indifference, one would not just posit solidarity with friends. Rather, concern for others would show vreciselv in both solidarjty and dispute. and both at the same time. This is what I see in the second, the weak programme in Boaventura de Sousa Santos's article, and it is thc one I prefer. In his strong programme, he continues the tradition of critique in pointing to something that is not, but could be. and elevates this to a higher position. seen as immediately reachable, if not actually reached, as soon as the obstacles are removed. His weak programme instead suggests a different understanding oC critique, pointing also to something that is not, but that is always struggling

to come into existence, thus is always present but in the form of failing. An euistemologv of seeing would not merely show the way lo knowledge, it would also need lo make visible the obstacles on that way. Since many of those obstacles will not disappear under any circumstances, the search for knowledge means the search for the different ways to overcome them1 Santos fails to acknowledge that knowledge and power are permanent-economic power is intrinsically tied to knowledge. Caraga, 2001 (Jolo, Director of the Science Department at the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, "Ceremonial Inadequacy: In Search of a New Enlightenment", European Journal of Social Theory 4(3),pg. 288) The difficulty of the analysis, however, 9 presence of power. In my view. this has a blurring effect. The entanglement of knowledge with power constitutes the foundation from which critcria for truth are derived in any society. Knowledge cannot be dissociated from power. The deployment of power always involves the constitution of a domain of knowledge from which iLc own legitimation and cultural identity can be derived; concurrently, -as Michcl Foucault pointed out, the rules that govern the operation of this body of knowledge involve a set of vower relations. Therefore, wc can say that knowledge and Dower mirror each other, to the cxtcnl that the conditions for the enactment of both spring from thcir mutual coexistence. In all epochs and communities each coniiguration of power, or knowledge, has set its indelible mark on the other. This is why we can ascertain that the Renaissance was premodern, i.e. not yet fully modern. It had some dimensions that were later to be part of the unfolding of modernity but. in cssence. its character was different. The liberation of the energies of free enterprise, thc scientific revolution, the emergcncc of national churches, the institmion of bourgeois states, are all mutually reinforcing, and essential for the affirmation ol' European peodes in the globe. A ncw worldview emerged, not in conneclion w~th any direct religious belief, but with a marked spatial character. The central question in this geometric worldview is the search for grand symmetries that correspond to invariance principles. which. in turn, originate in the absolute, eternal laws of nature. Nature is seen as obeying to Law. Time is a parameter. The Universe originated as space. Mankind (and its representatives, the European peoples) were in command of the world. But free enterprise was not solely a principle but a form of organization, of social relations, of action. Economic vower, in its m modern incarnation of industrialization. would certainlv promote its own body of knowledge, economics. In economics the issue of

capital is vjvotal, as one can easily guess. Santos poinls out deftly the problems and limitations of mainstream economics: but it is not clear if he believes thal some of the difficulties a re related to a change in the nature of capital-the emergence of a new type of capital. as proposed by Manuel Castells, 'informational capital'-not vet understood bv theory, or to a phasing out of the energies of modernity.I

AT: Bio~ower-Alt fails Biopolitics is good -only seeing it as bad a) ignores the massive decrease in structural violence it has caused and b) views power unidirectionally in contradiction within their own critique Dickinson, University of Cincinnati, 2004 (Edward Ross, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Rcflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March) <This understandinp of the democratic and totalitarian potentials of biopolitics at the level of the state needs to be underuinned by a reassessment of how biopolitical discourse operates in socictv at large, at the "prepolitical" level. 1 would like to try to offer here the bcginnings of a reconceptualization of biopolitical modernity, one that focuses less on the machinations of techncxrats and exverts, and more on thc different ways that biopolitical thinking circulated within German society more broadly. It is striking, then, that the new model of German modernity is even more relentlessly negative than the old Sonderweg model. In that older model, premodern elites were constantly triumphing over the democratic opposition. But at least there was an ou~osition; and in the long run. time was on the side of that ouposition. which in fact embodied the historical movement of modern- ization. In thc new model, there is virtually a biopolitical consensus.92 And that consensus is almost always rundamentally a nasty, oppressive thing, one that partakes in crucial wavs of the essential ~ualitv of National Socialism. Everywhere bionnlitics is intrusive, technocratic, lopdown. constraining. limiting. Biopolitics is almost never conceived ofor at least discussed in any detail- as creatin~ possibilities for people, as cxvanding the range of their choices. as empowering them. or indeed as doing anything positive for them at all. Of course, at the most simplc-minded level, it seems to me that an assessment of the potentials of modernity that innores the wavs in which biouolilics has made life tanaibly better is somehow deeply flawed. To give iust one example, infant mortality in Germany in 1900 was iust over 20 percent; or, in other words, one in five children died before reaching the age of one year. BY 1913, it was 15 percent; and hv 1929 (when average real purchasing power was not significantly higher than in 1913) it was only 9.7 uercent.93 The expansion of infant health programs-an enormously ambitious, bureaucratic, medicalizing, and sometimes intrusive, social engineering project- had a great deal to do with that change. It would be bizarre to write a history of biopolitical modernity that ruled out an a~ureciation for how absolutely wonderful and astonishing this achievement- and any number of others like it -reallv was. There was a reason for thc "Machbarkeitswahn" of the early twentieth century: manv marvelous things were in fact becoming machbar. In that sense. it is not really accurate to call it a "Wahn" (delusion, craziness) at all; nor is it accurate to focus only on the "inevitable" frustration of "delusions" of power. Even in the late 1920s. many social engineers could and did look with seat satisfaction on the changes they genuinely had the power to accomplish. Concretely, moreover, I am not convinced that vower operated in onlv one direction -from the top down- in social work. Might we

not ask whether peoule actually demanded welfare services, and whether and how social workers and the state struggled to respond to those demands? David Crew and Greg Eghigian, for example, have given us detailed studies of the micro~olitics of welfare in the Weimar'pcriod in which it becomes clear that conflicts between welfare administrators and their "clients" were sparked not onlv by heavvhandcd intervention, but also by refusal to help.94 What is more. the specific naturc of social programs matters a great dcal, and we must distinguish between the different dynamics (and histories) of different programs. The removal of children from their families for vlacemcnt in foster families or reformatories was bitterly hated and stubbornly resisted by working-class families; bur mothers brou~ht their children to infant health clinics voluntarily and in numbers, and aftcr 1945 they brought their older children to counseling clinics, as well. In this instance, historians of the German welfare state nught profit from the 'demand side" models of welfare development that are sometimes more explicitly explored in some of the international litcrature.95 In fact, even where social workers really were at~cmpting to limit or subvert the autonomy and power of parents, I am not sure that their aclions can be characterized only and exclusivelv as Dart of a microuhysics of oppression. Prorressive child welfare advocates in Germany, particularly in the National Center for Child Welfare, waged a campainn in the 1920s to persuade German parents and educators to stop beating children with such ferocity, regularity, and nonchalance. They did so because they feared thc unintended physical and psychological effects of beatings, and implicitly because they believed physical violence could conlpromise the development of the kind of autonomous, selfreliant subjectivity on which a modern state had to rely in its citizenry.96 Or. to give another common example from the period. children removed from their families aftcr being subjected by parents or other relatives to repeated episodes of violence or rape were being manipulated by biopolitical technocrats, and were often abused in ncw ways in institutions or foster families; but they were also being liberated. Sometimes some forms of the exercise of power in society are in some wavs emancipatorv; and that is historicallv significant. Further, of course we must ask whether it is really true that social workers' and social agencies' attempts to manipulalc people worked. My own impression is that social policy makcrs grew increasingly aware, between the 1870s and the 1960s, that their own ends could not be achieved unless they won the cooperation of the targets of policy. And to do that. they had to offer people things that they wanted and needed. Policies that incited resistance were -sometimes with glacial slowness, after stubborn and embittered struggles-de-emphasized or even abandoned. Should we reallv see the history of social welfare uolicv as a more or less static (bccause the same thing is always happening) history of the imposition of manipulative volicies on uovulations? I believe a more complex model of the evolution of social policy as a system of social interaction, involving contlicting and converging demands, constant negotiation, struggle, and- above all- mutual learning would be more appropriate. This is a point Abram dc Swaan and othcrs have made at some length; but it does not appear to have been built into our theory of modernity very systematically, least of all in German history.97>

AT: Bio~ower-Alt Fails (Bio~owerCan Be Good) Their critique of biopolitics has a pessimistic view of modernity, totalizing a diverse historical epoch and ignoring the good manifestations of biopolitical governance -Nazism is the exception, not the rule Dickinson, University of Cincinnati, 2004 (Edward Ross, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modcmity," Ccntral European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March) This issue is important. L belicve. in part because the project or Ferreting out the contribution of biopolitical discourscs to the construction of National Socialis~n so dominates the literature, creatino a sense of impending disaster that 1 believe has all too strongly shapcd the questions we, as historians, are ask in^ about the history of modern biopolitics. I wmt to give two examples thal 1 believe reveal the way this focus constrains our collective historical imagination. I do so not in order to point out that my colleagues are "wrong." but to suggest how powerfully our imaginations and our qucstions are shapcd by thc specter and spectacle of National Socialism. In a brilliant review article published in 1996, Peter Fritzsche posed the question "Did Weimar Fail'r' Fritzschc gave voice to a healthy skepticism regarding the tendency in the literature to imply that the history of social welhre programs is only part of the prehistory of National Socialism. The "darker vision of modernism" presented by Detlev Pwkert, hc suggested, "is compelling but not wholly persuasive." The "spirit of science" itself. he argued. does not introduce "auite so automatically a 'discourse of segregation' without the application of racist politics"; and he asked "to what extent are reformist practices invariably collusions in disciplinary regimes?, And yet, Fritzqche's reflections arc haunted by almost unrelieved foreboding, which merely accurately reflecls thc tone of the Literature he was reviewing. He suggested that "the central theme of this scholarship . .. is the regimentation and disciplinc of citizens in often dangerously imaginative ways": it "establishcs significant continuities between the Weinxu era and the Third Reich: the history of the republic reveals the "dark shadows of modernity."S8 Indeed, the conceptual framework Fritzsche set up seems to take totalitarianism, war. and mass murder as the end-point of "continuity." Taking up a question asked by Gerald Feldman. Fritzschr: suggested that the Weimar Republic was neither a gamble nor an cxperjment. but rather a laboratory of modmity. From this perspective. Fritzsche asserts, prhaps Weimar should be regarded as "less a failure than a scries of bold experiments that do not come to an end with the year 1933." The failure of political democracv "is not the same as the destruction of the laboratorv." Thus, the "coming of the Third Reich was not so much a verification of Weimar's singular failure as the

validation of its dangerous potential?.s9 Fritzsche's was a wonderful metaphor for Weimar Germany, a period of enormous creativity and experimentation in any number of fields: and it is surely also a fruitful way to conceive or the relationship between Wcimar and Nazi Germany. And yet- again, as Fritzsche's more skeptical comments pointed out -the laboratory didn't simply stay open; the experimenters didn't simply keep experinieniing; not all the experiments simply kept running under new management.60 Particular kinds of experiments were not oernutted in the Third Reich: those founded on the idea of the toleration of difference: those that dctincd difference as a psycholog~cal, political, or cultural fact to be understood and managed. rather than as a form of deviancc or subversion to be repressed or eliminated; those founded on the idea of integration through selfdirected uarticipation (as opposed to integration lhrouah orchestrated and obedient participation); and those that aimed at achieving a stable pluralism. There were many such experiments under way in the Wcimar period: given the cxtent to which the political fabric of the Weimar Republic was rent by ideological differences, they were often of particular imyowance and urgency. Many or those experiments appcd to be failing by the end of the 1920s: and that in itself was a critically important reason for the appeal ot'thc ideas championed by the Nazis. The totalitarian and biological conception of national unity was in part a response to the apparent failure of a democratic and pluralisl model of social and political integration. And yct. many of those very same experiments were revived. with enormous success, aftcr 1949. Examples from mv own field of research might include the development of a profession of social work that claimed to be a valuc-neutral foundation for cooperation between social workers of radically differing ideological orientation; the development of a psvchoanalvtic, rather than psychiatric, internretation of "deviance" (neurosis replaces inherited brain defects): and the use of corporalist structures of governance within the welfare bureaucracy. These mechanisms did not work perfectly. But they were a continuation of "cxveriments" undertaken in the Weimar period and shut down in 1933; and they did contribute to the stabilization ofa pluralist democracy. That was not a historically trivial or selfcvident achievement. either in Germany or elsewhere. It required time. ingenuity, and a large-scale convergence of long-term historical forces. We should be alive to its importance as a feature of modernity. As Fritzsche's revicw makes clear, then, much of the recent litcralurc seems to imply that National Socialism was a product of the "success" of a modernitythat ends in 1945; but it could just as easily be secn as a temporary "failure" of modernity, the "success" of which would only come in the 1950s and 1960s. As Paul Betts recently renlarked. we should not present the postwar pcriod as a "redcm~tive tale of modernism triumphant" and cast Nazism as merely a "regressive interlude." But neither should we dismiss the fact that such a narrative would be, so to speak, half true- that the democratic welfare slate is nu less a product of modernity than is totalitarianism.

AT: Bio~ower-Alt Fails (Bio~owerCan Be Good) Their critique only focuses on the dark side of modernity, masking the achievements of biopolitical modernity which is the large scale absence of mass murder not its cause Dickinson, University of Cincinnati, 2004 (Edward Ross, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March) A second example is Geoff Eley's masterful synthetic introduction to a collection of essays published in 1996 under the title Society, Culture, and the State in Germany, 1870-1930. Elcy set forth two research agendas derived from his review of recent hypotheses regarding the origins and nature of Nazism. Onc was to discover what allowed so many people to identify with the Nazis. The second was that we explore the ways in which welfare policy contributed to Nazism, by examining "the production of new values, new mores, new social practices, new ideas about thc good and efficient society." Eley suggested that we examine "strategies of policing and constructions of criminality, notions of the normal and the deviant, the production and regulation of sexuality, the . ..understanding of the socially valued individual ...the coalescence of racialized thinking . . ."62 So far so good; but why stop there? Why not examine the expanding hold of the language of rights on thc political imagination, or the disintegration of traditional authority under the impact of the explosive expansion of the public sphere? Why not pursue a clearer understanding of ideas about the nature of citizenship in the modern state; about the potentials of a participatory social and political order; about human needs and human rights to have those needs met: about the liberation of the individual (including her sexual liberation, her liheration from ignorance and sickness. her liberation from social and economic powcrlessncss): about the phvsical and psycholo~ical dangers created by thc existing social order and how to reduce them, the traumas it inflicted and how to heal them? In short, why not examine how thc construction of "the social" -the ideas and practices of the modern biopolitical interventionist com~lex -contributed to the development of a democratic politics and humane social policies between 1918 and 1930, and again after 1945? Like Fritzschc's essay. Eley's accurately retlected the tone of most of those it introduced. In the body of the volumc. Elizabeth Domansky, for example, pointed out that biopolitics "did not 'automatically' or 'naturally' lead to the rise of National Socialism," but rather "provided ...thc political Right in Weimar with the opportunity to capitalize on a discursive strategy that could successfully compete with liberal and socialist slrategies."63 This is correct: but the language of biooolitics was demonstrably one on which liberals, socialists. and advocates of a democratic welfare state could also capitalize, and did. Or again. Jean Quataert remarked--quite rightly, I believe -that "the most wo~rcssivc achievements of the Weimar welfare state were completely embedded" in biopolitical discourse. She also commented that Nazi policy was "continuous with what passed as the ruling knowledge of the time" and was a product of "an extrcmc form of technocratic reason" and "early twentieth-century modernity's dark side." The implicalion seems to be that "prog~essive" welfare policy was fundamentally

"dark": but it seems more accurate to conclude that bionolitics had a variety of votentials.64 Again, the point here is not that any of the interpretations offered in these pieces are wrong; instead. it is that we are. collcctivelv, so focused on unmasking the negative potentials and realities of modernity that we have constructed a true, but verv one-sided picture. The pathos of this picture is undeniable, particularly for a generation of historians raised on the Manichean myth- forged in the crucible of World War I1 and the Cold War- of the democratic welfare state. And as a rhetorical gesture, this analysis works magnificently -we explode the narcissistic self-admiration of democratic modernity by revealing the dark, manipulative, murderous potential that lurks within. thus arriving at a healthy. mature sort of melancholy. But this gesture too often precludes asking what else biopolitics was doing, besides manipulating people, reducing them to pawns in the plans of technocrats, and paving the way for massacre. In 1989 Detlev Peukert argued that any adcaualc picture of modernity must include both its "achievements" and its "~atho1oeies"-social reform as well as "Machbarkeitswahn," the "growth of rational relations bctwccn people" as well as the "swelling instrumental goal-rationality," the "liberation of artislic and scientific creativitv" as well as the "loss of substance and absence of limits [Haltlosigkeit]."65 Yet he himself wrotc nothing like such a "balanced" history, focusing exclusively on Nazism and on the negative half of each of these binaries; and that focus has remained characteristic of the literature as a whole. What I want to suggest here is that the function of thc rhetorical or explanatory framework surrounding. our conception of modernity seems to be in danger of being inverted. The investigation of the history of modem biopolitics has enabled new understandings of National Socialism; now we need to take care that our understanding of National Socialism does not thwart a realistic assessment of modern biopolitics. Much of the literature leaves one with the sense that a modern world in which mass murder is not happening is just that: a place where something is not --yet- happening. Normalization is not yet giving way to exclusion, scientific study and classification of populations is not yet giving way to concentration camps and extermination campaigns. Mass murder, in short, is the historical problem; the absence of mass murdcr is not a problem. it does not need to be investigated or explained.

AT: Bio~ower-Kev to Democracv Biopolitics is good -it's key to promote democracy and check totalitarianism Dickinson, University of Cincinnati, 2004 (Edward Ross, "Biopolitics. Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse Ahour "Modcrnity," Central Europcan History, vol. 37. no. 1, March) All of these questions, however, still address primarily the activities of technocrats and social managers. We arc still asking how bad social eneineering is. In fact, this entire discourse seems to be shaped by the fundamental suspicion that trying activcly to create a bcttcr society is alwavs and necessarily a bad thing -an undemocratic, manipulative, opprcssivc thing.98 This assumption is rooted in a particular understandins of the micropolitics of expertise and ~rol'essionalism. It is frequently argued that modern forms of technical knowledge and licensing create relations of dominance and subordination between experts and their "clients." Thus Paul Weindling, for example, asserted that, "Professionalism, reinforced by official powers. meant that welfare deiined new spheres for the exercising of coercion . . . The new technocracy of professions and welfarc administrators might be seen as erecting antidcrnocratic and coercive social structures by extending the welfare state." Michael Schwa-, similarly, observcd in 1992 that "even in the democratic variant of science there was a tendency to technocratic elitism" and the "scientistic objectification of hurnanity."99 And Detlev Peukcrt reminded us that "rationalization as a strategy of experls inherently contained [barg systematisch] the danger of the technocratic arrogance of experts, the overwheln~ing of those affected by the catalog of norms for rational living derived from the cxpert knowledge of the professions, but not from the experience of those aKectcd."100 Even more sinister, again, is the tendency of thcsc same experts to exclude, stigmatize. and pathologize those they are not ablc to "normalize." Zygmunl Bauman has presented the same casc with a particular clarity, concluding that since modernity is "about" order, and order always implies its opvosite, chaos. "intolerance is . . . the natural inclination of modern practice. Construction of order sets the limits to incorporation and admission. It calls for the denial of rights, and of the grounds, of everything that cannot be assimilated- for the de-legitimation of the other."lO 1 At its simplest, this view of the politics of expertise and professionalization is certainly plausible. Historically speaking, however. further coniecture that this "micropolitical" dynamic creates authoritarian, totalitarian, or homicidal potentials at the level of the state does not seem very tenable. Historically, it apvears that the greatest advocates of political democracy -in Germany leftliberals and Social Democrats -have been also the greatest advocates of everv kind of biopolitical social engineering. from public health and welfare programs through social insurance to city planning and, yes, even eugenics.102 The state they built has intervened in social relations to an (until recently) ever-growing degree; professionalization has run ever more rampant in Western societies: the production of scientistic and technocratic expert knowledge has proceeded at an ever more frenetic pace. And yet, from the

perspective of the first vears of the millennium, the second half of the twentieth centurv appears to be the great age of democracy in precisely those societies where these processes have been most in evidence. What is more, the interventionist state has steadily expanded both the rights and the resources of virtually every citizen -including thosc who were stigmati~cd and pcrsccuted as biologically defective under National Socialism. Perhaps these processes have created an cvcr more restrictive "iron cane" of rationality in European societies. But if so, it seems clear that there is no neccssarv correlation bctwecn rationalizalion and authoritarian politics; the opposite seems in fact to be at least equally true.

AT: Bio~ower-Kev to Democracv Biopower is key to democracy -five reasons Dickinson, University of Cincinnati, 2004 (Edward Ross. "Biopolidcs, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. I, March) <Why was Europc's twentieth century, in addition to being the age of biopolitics and totalitarianism, also the age of biopolitics and dcmocmcy'? How should we theorize thisrelationship? I would like to offer five propositions as food for thought. First, again, the concept or the esscntial ledtimac~ and social value of individual needs, and hence the imperative of individual rights as the political mechanism [or ncuing them mct, has historically bccn a cornerstone of some strategies of social management. To borrow a phrase from Detlcv Peukcrt, this does not mean that democracy was the "absolutely inevitable" outcome of the development of biopolitics: but it docs mean that it was "one among other possible outcomes of the crisis of modern civilization."l12 Second, I would argue that there is also a causal fit between cultures of expertise, or "scientism," and democracy. Of course, "scientism" subverted the real, historical ideological undeminninas of authoritarian polities in Europe in the nineteenth century. It also in a sense replaced them. Democratic citizens have the freedom to ask "why": and in a democratic system there is therefore a bias toward pragmatic, "obiective" or naturalized answers- since values are often regarded as matters of opinion, with which any citizen has a ri3ht to dil'fer. Scientific "fact" is democracy's substitute for revealed truth, expertise its substitute for authority. The age of democracy is thc age of professionalization, of technocracy; there is a deeper connection between the two. this is not merely a matter of historical coincidence. Third, the vulnerability of explicitly moral values in democratic societies creates a problem of legitimation. Of course there are moral values that all democratic societies must in some degree uphold (individual autonomy and freedom, human dignity, fairness, the rule of law), and those values are part of their strength. But as people's states, democratic social and political orders are also implicitly and oflen explicitly expected to do something positive and tangible to enhance the well-being of their citizens. One of those things, of course, ~ simply to provide a rising standard of living; and the visible and astonishing success of that vroiect has bccn crucial to all Western democracies since 1945. Another is the provision of a risin~ standard of health; and here again, the democratic welfare state has "delivered the ~oods" in concrete, measurable. and extraordinary ways. In this sense, it may not be so simpleminded, after all, to insist on considering the fact that modern biopolitics has "worked" heno omen ally well. Fourth, it was vrecisely the democratiz~ng dynamic of modern societies that made the auestion of the "aualitv" of the mass of

the ~opulation seem- and not only in the eyes of the dominant classes -increasingly important. Again, in the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the expected level of the averaae citizen's active participation in European political, social, cultural, and economic life rose steadily, as did the expected level of her effective influence in all these spheres. This made it a matter of increasin~ importance whether the average person was more or less educated and informed, more or less moral and self-disciplined, more or lcss healthy and physically capable, more or less socially competent. And modern social refoi-m -"biopolitics" defined very broadly-sccmed to offer the ~ossibil~ty of creating the human foundation for a society ordered bv autonomous participation, rather than hy obedience. This too was part of the Machbarkeitswakrz of modernity; but this was potentially a democratic "Wahn," not only an authori~arian one. Fifth, histr)rically there has been a clear connection between the concept of political citizenship and the idea of moral autonomv. The political "subiect" (or citizen -as opposed to the political subject. who rs an object of state action) is also a moral subiect. The citi~cn's capacity for moral reasoning is the legitimating postulate of all democratic politics. The regulation of sexual and reproductive life has long been undersrood in European societies to be among the most fundamental issues of morality. There is. therefore, a connection between political citizenship on the one hand, and the sexual and reproductive autonomv implied in thc individual control that is a central elenlent of the modern biopolitjcal complex. on the other. The association in the minds of conservatives in the late imperial period between democracy and declining fertility was not a panicky delusion; panicky it certainly was, but it was also a genuine insight into a deeper ideological connection.1 l3>

AT: Bionower -Kev to Democracv Biopolitics is not totalitarian, in fact it's good -it has empirically lead to the strengthening of liberal democracy which has on-balance prevented the violence they describe and been used against oppressive structures Dickinson, University of Cincinnati, 2004 (Edward ROSS. "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March) In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakasble. Both arc instances ol.the "disciplinary society'' and of hiopoliticnl. wgulntory. social-engineering rnohrni~y. and they sh;~1h11 genealogy with more authoril;~rian sliltes. including the National Socialist state. but also fascist Italy. for exanrple. And it is certainly lruitrul to view them tnln~ this very broad perspective. Hut thxt ~I~~Ivs~s Call easily become superticial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearlv the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantivelv quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere dcvclopcd Lhc fateful. radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism). the psychotic logic that leads from cconomistic population managcmcnt to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce .'health.'. such a system can -and historically does- crcate compu~sory ]>rog;lrn to enforce it. But wain, there are political and policv potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that arc very diffcrcnt from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes rewire, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasinrlv narrow limits on cocrcivc politics, and to have penerated a "logic" or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the reallv verv impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90 Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomv (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of "libertv," just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the verv least. totalitarianism cannot be the

sole oricntation point for our understanding: of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering. This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian (and Peukertian) theory. Democratic welfare states are regimes of powerlknowledge no less than earlv twentieth-centurv totalitarian states; these systems are not "opposites," in the sense that they are two altemalivc ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very different ways of oraanjzing it. The concept "power" should not be read as a universal stifling night of opr>ression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grev, are essentially or effectively "the same." Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomv and effective subiectivitv. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, "tactically polvvalent." Discursive elements (like the various elements of biopolitics) can be combined in dilTerent ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare statc): they cannot he assigned to one place in a structure. but rather circulate. The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create "multiple modernities," modem societies with quite radically differing potentials. Biopolitics is not the problem in and of itself -it's biopolitics deployed in totalitarians societies which is bad -our strengthening of democratic structures prevents, not causes, their impact Dickinson, University of Cincinnati,2004 (Edward Ross, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Retlections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, v01. 37, no. 1, March) In an impona~rt progranlnutic statement of 19% Geoft' Eley celebrdted the fact that Foucault's ideas have "fundamentally directed attention away from institutionally centered conceptioi~s oT government and the stale . . . and towud a dispersed and decentered notion of power aod its -microphysics.'"48 The "broader, deeper, and less visible ideological consensus" on "technmtic reason and thc ethical unboundedness of science.' was the focus of his interest.49 But the "power-producing effects in Foucault's 'micro~hvsical' sense" (Elcy) of the construction of social bureaucracies and social knowledge, of "an entire institutional apparatus and system of practice" ( Jean Quataert), simply do not explain Nazi policv.50 The destructive dynamic of Nazism was a product not so much of a particular mrdcm set of ideas as of a particular modern political structure, one that could realize the disastrous potential of those idcas. What was critical was not the expansion of the instruments and disciplines of biopolitics, which occurred everywhere in Europc. Instcad, was the principles that guided how those instruments and disciplines were organized and &. and the external constraints on 1hem.b

National Socialism, biopolitics was shaped by a totalitarian conception of social management focused on the power and ubiquity of the viilkisch state. In democratic societies, biopolitics has historically been constrained by a rights-based strategy of social management. This is a point to which I will return shortly. For now, the point is that what was decisive was actually politics at the level of the state. A cornpantive framework can help US to clnrify this point. Other states passed compulsorv sterilization laws in the 1930s -indeed. individual states in the United States had akady begun doing so in 1907. Yet they did not proceed to the next stem adopted by National Socialism -mass sterilization, mass "eugenic" abortion and murder of the "defective." Individual figures in, for example, the U.S.did nuke such suggestions. But neither the political structures of democratic states nor their legal and political principles permitted such policies actually being enacted. Nor did the scale of forcible sterilization in other countries match that of the Nazi program. I do not mean to suggest that such programs were not horrible; but in a democratic political context they did not develop the dynamic of constant radicalization and escalation that characterized Nazi policies.

AT: Bio~ower-Key to Democracvv Biopower is key to democracy-five reasons Dickinson, University of Cincinnati, 2004 (Edward Ross, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March) <Why was Europe's twentieth century, in addition to being the age of biopolitics and totalitarianism. also the age ol' biopolitics and democrac~'? How should we theorize this relationship? I would like to offer five propositions as food for thought. &, agaln, _the concept of the essential legitimacy and social value of individual needs. and hence the imperative of individual rights as the political mechanism for netting them met, has historicallv been a cornerstone of some strategies of social management. To borrow a phrase from Dctlev Peukert, this does not mcan that democracy was the "absolutely inevitable" outcome oi' the development of biopoiitics; but it does mean that it was "one anlong other possible outcomes of the crisis of modern civilization."ll2 Second, I would argue that there is also a causal fit between cultures of expertise. or "scicntism," and democracy. Of course, "scientism" subverted the real. historical ideolop~cal underpinnings of authoritarian uolities in Europe in the nineteenth century. It also in a sense reolaced them. Democratic citizens have the freedom to ask "why"; and in a democratic system there is therefore a bias toward ragm ma tic. "obiectivc" or naturalized answers- since values are often regarded as matters 01' opinion, with which any citizen has a right to differ. Scientific "fact" is democracy's substitute for revealed truth, expertise its substitute for authority. The age of democracy is the age of profcssional~zation, of technocracy; there is a dee~er connection between Ihc two, this is not merely a matter of historical coincidence. Third, the vulnerability of exulicitly moral values in democratic societies creates a problem of le&imation. Of course there are moral values that all democratic societies must in some degree uphold (individual autonomy and freedom. human dignity, fairness. the rule of law), and those values are part of their slrcngth. But as people's states, democratic social and ~olitical orders arc also im~licitlv and often explicitly expected to do something positive and tangible to enhance the well-being of their citizens. One of those thin~s, of course, & simply to provide a rising standard of living: and the visible and astonishing success of that proiect has been crucial to all Western democracies since 1945. Another is the provision of a rising standard oi health; and here again, the democratic welfare state has "delivered the goods" in concrete, measurable, and extraord~nary ways. In this sense, it may not be so simuleminded, after all. to insist on considering the fact that modern biopolitics has "worked" ~henomenally well. Fourth. it was precisely the democratizina dynamic of modern societies that made the question of the "aualitv" of the mass of

the vopulation seem- and not only in the eyes of thc dominant classes -increasindv imuortant. Again, in the course of the nineteenth and early twcntieth centuries the exoected levcl of the average citizen's activc participation in European volitical. social. cultural. and econonlic Iifc rose steadily. as did the expected level of her effective influence in all these spheres. This made it a matter of increasing importance whether the average person was more or less educated and informed. more or less moral and self-disci~lined, more or less healthy and physically capable, more or less socially competent. And modern social refornl -"biopolitics" defined very broadlv-scemed to offer the possibil~ty of creating the human foundation for a society ordered bv autonomous uartici~ation, rathcr than by obedience. This too was part of the Machbarkeifswahr~ of modernity; but this was potentially a democratic "Wahrt," not only an authoritarian one. Fifth. historicallv lhcre has been a clear connection between the concept of political citizenship and the idea of moral autonomy. The ~0litical "subiect" (or citizen -as opposed to the political subject, who is an object rrT state action) is also a moral subiect. The citizen's capacity for moral reasoning is the leaitimating postulate of all democratic politics. The regulation of sexual and reproductive life has long been understood in European societies to be among the most flundamcntal issues of morality. There is. therefore, a connection between volitical citizenship on the one hand. and the sexual and reproductive autonomv imulied in the individual control that is a central element of the modern biopolitical complex, on the other. Thc association in the minds of conservatives in the late imperial period between democracy and declining fertility was not a panicky dclusion; panicky it certainly was. but it was also a genuine insight into a deeper ideological connection. 1l3>

AT: Bio~ower-Kev to Value to Life (AT: Bare Life) Biopower does not result in bare-life -increase in biopower increases the potentialities of life Ojakangas, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies in Finland, 2005 (Mika, "Impossible Dialogue on Bio-power," Foucault Studies, No. 2, p. 528, May) <Moreover, life as the obiect and the subject of bio-power -given that life is everywhere, it becomes everywhere -is in no way bare. but is as the synthetic notion of life implies, the multiplicitv ol' the forms of life. from the nutritive life to the intellectual life, from the 37 biological levels of life to the wlitical existence of man. Instead of bare life, the life of bio-power is a plenitude of life. as Foucault 44 nutsit.Agamben is certainly right in saying that the production of bare life is, and has been since Aristotle, a main strategy of the sovereign power to establish itself -to the same degree that sovereignty has been the main fiction of juridico-institutional thinking from Jean Bodin to Carl Schmitt. The sovereign power is, indeed. based on bare life because it is capable of coniionting life merely when stripped off and isolated from all forms of life, when the entire existence of a man is reduced to a bare life and exposed to an unconditional threat of death. Life is undoubtedly sacred for the sovereign power in the sense that Aganlben defines it. It can be taken away without a homicide being committed. In the case of bio-power, however, this does not hold true. In order to function properly. bio-power cannot reduce life to the level of bare life, because bare life is life that can onlv be taken awav or allowed to persist -which also makes understandable the vast critique of sovereignty in the era of bio-power. Bio-power needs a notion of life that corresponds 45 to its aims. What then is the aim of bio-vower? Its aim is not to produce bare life but, as Foucault emvhasizes. to "multiply life", & 46 produce "extra-life." Bio-vower needs, in other words, a notion of life which enables it to accomplish this task. The modern synthetic notion of life endows it with such a notion. It enables biopower to "invest life through and through", to "optimize forces, 47 aptitudes. and life in general without at the same time making them more difficult to govern." It could be argued, of course. that instead of bare life (zoe)the form of life (bios) functions as the foundation of bio-power. However, there is no room either for a bios in the modern bio-political order because every bios has always been, as Agamben emphasizes, the

result of the exclusion of zoe from the political realm. The modern biopolitical order does not exclude anything -not even in the form ol' "inclusive exclusion". As a matter of fact, in the era of bio~olitics. life is already a bios that is only its own zoe. It has already moved into the site that Agamben suggests as the remedy of the political pathologies of modernity, that is to say, into the site where 48 politics is freed from every ban and "a form of life is wholly exhausted in bare life." At the end of Homo Sacer, Agamben gives this life the name "form-of-life", signifying "always and above all possibilities of life, always and above all power", understood as A4 potentiality (potenzu). According 10 Agambcn, there would be no power that could have any hold over men's existence if life were understood as a "form-of-life". Howcvcr, it is ~recisely this life, life as untamed powcr and ~otentialitv. that bio-power invests and oplimizes. If bio-vower multivlies and optimizes life, it does so, above all. bv multiulvina and ovtimizina potentialities of life. bv 50 fostering and ~enerating "forms-of-life ". > The purpose of biopolitical actions of the state is to increase the welfare and happiness of society Ojakangas, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies in Finland, 2005 (Mika, "Impossible Dialogue on Bio-power," Foucault Studies. No. 2, p. 528, May) <To say that bio-power stands outside the law does not yet mean that it stands outside state powcr. On the contrary, as we have already noted and as Foucault himself has shown, it was precisely the modern sovereign state that first started to use bio-political methods extensively for the care of individuals and populations. Undoubtedly, the original purpose of these methods was to increase state power, but i~ aim has also been, from the beginning, the welfare of the individual and of the entire population, the improvement 71 of their condition. the increase ol'thcir wcalth. their longevity, health and even happiness -havpiness of "all and everyone" (omnes et .singulatim): "The sole Purpose of the volice". one of the first institutional loci of the nascent bio-vower, "is to lead man to the 72 utmost happiness to be enioved in this life", wrote De Lamare in TreaQ on the Police at the beginning of the eighteenth century. According to Foucault, one should not, however, concentrate only on the modem state in looking for the origin of bio-power. One should cxarnine also the religious tradition of the West, especially the Judeo-Christian idca of a shepherd as a political leader of his

73 people. >

AT: Bio~ower-AT: It's Racist Biopower is used to care for individuals. Racism only occurs when sovereign power and biopower combine. And, once a bio-political society kills it's populace, it ceases to be biopolitical Ojakangas, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies in Finland, 2005 (Mika, "Impossible Dialogue on Bio-power," Foucaull Studies, No. 2, p. 528, May) <According to Foucault, it is that rans sf or mat ion which constitutes the background of what he calls governmentality, thal is to l!? say, bio-political rationality within the modern state. ," It cxplains why political power that is at work within the modern state as a lcgal framework of unity is, from the beginning of a state's existence, accompanied by a power that can be called pastoral. Its role is not to 70 ,, threaten lives hut to "ensure, sustain. and improve" them. the lives of "each and everv one". Its means are not law and violence 80 but care, the "care for individual life". It is preciselv care, the Christian power of love (agape),as the opvosite of all violence that is at issue in bio-power. This is not to say, however, that bio-power would be nothing but love and care. Bio-power is love and care PI ". only to the same extent that the law, according to Benjamin, is violence, namely, by its origin. 82 Admittedly, in the era of bio-politics, as Foucault writes, even "massacres have become vital." This is not the case, however, because violence is hidden in the foundation of bio-politics, as Agamben believes. Although the twentieth century 83 thanatopolitics is the "reverse of bio-politics", it should not hc understood, according to Foucault, as "the effect, the result, or the -

84 logical consequence" of bio-political rationality. Rather, it should be understood, as he suggests, as an outcome of the "demonic !?< combination" of the sovereign power and bio-vower, of "the city-citizen game and the shepherd-flock game" -or as I would like to put it, of patria potestas (father's unconditional power of life and death over his son) and cura matema (mother's unconditional duty to take care of her children). Although massacres can be carried out in the name of care. they do not follow from the logic of 86 hio-power for which death is the "obiect of taboo". Thev follow Erom the logic of soverei~n power. which legitimates killing by whatever armments it chooses. be it God. Nature, or life. Indeed. the imperative "to improve life. to prolong its duration, to improve its chances, to avoid accidenls. and to compensate P7 -8 for failings", may also legitimate killing. According to Foucault, it may legitimate killing if it assumes the following logic of argumentation of racism.: The more inferior specics dic out, the more abnormal individual are eliminated. the fewer degenerates there will be in the species as a whole. and gK the morc I -as species rather than individual -can live, the stronger I will be, the more vigorous I will be. I will be able to pmliferale. It is the logic of racism. according to Foucault, that makes killing acceptable in nlodern bio-political societies. This is not to say, however, that bio-political societies are necessarily more racist than other societies. It is to say that in the era of bio-politics. nrtly racism. bccause it is a determination immanent to life. can 'Tustify the murderous function ofthe State". 8') However, racism can only justify killing -killing that does not follow from the logic of bio-power but from the logic of the sovereign power. Racism is. in other words, the only way the sovereign power, the right to kill, can bc maintained in hiopolitical societies: 'K) "Racism is hound up with workings of a State that is obli6:d to use race. the elimination of races and the purification of the race, to exercise its sovereign power."

Racism is. in other words. a discourse -"cluite compatible" with biopolitics -through which bio-power can be most smoothly transformed into the form of sovereign power. 92 Such transformation, however. changes everything. A bio-political society that wishes to "exercise the old sovereign right to kill", even in the name of race, ceases to be a mere bio-political society, practicing merely bio-politics. It becomes a demonic combination" of sovereign power and bio-power, exercising sovereign means for bio-political ends. In its most monstrous form, & 93 becomcs the Third Reich. For this reason, I cannot subscribe to Agamben's thesis, according to which bio-politics is absolutized in the Third Reich. To be '34 surc. the Third Reich used bio-political means -it was a state in which "insurance and mssumnce were universal" -and aimed for bio-political ends in order to improve the living conditions of the German people -but so did many other nations in the 1930s. What distinguishes the Third Reich from those other nations is the fact that, alongside its bio-political apparatus. it crccted a massive machinery of death. It hecame a society that "unleashed murderous power. or in othcr words, rhe old sovereign right to take life" throughout the "entire social body", as Foucault puts it. It is not, thcrcfore. bio-politics that was abstilutimd in the Third Reich -as a matter of [act, bio-political measures in the Nazi-Germany were, although harsh, relatively modest in scale compared to some presentday welfare states -but rather the sovereign power: This power to kill. which ran through the mtire social hody of Nazi society, was first manifested when the power to take life. the power of life and death. was granted not only to the State but to a whole series orindividuals, to a considerable number of people (such as the SA, the SS, and so on). Ultimately. everyone in the Nazi State had the power of life and death ovcr his or her neighbours. if only kcause of the practice of 9h informing. which effectively meant doing away with the people next door, or having them done away with. The only thing that the Third Reich actually absolutizes is, in other words, the sovereignty of power and therefore, the nakedness of bare life -at least if sovereignty is defined in the Agambcnian manner: 'The sovereign is the one with respect to whom all men are 97..

potentiallv homines sacri, and homo sacer js the one with rcswct to whom all men act as sovereigns." >

AT: Bio~ower-AT: It's Racist State racism only occurs when sovereign power and biopower are combined. Biopower itself is not bad it is used to improve peoples' conditions of living Ojakangas,Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies in Finland, 2005 (Mika, "Impossible Dialogue on Bio-power," Foucault Studies, No. 2, p. 528, May) <For Foucault, the coexistence in political structures oT largc dcslructive mechanisms and institutions oriented toward the care of 1 lo individual life was something puzzling: "It is one of the central antinomies of our political reason." However, it was an antinomy precisely because in principle the sovereign power and bio-power are mutually exclusive. How is it possible that thc care of individual life paves the way for mass slaughters? Although Foucault could never give a satisractory answer to this question, he was convinced that mass slaughters are not the effect or the logical conclusion of biopolitical rationality. I am also convinced about that. To be sure, it can be argued thac sovereign powcr and bio-vower are reconciled within the modern slatc. which leaitimates killina bv bio-political arguments. Especially. it can be argued that these powers are reconcilcd in the Third Reich in which they seemed to "coincidc Ill exactly". To my mind, however, neither the modem state nor the Third Reich -in which the monstrosity of the modern state is crystallized -are the syntheses of the sovereign vower and bio-power. but. rather. the institutional loci of their irrecnncilahle tension. This is, I believe, what Foucault meant when he wrote about their "demonic combination". In fact. the historv of modern Western societies would be auite incomprehensible without takin~ into account that there exists a form of power which refrains from killing but which nevertheless is cauable of directing ~coplc's lives. The effectiveness of bio-vower can be seen lying precisely in that it refrains and withdraws before every demand of killing, even though these demands would derive from the demand of justice. In bio-political societies. according to Foucault. capital punishment could not be maintained exced by invoking less the enormity of the crime itselT than thc monstrosity of the criminal: "One had the right to kill those who 112 represented a kind of biological danger to othcrs." However, given that the "right to kill" is precisely a sovereign right, it can be argucd thac thc bio-political societies analyzed by Foucault were not entirely bio-political. Perhaps, there neither has been nor can be a society that is entirely bio-political. Nevertheless, the fact is that present-day European societies have abolished capital punishment. In

them, there are no longer exceptions. It is the very "right to kill" that has bccn called into question. However, it is not called into question because of enlightened moral sentiments, but rather because of the deployment of bio-political thinking and practice. For all these reasons, Agamkn's thesis, according to which the concentration camp is the fundamental bio-political paradigm 113 of the West, has to be corrected. The bio-vc)litical paradigm of the West is not the concentration camp, but, rather, the present-day welfare sociew and. instead of homo sacer, the paradigmatic figure of the bio-political society can be seen, for example, in the middle-class Swedish social-democrat. Although this figure is an object -and a product -of thc huge bio-political machinery, does not mean that he is ~ermitted to kill without committinp homicide. Actually, the fact that he eventually dies, seems to be his greatest "crime" against the machinery. (In bio-political societies, dcath is not only "something to be hidden away," but, also, as 111 Foucault stresses, the most "shameful thing of all". ) Therefore, he is not exposed to an unconditional threat of death, but rather to an unconditional retreat of all dying. In fact, the bio-~olitical machinen does not want to threaten him. but to encourage him. with all its material and spiritual capacities. to live healthily, to live long and to live happily -even when. in biological terms, he "should have 11.5 been dead long ago". This is because bio-power is not bloody power ovcr bare life for its own sake but pure power over all life for the sake of the living. It is not power but the living, the condition of all life -individual as well as collective -that is the measure of the success of bio-power.>

AT: Foucalt -Permutation Solvencv Foucault ignores juridical power as a key source of violence for the constitutional state. We can strategically reform the law and use the extension of rights to hedge against power -Foucault himself was engaged in these very same political like the Aff Habermas, Permanent Visiting Professor at Northwestern, 1987 (Jiirgen, The Philosovhical Discourse of Modernity, p. 289-291 ) Fouci~ullhc.rinr by nnalyf.ing the ni~m?livc lan$uape gantc oiraliorwl n:>lur~I law UI collwdbll wilh lhe lalcnl f~~nctitlns disi.~~oor eslilhlishmcnl atd lhr. cxcrciw of that ~llc no ilr~thorily has in the agr ol'Ck~ssicism fnr ~hc ahb~>lutiatalillc ]n,wvr. 1sst~veleignly lnrnlr of p~mirhmmt 1h11 Foucault drpicls in co~inecticn~~ ofthe slaw Ihat has a non no ply on vtolence is also expreswd ill the dem~~~strative uilh the prtwdurcs nra~llorn and onleiti. Froo thc .wme h~trlios~list ddvi~~tccs during tlr refiirm em of lhc Enlighleummt. myculmhralc. on Ihc nne hut 111 lltc Knaiim tkory ol'n~cirali~y pcrspalivc. krhrn dcscrihcs ~hc rnadc by lhc Classical Iongmlge ~imc imd lil\\. and. on Ihc othr hand. in ulilitari;~n~s~n. slate power. which is lo my. ol'a polilsal lntcrral~ngly cnoogh. Foucault doer 1101 go inuo the hct ihal thew in tern srvc the rth\,olullonn~y cstahlish~ncnt 01.21 co~~slilolionalirud order Im~irie~d llw proper [Iicinc LI~ idmlo$icrlly front thc s~lwrcignty of the prince lo the uiuerelcnty olthc propk. Thts kill nfr.epi~ne is. ufler all. cumchlcd wilh (how nom1li7.i1tp forms ofpunishmcnt 1k1I c(1mt1t111e Discip/i,trnnriPunirh. Because Foucault iilters out the internal aspccls of the development of law, he can inconspicuously take a tltird and decisive step: Whereas the sovereign power of Classical formations of power is constituted in concepts of right and law, this normative languagc game is supposed to be inapplicable to the disciplinary power of the modern aEe; thc latter is suited only to cmpiriwl. at least noniuridical, concepts having to do with the steering and organization of the behavioral modes and the motives of a population ~~C~UXI rendered increasingl~ manipulable hy science: "The procedures of nnrmaliralion cnmc 10 tx.crer mure cunsrm~ly engageti in the cnloni~illinn of tho* of the hw.I hclicvc that all this can explain the global Rnctinn~nc of what I would cau r society or nurm~~iz~tion.""AS thc tranqirion from doctrines of naturnl law a tho= ur IXIIWI societies show^," the CO~D~~X life-context of modern

societies as a whole can as a matter of fact be less and less construed in the natural-law categories of contractual relationships. However, this circumstance cannot justify the strategic dccision cw ~IIIIot.consq~~e~~ccs ror Foueaull's theory) to ne~lcct the development of normative StrUClUres in connection with the modern formation of power. AS won as Foucault IAXS UP the lhreads OI.I~W hinpolitical estnblishmctlt ,,fdi~cip~in;lry plwcr. k & drop the threads of the lcgal organization of the exercise of power and of the legitimation of the order of domination. Becausc of this, the unmounded im~ression arises that the bour~cois constitutional state is a dysfunctional relic from the oeriod of absoiutism. This uncircumspct Ievelinp of cuttun. and politics lo immediate s,~bstr.~tes of violencc explains the ostemihle gaps in his presentation. That his history of modern penal iustice is or the ;~pplicatia~t detached from the develoomcnt of the constitutional state might be defended on methodolo~ical grounds. The theoretical narrowing down to the system of carryinn out vunishment is more questionable. AS soon she ~SSSfiom the C:lnssicalrothc modcrn age. Foucault pays no attention whatsoever to penal law and to the law governing penal process. Otherwise, he would have had to submit the unmistakable gains in liberality and legal security, and the expansion of civil-rights guarantees cven in this area. to an exact interpretation in terms of the theory of Power. Bowcwr. hi presenlatinn i* utterly distoned hy the kt that he also filters out or tk hisknry of pn:ll pncliccs itself. all aspects of legal regulation. In prisons, indeed, iust as in clinics, schools, and rnilitarv installations. therc do exist those "special power relationships" that have bv no means remained undisturbed by an energeticallv advancing enactment of legal rights -Foucault himself has been politically engaged for this Cause. This seltctivi~y does not "kt. anythin8 away. from thc impr~nance of his Ptscmaling onmasking of the wp~ilary efiicts of power. list his generaliZJtion, in temlS of the ~heoly of power,ors~lcha sekclivc reading hinders Foucault from perceiving the ohenomenon acluallv in need of explanation: In ~e~rrn-sta~e democracies of the West, the spread of legal regulation has the structure dilemma, ~~CZIISit i* the kg:~~ cndnnyer ut Mom or their mean$ for wuiing treetlom that ~IICI~SCIWS presumptive icrlcficinria. Undm the prcmises of his tkoq of p,wcr. Foucault so levels down the com~lcxitv of societal modernization that the disturbing paradoxes of this process cannot even become apparent to him. The legal system provides an avenue for resistance to biopower Baxter, Law Professor at Boston University, 1996

(Hugh, Review, "Bringing Foucault into Law and Law into Foucault," 48 Stan. L. Rev. 449, January, Lexis) This interpretation of Siegel's article suggests a strategy for appropriating Foucault's insigh~s. Foucault offers, first and foremost, a way of elaborating the social and historical setting in which legal structures and communications operate. His account of Ihc "network" or "dense web" n282 of social relations emphasizes he imoortance of knowledge, particularly expert knowledgc, in the process of constituting, reproducing, contesting, and transformin? relations of power. Foucault's polemical dismissals nolwilhslanding, law is both product and producer of this ceaseless process. Law. no less than the discursive practices r'V781 Foucault analyzed in detail, provides resources both for the exercise of power and for resistance to power.

AT: Foucalt -Permutation Solvencv Foucalt's form of resistance is ineffective at dealing with global oppression -a combination of action and postmodernism is best Cook 92 (Anthony, Associate Professor at Georgetown Law School, "A Diversity of Influence: Reflections on Postmodernism," New Eng. L. Rev. 75 1) Scvcral things trouble me about Foucault's approach. First, he nurtures in many wavs an unhealthv insularitv that fails to connect localized struaglc to other localized struggles and to modes of oppression like classism. racism, sexism. and homophobia that transcend their localized articulation within this particular law school. that particular law firm, within this particular church or that particular factory. I note among somc followers of Foucault an unhealthy propensity to rely on rich, thick. ethnographic type descriptions of power relations playing themselves out in these localized laboratories of social conflicl. This reliance on detailed description and its concomitant deemphasis of explanation begins. ironically, to look like a regressive positivism which purports to sever the descriptive from thc normative, the is from the ought and law from morality and politics. Unlcss wc are to be trau~d in this Foucaultian moment of postmodern insularity, we must resist the temptation to sever description from explanation. Instead, our obiective should be to explain what we describe in light of a vision embracing values that we make exulicir in struggle. These values should act as magnets that link our particularized struggles to other struggles and more global critiques of power. In other words, we must not, as Foucault seems all too willing to do. forsake the possibility of more universal narratives that, while tempered bv ~ostmodern insights. attempt to sav and do some thin^ about the oppressive world in which we live. Second. Foucaull's emphasis on the techniques and discourses of knowledge that constitute the human subject often diminishes, if not abrogates, the role of human agency. Agency is of tremendous importance in any theory of oppression. because individuals are not simply constituted by systems of knowledge but also constitute hegemonic and counter-hegemonic systems of knowledge as well. Critical theory must pav attention to the ways in which ovuressed people not onlv are victimized bv ideologies of oppression but the wavs thev craft from these ideologies and discourses counter-heeemonic weauons of liberation.

AT: Foucalt -No Link + Essentialism No link -smaller sites of power are not tied to the state's use of global power domination -your kritik is essentializing Wickham, Professor of Social and Political Theory at Murdoch University, 1986 (Gary, "Power and Power Analysis: Beyond Foucault," Towurds a CrifiqueofFoucault, ed. Mike Gane, p. 171-172) <Meaghan Morris and Paul Patton, who can be said to be much more sympathetic to Foucault's project than Fine, argue that Foucault's conception of the nature of Dower is especially superior in its trcatment of 'global forms of domination'. They say Foucault is able lo go 'bchind the seemingly natural object. in ordcr to bring to light the particular combination of discursive and non-discursivc practices which give it its distinctive historical existence'. They offer the cxamplc of Foucault's treatment of thc 'modcrn state': while the central locus of power in society undoubtedly involvcs a certain co-ordination of the morc lowly techniques and power relations, it cannot be deduced from these. It functions also on a different register; its principle concern is the governance of larger multiplicities: territories or populations. The birth of the modern state, Foucault suggests is to be sought in the history of a certain art of governing populations (Morris and Patton, 1979,9). This passage not only repcats the knowledgelreality distinction (in the form discursive/non-discursive)-or at least seems to repeal it; to be fair to Morris and Patton they may not be equating the term 'nondiscursive' with reality but only using this term to refer to nonregularized configurations, like informal conversations, which do not as yet warrant thc label 'discourse'. It also repeats both the negative and essentialist features of Foucault's understanding of power. It talks of power in terms of global domination and despite the gesture towards a sueeestion that smaller sites of power relations are no1 necessarily related to more global sites it undoubtedly constructs the more global sites. especially the state, as unified essences which are 'above' and incorporate 'more lowly' sites. As I have argued at several points morc global sites do not exist 'above' smaller sites and incorporate them: they exist indcpendentlv of and use specific techniaucs to reproduce or repeat thcse smaller sites within their boundaries. All we need say about thc state is that rather than being a unified cssence with a definite form (and I must stress that I am levelling this criticism only at Morris and Patton's treatment of the state (in the above passage); there arc of course a multitude of theorics ofthe state and it would be absurd to attempt a single critique which addressed them all), the state is only a category which can be used to repeat or represent several swcitic practices -government practices, semi-government practices, bureaucratic practices. etc. -as a grouping in suecific sites. In this way a site around the policy of managing the economv, or a site around the ~olicv of rc~ulatinebroadcasting to a particular standard, involving the representation of the practices of several government departments, semi-government agencies, advisory bodies ctc. may be said lo be the state. But this is all the stalc is, it does not mean that these practices constitute a fixed, separately existing

g only this the statc is certainly not an always-important obiect of analysis -something it can only be when it is construcled as an essence. So whether Foucault produces a 'better' or 'worse' accuunt of the state is only really important in terms of criteria produced within any essentialist framework which so constructs thc state.>

AT: Foucalt -Alt Fails =Essentialist The alternative is essentialist and fails -power relations are not unified Wickham, Professor of Social and Political Theory at Murdoch University, 1986 (Gary, "Power and Power Analysis: Beyond Foucault," Towards a Critique of Foucault, cd. Mike Gane, p. 153-154) <We learnt above that Foucault sees technologies of power as functioning within, as being interated in, what he terms particular strategies. It is to an examination of the nature and operation of strategies that we now turn. Jef'Minson says that Foucault's use of the term strategy is not auite the same as in the 'political-cum-military' use -'Foucault's notion of a stratcny denotes a rerzularlv rewoduced vattern of effects,includit~gthe (re-)drawigrg up of e.g. reformative plans' (Minson, 1980, 11, his emphasis). One example of a strategy in operation which Foucault offers is that of the continuance of the 'bourgeois strategy'. The bourgeoisie is perfectly well aware that a new constitution or legislature will not suffice to assure its hegemony: it realises that it has to invent a new technology ensuring the irrigation by effects of power of the whole social body down to its smallest particles. And it was by such means that the bourgeoisie not only made a revolution but succeeded in establishing a social hegemony which it has never relinquished (Foucault, 1980 (d), 156). This example highlights a major problem with Foucault's notion of strategy. His treatment of this notion reinforces the essentialist tendencies of his analvlical framework for it forces us to understand power relations as completelv unified -in the above example they are unified around the classically essentialist economic category 'bourgeoisie' (a term which, it must bc stressed, does not always signal essentialism). Minson points out that a strategy is both the identification and unification of relations of vower in oueration (Minson. 1980, 10,my emphasis). Of course the unification of relations, or practices, does not nccessarily involve the invocatjon of an essence (whether the unification is theorized as a strategy or not). It is uossible to theorize the unity of a particular set of relations or practices without invoking an essence. But it is only possible to do so within uarlicular sltes. Once this process moves beyond suecitic sites. as it does in Foucault's case, it becomes false unification. It then ncccssarilv involves the invocation of' an essence which is used as the principle which unifies the relations or practices bevond their specific sites, beyond their specific conditions of existence.>

AT: Foucalt -Alt + Suffering Foucault undermines morals and politics -the alternative will only cause suffering and the destroy all ethics Thiele -Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida -2003 \Leslie Paul, 'The Ethics and Politics of Narrative," Foucalt and Hcidcggw: Critical Encounters, editors -Rosenberg and Milchmanl <The complementarity of Heidegger's and Foucault's accounts of modern demons and saving graces should not be too surprising. Foucault's indebtedness to and fascination with Heidegger is well documented. 1 My intent in this chapter is neither to focus on the complementarity of these visions, nor to outline the striking philosophical and political differences that remain in Heidegger's and Foucault's work. Rather, I attempt to make a claim for what at first blush might appear a lost cause. Despite their originality and inteilectual brilliance. Heidengcr and Foucault are often castigated as ethico-volitical dead-ends. They are criticized for their unwillin~ness or inabilitv to supplv the mounds for sound moral and political iudement. Heidegger's embrace of Nazism, in particular, is frequently identified as proof positive that he has little, if anything, to contribute to the ethico-political domain. The standard charge is that his highly abstract form of philosophizing, empyrean ontological vantage point, and depreciation of "das Man" undermines moral principle and political responsibility. From his philosophical heights, it is suggested, Heidegger remained blind to human sufferings, ethical imperatives, and political practicalities. He immunized himself against thc moral sensitivity, compassion, and prudence that might have dissuaded him from endorsing and identifying with a brutal regime. Those who embrace his philosophy, critics warn, court similar dangers. In like fashion, it is held that Foucault dug himself into an eauallv deep, though ideologically relocated, moral and volitical hole. Genealogical studies left Foucault convinced of the ubiquity of the disciplinary matrix. There would be no final liberation. The slickv, normalizing webs of power were inescapable and a "hermeneutics of suspicion" ouashed anv how of gaining the ethical and volitical high ground. 2 As such, critics charge, Foucault stripped from us all reason for resistance to unjust power and all hope of legitimating alternative ethico-political institutions. In a Foucauldian world of oanovtic power that shapes wants, needs, and selves, critics worrv, one would havc no justification for fighting and nothing worth fighting for. 3 In sum. Heidcgger's and Foucault's critics suggest that both thinkers undermine the foundations of the practical wisdom needed to ethically and politically navigate late modernity. Despite the brilliance and originality of their thought, arguably the greatest philosopher and the greatest social and political theoris1 of thc twentieth century remain ungrounded ethically and divorced fiom political responsibility. Critics argue that Heidepger's statements and' actions endorsing and defending Nazi authoritarianism and Foucault's radical anarchism, as displayed in his discussions of vouular iustice with Maoists, demonstrate that neither thinker is

capable of suvplying us with the resources for sound moral and political iudgment.>

AT: Foucalt -Alt = Contradictorv Foucalt's alternative is contradictory and should be rejected -he misconceives the role of power Wickham, Professor of Social and Political Theory at Murdoch University, 1986 (Gary, "Power and Power Analysis: Beyond Foucault," Towards a Critiq~ieof Foucault, ed. Mike Gane. p. 156-157) <There are two major problems with this treatment of the Tormation of subiects of vower. It is both too general and too negative. As I said above subiects are produced andlor reproduced or revcatcd in svecitic sites. There is no general process, whether it is called normalization or something else. in which subiects can bc said to be produced in relation to a unified essence called power. And in suggesting as he does here that sub.jects are produced in subjuga~ion, produccd as subjects of the essence of power. Foucault is promoting one of the maior misconceptions of vower which he urges people to avoid-neeative power: seeing power only in terms of a sovereign figure who or which alwavs prohibits or savs no (Foucault, 1979 (a), 60; 1980 (c), 140; and 1980 (e), 187). I think these criticisms point not just to a wcakncss in Foucault's understanding of the production of subiects but also, and probably more importantly, to weaknesses in the concept of sublect itself. This concept should be abandoned for two reasons. Firstly because of its negativity -because it suggests that suhiects are always subiected to something or someone rather than being produced in svecific sites with no inherent status in rerard to a strategy or technology or other 'sublect'. And secondly it should be abandoned because carries the implication that the process of subiection works on independently existing entities, such as individuals, people, etc, than producing these categories within it.> Foucault's alternative is internally contradictory: It either has no true political effect, or, if successful, it disproves itself by creating a new hegemonic discourse to discipline Habermas, Permanent Visiting Professor at Northwestern, 1987 (Jiirgen, The Philosovhical Discourse of Modernity, p. 279) 12) Foucault's historiography can evade relativism as little as it can this acule presentism. His investirations are caught exactly in the self-referentiality that was suvuosed to be excluded by a naturalistic treatment of the pn,hlematic of validity. Genealogical historioaravhy is suuvosed to make the practices of power, precise!" in their discouw-conslilutin~ achiuVctnenl. accessible to an emvirical analvsis. From this penpectivc. not only IWtruth claims confined to thc discourses wdhin which Ulcy arise; lhey exhaust their entire aienifkance in the functional contribution lhey make to the sell-

maintcn;~ncc of a pivcn tcttality ofdiscourse. .l.hat ie to my. the meaning of validitv claims consists in the Dower effects lhcv have. on thc other hand, this basic assumption of the theory of power is self-referential; if it is correct, it must destrov the foundations of the research inspired bv it as well. But if thc truth claims that Foucault himself raises for his gcneniony or knowledge were in fact illusory and amounted to no more than the cffecls that this theorv is capable of releasing wittun the circle LIT its adhcrcas. lhen the entire undertaking of a critical unmasking of the human sciences would lose its point. Wucanlt pursues gco~logical historiography with thc xrious intcnt of gening ;I science underway Ihn is ~~FTiclr sciences. If. the% its suwriorily Cannot be exvressed in the fact that somethino more 10the mismm~grd hum." convincing enters in place of the convicted pseudo-Sciences, if its snpcrioriry u.ere only ro heerpressrd in effect of its suppressin8 the hirhena dominam scientific discourse infort. Foucault's theorv would exhaust itself in the politics of theory. ad imled in setting theoretico~-po~itica~ pods tbr woa~ overburden thc capacities or even so hcmk I om-rmn enterprise. Foucault k awwc of this. Cunseqezntly. he would like to si11:le out his gellealogy from all the lest olrhe humun sctences in a mamcr lhat is rcconcilablc wilh the indn11Enml nssumprions of his own theory. 'RI this end. he turns gcneai0~ical historiography Upon itself': the difference that can eslabl5sh its preeminence ahove ;illthe other human sciences ir to be demunstmted in the hislory of its own emergence.

AT: Foucalt -No Alternative Foucault's ignorance of certain forms of struggles of oppression and human agency dooms the alternative Cook, Associate Professor at Georgetown Law School, 1992 (Anthony E., "A Diversity of Influence: Reflections on Postmodernism, Spring, 26 New Eng.L. Rev. 751, Lexis) Several things trouble me about Foucault's approach. First, he nurtures in many ways an unhealthv insularity that fails to connect localized struggle to other localized struggles and to modes of oppression like classism, racism. sexism, and homophobia that wanscend their localized articulation within this particular law school, that particular law firm, within this particular church or that particular factory. I note among some followers of Foucault an unhcallhy propensity to rely on rich, thick. ethnographic type descriptions of power relations playing themselves out in these localized laboratories of social conflict. This reliance on detailed description and its concomitant deemphasis of explanation bcpins, ironically, to look like a regressive positivism which purports to sever the descriptive from the normative, the is from the ought and law from morality and politics. Unless we are to he trapped in this Foucaultian moment of postmodern insularity, we must resist the temptation to sever description from explanation. Instead, our obiective should be to explain what we describe in light of a vision embracing values that we make explicit in strunde. These values should act as magnets that link our particularized struggles to othcr struggles and more plobal critiques of power. In other words, we must not, as Foucault seems all too willing to do, forsake the vossibilitv of more universal narratives that, while temuered by postmodern insights, attempt to sav ad do something about the onpressive world in which we live. Second, Foucault's emphasis on the techniques and discourses of knowledge that constitute the human subiect often diminishes, if not abrogates, the role of human agcncv. Agency is of tremendous importance in any theory of oupression, because individuals are not simply constituted by systems of knowledge but also constitute hewmonic and counter-hegemonic systems of knowledge as well. Critical theory must pay attention to thc wavs in which oppressed ueoule not onlv arc victimized by ideologies of on~ression but the ways they craft from these ideologies and discourses counter-hcgemonic wcapons of liberation. Totalizing critiques of law ignore its potential and undeniable past achievements. Practically applying philosophy to reform can tap into the perfectibility of a truly democratic state McCarthy, Professor of Philosophy and Humanities at Northwestern, 1987 (Thomas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Introduction, p. XVXVII) Habermas's disameements with Foucault certainlv do not amount to a blanket reiectio~ ofthiscriliatl perspectin on ~OWCSk~~o~lcdgc~~nfig~r;rti,~n~. J.t is th~

"totalization" of critiaue that he objects to, the trmcfutmntion of the cdt~qttc of reason by rcrlson -which irnm Kant to ~nn ---into hnd rnket~ on the s~ciiohistorr.al fonn of a critiquc ofidtzrlogy a crit~qoe UI tcnwn tout cnurt in thd name ,ti "rh~toriCall~aflirmed other of reason? On his view. the real uroblem is too little rather than too much enlightenment. a deficiency rather than an excess of reason. And hc suuvorts this view with a double-edwd critiaue of Foucault's "totalization." tlltcedgr applying ru aspfct of eenwhgy, the nrher to i& SUC~LII-thcurctic;~~ Bricfly, he nrEues that Foucault cannot escaue the "nerformative the tm~isc~rrk.nlal~hirtori~~~aphic aspect. contradiction" involved in using: the tools or rcason to criticiz,e reason; this has the serious conseauence of landino, his eenealopical investieations in a situation embarrassinolv similar lo that of the "sciences of man" he so tellinol~ criticized. iileaao~ meaning. validit), and vnltte that were lo hc rlim~nalsd by gctleahr~cal critiqui. ronv hack tn haom it 111 Ihc apcctral Corms of "prchmt~sm:' "I-rlat~vthm." and ~l.r).pton~~nilativ~s~n~" On the olher hand. [he social-tlrnrctical mding of modernity inspircd by thr: theory of powerturn$ out to he siniply ;lo itivcrsio~i of thc standad homanist rcading it is meant 10~pl;m. 11 is. ;\rg~tex Hnhcrmau. no lees one-sided: 'The essentiallv ambiguous nhenomenq of modern culture and societv are "flattened down" onto the olane of Dower. Thus. Ibr cxamole, the internal develoument of law and moralitv, which on his view bears effects of emancination as well as of domination. disauvears from Foucault's account of their normalizinn functions. It is vreciselv the amhinuitv of rationalization nrocesses that has to bc cantured. the undeniable achievements as well as the ualvahle distortions; and this calls for a reconstructed dialectic of enlinhlenrnent rathcr than a totalized critiaue of it. A, I rnentb)~rd.11 Ihc ootsel. Hnl*'rniS~s'a s1r:llegy 18 to ICIIII.~ 01111Mlemitj-ncglc,cted hg Nrt~scl!? 2nd hi\ Iolli)wcrr i n uhlch ihc principle 01 suh~?ztb~~ty rxposed tn tile COUIIICI~~I~COIII'(C a sell-*offic~cnl. L~II-~ISSC~I~VL' ~ne to lcll~n~ ul the cost of moderl~ltywas dt.ausn up. Examinrig Ihr miin cn?Fsroad.s in lhlh counlcld~scuursc. hc polnis lo indicatin~lh 01a path oprnd hut 11111 prtlh~ted. Ihr c~~nslruill crrtrlsnl ;u~d a "L'ouoteni~kt>r~ing" of rcasnn in tcrmr nl 3 noncoercivc tnlcrst~bjcctivily oim~~tuill Returning to Ihc Cusl maior cro.*srosd, hc urn; this notloll to recon.stnlc1 Hegel's idea ol cthtcdl lilt and lo a~pc understanding a1K1reclp~-~?lrccog~titic~n. tho1 thc ntkr of reaon invoked by thc pst-Xiitwchcans is nut alkquately rendered in their "model ol cxclttsiot~": it is better seen as a dibidd and dcswoyeZI ethical tulality. Habermas follows Hegel also in

viewino reason as a healing DOWCr Ofunifi~ali~n howevcr. it is nut thc Abootute thm he llcci in mind. but the uolbrced intsrs~thjectivity of rational agreement. AI and re~~n~iliati~n; the second ma.jorcrussro;xl, he follows Marx's indication that uhilosouhv must become oractical. that its rational content has lo he mobilized in pt2CtlCe. This yieklr it cormtcrposilion tn thr pst-Niemchean pnv'lcring of"lhe sxrtaordtanry" -l~mil experierrch 01aesthetic. mystical, or archaic prcrvrllil~~~e. If situated remon is viewed as social interaction, the polcnlial ol reson hns to he ffiili7ed in the commonicativc prncticc of onlituly. rvcryday lice. The ~xial practice Habermas huin mind cannot, however. he identified with Man's ccmcption of hbor: in his vicw. pmdutctivc ~tcttwtyIS tm sptritic and too rcstrictcd a miion to xr\r as ;I ~xuadtgm oimtianal pract~cc. Fur( hcrmnre. d harhnr~ on idealist residue -labor asco~tstituti\*c oia world in alienntcul lnrm that ha to be rwpptnpriated -that needs lo be overcomc if we an' u~ gel definai.elg kyond the paradigm of subjectivily. The .wlulion he opposes lo Ik simple elimination ofrhc. stthject is a kind of "detennioate ~sgatnIn": Ifurtnmunicntivc action is our parndigm. lhc decentera] suhject remains as a pmicipanl In xxnl islemction mediated hy lanpitagc. On this accosnl, there is an ~~ttertlal rel:tticm of comn~unicative practln lo resun. fur Plnpuage uw is oriented to validity cl;nmti. and vntidny clainls can 81 lhc crxl bc rcdecmed only tbongh interuubiective recognilion brnn~ht ahoul hy the unf<vd folrc of re;tsw. Thc inlcrnal relation of mcuning to validiry means tht umtnunication is not irtlly olway, "immanent" -thatle si11t;ttcd. conditioned -hut also alwayc "liansce~Ment" -thit ii, gcmd lo validity clnims thl arc mmnt to hold beyond any k~cd context ;md thus onhe indefinitely crilic~zed. deb&l. revid: "Validity chims have a Ji~ttus fire. As cl;tims. they tmxend my locitl cunleo: at Ihe samc time, they hwe lo he raised herc and now and kdc facto moenizcd ....The transcendent momcnt uf ~tttivcn;~l %illidit?. bursts cvery provinciality awnla: the obligatory munlrnt of accepted valtdily claims retnicrs them cmien oi a cu~ltext-bawl everylay pcetice ...3 moment ot uncondilionnlily is huilt Into factual prnceslws of mi~tonl sltder$tamJing -the validity laid claim to is diclinguished from the win1 ct~rrellcy of a dc tacto cstablishcd praclicc nnd yet serves it as the fnundation of an misli~ig u~n~ensus."This nrirntalitrn ofct~mrnunicative action to validity clatims admitting of N~II~EIIIand counter;~rgamen! is precisely what makes posihk the karning procesws that knd ro trnmformntions of nor worl~i views and thus of thc very conditions nnd svondarcls of rntit>mltty.

111 bum. then, Habermas agees with the radical critics of enlightenment that the oaradi~m of consciousness is exhausted. Like them. he views reason as incscaaahiv situated, as concretized in historv. societv. bodv. and language. Unlike them. however. he holds that thc defects of the Enlightenment can onlv be made good bv further enlightenment. The totalized cridauc of reason undercuts the cavacitv of reason to be critical. It refuses to acknowledre that modernization bears develo~ments as wcll as distortions of reason. Amon- the former, he mentions the "unthawino" and "reflective refraction" of cultural traditions, the universalization of norms and zeneralization pf values, ani the growtng rndiv~dllat~otl personal idcntitics nrereauisjtes for that effectivelv democratic orzanization of societv through which 01 alone reason can. in the end. become ~ractical.

AT: Foucalt -No Alternative Foucault's alternative = nihilistic -he lacks a clear vision for change Thiele -Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida -2003 [Leslie Paul, 'The Ethics and Politics of Narrative," Foucalt and Heidegger: Critical Encounters, editors -Rosenberg and Milchman] <Tk punuit of knowledge continues unabated fur the skeptic. Yet it proceeh with a suspicious eye. Tkre are inherent lindtations to-- and 3 price to pay for-the pursuit of bowledge. Charles Scott describes Foucault's efforts in this rcgard: "Far from the skepticism that argues that nothing is really knowable...~enealogies embody a sense of the historical limits that define our capacities Tor knowing and believine. Things are known. But they are known in ways that have considerable social and cultural costs." 8 Both Heidegger and Foucault maintain that there is no legitimate basis for the radical skeptic's conviction that knowledge is impossible or unworthy of pursuit. This sort of skepticism, Heidegger states, consists merely in an "addiction to doubt." 9 The skeptical nature of political ~hilosouhical thought, in contrast, is grounded in the imperative of endless inquiry. The point for Heidegger and Foucault is to inquire not in order to sustain doubt, but to doubt that one might better sustain inquiry. Al the same time, inquiry is tempered with a sensibility of the ethico-polilical costs of any "knowledge" that is gained. Doing political philosophy of this sort might hc likened to walking on a tightrope. If vertigo is experienced. a precarious balancc may be lost. Falling to one side leaves one mired in apathy, cynicism, and a~oliticism.This results when skeptical inquirv degenerates inlo a radical skepticism, an addictive doubt that denies the value of (the search for) knowledge and undermines the engagements of collective life, which invariably demand commitment (based on tentatively embraced knowledge). Falling to the other side of the tightrope leaves one mired in do~matic belief or blind activism. Authoritarian ideoloeies come to serve as stable foundations, or a reactive iconoclasm leads to irresponsible defiance. Apathv. cynicism, and apoliticism, on the one side. and dogmatic authoritarianism or reactive iconoclasm. on the other, are the dangerous consequences of losing one's balance. These states of mind and their corresponding pattenls of behavior relieve the vertigo of political plulosophical inquiry, but at n prohibitive cost. It has been argued that Foucault did not so much walk the tightrope of political philosophy as straddle it, at times leaving his maders hopeless and cynical, at times egging them on to an irresponsible monkcywre~rhing. For some, the Foucauldian fight from the ubiquitous powers of nonl~liwtion undermines any defensible nonnative position. Hopelessness accompanies lost innocence. Cynicism or nihilism become the only alternatives for those who spurn all ethical and political foundations. By refusing to paint a picture of a better future, Foucault is said lo undercut the impetus to struggle. others focus on Foucault's

development of a "tool kit" whose contents are to bc employed to deconstruct the appnrotuses of modern power. Yet the danger remains that FOUC~U~~'S "hyperactive" tool-kit users will be unprincipled activists. Luddites at best, terrorists at worst. In either case, Foucault provides no overarching theoretical -vision. Indeed, Foucault is upfront about his rejection of ethical and political theories and ideals. "I think that to imagine another system is to cxtend our participation in the present system Foucault stipulates. "Reiect theory and all forms of general discourse. This need for thcorv is still part of the 73 System We reject." 10 One might worry whether action is mcaot to take the place of thought.

AT: Foucalt -No Alternative Foucault does not deal with the underlying issues of social hierarchies that wraps us up with institutions. His alternative masks these with autonomy, while doing nothing to truly break away from power relations Habermas, Permanent Visiting Professor at Northwestern, 1987 (Jiirgcn, The Philoso~hical Discourse of Modernity. p. 286-288) Foucault cannot adeauatelv deal with the persistent problems that come up in connection with an intcrprclative approach to the object domain. a self-referential denial of universal validity claims, and a normative justification lor criliquc. The categories of meaning, validity, and value are to be eliminated not only on thc metatheoretical, but on the empirical level as wcll. Genealogical hisroriocraphv deals with an obiecl domain from which thc theorv of power has erased all traces of communicative actions entangled in lifeworld contexls. This suupression of basic conccpls that could take into account the symbolic prestructurina of action systems burdens his empirical research with problems that, this time at least: Foucault does not address. I will pick out two problems with a venerable historv in classical social theorv: thc issues of how social order is possible at all, and of how individual and society are related to one another. When, like Foucault, one admits onlv the model of processes of subiugation, of conli-ontations mediated by the body, of contcxts of more or less consciously strategic action: when one excludes any stabilizing 01' domains of action in terms of values. norms, and processes of mutual understanding and offers for these mechanisms of social integration none of the familiar equivalents from svstcms or exchange theories: then one is hardly able to explain iust how persistent local struggles could gct consolidated into institutionalized power. Axel Honneth has energetically worked out this problematic. Foucaull urcsunposes in his descriptions institutionallv sedimented disciulincs, power practices, technologies of truth and of domination. but he cannot explain "how there can be derived from a social condition of unintenupted struggle the agmegatc state of a network of power, however momentarv one conceives it as Conceptual difficulties similar to those raised by the epochal establishment of discourse and power formations are posed by the phenomena for which Durkheim introduced the key Lcrm "institutionalized individualism." If one admits onlv the model of empowerment, the socialization of succeeding generations can also be presented only in the image of wily confrontation. Then, howevcr, thc socialization of subiects capable of specch and action cannot be simultaneousl~ conceived as individuation, but only as the progressive subsumption of bodies and of all vital substrata under technologies of power. The increasingly individualizing formative processes that penetrate ever broader social strata in societies with traditions that have become ref-lecrive and with action norms that arc highly abstract, have to be artificiallv reinterpreted to make up for the categorical poverty of the empowerment model. Foucault, the theorist of power, encounters here the samc woblcm. as the institutionalist, Arnold Gehlen; 29 both theories lack a mcchanism for social integration such as language, with its interlacing of the performative attitudes of speakers

and hearers," which could explain the individuating effects of socialization. Just likc Gehlen, Foucault compensates for this bottleneck in his basic" concepts by purifying the concept of individuation of all connotations of self-determination and selfrealization, and reducing it to an inner world produced by external stimuli and fittcd out with arbitrarily manipulable, representative conlcnts. This time the difficulty does not result from the lack of an equivalent for familiar construclions of'the relationship between individual and society; rathcr. the issue is whether the model of an inflation of the usvchic thal is cvoked by power techniaues (or rclcased by the disintegration of institutions) does not make it necessarv to bring the growth in subiectivc freedom under descriptions that render unrecognizable the experience of an expanded scopc for cxprcssive self-manifestation and for autonomv.

AT: Foucalt -No Alternative (Nihilism) They are in a double bind -either Foucault is a nihilist or the alternative doesn't solve Hicks, Professor and chair of philosophy at Queens College of the CUNY, 2003 (Steven V., "Nietzschc, Heidegger, and Foucault: Nihilism and Beyond," Foucault and Heidemer: Critical Encounters, Ed. Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, p. 109. Questia) <Here Foucault seems less interested in defining a purpose for "incitation and struggle" than underscoring its "potential creativity": bringing into the struggle "as much gaiety. lucidity and determination as possiblc." 76 Given his belief that even our modern discourses of liberation, rights, and humanism are all deeply entangled in the inarticulable and inescapable background "web" of power practices. Foucault's onlv option to passive nihilism seems to be "the per~etuation and amelioration of the conditions that make strurgle itsell'possible "77 And this volitical task of promo tin^ the "pathos of struggle" functions as an alternative to the ascetic ideal: creating and maintaining "many sites of resistance" to Lhe numerous forms of domination, exploitation, and subiectitication present in the social and political bodv. 78 Admittedly, the "pathos of strupnle" has a strong (and from a Nietzschean perspective, a possibly suspect) negative component: strugnlin~ against anv system of constraints or technologies of Dower that ~revent individuals laffected bv the svsterns) from having "the possibility of altering them" or "the means of modifvine" them. 79 As an ethicopolitical ideal, the "~athos of struggle" would call for the negation of all political, social. and cultural conditions that preclude the possibilitv of strugalin~ to change these conditions. As Foucault writes, "perhaps one must not be for consensuality, but one must be against nonconsensuality." 80 But it would also contain an affirmative component as well. a "struggle for" something: "Minimally, it will be a struggle for the establishing of conditions in which selfcreation is made possible, in which the assertion of individuality and otherness is viable." 81 As with Nietzsche's alternative ideals (of "recurrence" and "will to power"), the final trajectory of the "pathos of struggle" remains undetermined. It can't tell us beforehand what our goals should be, only that (a) the conditions of their conception and articulation must remain "polymorphous" and "unhierarchical, " and that (b) whatever they are, they should remain rooted in gratitude and service to life- "a joyful ...creative, and selfconstituting engagement" -rather than resentment against it. 82 But as with Nietzsche's nonascetic ideals, the "pathos of struggle" might also supply some aftirmative content as well: the doing oS what is necessary to affirm your creative freedom and enhance the ongoing process of self-definition and social definition (within the constraints of not excluding or disempowering the viable "other"). For example, overcome the oppression of your present situation if it prevents you from getting a sufficiient sense of power and effectiveness in relation to life except by devaluing life. 83 In a manner somewhat reminiscent of Schillcr's attempt to instill an "aesthetic education" in humanity to promote political freedom, we might view Foucault as attempting to instill an "agonistic education3'- a will to struggle within "an overarching aesthetics of

life1'--to prepare "the nound for. and manifest, our creative freedom." 84 According to Foucault, glimpses olfreedom and creation of the self as a "work of art" are prompted by continuous acts of resistancc and political strugde that serve to loosen the hold of those vast matrices of disciplinarv power and ~echnoloqies of the bodv that threaten to overwhelm and homogenize us (cl'. HS. 2,:io-n). 85 As Foucault sees it, then, a will to struggle. an "aesthetic agonism, " becomes the delining characteristic and alternate (nonascetic) idcal that allows us to best live out our "unresolved existencevsurrounded bv ubiquitous. inescapable vower arrangements and totterinc on the abyss of nihilism.> Foucault is caught in a constant struggle to fight power structures, which leads to nihilism Hicks, Professor and chair of philosophy at Queens College of the CUNY, 2003 (Steven V.. "Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Foucault: Nihilism and Beyond," Foucault and Heidcgger: Critical Encounters, Ed. Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, p. 109. Questia) <Hence, the onlv "ethico-political choice" we have. one that Foucault thinks we must make every day, is simply to determine which of the many insidious forms of power is "the main danger" and then to engage in an activitv of rcsistance in the "nexus" of opposing forces. 72 "Unending action is required to combat ubiuuitous peril." 73 But this ceaseless Foucauldian "recoil" from the ubiquitous power perils of "normalization" ~recludes, or so it would seem, formulating anv defensible alternative position or successor idcals. And if Nietzsche is correct in claiming that the onlv prevailing human ideal to dale has been the ascetic ideal, then even Foucauldian resistance will continue to work in service of this ideal. at least under one of its guiscs, viz., the nihilism of negativitv. Certainly Foucault's distancing of himself from all ideological commitments, his recoiling from all traditional values by which we know and iudze, his holding at bay all conventional answers that press themselves upon us. and his keepinn in plav the "twists" and "recoils" that question our usual concevts and habitual patterns of behavior, all seem a close approximation, in the ethico~olitical sphere, to the idealization of asceticism.>

AT: Kritiks of Ri~hts-State Action Key Only through the use of the state can we bear witness to the 'tradition of the oppressed'' -plan is key to recognizing how to protect rights Deranty, Professor of Philosophy, 2k4 (Jean-Phillipe, Macquarie University. "Agamben's challenge to normative theories of modern rights", borderlands, h~tp://www.borderland~ejournal.adelaide.edu.au/volnol~2004/deranty~agambn schall.htm) 50. In the social and historical fields, politics is only the name of the contingency that strikes at the heart of systenlic necessitv. An ontology of continpcncv provides thc rncdel with which to think together both the possibilitv, and the possibility of the repetition of. catastrophe,as the one heritage of modcrnitv, and ~hc contingency of catastrophe as lopicallv entailing the possibilitv of its opposite. Modernity is ambiguous because it provides thc normative resources to combat the apparent necessity of possible systemic catastrophes. Politics is the name of the struggle drawing on those resources. 51. This ontology enables us also to rethink the relationship of modem subiects to rights. Modern subiects are able to consider themselves autonomous subiects because legal recognition signals to them that they are reconnised as full members of the community. cndowed with the full capacity to iudae. This account of rinhts in modernity is precious because it provides an adeauate framework to understand real political struggles, as fights for ri~hts. We can see now how this account needs to he complemented by the notion of contingency that undermines the apparent necessity of the progress of modernity. Modem subiects know that their rights are granted only contingently, that the possibility of the impossible is always actual. This is why rights should not be taken for granted. But this does not imply that thev should be reiected as illusion, on the grounds that thev were disclosed as contingent in the horrors of the 20th century. Instead, their continnencv should be the reason for constant nolitical vigilance. 52. By questioning the rejection of modern rights, one is undoubtedly unfaithful to the letter of Benjamin. Yet. if one accents that onc of the nrcat weaknesses of the Marxist philosophy of revolution was its inabilitv to constructivelv engage with the auestion of rights and the State. then it might be the case that the politics that define themselves as the articulation of demands born in the struggles against iniustice are better able to bear witness to the "tradition of the oppressed" than their messianic counterparts.

AT: Kritiks of Rights -No Alternative Rejecting rights undermines critical theorists ability to fight against oppression Deranty, Professor of Philosophy, 2k4 (Jcan-Phillipe, Macquarie University, "Agamben's challenge to normative theories of modern rights", borderlands, http://www.bordcrlandsejournal.adelaide.cdu.au/vol3nol~2~O4/deranty~agamb nschall.htm) 11. In the case of empirical examples, the erasure of difference between phenomena seems particularly counter-intuitive in the case of dissimilar modes of internment. From a practical point of view, it seems counter-productivc to claim that there is no substantial difference between archaic communities and modern comn~unities provided with the language of rights, between the lawlessness of war times and democratic discourse. There must be a wav of r~roblematising the ideological mantra of Western freedom, of modernity's moral superioritv, that docs not simply eauate it with Nazi propaganda (Ogilvie 2001). Habermas and Honneth probably have a point when they highlight the advances made by modernity in the entrenchment of rights. If the ethical task is that of testimony, then our testimony should go also to all the individual lives that were freed from alienation by the establishment of legal barriers against arbitrariness and exclusion. We should heed Honneth's reminder that struggles for social and political emancipation have often privileged the language of rights over any other discourse (Fraser, Honneth 2003). To rciect the language of human rights altoucther could be a costly gesture in understanding past volitical strunrrles in their relevance for future ones, and a serious strategic, ~olitical loss for accompanying present strugvles. We want to criticise the ideology of human rights, but not at the cost of renouncin~ the resources that rights provide. Otherwisc, critical theory would be in the odd position of casting aspersions upon the very people it purports to speak for, and of depriving itself of a maior weavon in the struggle against ovvrcssion.

AT: A~arnben-Alt Fails Agamben's use of the camp conflates victim with oppressor, preventing us from holding perpetrators responsible and destroying any ethical obligation to act since we posit everyone as the victim Sanyal, Assistant Professor of French at UC Berkeley, 2002 (Debmati, "A Soccer Match in Auschwitz: Passing Culpability in Holocaust Criticism," Representations, Issue 79, Caliber) I3tyoni the prohlcms inherent in a ~riinshiulo~iualtreatmen[ of shme imnd complicily. Agamben's radicalization of Levi's gray zone has even more disturb in^ consequences for understanding the relations of power within the camps. The unstable boundary between oppressor and oppressed in the grav zone is radicalized in Agamben's account such that the two positions appear to he reciprocal and convertible: ..lts-ms. in i~er.tktt the unly thing lhlll illlercsts him [LcviJ is whsl lnohua jsd>emcnl iul~~ssihle: Lhe pay zo~sin which vjctbns kco~i~e i.xccula#ncrs ;uld chcculloncrs becarnc riclin~s" (Hvm~rnots. 17).18 Wllilc Agsmben nowhere sugpsts that prprlrators and viclims tm~ydid exchangcporirions. his emphasis on the camps as sites for a potentiallv endless circulation of guilt nevertheless takes the convcrtibilit~ of victims and executioners as a structural given. Primo Levi, however, was at pains to emphasize that this convertibility was a ~oliticallv expedient fiction designed to erase the difference between victim and executioner by forcing Jews 10 panicipate 111 the murder and cre~tiation oi ~hca. own. II~also sllrs.& the singolx, unimaginable stram such P prcdicamcnt must have exened uptl the b~ TO transform such a charged, ambiguous lived reality into a formal conception of convertibilitv has disturbing ethical conseauences. It sunrrests that the perpetrators too, by virtue of occupying this zone of radical inversion and participating in the traumatic conditions of camp life, could be perceived as victims. The I~IIX~ ot this SlnIcturdl re~iproclty. however. is retllled by kvi in a cantlomy prclacc lo his discassio~l of ~hc Sud?rkummando: Thia mimcis, lhib idc~ll~ticntioti nr un~lalion ol cxchnttgc of rolcs ixtwrcn oppressor and victim. has provoked ~nuch dtscussinn. . . . I do all know. and il does rum much ~n[eresr me a, know.whether in my depths therc Itlrks a murderer, hut I do know Ul;d the murderers exlmed. not only in Germany. and still exist, retired or on actlvc duly. nnd Ulnl la confusc them with ther victhi~s is a monl discjse or an aesthetic ntfectalion or ,I hinister sign ol complicity: ebovc all, it is a precious service rendcrcd (intentionally or nnt) to the ncgalors olltuth. (Dr~~r~mi.

so) The conce~tualization of the wav zone as a transhistorical and transsubicctive site of'culpabilitv, "in which victims become executioners and executioners become victims." thus conflates the positions or MUSI~~S. Prominents.Kapl~s. and ss in a gesture that reaches bevond the concentralion camp experience to include "us" in a general condition of traumatic culpabilitv. This blurring of subiect positions leads to a vision of inescapable guilt, in which we are always already collectivelv steeped in the eliminationist logic that led to the concentration camp and continue unknowingly to perpetuate its violence. nu1 just this vision posits an cvcr-cncroach~ng web or complsity. it also, parnjoxi~illly, ;~s proposes an infinitelv elastic notion of victimhood. If we are obscurelv comdicit with the hpie ofthc socccr match. the inealiration of violence in daily lice. we are also comparably violated by the historical trauma of the camps. The generalization of complicit~ and victimization not onlv dismantles the historical specificity of the camps and the survivors' testimonies. It also, more disturbingly, coopts the figure of the victim as an "other" who is but an avatar of ourselves, a point I will adtires* in a momenl. Agamben's philosophy does not apply to politics -biopolitics is an empty term that ultimately blocks critical thought Virno, Professor of Linguistic Philosophy, 2002 (Paolo, University of Cosenza, 'General intellect, exodus, multitude. Interview with Paolo Virno', Archipe'lapo number 54, published in English at http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpvirno2.htm) <Agamben is a problem. Agamben is a thinker of great value but also, in my opinion, a thinker with no political vocation. Then, when Agamben speaks of thc biop< with valuan already sincc the archaic Roman right. And, in this. in my opinion, he is very wrongheaded. The problem is. I bclicvc, lhat the biopolitical is only an effect derived from thc concept of labor-power. When there is a commcdity that is called labor-power it is already implicitly government over life. Agambcn savs, on the other hand, that labor-power is onlv onc of the aspects of the biopolitical: I say the contrarv: over all because labor power is a paradoxical commoditv, because it is not a real commoditv like a book or a bottlc of water, but rather is simplv the potential to produce. As soon as this potential is transf'ormed into a commoditv. then, it is necessarv lo govern the living body that maintains this potential, that contains this potential. Toni (Negri) and Michael (Hardt), on the other hand, use biopolitics in a historically determined scnsc, basing it on Foucault. but Foucault spokc in few pages of' the biopolitical -in relation to the birth of liberalism -that Foucault is not a sufficient base for founding a discoursc over the biopolitical and my apprehension, my fear, is that the biopolitical can be transformed into a word that hides, covers problcms inslead of being an instrument for confronting them.A fetish word, an "open doors" word, a word with an exclamation point, a word that carries the risk of blocking critical thought

instead of helping it. Then, my fear is of fetish words in politics because it seems like the cries of a child that is afraid of the dark .... the child that says "mama, mama!", "biopolitics, biopolitics!". I don't negate that there can be a serious content in the term, however I see that the use of the term biopolitics sometimes is a consolatory use. like the crv of a child. when what serves us arc, in all cases, instruments of work and not propaganda words.>

AT: A~amben-Alt +Violence (I~nores Suffering) Agamben's conception of the camp as the paradigm of civilian life ignores the specificity of suffering in the Holocaust and normalizes its violence. It does not universally define our times and can be fought. We thus must struggle against particular sites of oppression Sanyal, Assistant Professor of French at UC Berkeley, 2002 (Debarati, "A Soccer Match in Auschwitz: Passing Culpability in Holocaust Criticism," Representations, Issue 79, Caliber) Aeamben's claim for the continuing relevancc of Levi's gav zone transforms the aberrant event of a socccr match played in AUSC~W~~Z-nml the allegory for a recurrent, unlocatable and transhistorical the complex weh of complicity bt.tween kictims imd cxcct11iowr.t srh a gnmc r~,~~ais--into violence. one contaminating the civilian world OK even a liberal democracy and its dailv rituals and spectacles. The analogy draw-, between thc 5ucmr match in ALISC~W~~I it Seems LO conllatc several in~ommensurate and and its ongoing rekirul in stddrums ml tekvisiun hrnadcasts is at oncc compelling and p~pluxing, SUI undefined k)rms of viohce. Perhaps the spectacles nlewrydny life distracting us from thc ..malsucres.' that .uurn)~mlt~s m:ly kseen as replicating the horrifying pmduaion of normalcy at the gmcs of the crematoria. Yet such 1Ir:~nshist~~riGil deployment of lhc succer match as lipure st~ggrsts that the cxtrernc. ehhntionist violence masked by a game in Auschwitz is hndamentolly the same as the violellfes masked by contemporary mi cullulr. It is also unclear whcthcr the ambiguotts metapbr of thc soccer match desigmlcs om diicmctior frnm or our pnniciilion in the massacres repealed '.NIL fu away from II.$:' Indeed. Agambcn obscurelv suggests that "the true horror of the camps" is woven into the very normalcy of dailv socio~olitical life, a nameless violence circulaling between spectator and spectacle, ad ~~fpmdm.like the shifting dynamic between victim and C(lmUmr executioner staged in the soccer match. me collective ..wc.' interpeilated by A~amkn ;ire cast as bati~ft.led and cnmplicit witnesses to. if not consumers of, &ucliond mmkin~ ora vioiolcnce tha remiins a -prf~t ala demal cipher.'' Even more troubling than the loss of context, definition, and specificity in this allegorical treatment of the soccer match is Agamben's conflation ol' litcral and metaphorical survival. "We" secondary witnesses and spectators of nth~etie events rind television

~TO~I~ISIP are identified with the camps' survivors (01 primary witnesses) and made to share their anguish and shame (-hem the anpishnnd shamcaf thc sorvivors.. . . but hence our shalne..).14 by distractio-in TOimagine that our actions and beliefs may inadvertentlv ~articipate4~~n the violences around us is a seductive point. Rw have Mtulatcd it with m,re power than Albert Camus. in his postwar novel 1.a peste. Tma. one of the characters paicipoting in the mistance to the plague that o!*emkes the city, claims that u'e are :ill peslife'~?'~. plague-ddiddcn. that each one of our daily acts and choices may end up colluding in unfnrefeen. hidden wags with the workings of violence. In a sunilm context. Alain Resnois and Jean Cayrul's docu~rcnlary. Nuit el hrouillard, concludes with n powerlul intuprllaliun. beckoning its spectaton to acknowledge their past ;u~d continued implication within the ideology of extermination deployed m the camps.19 Ye1 Cantus. Rcsnnis. and Cayml iegitimalely appealed to hiaoiicnlly concrete instantp of complicity hetween victins. perpetrators, and wi~ncsscs during the occupation and mll;~h>nsiunism. By wntrmt. Agambcn's plea that we recognize our continued implication within the indeterminate zone of ethics produced in the exlerminalion camps proposes an unexpectedlv normative reading of the Shoah. Erasing the specific circumstances of an event such as Nviszli's soccer match. and the nexus of conditions that it reveals about moral lifc in the concentration camp, he transforms a kev moment in Levi's testimony into a "perfect and eternal cipher." an undefined and onmipresent allegory whose players and spectators are internellaled into both com~~icily and victimization. T~Cinbrnzl coruiitions of Ihe gray ZO~C.S emfrgem undexgo a son of spatiotemporal masure. What the death camps reveal. it would seem. is no lcss than the human condition, onc "which knows no time and is in every place." Agamben's extension of the "gray zone" to civilian lili: today is analogous to his general claim that "Auschwitz is preciselv the place in which the state of exception coincides pfectly with the rule and the extrem sitoatioo becomes thc very paradigm of daily life" (Remnants, 19).Yet Primo Levi's exposit%" (11the mne makes quite the opposite claim. e the chapter det.lilin$ thc SKCS matchchapter that IS slgnifsantlg cno~tgh titled '.sh.me.'-Levi Stresses the irreduciblv singular nature of the prisoners' affective and somatic experience in the camps: -T~Cmental mechanism ofthe HdTllinge were different from OIIN: curiously, and in pac~llel. diKercnt also wen: the11 physiology owl p~~thalogy.'. Warning his readers against the temptation to apply categories drawn from the space of civilian normalcy upon their anguish. Levi proposes that "knowledge that has bcen built up and tested 'outside' in the world that. for he ~e o~simpticitg.wx

civilian.' (~rownxi.8s) is irrelevant lo the physiological and ps~chological conditions within the Lager. Agamben's appropriation of Levi's voice when discussing a different order of violence altogether is a disturbing ventriloquism that disregards the survivor's explicit iniunction against conllating the extermination camp and civilian life. The shame and anguish to kui relers in his allusion to the .'toho-huhu'. dexnnl stliversc. is no1 an abstract experience of moral chaos that is accessed by camp survivors and television viewers alike. It desi~nates the singular and elusive mixture of guilt. shame, anguish, and ethical responsibility that drove sun-ivtlr8 ofthe euenuinatiun cump lo testify on hehalf of tho= who never rett~rnaj. The shame that arises from having survived or witnessed extreme crueltv mav well be a new "ethical material," Asamhen suggeas 111 he discusbn of thr znne's redelinilinn of morniiry. But. to suggest that primary and secondary witnesses have a comparable experience 11r the traumatic inner dislocnlion Agamben desctikp is an untenable conflation of literal and melaphorical victimization, complicity, and survival. Fur how an tk "wc" intcr@cllated by Agamhn. a* ct?cot;lry wilnerses f~llly grasp the shame LcLi dcscnbe~ 2s. in hilenl defeat. he w~tches ;I Sondrrkommando dclianlly rhoul oul "Comrades. I am the last one!" before being emoted for hi% pakipation in Ihc rcvoll tha hleuj up a Birkenau crem;~cori~rm? ns he paiicipates in divesting thc Or the wave of naum.1 gripping tllc nmalur uf Bonlwski's rhnn story. '.This Wny for the Gas, ladies 2nd Cienlkmc~~" tnlcklwads of prisnnc1.r entering the camps of their possessions:, What we must question. then, is the impulse toward identification enabline Agamben to posit himself as ~urvivor-witne~s like the witnesses. instead view this match this moment of nmmalcy, as ~ho true humr of the camp.'). thereby assimilating the positicms of primary and secondary ("1. witmssing. TO conflate his Own Stance with that of the instam particularly ~roblematic, a11it is Nyiszli. and repms the soccer pame. Further. thc ambiguities of Nyiszli's psition as Mengele's experiment5 mnke it dilfimk ro t~ansparenlly place.16 kmben's cxtcnsion of shame, guilt. and "witne~~" in this not Pmo kvi. who pathohgist to Dr. iwsumc his

trauma. of responses to the affective and bodilv experiences occumng in the extreme conditions of the camps to "us" and "now" disregards the irreducible particularity of the may zone. It also erodes the very real differences between those who inhabited that zonc

(thc distincrtm for exjrnplc, between Milihs Nyiszli and Prio Levi) aS well as the multiple gaps separating "US" (rwdcm or testimonies. specraturs oia continuous figurative soccer march) and the survivor-witncs~s.~.l7

AT: Aeamben -Alt 3No Ri~hts(Ri~htsGoodl Even though the term rights can have negative connotations, it is necessary to renew rights that contain human dignity and prevent exploitation -the alternative is fascism Daly, Research Fellow in the Philosophy Department at the Australian National University, 2004 (Frances, Australian National University, "The Non-citizen and the Concept of Human Rights", borderlands, http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/volno1~2004/daly~noncitize n.htm) <2 1. At its most fundamental, right is the right to something, and within the realm of natural rights or rights of the human heinn, it has been principtally concerned with riehts against oppression and inecluali~v in order to realize a potential for freedom. Citizen rights have at their basis quite different values, namely, a ranpe of political and property rights to be realized within and not against the State. This is not to say that law associated with human rights is not, at times, itself an external form of oppression -but natural or human right is also able to offer something quite diffcrcnt. The term needs to be used advisedly because of the problematic connotations it has -but there is a tradition of natural right contain in^ anticipatory elements of human dignity in which forms of justice as ethically-based community survive, and it is this tradition, I would argue, which needs to be renewed. Wc can see this in all struggles for human dimity in which unsatisfied demands exist for overcoming the lack of freedom of exploitation and constraint; the ineaualitv of degradation and humiliation; the absence of communitv in egoism and disunity. And so too can we view this via the necessary reference point that a critique of right provides: bv acknowledginp, the hvpocrisy of law or the distance between intention and realization we have an important basis for distinguishing between the problem of right and its complete negation, such as we would see under despotic, fascistic rule. Thc use and abuse of right is not the same thins as a complete absence of right, and understanding this is vital to being able to comprehend where and in what ways democratic, constitutional Slates become, or are, fascistic. Natural r&&, or the right of the human being, occunies a space of interruption in the dividc between law and ethicality that can, on occasion, act as to reintroduce a radical oathos within right. Agamben is unable to allow for any of this because, for him, rights are without any basis in human respect. thcir institutional representation guaranteeing the logic of onlv the policc, the market and, ultimately, the 'extermination camps'.> Rights are key to challenging the State-Agamben's critique can't connect to reality Daly, Research Fellow in the Philosophy Department at the Australian National University, 2004 (Frances, Australian National University, "The Non-citizen and the Concept of Human Rights", borderlands,

http:Nwww.borderlandsejournal.adclaide.edu.au/vol3no1~2004/daly~noncitizc n.htm) ~24.The context of rights is one that is frequently unstable, and, as such. it is important to clearly assess the place of rights within our present conditions of unfreedom. Often as a result of their denial. human rights currentlv act so as to allow a uuestionin~ of the assumed authoritv of the State. Indeed, without a sense of rights it would bc difficult for us to understand the current absence of real freedom. If we consider the contemporary struggles of the 'Sans Papiers' in France, the several hundred thousand people whose refusal of the label 'illegal' and fight for documcnhtion is premised on the basis that the undermining of rights is merely a way of attaclung the value of dignity for all, we can see a clear example of the possibility that can be reali~ed through right. The Sans Papiers are well-known for thcir questioning of the assumptions of immigration policies, such as the existence of quotas, detention camps and deportations. and they ague cogcntly for an end to frontiers themselves. Madjigubne CissC argucs that the initiatives of those claiming their rights are basic to Lhc survival of communities (CissC, 1997: 3). This is donc on the basis of an appeal to rights of justice and egalitarianism. Indeed. it is not possible to understand this emancipatory strugglc outside a conception of rights. 25. Agamben views all such setting out of rights as essentially reintegrating those marginalized from citizenship into the fiction of a guaranteed community. Law only "wants to prevent and regulate" (Agamben, 2001: 1)-and it is ccrtainly the case that much law does -but within rights. I argue, we can also detect a potential for iustice. In contrast. Agamben contcnds that legal right and the law always operate in a double apparatus of pure violence and forms of life guaranteed by a Schmittian 'state of emergency' (Agamben. 2000: 43). And although he recognizes the dire consequences of a state of emergency with the eradication of the legal status of individuals, he views this as the force of law without law, as a mystical or fictional element, a space devoid of law, an 'empty legal space', or 'state of exception' as Carl Schmitt refers to it, that is essential lo the legal order (Carl Schmitt, 1985: 6). What is then eliminated here is anv sense of how the appeal to rights brings into question institutionalized unfreedom and whv this underlvinp insufficiencv between the idea of right and real need is opposed by those atlcmoting to expand the realm of human rights. The problem with this strategy for doing away with any distinction and placing the refugee in a position of pure potentialitv is that, instead of liberating or revolutionizing the place of the refugee, it creates an eternal present that is unable to connect the verv real realitv of difference with a critique of the societv that victimizes the refugee In the manncr w~th which we are currentlv so familiar.>

AT: A~amben-Alt destroys democracv and ri~hts Agamben's analysis destroys democracy and leads to state control. The alternative destroys citizenship and reduce rights to absolute politics Daly, Research Fellow in the Philosophy Department at the Australian National University, 2004 (Frances, Australian National University, "The Non-citizen and the Concept of Human Rights", bordcrlands, http:Nwww.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.cdu.au/vol3no 1-2004tdaIynoncitizen.htm) <26.There is much in Agamben's analysis of contemporary society, particularly via his usc or a Debordian critique of the spectacle, that forcefully restates some of the central problems of social life that we perceivc in commodification, a fetishized distancing and an alienation of the very nature of what it means to be human. But perhaps the ralhcr overstalcd or one-dimensional nature of Agamben's understanding of alienation reveals one of the problems with his use of this critique. He refers to the "absolutely banal man" who is tempted to evil by the powers of right and law (Agamben, 1993; 32); we have the 'falsification of all production' and the 'complete control of social memory and social communication'; or the "absolute systematic falsification of truth, of language and opinion 1.. .I without escapc" (Agamben, 2002). Because it is preciselv in such a critique that one would expect Agamben to not merelv acknowledgc the "comolete triumph of the spectacle" but to explain the relation between the spectacle and what 'positive possibility' there remains within conditions of alienation that might be used to counter these conditions. There would seem to be an enormous gau between Aeamben's critique of this society and the state of simplv being that continues to be a ~ossibilitv. This state of death that Agamben would argue now colonizes all structures of power and that eradicates anv experience of democracv might well still possess some kind of antagonistic clash, as Toni Neui argues, but it is difficult for us to see iust where resistance to this state might emerge (Nepri, 2003: 1). 27. Certainly, Agamben calls for making all residents of extraterritorial space (which would include both citizen and non-citizen) as existing within a position of exodus or refuge, and in this we can perhaps see some basis for resistance. A position of refuge, he argues, would be able to "act back onto" territories as states and 'perforate' and alter' them such that "the citizen would be able to recognize the refugee that he or she is" (Agamben, 2000: 26). In this Agamben directs our attention usefully to the importance of the refugee today -both in terms of the plight of refugees and their presencc in questioning any assumption about citizen rights, and also in placing the refugee, or "denizen" as he says using Tomas Hammar's term, as the central figure of a potential politics (Agamben, 2000: 23). But he also reduces the concerns of right and the values lhcv involve to forms of State control, eliding all difference within y separation of rinhts from the idcal ofethicalitv. in which liberation and dimity exist to be realized bevond anv form of contract.

28. 11 is always possiblc to suppose that a self-fashioned potentiality is simply available to us, and in some senses it is, but not because a type of theory merely posits the social and the historical as completely open to our manipulation or 'perforation'. Likewise, we cannot merely assume that changing 'forms of life' necessarily amount to types of refusal. Such a claim would only make sense if it were put forward on the basis of an appreciation of an impulse to freedom from particular types of constraint and oppression. It would also requirc a sense of how this impulse takes place within a variety of conditions, somc of which might be easily altered and some of which might not. In the absence of an engaged sense of what this impulse means, and of the context in which elements of freedom and unfreedom do battle. it is impossible to speculate on the nature of the subiectivily or potentiality which minht be em em in^ or which minht be in stages of decomnosition. Agamben merelv presumes that a strategy bv which we all identify as refugees will renew a politics and therebv end the current plight of the refugee, as if no other reality impingcs on this identification. This is also assumed on the basis that the State -in Agamben's theorizing, the abstraction of an all-encon~passing, leviathan State -is equally, readily and easily liable to perforation. This contradiction is indicative of a wider problem where what we encounter is a form of critiaue that is oddly inappropriate to the lylw of issue it addresses. 29. Much can be said in criticism of the doctrine of right, of thc limited nature of the understanding of freedom and rights in documents on rights. of the assumption of the place of citizen rights as the locus of the fundamental rights of the human, and most significantly, the absence of any sense of the undetermined nature of what being might mean. But what must be stated, 1feel, is that i! would bc a serious impoverishment of the ethical problem that we currently facc to denv any potential value of rights in carrvinq forth traces of an imuetus towards human dignity, of the ideals of freedom and equality, and to thus reduce riprhts to what might be termed an absolute politics. Rights cannot be reduced to citizenship riohts as if thc ideas of rights and citizenship arc coteminus. What most criticallv necds to be understood is. firstly, why values of l'rccdom and euualitv have such a limited and fragile place within conditions of such inordinate legalism, and, secondly, what the absence of freedom, which the cause of human rights inevitably sug~csts,means for the installation of any such rights. Without such an understanding we are left with a gestural politics that contains a Dosture of radicalism but one which fails to connect the aspirations of those who are struggling to achieve elementarv rights with a vision of a world that could accord them a degree of dignity. To acknowledgc this is not to be seduced by concepts of ri~ht or law, hut is rathcr to refuse the denial of a radical questioning of the possibilities with which a discourse presents us. Beniarnin's undcrstandinq of a genuinely messianic idea is something that is "not the final end of historical progress. but rather its often failed and finallv accomplished interrmtion" (Benjamin, 1974: 1231). We find this in valucs that resist exploitation and assaults upon human dignitv. And it is this realm that currentlv rauires urgent. emphatic and significant renewal.>

AT: Agamben -AIt +colla~sethe state Agarnben's alternative makes no sense on a public level. The net result is communities at war with the state which would collapse the state Cmiel. Professor of Cultural History at Iowa, 1996 (Kenneth. "The Fate of the Nation and the Withering of the State", Amcrican Literary History, Spring, p. 196. http:Nalh.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprin8/1/l84) <If community cannot be a closed thing. if it is forever open to the ootentiallv new. then the dream of a national communitv is simplv impossible. In Agamben's communitv. the idea oi'sorncthing being "unAmerican" makes no sense, for there is no delinine essence in a "whatevcr singularitv." Yet Agamben is also aware that ca~italism and the state will continue. Indeed, he recognizes that ai'tcr the fall of Communism, they are sweeping the globe. Politics, in the future, Agamben argues, will not be community building but thc perpetual project of communities against the state, "a struggle between the State and the non-State (humanity), an insurmountable disjunction between whatever singularity and the State organization" (84). I doubt Agamben's new community is actually coming. It remains far from clear that communities without identities arc emerging anywhere exccvt in the febrile imaginations of a few philosoohers. It is not that 1dislike the drcam. It is for me the most attractive dream there is. It is that I am skeptical that such "whatever singularities" are oossiblc on more than the level of oersonal behavior. Politics is too clunky for such subtlety. Even the new social movements seem far more down-to-earth and wone lo defining themselves than Anamben's theorizin~. Politics, alas, demands more leaden language. Still, the image of the state fighting communities is one worth pondering. Its distance from earlier welfare state thinking could not be more dramatic. Instead of the state embodying the will of the nation, we have a oicture of numerous communities at war with the -state. It is? and I say this with no relish, a far more plausible picture of our emerging politics than Walzer's happy pluralism. Just think of insurance companies. Perotistas, and gay and lesbian activists-all communities distrustful of the state. all committed to struggling with the state. Agamben does not ask what this perpclual warfare will do to government. Like Walzer, he assumes that the state will trudge on as before. Yet if this warfare between humanity and the state is constant. is it not plausible to surmise that hostility to the state will become permanent? With the fiction that the state embodies the nation's will dying. who will defend the state? Who will keep it from becoming the recipient of increasing rancor and from being permancntly wobbly? Isn't that a good wav of understanding recent politics in the US? And as for Agamben's own Italy- the past decade has revealed a public far more disgusted with the state than cvcn in America.>

AT: A~amben-Sin~ularitv destrovs ~olitics There's no alternative- singulacity cannot be described and will destroy politics as a whole Deranty, Professor of Philosophy, 2k4 (Jean-Phillip, Macquarie University, "Agamben's challenge to normative theories of modern rights", borderlands, http://www.horderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no 1~2004/deranty~agambnscha11.htm) 42. The conclusion is clear: if we want to move beyond biopolitics, beyond the violent politics of sovereignty, we havc to develop an alternative ontology where the potential is not always already recaptured by its own potentiality and thus forced to relate to its opposite. actuality. We have to think potentiality as pure or absolute potentiality. "beyond every figure of relation" (1998: 47). 43. Agilmhen thus connects Benjamin's "politics of pure means" with the alternative ontology articulated by Heidegger on the basis of his reading of Aristotle's metaphysics. In his 1931 lectures on the Metaphysics (Heidegger, 1981 : 114), in his Nietzsche lectures (1980: 64-65),and in the Letter on humanism (1977: 220), Heidegger had tied the imperative of a "recovery of the question of Being" to a radical rethinking of the categories of modality in which Being is freed from the productivist paradigm of actualitas. Only through a questioning of the modal logic operating within the onto-theological tradition could a free "ethos" be prepared as a genuine dwelling. Agamben's thought owes just as much to this fundamental inspiration as he does to Benjamin. How much Heidegger's ontology of potentiality has exerted a fundamental influence on him is especially clear in the lectures at the ColDge international de Philosophie published under thc title L'ombre de I'amour (1988: 44-46). 44. The descriotion of the radical politics that emerges from the ontoloav of pure potentiality can be found in The Coming Communitv, and it is here that the full consequences of Anan~hen's problematic interpretation and reappropriation of Benjamin, Heideaaer, Schmitt and Arendt become apparent. 45. In the notes that Benjamin was writing in preparation for his Theses on the philosophy of history, one reads: "The messianic world is the world of overall and integral actuality" (Benjamin 1991e: 1235).The last expression is a self-reference to the 1929 essay on surrealism (I 99Id: 309, [1929]). Against Beniamin's explicit e~uation of the "real state of exception" (the state of liberated humanity), with actuality. Agamben's coming community is a communitv of subiects that exist onlv as ne~ative potentialities (actualities that are the ~ossibilitv of not-beino actualisations of potentiality). the "whatever singularities". Because he has severed the conccpt of the communitv from all normative ties, and has reiected all conceptual and normative distinctions (between state of nature and civil state, law and violence, nomos and physis, normal state and exception. etc.), this community-to-come can onlv be ever described negatively. as beyond all forms of communitv. and accessed onlv in the flight from all present and all immanence. It is difficult to avoid thinking that the assumed messianism of this radical politics is only a form of negative theology. Difficult not to think. also, that politics constructed as the "gigantomachy" (Agamben 2003: chapter 4) of an ontotheology of power does not lead to the cvanescence of politics.

AT: A~amben-Alt fails Agamben fails to acknowledge daily forms of sovereign violence and power from below. The alternative would not get rid of all forms of sovereignty and power Hardt & Dumm, Literature Program and Romance Studies Department at Duke & Amherst College, 2000 [Michael& Thomas, "Sovereignty. Multitudes, Absolute Democracy: A Discussion between Michael Hardt and Thomas Dumm about Hardt and Negri's Empire," Theoq & Event 43, Project MUSE] <TD: In that regard. my sense is that you hoth recognize the power of Giorgio Agamhen's argument in Homo Sacer concerning the extraordinary violel~ce of sovereignty at the end of nnder~iity 2nd ye1 you seek to overconte wlmt tilay (not ccio unjustly) he thought of as a temifying passivity that his position cotild result in. MH: Our argument in Empirc does share sonlr centnl concerns with A:amhen's Homo Sacer, pnrticutarly surmunding the notions of sovereign(y and hiopower. Agamben hrilliantly el:lhonars n conception of nwdcrn soverei&mty based oti Cml Schmitt's notions of the decision on the exception and the state ofcmcrgency. in which thc modcrn functioning of ruk hcconrs a pernunent statc of cxccptioo. He tkn links this conception to the figure of the hanned or excluded person hack as far as nlicicnt Ronxin law with his usual spectoculnr crudition. l'hc pinnnclc and full realimtioli of modern sovereignty thus hccononlcs the Nazi concentration camp: the zone of exclusion and exception is the hem of nwdern sovereignty and grnuods the rule of law. My hesitation with this view is that by posing the extreme case of the concentration camu as the heart of sovereignty it lends to obscure the daily violence of modern sovereignty in all its forms. It implies, in other words, that if we could do away with the camp then all the violence of sovereignty would also disappear. The most significant difference between our projects. though. b that Agamben dwells on modern sovereignty whereas we claim that modern sovcrcigntv has now come to an end and transformed into a new kind of sovcreignty. what we call imuerial sovereignty. Imperial sovereigntv has nothing to do with the concentration camp. It no longer takes the form of a dialectic betwcen Self and Other and does not function through any such absolute exclusion, but rules rather through mechanisms of differential inclusion, making hierarchies of hybrid identities. This descriution nlav not immediately give vou the same sense of horror that vou gel from Auschwilz and the Nazi 1 horrors. But still none of that addresses the passivity you refer to. For that we have to look instead at Agamben's notions of life and hiopower. Agamben uses thc term "naked lifc" to name that limit

of humanity, the hare minimum of existence that is exposed in the concentration camp. In the final analysis. he'cxplains. modern sovereignty rules over naked life and biopower is this power to rule over life itself. What results from this analysis is not so much passivity, I would say, but powerlessness. There is no figure that can challenge and contest sovereignty. Our critique of Agamben's (and also Foucault's) notion of biopower is that it is conceived only from above and we attempt to formulate instead a notion of biopower from below, that is, a power by which the multitude itself rules Over life. (in this sense, the notion of hiopower one finds in som veins of ecofeminism such as the work of Vandana Shiva, olthough cast on a very different register, is closer to our notion ofa hiopower fnm below.) What we are interested in finally is a new biopolitics that reveals the struggles over forms of -life.> Agamben ignores the actual differences between liberal democracy and totalitarianism and only thinks in absolutes Heins, Visiting Professor of Political Science at Concordia University and Senior Fellow at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, 2005 (Volker, "Giorgio Agamben and the Current Slate of Affairs in Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Policy," 6 German Law Journal No. 5, May, http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=598) <A~ambcn is not interested in such weighing of costs and benefits because he assumes From the outset that taking care of the survival needs of-people in distress is simply the reverse side of the modern inclination to ignore precisely those needs and turn life itsell'into a 1001 and obiect of power politics. By way of conclusion. I will indicate briefly how his view differs from two other, onen no less shattering critiques of modern humanilarianisn~ Martti Koskenniemi warned that hum;lnitariali denlands and humin rights are ill danger ofdegmrating into "meretalk."[47] The recent crisis in Darfur, Sudan. can be cited as an example for a situ~tiun in which the repcatcd invocation of human rights standards and jus cogens norms, like those articulated in the Genocide Convention, might ultimately damage thosc norms themselves if states arc unwilling to act on them[48] This criticism implies that hun~ln rights should he taken seriously and applied in a reasonable manner. Both David Kcnnedy and Oona Hathaway havc gone one stcp funhcr by tnking issue even with those who proved to he serious by joining treaties or engaging in advocacy. In a contrnversial quantitative study. Hathaway contended that the ratificatiori of human rights treaties hy sets of given countries not only did not improve human rights conditions on the ground, but actually

correlated with increasing violations.[49] In a similar vein. David Kennedy radicalized Koskennie~ni's poitit hy arguing that human rights regimes and humanitarian law are rather part of the ~irohlem than part of solution, because they '?justify" and "excuse" too much.[SO] To some extent, this is an effect of the logic of legal reilsoning: marking a line between noncomhatants and cornhatants increases thc legitimacy of attacking the latter, panting privileges to lawful combat;ints delegitimizes unlawful belligerents and dnmatically worsens their status. On the whole. Kennedy is more concerned ahout the dangers of leaving hunmn rights to international legal clitcs and a profcssio~~al culture which is hlind for the misnutch hetween lofty ideals and textual articulations on the one side, and real people and prohlens on the other side.[51] Whereas these authors reveal the "dark sides" of overly relyilig on human rights talk and treaties, the moral fervor of activists or the mutines of the legal profession. Agamben claims that something is wrong with human rights as such. and that recent history has demonstrated a deep affinity between the protection and the infringment of these rights. Considered in this light. the effbrt of the British aid organization Save the Children. for insmnce. to help children in need both in Britain and abroad aftcr World War I -faithful to George Bcrnard Shaw's saying, "I have no enemies under sevenw-is only the tlip side of a trend to declm total war on othen regardless of thcir age and situation. l'his assertiol~ clcwly goes far beyond the voices of other pessimists. Agan~hen's work is understandable only against the hackdmp of all entirely familiar misuusl of lihenl democracy and its ability to cultivate nonparhn monl and legal perspectives. Accordinn to Agamben, democracy does not threaten to turn into totalitarianism, but rather both regimes smoothlv cross over into one another since they ultimately rest on the same foundation of a political interprelation of life itSelf.[521 Like Carl Schmitt. Agamhen sees the invocation oT human rights hy democratic goveni~nents as well ;IS the "humanitarian concept of hum;~nity"[Yil as deceptive manouven or. at least, as acts of self-deception on the part of the liher~l horlrgeois suhjecr. The difference hetveen Agamkn and Schmin lies in the fact that Schmitt fought liberal democracy in the ram! of the authoritarian state, whik Agamben sees demucncy and dictatorship as two equally unappealing twins. Very much unlike Schmitt. the Italicin philosopher confronts US with a mode of thinking in vaguely felt resemblances in lieu of distinctly pe~ceived differences. Ultimately, offers a version of Schmitt's theory of sovereignty that changes its political valence and downplays the difference hetween liberal democracy and totalitarian dictatorship-a difference about which Adorno once said that it "is a total difference. And I would say," he added, "that it would be abstract and in a problematic way fanatical if one were to ignore this difference."[54]

AT: A~amben-AT: Humanitarianism Humanitarianism does not reduce one to bare life -it is about protecting one's moral agency which Agamben ignores. Liberal democratic protections prevent military action and the slide to totalitarianism Heins, Visiting Professor of Political Science at Concordia University and Senior Fellow at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, 2005 (Volkcr, "Giorgio Agambcn and the Current State of Affairs in Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Policy," 6 German Law Journal No. 5, May, http:Nwww.gcrmanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=598) <According to this basic Principle of Distinction, modern humanitarian action is directed towards those who are caught up in violent contlicts w~thout possessinrr any strategic value for the respective warrinv parties. Does this imply that classic humanitarianism and its legal expressions reduce the lives of noncombalancs to the "bare life" ol' nameless ind~viduals beyond the protection ol' any le~al order? 1 would rather argue that humanitarianism is itself an ordermaking activity. Its goal 1s not the reservation of life reduced to a bare natural fact, but conversely the protection of civilians and thereby the protection of elementary standards of civilization which prevent the exclusion of individuals from any legal and moral order. The samc holds true for human rights, of course. Apamben fails to apvreciate the fact that human rights laws are not about some cadaveric "bare life", but about the protection of moral aeency.[33] His sweeping critique also lacks any sense for essential distinct~ons. It may be legitimate to see "bare life" as a juridical fiction nurtured by the modcm state, which claims the right to derogate from otherwise binding norms in times of war and emergency, and to kill individuals, if necessary, outside the law in a mode of "effective factuality."[34] Agamben asserts that sovcreignty understood in this manner continues to function in the same way since the seventeenth century and regardless of the democratic or dictatorial structure of the state in question. This claim remains unilluminated by the wealth of cvidence that shows how the humanitarian motive not only shapes the mandate of a host state and nonslalc agencies. but also serves to restrict the overational freedom of military commanders in democracies. who cannot act with impunity and who do not wage war in a lawless state of nature.[35] Furthermore, Agambcn ignores the crisis of humanitarianism that emerged as a result of the totalitarian degeneration of modern states in the twentieth century. States cannot always be assumed to follow a rational self-interest which informs them that there is no point in killing others indiscriminately. The Nazi episode in European history has shown that sometimes leaders do not swre the weak and the sick. but take extra care not to let them escape, evcn il'they are handicapped, very old or very young. Classic humanitarianism

depends on the existence of an international society whose members feel bound by a basic set of rules regarding the use of violencerules which the ICRC itself helped to institutionalize. Conversely, classic humanitarianism becomes dysfunctional when states place no value at all on their international reputation and see harming the lives of defenseless individuals not as useless and cruel, but as part of their very mission.[36]> Agamben's theory is outdated. Modern humanitarian law has no exceptions and apply to all individuals Heins, Visiting Professor of Political Science at Concordia University and Senior Fellow at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, 2005 (Volker, "Giorgio Agamkn and the Current State of Affairs in Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Policy," 6 German Law Journal No. 5, May, http:Nwww.gemanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=598) <The politicallhumanitarian divide is indeed a real one, but Agan~ben is inaccurate when he holds (a) that humanitarian law and human rights are essentially the same thing. and (b) that human rights are apolitical in the sensc of being outside the scope of scrious political conllicts or unenforcablc outside the domestic iurisdiction of states. While Agamben places civil rights within the political realm, he simullaneously seems to attribu~c thc acceptance of presumably a~olitical human rights not to 1hc salience of transnational legal norms, but to the contingency of humanitarian I'celinzs. Even Hannah Arendt indicted in her own day the harmlessness of human rights groups and discovered "an uncanny similarity" between their language and that of certain "societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals."[8] Today, however, we have good reasons to reiect this rigid dualism of enforcable civil rirrhts versus merely declaratory human rights as outdated. Agambcn is certainly right to draw a broad analogy between humanitarianism and human rights law, although he skips the important issue of how the two relate to each other. Both bodies of law share the obiective of protecting individuals under any circumstances. As Agambcn seems to realize, the classic separation between the law of war and law of peace. which limited the applicability of human rights to thc latter, was gradually replaced after 1945 by legal opinions and treaties containing clcar stipulations regarding basic human rights obligations which cannot be suspended evcn in times of war or other public emergencies. Thus, both Article 27 of the American

Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) and Article 15 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) list a number of "non-derorable" human rights, includino the rights to life and the right of belief, which are to be applied without exception in all circurnstances.[9]>

AT: Calculations Bad -Calculations Good Refusing to calculate masks the most totalitarian calculations. Refusal to be responsible for all the potential outcomes of our actions is the worst for violence and totally unethical Campbell, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle, 1999 (David, "The Deterritorialization of Responsibility," Morul Spaces, Eds. Michael J. Shapiro & David Campbell, p. 45-7) That undecidability resides within the decision, Den-ida argues. "that iustice exceeds law and calculation. that thc un~resentable exceeds the determinable cannot and should riot scrvc as alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles, within an institution or a state, or between institutions or states and others."" Indccd, "incalculable iustice requires us to calculate." From whcre does this insistence comeL? What is behind, whal is animating, these imperatives? It is both thc character of infinite iustice as a heteronomic rclationship to the other, a relationship that because of its undecidability n~ultiplies respc>nsibility. and the fact that "left lo itself', the incalculable and giving (donatrice) idea of iustice is always verv close to the bad, cvcn to the worst. for it can always be reappropriated bv the most Derverse calculation."" The necessity of calculating the incalculable thus responds to a duty. a duty that inhabits the instant of madness and compels the decision to avoid "the bad," the "perverse calculation." even "the worst." This is the duty that also dwells with deconstruction and makes it the starting point. the "at lcast necessarv condition," for the organization of resistance to totalitarianism in all its f0I-ms. And it is a duty that responds to practical political concerns when we recognize that Demda names the hod, the perverse, and the worst as those vio\ences "we recognize all too well without yet having thought them through, the crimes of xenophobia, racism, antiSemitism, religious or nationalist fanaticism."" Furthermore. the duty within the decis~on. the ohligation that recognizes the necessity of negotiating the possibilities pruvided by the impossibilities or justice. is not content with simply avoiding, containing, cornhaling, or negating thc worst vinlence -though it could certainly begin with those strategies. Instead, this res~onsibilitv, which is the responsibility of responsibility, commissions a "utopian" strategy. Not a strategy that is beyond all bounds of vossibilitv so as to be considercd "unrealistic," but one which in respecting the necessity of calculation. takes the possibility summoned bv the calculation as far as possible, ''must take it as far as possible, beyond the place we find ourselves and beyond the already identitiable zones of morality or politics or law, beyond the distinction between national and international, public and private, and so on."94 As Derrida declares. "Thc condition of possibility of this thing called responsibility is a certain experience and exurrimettr of the ~ossibilieofthe impossible: the testing of the aporia from which one may invent the only possible invention, the inz~ossible invention. hislcads Demda

to enunciatea proposition that many, !lot the least of whom arc his Habemnsian critics. could hardly have expected: "Nothing sce~ns to nle I<,ssoutdated than the classical emancipatory ideal. We cannot attempt to disqualify it today, whether crudely or wit11 sophistication, at least not without treating it too lightly and fornlinp the worst ~rn~liciries."~">

AT: Calculations Bad -Calculations Good Justice is infinite -failure to help the other and use calculations leads to perverse calculations and totalitarianism which have justified the worst atrocities in human history Campbell, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle, 1999 (David, "The Deterritorialization of Responsibility," Moral Spaces, Eds. Michael J. Shapiro & David Camphell, p. ) <The thente of u~~dccidahility gives us the context of the decision. hut in and of itself undecidability does not provide an account of tlic dccision that would satisfy the concern raised hy Critchley. "Decisions have lo he token. Bur how? And in virtue of what? How docs onc make a decision in an undecidahlr temin?"x"l'hese questions point to lhe nub of the prohlern. Tor sure. but thcy arc issues that do no1 go unnoticed in Der-rida's work. They an' of pnrticular conceni for Derrida in "Force of LIW." in that essay, subsequent to making the casc for thc intrinsic deconstmctihility of the law and noting how this is :ood ncws for politics and historical progress. Derrida argues that the law's deconstmctibility is made possible by the ~rndeconstructibility of iustice. Justice is outside and bevond the law. "Justice is the experience of the im~ossible."~~ ~ustice is not a vrinciple, or a foundation. or a auidinn tradition. Justice is infinite, and -in a favorable comparison to Levinas's notion of justice -"the heteronomic relation to others, to the faces of othcrncss that govern me, whose infinity I cannot thematize and whose hostage I rcrr~ain."~'In these terms, justice is like thc pre-oridnal, an-archic relation to the other, and akin to the undecidable. It represents the domain of the impossible and the unrepresentable that lies outside and bevond the limit of the possible and the representable. But it cannot be understood as "utopian," at least insofar as that means the opposite of "realistic." It is not indeterminate. It is undecidable. It is that which marks the limit of the possible; indeed, it is that which brings the domain of the possible into being and gives it the ongoing chance for lransformation and re-figuration, that which is one of the conditions of possibility for ethics and politics. In this context, justice enables the law, but the law is that which "is never exercised without a decision that cuts, that divides."88 law works from the unrepresentable and seeks to represenl; it takes from the impossible and conceives the possible; it is embedded in the undecidable but nevertheless decides. Nonetheless, "the undecidable remains caught, lodged. at least as a ghost -but an essential ghost -in evcry decision. is every event of decision. its ghostliness deconstructs from within any assurance of presence, any certitude or any supposed critcriologv that

would assure us of the iustice of the dccision, in truth of the very event of a decision."'" The undecidable within the dccision does not, however, prevent the decision or avoid its urgency. As Derrida observes, "a iust decision is alwavs reauired immediately, 'ri~ht away' " This necessary haste has unavoidable consequences because the pursuit of "infinite information and the unlimited knowledge of conditions, rulcs or hvpothetical imperatives that could iustify it" arc unavailable in the crush of time. Nor can the crush of time be avoided, cvcn by unlimited time, "because the moment of decision, us such, alwavs remains a finite moment of urgencv and precipitation." The decision is alwavs "structurallv finite." it "alwavs marks the interruption of the iuridico- or ethico- or politico-cognitive deliberation that vrecedes it, that must precede it." This is why, invoking Kierkegaard, Derrida declares that "thc instant of decision is a mdness."u" The finite nature of thc decision may be a "madness" in the way it rendem possible the impussihle. the infinite character of justice, hut Dcmda arnues for the necessity of this madness. Most importantly. although Derrida's argunlent concerning tk decision has, to this point, been concerned with an accmm of the pn~rdi#reby which a decision is possihle. with respect to the necessity of the decision that Dcrrida begins to formulate an account of the decision that bcars upon the content of the decision. In so doing, Derrida's arnumenl addresses more directlyIMIE direclly, I would argue. than is acknowledged by Critchky -the concern that for politics (at last for a pmgressivr politics) one must provide an account of the decision to combat domination.

AT: Otherization -Plan key ~reventextermination Operating within a framework of ethics is critical to prevent ontological totalitarianism. Our act of infinite responsibility for the other though the plan is critical to prevent extermination of the other Campbell, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle, 1999 (David, "The Deterritorialization of Responsibility," Moral Spaces, Eds. Michael J. Shapiro & David Campbell, p. ) <In this contemporary milieu, a 1934 essay by Emmanuel Lcvinas ("Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism") has bccn republished with a preface offering a different account of danger. In lhat short note, Levinas argued that the ori~ins of National Socialism's "bloodv barbarism" were not to be found in an aberration of reasoning or an accident of ideology, but rather in "thc essential possibility of elemental Evil into which we can be led by logic and against which Western philosophy had not sufficiently insured itself."' Moreover, the possibilitv of evil as a product of reason, something against which Western philosophy had no guard, was "inscribed within the ontology of a being concerned with being." As such, this possibilitv remains a risk: it "still threatens the subject correlative with being as gathering together and as dominating," even though this subject (the subject of liberalism and humanism) is "the famous subject of transcendental idealism that before all else wishes to be free and thinks itself free."" In this statement, Levinas offered the core of a thought developed over the last six decades, a thought with the potential to chart an ethical course for subjects implicated in deconstruetion but who want to resist destruction. Levinas's ~hilosophv-that of ethics as first philosophv-is "dominated bv the presentiment and the memory of the Nazi horror,"6 and from under the shadow of Auschwitz seeks to install a disposition that will prevent its repetition.' Yet this summons is not answeredby the admonition to return to the dominant moral-philosophical discourse of modernity with its traditional concept of responsibility, where ethics is most often understood in terms of the moral codes and commands pertaining to autonomous agents (whether they be individuals or state^).^ For Levinas, being beholden by reason to elements of thal tradition was the basis uuon which the Holocaust (among other related atrocities) was ~ossible.~ Instead, Levinas argues that in order to contiont evil it is the totalities of that moral-philosovhical discourse that must be contestcd, for "political totalitarianism rests on an ontoloeical t~talitarianism."'~ The critique of "ontological totalitarianism" puts Lcvinas in tcnsion with the legacies of (Greek) philosophy, at least insofar as Levinas understands that philosophy to have been dominated by a way of thinking in which truth is equivalent to presence. "By this I mean an intelligibility that considers truth to be that which is present or copresent, that which can be gathered or synchronized into a totality

that we would call the world or cosmos.""' That which is Other is thereby reduced to the Same. This transformation is considered by Levinas to be an "alchemy that is performed with the philosopher's stone of the knowing ego," a being concerned with being.'" "Political totalitarianism" originates in this privilege mantcd to presence because it disenables and resists an understanding of that which cannot be thematized, the "otherwise than ~ein~."" as one of the bases for the Nazi horror In this context, anlisemitisrn -is more than "the hostility felt by a majority towards a minority, nor only xenophobia, nor any ordinary racism." Instead, it can be understood as "a repugnance felt for the unknown within the psyche of the Other, for the mystery of its intcrority or... a repugnance felt for the pure proximity of the other man. for sociality itself."14 However, there is for Levinas another tradition of thought that takes us in this otherwise direction: the Hebraic (as opposed to Hellenic) tradition.'"lthough Levinas does not discount the Grcek tradition's capacity to understand the interhuman realm as presence, he argues that this realm "can also be considered from another perspective -the ethical or biblical pcrsmctive that transcends the Grcek language of intelligibility- as a theme of iusticc and concern for the other as other, as a theme of love and desire, which carries us beyond the infinite being of the world as ~rescncc."'~ Levinas cannot therefore be understood as being bound bv an either/or logic through which one tradition is reiectcd in favor of another. Instead, he argues that "the interhuman is thus an interface: a double axis where what is 'ofthe world' qua phenmmenoIogical irttelligibility is juxtaposed with what is 'not ol'thc world' qua ethical responsibility. "I7 This double axis of presence and absence, identity and altcritv, "essence and essence's other." stands as "the ultimate relationship in Being," the "irreducible structure upon which all the other structures rest."18 It is that which constitutes, or reterritorialixcs, the space -the "null-site," a nonplace of a place -of responsibility, subjectivity, and ethics in the location detemtorializcd by Heidegger (and others).19> Using the state is the only way to fulfill our infinite responsibility to the other Campbell, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle, lYW (David. "The Deterritorialization of Responsibility," Moral Spaces, Eds. Michael J. Shapiro & David Campbell. p. ) <Moreover, the spatial dimcnsion foregrounded by the third party's disturbance and the resultant need for iustice is associated with the state. "Who is closest to me? Who is the Other? ...We must investigate carefullv. Legal iustice is rewired. There is need for a ~tate."~' Being,Levinas writes that "a problem is posited bv proximity itself, which, as the immediate -Equally, in Ofhenvise Tf~an itself, is without problems. The extraordinarv commitment of the other to the third party calls for control, a search for iustice,

societv and the state."" Indeed, Levinas has an aoorovin~ view of the state. rcaardinrr, it as "the highest achievement in the lives of western ueo~les,"~" something perhaps attributable to his contestable interprctalion of the legitimacy of the state of ~sracl.~'>

AT: Otherization -Res~onsibilitv to Other Exists Our responsibility to the other is infinite and cannot be calculated -it is critical to understand subjectivity and ethics Campbell, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle, 1999 (David, "The Deterritorialization of Rcsponsibilily," Moral Spaces, Eds. Michael J. Shapiro & David Campbell, p. ) <Levinas's thought radically refigures our understanding of responsibility. suhiectivity, and ethics, for the meaning of each is implicated in the other: "TResponsibilitv [is1 the essential, primary and fundamental structure of subiectivitv. For I describe subjectivity in ethical terms. Ethics ... docs not supplement a preceding existential base; the very node of the sub.jective is knotted in ethics understood as responsibility."20 Of these concepts, rcsponsibili~y is pcrhaps the most important because, for Levinas, being is a radically interdependent condition, a condition made possible only bccausc of my responsibility to the Other: Responsibility for the Other, for the naked face of the first individual to come along. A responsibility that goes beyond what I may or may not have done to the Other or whatever acts I may or may not have committed, as if 1 were devoted to the other man before being devoted to myself. Or more exactly, as if I had to answer for the other's death even before being. A guiltless responsibility, whereby I am none the less open to an accusation of which no alibi, spatial or temporal, could clear me. It is as if the Other established a relationship or a relationship were established whose whole intensity consists in not presupposing the idea of community." This responsibility is unlike that associated with the autonomous moral agents of traditional conceptions. It is "a res~onsibilitv without limits, and so necessarily excessive, incalculable, before memory... a responsibility before the very concept of rc~~onsibilit~."'~ and thus It is a responsibility that is pre-original, an-archic, and devolved from an "infrastructural a~teritv,"~~ reworks our understanding ol'both subiectivity and ethics. Responsibility understood as such refigures subiectivitv because the very origin of the subject is to be found in its subiection to the Other, a subiection that precedes consciousness, identity, and freedom, does not therefore originate in a vow or decision, and -ergo -cannot be made possible by a command or imperative." In other words, subjects are constituted by their relationship with the Other. Their being is called into question by the prior existence of the Other, which has an unremitting and even accusative hold on the subject. Moreover, and this is what re-articulates ethics, this relationship with the Other means that onc's beinn has lo be affirmed in terms of a right to be in relation to the Other: One has to respond to one's right to be, not by referring to some abstract and anonymous law, or judicial entity, but hecause of one's fear for the Other. My being-in-the-world or my "place in the sun," my being at home? have these not also been the usurpation of spaces belonging to the other man whom I have already oppressed or starved, or driven out into a third world: are they not acts of

repulsing, excluding, exiling, stripping, killing?25 Having decentered subjectivity by making it an effect of the relationship with the Other, Levinas's thought recasts ethics in terms of a primary responsibility that stakes our being on the assertion of our right to be. As Levinas declares, "We name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethic^."'^ In turn, the recasting of ethics reinforces the decentering of subjectivity: Ethical subiectivity dispenses with the idealizing subiectivity of ontology, which reduces evervthing to itself. The ethical "I" is suhiectivity precisely insol'ar as it kneels before the other, sacrificing its own liberty to the more primordial call of the other. The heteronomy of our response to the human other, or to God as the absolutely other, prcccdcs thc autonomy of our subjective freedom. As soon as I acknowledge that it is "I" who am responsible, I accept that my freedom is anteceded by an obligation lo the other. Ethics redefines subiectivitv as this heteronomous responsibilitv. in contrast to autonomous freedom." Levinas's philosophy of ethics as first philosophy is clearly in accord with the demise of universality as signalled by "the cnd of philosophy," especially as his enterprise has been animated by a concern for the political consequcnccs of Being. ontology, and totality. At the same time, and partly because its truly radical nature goes beyond the confines of eitherlor logic, it can be argued that there remains an important moment of universality in Levinas's thought. I1 is to be found -paradoxically- in "the vcry particularity" of the obligation to the other.'' We are all in that circumstance, and it is thus universal, a form ol' transccndence. Not the transcendence of an ahistotical ego or principle, but transcendence in the sense that alterity. being's other, is a necessity structured by dgerance rather than ontology, which effects a transcendence without presence.2hs Levinas observes, "The fundamental expcriencc which objective experience itself presupposes is the experience of the

AT: Deconstruction K -Permutation Solvencv Ethics and deconstruction must be combined to be open towards the other. The two alone fail Campbell, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle, 1999 (David, "The Dcterritorialization of Responsibility," Moral Spaces, Eds. Michael .I.Shapiro & David Campbell, p. ) <The affinities between "Levinasian ethics" and "Derridean deconstruction" are considerable. Most notably, alteritv incites ethics and responsibilitv for each, as both depend on the recognition of a structural condition of alteritv prior to subjcctivity and thought. As Derrida argues in defense of the proposition that deconstruction entails an affirmation, "IDcconstruction is, in itself, a positive response to an allcritv which necessarilv calls, summons or motivates it. Deconstruction is therefore vocalion -a response to a call... The other prcccdes philosophv and necessarily invokes and vrovokes the subiect before any genuine questioning can begin. It is in this rapport with the other that affirmation expresses itself."" As such, "Deconstruction is not an cnclosurc in nothingness, but an openness towards the other."" Deconstruction's unconditional affirmation has enabled Simon Critchley to arguc that the question of ethics and deconstruction is not one of deriving an ethics from deconstruction. but of recognizing that deconstruction has a basic ethicalitv, that it takes place ethicallv, because of its orientation to the call of the other. But, for Critchley, deconstruclion alone "fails to navigate the treacherous nassage from ethics to politics,"'hnd requires the supplement of Levinas's unconditional responsibility to traverse this passage. The Lev~nasian fortification is effective because "for Levinas ethics is ethical for the sake of politics-that is, for the sake of a new conception of thc organization of political space." In consequence, Critchlcy's argument (although it is not specifically intended as a critique of Derrida) is that "politics provides the continual horizon of Lcvinasian ethics. and that the problem of politics is that of delineatin2 a form of political life that will repeatedly interrupt all attempts at tot~dlization."'~> Deconstruction combined with action prevents totalitarianism. Failure to do so eliminates any possibility of politics Campbell, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle, 1999 (David, "Thc Deterritorialization of Responsibility," Moral Spaces, Eds. Michael J. Shapiro & David Campbell, p. ) <But the concern about politics in Derrida articulated by Critchley & not about politics per se, nor about the possibilities of political analysis, but about the prospects for a ~rogrcssive, radical politics, one that will demand -and thus do more than simply permit the decision to resist domination. exploitation, oppression, and all other conditions that seek to contain or eliminate alteritv.

Yet, again. I would argue that the above discussion demonstrates that not only does Derridean deconstruction address the question of politics, especially when Levinasian ethics draws out its political qualities, it does so in an affirmative antitotalitarian manner that gives its polilics a uarticular quality, which is what Critchley and others like him most want (and rightly so, in my view). We may still be dissatisfied with the prospect that Derrida's account cannot rule outforever perverse calculations and unjust laws. But to aspire to such a guarantee would be to wish for the demise of politics, for it would install a new technologv. even if it was a technologv that began life with thc markings of progressivism and radicalism. Such dissatisCaction, then. is not with a Derridean politics, but with the necessities of politics per se, necessities that can be contested and negotiatcd, but not escaped or transcended. It is in this context that the limits of the Levinasian supplement proposed by Critchley as necessary for deconstruction become evident. While it is the case that Levinas's thought is antagonistic to all totalizing forms of politics, recognizing the wav that ontological totalitarianism gives rise to political totalitarianism. 1 argued above that thc limit of its critical potential is exposed bv the question of the state. In this regard, insofar as Derridean deconstruction requires the Levinasian supplement, that su~~len~ent itself needs to be suvplementcd. and supplemented with recognition of the manner in which deconstruction's at'firmafon of alterity deterritorializes responsibilitv. and pluralizes the possibilities for ethics and politics over and bcvond (yet still including) the state.'07>

AT: Otherization -Res~onsibilitvto Other Exists Our responsibility to the other comes before everything else, even if it means abandoning politics or Democracy Campbell, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle, 1999 (David, "The Deterritorialization of Responsibility," Moral Spaces, Eds. Michael J. Shapiro & David Campbell, p. ) <Notwithstanding the interrelated nature of the norm of the interhuman and the rules of governance, in the shift to morality Levinas argues that ethics "hardens its skin as soon as we move into the political world or the impersonal 'third' -the world of government, institutions, tribunals. prisons, schools, committees. and so on."66 This "hardening of the skin" is a manifestation of the way in which Levinas understands politics to involve "a totalizing discourse of ontology,"b7 a discourse most evident in arguments enunciated by and for the state. Nonetheless, in his discussion of the shift from ethics to morality, Levinas exhibits a less sanguine attitude to the state than noted above: If the moral-political order totally relinquishes its ethical foundation, it must accept all forms of society, including the fascist or totalitarian, for it can no longer evaluate or discriminate between then]. The state is usually better than anarchy -but not always. In some instances -fascism or totalitarianism, for example -the political order of the state mav have to be challenged in the name of our ethical resvonsibilitv to the other. That is whv ethics must remain the first ~hiloso~hv.~~ Even though Levinas's limited reservations about the state are here restricted to the nature of (domestic) political order, the idea that "the state may have to be challenged in the name of our ethical responsibilitv to the other" at least allows for the possibilitv of extending ~olitical action in terms of the ethical relation beyond the bounds suggested bv Lcvinas's previous reflections on the third party and the state. There is no doubt, however, that to fulfill the promise of Levinas's cthics with resvect to international politics, this possibilitv for challenge has to be carried a good deal further. Moreover, I would ague, this possibility for challenge has to be vursued in order to maintain tidclitv with Levinas's conviction that neither politics nor warfare can obliterate the relationship of the self to the other as a relation of resvonsibilitv. Indeed. this endeavor might be thought of in terms of making Levinas's thought more "Levinasian," for pursuin~ this possibilitv of challenge flows from the recognition that "iniustice -not to mention racism, nationalism, and imperialism -beeins when one loses sight of the transcendence of thc Other and forgets that the State, with its institutions, is informed bv the vroximitv of mv relation to the Our relationship to the other is always necessary, not matter the circumstances. We cannot say 'no' or 'it is not my responsibility' Campbell, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle, 1999 (David, "The Dcterritorialization of Responsibility," Moral Spaces. Eds. Michael J. Shapiro & David Campbell, p. )

<Levinas's thought is appealing for rethinking the question of responsibility, especially with respect to situations like the Balkan crisis, because it maintains that there is no circumstance under which we could declare that it was not our concern. As Levinas notes, people can (and obviously do) conduct their relationship to the Other in terms of exploitation, oppression, and violence. Bul no mattcr how allergic to the other is the self, "the relation to the other, as a relation of responsibilitv, cannot be totally suppressed, even when it takes the limn of politics or warfare." In consequence, no self can ever opt out of a relationship with the other: "1111 is im~ossible to free mvself by saving. 'It's not my concern.' There is no choice. for it is always and inescapably my concern. This is a unique 'no choice.' one that is not slavery."'37 This unique lack of choice comes about because in Levinas's thought cthics has been transformed from something independent of subjectivity-that is. from a set of rules and regulations adoptcd bv ~rcpiven. autonomous agents -to something insinuated within and integral to that subiectivitv. Accordingly, ethics can be understood as something not ancillary to the existence of a subiect; instead, ethics can be a~prcciated for its indispensability to the verv being of the subiect. This argument leads us to the recognition that "we" are alwavs alreadv ethicallv situated, so making iudgments about conduct depends less on what sort of rules are invoked as regulations and more on how the interdeven-dencies of our relalions with others are appreciated. To repeat one of Levinas's key points: "Ethics redcfines subiectivitv as this heteronomous responsibilitv. in contrast to autonomous freedom."'38

AT: Lacan -Essentialism Essentialism: Lacanian theory is premised on the myth of constitutive lack; it places its highly symbolic universal theory outside the realm of the signified, shielding it to any criticism, over-applying it to all specific scenarios of antagonism, and recreating the symbolic order that it claims to criticize. Robinson, Professor of Politics at Nottingham University, 2004 (Andrew, "The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique," http://andyrohinsontheoryhlog.blogspot.co~ <More precisely, 1 would maintain that "constitutive lack is an instance of a Barthesian myth. It is, after all, the function or myth to do exactly what this concept does: to assert the emntv faclicitv of a particular ideological schen-ra while rejecting anv need to arnue for its assum~tions. 'Myth does not deny things; on the contrary, its [unction is to talk ahour them: simply. it purifies thcm, it makes them innocent. it ~ives them a natural and eternal iustification, it is a clarity which is not that of anexplanation but that of a slnlement of fact' (2000. 143, my emphasis). This is precisely the status of "constitutive lack": a supposed fact which is supposed to overate above and beyond explanation, on an ontoloaical level instantly accessible to those with the courage to accept it. Myths operate to construct euphoric eniovmenl for those who use them, but their operation is in conflict with the social context with which they interact. This is because their operation is connotative: they arc "received" rather than "read (1984,232). and opcn only to a "readerly" and not a "writerly" interpretation. A myth is a secondorder signification attached to an already-constructed denotative sign, and the ideological message proiected into this sign is constructed outside the context of the signified. A myth is therefore, in Alfred Konybski's sense. intensional: its meaning derives from a prior linguistic schema, not from interaction with the world in its complexily. Furthemre, myths have a repressive social function, carrying in Barthes's words an 'order not 10 think' (1997.59). They are necessarily projected onto or imposed on actual people and events, under the cover of this order. The "triumph of literature" in the hminici trial (2000.43-6) consists precisely in this proiection of an externally-constructed mythical schema as a way of avoiding engagement with something one does not understand. Lacanian theory, like Barthesian myths, involves a prior idea of a structural matrix which is not opcn lo change in the light of the instances to which it is applied. (This is one of the reasons why the strong ontology founding Lxanian theory is rarely accompanied by a systematic epistemology). iiick's writes of a 'pre-ontological dimension which precedes and eludes the construction of reality' (1997a. 208), while khu suggests there is a formal structure of any chain of eqoivalences which necessitates the logic of hegemony (1996.57). Specific analyses are referred back to this underlving

structure as its necessary expressions. without auparentlv being able to alter it; for instance. 'those who triggered the process of denlocratization [in eastern Europe]. ..are not those who today enjoy its fruits, not because of a simple usurpation ...but because of a deeper structural logic' (Aiiek, 1992a. 27). In most insttccs. the mythical operation of the idea of "constitutive lack" is implicit, revealed only bv a rhetoric of denunciation. or instance. Mouffe accuses liberalism of an 'incapacity ... to grasp ... the imduciblc character of antagonism' (1993, 1-2). whilc %ck claims that a 'dimension' is 'lost' in Butler's work bccause of her failure to conceivc of "trouble" as conaitutivc of "gender" (1994.71). This language of "denial" which is invoked to silence critics is a clear example of Barthes's "order not to think": one is not to think about thc idea of "constitutive lack", one is simply to "acc~pt" it. under pain of invalidation. If somcone else disagrees, sfhe can simply hc told that there is something crucial missing from hcrlhis theory. Indced. critics ru-e as likely to he accused of heing "dangerous" as to be accused of heing wrong. One of the functions of myth is to cut out what Trevor Pateman terms the "middlc lcvel" of analytical concepts. establishing a short-circuit between high-lcvel gcnenlimtions and ultra-specific (pseudo-)concrete instances. In Barthc3's classic case of an image of a black soldier saluting the French flag, this individual action is implicitly connected to highly abstract concepts such as nationalism. without the mediation of the particularities of his situation. (These paflicularities, ifrevuled. could undermine the myth. Perhaps he enlisted for financial reasons. or due to threats of violence). Thus, while myths provide an analvsis of sorts, their basic operation is anti-analytical: the analytical schema is fixed in advance. and the relationship between this schema and the instances it organizes is hierarchically ordered to the exclusive advantage of the former. This is precisely what happens in Lacanian analyses of srwcific political and cultural phenomena. iiiek specificallv advocates 'sweeping generalisations' and short-cuts between specific instances and high-level abstractions, evading the "middle level". 'The correcl dialectical procedu re... can bc best described as a diictjump from the singular to the universal, bypassing the mid-level of particularity'. He wants a 'direct jump from the singular to the universal', without reference to particular contexts (Butler, hclau and Aii~ek, 2000,239-40). He also has a concept of a 'notion'

which has areality above and beyond any referent, so that. if reality docs not fit it. 'so much the worse for reality' (Butler. Laclau and Ziiek, 2000, 244). The failure to see what is redly going on mans that one sees mow not less. hecause libidinal perception is not impeded by annoying facts (seeButler. Laclau and 2ii.k. 2000.248). ZiZek insists on the necessity of the gesture of externally projecting a conception of an essence onto phenomena (1994.62-3), even affirming its necessity in the samc case (anti-Semitism) in which Reich denounces its absurdity (tifelt.1994,74; Reich. 1974, 30-1). This amounts tom cndorselncnt or myths in the Barthesian sense, as well as demonstrating the "dialectical" genius of thc likcs of Kelvin McKenzie. hcanian analysis consists mainly of m cxcrcise in projection. As a ~sult. Lacanian "explanations" often look more propagandistic or pedagogical than explanatorv. A particular case is dcalt with only in order to. wd to the extent that it can. confirm the already-formulated structuwl theory. Judith Butlcr criticizes iilek's method on the grounds that 'theory is applied to its examples', as if 'already true, prior to its exemplification'. 'The thcory is articulated on its self-sufficiency. and then shifts register only for the pedagogical purpose of illustrating an already accomplished truth'. It is therefore 'a theoretical fetish that disavows the conditions of its own emergence' (Butler, Laclau and iitck, 2000.26-7). She accuses Laclau of developing a model of explanation which reduces social movements to a single logic of claim-making. Using his method. '[wle become meta-commentators on Ihe conditions of possibility of political life without then both~ng to seewhether the dilemmas we assume to pertain universally are. in fact. at work in thc subject we purport to judge' (Butler. klau and Ziiek. 2000,169). The momcnt at which, for instance, a specific law is laken lo exp~ss the Law as a prior concept. Lacanians adout 'a credo of faith'; this is 'the moment in which a thcoty of psychoanalysis becomes a theological project'. Such simplification is 'a wav to avoid the rather messy psychic and social entanglement' involved in studying specific cases (Butler. Laclau and iihk, 2000, 155-6). Similarly, Dominick LaCapra objects to the idea of constitutive lack because specific 'losses cannot be adeciuatcly addressed when they are enveloped in an overlv qeneralised

discourse of absence ...Convcrscly. absence at a "foundational" level mnot simply bc derived fiom particular historical losses' (1999,698). Attacking 'the long story of conflating absencc with loss that becomes constitutive instead of historical' (1999.719). he accuses several theorists of eliding the difierence between absence and loss, with 'confusing and dubious results', including a 'tendency to avoid addressinc! historical problems,

including losses, in sufficientlv swcitic terms', and a tendency to 'enshroud, verhavs even to etherealise. them in a generalised discourse of absencc' (1999,700). Unlikc structural absences. traumatic historical events art: always determined by spcciiic circumstances (1999.725). For instance, refemng to iifek's remark that explanations of the Holocaust and the Gulag are 'so mavy attempts to elude the fact that we art: dealing with the "re$' ... which returns as the s,me trnumatic kernel in all civilisations' (1989. SO), hCapra rcrnarks that Ziiek performs 'an extreme and extremely dubious theoretical gesture' of reducing spccific events to mere manifestations of an underlying structure (1999,727). (Mapra, however. revives the idea of constitutive lack in his concept of genenl or structural absence -'absence as absence' or 'untranscendable structural trauma' [1999,722] -which simply displaces the problem of '-surplus lack" into one of how one tells whether a phenomenon is a contingent "tack" or a stn~ctural "absence"). Daniel Bensiiid draws out thc political consequences of the projection of absolutes into politics. 'The fetishism of the absolute event involves. .. a suppression of historical intelligibilitv, necessary to its de~oliticization'. The space from which politics is evacuated 'becomes.. . a suitablc place for abstractions. delusions and hvpostases'. Instead of actual social forces, there are 'shadows and spectrcs' (2002,7). The operation of the logic of projection is predictable. Accordina to Lacanians, there is a basic structure (sometimes called a 'ground' or 'matrix') from which all social phenomena arise. and this structure, which remains unchanged in all eventualities, is the reference-point from which particular cases are viewed. For instance, &ek. replying to cridcisms of Lacanian film theory thm its concept of "the gaze" never expresses anything which arises concretely in a film. states thnl the gaze, which is a structunUessentia1 category. is prior to inslances of eyes and sight (Butler, Laclau and Zikk, 2000.260). The "tit" between theory and evidence is constructed monologically by the reduction of the latter to the former, or by selectivity in inclusion and reading of examples. At its simplest, the bcanian myth functions by a short-circuit between a particular instance and statements containing words such as "all", "always", "nevc~"", "necessity" and so on. A contingent example or a generic reference to "experience" is used, misleadingl~. to found a claim with supposed universal validity. For instance, Stavrakakis uses the fact that existing beliefsystems are based on exclusions as a hasis to claim that all bclicfsystems are necessarily based on exclusions (1999.63-4), and claims that particular traumas expwss an 'ultimate impossibility' (1999.84-5). Similarly, Laclau and Mouffe use the fact that a particular antagonism can dismpt a particular fixed identity to claim that the social as such is penetrated and constituted by

antagonism as such (1985. 129-9). Phenomena arc often analysed as outgowlhs of something exterior to the situation in question. For instance, iikk's concept of the "social symptom" depends on a reduction of the acts of one particular series of people (the "socially excluded", "'fundamentalists", Scrbian paramilitaries. etc.) to a psychological function in the psyche of a different group (westemers). The "real" is a supposedlv self-identical vrinci~le which is used to reduce anv and all qualjtative differences between situations to a relation of formal equivalence. This shows how mythical characteristics can be projected from the outside, although it illso raises a different prohlcm: the underconceptualization of thc relationship between individual psyches and collec:ctive phenomena in Lacanian theory. TOO often. the denial of a dividing-line between the two is used as an excuse for simply nilling between them, as if there is no difference between analysinn a single individual and a social conflict. Lacanians frcqucnllv avoid questions of agencv (~iiekhils more to say about "class stmpgle" than classes, for instance). and a related tendcncy for psychological concepts to acquire an ersatz agency similar to that of a Mantian fetish. 'The Real" or "antagonism" occurs in phnses which have it doing or causing something. As Barthes shows, myth ofCm tht: psychological benefits of empiricism without thc epistemological costs. Tautology. for instance. is 'a minor ethical salvation. the satisfaction of having militated in favour of a truth ... without having to assume the risks which any son~ewhat positive search for truth inevitably involves' (1997.61). It dispenses with the need to have ideas, while treating this release as a stern morality. Tautology is a rationality which simultaneously denies itsclf, in which 'the accidental failure of language is magically identified with what one decides is a natural resistance of the objcct' (1997, 152-3). This passage could almost have been written with the "Lacanian Real" in mind. The characteristic of the Real is precisely that one can invoke it without defining it (since it is "beyond svmboiizalion"), and that the accidental failure of language, or indeed a contingent failure in social praxis, is identified with an ontological resistance to svmholization proiected into Being itself. For instance, 2i?ek7s classification of the Nation as a Thing rests on the claim that 'the only way we can dctcrmine it is by ... empty tautology', and that it is a 'semantic void' (1990, 53). Sinlilarly. he claims that 'the tautological gesture of the Master-Signifier'. an empty performative which retroactively turns presuppositions into conclusions, is necessary, and also that

tautology is the only way historical change can occur (1994.43.59). He even declares constitutive lack (in this case. termed the "death drive") to be a tautology (1994, 50). Lacanian references to "the Real" or "antagonism" as the cause of a contingent failure arcreminiscent of Robert Teflon's definition of God: 'laln explanation which means "I have no explanation"' (cited Bufe ed., 1995,188). An "ethics of the Real" is a minor cthical salvation which savs very little in positive terms, but which can pose in macho terms as a "hard" acceptance of terrifving realities. It authorizes truth-claims -in Laclau's language. a 'reality' which is 'before our eyes' (1990.97). or in Newman's, a 'harsh reality' hidden heneath a pmtcctive veil (2001,53) -yithout the attendant risks. Some bcanian theorists also show indications of a commitment based on the p;uticular kind of "e~~phoric" enjoyment Barthes associates with myths. Laclau in paliicular emphasi7xs his belief in the 'exhilarating' significance of the present (1990,923). hinting that he is committed to euphoric investments gencratcd through the repetition of the same.>

AT: Lacan -Essentialism Lacan's alternative, to embrace lack, is to "create an illusion of order when there is none." It is the essence of fantasy construction, requiring elimination of difference in order to maintain the smooth functioning of the Master Signifier. Robinson, Professor of Politics at Nottingham University, 2004 (Andrcw, "Thc Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique," http://andyrobinsonthcoryblog.blogspot.com/) <The nap between the two kinds of conlin.lencv is also su~aested bv the Lacanian insistence on thc "necd" for a master-signifier (or "nodal point"), i.e. a particular signitier which fills the position of universalily, a 'symbolic injunction which relies only on its own act of enunciation' (zitek, 2001d. 6). It is through such a gesture that one establishes a logic of sameness, and such a logic seems to ba desired by hcanians. Butler remarks that kikk's text is a 'project of mastery' and a discourse of the law in which -the "contingency" of language [is]mastered in and by a textual practice which speaks as the law' (1993. 198). He demands a "'New Harmony", sustained by a newlv emerged Master-Sgnifier' (kiiek 1999, 154). This insistence on a master-signitier is an anti-contingent gesture. especially in its rejection of the multiordinality of language. It is, after all, this multiordinality (thc possibility of making a statement about any other staement) which renders language an open rather than a closed system. The "need for a master-si~nifier seems to be a "need" to restore an illusion of closure, the "need" for metacornmunication to operate in a repressive rather than an open way. This "need" arises because the mythical concept of "constitutive lack is located in an entire mythical narrative in which it relates to other abstractions. ~nthe work of Laclau md ~ouffe, this expresses itself in the demand for a "henemonic" agent who continnentlv expresses the idea of social order "as such". One should recall that such an order is im~ossible, since antagonism is constitutive of social relations, and that the hegemonic gesture therefore rcquires an exclusion. Thus. the establishment of a hegemonic master-sicmifier is merely a useful illusion. me alternative to demanding a master-signilier -an illusion of order where there is none -would be to reject the pursuit of the ordering funcqion itself, and to embrace a "rhizomatic" politics which goes beyond this pursuit. In Laclau and Mouffe's work. however. the "need for a social order. and a state to embodv it, is never questioned, and. even in Zizek's texts, the "Act" which smashes the social order is to be followed by a necessarv restoration of order (e.g. 1989.21 1-12). This necessity is derived ontologically: people an, says iiiek. 'in need of firm ronts' (Butler, Lclclau and 2ii.ek. 2000.250). The tautological

gslure of establishing a master-signiiicr by restrospcctively positing conditions of an object as its components, thereby 'block[ing] any further inquiry into thc social meaning' of what it quilts (i.e. reprcssivc mctacommunication), is a structural necessity (1993,49). This is because 'discourse itself is in its fundamenlal structure "authoritarian"'. A distortion intnducing non-founded violence into language is necessary, and 'with Lacan. tho master is an impostor, yet the place occupied by him ... cannot he abolished, since the very finitude of every discursive field imposes its structural necessity'. The role of the analyst is not to challenge the place of the muter, but to occupy it in such a way as to expose its underlying contingency (1992~. 103). The master-si~nifier, also termed the One. demonstrates the centrality of a lofiic of place in Lacanian theory. Badiou accomplishes the ultimnate gesture of obedience to King Abacus in specifying mathematics -the core of many logics of place -as the mat of being-as-being (is. in itself). When all particularity is stripped away, 'what rcmains is mathematics' (2001. 130). His position on revolutionary change is similar to ~iiek's. It is inevitable, even 'destiny'. that every "truth" or revolutionary break should return to the logic of normalization (2001.70). The truth-event is fated to 'disappear' (2001.72). and truth can only change the content of' opinion (is. everyday symbolic discourse), not destroy it (2001.80). Lacanians assume that constitutive lack necessitates the construction of a uosilivc spacc which a particular agent can -fill (alhcit contingently). The "empty" place of power in liberaldemocmtic lamian texts such as those of Laclau, Mouffe. Stavrakukis and Newman is not empty at all. since it involves a particular (though changing) positivity. An "empty" place of power would involve, not an agent who adopts the "empty" position. but a simple absence of the position. or in other words. the destruction of the state and the free emergence of rhisomatic networks with no determinate centre. Therefore, the commitment to master-signifiers and the state involves a continuation of an essentialist image of positivity, with "lack" operating structurallv as the master-siunjfier of Lacanian theory itself (not as a subversion ofpositivity, but as aparticuiru. positive element).>

AT: Lacan -Essentialism Lacanian theory, beneath a veneer of anti-essentialism, mythically represents constitutive lack as objective truth that cannot be criticized. Acceptance of human nature as inherently antagonistic justifies any violence against individuals. Robinson, Professor of Politics at Nottingham University, 2004 (Andrew, 'The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique," http://andyrobinsonthcoryblog.blogspot.cod) <The reason Lacanians can claim to be "anti-essentialist" is that there is a radical rupture bctween the form and content of Lacanian theory. The "acccplance ol'contingcncy" constructed around the idea of "constitutive lack" is a closing, not an opening, gesture, and is itself "esscnlialist" and non-contingent. Many Lacanian claims are not at all contingent, bur arc posited as ahistorical absolutes. take m i~tstancc Lium Mnufk'z work. 'powcrand i~nlagt>nism' are ruppowd lo hn\c an 'incradrablc chnraclrr. so that 'any social obiect~vily is const!tutcd thn,ogh acls 01-power' and wlll sllo~ tr;tces 01 cxclurunns (2000. 21). One could hardly find a clearer example anywhere of a claim about a fixed basic structure of Being. One could also note again thc frequency of words such as "all" and "alwavs" in the Lacanian vocabulary, ,VWCII ;LF instmccs of cn?fr;~diction md anomaly. For instance, 1acla11 and Mnuffe accuse ~ornmatierasofes~entialis~ntwausc he uses tlr phr;~se .wilat it is', yet hey use tk same phrnse only two papeseariier (1990, 129. 131). The dislocation between form and content involves "playing with words", rather than constructing a hnguage game. Ludwip Wittgcnstcin arg~s 11131 'ifsomeone wished 10SOY: here i? something cnmmn 10 nl~ lhcsc conslri~ctions -nanrly tht. diajunclion af all their cumlwn prt~pcnbs" -I shottli rcply: Now yo11 mc only playtng with wet-ds' 11067. pm 1 .sect. (77.3%). 1,acanian iheory .seems. indeed. to he trealinp disjunction as a basts for sim~inriry. The "contingcncy" cmhced ill Lacaninn theory is no1 an opcnness which ex&? specifiable positivities. but n positivity podng us negativity. .lhc rchianship betwccn contingcncy and "co~~titulive is &c tk lack'' relationship belwccn Gamans and 'Germ.anne%.'. or tables and 'tablenrss". in the work of Bmhcs. One could SPA. therefore. of n "lack-IW?" or a "contin&ency-ness" nr an "anlagonism-ness" in L&an political thetlry, and ofthis theo~ as a claim to fillnex? with this reified "lack-ness" a? om of the posiliie ekments within the fullness. One .wmetimrs finds dhct instances of such mylhicnl vocobulaly. ns tbr instanre when Stavmknkis dcma~lds ack~~owlcdgcmcnt with core ideas posited as anqtmtionable dogmas and thc entire stn~clu~re of 'evcnl-ncss and negativity' (2003.69). Indccd. it is an especially closed vvictg of SuU~~css, virtually immune lo

falsification. ASRUII~~CI~~~S. the Real 'is never subject to the same logic of contingency that il secures' (1993, 196). It is indicative that Lacanians do not allow their own edifice to be haunted by any kind of outside: it is for 2ikk a defining feature of both psychoanalysis and Marxism that they are able to interpret resistances to their arguments (i.e. an outside) as the resull of the object they are studying li.e. as an insidc) (2001~. 174).The fixed structure of hcanian theory is strongly operative in resultant arguments. although it is concealed to some extent by an apparent rcluctancc on the part of hcanian thmrists to engage in metacommuniclltive dialogue about their theorelical claims. This allows a smoothlv-flowing rhetoric within which they can subsume contemporarv evcnts and specific subiects of analysis. However. beneath this rhetoric, the essentialist basic structure and the myth of "constilutivc lack" call the shots. One even finds at times an open rcl'ercnce to lack as an essence. For instance. Laclau and Mouffe refer to negativitv and antagonism as foundalional and grounding (19x5. 145. 19s:c.f. Newman. 2001, 153). Newman refers to 'rkemptiness a 1k hcm orpl~~. (2M)I, 50-1 ). Stavrakakis ud comcs close to admitting his ow~~euwntiatism ". rch 10 the Real a\ 5nhercnt in hum:m experience. II~UO,87) and IXI;III admits 'privileging the moment of ncgali~ity' (1~90. 17). Z~iekat times embraces "e~selltiali~m" and his entire analysis is unashamedly ontological. Sometimes, Lacanians imply the existence of an element in human nature which necessitates ~~nfli~t. Mouffe refen to 'an clement of hostility among hr~mnn beings. and iknounces others fi~rrejecting the idea that violence is inhelm1 in human nature. and Newman ciles Lncaa's vicw that mrstitutivc lack is 'alm,sl G~I~I~I. ?(xx). 130-?; Ncwm;t~l, ?m~. IM). Most often, one finds the essentialism of "constitutive lack" concealed beneath a simple chanoe (MOUV~. of words. Instead of "essential". one might say "raciical", "consti~utive", "primordial". "fundamental". "basic" or "indivisible". and this allows an essentialism at the lcvcl or form to be combined with an anti-essentialism at the level of content. For instance, 32ek bikes the term 'constitutive' to mean 'the story of everyone' (1992~.74). i.e. more-or-less the same as a universal cssencc.

One way in which Lacanian theorists differentiate themselves from "essentialism" is by reference to the idea of "constitutive lack" as negativitv. For instance. Laclau claims that he does not pose his theorv as a full awareness of obiectivity because 'antagonism is the limit of all obicctvity' and has no obiectivc mcanina of its own (1990, 17).Therefire. in Stsvrwis's IC~.Lmnian I~CO~ duun the limits hetween is suppo~dly bwak111~ thought und non-thought. encirclins nthr than symbolizing lack (199'4.823). and crcating n &paw within thought for an ~I*~~~IICFE are misleading. They may of its own limits. Such C~TIS apvlv to the arguments of (sav) Derrida or Korzybski. but the syntax and grammar of Lacanian theory is not such as to permit such an owning. Constitutive lack apucars in Lacanian rhetoric as an entity with a positive name, such as 'the Real', and instances of lacking are frecruentlv nominalized or "explained" by reference to it. As Butler asks, assuming sociality and conceptualization to havc a limit. 'why arc we compelled to give a technical name lo this limit. "the Real", and to make the further claim that the subject is constituted by this forcclosurc:l The use of technical nomenclature ovens up more problems than it solves'. Indeed. it could even be a gesture of discursive control in its own right. 'Arc we using the categories to understand the phenomena, or marshalling the phenomena to shore up the categories "in the name of the father"?' (Butler, Laclau and iiiek, 2000,152). Perhaps it involves social significations reified as prediscursive (1993, 195). In anv case, to say that the real resists symbolization is already to symbolize it(191)~.207). The technical lerm operates in much thc same way ;LC in posiriv~sric theories, where the use of :I noon tumv a set ofohwrved "facts" into a "'law". Lack (in thc sunsc of lhc vcrb "to lack-) is explained by means of a noll~inalized hck (for inst,ancc, Ur fiiitlrc vfsocicty by thc hcl of moguobm). and rhc various venluns of nominalized lack ore arranged in sentems ~nvolvinp tk verh "to be".It is not simply ;I elation cifdislowlion hut a theoletical entity in irs own righl. For instance. ".class struggle'' is tha an account uf which every direct rrlrrrnce to universality ...is...'bin.&". disl<xaled with regard to its literal meaning. 'Y:luss slruggle" is the Marxia name Rlr this bastc "operator oldiulocatiun"' @i~.ek. 1997a. 217). One mlghl compnre lhis formula In the staement. "I don't lolow what filuscs dislocnrion". Zifek also rebn lo 'the nnivenal lraumnic kentel which returns as rhe Same Ihn,ughoot all historiwl cpcchc'. cpochs which shookl be conce~ved 'as n SerPs nl rlltunately hiled atlempls to deal with the same "unhQtori~1~. tr;~umatic kernel' (1992~. 81). Dallmayr similarly wrlles of Lucka~ and Mool'fe's c<~n~=pt nut imply a Incl. but a "nihilatting" potency'. 'a niltilating trntee with real eitkcls' (1987, 287, 292-3). Sta\~mknkis differentiates ncgalivily. an

of ;utta&oni?m Iht '~~egativilvdesiynIw ontolo:ical concept of 'that which ... shows the limits of tltc conqtilinion of ohifftiviry', from cnotingnt insianccd of neg1;ivilies (7003.56) and Ncwman writes of a 'crcal~ve and a~nstilulivr absence' 12001.142). Bad~ou's Real -nurre situ:tmd thm (he rest. yct still an ontoln:ical ~wessity-has the me p>silive role. llmce. 'at the heri olevery silualion. at the fnundation of its hemp. there is a "situated'. void. aroud which is orpanisd the pkniltI*... of the situalia~' (2001.6Xl. This void is a spcific ekment. sn that 'the event n:unes the void insofar as it names thc not-known orthc situation' (2D01.69). and it must name the one true cenlrol void ofthe situation (2001.72). This notion of the void as p~>sitivity -as somcrhing already present in the sitl~alion which motiv:~tes changc -is the only snhst;mti;~l difference belween Badioa's tn1111-events and Koho's paradigm-shifts. (It \r.nold seem lo min taking. for inslalcc, the-lacy of fxtorics lurole Ik indt~seial rev0111tbn to be :In ;tcli\.e. positive ek~ncnl which tlw revnlu~inn nmnd. a "rcC void 1-;11hcr than snmelhing constn~cled relmcpectively out of 11 sitoation open to man? dillcrcnt dcvclnpn~cnls: Illis is ccn:~inly how Hadiou re& the rke of quanlum physics) . Hurler notes that 'the "real" that is a"'rucl;" or a "'kerml" or sumclimes n 'bubsliurc" is also. and wmelimrr within the $:me sentence. "a It~ss". a 'heptiviry"' (1993. 1981. Cun*lilutive I%k is :I pudlivily -an '.~~pemltaofdislocation".a "sihihting.. elentent -in the Lacanian \~rdbultuy. It b lhis process of mylhiul consln~clio~~ whiclt ollowa Id lo be drfiued precisely, and uhjch Iherrfore nleels (for inslmcel Newman's criterion thal it kIcss 'mdically undcrdcimcd' than krrida.s concept of lack (2001. 1321. One Can only avoid an "I-don't-know" being underdefined if one misre~resents it mythically. The idea of "constitutive lack" is equivalent to a conceDt of a positive element in human nature which necessitates conflict with others. For instance, the claim that 'the political is a dimension... inherent to. .. society and which determiners1 our lie. humans'] very ontological condition' (1993, 3) could be rephrased as a claim that it is natural to hate or fight. Many of the conservative authors who intermittently littcr thc rcfcrcnccs of Lacanian political theory (e.g. Schrnitt and Hobbes) are explicitly committed to n negative conception of human nature.>

AT: Lacan -Essentialism Lacan's critique of neurosis demonstrates how mythological the notion of inevitable lack is -psychosis can only be defined as "not neurosis," ensuring that psychosis is then repressed in order to ensure the survival of psychoanalytic theory. Robinson, Professor of Politics at Nottingham University, 2004 (Andrew, "The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique." hltp://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/) <More evidencc for the mythical character of the idea of "constitutive lack" comes from the assertion that it is irreducible and unavoidable (an "indivisible remainder+'. in one of 2iiek.s favourite catchphrases). If it is repressed or even foreclosed. it necessarily relums (in symptoms. "social sympto~ns". delusions. hallucinations and so on). This claim rests on a repressed element within Lacanian theory itself: psychosis. When Lacan defines psychosis as the foreclosure of the nameof-the-father. he pcrforrns a gcsrurc similar to that seen in a classic episode of Blackadder. when Baldrick proposes that the word "cat" bc dcfincd as "not a dog". Because of the mythical operation of the core account of neurosis in Lacanian theory. il can only refer to psychosis bv defining it as "not neurosis". The absence of a positive discussion of psychosis -its reduction to a failure of the construction of neurotic subiectivitv -is evidence of the all-pervasive operation of the mvthical modcl ofa core structure. It also allows psychosis to return as the repressed element in Lacanian theorv itself, the element it must denv to survive as a theoretical edifice. For Badiou. for instance, one must avoid challenging the reign of opinion (phadc discoune), as this leads to madness (2001, 84).The Deleuzian "sch~zo" contrabts favourably with the Lacanian masochist as the psychological basis for a radical "linc of flightv.> Lacanian theory places itself in a double bind -either it "loses its universalist status" or it links back into what it critiques. Robinson, Professor of Politics at Nottingham University, 2004 (Andrew, "The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique," http:llandyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/) <The idea of "constitutive lack" is suuposed to entail a reiection of neutral and universal standuoints, and it is this reiection which constructs it as an "anti-essentialist" position. In wactice, however. Lacanians restore the idea of a universal framework through the backdoor: the unjversalitv of a statement such as that "there is no ncutral universality" is constructed so as to privilege whichever side in a conflict accepts [he statement more completely. "Acccplancc" or "awareness" of the fundamental ontological level becomes the very neutral standpoint of objectivity it claims to obliterate, reassertinn cssenlialism in the very act of denying it. Take, for instance,

iiiek's claim thal 'a true Leninist is not afraid ... to assume all the consequcnccs, unpl~~sant as they may be. of realizing his political project ... [A] Leninist, like a conservative. is authentic [because]. .. fully aware of what it means to take power and to cxcrt it' (2001b. 4). Can one find a clearer example of a claim to a status of authcnticity due to a position of ontological privilege, in this case a privilege confenwi by "awareness" of the underlying lack'? It should be added that this is by no means the only reference to "authenticlly" in piiek's work. The Act. his primary ethical concept. is constructed around a reference to authenticity. defincd in exclusion of the various instances of 'false' acrs and 'shirking of the Act'. Beneath the idea that "there is no neutral universality" lurks a claim to know pI-eciselv such a "neutral universality" and 10 claim a privileged position on this basis. A consistent belief in contingency and "anticsscntialisnl" entails sccpticisrn about the idea oiconstitu~ive lack. Afier dl. how docs onc know that the appearance that 'experience' shows lack to be constitutive retlects an underlying universality, as opposed to the contingenl or evcn simulated effects of a particular discourse or episteme? Alongside its opponents. shouldn't Lacanian theorv also be haunted bv its own fallibility and incompletion? There is a paradox in the idea of radical choice, for it is unclear whether Lacanians believe this should be applied reflexively. ISthe choice of Lacanian theory itself an ungrounded Decision? If so. the theory loses the universalist status it implicitly claims. If not, it would seem to be the kind of structural theorv it attacks. A complete structural theory would seem to assumc an extracontingent standpoint, even if the structure includes a reference to constitutive lack. Such a theorv would seem to be a radical negation of the incompletion of "I don't knoww.>

AT: Lacan -Essentialism The idea of constitutive lack is a roadblock to true knowledge -it symbolizes lack instead of affirming the fact that we may not know the answer to every question. Robinson, Professor of Politics at Nottingham University, 2004 (Andrew, "The Political Theory oSConstitutive Lack: A Critique," http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/) <The difference between contingency and "constitutive lack" becomes clear if one imagines other ways in which the former could beexpressed. Onc important expression of an awareness of contingency is a preparedness to say "I don't know". This phrase -sadly anathematized in contemporary wcstem societies which identify "knowledge" with quick-fire answers, but expressing a nohlc tradition stretching hack to Socrates -expresses a "contingent" awareness that a particular aspect of the world has escaped one's own symbolic schema, and thal (in Lacanian terms) the Symbolic itself is incomplete. As Postman and Weingartner pu~it, 'good learners do not need to have an absolute, linal. irrevocable resolulion to everv problem. The sentence "1don't know". dms not depress them, and they certainly prefer it to the various forms of senmtic nonsense that pass for answers to questions that do not as yct have any solution -or niay never have one' (1969.42). They even advocate that teachers use "I don't know" as a pcdogogical tactic to inspire investigation (1969,103). Trevor Pateman adds that '[Ilt is significant when pco~le givc an answer when really they don't know. because they create an illusion of knowledge. which at the collective level may function as a real obstacle to understanding' (1975, 14). Pointing to a gap in one's knowledge by the metacornn~unicative statenlent "I don't know" is far more direct than the more immediately communicative and apparently affirmative use of phrases involving words such as "the" and "is". Is the idea of a "constitutive lack" equivalent to the gesture of saying ''I don't know"'? Although (as noted above) it is an explanation which means "I don't know", it nevertheless poses as an explanation, and so is part of the problem Pateman outlines. One could, of course, refer to thc instance wh~rc onc says "1 don't know" as a "gap in one's knowledge". and subsequently refer to this as "the gap". gnerating a use of language superficially similar to Lacanian theory. This is possible due to what Korzybski terms the multiordinality of language: although one cannot make a statement about what onc does not know, one can nevertheless makc a statcment about one's incapacity to make a statement, because it is always possible to make a statement about a statcment (or its absence).

A"second-order" norninalization of this kind could indeed express an impossibility without attempting to symbolize it (i.e. without asserting onc way or anothcr the nmure of that which one does not know). However, one could not incorporate such a "second-order" concept in some of the phrases which arise in Lircanian theory. There is a particular problem as regards phrases involving words such as "constitutive", "primordial" and "irreducible". The idea of a constitutive "1-don't-know" is virtuallv meanindess. If it could he rendered meaningful, it would seem to mean something along the lincs of the idca that inquiry and creation are motivated by gaps in knowledge. It would not pmciude (for instance) learning something one does not know, and therefore. it does not have the reductive and limiting effects of the idea of "constitutive lack" (for instance, that all social organization is reducible to antagonism).This suggests that. in Lacanian theory. the "I-don't-know" gesture isreified into something else: it has a silent "-ity" on the end. and relates to instances of "I don't know" in much Lhe same way that "Gemanness" relates to individual Germans.> Lacan mischaracterizes the nature of conflict -he rules out the possibility of antagonism arising from any specific, contextual causes. Robinson, Professor of Politics at Nottingham University, 2004 (Andrew, "The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique," http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/) <It should bc added that the idea of "constitutive lack" is radically incompatible with the idea that specific conflicts result from specific, contextual causes. MouSfc distances her view explicitly from anv idea that conflicts have a contingent and empirical basis (2000, 19.48). She insists that .far from being merely empirical or epistemcllogical, the obstacles to rationalist devices ... arc ontological' (2000.98). This does. not, however, stop her from claiming to have provided an analysis which cxplains how specific antagonisms arise (1993 2: c.f. Laclau, 1996. 17). Even more clearly. ~ikk constructs his idea that lack is a featurr, of desire as such in opposition to the idea that alienation results from present, contingent capitalist conditions (1990.56) and denounces the idea of contingency as an incapacity of concepts to grasp a complex reality as incompatible with the idea of the Real (Riitler. LaElau and %:iiek. 2000.21 6).Guattari's critique of psychoanalysis makes clw the myths which underlie it. 'Psychoanalysis transforms and deforms the unconscious by forcing il to pass through the grid of its system of inscription and revresentation. For psvchoanalysis, the unconscious

is always already there. genclicallv programmed. structured, and finalized on obiectives of conformity lo social norms' (1996, 206).>

AT: Lacan -AT: Lacan is not Essentialist Their claims that they aren't essentialist are bunk -Lacanian's espouse anti-essentialism in order to cover up the mythical nature of the notion of constitutive lack. Robinson, Professor of Politics at Nottingham University, 2004 (Andrew, "The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique," http://andyrobinsontheoryblop.blogspot.com/) <But isn't there a prohlcn~ here'? Barthesian myths arc claims to express social fullness or an avowed essence, whereas the Lacanian "constitutive lack" is introduced precisely so as lo attack such illusions of fullness, and is (~iirk apm) articulated to poststructuralist antiesscntidism. It is widely accepted amongst poslstructuralists that if one endorses continaencv and openness, one must oppose the reduction of the world to a fixed system ol'essences. To gain support in this milieu, Lacanians musl make a show of opposing essentialism, a show they are more than hao~y to ~crlixm. For instance, Suvrakakis states that "a certain indeterminacy ...has to tK:retained as a trace of the real within representation' (1999, 12). Newman claims that Lacan's theory of lack is 'not. .. csscntialist or fb~~ndational' (2001, 10). Laclau denies that he believes in a grouncl (1990.27) and Mouffe claims to he 'anti-csscntialist' (1993, vii). Isn't this hostility to essentialism a decisivc criticism of my analysis:' It is indeed the case that much of Lacanian theory makes itself acceptable in a critical 1hcory/cultural studies context by avpealine to "anti-essentialism", contingency and indeterminacy, but such verbal commitments do not li,~ndarnentallv alter its mvthical structurc. It is revealinn that Lacinians rarely define concepts such as "essentialism", because any possible distinction between (say) an "essence" and a "constitutive element", or between a "ground and a "primordial character", would have to be extremely pmise and technical, and since there is a recurrent suggestion, ovenvhel~ning in some passages (e.g. hclau. 1990. 186),that the Lacanian concevt of "essenlialism" simply means "not Lacanianism". Lacanians assume that the idea ofa founding negativity is not essentialist. whereas any idea of an autonomous positive or affirmative force, even if constructed as active, undefinable, changing andlor incomplete, is essentialist (e.g. Ncwman 2001,77, 149).>

AT: Lacan -Conservatism Lacan's alternative is a terribly conservative fantasy -it writes world problems off as "inevitable" and 'Cconstitutive of existence," thereby ending all hope of solving them, all the while universally applying a fantastical symbolism that replicates what Lacan critiques. Robinson, Professor of Politics at Nottingham University, 2004 (Andrew, "The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique," http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/) <There is a danger of a stultifying conservatism arising from within Lacanian ~olitical theory. echoing the 'terrifying conservatism' Deleuze suggests is active in any reduction of history to negativity (1994,53). The addition of an "always" to contemporary evils amounts to a "pessimism of the will", or a "repressive reduction of thought to the present". Stavrakakis. for instance, claims that attempts to tind causes and therehv to solve problems are always fantasmatic (1999, 87), while iii.ek states that an object which is perceived as blocking something does nothing but materialize the alrcadyoperalivc constitutive lack (1992c, 89). It is not clear whether such hostility applies to all instances of solution, or whether thcrc is a difference between "constitutive lack" and some kind of surplus lack arising from contingent conditions. Certainly, Lacanians often rcvert to contingent, empirical explanations, even when these seem contrary to their own theoretical assumptions (e.g. Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, 131). In any case, a Lacanian approach to an instance of lack. such as environmental crisis, famine or political repression, carries a laroe danger that a contingent phenomenon will be labelled as constitutive and therebv placed beyond criticism. For instance, the argument that* since existing food production is sufficient for the world's population, the existence of famine is an intolerable indictment of the world trade system and global powcr relations would be severely damaged by a Lacanian claim that an inclusivc distribution system is an impossible totalitarian fantasy. Contingent explanations -for instance, that the current famine in southern Africa is a result of IMF demands that governments scll food stocks -are in competition with the Lacanian mythical gesture of explaining shortages and conilicts by reference to a constitutive impossibility of completion. Even if Lacanians believe in surplus/contingent as well as constitutive lack, there are no standards for distinguishing the two. How does one tell an expression of "constitutive lack" from an effect of a particular regime of Dower. or for that matter from an imagined, nonexistent boaevman? Perhaps all instances fall into the former category anyway: if it is not possible to know whether anv suecific im~asseis an instance of constitutive lack or not. it is not possible to know that any of them are, and there is therefore no basis for claiming with anv certainty that constitutive lack exists. (ii~ck effectively admits that no element in the world is Real per se, reducing his affirmation of the idea to a suggestion that its rejection would lead to liberal conclusions [&iek and Salecl, 1996,41-21.This suggests that he is prepared to affirm whatever he must affirm to avoid a conclusion he has decided in advance to view as unacceptahlc -a far tlight from his official image as a daredevil revealing repressed truths). Even if constitutive lack exists. Lacanian

theorv runs a risk of "misdiagnoses" which have a neophobe or even reactionary effect. To take an imagined example. a Lacanian living in France in 1788 would urobablv conclude that democracy is a utopian fantasmatic ideal and would settle for a uragmatic reinterpretation of the anciCn regime. Laclau and Mouffe's hostility to workers' councils and 2iiek's insistence on the need for a state and a Party (e.8. Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, 178; iiiek, 2002b, 296-7; 1997a, 157) exemplify this neophobe tendency. The construction of (for instance) the relation between colonizer and colonized in terms of "constitutive antagonism" (see Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 129) turns colonialism into an ex~ression of an unchangeable ontologv and impedes the possibility of anti-colonial rebellion. It is also interesting that Newman begins his book with an intention to destroy the place of power, but concludes with the view that this is impossible. Instead of 'the anarchic desire to destroy hierarchy', he demands that power merely be reinterpreted and displaced (2001,37, 1 18-19).The pervasive negativity and cvnicisrn of Lacanian theorv offers little basis for constructive activity. Instead of radical transformation, one is left with a pragmatics of "containment" which involves a conservative de-problematization of the worst aspects of the status quo. The inactivity it counsels would make its claims a self-fulfilling prophecv by acting as a barrier to transformative activily. To conclude, the political theory of "constitutive lack" does not hold tooether as an analytical vroiect and falls short of its radical claims as a theoretical and political one. It relies on central conceuts which are constructed through the owration of a mythical discourse in the Barthesian sense, with the result that it is unable to offer sufficient openness to engage with complex issues. If political theory is to make use of poststructuralist conceptions ofcontingency, it would do better to look to the exaniples provided by Deleuze and Guattari, whose conception of contingency is active and affirmative. In contrast, the idea of "constilulive lack" turns Lacanian theorv into something its most vocal proponent, ii~ck, claims to attack: a "plague of fantasiesm.>

AT: Lacan -Conservatism Lacanian political theory is the essence of conservatism -its focus on altering relationships to power instead of actually changing the structures themselves displaces actual radical resistance and allows oppressive systems to function even more smoothly, a notion that Lacan originally critiques but ultimately reinforces. Robinson, Professor of Politics at Nottingham University, 2004 (Andrcw, 'Thc Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique," http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/) <It is in this pragmatism that the ambiguity of Lacanian polilical theory resides, for. while on a theoretical level it is based on an almost sectarian "radicalism", denouncing everything that exists [or its complicity in illusions and guilt for the present, its "alternative" is little different from what it condemns. .rust like in the process of psychoanalytic cure. nothing actually changes on the level of specific characteristics. The onlv chanae is in how one relates to the characteristics, a process %&ek terms 'dotting the "i's"' in mlity, recognizing and thereby installing necessity (1994,57.61). All that changes, in other words, is the interoretation: as long as thev are reconceived as ex~ressionsof constitutive lack. thc old uolitics are acceptable. Thus, 2iiiek claims that de Gaulle's "Act" succeeded by allowing him 'effectively to realize the necessary pragnmtic measures' which others pursued unsuccessfully (1997b. 72-3). More recent examples of kick's pragmatism include that his alternative to the U.S. war in Afghanistan is only that 'the punishment of those responsible' should be done in a soirit of 'sad dutv', not 'exhilarating retaliation' (2002b. 244), and his "solution" to the Palestine-Israel crisis is NATO control of thc occupied territories (20021129). If this is the case for ~ikk, the ultm-"radical" "Marxist-Leninist" Lacanian, it is so much the more so for his more moderate adversaries. Jason Glynos, for instance, offers an uncompromizing critique of the construction of guilt and innocence in anti-"crime" rhetoric, demanding that demonization of deviants be abandoned. only to insist as an afterthought that, '[olf course, this ... does not mean that their offences should go unpunished' (2001.98, 109). Similarly, Mouffe's goal is to imvrove the efticiencv of liberal-democratic politics by removing the effects of occultation resulting from the refusal to accew antagonism (1993, 140, 146). Badiou, meanwhile. expends a good deal of suace attacking the inanities of idle. phatic discourse (in his language. "o~inion"), only to identify it with sociality in general and thereby declare it a necessity (2001,50-1,79). Lacanian theorv tends, therefore. to produce an "anvthing goes9' attitude to state action: because everything else is contingent, nothing is to limit the practical consideration of tactics bv dominant elites. The only channe is a chanae in interpretation, as Zikk admits (1997a. 90-1). After

all, thc subiect can channe nothing: thc rolc of the Act is merelv to add oneself to reality by claiming responsibility for thc given (1989,221 ).> The myth of constitutive lack paralyzes politics and progressive action -its attempted universal overapplication translates to a command "not to think," and thus fail to affect real change. Robinson, Professor of Politics at Nottingham University, 2004 (Andrew, "The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique," http:Nandyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.cod) <There is more than an accidental rclationshio between the mvthical operation of the concept of "constitutive lack and Lacanians' conservative and pragmatist polilics. Myth is a way of reducing thought to the present: the isolated sips which arc included in the mythical gesture are thereby attached to extra-historical abstractions. On an analytical level, Lacanian theory can be very "radical". unscrupulously exposing the underlying relations and assumptions concealed beneath officially-sanctioned discourse. This radicalism, however, never translates into political conclusions: as shown above. a radical rejection of anti-"crime" rhetoric turns into an endorsement of punishment, and a radical critiaue of neoliberalism turns into a wagmatist endorsement of structural adjustment. It is as if there is a magical barrier between theorv and politics which insulates the latter from the former. One should recall a remark once made by Wilhclm Keich: 'You plead lor happiness in life. but security means more to you' (1974.27). Lacanians have a "radical" theorv oriented towards hapuiness. but uoliticallv, their primarv concern is sccuritv. As long as thev are engaged in politically ineffectual critiaue, Lacanians will denounce and criticize the social svstem, but once it comes to practical problems, the "order not to think" becomes operative. This "magic" barrier is the alibi function of mvth. The short-circuit between specific instances and high-level abstractions is politicallv consequential. A present rvil can he denounced and overthrown if located in an analysis with a "middle level". The Lacanian gesture, however, is instead to present the evil and then add a word such as "always" to it. In this wav, a present problem becomes eternal and social change becomes impossible. At the very most, such changc cannot aflect the basic matrix posited by Lacanian lhcory. because this is assumcd to operate above history. In this wav. Lacanian theorv operates as an alibi: it offers a little bit of theoretical radicalism to inoculate the svstem against the threat posed bv a lot of politicized radicalism (cf. Barthes, 2000.41-2). ~n L?clau and Mouffe's version. this takes the classic Ba~tl~csian form: "yes. liheral democracy involves violent cxclusions. but what ih this compared to the descrt of the rca1 outside it?)' The ~iiekian version is more complex: '.yes, there can be a revolution. but after thc revolution. one must return to the pragmatic tasks or the present". A good example is pmvidcd in one of U's texts. The author presents an excellent analysis of a Kaikaesque incident in the former Yugoslavia whcre the state gives

a soldier a direct. compulsory mdcr to take a voluntary oath -in other words. attempts to compel consent. Hc then ruins the impact of this example by insisting that there is alwavs such a moment of "forced choice", and that onc should not attempt to escaoe it lest one end up in psychosis or totalilatianism (1989, 165-6). The political function of Lacanian theorv is to preclude critique bv en cod in^ the present as mvth.>

AT: Lacan -Conservatism Lacanian theory attempts to create a universal order that blocks progressive political action with the myth that one must simply accept antagonism. Robinson, Professor of Politics at Nottingham University, 2004 (Andrew, "The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique," http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/) <The myth of constitutive lack, like all myths. has a closing rolc: it limits what can he said through an "order not to think. On thc olhw hand, the idea that creativity is motivated by a stance Ihat "I-don'tknow" has an opening erfect. As Callinicos puts it. 'IwJhat Badiou calls the "void in a situation is rather the sct of dclcrminate possibilities it contains. including that of transformation' (2001. 394). Uthell: is nn imducihlr "Real" benwth wch blockage or Inck. tlicse can bc overcome by cmtive action. as with the creative role of anomalies in paradigm-change in the sciences. and the creative role ol".psychotic" philosophies such as those of tklcl~zcand Nietzsche. The impcrative in Lacanian theory is to "accept"lack, whereas the logic of a non-mythical idea of contingency is to use ovwortunities for openness as a basis for creativity. The difference between mvthical and non-mvthical versions leads politically to the difference between acceptance of blockapes and attempts to overcome them. Psychologically. it involves the d~fference hetween reactive and active charac~rr-structures. Lacanian theories involve a strong comnmitnient to slave morality. as exemplified by hclau's insistence that every chain of equivalence involve a unity against an external threat (1996, 57,).Norval's advocacy of the use of "apartheid as a bogeyman in South African politics (in Laclau 1990, 157) and Mouffe's demand for subnlission to rules (1993.66-9), but also in ziii~ek's '.revolutionary" insisteuce on the need for masochistic self-degradation, 'subjective destitution' and identification with a Master and a Caust: (e.g. 2002b. 2534,2001a. 77-8; 1999,212,3758). not to mention his directly reactive insistence that self-awareness amounts to awmncss of the negative, of death and trauma, prior to any active identification or nrticulation (Butler. hclau and iiiek, 2000.256-7). This is a retemtorializing "contin~ency" which fits closely with the operation of ca~jtalist ideology, where 'under conditions we recognize as desperate, we are told to alter ourselves', not the conditions. because the sell' is conceived as a decisionist founder (Nielsen. 1978,168-70). The alternative is a difference which is not reified into a "positive" negativity. According to Delcuzc, there are two models of contingency: thc creative power of the poet, and the politician's denial of difference so as to prolong an established order. It is for the latter that negation

(lack) is primary, 'as if it were necessary to pass through the misfortunes of rift and division in ordct to be able to say yes'. For the poet. on the olher hmd, difference is 'light. aerial and aftinnative'. 'There is a falsc profundity in conflict, but underneath conflict. the play of differences', differences which should be affirmed as positive and not overcoded by negativity (lYY4.50-4). Deleuze and Guattari radially oppose the hcanian modd of desire. 'Desire does not lack anything: it does not lack its object. It is, rather, the subject which is lacking in desire. or desire that lacks a fixed subject. ..Desire and its object are a unity ... Desire is a machinc, the object of desire also a connected machine' (1977.26). 'Ours is no art of mutilation, but of excess. superahundance, amazenienr', declares Hakim Bey. Though 'truly fearful Lhings' exist in the world, they can perhaps be overcome -'on the condition that we build an aesthetic on the overcoming nther lhm the f~r' (1991.37.78). A constitutive "I-don't-know", if such aconcept is thinkable, would involve precisely such a free play of differences, and not, to use Ziiek's term. the 'good terror' which ensures that this frcc play is brought to a halt (Butler, Laclau and &ek, 2000, 326; ~ii.ek,2002b, 311). It is through the mvthical construction of "constitutive lack" that Lacanian theorv is able to derive a drive for "order" from a startingpoint of contingency.>

AT: Lacan -Violence Lacanian theory, in its acceptance of social antagonism, requires continued violence and social exclusion while failing to radically alter the status quo. This approach reinstates the social order that it critiques and blocks true radicalism. Robinson, Professor of Politics at Nottingham University, 2004 (Andrew, "The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique," http:/landyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspo~.co~ <ii?ek's anti-capitalism has won him friends in leftist circlcs, but the capitalism to which he objects is not thc capitalism of classical Marxist critique. One could. indeed. question whether %i?ek is attacking capitalism (as opposed to liberalism) at dl. His "cavitalism" is a stultifying world of suffocating Good which is unbearable precisely because it lacks the dimension of violence and antagonism. a is. he mys, 'boring', 'repetitive' and 'perverse' because it lacks the 'properly political' attitude of 'Us against Them' (2001~1.2378). It therefore eliminates ihe dement of unconditional attachment to an unattainable Thing or Real. an clcmcnt which is the cort: of humanity (2001~. 8-9: 2iit.l; and Salecl. 1996.41-2). It delivers what kikk fears most: a 'pallid and anaemic. self-satisfied. tolerant peaceful daily life'. To rectify this situation, thcre is a need for suffocating Good to bc dcstroycd hy diabolical Evil (2000a, 122). 'Why nllt violence?' he rhetorically asks. 'Homble as it may sound. 1 think it's a uscful antidote to all the aseptic, frustrating, politically comct pacifism' (20Mc. 80). There must alwavs be social exclusion, and 'enemies of the Deovle' (Butler. Laclau and ?iick. 2000.92). The resultingpolitics involves an 'ethical duty' to accomplish an Act which shattcrs the social edifice by undermining the fanantasies which sustain it (1997a, 74). As with Mouffe. this is both a duty and an acceptance of necessity. 'By trav~rsing thc fantasy the subject accepts the void of his nonexistence' (1999,281). Baudrillad takes a position similar to Ziiek's. denouncing an empty world in which '[elven the military has lost the privilege of use-value, the privilege of real war' (1995,28). His critique of the Gulf (non-)War has w overtone of distaste for the sanitization of war and the resultant loss of the dimension of antagonism: if this were a real war. it would be more acccptable. Elsewhere, he denounces simulation for the absence of violence and death. 'Completely expunged From the political dimension, it is dependent.. .on production md mass consumption. Its spark has disappeamd: only the fiction of a political universe is saved' (1988. 181 ). On a political level, this kind of stance leads to an acceptance of social exclusion which negates compassion for its victims. resultant inhumanitv finds its most extreme expression in iiiek's work, where 'today's "mad dance", thc dynamic proliferation of

multiple shifting identities.. . awaits its resolution in a new form of Terror' (Butler. Laclau and Aiiek, 2000,326). Badiou's. in which the ethics of truth is 'always more or less combative' and requires 'the singular operation of naming enemies' (2001,75), and Baudrillard's, where the spirit of terrorism is accredited with the ultimate ethical status as 'the absolute, irrevocable event' (20()2,17) which can make the system collapse under an excess of renlity 0983.120). It is also present. however, in the ~oneddown exclusionism of authors such as Mouffe. Hence, democracy depends on 'the possibility of drawing a frontier between "us" and "thcm'", and 'always entails relations of inclusion-exclusion' (2000.43). 'No state or political order.. . can exist without some form of exclusion' expmien~xd by its vidims as coercion and violcncc (1993, 145). and. sincc Mouffc assumcs a state to bc ncccssav, this means that one must endorse exclusion and violence. (The supposed necessity of the state is derived from the supposed need for n master-signifier or nodal point to stahilipe identity and avoid psychosis, either for inrlividuals or for societies). What is at stake in the division between these two trends in Lacanian political theory is akin to thc distinction Vaneigem draws between "active" and "passive" nihilism (1994.178-9). The Laclauian trend involves an implied ironic distance from any specific project, which maintain nwarecess of its contingency; overall. however, it reinforces conformity by insisting on aninstitutional mediation which overcodes all the "articulations". The Ziiekian version is committed to a more violent and passionate affirmation of negativity. but one which ultimatela changes very little. The function of the 2i:itekian "Act" is to dissolve the self, producing a historical event. "After the revolution", however, everything stavs much thc same. For all its radical pretensions. %ik~s politics can be summed up in his attitude to neo-liberalism: 'If it works. why not try a dose of it?'i?ii.ck and Salecl, 1996. 32). The same can be said of Badiou. whose ostensibly radical conunitn~ents do not prevent hi111 from making a virtue of moderation (2001,9l) and insisting that 'the Good is Good only to the exteni that it does not aspire to render the world good'. Thus. 'the Dower of a truth is also a kind of powerlessness' (2001.8s). 'Thm is no History other than our own: there is no true world to come. The world as world is, and will remain. beneath the true and fa1 x...[and] beneath Good and Evil' (2001,85). The phenomena which are denounced in Lacanian theory are invariably readmitted in its "small print". and this leads to a theory which renounces both effectiveness and political radicalism.>

AT: Lacan -Violence Theories of constitutive lack are based on a myth that blocks progressive politics -in their embracement of social antagonism, they prevent radical political action and instead encourage violence and strife. Robinson, Professor of Politics at Nottingham University, 2004 (Andrew, '"The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique," http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/) <The challcngc psed by this influential p~rspcctivc is too important to ignore. Its paradigmatic structure -the shared. oRen unconscious and unreflexive, assumptions which unite its various proponents in a single way of thinking and arguing -is becoming the dominant trend in (ostensibly) radical thcory. It is accounting for a growing number of submitted and published aflicles and is gaining a growing support among researchers and graduates. It has almost invisibly gained a roothold in theoretical litemlore significant enough to nise its influence lo a level second only. perhaps, to thc nnalyticallRawlsian tradition. This is at least palily due to i~s radical pretensions. It is. however, crucial to challenge it, because its political effects are to paralyse "radical" theory. It provides a very weak basis for anv kind of vof tics, and certainly no basis for a radical or transformative agenda. It is. in short, a surrogate radicalism, n theoretical placebo which does not live up to the promises il makcs.1' This article examines this paradigm through a critique of its founding concept. In contrast to the claims of authors such as Laclau to have escaped the "essentialism" of classical political theory, I shall demonstrate that the idea of "constitutive lack" involves the reintroduction of myth and essentialism inlo political theory. 1shall demonstrate that Lacanian political theor?, cannot meet its claims to be "radical" and "anti-essentialist". and its central arguments are analytically flawed. k;rst of all, however, 1shall outline the parameters of this new theoretical paradigm. A new paradigm: the concept of lack in political theory The concept oTb'constitutive lack" arises across a number of theories and under a number of labels (e.g. the Ral, the Thing. antagonism and the political). It emerged initially as an ontological concept in the work of Jacques Lacan. the focus of much adulation among the authors discussed hm. Bndiou goes as far as to say that 'a philosophy is possible today, only if it is compatible with Lacan' (1999.84). There is already in Lacan (and Althusser) an imperative to embrace or accept the lack at the root of the social. He explicitly states that the question of ethics 'is to be articulated from the point of view of the location of mun in relalion to the Real' (1988, 11).

It is this imperative which provides the starting-point for the kind of politicized Lacanianism with which this paper is concerned. The basic claim ol'kdcanian theory is that identity -whether individual or social -is founded on a lack. Therefore. social relations are ~w~vS irreducibly concerned with antagonism, conflict, strife and exclusion. Chantal ~ouffc, for instance. writes of 'the primary n'alily of strife in social life' (1993, 113), while S1avo.i ~iiek seeks an 'ethics grounded in reference to the traumatic Real which resists syn~bolization' (1997~1,213). '[Llack ("castration") is original; enjoyment constitutes itself as "stolen"' (1990.54). According to Stavrahkis, the Real is 'inherent in human experiencc' and 'doesn't stop not being written' (1999. 87). Hence. the primary element of social life is a negativity which prevents the emcrgcnce of any social "whole". In Mouffe's words. '[slociely is the illusion ... that hides the struggle and antagonism behind the scenes', putting the 'harsh rcality' of antagonism hehind a 'protective veil' (1993.51.53). For Newman. '[wlar is the reality', whereas '[slociety is the illusion ...that hides the struggle and antagonism behind the scenes' (2001. 5 1). For Stavrakakis. 'personal tnum, social crisis and political rupture mconstant characteristics of human experience' (2003,56). Such claims have political conscquences, because they rule out the possibilitv of achieving substantial improvements (whether "reformist" or "revolutionarv") in any area on which this fundamental ne~ativitv bears. The dimension of antauonism is, after all, 'ineradicable' (~ouffc,2000.21). Instead of the imperative to overcome antagonism which one finds in forms as diverse as mar xi ill^ revolution and deliberative democracy. hcanian political theory posits as the centml political imperative a demand that one "accept" the underlying lack and the constitutive character of antagonism. While the various authors disagree about the means of achieving this, they agree on its desirability. heaninn theory thus entails an ethical commitment to crcatc conflict and antagonism. This ethics mostly expresses iLwlf via a detour into ontology: the ethical imperative is to 'accept' or 'grasp' the truth of the primacy oC lack, and the accusation against opponents is that they fall into some kind of fallacy (illusion. delusion. blindness. failure 10 accept, and so on). At other times. however. one finds a direct ethical advocacy of exclusion and conflict as almost goods in themselves.

To lake an example. Chantal Mouffe criticiscs dcconstructive ethics for being 'unable to come to terms with "the political" in its antagonistic dinlcnsion'; 'what is missing' from a politics of dialogue with others is 'a proper reflection on thc: rnonient of "decision" which characterises the field of politics' and which 'entail[s] an element of force and violence' (2000. 129-30). To this ostensibly incomplete politics, Mouffe adds an imperative about 'coming to tcrms' with the 'nature' of the social. One should seek a politics which 'acknowledges the real nature of [the] frontiers [of the social] and thc forms of exclusion that they entail, instead oltrying to disguise them under the veil of rationality or morality' (2000. 105). A failurc to accept antagonism is a 'dangerous liberal illusion' and an 'aversion to reality' (1993. 127. 149). Mouffe themfore accepts social exclusion as a necessity, and opposes any attempt to resolve (rather than institutionalize or domesticate) conflict. Friendjenemy frontiers are necessary. and hostility. which is ontological and ineradicable, can be contained but never eliminated (1993.34). In practice. this means directly favouring the existence of conflict and antagonism. In other passages, Mouffe expresses the ethics of antagonism more directly, labelling it as a value in its own right. Hence, equality and liberty 'can never be. ..reconciled, but this is precisely what constitutes for Nouffe] the value of liberal democracy' (1993, 110). She abo refers to divis~on asan 'ideal' and an 'urgent need' (1993. 114. 11 8). In other words, negativity and conflicl arc given a nositive value of their own, because thcv express what is taken to be the essence of social life: constitutive lack. One finds the same view expressed in works by other authors who use the hcanian paradigm. Emesto bclau, for instance, claims that a 'world in which refonn takes place without violcncc is not a world in which 1 would like to live' (1 996. 114). Hc also calls for 'a symbolisation of in~possibility as such as a posit~ve value' (Butler. Lrrclau and Ziick, 2000, 199). Bdiou, meanwhile. insists that ethics remain confined by the Real. 'At least one real clement must exist.. .that the truth cannot force' (2001. 85).>

AT: Lacan -Alternative Doesn't Solve Case Alt doesn't solve case--Recognizing "the Lack" can't access the realworld policy impacts inevitable in the status quo Robinson 2k5 [Andy, author, PhD at University of Nottingham, "The Political Theory ol'Constitutive Lack: A Critique", The Johns Hopkins University Press, http:llmuse.ihu.eduliournalsltheorv and evenUv008/8.lrobinson.html#a~thbio] The function of the iiiekian "Act" is to dissolve the self. producing a historical event. "After the revolution". howcvcr, cvcrvlhing stavs much the same. For all its radical pretensions, iiiek's politics can be summed up in his attitude to neo-liberalism: 'If it works, why not try a dose of it?x.The phenomena which are denounced in Lacanian theory are invariably readmitted in its "small print", and this leads to a theorv which renounces both effectiveness and political radicalism. I1 is in this pragniatism that the ambiguity of Lacanian political theory resides, for. while on a theoretical level it is based on an almost sectarian "radicalism", denouncing everything that exists for its complicitv in illusions and guilt for thc prcsenl. its "alternative" is little different from what it condemns (the assumption ap~arentlv being that the "svmbolic" change in the psvchological coordinates of attachments in reality is directly effective, a claim assumed -wronglv -to follow from the claim that social realitv is constructed discursively). Just like in the process of psychoanalytic cure, nothing actually chan~es on the level of specific characteristics. The only change is in how one relates to the characteristics, a process ~iiek terms 'dotting the "i's"' in reality, recognizing and thereby installing necessity=. All that changes, in other words, is the interpretation: as long as they are reconceived as cxpressions of constitutive lack. the old politics are acceutable. Thus, ii~ek claims thatbe Gaulle's "AcF" succeeded by allowing him 'effectively to realize the necessary pragmatic measures' which others pursued unsuccessfully~.

AT: Stavrakakis -Permutation Solvencv By endorsing the affirmative as an act of hope, not utopia -it is possible to have politics without utopia Stavrakakis, Teaching Fellow in Government at the University of Essex, 1999 [Yannis, Lacan and rlze Political , p. I 11What should not be neglected however in Ricoeur's standpoint is the centrality of the element of hope. No doubt, a society without hope is a dead societv. Yet, in reality, to eliminate the element of hope is a dead society. Yet, in reality- eliminate the element of hope from human life is not only undesirable but also impossible. As Jacques Derrida has put il: There is no lannuape without the wrformative dimension of the promise, the minute 1open my mouth I am in the promise. Even if I sav 'I don't believe in truth' or whatever. the minute I open my mouth there is a 'believe me' at work. Even when I lie, and perhaps especially when I lie, there is a 'believe me' in play. And this 'I promise you that I am spcaking the truth' is a messianic a priori, a promise which, even if it is not kept, cven if one knows it cannot be kept, takes place and qua promise is messianic. (Derrida, 1996:82-3) In addition, for Derrida, this clement of horn is not necessarily utopian: 'I would not call this attitude utopian. The messianic experience of which I spoke takes place here and now' that is the fact of promising and speaking is an event that takes place hcrc and now and is not utopian' (ibid.). Is it then possible to retain this elcmcnl of hope without incorporating it into a utopian vision? Can we have passion in politics without holocausts? Furthermore, is it possiblc to have a politics of how, a politics of change without utopia? The experience of the democratic revolution permits a certain optimism. Democratization is certainly a political project of hope. But democratic discourse is -not (or should not be) based on thc vision of a utopian harmonious societv. It is based on the recognition of the impossibility and the catastrophic consequences of such a dream. What differentiates democracy from other political forms of society is lenitimization of conllicl and the refusal to eliminate il through the establishment of an authoritarian harmonious order. Within this framework the antagonistic diversity between different conceptions of good is not seen as something negative that should be eliminated, but as something to be valued and cclcbratcd. This requires the presence of institutions that establish a specific dynamic between consensus and dissent ... This is why democratic politics cannot aim towards harmony and reconciliation. To believe that a final resolution of conflict is evcnlually possible, even whcn it is envisaged as asymptotic approaching to the regulative idea of a free unconstrained communication, as in Habcrmas, is to put Lhc pluralist democratic project at risk.(Mouffe, 1996b:g)''

Plan is a pre-requisite for their alternative-we must first establish a fantasy before we can traverse it Stavrakakis, Teaching Fellow in Government at the University of Essex, 1999 [Yannis,Lacan and the Political, p. 1611 Freud was, in fact, the first to connect politics with the impossible. In his view, politics, together with psychoanalysis and education. constitutes an impossible profession. But if democratic politics is attempting somcthing ultimately impossible, that is to say institutionalizing social Iack, in fact cven if this quasi-utopian move, this is a quasi utopia structured around its own negation; it negates the idea of its absolute realiiilion, in other words this is a 'quasi-utopia' beyond fantasrnic p>litics. IT thm is an Aujhebung in Lacan. it is one in which Hegel's progress is replaced by the anti-utopian 'avatars of a Iack' (Lacan in Evans, 1996a:43). Thus way. what is altered is not only the positive content of politics (utopian visions mreplaced by the language games around a mcognition of lack. which means that happiness is no longer a legitimate political objective although a better society definitely is) but also the support giving coherence to this positive content (the fantasmtic support is traversed by this recognition of lack). Moreover, if this is a quasiutopian or utopian move. it can only be a utopian negation of utopia (remember Lacan's rnetalinguistic negation of meta-language in the first note of the introduction). Perhaps the rantasmatic structure of utopia can only be traversed aftcr we situate and orient ourxlves within its dangerous ground: fantasy has to he constructed before it is traversed. In addition, one has to keep in mind that the crclssing of utopian fanlasy does not enpail the disappearance ofthe social symptom but a new modality of interacting with it. To this we will return in the last chapter oT this bwk. In any case, this new modality. even if one still wants to call it utopian, has important repercussions for ow life: it neutralizes the catastrophic effects or byproducts of utopian visions. And this is something fundamental.

AT: Psvchoanalvsis -Action Kev Psychoanalysis must be accompanied with political change to have any hope for solvency-Lacan's alternative fails Milovanovic, Professor in Criminal Justice at Northeastern Illinois, 1994 [Dragan. 8 Emory Intcrnational Law Review 67, <For current critical feminist theorizing that focuses on postmodernism, more and more analysis is finding itself in a dialogue between Marxism and the body of work by Lacan. n75 The [*97]shortcominas of Lacan's work by itself. are recoanized, even if his work does provide some key elements, or tools, for critical inquiry. Perhaps Braidotti said it best: ".. .The ~olitico-ewistemoloqicalquestion of achievinq structural transformations of the subject cannot be dissociated from the need to effect chanaes in the sociomaterial frames of reference. . . ." n76 Future developments surely will arise in the integration and synthesis of a psychoanalytic semiotic examination grounded in a historical, materialistic critique of the given mode of production. Necessarilv, the effects of the Imaqinarv, Svmbolic, and Real Orders need to be inteorated into anv transformative ~olitical aqenda, es~eciallv within leaal discourse in which chanae may be made manifest most immediately.>

AT: Psvchoanalvsis -Alternative Fails Psychoanalysis has lost its innocence- it is now shaped according to the subjects knowledge. In postmodern society, people make their own decisions, kritik will not influence them. Nicol, University College at Chichester, 1999 [Brian, "As If: Traversing the fantasy," Paragraph, v24 i2, p. 149-1501 All this suggests why it is problematic to equate this knowingness with liberation. In 'You May!,' an article recently published in the London Review of Books (particularly interesting because it is a more deliberately accessible statement of the aims of his project). Zizek survevs what he sees as evidence of the dominant attitude of 'refiexiveness' in the postmodern wrmissive society. In the apparent absence of the symbolic order to instruct us in our social behaviour, 'all our impulses, from sexual orientation to ethnic belon~np, are more and more experienced as matters of choice' (Zizek, 1999a, 1): one can choose how to be seduced, how to rewrite one's psvcholo~ical history, how to be racist. psychoanalytic symptoms have 'lost their innocence,' and are shaped according to the subiect's knowledge of psvchoanalytic theory (Zizek, 1999a, 2). This means that the law no longer operates via repression and the imposition of a strict social hierarchy, but effectively sponsors our acts of transgression, demanding that we 'Enjoy!'. Zizek's argument is to emphasize, firstly, that although on the face of it something has changed in the nature of our relation to the big Other, beneath the surface things are still the same. The apparent endorsement of our transgressive acts by the Other only creates new guilts and anxieties: 'Our postmodern reflexive society which seems hedonistic and permissive is actually saturated with rules and rerrulations which are intended to serve our well-being (restrictions on smoking and eating, rules against sexual harassment)' (Zizek, 1999a, 5). With the demise of one kind of adherence to the law comes another in its place. The second aspect of his argument is to wonder: if the law regulates our enjoyment, where is the potential for subversion?> Psychoanalysis fails -it is an endless cycle that leads to paralysis Miers, Ph.D. and Director of Liberal and Professional Studies at Towson University, 1999 (Paul. "Language and the Structure of Desire," MLN 114.5 (1999) 10781091, Project MUSE) Note: Towson University is the second largest university in Maryland <This last confusion is perhaps most clearly illustrated in Slavoj Zizek's attack on Butler in his most recent work, The Ticklish Sub-ject. Zizek's continual nced to uut forward Lacan as the one true master who can validate a grammar of self-continuration ends up exposing the fundamental problem with Lacan. Unlike Freud, who by confusing sex and kinship, cclllapses them both into a single undifferentiated libido, Lacan fullv rcalizcs that identity is fractured bv the s~lit between affinity and dcsccnt in the kinship svstem.

Lacan. however, makes the fatcrul choice of letting affinity and descent pain symbolic authority ovcr thc subiect hy allowinn its desires to be structured by the monolithic fiction of the totalized and totalizing Other. The subiect is thus dcnicd any way to stratenize a passage through the field of dcscent and aflinitv: both the horizon of affinity "out there" and the zero dcarcc of identity "in here" are permanently blockcd. Lacanian analvsis is thus a perfect interminable machine which gives its dcvotces a paradoxical but stable one-size-fits-all allegory in exchange for living in a zone of oversaturated structures as permanently infantilized adults who play at the masuuerade of sex--perhaps the perfect psycho-anthropology for some whole zone of postculture culturc, particularly in Paris. [End Page 1082]>

AT: Uto~iasBad -Uto~iasGood Utopian politics allows us to re imagine our world so we can begin to construct a new one. ..fantasies are key to conscious-raising Milovanovic, Professor in Criminal Justice at Northeastern Illinois, 1994 [Dragan. 8 Emory International Law Review 67, I/n] <Lacan's views on the borromean knot. which indicate how knotbreaking and repairing may produce allcrnalive Symptoms, are also relevanl. In other words. borromean knots, as demonstrated earlier. provide a degree of consistency to the psychic apparatus. These knot-configurations can he reconfigured for alternative embodiments of desire and construclions or bodies of knowledge. Alternative myth-making, then, implicates the proccss by which borromean knots are reconstituted. Through the recreation of myths the individual is in the position [*96] of creating an "elsewhere". According to Cornell's reading of the ideas of Cixous, We re-collect the mythic figures of the past. but as we do so we reimanine them. I1 is thc polential variability of myth that allows us to work within myth, and the signilicance it offers, so as to reimanine our world and by so doing, to be,oin to dream of a new one. n69 in this way, an affirmative politics of the feminine emerges that is also utopian in its attempt to point to an elsewhere. n70 As Cornell states: Consciousness-raising must involve creation, not just discovery. We need our poetry, our fantasies and our fables; we need the poetic evocation of the feminine body in Irigaray and in Cixous if we are to finally find a way bcyond the muteness imposed by a gender hierarchy in which our desire is "unspeakable". n71> Creating an imaginary order is the only way to deconstruct the oppressive legal and political order Milovanovic, Professor in Criminal Justice at Northeastern Illinois, 1994 [Dragan, 8 Emory International Law Review 67, I/n] <.L\ccordingly. t11e Imacinarv Order is also neccssarilv intearal lo il tnnsforinativc politics. An inteeration of the thrce Orders is therefore necessary Tor a hon:~ fde sl.aremcnt on an allcrntttivc transfixnrativc oolilics ant1 law. Only in this way arc opprcssivc lcyal stn~clu~.es dcconstructed and an alternative Iczal arid oolitical order reconstructed. Given the existence of lepal obstraclions such as the juridic subject. linear forn~sof reasoning. circurnscribcd coclificalions ofsipniiieds, dualistic conccplt~alirations ol'social renli~y. and ronns of hatc or rovcnpe politics historically inbercnl in Inmy "humanistic" movements--all of which support hierarchy--genuine change only can take place by way of this transpraxis. Thus. the next section

of this Essay considers Cornell's work, which has focuscd on tlie Ima~inarv Order as n potential vista for "what co~~ld he".>

AT: Uto~ianFantasies Bad -Uto~iasGood Utopian fantasies are good -they allos us to bring about change Devall & Sessions,Deep Ecologists, 1985[Bill & George, Deep Ecology, p. 1621 <Developing ccotopian visions is part of our environmental education. In a society famous for dvstopian visions. such as Brave New World and 1984, ecotopian visions present affirmations of our bonds with Earth. Crcating ecolopian futures has vractical value. It helm us articulalc our goals and presents an ideal which may never bt: completelv rcalizcd but which keeps us focused on the ideal. Wc can also comoarc our ocrsonal actions and collective public decisions on specific issues with this poal. We suogest that ecotopian visions give perspeclive on vain-glorious illusions of both revolutionarv leaders and the wouaganda of defendersof the status QUO. Furthermore. ecotopian visions help us scc the distance between what ought to be and what is now realily in our technocratic-industrial society. In this chapter, we use ecotopia in the broad sense of all visions of a good society placcd in the context of deep ecological norms and principles. We present the ecotopian visions of Loren Eiseley, Baker Brownell, Aldous Huxley, Gary Snyder and Paul Shepard. We should keep in mind that ecotopian visions are always tentative; the examples given in this chapter are first approximations and not complete statements.' In addition to acting as a provocative catalyst for public debate, creating ecotopian visions is also useful for the development of ecological consciousness in people who struggle with these visions. This process enables one lo sharoen both the image of the ecotopian future, and the rational skills needed in vublic debate to argue the points. We feel this process is an essential part of environmental education for high school- and college-ape students. This may hel~ them see viable alternatives to the status QUO which they can incorporate into their own lives. Even grammar school children can gain from this activity. With some ingenuity on the part of teachers, deep ecology principles can be introduced using the deep questioning process. Inspiration for ecotopian visions can be drawn from the anthropological literature on hunterlgatherers, small-scale agricultural communities, and contemporary primal cullurcs. A direct transition from our own culture into an ecotopia is beyond the imagination of most people. And so deciding on what is thc "hest" ofcontempc~raw culture to include in the ecoto~ian vision is part of lhc educational process. This can help us understand the difference between vital and nonvital human needs and brin~ us to a greater realization of the implicat~ons of apdying deep ecology norms.>

AT: Traverse the Fantasy -Utoaias Good Ideological fantasies are both inevitable and valuable -attempts to traverse the fantasy are problematic Nicol, University College at Chichester, 199Y [Brian, "AsIf: Traversing the fantasy," Paragraph, v24 i2, p. 1521 cZizek occupies a rather paradoxical position for a Marxist. His aim to 're-hystericize' the subject, to return it to its questioning function, has an obvious correlation with his stated commitment to emancipation (in his prefaces to Tlze Ziiek Reader and The Ticklish Subject). But where Marxist 'ideology critique' is, as a rule, geared towards demystifying ideology in order to achieve some kind of greater awareness which can contribute to social change, so deeply rooted in the psychic structure is Zizek's idea of the fantasy that there can be no change: we cannot deal in any other wav with the void at the heart of ourselves. Ideologv, in other words, is not iust inevitable, but valuuble, because without it we would lapse into neurosis sor even psvchosis. The implication of his analysis of contemporary culture is that exposing the fantasies which glue our being together might enable us to traverse them. But this is problematic. and not only because it brings us up against the familiar difficulty with psychoanalytic attempts to transpose the persona1 onto the collective who would be the equivalent of the analyst? Zizek's notion of the ideological fantasv does not suggest it is a pathological symptom in the psyche of the subject: it is perfectly normal, Time and again he explains how our experience of social reality depends upon 'a certain as if 'we act as if we believe in the almight-iness of bureaucracy, as if the President incarnates the Will of the Peovle. as if the Party expresses the obiective interest of the working class'. But he also reminds us that if we do not act in this way 'the very texture of the social field disinteprates' (Zizek, 1989. 36)-and this is an outcome of a auite different order to political revolution.>

AT: Traversin~ the Fantasv -Fantasies Good -. September llthproves that the idea of the fantasy is ridiculous -It prevents us from averting future suffering and global violence Crosswhite, Associate Professor of English at University of Oregon, 2001 (Jim, "A Response to Slavoj Zizek's "Wclcomc lo the Descrt of the Real!"," Septembcr 25, http://www.uoregon.edu/-jcross/response~to~zizck.htm) <An acknowledgment of the difference bciwecn thc rcal and the imaginary is a condition for social criticism that has a real relation to And critical humility in the face of rcal suf'cring is a condition for social criticism that will remain humane. The writer of "Welcome to the Desert of the Real" seems almost to believe that reality has collapsed into a hyperbolic critical parody of itself', as if hc can't quite tell the difference between real maple and the social Dowers with which those real people are contending. This approach to real suffering by way of fantastic conflations and exaggerations might be tolerable iT it had some purpose, if it lcd us somewhere, but it does not. Zizek is not alone in this (and he sounds a littlc like a Baudrillard tape in this piece), but to preach this fantastic sermon in the context of Septembcr 1 1 is to move away from critique and toward the grotesque. The idea of a "sphere" and the notion of a faked reality arc as old as Plato's cave and its ("spectral") shadow makers. Even there the inhabitants would resist and then kill anyone who tried to hrcc them to recognize the fakery and acknowledge an "outside." Even there the flickering shadows have achieved near immatcriality. The "ultimate American paranoiac fantasy" is more a genre with a long history than it is a national property of Americans. We generate social criticism with this form. Wc imaginc our reality as deficient in reality in order to imaginc ways to break through (LO use the metaphor of the reality hackers) to a better reality, one that is less fake, less impoverished, not so thoroughly managed by the wrong people, not so completely in the dominion of the wrong powers. Of course the genre twists with the tjme. Philip K. Dick's paranoia is shaped partly by the cold war era, partly by drugs, partly by Dick's weird psychology. And no one would want to deny the new appropriateness of the genre to capture all the new virtuality produced hy technology--electric lights, telephones, film, television, satellite communication, the WWW and all the rest. Gibson's Neuromancer forced us into imagining online virtuality as the real site of what still tries to be decisive, heroic action. And as far as the fantastic goes, any well-lit supermarket or department store displays the Consumable Irreal. There is no question that there are good grounds for highlighting and exaggerating the irreality whose power to eclipse the real keeps growing. But to say that what happened on September 11 is like the scene in the Matrix where Morpheus introduces the Keanu Reeves character

to the "desert of the real" is to say something that belongs on a Fox Network talk show. For what Americans is it true that the events of Septembcr 11 broke into an "insulated artificial universe" that generated an image of a diabolical outsider'? Let's not consider the 5,000 incinerated and dismembered men and women and children who suffered from disease and iniury like all people, who cleaned toilets and coughed un phlegm and changed diapers and actuaIly occupied with what was once their real bodies those towers which, for Zizek. stand for virtual capitalism. They can't be the ones whose delusions generated the fantasy of a diabolical outsider. None of them, none of their surviving children, none of their fellow citizens fantasized Bin Laden's ruling that it is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, to kill the Americans, military and civilians. SO for whom has the fantastic "outside" broken in and smashed, with "shattering impact," an immaterial world of delusion? For whom does Osama Bin Laden appear as a character from a James Bond film? For whom did thc events of September I I arrive with the painful awareness that we were living in an artificial insulated realitv? For whom do the people and events in this massacre of innocents appear solely in the shapes of film and television? Perhaps, perhaps the Americans living in an insulated, artificial reality are the characters in American television shows and in increasingly intertextual American films. Perhaps these are the Americans Zizek is listening to, watching, imagining. But here is the true "shattering impact:" that 5.000 innocent people who lived real lives in real, vulnerable human bodies, who bore real children, suffered real disease and injury and pain, bled real blood; 5.000 real people who helped to sustain a cosmopolitan city of millions and millions of other real people of different ethnic groups and religions and languages, real citizens who had achieved a great measure of peace and hope. who had been slowly and successfullv bringing down the New York Citv crime rate; that 5,000 of these veovlc would have their real bodies and lives erased in a matter of minutes, and that onlv body parts. the vapors of the incinerated, and the grieving and the sorrowful and the orphans would remain. This is the shock. This is the disbelief. Not the shattering of an illusion but the shattering of those real people and their real bodies. Not the shattering of a virtual reality, but the erasing of what was real. This is why the people of New York wept in the streets, why the tears and grief will continue. And this is why, in their grief, the survivors will struggle to preserve a memory of what was real, and to keep this memory of what was real from evanescing into someone elsc's symbol, or fantasy, or tool. Were the real lives they led less real for any happiness or peace they achieved? Are the unfathomable sufferings of Rwanda and what happened in Sarajevo to be the measure of what is most real? And yet ..1Zizek's writing, what happened on September 11 is not real but svmbolic, as it seems to have been for the murderers, too: "the actual effect of these bombings is much more symbolic than real." We are just "getting a taste of' what goes on around the world "on a daily basis." OK, perhaps we are insulated and ignorant. But where are 5.000 innocents being incinerated by murderers on a daily basis? If Zizck is saying that Americans should be more knowledgeable about the lives and sufferings of other peoples whose lives and

sufferings are entangled with America's own history, then who would disagree? If Zizek is saying that American power and its direct involvement in international affairs create a special responsibility for our educational systems and our media to provide us with a

knowledge of global matters that wc havc not yet achieved, then who would disagree? If he is saying that Americans should comprehend more deeply how peoplc in othcr parts of the world comprehend us, once more, who would disagree? If he is saying that real understanding of geographically distant others is endangered and distorted by the fantasies of film and television, are thcrc educated Americans who have not heard this? Is the slruggle to educate a democratic citizenship adequate to our time and the realities of globalization unique to the United States'? That would be hard to belicvc. However, it must be conceded by all that the U.S. faces one special difficulty and so a special but obligatory struggle here. Many of its citizens will never have a first hand experience of Europe or the Middle East or Africa or Asia or even South America. I can drive or fly 3.000 miles and never leave my country. At best, I can get to Mexico or Canada. This would take someone living in France through all of Europe and into central Asia, or into the center of Africa. Thc problems of truly comprehending these others whose languages are rarely spoken anywhere near you and into whose actual presence you will never come arc not trivial. But seems to be saying something morc than all of this. He seems to know more than most of us know. He knows that "the ultimate truth of the capitalist utililarian dc-spiritualized universe is the de-materialization of the 'real life' itself, its reversal into a swctral show." This is difficult to comprchcnd. Is this the "ultimate truth" about a real nation, about real people, about a real, existing economic svstem. about an ethical rhcorv, about a fantasy of real people. or about movies or television or what? The problem may be that many of us cannot imagine thal "capitalism" (is it one thing?), which is after all something historical, has an "ultimate truth." And it is difficult to understand what he is asking a1 the end: "Or will Amerird finally risk stepping through the fantasmatic screen separating it from the Outside World, accepting its anival into the Real world, making the long-overdue move from 'A thing likc this should not happen HERE!' to 'A thing likc this should not happen ANYWHERE!'." Of course, to abandon the "hcrc" for the "anvwhere" would be foolish. We arc in real bodies in real places with real limitations and with real work to do. It is not simply a "fantasmatic screen" that dccply attaches pcople in a unique way to the sufferings of their neighbors and their fellow citizens. But the demand that Zizek makes is ncithcr unfamiliar nor inappropriate. It is more than worth pursuing. What can we do to work to see that what the people of New York City suffered on Seplemlwr 1 1 does not happen anywhere.;neither in the U.S. nor anywherc else? The reactions of the American government now threaten regions all over the world and seriously threaten liberty and privacy and tolerance in the United States. The American past carries humanitarian successes and catastrophic failures and genocide. Pcrhaps fantastic critiquc has a role to play. Certainly we must struggle to sustain serious social criticism through threatening times, but unlcss we are simdv displaving critical virtuosity, we must achieve a kind of criticism that is reasonablv concrete, less pretending to ultimate truths of historv, more ca~able of acknowledging the real suffering of real people, criticism that is not too proud to descend to thc practicable. What do we seek now'? First, to avert a catastrophe. We must undo the terrorist networks and prevent American anger and power from leading us into thc catastrophic roles that seem to have been scripted for us. Five thousand innocents are murdered in New York City.

That is more Lhan enough. Every dead innocent fuels more anger, either from the powerless or from the powerful. Avcrting an escalation of global violence is the immediate and pressing task. Undoing and weakening the terrorist networks, withdrawing support from them. arresting thc guiltv--evervone who is not already a monster must be persuaded to join in this. Restraining American power and calming American anger-all Americans must work tirelessly on this in their own ways. Steadily and powerfullv and consistently exposing and addressing and undoinp the intolerance that threatens-all Americans must engage in this struggle.>

AT: Traverse the Fantasv -Fantasies = Inevitable (alt fails) The alternative has no solvency. We aren't tricked into entering the fantasy ... we understand and consciously enter it. We enjoy it our ideology, and the negs kritik has no way of changing that. Nicol, University College at Chichester, 1999 [Brian, "As If: Traversing thc fantasy," Paragraph, v24 i2, p. 148-1491 Zizek's theory of the ideological Fdntasy suggests how complex and powerful our relationship with ideology is. Ideologv isn't something that cleverly tricks us, making us believe in something we don't. Rather it is effective precisely because it acknowlednes what it cannot explain, and because it appeals to precisely the same sense ofeniov-meanf which threatens to blow it apart. Generally speaking, the theory of ideology before Zizek suggested that we conformed because we didn't know what we were really doing. Zizek-influenced here by the work of the German philosopher Peter sloterdijkI2-armies that ideology is more a matter of knowing what we do is false but still doing it anywav, just as we know that the lagoon scenario acted out by stewardesses is unlikely to save us in a plane crash but still go along with it. Ideolonv is something that itself yields enjoyment: we adhere to the Law because it apueals to our enioyment. This is also why Zizek thinks any theory of contemporary politics or society needs to take account ofenjoyment as a political factor'. In a number of books (For They Know Not What They Do, The Metastases of Enjoyment and ?he Sublime Object of Ideology) Zizek explores the role played by enjoyment and the fantasy in oppressive elements of our culture, like totalitarian regimes and racist and homophobic groups. Such communities are held together, he suggests, by the fact that the Law promises a kind of enjoyment as much as it prohibits it. This relationship is secured through the fantasies they share (about, say, the figure of the Jew) which serve both sides of the Law: order and transgression. Zizek's writings on culture and ideology demonstrate how late capitalism -always supported by its 'familiar,' 'liberal democracy1-sustains its dominant position by ensuring that the subject colludes in hisfher own subjugation. The idea of knowing. what we're doing but still doing it anyway can explain what Sloterdijk calls the 'cynical reasoning' evident in postmodern culture. Nowadays, we all know that presidents lie, yet we still support them. We know that advertisers exaaaerate the value of their ~roducts, vet we still buy them. More than previous forms, postmodern ideology continually flaunts its own ideological operations: post-ironic advertising draws attention to the whole sham of advertising and its own hyperbole, TV generates endless programs based on the out-take, or what goes on behind the scenes.>

AT: Traversin~ the Fantasv -Fantasv destrovs svmbolic order Zizek emphasizes that the only way to find the "real" is to work within the fantasy -The fantasy draws attention to the 'feal," and shatters the symbolic order Nicol, University College at Chichester, 1999 [Brian, "AsIf: Traversing the fantasy," Paragraph, v24 i2, p. 147-1481 <For Zizek ideology is nothing less than the way we cope with the truth that subjectivity and social reality are each constructed around a traumatic void. ldeology is thus much more complex than Marxist critique has hitherto realized. When we take into account the real, Zizek says, 'it is no longer sufficient to denounce the "artificial" character of the ideological experience, to demonstrate the way the object experienced by ideology as "natural" and "given" is effectively a discursive construction, a result of a network of symbolic overdetermination' (Zizek, 1991a, 129). Zizek thus complicates two key tenets of ideology critique, the notion that ideology is a particular kind of discourse. and the idea that there is an alternative 'reality' behind the false one maintained bv ideologv. Ideologv does preserve a false version of reality, but behind it is the real, a realm beyond signification, not another symbolic order. The key to Zizek's argument is the Lacanian conception of fantasy, defined by Lacan as the relation of the barred subject to the objet a ($Oa). The function of fantasy is to fill the void created by the real. It creates a space, a kind of blank screen on which the subject's desires can be projected. In this way. fantasy realizes desire-not in the sense of satisfying it, but by brinning it out in the open, giving it a shape. And this is ureciselv what ideology does. One of the most striking aspects of Zizek's theory of ideology is his insistence that, though it might seem otherwise, fantasy serves to sup~ort ideolow rather than challenge it. It is natural to think of fantasv as an escape into a realm of wishfulfilment, divorced from reality. but Zizek emphasizes that reality actually depends upon subscribing to the fantasv. This accounts for another revision of Althusser's theory. Many readers of his work have pointed out that Althusser does not satisfactorily explain why the subject is so willing to be interpellated. Zizek suggests that it is because there is something fundamentally attractive about ideology which goes beyond its content. We sense the symbolic order is a purely bureaucratic mechanism designed to keep us in our subject positions. We also intuitively apprehend the real is beneath it all the while. Fantasy is what enables us to cover up this knowledge and continue to function as normal subjects, to continue to make life 'meaningful' in the symbolic. Zizek demonstrates that there is a characteristic doubleness about ideology. The ideolonical fantasv manages to cover UP the real and persuade us to accept the Ionic of the svmbolic, but by doing so draws attention to the fact that the real is what the symbolic order is built upon and is continually readv to shatter it. One of his best examples concerns the familiar safety rituals we are taken through on aeroplanes as they take off. He asks:

Aren't they sustained by a fantasmatic scenario of how a possiblc planecrash will look? After a ~entle landing on water ~miraculouslv,it is alwavs su~uosed to haopen on water!), cach of the passengers puts on the life-jacket and, as on a beach toboggan, slides into the water and takes a swim, like a nice collective lagoon holiday experience under the guidance of an experienced swimnling instructor." In this scenario, the fantasv enables us to imagine that we will be safe in the event of a plane crash, even though we know perfectly well this is unlikely to be the case. Thus. the fantasv simultaneouslv covers up the real and draws attention to it. It expresses the very thing, the horrible reality of a lane crash, which has been repressed, which cannot otherwise be svmbolized. The mechanism works on a more explicitly political level, too. In Looking Awl37 Zizek gives a reading of two films which portray persecutory totalitarian worlds, Terry Gilliams's Brazil and Rainer Fassbinder's Lili Marleen. Each film is named after the popular song which resounds throughout, and which functions in two contradictory ways: as a support for the prevailing totalitarian order, a kind of signature-tune for the dominant ideology, making it all seem unified and attractive, but also as a 'fragment of the signitier permeated with idiotic enjoyment'. Each song is 'on the verge of transforming itself into a subversive element that could burst from the very ideological machine by which it is supported' (Zizek, 1991a, 129). Brazil ends with the apparent defeat of its hero, who has been broken by savage torture, only for him to escape his oppressors by whistling 'Brazil1.>

AT: Traversing the Fantasv -Leads to bare life Attempt to traverse the fantasy turns people into bare life and destroys all freedom Robinson and Torrney, Professors of Politics at Nottingham University, 2003 (Andrew and Simon, "Zizek is not a Radical." http://homepage.ntlworld.com/simon.tormey/a~icles/Zizcknotradical.pd~~ <The Act thus reproduces in the socio-political field the Lacanian concept of traversing the fantasy. Traversing the fantasv involves 'accevting' that there is no way one can be satisfied, and thereforc a 'full acceptance of the vain ... as inherent lo the excess of pleasure which is iouissance', as well as a reiection of everv conception of radical difference.68 It mcans, contra Nictzsche, 'an acceptance of the iact that there is no secret treasure 112 me',69 and a transition from being the 'nothing' we are today to being 'a Nothing humbly aware of itself. a Nothing paradoxically made rich through the very awareness of its lack1.70 It involves being reduced to a zero-point or 'ultimate level' similar to that seen in the most broken concentrationcamv inmates,71 so the role of analysis is 'to throw out the baby ... in order to confront the patient with his 'dirty bathwater',72 inducing. not an improvement, but a transition 'from Bad to Worse'. which is 'inherently 'terroristic'.73 It is also not l'recdom in the usual sense, hut prostration before the call of the truth-cvent,74 'something violentlv imposed on me from the Outsidc throuph a traumatic encounter that shatters the very In true Orwellian fashion, Zizek claims that in the Act, freedom cquals slavery; the Act involves 'the highest freedom and also the utmost passivitv with a reduction 10 a lifeless automaton who blindly ~erforms its gestures'.76> -.75

AT: Zizek -Alt +Violence Zizek's theory invites and even encourages violence -it should be rejected just on the notion that he would approve of humanity's most unspeakable atrocities Robinson and Tormey, Professors of Politics at Nottingham University, 2003 (Andrew and Simon, "Zizek is not a Radical." http://homepage.ntIworld.codsimon.tormey/articleslZizeknotradical.pd~~ <As hecon~es evident 'class struggle' is not for Zizek an empirical referent and even less a category of Marxisartt sociological analysis, but a synonym for the Lacanian Real. A progressive endorsement of 'class stmarrlc' means positing the lack of a common horizon and assuming or asserting the insolubility oipolitical contlict. 16 It therefore involves a glorification of conflict, antagonism, terror and a militaristic logic of carving the field into good and bad s~des, as a good in itself.17 Zizek celebrates war because it 'undermines the complacencv ol' our dailv routinc' by inlroducinn 'mean~ngless sacrifice and destruction'.l8 He fears being trapped by a suffocating social peace or Good and so calls on people to take a 'militant, divisive position' of 'assertion of the Truth thal enthuses them'.l9 The content of this Truth is a secondary issue. For Zizek, Truth has nothing to do with truth-claims and the field of 'knowledge'. Truth is an event which 'just happens', in which 'the thing itself' is 'disclosed to us as what it is'.20 Truth is thercforc the exaggeration which distorts any balanced system.2 l A 'truth-effect' occurs whencver a work produces a strow emotional reaction, and it need not be identified with emvirical accuracv: lics and distortions can have a truth-effect, and factual truth can cover the disavowal of desire and the Rea1.22 In this sense, therefore, Lenin and de Gaulle, St Paul and Lacan are all carriers of lhc truth and therefore are progressive, 'radical' ligures, despite the incompatibility of their doctrines. Such individuals (and it is always individuals) violently carve the field and produce a truth-effect. That de Gaullc and the Church are political rightists is of no importance to m,since hc redcfines 'right' and 'left' to avoid such problems. Hc also writes off the human suffering caused by carving the field as iustified or evcn beneficial: it has a 'transcendental genesis' in the subiect, and its victims endure it because thev obtain ioui.ssarzce from it.23 The structural occurrence of a truth-event is what matters to him -not what kind of world results from it. This is a secondarv issue -and anywav one that he thinks is impossible to discuss, since the logic oTliberal capitalism is so total that it makes alternatives unthinkable.24 One should keep the utopian possibility of alternatives open, but it should remain empty, awalting a content.25> Zizek's alternative requires a mass of violence only equated by the most repulsive acts in history, such as the Holocaust Robinson and Tormey, Professors of Politics at Nottingham University, 2003

(Andrew and Simon, "Zizek is not a Radical," http:/homepage.ntlworld.com/simon.~~~mey/artic1es/Zizeknotradica1.pd~ <Secondly, Zizek implies that knin must in some sense have 'understood' that the revolution would ncccssmily betray itself. and that all revolutions are structurally doomed to fall short of whatever ideals and principles motivate them. He also implies that the success or failure of a revolution ha nothing to do with whether the modcs of though1 and action. social relations and institutions which follow are at all related to the original revolutionary ideals and principles. What matters is that power is held by those who 'identify with the symptom'. who call themselves 'Proletarian'. Zizck therefore endorses the conservative claim that Lenin's utopian moments were Machiavellian manoeuvres or at best confused delusions, veiling his true intentions to seize power for himself or a mall clib: Lenin was the 'ultimate political stntcgist'.l21 That Ziek endorses the 'Lenin' figure despite endorsing nearly every accusation against Lcnin serves to underlinc the degree to which Zizek's politics are wedded to conservative assumptions that re~ression, brutality and terror are 'alwavs with us'. Rejecting the claim that politics could be otherwise, Zizck wishes to firasp, embrace and even revel in the gubbiness and violence of modern politics. Thc moment of utopia in Russia was for Zizek realised when the Red Guards succumbed to a destructive hedonism in 1nonlent.s of Bataillean excess.122 The only difference for Zizek between leftist ethics and the standpoint of Oliver North. the Taleban, the anti-Dreyh~sards and even the Nazis is that such 'rightists' legitimate their acts in reference to somc higher good, whereas leftists also suspend the higher good in a tmly authentic gesture of suspension.123 The Soviet Terror is a good terror whereas the Nazi one is not, onlv because the Soviet terror was allerredlv more total. with everyone being potentially at risk, not onlv out-grouus. 124 Zizek goes well bevond advocating violence as a means to an end; for Zizek, violence is part of the end itself, the utopian excess of the ~ct. The closest uarallel is ~hc nihilism of Nechaev's Catechism of a Revolution which proclaims that 'evervthinrr is moral thal contributes to the triumph ol'the revolution; evervthing that hinders it is immoral and criminal'. 125 As Pctcr Marshall comments in his digest of anarchist writings and movernents, the Catechism

is 'onc of the most repulsive documcnls in the historv of terrorism'. One can onlv speculate what he would have made of 'Repeating Lenjn'.126 >

AT: Zizek -Alt Violence Zizek's strategy for change is both impossible and excessively violent, reintroducing the oppression that it seeks to prevent. Forming coalitions among progressive leftists based on notions of positive change is the only way to overthrow actual structures of capitalism -Zizek offers only fragmentation and failure. Robinson and Tormey, Professors of Politics at Nottingham University, 2003 (Andrew and Simon, "Zizek is not a Radical," http://homepage.ntlworld.conl/simon.to~ <Zizek's politics are not merely impossible, but potentially despotic, and also (between supporl for a Master, acceptance of pain and alienation, militarism and the restoration of order) tendentially conservative. Thev serve only to discredit the left and further alienate those it seeks to mobilise. Instead, a transformative politics should be a process of transrormation, an alinear, rhizomatic, multiform plurality of resistances. initiatives, and, indeed, acts, which arc sometimes spectacular and carnivalesque, sometimes prefigurative, sometimes subterranean, sometimes rooted in institutional change and reform. sometimes directly revolutionary. Zizek's model of the pledged mou~, bound together by the One who Acts, is entirely irrelevant to the contemporaw world and would be a step backwards from the decentred character of current leftradical politics. Nor need this decentring be seen as a weakness as Zizek insists. It can be a strength, protecting radical politics from selfappointed elites, transformism, infiltration, defeat through the 'neutralisation' of leaders, and the threat of a repeat of the Stalinist betrayal. In contrast with Zizek's stress on subordination, exclusivit~, hierarchy and violence, the tendency of anti-capitalists and others to ado~t anti-authoritarian, heterogeneous, inclusive and multiform types of activity offer a better chance of effectivelv overcorninn thc homogenising logic of capilalism and of winning sumor1 among wider circles of those dissatisfied with it. Similarly, the emphasis on direct action -which can include ludic, carnivalesque and non-violent actions as well as more overtly confrontational ones -generates the possibility of empowernlent through involvement in and suvpon for the myriad causes which make up thc anti-capitalist resistance. This resistance stands in stark contraqt to the desert of 'heroic' isolation advocated by Zizek, which. as Laclau puts it, is 'a prescription for ~olitical quietism and sterility'. 154 Zizek is right that we should aim to overcome the 'impossibilities' of capitalism, but this overcoming should involve the active prefiguration and construction in actuality of alternative social forms, not a simple (and actually impossible) break yitJ everylhinn which exists of the kind imagined bv Zizek. It is important that radicals invoke 'utopias', but in an active way, in the forms of organisation, 'disorganisation', and activity we adopt, in the spaces we crcatt: for resistance, and in the prefiguration of allernalive economic, political and social forms. Utopian imaginaries express what is at slake in left radicalism: that what exists does not exist of

necessity, and that the contingency of social institutions and practices makes possiblc the overthrow of existing institutions and the construction or creation of different practices. social relations, and conceptions of the world. The most Zizek allows to radicals is the ability to 'climpse' utopia while enacting the reconstruction of oppression. Radicals should go further, and bring this imagined 'other place' into actual existence. Through enacting utopia. we havc the ahility to bring the 'no-where' into the 'now-here'.> Zizek's alternative is authoritarian -It only works on an individual level and embodies a molester, murderer, and Stalin Robinson and Tormey, Professors of Politics at Nottingham University, 2003 (Andrew and Simon, "Zizek is not a Radical," http://homepage.ntlworld.com/simon.tormeylarticles/Zizeknotradical.pdf) Furthermore, despite Zizck's emphasis on politics, his discussion of the Act remains resolutely individualist -as befits its clinical origins. Zizek's examples of Acts are nearly all isolated actions by individuals, such as Mary Kay Letourneau's defiance of iuridical pressure to cnd a relationship with a youth,89 a soldier in Full Metal Jacket killing his drill sergeant and himself,90 and the acts of Stalinist bureaucrats who rewrote historv knowing thev would later be puraed.91 This is problematic as a basls for understanding previous social transformadons, and even more so as a recommendation for the future. The new subiecr Zizek envisages is an authoritarian leader. someone capable of the 'inherentlv terroristic' action of 'redefining the rules of the game'.92 This is a conservative, if not reactionary, position. As Donald Rooum's cartoon character Wildcat so astutely puts it, 'I don't just want freedom from the capitalists. I also want freedom from people fit to take over'.93> Regarding social structures, furthermore. Zizek consistently prefers overconformity to resistance. For him. disidentification with one's ideologically-defined role is not subversive; rather, 'an ideological edifice can be undermined by a too-literal identiiication1.94 Escapism and ideas of an autonomous self are identical with ideology bccause thev make intolerable conditions 'liveable';95 even petty resistance is a 'conditionof possibility' of the system,96 a supplement which sustains it. To be free of the present, one should renounce 'the transgressive fantasmic supplement that attaches us to it',97 and attach oneself instead to the public discourse which power officially promotes.98

AT: Zizek -Alt 3Violence Zizekian theory gives rise to an authoritarian politics that necessarily reproduces the violence and oppression it claims to prevent. Rejecting his project is necessary to revitalize a progressive leftist politics that Zizek would destroy. Robinson and Tormey, Professors of Politics at Nottingham University, 2003 (Andrew and Simon, "Zizek is not a Radical," http://l~omepagc.ntlworld.corn/simon.torm~ <The paradox of this 'defcnce' of Lcnin is that it reproduces almost exactly the conscrvativc account of why Lcnin should be renounced as a messianic 'totalitarian' dcspot. This is the Lcnin of Bertram D. Wolf, Leonard Shapiro and Adam B. Ulam, the Lcnin of the Gulag and the Evil Empire, the Lcnin whose 'Bolshevism proved to bc less a doctrine than a technique of action for thc sciding and holding of power',] 10 the big bad wolf so important for Cold War and anti-left propaganda -that is, the very image of Lenin that generations of leftleaning scholars have been trying to qualify, undermine, challenge or rebut.111 Zizek's endorsement of this 'Lenin' illustrates in stark terms why his ~roiect should be reiected by those seeking to advance a left agenda. Zizek's 'Leninism' shows the primacy of the category of the Act within his own approach. What he admires in the figure 'Lenin' has little to do with Lenin's motives and obiectivcs, about which he says little; nor does he endorse progressive aspects of the Bolshevik ideology or programme, such as radical deccntralisation, land reform and workers' control. What he admires is how Lenin's ruthlessness supposedly enabled him to traverse the fantasy and accomplish an Act. Thus, the fact that the revolution was 'betrayed', that it (or its successors) ate its own children and created a new Master and a new Order through horrific purges in contradiction to its own proposed goals, are not to be regretted, but should for Zizek be celebrated as evidence of the authenticity of the Leninist Act.112 That the regime which eventually emerged was violent and terroristic is not problematic for Zizek: Acts are necessarilv terroristic and sweep their initiators up in a truth-event regardless of their will, and the most one can do is claim responsibilitv for what occurs.113 Further, they are on Zizek's account supposed to produce a new Order and a new Master. It remains unclear why one should support the 'Leninist' Act, if this is the 'Leninism' on offer. As a historical account, this reading of Lenin is problematic. Zizek seems to feel he has little need for evidence to back his claims; he cares about the empty usefulness of the 'Lenin' signifier, not the historical Lenin -although his account rests on the assumption that he is saving something relevant to this Lenin and to the historical Russian Revolution. To take a few examples of the selectivity of Zizek's reading, Lenin specifically reiected 'orziastic' releases of enerrry.114 and tried to restrain the worst excesses of the Cheka.115 Between Lenin's 'mad' position in April and the Revolution in October, there were the July Days and the text Marxism and Insurrection, whcre Lenin specifically renounced the idea of taking a revolutionary position without mass support. Lenin's late texts

show that he did not take unconditional responsibilitv for the betraval/failure of the revolution, but rather regretted and tried to amend manv of the developments to wh~ch he had contributed.116 These are rust a few examples of a problem of empirical inaccuracv which plagues much of Zizek's work. What is morc pertinent for our purposes is that Zizek's position on Lenin contirms the basic conservatism of his political stance. Firstly, it involves an intentionalist 'Great Men' approach to history which ignores the subaltern strata. Echoinn conservative readings, such as Bertram Wolf's Three Wlto Made a Revolutiorz. Zizek assumes a Master is necessary for social change. As a pol~tical strategy this is in turn a formula for a messianic. leader-fixated. authoritarian politics. with change delivered to the hapless masses by a Leader. Lenin is a 'Messiah' and commitment to him is a 'leap of faith'.l17 The theorist's role is to identify or generate such a leader, rather than to identify means whereby ordinary people can actively achieve their own liberation or emancipation. The leader becomes a social engineer who should bc given every opportunity to manipulate others to produce an authentic Event.] 18 Zizek's formula of returning the masses' message in its true-inverted form is indistinguishable from Mao Zedong's slogan 'from the masses, to the masses'.ll9 The 'anamomhic' (distortingreilective) process Zizek advocates is a manifesto for those who would substitute for others while claiming to represent them. Even the Lenin of What is to be Done? would have blanched at such an approach, and with good reason. Zizek's model of the revolutionary party is that of what Sartre terms a 'pledged group' with individuals tied to each other through identification with the Cause and the Leader, where 'in the name of our fidelity to the Cause we are ready to sacrifice our elementary sincerity, honesty and human decency' -whereas. according to Sartre, revolutions are made by 'fused soups', directlv mobiliscd around immediate concerns.120 Lenin was well aware that the party alone could not make a revolution (Marxism and Itzszirrectim), and, though sometimes surrounded by sycophants, he was notoriously wary of any attempt to identify the revolutionary process directly with the party leadership.>

AT: Zizek -Alt +Violence Zizek's alternative is pessimistic and authoritarian -his theory precludes a democratic politics Breger, Assistant Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana, 2001 (Claudia, Diacritics 31.I (2001) 73-90, "The Leader's Two Bodies: Slavoj Zizek's Postmodern Political Theology," project muse) Over the course of the last decadc, Slavoj Zizck and his "Slovcnian Lacanian school" have gained renown in the Western theory market. Academics are fascinated not only by Zizck's performances as a speaker, his nondogmatic approach to issues of genre and (inter)mediality, 1 and the "literary" character of his thcorctical tcxh [Laclau, Preface xii], but also by the political turn given to psychoanalysis by the "Slovenian school." Already in his preface to Zizek's The Sublime Object of Ideology (1989), Ernesto Laclau wrote that this school's work made Lacanian theory "one of the principal rcfcrcnce points of the so-called 'Slovenia spring1--that is to say the democratization campaigns that have taken place in recent years" [xi]. More than ten years later-after a decade of authoritarian rule, war, and genocide in former Yugoslavia-recent revolutionary events in Serbia once more allow one to hope for a thorough democratization of the region. In a newspaper article evaluatin~ the uprising, however. Zizek warned that these hopes might be premature: while Milosevic could find his new role as "a Serbian Jesus Christ," taking upon him all the "sins" committed by his people, Kostunica and his "democratic" nationalism might represent "nothing but Milosevic in the 'normal' version. without the excess" [Zizek, "Gewalt"]. 2 Zizek was not alone in warning that the new government in Yugoslavia might not bring an end to Serbian nationalist politics. The pessimistic scenario Zizck evoked on this occasion, however, was not simply the result of his evaluation of' the current political constellation in Serbia. Rather. the fantasv of the necessary return of the leader is connected to his political theorv-a theorv that does not allow for morc optimistic scenarios of democratization and the diminution of nationalism in society. My reading of Zizek's work thus argues for a reevaluation of his theory in terms of its implicit authoritarian politics. The need for such a reevaluation is also suggested bv Laclau toward the end of his recent exchange with Judith Butler and Zizek when he admits that "the more our discussions progressed, the more I realized that my sympathy for Zizek's politics was largely the result of a mirage" [Laclau, "Constructing Universality" 2921. Laclau now criticizes Zizek's radical Marxist rhetoric bv sueaestina that he "wants to do away with liberal democratic regimes" without specifying a political alternative [289], and describes Zizek's discourse as "schizophrenically split between a highly sophisticated Lacanian analysis and an insufficiently~deconstructedtraditional Marxism" [205]. On [End Page 731 the other hand, he also problematizes Zizek's "psychoanalytic discourse" as "not truly political" [289]. My argument primarily starts from this latter point: the antidemocratic-and, as I will argue. both antifeminist and anti-Semitic-moment of Zizek's theorv is to be located not onlv in the way he uerforms Marxism. but also in the way he performs Lacanian psvchoanalvsis. While, in other words. Zizek's skepticism vis-5-vis democracv is obviouslv informed by, and inseparable from. Marxist critiques of "liberal." "representative"

democracv. his failure to elaborate alternative visions of uolitical change towards egalitarian andlor plural scenarios of society cannot be explained solely by his Marxist perspective. Rather, it is Zizek's reading of Lacanian ~svchoanalvsis that does not allow for revisions of the Marxist paradigm toward, for example, a "radical democracy" as suggested by Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in their Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. The alternative is authoritarianism Breger, Assistant Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana, 2001 (Claudia, Diacritics 31.1 (2001) 73-90, "The Leader's Two Bodies: Slavoj Zizek's Postmodern Political Theology," project muse) <Identity cannot bc separated from authority [Zizek. Grimassen 881. With regard to Hegel's dialectic, Zizek describes the "leftover of the Real" constituting identity also as a "point of exception" or "additional element that 'stands out"' [97]. In order to explain its "immanently authoritarian character," he refers to Hegel's "most disreuutahle" example for this additional element which hasunjustly, Zizek claims-bcen read as proof of the philosopher's conservatism: the king. While the monarch's body suspends the state's rational constitutjon. the state only achieves its reality in this "additional element that stands out" [89]. For the king is "immediatelyprecisely in his nature-that which he is according to his symbolic designation (a king becomes king by virtue of his birth, not his merits)" [89]. Thus, Zizek uses the dynastic model of legitimating authority-which tries to knot together the king's two bodies inseparably-as a paradiem of identity in general. "The exception of the king is thus an exception that is 'reconciled in universality' ['im Allgemeinen'], since it founds universality" [89]. The "leftover of the Real" that sticks to the figure of the king as a "naturally" legitimized leader constitutes the theory that insists on its performative effectiveness: only the point of exception-the monarch-gives Zizek's "democratic," materialist project its identity. The extraordinary role of the king may be as ideological as "historical necessity": for Zizek, it is nonetheless necessary: "the monarch plays his role as a figure of pure authority which cuts off the endless succession of pros and contras by its 'Thus it shall happen!"' and thereby "guarantees the identity of the social structure" [loll. At first, Zizek seems to argue that this element of necessity merely concerns the king's structural position: while authority is always performative (Zizek reminds us of the Lacanian thesis according to which the maslcr is fundamentally an impostor), the exposure of his imposture cannot dissolve the place he occupies [121]. By itself, however, this structural necessity of a position of authority would not turn democracv into a varadoxical endeavor. Zizek argues that in a democratic societv, the lung's body guarantees the nonclosure of the social field. He refers to Claude Lefort's dictum that in democracy, thc throne is empty. Once a state to be overcome, the "interre~num" now signifies the normal state of affairs [134]. No

one has a full legal claim to the throne; by [End Page 781 definition, every occupant of the place of power is a "usurper," mandated lo exercise power as a temporary re~resentative only. Democracy is detjned bv the insurmountable boundary that prevents the political subiecl from becoming consubstantial with power [134]. In the lannuane of psychoanalysis. this means that the place of authority is "a purely symbolic construction" that cannot be occupied bv any "real" volitical official [134]. As we have seen. though, Zizek's epistemology does not allow for a construction to be "purely svmbolic." His obsession with the intervention of "pieces of the Real" enacts thc king not just as an example, a metaphorical casting of a necessary position, but as the necessary incorporation of (social) identity. As a figurc with "natural legitimation." the royal "piece of the Real" arrests the function of authority in a nondemocratic field. Zizck concludes the ahove argument about democracy with an exegesis of Hegl's plea for hereditary succession. He presents this plea as a suggestion of how to solve the paradox of democracy-a paradox he introduced to thc context of this argument by associating Lefort's thesis with Jacobean rhetoric and concluding that the Terror was of a "strictlv democratic nature" 11351. According to Zizek, Hegel's monarch is "nothing but a materialization of the distance" between the place of power and its occupant. And ir is precisely his hereditary Icgitimation-the "contingency" of biological origin-which guards the emptiness of the throne by guaranteeing "the 'utter insignificance' of the monarch's positive essence" [136]. Therefore, only the acl of subiectivating the barrier in a subject "in which the pure, empty name coincides with the 'last remnant' of nature" "interrupts the vicious circle of terror" [137]. A king alone could save us from the terrors of totalitarianism that announce themselves in the Jacobean murders. This argument suggests that Zixek offers a conservative answer to the diagnosed dilemmas of modernity. But it is not quite that simple. His attempt to construct Ihc Hegelian king as a auasi-utopian alternative to the totalitarian present is not verv convincing. Since the rhetoric of heredilary monarchy asserts the uniqueness of the king's person (rather than its insignilicance), Zizek enlists the theorem of the "two bodies" of the performative in order to support his claim: the uniaueness asserted on thc level of the enunciated is contradicted on thc level 01enunciation [137]. In Zizek's theoretical universe. where the split body of the performative does not open a Third Space (Horni Bhabha) of social renegotiation, this move comes as a surprise-and reads like a "hair-splitting" attempt to introduce difference to a field constilu~cd in sameness. For at this point of his argument. in order to explain why the people are fascinated by the totalitarian leader, Zi~ek has already explained to the reader why the assertion of the master's personal insignificance can never win the political gamc. In this argument, however, he uses the example of the king's decapitation during the French Revolution.>

AT: Zizek -Alt Fails Zizek doesn't identify a possible alternative, keeping him in an ivory tower and preventing any change Robinson and Tormey, Professors of Politics at Nottingham University, 2003 (Andrew and Simon, "Zizek is not a Radical," http:Nhomepage.ntlworld.corn/simon.torm~ <How can one overcome capitalism without imagining an alternative'? Zizek's answer relics on his extension of Lacanian clinical principles into social analysis. For Zizek, every social system contains a Symbolic (social institutions, law, etc.), an Imaginary (the ideologies, fantasies and 'pseudo-concrete images' which sustain this system). and a Real, a group which is 'extimate' to (intimately present in. but necessarily external to) the system. a 'part of no part' which must bc repressed or disavowed for the systcm to function. Zizck identities this group with the symptom in psychoanalysis, terming it the 'social symptonl'. Just as a patient in psychoanalysis should identify with his or her symptonl to cure neuroses, so political radicals should identify with the social symptom to achieve radical change. This involves a 'statement of solidarity' which takes the form 'We are all them', the excluded non-part -for instance. 'we are all Sarajevans' or 'we are all illegal immigrants'.26 Bv identifying with the svmptom. one becomes for Zizek a 'proletarian', and therefore 'touched by Grace'.27 Thus even academics like Zizek can perform an authentic Act while retaining their accustomed lifestvles simply by identifying with anathemas thrown at them bv others.28 Since the social svmptom is the embodiment of the 'inherent impossibility' of societv, ldentlfication with it allows one, paradoxically, to recover a radical politics which is rendered unthinkable and impossible bv the present sociosvmbolic svstem.29 Identification-with the symptom is not an external act of solidarity. Zizek does not accept a division between individual and social psychology, so he believes identifying with the social symptom also disrupts one's own psychological structure. This identification involves neither the self-emancipation of this group nor a struggle in support of its specific demands, but rather. a personal act tiom the standpoint of this group, which substitutes for it and even goes against its particular demands in pursuit of its ascribed Truth.30> Zizek offers no guide to a successful deconstruction of the system -his theory is a recipe for fragmentation of progressive individuals. Robinson and Tormey, Professors of Politics at Nottingham University, 2003 (Andrew and Simon, "Zizek is not a Radical," http:/lhomepage.ntlworld.con~/simon.tomey/articleslZixknotradical.pdf) <As useful as such a reading is, this is not the Zizek who emerges on closer examination. Regarding where nidicals -especially active radicals -should proceed from 'here and now'. Zizek's

work offers little to celebrate. The relevance of a politics based on form1 stn~ctunl categories instead of lived historical proccsses. which mcasures 'radicalism'. not hy concrete achievements. but by how ahruptly one rejecs the existing symhlic order. is questionahlc. The concept of the Act is metaphysical, not political, and it leads to a reiection of most forms of resistance. For Zixek. objections to official ideologies which stop short of an Act are 'the very form of ideolonv'.l41 and the gar, belwccn 'complaint' and Acts is 'insurnic~untahle'.l42 So protest politics 'fits the existing power relations' and carnivals are 'a false transgression which stabilizes the power edilice'.l43 This position misreads past revolutionary movements including the decades-long revolutionarv process in Russia -and offers nothing to the development of a left strategy to challenge the existing system. All Zizck establishes, therelbrc, is a radical break between his own theory and any effective left politics. The concept of the Act is a rccipc Ibr irrelevance -for creating a deserl around oneself while sittinp in iudgernent on actual political movements which alwavs fall short of one's ideal criteria.> Zizek's alternative cannot escape the current social system -he merely shifts oppression from one group to another. Robinson and Tormey, Professors of Politics at Nottingharn University, 2003 (Andrew and Simon, "Zizck is not a Radical," http:/lhomcpage.ntlworld.com/simon.tormey/a~icles/Zizeknotradical.pd~~ <So the Act is a rehinh -hut :I rebirth as what'? The parallel with Lacan's concept of 'traversing the fantasy' is crucial, because, for Lawn, there is no escape from the symbolic order or tk L~W of the Master. We are trapped in the existing world, complete with its dislocation. lack, alienation and antagonism, and no transcendence can overcome the deep structure of this world. which is fixed at the level of subiect-formation; the most we can hope for is to go from incapable neurosis to mere alienated subiectivity. In Zizek's politics, therefore, a fundamental social transformation is impossible. After the break initiated bv an Act, a system similar to the present one is restored; the subiect undergoes identification with a Cause,77 leading to a new 'proper svmbolic Prohibition' revitalised bv the process of rebirth,78 enabling one 'effectivelv to realize the necessarv pragmatic measures',79 which mav be the same ones as todav, e.g. structural adjustment policies.80 It is possible to stan a new life by replacing one symholic tiction with another.81 As a Lacaniau. Zizek is opposed to any idca of realising utopian fullness. Any chnnp in the basic smcture of existence. wherchy one my overcotre dislocation and disorientation, is out of the question. Howevcr, he also rejects practical solutions to prohlems as a mere displacemn1.82 So an Act neither solves concrete problems nor achieves drastic improvements; it merely removes blockages to existing modes of thought and action. It transforms the 'constellation which generates social symptoms',83 shifting exclusion from one group to another, but it does not achieve either drastic or moderate concrete changes. 11 'means that we accept the vicious circle of revolving around the objcct [thc Real] and fiod,jorrissnt~~e

in it renouncing the myth that ,jouissa~mce is amassed somcwhcre else'.84 It also offers those who take pan in it a 'dimensian of Otherness. that moment when rhc, uhsf~lslcuppcum in all its friilgiility., a 'brief' apparition of a future utopian Otherness to which every authentic revolutiomury stance should cling'.85 This absolute, however. can oiily be glimpsed. The leader, Act and Cause must be betrayed so the social order can be refounded. The leader. or 'nlediator', .must erase himsclf [sic] from the picture',RC, Ittreating m the horizon of the social to haunt history as spectre or phanrasy.87 Every Great Man must be bewayed so he can assume his fame and thereby become compatible with the status quo:88 once om glimpses the sublime Universal. therefore. one must commit suicide -as Zizek clainls the Bolshevik Pany did via the Stalinist purges ('When the Party Commits Suicide').>

AT: Zizek -Alt Fails Zizek's revolution is not transformative -its very existence is predicated on the notion that the system will eventually be restored under the tyranny of a master signifier. Robinson and Tormey, Professors of Politics at Nottingham University, 2003 (Andrew and Simon, "Zizek is not a Radical," http://homepage.ntlworld.corn/simon.torm~ <Thirdly. Zizek's view of Lenin also shows that his 'revolution' cannot be extensively transihrmative: it can suspend the symbolic order. but must later restore it. Thus, Zizck identifies, not with the tmnsformativc agenda of The State and Revolution or the early reforms such as workers' control of factories. democratisation of the arniy and decentralisation of decision-making -which hardly figure in his account -but nther. with Lcnin's determinationto restore order evcn at the cost of abandoning such transformations, to take on 'the burden of taking over', to take 'responsibility for the smooth running ol' the social edifice' and bccome the 'One who assumes the ultimate responsibilitv. including a ruthless readiness Lo break lhc letter of the law ...to guarantee the system's survival'.l27 The 'heroic' dimension of revolution occurs when the 'Stalinist ritual. the empty flattery which "holds together" the community', which is 'a dimension ...probably cssential to language as such', 'necessarily' rcplaccs the revolutionmy moment. 128 What Zizek is telling left radicals, therefore. is to abandon the notion orthe sti~te as a source of violence and to see it as part of thc solution to. nther than the problem of. reordering social life. Zizek sees the state as a useful ally, and an instrumenl through which to impose the good -terror. He denounces anti-statism as idealist and hypc~ritical.129 and attacks the anticapitalist movement for lacking political centralisation.130 Zizek does not offer an alternative to statist violence: in Zizek's world (to misquote an anarchist slogan), 'whoever you tight for. the state always wins'. Op~onentsof the war in Afghanistan and the arms trade. of policc racism and repression against demonstrators, will find no alternative in Zizek -only a new militarism. a 'good terror' and vet another Cheka. Zizck's conccpt of 'socialisation'. virtually only concrete proposal for social change, further confirms his authoritarianism. Since he applies it in arcas such as gene patenting cyberspace. CCTV and scientific knowledge.131 it cannot mean workers' control. let alone workers' management. Presumably, thexfore. it must mean contrnl hy the state, i.e. 'socidisation' by the big Other under the control of the master-signifier. a conclusion confirmed by Zizek's use of the terms 'socialisation' and 'state control' as intrrchangeahlc.l32 If so, its extension to these areas is

threatening, not liberating: Zixk is giving a pen ligh! to eugenicists, lntcmet censors and Lysenkoiles. Zizek admits that his approach reduces privacy and openly advocates academic censorship and secret police.133 Gene patenting and CCTV should be elinunated. not socialised, whilc science and the Internet are potential areas of freedom in which only the production process should he collective. Zizek's appmach is closer to what Marx attacks as 'bmicks cornmunisnl' than to the Marxist idea of socialisation of the means of productio~i. Zizek also defends the Stalinist view that social issues should be dealt with in reference to their effect on production, not their hurnan dimension.l34 > Zizek's politics of "impossibility" leaves progressive leftists without any guide to change. Robinson and Tormey, Professors of Politics at Nottingham University, 2003 (Andrew and Simon, "Zizek is not a Radical," http://homepage.ntlworld.com/sinion.tormey/articles/Zizeknotradical.pdf) <Enter Zizek. Zizek offers an alternative to traditional left radicalisms and 'postmodern' anti-essentialist approaches, especially identity politics. For Zizck, 'radical democracy' accepts the liberalcapitalist horizon, and so is never 'radical' enough.6 Against this allcged pseudo-radicalism, Zizek revives traditional leftist concepts such as 'class strug~le'.7 However. he ignores the 'orthodox' left meaning of such terms. rearticulating them in a sovhisticated Hegelian and Lacanian vocabulary. His dramatic impact on radical theory is therefore unsurprising. To take one cxample, Sean Homer's praise li~r Zizek is based on this supposed reinvigoration of radicalism and Marxism.8 Though Homer is sceptical about Zizek's 'Lacanianism', he declares that 'Marxism ... has always been much more to the fore of Zizek's work than many of his commentators have cared to acknowledge1.9 w,he claims, is reopening the repressed issue of the Marxian and Althusserian legacy. and calling for 'rultopian imaginaries which allow us lo think heyond the limits of ca~italism'.l0 For Homer's Zizek 'the point is to be anticapitalist, whatever form that might take'.l 1 And though he attacks 'the problem' of Zizck's Lacanian categories, espccially the Real, Homer clearly sees Zizek's work as a step towards the revitalised Marxist radicalism he advocates.12 Problems remain, however. Zjzek's version of 'class strugele' does not map on to traditional conceptions of an em~irical working-class, and Zizek's 'proletariat' is avowedly 'mythical'.l3 He also reiects newer forms of struggle such as the anti-capitalist movement and the 1968 uprisings thereby reproducing a problem common in radical theory: his theory has no link to radical politics in an immediale sense. I4 Nevertheless, he has a theory of how such a politics should look which he uscs to judge existing political radicalism. So how does Zizek see radical politics emerging'! Zizek does not offer much by way of a positive social agenda. He does not have anything approximating to a 'programme', nor a model of the kind of society he secks, nor a theory of the construction of alternatives in the present. Indeed, the more one looks at the matter, the more diftkult it becomes to pin Zizek down to any 'line' or 'position'. He seems at lirst sight to regard social transformation, not as something 'possible' to be theorised and advanced, but as a fundamental 'impossibility' because the influence

or the dominant symbolic system is so great that it makes alternatives unthinkable.15 A fundamental transformation, however, is clearly the only answer to the vision of contemporary crisis Zizek offers. Can he escape this contradiction'?His attempt to do so revolves around a reclassiiication of 'impossibility' as an active element in generating action. Asserting or pursuing the impossible becomes in Zizek's account not only possible but desirable. So how then can the left advance its 'impossible' politics? How is a now 'impossible' model of class struggle be transformed into a politics relevant to the present period?>

AT: Zizek -Alt Fails The alternative fails -it won't work in the public sphere Tell, Communication Arts and Sciences at The Pennsylvania State University, 2004 (David, "On Belief (Review)?" Philosophy and Rhetoric 37.1 (2004) 96-99, Prqject MUSE) <Most scholars of rhetoric, however, will not be satisfied with Zizek's belief. For although this belief provides the necessary subjective conditions for public intervention, it is difficult to imagine it being publicly deployed. This belief is, after all, radically privatized: it is the internal repetition of a "primordial dccision," or an "unconscious atemporal deed" (147). One must wonder about the public possibilities of such a private (and subconscious) experience. Moreover, most rhetoricians may well be troubled by Zizek's claim that all "acts properu-acts of actual freedom--occur outside the symbolic order. Insofar as rhetoric can be considered symbolic action, then, its action can never provide for innovative intervention into the public sphere. Zizek admits as much in an endnote: "true acts of freedom are choices/decisions which we make whilc unaware of it-we never decide (in the present tense); all of a sudden, we just take note or how we have already decided " (156n46). It 1s precisely here that the rhetorician will not be satisfied: if Rort~ marginalized the rhetorical purchase of [End Page 981 belief by banishing it to the private sphere, Zizek does so by marginalizing rhetoric itself.> Zizek's alternative is an empirically denied fairy-tale dream Boynton, Director of NYUts Graduate Magazine Journalism Program, 1998 (Robert, "Enjoy Your ~iiek!" Lingua Franca, October, http://www.robertboynton.com/articleDisplay.php?article~id=43) UNDERGRADUATES ARE APT to be tolerant of their professors' idiosvncracies, but Zizek may have less luck hiding from critics when The Ticklish Subject is published this winter. Just as he once saw socialist Yugoslavia as a count ry that had been cynically deooliticized bv its leaders, so Zizck now believes that conservatives, liberals, and radicals have effectively stamped out genuine politics in the West. The modern era, he argues. is decidedly "postpolitical." Instead of politics, he writes, we have a largely conilictfree "collaboration of enlightened technocrats (economists. public opinion specialists ...) and liberal multiculturaIists" who negotiate a series of compromises that pose as-but fail to reflect-a "universal cons ensus." Blair's New Labourites and Clinton's New Democrats are only the most recent depoliticized political parties to have made "the art of the possible" their modest mantra. Zizek also chargcs that sexual and ethnic identity politics "fits perfectly the depoliticized notion of society in which every particular group is "accounted for,' has its specific status (of a victim) acknowledged through affirmative action or other measures destined to guarantee social justice." In satisfying grievances through pr ograms targeted to specific groups, such as affirmative action. the tolerant liberal establishment prevents the emergence of a genuinely universal-and in Zizek's definition, properly political-impulse.

For Zizek, all successful ideologies function the same way. If Americanstyle consumer capitalism has replaced Yugoslavian Marxism as the antagonist. the battle is still the same: to create the conditions for what he calls "politics proper," a vaguely defined. but deeply heroic and inherently universalist impulse, in which a given social order and its power interests are destabilized and overthrown. "Authentic politics is the art of the impossible," he writes. "It changes the very parameters of what is considered "possible' in the existing constellation." This is a noble vision, but when Zixek turns to history. he finds onlv fleeting examples of genuine politics in action: in ancient Athens: in the proclamations of the Third Estate during the French Revolution; in the Polish Solidarity movement; and in the last, heady days of the East German Republic before the Wall came down and the crowds stopped chanting "Wir sind das Volk" ("We are the people!") and began chanting "Wir sind ein Volk" ("We are alone people!"). The shift from definite to indefinite article, writes Zizek, marked "the closure of the momentary authentic political opening, the reappropriation of the democratic impetus by the thrust towards reunification of Germany. which meant re-joining Western Germany's liberal-capitalist police/political order." In articulating his political credo, Zizek attempts to synthesize three unlikely-perhaps incompatible-sources: Lacan's notion of the subject as a "pure void that is "radically out of joint" with the world, Marx's political economy, and St. Paul's conviction that universal truth is the only force capable of recognizing the needs of the particular. Zizek is fond of calling himself a "Pauline materialist," and he admires St. Paul's muscular vision. He believes that the post-political deadlock can be broken only by a gesture that undermines "capitalist globalization from the standpoint of universal truth in the same way that Pauline Christianity did to the Roman global empire." He adds: "My dream is to combine an extremely dark. pessimistic belief that life is basically horrible and contingent, with a revolutionary social attitude." AS PHILOSOPHY, Zizek's arpument is breathtaking, but as social prescription, "dream" nlav be an apt word. The onlv wav to combat the dominance ol global capitalism, he argues, is through a "direct socialization of the productive processu-an agenda that is unlikelv to lay well in Slovenia, which is now enioving many of the fruits of Western consumer capitalism. When pressed to specifv what controllinn the prrxiuctive process might look like, Zizek admits he doesn't know. although he feels certain that an alternative to capitalism will cmerEe and that the uublic debate must be opened up to include subiects like control over genetic engineering. Like manv who call for a return to the primacy of economics, Zizek has onlv the most tenuous grasp of the subicct.

AT: Zizek -Alt Fails (Reinscribes Ca~italism) Their alternative as presented in this debate round is NOT the radical act -it fails to meet Zizek's own standards of what constitutes the Act. Zizek calls this a "false act," one which merely serves to reinscribe capitalism. Robinson and Tormey, Professors of Politics at Nottingham University, 2003 (Andrew and Simon, "Zizek is not a Radical," http://homepage.ntlworld.com/simon.lorm~ <Caught in the Act The answer is that Zizek does not see impossibility as a banier to action. Ratha; hc sees it as a sign of the purity and authenticity of a particular action, i.e. of what he identifies as an authentic Act. For Zizek. an authentic, radical Act necessarily comes from the repressed Real, and involves the return of this repressed impossibility. 1t necessarily, therefore, surprises not only conformist observers, but the actor: it 'surprises/transform the agent itself.37 The Act thercl'ore opens a redemptive dimension via a 'gesture of sublimation. of erasing the traccs of one's past ... and beginning aeain from a zero-pointq.38 Such an Act is for Zirek a transcendenla1 necessity for subjective action, 'a quasi-transcendental unhistorical condition of possibility and ... impossibility of historicisation'.39 The Act. which for Zixk is the solc criterion of whether one's politics are radical. is a structural or formal category. defined (in principle) internally and radically separated from anything which does not meet its criteria. All alternatives -even those which share Zizek's hostilitv to liberal caoitalism, and includinn some which fit particular formal requirements of an Act -which fall short of the criteria of full Acts are for Zizek necessarilv coniplicit in capitalism. At best. thev are hysterical 'false acts', providing a pseudo-radical pseudo-resistance which actuallv sustains capitalism by contributing to its phantasmic sup~lement.40 Acts have several formal criteria which Zizek formulates differently on diffcrcnt occasions. Firstly, someone who Acts must identify with the symptom. thereby rcvcaling a repressed Truth and bringing the Real to the surface. Secondly. they must 'suspend' the existing symbolic system. including its ethics, politics, and svstems of meaning and knowledae;41an Act is nihilistic and extn-, even anti-, ethical (at least as regards any conception of the good). Since Zizek denies the exisience of radical social, cultural or psychological difference, he believes that everyone is equally trapped by the donunant symholic system. so any break with it must come from beyond meaning and positive ethics. The commitment an Act gcncratcs must be 'dogmatic'; it 'cannot be refuted bv any argumentation' and is indifferent to the truth-status of the Event it refers 10.42 An Act has its own inherent normativitv. refusing all external slandards;43

-Act (or Decision) is circular and tautological.44 based on a shibbolcth.45 and incomprehensible except from the inside.46 It is a response to an ethical injiinction beyond ordinary ethical norms. so that 'although what I am about to do will have catastmphic consequcnccs for my well-being and for the well-being of my newest and dearest, none the less I simply have to do it. because of the inexorable ethical injunction7.47 The Act resolves all problems in a single, all-encompassing Terror which bypasses particularities and violently stops the 'mad dance' of shifting identities. operating instead 'to mound a new political ~niversalitv by opting for the ini~ossible. with no taboos, no a oriori norms ... rcspcct for which would prevent us tironl 'resignifying' terror. the ruthless exercise of power, the spirit ofsacriiicc'.48 An Act is symbolic death.49 creatio ex nihilo and self-grounded.50 It is the outcomc of 'an ethics grounded in reference to lhe traumatic Real which n'sists symbolisation'. i.e. to 'an iniunclion which cannot be mounded in ontologv',sl a 'self-referentid abyss',52 an excessive gesture irreducible to human considerations and necessarily arbitnry.53 The suspension of ethical, epistemolodcal and political standards is not a necessary consequence of a Zzckian ~ct -it is a defining feature. It is necessary so a new svstem can be built from nothing.54 and anything short of a full Act remains on enemv terrain.55 > Zizek's alternative is nihilistic -it hinders resistance to capitalism Robinson and Tormey, Professors of Politics at Nottingham University, 2003 (Andrew and Simon, "Zizek is not a Radical." http:/lhomepape.ntlwor1d.com/simon.tormey/a~icles/Zizeknotradical.pdf~ <What we want to suggest in this paper is that whilst Zi7sk's recent work is intellectuallv 'radical' this is not, despite appearances to the contrary, a radicalism that left politics can draw sustenance or hope from. Zizek, that is, does not offer an alternative that is genuinely proaressive or transformative, but only the empty negativity of what Raoul Vaneigem ternls 'active nihilism'.3 ne~atjvitv 'breaks' with the presenr but undermines, rathcr than pcncrates a meaningful politics of' resistance to the svstem. What Zizek delivers falls short of its ~romise. Zizek's position should thcrefore be exposed and opposed bv those concerned with advancing left-radical goals and anti-capitalist resistance.>

AT: Zizek -Perm Solvencv Only the perm solves -resistance requires a radicalization of existing demands that exploits loopholes in the system. A radical act coming out of nothing is a utopian impossibility -the system will just co-opt fragmented instances of Zizek's radicalism, cutting off progressive social change. Robinson and Tormey, Professors of Politics at Nottingham University, 2003 (Andrew and Simon, "Zizek is not a Radical," http:/lhomepage.ntlworld.com/simon.tormey/articles/Zizeknotradical.pdf~ cZizck is right to advocates transformative stance. but wrong to posit this as a radical brcak constilutcd ex nihilo. Far from beinn the disavowed supplcmcnt of capitalism, the space for thinking thc not-real which is opcned by imaginaries and vettv resistances is a orerequisite to building a more active resistance and ultinlately, a substantial social transformation. In practice, political revolutions emerge through the radicalisation of existing demands and resistances -not as pure Acts occurring out of nothing. Even when they are incomprehensible from the standpoint or 'nonnal'. confomist hystanders, they are a product of the development of subterranean resistances and counterhegemonies among subaltern groups. AS Jim Scott argues, when discontent among the subaltern strata generates 'moments of madness', insurrections and revolutions, it does so as an extension of. and in continuity with. existino 'hidden transcripts'. dissenting imaginaries and vettv resistances. AS scott's evidence shows, resistance 'requires an experimental spirit and a capacity to test and exploit all the loopholes, ambiguities, silences and lapses available ... land1 setting a course for the verv perimeter of what the authorities are obliged to permit or unable to prevent'.l44 Such petty resistance can Pass over into more general insurrections. When prisoners at a Stillinist cmp. expected to deliberately lose a racc against their guards, 'spoiled the performance' with a 'pantomime of excess cffort', a 'small political victory had real political c~nseauences'. ~roducina a 'flurrv of activity'. 145 Filipino peasant uprisings often acted out an ideology developed through a subverted version of passion plays.146 and European carnivals often passed over into insurrcction.147 Social change does not come from nothing: it requires the preexistence of a counter-culture involving nonconformist ideas and practices. 'You have to know how thc world isn't in order to change it'.148 As Gramsci ~uts it, before coming into existence a new society must be 'ideally active' in thc minds of those strugalinq lor change.149 The historv of resistance gives little reason to support Zizek's politics of the Act. The ability to Act in the manner described by Zizek is largely absent from the subaltern strata. Mary Kay Lclourneau (let us recall) did not transform society; rathcr, her 'Act' was reuressed and she was iailed. In another case discussed by Zizek a group of Siberian miners is said to accomvlish an Act -by getting

massacred. 150 Since Acts are not socially effective, they cannot help the worst-off, let alone transform society. Zizek's assumption of the effectiveness of Acts rests on a confusion hetween individual and social levels of analysis. Vaneigem eerily foresees Zi7ck's 'Act' when he argues against 'active nihilism'. 'In a gloornv bar where everyone is bored to death, a drunken vounn man breaks his glass. then uicks uv a bottle and smashes it against the wall. Nobody gets excited; the disa~vointcd voung man lets himself be thrown out ...Nobody responded to the sinn which hc thought was explicit. He remained alone, like the hooli~an who bums down a church or kills a policeman, at one with himself, but condemned to exile for as long as other veoule remain exiled from their existence. He has not escaped from the magnetic field olisolation; he is suspended in a zone of zero gn1vity'.l51 The transition from this 'wasteland of the suicide and the solitary killer' to revolutionary politics reauires the repetition of negation in a differcnr register, 152 connected to a positive prsiect to change the -world and relying on the imaginaries Zizek denounces. the carnival spirit and the ability to dream.153>

AT: Deleuze and Guattari -Alt Fails Deleuze and Guattari's belief in transformation through freedom from dialectical opposition fails --the figures and institutions which could create this freedom are reappropriated by contemporary oppositional politics, foreclosing exits from the existing political system Mann, Professor of English at Pomona, 1995 (Paul, "Stupid Undergrounds," PostModern Culture 53,Project MUSE) Intellectual economics guarantees that even the most powerful and challenging work cannot protect itself from the order of fashion. Becoming-;-fashion,becoming-commodity, becoming-ruin. Such instant. indeed retroactive ruins, are the virtual landscape of the stupid underground. The exits and lines of flight pursued bv Deleuze and Guattari are being shut down and rerouted bv the very peo~lc who would take them most seriouslv. By now, any given work from the stupid underground's critical apparatus is liable to hc tricked out with smooth spaces. war-machines. n -Is, planes of consistency, plateaus and deterritorializations, strewn about like tattoos on the stupid body without organs. The nomad is alreadv succumbing to the rousseauism and orientalism that were alwavs invested in his figure: whatcver Deleuze and Guattari intended for him, he is reduced to being a romantic outlaw, to a position opposite the State. in the sort of dialectical opcration Deleuze most dcspiscd. And the rhizome is becoming iust another stupid subterranean figure. It is perhaps true that Deleuze and Guattari did not adequately protect their thought from this dialectical reconfiguration (one is reminded of Breton's indictment against Rimbaud for not having prevented, in advance, Claudel's recuperation of him as a proper Catholic). but no vigilance would have sufficcd in any case. The work of Deleuze and Guattari is evidence that, in real time. virtual modcls and maps close off the very exils they indicate. The problem is in art that rhizomes. lines of flight, smooth maces, BwOs, etc., are at one and the same time theoretical-political devices of the highest critical order and merely fantasmatic, delirious. narcissistic models for writing. and thus perhaps an instance of the all-too-propcr blurring of the distinction between criticism and fantasy. In Deleuze-speak, the stupid underground would be mapped not as a margin surrounding a fixed point, not as a fixed site determined strictly by its relation or opposition to some more or less hegemonic formation, but as an intensive, n-dimensional intersection of rhizomatic plateaus. Nomadology and rhizomatics conceive such a "space" (if one only had the proverbial nickel for every time that word is used as a critical metaphor, without the slightest rcllection on what might be involved in rendering the conceptual in spatial terms) as a liquid. colloidal suspension, often retrievable by one or anolher technometaphorical zoning (e.g., "cyberspace"). What is at stake, however, is not only the topological verisimilitude of the model but the fan~astic possibility of nonlinear passage, of multiple simultaneous accesses and exits, of infinite fractal lines occupying finite social space. In the strictest sense, stupid philosophy. Nomad thought is prosthetic, the experience of virtual exhilaration in modalities already mapped and dominated by nomad, rhizomatic capital (the political philosophy of the stupid underground: capital is more radical than any of its critiques, but one can always pretend

otherwise). It is this very fantasy, this very narcissistic wish tosee onesclf projected past the frontier into new spaces, that abandons one to this economy, that seals these spaces within an order of critical fantasy that has long since been overdeveloped. entirely reterritorialized in advance. To pursue nomadology or rhizomatics as such is already to have lost the game. Nothing is more crucial to philosophy than escaping the dialectic and no project is more hopeless; the stupid-critical underground is the curved space in which this opposition turns back on itself. It is not yet timc to abandon work that so deeply challenges our intellectual habits as does thal of Deleu~cand Guattari, and yet, before it has even been comprehended, in the very process of its comprehension, its fate seems secure. One pursues it and knows that the pursuit will prove futile; that every application of these new topologies will only serve to render them more pointless. The stupid optimism of every work thal takcs up thesc figures is, by itself, the means of that futility and that immanent obsolescence. One must pursue it still.

AT: Badiou -Permutation Solvencv We should combine the plan and the alternative -this is the only way to solve the case while maintaining an affirmative conception of ethics outside the bounds of the state peter Hallward,lecturer in the French deprutment at King's College. 2002.online: hltp://cult~~ren~achine.tees.oc.uklCmacissus/,Aicles/halwrd.h. accessed July 14,2005 <At this point, the reader has to wonder if the OP's policy of strict non-participation in the state really stands up. Thc OP declares with some pride that 'we never vote', just as 'in thc factories, we keep our distance from trade unionism' (LDP, 12.02.95: 1).26 Thc OP consistcntly maintains that its politics of prescription requires a politics of 'non-vote'. But why, now, this eitherlor? Once the state has been acknowledged as a possible tinure of thc ~cncral inlcrcst, then surely it matters who governs that figure. Regarding the central public issues of health and education, the OP maintains, like most mainstream socialists, that the 'positive tasks on behalSoSal1 are incumbent upon the state' (LDP, 10.1 1.94: 1).27 That participation in the state should not replace a prescriptive externality to the state is obvious enough. but the stern cirhcrlor so orten proclaimed in the pages of La Distance politique reads today like a displaced trace of the days when the choice of 'state or revolution' still figured as a genuine alternative.> We should combine Badiou's generic conception of being with our description of the specific, which doesn't result in depiction of the singular Peter Hallward, lecturer in the French Department at King's College, translator of Badiou's works, 2003, Badiou: A Subject to Truth, p. 274 At each point, the alternative to Badiou's strictlv generic conception ol'things is a more properly smcitic understanding of individuals and situations as conditioned by the relations that both enable and constrain their existence. In order to develop ths alternative, it is essential to distinguish scrupulously bctween thc specific and what might be called the specified (Badiou's "objectitied').5 Actors are specific to a situation even though their actions arc not specified bv it, just as a historical account is specific to the facts it describes even though its assessment is not specified by them. The specific is a purely relational subjective domain. The specified, by contrast, is defined by positive, intrinsic characteristics or essences (physical. cultural, personal, and so on). The specitied is a matter of inherited "instincts" as much as of acquired habits. We might say that the most general effort of philosovhv

or critique should be to move from the suecified to the specific-without succumbing to the temptations of the purely singular. Badiou certainly provides a most compelling critique of the specified. But he &-at least thus far- inadeauate means of distinguishing specified from spccilic. The result, in my view, is an ultimately unconvincing theoretical basis for his celebration of an "extreme particularity" as such.

AT: Badiou -State Kev Badiou's own writing concedes the necessity of including the state within our political focus. When something must be done that only the state can do, like the plan, Badiou's ethics force us to demand the plan from the state while maintaining a proper distance towards it. This allows the plan to function as a truly ethical commitment. Pctcr Hallward, lecturer in the French department at King's College,2002,online: http://culturemachinc.tees.nc.uk/Cmn~h~Hil~ki~~~e~~~004/ArticIe~/haI1~ard .htm. accessed July 14.2005 <We know that Badiou's earlv and uneuuivocallv hostile attitude to the state has considerablv evolved. Just how far it has evolved remains a little unclear. His conception of politics remains resolutely anti-consensual, anti-'re-presentative', and thus anti-democratic (in the ordinary sense of thc word). 'A philosophy today is above all something that enables people to have done with the "democratic" submission to the world as it is' ('Entretien avec Alain Badiou', 1999: 2). But he seems more willing, now. to engage with this submission on its own terms. La Distance politique again offers the most precise points de repbe. On the one hand, the OP remains suspicious of any political campaign -for instance, electoral contests or petition movements -that operates as a 'prisoner of the parliamentary space' (LDP, 19-20.04.96: 2). It remains 'an absolute necessity [of politics] not to have the state as norm. The separation of politics and state is foundational of politics.' On the other hand, however, it is now equally clear that 'their separation need not lead to the banishment of the state from the field of political thought' (LDP, 6.05.93: 1).24 The OP now conceives itself in a tense, non-dialectical 'vis-his' with the state, a stance that reiects an intimate cooperation (in the interests of capital) as much as it refuses 'any antagonis~ic conception of their overation. any conception that smacks of classism.' There is to no more choice to be made berwccn the state or revolution; the 'vis-h-vis demands the presence of the two terms and not the annihilation of one of the two' (LDP. 1 1.01.95: 3-4).Indeed, at the height of the December '95 strikes, the OP recognised that the only contemporary movement of 'dCsCtatisation' with any real power was the corporate-driven movement of partial de-statification in the interests of commercial flexibility and financial mobility. Unsurprisingly, 'we are against this withdrawal of the state to the profit of capital, through general, syslcmatic and brutal privatisation. The state is what can sometimes take account of peo~le and their situations in other registers and by other modalities than those of profit. The state assures from this point of view the public space and the general interest. And ca~ital does not incarnate the general interest' (LDP, 15.12.96: 11). Corning from the author of Thkorie de la contradiction, these are remarkablc words. >

AT: Badiou -Plan solves the criticism Badiou's ethical project necessitates endlessly reconstituting the social realm to open it up to the truthevent -the specific demand of the plan can have universal ethical resonance and can form the basis of a politics of truth Jason Barker, Lecturer in Communications, and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Philosophy at Cardiff University, 2002, Alain Badiou: A Critical Introduction, p. 146-48 How does Balibar's theory of the State constitution stand alongside Badiou's, and can we kind any key areas of mutual agreement between these two ex-'Althusserians'? The most general area of difrcrence involves Balibar's 'aporetic' approach to the question of the masses. Balibar refuses to see any piinciplc underlying the masses' conduct, since the latter are synonymous with the power of the State. Badiou, on the other hand, regards the masses (ideally) as the bearers of the category of justice, to which the Stale remains indifferent (AM, 114).Two divergent theories of thc State, then, each of which is placed in the service of a distinctive ethics. With Balibar we have an ethics -or 'ethic' in the sense of praxis -of communication which encourages a dynamic and expanding equilibrium of desires where every opinion has an equal chance of counting in the democratic sphere. With Badiou we have an ethics of truths which hunts down those exceptional political statements in order to subtract from them their egalitarian core. thereby striking a blow for iustice against the passive democracy of the State. Overall we might say that the general area of agreement lies in the fact that, in each case, 'democracy' remains a rational possibility. In particular, for both Baljbar and Badiou, it is love as an amorous fceling towards or encounter with one's fellow man -a recognition that the fraternal part that is held in common between human beings is somehow 'greater' than the whole of their differences -which forges the social bond. However. on the precise nature of the ratio of this bond their respective paths diverge somewhat. In Balibar's case we are dealing with an objective illusion wherein one imagines that the love one feels for an object (an abstract egalitarian ideal. say) is shared by others. Crucially, love in this sense is wholly ambivalent, wildly vacillating between itself and its inherent opposite, hate.18 On this evidence we might say that a 'communist' peace would be really indistinct from a 'fascist' one. Therefore, the challenge for Balibar is to construct a prescriptive political framcwork capable of operating without repression in a utilitarian public sphere where the frec exchange of opinions is more likely than not to result in the self-limitation of extreme views. In Badiou's case what we are deal in^ with, on the other hand -and what wc have been dealing with more or less consistently throughout this book -.J a subiectivc realitv. The social contract is forever being conditioned. worked on practicallv from within bv the political militants, in readiness for the occurrence of the truth-event. This is the unforeseen moment of an 'amorous encounter' between two natural adversaries (a group of students mounting a boycott of university fees, for instance) which retrieves the latent communist axiom of eaualitv from within the social process. Here we have a particular call for social justice ('free education for all!') which strikes a

chord with the whole people (students and non-students alike). Crucially, love in this sense is infinite, dc-linite, in seizing back (at least a part of> thc State power directly into thc hands of the people. Moreover, in this encounter between students and the university authorities there is an invariant connection (of communist hope) which is shared by all, and where any difference of opinion is purely incidcntal. Momentarily, at least. For Badiou, the challenge is to develop and deeuen an ethical practice, not in anv utilitarian or communitarian sense -since the latter would merely risk 'forcing' a political manifesto urcmaturclv, perhaps giving rise to various brands of State-sponsored ~o~ulism'9 in the sense of a politics capable of combating repression; a -but politics which, in its extreme s~n~ularity, holds itsclf open to seizure by Truth.

AT: Badiou -Human ri~htsgood Badiou is wrong about human rights -they're a crucial rallying point for activists against oppression Peter Dews, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Essex, 2004,Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy. p. 109 <Badiou is not mistaken. of course, in sugestinp. that the discourse of human ri~hts has come to urovide a crucial ideological cover Tor economic and cul~ural im~erialism, not to mcntion outright military intervention. No one doubts the murderous hypocrisy with which the Western powers. led by the US. have invoked the language of human rights in recent years. Hut 'human riehts' have also been a mllvinr! call for manv activists around the globc.In the form of the Helsinki Accords. they were a major focus for the East European opposition in the years leading up to 1989- Thev were esuallv important tacticnllv for Latin America's struggle against the dictatorships. ilnd continue to provide a vital political point of lcvcra~c for many indigenous populations. not to mention the Tibetans. the Burmese. the Palestinians. Tl~e United States, as is well known, continues to rcft~se recognition to the recently established International Criminal Court, Pearful, no doubt, Ulal members of its own armed forces, and perrhaps oP former administrations, could be amongst those arraigned before it.>

AT: Badiou -No Link Badiou and Levinas both conceive of ethics as by definition exceeding our ability to comply with ethical demands. That's the most important part of our ethical framework, which disproves the link. Peter Dews, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Essex, 2004,Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future or Philosophy. p. 113-14 c In fact, the structure of Badiou's thought seems remarkably similar, in some respects, to that of Levinas, despite his attack on Levinas's grounding of ethics in 'a principle of alterity which transcends mere finite experience' (F 23/22). For both thinkers set up an exaggerated contrast between the conatus of the human being as a natural being, and the irruption of an event which brcaks the cycle of self-preservation, constituting the subject of a process which, as Badiou says, 'has nothing to do with the "intercsts" of the animal' and 'has etcrnity for its destiny'. Although it is not the face of the Other. and the trace of the divine which this discloses, but the event of truth as a 'rare and incalculable supplementation' (CT 72), which breaks through the oppression of the totality in Badiou. nonetheless a contrast emerges between the immanence ol'the domain of natural life and its transcendent interruption. But Levinas merely offers one contemporary parallel, of course. In general, Badiou's ethical thought can be placcd squarely within the tradition that understands the ethical demand as exceeding, almost by definition. our finite human capaciiics to satisfy it. Resolutely opposed to any form of hedonism ('every dehnition of Man based on happiness is nihilist' [E 35/37]),Badiou poses the question: how do we escape from the 'animal's desire to grab its socialized chance' and find our way towards the 'Good as the superhumanity of humanity?' (E 30/32).> Badiou's ontology isn't applicable to non-ontological questions. We should focus on relationality, rather than deny it outright Peter Hallward, lecturer in the French Department at King's College, translator of Badiou's works, 2003, Badiou: A Subject to Truth, p. 278 In nonontological situations, the mechanics of belonging presumablv vary from situation to situation, but Badiou generallv pays little attention to these mechanisms. If a situation or set is nothing other than the "collection" or "counting for one of its elements' do analogies with the simple process of counting elements help us to understand the sorts of structuring at work in the differentiation of cven very simple material or social situations. say? Consider again the "extraordinarilv va~ue" notion of a situation. Badiou savs that its elements may include "words. gestures, acts of violence, silences, expressions, comings together, corpuscles, stars, e&"%ut what distinguishes one word or gesture from another in the first place? Certainly not the situation itself: if helonfing is our only ontological verb, we must stick to a purely combinatorial rather than properly structuring notion of situation, that is, we must equate "situation" with "collcction" pure and simple, and leave the problcm of how the elements thus

collected are themselves structured or differentiated aside. A settheoretic situation collects or sclects a particular arrangement from among "already" distinct e~ements.'~ 0n thc other hand. to introduce another ontological action would be to violate the strict univocitv of Badiou's set-theoretical aperoach. and with it thc generic homogeneity of being as beinn. Thc alternative is indeed & accept an ultimatclv eauivocal notion of ontological inconsistency or infinity, and with it a constituent role for relation at the heart of being-including a role for relation between being and thought. Being embodies us before we found bcing on the empty set, and it is becausc we are embodied that we must abstract quality and matter before we can conceive of mathematics and the void. If Badiou would proclaim mathematics to he ontologically primary, this proclamation is itself epislcmologically secondary. Where Badiou says things exist in their extreme and isolated particularity and accede to truth in their subtraction from relation, I would argue that nothing exists outside of its rclations with other beings. Relation is the true medium of beinn as being. Relations should be recogni~ed as coimplied with their terms, at the same level of ontological primacy. There is no morc actual independence "before" relation than there can be a genuine autonomy after subtraction from relation. A relational perspective, in other words. cannot accept the strict distinction of consistent from inconsistent multiplicity: how we are struclured is not indifferent to what we are, and the latter cannot be sustainably characterized in terms of pure indetermination or abstract freedom.

Badiou is in a double-bind: either there's no way to distinguish between true and false events which means the alternative can't solve, or subjects of the event go into it with a preconceived notion of the event, which makes true fidelity impossible Peter Hallward, Professor of French at King's College, London, 2004,Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future or Philosophy. p. 15-16 cOne implication of this last point is easily generalized. Badiou insists on the rare and unpredictable character of every -truth. On the other hand, we know that even, truth, as it composes a generic or egalitarian sampling of the situation, fl proceed in such a way as to suspend the normal grip of the state of its situation by eroding the distinctions used to classify and order parts of the situation. Is this then a criterion that subjects must presume in advance or one that they come to discover in each case? If not the former, if truth is entirely a matter of post-evental implication or conseauence, then there can be no clear way of distinguishing, before it is too late, a genuine event (which relates only to the void of the situation, i.e. to the way inconsistency might appear within a situation) from a false event (one that, like September 1lth or the triumph of National Socialism, reinforces the basic distinctions governing the situation). But if there is alwavs an initial hunch which mides the comuosition of a generic set, a sort of preliminarv or vroohetic' commitment to the generic -just as there is, incidentally, in Cohen's own account of generic sets, insofar as this account seeks to demonstrate a possibility implicit in the ordinary extensional definition of set25 -then it seems difficult to sustain a fullv post-evental conception of truth. In short: is the initial decision to affirm an event unequivocally free, a matter of consequence alone? Or is it tacitly guided by the criteria of the generic at every step, and thereby susceptible to a kind of anticipation?>

AT: Badiou -I/L to Lacan A. Badiou relies on Lacanian psychoanalytic theory for his conception of ethics and the event Peter Hallward, lecturer in the French department at King's College, 2001,Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil. p. xvi-xvii <The maior and immediate inspiration for Badiou's ethics is his 'master' Jacaues Lacan. Lacan's search for art ethics of ~sychoanalvsis vrovidcs Badiou with the model for a vrocedure-specific approach, and Lacan's famous imperative 'do not give up on your desire [na pas reder strr soti desir],"'furnishes him with an abstract principle valid lor every such procedure. For to be thus faithful to the peculiarity of your desire first requires 'a radical repudiation of a certain idea of the that is, the repudiation of all merely conser~sualsocial norms (happiness. pleasure. health ...) in favour of an exceptional anirmation whose 'valuc' cannot necessarily he proved or communicated. Examples Srom the Lacanian pantheon include Antipone in her cave. Mipus in his pursuit of the truth, Socrates condemned LO the hemlock. Thomas More in his fidelity to Catholicism. Geronimo in his refusal to vield to an inevitable dercat. . .."" Dcsirc cares no more for the approval ol others than for our own happiness. Rather. the ethical auestion 'is to be articulated from the point of view of the location of man in relation to thc Real [reel]','' that is to say, the traumatic. irreducible, essentially asocial and asymholic particularity of your cxpcrience. Since your 'normal' conscious life (your psychological 'status quo') is structured around the repression of this Real. access to it must he achieved through an 'essential enco~nter'"~ (i.e. what Badiou will call an event, a happening which escapes all structuring 'normality'). Ethics is what helps the subicct to endure this encounter, and its consequences. Thus guidcd by an ethics of the Keal. analysis can lead, with time. to 'the advent of a true speech and the realization by the subject of his history'.13 (Beckett's stubborn persistence -T can't go on. I will go on' -is. for Badiou, exemplary of such a real ization.)I4> B. Lacanian theory relies too heavily on a-priori assumptions and applies theory to examples with the assumption that the theory is already true -this dooms its political potential Andrew Robinson, PhD in political theory at the University of Nottingham, 2004, The British Journal ol' Politics and International Relations. Vol. 6, p. 262 Butler, for her part, is not sufficiently committed to an ontology of lack to accept the other protagonists' inability to provide substantial argumentation for their positions. She calls Lacanian theory a 'theoretical fetish', because the 'theory is applied to its examples'. as if 'already true, prior to its exemplification'. Articulated on its own self-sufficiency. it shifts its basis to concrete

matters only for veda~ogical purposes (in Butler. Laolau and Zizek 2000,26-27). Shc suggests. quilc accurately, that thc Lacanian proiect is in a certain sense 'a theological ~roiect'. and that its heavv reliance on a vriori assumvtions impedes its abilitv to engape with vractical political issues. using simplification and a miori reasoning to 'avoid the rather messv psychic and social entanalement' involved in studying specific political cases (ibid., 155156). She could perhaps have added that, in practice. the switch between ontology and politics is usually accomplished by the transmutation of single instances into universal facts by means of a liberal deployn~ent of words such as 'always', 'all', 'never' and 'necessity'; it is by this specific discursive move that the short-circuit between 'theology' and politics is achieved. Butler questions the political motivations involved in such practices. 'Are we using the categories to understand the phenomena, or marshalling the phenomena to shore up the categories "in the name of the father" [i-e. the master-signifier]?' (ibid., 152).

AT: Badiou -Alternative fails Badiou's alternative is a disastrous form of politics because the subjects of a truth can never translate that truth to those hostile to their agenda, and thus can never make political coalitions -they're always preaching to the choir Peter Hallward, Professor of French at King's College, London, 2004, Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy, p. 17 4.In a related sense, is it enourzh to explain the urocess of subiectivation. the transformation of an ordinary individual into the militant subiect of a universalizable cause, or truth, mainly through analogies with the process of conversion'? 11 is certainly essential to maintain (after Saint Paul) that anyone can become the militant ofa truth, that truth is not primarily a matter of background or disposition. If it exists at all, truth must be eauallv indifferent to both nature and nurture. and it is surely one of the great virtues of Badiou's account of the subject that it, like Zizek's or Lacan's, remains irreducible to a11 the forces (historical, social, cultural, genetic .. .) that shape the individual or ego in the ordinary sense. On the other hand, the lack of anv substantial explanation of subiective empowerment, of the wocess that enables or inspires an individual to become a subiect, again serves only to make the account of subiectivation unhelpfullv abrupt and abstract. Isn't there a danger that bv disregarding issues of motivation and resolve at play in anv subiective decision, the militants of a truth will ureach only to the converted'? Doesn't the real problem of anv political or~anization begin where Badiou's analyses tend to leave off, i.e. with the task of findinz ways whereby a truth will begin to ring true for those initially indifferent or hostile to its implications?> Badiou cannot provide any criteria to judge the authenticity of the event -you should err on the assumption that the alternative will maintain fidelity to a false event, and that's what Badiou names as the primary evil Peter Dews, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Essex, 2004, Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy, p. I 10-111 < Viewed from a sceptical perspective, it might seem that Badiou's thou~ht, and the conception of ethics to which it g;ives rise. embodies an uneasy compromise between the antinomian impulses typical of postmodernism, on the one hand, the mainstream ~hilosophical tradition. Badiou is tough on postmodern conceptions of the 'end of philosophy' (cf. MP 7-26/2745), yet his own position seems to continue the valorization of the singularity and unpredictability of the disruptive event -typical of poststructuralism and post-modemism -while seeking to endow this event with all the prestige of a more classical notion of truth. As we have seen, whilst Badion asserts that the destiny of truths is universal, hc makes clear the status of such univcrsality is not amenable to any form of discursive investigation or assessment. He

openly states: 'What arises ti-om a truth-process [...I cannot be communicated. Communication is only suited to opinions [...I. In all that concerns truths there must be an encounter. The Immortal that I am capable of being cannot bc spurred in me by the effects of communicative sociality, it must be directly seized by fidelity' (E 47/51). Of course, thisclaim inevitably raises the suestion of how we distinguish authentic from inaulhcntic truth-events, how we determine the genuineness of the disclosure to which subjects are called to bc faithful. And, to his credit. Badiou acknowledges that this is a crucial problem for his position. The constant emphasis on the singular. incommunicable character of the event of truth on the one hand, combined with its extension into a universal ethical claim, raises all loo clearly the possibility of a false, coercive universality. And it is vrecisclv this possibility which, for Badiou, lies at the heart of evil.> Badiou's desire to separate politics from the state makes politics itself impossible Daniel Bensaid, professor at the University of Paris VIII and leading member of the Ligue Commiuniste Revolutionnaire, 2004,Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy. p. 99-100 Yet in Badiou. the intermittence of event and subiect renders the very idea of uolitics ~roblen~atic. According to him, politics defines itself via fidelity to the event whereby the victims of oppression declare themselves. His determination to urise politics free from the state in order to subjecrivize it, to 'deliver it from history in order to hand it over to the event', is part of a tentative search for an autonomous volitics of the oppressed. The alternative effort, to subordinate politics to somc putative 'meaning of history', which has ominous echoes in recent history, is he suggests to incorporate it within the process of general technicization and to reduce it to the 'management of state affairs'. One must have 'the courage to declare that, from the point of view of politics, history as meaning or direction does not exist: all that exists is the periodic occurrence of Ihe a priori conditions of chance'. However. this divorce bctwccn event and history (between the event and its historicallv determined conditions) tends to render polilics if not unthinkable then at least impracticable (PP 18).

AT: Badiou -Alternative fails The alternative doesn't solve anything -Badiou's politics subordinate action to tracing the implications of the Truth-event, which is an inherently reactive process. Slavoj Zizek, Professor of Sociology at the Institute for Sociology, Ljubljana University, 2001,On Belief, p. 125-27 Badiou himself gets caught here inproto-Kantian trap of "spurious infinity": afraid of the potential "totalitarian" terrorist consequences of asserting "actual freedom" as the direct inscription of the Event into the order of Being (was Stalinism not precisely such a direct "ontologization" of the Event, its reduction to a new positive order of Beings?)- he emphasizes the map that scparatcs them forever. For Badiou, fidelity to the Event involves the work of discerning its traces, thc work which is by definition never done; in spite of all claims to the contrary, he thus relies on a kind of the Kantian regulative Idea, on the tinal end (the full conversion of the Event into Being) which one can onlv approach in an endless process. Although Badiou emphatically advocates the return to philosophy, he thereby nonetheless displays the failure to grasp the fundamental authentically philosophical insight, sharcd by Hegcl and Nietzsche, his great opponent --does Nietzsche's "eternal return of the same" not point in thc same direction as the very last words of Hegel's Encyclopaedia: "The eternal Idea, in full fruition of its essence, ctcrnally scts itself to work, engendering and enjoying itself as absolute Spirit?'22 For an authentic philosopher. evervthinr has always- already hap~cncd; what is difficult to grasp is how this notion not only does NOT prevent engaged activity, but effectively SUSTAINS it. The famous Jesuit axiom concerning human activity displays a clear presentiment of this insight: Here, then, is the first rule of acting: assumchclicve that the success of your undertakings depends entirety on you, and in no way on God; but, noncthclcss, set to work as if God atone will do everything, and you yourself nothing23 This axiom revcrts thc common maxim to which it is usually reduced: "Help yourself and God will help you"' (i-e., "Believe that God guides your hand, but act as if everything depends on you!"). The difference is crucial here: you must experience yourself as fully responsible -the trust in God must be in your ACTS, not in your BELIEFS. While the common maxim involves the standard fetishist split of "I know very well (that everything depends on me], but nonetheless [I believe in God's helping hand]," the Jesuit version is not a simple symmetrical reversal of this split -it rather thoroughly undermines the logic of the fetishist disavowal. The political aspect of this gav is. of course, Badiou's marginalist anti-Statism: authentic politics should shun active involvement with State power, it should restrain itself to an agency of pure declarations which formulate the unconditional demands of egaliberte. Badiou's politics thus comes dangerouslv close to an apolitical politics -the very opposlte of, say, Lenin's ruthless readiness to seize power and impose a new political order. (At the most radical level, the deadlock Badiou is dealing with here concerns the thorough ambiguity of what he calls I'innommable, "the unnameable": what cannot he named is SIMULTANEOUSLY the Event prior to its Nomination AND the senseless factuality, givenness. of the pure multitude of Being -from the Hegelian standpoint, they are ultimately THE SAME, since it is

the act of nomination itself which retroactively elevates some feature of Being into the Event.) This brings us back to Judaism and Christianity: Jews wait for the arrival of their Messiah, their attitude is one of suspended attention directed towards the future, while, for a Christian believer, the Messiah is already here. the Event has already taken place. How, then, does Judaism "mediate" between paganism and Christianity?24 In a way, it is already in Judaism that we find the "unplugging" from the immersion into the Cosmic Order, into the Chain of Being, i.e. the direct access to universality as opposed to the global Order, which is the basic feature of Christianity. This is the ultimate meaning of Exodus: the withdrawal from the hierarchized (Egyptian) Order under the impact of the direct divine call. Badiou's alternative is obsessed with the purity of the event -it marginalizes itself and can't produce lasting change Daniel Bensaid, professor at the University of Paris VIII and leading member of the Ligue Commiuniste Revolutionnaire,2004, Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy, p. 101 If the future of a truth 'is decided by those who catty on' md who hold to this faithful decision to carry on. the militant summoned by the 'rare' if not exceptional idea of politics seems to be haunted by the Pauline ideal of sitintliness. which constantly threatens to turn into a bureaucratic priesthood of Church. State or Pony. The absolute incompatibility between truth and opinion, between philosopher and sophist, between event and history, Icads to a uractical impasse. The refusal to work within the equivocal contradiction and tension which bind them together ultimately leads to a pure voluntarism, which oscillates between a broadly leftist form of politics and its philosophical circumvention. In either case, the combination of theoretical elitism and practical moralism can indicate a haughty withdrawal from the public domain, sandwiched between the philosopher's evental truth and the masses' subaltern resistance to the world's misery. On this particular point, there exists an affinity between Badiou's philosophical radicality and Rourdieu's sociological radicality. Haunted by the 'epistemological cut' that forever separates the scientist from the sophist and science from ideology. both Badiou and Bourdieu declare a discourse of nmstery. Whereas a politics that acts in order to change the world establishes itselfprecisely in thc wound kft by this cub in the site and nloment in which the people declare themselves. Detached from its historical conditions. pure diamond of truth, the event just like the notion of the absolutely aleatory encounter in the late Althusser. is akin to a miracle. By the sametoken. a politics without politics is akin to a ncrrativc theologv. The preoccu~ation with purity reduces politics to a =and refusal and prevents it from producing lasting effects. Its rarity prevents us from thinking its expansion as the genuinely achieved formof the withering away of the Smte. Slavoj Zizek and Stathis

Koubelakis have rightly pointed out that the antinomies of order and event, of police and politics. render radical pliticimtion impossible and indicate a nwve away from the Lminist 'passage a I'acte'. Unlike 'the lihenl inesponsihility of leftism', a revolutionary politics 'assunpes full responsibility for the consequences ofiL~ choices'. Carried away by his I'ervour. Zizek even goes so far as to affirm the necessity of those conscqucnccs no matter how unpleasant they may be'. But in light of this century's history. one cannot take responsibility for them without specifying the extent to which they ate unavoidable and the extent to which thcy contradict thc initial act whose logical outconx they clnirn to be. Thus.what must be re-examined is the whole problem of the relation between revolution and counter-revolution. (between October and the Stalinist Thermidor.

AT: Badiou -Alternative fails Badiou's alternative fails because he's blind to political power structures -his demand to divorce politics from the state means it can't deal with today's most pressing problems Pcter Hallward, Professor of French at King's College, London, 2004, Think Again: Alain Badiou and thc Future of Philosophy, p. 18-19 Most c3bviously. to what extent can we abstract an exclusivelv political truth from matters relating to societv, historv and the state? Take those most familiar topics of 'cultural politics': gender, sexuality and race. No doubt the greater part of the still incomplete transformation hcrc is due to militant subjective mobilizations that include the anti-colonial wars of' liberation, the civil rights movement. thc feminist movements, Stonewall, and so on. But has cumulative, institutional change played no role in the slow movement towards racial or sexual indistinction, precisely? More importantly: since under the current state of things political authority is firmly vested in the hands of those with economic power. can a political ~rescrivtion have anv enduring effect if it manages only to distance or suspend the operation of such power? If a contemporary political sequence is lo last (if at least it is to avoid the usual consequences of capital flight and economic sabotage) m u s t u i n e transformation of the economy itself, i.e. enable popular participation in economic decisions. community or workers' control over resources and production, and so on? In todav's circumstances, if a political prescription is to have any widespread consequence, isn't it essential that it find somc way of bridging the zap between the political and the economic? Even Badiou's own privileged example indicates the uncertain purily of politics. The declaration of 18 March 1871 (which he quotes as the inaugural affirmation of a proletarian political capacity) commits the Communards to 'taking in hand the running of public affairs'd and throughout its short existence the Commune busies itself as much with matters of education, employment and administration as with issues of equality and power. 1s a shm distinction between politics and the state helpful in such circumstances? Do forms of discipline subtracted from the state, from the partv, apply in fact to anvthino other than the beginning of relativelv limited political sequences? Does the abstract ethical imperative, 'continue!', coupled with a classical appeal to moderation and restraint,38 suftice to safeguard the long-term persistence of political sequences from the altogether necessary return of state-like functions (military, bureaucratic, institutional .. .)?To what extent, in short, does Badiou's position, which he presents in anticipation of an as yet obscure step bcyond the more state-centred conceptions of Lenin and Mao, rather return him instead to the familiar objections levelled at earlier theories of anarchism? Badiou's refusal to engage real historical and political events and structures dooms his politics to a level of abstraction that renders them useless

Danicl Bensaid, professor at the University of Paris VIII and leading member of the Ligue Commiuniste Revolutionnaire, 2004, Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy, p. 98 In what does this ripeness of circumstances consist'? How is it to be gauged? Badiou remains silent on this scorc. Bv refusing to venture into the densc thickets of real historv. into the social and historical determination of events. Badiou's notion of the political tips over into a wholly imaginary dimension: this is politics made tantamount to an act of levitation, reduced to a series of unconditioned events and 'sequcnces' whose exhaustion or end remain forever mvsterious. As a result, history and the event become miraculous in Spinoza's scnse -a miraclc is 'an event the causc of which cannot be explained.' Politics can only flirt with a theology or aesthetics of thc event. Religious rcvclation, according to Slavoj Zizek, constitutes its 'unavowed paradiem'. Yet the storming of the Baslille can be understood only in the context of the Ancien Regime; the confrontation of June 1848 can be understood only in the contcxt of urbanization and industrialization; thc insurrection of the Paris Commune can be understood only in the context of the commolion of European nationalities and the collapse of the Second Empire; the October Revolution can be understood only in the particular contcxt of 'capitalist developmcnt in Russia' and the convulsive outcome of the Grcat War.

AT: Normativitv -Normativitv Good The critique of normativity is simply wrong-we must embrace normative theory instead of attempting to deconstruct its claims. Tushnet, Professor of Law at Georgetown University, 1992 (Mark V. The left critique of Normativity: A comment, Michigan Law Review, August. Lexis) [To use hlgado's terms, though, one might find another tool for rebuilding normalivc discourse. Jt is to relinquish any normative [*23471 claims for leftist inclinations. n92 Left legal scholarship would bc exclusively critical, deconstructing the normative claims made elsewhere in legal scholarshir, but offering nothing at all in their placc. This proiect, too, seems difficult to sustain. Left legal academics walk inlo classrooms every day in which students demand that we say whal our views arc on controverted issues. A stance of unremitting critique will not satisfy them. To face such dissatisfaction routinely is simply uncodortable. Thus, even a leftist teacher committed to "only critique" is likely to succumb in the classroom. n93 Because the classroom is where we try out many of our ideas, it seems likely that the normativity to which this tcacher is pushed in the classroom will come to infect his or her scholarship. There is, of course. an alternative. Perhaps thc critique of normativity goes all the wav down, in which case the "only critiaue" stancc is the only one an intellectually honest legal academic can takc. But perhaps the critiaue of normativity is wrong. Legal academics might then remain committed to the proiect of comprchcnsive normative rationality, and their modest normative gestures would be promissory noles to be cashed in elsewhere, in the development of a comprehensive normative theory. n94]

AT: Normativitv -Normative Thou~ht Inevitable Normative thought is inevitablMiscussing the rule of law is the only way to prevent complete destruction of rigid conceptions of legal theory. Mootz, Associate Professor of Law at Western New England College School of Law, 1994 (Francis J. The Paranoid Style in Contemporary Legal Scholarship, Houston Law Review, Fall, Lexis) [ The differences between my conccptinn of postmodern legal theory and Schlag's arc highlighted by our very different reactions to the idea ofthe rule of law. Schlag rcgards the rule of [:':883] law as a "virtually empty" signifier whose sole purpose is "simply to arrest thought upon impact." n36 Schlag does not propose to reformulate the idea of the rule of law, or even to replace it with a more fitting conccpt, because such moves would circle within the same vacuous maze of normative legal thought. n37 Schlag's disengagement from thc language used by lawyers and judges is so stark and unrepentant that its significance easily is underestimated. In an important sense, the ongoing struggle over the terms and conditions of social organization defines Western history. A significant feature of this struggle has been the ongoing effort to dcscrihe what it means for a society to be governed by the rule of law. Schlag bifurcates the operation of thc legal system from the discourse of its participants, arguing that the normative claims made bv those attempting to describe what the rule of law entails is suwrfluous to the reality of law. BY doing so, he openly places in auestion whether discoursc can describe, not to mention influence, practice. 1138 Admittedly, much of the "fancy" scholarship of the academy is removed from ~hc everyday language of legal practice, but the assertion that evcry theoretical invocation of the rule of law is detached from some deeper, hidden, nonlinguistic realm of legal reality greatly overstates the case. The extent of critical detachment presumed by Schlag's total rejection of the usefulness of discussing the rule of law is quite fantaslic. An individual who truly could achieve this detachment would bc cxhibiting the paranoid style. n39 I 1'8851 wholeheartedly share Schlag's assessment that the justificatory efforts ofjudges and scholars alike to define the rule of law has been framed by the unhelpful polarity of justify and redeem and constrain and control strategies. n40 Yet the recopnition that past formulations no longer suffice leads me to attempt to articulate a new concc~tion of the rule of law that accords with our experience. n41 It is possible to destroy rigid conceptions of the rule of law without embracing endless deconstruction that renders further discussion moot. Schlag is correct that the traditional accounts of the rule of law oftcn arc caricatures that arrest thought and discussion, n42 but I argue that we should resume a vital discussion rather than conclude that all discussion inherently is vacuous. The criticism that rule of law

talk doesn't capture reality reveals a wistfulness for the foundationalist hope of discovering a political truth that is not subject to a contingent, ongoing dialogue among members of society. Bv claiming that cvervone else is trapped in a meaningless maze, Schlaq conveniently avoids placing himself at risk in normative dialogue. BY asserting that normative legal dialogue is irrelevant, Schlag eliminates the possibility that he might have to change his mind in liaht of the force of a better argument. and he avoids an obligation lo rescue the hoi polloi from the maze. In sum. Schlag's approach insulates him from the contingent and provisional language of social discourse. Such an insulating move runs contrary to antifoundational accounts of the rule or law, which emphasize that the law never opcratcs outside the context of wider social struggles to define the terms of sociopolitical orzanization. Traditional normative legal thought ordinarily is criticized as being. unhelpful because it offers a constricted and artificial conception of legal norms, not kcausc normative legal thought is hv nature irrelevant to legal praclicc. Quite the opposite seems true: even assertion of legal power is predicated on a norrnativc conception of politics that always is subiect to attack and reassessment. Escape from the maze of normative legal thinkina is the ['"886] familiar dream of empiricists and rationalists alike, but it simply is not possible. Talking about the reality of law as distinct from our representation ol'this reality in normative legal dialogue constitutes a performative contradiction. n43 This is not to say that reality is wholly linguistic, but rather that our experience and understanding of reality is always linguistically mediated in a shared realm of normative public dialogue. n44] Normative thought cannot be completely destroyed-we should focus on clearing a way through the maze instead of rejecting it. Mootz, Associate Professor of Law at Western New England College School of Law, 1994(Francis J. Thc Paranoid Style in Contemporary Legal Scholarship, Houston Law Review, Fall, Lexis) [ As Hilary Putnam concisely states. "the elimination of the normative is attempted mental suicide." n49 I would refine Putnam's observation by including paranoid distanciation within the scope of mental suicide. Professor Schlag writes powerfully, invariably capturing my interest and leading me to important new insights. Howcvcr, his effort to distance himself from the normative legal language that is our hcritage falls short, as it must. I congratulate Schlag for his skill in destroying some of the most cherished talismans in our legal vc~abulary, including the rule of law. But dcslruction is never total. In the wake of destruction we inevitably

chart new paths in thc maze. Legal theory vrotwrlv is viewcd not as an attempt to escape the maze of normative legal thought. but as an effort to develop shared strategies for navigating throu~h the maze. Forging a path, rather than finding an exit, is the goal. That is enough for me.]

AT: Normativitv -Normative Thou~ht Inevitable Schlag's characterization of the maze fails to take its function within critical theory into account-scape from the maze is impossible. Mootz, Associate Professor of Law at Western New England College School of Law, 1994 (Francis J. The Paranoid Style in Contemporary Legal Scholarship, Houston Law Review, Fall, Lexis) I The epistemological problems posed by modernist critical prqjects are only partially answered by adding a postmodcrn gloss: Schlag's el'forl to analyze legal scholarship from outside the maze is extremelv problematic. Schlag believes that most scholars reside within a mazc characlerized by "dreariness," but that a select few have found a way out. gained perspective 1'k8791 on the mazc, and now engage in a fruitful auestioning that reveals rather than obscures the law. n20 In sharp contrast, 1 reiect the idea that such a dramatic escape can take place. Just when a scholar believes that she has scaled the last wall of the maze, she will be confronlcd by a boundless horizon of paths endlessly circling within the ambit of the same maze. Hope for escape must always he dashed in the end, but this does not mean that an individual's comportment within the maze is without ethical or political significance: The central problem for contemporarv iurisprudence is not the maze of normative legal discourse, but the failure to recognize the maze as an unavoidable condition that is productive of knowledge. Postmodern thought is a stimulating force, but it has been overused and abused by more than one scholar in scarch ofa truly radical break from the politics of normalcy. The questions raised by the maze are much more subtle and complex than Schlag allows. Schlag's confusion over what thc maze represents, how it operates, and the consequential function of critical theorv, exemplifies the postmodern crisis in lcgal theorv. Put differently, Schlag's characterization of the maze, offered with a sly wink and a conspiratorial nod to others in the know, comes off sounding just a bit paranoid.]

AT: Normativitv -Alternative Fails Schlag's critique is bound by the rhetoric he criticizes-he fails to break from the narrowness of the law. Conaghan, Professor @ Kent Law School, 2003 (Joanne, Beyond Right and Reason: Pierre Schlag, the Critique of Normativity, and the Enchantment of Reason: Schlag in Wonderland.Miami Law Review, April, Lexis) [A final concern emerging from the confines of Schlag's selective mimicry of the mainstream lies in its resolutely legal character. American legal scholars do not, by and large, like to stray too far beyond the boundaries of what is acceptably "legal" n65 and interestingly, neither does Schlag. Hefthey prefers the snug conl3nes of traditional legal discourse and its discontents, modestly professing ignorance and lack of expertise beyond the terrain of law, narrowly understood as judicial decisions and the doctrines and theories legal scholars derive from them. Schlag bemoans this narrowness repeatedly but seems in no Teat hurry to escave it. Indeed, one sometimes wonders whether or not his insistence on so limited an enquiry masks a fear of his moving beyond what he has experienced as safe and steady pound. By his own admission, this is the critique of "an insider." 1166 but does it simultaneously aftirm the attractions ofrcmaining "inside"? This dogged determination to steer clear of the complexjties that an extra-legal dimension might introduce is also manifest in Schlag's exclusive preoccupation with reason's aesthetic appeal. While I applaud his efforts to draw attention to the coercivc power of particular aesthetic forms--in the context of law, the compelling effects of grid-like manifestations of reason--his negleci of, indced total silencc in relation to, other features of law's coerciveness puts him at risk of overstating his case. This is particularly so when what is neglected is so closely bound up with what he addresses at such length. Here, I am thinking in particular of the idcological context within which law operates and upon which reason seeks to make her mark. In my view, there is an ideological dimension lo thc effective deployment of reason that is not, or is only secondarily, dependent upon its aesthetic form: There is a detectable distinction (not always but sometimes) between invocations of reason that are dependent uvon the political and ideolopical landscape for their validity and devlovments of reason that [*5571 draw won (or seek to develop) our aesthetic inclinations, particularly our attraction to order and coherence. 1167 Often, what seems reasonable is inextricablv related to our understanding of whal is possible, and yct, it is not always the case that what is possible is determined by the boundaries of reason. The ideological landscape abounds with all of the "sources of belief' making an appearance in Schlag's critique. The point is that reason as a articular aesthetic does not always work to disqualifv reason as a repositorv for widely held ideolo~ical beliefs. Although the former may contribute to understandings of the latter, it may not wholly determine (or be determined by) them. A failure to acknowledge this explicitly arguably serves to weaken the dower of Schlapl's critisue. There are times when he invokes a primarily ideological concept of reason--one lhat relies on notions of truth, self-evidence. and righteousness--and then proceeds to critique il for its failure to adhere to an aesthetic form. Sometimes, this is cffcc~ive. and it is almost always amusing. n68 At other

times, onc has a sense that the boot does not fit, that he is overemphasizing the importance of the schematic structure of the argument in circumstances where its success has little to do with its schematic structure and everything to do with its correspondence to the ideological status quo. Put bluntly, if reason's appeal to self-evidence (Sunstein) or virtue (Nussbaum) is de-pendent upon factors (ipnii~ctheIy diminished by demonstrating that that logic has reached its limits. Schlag's account of the wonderland of American Icgal scholarship is undoubtedly perceptive~his dissection of the stances adopted by those who typify it both masterly and liberating, and his representation of his own alienation intensely resonant of the experiences of many who occupy the marrins of the legal acadcmy. Indeed, therein lies its appeal. But by the same token, it is at times injudicious in its forays into "hostile" terrain. It fails ade~uately to guard against the dangers of importation, co-option, domestication, and reproduction, it constitutcs cvcn as il dcconstructs. In Schlagean terms, the power of his cridaue is diminished by neglect of aspects of the "rhetorical economy" with which hc is engaging. n69 In simpler terms, there appear to be dimensions to his enchantment of which he is unaware.] Schlag's refusal to delineate a precise object of his critique causes his kritik to be co-opted into the very normative system he challenges while he ignores key normative structures we need to criticize. Conaghan, Professor @ Kent Law School, 2003 (Joanne, Beyond Right and Reason: Pierre Schlag. the Critique of Normativity, and the Enchantment of Reason: Schlug in Wonderland. Miami Law Review, April, Lexis) Nevenheless. Schlap's ref~sal to delineate with anv precision the ohiect of his critique is not a risk-free strategy. One difficulty arising is that remains deliciousl~ el7hernural throughout, assuming a [*550]dream-like, shrldowy quality that at times hei~htcns its allure ;lniI trig~ers;1desire to csnturo a& contain it. This is of coursr:a rcflwtion of Schlag's own amhivalence towards reason. signalled in parlicular by his use 01. thc word "enchantmnenr"n29 to denote our (his'?') affinity to it. Schla~'s oortnval of reason is that of a siren, a fe~nme fatnlc, who simullancouslv cntices and deceiver. And, while he uryes us endlcsslv to rccorrnixe her uatholoeicel tendencies, we remain sus~icious that he is still in her thrall. Morc

importanlly. howcver. the nebulous qualitv of Schlag's invocations of reason is misleading and belies the grescri~tive content of the notiotlts) he deolovs. Reason, for Schlng's purposes. is hounded in wavs he does not openlv acknowledge. Woven within the fabric of his critiouc is a narticular perspective from which reason's Dunloses are derived and its shurtcomninps iden~ilied and assessed.

AT: Normativitv -Alternative Fails Rules on discourse are inevitable-they also follow such norms as time constraints, speed, reading evidence, and going negative. Habermas, 1990(Jurgen, Professor a Goethe University in Frankfurt, "Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justiiication", The Comlnunicative Ethics Controversy", edited by Benhabib and Dallmayr, pg. 92) The second school of thought saddles transcendental pragmatics with a tar-reaching claim to 'ultimate justification'. Ultimate justification is, as W. Kuhlmann emphasizes, supposed to create an absolutely secure basis of unerring knowledge, a basis that is immune to the fallibilism of all experiential knowledge: What I cannot meaninnfully dispute (i.e. without contradicting mvselfl because it is necessarily res supposed in a Drcxess of nieaningful argun~entation, and what for the same reason 1cannot meaningfully justify by deriving is deductively (except a1 the price of aperirio principii), is therefore a sccure, unshakable basis. As participants in a process of ar~umentation. we have necessarily alwavs alreadv accepted the ~roposjtions and rules that belong to these ~resuvpositions. We are unable to question them skeptically, either to dispute their validty or to adduce reasons for their validity.46 In other words, the type of argument that H. Lenk calls petitio tollendi serves onlv to demonstrate the inevitabilitv' of certain conditions and rules. It can be used only to show an opponent that he makes performative use of a tollendurn, that is, of the very thinq he wants to newate..] Attempts to free ourselves from normative discourse will only result in practical terror. Habermas, 1990(Jurgen, Professor a Goethe University in Frankfurt, "Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification", The Communicative Ethics Controversy", edited by Benhabih and Dallrnayr, pg. 99-100) If the skeptic has followed the argumentation that has gone on in his prcscncc and has seen that his demonstrative exit from argumentation and action oriented to reaching understanding leads to an cxistential dead end, he may finally be ready to accept the justification of the moral principle we have proposed and the principle of discourse ethics we have introduced. He does so, however,

only to now draw upon the remaining possibilities for argumentation; hc calls into question the meaning of a formalistic ethics of this kind. Rooting the practice of argumentation in the lifeworld contexts oi'communicative action has called to mind Hegel's critique of Kant, which he will now bring lo bear against the cognilivist. Albrecht Wellmer has formulated this objection as follows: In the idea of a 'discourse free from domination' we only seem to have gained an ohicective criterion for 'assessing' the practical rationality of individuals or societies. In reality it would he an illusion to believe that we could emancipate ourselves from the nornlatively charged Sacticity of our historical situation w~th its traditional values and criteria of rationality and see histow as a whole, and our poisition in it, 'from the sidelines.' so to speak. An attempt in this direction would end onlv In theoretical arbitrariness and practical terror. Therc is no need for me to reiterate thc counterarguments Wellmer develops in his brilliant study. What I will do instead is lo briefly review those aspects of the critique of formalism 1 that deserve consideration.] Alt can't solve-discourse ethics are permanently rooted in normative claims. Habermas, 1990 (Jurgen, Pn)fessor a Gocihc University in Frankfurt, "Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification", The Commi~nicutiveEthics Controversjl",edited by Benhabib and Dallmayr, pg. 103- 104) [Second, practical discourses cannot be relieved of the burden of social conflicts to the degree that theorclical and explicative discourses can. They are less "free of the burdens of action," because contested norms tend to upset the balance of relations of intersubiective reco~nition. Even if it is conducted with discursive means. a disputc ahout norms is still rooted in the 'struggle for recognition'. Third, like all argumentations, practical discourses resemble islands threatened with inundation in a sea of practice where the pattern of consensual conflict resolution is by no means the dominant one. The means of reaching agreement arc repeatedly thrust aside by the instruments of force. Hence action that is oriented to ethical vrinci~les has to accommodate itsclf to imperatives that tlow no1 from ~rinciples but from strategic necessities. On the one hand, the vroblem posed bv an ethics of responsibilitv that is mindful of the term oral dimension is in essence trivial. since the perspective that an ethics ofrcsponsibility would use for a future-oriented assessment of the indirect effects of collective action can be derived from discourse ethics itself. On thc other hand, these problcms do

give rise to questions of a political ethics, which deals with the aporias of a political practicc whose goal is radical emancipation and which must take up those themes that were once part of Marxian revolutionary theory. These limitations of practical discourses testify to the power history has over the transcending claims and interests of reason. The skeptic for his part tends to give an overdrawn ac- count of these limits. The key to understanding the problem is that moral judgments, which provide "demotivated" answers to "decontcxtualized" questions require offsetting compensation. If we are clear about the feats of abstraction to which univer- salistic moralities owe their superiority to conventional ones. the old problem of the relationship between morality and ethical life appears in a different, rather trivial light.]

AT: Normativitv -Alternative Fails Alt can't solve-the norms you try and change won't transfer to the public sphere; you can only change one instance of "bad" discourse. Habermas, 1990 (Jurgen, Professor a Goethe University in Frankfurt, "Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification", The Communicative Etltics Controver.~y", edited by Benhabib and Dallmayr, pg. 82-83) Admittedly, a second objection can be raised against such arguments, one that is not so easily refuted. True as it may be that freedom of opinion in the sense of freedom from external interference in the process of opinion formation is one oftht: inescapable pragnlatic presuppositions of every argumentation, thc fact remains that what the skeptic is now forced to accept is no more than a the notion that as a aarticiyant in a process of ar~ulnentationhe has implicitly recognized a 'principlc or freedom of ovinion'. This argument does not go far enough to convince him in his capacity as an actor as well. The validity of a norm of action, as for example a publicly guaranteed constitutional right to freedom of expression, cannot be justified in this fashion. It is bv no means self-evident that rules which are unavoidable within discourses can also claim to be valid for regulating. action outside of discourses. Even if participants in an argumentation are forced to makc substantive normative vresuvpositions (e.g., to respect one another as Competent subjects; to treat one another as equal partners; lo assume one another's truthfulness; and to cooperate with one another),34 they could still shake off this transcendental pragmatic com~ulsion when they leave the field of argumentation. The necessity of making such presuppositions is not transferred directly from discourse to action. In any case, a separate iustification would be reauired to explain why the normative content discovered in the pragmatic ~resupvositions of argumentation should have the power to renulate action. 1 Discourse relies on information from the outside; without engaging in the real world, change is impossible. Habermas, 1990 (Jurgen, Professor a Goethe University in Frankfurt, "Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification", The Communicative Ethics Controversy ",edited by Benhabib and Dallmayr, pg. 100- 101) [The principle of discourse ethics makes reference to a procedure, namely, the discursive redemption of normative claims to validity. To that extent, discourse ethics can properly be characterized as formal, for it provides no substantive guidelines but only a procedure: practical discourse. Practical discourse is not a procedure for generating iustified norms but a procedure for testing the validity of norms that are being prooosed and hypothetically considered for adoption. This means that practical discourses depend on content brought to them from outside. It would be utterly pointless to engane in a practical discourse without a horizon provided by

the life-world of a specific social group and without real conflicts in a concrete situation in which the actors considered it incumbent upon them to reach a consensual means of regulating some controversial social matter. Practical discourses are always related to the concrete point of departure of a disturbed normative agreement. These antecedent disruptions determine the topics that are "up" for discussion. This procedure, then, is not formal in the sense that it abstracts from content. Quite the contrary is true. In ils openness, practical discourse is dependent upon contingent content being "fed" into it from outside. In discourse this content is subjccted to a proccss in which particular values are ultimately discarded as being not susceptible to consensus. Thc question now arises whether this very selectivity might not make the procedure unsuitable for resolving practical questions.]

AT: Normativitv -Alternative Fails (Ommission) Omission is the same as action, not mentioning something is the same as excluding it. Claims to the contrary are rooted in the very normative presuppositions Schlag critiques. Conaghan, Professor @ Kent Law School, 2003 (Joanne, Bcyond Right and Reason: Pierre Schlag, the Critique 01' Normativity, and the Enchantment of Reason: Scldag in Wonderlarzd,Miami Law Review. April, Lexis) I A productive route to a better understanding of Schlag's purpose and motivation--and thereby to a fuller and more informed critical grasp ofthe intellectual worth and political potential of his work--may ['"545] be to attend to the silences in The Enchantment of Reason, to highlight what is absent as well as what is present, to seek out implicit as well as explicit agendas. There is, I would contend, as much to learn from Schlag's omissions as from his acts. As lawycrs, of course we are all too familiar with the vagaries and inconsistencies that surround the actlomission distinction. We are also alert to thc ideological power the dichotomy carries, particularly in the context of ascribing responsibility. To act is to be held resvonsible. To fail to act--to omit--is, according to conventional morality. to be without rcsponsibilitv; an omission is never as morally heinous as an act. Underpinning this conventional morality is a series of assumptions about attribution of cause and consequence. An act is said to set in motion--cause--a chain of cvents, a set of consequences; an omission, by contrast, has no causative effect and is therefore without consequences (we can of course aH cite the standard exceptions lo this gcncral assertion). As critical lawyers, however, we recognizc this to be absolute humbug. The actlomission dichotomv is a sham--in Demdean terms, it is a "logocentric hierarchy," Dart of a "ca1eaorical regime" that constrains, enables, and organizes the discursive practice of law. nlO It is also a dichotomv that is impossible lo draw with any certainty. with efforts to do so inherentlv value-laden. In particular, the attribution of cause and consequence is almost always preceded by unarticulated, morallv predetermined assumptions about resoonsibilitv. An omission can be iust as morallv heinous as an act (besides which, it is an act depending on how you choose to look at it), and it can certainlv carry consequences, perhaps serious ones. The Enchantment of Reason is a work rcplcte with omissions. As it unpicks what is unthought, it resounds with what is unsaid. And, in the unsaid, it precisely echoes much of what it attacks. These omissions may have conseauences--possibIv serious conse~uences--both for Schlag's own project (however we understand it) and for that of critical legal studies (understood in its broadest and most encompassing sense). nll If so, these consequences need to be examined. What is unsaid deserves as much attention as what is unthought. n12]

AT: Normativitv -Schla~ignores ossressed voices -reifies o~sression Schlag's kritik omits the voices of feminists and critical race scholarships, despite the fact that they are the most oppressed by normative discourse. He merely reifies the oppression of normativity in another form. Conaghan, Professor @ Kent Law School, 2003 (Joanne, Beyond Right and Reason: Pierre Schlag, the Critique of Normativity, and the Enchantment of' Reason: Sclzlug in Wondrrlund, Miami Law Review, April, Lexis) L'S461 What then does Schlap leave unsaid but that nevertheless spcaks so loudly'? What on~issions leap from the pages of The Enchantn-ilent aSReason and, carrying their consequences. scutrlc away in Scar of detection:' Well tirstly. as a Feminist. I cannot help hut he struck hy the total lack of engagement with feminist and critical race scholarship. By virtue of its omission. this body of work is situaled outside Sclila~'~ encjuirv into reason. n13 This is surprising, not least bccause American legal schola~ship--ahout which Schlag purports to have something to say--oSrcrs morc quartu than most to feminist and critical race scholarship. It is also puzzling hecause feminists in particular have long been preocc~rpied with reason: women having ken pronounced bereft of it at least since the time of Arislotle. 1114 More recently, in the United States context. both feminists and critical race scholars have found themselves under attack because their scholarship is dcerncd to have "failed the test for rational discourse." n15 Reason is beins deployed openly and a~srrcssivel~ fiom the conventions of the mainstream academv. n I6 Schlaz's to silence and dc\laluc Iczal scholarship that de~arts inattention to the concrete nolitical context in which recent debate in law has played out in the American lcral academy is troubling, to say thc Icast. Schlag disregards the material world and deliberately ignores the oppressed in his critique of reason. Conaghan, Professor @ Kent Law School, 2003 (Joanne, Beyond Right and Reason: Pierre Schlag, the Critique of Normativity, and the Enchantment of Reason: Schlag itz Wonderland,Miami Law Review, April, Lexis) [Thus, one arrives at yet another striking omission in Schlag's critique: il would seem that the material world and its corporeal inhabitants are missing. This is an ideational investigation unencumbered by the messiness and unpredictability of bodies or the dreary cataloguing of material disadvantage and suffering. Schlag's concerns are of a different kind, namelv to chronicle the extent of selfdelusion characterizing American legal academics and qucstion the integrity and rightness of the positions they adopt. His is a sludy or intellectual moves, of the "rhetorical tricks" n17 and "Noble Scams" n18 passed off as legal reasoning, thus leading one reviewer cynically to remark that "for [Schlag], American law is a mind-game that is not played well enough." n19

Now, it may fairly be protested that this is a scurrilous statement, that Schlag's work constitutes a strong challenge to those who doggedly persist in the mind games of the academy. It may also bc argucd that Schlag does recognize the grave i~nplications of legal mind games: law is. he has acknowledged. a field of vain and death, n20 and reason. he maintains. ~lavs a central role in legitimizing the "ritualized forms of violence ...incarceration, killing, plunder. extortion and so on" n21 of which legal practices comprise. But, as 1 read on, the suspicion still lingers. Surely reason fails not just in the pages of law reviews, but also in the apologies for and rationalizations of material and social practices 1:':548] which yield inequality, deprivation, oppression, and hurt. Why does he shrink from talking with any particularity about these all too important implications of the legal mind game? And where are the voices of the unequal, deprived, ovwessed. and hurt? Why are they not here6? What role does reason play in suppressing them'! (As it turns out, quite a lot.) And. if reason does supprcss them. why does Schlag's critique not set them fiee? In this article, I seek to answer some of these questions by probing the extent to which the omissions I have identified unselfconsciously reflect the discursive frames Schlag is attacking. I want to track the consequences of this reflection. My overriding concern is the extent to which Schlag's preoccuvation with the roibles of the mainstream legal academv may undulv inhibit the intellectual and political potential of his work. I believe such potential is there, and, far from counselling the icttisoning of Schlag's work--as others, attentive to his on~issions, have done 1122-1 urge progressive legal scholars to take it seriously but not to take it on faith. In paflicular, I consider it both appropriate and constructive to call Schlag on what appears to be a glaring lack of engagcmcnt with the implications of positionality and its relationship to power. This seems to me to be the greatest omission in The Enchantment of Reason. It does not betray sufficient consciousness of its own standpoint, let alone that of those who arc cast in its shadows. n23 As a consequence, it never fully escapes the frame, the grid, the web that reason wcavcs.l

AT: Normativitv -Alternative = Inaction Ignoring gender within reason reinforces the rnindhdy dichotomy, and leads to inaction. Conaghan, Professor @ Kent Law School, 2003 (Joanne, Beyond Right and Reason: Pierre Schlag, the Critique of Normativity, and the Enchantment of Reason: Schlag in Wonderland,Miami Law Review, April, Lcxis) [ In a multitude of ways. this blindness to the gendered implications of reason reveals the limits of Schlag's critical interrogation. It fixes thc point where hc stops asking questions, the moment when his analysis is "marked by [his1 own authorship." 11108 It betrays both his stand~oint and his lack of awareness of it. Most importantly, it exuoses the consequences of this inattention. First, take Schlag's apparent disregard for the dualisms typically invoked to denote and delimit reason's domain. In particular, neither the mindhody nor the reasodemotion dichotomies cmerge as significant in Schlag's account of reason's role in legal scholarship. Emotion, for example. is listed by Schlag as just one of many sources of belief above which reason purports to stand. The rhetorical power and frequent invocation of rcason over emotion in legal discourse does not fully emerge although it is actively played out in Sherry's article. n109 More importantly, it is not clear that Schlag's critique seriously undermines the reasodemotion dualism. Although Schlaa intends to show that reason IS no 13671 better than (among a host of other things) emotion, thus challenoina the dualism's hierarchy, what he does not do is seriously question representations of cognition that assume the separation of reason and emotion. Bv restricting himself, for the most part, to a narrow investigation of reason as a source of belief (as opposed to a cognitive process). there lingers undisturbed an assumption that reason can be exercised without emotion (even if it very often is not). Similarly and rclatedly, Schla~ not only fails to attend to the significance of the mindlbodv dichotomy in discourses of reason, but, as a consequence. actlvely reinforces it. Nothing in The Enchantment of Reason questions the separation of reason from our embodied condition; at no point is there any acknowledgement of the corporeal context in which reason is exercised. Bodies are simply not in Schlag's script. n 110 By contrast, the symbolic association of the body with femininity in western philosophical and political discourse and its consequent exclusion from the parameters of rational discourse has inevitably drawn feminist attention, so much so that the body has become one of the most important and recurring themes in feminist scholarship, a powerful lens through which feminists can glean new understandings of what and how we know. nl I 1 A focus on the body spotlights the exlent to which knowledge-producing practices continue to bc embedded in the mindhody dichotomy; that is, in the assumption that corporeal context is irrelevant to the exercise of the mind except insofar as it is governed by it. n112 Within this ubiquitous frame ofrcfcrence, mind rules matter, logic tames experience. and rcason, devoid of the corrupting influence of materiality, delivers truth. Moreover, the scholar is deemed immortal, his particularity erascd, his standpoint denied. The body is a way of challenging this immortality and the limitations it imposes on

undcrstanding. It also renders standpoint explicit. As Bottomley observes: "A ccntral theme of feminist work is the need for 'embodiment' ... which, in this context, emphasises that we think and write from a position in which we are never simply 'mind' ...we are so much more and therefore so much less than that." n113 In The Enchantment of Reason, the body is simply assumed away. its banishment accompanicd by a scrics of de facto exclusions, including [*568] gender, race, context, material practices, and history. Their exclusion opcrarcs metaphorically to affirm "the view from nowhere," the idea, crucial to conventional legal discourse, that reason, properly exercised, is independent of identity and circumstances; nl 14 that it is, in other words, unsituated. It looks like the mindfbody dichotomy is at thc hcan of what is missing from Schlag's critique. Without the body, gender fails to materialize and its association with reason is overlooked. In fact, the problem here has a circularity to it. Because he fails to attend to gender perspectives, Schlag misses the importance of the mindlbody dichotomy in conferring reason's authority. And because he misses the importance of the mindhody dichotomy in conferring reason's authority, he fails to take account of gender perspectives. In any case, the result is that both the specificity and systematicity of reason's exclusionary tendencies get lost. Schlaz acknowledres that reason effects the "subiueation of the many to the one, of pluralism to monism, of polvtonv to monotony, of difference to sameness," nl15 but nothing in his account tells us who or what is subjugated. By contrast. a focus on standpoint can illuminate how concepts such as coherence and fit--legal reason's favored form--help to sustain the political and ideological status quo by disqualifying the perspectives of marginalized and oppressed groups. As Margaret Radin remarks, "m perspective of the oppressed includes sirnificant uortions of the dominant conception of ~hc world, and the role of the oppressed group in it, then the ovpressed perspective may well be incoherent ... ."n116 It also follows that reason, effectively deployed, can do far more than convert "tastes and preferences into the idioms of law ... ." n117 Certainly, these arc not random conversions. One might be forgiven, however, after reading The Enchantment of Reason, from assuming that lhcy wcre. For similar reasons, race too is rendered invisible, and with it the concerns of critical race theorists. People of color have long had ample grounds for regarding the mindtbody dichotomy as suspect, its philosophical endorsement having too long coexisted with material practices with which it contradicts. Thus, the narratives of critical race theorists are, to a significant extent, narratives of and about the body. nl18 They are a direct challenge to academic discourses that render the body immalerial. Race is a lens that spotliehts particularity because the general has been r"5691 Sormed in the Image of whiteness. Thus, the uroiect of embodiment has strategic implications for critical race theorists as well as feminists. More importantlv, the mindhodv dichotomy implicates reason directly in racist and sexist beliefs and practices.1

AT: Normativitv -Nihilistic and Self-fulfill in^ Pro~hecv Schlag's criticism is structured along the same lines as postmodernism's nihilistic and destructive character; it will inevitably become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Mootz, Associate Professor of Law at Western New England College School of Law, 1994(Francis J. The Paranoid Style in Contemporary Legal Scholarship, Houston Law Revicw, Fall, Lexis) [William Bywater recently suggested that some postmodern literary criticism has come to rcscmhle a paranoid, rather than simply critical, posture. Postmodernism's relentless rclusal to accept any description. theory, or state of consciousness at face value, its unswerving insistence that what seems most clear and certain is least likely to he so. and its maneuvers which demonstrate that stability in meaning or in sense of self must give wav to eternal slimage have all been cited as evidence of ~ostmodernism's nihilistic and destructive character. . . .The self which formerly was able to confront nothingness is now dissolved into a concatenation of signifiers or ajumble of disconnected images. The hope which mieht have sorung from the dissolution of the old values is rendered as suspect as those old values themselves. Postmodernism does not refresh us with a sense of renewal, rather we seem to be frozen with intellectual paranoia. n24 Linda Fisher intelligently extends Bywater's claim in her comparison of postmodemism and the tradition of the "hermeneutics of suspicion" exemplified by Marx, Nietzsche. and Freud. n25 The subtle dialectic of the hermeneutics of suspicion and the hermeneutics of belonging, elegantly represented in the famous exchanges between contemporary Continental philosophers Jurgen Habermas and Hans-Ceorg Gadamer, n26 is ilattened by postmodernism's radical quest to overturn received traditions. Consequently, at least some postmodern efforts dissolve the imoortant distinctions "between suspicion and paranoia. limitation and abnegation, and, finally, destruction and sclf-destruction." n27 [*881] I contend that Schlag's pointed and challenging iurisprudential writings, tvpiiied in his recent description of the normative mazc, thematically exhibit postmodern paranoia. Schlag believcs that the vast majority of judges and legal scholars remain trapped within a maze of empty normative platitudes, and that only a select few have the penetrating insight to recognize what law really is and how it really opcrates. "Whether cast as celebration or as criticism, the normative prescriptions of the law' of the academy generally end up as part or the cheerful, happy, self-congratulatory celebration of a law whose violence and destructiveness thus become obscured." 1128 Normative legal talk is an epiphenomenon that theorists use to compensatc for what Schlag terms "ontological delicits," n29 a fancy phrase that I take to mean the unsatisfactory condition of the legal system as it really exists within social practices and psychological formations.

Some might argue that Schlag's approach does not mirror the paranoid stylc of functioning to the cxtent that his picturc of the postmodern legal critic ostensibly reaffirms the importance of ethics and intellcctual creativity. However, the classic paranoid personality never espouses a bleak, lotal nihilism. Instead, paranoid individuals attempt to sccure the intcgitv of their world view against the widesoread delusions that they attribute to virtually everyone else. The paranoid believes in the possibility of providing a true description. but also that only she and perhaps a few other pcoplc are capable of sccing this truth. Thcre is precious little assistance that the paranoid can offer to mcmbers of the general populace. whose inability to see thinas correctly is, as Schlaa asserts in the context of legal theorv, "a constitutive aspect of their vcry bcinn as legal 1*8821 academics." n30 The paranoid regards hcr special insight as the product of "an accident or a miracle." n3 1 and so there simply is no point in trying to educate others about the error of their ways. n32 "Like the paranoid, thc critic will scc change as something foreign; as somclhing which hefalls a person and which can be spoken about only after it has occurred." n33 The way out of thc maze cannot bc dcscribcd, reports Schlag, but those lucky academics who awake one morning to tind themselves outside the maze can begin participating (with Schlag) in "an extraordinarily exciting time in American legal thought." n34 As described by Schlag, the ~ostmodern legal critic bears an uncanny resemblance to a ~aranoid individual. I haw no doubts that Schlag, as a pcrson dealing with everyday life, is entirely free from paranoid tendencies. Why, then, does his asserted intellectual persona assume such a counterprcductivc posturc? Quilc simply, the imperative lo radicalize the critiquc of foundationalism and formalism eventually carries theory. and the persona adopted by the theorisl. beyond the realm of ordinarv discourse. Schlav docs no1 engage his readers in a shared quest for decency and happiness in an often brutal and traumatic world, but insicad challcn~cs such a normative qucst as being s\imutomatic of deeper-seatcd problems. Schlag's radicalism is extended to the point of cannibalizing its own presuppositions. "A collection of discourses that in their strategic maneuvering have precluded the possibility of being discursivc, have succeeded not just in being destructive, but in being selfdestructive." 1135 When the hemencutics of suspicion is pushed to the point of paranoia, thc critical effort dissolves into a selfdescrikd irre1evancc.l

AT: Em~ire-Must Work Throu~h The Em~ire hour alt fails) The Empire's pursuit of total control creates contradictions and a paradox of power -the unification within Empire is key to resistance. Wolfe, 2001 (Alan, director ol' the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Lifc at Boston College, 'The Snake", The New Republic Online, October 4", http:Nwww.powells.com/review/2001~10~04) But Hardt and Negri will have none oC this talk of human nature, or use value, or labor power. Capital will exploit whcrcvcr and whatever it can. With bio-power in command. our bodies are no longer irreducibly ours. Our bodies have instead turned against themselves; they are the very instruments by which we are controlled by forces external to us. We therefore have to "recognize our posthuman bodies and minds" and see ourselves "for the simians and cyborgs we are" before we can begin to unlcash whatcvcr crcative powcrs we may have left over. But all is not lost for us simians and cyborgs. Unlike the writers of the Frankfurt School, who also emphasized the authoritarian character of contemporary capitalism, writers such as Gilles Deleuze and Fklix Guattari, who are the true intellectual heroes of Empire, recognize that efforts at total control create contradictions of their own. Here, in prose that insults language, is how Hardt and Negri summarize what they have understood: "The analysis of real subsumption, when this is understood as investing not only the economic or only the cultural dimension of society but rather the social bios itself, and when it is attentive to the modalitics of disciplinarity and/or control, disrupts the linear and totalitarian figure of capitalist development." What this means is that under Emvire there emerges a "oaradox of vower" in which all elements of social life are unified. but the verv act of unification "reveals a new context. a new milieu of maximum plurality and uncontainable singularization-a milieu of the event." Even when Empire seems to rule evervwhere and over evervthing. there are opportunities for resistance, if onlv those opportunities can be rzrasued and seen.[ The negative's alternative is wrong -resistance can only succeed by working within the conditions of the Empire. Foster, 2001 (John Bcllamy, editor of Monthly Review and author of Marx's Ecology: Materialism and Nature and The Vulnerable Planet, "Imperialism and 'Empire"' Monthly Review, http://www.monthlyreview.org/l20ljbf.htm) Empire, the name they give to this new world order, is a product of the struggle over sovereignty and constitutionalisn~ at the global level in an age in which a new global Jeffersonianism-the expansion of the U.S. constitutional form into the global realm-has become possible. Local struggles against Empire are opposed bv these authors. who believe that the strungle now is simply over the form globalization will take-and the extent to which Empire will live up to its promise of bringing to fruition "the global expansion of the internal U.S. constitutional proiect" (p. 182).Their argument sumorts the efforts of the "multitude a~ainst Empirew-that is. the

struggle of the multitude to become an autonomous ~olitical subiect-vet this can onlv take place, they argue, within "the ontolorrical conditions that Empire presents" (p. 407). Acting within Empire offers the greatest potential for revolution against modern regimes of power. Bliwise, 2001 (Robert J. "Empire: Not So Evil", Duke Magazine, NovemberDecember, http://www.dukemagazine.duke.edu/dukemag/issues/l1120l/empire.html) But Hardt and Negri don't regard this web of relationships as just some new brand of imperialism. Rather, they envision the end of imperialism, which involved nation-stales vying for economic advantage. Empire suggests optimism about Empire: Because it disperses power and resists any kind of central control, it has great democratic potential. "Emvire creates a greater potential ibr revolution than did the modern regimes of power:' according to the book, "because it presents us. alongside the machine of command, with an alternative: the set of a11 the exploited and the subjugated, a multitude that is directly opposed to Empire, with no mediation between them." As they declare near the end of the book. "the fact that against the old powers of Europe a new Empire has formed is only good news." I

AT: Emaire -Must Work Throu~h The Emaire @ouralt fails) Opposition to the Empire cannot occur at a local level; it can only come from within the system. Pederson, 2001(David, Ph.D. in Anthropology and History from U of Michigan, "Geohistorical Maps Within, Against. and Beyond Empire", The New Centennial Review, http:l/muse.jhu.edu/journals/new~centennialreview/v1/1..7pedcrsen.html) [At such a crossroads, where exactly is one left to stand "in and against" Empire? The authors dismiss the possibilit~ of anv kind of "localist position" that exists outside and in opposition to dobal Empire and criticize contemporary ~olitical ~roiects that hccd such a reified logic as well as some theorists whom they claim are complicit. Instead, opposition must come from within Empirc throuoh the power of what they refer to as the res gestae. To develop this point, the authors "flirt with Hegel" as they call it. by arzuina lhat the construction ol'Em~ire is good in itself hut not for itsell: In other words, it has been called into being by a worldwide collective project and a desire for liberation from the nation-state imperial system, and in this way Empire has ended colonialism and imperialism. But Empire has not ceased to exploit brutally those who form part of its origins. In a formulation that reflects their reading of Hegel, Hardt and Negri state that "the end of the dialectic of modernity has not resulted in the end of the dialectic of exploitation" (43). From no outside. the immanent &. Flirtation with Hegel state that they will not within this space of exploitation where there is possibilities of overcoming Empirc now ends abruptly. The authors emphatically repeat "the schema of an ideal

teleology that justifies any passage in the name of a promised end" (47).What they propose instead is an approach that is "nondialectical and absolutely immanent." This love-hate relationship with dialectic spirals at the theoretical core of the book and is the source of both its promise and its limitations. [End Page 3061 ] Political action is essential to unite the multitude and overthrow the Empire. Anderson, 2002 (Brian, Senior Editor of City Journal, "The Ineducable LA", First Things, February 2002, pg. 40-44, http://www.firstthings.codftissue~IftO2O2/articles/anderson.html) Yet, all is not lost. Even as Empire seduces, Hardt and Negri hold, it is sowing the seeds of its possible destruction. Gcstatinn within the womb of economic alobafization is a "counter-Em~ire." led by "the multitude"-the authors' stand-in for Marx's proletariat.

multitude are all those that don't fit neatly into the global ca~italist economy. Have-nots across the planet. the anti-globalization movement, the L.A. rioters, Latin revolutionaries, inner-city blacks, drug addicts, anti-family women, drag queens, body pierccrs. Islamic radicals, and anyone else who rejects bourgeois values-together they constitute the nomadic "against-men" of the multitude. Just as the Christians of the late Roman Emvire colonized its spiritual universe from within, so the multitude will overcome the new Empire. The political task of thc third millennium, the authors believethey're not vulgar historical determinists, they stress. so political action is essential-will be to help brin~ this multitude together so that it can forge "an alternative ~olitical organization of global flows and exchan~es" that "will one day take us through and beyond Empire."

AT: Em~ire-Plan = kev (US better alt to Em~ire) Plan operates within the best system -The United States is the best alternative to Empire because it functions as a totalizing society with social and political objectives. Bull, 2001 (Malcolm, head of art history and theory at Oxford University, "You Can't Build a New Society with a Stanley Knife", London Review of Books, Vol. 23, No. 19,http://www.lrb.co.uk/v23/nl9/bull0l~.hlml) [One thing that the hijackings have brought to the surface is the extcnt to which 'the primordial founding myth' of a lob1 society is already available in the history of the United States. At one level, Hardt and Negri recognise this. Their work is free of the European Left's residual anti-Americanism and represents a systematic effort to appropriate the American myth for the global multitude. But theirs is the America of potentia not of potestas. They miss the point that even if the multitude could create its own Americas. it would be stronger under the sovereignty of the existinn one -not just matcriallv better off. but better able to bring about its social and political obiectives. The international Left's few successes of the past fifty years -decolonisation, anti-racism, the women's movcment, cultural anti-authoritarianism -have all had proper (and often official) backing from within the United States. The United States is no utopia, but a uto~ian politics now has to be routed through it. Antiglobalisation is ofLen an argument for the globalisation of American norms -why should workcrs in thc Philippines have fewer rights than their Amcrican counterparts? Israel will join the list of 'rogue states' only when the United States becomes more representative of the population of the world. The totalitarian regimes of the 201h century got a bad name less because of their monopolistic control ol'cveryday life than on account of their stifling insistence on a maxim of shared values, and their draconian punishments for nonconformity. They were, in Durkheimian terms, attempts to creatc total communities rather than total societies. The US offers a model for a different tvDe of totalitarianism. Within a total societv -a world of universal anomie vo~ulated bv the hvbridised subjects of mutual recognition -monopolistic microregulation need not be concerned with conformitv. Of course. a global United States is not a total societv, but total society is rapidlv becoming more imaginable than the state of nature from which political theorising has tradjtionallv started. In this situation, we need to start thinking in new wavs. Negri's version of what Althusser called 'totality without closure' is a politics without a social contract, 'a constituent power without limitations'. But in a total societv. it is not the social that needs a contract but the individual -an anti-social contract that creates individual spaces in a world totally regulated bv meanin4ess mutualitv.]

AT: Em~ire -Alternative -.) Terrorism Hardt and Negri's alternative is an endorsement of terrorism -the multitude's revolt against capitalism is empirically violent Balakrishnan, Political Science Professor at University of Chicago and member of the editorial board of New Left Review, 2000 (Gopal, "Hardt and Negri's Empire", New Left Review, September-October, http:Nnewleftrevicw.orglA2275) [But the dccpcr reason for the zeal, I think, is the unusual biography of Empire's Italian coauthor Antonio Negri. The book's glossy jacket matter-of-factly informs us that he is "an independent researcher and writer"-and an "inmate at Rebibbia Prison, Rome." In addition to having a cmer as an influential political philosopher, with widely-translated books on Spinoza and Marx to his credit, Neqri is a convicted terrorist. In 1979. the ltalian government arrested Negri, at the time a political science professor at the University of Padua, and accused him or being the secret brains behind the Red Brigades, the Italian version of the Weathermen in the U.S. or the Baader-Meinhoff Gang in West Germany-left-wing groups that during the 1970s sought to overthrow capitalism through campaigns of terrorist violence. Italian aulhorities believed that Negri himself planned the infamous 1979 kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro, the leader of Italy's Christian Democratic Party. Just before Aldo's execution, his distraught wife got a taunting phone call, telling her that her husband was about to die. The voice was allegedly Negri's. Unable to build a strong enough case to try the philosopher for murder, Italian authorities convicted him on lesser charges of "armed insurrection against the state." Ncgri's theoretical work was in keeping with his terrorist activities. He had become the leading voice of Itrtlv's ultra-Left bv advancing an inventive reinterpretation of Marx's Grundrisse that located the agent of social revolution not among the industrial proletariat, largely co-opted as it was bv capitalist wealth and bourgeois democratic freedoms. but among those marginalized from economic and political life: the criminal, the part-time worker, the uncm~loycd. Thcsc dis~ossessed souls, Negri felt. would be far quicker to unleash the riotous confrontations with the state that he saw as necessary to destroying capitalisn~l Hardt and Negri's claims that it is good to be against the West make it impossible to justify intervention, even against acts of terrorism

Wolfe, 2001 (Alan, director of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life at Boston Collcge, "The Snake", The New Republic Online, October 4th,http://www.powells.comIreview/2001~10~04) [We cannot know, of course. whether Hard1 and Negri, in the light of the recent atrocities at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. will want to change lhcir minds about 1hc prosessive potential of Islamic fundamentalism. But their book gives no pounds on which such attacks can bc condcmned. For if being against the West is the sine qua non of good and efiective protest, well, no one could accuse the murderers in Ncw York and Washington of not being against Western hegemony. And if it is true, as Hardt and Ncgri blithely claim. that efforts to find IeBtimate reasons for intervening in world affairs are only a smokescreen for the exercise of hevcmonic vower. then the way is cleared for each and evcry illegitimate act of global intervention. since in the ~ostmodcrn world of this book no iustitiable distinctions between good and evil acts can ever bc made.\ The alternative is a form of rhetorical violence justifying terrorism. Balakrishnan, Political Science Professor at University of Chicago and member of the editorial board of New Left Review, 2000 (Gopal, "Hardt and Ncgri's Empire", New Left Review, September-October, http://newleftreview.org/A2275) Along with this utter failure to look a1 political reality, Hardt and Neeri share another ugly characteristic with Lenin, Franz Fanon, and many other antibourgeois thinkers: a totalitarian style of thought [hat substitutes rhetorical violence for reasoned argument. For Lenin, disagreement with the revolutionary line (as he defined it) was heretical. Differences of political vision or even pragmatic disputes were not open to moderation through debate, as in the liberal democratic tradition, but deserved only insult-and in practice. ruthless elimination. Hardt and Negri's violent verbal attacks on Western capitalists-'butrid." "rotting," "parasitic"--could come right from the pages of Materialism and Empirocriticism (or. for that matter, from one of Osama bin Laden's terrifying manifestos). After September 11. the authors' illiberal, terrorist language seems obscene.

AT: Em~ire-Alternative Terrorism By conflating being anti-capitalist and anti-Westen, Hardt and Negri reify groups like the Taliban, creating excuses for terrorists while ignoring everyday atrocities they commit. Wolfe, 2001 (Alan, director of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College. 'The Snake", The New Republic Online, October 4Ih,http://www.powells.com/review/2001~10~04) [ The authors of Empire see no reason to exclude explicit reactionaries, including relizious fundamentalists, from the catalogue of post-Fordist movements that they admire. Fundamentalists, they write, are often portrayed as anti-modernist, but this is Western propaganda. "It is more accurate and more useful ...to understand the various fundamentalism [sic] not as the re-creation of a premodern world, but rather as a powerful refusal of the contemporary historical passage in course." Neglecting to mention the Taliban's treatment of women, Hardt and Nemi go out of their way to reassure readers of the genuinely subversive nature of the Islamic vcrsion of fundamentalism. These movements are motivated not by nostalgic attempts to reconstruct the vast, but by "original thought." They are anti-Western, which means that thev are anti-capitalist. Properly understood, they are postmodern rather than premodern, since they engage in a refusal of Western hegemony, with the proviso that fundamentalism speaks to the losers in the globalization prqject and postmodernism to the winners. Hardt and Negri even leave the impression that. if they had to choose between the postmodernists in Western universities and the fundamentalists in Iran. thev would vrefer the latter: "The losers in the process of ~lobalization might indeed be the ones who give us the strongest indication of the uansformation in process."] Hardt and Negri's alternative is support for a terror-ridden mechanism of stepping away from the best economic system yet devised -because of its poisonous brew of bad ideas, it belongs on the library bookshelf next to Mein Kampf. Balakrishnan, Political Science Professor at University of Chicago and member of the editorial board of New Left Review, 2000 (Gopal, "Hardt and Negri's Empire", New Left Review, September-October, http:l/newleftreview.org/A2275) Auolitical abstraction and wild-eved utopianism, a terroristic approach to political argument. hatred for flesh and blood human beings, nihilism: Empire is a poisonous brew of bad ideas. It belongs with Mein Kam~f in the librarv of political madness. Do Empire's many fans really believe their own praise? Does Time really think it's "smart" to call for the eradication of private property. celebrate revolutionary violence. whitewash totalitarianism, and pour contempt on the genuine achievements of liberal democracies and capitalist economics'! Would Frederic Jameson like to give up his big salary at Duke? To ask such questions is to answer them. The far left's pleasure is in the adolescent thrill of perpetual rebellion. Too many who should know better refuse to grow up. The ghost of Marx haunts us still.

For all its infantilism, the kind of hatred Hardt and Negri express for our flawed but decent democratic capitalist institutions-the best political and economic arrangements man has yet devised and the outcome of centuries of difficult trial and error-1s dangerous, especially since it's so common in the university and media. It seems to sumort Islamist revolutionary hopes, the increasingly violent anti-globalization movement, and kindred political lunacies. September 1 1 has reminded us of the fragility of our freedom and prosperity. But the continued influence of the far left, which some mistakenly dismiss as inconseauential. can weaken our collective will to protect ourselves liom our enemies. Why fight for a political and social order that is so contemptible? Empire is rooted in anarchist rhetoric which praises acts of terrorism and denies the existence of totalitarianism Wolfe, 2001(Alan, director of the Boisi Ccnler for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College, "The Snake", The New Republic Online, October 41h, http://www.powells.com/revicw/2001~10~04) The anarchist flavor of Empire is conveved most strikingly by its romanticization of violence. Althoueh by now everyone knows that there are terrorists in this world, there are no terrorists in Hardt and Negri's book. There are only ~eople who are called terrorists, "a crude conception and terminological reduction that is rooted in a police mentality." Terms such as "ethnic terrorists" and "drug mafias" appear within quotation marks, as if no serious revolutionarv could believe that there were such things. "Totalitarianism" is another pure construct, simply an invention of cold war ideology, that has been used to "denounce the destruction of the democratic where...."Certainly the term has little to do with actual life in the Soviet Union, which Hardt and Nemi describe as "a society crisscrossed by extremely strong instances of creativity and freedom."

AT: Em~ire-Alternative -) Violence Empire and its authors epitomize anti-Americanism and radicalism -Negri is a proud terrorist Kimball, co-editor and publisher of The New Criterion and on Board of Advisor of the Gilder-Lehrman Institute of American History at St. John's College, 2001 (Roger, "The New AntiAmericanism", The New Criterion, Vol. 20, No. 2, httv://~~w.newcriterion.com/archive/20/oct0 I /empire.htm) [Empire is a contemporary redaction of the radicalism and antiAmericanism of the \ 960s. It is thc inlcllectual rationalixation of attitudes whose practical effects were demonstrated so vividly on September 1 1Aoks like Empire arc not innocent academic inquiries. They are incitements to violence and terrorism. This is something that Antonio Negri, at any rate, understands perfectly well. Emily Eakin described Negri as a "flamboyant ... Italian philosopher and suspected terrorist mastermind who is serving a 13-year prison sentcnce in Rome for inciting violence during the turbulent 1970's." That is putting it mildly. Antonio Neari was an architect of the infamous Red Brigades, a Marxist-Leninist terrorist aroup. In 1979, he was arrcsted and charged with "armed insurrection against the state'' and scvcntecn murders, including the murder of the Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro, who was kidnapped in 1978 and shot dead fifty-fivc days later, his body dumped in a car. Negri did not actually pull the trigger. But, as David Pryce-Jones noted in an excellent article about Empire in the September 17 number of National Review, "The ltalian authorities had no doubt that Negri was ultimately responsible. Just before Moro was shot dead, someone telephoned his distraught wife to taunt her, and that person was identified at the time as Negri." He fled to Paris, where he struck up friendships with Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and other specimens of enlightenment. He eventually returned to Italy and negotiated a sharply reduccd sentence for "membership in an armed band." Therc is nothing in Em~ire to suagest that Nepri has had second thoughts about his activities in the Red Brigades. On the contrary, whcnever violent insurrection is mentioned. it is ~raised. In an op-ed piecc published in The New York Times in July, Hardt and Newi congratulated the violent protesters in Genoa who took to the streets this summer when world financial leaders met there. "These movements," they enthused, "are what link Genoa this weekend most clearly to the openness-toward new kinds of exchange and new ideas--of its Renaissance past." (Hardt and Negri have what might gcncrously be described as an idiosyncratic view of the Renaissance. In Empire, they write-in italics, to be sure we don't miss it-that "Michel Foucault's final works on the history of sexuality bring to life once again that same revolutionary impulse that animated Renaissance humanism." I wonder what Jacob Burckhardt would have said about that.)] Their alternative demands violence -Hardt and Negri believe the multitude can only be successful through barbarianism.

Balakrishnan, Political Science Professor at University of Chicago and member of the editorial board of New Left Review, 2000 (Gopal, "Hardt and Negri's Empire", New Left Review, September-October, http://newleftreview.org/A2275) [The counlcr-Empire is possible only after modernity-including the universal solvent oTglobal capitalism-has dissolved the certainties of all earlier ages. Hardt and Negri's multitude is a Promethean power, born with the modcrn age's emancipation of the human will from the moral constraints of rcligion and human nature. "Today there is not even thc illusion of a transcendent God," the authors proclaim. "The mythology of the languages of the multitude interprets the telos of thc earthly city, torn away by the power of its own destiny from any belonging or subjection to a city of God, which has lost all honor and Icgilimacy." Human nature is a mirage too. We must embrace our "post-human" identities as monkeys and cyborgs, Hardt and Ncgri aver. "Humanism after the death of Man," the authors call their stark vision of man as demiurge. The multitude represents an "uncontainable force," an "exccss of value with respect to every form of right and law." Beyond good and evil, it will "create and recreate" the human world in a "sccular Pentecost." Hardt and Nerrri, dreaming of Communist Supermen, view the American Declaration of Indepcndcncc and the Maninspired revolutions of the twentieth century as anticipatory signs of the corning liberation. These epochal tmnsl'ormations will require a cleansing bloodletting. '"The new barbarians" of the multitude must "destroy with an affirmalive violence and trace new paths of life through their own material existcncc." Hardt and Negri's language bristles menacingly at the multitude's bourgeois enemies: "Who wants to see any more of that pallid and parasitic European ruling class that led directly from the ancien rkgime to nationalism, from populism to fascism. and now pushes for a generalized neoliberalism? Who wants to see more of those ideologies and those bureaucratic apparatuses that have nourished and abetted the rotting European elites'? And who can still stand those systems of labor organization and those corporations that have stripped away every vital spirit?"]

AT: Em~ire -Alternative +Violence Negri supports the use of violence to resist capitalism. Wolfe, 2001 (Alan, director of Lhc Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College, "The Snake", Thc New Republic Online, October 41h,http:Nwww.powells.corn/review/2001~10~04) As is thc case with so much of the violence associated with the New Left, it is difficult to know exactly what Negri did. We do know that Ilaly, like Gcrmany, experienced considerable political violence in the 1960s and 1970s, and that many radical groups, distrustful of the cautious conservatism of the Community Party, created ultraleftist sects such as Autonomia Operaia that either engaged directly in criminal acts or sought to justify them as a necessary stage in the destruction of capitalism. Negri. who was closelv associated with these splinrcr groups as a member and a theorist, has had many opportunities since then to revisit his vast and LOreflect on whether the violencc of thc times was wrong. He has chosen not to do so. Instead he has argued that violence is built into all thc institutions and all thc practices of cavitalism, as if to conclude that because society itself is so violent. one can hardlv be surprised that its opponents tend in that direction as well. Empire is merely the latest of a series of books in which a completely unrepentant Negri defends himsclf. No wonder that efforts to win his full release from prison -efforts tha~ will surely escalate now that Negri has received the imprimatur of America's most prestigious academic press -have failed.

AT: Ern~ire-Alternative .lustifies Holocaust Hardt and Negri essentialize the state as always bad, and resistance movements as always good -within this criticism, they praise ordinary Germans who supported the Nazi regime, downplaying the impact of the Holocaust Wolfe, 2001 (Alan, director of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College, 'The Snake", The New Republic Online, October 4'h,http://www.powells.com/review/2001~10~04) N~EI-Lwhen not in prison, has been a political philosopher, and he is the author of numerous books, manifestos. and theses on subjects ranging from Spinoza's metaphysics to the nature of insurgency under contemporary capitalism. In nearly all this work, as in Empire. he jnvariablv associates violence with states in the exercise of their vower, never with opposition soups and their tactics. For the latter, any action, no matter how insurrectionary, is justified. For the former, any action, no matter how peaceful, is terrorism in disguise. From this warped perspective. all states arc equally bad and all movements of opvosition are equally good. Only the working of such a mvopia can help the reader to understand why the authors of Empire arc incapable of mustering any rigorous historical or moral consciousness of Nazism and its policy of Jewish extermination. In thcir view Nazism is capitalism. and that is the end of the story. Nazi Germany, Hardt and Negri write, far from a unique excursion into human evil, "is the ideal type of the transformation of modern sovereigntv into national sovereigntv and of its articulation inlo capitalist Ibrm ...." Since Nazism is merelv normal capitalism -this point of view was once associated with the Frankfurt School, and it survives almost nowhere outside the pages of this book -therc is no reason to single out the Nazis or their sympathizers for crimes against humanitv. Astonishinglv. Hardt and Negri arc worse than neutral in their discussion of the Nazi pericd: they actually heap praise on the ordinary Germans who supported the regimc. The obedience of these citizens is called "exemplary" in this book. The authors also celebrate "their military and civil valor in (he service of the nation," before moving on to identify the victims whom they valorously helped to send to Buchenwald as "communists, homosexuals, Gypsies, and others." the latter, presumably, being the Jews (whom Hardt and NeM reserve for Auschwitz). I am not making this up. Lest anyone consider these apologetics for Nazism a misreading of my own -how can good leftists, after all, engage in a downplaying of the Holocaust? -Hardt and Negri twice acknowledge that thev are completely fed up with lhc whole question of totalitarianism. It is certainly much less interesting to thcm than the de~redations of Empire. Thc phenomenon of totalitarianism. they write. has already been described "with great fanfare" by "many (in fact too many) authors"; and then they announce, in the one sustained passage in their book devoted to Hitler and his regime, that, desvite their efforts to write a book aiming

to discuss cvcrything, thev plan to "leave this story to other scholars and to the disgrace of history."

AT: Em~ire-Globalization Good Hardt and Negri's assumption about the globalization of the market is wrong. MNCs are reliant on the nation-state -the imperialist state is key to protecting trade and destabilizing nationalist regimes. Petras, 2001 (James, Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University, "Empire With Imperialism". Rebelion: Petras Essays in English. October 29, h~p://www.rebelion.org/petras/english/iOlOlO2.htm) All the maior trade agreements. liberalizing trade and establishing new trade regulations are negotiated by the states, enforced by the states and subiect to statc modifications. GATT. WTO, Lome. etc., which established the trade rules and framework for global trading networks were formulated hv the states. In addition, bi-lateral as well as regional multi-lateral trade pacts, such as NAFTA. LAFTA, etc. are initiated by the statc LO open new markets for the multinationals. The imrwrial state ouerates in svnerpv with its multinational corporation. The "expansion in markets" has nothing to do with multi-national corporations superseding anachronistic states: on the contrarv, most movements of capital to new markets depend on the state intervening to knock down barriers and in some cases destabilizin~ nationalist rcgimes. Investment Agreemcnls New multi-lateral as well as hi-lateral investment agreements are formulated at the state level with the agreement and active participation of the MNCs. The reason is clear: the MNCs want state participation to guarantee that their capital will not be expropriated, subiect to "discriminatorv" taxes, or restricted in remitting profits. The state is the enlbrcer of invcstmenl guarantees, a crucial element in comoratc investment expansion. In manv cases. the imperial states use their representatives in the IF1 to impose new investment codes as conditions for 'stabilization' or development loans. Protection, Subsidies and Adjudication The impcrial states of EU impose powerful protective bamers for their agricultural products. Thc U.S. and European states heavily subsidize agriculture with low rates for electricity and water use. Research and development of new technology is heavily linanced by the state and then turned over to the multi-nationals. At each stage prior to, during and after the expansion of MNC overseas into the international market. the state is deeplv implicated. Moreover, where national enterprises are non-competitivc, thc imperial states invent pretexts to protect them from more efficient producers. Japan protects its rice producers, even though their production is ten times more costly to consumers. The U.S. provides huge subsidies to agrobusiness exporters in the form of research, cheap water rates and tied loans to thc purchase of U.S. grain exports. EU subsidizes the formation of its high tech industries. Statism or neo-statism is the centerpiece of 'global expansion' of MNCs, located in the imperial states. The state has mown. its reach

has been expanded, its role in the international economv is essential. The empty rhetoric of 'free markets' promoted by conservative ideologues has been consumed and panoted by the "globalist left". While NH write about the declining role of the state, the Right has been active in promoting state activity to further the interests of thc MNC's. While NH write of the 'globalization' of markets, the MNC's from the imperial countries and their states carve up thc markets, enlarging their spheres of domination and control. Above all the imperial state is not simply an economic institution; the overseas cxpansion of the MNCs is heavily dependent on the militarv and political role of the imperial state. Globalization increases world prosperity and freedom -Hardt and Negri provide no evidence to the contrary. Balakrishnan, Political Science Professor at University of Chicago and member of the editorial board of New Left Review, 2000 (Gopal, "Hardt and Negri's Empire", New Left Revicw, September-October, http://newletireview.orglA2275) [Inseparable from the failure to think politically, Hardt and Neni, like the rioters endlessly disrupting World Trade Organization meetings, offer no cvidence to support their basic charge that economic globalization is causing wide-scale planetaw misery. Predictably, his past summer, as the G-8 meeting got underway in Gcnoa. Italy, the New York Times chose these two "joyful" Communists to write a lengthy oped extolling the virtues of antiglobalization rioters. The truth about globalization is exactly the reverse of what Hard1 and Negri assert. Globalization is dramatically increasing world prosveritv and freedom. As the Economist's John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge point out, in the half centurv since the foundation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). the world economy has expanded six-fold, in part because trade 1 the past decade of accelerated economic globalization. avvroximatelv 800 million vcodc cscaped povertv.1

AT: Empire -Globalization Good Globalization allows for justice, solidarity, democracy and citizenship Gills -2002 IHarry K. Chair of the World Historical Systems theory group of the l~itemational Studies Association and a faculty al'filiate ofthe Clobali/atlon Ue\earch Center of the Uni\ersity of Hawaii, "Democmti~ing Glohalir~tion and C;lobali~ing I>eniocrac). May. Annals of thc American Academy of Political and Sociiil Science. hlay] <If there is dobnl cr~vitalisln. thcn the system eives rise to and in fact requires funda~nenttl countemarts. includinz elobal iustice, plobal solidaritv. nlobal de~nocracv, and glohnl citizenship. the last 01-these pcrhilps being espcciallv sipnilicani. We need a crctliblc political theory of-I"I hhj de~nocracv has4 or1 he new concept of elohnl citizenshiv rather than merely a pragmatic nroblem-sc)lvinr 31)nroach. If democr:lccl is 3 process of building countcrvailino powers. thcn the democratic thcorv we have at present. which is based on countries and thcir domestic political 01-dcr. n~ust he transa~sed to the clohal level. To do so, we must also elevate or transpose Lheclassic enlightenment democratic ideals nfequality, iusticr. solidarity (fraternity). and liberty to the global Icvel. Defining "global equality." "global justicc," "global solidarity." and "ylohal libcrty" will be thc prcrcquisiles to tbrmulaling a theory of global dcnlc~cmcy and global citizenship. In my owen \;iew. these definitions an11 this global dcn~ocratic theory does not necessnrily requi1.c a global or "world polity" (Ruggie 1998) or a theory of a "global state" as sucll (Shaw 2000].> Globalization is inevitable, and it allows for global democratic freedom Gills -2002 [Barry K, Chair of the World Historical Systems theory group of the International Studies Association and a faculty affiliate of the Globalizat~on liesearch Center of the University of Hawaii. "Democratizing Globalization and Globalizing Democracy, May, Annals of the American Academy or Political and Social Science. May] <Thus, there is likewise a historical dialectic hetwmn globalization and democrattization. a process that is u~lavoidahle. I frmly helieve, on both historical and moral grounds. that this historical dialectic Icads strongly. even inexorably. toward the practices and theory of olobal democracv, that is, to the rrlohalixadon of dcmocracv and the democratization of globalization. Insohr as neoliheral economic globali~ation has succeeded, it creates the conditions for further critical social responses that lead to renewed slniggles for democratic freedoms and participatiotl bv the ordinar!: people i~ffectedbv these [:':I 681 chnnecs. In these processes of rcncwcd dcmocr~tic stmgglcs. wc may c~pcct to scc contin~lcd efforts at selfgovernment by

many pcoples and also expanded representation. Globalization allows the transcending of old established and fixed territorial unirs and borders of polilical re~resent;~tion, thus allowina a more tcrritoriallv dirlust. vatten1 ol'volitical comnlunitv to cmcrrc. and 10(10 so globallv. This process deepens democracy by extending it to the gltrbai arena hut moreo\,er by also devolving power to self-constituting communities seeking selfgovernment and representation in thc political order, wl~cthcr this be on a local. national. regional. or global Icvel.>

AT: Em~ire-Globalization Kev to Democracv Globalization increases democracy -only by working through the empire can political innovation spread Balakrishnan, Political Science Professor at University of Chicago and member of the editorial board of New Left Review, 2000 (Gopal, "Hardt and Negri's Empire", New Left Review, September-October, http:Nnewleftreview.org/A2275) [ In The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Thomas Friedman argues that globalization brings democracy in its wake in part because it feeds on a now irresistible desire of consumers and would-be consumers-his version of the multitude-to be a parl of the system, in a dialectic that subjects democracy to an ever tighter market-discipline. Empire can be read as the Lexus and Olive Tree of the Far Left. Both books argue that globalization is a process powered from below. Friedman portrays a ubiquitous dispensation buoyed by pension-fund speculation, credit-card protligacy and the universal appeal of the American way of life. Crude and exaggerated, the book effectivelv portrays social realities that are not always more subtle, in ils own fashion demystifving saccharine pieties of the hour. From an inconiparably higher cultural level, Negri and Hardt often fail lo achieve this level of realism, and end up recasting some of the mythologies of American liberalism. Friedman leaves not the smallest doubt about the paramount power of the United States as global banker and gendarme: indeed rubs in with chauvinist relish what Hardt and Negri would metapllvsicall~ sublimate. But while they downplay the mailed fist of the US in the global arena, they mint America a more eratifvinn centralitv as a laboratow of domestic political innovation. As they see it, both the apogee and thc antithesis of Empire lie in the inclusive, expansive republicanism of the US Constitutjon, which long ago shed the European fetish of a homogeneous nation. In this spirit, Hegel is cited-'America is the country of the future, and its world historical importance has yet to be revealed in the ages which lie ahead . . . It is the land of desire for all those who are weary of the historical arsenal of old Europe'-and Tocqueville congratulated for deepening him. with an exemplary understanding of the significance of American mass democracy. There is an echo of old illusions here. Emvire bravely upholds the possibility of a utopian manifesto for these times, in which the desire for another world buried or scattered in social exverience could find an authentic language and point of concentration. But to be ooliticall~ effective. any such reclamation must take stock of the remorseless realities of this one. without recourse to theoretical ecstasy.]

AT: Em~ire-Ca~italismGood (their alt = uto~ian) Capitalism is empirically better than any alternative economic order at diminishing human suffering~aidtand ~e~ri's alternative is utopian nonsense. Balakrishnan, Political Science Professor at University of Chicago and member of the editorial board of New Left Review, 2000 (Gopal, "Hardt and Ncgri's Empire", New Left Review, Scptember-October, http:Nnewleftreview.org/A2275) Ncedless to say, economic globalization isn't without its downside. As I've a~gued in these pages (see "Capitalism and the Suicide of Culture," February 2000), it can-there's no nccessity at work-amplify and disseminate some of the less attractive aspects of today's liberlinc culture. But on balance, as neoconservative sociologist Peter L. Beroer has suanested, the empirical evidence proves it far preferable to any alternative economic order we know of. It has profoundly diminished human suffering. If Hardt and Negi's depiction of global ca~italism is mendacious, their hazy altcrnative to it-absolute democracy, open borders, equal con~pensation-is apolitical utopian nonsense. How would such schemes actually work? Hardt and Negri never sav. Do they truly think that "annullinn" private wopertv and eliminating nations. if it were somehow possible, would be liberating'? Wouldn't it lead to a totalitarian increase in political power, as in the old Soviet Union? But then Hardt and Negri seem to look back fondly on Lenin and Stalin's dark regime. "Cold war ideology called that society totalitarian," they complain, "but in fact it was a society crisscrossed by extremely strong instances of creativity and freedom, just as strong as the rhythms of economic development and cultural modernization." To which one can only respond: Have they never read a page of Solzhenitsyn? Moreover, as filled with admiration as Hardt and Negri are toward the Soviet Union, they are contemptuous toward the decencies and the humbleoften not so humblefrcedoms of democratic capitalist societies.

AT: Em~ire-US leaders hi^ good (alt fails) The alternative to Empire is a world with no control of risk -a world in which the US exercises leadership at least holds promise. Bull, 2001 (Malcolm, head of art history and theory at Oxford Universily, "You Can't Build a New Society with a Stanley Knife", London Review ol' Books, Vo1.23, No. 19.http://www.lrb.co.uWv23In19/bull0l~.html) [But that can only be a reason for people to stm thinking about what new forms of totalitarianism might be possible, and, indeed. desirable. In thc United States, the discussion has been kick-started by the recent hijackings. Globalisation appears to have created a world of unlimilcd risk. without a corresponding totalisation of the means of social control. Somc commentators, following Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilisations' model, argue that global social control is impossible and thc only way to contain risk is to maintain the boundaries belwccn civilisations. For Neoliberals, however, commitment to globalisation nccessitates the search Sor some form of global authority -the shifting nexus of institutions and alliances that Hardt and Negri call Empire. But this is never going to yield the type of intensive social regulation needed to limit all the risks of a global societv. Unlimited risks need total controls and, as Hardt and Negri point out, 'totalitarianism consists not simply in totalising the effects of social life and subordinating them to a global disciplinary norm' but also in 'the organic foundation and unified source of society and the state'. Hardt and Negri have no interest in the control of risk -a world of unlimited risk is a world of unlimited constituent power -and they dismiss the totalitarian understanding of societv as one in which 'communitv is not a dynamic collective creation but a primordial founding myth.' But the debate about social control prompted by the hijackings is one that others on the Left should hurry to join. The issue here is not American hypocrisy (Nagasaki, not Pearl Harbor. is the relevant comparison): let the Swiss cast the first stone London has statues of war criminals all over the placc. k is rather that, without yet realising it. the world's only superpower wants to achieve something that presupposes greater economic and social justice. Current US policy may be unacceptable, but the long-term proiect holds an unexpected promise. If the 'war against terrorism' is going to be less of a iiasco than the 'war on drugs', it requires global social inclusivity and reciprocity. Total social control involves a degree of microregulation with which individuals have to co-operate. One way totalitarian societies have differed from those that are merely authoritarian is in their provision of work and healthcare. (If you want to keep track of people you cannot abandon them when they are unemploycd or sick.) The link between welfare and totalitarianism works both ways: social regulation and inclusion go together. If the US wants lo make the world a safer place, it will eventually have to offer, or force other governments to provide, the population of the entire world with the means to participate in global societv. This will involve real conslraints on the operation of the market, particularly finance capital. Tuesday, 11 September 2001 may prove to be the date at which Neoliberalism and globalisation parted company.]

AT: Emoire -US action solves crisis manaeement (MNCs) Intervention by imperial states is key to crisis management -the state is key to prevent global economic collapse by propping up MNCs and preventing collapse of currencies. Petras, 2001 (James, Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University, "Empire With Imperialism", Rebelion: Petras Essays in English, October 29, http://www.rcbclion.org/petraslenglish/niO 10 102.htm) Ovcr the past decade several major financial and economic crises have occurred in various regions of the world. In each instance& imperial states. particularly the U.S. statc, have intcrvcned to save the MNC. and avoid the collapse of financial svstems. For example, in 1994, when the Mexican financial system was on thc verge of colla~se, then President Clinton intervened to dispatch $20 billion lo the Mexican state to bail out U.S. investors and stabilize the peso. In the second instance, during the Asian crisis of 1998, the U.S. and European Povernmenis approved an IMF-WB multi-billion dollar bail-out in exchanpc for opening their economies. particularlv South Korea. to l'oreian takeovers of basic industries. In thc Brazilian crisis in 1999 and the Argentine crisis in 2001, Washington pressured the IFl's to bail-out the regimes. Within the U.S. the threatened bankruptcy of a major international investment bank, led to Federal Reserve (central bank) intervention, pressuring a private bank bail-out. In a word, with greater frequency and with greater resources the imperial state has played a dominant role in crisis management, saving maior investors from bankruptcy, ~roppinn up insolvent MNCs and preventine the collapse of currencies. More than ever the MNCs and the so-called "global economv" depends on the constant massive intervention of imperial statcs lo manaee the crisis, and secure benefits (buy-outs of local enterprises). Inter-imperialist Competition The competition between rival imperial powers, economic enterprises and MNC's has been essentiallv spearheaded by rival imperial states.For example, the U.S. imperial statc is leadinn, the fight to open European markets to U.S. beef, and U.S. exports of bananas from South and Central America. while the Japanese and the European states negotiate with the U.S. to increase the 'quota' on a series of exports. including steel, tcxtiles, etc. Trade and markets are largely defined by state to state agreements 'Globalization' is not only a product of the 'growth of thc MNC', but largely an artifice of state to state agreements. The competition between capitals is mediated, influenced, and directed bv the state. The markets do not transcend the state, but operate within state defined boundaries. Conquest of Markets The state plavs a pervasive and profound role in the conquest of overseas markets and the protection of local markets. In the first instance, the state providcs indirect and direct subsidies to export sectors. In the U.S., agricultural exports receive subsidized water and electrical power, and subsidics in the form of tax relief. _Secondly, the imperial state, via the IFI, vressures loan recivient states in the

Third World, through conditionality agreements, to lower or eliminate trade barriers, privatize and de-nationalize enterprises, thus permitting U.S., European and Japanese MNCs to penetrate markets and buy local enterprises. So-called "globalization" would not exist if it were not for state intervention. nor would the markets remain open if it were not for imperial state military and electoral intervention. politicaleconomic threats or vressure and recruitment of local c1ients.l

AT: Em~ire-Alternative Fails (Lack of ern~iricism/~roof Hardt and Negri's argument for empire lacks historical and empirical evidence--the examples they give aren't based off realistic versions of history. Petras, 2001 (James, Professor of Sociology at Bingham~on University, "Empire With Imperialism", Rebelion: Petras Essays in English, Oclober 29, http:l/www.reklion.or~petrasleng1ish/negri10102.htm) [ The authors argue early on that the intellectual origins the U.S. revolution can be traced 10 Spinoza and Machiavelli. Rousseau and Locke arc given short shrift, despite their greater immediate relevance. Extended and lcndcncious discussions of sovereignty are interspcrscd with reductionist assertions which collapse or omit numerous variations. For example, in their discussion of totalitarianism and the nation-state they argue "If Nazi Germany is ideal type of the transformation of modem sovcreignlv into national sovereignty and of the articulation in its capitalist form, Stalinist Russia is the ideal type of the transmission of povular intcrcst and the cruel logics that follow from it into a proiecl of national modernization, mobilizing for its own purposes the productive forces that yearn for liberation from capitalism" (p.110). I have quoted extensively in order to illustralc the confused, illogical, unhistorlcal nature of the author's broad and vacuous generalizations. What empirical or historical basis is there for claiming Nazi Germany is the "ideal type"'? National sovereignty pre-existed the Nazis and continues atler iedemise in non-totalitarian settings. If Stalin's Russian embodied "~o~ular interest" why should anyone seek to be liberated from it? "Cruel logic" ol'"popular interests" is slul'f from the ancien regime -hardly the basis for orienting the "multitudes" which the wrilers describc to be the new agencies for democratizing the world. The authors engage in what George Saboul once referred to as the "vacuum cleaner" approach to history: a little of ancient history, a smattering of exegesis of elementary political theory, a plus and minus evaluation of post-modernism, a celebration of U.S. constitutionalism, a brief synopsis of colonialism and post-colonialism. These discursive forays provide an intellectual gloss for the core argument dealing with the contemporarv world: thc disappearance of imperialism: the obsolescence of impenal states, nation states (and boundaries) and the ascendancy of an ill-defined Empire, dobali~ation, and supra-national govermny bodies, apparently resembling the United Nations.] Hardt and Negri's call to reject the Empire is incompetent -it lacks data, proof, and empiricism. Wolfe, 2001 (Alan, director of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College, "The Snake", The New Republic Online, October 4', htt~://www.powells.com/rcvie~~/2001

10 04) Most of Empire is an exercise in nominalism. in the attempt to name, rather than to describe. to analyze. or even to condemn, the new order that its authors see emerdng. Although it is presumably devoted to outlining the contours of a new mode of production, the book contains no data, offers no effort to demonstrate who owns what or holds power over whom, and provides no indicators of any of the deplorable conditions that it discusses. As if once again to distinguish itself from Marx, Empirc, like the left Hegelians whom Marx once attacked, moves entirely at the level of ideas. Unlike the left Heyelians. however, Hardt and Neari handle ideas incompetent1y.t The notion of refusing the Empire will fail due to Hardt and Negri's false view of social production. Post, 2002 (Charlie, member of Solidarity's National Committee, "Review: Empirc and Revolution", International Viewpoint Magazine, http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/articIe,php3? id~articl~435) The notion of the 'multitude' confronting the 'Empire', at all points and through all 'acts of refusal', rests on the cluestionable claims that production has been 'informationalised' and social production has become 'decentred' and 'smoothly' diffused across the globe. As we have seen. the reality is quite different: industrial production remains dominant within capitalism. and the centres of industrial production remain geographically concentrated in the advanced capitalist 'north' and select parts of the 'south.' Not surprjsin,olv. the potential and actual power of industrial working class activity has diminished in the past thirty years. Clearly twenty years of political defeats and economic restructuring at the hands of capital, undermine the confidence and ability of workers to take action at the point of production and in the streets. However, in the past decade we have begun to see a turn-around in the class struggle, that again demonstrates the power of organized workers in strategic sectors of the economy. Beginning with the public sector strikes in France -spearheaded bv the transport, postal and telecomrnunicalions workers -we have seen a new rise of industrial action across western Europe, and to a lesser extent in the US (the UPS slrikc in 1997 being the most important example).

AT: Em~ire -Alternative Fails (Multitude Bad) Hardt and Negri's definition of the multitude is inconsistent with capitalism today-their idea of the multitude will not achieve global justice. Post, 2002 (Charlie, mcmbcr of Solidarity's National Committee. "Review: Empire and Revolution", International Viewpoint Magazine, http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/article.php3? idgrticle=435) [Hardt and Negri's notion of the 'multitude' is not onlv an unrealistic representation of the relationship between labour and capital today: it has a long and uroblematic political hislow. Negri first argued that a new 'revolutionarv subiect' had displaced the 'collective worker' in the large factories of northern Italy in the late 1970s, as growing unemployment and employer victimization of worker militants crushed the wave of industrial militancy that began in 1968-69. Negri and the 'autonomist' currcnt in the Italian revolutionarv left argued that the 'social worker' -all those ouprcssed bv capitalism, whether emuloved or unemploved -had become the new force for social revolution. In fact, Ncgri and his cothinkcrs privileged the unemployed -those who 'refused work'. These ideas provided solace to a political currcnt whose support among employed workers in the large factories had disappeared by the late 1970s, reducing them to a base among students and unemployed youth. However, these notions also iustified acts of uolitical desueration: most notably. 'autonomist' vouth mounting ideological and uhvsical attacks on organized and employed workers for their unwillingness to 'refuse work'. 1111 Todav, none of the currents influcnccd bv Ncgri and autonomism, like the Tute Bianche in Italy, engage in uhvsical attacks on or~anized workers. While the Tutc Bianche have engaged in solely nonviolent forms of direct action, they often take action against the police without regard to the real relationship of forces in society. In practice. they often substitute their own courageous, nonviolent action for mass action by working people. Nesi and Hardt's theories do not sim~lv iustifv such practices, but activelv discourage the hard strategic thinkina about building alliances between anti-capitalist vouth and rank and file workers, that is crucial to the long-term success of the new struggle for global iustice.1 The multitude will never be unified-the "workers" will stand for different objectives, fail to communicate, and desire to murder each other. Wolfe, 2001 (Alan, director of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College, "The Snake", The New Republic Online, October 4"', http://www.powells.com/review/2001~10~04) [Never saying so explicitly, the authors of this book, in identifying their hopes with such disparate movements of protest whatever their targets or their political coloration, are throwing over the most central uro~osition of Marxism: class consciousness. Workers no longer need to be aware of themselves as workers in order to bring down capitalism. They need not develop a revolutionarv strategy,

for under contemporary condilions "it may no longer be useful to insist on the old distinction between strategy and tactics." They do not even need to be workers. All that is required is that thev set themselves UP against power, whatever and wherever power happens Never mind that movements that do so can stand for wildly different obiectives -an open society here, a closed society there: or that thev are also, as Hardt and Negri point out, often unable or unwilling to communicate with each other. Indeed, as Hardt and Negri do not point out, they miphl, if they had the chance, prefer to kill one another. But this lack of communication and mutual appreciation "is in fact a strength rather than a weakness." Traditional Marxism aimed to find the weakest link in the capitalist system and to exploit it. But there are no more weak links. Cavital has become so pervasive that it exposes itself nowhere, but this means that it is really exposed everywhere. Protest movements simplv cannot be peripheral: since there is no center, there is no peripherv. Everything that dissents -even "uiercings, tattoos, punk fashion and its various imitations" -foreshadows the stirrings that are necessary to challenge the new forms that capitalism is taking.1 Hardt and Negri offer no political alternative to empire. Anderson, 2002 (Brian, Senior Editor of City Journal, "The Ineducable Left", First Things, February 2002, pp. 40-44, http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft0202/articles/anderson.html) JThe success of Empire is astonishing when vou cut through the iargon and see exactlv what it says. Hardt and Nemi fall prey to everv destructive error that has characterized radical antibourgeois thouph~, of the left and right, Srom Lenin lo Heidegger to Foucault to Islamism. Though the book seems on first inspection to be something new. it is really very old news. Like their radical predecessors, Hardt and Ncrrri fail to think politicallv-fail to explore the real uossibilities and dangers of political reality and take measure of the lessons of historv. Though the authors say they want to mine the "dense complex of experienceF-a praiseworthy aim for any political thought-a reader of Empire will wander through hundreds of pages of arid theory before he encounters a flesh-and-blood political actor or a real decision or historical cvcnt or institution. The book, like much contemuorarv political theory, is inhumanly abstract. The same abstraction was abundantly evident when Hardt appeared on The Charlie Rose Show. To the host's commonsense questions. Hardt could only respond in hallucinatory theory-speak. To anyone unfamiliar with the latest academic buzzwords, he sounded like a space alien. Rose seemedjustitiably-completely befuddled.]

AT: Em~ire-Alternative Fails (Multitude Bad) No alternative -Hardt and Negri offer no advice for resistance. Wolfe, 2001 (Alan, director of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College, "The Snake", The New Republic Online, October 4~,http://www.powclls.com/review/2001~10~04) To such movements of resistance. Hard1 and Ncgri offer praise but no advice. Never has a revolutionary manifesto been so devoid of actual content as the one contained in this book. Thc real militant against Empire, Hardt and Negri insist, is no[ onc "who acts on the basis of duty and discipline, who pretends that his or her actions are deducted [sic] from an ideal plan." (The Jesuits are, somewhat bizarrely, offered as an example of such discipline, but any Marxist would read this as a rejection of a Leninist rcvolulionary vanguard.) No, lo be a militant you must turn the bio-power directed against vou inside out, by exploring "the productive coo~eration of mass intcllccluality and affective nclworks, the productivity of postmodern biopolitics." Hobsbawm wrote of the chiliastic bandits of thc nineteenth century that, whatevcr their other differences, they shared "a fundamental vagueness about the actual way in which the new society will be brought about," and no better description of anarchism in its postmodern form has yet been written. Hardt and Negri admit they have no idea how the multitude will rise up and throw over the multitude. Wolfe, 2001 (Alan, director of thc Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College, 'The Snake", The New Republic Online, October 4th,hltp://www.powells.com/review/2001e10~04) [And redemption will come from the multitude, who desvite their oppression under empire -or Empire -remain pure in heart. In them, one can see the emergence of the new citv that will put us at one with the world. Unlike Augustine's. of course, their city cannot be the divine one, since "the multitude today ...resides on the imperial surfaces where there is no God the Father and no transcendence." Instead, they will create "the carthly city of the multitude." which the authors esoterically define as "the absolute constitution of labor and cooperation." About the practical question of how this can be done, Hardt and Negri have nothing sionificant to sav. "The only response that we can give to these questions is that the action of the multitudc bccomes political primarilv when it begins to confront directly and with an adequate consciousness the central repressive operations of Empire." This, too, is a Christian conception of revolution. We cannot know how we will bc saved; we must recognize that if only we have faith, a way will be found.]

Voting for the critique will not affect the overall trends of globalization -Hardt and Negri have no means to operationalize their alternative Wolfe, 2001 (Alan, director of the Boisi Centcr for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College, "The Snake", The New Republic Online, October 4th,http://www.powells.com/review/2001~10~04) [ But such a sensible and decent lcft will not emerge if Empire -a lazy person's guide to revolulion -has its way. The authors of this book, having taken no steps to learn anythine about what globalization actually is and what its continuation would actually mean, cannot insvire their readers to do likewise. Rather than developinp a tutorial attitude toward protest, brincring to younger militants the knowledge of historv and the wisdom of expcricnce, they glorify knownothingism and turn obsequious before fascists. Instead of reminding protesters that politics is a demanding business, thev romanticize the self-indulgence of punks and freaks. Faced with the difliculties of constructing a theoretical account of how an everchanging capitalism has changed once again, thev paper over their contradictions with jargon and borrow promiscuously from every academic fashion. There is indeed corruption in the contemporary world -and none more noteworthy in this context than the intellectual ct)rruption that can enable a book as shabby as this one to be taken seriouslv by anvone.1 Empire does nothing to advance the goals of the left -it pretends that revolution is easily achievable, Wolfe, 2001 (Alan, director of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College, "The Snake", The New Republic Online, October 4*, ht~p:Nwww.powells.com/review/200 1-10-04) Empire is to social and political criticism what pornography is to literature. It flirts with revolution as if one society can be replaced by another as easily as one body can be substituted for another. It gives academic readers the thrill of enea~np with the ideas of the New Left's most insurrectionary days, all the while pretending that the author of these ideas is an "indevendent researcher and writer," as Harvard's book iacket calls Nemi. while secretly hoping -imagine the glamour in radical academic circles that this would give him! -that he really was guilty of the acts for which he was imprisoned. For angry militants who have never read Bakunin but who understand in their gut that every destructive urge is a creative one, Empire offers the support of professors who are supposed to know what they are talking about; and if one is too busy running through the streets to grasp Lhe full implications of what Homi K. Bhabha

says about binary divisions, or to reflect on Althusser's reading of The Prince, onc can at least come away rinsed in the appropriate critique. Empire is a thoroughly non-serious book on a most serious to~ic, an oulra~eouslv irresponsible tour through questions of power and violence -questions that, as we cannot help but remember as we mourn our dead in Manhattan and Washington, demand the Erealcst rcs~onsibility on the part of both writers and readers.1

AT: Em~ire-Alt 3Suffering (No rule of law) The alternative will result in more suffering due to the absence of morality and rule of law. Anderson, 2002 (Brian, Senior Editor of City Journal, "The Ineducable Left", First Things. February 2002,pg. 40-44, http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/~0202/articles/anderson.html) [Hardt and Negri's final delusion is their cartoon version of the modern world as comuletely secularized. Tell that to the Islamist fanatics who made bombs out of planes. praying to Allah as they died, or Lo the friends and relatives of thosc they killed who have crowded into churches and synagogues seeking meaning and solace for thcir suffering. For both good and ill, as AndrC Malraux predicted. Ihc twenty-first ccntury clearly will be religious. not secular. Hardt and Negri believc that something decent will arise from their lawless atheism. But why assume iustice will prevail from such nihilism. whcn everything wc know from history-the wounded history of the twentieth century above all-says that it results invariably in the law of the iunple? Without moralitv and the rule of law, the powerl'ul simply feel free to raue and pillage; the weak can only trcmblc and hide.1

AT: Em~ire-Irn~erialism Inevitable Claims of a global economy and new world government are dubiousimperialism is inevitable. Petras, 2001 (James, Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University, "Empire With Imperialism", Rebelion: Petras Essays in English, October 29, http:Nwww.rebelion.org/petraslcnglisNne,OlOlO2.htm) Assumption 2: The old nation-state governments havc bcen superseded hv a new world government. madc up of the heads of the IFI. the WTO, and the heads of the MNCs (p. 326). This is an argument that is based on a superficial discussion of epiphenomena, rather than a deeper analvtical view of the structure of power. While it is true that the IFIs make many imporlanl decisions in a great many geographical locations affecting significant economic and social sectors, these decisions and the decision-makers are closely linked to the impcrial states and the MNCs which influence them. All tor, IF1 officials are appointed by their nationallimperial governments. All their crucial policy guide lines that dictate their loans and conditions for lending are set by the fhance, treasury and economy ministers of the imperial states. The vast majority of funds for the IFIs come from the imperial states. Representation on the executive board of the IF1 is based on the proportion of funding by thc imperial states. The IMF and the WB have always been led by individuals from the U.S. or E.U. Hardt and Negri's vision of IF1 power is based on a discussion of derived power not its imperial states source. In this sense, international power is based in the imperial states not on supra-national entities. The latter concept grossly overestimates the autonomy of the IFIs and underestimates their subordination to the imperial states. The red significance of the IFIs is how they magnify, extend and deepen the power of the imperial statcs and how they become terrain Sor competition between rival imperial states. Far from superseding the old states, the IFIs have strengthened their positions. Assumption 3: One of the common arguments of globalist theorists like Hardt and Negri is that an information revolution has taken place that has eliminated state borders, transformed capitalism and created a new epoch (p. 145) by providing a new impetus to the dcveloprnent of the productive forces. The claims that information technologies have revolutioni~ed economies and thus creatcd a new global economv in whjch nation states and national economies have become superfluous is cxtrcmelv dubious. A comparison of productivity growth in the U.S. over the past half century fails to suoport thc globalist argument. Between 1953-72, before the so-called information revolution in the U.S. productivity grew an average 2.5%; with the introduction of computers, productivity growth between 1973-95 was less than half. Even in the socalled boom period of 1995-99, productivity growth was 2.5% about the same as the pre-computer period. Japan which makes the most extensive use of computers and robots has witnessed a decade of stagnation and crises. During the year 2000-01, the information sector went into a deep crises, tens of thousands were fired, hundreds of firms went bankrupt, stocks droppcd in value some 80%. The speculative bubble, that defined the so-called information

economy, burst. Moreover, the major source of growth of productivitv claimed by the globalists was in the computerization of the area of computer manufacture. Studies have shown that computer use in offices is directed more toward personal use than to exchanging ideas.Estimates run up to 60% of computer time is spent in activity unrelated to the enterprise. Computer manufacturers account for 1.2% of the U.S. economy and less than 5% of capital stock. Moreover, the U.S. population census provides another explanation for the higher productivity figures -the 5 million illegal immigrants who havc flooded the U.S. labor market in the 1990s. Since productivity is measured by the output per estimated worker, the 5 million uncounted workers inflate the productivity data. If the 5 million are included the productivity figures would deflate. With the decline of the information economy and its stock valuations it becomes clear that the "information revolution" is not thc transcendent force defining the economies of the maior imperial states, let alone defining a new world order. The fact that most veonlc have computers and browse, that some firms have better control over their inventories does not mean that power has shifted bcyond the nation-state. The publicists' claims about the "information revolution" ring hollow, as the investors in the world stock markets move funds toward the real economy and away from the high tech firms which show no proiits and increasing losses.]

AT: Ern~ire-Im~erialism Inevitable Neo-liberalism as an alternative is a fabrication-imperial states and power will always exist. Petras, 2001 (James, Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University, "Empire With Imperialism", Rebelion: Petras Essays in English, October 29, http:l/www.rebelion.org/petras/english/negriOl0102.htm) J Neo-liberalism was always a mvth: the imperial states have never completely opened their markets, eliminated all subsidies or failed to intervene to prop up or protect strate~ic economic sectors, either for political or social reasons. Neo-liberal imperialism always meant selective opcnness to selective countries over specitied time periods in selective product areas. Markets were opened by the U.S. government to products produced by U.S. affiliates in overseas countries. "Free trade" in the imperial country was not based on economic but political criteria. On the other hand Euro-U.S. policymakcrs and their employees in the IMF-World Bank preached "market fundamentalism" to the Third World: elimination of all trade barriers, subsidies and regulations for all products and services in all sectors. Imperial states' selective free market practices allowed their multi-nationals to capitalize on market opportunities in target countries practicing market fundamentalism while protecting domestic economic sectors which included important volitical constituencies. Conflict erupted when the two imperial rivals. the U.S. and Europe (both selective free marketers) attempted to pry open the othcrs' markets while protecting important political constituencies. With the advent of the triple crises of recession, speculative collapse and intensified competition, the imperial countries have resorted to greater state intervention in a multiplicity of sectors: increased agricultural and other state subsidies -$30 billion in the U.S. in 2001.; increased resort to interfering in trade to impose "quotas" on imports (Bush's commitment to the U.S. steel industry) and intensif3ed exploitation of Third World regions to increase the flow of profits, interests and trading advantages (the U.S. "Free Trade of the Americas" proposal) and war, military Keynsianism -as in the US attack on Afghanistan. State managed trade that combines protection of home markets and aggressive intervention to secure monopoly market advantages and investment profits defines the content of neo-mercantilist imperialism. Neo-liberal imperialism with its free market rhetoric and selective opcning of markets is being replaced by a neo-mercantilism that looks toward greater monopolization of regional trading zones. greater unilateral political decisions to maximize trade advantages and protection of domestic producers and greater reliance on militarv strateries to deepen control over crises ridden neo-liberal economies run by discredited clients and to increase militarv Keynsianism.] The new form of "imperialism" exercised by the United States cannot be equated with colonial takeover-the emphasis on free trade is too strong.

Steinmetz, Associate professor of sociology at the University of Michigan, 2003 [George, "The State of Emergency and the Rcvival of American Imperialism: Toward an Authoritarian PostFordism," Public Culture 15.2 (2003) 323-345, p. project muse] [Thcrcare at least two crucial differences between this nascent (neo)imperialism and colonialism. The first distinction is especially important for the inhabitants of the periphery. Imperialism, unlike colonialism, allows powerful members of the periphery to retain at least nominal control over their own states, even ~f peripheral states and economies are still subiect to asymmetrical pressures from the core and to thc uncontrollable dynamics of global capitalism. The difference between imperialism and colonialism also matters for the analysis of the core countries. Were we to diagnose current American policy as moving toward a form of colonialism, this would suggest a dccline rather than a reconsolidation of American hegemony. It would also predict tendencies toward the formal control of peripheries by other core powers, as in the late-nineteenth-century scramble. Niall Ferguson (2001 :79). among many others, claims to discern such a colonial trend since September 1 1: he perceives the movement of the United States "from informal to formal imperialism" and toward the creation of a "new kind of colony." Tellingly, this diagnosis is summarized as a "White Man's Burden" rather than a "rich man's burden," calling attention to the "rule of difference" that distinguishes colonial from noncolonial states (Chatterjee 1993;Steinmetz 2002). Yet the United States is not taking control of peripheral governments, nor does it seem to be focusing primarily on securing markets in particular parts of lhc periphery for specifically American capital. Critics of the new national security policy have failed to emphasize its diffcrcnces from both the decentered multilateralism of Empire and the channeled direct control of colonial governance. In addition to preserving American military and political supremacy, the goals of the Bush administration, according to its September 2002 paper on national security, include "igniting" a "new era of global economic growth throuh free markets and free trade." Indeed, free trade is described here as a basic "moral principle" (White House 2002: 17-20). 9 Whatever one's views of the drawbacks of free [End Page 3331 trade for poor and develo~ing countries and of the limits of the American version of democracy that is to be exported with it, this prosam cannot be equated with colonial takeover. Even in the discussions of a postwar occupation of Iraq, U.S. planners have been quick to insist that there is no intention of installing a permanent colonial government. 10 And one characteristic of the campaign in Afghanistan has been a division of labor between the United States, which has arrogated to itself responsibility for overall decision making and military interventions, and the European powers, which have been left with the responsibility for postwar sociopolitical reconstruction and transferring power to an Afghan-controlled government (Ignatieff 2002).]

AT: Em~ire-Ca~italismInevitable A 'New Economy' does not exist -capitalist crisis still occur Petras, 2001 (James, Professor ol' Sociology at Binphamton University, "Empire With Imperialism", Rebelion: Petras Essays in English. October 29, http://www.rebelion.org/pctrasknglish/nOlOlO2.htm) Assumption 4: Related to thc prior assumption, globalists NH areue that we are living in a New Economv that has superseded the Old Economv, of manufacturers, mining. azriculturc and social scrviccs (pp. 3-21). According to the globalists the 'market' creates new efficiencies produced by the new technologies and ensurcs high growth. The recession of late 2000-2002 certainlv refutes the claims of the New Economv ideologues: the business cvclc continues to oueratc and. moreover, thc cycle is particularlv accentuated by the highlv speculative nature of the 'Ncw Economv'. As it turns out, the 'New Economv' demonstrates all the features of a volatile speculative economv, driven bv exorbitant claims of high returns. In the absence of profits or even revenues, it turns out that much of what was touted as a 'New Economv' was a colossal l?nancial swindle. where the high returns to the earlv investors led to financial ruin to the later investors. The "new efficiencies" promised did not overcome the logic of the capitalist business cycle. "Just in time production" was premised on stable and continuous growth ol'dcmand. The recession of 2000-2002. the sudden decline in demand, led to an accumulation of inventories among producers and scllcrs, and the resultant lay-offs. Cash-flow problems, increased indebtedness and bankruptcies characteristic of the "Old Economv" reappeared with a vennence. It is clear that the so-called "New Economy" does not transcend capitalist crisis. in fact it is more vulnerable and has fewer resources to fall back on since most of its cash flow depends on speculative expectations of continuous high returns. The sharp decline in commercial advertising earnings on the web sites and the saturation of the computer market has led to a structural crisis for both producers of hardware and software, leading to a giant shake-down in the 'industry' --the exorbitant 'paper value' of the stocks have tumbled to a fraction of their value and the major Internet companies are struggling to survive, let along define the nature of a 'new capitalist epoch'. Hardt and Negri concede that Empire only exists as a concept -collapse of capitalism is not inevitable Kimball, co-editor and publisher of The New Criterion and on Board of Advisor of the Gilder-Lehrman Institute of American History at St. John's College, 2001 (Roger. 'The New AntiAmericanism", The New Criterion. Vol. 20. No. 2, htt~://www.newcriterion.com/archive/2OloctO I/empire.htm) I"EmvireW is Hardt's and Negri's term for that transnational, capitalist entitv--or perhaps it is a process: it is difficult to say-that has

supposedly succeeded the nation state. (The nation state they regard as a dinosaur that is well on its way to the dust-bin of history.) Hence Empire is not coterminous with the United States, though Hardt and New clearly believe that the U.S. figures prominently in thc architecture of Empire. In fact. what they call Empire does not really exist. Hardt and Negri sometimes come close to acknowledging this (though a page later they are populating Empire with all sorts of powers and attributes). In their preface, Hardt and Ncgi boldly claim that Empire is "not a metaphor but a concept, which calls primarilv for a theoretical approach." The words "theoretical approach" should send a shiver down the spine of any sensible person. The burden of their remark is to declare intellectual open season. When it comes to applvino a "theoretical avvroach" to a "concept," the bottom line is: anything goes. Still, using a capital letter whenever Empire is mentioned was a sound rhetorical move. It helps to give this airy nothing local habitation and a name, and people who are reassured by being told that something is not a metaphor but a concept will be grateful for that. Eakins writes that Hardt and Negri believe "Empire is good news." In truth, they excoriate it on virtually every page. "In Empire corruption is everywhere," they write in one typical passage. "It is the cornerstone and keystone of domination." One of their central questions is how the "multitude" (their term for what Marx called the proletariat) can become political and overcome "the central repressive operations of Empire." (The answer, which comes on page 400: "We cannot sav at this point.") Does this sound like "good news"'? No, Hardt and Negi do not regard Empire as good news. They regard it as Man regarded capitalism: something so bad that it would necessarily perish of its own badness. (Marx, being a Hegelian, substituted "contradictions" for "badness" in order to invest the process with the appearance of logical necessity, but there is no reason to dignify that philosophical sleight-of-hand by perpetuating the linguistic solecism.) Eakins is also wrong to suggest that Empire may represent the "Next Big Idea." This is mainly because Empire is based on a launhablv tinv idea, and one that is also old and wrong. The idea, again, is Marx's idea about the inevitable collapse of capitalism. It seemed big once upon a time. It is now as thoroughly discredited as an historical or political idea can be. Hardt and Negi gussy up Marx with a formidable panoply of New Age rhetoric about globalization. But the creaking you hear as you make your way through the book is the rusty grinding of the dialectic: it goes nowhere, it means nothing, but it keeps creaking along.]

Hardt and Negri's critique of capitalism fails to account for the realities of modern economics. Post, 2002 (Charlie, member (of Solidarity's National Committee. "Review: Empire and Revolution", International Viewpoint Magazinc, http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/article.php3'~id~article=435) [While Hardt and Negri's critique of the politics of post-modernism is both insightful and salutary, their embrace of its substantive analysis reduces Empire to vet another example of what Kim Moody called 'globalonev'. [3] Put simply, the analysis Hardt and Nexri present in Empire of the contemporary capitalist world economv is unrealistic -it does not correspond to the realities of capitalist production and accumulation today. At the centre of Hardt a~idNegri's nolion of 'e~npirc' is that they call thc 'postmodernisation. or the informalionalisalion of produc~on.' In this schema. the transition from 'niodernity' and 'postmdernicy' involves an hisloric shift fro111 as 'economic paradigm' where "industry and the manufacture of durable goods occupied the privileged position" to onc whcrc "providing scrvices and manipulating infnrt~uliori :IEat IIK heart of econonic production". [4j (1). 280) Freed from the spatial constraints associated with industrial production, the production of services and information allows for rapid and easy geographic mobility of capital and the creatinn of a 'sliwnth' -relatively evenly developed -global economic space. The realitv of the capitalist world economv is quite different. It is true that the percentage of workers emploved in industrv -the production of material goods and services -has declined continuousl~ for over a centurv. As Harry Braverman argued in his classic Labor and Monopoly Capital, [5]this is the inevitable result of capitalism's continuous mechanization of production. and the resullant reduction in the percentage of workers needed to oroduce goods. However. the number of industrial workers. in most industrialized societies. has remained stable or grown slightly. Even more important, the proportion of total output industrial workers produce has increased over the past fifty vears. [6]1 Hardt and Negri refuse to accept the reality of the permanent existence of capitalism-this makes all their judgments ridiculous. Kimball, co-editor and publisher of The New Criterion and on Board of Advisor of the Gilder-Lehrman Institute of American History at St. John's College, 2001 (Roger, "The New AntiAmericanism", The New Criterion, Vol. 20, No. 2, htt~://~~~.newcriterion.com/archive/20/oct0l/empire.htm) It is not just the style of Empire that is rebarbative. Its judgments are too. They are mostly a tapestry of Marxist chestnuts updated for contemporary circumstances. Remember the Cold War? Leftist dogma maintains that it is impossible that the United Stales won the Cold War. Ergo, the fact that the United States did win it-that the policies of the Reagan administration brought about the collapse of

the Soviet Union-must be denied at every turn. So it is business as usual when Hardt and Ncgri solemnly assure us that "thc United States did not defeat the socialist enemy" in the Cold War; rather "The Soviet Union collapsed under the burden of its own internal contradictions." "Internal contradictions7'? We require permits for handguns: why not for lethal concepts such as the Hegelian-Marxist dialectic? Its careless use is clearly a public intellectual-health hazard. The dialectic is the ultimate sophist's tool. Marx hlmself realized this. In an 1857 letter to Engels about an clection prediction, Marx wrote: "It's possible that I shall n~ake an ass of mysclt. But In that case one can always get out of it with a little dialectic. I have, of course. so worded my proposi~ion as inbe right either way." Hardt and Nenri are not as cautious as the master. They are adept at deplovin$ the dialectic. but they haven't mastered the art of duplicitous ambiguity. Thus they baldly conclude that the Gulf War was "reallv an owration of oppression"-pemctratcd, oi'course, not by Saddam Hussein but by the United States. The Los Angeles riots thev describe as one of "the most radical and powcrful struggles of the final years of the twentieth century." High praise indeed! Most of us, looking back over the history of the nineteenth- and twcntielhcentury, would conclude that there was no international proletarian revolution as Marx predicted there would be. But according to Hardt and Nenri such a judgment would be superficial and short-sighted: "actually." they write, the proletariat "'won"' because nation states are not as powerful now as they once were. 1 suspect that pan of the reason Empire is such a hit in the academy is its superior insulation. Hardt and Negri have sealed everv point of ingress: no hint of realitv is allowed to seep in. The single neatest embarrassment to Marxist theory has alwavs been the longevity of capitalism. It was supposed to implode from "internal contradictions" long ago. But here it is 2001 and capitalism is still going strong and making the world richer and richer. Attempting to explain this is the greatest test of a Marxist's ingenuity. Here is how Hardt and Nemi handle the problem: As we write this book and the twentieth centurv draws to a close. capitalism is miraculouslv healthv, its accumulation more robust than ever. How can we reconcile this fact with the careful analyses of numerous Marxist authors at the beginning of the century who point to the imperialist conflicts as symptoms of an impending ecological disaster running up against the limits of nature?

Thev offer three hvpotheses for this imponderable situation. One, that capitalism has relormed itself and so is no longer in danger of collapse (an option thcv dismiss out of hand). Two. that the Marxist theory is right except for the timetable: "Sooner or later the once abundant resources of nature will run out." --well, it is a little difficult to say what the third hypothesis is. It has to do, they say, with the idea that ca~italism's expansion is "internal" rathcr than "external," that it "subsumes not the nonca~italist environment but its own capitalist terrain- that is, that the subsumption is no longer formal but real." I won't attempt to explain this for the simple reason that I haven't a cluc about what it means. Is there anv inlponant option they have neglected'? Could it, iusl possiblv. be that the "careful analvses of numerous Marxist authors" was iust plain wrong'? This is a possibility apparently too awful to contemplate, for Hard1 and Ncpi never raise it.]

AT: Em~ire-No Tech Revolution The third technological revolution never occurred-information technology has seen a negative growth in recent years. -Petras,2001 (James. Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University, "Empire With Imperialism", Rebelion: Petras Essays in English, October 29, http://www,rebelion.org/petras/englisWnegri010102.htm) IN and H's second maior argument is that we are living in a totallv new euoch. A new capitalism thanks to the third scientific technological revolution (TSTR).Detailed empirical studies on the 1990s economy has effectively refuted the argument that IT, fiber outics and biotechnology inaugurated a "new epoch of capitalism" bv revolulionizing the forces of production. Japan which earlv on "robotized" its factories and engineered and applied manv or the new IT producls has been stagnant (average growth of about 1 percent for the past 1 I years) and entering a deep recession in 2001 ). The U.S. manufacturing sector has been in negative ~rowth since the end of August 2000 and continues for 12 consecutive months -the longest period of negative growth on record sincc the end of the World War. The recession is expected Lo continue for an uncertain period -estimates run from 1 to 3 years. The 1T growth rates were negative throughout 2001. The prospects for an early recovery are dim as negative savings rates, huge deficits, a strong dollar inhibit domestic or export powered growth. As structural and cyclical crises colncide it is highly likely that the recession will continue for some time ahead. The recession totally undermines the IT ideologues who declared that the "New Economy" has made the business cycle obsolete. In fact, the IT companies have been the hardest hit in the current downturn. Over 80 percent of the dot.coms are not profitable. Secondly, the IT economy todav is less competitive and more concentrated than ever. where a few giants have survived and manv have failed. While thousands of dot.coms went under, the top 5 IT companies retained their position among the top 10 rankings worldwide. Thc productivity revolution -growth of 2.5% -was based on a short interval of four year (1996-2000) and was followed by a decline in productivity to a negative 1.2% during the first quarter of 2001. The multi-billion dollar investment in IT drained investment from more productive uses. led to vast overcapitalization in one sector that had low returns and little spill-over effects. Moreover. the biggest boost for ITcame from the Y-2 scam -thc hype ofa system breakdown, with the onset of the new Millenium. Hundrcds oS billions were spent on IT between 1996 through 1999 to avoid a dubious prqject with virtually no long term effects. No scrious critical evaluation and comparative analysis was conducted between countries like Russia, China, Finland and a few others which spent a fraction of what was spent in Europe and North America on Y-2,

without suffering a "catastrophic breakdown." This raises the question of whether the IT bubble was itself an artifact of a massive promotional fraud. In anv casc, the data base for IT claims of a productivity revolution are extremely limited and problematical. A recent study by Paul Strassman, a lcading critic of IT ideologues, based on a study of 3,000 European companies demonstrates no relationship between investment in computers and profitability. Thus the three basic claims of the IT revolution, that it has put to rest the business cycle, has generated a sustained productivity revolution and produces high profits are not in accordance with reality. In fact, the irrationalities of capitalism have been amplified by thc IT bubble: the business cycle operates in full force, productivity tends to stagnation and there is a tendency for the rate oS profit to decline. A recent article by Robert Gordon which analyzes the increase in productivity (between 1995-99) raises serious doubts about the claims ol'the Hardt and Nemi of a "new euoch." He argues that almost 70%of the improvement in vroductivitv can be accounted for bv improved measurements of inflation (lower estimates or inllation necessarily mean higher growth of real output, thus productivity) and the response of uroductivitv to the exceptionallv rapid output growth ol' thc 3 Yz vear period. Thus, onlv 3070 of the 1% increasc in productivitv (or 3%)during the 1995-99 period can be attributed to computerization of the so-calied "information revolution". hardly a revolution.l

AT: Em~ire-AT: Soverei~ntvLinks Hardt and Negri fail to distinguish between the different types of crisis-the type of sovereignty they describe isn't realistic. Steinmetz, Associate professor of sociology at the University of Michigan, 2003 [George, "The State of Emergency and the Revival of American Imperialism: Toward an Authoritarian PostFordism," Public Culture 15.2 (2003) 323-345, p. project muse] [How can we tell whether the United States is in fact emerging as a new hegemon? One criterion is provided by Carl Schmitt ([I9221 1985: 5): "Sovereign is he who decides on the exception." Hardt and Negri (2000: 377-78) dismiss Schmitt's decisionism as both "irrational" and irrelevant; for them, the current condition of Empire is a permanent state of exception. Hardt and Negri equate the endemic shattering of all social relations and identities characteristic of capitalism in general with crisis lout court. Yet it makes a great deal of difference whether we are faced with a crisis of emulovment. a crisis of urofits. or both; it also matters immensely whether social actors understand themselves as living through a crisis. We need to distinguish between three meanings of crisis: ( 1) the permanent crisis that is eauivalent to capitalism for Hardt and Ncgri. (2) the crisis of capitalist accumulation (falling rates of prolit) or of emplovmcnt, both of which may or may not be expressed in a language of crisis, (3)crises that are discursivelv articulated as such on a society-wide scale. To collause the first into thc second is to fail to recognize the periodic intensification of pressures urging social actors to seek a chanze in regulatory liamcworks. Indeed, Hardt and Negri's account of transitions between modes of regulation is rooted in a style of Marxism according to which capitalist crisis in the second, more punctual, sensc plays a central propelling role. 15 To collapse the third sense of crisis-that is, crisis as a discursively constructed object-into the other senses is to [all back into the sort of sociomaterialist obiectivism that Marxists and other social theorists have been trying to overcome for some time. Yet it is this third sense olcrisis--crisis as a publicly articulated and widely acknowledged condition-that leads us to the real test of sovcreigntv. It is possible to identify the locus of sovcrcignty only when the future direction of a socicty (or indeed its very existence) is at stake and when most social actors arc focused on strategic auestions. In a period like the 1900s, by contrast, American society was not generally perceived as being in crisis, and as a result, politically, questions of "who decides" were much [End Page 3361 less urgent. It is thcrefore not surprising that this era gave rise to theories of a decline of the state.]

AT: Em~ire-AT: Nation-State Links Hardt and Negri's claims that there is sovereignty/imperialism beyond the nation-state lacks plausibility. Post, 2002 (Charlie, member of Solidarity's National Committee, "Review: Empire and Revolution", International Viewpoint Magazine, http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/article.php3'? id~ar~icle=435) [The result of the internationalisation of lean production over thc past two decades has not been a 'smooth' or 'dcccntrcd global network' or 'empire' that Hardt and Nesi claim. Ouite thc opposite, thc centres of accumulation and social power remain in the centres of advanced capitalism in Western Europe. the US and Japan. Global uneven and combined develo~ment -the growing pap in incomes, production and the like -between this global 'north' and the global 'south' has only grown wider. Some regions of the former 'third world' have become centres of labour-intensive assembly and parts production (the 'Newly Industrialized Countries' of Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan). becoming cxtcnsions of capitalist accumulation cantered in the 'north.' However, vast expanses of the globc (sub-Saharan Africa) remain at best sites of raw material extraction, or at worst huge labour reserves, marked by extreme povcrly and capitalist-created famine and natural disasters. Hardt and Nemi's claims that the nation-state and inter-imperialist rivalry have declined in importance with the rise of 'empire' and various institutions of 'global ~overnance' (World Bank, IMF, WTO, G7, EU, NATO, etc) lack theoretical and even em~irical plausibilitv. The 'declining effcctivcncss' of the nation-state can be traced clearly through the evolution of a whole series ol'global juridico-economic bodies, such as GATT, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the IMF. The globalisation of production and circulation. supported bv this supranational juridical scaffolding. supersedes the effectiveness of national iuridical structures (p 337). Clearly, gh& 'supranational juridical scaffoldina' has been crucial in changing the political environment for capitalist accumulation over the past two decades. Clearly, 'neo-liberalism' -(he dismantling of the rules that restrict corporations at home and abroad -would be impossible without these 'global juridico-economic bodies.' However, the mowing importancc of thesc trans-national organizations does not mean that, in the words of Hardt and Negri 'state functions and constitutional elcments have effectively been displaced to other levels and domains' (p. 307). On the contrary, the abilitv of these dobal political bodies to operate effectively rewires, in many wavs, the strengthening of the national-capitalist state. [Kim Moody presents a compelling alternative analysis. The trans-national corporations (TNCs) havc neither the desire nor ability to create a world state. They have opted instead for a svstcm of multilateral ameements and institutions that they hope will provide coherence and order the world market. Through Lhcir 'home' governments. the TNCs have attempted to negotiate forms of regulation through the GATT, the new WTO, and the vanous regional and multilateral trade agreements. They have also transformed some of the old Bretton Wocxls institutions, notably the World Bank and IMF. [9] To ensurc the unhindered operations of the trans-nationals and protect private business property, these global political institutions

require national capitalist states capable of denationalising industries, abolishing social welfare programs and labour regulations. generallv dercnulatinz their capital, labour and commodities markets. and containinn challenges from below. Put simply, rather than representing a simple shift of political powers 'upward' from the nationstate to the 'global iuridico-economic bodies', the development of the WTO. EU, and the like actually enhance the role of the nation-state. Hardt and Negri's go furthcr along this path. They claim that 'Empire' "is a decentred and deterritorialising apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its expanding frontiers" (p xii) in which "what used to be conflict or competition among several imperialist powcrs has in important respects been replaced by the idea of a single power that overdeterniines them all, structures them in a unitary way, and treats them under the one common notion of right that is decidedly postcolonial and postimperialist" (p 9).1 The imperial state has not disappeared-the rise of the nation state in the world economy proves. Petras, 2001(James, Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University, "Empire With Imperialism", Rebelion: Petras Essays in English, October 29, http://www.rebelion.ore/petras/english/niOlOlO2.htm) [ Let us start with Negri's and Hardt's (NH) assertion of thc decline of the nation or imperial state. Their argumcnt for a state-less empire exaggerates the autonomv of capital from the state and parrots the false propositions of the free markct ideologues who argue that the "world market" is supreme. Contrary to NH, in the contemporary world, the national state, in both its imperial and neocolonial form, has expanded its activity. Far from being an anachronism. the state has become a central clement in the world economv and within nation- states. However, the activities of the state vary according to their class character and whether they arc imperial or neo-colonial states.

AT: Em~ire-Borders Links Empire's claims of fluidity are wrong -borders were more fluid before World War I than the status quo. Bliwise, 2001 (Robert J. "Empire: Not So Evil", Dukc Magazine, NovemberDecember, http:llwww.dukemaguine.duke.eduldukemaglissuedl1120llempirc.html) Other analysts point out that borders were. if anything, more fluid in the past. Exactly one month before the events of September 11, The New York Times offered a skeptical look at the novelty of toclay's globalization. Before World War 1, "There were no passports and virtuallv no restrictions on immigration, making for perhaps thc bigpcst migration in human history." BY one estimate reported in the article. one-scvcnth of the world's working-age population mimated across national boundaries between 1870and 1925. In more recent times. the U.S. may be the only country to have boasted a relatively men immigration policy.

AT: Em~ire-MNCs Multi-national corporations are not fluid-the assumptions of Empire are based on flawed studies and analysis. Petras, 2001 (James, Professor of Sociology at Bingharnton University, "Empire With Imperialism", Rebelion: Petras Essays in English, October 29, http://www.rebelion.org/petras/english/negriOl0102.htm) [In conclusion lhc imperial states, far from being superceded by the overseas expansion of capital, have grown and become essential components of the world political economy. NH concept of cmpire mvstities the role of the imperial state, thus underminino an essential adversary. in the front lines of the defense of the privileges and power of the MNCs. Hardt and Neari base their argument about a state-less, class-less empire without imperialism on the notion of a world market dominated by multi-national corporations (MNC) which, they argue. "must cventuallv overcome imperialism and destroy the barriers between inside and outside." (p. 234) These "global" MNCs have turned thc nations and imperial states into anachronisms. NH provide no data on the internal organization of the MNCs, no analvsis of the decision-making structure, no discussion of their relations to states. Theorizing by fiat is a convenient wav of' evading inconvenient empirical studies. Essentially Hardt and Negri's argument is based on six unsubstantiated assumptions. Assumotion I :MNC are global corporations which have no swcilic location in anv particular nation-state. They form a new world economy divorced from national controls and are part of a new world ruling class. This assumption is based on the fact that large scale corporations opcralc in a number of countries, they are mobile and they have the power lo evade taxes, regulations in many national jurisdictions. Thcrc arc several conceptual and empirical vroblems with this assumption. First, thc fact that MNCs operate in manv countries does not detract from the fact that the headquarters, where most of the stratenic decisions, directors and profits arc concentrated. arc located in the U.S., E.U. and Japan. Secondly, rnobilitv is based on strategic decisions taken bv directors in the headauarters in the imperial centers. These decisions depend on the political and economic conditions created by the imperial state and its representatives in the IFIs. Mobility is contingent on intcr- state relations. Thirdly, evasion of taxes and regulations, is possible because of deliberate policies in the imperial states and their multi-national banks. Non-enforcement of laws against transfcrs of illicit earnings from the neo-colonial countries to the imperial countries is a form

of state aclivitv favoring large scale transfers of wealth that strengthen external accounts. The MNCs' flouting of neo-colonial state regulations is part of a broader sa of power rclalions anchored in the imperial, neo-colonial state relations.] MNCs do not exist absent from the state -Hardt and Negri fail to recognize the combined forces of MNCs and imperial states Petras, 2001 (James, Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University, "Empire With Imperialism", Rebelion: Petras Essays in English, October 29, http:Nwww.rebelion.org/petras/englis~iOl0102.htrn) Assumption 5: Globalist theorists like NH write of an 'imperial syslcm' as opposed to imperialist states -(preface), as if one could not exist without the other. The 'system' has no 'centcr' since all states have lost their special significance before the all powcrful MNC who dominate markets. Systems approaches fail to recognize the class and institutional power of nationally owned and directed banks and industries. Even more fatal, thc svstcms theorists fail to link the structures, operations, legal codes and linkages between imperial slates. the multi- national comorations and their offspring in the IFI's and the vast reach of their power and concentration ol'profits, interest, renls and royalties in the imperialist countries. The 'svstem' is derived from and is sustained bv the combined forces of the imperial state and its MNCs. To abslract from the spcciricities of ownership and state power in order to describe an imperial svstem is to lose sight of the basic contradictions and conflicts, the inter-state imperial rivalries and the class struegles for state power.

AT: Em~ire-AT: Bio~owerIm~act Hardt and Negri have the concept of biopower backwards-for powerless human beings, autonomy leads to extinction. Bull, 2001 (Malcolm, head of art hislory and theory at Oxford University, "You Can't Build a New Society with a Stanley Knife", London Review of Books, Vol. 23, No. 19, http:l/www.lrb.co.uWv23/n19/bull0l~.html) [lt would, I think. be difficult for Hardt and Ncgi to turn their argument around in this way. Although they recognise the function of socictv in the production of individual subiectivilies they barelv acknowledge its role in the production of Dower. Using Foucaull's model of biopower, thev argue that power constitutes society, not the other way round: 'Power, as it produces, organises; as it organises, it speaks and expresses itself as authority.' In reply to Machiavelli's observation that the project oiconstructing a new society needs arms and money, they cite Spinoza and ask: 'Don't we already possess them? Don't the necessary weapons reside precisely within the creative and prophetic power of the multitude?' No one is powerless; even the old, the sick and the unemployed are engaged in the 'immaterial labour' that produces 'total social capital'. Sounding a bit like Ali G,they conclude: 'The poor itself is power. There is World Poverty, but there is above all World Possibility, and only the poor is capable of this.' It is dificult to see how this analysis comurehcnds lhc reality of uowerlessness. You mav be able to threaten the world with a Stanley knife, but you cannot build a new societv with one. Insofar as the problems of the powerless have been addressed in recent years it is ofen through a dynamic that works in the opposite direction to the one Hardt and Negi suggest. Their response to globalisation is to maintain that since we have not contracted into global societv, we still have all the power we need to change it. The alternative is to argue that a geomaphicallv boundless societv must also be a totally inclusive societv. The latter is an extension of what used to be called the politics of recognition. Globalisation may have replaced multiculturalism as the focus of contemporary political debate, but there is an underlying continuity: the concern of anti-globalisation protesters with remote regions of the world, with the lives of people unlike themselves, and with species of animals and plants that most have seen only on TV is predicated on an unparalleled imaginative identification with the Other. This lotalisation of the politics of recognition from the local to the global is what has given momentum to campaigns such as the one for African Aids victims: here. it is a ouestjon of svmpathv rather than sovereigntv. of iustice rather than power. In many cases. unless the powerful recoonised some kinship with them. the vowerless would iust die. Capitalism has no need for the 'immaterial labour' of millions now living. For vowerless human beings, as for other svecies. autonomv leads to extinction.]

AT: IR Fern -Focus on identitv 3 exclusion The criticism's focus on identity creates a politics of exclusion that prevents meaningful critiques and turns the very superior identification they try to solve Jarvis 2k [DSL, 'international Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism', February, University of South Carolina Publishing, pg. 160-1 621 JICritical research agendas of this type, however, are not found easily in International Relations. Critics of feminist perspectives run the risk of denouncement as either a misogvnist malcontent or an androcentric keeper of the gate. & &in much of this discourse is an unstated political correctness, where the historical marginalization of women bestows intellectual autonomy, excluding those outside the identity goup from legitimate participation in its discourse. Only feminist women can do real, legitimate, feminist theory since, in the mantra of identity politics, discourse must emanate from a positional (personal) ontology. Those sensitive or svmpathetic to the identity politics of particular noups are, of course, welcome to lend support and encouragement, but only on terms delineated by the groups themselves. In this way, they eniov an uncontested sovereign hegemony over their own selfidentification, insuring the group discourse is self constituted and that its parameters, operative methodology, ,uu\ standards of argument, appraisal, and evidentiary provisions are self defined. Thus, for example, when Sylvester calls lor a "home.steading" does so "by [a] repetitive feminist insistence that we be included on our terms" (my emphasis). Rather than an invitation to engage in dialogue, this is an ultimatum that a sovereign intellectual space be provided and insulated from critics who question the merits of identity-based political discourse. Instead, Sylvester calls upon International Relations to "share space, respect, and trust in a re-formed endeavor," but one otherwise proscribed as committed to demonstrating not only "that the secure homes constructed by IR's many debaters are chimerical," but, as a consequence, to ending International Relations and remaking it along lines grounded in feminist postmodernism.93 Such stipulative provisions might be likened to a form of negotiated sovereign temtoriality where, as part of the settlement for the historically aggrieved, border incursions are to be allowed but may not be met with resistance or reciprocity. Demands for entry to the discipline are thus predicated on conditions that insure two sets of rules, cocooning postmodern feminist spaces from systematic analyses while "respecting" this discourse as it hastens about the project of deconstructing International Relations as a "male space." Sylvester's impassioned plea for tolerance and "emphatic cooperation" is thus confined to like-minded individuals, those who do not challenge feminist epistemologies but accept them as a necessary means of reinventing the discipline as a discourse between postmodern identitie-the most important of which is gender." Intolerance or

misogyny thus become the ironic epithets attached to those who question the wisdom of this reinvention or the merits of the return of identity in international theory."" Most strategic of all, however, demands for entry to the discipline and calls for intellectual spaces betray a self-imposed, politically motivated marginality. After all, where are such calls issued from other than the discipline and the intellectual-and well establishedspaces of feminist International Relations? Much like the strategies employed by male dissidents, then, feminist postmodernists too deflect as i1lep;itimate any criticism that derives from skeptics whose vantage points are labeled privileged. And privilege is variously interpreted historicallv, especially along lines of race, color, and sex where the denotations white and male, to name but two, serve as generational mediums to assess the injustices of past histories. White males, for example, become generic siznifiers for historical oppression, indicating an ontolo,oicallv privileged group by which the historical experiences of the "other" can then be reclaimed in the context of their related oppression, exploitation, AND exclusion. Legitimacy, in this context, can then be claimed in terms of one's group--identity and the extent to which the history of that particular goup has been "silenced." In this same way, self-identification or "self-situation" establishes one's credentials, allowing admittance to the group and legitimating the "authoritative" vantage point from which one speaks and writes. Thus, for example, Jan Jindy Pettman includes among the introductory pages to her most recent book, Worldinjj Women, a section titled "A (personal) politics of location," in which her identity as a woman, a feminist, and an academic, makes apparent her particular (marginal) identities and group loyalties.% Similarly, Christine Sylvester, in the introduction to her book, insists, "It is important to provide a context for one's work in the often-denied politics of the personal." Accordingly, self-declaration reveals to the reader that she is a feminist, went to a Catholic girls school where she was schooled to "develop your brains and confess something called 'sins' to always male forever priests," and that these provide some pieces to her dynamic obje~tivit~.~' Like territorial markers, self-identification permits entry to intellectual spaces whose sovereign authority is "policed" as much by marginal subiectivities as they allege of the oppressors who "police" the discourse of realism, or who are said to walk the corridors of the discipline insuring the replication of patriarchy, hierarchical agendas, and "malestream" theory. If Sylvester's version of feminist postmodernism is projected as tolerant, per-spectivist. and encompassing of a multiplicity of approaches. in reality it is as selective, exclusionarv. and dismissive of alternative perspectives as mainstream approaches are accused of being.]]

AT: IR Fern -Focus on identitv +exclusion They criticize the notion of generalizing women while grouping men into a patriarchal stereo-type which perpetuates the gender categories they try to solve. Jarvis 2k [DSL, 'International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism', February, University of South Carolirza Publishirtg, pg. 163-1641 We might also extend a contextualist lens to analyze Sylvester's formulations, much as she insists her epistemologcal approach does. Sylvester, for example, is adamant that we can not really know who "women" are, since to do so would be to invoke an essentialist concept, concealinp the diversity inherent in this cateporv. "Women" don't really exist in Sylvester's estimation since there are black women, white women, Hispanic, disabled, lesbian, poor, rich, middle class, and illiterate women, to name but a few. The point, for Sylvester, is that to speak of "women" is to do violence to the diversity encapsulated in this category and, in its own wav, to silence those women who remain unnamed. Well and good. Yet this same analytical respect for diversity seems lost with men. Politics and international relations become the "places of men." But which men? All men? Or iust white men, or rich, educated, elite, upper class, heterosexual men? To speak of political places as the places of men ignores the fact that most men, in fact the overwhelming maiority of men, are not in these political places at all, are not decision makers, elite, affluent, or powerful. Much as with Svlxester's categories, there are Door. lower class, illiterate, gav, black, and white men, many of whom suffer the vestiges of hunger, poverty, despair, AND disenfranchisement just as much as women. So why invoke the category "men" in such essentialist and ubiauitouswavs while cognizant onlv of the diversity' in tiie category "women." These are double standards, not erudite theoretical formulations, betraying, dare one say, sexism toward men by invoking male gender generalizations and crude caricatures.1I

AT: IR Fern -Focus on identitv 3 Exclusion (shatters movement) The focus on identity politics creates a self-identifying race to the bottom that fractures their movement and turns International Relations into identity group wars Jarvis 2k [DSL, 'International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodcrnism', February, Uiziversity of South CarolinaPuBlisl~ing. pg. 163-1641 [[Problem of this nature, however, are really manifestations of a deeper, underlying ailment endemic to discourses derived from identitv politics. At base, the most elemental question for identity discourse, as Zalewski and Enfoe note, is "Who am I?"TMThe personal becomes the political, evolving a discourse where self-identification, but also one's identification by others, presupposes multiple identities that are fleeting, overlapping, and changing at any particular moment in time or place. "We have multiple identities," argues V. Spike Peterson, "e.g., Canadian, homemaker. Jewish, Hispanic, socialist.""" And these identities are variously depicted as transient. polvmomhic. interactive, discursive, and never fixed. As Richard Brown notes, "Identity is given neither institutionally nor biologically. It evolves as one orders continuities on one's conception of onese~f."'~' Yet, if we accept this, the analytical utility of identity politics seems problematic at best. Which identitv, for example. do we choose from the many that anv one subiect mi~ht display affinity for? Are we to assume that all identities are of equal importance or that some are more important than others? How do we know which of these identities might be transient and less conse~uential to one's sense of self and, in turn, politically significant to understanding international politics? Why, for example. should we place gender identitv onto-logically prior to class, sexual orientation. ethnic origin. ideological pers~ective. or national identity?"" As Zalewski and Enloe ask, "Why do we consider states to be a major referent? Why not men? Or women?"lo4 But by the same token, why not dogs, shipping magnates, movie stars, or trade regimes? Why is gender more constitutive of global politics than, say, class, or an identity as a cancer survivor, laborer, or social worker? Most of all, why is gender essentialized in feminist discourse, reified into the most ureeminent of all identities as the vrimary lens through which international relations must be viewed? Perhaps, for example, people understand difference in the context of identities outside of gender. As Jane Martin notes, "How do we know that difference .. . does not turn on being tat or religious or in an abusive re~ationshi~?""'~ The point, perhaps flippantly made, is that identity is such a nebulous concept, its meaning so obtuse and so inherently subjective, that it is near meaningless as a conduit for under standing global politics if only because it can mean anything to anybody. For others like Ann Tickner, however, identity challenges the assumption ot state sovereignty. "Becoming curious about identity formation below the state and surrendering the simplistic assumption that the state is sovereign will," Tickner suggests, "make us much more realistic describers and explainers of die current international system."'06 The

multiple subjects and their identities that constitute the nation-state are, for Tickner, what are important. In a way, of course, she is correct. States are constitutive entities drawn from the amalgam of their citizens. But such observations are somewhat trite and banal and lead Tnternational Relations into a devolving and perpetually dividing discourse based upon ever-emergent and transforming identities. Surely the more important observation, however, concerns the bounds of this enterprise. Where do we stop? Are there limits to this exercise or is it a boundless project? And how do we theorize the notion of multiple levels of identities harbored in each subject person? If each of us is fractured into multiple identities, must we then lunge into commentaries specific to each group? Well we might imagine, for example, a discourse in International Relations between white feminist heterosexual women, white middle class heterosexual physically challenged men, working class gay Latinos, txansgendered persons, ethnic Italian New York female garment workers, and Asian lesbian ecofeminists. hch would represent a self-constituted knowledge and nomenclature, a discourse reflective of specific identity-group concerns. Knowledge and understanding would suffer from a diaspora. becoming unattainable in any pers~icacious sense except in localities so specific that its general understanding. or inter-group applicability, would be obviated. Identity grouvs would become so splintered and disparate that International Relations would approach a form of identitv tribalism with each group forming a kind of intellectual territory, jealously policing its knowledge borders from intrusions by other groups otherwise seen as illegitimate, nonrepresentative, or opposed to the interests of the group. Nor is it improbable to suppose that identity politics in International Relations would evolve a realpolitik between noups, a realist power-struggle for intergroup legitimacv or hegemonic control over particular knowledges or, in the broader polity', situations of intergroup conflict. With what legitimacy, for example, do middle class, by and large white, affluent, feminist, women International Relations scholars speak and write for black, poor, illiterate, gay, working class, others who might object, resist, or denounce such empathetic musings? The legitimacy with which Sylvester or Enloe write, for example, might be questioned on grounds of their identities as elite, educated, privileged women, unrepresentative of the experiences and realities of those at the coal face of international politics.]

AT: IR Fern -Focus on identitv +Exclusion (shatters movement) Their focus on identity politics creates global fragmentation and seclusion. Only using the commonality of ethical humans can we unite to solve power relations, war, and disease Jarvis 2k [DSL, 'International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism', February, University of South Curolinu Publishing, pg. 167-1681 [[Lurking behind such positions, of course. is the highly problematic assumption that a fundamental shift in the political, social. and economic worlds has occurred: that "people, machinery and money, images and ideas now follow increasingly nonisomorphic paths, and thal because of this there is a "deterritorializing mobility of peoples. ideas. and images." one overconling the "laborious moves of statism to prpjcct an image of the world divided along territorially discontinuous (separated) sovereign spaces, each s~~pposcdly In this new with homogeneous cultures and impervious essences.""' world where global space as-territory has been ohlileratcd, whcre discrete national cultures no longer exist hut are dissolved by cosmopolitinism and ubiquitous images peddled by hypermodern communications. all that remains as tangible referenls for knowledge and understanding, we are told, are our own fractured id en ti tie^."^ While, lor tcminists, this is profoundly liberating. allowing them to recognize a "multiplicity of identities." each engaged in a "differing politics," it also betrays how narrow is the intent of feminist postmodemism. which stands lot no other end except the eradicadon of e~sentialism."~ Much as Ashley saw m positivism tyrannical structures of oppression, so in essentialism postmodern feminists sec the subjugation of diversity amid universal nar-i.iliws Vet the reification of difference as the penultimate ontological beginning and end point seems disingenuous in the extreme. The auestion is not whether there are differences--of coursc therc are-but whether these arc significant for lntemational Relations. and if so in what capacity? Historically. the brief of International Relations has been to go out in search of those things that unite us. not divide us. Division, disunitv. and difference have been the unmistakable problems endemic to global politics, and overcoming them the objective that has provided scholars with both their motivating purpose and moral compass. In venerating difference, identity politics unwittingly reoroduces this problematia~ie; exacerbating differences beyond their sisnificance. fabricatinrr disunity contributing to social AND mlitical cleavage. Yes, we are not all the SAME. BUT the things that unite us air surelv more imoortant, more numerous. and more fundamental to the human condition than those that divide us. We all share a conviction that war is bad, for example, that violence is obiectionahle, global poverty unconscionable, and

that peaceful interstate relations are desirable. Likewise, we all inhabit one earth and havc similar environmental concerns. have the same basic needs in terms of developmental requirements, nutrition, personal security. education, and shelter. To sumose that these modernist concerns are divisible on the basis of tender. color, sexuality, or religious inclination seems svecious, promotine contrarietv where none really exists from the perspective of International Relations. How, for example. amid the reification of ever-divisible difference. do we foster political community and solidarity, hope to foster treater global collectivitv, or unite antithedcdlv inclined religious, segregationist, or racial groups on the basis of their professed difference? How this is meant to secure new visions of international politics, solve the divisions of previous disputations, or avert violent factionalisms in the future remains curiously absent from the discourse of identitv p~litics."~" The Alt doesn't solve--Radical disagreements within the feminist framework will hinder your movement. A holistic feminist advocacy can't solve. Jarvis2k [DSL, 'International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism', February, Universit): of South Carolina Publishing. pg. 1461 [[But if the call to begin afresh the study of international relations resounds loudest among feminists. the respective approaches they proffer fall victim to radical disa~reement. Postmodern feminism. feminist postmodernism, feminist empiricism, cultural feminism, or standpoint feminism, to name but a few, are among the many feminisms whose respective approaches either embrace women. relect their existence altonether, invoke the categories of gender, sexuality, patriarchy, or rnasculinism. or wish to repudiate all of these on the basis of their socially constructed nature. For feminists, the conundrum is manifest bv vroblems of identitv, rewesentation, and language. Simply to "add women and stir" presupposes the subordinate importance of yender and, more importantly, that the category "women" is ubiquitous. For some feminists, for example, we can never really know "who are women," "where are women," or even "what are women."" Do women really exist or is the category "women" merely inscribed by patriarchal norms that represent little more than socially constructed fabrications? And if women do exist, does this singular noun presuppose a shared experience, a sisterhood, in short, a sex similarity? Attempting to dismantle the masculinist hegemony of International Relations thus roves discursive for feminists who tend to divaricate between two dominant schools of thought. These we might term :on-structivist or e~istemolo~cal feminism. and the second essentialist. onto-lodcal or standuoint feminism.""

AT: IR Fern -Reifv Difference Falselv (Alt Fails) Feminist critiques reify difference falsely and recreate the same epistemological problems under a mask of sensitivity Jarvis 2k [DSL, 'International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism', February, Universiry oj'South Carolina Publishing, pg. 165-1661 Celebrating and reifying difference as a wlitical end in itself thus run rhc risk of crcatina increasingly divisive and incommensurate discourses where each moup claims a knowledge or experienced based legitimacy but, in doing so, precluding the possibilitv of common understanding or intergroup political discourse. Instead, difference produces antithetical discord and poli tical-lribalism: only working class Hispanics living in South Central Los Angeles, for instance, can speak of, for, and about thcir community, its concerns, interests and needs; only female African Americans living in the projects of Chicago can speak "lcgilimately" of the housing and social problems endemic to inner city living. Discourse becomes confined not to conversations between idcnlity groups since his is impossible, but story telling of personal/group experiences where the "other" listens intently until their turn comes to tell their own stories and experiences. Appropriating the voice or pain of others by speaking, writing, or theorizing on issues, perspectives, or events not indicative of one's groupidentity becomes not only illegitimate but a medium of oppression and a means to silence others. The very activity of theory and political discourse as it has been understood traditionally in International Relations, and the social sciences more generally, is thus rendered inappropriate in the new milieu of identity politics. Poliricallv, ~romssives obviouslv see a danger in this tvue of discourse and, from a social scientific verspective, understand it to bc less than risorous. Generalizing, as with theorizing, for example, has Fdllen victim to vostmodern feminist reactions against methodolo~ical essentialism and the adoption of what Jane Martin calls the instillation of false difference into identity discourse. By reacting against the assumption that "all individuals in the world callcd 'women' were exactly like us" (is. white, middle class, educated, etc.), feminists now tend "a priori to give privileged status to a predetermined set of analytic categories and to affirm the existence of nothing but difference." In avoiding the "pitfall of false unity," feminists have thus "walked straight into the trap of false difference. Club words now dominate the discourse. Essentialism, ahistoricism, universalism, and androcentrism, for example, have become the "prime idiom[s] of intellectual terrorism and the privileged insuumcnt[s] of political orthodoxy." While svmuathetic to the cause. even feminists like Jane Martin are critical of the methods that have arisen to circumvent the evils of essentialism, characterizing contemuorarv feminist scholarship as imposing its own "chilly climate" on those who question the methodolonical uroclivitv for difference and historicism. Postmodern feminists. she arcucs, have fallen victim to compulsorv historicism. and by "reiecting one kind of essence talk but adopting another," have followed a course "whose logical conclusion all but precludes the use of language." For

Martin, this apvroaches a "doymatism on the methodolonical level that we do not countenance in other contexts ....11rules out theories, catenaries, and research proiects in advancc; prciudgcs the extent of difference and the nonexistence oP s~milaritv." In all, it smaks to a methodological trap that produces many of thc samc problems as before, but this time in a language otherwise viewed as progressive, sensitive to the particularities of idcntity and gender, and destructive of conventional boundaries in disciplinary knowledge and theoretical endeavor.

AT: IR Fern -Makes Disci~line Meaninpless (Alt Fails) Feminist criticism of international relations makes the discipline meaningless- including cultural politics into international relations strips the discipline of any capacity to inform policy Jarvis 2k [DSL, 'International Relations and the Challenge of ~ostmodernism', February, Urziversily qf Snztth Carolina Publishing, pg. 168-1701 Melhcdologically, the imvlications of reifying false difference are also far from benign for International Relations, but betrav a devolution of dis- ciplinarv knowledge and theory amid sundrv. narratives ca~tive to personal "travelogues," attempts to recreate histories or enumerate a catalogue of previous "silences" simply on the basis that such has no1 been done before. The result is a tvpe of aeenda inflation, s~rawline research topics that. from a more traditionalist pers~ctive, would seen1 unrelated to International Refations.Considcr, for example, Ririgit Weiss. who attempted to extol the virtues of an identity-based research agenda for International Relations, suggesting that wc think of "symbols such as phone boxes. mail boxes. or the little green man flashing elecmnically above pedestrian crossing. [Thesel are national (identity) symbols which we seldom notice as such." she writes. "Only: (sic) once we are away from home do we perceive them as different. First deduction. Being abroad we learn to know what hon~e means." Travel, and thc distance associated with it, for Weiss "helps us to define who we are (and where we come fromtwhich is a necessary condition for developing an international perspective." Thc old adage that "travel does round the individual" is now reiterated in postnlodern fmm, and International Relations exalted to bcco~ne "inlerNETionalU or "intcr- cultural" studies where, for example, Weiss notes that with the internet "one can travel from ocean to ocean. from continent to continent. from country to country and around the globc in one night-lhrough cyber- space." One can only suppose that play on the inlemel assists in thc formation of our personal identities, makes us better scholars: and that rctlcctions on this can constitute discourse in "InterNETional" studies. As a final rdkction on what "intercultural" as opposed to International Rela- tions might look like. Weiss recalls the Container96---Artacross Oceam exhibition held in Copenhagen, where "adists corning tiom 96 seaport cities. ..cwtd art works inside the containers. The visitors wen: ablc to 'circumnavigate the globe in just a few hours' and could 'take a walk from continent to continent. from climazone to clima7.one and from seaport to seaport and enter into visions and rcalitics, 3s perceived by artists fmrn ncar and far."'l 15 "In my view." Weiss writes, "this exhibition is an cxample for an alternative vision of international relations, and might help us look beyond the scope of the discipline." 116 Similarly, Marysia Zalewski concerns herself "with the interscction between the intern~tional political economy and pregnant women's bod-ies," and

addresses concerns such as the "ethics of 'quality-controlled babies,'" the relationship between eugenics and economic ideulogies. and how thc "ubiquitous use of ultrasound is incrementally erasing thc pres- ence of the mother" while "the fetus is imagined as a sort of extra-terrestrial floating in 'space."' Her discussion is counterpoised against qiiestions that reflect on popular cultural images like the movies Tlzrre Men and a Bdv, Junior, and Tootsic. Ultimately, she is concerned vvith "what might happen whcn men can have babies? Or when thc boundary between women and machine collapses'? What might this do to our notions of subjectivity? Have reproductive technologies heralded the anival ofthe posthuman bodythe cyborg-at the end of the twentieth ccnrury'Yll7 Likewise. Cynthia Enlot: sees the purvicw of International Relations extending to such topics asthe dating practices of American soldiers and the rumors sum~unding "'barracks girls.' young British girls who leave home and in lime become rcsident sexual partners of American male soldiers." I18 Issues and topics germane to International Relations Enloe extends to interncial liaisons and romance9 hetween Afncan American GIs and British women; the scxual proclivities of U.S. soldiers; and observations that "Women crul seem as much a threat as a comfort to the modem wanior. A women is to be destroyed just as the enemy is to be destroyed"; or that somc soldiers are "far more ambivalent about womcn as a direct result of thcir militarized sexuality."l19 While interesting, one wonders if the disciplinaw parameters of International Relations are now so porous as to be meaninaless. If, as Martin Griffiths and Terry O'Callaghan suggest, "Anyone can 'ioin' IR, regard- less of their formal training." is there any longer an intrinsic meaning or purpose to what we do other than engage in academic musings for -thcir own sake? 121 Doesthis mean. for cxample. that no fomlal training or grounding in world politics will suffice as pxparation for studying them. that there is no core to oiir subject. no central conccms or rccuning themes that warrant at least n~dinlentary attenlion if one is to have an elementary gnsp of things international? The obliteration of intellectual boundaries, the suggestion that there is "no valid distinction hetween the internadonal and domestic s~heres,"I?I and that all issues are germane to International Relations supposes that we can not only "forget IR thcor~," as Roland Bleiker urges, but read, write, and research anything of nominal interest to us and call this international ~olitics. Birigit Weiss's vision of container art exhibitions or Cynthia Enloe's reflections on the posthuman body-the cyborg-threatens not just to expand the vistas of our discipline but. in doing so. make

us little more than a comoendium of the visua1 ans. science fiction. identities. oersonal stories. and research whims whose intellectual agendas are so disnarate as lo be meaningless. Indeed. precisely how this makes for better knowled~e and a better understanding of global politics or how such agendas or concerns arc related to global events and processes, we are never told. The onlv obicctive evident in the new identity politics sccms to be the "transg?.cssion of boundaries." where everything no matter how disparate is assumed to be related to international politics and where the vurview of our disciplinary lenses are counseled to have no focus but be encompassing of all thin~s social. political, and economic.

AT: IR Fern -I~noressuffer in^ of Men Their critique's over-focus on gender violence only serves to mask other forms of violence, particularly towards men Jarvis 2k [DSL, 'International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism', February, University of South Camlina Publishing, pg. 17 1-21 Yet, according to V. Spike Peterson, "male violence constitutes a 'global war against women,"' perpetrated with state complicity because of patriarchal relations that invariably see women suffer far more than men." In Peterson's estimation, womcn suffer a heavier burden than do men, suffer more emotional stress and bear the burden of patriarchal state expenditures that benefit men at the expense of womcn. "Systematic violence," things like "sexual harassment, battery, rape, and torture," Peterson and Runyan argue, "is the persistent price that women pay for the maintenance of large militaries." The implication, of course, is that mcn pav no vrice and enioy freedom from violence when. in fact. we know that hazing rituals, phvsical and verbal abuse, torture, and mental torment are daily occurrences throughout the armies of the world and these staffed almost cxclusivelv by men. Human rights trx, suggest Peterson and Runyan, are compromised by militarization. "Amnesty International vividly documents examples of military and police forces around the world terrorizing, imprisoning, and even torturing womcn who seek information about family members who have 'disappeared' at the hands of government-sponsored death squads." What Peterson and Runvan forget to add, howcvcr, is that by Amnesty International's own estimation. the overwhelm in^ number of political prisoncrs in the world who suffer crucl and inhumane treatment hav~en to be men: that those who "disappeared" under Argentina's military junta and Nicaragua's and El Salvador's U.S.sponsored death scluads in the 1980s were disprovortionately malc; and that torture of political prisoners by sheer weight of numbers therefore concerns, disproponionatelv. the torture of malc political vrisoners. Their critique ignores the suffering of males Jarvis2k [DSL, 'International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism', February, University of South Carolina Publishing, pg. 17 1-21 Even the traditional concerns of Inlcrnational Relations, war and conflict studies, are not spared from the biased framing of the gender variable. Cynthia Enloe, [or instance, tells of the plight of women during the Bosnian war and how Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian men used rape as an instrument of terror. By implication. however, we are left to assume that men in the Bosnian conflict endured no terror. brutality, or deprivations. but were simply the pcrpctrators of atrocities. Similarly, in discussing the Gulf War, Enloe is highly exclusive in dealing with gender, adequately narrating the plight of female migrant workers in Kuwait who suffered atrocities like rape and torture at the hands of Iraqi troops, but neglecting the "wider Iraqi process of detention, torture, execution. and forced removal ...of tens of thousands of Kuwaitis" that, "judging from the human-rights and media reports, [were1 virtually all male."

Narratives of this tvne reveal how exclusive has bcen the framing of the "gender variable" in International Relations, where men are characterized as a hegemonic gender-class whose interests, concerns, actions, and writings are ou~osed 10 the interests and wellbeing of women. As Sylvester writes, "states and their regimes connect with people called women only to cnsurc ...that the benefits of regime participation will flow from 'women' to 'men' and not ever the other way round." With such a mindset, facts become su~erfluous to the arrument(s), leading to a fallacy of composition where assertive urose is itself offered as evidence of the disnmnortionate level of burden or victimization that women suffer. Thus, for example, Jones is plainlv bemused at Ann Tickner's assertion that women have bcen forccd to enter "the militarv primarilv in the lower ranks." But, asks Jones. "how else does one enter the military. except at the lower levels?" Likewise, Peterson and Runyan assert that "the plight of both Third World and Western women has been exacerbated by the debt crisis." Third World and Western men, avparentlv. were untouched bv this same debt crisis. And when commenting on the migration south of the border of "thc jobs of many working-class women in the United States," Peterson and Runyan announce with horror how, bctwccn " 1979 and 1983,35747 of the workers who lost jobs because of plant closings in the United States were women." What they Fail lo point out, of course, is that this means that fully 65 percent of those who lost their jobs because of these same plant closings were men."' Moreover. if we look at the available evidence for issues like murder, suicide, homelessness, life expectancy. and mortalitv rates, we find that rather than a hegemonic gender-class. statisticallv men kill each other at a far greater rate than thev do women. commit suicide at a rate almost three times that of womcn. constitute about 80 percent of the homeless in the Ututed States, throughout virtuallv every communitv in the world live shorter lives than do women. and in the developed world suffer a mortality rate due to disease twice that for women.

AT IR Fern -Alt Fails Rethinking fails -The kritik is essentialist, reproducing the exact stereotypes produced under patriarchy Whitworth, Assistant Professor of Political Science York University, 1994 (Sandra, Feminism and International Relations: Towards a Political Economy of Gender in Interstate and Non-Governmental Institulions, p. 20) <Evcn when not concerned with mothering as such, much of the politics that emerge from radical feminism within IR depend upon a 're-thinking' from the persvective of women. What is left unexplained is how simplv thinking differentlv will alter the material realilics of relations of domination between men and women.'" Structural (~atriarchal) relations are acknowledged. but not analvsed in radical feminism's reliance on the cxpcricnccs. behaviours and perceptions of 'women'. As Sandra Hardine notes, the essential and universal 'man', long the focus of Ccminist critiques, hasmerely been replaced here with the essential and universal 'woman'." And indeed, that notion of 'woman' not only ignores important differences amongst women. but it also reproduces exactly the stereotypical vision of women and mcn, masculine and feminine, that has been produced under patriarch^.^' Thosc womcn who do not fit the mould -who, for examplc, lake up arms in military struggle -are quicklv dismissed as ex~ressing 'negative' or 'inauthentic' feminine values (the same accusation is more rarely made against men).") 1n this way, it comes as no surprise when mainstream 1R theorists such as Robert Keohane happily embrace the tenets of radical femini~rn.'~ It requires little in the way of re-thinking or movement from accepted and comfortable assumptions and stereotypes. Radical feminists find themselves dclcnding the same account of women as nurturing, pacifist, submissive mothers as do men under patriarchy, anti-feminists and the New Right. As some writers suggest, this in itself should give feminists pause to reconsider this position.51> Their alternative is nihilist-it rejects all forms of political action that could improve the way society views gender. Whitworth, Assistant Professor of Political Science York University, 1994 (Sandra, Feminism and Intcmational Relations: Towards a Political Economy of Gender in Interstate and Non-Governmental Institutions, p. 22-23) This points also to the serious limitations involved in feminist vostmodkrnist understandings of 'social construction'. While acknowledging that identitics and meanings are never natural or universal, mtmodernists locate the construction of those meanings almost exclusivelv in the play of an ambiguously defined power, organised through discourse. This meansthat identities and meanings are constructed in the absence of knowing actors, and more importantly, that there is very little that knowing actors can do to challenge those meanings or identities. The

ways in which vower manifests itself, the particular meanings and identities that emerEc. seem almost inevitable. They are unrelated to prevailing material conditions or the activities of agents and institutions. Similarly, critics mav describe the ~lav of power in the construction of meaning. but cannot participate in changing it.63 As Marysia Zalewski writes: The post-modernist intention to challenge the power of dominant discourses in an attemvt to lead those discourses into disarrav is at first glance agpealin~, but we have to ask what will the replacement be? If we are to believe that all is contingent and we have no base on to which we can ground claims to truth, then 'power alonc will determine the outcome of com~ting truth claims'. Post-modernist discourse does not offer any criteria for choosing among competing exvlanations and thus has a tendency to lead towards nihilism -an accusation often levelled at the purveyors of post-modemism and to which they seem unable to provide any answer, except perhaps in the words of onc post-modmist scholar 'what's wrong with nihilism'?64 Postmodcrnists are equally post-feminist, a title they sometin~cs adopt, for their analysis loses sight of the political imperatives which inform feminism: to uncover and change incsualities between women and men. As Ann Marie Goetz suggests, when many of the issues surrounding women and international relations are ones which concern the very survival of those women, postmodernism's continued back-twdallinn and disclaimers are not onlv politicallv unacceptable, they are, more im~ortantlv, politically irresponsible.

AT: IR Fern -No Gender Bias No evidence exists for gender bias in international relations -feminists substitute facts for feelings and create theory based upon isolated personal experiences Jarvis2k [DSL. 'International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism', February, University of So~tth Carolina Publishirtg, pg. 173-41 Crude characterizations of a herzemonic gender class thus display an anomalous capacity to ignore con~pletely those facts that do not accord with ideological belief. And postmodern feminists have been most adroit ac this. substituting the evidentiary re~uiremcnts of svstematic observation and reasoncd argument for identity discourses that rely on "perceptions" and "feelings." In a recent survey conducted for the International Studies Association (ISA) by the Committee for Study on the Status of Women in International Relalions. for example, Marie Henehan and Meredith Reid Sarkees frame thcir survcy in such a way as to measure the subjective perceptions of respondents. "The respondents were asked whether they had perceived gendzr bias in the coursc of their career."l39 In an alternate survey conducted for the same ISA conuittee. Christine Sylvester notes that "many respondents rcport feeling isolated within their departmerits and from major networks in the field."l40 Aside from thc obvious fact that pcrccptions of bias or feelings of isolation are not exctusive to women, questions of the methodological auvrovriateness of anecdotal evidence need also to be explored. That the reality of any situation can be gauged from personal narratives based exclusively won perception makes for bad social science and leads, ultimately, to destructive debates that hurl about subjective accusations. 141 Witncss, for example, the claims of matriarchal superiority when standpoint feminists insist that "women have a distinctive, superior view of the world, distinctive because shaped hy those features of their experiences that distinguish them from men, superior on the . . . basis that the oppressed are capable of a highcr form of awareness than the oppressor." 142 This is sirnply inverted patriarchy, premised on little more than fanciful whims about thc innatc characteristics of women vis-a-vis men. It replicates the privileging of' one gender over another and discharges all hove of eauality between genders on the basis of merit alone. Moreover, it invokes a crude and unsubstantiated argument derived through intuition, that women feel more deeply, are better knowers, and thus have better understandings of' international politics. But how is this different from vatriarchal-chauvinist claims that mcn are more rational, logical, strategic and women more emotional, less reasoned, and captive to their biological cycles? Both such arguments are equally as preposterous and necd to be abandoned, not invoked as a means forward for understanding international relations. More obviously, such silly methods tend toward a perverse hierarchical index of who suffers the most. who bears the most burdcn, feels the most hurt.

AT: IR Fern -Permutation (Realism) The only way to reconceptualize the feminist role in international relations is through empiricism working within a realist framework is necessary for change Keohane -1991 (Robert, Professof oflnternational Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University. "International Relations Theory: Contributions of a Feminist Standpoint," Gender and International Relations, ed. Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland, p. 45-6) <Nevertheless, emphasizing the victimization of women by 'the patriarchal state' or 'the intcrstate svstem' ~rovides only limited insights into international relations. Some analysts succumb to the temptation to discuss, in sweeping terips, 'thc patriarchal state' or 'the war systen~' without making distinctions among states or international systems. To do so commits the analytical error 01' reil'ving a stvlized 'patriarchal state' or 'war system'. Furthermore, excoriating universal repression seems to lead more toward moralizing about its iniquity than toward the analysis of sources of variation in its incidence. At a descrintrve level, a valuable contribution of feminist emviricisni would be to document the extent to which the inter-state system depends on thc under-rewarded labour of women or on genhered structures of society that disadvantage women. One can ask, as Cynthia Enloe has started to do, to what extcnt thc inter-state system is dependent on gendered roles (diplomat, soldier) that sharply differentiate, by gender, public and private realms." More ambitiously. feminist empiricism could seek to exvlort: the conditions under which repression of women is more or less severe: what types of statcs and international systems have more adverse consequences for women's lives than others'! To make a major impact on thinking about international relations, however, it will not be sufficient exvl ic it1 v to voint out that women have been marginalized in the state and in inter-state politics. This realitv is well known, even if conventional international relations theorv has tcnded to ignore it! Feminist empiricism will be most significant. it seems to me, if used in conjunction with feminist standpoint re-conceptualizations to re-examine central concevts of international relations theorv bv asking about their values for empirical research. Feminist empiricism, guided by feminist reconceptualization, could go beyond the cluestion of 'the' role of women in international relations' to a critical anal vsis of the extent to which contemporarv international relations theory helps us to understand what is havmnina in world politics today.>

Only the permutation solves -working within the realist framework is the only way to deny nihilism and include those outside of the feminist circle -necessary for change Keohane -1991 (Robert, Professof of International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, "International Relations Theory: Contributions of a Feminist Standpoint," Gender and International Relations, ed. Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland, p. 46-7) It seems to me that this post-modernist proiect is a dead end in the studv of intcmational relations -and that it would be disastrous for feminist international relations theory to pursue this path. Of course 1 am aware that social knowledge is always valuc laden and that objectivity is an aspiration rather than an accomplishment. But I obiect to the notion that because social science cannot attain anv perfectlv reliable knowledge, it is iustifiable for students of society to 'obliterate the validity of realitv'." I also obicct to the notion that we should happily accept the existence of multiple incommensurable epistemologies. each equallv valid. Such a view seems to me to lead away from our knowledge of the external world and ultimately to a sort of nihilism. Hawkcsworlh argues that 'the world is more than a text' and that feminists should avoid 'the postmodernist tendency to reiect all reasons'."' I would go further and say that agreement on epistemological essentials constitutes a valuablc scientific asset that should not be discarded lightlv. With such agreement, people with different commensurable terms can perhaps come to an agreement with the aid of evidence. As philosophers of science such as Imre Lakatos have argued, the invalidity of naive falsificationism does not destroy the possibility of establishing standards for scicntilic research: participants in the process apply criteria having to do with resolution of anomalies, discoverv of new facts, and what Lakatos calls 'the requirement of continuous growth'.'" A maior aim of science, evcn social science, is to provide us with a common set of epistemological tools, in a discipline. for ascertaining the nature of rcality and therefore testing the adequacy of our theories. This is not to pretend that any knowledge is perfectly 'objective': clearly our values, our upbringing, our bodily experiences and our positions in society -gender, class, culture, race -all afl'ect what we believe. But sciencc has the value of narrowing gaps in belief bv providing common standards to test beliefs, and therefore disciplining our minds, protecting us to some extent from bias. The very difficulty of achieving social scientific knowledge is an argument for cherishing rather than discarding social science and the aspiration for a more or lcss unified epistemology. I fear that many feminist theorists of international relations may follow the

currently fashionable path of fragmenting epistemology, denvinn the vossibilitv of social science. But I think this would be an intellectual and moral disaster. As Linda Alcoff voints out, 'poststructuralist critiaues of subiecti vi tv pertain to the construction of all subiects or thev pertain to none. .. . Nominalism threatens to wipe out feminism it~elf.'~' That is, feminist theorv cannot be without a positive standpoint -it cannot be only adversarial. Retreating to post-modcrn adversarial analysis would foreclose the relations that could be regarded as valuable by people outside the feminist circle. Scientifically. it would lead away from what I think fcminist thcorv should do: generate novcl hvpotheses that could thcn be evaluated with evidence, in a way that could lead to convincing results. Politically, as Hawkesworth declares, should ~ostmodernism's seductive tcxt pain ascendancy. it will not be an accident that vower remains in the hands of the white males who currently possess it. In a world of radical inequality. relativist resipnation reinforces the status QUO.''>

AT: Anthro~ocentrism -Anthro + Romance nature = extinction Rejection of anthropocentrism is reductionist, recreating hierarchies by romanticizing Nature -this causes humans to stop fearing death, causing extinction Hand -editor of TCRNews.com and an advocate for the homeless -2002 [Stephen, 2-21-2002, The Image of Cod vs. Animaility. http://tcrnews2.condnihil.html] Today. so-called Eco-theologians. like Matthew FOX and a host of othm. are heard calling for an "end to anthropocentrism". Human beings, they urgc, should no longer consider thetnselves as the centcr of creation, having "dominion" over the animal world hecausc Gcnssis, wherein this natunl hierarchy is first declared. is said to be outdated, fit only for demythologization. Moreover they pnss their views urgently. suggesting that Holy Mothcr the Planct will "die" if the new course is not taken. And because their theories are essentially the fruit of religious apostasy, they will brook no opposition. They have replaced God the Rther with thc morally indifferent Earth-Mother. All that matters to this new goddess is that shc beconle efficiently organized. Under the pretext of doing precisely that new modalities of power are being put in plucc worldwide. These powers are ~etlerally globalist in orientation and seek to unite the peoples of the world under one religion ---0ragrced upon religious principles--and one "world government". The Popes were warning about this pantheistic one-worldism at the very beginning of this ccntury, as witness Pius X's Apostolic letter to the Sillon in France. Obviously, when the Bible's creation-based, antropocentric, revelation is reiected, and an evolutionary animal continuum (from amoeba to -1 is presupposed as the only reality, then men begin taking their cues for behavior from the animal world. This rationalization has reached tragically absurd levels, as witness post-modernist writer Steven Shaviro's longing for the sexual aUtOnOm~ of bacteria. He spkslongingly ofthe "fluid promiscuity" of bacteria, "the earths most primordial inhabitants" which are "fmfrom any concerns about origins. any metaphysical nostalgia". Most importantly for Shaviro, bacteria induge in a milt free "perpetual orgy" where there is no "clear distinction between copulation and infection". ..and where there is no linkage between sexuality and reproduction.7 Shaviro sugnests that bacterial and insect models are "nature's" antidote to culture. He is far from alone in this kind of reductionism. One cannot watch the "nature" shows on television without being inundated with this incessant vropaganda. Thus the "freedom" of the ape is coveted. Nature is romanticized. And the dark side of the iungle is iauntily rationalized as if it were all iust fine. Onlv the spiritually blind can suppress the existential horror which this

picture should evoke in man, precisely because he is rational. such horror, if modern man had his wits about him, would hc vicwed as teleological, it.. pointing to thc truth and goal (Telos) of human existence. If man were a mere animal Or the moral equivalent of bacteria he should not fear death. If his death were as "natural" as an autumn leave falling, he would hardly consider death an existential shock. Unlike the animals,8 however, which are "irrational ...created by nature for capture and destruction" (2 Peter 2: 12), man is oriented to another Telos, to God Who is man's Freedom and Life who is the Alpha and Omega of existence. The negative essentializes 'nature' frustrating their alternative Barry, lecturer in the Department of Politics at Keele University, 1999 lJohn, Rethinking Green Politics. p. 521 Similarlv we can think of other animal calceorics such as 'pet' or 'food animal'. which like 'vermin' both describe thc particular relation in which that animal stands to us as well as prescribing the appropriate treatment. The point is the ubiquity of this normative 'backmound' that animals are not mere 'things'. Morally relevant categories in regard to the inanimate world arc less common but conccptualixations such as 'private propcriy', 'garden', 'national park', 'city' and in lcss enlightened times 'forest', 'uncharted lands', 'wasteland' and 'wilderness' are testamenl to the ubiquity and naturalness of human moral categorization of the external world.' This human conccrn with cateeorizino the natural world dcmonstrates that because wedo not interact with an entity called 'nature' or the 'environment', there can be no single moral princivlc lo govern this multifaceted and com~lex relation. In short, such moral categories and the process of categorization are partly constitutive of that relation.

AT: Anthro~ocentrisrn-Anthro kev to action/ecolo~ical conscience (alt fails) Concerns over humans and the well being of ecosystems cannot be separated -anthropocentrism is key to creating an ecological conscience, you don't solve your alternative Johnson-1996 [Pamela C., Development of an Ecological Conscience: is Ecocentrism a Prerequisite? The Academy of Management Review -peer reviewed journal, July] 3. Anthropocentrism, especially when motivated by concerns about intergenerational equity and justice, can be a strong foundation for the development of 'an ecological conscience. If one elevates the well-being of the entire human species, now and in the future, to the center of moral consideration, it becomes impossible to escape the conclusion that the well-being of humans and the well-being of the ecosystems on which we depend are inextricably linked. We have one small planet, and as a species we are interconnected with other species in a complex set of ecological relationships about which we have only limited understanding. It seems to me that egocentrism and ethnocentrism are more ecologically problematic than anthropocentrism. If we can get over the anthropocentric/ecocentric divide, we can begin to address some more pressing issues hinted at by Hanna (1995: 797) when he asked, for example, "What level of environmental disturbance would make it appropriate to close a plant or shut down a business (thereby significantly stressing and placing at risk a human 'community)?" Specific questions about the ethical principles and reasoning processes we use to mediate interspecies conflicts (particularly between "vital interests" of humans and other species) are the tough ones. Paradigm definition is necessary but insufficient to address such issues. Questions such as these are where the hard work of operationalizing an ethic or a paradigm really begins. Non-anthropocentric appeals won't mobilize action Light, professor of environmental philosophy and director of the Environmental Conservation Education Program, 2002 (Andrew, Applied Philosophy Group at New York University, METAPHILOSOPHY, v33, n4, July, p. 441) Even if Katz and Oechsli's arguments are technically correct as a possible statement of the implications of anthropocentrism in environmental policy and environmental activism, the facts ol' the case do not bear out their worries. And we can imagine this to bc so in many other cases. Even if sound nonanthropocentric motivations can be described for other policies clr acts of environmental heroism, at best we would expect that any motivation for any action would be mixed, especially when it is a human performing thal action. An environmental ethic that ignored this lesson would be one that would be ill fitted to participate in policy decisions where the context always involves an appeal to a variety of intuitions and not only to a discrete set. We must ask ourselves eventually: What is more im~orlant. settling debates in value theory correct or actually motivatinp pcople to act, with the commitment of someone like Mendes, to preserve nature? The pressing timeframe of environmental problcms should at least warrant a consideration of the latter.

AT: Anthro~ocentrism-Anthro kev to ~rotect environment/ecolo~ical conscience lalt fails) Acceptance of the prevalence of the anthropocentric mindset is necessary and must be incorporated or the critique fails. Light, Andrew, Assistant Professor of Environmental Philosophy and Director, Environmental Conservation Education Program, 2002 (Environmental Ethics: What Reallv Matters What Reallv Works David Schrnidtz and Elizabeth Willott, p. 561) It should be clear by now that endorsing a methodological environmental pragmatism requires an acceptance of some form of anthropocentrism in cnvironmcntal ethics, if only because we have sound empirical evidence that humans think about the value of nature in human terms and pragmatists insist that we must pay attention to how humans think about the value of nalure. Indeed, as I said above, it is a common presupposition among committed nonanthropocentrists that the proposition that humans are anthrovocentrist is true. though regrettable. There are manv problems involved in the wholesale reicction of anthropocentrism by most environmental philosophers. Whilc I cannot adequately explain my reservations to this rejection. for now I hope the reader will accept the premise that not expressing reasons for environmental priorities in human terms scriouslv hinders our ability to communicate a moral basis for better environmental policies to the public. Both anthrovocentric and nonanthropocentric claims should be open to us. Anthropocentrism helps create an environmental ethic necessary to protect humans and nature Barry, lecturer in the Department of Politics at Keele University, 1999rJohn. Rethinking Green Politics, p. 57-58] For example, by claiming part of nature as property people are obliged to treat it differently than if it were unowned. Individuals now stand in a different relation to that part of nature, because they now stand in a different relation to other humans. Thus, the treatment of nature viewed purely as a human resource can be guided, at least in part, by ethical considerations. In discussing the cluestion of how we ought to treat the non-human world the focus should be on the evaluation of the reasons given for varticular tvms of usape. Much of environmental ethics concerns itself with establishing that treatment he premised on the independent moral status of non-humans, rather than focusing on the primacv of the relational character of humanlnonhuman affairs. One possible reason for this proprietarian view suggested earlier is the non-anthropocentric conviction that a human-centred environmental ethic, resting on human interests in and valuations of nature, cannot guarantee the a priori preservation of nature from human use that many deep ecologists and cnvironmenlal ethicists see as the mark of any 'true' environmental ethic. Anthropocentric moral reasoning is held lo be a precarious and insufficient cthical basis for the ~rolcction of nature. If, however, we reiect the notion that an environmental ethic must be iudrred bv whether or not it secures this a ~riori protection for the natural world, and instead see the iob of anv environmental ethic as regulating actual human uses of nalurc and identifying abuses, then anthropocentrism uer se (as opposed to particular conccpdons of

it) need not stand accused of being part of the problem rather than van of the solution. It is the conviction of those who believe that non-anthropocentrisrn is necessary for an environmental ethic that leads to an emphasis on the non-anthropocentric powers, values or capacities, and which marks much of what I have called the proprietarian strand of environmental ethics. This nonanthropocentric ethic presents us with a picture of the world in which humans are disinterested valuers. The naturalistic anthropocentrism of an ethic of use sees humans as 'interested and partial valuers'. and active transformers of that world. Because a relational view ultimately turns on human interests and concerns, it is viewed as capable only of an 'ethic for the use of the environment' as opposed to a genuine 'cnvironmcntal ethic' (Regan, 1982), defined as an ethic which gives nonanthropocentric reasons for the protection of nature. What I wish to do in this section is to argue that an 'ethics of use' which regulates social-environmental interaction is a sensible ethical platform upon which actual. concrete human-nature conflicts and decisions can be resolved, and upon which peen politics can base itself. Anthropocentrisrn must be the basis of our green politics -the K fails in its rejection Barry, lecturer in the Department of Politics at Keele University, 1999[John, Rethinking Green Politics, p. 121 This chapter looks at deep ecology as the pre-eminent ecocentric approach within green moral theory. The aim of this chapter is not to offer a comprehensive overview of deep ecology, but to argue that as it stands deep ecology is insufficient to around meen political claims and ~olicv prescriations. The basic argument is that deep ecolosv is unable to provide the necessary normative basis for areen political theory. A central reason for this failure is that deep ecologv's non-anthropocenlrism is premised on a false understanding of anthrouocentrism. Allied to this is the particular understanding of morality and ethics within deep ecology, an understanding which gives little attention to the collective, intersubjective character of the ethical as a sphere of human action. The aim of this chapter is to clear the ground for the argument in the next where it is argued that anthropocentric moral reasoning is not only perfectly legitimate but fundamentallv necessary to green aolitics if the ggp between its political and philosophical claims is to be overcome.

AT: Anthro~ocentrism -Anthro Won't Hurt the Environment Anthropocentrism is not inherently destructive toward the environment -they've simply defined it that way Barry, lecturer in the Department of Politics at Keele University, 1999 [John, Rethinking Green Politics, p. 24-25] Sensitivity to the various gradations within anthromxentrism is blunted by the definition of anthropocentrism used by deep ecologists. Eckerslcv defines it as "the belief that there is a clear and morally rclcvant dividinfi line between 1-~uniankincd and the rest of nal 'ure, that humankind is the only or principal sourcc of valuc and meaninn in the world, and that non-hu man natul -e is there !'or no otl pumosc but to serve humankind. (1992a: 51, cmphasis added)" Breaking this statement down into three pro positions, we can d iscern different asmcts of the deer, ecolonical critiquc of anthropocentrism. Firstly, that there is a morally relevant divide between humans and non-humans is a statement that all except committed biospheric egalitarians would agree with. As explained in the next chapter, being human counts for something in a way which the charge that anthropocentrism is simply 'ungrounded speciesism' fails to register (Routley and Routley, 1979). That the difference between humans and nonhumans may be one of degree rather than kind does not deflate rhc importance of this basic distinction between how humans Interact with each other and how they interact with the rest of the world. As will be recalled, in the introduction I argued that the moral basis of green political theory is a composite one, made up of two moral spheres, one human only and the other concerning socialenvironmental relations. The second statement, that humans are the onlv morallv relevant beings in the world. does not follow from the first. Accepting our status as the onlv or main source of value and meaning in the world can ground widely different attitudes to the world. From this perspect~ve anything from the com~lete and unhindered exploitation of the world (the third statement) to the widespread protection of vast tracts of nature from human interference can be forthcoming. For purely human reasons, informed by the idea that we attribute value in an otherwise valueless world, our action in the world can be either extensive or minimal, and is compatible with extending moral considerations to human interaction with the non-human world. And finally, there is nothing inherently ecologicall~ unfriendly about the facl that humans, as Tar as we know. are the onlv species with a moral sense. It is the third statement that goes to the heart of the deep ecologv position, where anthropocentrisrn is understood as expressing an exclusively strong instrumentalist conception of the world. In Eckersley's formulation the non-human is said to be exclusively of instrumental concern to the anthropocentrist. However. it does not follow. either loqicallv or in practice. that the first two positions lead to this instrumentalist one. This hypothesis can be viewed as, in parl, a metaphysical claim, the idea that the world exists solely for human tine and enjoyment. Without such a metaphysical context it is difficult to sets how this statement can be meaningful. Unlike the previous two arguments, which can be though1 of as expressing general ethical features, the presumption that the non-human world is there purely for human use is a meta-ethical claim. The problem

wilh anthropocentrism, for deep ecology. is thus not how it operates as an ethical theory, since ethics is meaningless outside an anthropocentric context, but how it operates as a metaphysical position about the place it accords humans within the natural order. Yet therc is no necessary reason why this strange claim -which, religious justifications apart, would be extremely difficult lo establish should be thought of as essential to anthropocentrism. The real reason why deep ecologists are suspicious of reformed anthropocentrism is that the status of the non-human world remains contingent: that is, it does not enjoy permanently protected status. This suspicion rests on the fact that deep ecology has at its heart an a priori position which privileges the preservation of nature over the human use of nature (see below). Anthropocentrism doesn't exclude environmental protection Barry, lecturer in the Department of Politics at Keele University, 1999 [John, Rethinking Green Politics, p. 351 We may think of environmental virtue as having to do with the retinement of moral discernment in regard to the place of nature as a constilutive aspect of the human good. The cultivation of environmental virtues can then be regarded as a matter of discerning the place nature has within some particular human good or interest. A more positive statement would be to say that those who destroy nature are motivated by an unnecessarily narrow view of the human good, and that 'what they count as important is too narrowly confined' (Hill, 1983: 219). In so doing the inherent plurality of the 'human good' is occluded. That is, forms of anthropocentrisrn which narrow the human good and human interests can be criticized as vices, or potential vices. At the same time, those who destroy nature also often have a mistaken appreciation of the 'seriousness' (Taylor, 1989) of the human interest or good in the service of which nature is destroyed. However, to reiect anthropocentrism is not the solution, but is rather itself a vice of which we need lo be aware. A virtue approach is thus anthropocentric in that its reference point is some human good or interest, but as argued in the ncxl chapter, this ethical (as opposed to metaphysical) anthropocentrism is compatible with including considerations of non-human interests and welfare.

AT: Anthro~ocentrism -Humans and Nature are not zero-sum No internal link -humanlnature relations are not zero-sum Barry, lecturer in the Department of Politics at Keele University, 1999 [John, Rethinking Green Politics, p. 64-65] The point about the virtues is that they are both partlv constitutive of human well-being, while also being instrumentally valuable to human well-being. Thc claim that the practice of ecoloeical virtues is constitutive of well-being helps to offset the notion that green polit~cs necessitates sacrificing human welfare, a common view remised on the idea that the relationship between humans and nature is necessarily a zero-sum game. This leads to parasitic forms of socialenvironmental relations. Green politics, in the search for symbiotic relations, can take inspiration from the deep ecology notion that while human tlourishing is compatible with decreasing human impact on the world, the flourishing of the natural world requires such a decrease.

AT: Anthro~ocentrism-Perm Solves Best Immanent critique of anthropocentrism is better than rejection -only our permutation solves Barry, lecturer in the Department of Politics at Keele University, 1999 [John, Rethinking Green Politics, p. 7-81 Ecological stewardship, unlike ecocentrism, seeks to emphasize that a self-reilcxive, long-term anthropocentrism. as opposed to an 'arrogant' or 'strong' anthro~ocentrism. can secure many of the policv ohiectives of ecocentrism. in terms of environmental prcscrvation and conservation. As argued in Chapter 3, a refurmzd, reflexive anthropocentrism is premised on criticallv evaluating human uses of the non-human world, and distinguishing 'permissible' liom 'impermjssible' uses. That is. an 'ethics of use'. though anthropocentric and rooted in human interests, seeks to regulate human interaction with the environment bv distinguishing legitimate 'use' Srom uniustified 'abuse'. The premise for this defence of anthropocentric moral reasoning is that an immanent critique of 'arrogant humanism' is a much more defensible and effective way to express meen moral concerns than rciecting anthrouocentrism and developing a 'new ecocentric ethic'. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, ecocentric demands arc prcmised on an over-hasty dismissal of anthropocentrism which precludes a recognition of the positive resources within anthropocentrisrn for developing an appropriate and practicable moral idiom to cover social-environmental interaction. The permutation solves -only an immanent critique of anthropocentrism can spur a successful environmental movement Barry, lecturer in the Department of Politics at Keele University, 1999 [John, Rethinking Green Politics, p. 41-42] On the one hand there is the idea that green politics ought to be aimed at securinv public support for green policies and practices, which is of course esscntial for the democratic legitimacy of green politics as argued in Chapter 7. On the other hand any agreement must begin from an awareness of the political nature of many of the existing moral injunctions concerning human-nature relations. Prime examples are the various laws prohibiting cruelty to animals in most countries. Building on what was suggested in the last chaptcr, I wish to make the argument that the heart of the green political project lies in the exposition of the contradictions within contemporary moral thought and culture, rather than proclaiming the total crisis of Western culture and the bankruptcy of its anthropocentric moral tradition. It is the supposed bankruptcy, coupled with arguments concerning the 'dangerousness', of anthropocentrism that leads to calls for a 'new' (i.e. external) nonanthropocentric environmental ethic. However, & anthropocentrism has not been demonstrated to be either bankrupt or a 'dangerous' orientalion to the non-human world (Fox, 1990), the compulsion to search beyond anthropocentrism for an appropriate moral idiom loses much of ils force. An immanent critique of anthropocentrism ought therefore to be the strategy adopted in order to achieve public support for thc normative ends of green politics. For cxample, it would seem more likely that greens would secure normative aneement for their position by identifving discrepancies

within the present normative underpinning of current human-nature interaction. If greens present their normative case in terms of the contradictorv andlor the incomplete nature of the current dominant moral consensus on human-nature relations, the immanence of their position means that it would be both stronger (because nonanthropocentric accounts do not hold up under scrutiny) expressed in a language readilv understood by those to whom its message is addressed.

AT: Global -local: Permutation Solvencv Perm solvency- global and local communities are interconnected. We shouldn't give up our local identity, but we should look at the world community first. Nussbaum, Professor of Law and Ethics at University of Chicago Law School, 1994 [Martha, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,"The Boston Review, www.soci.niu.edul~hiIdept/Kapitanlnussbauml .htmI] <The Stoics stress that to be a citizen of the world one does not need to give up local identifications, which can frequently be a source of great richness in life. They suggest that we think of ourselves not as devoid of local affiliations, but as surrounded by a series of concentric circles. The first one is drawn around the self; the next takes in one's immediate family; then follows the extended family; then, in order, one's neighbors or local group, one's fellow city-dwellers, one's fellow countrymen --and we can easily add to this list groupings based on ethnic, linguistic, historical, professional, gender and sexual identities. Outside all these circles is the largest one,.that of humanity as a whole. Our task as citizens of the world will be to "draw the circles somehow toward the center" (Stoic philosopher Hierocles, 1st 2nd CE), making all human beings more like our fellow city dwellers, and so on. In other words, we need not give up our special affections and identifications, whether ethnic or gender-based or religious. We need not think of them as superficial, and we may think of our identity as in part constituted by them. We may and should devote special attention to them in education. But we should work to make all human beings part of our community of dialogue and concern, base our political deliberations on that interlocking commonality, and give the circle that defines our humanity a s~ecial attention and respect. > Our argument is not that we should eliminate local levels, but rather that the global levels should be looked a first Nussbaum, Professor of Law and Ethics at University of Chicago Law School, 1994 [Martha, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,"The Boston Review, www.soci.niu.edu/philde~t/Kapitan/nussbauml.htrnl] <mclearly did not mean that the Stoics were proposing the abolition of local and national forms of political organization and the creation of a world state. The mint was more radical still: that we should rrivc our first allegiance to no mere form of government, no

temporal power, but to the moral community made u~ by the humanity of all human bcin~s. The idea of the world citizen is in this way the ancestor and source of Kant's idea of the "kingdom of ends," and has a similar function in inspiring and re~ulating moral and political conduct. Onc should always behave so as to treat with equal respect the dignity of reason and moral choicc in cvcn, human m.It is this conception, as well, that inspires Tagore's novel, as the cosmopolitan landlord struggles to stem thc Lidc or nationalism and factionalism by appeals to universal moral norms. Many of the specches of the character Nikhil were drawn from Tagore's own cosmopolitan political writings. >

AT: Global -local: Global Action Good We have a moral obligation to the global community, where we were born and where we live are all just accidents, we all belong to the global community Nussbaum, Professor of Law and Ethics at University of Chicago Law School, 1994 [Martha, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,"The Boston Review, www.soci.niu.edu/phildept~Ka~itanlnussbaum1 .html] <Asked where he came from. thc ancient Greek Cynic hil lo sop her Diogenes replied. "I am a citizen of the world." He meant by this, it appears. that he refused to be defined bv his local origins and local goup memberships, so central to the self-image ofa conventional Greek male; he insisted on defining himself in terms of more universal aspirations and concerns. The Stoics who followed his lead developed his imagc of the kosmou politCs or world citizen more fully. arguing that each of us dwells, in effect. in two communities --the local community of our birth, and the community of human argument and aspiration that "is truly great and trulv common, in which we look neither to this corner nor to thal, but measure the boundaries of our nation by the sun" (Seneca, De Otio). It is this community that is, most fundamentally, the source of our moral obligations. With respect to the most basic moral values such as justice, "we should regard all human beings as our fellow citizens and neighbors" (Plutarch, On the Fortunes of Alexander). We should regard our deliberations as, first and foremost, deliberations about human problems of people in particular concrete situations, not problems growing out of a national identity that is altogether unlike that of others. Diogenes knew that the invitation to think as a world citizen was, in a sense, an invitation to be an exile from the comfort of patriotism and its easy sentiments, to see our own ways of life from the point of view of justice and the good. The accident oC where one is born is iust that, an accident: any human being might have been born in anv nation. Recognizing this, his Stoic successors held, we should no1 allow differences of nationalitv or class or ethnic membershiv or even gender to erect barriers between us and our fellow human beings. We should recognize humanity wherever it occurs, and give its fundamental ingredients, reason and moral capacity, our first allegiance and respect. > Working global allows us to have self knowledge, solve our problems better, and allows us to recognize the value of each and every person Nussbaum, Professor of Law and Ethics at University of Chicago Law School, 1994 [Martha, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,"The Boston Review, www.soci.niu.edu/phildepWKapitan/nussbaurn1.htrnl]

<Stoics who hold that good civic education is education for world citizenship recommend this attitude on three grounds. First, & hold that the studv of humanitv as it is realized in the whole world is valuable for self-knowledge: we see ourselves more clcarlv when we see our wavs in relation to those of other reasonable people. Second, they argue, as does Tapore, that we will be better able to solve our problems if we face them in this wav. No theme is deeoer in Stoicism than the damage done bv faction and local alleniances to the ~olitical life of a moun, Political deliberation. they argue, is sabotaged again and again by partisan loyalties, whether to one's team at the Circus or to one's nation. Onlv bv makine our fundamental allcniance that to the world communitv of iustice and reason do we avoid these dangers. Finally, they insist that the stance of the kosmou ~olitEs is intrinsicallv valuable. For it recoenizcs in nersons what is esveciallv fundamental about them, most worthy of respect and acknowledgment: their aspirations to justice and goodness and their capacities fbr reasoning in this connection. This aspect may be less colorful than local or national traditions and identities --and it is on this basis that the young wife in Tagore's novel spurns it in favor of qualities in the nationalist orator Sandip that she later comes to see as superficial; it is, the Stoics argue, both lasting and deep.> Global planning and global knowledge are key to survival Nussbaum, Professor of Law and Ethics at University of Chicago Law School, 1994 [Martha,"Patriotismand ~osmopo~itanism." The Bostoiz Review. www.soci.niu.edu/-philde~t/Ka~itan/nussbauml.html] <We make headway solving problems that require international cooperation. The air does not obey national boundaries. This simple fact can be, for children, the beginning of the recognition that. like it or not, we live in a world in which the destinies of nations are closelv intertwined with respect to basic goods and survival itself. The vollution of third-world nations who are attempting to attain our high standard of living will. in some cases. end up in our air. No matter what account of these matters we will finally adout. anv intelligent deliberation about ecologv --as, also, about the food supply and population --rewires global planning, global knowledze. and the recognition of a shared future. >

AT: Global -local: Global Action Good Working at a global level is key to understanding problems in the world, a local approach focuses strictly on our problems, and disregards the struggles of other peoples in other nations Nussbaum, Professor of Law and Ethics at University of Chicago Law School, 1994 [Martha, "Patriotismand Cosmopolitanism,"The Boston Review, www.soci.niu.edulr>hildew~Kawitan/nussbauml .htrnl] <But is it sufficient? As students here grow up, is it sufficient for them to learn that thev are above all citizens of the United States, but that they ought to respect the basic human rinhts of citizens of India, Bolivia, Nigeria, and Norway? Or should they, as I think --in addition to giving special attention to the history and current situation of their own nation --learn a good deal more than is frequently the case about the rest of the world in which thev live, about India and Bolivia and Nigeria and Norway and their histories, problems, and comparative successes? Should they learn only that citizens of India have equal basic human rights, or should they also learn about the problems of hunger and pollution in India, and the implications of these problems for larger problems of global hunger and global ecology? Most important, should thev be taught that they are above all citizens of the United States, or should they instead be tau~ht that they are above all citizens of a world of human beings, that, while they themselves happen to be situated in the United States, they have to share this world of human beings with the citizens of other countries? 1shall shortly suggest four arguments for the second conception of education, which I shall call cosmopolitan education. But first I introduce a historical digression, which will trace cosmopolitanism to its origins, in the process recovering some excellent arguments that originally motivated it as an educational pro-ject. > Global resistance has the power to create broad coalitions Gills -2002 [Barry K.Chair of the World Historical Systems theory group of the International Studies Association and a f'aci~ltyaflilhte of'thc Globalization Rcscarch Center of tlie University of Hawaii, "Democratizing Globalization and Globalizing Democracy. May. Annals of the American Acadc~ny of Political and Social Scicncc, May] In this sense, we may conclude that we are living through the (gradual or sudden?) demise of the old world order and the (slow or suddcn?) birth of a new one. Economically, this new order is based on an increased level of global economic integration and unison. Politically, howcver, it is premised on the need to translate grassroots particiuatory political action into increasinelv uouular

democratic forms of Eovernance at local, national, regional, and global levels (Gills 2000c; 2001). Moreover, italso based on a real need to combine the peoples and social forces of North and South in new ways. bringing, together new coalitions drawn from movements around the world. The Irovernments and the corporations of the world must now listen to and accommodate the demands of the ueoplcs ol' the whole world, who represent the voice of the governed. This new reality, which in my view is an objective onc and not merc idealism, therefore requires a new [*I691 paradigm. This new paradigm of world order must be based profoundly on nlulticivilizational dialogue and universal inclusion. Rather than a political order based on one nation, we are moving toward the need for a political order based on one humanity, and only democratic norms can accommodate such a form of governance.

AT: Global -local -Alt I~noresHuman Rights Working strictly on a local level disregards human rights Nussbaum, Professor of Law and Ethics at University of Chicago Law School, 1994 [Martha, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," The Boston Review, www.soci.niu.edul~hilde~t/Kapitan/nussbauml .htrnl] <Proponents of nationalism in politics and in education frequently make a thin concession to cosmopolitanism. They may argue, for example, that although nations should in general base education and political deliberation on shared national values, a commitment to basic human rights should be part of any national educational system, and that this commitment will in a sense serve to hold many nations together.3 This seems to be a fair comment on practical reality; and the emphasis on human rights is certainly necessary for a world in which nations interact all the time on terms, let us hope, of justice and mutual respect. >

AT: Global -local: No Alternative Nayar concedes that his philosophy is vague and that there is no alternative to the problems he presents Nayar 99(Jayan Nayar, professor of la% a1 thc University of Warwick, Orders of Inhumanity, leuis) <And so, what might 1 conlrihutc lo the prcscnt collective excrcisc toward a futuristic imaging of human possibili~ics? I am unsurc. II is onlv from mv v~cwoftht "world." aflcr :ill. that 1can proicci my visions. These visions do not go so far as to visualize any "world" in its totality; they are uncertain cvcn w~th regard to worlds closcr lo home. worlds reouirinp ~ransfctrmatorv aclions all lhc same. Tnstcad of fulfill~ng this task of' imagining hturc thereforc I simply suhmit the following two "poems.">

AT: Global -local: Checks on elobalization now (no need for global state) A centralized state is unnecessary, we have a system of checks and balances to check back globalization Brecheretal, Historian, Activist, and Analyst for Foreign Policy in Focus, 2000 [Jeremy, Tim Costello and Brendan Smith, Clobulizutionfrom Below, p. 42-43] <A centralized global state is not required to address these vroblems. Indccd. the difficult)' of establishing such an institution and the equally important difficulty of making it democratically accountable make such a state a dubious objcctivc Uor thc advocates of globalization from below. But supranational regulation does not require such centralization; the pattern of overla~uing authority and multiple lovaltics that is now emerring suggests the vossibilitv of a system of checks and balances within an emerging global volitv.'" As Filipino activist and scholar Walden Bello put it, Today's need is not another centralized global institution, reformed or unreformed, but the deconcenhation and decentralization of institutional power and the creation of a pluralistic system of institutions and organizalions interacting with one another amid broadly detined and flexible agreements and understandings.ln Instead of counteruosing local, national, global, and other levels of power ,advocates of globalization from below should ar,auc for a strendhcning in both state and civil society at every lcvel of those nonmarket functions that are necessary to protect people and planet. People need to be empowered at even,' level vis-a-vis corporations and the market. The needed non-market functions should be initiated at any appropriate level, in state and/or civil society, in ways that strengthen the gassroots movement and raise those at the bottom.">

AT: Nietzsche /Nihilism -Replicates Status Ouo Problems Nihilism is an ineffective means of resistance that replicates everything bad about the status quo Mann, Professor of English at Pomona, 1995 (Paul, "Stupid Undergrounds," PostModern Culture 53, Pro-ject MUSE) One might find it amusing to assume the pose of someone who states problems with brutal simplicity. As in this litllc nugget: Every historical form of cultural and political revolt, transgression, opposition. and escape has turned oul to bc nothing more than a systemic function. The notion of recuperation has encountered a thousand alibis and counter-tropes but still constitutes the closest thing cultural study has to a natural law. Collage. antimelodic highdecibel music, andmasterpicccs, romantic primitivism, drunkenness and drugs, renegade sexuality, criticism itscll': it is amazing that a singlc radical claim can still be made for any of this, and entirely characteristic that it is. Every conceivable form of negation has bccn dialectically coordinated into the mechanism of progress. The future of the anti has not yet been reconceived. That is why it is ridiculous to accuse some poor kid with a bad attitude or some putative grownup with a critique but no "positive program for change" of being nihilistic: strictlv speaking, nihilism doesn't exist. What was once called nihilism has long since revealed itself as a general, integral function of a culture that, in all its glorious pos~tivism, is far more destructive than the most vehement no. Nothing could be more destructive. more cancerous. than the positive proliferation of civilization (now there's a critical cliche), and all the forms of oppos~tion have long since revealed themselves as nieans of advancing 11. As for the ethos of "resistance": iust because something feels like resistance and still manages to offend a few people (usually not even the right people) hardly makes it effective. It is merely ressentiment in one or another ideolodcal drag. And how can anyone still be deluded by youth, by its tedious shrugs of revolt? Even the young no longer believe their myth, although they are quite willing to promote it when convenient. Punk nihilism was never more than the nihilism of the commodity itself. You should not credit Malcolm McLaren with having realized this just because he was once pro-situ. All he wanted was to sell more trousers without boring himself to death; indeed he is proof that the guy with the flashiest ressentiment sells the most rags. And if he wasn't bored, can he be said to have advanced the same favor to us? Nihilism entrenches ideas that promote arrogance and victimization Dyson, 05, (Maurice R., Assistant Professor of law at SMU, "Awakening an Empire of Liberty: Exploring the Root of Socratic Inquiry and Political Nihilism in American Democracy," Democracy Matters: Winning the Fight Against Imperialism, v. 83 no2 p. 575-602, Wash Univ Law Quarterly, ISSN: 004-0862, Wilsonselect plus) Furthermore, for West. these three entrenched do~mas are in turn driven by three forms of "political nihilism." These are evan~elical nihilism, paternalistic nihilism, and sentimental nihilism. "Evangelical nihilism" is a notion of arrogant superiority that iustifies might

as right, or in other words, the belief that the U.S. would not be so ~owerful if we were not right. West terms it "evangelical" because of its perceived militant intolerance for dissension as well as blind faith to the bclicf that the exercise of power is a prcdicatc to ensuring security and prosperity. For West, the quintessential evangelical nihilist is derived from Plato's Republic in the form of Thrasynlachus who debates with Socrates the moral superiority of might. (FNl) Paternal nihilism, on the other hand, treats American citizens as victims ofdcccption bv govcrnmenl actors who in turn attempt to superficially appease the masses. These governmental leaders fundamentally accept corrupt regimes and policics rather than question them.He hds in Fyodor Dostoyevsky's The Brothers Karamazov the literary metaphor for paternal nihilism in the form of the Grand Inquisitor. As West points out, this character knows full well the atrocities of the Inquisition represent a gross distortion of the Christian gospel. but nonetheless, personally takes part in condemning infidels to death sentences because he believes the corrupted church is the best that mankind can hope for.(FN2) The political nihilist is faulted here not iust for his failure of imagination to envison a truer democracy. but for his lack of conviction to battle corrupt elites even when history has shown these battles can be vigorously waged.(FN3) Sentimental nihilism refers to West's belief that the news media's oversimplification and sensationalized reporting of global cvenls sacrifices truth for distraction. Sentimental nihilism pacifies the American people by blunting the critical aspccls of news cvcnts that implicate corruption in government.

AT: Nietzsche/Nihilism -Results in No Value to Life Nietszche's denying of being leads to nihilism by removing all meaning in life. This leads to an endless search for power which never is successful Hicks, Prc>fcssor and chair of philosophy at Queens College of the CUNY, 2003 (Stcvcn V., "Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Foucault: Nihilism and Beyond," Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters, Ed. Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, p. 109,Questia) <Here again, onc might raise objections to Heidcgger's equating of Nietzsche's doctrine of will to power with thc metaphysics of subjectivity. Aftcr all, Nietzsche often attacked Dcscartes's "ego cogito" as a logical or linguistic tiction (cf. BGE, 88 16, 54). Yct according lo Heidcggcr, Nietzsche still follows Descartes's lead in making human beings the subiect or ibundation of things. Unlikc Descarles. howcvcr, Nictxsche's subject is not a fixed mental substance, but the body interpreted as a center 01' instincts, drives, affects, and sublimations, i.e., as will to power. Heidegger claims that this "body as given" idea still involves Nietzsche in a "fixitv" that brings him into thc philosophv of presence: "Nictzsche argues that king is as fixated, as permanent" (N, 2:200). And this forced sense of presence. Hcidcgger thinks, leads to thc dangcrs of "radical obiectitiability" and to the "disposability of beings, "i.c., treatinn beings as nothing but obiects of use, control, and management. 32 Moreover, like its Cartesian counterpart, thc Nictzschean subject reins supreme ovcr the whole of beings and posits "the measure for the beingness of every ... being" (N, 4:121). 33 In claiming that "truths are illusions" and that "Being is an empty fiction, " Nietzsche "fashions for the subject an absolute power to enjoin what is true and what is falsc" and hence to define what it means "to be" or "not to be" a being (N, 4:145). According to Nietzsche, what is trucwhat has being-is thal which serves the interest of the subject whosc essence is will to powcr (in the mode of existcncc of eternal recurrence; cf. N, 2:203). Being is thus reduced to the status of a value or a "condition of the preservation and enhancement of the will to power" (N, 4:176). This is why Heidegger considers Nietzsche the "consummation, " and not the overcoming, of Western metaphysics: bv reducing Being to a value. the doctrine of will to power makes the nihilism of the metaphvsical tradition (the assumption that Being itself is nothing and the human will everything) a matter of ~hiloso~hical vrincivie. 34 Thus Nietzsche's "counter-ideals" of will to power and eternal recurrence. far from overcoming nihilism, actually express or exemplifv the loss of any sense of Being, or the withdrawal of Being itself, in favor of beings (ie., products of human will). As Heideager reads him, Nietzsche understands Being in terms of value (or what is useful for enhancing the human will) because Being itself has totally withdrawn in default. And this brings to completion traditional metaphvsics. which, according to Heidegger, is the history of Being in its withdrawal. As Heidegger sees it, Nietzsche's metaphysics of will to power is "the most extreme withdrawal of Being" and thus 'the fulfillment of nihilism pro~er" (N, 4:204. 232). So Nietzsche brings to completion. in his denial of Being, the very nihilism he wanted to overcome.

Far from twisting free of the ascetic ideal, Heidegger claims, Nietzsche 's doctrine of will to power actuallv urovides the basis for its most complete exuression in the modern "secularized" ascetic "willtocontrol" evervthing. In other words, instead of seeking salvation in a transcendent world bv means of ascetic self-denial-the aspect of metaphvsics that Nietzsche most obviouslv reiects-salvation is now, Heidergcr claims, sought "exclusivelv in the free self-development of all the creative powers of man" (N, 4339). This unlimited expanding of power for power's sake parallels in manv wavs what Nietzsche characterized as the most terrifying aspect of the ascetic ideal: thc vursuit of "truth for truth's sake." It is, according to Heidcgger, the "hidden thorn" in the side of modcrn humanity (ci: N, 4%). This "hidden thorn" expresses itself variously in the Protestant "work ethic" and in the "iron cage" of bureaucraticLcchnological rationality (discussed in the works of Max Weber); it also expresses itself in the various power aims of modern scientific/technologicalculture as well as in the fkenzied impulse to produce and consume things at ever faster rates. Heidem suggests that Nietzsche's own fimre of the Overman (Ubennensch) foreshadows the calculatina. technological attitude of modern secularized asceticism: "His Overman [standsl for the technological worker-soldier who would disclose all entities as standingreserve necessarv for enhancing the ultimately aimless quest for vower for its own sake." 35 This emerging technologjcal human, pounded in a control-oriented anthropocentrism, compels entities to reveal onlv those one-dimensional aspects of themselves that are ccmsistent with the power aims of a technological/vroductionist culture. Instead of dwelling and thinking in a world unified by what Heidegger metaphorically terms the "fourfold of earth and sky, gods and mortals, " impoverished modern technocrats occupy a world "bereft of gods" in which thinking becomes calculating. and dwelling becomes tantamount to the "technological domination of nature" and what Nietzsche calls "the common econonlic management of the earth ;Iwhich "mankind will be ahle to find its best meaning as a mtchiie in the service of this economy" (WP. F) 866). Thus citizens come to he viewed prinlarily as consumers, wilderness is looked upon in terms of "wildlife managemot areas, "and genuine human freedom is "rcplaced by the organized global conquest of the earth. and the thrust into outer space" (N. 4:248). As Heidegger sees it. "our en entertains the illusion that man. having become tiee for his humanity, has freely taken (he universe into his power a1~1 disposition" (N, 4:248). 111 sutnnnry, Niel~-qcl~e tried lo combat tk nihilism of the ascetic ideal (e.g., the collnpse of the Christian trtble of values) by bringing fixth new wnascetic values thal would enhance rather than devalue hunlanity's will to power. According to Heideger. however, instead of overcoming nihilism, Nietzsche simply reinforced it. Bv characterizing Bcing as an "em~tv tiction" and "the last smoke of a vaporized realitv " (TI, 2:2,481), and by degrading it to the status of a value for enhancing the subject's will lo power, Nietzsche loses anv sense of Being as such. For him it is a mere nothing, a "nihil." And this

brings to completion the "fundamental movement" of historv in the West. which is nihilism: the withdrawal of Being itself and the consequent focus on beings as objects for "consolidating the uower of Will and for expanding it out bevond itself' in an everincreasing spiral. 36 As Heidegger sees it, this "eternally recurring" will to power, or "will to will. " is a will-to-control that only reinforces the nihilism Nietzsche feared: the loss of meaning or direction, the devaluation of the highest values, the "constructs of domination, "and the devotion to frenzied consumption and production.>

AT: Nietzsche/Nihilism-.Tus tifies Holocaust Nietzsche's philosophies legitimized Nazism and the holocaust Ortega-Cowan, 03, (Roman, B.A. Boston College, J.D. with honors @ Florida State University College of Law, "Dubious Means to Final Solutions: Extracting Light from the Darkness of Ein F Hrer and Brothcr Number Onc," Florida State University Law Review, Fall, 31 Ha. St. U.L. Rev. 163) Finally, Nietzsche's emphasis on the triumph of the will over emotion gavc thc Nazis the mcntal strength to accomplish thc horrors ol' the Holocaust. n35 The choice of self-delinition through hardness was scen as central to the establishment and assertion of a new national idenlitv. and such emphasis led to a devaluation of human comp,assion and othcr cmolions. n36 Wilh a set ideolozy of hatred founded upon angry anti-Semitism, a belief in "scientific" racial superiority, and a will immune from emotional influence, the Nazis embarked on a catastrophic mission tmectina a clearlv defined enemy. After taking control of the government, they quickly built a wall of legal repression around thc Jcws, which culminated in the Nuremberg Laws and Kristallnacht decrees and left the Jews vulnerable to the violence that lay ahead. n37 Nietzsche's philosophies were the driving forces behind Hitler's dictatorship - - placing supreme value on the "higher man" legitimizes all atrocities May, 99, (Simon, College Research Fellow in Philosophy @ Birkbeck College, Nietzsche's Ethics and his War on 'Moralitv,' "Nietzsche's ethic versus 'morality': The new ideal," p. 132-133) An apologist for Niehschc might suggest that his ethic is not alone in effectively legitimizing inhumanity. He might argue, for example, that some forms of utilitarianism could not prevent millions being sacrificed if greater numbers could thereby be saved; or that heinous maxims could be consistently universalized by Kant's Categorical Impcrativc-maxims against which Kant's injunction to treat all human beings as ends in themselves would afford no reliable protection, both bccause its conception of 'humanity' is vague and because it would bc overridden by our duty, as rational agents, to respect just such universalized maxims. To this apologist one would reply that with Nietzsche there is not even an attempt to produce a systematic safety net against cruelty, especially if one iudges oneself to be a 'hieher' type of person with life-enhancing pursuits-and, to this cxtent, his philosophy licenses the atrocities of a even though. by h~iperwn.1 labh ofvalue.;. heexcunlres unl~Semnam and vtrulcnt nat~oa,rltrm Indeed. lo tho[ extent it is irrelevanl whether or not Nietzsche himself advocates violence and bloodshed or whether he is the gentle person described bv his contemporaries. The reality is that the supreme value he places on individual life-enhancement and self-legislation leaves room for, and in some cases explicitly iuslifics, unfettered brutality.

In sum:the p~inl here isno1 lo rebut Nict7.rche's claim thal 'everylhing evil. teniblc. tyranniwl in mim' serves his enhancemenl :Ismuch as iunppsile doe$'(ROE. Lmy emphesti)-- for arh a rebutla1 would bc a major CIK~Ionknking in is oan"8hl. It is rather to suggest that the necessary balance between dan~er and safetv which Nietzsche himself regards as a condition for flourishing cforexlunpk, inrKic,~iote inrmBCX.44) is not vouchsafed by his extreme individualism. Indeed, such individualism seems not only self-defeating, but also quite unnecessary: for safeguards against those who have pretensions to sovereignty but lack nobility could be accepted on Nietzsche's theory of value as lust another 'condition for the preservation' of 'higher' types. Since the overriding aim of his attack on morality is to liberate people from thc repressiveness of the 'herd' instinct, this unrelieved potential danger to the 'higher' individual must count decisively against the success-and the possibility oS succcss-of his prqiect.

AT: Nietzsche/Nihilism -Justifies Holocaust Nietzsche's philosophies legitimized the Holocaust --his notions of master morality fueled the fire behind genocides of the weak and imperfect through framing them as "man's greatest danger'' Aschheim, 97, (Steven E., German Cultural and intellectual History professor @ the Hebrew Universily, Jcrsalem, Nietzsche and Jewish Culture, "Nietzschc, Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust," cd. Jacob Golomb, p. 13-16) At my nte. what I am propnsing here is 1b?1 hoth in its o\vrll hiocogenic prlilial and medical vision. its pm~nrnmalic ohseraion with degcnerathn end repnerntbn. whether in pflodistic foml or ult. there are ckar inloritling pacllkls wilh key NielLxheea categories ad goals. Rem one prqeclivc. :IS itokn Jay 1,iftos has recently perssrwsivcly ;irgved. Nazism is a h ~ ~ the "medicalisation of killing". genocidal impulses were implicit within a bio-medical vision and its vast, self-vroclaimed pronrammatic task of racial and eugenichygiene. On an unprecedented scale it would assume control of the human biological future, assuring health to positive racial stock and purging humanity of its sick. deoenerative elements. Its vision of "violent cure". of niurder and genocide as a "therapeutic imperalive",Linonargucs, resonates with such Nietzschean themes.40 While every generation mav emphasize their particular Nietzsche, there can be little doubt that in the first half of this century various Eurooean political circles came to rcgard him as the deepest diagnostician of sickness and degeneration and its most thorounhnoing regenerative therapist. "The sick, he wrote, "are man's greatest danger: not the evil, not the 'beasts of vrey'."41 TOhesure, as was his wo1tt. employed these nnlmns In luult!ple, shifting ways. ;ls nslaphor and "on! (hc even has a sectton or1 'ennoblement through dcgeneralion"??) but must oilen. most c~~tcially. it was repr?scnlfd (and ttnlnsln~dl as a subtanlial literal danger whose overcoming thn~ph dmic Although he Was no1 alotlc in the wider mcasurcs w.ls the prccondilion tor the urgent rc-creation oro "natornlimil". ~tondccadcnr hl~~~ta~ititd. nineteenth-century suasi-bio-medical, moral. discourse of "de~eneration"43 -that highly flexible, politically adiustable tool that cut across the idcological spectrum, able simultaneously to locate. diaanose and resolve a vrevalent, though inchoate, sense of social and cultural crisis through an exercise of eugenic labeling and a langua-e of bio-social pathologv and potential renewal44 -hc formed an inlcgral part in detininr! and radicalizing it. He certniniyconstitltted its most important conchti1 into theemeqinpradicnl right. what else was Niet~.whe's Leknsphilnx~phie, hiS

reassertion of instinct and his proposed transvaluation whereby the healthy naturalistic ethic replaced the sickly moral onc (a ccntraltheme ulnve~lict~tly isnored or elidcd by thc clllTcnl p>st-slructur.~list champions of Yicvmhc). "Tell me, my brothers". Zxalhustra usks. "whal du we convnkr bad sod wont oPaU? Is it not degenerntionl'"l5 In this world. the wassenion ol all that is meral md hc~lthy is dependent upon Ihe nlthless extirpation of tho,% mli-mtural ressenlimern sources oldegenention who haw thoroughly weaked and ialsilied thc twlural and arislucnlic bilses ld life. Over and over again. and indiffeermt wayh. Nkt~whe declared lhdl "The s-ics requires that lhe ill-constiluled. weak, degenerate, prisW.46 The Nazi bio-political understanding of. and solution to "degeneration", as I have tried to show here and elsewhere, was in multilaycred ways explicitly Nietzsche-inspired.From the World War I through its Nazi implementation, Nietzschean exhortations to prevent procreation of "anti-life" elements and his advocacv of euthanasia, of what he called "holy cruelty" -"TheRihliol prnhihillon'lhnt~shah not k111'". hc noted m The Will to l%~wcr. 'is s plecc 01 oni\ete compared with thc seriousness of the prohibition of lifc to dccadcnls: 'thou shall not proct-catel'. . . Sympathy tor dccadcnls. equal rights for Ihe illconaitllted -thnt ulruhl ktk pro(oundes1 immor.llily. that wollld he antmalure il,wlf as mnr;llily!"47 -holh tnspired nnd provided a 'higher" mlinnale for the<*risIs and practitioners off such meesum.48 The translation of traditional anti-Jewish impulses into genocide and the murderous policies adopted in different degrees to other labeled outsiders (Gypsies, physically and nxentally handicapped, homosexuals. crii~nals. inkrior tistem peoptcs and (;ommunist poiitical enemies) occurred within the distinct context of this medico-bio-eugenic vision. There were, to be sure. many buildinp-blocks that went into conceivina and implementing genocide and mass murder but I would argue that this Nietzschean framework of thinking provided a crucial conoe~tual precondition and his radical sensibility a partial trigger for its implementation. Kelated to hill illso goinp beyond these pmgwntnntic parallelh .tnd llnkr we lnllst raise attother highly spccolatiw. though neccaary. issuc: the vexed qnestioil ofelwbling preconditions ilnd pychobgical motivations. Clearly, for events as thick and complex as these no single theortical or melh~x7obgical approach or melhlnlology will saffice. Yel, given lltc extritonl~~iary a~wlysis nature of rhe evetlls, more conventinni~l modes ot'hist~~rical soan i~xh rhci limits and &mami novel answers (the sludy of Nxism has providrd them in abundance. same more. some less convincinp49). 1 an not thus chiming exc)usivencss for the Nictz?chean chncl~l a1 this lcvcl of

cxplaniliotl hut rather arguing lor his continueti and imponanr rclcvance. Tn he sure, or late, many accounts of the ideas hehlnd. :lml thc psychological wellrprings ennhling, mzss munlcr have kn. it imylhio~. mliNktrsclx?att in uonlml. Tor Chrjstupher Brnwning it was hardly Nicrrschean intuxicalion. the nihilistic belief that "a11 is permitted". lhat mollvalcd lk "onliikillers" -but rather pmsaic innring psychological ~nccha~~isnts such as zrotip conformity. dcfclrnce lo authnrity. the dulling wwen ot alcohul al*l simpk (but oowerful I ~rocesscsolrnu~in~~~nn.SJ l'ar fnrm ind~catin~ Por ('brae L. Mn~c a dynamic anli-hoorgeois N~rtzschean rcvoll, the masimurders rcpresenled a defense of bouigeois mnrnl;~?.. tk allelnpt to preserve ickan, niderly middle-class world apalnst all thow onr.ci&r and deviant groups that thr&taled it.51 Thcsc cnnlnin imponam insiehls but. in my view, k~ve out crucial exwrienlial inorcdicl~ls. clns~lv rclsltd to Ihr Kielrschcan dimmaion. which must form at lcasl oar1 08thc nicmre. At sonic point or :mother. tk realizalion must have dawnai on the cttncei\'t:rs and (rerpetratlrs of this cvcnt that wmcrhing quile exlraordinary. unprececfenlcd. was occurring and tka ardmary und rniltdlc-class men we: commilling radically trnn.sgrc%sivc. tahwbreaking, quile "un-hourgcnis" acls.52 T:\,en il'we grant the prnblem:lllc propwilion that such acls were do* in older to defend hiloryois inlercsts and vnltas, we wnuki want lo know ahln the galvanizmg. radicalizing trig!cr that allowed decision-makers and perpetrators ;IWlo set out in lhis direction and do the deed. Toque that it was "racism" mrcly pushes the argunant a slcp backward, for "racism" on its own -while always pernicious -has lo k mde genucidal. We are left with the issue of thc radicalizing, triggering forces. These may be many in number but it seems to me that Nietzsche's determined anti-humanism (XIatheism that, as (it~rgc Lichtkim has noted, diIfers frnm the kuerbachin~~ imaginings and attempt 10 repksr lheisrn with humsnisn133), ap~~alyptl~ exhortatory visions, rendered such a possibility, such an act, conceivable in the first vlace (or, at the verv least. once thought of and given the correct selective readings easily able to provide the avprovriate ideological cover). This Nietzschean kind of thought, vocabulary and sensibility constitutes an important (if not the only) long-term enabling precondition of such radical elements in Nazism. With all its affinities to an older conservatism, it was the radically exverimental, moralitv-challenginn, tradition-shatterinp Nietzschean sensibilitv that made the vast transformative scale of the Nazi vroiect thinkable. Nietzsche. as one contemporary conlmentator has pointed out. "prepared a consciousness that excluded nothing that anyone might think, feel, or do, including

unimaginable atrocities carried out on a Baantic orderN.54 Of course. Nazisnt was a manifold historical pknomenon and its rnvn1,lulionary 111nlst sat side by side with petif-hour&ois, ~m~vincial, impuLw.55 But surely. beyond its doctrinal trxiitiuml ad c~nservatiw emphases on destruction and violent regeneration. health and disease. the moral and historical significance of Nazism iies precisely in its unprecedented transvaluations and boundary-breaking extremities, its transgressive acts and shattering of vreviouslv intact taboos. It is here -howeverparwlislic, selectively mediated or debased -that the sense of Nazism. its informing proiect and exwriential dynamic, as a kind of Nietzschean Great Politics continues to haunt us.

AT: Nietzsche/Nihilism-Leads to Classism Nietzsche's calls for distinctions between the "weak" and the ''strong" are notions of classism and serve to reinforce patriarchal dominance Schutte, 84, (Ofelia, assistant prolessor of philosophy @ University of Florida, Bevond Nihilism: Nietzsche without Masks, "Nietzsche's Politics," p. 186-188) As long as OIXzivcs philowph~cal crcdibilily 111 thc ktoric of th~' "saprier type" or 'h~ghcr" pcrson and is id^' the political atxl praclicnl ilnplicatiow of hlw Ih$ rhclllnc i.s instantind. hoth by Nieict7xk ;lsd hy ~hc hislorical patriarchal trudition in which wc still live. we zvr defending aha1 I shall CIIII "III~. politics d.unspcu.ircd prcjudicc." While the logic of unspecified preiudice calls for Lhc higherllower distinction without committing itself to anv particulars to fill thosc categories, Nietzsche has made it quite clear what groups hv "nature" or "destiny" are higher and what lower. IICI~,, two statements regarding women and workers, two erouns Nictzschc has condemned 10 the "low." Hc!vrsin~(brthc'?: rtiltenlent that "the clcrnal feminine dr.~ws us higher.'' the ;authnrnf li*yc~nt~ (iuod awl Evil wrcrlc: "I dc~MII duoht tl1;11 cvcry nohler women will wisl thb faith. lor shc klieves the wme ahlut Ihe Etcrnnl-Mascu~inc..'bZ nc criterion of a womn's "nubility." then. i,, kr"faith' tha~ the male. ;IS mule, is more nobk lhan krsclf. This insidious rhetoric is also applied to the slave, who is urged to believe that his exploitation is iustitied because the rnasterlaristocrat is more noble than he. When one unmasks the realities of this rhetoric. one sees that the practical advantages do not go to "superior" uerson~ven assuming there Were SO pure a type-but simplv to the privileged classes of the established society.Nict~~he OUI ill T~ilight hi~nxll~pomlslhis Idab: Thr I~al~~)rquesth~n. botton~. the degetleralion of lnwinct. wh~ch is today the can.= ot a11 stupid~tiec-1s that thcrc is a tahorqueslion at all. Cenain things one does not quesinn: that is the first Thc slupidily-at llnpcrelive II~tnslincl. . . . I3111 what was dnm? . . .Ths inctincts by virtue of wliich thc worker bca~mes psaible as a clx$s, possibk in ha own eyes. hve hern deslrnycd through und through with the mcrst irresponslhle thne$htlessoess. The worker wm qualified lor military rervice. grilnled thc right to organize and to vote: 1s it any wonder that lhe worker today rxpcrir~rs his own existence as distres%ingmorally speaking. us an injustice'! Bat what is wwrcd? ...Ifune wanls ;mend. one must also want the means: irone wants slavcs. one is a fool if one eduwtes them lo be 1naaera.63 The theme of the "strength" of not questioning the structure of power that serves the interests of a vrivile~ed class is not simply anti-

liberal to the point of malice Nktrxhe nigecuc in the aphorism that prcmics t~i one,. 11 is nn11-critical tothe point ofmalice. These statements on women, the working class. and the need of the privilceed class for thounhtless and obedient "slaves" are not simvlv isolatcd opinions on Nietzsche's part. as somerimes thev tend to be read. Thev are logically tied to other notions that Nietzsche is commended lor holding-such as the distinction between the "superior" person and the "herd." the belief in a "strong" culture, and even the love of one's fate. ~h~~actt~tweig,,,,r~ the concrete side ot Ihc issclr whilc holding an lo the more abstract s~dcshows that in th~rcasc we are niuch lrss logical (ha11 fiiet~sche. ior we ruv thc olics cauehr in a logical dilemma. while Niclzschc b11oI. Nilmk. however, is coughr in a much larger tyc ofconlradrlion even rhough his logtc 1.q tight with respect to thc wmiection bctaccn eliusm atxl oppressit1n This it. the ~(tntradiction klwern hia tnrended nffirmation of lire arni his reacriosar?; and nihilistic p?lilics. Still. the polilical implicaiinns of Nictzslr's thought call bc tumd w?(inllo slime extent if we ask: wns no1 Nietzschc corrcct in ~nsisl~;ig upon a bgicnl ur~lneclion between a "stnrng" masculine ileal. a ''stron~" pntrinrchnl system where a few will culture. and a hlind systeni 01 polilcal expbilalion snd psychihigicnl repression:' Is it no1 lruc that il lhe roo1 ofonc's va1tIi.s is to implemenl a "trong" curn~irsnd and Ihe rrsl will okg, it is then foolish to ailow moral codes which bvor the notions ofthe un~wrsal htherhond and sisterhnnd ol htinia~i bcincs? Does not the rnc*rnlily ol'univcrs~il human dipiry entail in theory. if no1 n~so in pricticc. thc eliminatiott nfau tbrm~ orelitism. domimltiu~i. ;md npprtssi(~na! In hiietzschei ikl cof~greomrsrm the logic ofthe entremc-f hc was WCII nwarc. nut thanks to his one fi~q th~s uninhibited articulation of thc extreme he has exposed the logic of patriarchal domination in its essence. While Nictzschc has ollt~ied inccntivcs Y~OUS . . for ovcrlumine Ihc dcmlrralt intlucnccs of mudem limes and for institl~ting a "purer" syslem of pnlriarchal Jomi~~alC~n under the hnncr ofavercr~ming the "evils" of "effeminrcg" and "d~idence." It IS UP to US, not him, to make the choice as Lo what we want our ~olitical future and our moral values to be. His apveals to destiny. intolerance, and

Ihe suspension of critical questioning of authoritarian volitical institutions are no1 convincing.

Tkhubris is nut confined 10 vocali7ing divine iaention. It also consists in hixk'mg scriptural tradilion. TM devil can always quote scripture to his use. and thcrc is never a skirtage in ~ulg faith of tats jtlslifyin? the use or forre. Equall). all relipens contain sac& axis urgin: helevers to trmt human kings decently. Some may be more univrrs;~listic in tkqe claims than olhen. Some may conlime tltc dutics ofkmvokncc: lo fellllu, klicverr. while orhels may extend these dt~tics 10 thc whok of humankind. Dl11 whatever the nmhit of thcir monl concern, all relipioas teaching oflen some resistance la the idca thr it is ,miifiabk 10 kill or abuse other llu~nan kin&*. This resiscnnce my range from uulright condemnalion to qualified justihcation ax J.I~SIrerun. A nihilist use of rclizious doctrine is one that perverts the doclrinc illto a justification for inhuman dceds and ignores any part of the doctrine which is resistant to its violent purposes. The nihilism here engages in a characteristic inversion: adjustin- religious doctrine to rationalize the terrorist goal, rather than subiectin~, it to the genuine interrocration of truc faith. It is unnecessary here lo document the extent lo which Al Qi~nia hs exploited and distmed the true faith of Islam. Tu takc bul one examplc, the rndition of jihad. vhich refers I11 lk obligalion nf the klicucr to stnlpgk sealnst inn- wc;lknes &nilcomlption. has heen disttincd into an obligation to wage war itgains1 Jews arni Americans. In the had% of Osan~a bin Ladcn. the sprci0c;1Uy religious am3 inl~crdirecled contenl ofjihad has hccn crnptkd out ;md replaced hy a doctrinc ji~slifying acts of terror, Tbis tw olreliginus justilicslion drmmttally amplifies tho (iolilicol imwt of le~mrisl anions. When At Qaech st~ikes. it cao clililn that it ilcts on bchallof a h~lliun Muslina. This may he a lie, hut ir is an inlluc~rliol ow n~m~! thelers. Approprinunp relig~ous doctrine in this way illso enablcs the group to offerpotential recruits lhc promisc of m~rlyrdom. Immnrlality complicnles thc rehtiomhip ktwm violcnl mns and prlitical ends. Ibr the pmmisc nl ctcnial liP has Le efTcct oTm*inp it .z sccotxlory m;ilter bl the suicide hlnher whether or not thc act achieves i~nylhiip poliiical a1 all. What mallen most i? securing entry into Paradise. Hcw polilietl violcnm hecomes s~~hservrnl not lo a puli1ic:iI end but la a prrulnal one. Once violent means cease to serve determinate political ends, they take on a lik of thcir own. When personal immortality becomes the goal. the terrorists cease to think like ~olitical actors, susceptible to rational calculation of effect. and begin to act like fanatics. It is not casy a tun1 homa~~ sl~icidc bombs hew 10 crc'csrc .I an kings into 1.11mlrs. In urdur to do so. temorist gnlupr th31 IIK cult of&alh a~ld sdcriiice. anchored in pnwertlll Ianpuager ol hcliet Osama bin Ladcn ul~d

interview wilh an k~m'ic&n Iangungc of faith: journ;dist in Mi~y 1'198 ~n Atghaoislan lo justify anorism in ~hc The tennrism wc practim is oflhe cvmmcndahle kind tor it is dircclcd at tk tyrants and 111s aggressors and the enrmics of Allah. the lyrants. !ha trailo~x who comlnir acts oftrcnson npaina their own co~ntrics and their ow* Lilh mi thck nwn p~nphct and lhcir own nation. What is noticeable here is the use of religion not iust to iustify killing the infidel but to override the much more serious taboo against killing fellow believers. The function of nihilism here is to recast real, living membcrs of the lslamic faith as traitors deserving death. Nihilism takes the form of nullifyin. the human reality of people and turn in^ them into tarnets.

AT: Nietzsche/Nihilism -Root of all violence Nihilism is the root of ail violence and manifests permanent death cults in societies Ignatieff -2004,(Michael, Carr Professor oT Human Rights at Harvard's Kenndy School of Government, excerpt from "The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror," Princeton University Press, New England Review v. 25 no112 (2004) p. 54-74, Journal: N Engl Rev, ISSN: 1053:1297) Nihilism--which is the blunt name for takinn the gloves off--holds real dangers for both sides. When a democratic state licenses all means to repress a terrorist soup, it mav only play into the hands of its cncmy. Some terrorisl moups deliberately seek to draw reprisals upon themselves in order to radicalize their own ~opulation. As the state's repression increases. the terrorists respond by tightening their screws on their base of support, replacing a political relation to their own side with one of unvarnished tyranny, killing or intimidating anyone who questions whether the costs of the campaign arc outweighing the gains. Populations that once supported armed struggle for reasons of conviction bccome trapped either in fanaticism or in complicit silence. In the process, political regulation of terrorist groups by their community at large becon~es impossible. Moderate voices who might persuade a community to withdraw their support from terror arc silenced. In place of a properly political culture, in which groups and interests compete for leadership, a people represented by suicide bombers ceases to be a political community at all and becomes a cult. with all the attendant hysteria, intimidation, and fear. This is the process by which nihilism leads to a war without end. In such a terrorist cult, many praiseworthy moral virtues are inverted, so that they serve not life but death. Terrorist groups typically expropriate the virtues of the young--their courage, their headstrong disregard for consequences, their burning desire to establish their own significance--and use these to create an my of the doomed. In this way, violence becomes a career, a way of life thal leads only to death. Once violence becomes part of a communitv death cult. the onlv rational response by a state under attack must be to eliminate the enemy one bv one. either by capture and lifelong imprisonment or bv execution. Those for whom violence has become the driving rationale of conduct cannot be convinced to desist. Thev are in a deathlv embrace with what thev do, and argument cannot reach them. Nor can failure. It counts for nothing that violence fails to achieve their political obiective because such achlcvement has long since ceased to be the test of their effectiveness. It is redemption they are after, and they seek death sure that thcv have attained it. Thev have nothing to negotiate for, and we have nothing to gain by negotiating with them. They will take gestures of conciliation as weakness and our desire to replace violence wilh dialogue as contemptible naWived. To say we are at war with Al Qaeda and suicide bombers in general is to say that political dialogue is at an end. We have nothing to say to them nor they to us. Either we reva ail or thev do, and force must be the arbiter.

AT: Nietzsche Nihilism -Leads to Violence Nietzsche is a nihilist -the alternative causes violence and annihilation because it destroys ontology Hicks, Professor and chair of philosophy at Queens College of the CUNY, 2003 (Steven V., "Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Foucault: Nihilism and Beyond," Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters, Ed. Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, p. 109, Questia) <This response, however. only succeeds in postponing Heidegger's real objection. For according to Heidegger, psychology (and indeed, all of the human sciences) are caught up in the web of traditional metaphysical thinking. As such, "Nietzsche's 'psychology' is simply coterminous wilh metaphysics ... .[it] lies grounded in the very essence of modern metaphysics" (N, 4:2, 8). Heidemer argues that "modern" metaphysics is defined precisely by the fact that "man becomes the measure and center of beinps. " and this, in turn, results in the modern technological understanding of beings as obiects for use and control. or as Heidegger says, entities wholly present as "standing-reserve" (Bestand) (QT,17). 26 This extends even to human beings themselves, who are increasingly transformed by the "human sciences" (and their technological systems) into "resources" for obiectification and control (cf. N, 4:23445). Here, Heidegger anticipates Foucault's claim that modern technological systems attempt to make human beings whollv present as "bio-power, " or subiects com~letelv present for surveillance and control via the disciplinary practices of institutions (psychological, juridical, carceral) whose aim is to "normalize" human life. 27 Thus from Heidegger's perspective, the actual nihilism Nietzsche feared-" annihilation, spreading violence, " and so forth-is evoked by the ~reuonderance, in the modern world, of this productionist, technolorical "obiectification of being. " and bv "the complete ordering of all beings in the sense of a systematic securing of stockpiles" for further technoloaical usage, control, and domination (N, 4:229-34). 'The relentlessness of [this] usage extends so far ... that the abode of Being-that is, the essence of man-is omitted; man is threatened with the annihilation of his essence, and Being itself is endangered" (N, 4:245). Ironically, Heidegger argues, it was preciselv Nietzsche's "pro~osinx of Being as a value posited by the will to power" that led to this "final lnihilisticl step of modern metaphysics. in which Being comes to amear as will to power" (N, 4234). Simply put, Nietzsche's doctrine of the will to power succeeds in reducing the whole question of Beine to the status of a value; and this completes the "metaphysics of subjectivity" initiated by Descartes, which in turn results in a "blindness" to the whole question as to what Being itself is. This "blindness to Being, "Heidegger argues, is at the root of all nihilism and IS connected to the modern technoloeical/~roduclionistattitude toward the world (cf. N, 4:231-32). Why does Heidegger makc this claim'? Heidegger believes that metaphysics is essentially the history of Being, a history in which Being discloses itself as withdrawn in "default " or concealed (cf. N, 4:230-32). He basically reads the whole history of Western philosophy as the history of Being and its gradual self-concealment. In this context, Heidegger praises Nietzsche for his insight into "the basic development" of that history: "In

his LNietzsche's] view it is nihilism ... .The phrase 'God Is Dead' is not an atheistic proclamation; it is a formula for the fundamental experience of an event in Occidental history" (N, 1:156). Heidegger even suggests that Nietzsche came close to recognizing (albeit opaquely) that the fundamental question of Being had been "omitted, " forgotten, or supvressed within the nletaahvsical tradition of previous philosophy, and that this "omission of the default of Being in its unconcealment" is the very "essence of nihilism" (cf. N, 4:230-32). For example, when Nietzsche denies truth or refers to Being as "an empty fiction" (see TI, 481), Heideager claims that he is actually experiencing and expressing the "nothing" or "omission" of Being itself in the history of Western r>hilosophy. which is tantamount to nihilism: Nihilism culiminates in authoritarianism Christenson, 85, (Gordon A., Nippert Professor of Law and Dean @ University of Cincinnati College of Law, "Uncertainty in Law and its Negation: Reflections, University of Cincinnati Law Review, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. 347) Sum dramatically chancleri?e the lrrmls just descrikd 41s legal nihilism or Ihe negation ofthe exercise of legilimate power withoul the assenion nfsi~htnnlivr theory in ilp place. As Michael Pnianyi so cogently br noled, nihilism, whether real or imagined, leads [*357] inexorably to authoritarian responses and to the rise of ideology. Thesecultd phenomenon which gave rtsc to our pc~t~cul~r pridicamcnl lhoh cmeqed from the converbion ofsubjtrtivr mor;~l iudgmenl into ideology. Whether derived from ihc lwc~nicth cenlury rrrolulions based on sncialbm or M.misrn, no lhc human . . righls movcmcnr. or on a Icsurgcnce ot'mco~~rvatis m. the intcllmunl nrnts of such nxwemcots an-wcI1 dcscribal in European and Latin American licntuccs. Symholic of that litmtcue. and resultln~ ln the negation of law and value. are Neitzche's moral and ethical superiority, Domoyevskik novels and shon storks and the wo~ks of the phenomenologists. exiPtentidists and structunlisls. All ask similar qtations. Post-Marxisl thinkers --Hrbermur. Got~caall and Herger and other non-legal critid scholm --havc pained infloc~tcc in lcgal scholuship u.hich finds thcm to kc useh11 anz~lytic tm~ls. If there is no common basis for law or morality other than through a subjective or ideological construct. then the question is not what values underpin a particular legal systcm. but how one's subiective preferences may be infused with vower, strategy and tactics throughout the general community or imposed by coercion. ~ht:I~WFIadvocae long US& ~arioustechniques b2.d an pragmalic ideas of progress. the frontier and chanre. The=

havc hecn a~snciatcd wilh thc n~rnanticism of thc defender of the poor and downrmdden. the fighlcr for civil rights. the human-righls warrhr nml the x>cbl reformer. wtni use cows adlaw as insuumrnts olswinl cbng. In this construct. law as secalar system has nu ~iormarireconlent tho1 is srrt uitimnlely subjwtivc. If God isdead. all thi~lgs arc morally possihlc. Thc mainciai~n lo legitimacy or validity rats UI prnccs: namcly that the advncates who represent a pantular mmomltty or a paniculdr social philnsophy fight aml prevnil as waniors and advncatrs in an existing &eisionmaking prnces?.akin to chivalry. aimed at changinp offkin1 hehavior orcustnm hy lighling i~l,justice, adntiltcdly a subjective curlstns[. Once, huwever. the suhjcclive dvwacy mndel of chanpirlg the stlcid struclure is an accepted way ol lifc. Ihc natural reaction is Ihat sauce tbr the goose is sauce for ~hr gandcr. If thc obicctivc validity of thc normafivc systcm tacitly is rcjxtcd hy lhosc who .wlilo changc it, then ndicals holding an opposile klief might just as well produce il similar claim by un aclivlsm with sub'jcclivc prelcrenceq ewn Inore firmly nrnted w~thin the vices of common life, The dialectic of thesis. anlithesis and synlhcsks thit seed tu move outwad twm the sobjecti%e lo lm ob.it:iIivc wirkl-view wukl wcnk for the radicul right just as well as for& Marxist ktt!

AT: Nietzsche/Nihilism -AT: Christianitv Nietzsche's condemnation of Christianity contradicts itself --his accusations of Christianity's faults are self-serving without support - - this accusations of Christ are actually his faults Thompson, 51, (R. Motson, M.A., Nietzsche and Christian Ethics, "Niclxschc's Doctrines Examined," p. 48-51) 11 is im~lrlhcrta hc mtsd that Nictzsche condemns Christianity chiefly on the mounds that its earliest followers misrepresented its teaching. But hcrc again Nietzsche's thinking is uncertain and somewhat confused. Hc condemns the Christian religion because of its adherents. and vet thal is the very thing he tells his readers not to do. At least he declares that the 'first adherents of a creed do not prove anvthinn a~ainsl it1. and Anthony Ludovici has said in his Preface to The Twilighl of thc Idols that Nietzschc cleverly guarded himscll'against 'bad company'. We would point out, however. that Nietzschc never sccms to apply thc same guard to Christ as he did to himself. Niel?.whc says th~t Clwist's Ibllowcrs mutilated his lci~ching so much tht, were Hc hcrc tildi~y, He wnuki not recognize il as Ilis own: and hc. momnucr, rcrers to thc New Testament in a dccidcdly uncomplimenlary wily. call~~ig it (as wc havc cnrlie~)a literary fr;iud. am invention ol'ideas. We nx~y wcll aak thLI pcninenl questitin lhel-rl'ore. What.according lo Nirlzsche. is Clmristk real teaching'?If the Ncw l'cstamc~tt ih not Christ's 1e;lching. then whew ar.wc trl Innk itir il'! Dcxs Nict7sche mdirn tho1 Christ's tcachhmg in r~~lily more 10 his own ideal was c~ppusrtl It1 the New Tesl;lment i~nd rexlly conli~rn~~d of gre;rt teachine in Thus Sphc 2Cui1thustm? 11Niel~$chc calls lhc New Tesl;~rnant a 'literary fri~ud'. what justification has he for rrg;mtlng Jesus as a dwadcnl or disillosiuned tira~mer? Iftht: New 'l'eslment mprescnts idci~s inrcnttrl theealy Christia~rs. then it stands IUI-EIWII that ~ict~~~h~~s~~nty ponmit orchtist is ial~c. It is without anv historical cvidcncc. NOwonder Nictzsche displays uncertainty and inconsistency4 in his opinion of the Founder of Christianity (i.e. Christ, not Paul). Nietzsche is doubtless right in his insistence on the fact that the Gospels are the outcome of the very Early Church, but to dismiss all the tcachinn contained therein as frauds and inventions designed purely for ends of self-interest is a huge blunder. The New Testament reflects the current conceptions of the Early Church concerninp Christ, His life, teaching, and work; but if the teaching: containcd therein is purely invention and a weapon of power in the hands of the masses, then a fortiori to speak of Christ at all is sheer nonsensc, for the Gospcls supply the primary data for a portrait of Christ together with His teaching. Nietzsche's 'inconceivable corruption' (to use Nietzsche's own phrase) of the New Testament can only be vut down to a mind coloured by preconceived ideas and irrational. unscienlific preiudicc. He attempts (and the attempts are not very convincing) to fit all the facts into his varticular theorv and schemes of Lhines. With Nietzsche, -

it is a question of rnal-adjusting the facts to suit his arguments. He gives the facts a little twist and so lhcv arc lbund lo support his thcsis. We can only smile at his weak attempts to explain the life and teachin? of Christ. TOhit upon a11 isolated saying like the SO called of despirand dislllm~s~nnmc~~l from the Cmss (i.e. 'My (itid. My God. why hast Tho11 forsaken Me?) and hsea klicf on il is dangcrous.6 Onc strongly suspects that in the light of recent reseivch m New Testament criticism. Nictzschc would be constrainal to disciwd some oi his theories regarding the Hew 'resrame~tt. We should du wcll 10 remind the r~idcr at this paint that Nielzsche is a poor hand a1 Nrw Testament exegesis. His interpret.~ti(ln. fiir instimcc. of tbc Book of Kcvclnlion found in The Gmedlugy uiMor~lr (p. 54) is entirely fizlsr. (Orsanized Christianity has always had lo sufler at tk hands of men who are nut mmpctcnt New Testmncnt scholars at all sind are nut recognized as such, yct who dogmntix irccly on thc intcrprctation olthe Bihle. A mudern instance oithb is lou~md in tieorp Bern;ml Shaw's Adventures oia HlachGirl in her Scmh fur God.) Furthermore, to speak of Jesus as out of touch with reality and living in a vain world of dreams and images, is a complete mlsre~re~entationof the facts. (we sawjust previously that Nietzsche is ha~dly competcot 10 pass any judgment ill all 011 Christ in QICC oi KG pcculiu thcory ofthe New 1'cslsmcm.i The ldeolist and tk Realist arc both peribctly hlended in Jerku. ~c was well awxe of the facts and contrndictionz of life: He was alive to the reality ofsin: His ~aying~ and parables reveal that He Was constantly in touch with the actual. His temptations show that He underwent ereat moral and spiritual conflicts which did not leave Him when He left the wilderness. No other neat teacher has had such command of the problems of life as Jesus or been so thoroughly acquainted with its sorrow and pain. We mi~ht add here that Nietzsche himself, living his hernut life in Italy and Switzerland, was hardly the man to speak of Jesus as out of touch with the reality of life. It was Nietzsche who was the vain dreamer, not Christ. It was Nietzsche who withdrcw himself from the surge of an angry world, not Christ. Nietzsche opposes Christianity - - his ideas sought to strip Christianity of its values Jaspers, 63, (Karl, German psychiatrist and philosopher Nietzsche and Christianity, "Introduction," p. 1) Thc shocking savagery of Nietzsche's stand against Christianity is well known. To quote an example: "If one equivocates nowadays in his relation to Christianity, I will not give him the lasl finger of my two hands. Here there is only one righteousness: utter reiection."

Nietzsche proceeds to unmask Christianity with indignation and contempt, in a style which runs from calm inquiry to strident pamphlclccring. Christian realities are stripped bare under an cxlraordinary weallh of aspects. Absorbing the logic of earlier opposidons, Nietzsche became the new fountainhead of anti-Christianitv, which had perhaps never before been so radical and so aware of its ultimate implications.

AT: Nietzsche/Nihilism -Alt Fails Nietzsche's calls for the affirmation of life fail - - the dual nature of good and evil results in nihilism and precludes the affirmation of human life Schutte, 84, (Ofelia, assistan1 professor of philosophy @ University of Florida, Bevond Nihilism: Nictzschc without Masks, "Conclusion," p. 189-1 90) The main problem that apwars to delimit Nictzsche's philoso~hical affirmation of life is his failure to value human life as much as life in its totality. His advances over nihilism arc rooted in the notion that there is no need to invent a more wrfect form of lifc (as in the notion of an afterlilt) since life already has sul'l'icient meaninn and value. The Dionysian struggle against the Socralic approach to existence is based on the view that reason has exceeded its role when it purports to define the meaning of life in terms of reason itself. And yet, the same opportunity that Nietzsche would like to see given to life is denied to human life. There is an irresistible tcndcncy on Nietzsche's part to deny the value of human lire as such and to accept it as valuable onlv if it is perfect, noble, or strong. Thc dualism between good and cvil is maintained as a measure of human worth. The fact that the dualism remains, however, means that the broader proiect of thc affirmation of life in its totality is blocked. Zarathustra's position serves as an illustration of this dilemma. His love of life is stifled by the torture he experiences a1 the thought that "small" human beings will rccur eternally. Human weakness and failure elicit in Zarathustra a sense of nausea for the wholc of existence. His perception and appraisal of realitv appear to be out of balance. Even though Zarathustra finallv accepts the idea of the recurrence, he makes his choice at the cost of his seaaration from humanitv. He drops all human contact and stays in the mountains, desiring intercourse with ctcrnity atone. There is an important split between his desire to affirm life and his inabilitv to affirm human life. Human life still appcars to be too small, too insignificant and wretched to Nietzsche. Thus he constantlv seeks grandeur. Nietzsche noted that human life has dwindled because human beings lack opportunities Sor integrated and creative activities. mistake, however, to link creativity and internation with the aualitv of greatness. The demand for greatness involves a value iudgment against anvthing that is not cxccptionallv powerful or distinguished. This involves a devaluation of the ordinarv asuects of human life. If these aspects do not counl toward making human life meaningful, however, then one is still cxhibiling a nihilistic attitude toward human existence. Nietzsche is right in claiming that nihilism must be overcome in order Ibr human beings to lead creative and resourceful lives. On the other hand, when he associates the latter values with the creation of a strong and maiestic culture. he delinuts

the meaning of creativity. The expectations he places upon it are nihilistic as long as creativitv is made to tit under a paradigm of domination. The alternative fails --calls for overcoming nihilism reinstates the notion of self division which results in a constant state of nihilism Schutte, 84, (Ofclia, assistant professor of philosophy @ University of Florida, Bevond Nihilism: Nietzsche without Masks, "Conclusion," p. 190) Traditionally, the answer to the split between Nietzsche's critique of human life and his affirmation of life has been to explain his reaction against human wcakness as a reaction against nihilism. His position might be justified this way if one viewed the rejection of human nature not as a devaluation of human nature as such but as a rejection of the nihilism that has "overtaken" humanity. Certainly, Nietzsche's work-at least significant portions of it-lends support to this hypothesis. Nevertheless, his analysis of nihilism is insuff'iciently radical. It does not point to the dualism inherent in the notions of strong versus weak. of master versus slave. In order to overcome nihilism. one must transcend all forms of dualism, not merelv some of them. The use of thc notion of nihilism as one of two poles of an opposition between "right" and "wrong" must also he avoided. If "nihilistic" human life stands to "IiSc-aflirming" human life as evil to the good, and if. furthermore, one considers the "prolific" forces as being commanded bv "destiny" to chastise the "evil" forces, then one falls back precisely upon the problem of self-division that plagues the nihilistic consciousness. Thc question that emerges out of this is whether it is indeed possible for human beings to transcend dualism. Nietzsche's theories don't apply --the only way to effectively criticize Western culture is to experience it Jay, 88, (Martin, Sidney Hellman Ehrman Professor of History @ University of Berkeley, Fin de Siecle: Socialism and other essays, "From Intellectual History to Cultural Criticism: Reflections on the Habermas-Gadamer Debate," p. 33) One final implication of Gadamer's hermeneutics that merits comment concerns the notion of a fusion of horizons. Putting aside its problematic harmonistic implications. what this fusion suggests is, first, that historians themselves must be aware of their own historicity and. second. that they are themselves irrevocablv changed by their retlective involvement with the past. Although it would be wrong to characterize this involvement simply as a form of surrender,57 it is nonetheless more ambiguous in this regard than either the outmoded positivist obiectification of the vast or the more recent structuralist version of the historian as a detached decoder of the svnchronic relations of the past preserved in the present.38 Gadamer's defense of prejudice may well have conservative implications, but it reminds us that we delude ourselves if we think our present vantage point is somehow outside of history. Participation as well as distanciation is necessarv to our understanding of the past. It is impossible, as some of the French post-structuralists seem to imply, criticize the Western tradition from a position external to it.

AT: NietzscheNihilism -Alt Fails Nietzsche is a nihilist -he can never overcome nihilism because his philosophy is rooted in it Hicks, Professor and chair of philosophy at Queens College of the CUNY, 2003 (Steven V., "Nietzsche, Hcidegger, and Foucault: Nihilism and Beyond," Foucault and Heiderner: Critical Encounters, Ed. Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberp, p. 109, Questia) <In his lectures on Nietzsche, Heidegger poses the following question: In Nietzsche's philosophy, "which for the tirst time expresses and thinks nihilism as such, is nihilism overcome or is it not?" (N, 4:200). Heiderner 's direct answer: Nietzsche's ~hilosophy is "nihilism proper, " does nor overcome nihilism. but also that "it and this implies not onlv that Nietzsche's ~hiloso~hy can ncvcr overcome it" because "it is the ultimate entanelement in nihilism" (N, 4:203). Despite Nietzsche's valiant efforts to formularc a nonascetic/antinihilisticideal in tcrms of which humanity could aftirm rather than devalue the natural world. Heidegger argues tha~ Nictzsche fails ureciselv because hc "posits new I nonasceticl values from the [perspective of1 will to power" (N, 4:203). According to Heidegger, this 1s simplv the "culmination" of the history of traditional (productionist) meta~hvsics, which, in turn. rcsults in the verv nihilistic "constructs of domination" that Nietzsche feared the most. "Such utterly completed, perfect nihilism is thc fulfillment of nlhil~sm propei' (N, 4:203). Why does Heidegper claim that Nietzsche 's philosophy is the ultimate "fulfillment" of nihilism and not its overcoming? Heideggr believes that Nietzsche's doctrines of "will to power" and "eternal recurrence" are themselves metaphysical doctrines: that is to say, they are intended as answers to traditional metaphysical questions concerning essence and existence. As such, Heidegger argues, they are connected to the whole history of nihilism and to the modern technologicaYproductionistattitude toward the world which that history entails. Let me enlarge on this. As we have seen. Nietzsche basically understands traditional metaphvsics as the acceptance of a "true" or transcendent world that ultimatelv devalues this (ordinary, everyday) world. This eventually leads to the idealization of asceticism. which in turn leads to nihilism when the values vrovped up bv metaphvsics and its ascetic ideal are devalued. Nietzsche aims to overcomc nihilism and asceticism by overcoming metaphysics, and this he attempts to do, in part at Icast, by means of his doctrines of will to power (which provides the basis for a new kind of valuation) and eternal recurrence (which rules out a "true" or transcendent world). Heidegger argues, however, that these supposed nonascetic doctrines are themselves thoroughly metaphvsical since thev claim to offer Nietzsche's answer to thc old auestion concerning the "Being of beings": "will to power" is the ultimate essence of the world under the mode of existence of "eternal recurrence" (cf. N, 2:203). 21> The alternative fails - - attempts to move beyond nihilism only brings back its return Research in Phenomenology, 03, (Dennis Keenan, "Nietzsche and the Eternal Return of Sacrifice," 33 167-85 2003,

wilsonselectplus) In the work of Nietzsche, sacrifice can only sacrifice itself over and over (in an eternal return of the same) because what it seeks to overcome (the nihilistic revelation of truth that sublates sacrifice's negation) makes this sacrifice of itself both necessary and useless. Thc truth is eternally postponed in a necessary sacrificial gesture that can only sacrifice itselt; therebv rendering itself useless. In & attempt to step bevond nihilism, that is, in the attempt to negate (or sacrifice) nihilism, one reveats the negation characteristic of nihilism. One becomes inextricablv implicated in the move of nihilistic sacrifice. The sacrifice of the sacritice characteristic of nihilism, that is, the sacrifice of sacrifice, can only rakc place as (perform itself as) the impossibility (or eternally postponed possibility) of its realization. One. therefore. produccs or performs an interminable steptnot beyond, an incessant step bevond that eternallv returns. Sacrifice is to be overcome. What could be morc obvious to a reader of the work of Nietzsche? And yet, is it that obvious? A careful reading of the work of Nietzsche will reveal that in the attempt to step bevond sacrifice, one becomes inextricablv implicated in the move of nihilistic sacrifice. Sacrifice returns ... eternally.

AT: Nietzsche/Nihilism-Alt Fails (Power Relations) Nietzsche's alternative fails to create change - - it fails to provide an alternative to power relations and results in complete obedience to the state Schutte, 84, (Ofelia, assistant professor of philosophy @ University of Florida, Bevond Nihilism: Nietzschc without Masks, "Conclusion," p. 19 1-192) Despite Nictzsche's contribution to the problem of resentment, he cannot see through com~letelv to its solution because he fails to reconsider the meaning of authority under a "trans-vduatcd" ~erspective on values. The answer he sought at this level-the idea of will to power as don~ination-is in no way a radical answer to what authoritv would mean under a new svstem of values. It simplv reconfirms the traditional meanin: of'authoritv-namcly, the power of command and the enforcement of rules-although, instcad of grounding the power of command upon a "sublime" or a "moral" basis, Nietzsche gives it an extra-moral foundation. In doing this he is not carrying Western culture to a new ground of values. He is simply taking away some of the more hypocritical trimmings from the attitude toward power that has generally prevailed in the culture. A reconsideration of the meaning of authoritv would question the need for appealing to authoritv under a lilc-alfirming conception of values. If the aim of overcoming nihilism is the healing of human beings from fragmentation and alienalion, and if it is the philoso~her's task to achieve this aim, should the philosopher invent various appeals to the authority of reason or life to make his or her contributions to human understanding more acceptable or enticing? Must the approach to the investigation of a vital issue he mystified in this manner? Obedience to authoritv binds the self. To end an argument by stating "Thus life wills il" does not lend anv additional support to the argument. Moreover, it would seem that dependence upon authoritv is the mark of a rcstless consciousness. of a consciousness that cannot provide its own foundations for values. Such a consciousness seeks to losc itself in an authoritarian formula or, if it is somewhat bolder, it will seek compliance with its values bv others as a wav of reassuring itself that its values have a foundation. The call for distinguishing individuals as superior or inferior reinforces the dependence on authoritative systems of power --the alternative will never solve because it relies on higher powers --it is impossible to produce change until individuals are able to overcome the desire for a superiorlinferior dichotomy Schutte, 84, (Ofelia, assistant professor of philosophy @ University of Florida, Bevond Nihilism: Nietzsche without Masks, "Conclusion," p. 192-193) The ideologv of superior/inferior reinforces the dependence of individuals upon authoritative systems of value. Because one can always be judged inferior to son~ething superior to oneself, one is alwavs subicct lo the power of that which is deemed superior to one's ~erformance and values. Th~s creates in some the desire to conform to external standards of conduct so as to prove one's value.

However. the result ol'this type of alienation is the mentalitv of the "herd" criticized bv Niclzschc. On the other hand, in others the ideology of superior/inFcrior may create a need to compete and either rival or overcome the previous authorities. And yet there seems to be only one permissible way of being successful in this respect, and that is to become a "new" authority. The circle of alienation, however. is not broken bv the latter procedure. The verson who attains the more valuable or "superior" status simplv moves to a different position in the circle of nihilism. Moreover, because one cannot be "superior" in everv respect. the or~anism remains fragmented and alienated. Standards of values outside its own needs are held uv as measures of its value in evcrv conceivable area of the individual's appearance and performance. Indeed, this panorama ofcxistence yields the scene laid out by Nietzschc whcre modern human beings are depicted as either completely manipulated by standards of value external to themsclvcs or else. in rebellion against this. rising as dictators over the masses. In a society or culture where everyone has to account for one's value lo a "higher" authoritv, the possibility of emptiness and frarzmentation will always stav with human beings. The need to Drove one's value to a hieher authoritv may keep one from develop in^ those talents and virtues that would be most meaningful to oneself. The origin of the depreciation of human life, then, is in the need to make human life ijt the expectations of a "su~erior" authoritv. The divided consciousness resulting from this cannot transcend nihilism until and unless it can transcend the dependence on authoritarianism. The nihilistic mind wants to control realitv: it docs not want reality simply to he. Where it can no longer control, it only knows how lo suspend its desire to grasp bv submitting to a higher force. This reinforces its sense of helplessness and its inordinate need always to keep in control of things. Like "superior" and "inferior," the opposites "good" and "evil" serve to reinforce the authoritarian mentalitv. Lt is not so much the opposition of terms as the authoritative confinement into which the self is trapped when these terms arc employed that reveals their nihilistic nature. One must remembcr that Zarathustra, the superior teacher, is just as confined to his mountain top-despite the appearance of freedom-as the "inferior" people living in the valley. Once the ideologv of superiorlinferior and good/evil sets in. one is confined. restricted. and immobilizcd in the quest for personal integration and a healthv sense of values. One escapes individualitv bv vlacing one's identitv within the boundaries of one or both of these categories (su~eriorlinferior, goodlevil). Escaping individualilv, onc never succeeds in learning what it means to be a healthv individual.

AT: Nietzsche/Nihilism-Alt Fails (Suaerman) The concept of the Superman fails --it fails to make progress and contradicts the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence and culminates in totalitarianism and tyranny- -Napoleon proves Thompson, 1951,(R. Motson, M.A., Nietzsche and Christian Ethics, "Nietzsche's Doctrines Examined," p. 38-40) Nietzsche thought lhat his doctrine of the Superman gave direction and ourpose to life. Moreover, it was to him an adequate substitute for God. the goal of mankind found in mankind, which would evoke from man his best in a creative endeavour to fulfill those conditions where thc Superman could have full sway. The ereat disappointment about this doctrine is that the work is done for the Superman: he is the creation of the centuries, a product of a direct elimination of the weak and the survival of the strong (though on Nietzsche's theory there hardly seems to he any 'survival' at all, Survival implies at least struggle, and yet Nietzsche's Superman seems to come into his own without any cffort on his part). Superman has risen lo his high place of honour not bv his own efforts, but bv the achievement of those whom he regards as his inferiors-mere laughing-stocks. Furthermore, thc idea of the Superman seems to lose meaning and force in the light of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. If mankind is caught up in an eternal round of events, Superman merelv hccomes a cog in the wheel which is destined for ever to revolve. Heis, as it were. fated to appear every so often in the time-scries whatever happens. Professor Eric Waterhouse14 has said that the 'reductio ad absurdurn' of evolutionary ethics is Nietzsche's doctrine of the Superman. Nietzsche asks whv should the evolutionary process stop at man? We may equallv well ask, why should it stop at Suwrman? A race of Supersupermen would be the next step. Nietzsche seems to identify promess with evolution, but they do not ncccssarilv mean the same thing. Mr. Stephen Ward, in his excellent little book, Ethics: An Historical Introduction, says: 'The idea of evolution is not to be identified with the idea of growth. ...In the evolutionary process all the stages seem equally unimportant. Growth has a culminating point; evolution has none. . . . Evolution must not be used as a means of introducing the old ideas of progess and perfectibility under a new name.' In any case, it is hard to see, in view of the Eternal Return, how promess has any meaning in Nietzsche's system. Nietzsche cites Napoleon as an example in history of a higher type of life, vet his influence was mainlv destructive. Like Nietzsche's ideal, he ignored the herd. Men to him were mere instruments of power and personal ambition. He claimed to be governed bv his own code of laws; he was an expression of the Will to Power un-governed by anv thought of the 'divine right of living': his energv was directed purelv along selfish lines: he bled Europe to death in order to gain the world. But those same Napoleonic characteristics when canalized along the line of service and selflessness become creative forces. Napoleon did the verv things that Nietzsche required of his Superman and was a failure. (The reason for this emerges later on Elbawhen Napoleon, with one of those flashes of real insight often given to powerful men, in weighing up the worth of his work compared with that of Christ, said: 'Other great conquerors won

their kingdoms with the sword. There has only been One who has established His kingdom by love, and to this day millions would die for Him.'). We can see, therefore, that a doctrine like the Supcrman leaves room for tremendous licence. Any man as Professor Simmel has pointed out, may think himself a Superman, which would give him the right, on Nietzsche's principles. to consider himself 'a law unto himself. This is dangerous: for it would lead to tyranny and a complete disregard of anv social responsibilities or obligations. But what else can one expect of a doctrine, the animating principle of which is merely a blind will to powcr? Moreover, the uncertainty of the results of such a doctrine lead one to wonder what would happen next. As Walter Lippmann has asked in his Preface to Morals, who can say, after Nietzsche has shot his arrow of longing to the other shore, whether hc will find Caesar Borgia, Henry Ford, or Isadora Duncan?l9

AT: Hiedegger -Alt Fails Heidegger's alternative is based on dogmatic authoritarianism that can never lead to positive change Thiele -Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida -2003 [Leslie Paul, "The Ethics and Politics of Narrative," Foucalt and Heidegger: Critical Encounters, editors -Roscnbcrg and Milchman] <The pursuit of knowledge continues unabated for the skeptic. Yet it proceeds with a suspicious eye. Thcrc are inherent limitations 10-and a price to pay for-the pursuit of knowledgc. Charles Scott describes Foucault's efforts in this regard: "Far from the skepticism that argues that nothing is really knowable ...g cncalogics embody a scnsc of the historical limits that define our capacities for knowing and believing. Things are known. But they arc known in ways that have considerable social and cultural costs." 8 Both Heideraer and Foucault maintain thar there is no legitimate basis for the radical skeptic's conviction that knowledre is imvossible or unworthy of pursuit. This sort of skepticism, Heidegger states, consists merely in an "addiction to doubt." 9 Thc skeptical nature of political philosophical thought, in contrast, is mounded in the imwrative of endless inquiry. The point for Heidegger and Foucault is to inquire not in order to sustain doubt, but to doubt that one might better sustain inquiry. At the same time, inquiry is tempered with a sensibility of the ethico-volitical costs of any "knowledge" that is gained. Doing political philosophy of this sort might be likened to walking on a tightrope. If vertigo is exverienced, a precarious balance may be lost. Falling to one side leaves one mired in apathv, cynicism, and apoliticism. This results when skevtical inauirv degenerates into a radical skepticism. an addictive doubt that denies the value of (the search for) knowledge and undermines the engagements of collective life, which invariably demand commitment (based on tentativelv embraced knowlcdnc). Falling to the other side of the tightrope leaves one mired in dogmatic belief or blind activism. Authoritarian ideolodes come lo serve as stable foundations. or a reactive iconoclasm leads to irresponsible defiance. Apathy. cvnicism, and apolitic~sm, on the one side. and donmatic authoritarianism or reactive iconoclasn~, on the other, are the dangcrour, consequences of losing one's balance. These states of mind and their corresponding patterns of behavior relieve the vertigo of political philosophical inquiry, but at a prohibitive cost. It has been argued that Foucault did not so much walk the tightrope of political philosophy as straddle it. at times leaving his readers hopeless and cynical, at times egging them on to an irresponsible monkeywrenching. For some, the Foucauldian flight from the ubiquitous powers of normalization undermines any defensible normative position. Hopelessness accompanies lost innocence. Cynicism or nihilism become the only alternatives for those who spurn all ethical and political foundations. By refusing to paint a picture of a better future, Foucault is said to undercut the impetus to struggle. Others focus on Foucault's development of a "tool kit" whose contents are to be employed to deconstruct the apparatuses of modern power. Yet the danger remains that Foucault's "hyperactive" tool-kit users will be unprincipled activists, Luddites at best. terrorists at worst. In either case, Foucault provides no

overarching theoretical vision. Indeed, Foucault is upfront about his rejection of ethical and political theories and ideals. "I think that to imagine another system is Lo extend our participation in the present system, " Foucault stipulates. "Re-ject theory and all forms of general discourse. This need for theory is still part of the system we reject." 10 One might worry whcther action is meant to take the place of thought. If Foucault occasionally straddles the tightrope of political philosophy, Hciderncr obviousl~ stumbled off it. In the 19305, Heidenaer enclosed himself within an authoritarian svstem of thought mounded in ontolovical reilications of a "folk" and its history. Heidezger's historicization of metaphysics led him to believe that a ncw philosophic epoch was about to be inaugurated. It implicitly called for a ~hilosophical Fuehrer who could nut an end to two millennia of ontological forgetting. I I The lcmptation for Heidegger to ~dentifv himself as this intellectual messiah and to attach himself to an authoritarian social and volitical movement capable of sustain~ng cultural renewal proved irresistible. Whether Heidegger ever fully recovered his balance has been the topic of much discussion. Some argue that Heidegger's prerogative for political philosovhizinr! was whollv undermined bv his infatuation with folk destiny, salvational rods, and political authoritv. 12>

AT: Hiedegger -Alt Fails Hiedegger's philosophy does not apply and is dangerous in the political realm because metaphysical results will not result from politics Wolin, Professor of Modern European Intellectual History at Rice, 1990 (Richard, The Politics of Being, p. 1 17-118) Moreo\er. :a Ilarries inlicates. Hcidegtcr's lhroiy of the slate a a "\vnh" is n~odflcd own his thxy of thc work of XI. TIIIIS. as we have sccn. ill Hcideuer'a view. both wol.ks ol'an and thc stole arc ex;lmples ul Ihe "scllir1~-lo-m~rk ol'lnllh." In essncc. Ihc sldc hcctimcs a hurt uvwk ,$an:Iikc tk work of an. it pmicipitcs in rhc rcvelalion ol m~th, pl on a much mom grdndiosc and fundsmm~tal scalc. sincc il is Ihc Ger,~nrrlunsrwrrl wilhbl which :~ll thc otkr suh-woks sn;wt lhcir prwssigncd mlw. Howcvrr. the idol or hsi~~g 13" pmposilioe. Though We mav political jodg~nc~as amhgy will1 acsthclie judgmcnls is all cxtrcmcly ~cnucr~a readilv accept and even welcome Heidegger's claim that works of art reveal thc truth or essence of beings ~IIWwok IOCUII lvpnr~lm~tion ...ia IIOI ~k 01. sotno p~rlicuhr entity that hhappns lo hc ~~CSTIII31any given tin~c." ohwves Heideger: 'it cnnlrary. ~hc wpmduc.rion of thc thing's grnrnrl rs.srnc.r").mWe mUSf QU~S~~OY~ is. on ~ix the attemPt 10 transpose aesthelico-mclaphvsical criteria to the realm of political life proper. Is it in point of fact nieaninrrful to swak of the "unveiling of truth" as the raison d'etre of politics in the same way one can say this of a work of art or a philosophical work? Is not politics rather a nonmetaphysical sphere of human interaction, in which the content of collective human ~roiects. institutions, and laws is articulated, discussed. and agreed upon? Is it not, moreuvcr. illsome sense dan~erousto expect "meta~hysical results" from politics? For WIIS instead a sphere of human plurality. difference. and multiplicitv; Iience, a realm in which the more exacting criteria of philosophical truth must play a subordinate role'? ~ndthus,_~~~ld it not in fact be to place a type of totalitarian constraint on politics to expect il to deliver over truth in such pristine and unambiguous fashion? AI~]e\tn if Heideggeres ow11 conceptLon or tmth (wl~ich we sh.111 turn to shonly) is suficiently tolerant and piurulistic to allay such ~C~IS.shouldn't the main categorv of political life be illstice instead of truth? undo~btertly. Heidegger's long-standing

preiudiccs against "value-philosophv" prevented him from seriousiv entertaining this vro~osition; ad thus, as a categorv of political judgment. justice would not stand in sufficienllv close proximity to Being. In a11 of the nti,retneaioned irannces. we see that Heidegger's political philosophy is overburdened with ontolo~ical considerations that end up stifline the inner logic of ~olitics as an independent sphere of human action.

AT: Hiedegger -Alt 9Sufferin~lExtinction Heidegger's philosophy is reminiscent of Nietzhe's nihilism -rejecting all technology makes life meaningless, culminating in extinction Hicks, Professor and chair of philosophy at Queens College of the CUNY,2003 (Steven V., "Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Foucault: Nihilism and Beyond," Foucault and Hcidc~ger: Critical Encounters, Ed. Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, p. 109,Questia) <Why a "philosophical shock"'? The answer, in part, may be that ti-om Foucault's perspeaivc, Hcidegeer's insightful readino, of Nietzsche and the problem of nihilism is itself too ascetic. Heidepger's emphasis on "silence" as proper to Dasein's being, his frequent use of quasireligious (even Schopenhauerean) terms of "grace" and "call of conscience, " his many rcferences to the destiny of the German Volk. his avoidance of politics and the serious "~uietistic" tone of Heidegperian Gelassenheit arc all reminiscent of the lifedenying ascetic ideal Nietzsche sought to avoid. 65 Moreover, Foucault seems to join with Derrida and other "neo-Nietzscheans" in regarding Heidegeer's idea of "lettinn Being be'-his vision of those who have left traditional rnctaphysics behind and with ik thc obsession with mastery and technology that drives contemporarv civilization-as too passive or apalhetic a response to the leoitimate problems of post-Nietzschean nihilism that Heidcgger's own analysis uncovers. 66 Here we havc arrived at a key difference between He~degger and Foucault: for Foucault, Heidcggcr takes insufficrent account of the playful and even irrcvcrcnt elements in Nietzschc and of Nietzsche's critique of the dangers of Lhc ascetic ideal. Foucault joins with other new Nictzscheans in promoting, as an alternative to Hcideggerian Gelassenheit, the more Nietzschean vision of "playing with the text"-which in Foucault's case means promulgating active and willful images of resistance and struggle against particular practices of domination, rebellion against "micropowers, " and blatant disregard for tradition (cf. DP, 27). 67 This context-specific, unambiguously confrontational nature of Foucault's critique of the forms of domination and technologies of power lodged in modem institutions offers a more Nietzschc-like response than the one Heidegger offers to the nihilistic problems of Western civilizalion. As Foucault sees ~t,the lessons Heidemcr would havc us draw from Nietzsche throw us back to the passive "nihilism of emptiness" that Nietzsche feared. While not predicting the emergence of better times, Foucault tries to offer a better (less passive, less ascetic) model for reforming our "background practices" and for cullivating an affirmalive attitude toward life that he and othcr nco-Nictzscheans think may be "our only chance to kcen from extinmishing life on earth altogether." 68> Heidegger undermines morals and politics -the alternative will only cause suffering and the destroy all ethics Thiele -Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida -2003 [Leslie Paul, "The Ethics and Politics of Narrative," Foucalt and Heidegger: Critical Encounters, editors -Rosenberg and Milchman]

<The complementarity of Hcidegger's and Foucault's accounts of modern demons and saving graces should not be too surprising. Foucault's indebtedness to and fascination with Heideggcr is well documented. 1 My intent in this chapter is neither to focus on the complementarity of these visions, nor to outline the striking philosophical and political differences that remain in Heidegger's and Foucault's work. Rather, I attempt to make a claim for what at first blush might appear a lost cause. Despite their originality and intellectual brilliance, Heidegger and Foucault are often castigated as ethico-political dead-ends. Thev are criticized for their unwillingness or inability to supply the grounds for sound moral and political judgment. Heidegger's embrace of Nazism, in particular, is frequently identified as proof positive that he has little, if anythinu, to contribute to the ethico-political domain. The standard charue is that his highlv abstract form of philosophizino empyrean onrolo~ical vantage point. and depreciation of "das Man" undermines moral principle and political responsibility. From his philosophical heights, it is suggested. Heidewer remained blind to human sufferings, ethical imperatives, and pol~tical practicalities. Hc immunized himself against the moral sensitivity, compassion. and prudence that mi~ht have dissuaded him from endorsing and idcntiliring with a brutal regime. Those who embrace his philosophv. critics warn, court similar dangers. In like fashion. it is held that Foucault dug himself into an equally decp, though ideologically relocated, moral and political hole. Genealogical studies left Foucault convinced of the ubiquity of the disciplinary matrix. There would be no final liberation. The sticky, normalizing webs of power were inescapable and a "hermeneutics of suspicion" quashed any hope of gaining the ethical and political high ground. 2 As such, critics charge, Foucault stripped from us all reason for resistance to unjust power and all hope of legitimating alternative ethico-political institutions. In a Foucauldian world of panoptic power that shapes wants. needs, and selves, critics worry, one would have no justification for fighting and nothing worth fighting for. 3 In sum, Heidegger's and Foucault's critics suggest that both thinkers undermine the foundations of the practical wisdom needed to ethically and politically navigate late modernity. Despite the brilliance and originality of their thought, arguably the greatest philosopher and thc greatest social and political theorist of the twentieth century remain ungrounded ethically and divorced fiom political responsibility. Critics argue that Heidegger's statements and actions endorsing and defending Nazi authoritarianism and Foucault's radical anarchism. as disvlaved in his discussions of popular justice with Maoists, demonstrate that neither thinker is capable of su~plying us with the resources for sound moral and nolitical iudgment.>

AT: Hiedegger -Alt fails (iustifies Holocaust) Heideggerians are in a constant search for truth. Their beliefs are the reason Germans became Nazis by justifying the bringing out of certain 'inner greatnesses.' This blind attitude assures s that calls for an ontological shift will inevitably fail Zizek, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Sciences in Ljubljana, 1999 (Slavoj, The Ticklish Subiect, p. 13-15) <Apropos of this precise point, I myself run into my first trouble with Heidegger (since I began as a Heideggerian -my first published hook was on Heidegger and language). When, in my youth, I was bombarded by the official Communist philosophers' stories of Heideggcr's Nazi engagement, they left mc rathcr cold; Idefinitely more on the side of the Yuaoslav Heidegrarians. All of a sudden. however, I became aware of how these Yugoslav Hcidcnrarians wcrc doing exactly the sauce thing w~th respect Lo thc Yugoslav ideology of self-management as Heidegger himself did with respect to Nazism: in ex-Yugoslavia, Heidesgerians enlertaincd the same ambiguously assertive relationship towards Socialist selfmanagement, the official ideology of the Communist regime -in their eves. the essence of sell-management was the very essence of modern man, which is why the philosophical notion of sclfmanagemrnt suits the ontological esscnce of our epoch, while the standard political ideology of the regime misses this 'inner greatness' of self-management ... Heidcgaerians are thus eternally in search of a positive, ontic political system that would come closest to the epochal ontological truth. a strategy which inevitablv leads to error (which, of course, is always acknowledged only retroactively, post factum, after the disastrous outcomc of one's engagement). As Heidcgger himself put it, thosc who carne closest to the Ontological Truth are condemned to err at the ontic level ... err about what? Precisely about the line of scparation between ontic and ontological. The paradox not to be underestimated is that thc very philoso~her who focused his intcresl on the enigma of ontological difference -who warned again and again anainst the metaphysical mistake of conferring ontological dignity on some ontic content (God as the highest Entity, for example) -fell into the trap of conferring on Nazism the ontological dignity of suiting the essence of modern man. The standard defence of Hcidegper against the reproach of his Nazi pas1 consists of two points: not only was his Nazi engagement a siinple personal error (a 'stupidity [Dummheit]', as Heidegger himself put it) in no way inherently related to his philosophical project; the main counter-argument is that it is Heidegger's own philosophy that enables us to discern the true epochal roots of modern totalitarianism. However, what remains unthought here is the hidden complicity between the ontological indifference towards concrete social svslcms (capitalism. Fascism. Communism), in so far as thcy all belong to the same horizon of modern technologv. and the secret privileging of a concrete sociovolitical model (Nazism with Heidcgger, Communism with some 'Heideggerian Marxists') as closer to thc ontolosical truth of our epoch. Here one should avoid the trap that caught Heideager's defenders, who dismissed Heidegger's Nazi engagement as simple an anomaly,

a fall into the ontic levcl, in blatant contradiction to his thought, which teaches us not to confuse ontological horizon with ontic choices (as we have already seen, Heidegger 1s at his strongest when he demonstrates how, on a deeper structural level, ecological, conservative, and so on, oppositions to the modern universe of technology are already embedded in the horizon of what thcy purport to reject: the ecological critique of the technological exploitation of nature ultimately leads to a more 'environmentally sound' technology. etc.). Heidegner did not engage in the Nazi political project 'in spite of his ontological ~hilosonhical approach. but because of it; this engagement was not 'beneath' his philosophical level -on the contrary if one is to understand Heideggcr, the key point is to grasp the complicity (in Hegelese: 'speculative identity') between the elevation above ontic concerns and the oassionate 'ontic' Nazi political engagemenl. Onc can now see the ideological trap that caught Heidegger: when he criticizes Nazi racism on behalf of the true 'inner greatness' of thc Nazi movement, he repeats thc clcmcntary ideological gesture of maintaining an inner distance towards the ideological text -of claiming that there is something morc beneath it, a non-ideological kernel: ideology exerts its hold over us by means of this very insistence that the Cause we adhere to is not 'merely' ideological. So where is the trap? When the disappointed Hcide~gerturns away from active engagement in the Nazi movement, he does so because the Nazi movement did not maintain the level of its 'inner greatness', but legitimized itself with inadequate (racial) ideolo~y. In other words, what he expected from it was that it should legitimize itself through direct awareness of its 'inner greatness'. And the problemlies in this very expectation that a political movement that will directly refer to its historico-ontologica1 foundation is possible. This exvectation, however, & in itself profoundly metaphvsical, in so far as it fails to recognize that the gar, separating the direct ideological legitimization of a movement from its 'inner greatness' (its historico-onlological essence) is constitutive, a oositive condition of its 'functioning'. To use thc terms of the later Heidegger, ontological insight necessarily entails ontic blindness and error, and vice versa -that is to say, in order to be 'effective' at the ontic level, one must disregard the ontological horizon of one's activity. (In this sense, Heidegger emphasizes that 'sciencc doesn't think' and that, far from being its limitation. this inability is the very motor of scientific progress.) In other words, what Heidegger seems unable to endorse is a concrete political engagement that would accevt its necessary, constitutive blindness -as if the moment we acknowledge the gap separating the awareness of the ontological horizon from ontic engagement. any ontic engagement is devrcciated. loses its authentic dignity.>

AT: Hiedegger -Alt Fails (iustifies Holocaust) Heidegger's philosophy has moral consequences and leads to paralysis -It justifies sitting back and allowing for the Holocaust while criticizing the technology used to kill the Jews Bookchin, Founder of the Institute for Social Ecology and Former Professor at Ramapo College, 1995 (Murray, Re-enchanting Humanity, p. 168-170) "lnmfiu as Hcitk~gcrcnll be soicl lo have hd a prnject lo shape humiln lilcwnys. il w;!s as an cndcavor to reskt. or should 1 day. demur tivnl. whu hc ecmueived 111 hc ;In all-c~roaching fcchmcnlic menlnlity and civiliz~tic~~~ that rcndcrnl humm beings 'inaothm~ic' in tl~eir rehliorahip to a presumshly scl&pner;ttivc reality. 'isness'. or mnre rsoteriwlly, 'king' isrinj. Nu1 uniikc maay Gcrm~n reacrbnarics. Hcidegeer viewed 'modernitv' with its democratic spirit. rationalism, respect for the individual, and technological advances as a 'falling' (Gefullen) from a pri~nal and naive innocence in which humanitv once 'dwelled.' remnants of which he believed existed in the rustic world inlo which he was born a ccnlurv avo. 'Authenticitv', it can be said without any philosophi~al frills, lav in the pristine Teutonic world of thc lribal Germans who retained their ties with 'the Gods'. and with latcr pcoplcs who still tried to nourish their past amidst the bliahtcd trails of the modern world. Since xomc authors try to muddy I3cideggcr's preinpsnriln messzzge by focunnp os ~LFass~~mcd and i~mring hi, hatred ollhe 1:rcnch Revoluuon and ils e$alirarinn. tclicl in lndividwal fr~rsJu~n 'hcrd-like dclnocncy ol thc my'. by himlt'counts hr nothing'. he declared after kroming a rnemhcr of the it is rvonh cmphasirinp (hat such n view wilhers m the I~ght of his denial of individunlily. l'hc indivicll~;~l National sn-"list pang in 1933. 'I~L. t"r evcrgl~inp."' AS a member of the Nazi partv. which he remained up to the defeat of Germany fate or our VOU-m its ~t;~tcco~nts twelve vears later, his antihumanism reached strident, often blatantlv reactionary proportions. Newly appointed as the rector of the University of Freiburg upon Hitler's ascent to power. he readily adopted the Fuehrer-principle of German fascism and preferred the title Rektnr-Fuhrer, hailing the spirit of National Socialism as an antidote to 'thc darkening of the world, the flight of the gods, the destruction of the earth Ibv technologvl, the transformation of men into a mass, the hatred and suspicion of evervthing free and Creative'''HBmost un~llvory irrnxka were directed in the lecmrcs. from which tkse lines aie l&m. 'from a metaphysical point of view'. ngainsl the pincers' created by Amcrica and Russia that threaten ro squeere 'thc ri~rthermosrCOCWL'or the gbbe ... by tcchtx,~o_eg and ...econnmic c~~~oitntion." techno log;^. as Heidcaer construes it. is 'no mere means. Technologv is a wav of

revealing. If we give heed to this. then another whole realm for the essence of tcchnologv will open itself un to us. It is thc realm of revealing, i.e., or truth.'" After which Heidegger rolls out technology's transformations, indeed mutations, which give risc to a mood of anxiety and finallv hubris, anthropocentricitv. and the mechanical coercion of things into mere obiects for human use and . . ex~loltatlon.Heide$errs views on tcchnolopy art pan ot.a larger welln~~schaut~~~g hem. and dcrnnmls a degree or interpretive effort wc ~tlust forgo lor ihr pirxnl in the ccmntcxt of which ir lutr multimlored to di~uss a criticisnl or tcchnc,phcthin. Suffice it to sav that there is a good deal of primitivistic animism in Heidegger's treatment of the 'revealing' that occurs when techne is a 'clearino' for the 'expression' of a crafted material -not unlike the Eskimo sculptor who believes (g~itcwT,ng~y.may dd) that he is 'bringing out' a hidden form that lies in the walrus ivory hc is carving. But this issue must be seen more as a matter of metaphvsics than of a spirituallv charged technique. Thus, when Hcideggcr praises a windmill, in contrast to the 'challen~c' to a tract of land from which the 'hauling out of coal and ore' is subiected. he is not being 'ecological'. Heidegger is concerned with a windmill, not as an ecological technology, but more meta~hvsicallv with the notion that 'its sails do indeed turn in the wind; thev are left entirely to the wind's blowing'. The w~ndmill 'does not unlock cnergv from the air currents, in order to store Like man in relation to Being, it is a medium for the 'realization' of wind. not an artifact for acauirinrr power. Basically, this interpretation of a technoloyical interrelationship reflects a regression -sociallv and psvchologicallv as well as metaphvsicallv -into auietism. Heidegeer advances a message of passivity or wassivitv conceived as a human activity, an endeavor to let things be and 'disclose' themselves. 'Letting things be' would be little morc than a trite Maoist and Buddhist prcccpt were it not that Heideager as a National Socialist became all too ideologicallv engaged, rather than 'letting things be', when hc was busily undoinir 'intellectualism,' democracy. and technological intervention into the 'world'. Considering the time, the place, and the abstract way in which Heidegger treated humanity's 'Fall' into technological 'inauthenticitv' -a 'Fall' that he, like Ellul, regarded as inevitable, albeit a metaphysical, nightmare -it is not hard to see why he could trivialize the Holocaust, when he deigned lo notice it at all, as part of a techno-industrial 'condition'. 'Agiculture is now a motorized (matorsierre) food industry, in essence the same as thc manulacturing of corpses in the gas chambers and extermination camps,' he coldlv observed. 'the same as the blockade and starvation of the countryside. the same as the production of the hydrogen bombs.'" In placing the industrial mearts by which manv Jews were killed before the ideological ends that guided lhcir Nazi exterminators. Heidegger essentiallv displaces the barbarism oS a sl7ecific state apparatus, of which he was a part, bv the technical proficiency he can attribute ro tlze world at large! These imrnensclv revealing ofthanded remarks, drawn from a speech hc gave in Bremen m 1949, are beneath contempt. But thev point to a way of thinking that gave an autonomy to technique that has fcarl'ul moral conseouences which we are living with these days in the name of the sacred, a ~hraseologv that Heidegger would find verv

congenial were he alive todav. LMC~~, to its logical nndcn~dely pr"nitiv1rtic concltr~inns, linallv devolves into a dark reactionism and technophobia, ~OIIOW~~ a varalvzing auietism. For if our confrontation with civilization turns on passivitv before a 'disclosing of Being', a mere 'dwelling' on the earth, and a 'letting things be'. to use Heidcg~cr's verbiage -much of which has slipped into deep ecologv's vocabulary as well -the choice betwccn suuporting barbarism and enlightened humanism has no ethical foundations to sustain it. Freed of values grounded in obiectivi~v, we are lost in a quasi-religious antihumanism. a spirituality that can with the same eouanimitv hear the cry of a bird and ignore the anpuish of six million oncc-living people who were put to death bv the National Socialist state.

AT: Hiedegger -He's a Nazi Heidegger is a Nazi and that is the basis of his philosophy Thiele -Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida -2003 [Leslie Paul, "The Ethics and Politics of Narrative," Foucalt and Heidegger: Critical Encounters, editors -Roscnberg and Milchman] CHeidegner was a Nazi, and a rather unrepentent one at that. Some suggest Heidegg-er's Nazism cannot be separated from his philoso~hv, that indecd the formcr follows from the latter. The argument, in short, is that Heideo~er's political biomaphv prettv well tells the whole story. This position has been rearticulated periodically since the end of the Second World War, each time creating something of an academic row. 16 To be sure, the storv of Heideager's life does not well illustrate an education in sound moral and political iudpment, except perhaps as an example of a lesson left unlearned. Yct the storv that Heideager himself tells about human life. about human heina in historv, can do much to cultivate moral and political iudnment. I assert this despite insightful critiques of Heidegger that accuse him of ignoring and eliding phronesis as a human potentiality. 17 My argument, then, is not that Heidegger's work explicitly celebrates prudence. but that his vhilosovhical narrative facilitates its cultivation.>

Liberal humanism liberates more than it destroys and stops the worst oppression in history -the West's fight against communism proves Kors, Professor of History at University of Pennsylvania and Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2001 (Alan Chades, "Triumph without Self-Belief," Orbis, Summer, ebsco) For generations. and 10 this dily. Ihc great defenders of the honuin. colhsequence* of the albsaic~n orc;~pital by free m;u%cls--l.od~.ig von Miscs. Priidrich Hayrk. and Milton I'ricllman. ior rxamplr--hve ~~mi~incvl uncxplol~%l. mal'$in;lli~a.i nr dis~~ti*rcd wr: memory, thosr who dreamd ah3111 and dtahstcd how ow would ~nnlie the tratwitii~n its ahsed by morl Amcrkan intcllcctunls. 'l'hc lionized intcllc~ti~als ;~nd;ue.in s~'~~limualdl Ii'Om allp~odllcli~e ;I full generation. academic intellecl~tN callurc nbnvc all $cncnlly viewed the West's anlicommunist military strength. la aln~tc its and un.it~al c;~piralism la tk co~nucopia ofcenlnl plmniq. I:ur uillinpness to pmjccl lhal strength. as tk great nhst;~cle to intc~ni~tiond justice aid pacc. ant1 derided the dourin. ol'patce thni~tph slrcnpth as the slopt~n of the dcmcntcd. For at kast a p~tcrslion. Wcstrrn inttllcctui~l corllcmpt iur tk West as ;I crviiizalion. s sct orllualr. md lhc c~hjtct ol'hnpe for the polentills of humitnity has been Ib cumicul~~m ofthc humaoitie~ ;Ind"stit" sucial sciences. (;iven thest- idfi~hly sat1 phcnonic~n. thc wcmillg trit~~npholllr West (both the collapse ofnco-Mmxist thmryat universilicsoutside the Wehl. and especially the downfall of Ihe Soviet empin.) will bc understood hy Westen1 intelln.tttals ;IS rhnwins. in the killer case. how ithcord Wwtcrn fcilrs wn'e from the stan. and. in bolh cam. not so mnch a vtctory for the Wcst ar merely Ihc ecnnnmic colhpsc of communists who ill variotts ways bctraycd ihcu ideals or iail~ul a1tempcr the~tt ui~hadqualc prsgmafism or relativism. One must wall. ht)wever. the years 1975-76 in the world oflhe intellecttrol kft: debal in Indilchina: ihe excitemen1 over Ramcommonism: thc anticipation ot thc joy at A~~lcrica~: ola. ten. a hundrcd Viclnnms: Ik conlcmpt for .lc;u>17nncois Kcvcl's The Totahtxinn Te~tiptalit~n: tl~e ttbiquilous tk~i-ks of mor;~l equivslcnce: the thrill OCli;~mmcrs and sicklcs in Ponagal: the jus(ilicat~on? of ~hc rmtwmml tifCuhan lrnops into those prwl hupcu for mnknd. Angc~ta ;~mlMo&mhiqnc; tk Loathing oiau eftonfi to prerervs Western strategic suprio~ity or even parity. One must recall. mnderd, thc early 1980~: the mmnl ictzatm~~ :tml the homicidal megalomaniac Menpistu of Ethiopia; the dcn~onization ofkeagan's fo~eig~t

of the kkptumniacal and antidcnlocratic C;tsmtia Sandi~~istas policy: the outrege when St~san Sont;ry declared tk iludlence of Reader's l11gsT better inf(mned than renders of?W Nation about thc histoly of thc LISSR. the rntrckery orthe prcsidenl's description ofthe Sov~ct Union as thC "evil empire'. and of communism ;I& a vision thst Wuukl rltd on "the duslhin of hislov": and the xadcmic as.wintiom that approved poliiically cormct resolutionb for 11 nuclear trcczc. llc httcr included the American Historical Assncialh~t. which vntcd in overwhelming numbers In infornl the American sovernment and public that. as pmkssional hiiorians, lhcy knew that Rra$an3s rearmament pmgnm and depk>ymellt of nusibs in Burupe woukl lead tu ;I severe worsenilia ofU.S.-Soviet rclalions. end the possibilities of pwa. and culminate in an exchange of weapons in an inch~ctablc conflict. All of that will be rewritten. ft)rgotlen. i~ldiectly Itlrtilied. and incorporated into n world vicw lhal s~ill ponmys thr wc~tus empire an11 the victim. The initial appeal of communism and romanticized Third World leaders--^^^^ Nkrumah. Julius N~CTCE. M~O ofthe world s mong, Ho Chi Minh. Fklel C~mo. Sckou~oun?. and Daniel Oneg--wlu) woukl r&ii human well-bemg and productivity !well, they certainly r&fin& sornahing) reflected the Wcslcrn pathology whereby intellectuals delude themselves svstematically about the nonWcst, about that "Other" standing against and apart from the SOCletY that does nil1 appreciate those intellectuals' moral md prxtical authority and status. However. when an cncmy msc that lmly hated Westem inlcllccluals--namely, Etscism--ad whose defeat depnded upan thc Wrsl'~ scli-belief. Westem inlellecluls quickly bame mnslers oi judgments ofak)lute suiuperiomy ard had na diflict~lty in defining a contcsr tctwcen good md eviL Cognitive dissonance is un aslonishjne phenomenon. and utacadcmjccirc~es. it prevents ~hr~essenti?~ hinoricnltmths trum bciltgtold. ~irsl, the most murderous rcnime in all of human history. the Bolsheviks in power. has fallen: its agents were guiltv of irredeemable crimes against humanity, and its apologists should do penance for the remainder of their b.Anticommunists within the law were wi~niors for human frmiom; communists and iu~ti-aaicummnnists. whawver their intentions. were wuniors for human misery and slavery. The most that can be said in communism's favor is that it was capable of building, by means of. slave labor and terror, Qunulacrum oltiary. Indiana. ouce only, without ongoing mamntcnancc. and minus the p~xlstuff. Secondly. voluntary exchange among individuals held morally resvonsible under the rule of law has demonstrably created the means of both p~oswritv and diverse social options. Such a model has been a precondition of individuation and frecdom, whereas regimes of central planning have created poverty, and (as Hayek foresaw) ineluctable developments toward totalitarianism and the Worst abuses of Power. Dynamic free-n~arket societies. grou~tdcd in rights-bud individwslism. have altered the entire human comrp!ion of Freedom and diynily ti~r tiumcrly maginalizcd grottps.

The entire "%c~alisl expcrimct~l." by conlmsl, ended in stnsiq. ethnic hatreds. rhr absence crievrn the minimal preconditions of econtm~. social. and poliliwl renewal. and categoricsl contclllpt for both ! ndivduatk)n and mialrityripha. Thirdlv. the willingness to contain communism, to fight its expansion overtlv and covcrtlv, to sacrifice wealth and often lives against its heinous efforts at extension--in Europe, Vietnam, Central AS^. Central Ameriw, Korca. L~OS. Cambodia. ad. indeed. ~irenada--Was. with the struggle against Nazism owi a much hrkfer period. the Ereat gift of Amcrican taxpayers and the American ~eo~le to vlanet earth. AS 13ritain ~mnder Churchill was "the West" in 1940, m wa the UnucJ Slates from 1945 lo 1989. dnw~ng from ns values to stand against what ww simtlltancot~aly its mutant offspring and its anlithesir. In the lwe~~tierh century. the Wcst met and survived its ercatcsr triaL On the whuk. however. Wcslcrn intellectuals do nnt revel in tkse triumphs. to s:~y thc leas^. Where is the celehmlion'? Just ;IS imponant, where thc accounting? 011 the Left. to hw either woukl bc to implicate om'sown thoaphl and sill in the I;qest crime am? folly ~n the hisloly or mallkind. Wc have seen myriad docu~trt~tarrs ofthr victims of Nazis111. hut where is the Shoah. or on the collective and individual solfcr~ng thc Nieht ad Fog. let ahme the Nt~lrm~rg viclims who froze to death Or trails orthc postcommunist pnseat? As Solzknitsyn predicted repeamily in The Gulag Archipelago. the COU~~~~SS were maimed in the Arctic death camps would go unremembered: thc ofticers and guards who broke their bodies and often their souls would live Out thcir lives On ~ensions, unrnolt.ned: and those who gave the or~lcrs would dic o we fully and u~lpunished. Ourdrrumenlary makers and monl intrllcctuals do 11111 kt 11s ~o~get any victinl or the Ilolocaust. wc hunt down nincty-year-old guards SO that tk how ofthe ded miph hnvc jnsticc. and properly a). The bones of Lenin's and Stalin's and Brezhnev's camps crv out for iustice, as do the bones of North Vietnam's exterminations, and those of Poi Pot's millions, and Mao's tcns of millions. cakes. howevcr. the Samc inlelkctuals cry out apaiml-what is heir ptu.;~re'!--"wiLch-hlmts.'mi :;wk as to let tk pus1 he thc past. Wc cclc$alcd lhc ~nilbnnium with jubilation: we have not yet cekhled thc triun~ph of Ihe Wea. Ask Ameriwn high scll(o1 urcvcn colkgc studcnts to nttmhcr tiitleh victims and Colu~nbs's riciuns. and they will imswer. for bnth. ~n the tens ormillions. Ask them to ~lt~rnber Stalin's vicluns and. if my experience

is lwical. they will anqwer m the thut~slltxis. Such is theireducalio~l. even now. The tlhsence ofccthrat~on. of teaching the kssons Icmed. atxf orden~anlr Lir accountability 8s prhps easily nncklerrtood on the Left. Convinced that the Wcst above all has been the source of artificial relationships of dominance and subservience, the commodification of human life. and ecocide, leftist intellectuals have little interest in obiectivcly analvzinn the manifest data about societies of v0luntarY exchange, or in corning 10 tern with thc sk~wly and newly rclcabcd data abut tk conditions of life and dcath under the Hol~heviks md thcir heirs. tor in cunfminy or rciting vitriols thecwies on the olllcome of !he Cold War (let alone. giwn theircontcmpmry concerns. in mlyzin! ecological or gender politics under communist or Third World regimes). Less obvious. but equally striking in some ways. has been the absence of celebration on so mnch of ihe inlellt~tual Riyht, because it is not ar a11 cennin stlmethtog wrxthcalling Wcslcrn civilimtion did in lac1 .run,lve rhe twentieth century.

AT: Hiedegger -Humanism Good Strengthening human virtues is the only way to maintain peace by preventing horrible atrocities like the Holocaust from ever happening Ketels, Associate Professor of English at Temple University, 1996 (Violet B., "'Havel to the Castle!' The Power of the Word," 548 Annals 45, November. Lexis) <[*4h] THE poiitical bestiality of our age is abetted bv our willingness to tolerate the deconstructing of humanist values. The vroccss bedns with the cvnical manipulation of lannuane. It often ends in stupefvino murderousness before which the world stands silcnt, frozen in impotent "aucntismW--a wait-and-scc stance as unsuited to the human plight as a pacifier is to stopping UP the hunger of a starving child. We have let lapse our pledge to the 6 million Jcwish victims of the Holocaust that their dcaths mi-ht somehow be transfiguring for humankind. We allow "slauehterhouse men" tactical status at U.N. tables and "cast down our cves when the devraved roar past." nl Peacemakers, dclcgated by us and circumscribed by our fears. temporize with thugs who havc rcvivcd lebensraum clain~s more boldly than Hiller did. In the Germany of thc 1930s. a demonic idca was born in a demented brain: the word went forth: orders wen: given. repeated, widely broadcast; and men, womcn. and childrcn were herded into dcah camps. Their offshore signals. cries lor hclp. did not sumnon us to rescue. We had bccome inured to the reality of human suffering. We could no longer hear what the words meant or did not credit them or not enough of us joined the chorus. Shrieking victims perished in thc cold blankness of inhumane silence. We were deaf to the apocalyptic urgency in Solzhenitsyn's declaration from the Gulag that we must check the disastrous course 01history. We were heedless of the lesson of his experience that only the unbending strength of the human spirit. fully taking its stand on the shifting frontier of encroaching violence and declaring "not one step further," though death may be the end of it--only this unwavering firmness offers any genuinc defense of mace for the individual, of genuine peace for mankind at large. n2 In past human crises. writers and thinkers strained languagc to the breaking point to keep alive the memory of thc unimaginable, to keep the human conscience from forgetting. In the current context, however. intcllcctuals seem more devoted to abstract assaults on values than to thoughtful probing of the moral dimensions of human expcrience. "Heirs of the ancient possessions of higher knowledge and literacy skills," n3 we sccm to have lost our nerve. and not onlv because of Holocaust

history and its tragic aftermath. We feel insecure before the emvirical absolutes of hard science. We are intimidated by the "high modernis1 rage against mimesis and content," n4 monstrous progeny of the union between Nietzsche and philoso~hical formalism, the grim ~rovosal we have bought into that there is no truth, no obicctivitv. and no disinterested knowledge. n5 Less certain ahout the power of language. that "oldest flame of the [*47] humanist soul," n6 to frame a credo to live bv or criteria to judge bv, we are vulnerable even to the discredited Paul de Man's indecent hint that "wars and revolutions are no1 empirical events . . . but 'texts' masquerading as facts." n7 Truth and reality seem more elusive than they ever were in the past; values arc pronounced to be mere fictions of ruling elites to retain power. We are embarrassed bv virtue. Words collide and crack undcr these new skeptical strains, dissolving into banalities the colossal enormity of what must bc expressed lest we forget. Remembering for the futun: has become doubly dispiriting by our having to remember for the prcscnt. too. our having to register and confront what is wrong hcn: and now. The reality to be fixcd in memory shifts as we seek words for it: the memory we set down is flawed by our subjectivities. It is selective. deccptivc. partial. unreliable. and amoral. It plays tricks and can be invented. It stops up its ears to shut out what it does not dare to facc. n8 Lodged in our brains. such axioms, certified hy sciencc and statistics, tempt us to concede the final irrelevance of words and memory. We have to gt on with our lives. Resides, memories reconstructed in words. even when they are documented by evidencc. have not often changed the world or fcndcd off the powerful seductions to silence. forgetting, or denying. Especially denying. which, in the case of the Holocaust, has become an obscene industry competing in thc open market of ideas for control of our sensc of the past. It is said that the Holocaust never happened. Revisionist history with a vengeance is purveyed in words: something in words must set against it. Yet what? How do we nerve to the task when we are increasingly disposed to cast both words and memory in a condition of cryogenic dubiety? Not only before but also since 1945. the criminality of governments. paraded as politics and fattening on linguistic manipulation and deliberately reimplanted memory of past real or imagined grievance, has spread calamity across the planet. "Thecancer that has catcn at the entrails of Yugoslavia since Tito's death [hasl Kosovo for its locus." but not lnerely as a piece of land. The country's rogue adventurers use the word "Kosovo" to reinvoke as sacred the land whm Serbs were defeated by Turks in 1389! n9 Memory of bloody massacres in 1389, sloganized and distorted in 1989. demands the bloody revcngc of new nlassacres and returns civilization not to its past glory but to its gory trihal wars. As Matija Beckovic. the bard of Scrb nationalism. writes. "11is as if the Serbian peoplc waged only one battle--by widening the Kosovo chamel-house, by adding wailing upon wailing, by counting new madyrs to the martyrs of Kosovo. . . . Kosova is the Serbianized [*48] history of the Flood--the

Serbian New Tcstanient." n10 A cover of Suddeutsche Zeitung in 1994 was printed with blood donaled by refugee women fmrn Bosnia in an eerily perverse afterbirth of violence revisited. nl1 We stand benumbed before multiplying horrors. As Vaclav Havel warned more than a decade ago, rcgimes that generate them "are the avant garde af a global crisis in civilization." The depersonalization of vower in "svstem, idcolony and avparal," vatho1oBcal suspicions about human motives and meanings, the loosening of individual resvonsibilitv, the swiftness by which disastrous events follow one upon another "have deprived us of our conscience. of our common sense and natural speech and therebv, of our actual humanity." n12 Nothing less than the transformation of human consciousness is likely to rescue us.>

AT: Hiedegger -Humanism Good Anti-humanism justified the Holocaust by using an 'all-or-nothing' mentality. We must challenge the reduction in humanist values in order to prevent another Holocaust from happening Ketels, Associate Professor of English at Temple University, 1996 (Violet B., '"Have1 to thc Castle!' The Power of the Word," 548 Annals 45, November. Lexis) <History has survived them and provides a regenerative, other view against nihilism and detachment. It testifies that our terror of being found ouilty of phrases too smooth or iudgment too simple is not in itself a value. Some long in^ for transcendence wersists in the human spirit. some tenacious faith that truth and goodness exist and can prevail. What happened in the death camps. the invasion of Prague by Russian tanks, the rape of Muslim womcn, the dismembering of Bosnian men, the degrading of a sophisticated society to subsistence and barbarous banditry: these things do not become fictions simply because we cannot speak of them adequately or becausc composing abstractions is sarer than responding to the heinous reality of criminal acts. No response to the Holocaust and its murderous wake or to the carnage in the former Yugoslavia could possibly be adequate to the alrocities alphabeti~ed in file folders of perpetrators or to the unspeakable experiences burned into brains and bodies of survivors. But no response at all brceds new catastrophe. Saul Bellow warncd about the "humanistic civilized moral imagination" that. seized with despair, "declines into lethargy and sleep." n15 Imagine the plight of human creatures if il were to be silenced altogether, extinguished or rorgotten. "Humanism did not produce the Holocaust, and the Holocaust. knowing its enemies. was bent on the extermination of humanism. It is an odd consequence of an all-or-nothine mentalitv to repudiate humanist values because they are inadeauate as an antidote to evil." n16 Basic human rights asserted in words cannot be restored in reality unless they are matched to practices in all the spheres of influence we occupy. We feel revulsion at the repudiation of humanist values so visible in the savagery of the battlefield and the councils of war. Yet we seem inoculated against seeing thc brutalities of daily human interactions. the devaluing of values in our own intellcclual spheres. the moral and ethical debunking Sormally incorporated into scholarly exegesis in literature, philosophy. the social sciences, and linnuistics, the very disciplines that cradled humanist values. Remembering for the future by rehearsing the record, then, is not enough, as the most eloquent witnesses to Holocaust history have sorrowfully attested. We must also respond to the record with strategies that challenge humanist reductionism in places where we tend to overlook it or think it harmless. Our moral outrage should be intensified. not subdued, [*501 bv what we know. We must search out alternatives to the anomie that seizes us whcn the linguistic distance between words and reality seems unbridgeably vast, and reflections upon historical events ill matched to the dark complexities ol' the human experience we would illumine.> Anti-humanism destroys human dignity

Campbell, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle, 19W (David, '"The Deterritorialization of Responsibility." Mom1 Spaces, Eds. Michael J. Shapiro & David Campbell, p. ) <Liberalism is thus insufficient for human dignity because the election that justifies man "comes from a god -or God-who beholds him in the face of the other man, his neighbor, the original 'site' of the eve la ti on."" Similarly, humanism is insufficient, and "modern antihuman-ism ... is true over and beyond the reasons it gives itself." What Levinas finds laudable in antihumanism is that it "abandoned the idea of person, goal and origin of itself, in which the ego is still a thing because it is still a being." As such, antihumanism does not eradicate the human, but "clears the dace for subiectivity positine itself in abnegation, in sacrifice. in a substitution which precedes the will." It would therefore be a gravc error to conclude in haste [hat Levinas's antihumanism is either inhuman or inhumane. To the contrary. Levinas declares that "humanism has to be denounccd only because if is not sufficiently Izurnun,I"" because it is insufficiently attuned to alteritv. If one understood "humanism" to mcan a "humanism of the Other." then there would be no greater humanist than Le~inas.~~>

AT: S~anos-Alt Fails There is no alternative, disclosure just leads back to where it started, it won't destroy humanism Lewandowski 1994 (Joseph D, associate Professor and the Philosophy Program Coordinator at Central Missouri State University, "Hcidcgger Literary Theory and Social Criticism" PHILOSOPHY & SOCW CRITICISM Vol. 20 No. 3 pp. 109-122, 1994.) But radicalized or not, S~anos's trading of any possibilitv of 'determinate truth' Tor Hcideggerian disclosure as eventin,: of truthtuntruth robs his critical theory of the necessary yardstick needed to measure 'emancipation'. Heidegger's disclosure is a cryptonormative truth: it is an event before which any critical judgment necessarily fails. Disclosure is not a process of inquiry. but rather a revcalinn/concealing that befalls or overtakes us. In his eagerness to draw oul thc cnabling features and 'post1-humanist dimension of Heidegger's disclosure, Spanos fails to see the inevitable and internal limits to truth as disclosure.' Gadamcr encounters similar problems, despite his keen insights, when he holds on to a Heideggerian disclosure that too often undermines the power of critical reflection. And the postmodern Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo encounters a related problem when he attempts to take leave of modernity and proclaim a liberating postmodernity via Hcideggcr's di~closure.~ But while a purely aesthetic theory interested in 'textuality' can quite justifiably be grounded in truth as disclosurc (as American deconstruction or Vattimo's il pensiero debole is), a truly critical theory interested in emancipation simply cannot: some typcs of 'emancipation' are false and need to be rejected. Texts may very wcll 'disclose' worlds in the same way that, say, the Greek temple does for Heidegger. But a genuinelv critical theorv needs to be able to say what worlds are bcucr or worse Ibr actual agents in actual worlds -a need, I might add, that Spanos is constantly aware of and typifies in his denunciation of American imperialism in Vietnam (and elsewhere) in Heidegger and Criticism. In the strongest sections of Heidegger and Criticism, Spanos rightly faults deconstruction (and earlier forms of immanent textualism from formalism to the New Criticism) for making world-disclosure the only function of texts, thereby divorcing them from the actual world and rendering many forms of deconstruction a 'sterile textual gamc' (p. 123). He criticizes deconstruction for 'its oversight both to the worldliness of the text under scrutiny and to the positive, the pro,jective, that is, worldly possibilities it discloses' (p. 122, original emphasis). In this 'oversight', deconstruction misses what, according to Spanos, a positive account of destruction sees: the 'positive' possibilities of disclosive texts. But the 'positive' possibilities of a destructive hermeneutics as disclosure -if by 'positive' we mean 'other', possiblv freer or better, worlds -cannot bc criticallv assessed. The limits of the one-sided disclosive account of 'textualitv' S~anos tinds troublesomc in deconstruction presents no less a limit to his appro~riation of Heidegger's hermeneutics that

also preserves Heidegger's 'nost'humanist notion of truth as disclosurc. Spanos's Heideggerian destruction, despite its positive, ernancipatory intentions. is caught in the same acritical 'game' in which he tinds critlcs such as Barbara Johnson, J. Hillis Miller and Paul de Man, and the same cryptonormativity of other contemporary appropriators of Heidegger such as Gadamer and Vattimo. The question is not one of humanism, posthumanism, or even Nazism (labels I think we should use sparingly: 'isms', as Heidegger himself said, are suspect), but rather of what is an adeauate mound for a critical theorv oriented toward emancipation, and how best to situate litcrarv theory upon such a around. Spanos' use of genealogy is not emancipatory Lewandowski 1994 (Joseph D, associate Professor and the Philosophy Program Coordinalor at Central Missouri State University, "Heidegger Literary Theory and Social Criticism" PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM Vol. 20 No. 3 pp. 109-122, 1994.) Spanos, however. thinks Foucault can provide an alternative materialisl grounding for an emancipatory critical theory that would obviate the objections of someone such as Marcuse. But the turn to Foucault is no less problematic than the original turn to Heidegger Genealogy is not critical in any real way. Nor can it tame or augment what Spanos calls Heidegger's 'overdetermination of the ontologka of power and not, as Spanos thinks, a 'concrete diagnosis' (p 138)of powcr mechanisms. Thus it dramatizes, on a different level the same shortcomings of Heidegger's fundamental ontology. The affliativc relationship (p. 138)that Spanos tries to develop between Heidcgger and Foucault in order to avoid the problem Marcuse faced simply cannot work. Where Heidegger ontologizes Being. Foucault ontologizes power. The latter sees power as a strategic and intentional but sub:lectless mechanism that endow's itself and ~unches out 'docilc bodies', whereas the formed seese Being as that neutered term and no-thing that call us Foucault (like Spanos) never works out how genealogy is emanci~atorv. or how emancipation could be realized collectives bv actual aucnts in the world. The 'undefined work of freedom' the later Foucault speaks of in his work. The genealogy of power is as much a hvnostatization as is fundamental ontologv: such hv~ostatizations tend to instilute the impossibilitv of practical resistance or freedom. In short, I don't think the Heideggerian 'dialogue' with Foucault sufficiency tames or complements Heidegger, nor does it make his discourse (or Foucault's, for that matter) any more emancipatory or oppositional. Indeed, Foucault's reilicd theory of power seems to undermine the verv notion of 'Opposition' since there is no subiect (but rather a 'docile' body) to do the resisting (or in his later work, a privatized self to be within a regime of truth), nor an object to be resisted. As Said rightly points out in the The World, The Text, and the Critic, 'Foucault more or less eliminates the central dialectic of opposed forces that still underlies modern society' (p. 221) Foucault's theory of power is shot through with false empirical analysis, yet Spanos seems to accept them as valid diagnoses. Spanos fails lo see, to paraphrase Said's criticism of Foucault's theory of power, that power is neither a spider's web without the spider, nor a smoothly functioning diaeram (p. 221)

AT: Ssanos -Alt Fails Spanos' rejection of Humanism destroys any political project and/ or allies and allows the right to take over Perkin 1993(J. Russell, Professor of English at Saint Mary's University, Theorizing the Culture Wars, Postmodern Culture PMC 3.3, http://muse.jhu.edu/~journals/postmodern~culture/v00313.3r~perkin.html) My tinal criticism is that Svanos. by his attempt to vut all humanists into the same categorv and to break totally with the tradition of humanism, isolates himself in a posture of ultraleftist purity that cuts him off from many potential political allies, especially when, as I will note in conclusion. his practical recommendations for the practical role of an adversarial intellectual seem similar to those of the liberal pluralists he attacks. He seems illinformed about what goes on in the everyday work of the academy, for instance, in thc iield of composition studies. Spanos laments the "unwarranted neglect" (202) of the work of Paulo Freire. yet in reading composition and pedagogy journals over the last few years, I have noticed few thinkers who have been so consistently cited. Spanos refers several times to the fact that the discourse of the documents comprising The Pentagon Papers was linked to the kind of discourse that first-year composition courses produce (this was Richard Ohmann's argument): here again, however, Spanos is not up to date. For the last decade the field of composition studies has been the most vigorous site of the kind of oppositional practices The End of Education recommends. The academy, in short, is more diverse. more complex, more genuinely full of difference than Spanos allows, and it is precisely that difference that neoconservatives want to erase. By seeking to setmate out only the vure (posthumanist) believers, Svanos seems to me to ensure his self-marginalization. For example. several times he includes pluralists like Wayne Booth and even Gerald Graff in lists of "humanists" that include William Bcnnett, Roger Kimball and Dinesh D'Souza. Of course. there is a polemical purpose to this, but it is one that is counterproductive. In fact, I would even question the validity of calling shoddy and often inaccurate journalists like Kimball and D'Souza with the title "humanist intellectuals." Henry Louis Gates's final chapter contains some cogent criticism of the kind of position which Spanos has taken. Gates argues that the "hard" left's o~position to liberalism is as mistaken as its ovvosition to conservatism, and refers to Cornel West's remarks about the field of critical legal studies, "If vou don't build on liberalism, vou build on air" (I 87). Building on air seems to me precisely what Spanos is recommending. Gates,on the other hand, criticizes "those rnassivelv totalizing theories that marginalize practical political action as a iciunc indulgence" (192). and endorses a coalition of liberalism and the left. Spanos can't escape western metaphysics Perkin 1993 (J. Russell, Professor of English at Saint Mary's University, Theorizing the Culture Wars, Postmodern Culture PMC

3.3, http://n~use.jhu.edu/journals/postmodern~culture/vOO3/.3r~perkin.html) There are further problems with the narrative built into The End of Education. Humanism is always and everywhere, for Spanos, panovtic, repressive, characterized bv "the metavhysics of the centered circle," which is repeatedly attacked by reference to the same overcited passage from Demda's "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciencesw--not coincidentally one of the places where Derrida allows himself to make large claims unqualified by their derivation from reading a particular text. In order to make this assertion, Spanos must show that all apparent difference is in fact contained by the same old metaphysical discourse. Thus, within the space of four pages, in the context of making absolute claims about Western education (or thought, or theory), Spanos uses the following constructions: 1 ."whatever its historically specific permutations," 2. "despite the historically specific permutations," 3. "Apparent historical dissimilarities," 4. "Despite the historically specific ruptures." (12-15) Western thought, he repeats, has "always reaffirmed a nostalgic and recuperative circuitous educational journey back to the origin" (15). This over-insistence suggests to me that Spanos is a poor reader of Demda. for he is not attentive to difference at particular enough citations from Heidegger, whereas his rather anticlimactic final chapter shows, as Derrida recognizes more explicitly, that one cannot escape logocentrism simply by wish in^ to.

AT: Baudrillard -No Alt Baudrillard's alterntive is nihilism Rojek 1993 (Chris, Deputy Director, Tlzeory. Culture & Society Centre ,F'rofessor of Sociology and Culture at Nottingharn Trent University, Forget Buadrillard? Edited by Chris Rojek, pgs 109) What end is this strategy designed to secure? Baudrillard is rc~ular!y criticized for the sourness of his analvsis. He is accused of yearning for the end of everything and leadinc, us to the very gales of nihilism. However, this is lo undercstimate Baudrillard's desire to provoke. He wutzts to be accused of talking nonsense in ordcr to compel critics to conl'ront the nonsense which lies behind their own assumptions and proposals. The strategy is one of defusion and opposition. Instead of pinning one's hows upon collectivism and Utovia Baudrillard emphasizes the dispersal of bodies, the circulalion of signs and the decentring of politics. Thcrc is also a clear antiintelleclualism in Baudrillard's writing. It may seem surprising to makc this observation for Baudrillard's dense and wordy prose seems calculated to appeal only to intellectuals. However, his work radiates distrust of intellectuals who claim to show us reality or to trace our present condition to origins or fixed causal networks. In part Baudrillard's dislike of intellectuals and intellectualism reflects his pcrsonal background. His family have their roots in the nonconformist peasantry. His parents were minor administrators in the civil service and he is the first of the line to go to university (Gane 1993). Also he can hardly have been left unaffected by the events of 1968 in Paris and the collapse of left-wing aspirations for fundamental change in society. Baudrillard gained his first university post at a time when the Left were painfully coming to terms with the honws of statist rule in Eastern Europe. In the 1950s and 1960s when the grand old men of western Marxism reasserted the underlying veracity of Marxist theory, Baudrillard's thought was being formed in a climate of broken promises. His drift into the 'gesturial' politics of the Situationists reflects an impatience with mainstream Marxism. And although he has moved on rather sharply from Situationism with its youthful hope of revolution and revelation of the Spectacle he has, in interviews, often expressed his nostalgia for the joyful anarchism of Situationist times. Baudrillard then is concerned with examining society at a molecular level. He wants to show us the extraordinary character of the times liom the most ordinary standpoint imaginable: the standpoint of the consumcr. And if his language is elliptical, rnultilaycred, discontinuous and suffused with poetical insight who is to say that this is not an accurate retlection of ordinary consumer consciousness? Is Baudrillard perhaps finding words for what goes through all of our minds as we participate in the addrenched, media-manipulated world of the present-day metropolis? Baudrillard's strategies will inevitably fail, they have no place to go Rojek 1993(Chris, Deputy Director, Theory, Cultlrre & Society Centre ,Professor of Sociology and Culture at Nottingham Trent University, Forget Buadrillard? Edited by Chris Rojek, pgs 109) Pop Art dated rather quickly. By the early 1970s most of the kcy helmsmen had abandoned ship. Peter Blake flirted with an erratic

choTa e-box version of English pastoralism; and Warhol swapped Ws leather jacket for an Armani suit and became increasingA absorbed in his business affairs. Pop Art's preoccupation with Ad-Mass culture was unable to sustain itself. In rcl'using to consder to culmrc as a produced set of processes it was unable to explore he roots ofits complicity with the Ad-Mass worid. Without critical distance it inevitably became the savant of Ad-Mass. Warhol did as the court painter of German industrialists, Texan entrepreneurs and the Hollywood aristocracy. Baudrillard's severe self-irony and the mobility of his commentaries will probably save him from the collaborationism to which the Pop Art movement eventually succumbed. Nevertheless he faces the same strategic vroblem that faced Warhol, Jim Dine, Robert Indiana and the others in the 1960s. How to outdo your last provocative statement'! A sociology of provocalion is pregnant with the crisis of inertia. In old age parody tends to be the only way in which it can deal with the triumphs of its youthful radicalism. Nielische and Marx avoided this fate because they never lost their disappointment with existing conditions. But their tones of rage, ferocitv and optimism are unknown to Baudrillard. Having destroyed the world as we know it and dismissed Utopia as a snare and a delusion where is their: left for Baudrillard to oo?

AT: Baudrillard -No Alt Baudrillard's alternative fails, mostly because he doesn't have one Best & Kellner, Department of Philosophy at University of Texas-El Paso, 1998 [Steven & Douglas, http://www2.cddc.vt.edu/i!luminations~ell28.11tm, "Postmodern Politics and the Battle for the Future"] In the aftermath of the 1960s, novel and conflicting conceptions of postmodern politics emerged. Postmodern politics thus take a varictv of forms and would include the anti-politics of Baudrillard and his followers, who exhibit a cynical, despairing, reiection of the bclicf in emancipatorv social transformation. as well as a variety of efforts to create a new or reconstructed politics. On the extreme and apolitical position of a Baudrillard, we are stranded at the end of historv. paralyzed and frozen. as the masses collapse into inertia and indifference, and simulacra and technologv triumph over azcncv. Thus, from Baudrillard's perspective, all we can do is "accommodate ourselves to the time lei1 to us." [3] Baudrillard speaks from an egoistic position of privilege -his criticism is just a narcissistic game Rojek 1993 (Chris, Deputy Director, Theor?;, Culture & Society Centre ,Professor of Sociology and Culture at Nottingham Trent University, Forget Buadrillard? Edited by Chris Rojek, pgs 109) THE SEDUCTIONSOF THE SELF Baudrillard's emphasis upon dispersal, aesthetics, irony and poetic sensibility is often taken as evidence that he is enraptured with egoism. His sternest critics accuse him of treating social life as a sort of electronic fashion parade and reducing social analysis to nothing but a narcissistic game (Kellner 1989). There is some justice in these criticisms. As Bauman (1992: 154-5) has quipped, Baudrillard sometimes gives the impression of viewing the world exclusively through the window of a speeding automobile or through the tlicker of images on the TV screen. There is an undoubted irony that this apostle of mobility and pathology also seems to be the most sedentary and ecapsulated of commentators. Whether he is commentating on the Gulf War from the safety of his Paris apartment or traversing the USA in the compartment of his AirAmerica plane, ever watchful, ever ready with the appropriate ban mot, Baudrillard gives the impression of being the buddha of cool. Baudrillard's alternative fails, mostly because he doesn't have one Best & Kellner, Department of Philosophy at University of Texas-El Paso, 1998 [Steven & Douglas, h~p://www2.cddc.vt.edu/illuminations/kcll2.litm."Postmodern Politics and the Battle for the Future"] In the aftermath of the 1960s, novel and conflicting conceptions of postniodern politics emerged. Postmodern politics thus take a

variety of forms and would include the anti-politics of Baudrillard and his followers, who exhibit a cvnical, despairing reiection of the belief in emancipatorv social transformation. as well as a varietv of efforts to create a new or reconstructed politics. On the extreme and apolitical position of a Baudrillard, we are stranded at the end of historv. paralyzed and frozen. as the masses collapse into inertia and indifference, and simulacra and technolonv triumph over aeencv. Thus. from Baudrillard's perspective. all we can do is "accommodate ourselves to the time left to us." [3]

AT: Baudrillard -Alt reintrench modernism Baudrillard's criticism doesn't move past modernism -instead it reentrenches it Rojek 1993(Chris, Deputy Director, Theory. Culture & Society Centre ,Professor of Sociology and Culture at Nottingham Trent University, Forget Buadrillard? Edited by Chris Rojek, pgs 109) -His lacerating nihilism, his readiness to prick any cause, his devotion lo experience for experience s sake, arc all recurring tropes of at least one tvve of modernism. To be sure. modernistn is a multi-Sacelcd concept. Rather than speak of the project of modernism it is perhaps more accurate to speak oprojrcts of modernism. These proiccts work around a central dichotomv: rcflcclina the order of thinps and exposing the fundamental disorder of things. In the political realm the keynote proiects designed to rcllect the order of things have been (a) providing a theorv of liberal democracv which Icxilimales the overation of he market: (b) the socialist critiuues of capitalism and thc plan for the reconstruction of society; and (c) the feminist transformation of the male order of things. These are all constructive ~roiccts. They either aim to give shape to people's lives or they seek to replace the easing set of politico-econon~lc conditions with a state of affairs that is judged to be superior on rational or moral grounds. Baudrillard it might be said, traces the dispersal of these proiects He relishes being the imp of the perverse, the ruthless exponent of the disorder or things His work exposes the posturing and circularities of construetivc arguments. But in doing this Baudrillard is not acting as the harbinger of a new postmodern state of affairs. Rather he is treading the well worn paths of one type of modernist sceptism and excess -a path which has no other destinv than repletion. His message of 'no future' does not transcend the polit~cal dilemma of modernism. it exemplifies it.

AT: Baudrillard -Alt i~nores exploitation and destruction Debates over reality and hyperreality ignore economic exploitation, environmental destruction and government deception and propaganda Norris 1992(Christopher, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wales in Cardiff, "Uncritical Theory: Postmodernism, Intellectuals, and the Gulf War", pg 29) One could stilrt to clear away some of the sources of contusion by pointing out that post-structuralism rests on highly questionable premises; that there exist alternative, more cogent ways of treating the same basic issues;2n and that Baudrillard theses cannot hold up when subjcclcd to any kind of reasoned critical scrutiny. Of course I am not suggesting that the best thing to do in thcsc prcsent bad times is to sit around endlessly debating such specialized matters of truth, language and representation. Much better lcavc off these discussions for now and devote all one's time and energy to protesting the massive injustice of a war whose causes were incxtricably tied up with the history of and British regional policv; whose highsounding justificatory rhetoric was a cover for crude economic sclf-interest; whose conduct involved unprecedented levels of coercive propaganda and mass-media distortion: and whose cost in terms of civilian casualties and environmental impact will most likely never be known, since anv details coming back are subiect to thc tightest 'security' restrictions. Baudrillard ignores societal interest in destroying the real Norris 1992(Christopher, professor of philosophy at the University of Wales-Cardiff, Uncritical Theory: Uncritical Theory: Poslmodernism, Intellectuals, and the Gulf War, pg 127) The same applies to Baudrillard with his placid postmodernist assumption that truth and critiaue are hopelessly outmoded concepts notions scarcely to be thought of in a world given over to the infinitized play of simulacra. Here again, the one westion that Buadrillard never asks is a auestion concerning the social determinantsthe specific modes of knowledrre-constitutive (or knowledgedenying) interest -that have worked to engender this outlook of terminal cognitive and ethicc-political abandon. And so it becomes possible, as Eagleton writes, 'in a cynical "left" wisdom, to celebrate this catatonic state as some cunning last-ditch resistance to ideological meaninr -to revel in the very spiritual blankness of the late bour~eois order as a welcome relief from the boring old human nostalgia for truth, value and reality1.6

NEG -INDICTS OF RORTY/PRAG Turn -Rorty's publiclprivate distinction destroys action by the masses against hegemonic forces Norris 1992(Christopher, professor of philosophy at the University of Wales-Cardiff, Uncritical Theory: Uncritical Theory: Postmodernism, Intellectuals, and the Gulf War, pg 131) Thus for Rorty it is the chief merit of a 'postmodern liberal bourgeois' society that it allows individuals to cultivate the private virtues (tolerance, compassion, moral refinement, aesthetic apprecialtion etc) while respecting the crucial distinction between private and public realms, and thus discouraning those same individuals from getling mixed up with political issues bevond their arorxr range of concern. Hence the title of his recent book Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, where Rorty argues the case for a scaled-down conception of the intellectual's role in public affairs which speaks directly to this current mood of laissez-faire liberal consensus thinking.12 'Irony' figures on Rorty's list since it signifies the readiness to trcat one's own ideas. attitudes and values as a set of shifting and provisional beliefs, arrived at through an open-ended process of 'self-creation' that gives no right to pronounce or criticize in matters of wider socio-political debate. 'Contingency' denotes the cleareyed recognition that those beliefs take rise within some given cultural context. or in response to a transient phase in the ongoing 'conversation of mankind', and can therefore claim nothing more in the way of ultimate validity or truth. And 'solidarity' is best served -in Rortv's view -by maintaining the liberalist-pluralist outlook, upholding the separation of private and public realms, and acknowledging (in good pragmatist fashion) that it is pointless to criticize this current consensus when it offers the only chance of conversing on relevant, socially-acceptable terms. Thus the liberal ironist is one who has followed Rorty in abandoning all those delusive truth-claims that were once thought to distinguish 'philosophy' (or 'theory') from othcr, less demanding activities of thought. He or she will be readily persuaded I) that philosophy has outlived its purpose, at least as a discipline supposedly specialized in adjudicating issues of truth, argumentative validity, ethical warrant, political justice and so forth: 2) that imaginative literature is now our main source of intellectual stimulus, not only in the form of novels and poems but also in the work of those 'postphilosophers' (Derrida among them) who set out to level such old-fashioned genre distinctions; 3) that we are mistaken -still hung up on Enlightenment beliefs about the 'political responsibility of the intellectuals' -if we seek to bridge the gap between private and public spheres; and 4) that since the onlv arguments that count are those with some measure of consensus appeal, therefore 'solidarity' (rather than criticlue) is the best -indeed the onlv -mcans of' promoting the wider communal good. Anv discrepancies that might arise between, for example, George Bush's vision of America's role in the 'New World Order' and the evidence of US interventionist designs in the Gulf and elsewhere would then be a matter for delicate adiustment on the part of those wise individuals who had learned not to confuse issues of moral conscience with issues of legitimacy in the pubhc-political realm. Thus in Rortv's ideal society, as Eagleton remarks, xhe intellectuals will be ironists. vractisinq

a suitably cavalier. laid-back attitude to their own beliefs, while the masses. for whom such self-ironizing might prove too subversive a weauon, will continue to salutc the flag and take life seriously'.l3 This seems to me a fair statement of the consequences of Rorty's position when applied to the Gulf War, its coverage in the massmedia, and the attitude of many intcllcctuals who perceived the mendacity of 'Allied' propaganda but failed to take a stand on moral or principled mounds. But therc was another, in some ways more creditable motive for this reluctance to apply the standards of 'enlightened' critique to a situation that seemed to challenge every last truth-claim, principle or value of Western ethnocentric discourse. Kevin Robins put this case in an article for Marxism Today that took its bearings from Edward Said's powerful indictment of the way that European and US perceptions of 'the Orient' have constructed a stereotyped image of the Arab 'mentality' -irrational, despotic, shiftless, violently unpredictable etc -as a foil to their own superior forms of self-assured 'universal' reason. This characterization of those outside the Western Enlightenment tradition as being incapable ol'reason and therefore inferior is a legitimate critique of that tradition in its imperialist or ethnocentric form. Scholars, diplon~ats, military strategists and 'exputs' of every kind have colluded through the ages in producing this hegemonic discourse which can then be used -in situations like the Gulf War -to generate a whipped-up propaganda campaign of racist sentiment and anti-Arab hysteria. Thus in Robins's words. in this quest to appropriate the world the West learned to define its own uniqueness against the other, against 'non-Europe'. If the political reality has always been one of conflict and disunity, the construction of an imaginary Orient helped to give unity and coherence to the idca of the West. This-Orient was, moreover. a mirror in which Europe (and subsequently America) could see reflected its own supremacy. .. .Fundamental to both its difference and its inherent superiority, it seemed, was the principle of rationality. .. . Modernity is defincd against pre-modernity, reason against irrationality and superstition, and this divide is mapped on to a symbolic geography that counterposes the West and its Orient. Its Orient, because if 'the West' did not exist. then the Orient could not exist either. . . . And the existence and identity it has bestowed is one of constitutive inferiority and deficit.14

NEG -INDICTS OF RORTYIPRAG Pragmatism precludes critical assessment of its own ideas and is motivated by societal interests to promote Western liberalism Norris 1992(Christopher, profcssor of philosophy at thc Univcrsity of Wales-Cardiff, Uncritical Theory: Uncritical Theory: Postmodernism, Intellectuals, and the Gulf War, pg 149-150) In shorl, the upshot of a thoroughgoing neo-pragmatism -an ethics and a politics of Hegelian Sittlichkeit pushcd to its logical extreme -is to cut away the grounds for any critical assessment ot the preiudiccs. Ihe hlindspots or ideological motives thal inhabit our own discourses ofpower/knowledqe. And if the pragmatist in question just happens to &, like Rorty, from the vantage-point ofa privileged he~emonicculture with the power to impose its own values and be ids on a well-nigh global scale, then there is reason to suspect that societal interests are at work behind the liberal~luralist rhetoric. One such motive -as Eagleton noles -is to discredit the very notion of 'ideology' (along with that of Ideologiekntik) as belonging to a discourse whose grounding suppositions have now been shown up as either philosophicllly naive or politically beside the point, since we ave lately moved on mto a phase of the 'cultural conversation where such .dealcount for nothing in terms of their pcrsuasivc cSficacy. However one chooses to describe this phase -'postmodern' ' post Enlightcnmcnt', 'post-philosophical' anti founda~ionalist', 'neopragmatist or whatever -it leaves no room for the outmoded idea that criticism could come uv with cogent reasons for abandoning this or that convenient item of socially-acceptable belief In which case we should have little choice but to agree with Baudrillard's terminal prognosis, tha isZ say, his argument -amounting to a kind of inverted Platonic metaphysics -that 'it is no longer a question of a Salsc representation of Tahty (ideology), but of concealing the fact that the real is no longer "tome thinkers on the left -Fredric Jameson preeminent among; them -have striven to articulate a theory of this 'postmodern condition that wo Jd treat it pretty much as a cultural given, a product o present-day (i e late-capitalist) socio-economic developments, while none the less maintaining that it slill gives room for certain forms of localized res stance and critique." It seems to me that Eagleton is nearer the mark wh h ata ks postmodernism as a direct reflex of the interests bound Ip with consumer capitalism in its latest, avowedly post-ideo og caj phase, and hence as a symptom of mere bad faith on d<r Pato conformist intellectuals. After all, as Eagleton pointedly rmarksno ndividual life, not even Baudrillard's, can survive entirely bereft of meaning, and society which took this nihilistic road would simply be Nurturing massive social disruption1- From this point of view lanced' capitalism can be seen to oscillate 'between meaning and non-meaning, pitched from moralism to cymc-sm and plagued by the embarrassing discrepancy between the two'- In which casc what really nTeds explaining is the readiness of so many thinkers -including Matists and radicals of various persuasion -to regard postmodernism as anything more than a short-lived sw,ng of intellectual fashion brought

about by the widespread retreat from .ssues of real-world political import. Rorty, by refusing to acknowledge politcal alternatives, foroges criticizing consensus beliefs like racism and sexism. Norris 1992 (Christopher, profcssor of philosophy a1 thc University of Wales-Cardiff, Uncrilical Theory: Uncritical Theory: Postmodernism, Intellectuals, and the Gulf War, pg 155) The trouble with all 01'- as I have suggested already -is that it offers no hold for understandina how that same communal rhetoric can give rise to the kind of populaist fervour, the crusadinr! zeal and ramvant zeno~hobia that formed so pervasive and depressing a feature of' American resnonses to the Gulf War. More precisely: Rorty's araument doesn't so much fail to explain such phenomena as make them appear well-nigh inevitable, given his tour courl identiiiication of Amcrican values with that is 'good in the wav of belief for memebrs of the relevant cultural community. Where it does miss the point in a massive way is in refusing to acknowledge any possible alternative, any mcans of critici~ina consensus-beliefs for their narrow, parochial. self-serving. exploitatjve, class-based, chauvinistic or downright racist character, and of doing somorever -in accord with those principles of justice, freedom and truth sur>posedelvenshrined within the social institutions of Western liberal democracy.