ETIENNE BALIBAR

"Succinct and informative" Fredric Jameson "A trenchant and exciting analysis of the philosophy of Marx" Immanuel Wallerstein

The Philosophy of Marx

ETIENNE BA LIBAR
Translated by Chris Turner

VERSO

Contents

This bDok Iml bern pl/hlishd lIIirh finllncull sup!ort

flow

ll,r Frnh Millistly of Forrign AjfoirJ SOln-Di,cCliOIJ de III Polifiquc d" Livre

Marxist Philosoph y or Marx's Philosophy?

Philosephy and non-philosophy
A break

and

ruptures

This di tio ll

Ve,.o 1995. 2007 Translation Chri.'l Turner i995, 2007 First I'ublishal as Ut phi/nJophie dt M"", @ Dcouvc:rt., colldon 'rtperes' 1993 All r ights reserved

Pint Imblislll'tl ill English by Verso

publisbed

by Ver6{,

2007

1995

Changing the World: From Praxis

The

to

l'roductiOtl

Theses

()II

Feuerbach

Revolution against philosophy

PraxIs

and class struggle

The two sides of idealism

The moral rigbts of the: a mhor and translator bal/ e been asserted

The subject is practice The reality of the 'human

An ontology of relations

essence'

135791086 42 Vrno UK: 6 Me3rd Srrect, London WIF OEG USA: ISO Varick SUCCt, New York, NY 10014.4606 www. ks.oom Verso is the imprinl of New Lefl Books IsnN-13:

Stlrner's objection (The) German Id eology The rcvolmionary overturning of history The unity of practice 3

Ideo l o gy or Fetishism: Power and Subjectio n

Theory and practice

42

978-1-84467-187-8

The

autonomy and limits of consciousness of ideology

Briciob Lib Cattaloglling in Publicacion Data A "1Ilogue record for Ihis boo), is available from the British Lib Library of Conss CRt:lloging-in.Publication Data

The aporia

Intellectual difference

'Commodity fetishism' The necessity

of appearances

A callog rcorJ for dlis boo), is "vailnble from the Library of Congress
l'rint,-d in Ihe USA by Courier

'Reification'

Marx and idealism (reprise)

Exchange and ob li g a tion : the symbolic in Marx

Stoughton

Inc.

CONTENTS

The question of 'human rights' From the idol to the fetish

Marxist Phi losophy or Marx's

80

4 Time and Progress: Another Philosophy of History?

The negatiotl of the negation The Marxist ideologies of progress The wholeness of hisrory A schema of causality (dialectic I)

Philosophy?

R e a l c ontr ad iction (d i alec:tic 11) The truth of economism (dialectic III) 5

The instance of the class s tru ggl e The 'bad side' of history

The g e n eral i d e a of this l i t t l e book is t o understand a n d e x p lain

Science and Revolution

Three philosophical pathways Incomplete works For and against Marx

113

w h y M arx w i l l still b e read i n the twenty-first century, not only as a monument o f the past, but as a contemporary a u t h or - c o n t emporary both because o f the qu estions h e poses for philosophy a n d because of the concepts h e offers it. Limiting myself to w h a t seem to me the essentials, I w ou l d like to give readers a means o f fin ding t h eir bearings in M arx 's w r i tings a n d intro duce them to the debates which they have prompted.
I would a l so l i k e to d e f e n d a somewhat paradoxical thesis:

Notes

123
132

Biblioraphical Guide

whatever may have been thought i n the past, there is no Marxist

philosophy a11d ther e never will be; on the other h a n d, Marx is more important for philosophy t h a n ever b efore.
We have first to come to some understanding on the m e a n i ng of ' M arxist ph i l o soph y ' . This expression might refer to t w o quite d i fferent things, though the tradition of orthodox M a r x ism, which developed at the e n d o f t h e nineteenth c e n tury and was i n stitut i o n alized by the C o mmun ist state-parties a fter 1931 and

1945, considered them i n d i s s o c i a b l e : the 'world-view' of the

s o c i a l i s t movement, based o n the idea o f the historic role o f t h e w o r k ing class, a n d t h e system attributed to M a r x . L e t u s n o t e rig h t a w a y t h a t neither o f t h e s e ideas i s strictly connected with the other. Various terms have been invented to express the philosophical content common ro Marx's work and to the p o l i t i c a l a n d s o c i a l moveme n t w h i c h acted in h i s n ame; t h e most famous of these is 'dia lectical materialism ' , a relatively l a t e term and one in spired by the LIse Engels h a d m a d e of v a rious of Marx 's

T H E PH ILOSOPHY OF MARX

M A RXIST PH I L OSOPHY OR M A RX'S PH I L OSOPH Y ?

formulations. Others have contended t h a t , strictly speaking, M arxist philosophy is not to b e found in Marx's writings, but reflection o n t h e meanil'lg, principles a n d ultiversal significance o f his work; or, i n d e e d , t h a t it still remains to be constituted or formulated in systematic fashion.1 Conversely, there h a s never been any shortage o f p h i l o logists o r c r i t i c a l thinkers to e m p hasize the distance between the content of Marx's texts a n d t h eir later ' M a rxist' fate, a n d to s h o w that the exi stence of a philosophy In M a r x in no way i m p l i e s t h e subsequent existence of a M a rxist p h i l o s o p h y . This debate m a y b e settled i n a m a n n e r a s s i m p l e a s it is r a d i c a l . The events w h i c h m a r ked the e n d o f the g r e a t c y c l e d u ring which M arxism functioned a s a n organ izational doctrine (1890-1'90), h a v e added n o t h i ng new to the discussion itself, b ut h a v e swept a w a y the interests w h ich opposed its being opened up_ There
i s , in reality, no M a rx i s t philosophy, either as the world-view o f

Dialectical materialism
This term was used t o refer to philosophy in the official doctrine of the Communist parties, and it has also been employed by a number of critics of that doctrine {see Henri Lefebvre, Dialectical Materialism {1940J trans. John Srurrock, Cape, London, 1968. It was nO[ used by

emerged retrospectively, a s a more general and more a b s t r a c t

eit her Marx (who spoke of his 'dialectical method') or Engels (w ho uses the expression 'materialist dialectic'), but seems to have been invented in 1887 by Joseph Dierzgcn, a socialist worker who corresponded with Marx. It was, h.wever, on the basis of Engels's work thaL Lenin developed this theory (in Materialism a nd Empirio-criticim, 1908) around three guiding themes: the 'materialist inversion' of the Hegelian dialectic; the historicity of ethical principles in their relation to the class struggle; and the convergence of the 'laws of evolution' in physics thus takes up a position btween a hist./"icist Marxism (Labriola) and a determinist Marxism, akin to 'Social Darwinism' (Kautsky). After the Russian Revolution, Soviet philosophy was divided between the 'dialecticians' (Deborin) and the 'mechanists' {iukharinl. The debate was settled by General Secretary Stalin who, in 1931, isued a decree identifying dialectical materialism with Marxism-Leninism (d. Rene Zapata, Lliites philos ophiques en URSS 1'22-31, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1983). Seven years later, in the pamphlet Dialectical and Historical Materialism (1938), he codified its content, enumerating the laws of tbe dialectic - the foundation of the individual disciplines and of the science of history in particular, as well as the a priori guarantee of their conformity to the 'proletarian wodd-view'. This system, known as diam at for shon, was to be imposed on the whole of intellectual life in the socialist countries and. with varying degrees of resistance, on Western Communist parries. It was to serve to cement the ideology of the pany-Stare and control the activity of scientists (d. the Lysenko affair, studied by Dominique Lecourt in Proletariall Science? Tf1e Case of Lysenlw. trans. Ben Brewster, New Left Books, London, 19771. However, we should add two correctives to this monolithic picture. Firstly. as early as 1937, with his essay 'On Contradiction' (in (Helmholtz), biology

(Darwin)

and political eCenomy (MarX). Lenin

a social movement, o r

as

t h e doctrine o r system o f a n a u thor

c a l led M a rx. Parad oxi cally, however, this negati v e conclusion, far from nullifying o r d i m i n i s h i n g the importance of M arx for philosophy, greatly increases it. Freed from a n i l l u s i o n and a n i m p o sture, w e g a i n a theoretical universe.

P h i losop h y a n d non-p h i l o sop h y A n e w difficulty awaits us here. Marx's theoretical t h i n k i ng presented itself, at v a r i o u s p o i nts, n o t as a philosophy, but as a n alternati ve to philosophy, a non-philosophy or even a n anti

I'hilosophy. A n d it h a s per h a p s been t h e g r e atest anti-p h i l o s o p h y

of the modern age. F o r M a rx, p h i l o s o p h y a s he h a d learnt it, from the tradition which r a n from Plato to Hegel, includi ng more or less d i s s i dent m a teri alists like Epi c u rus or Feuerbach, was in fact merely an i n d i v i d u a l u n d e r taking aimed a t interpreting the w o r l d . At best t h i s l e d to leaving the wo r l d as it was; at worst, to transfiguring it. However, opposed a s h e was t o the t r a d i t i o n a l form a n d 'Isages o f philosophical discourse, there can be little d oubt t h a t he d i d himself i n terlace h i s histori co-social a n a l y ses a n d p r o p o s a l s f o r p o l i t i<.:al action w i t h p h i l o s o p h i c a l statements. H e h a s been

Four Essays on l'hiloso(lhy, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1966). Mao Tse-Tung had proposed an alternative conception, rejecting the

idea of the 'laws of the dialec:tic' and stressing the complexity of contradiction (Althusser would later draw on rhis ill his 'Contradiction and Ovetdetermination', in For Marx, trans. Ben Brewter, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1969; first French edition, 1965). Secondly, at least one school of thought - that led by Geymonat in Italy - made dialectical materialism the starting-point for a historical epistemology that is not without its merits (d. Andre Tosel, 'Ludovico Geymonat ou la lutre pour un manhialisme dialectique nouveau', in l'raxis. Vers une r efoncia t ioll en
philosophie marxiste, Messidor/Editions Sociales. Paris, 1984).

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MARX

M A RXIST PHILOSOPHY O R M A RX'S PHILOSOPHY?

5
0

sufficiently cr iticized by pos itivism for d o i n g this. Wha t we need to es t a b l i s h , then, is w h e t h e r these sta tements form a coherent whole . My h ypothes is is tha t t h is is nor the case a r all, a t leas t if the i d e a of coherence to which we a r e refer ring cont inues to b e informed by the i d e a of a sys tem. Having broken with a certain form of philosophy, M a r x w a s n o t led by h i s theoretical a c t ivity towards a un ified s ys tem, but to a n at leas t poten tia l

neutra liza t ion, But t h is has o n l y ca used it to h a u n t the totality on tha t dis course from w i t h in.

contemporary p h ilosop hica l d i s c ourse a l l the more a n d t o work This a n t i-philosophy which Marx's thought a t one p o i n t intended to b e , t h is n o n - p h i l o s o p h y w h i c h i t certa i n l y was b y compa rison w i r h e x i s t i n g practice, t h us produced a converse effect to the one at which it was a immg. Not o n l y did it not put a n end to philosophy, b u t gave rise w i t h in i t to a ques t i o n which is now perma nently open , a q uest ion from which p h i l o s o p h y h a s since b e e n a ble to d r a w sus tena nce a n d w h i c h h a s co ntri buted to its renewal. There is in fact no such thing a s a n 'eter n a l p h i losoph y ' , a l w a ys identica l to itself: in p h i losophy, there a re turning-points, t h re s h o l d s beyond w h i c h there is n o turning b a c k . What h a p pened w i t h Marx w a s precisely a displa ceme n t o f the s i te a n d the questions a n d ob jectives o f p h i losophy, w h i c h one ma y accept or reject, bur w h i c h is so compe l l i n g that i t cannot b e i g n o r e d . Afrer t h i s , we c a n a t last return t o M a r x a n d , w i t hout either d iminis h i n g or betra ying h i m , rea d h im as a

plurality of doctrines w h ich has left h is readers a n d successors

in something of a qua n d a r y . Simila rly, it did not lea d h im to a u n iform dis course, but to a pe rma nent oscilla t ion between ' f a l l i n g short of' and ' g o ing beyond' ph ilosophy. By falling short of philosophy, I mea n stating pro positions as 'conclus ions w i t h o u t premisses ', as S p i n o z a and A l t h usser would h a ve p u t it. O n e example is the famous formula from The Eighteenth Brumaire which Sartre, among others, cons i dered the

of Lmtis Bonaparte
history, but not
0

cen t r a l thesis of historica l ma teria lism: 'Men ma ke their own f their o w n free will; n o t under circumsta n ces they themse lves have chosen but under the given and inherited circumsta nces with w h ich they a re d i rectly confron ted.'2 By

philo soph er.

Where a re we to look, in these conditions, for the philosophies o f M a r x ? After the rema rks T h a ve just ma de, there c a n be no doubt as to rhe a nswer: in the open tota lity of h is writings a n d there a l o n e . N o t o n l y i s there n o dis tinction t o b e ma de b e t ween 'philos o p h i c a l ' and 'his torical' or 'economic' wO!'ks, but that d ivis ion would be the surest w a y to fail to understand a nything o f the critica l rela tion in which M a r x s t a n ds to the w h o le p h i l o sophical tradition, a n d o f t h e revolutiona ry effect h e h a s had upon it. The mos t te c h n i c a l a r guments i n Capital a re a ls o t h ose in which the ca tegories o f logic and ontology, rhe rep resenta t ions of the i n d i v i dua l a n d the social b o n d , were wrested from their t r a d itiona l definitions and re - t h o u g h t i n terms o f t h e necessities of h istorical a na lysis. The mos t conj unctura l a rticles, w r itten a t the time of t h e revolutiona ry experien ces of 1 848 or 18 71, or for inter nal dis cussion w i t h i n the I n terna tiona l Working Men's Associa tion, were a lso a mea ns o f ove r t u r n i n g the t r a d itiona l rela t i o n s h i p bet ween society a n d Sta te a n d developing the idea o f a r a d i c a l democracy which M a r x had first sketched out for its own s a ke in h is c r i t i c a l notes o f 1843, written i n the ma rg ins to Hegel's Philosop hy of Right. The mos t po lemica l o f h is writings a ga inst Proudhon, B a k u n i n or L a s s a lle were a lso those in w hich

going beyol1d philos ophy, on r h e other hand, 1 mea n a discourse

one determined by the position it oc cup ies in the eld of ocia l conflicts a n d , in p a r t icula r, in tha t of the class struggle. Ye t let us repea t t h a t these contra dictions, these oscil la tions in no sense represent a wea k ness on Marx's part. They bring into ques tion the very essence of p h i l osophica l a c t iv it y: its contents, its style, its method, its inte llec tua l a n d politica l functions . T h is was true in M a r x's d a y a n d is proba b l y still true today. It might therefore be argued that, after Marx, philosophy is nO lmzger as it was be(ore. An ir reve r s i b le event ha s occurred, one which is n o t compa rable with t h e emergence of a n e w p h ilos o p h ica l p o i n t of view, because it not only o b l i ges us to change o u r ideas or me t h o d s , but to tra nsform the pra ctice of p h i losophy. Marx is certa i n l y nor the o n l y writer i n his tory to h a v e produced effects of this kind. In the modern a ge a lone, there has a lso been Freud, to mention but one, t h ough he opera ted in a d ifferent fie ld and had other a ims. However, compa rable e x a mples a re, in fact, very r a r e . The caes ura effected by M a r x has b een more or less clea r l y a c k n o w ledged, mor e o r less w i l l i n g l y accepted; it has even given rise to violent refutations and strenuous a t tempts a t which shows tha t p h i l o s o p h y is not an autonomous a ctiv ity, but

THE PHILOSOPHY OF M ARX

MARXIST PHILOSOPHY OR MARX'S PHILOSOPHY?

t h e discrepancy between the theoretical schema of the develop ment of the ca pit alist economy and the real history of bourgeois society appears and forces M arx to outline an origina l dialectic, distinct from a mere inversion of the Hegelian idea of t h e progress of Geist ... In fact, each of Marx's works is simultaneously imbued with philosophical labour and ranged confronta tionaHy against t h e way the tradition h a s Isolated and circumscribed philosophy (which is one of the driving forces of its idealism) . But this gives rise to a final anomaly which, in a sense, he experienced within himself. Three sources or four masters?
The presentation of Marxism as a world-view long ago coalesced around the formula, the 'three sources of Marxism': German philosophy, French

socialIsm and Britl5h polmeal economy. This derives from the way in
which Engels divided up his exposition of historical materialism in AntI' Dahrmg (1878), and sketched the history of the antithetical relations schema would be systematized by Kamsky in a lecture of 1907 entirled 'The Three Sources of Marxism. The J-listoric Work of Marx', in which the '$Cience of society, starting out from the standpoint of the proletariat' is characterized as 'the synthesis of German, French and British thought'. lhe intention was not only to promote internationalism, but to present the theory of the proletariat as a totalization of European history, ushering in the reign of the universal. Lenin was to adopt the formula tion in a lecture of 1913, 'The lhree Sources and Three Component Pans of Marxism'. However, the symbolic model of a combination of the component parts of culture was, in reality, not new: it reHected the persIstence of the great myth of the 'European triarchy', expounded by Moses 1less (who had used the expression as the tide of one of his books in 1841) and taken up by Marx in his early writings, III whIch the notion of the proletarrat made its appearance. Once we put behind us the dream of effecting a totalization of thought in terms of this 'three parts of the world' archetype (a world bounded, significantly, by Europe). the question of the 'sources' of Marx's philo theorists, becomes an open one. In an impressive recent work sophic1 thinking, i.e. of its privileged relarions with the work of past between materialism and idealism, metaphysics and dialectis. This

A break and ruptures

M ore than other writers, Marx wrote ;,t the COI,jrmcltfre. Such an o p tion did not exclude either the 'pa tience of the concept' of which Hegel spoke, or the rigorous weighing of logical consequences. But it was certainly incompa tible with stable con clusions: Marx is the philosopher of eternal new beginnings, lea ving behind him many uncompleted drafts and projects . . . Th e content of his thought is not separable from his shifts of position. Th a t is why, in studying hi m , one cannot abstractly reconstruct his sys t e m. One has to retrace his development, with its breaks and bifurcations. In the wake of Althusser, discussion in the nineteen sixties and seventies was greatly preoccupied with the 'break' or 'rupture' which he saw as o ccurring in 1845, with some writers support ing his arguments a n d others contesting them. That break, contemporaneous with the emergence of the concept of 'social relation' in Marx, was seen as marking a point of n o return, the origin of a growing distancing from the earlier theoretical h u m ani s m . I s h a l l return to this term below. This continued ruprure is, in my view, undeniable. Among its underlying causes are a number of immediate political experiences: in particular, the encounter with the German and rrench proletariats (the British proletaria t in Engels's c a se), and the active re-entry into social struggles (which has its direct counterpart in the exir from a c a d emic philo s o p hy). Its contenr, however, is essentia lly the product of intellectual elabora tion. O n the other h a n d , there

(II filo di Ariatrna, Qllindici leziom d, filoso/ia marxista, Vangelista, Milan, 19"), Constanzo Preve has given a lead here, assigning to Marx 'four masters': Ep"uru$ (on whom he had wfltten his thesis, 'On the Difference between the l)emocmean and Epicurean r'h.losophy of Nature', 18411 for the materialism of freedom, given metaphorical expression In the doctrine of the cimamell or random 'swervmg' of atoms; ROIIsseall, who supplies the idea of egalitarian democracy or association based on the direct partici pation of citizens in the formation of the general will; Adam Smith, from whom the idea that the basis of property is laboul' is raken; and, lastly, Hegel, the most important and the most ambivalent, a constant inspira tion and adversary to Marx In h,s work on 'dialectical contradiction' and historicity. The advantage of this schema is that it directs anention towards the mternal complexity of Marx's work and the successIve shifts which mark his critical relation [0 the philosophicallradinon.

were a t least two other equally important ruptures in M a rx's life, determined by events potentially ruinous for tbe theory which, at the time, he believed he could safely uph old. The result was that that theory could only be 'rescued' on each occasion by

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MARX

MARXIST PHILOSOPHY OR MARX'S PHILOSOPHY?

a re-foundation, carried o u t either by Marx himself o r by another (Engels). Let us recal! b riefly what were the 'crises of Marxism' before Marxism as such existed. This will also provide us with a general framework for the readings a n d discussions which follow.

of political conjunctures a n d the long-term trends o f social evolu tion. And it is a t this point that Marx returns to the project of a critiq ue o f political economy, to recast its theoretical b a ses and carry it through to completion - a t least u p to the appearance of Volume 1 o f Capital i n 1867. This involved him i n unremittin g labour which we may legitimately interpret as reflecting a strong desire to gain revenge upon victorious ca pita lism -a nd the antici pated con viction that he w ould do so - both by laying bare its secret mechanisms (mecha nisms it did not itself understand) and demonstrating its inevitable collapse.

After 1848
The first crisis coincides with an epochal change for the whole of n i neteenth-century thought: this w a s the failure of the revo lutions of 1848. It is sufficient simply to read the Co ist Manifesto (written in 1847) to understand t h a t Marx had entirely shared the conviction that a general crisis of ca pita lism was imminent.3 This was to create a situa tion in w hich the proletar i a t , takin g the lead for all the dominated classes in all (t he) countries (of Europe), w ould establish a radical democ racy w hich would itself lead, in short order, to the abolition of classes and to communism. The intensity a n d enthusiasm of the insurrections o f t he 'sprin gtime of peoples' a n d the 'socia l republic' could not but seem to him to be the execution of that programme. The disappoinrment, when it came, was therefore all the greater. The defectio n of a section o f the French socia lists to Bonapartism a n d the 'passivity of the workers' in the face o f the coup d 'etat, comin g a s they did i n t h e w a ke of t h e June massacres, were particularly demoralizing in their implications. I shall return below to the way this experience caused the Marxian idea of the proletariat and its revolutionary mission to waver. The extent of the theoretical uphea vals this produced in Marx's thinking cannot be underestimated. It meant aban doning the notion of 'perma nent r e volutio n ' , which precisely expressed the idea of an imminent transition from class to class less society and also the corresponding political programme of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' (as opposed to the 'dictatorship of the bourgeoisie ' ) .4 It meant the enduring eclipse - for which I sh all attempt t() outline the theoretical reasons below - of the concept of ideology, w hich had only just been defined and scarcely been utilized. But it also led to rhe definition of a research programme bearing on the economic determination

After 1871
Then, however, came the second crisis, in t h e form of the Franco-Prussian war o f 187., followed by the Paris Commune. These events plunged Marx into depression, pro viding a stark reminder of the 'bad side of history' (to which we s h a l l return), i.e. its unpredictable course, its regressive effects a n d its a p p a lling human costs (tens of thousands dead in t h e war, tens o f thousands o f others kil l e d in t h e semaine sa nglante - not to mention the numbers deported - which, for the second time in twenty-five years, decapitated the revolutionary proletariat of France a n d struck terror into those of other countries). I cite this emotive catalogue of events only because we h a ve to take the full me a s u re of the break they represented. T he European war ran counter to the idea Marx had formed of the directing forces a n d fundamental conflicts of politics. It reduced, at least in appearance, the importance of the class struggle by comparison with other interests and passions. The fact that the proletarian revolution broke out in France (and not in B ritain) ran counter to the 'logical' schema of a crisis a rising from c a pita list accumu lation itself. The crushing of t h e Commune revealed the disparity between bourgeoisie a n d proleta riat in terms of forces and capacity for manoeuvre. Once again, there sounded the 'solo . .. requiem' of the workers of w h i c h The Eighteenth Brumaire had spoke n . Without doubt, M a r x faced up t o a l l t h i s . H e w a s a b l e to read in the spirit of the defeated proletarians, short as their experiment had been, the invention of the first 'working-class government',

10

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MARX

MARX[ST PHILOSOPHY OR MARX'S PH[l.OSOPHY?

11

w h i c h he regarded as ha v i n g la cked o nly the force of organiza t i o n . To the socialist parties t h a t were then forming, h e proposed a
new

1841

Feuerbach, The Essenu

ofCbnstiamty; Proud hon, What IS Property?; Hess, Die europiiische Triarchie; Marx's doc[Oral thesis ('On the

d octri n e of the d i ctatorship of the proletari a t as the

1842 1843

d i sma ntling of the State appara t u s in a 'tra n s i tiona l pha se' in which the pri nciple o f communism w o uld be ra nged a ga inst the principle of bourgeois right. But h e d i s s o l v e d the In ternational (which w a s r i v e n by i n s urmo un table contra d i ct i o n s). And he interrupted t h e w rit i n g of Capital, the draft rna ing suspended in t h e mid d l e
0

Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean ('hilosophy of Nature'). Marx becomes editor of Rhemische Ze,'ung. Caber, Voyage en ICQTle. Carlyle, Past and Present; Feuerbach, 'Principles of the Philosophy of the Future'. Marx in Paris: ednor of Franco-German Yearbooks (containing 'On the Jewish Question' and 'A Conmbution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction'}. miirchen. Marx writes the E c onomI C and Philosophical ManuscrIPts

f the c h a p ter on 'Classes', to learn

Rus s i a n and ma thema t i cs, and to embark, via an enormo us a m ounr o f reading, o n the rectification o f his theory of socia! e v o l u t i o n. This ta sk, interspersed with the settling of accounts with vari o u s indiv i d uals, w a s to occupy the last ten years o f his l i fe. It w a s to Engels, his constant partner in dialogue and, at times, h i s inspirati o n , tha t it w o uld fall to systematize historical ma teri alism. the dialectic and socialist stra tegy. B u t let us not run a h e a d o f ourselves. For the moment we are in

1844

Com!e, Discollrs sur /'espr,t POSltlf; Heine, Delltschkmd, em Winter

and, with Etlgels, publishes The Holy Fam ily; Engels p u b lis h es The Cor,dition of the English Working Class.
1845

Sti me r, The Ego and its OW'I; Hess, 'On the Essence of Money'. Marx expelled to Belgium; draws lip the Theses on Fe u erb ach and, with E.ngels, writes The German Ideology. The Poverty of Phi/os01hy (a r es p onse to l'roudhon's PhilosophY of Poverty). Marx j oins the League of the Just, which becomes the

1846

Communist

League, for whidl, with Engels, he writes the

Commun ist

Mar,ifes,o in 1847,
1847 184!1

! 845. Marx is twenty-seven. He h a s a doctorate in p h i l o s o p h y

from the Un i v er s i t y o f J e n a . is the former e d i t o r o f the Rheinische

Ten-hour bill in "ritain {limiting workmg day). Micheler, Le Pell/Jle. European revolunons (February). Back in Germany, Marx becomc:s editor of the Neue Rhemische Zelttmg. a revolutionary, democratic journal. 'June Days' massacre of French workers. C ali fo r ni a n gold rush. Renan, The Future of S':lena (published in 1890); John Smart Mm, Prmciples of Po/.tiCQI Economy; Th,ers, De la propriete; Lerollx, De regailte. Failure of the Frankfu!t National Assembly and reconquest of Germany by the royal armies. Marx emigrates to l ond on , Marx, Clnss Stmggles
m

Zeitung in Cologne a n d the Franco-German Yearbooks in Pa ris,

a n d h a s been expelled from France. at th e request o f Pruss i a , a s a p o l i tica l a g i ta tor. Th o u g h p enni less, h e has j u s t married the yo ung ba roness v o n Westphalen and t h e y have a l i ttle daughter. L i k e all t h o s e of h i s g e n era ti on, the 'cla ss of forty e i g h t ' , h e sa w h i ms e l f a s an up-a n d -coming young ma n .

1849

1850

France; Richard Wagner, JudaIsm

MIISIC.

Chronological table
1818 1820 1831

1851 l852

louis N apol eon Bonaparte's coup d'etat.

Marx, The Eighteelllh BTlfmaire of l,Olfis Bonaparte. League dissolved.

Commun ist

Marx born at Trier (Rhineland ['russia).

B i n h of Engels.
1853

Hugo, Les Cbatlments; Gobmeau, The Inequality of H uman Races,

Death of Hegel. Pierre l.eroux in France and Roben .wen in Britain invent the word 'socialism'. Revolt of the Camas in Lyon.

1854-6 Crimean War . 1857 1858

1835 1838

Potu'jer, l.a Fausse Industrie morulie.

British Charrism). Blan-. ..i advocates the 'dictatorship of the prole tariat',
Fe argus O'COIlOor draws up the l'eo1le's Charter (the manifesto of

Ruskin, The Political Economy of Art; Baudelaire, Les Fiellrs du Mal.

l'roudhon, De la iustice dalls la Rellolution et dans i'Eglise; Mill, On Lib er ty ; Lassalle, Die Phiioso/,hie Herakleltos des D.rnkle" VOIl
Ephesos. Marx,

1839

Marx studieS law and

Berhn.

philosophy

at the universities of

Bonn

1859

and

begins on [he Suez Canal. Darwin, The o rig irl of SpeCIes. Englishwomall'5 jounwl (the first femints! period i c al ) founded.

A Co nt rib uti or,

to

the C riti q ue

of

Political Eo:OMmy. Work

12

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MARX

1861

American Civil War. Abolinon of slavery in Russia. l..assalle, System der erwo rbenen Reehte. Polish insurrection. Hugo, Les Ml sera bles ; Renan, Dosroyevsky, The [/lsu/led a"d I",ltred.

C h a n ging t h e World: F
to

rom

Praxis

1863

LIfe of

JeslI$o;

Production

1864

Recognition of the right to strike in France. International Working Men's Association founded in London: Marx elected as the General Council's corresponding secretary for Germany.

1867

Marx, CD,ita/. A Critique of Pobtlcal COllom)" Volume 1. Fr('nch con4luest of Cochinchllla. First Trades Union Congress In Bmalll. Haeckel, Natural H,story of CreatIOn; William Moms, The Ea rthly ParadIse. German Social-Democratic Workers' Party founded (Behel,

D,sraeli extends male suffrage in Britain; customs union In Germany.

1868

1869

In the eleventh a nd last of t h e Theses

Oil

Feuerbach. we read:

Tolstoy, War alld Peace; Matthew Arnold, CIt/titre and Allarr-hy.

Liehknecht). Sue2 canal opened. Mill, The Sub;ectioll of Women;

'The p h i losophers have only interpreted the w orld, in va r i o u s w a y s ; t h e p o i n t i s to cha11ge it.' T h e aim of t h i s cha pter i s t o begin to u ndersta nd w h y Marx did not stol' there, even though, i n one sense, nothing that h e wrote afterwards ever went beyond the h o rizon of the prob lems p o sed by this formulation.

1870-1 FrancoPrussian War. Proclamation of German Reich at Versailles. Siege of Paris and insurre;:l:tion of C{101Il1Un<1rds. Marx, The Cim/ War
In

FraJlce, Address of tile G/:ueral Council; Bakunin, God all d tbe St"te.

1872

Hague Congress (hreak-up

of

the First International and transfer of

the seat of the General Council to New York). Russian translation of The BIrth of Tragedy. 1873 187 1875 Bakul\in, StatIsm alld Allarchy. Walras, Elements of Prlre conomtt;s, Or The Theory ofSocia{ Wealtll.

the first volume of CaTlital. Darwin, The Descellt of Mall; Nieo;sche,

T h e Theses

011

Feuerbach

What arc the Theses? A series of a p h orisms t h a t here o utli ne a cmica l argument, there advance a l a p idary prop osition a nd w h a t is, at times, a lmost a slogan. T h e i r style combines the terminology o f G e rma n p h ilosophy (which sometimes ma k e s them diffi c u lt to read toda y) w i t h a d i rect interpella t i o n , a r e s o l u t e imp ulse w h ich, in a way, mimics a l i bera ti o n : a repeated exit from theory in t h e direction of revolutionary activity (or

Gotha Congress at which German socialist parties (lassalleans and Marxists) are unified. French translation of Volume I of ea"tal. Victoria crowned empress of India. Spencer,
at

1876

International officially dIssolved. Dosroyevsky, The Possessed. "USI

Priilcl,les

of Sorin/ogy,

s"elhalls

Bayreuth inaugurated.

1877 1878

Marx, Letter to Mikhailov$ky; Morgan, A'lciellt Society. Annsocialist

(or 'ExeptlOnal') law In Germany.

Engels, AII"

Dllhrmg, WIth a chapter hy Marx. 1879 French Workers Parry founded hy Guesde and Lafargue. Iflsh t.and League founded. Henry Ge.rge, I>rogress and POllerty. 1880 1881 C;ommunards amnestled. Free, compulsory, secular primary education in Fran.:e. Akxlmder II assassinated by the 'Society for the LiberatJon of the People'. Duhrlllg, IIl1d CU/tlll" der Viilker ... ; Marx, Letter to Vera Zasulich. 1882 Engels, 'Bruno Bauer and Early Christianity'. Rebel, \\i"o m a t l and So cia /ism. Nietzsche, Tlms S,oke Zaralhustra. Death of Marx.l'lekhanov sets up the 'Emancipation of L.abour' group. Dlc

practice). They were written some time a ro und Ma rch 1845, w h e n t h e y o u n g scholar a nd politica l journalist from the Rhine
land w a s living in Br u ssels, u nder a degree o f p o l ice s u rveillance. it w o u ld n o t be long before h e was joined by his friend Engels, with whom he was to begin a collabora t i o n t h a t w o u ld last a life time. It does not seem he ever intended these lines for p u b l ication: they are of the o rder of 'memora n d a ' , formu l a s set down o n p a p e r to be remembered a nd prov ide c o n s t a n t inspira t i o n.

flldmfrage als

I;rage der RasserlScI,iidlu;l;keit fiir Exutef/z, Sitte

Al t h i s p o i n t , M a r x w a s e n g a g e d in a project we can p icture

13

I RIB

14

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MARX

CHANGING THE WORLD

15

fairly clearly, tha n k s to th e rough drafts p u b l i s h e d i n 1932 whi c h h a v e si nce b e e n k n o w n a s the Economic and Philosophical ( o r

I d o not i n te n d t o enter i n t o a n e x h a u s t i v e e x p l i c a t i o n o f this text here. The reader m a y consult the w o r k by Georges Labica which s t u d i e s e a c h f o r m u lati o n in de t a i l , ta k i n g the later com mentaries with all their di vergences a s indica t i v e of the i nternal problems these f o r m u l a t i o n s pose.4 Labica d e m o n strates w i t h perfect clarity h o w t h e Theses a r e structured. F r o m be g i n n i n g to e n d , the a i m i s , by i n v o k i n g a 'ne w ' or pra ctica l mate r i a l i sm , to move beyond the tr a d i t i o n a l o p p o si t i o n between p h i l o s o p h y ' s 'two c a m p s ' : idealism (i . e . , chiefly, Hegel), which p r o j e c t s a l l r e a l ity into the world o f s p i r i t o r min d , a n d the old o r 'contem p l a tive' materialism, which reduces all i n t e l l e c t u a l a b stra ctions to sensuousness, i.e. to l i fe , sensation and affectivity in the style of the Epicureans a n d the ir modern d i sciples (H o b b e s , D i der o t , He lvet i u s etc.).

1844) Manuscripts.1 Th i s is a phe n o me n o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s (a i m ing t o establish the m eaning or n o n-m e a n i n g) o f t h e a l i e n a t i o n

of h u m a n l a b o u r in t h e f o r m o f w a g e la b o u r . T h e influences o f R o u ssea u , Feuerb a c h , P r o u d h o n a n d Hegel a re closely combined i n the se writings with his first read i n g o f the economists (A d a m S m i t h , Jean-Ba p t i ste S a y , R i cardo, S i s m o n d i ) to p r o d u c e a humanist, natura l i st i c conception of c o m m u n i s m , concei ved as the reconciliation o f m a n w ith h i s own l a b o u r a n d w i th n a t u r e , and hence with h i s 'species-be ing' w h i c h p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y h a d a b o l i shed, l e a v i n g hlm, a s a r e s u l t , 'estranged from h i m se l f ', Now, Ma rx was to i nterrupt th i s w o r k (wh i c h he would resume much l a t e r on quite other f o u ndations) and undertake w ith Engels the writing o f The German Ideology, which m a i n l y ta ke s the form o f a p o l e m i c against the v a r i o u s s t r a n d s o f 'Young H e g e l i a n ' p h i l o s o p h y inside a n d o u tside t h e u n i v ersity (L u d w i g Fe uerbach, Bruno Bauer and Max Stimer, all o f whom were l i n k e d to some degree to the movement opposed to the Restora t i on w h i ch d re w its i n spirat i o n from
a

The critique of ali enation

If we refer to the debates of the period, the threa d of the argu ment i s relatively clear. Feuerbach sought to e x p l a i n 'reli g i o u s a l i e nati o n ' , i.e. the fact that real, sensuous m e n r e p r e s e n t salva tion a n d perfecti on to themselves in a n othe r sllJra-sensuous world (a s a projection of the i r own 'essentia l quali t i e s ' into i m a g i na r y beings and s i t u a t i o n s - in p a r t i c u l a r , the bond of c o m m u n ity or love w h i c h u n ites ' h u m a n k i n d '}." By becoming consc i o u s o f this m i stake, h u m a n be ings w i ll become c a p a b l e o f 're a p p r o p r i a t i n g ' the i r essence which h a s b e e n a l i enated i n God and, hence, o f r e a l l y l i v i n g o u t fra ternity o n earth. F o l l o wing Feuerbach, critical p h i l o s o p h e r s ( i n c l u d i n g Marx h i m self) attempte d to extend the same schema to other p h e n o m e n a o f the abstracti on a n d ' d i sposse s s i o n ' of h u m a n e x i ste nce. They sought, in particular, to e x t e n d it to the const i t u t i o n o f the

'left' rea d i n g of

the a u thor o f the Phenomenology a n d Philosophy of Iight). The composit i o n o f rhe Theses coinc i des w ith th i s i nte r r u pti o n .2 And i t is p r o b a b le tha t s o me of the theoretical reasons for i t are ro

be found in the text. B u t it is a lso c r u c i a l to identify the e xact

relat i o n s h i p betwe en the Theses and the arguments of The

Gem/an Ideeleg)'.3 [ s h a l l return to this p o i n t below.

LOllis Althusser, one o f many w e l l-k n o w n p h i l o s o p h e r s to h a v e offered rea d i n g s of the text, presenred th e Theses as the
' b o rd

anterieur' - i.e. the f r o n t or anterior e d g e' - o f a break,

l a u n c h i n g one o f the great deb ate s in contemporary

thus

Marx i sm. [n h i s view, the 1844 Manuscripts, with the i r cha rac te ristic h u m a n i s m , could b e sa i d to be works predating rhe break, while The Germall ldeology, or rathe r its fi r st part, w i t h i t s de d u ction o f t h e succe ssive f o r m s of p r o p e rry a n d State, i n w h i c h the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r provides the g u i d i n g thread, c o u l d be sa i d to r e p re sent t h e real emergence of the 'scie nce
0

political sphere, i solate d from society, as a n i d e a l c o m m u n ity

in which h u m a n b e i n g s were sa i d to be free a n d equa l. However, says M a r x i n the Theses, the real reason for t h i s p r o j e c t i o n is not an i ll u s i o n of c o nscio u s n e s s or a n effect o f the i n d i v id u a l i ma g i n a t i o n : i t i s the split o r d i v i s i o n w h i c h re i g n s i n society, it is the practical conflicts which set men a g a i n s t e a c h orher, to w h i c h the heaven of relig i o n - or of p o l i t i c s - offers a m i racu lous solution. They cannot really leave these d i v is i o n s behind

f h i s t o ry'.
-

'earlier limit'

bord anterieur extreme' (Pour Marx, Maspcro, (For Marx, p. 33}. [Trans.]

" Althusser's English translator renders t h e full expression employed Paris, 1972, p.

25)

'If!
as

16

THE

PHILOSOPHY O F MARX

C HANGING THE W ORL D

17

Karl M a r x: Theses o n Feue"bach (1845)

l. The chief defect 0 f all hitherto existing materialism . .. is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, IS conceived only in the form of the .tJject or of (COT/

witho u t a - pra ctica l - transformation w h ich a b o l i s h e s the dependence o f certa in h u m a n beings upon others. It is not, therefore, for p h i l o s o p h y to bring a n end to a liena tion (since philosophy h a s n e v e r been a n ything b u t a c o m m enta r y o n - o r translation o f - t h e idea ls o f recon cilia tion in r e l i g i o n o r p o l i t i c s ) ; t h a t i s a task f o r r e v o l u t i o n , t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r w h i c h l i e i n the ma teria l existence of i n d i v i d u a l s a n d their social r e l a t i o n s . The

templ.ti.", b u t

nor as sensu.us human actilJlly, p"actice, not subjectively.

Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the actilJe side was developed abstractly by idealism - which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as su ch.Feuerbach waOlS sensuous objects, really distinct from the thought objects. b u t h e does n o t conceive h u m an activity itself as objective al:tivity . . .

T h eses

on

Feuerbach hence dema n d a definitive exit (Ausgang)

from philosophy, as the o n l y m e a n s of rea lizing wha t has a lw a y s been its loftiest a m bition: e m a n c i p a t i o n , l i b e ra t i o n .

upbring ing forgets thaT circumstances are changed by men ar.d dlat it is essential to educate the educator himself. This doctrine m u s t, therefore, divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society. The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-changing can be conceived and rationally understood only as
revolutionary practice.

m. The materialist doctrine concerning the changing

0 fCircumstances

and

Revolution a gainst phi l o s o p h y T h e difficulties begi n p r e cisely a t this p o int. There can be no doubt tha t Marx never v e n t u r e d to p u b lish a c a l l for s u ch an exit, or did not find an o p p o r t u n i t y to do so. A n d yet he wrote it a nd, like a ' p u r l o i n e d letter', it has come d o w n to us. Now, the sta te" ment in questien is ra ther p a r a doxica l. In a sense, it is a b solu tely consistent with itself. Wha t it requires, i t i m m e d i a t e l y does (em p l o y i n g a la ter terminology, one m i g h t be tempted to s a y that there i s something 'performa tive' a bout it). To write: 'The philosophers have o n l y interpreted the world, in va rio u s ways; the p o i n t is to c a ge it', is to posit a point o f n o return for a l l thinki n g tha t wishes t o b e effective, down"to"earth o r ' w o r l d l y ' . It is a l s o to forbid o n e s e l f to regress, revert to phi l o s o p h y . Or, if o n e prefers, it is t. c o n d e m n oneself, i f o n e were b y a n y chance to begin interpreting the world a ga in - p a r t i c u l a r l y the socia l world - to lapse back into the a mbit o f philosophy, since there is no third wa y between p h i l osophy and r e v o l u t i o n . At t h e o u t s i d e , i t m a y therefore mea n c o n d e m ning o n e self to s i l e n ce. B u t the harshness of this a lternative revea ls i t s other s i d e : i f ' s a y i n g is doing',6 t h e n , on t h e other h a n d , ' d o i n g is saying' and words a r e n e v e r innocent. For e x a m p l e , it is n o t innocent to posit that the interpreta tions of the w or ld are vario us, wherea s the revo lutio n a r y transformation is, implicitly, one or

IV. Feuerbach srans OUt from the facr of religious self-alienation, of the
duplication of the world into a religious world and a sel:ular one. Bu t that the secular basis detaches itself from itself a n d establishes itself as an independent realm in t h e douds can only be expla;ned by t h e cleavages and self -contradictions within this SllCular basis. The laner must, there fore, in itself be both understood in its contradiction and revolutionized in practice. Thus, for instance, after the earthly family is discovered to be the secret of the h o ly family, the former must then itself be destroyed in theory

and in practice .. .

h n

VI. Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the Immfln essence. But the human essenl:e is no abstraction inherent in each s i n g le individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations. Feuerbach, who does nor enter upon a criticism o f this real essence, is conseq uently compelled:

1.

To

abstract from the historical process and

[0

fix the religious

sentimem as something by itself and to presuppose an abstract - isolated - human individual. 2. Essence, therefore, can be comprehended only as 'genus', as an internal, dumb generality which naturally unites the many individu als .
XL The philosophers have only mle,preted the world i n various ways; the

point is to change it.

univocal. For that m e a n s there is o n l y one s i n g l e w a y of chang

(Ka rl Ma rx, Ea,,[), Writmgs, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton, l'enguinJNew

Left

ReView, Harm ondsworrh, 1975, pp. 421-231.

ing the world: the one which a bolishes the e x i s t i n g order - the revolution - which cannot be reactiona ry or a nti-popula r. Let us note, i n pa ssing, that M a r x was very soon to retract this thesis:

18

THE P H I L O S O P H Y OF M A R X

CHANGING THE WORLD

19

The critique o f political economy

The expression 'critique o f political economy' figures repeatedly in t h e tirle or programme of M a r x ' s m a i n w o r k s , r h o n g h i t s c o n t e n t constanrly changes. The Economic and Philosophical M an us crip t s of 1 8 4 4 are them selves a draft o f a work which was to have been entitled Zur {(ritik der politischen eekollomie, a tirle later given to the wotk published in 1 8 5 9 a s the 'first parr' o f a general treatise and u s e d as r h e subtitle of Capital

provides the ' s o l u t i o n ' to the i n t e r n a l conflicts of p h i l o s op h y a n d ' r e v o l u t i o n a r y p ractice' w o u l d thus r e a l i z e an o l d a m b i t i o n o f philosophers (Aristotle, K a nt , Hegel . . . ) better th an t h e y could! But there is more to it t h a n t h i s : it was not b y c h a n c e t h a t t h i s f o r m u l a c o i n e d b y M a r x , this i n j u n c t i o n w h i c h is already, in itself, an act o f 'departure', a c q u i r e d its philosophical renown _ If w e search o u r m e m o ries a little, w e can very soon fi n d a profound k i n s h i p n o t o n l y w i t h other watchwords (such a s R i m b a u d 's 'ch anger la v ie': we k n o w that Andre Breton, among others, made t h i s connection),' but with some e q u a l l y lapi dar y , p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s , w h i c h a r e t r a d i t i o n a l l y considered ' f u n d a m e n t a l ' a n d w h i c h take the f o r m , a t t i m e s , o f tautologies a n d , a t others, o f antitheses. A l l these f o r m u lations, different i n content or opposed in intent a s they may b e , share a common concern with the question o f the relation between theory and practice, consciousness a n d life. This is true from Parmenides's ' T h i n k i n g a n d being are one' to Wittgenstein's 'Whereof one cannot s p e a k , thereof one m u s t be s i l e n t ' , via S p i n o z a ( ' G o d i s n a t u r e ' ) , Kant ('I have therefore found it neces sary to deny knowledge, i n order to make room for f a i t h ' ) , a n d Hegel ( ' T h e r a t i o n a l is r e a l a n d the real is r a t i o n a l ' ) . A n d here is M a r x ensconced not j u s t at the heart of p h i l o s o p h y , but at the heart o f its most speculative turn, in which it strives to thirlk its
O w n limits, whether to a b o l i s h them or to establish itself on t h e

(of w h i c h Volume 1 , the o n l y volume published by Marx himself, appeared in 1 86 7 ) . To these we m a y add a greitt mar.y u n p u blished pieces, aaicles and sections in polemical works. I t seems, then, that this phrase expresses the per m a n ent modality o f Marx's intellectual relation t o h i s scitnti fi c object. T h e initial objective was the cri tique of political alination in civil/bourgeois society, as well as the 'speculative subjects' the organic unity of which philosophy claimed to express. But a fundamental shift occurred at a v e r y e a r l y stage: 'criticii!:ing' law, morality a n d politics meant confronting them with their 'materialisr basis', with the process by which social relations are constituted in labour anti production. In his own way. Marx thus discovered the dual meani/fg o f the term crItIque: on the one ha n d, the eradication of error; on the o t h e r , knowl edge of the limits of a faculty or practice. But whar conducted this critique, for Marx, was no longer merely analysis, but history. This i s what enabled h i m to combin 'dialectica lly' the critique o f the necessary illusions of theory ( ' c o m m o d i t y fetishism'l. the development o f t h e internal, irrec oncilable contradictions in economic reality (crises, the antagonism between labour and capital, based o n the exploitation o f 'labour-power' as a commodity) and, finally, the oUtline of a 'political economy of labour', opposed to that o f the bourgeoisie ('Inaugural Address of the International Working Men's Associ a r i o n ' , 1 8 64}. The fate of Marx's crinque is depen dent O n the 'two discoveries' he claimed: the deduction o f the m o n e y form from the necessities of commodity circulation and the reduction of the laws of accumulation to the capitaliation of surplus value (Mehrwert). lioth are related to the definition of value as a n expression o f sodally necessary labour, in which i s roored rejection of the viewpoint of the abstract homo oec;enomiw$, defined solely by the calculation o f his i n d i v i d u a l utility'. For a n account o f the technical aspects o f the critique of political

b a s i s o f a recognition o f t h o s e l i m i t s . L e t us keep i n m i n d t h i s profound a m b i g u i t y ( w h i c h we m u s t b e c a r e f u l not to t u rn i n t o a n i n s u r m o u n t a b l e contradiction, b u r w h i c h we m u s t not make into a sign o f u n f a t h o m a b l e p r o f u n d i t y either, s i n c e this w o u l d soon l e a d u s back to that ' m y s t i c i s m ' the r oots o f wh ich Marx is, in fact, seeking out here . . . ) and let us examine more closely t w o key questions i m p l i e d in the Th eses; that of the relation between 'practice' ( o r praxis ) and 'class struggle'; a n d that o f anthropology o r the ' h u m a n essence ' .

economy in Marx, see Pierre Salama and Tran Hai Hac. 11lb"odIlCt/OIl ti l'economie d e M a rx ( L a Decouverre, Paris, 1 9 9 2 ).

as early as the Man ifesto a n d , a fo rtiori, in Capital, he w a s to note the power w i t h w h i c h c a p i t a l i s m 'changes the w o r l d ' . And the question o f w h e t h e r the w o r l d c a n n o t b e changed in several different ways and of how one c h a n g e can fi t into another - or even divert it from its course - would become crucial. Moreover, t h i s thesis w o u l d m e a n that t h i s single transformation a l s o The Theses speak o f revolution, b u t they d o n o t use the expres sion 'class struggle'. It w o u l d not, however, be a r b i t r a r y to

Praxis a n d class struggle

20

THE P HI L O S O P H Y OF

MARX

CHA N G I N G

THE WORLD

21

register its presence here between the l i n e s , o n condition that w e clearly specify what is meant b y the term i n t h i s case. Thanks t o the work o f scholars in the field o f German s t u d i e s , we h a v e f o r s o m e years now b e e n better a c q u a i n t e d with t h e intellectual environment that gave rise to these formulations, which M a r x articulated in t e r m s that are p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r i k i n g , b u t which were not a b s o l u t e l y his own as regards their content.s The revolution Marx h a s in mind c l e a r l y refers t o French traditions. What the young radical democrats wish to see is the revival o f the movement which h a d been interrupted, then reversed, by the 'bourgeois' establishment o f the r e p u b l i c after Thermidor, by Napoleon's dictatorship a n d , f i n a l l y , by the Rest.ration a n d the Counter-re v o l u t i o n (in any case, by t h e

t h e artisans o f the Parisian f a u b o u r g s a n d of t h e caves o f L i l l e which Victor Hugo described, t h e S i l e s i a n w e a v e r s to whom Marx devored long c o l u m n s in h i s Cologne-based Rheinische Zeitung. I n short, they are a l l those now c a l l e d (from a n old Roman word) proletarians, which the I n d u s t r i a l R e v o l u t i o n created i n h u g e n u m b e r s , crowding t h e m i n t o i t s c i t i e s and p l u n g i n g them into poverty, a n d who have now begun to shak e the bourgeois o r d e r by their strik es, their 'combinations', their insurrections. They are, s o to s p e a k , the people of the people

(Ie pezll)le du peuple), its most authentic fraction a n d the pre

figurement o f its future. A t the point when critical i n t e l l e c t u a l s , f u l l o f g o od w i l l a n d i l l usions, are s t i l l p o n d e r i n g w a y s o f democ ratizing the State a n d , to that end, of enlightening w h a t they c a l l ' t h e masses', those masses themselves h a v e a l r e a d y gone i n t o action; t h e y h a v e in fact a 1 r e a d y recommenced t h e r e v o l u t i o n . I n a d e c i s i v e f o r m u l a w h i c h r e c u r s in a l l the t e x t s o f this from The Holy Family ( 1 8 4 4 ) to t h e C o mmunist Manifesto ( 1 847), M a r x w i l l say that this proletariat 'represents the dissolution in action o f bourgeois/civil society rbiirgerliche Gesellschaft l', m e a n i n g by t h i s : ( 1 ) that the conditions of e x ! s period, tence o f the p r o l etarians (what w e would t o d a y term socIal e x c l u s i o n ) are in contradiction with a l l t h e principles of that society;

State). T o be e v e n m o r e precise, the aim w a s t o bring the r e v o l u

tionary m o v e m e n t to f r u i t i o n o n a E u r o p e a n s c a l e , a n d to render it universal by recovering the inspiration a n d energy of its 'left wing', that egalitarian component o f the Revolution (repre sented principally by Babeuf} from which, at the beginning o f the nineteenth century, the idea o f c o m m u n i s m emerged.' Marx w o u l d be very e m p h a t i c that this was not a speculative conception, implying an ideal
or

experi m e n t a l community ( l i k e

Cabet's 'Icarie'), b u t a s o c i a l movement w i t h d e m a n d s t h a t were merely a coherent a p p l i c a t i o n o f the p r i n c i p l e o f Revolution - gauging how m u c h liberty h a d been achieved by the degree of e q u a l i t y a n d vice v e r s a , with fraternity as t h e e n d resulr. A l l jn a l l , what Marx and o t h e r s c o m e to recognize is that there is no m i d d l e way: jf the revolution is halted in its course, it can only regress a n d reconstitute a n aristocracy o f owners w h o use t h e - reactionary o r l i b e r a l - State to defend the established order. Conversely, the o n l y p o s s i b i l i t y o f completing the revo l u t i o n a n d r e n d e r i n g i t irrev e r s i b l e is t o give i t greater depth, t o make it a social r e v o l u t i o n . B u t who w i l l b r i n g about t h i s social r e v o l u t i o n ? Who are the heirs o f Babeuf a n d t h e Montag1zal'ds? One has simply t o o p e n o n e 's eyes to what i s c u r r e nt l y going on i n E u r o p e , to listen t o t h e cries o f a l a r m o f t h e possessing c l a s s e s . T h e y are the English ' C h a r tist' workers ( w ho m Engels has just described i n h i s

(2)

that they themselves live by o t h e r v a l u e s than

those o f p r i v a t e property, p r o fi t , patriotism a n d b o u r g e o i s i n d i v i d u a l i s m ; a n d (3) that t h e i r g r o w i n g o p p o s i t i o n to t h e State a n d the d o m i n a n t class is a necessary effect of the m o d e r n social s t r u c t u r e , but one w h i c h will s o o n prove l e t h a l f o r t h a t structure.

Action in the present

The words 'in der Tat' ( i n action) are p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t . O n the one h a n d , t h e y e v o k e the present, effective reality, t h e 'facts' (die Tatsach e n ) : they therefore e x p r e s s M a r x ' s p r o f o u n d l y

anti-utopian o r i e n t a t i o n a n d a ll o w us t o u n d e r s t a n d w h y t h e
reference to the fi r s t f o r m s o f .proleta r i a n c l a s s struggle, a s i t w a s beginning to become organized, i s s o d e c i s i v e f o r h i m . T h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y practice o f w h i c h t h e Theses speak d o e s n o t h a v e
t . implement a programme or a p l a n for t h e reorganization of

Conditi.n o f the Working Class in Englal1d o f 1 844, a book

which can s t i l l be read with admiration today a n d which had an a b s o l u t e l y c r u c i a l effect on M a r x ) ; they are the Canuts o f Lyon,

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF MARX

CHANGINC THE WORLD

23

society. S t i l l less does i t need t o depend upon a vision o f the future offered by philosophical and sociological theories ( l i k e those o f the philanthropists o f t h e eighteenth a n d e a r l y nine teenth centuries). But i t must coincide w i t h 'the real movement which abolishes the present state o f things', a s Marx was soon t o write i n The German Ideology, e x p l a i n i n g that this was the only materialist d e fi n i t i o n of c o m m u n i s m . But here we t o u c h on t h e second aspect: ' i n action' also m e a n s t h a t we are speaking o f a n activity (Tatigkeit), a n enterprise unfolding in t h e present to which i n d i v i d u a l s are committed with all their physical and intellectual powers. This represents a significant reversa l . As opponents of the p h i l o s o p h i e s of history which were always r u m i n a t i n g on the m e a n i n g o f t h e past, and the philosophies o f right which simply provided a commentary o n the established order, Moses Hess a n d other 'Young Hegelians' had proposed a philosophy of action ( a n d Feuerbach had published a manifesto for a philosophy of the fut&fre). But, deep down, what Marx means is this: a c t i o n must be 'acted o u t ' i n t h e present, not c omment ed upon or a n n o u n c e d . B u t then phi losophy must give u p its place. I t is not a 'philosophy o f action', b u t action itself, action 'sans phrases " which corresponds to revolutionary d e m a n d s and the revolutionary movement. And yet this i n j u n c t i o n to give u p its place cannot be ignored by philosophy: if it is consistent, philosophy must paradoxically see i n that i n j u n c t i o n its own realiza tion. Naturally, M a r x is thinking here, first and foremost, o f t h a t German idealist t r a d i t i o n with which h i s o w n t h i n k i n g is i m b u e d , a t r a d i t i o n w h i c h h a s s u c h c l o s e affinities with the French revol u t i o n a r y i d e a . H e is t h i n k i n g o f the K a n t i a n i n j u n c t i o n to ' d o one's d u t y ' , to act ill the world in conformity with the categorical imperative (the content o f which is human frate r n i t y ) . A n d also o f Hegel's phrase in the Phenomenology: 'What must be is also in fact lin der Ta t], a n d what o n l y must be, without being, has no truth.' More politically, he is t h i n k i n g o f the fact that modern philosophy has identified the universal with the principles o f rhe Declarati011 of the /{;ghts of M a n and the Citizen. But these prmciples, sacro sanct in theory, are either ignored and contradicted at every t u rn by bourgeois society, where neither e q u a l i t y n o r even liberty reigns, to say nothing o f fraternity; or else they are beginning to pass i n t o reality, b u t i n a revolutionary, 'insurrectionary' practice

(the practice of t h o s e w h o are rising up together, where necessary su b stitut i n g t he 'criticism o f w e a p o ns' f o r the 'weapons of critic i s m ' ) . It i s , first and foremost, this c o n s e q u e n c e , w h i c h is somewhat h a r d for philosophy to t a k e b u t arises o u t o f its own principles, t h a t M a r x has in mind when he writes here o f inverting idealism to produce m a t e r i a l i s m .

The t w o sides o f idealism Let us h a l t here, once again, and examine this p o i n t . I f these remarks are accurate, it m e a n s that Marx's materialism has nothing to do with a reference to matter - and t h i s w i l l remain the case for a very long time, u n t i l Engels undertakes to reunite M a r x i s m with the natural sciences of the second h a l f o f the nine teenth century. Fo r the moment, however, we are d e a l i n g with a strange ' m aterialism wit h o u t matter'. Why, then, is this term lIsed ? Here h i s t o r i a n s of philosophy come back into their spite o f the knocks t h e y h ave j u s t taken from M a r x . They xplain t h i s p a r d o x , which also leads them to p o i n t u p t h e . mbrogl o t h a t a ns e from i t ( t h o u g h , l e t u s repeat, that imbroglio In

I a n y t h l l i g b t a r b ! t r a r y ) . I f Marx d e c l a r e d t h a t it was a prin . Ciple of matenallsm t o c h a n g e the world, seeking a t the same time

e terms

to differentiate his position from a l l e x i s t i n g m a t e r i a l i s m ( w h i c h ' o l d ' m a t e r i a l i s m a n d w h i c h depends p r e c i s e l y on t h e

Idea that everything h a s u l t i m a t e l y to be e x p l a i n e d in t e r m s o f matter - w h i c h i s also a n 'interpretation o f the w o r l d ' a n d contestable a s such), t h i s was c l e a r l y i n o r d e r to take the c.lltrary

stance to that of idealism. The k e y to Marx's formulations resides

not in the word ' m a t e r i a l i s m ' , but in the term ' i d e a l i s m ' . Once a g a i n , we must ask why this should be. The first reason is that the idealist interpretations of nature an d history proposed by p h i l osophers invoke principles like . S p i r i. t , r as ? n, consciousness, t h e idea etc . . . And, in practice, such prmclples a l w a y s lead not to revolution, but to t h e edu cation (if not, indeed, the e d i fi c a t i o n ) o f the masses, which the p hilosophers themselves generously offer to t a k e i n h a n d .
I n Plato's t i m e t h e y sought to counsel p r i n c e s in the n a m e o f

t h e i d e a l s t a t e . In o u r d e m o c r a t i c era, t h e y seek t o e d u c a t e t h e citizens ( o r 'educate t h e educators' of the citizens: t h e judges,

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THE P H I L O S O P H Y O F MARX

CHANGING THE WORLD

25

doctors a n d teachers, by a s s um i n g their position, a t l e a s t morally, at the v e r y top o f the a c a d e m i c e d i fi c e ) in t h e name o f rea son a n d e t h i c s . This is n o t w r o n g , but behind this f u nction o f i d e a l i s m there is a more f o r m idable difficulty.

In modern philosophy (the

philosophy w h ic h fi n d s its true language w i t h Kant), whether one speaks o f consciousness, spirit o r rea son, these categories w h i c h express the u n i v e r s a l always have two sides to them, and Marx's f o r m u la tions i n the Theses constantly all ude to this. They intimately c ombi n e two ideas; representatt'on and sub;ec

tivity. It is precisely the o r i g i n a l i ty a n d strength of t h e great

(Germa n) i d e a l i s t tradition that it thought this c ombina tion thro u g h systema tically. Clearly, the notion of 'interpreta t i o n ' to which Marx refers is a variant of the idea o f represen tation. For the idealism criticit.ed here, thl.:: world is the object of a contem p l a t i o n which seeks to perceive its coherence and its 'mea n i n g ' and thereby, w i l l y - n i l l y ,
to impose a n order o n it. Marx v e r y clea r l y discerned the inter

dependence between the fact of thinking an 'order o f the w o r l d ' (especially in the s o c i a l a n d p o l i t i c a l register) a n d the fact o f valorizing order i n t h e world: both a g a i n s t ' a n a r c h y ' a n d a ls o a ga i n s t 'movement' ('Je hais I e mOlwement qui dip/ace

les

/ignes', as Ba u d e l a i r e w a s to write)'" . . . He a l s o saw very clea rly

that, from this point o f view, the 'old materialisms' or p hilo s o p h i e s o f n a t u r e , which s ubstitute m a n e r for m i n d a s t h e organizing principle, c o n t a i n a s t r o n g element o f idealism and a re, in the e n d , merely disguised idealisms (wha tever their very different politica l consequences). This enables us to understa nd why it is so easy for idea lism to 'comprehend' materialism a n d therefore to refute it or integrate it (a s we see in Hegel, who has no problem w i t h ma terialisms, except perhaps with that o f S p i n oza , hut Spin oza is a rather atypical materialist . . . ) . l .astly, he saw that the heart o f modern, post-revolutionary idealism consists i n referring the order o f the world and of 'representa tion' back to the activity o f a

? f th e primac y of ' i d e a s ' ) , but a p h i l o s o p h y o f s ubject ivity (wh i c h IS c e a r l y expres sed i n t h e d e c i siv e impor tance a ss u m e d by the noti on o f M a r x t h o u g h t that t h e s ubject ive activit y o f I d e a lism speak s is, a t bottom , t h e trace, the denega tion (the s i m u l t a n e o u s recogn ition and misrec ognitio n) o f a more real activity , an a ctivity that i s more 'effect ive', if we m a y ventur e the expres sion: a n a c tivity which w o u l d be a t one and the same time the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the externa l world and the forma tion (Bildu llg) o r tra nsform ation of self. Witne ss the insiste nt way in which the v o cabula r y of the act , of action a n d a ctivity (Tat, Tiitigk eit, Handl ung) recurs in the writin gs o f Kant an , even more ma rkedly , o f Fichte (this is, in reality, where the ' p h i l o s o p h y o f action ' e x t o l l e d by the Young Hegel i a n s comes from). itness a lso the way Hegel descri bes the m o d e of being of consci ousnes s as a n active experience and the f unctio n of the c o ncept a s a labou r (the 'la b o u r of the n e g a t i v e ') . A l l in a l l , then, i t is not difficu lt to derive the f o l l o w i n g h ypothe sis from M a r x ' s a phoris ms: just as t r a d i t i o n a l ma terialis m in reality concea ls a n idea l i s t f o undat ion (repre se n t a t i o n , c o n t e mpla tion), so mode rn idea l i sm in reality conce als a mater ialist orient ation in the func tion i t attribu tes to the acting s ubjec t , a t least if one accept s that there i s a latent conflic t betwee n the idea of represe ntation (i n t e r pretati on, con templa tion) and that o f a c tiv ity (labour , . p ractlce , transf ormat ion, c h a n g e ) . A n d what he propo ses i s quite . S im ply to explod e the contra diction , to dissoc iate repres ematio n a n d s ubjecti vity and a l l o w the catego ry of practic al a ctiv i t y to emerg e in its own right.

The s ubject i s practice Did he succeed i n th i s u n derta k i n g ? In a s e n s e , completely, since it is perfectly possible to argue that the only true s ubject is the practical subject or the s ubject of pra ctice or, better s t i l l , that

subject

who creates

or, as K a n t i a n language h a s it, 'constitutes' rhem. We then come to the other side of idea lism, where it is not a philosophy of representation (or, i f o n e prefers, a mere philosophy

the subject is nothing other than practice which h a s a lw a y s a l ready beg un a n d contin u e s indefi n i t e l y. B u t does t h i s get us o u t
o f i d e a l i s m ? N o t h i n g could b e less certa in, p r e c i s e l y beca use, historica lly speaking, ' i d e a l i s m ' covers both the point o f view of represenra tion a n d t h a t o f subjectivity. In reality, what we h a v e here is a circle or a theore tica l intercha nge which functions

Les Fleurs du Mal. Francis Scarfe translates: ment I hare, that disturbs rbe ideal line' (p. 27). [Trans.]

It

From 'La Reame',

'move

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T H E P H I L O S O P H Y OF M A R X

C H A N G I N G THE W O R L D

27

i n both directions. I t i s poss ible to say t h a t , b y identifying the essence o f s ubjecti v i ty with practice, and the reality of practice with the revolutionary acti v i ty of the proleta r i a t ( w h i c h i s one with its very exi stence ) , Marx rransferred the category of subject from idealism to m a t e r i a l i s m . But it i s e q u a l l y possible to assert that, precisely by so d o i n g , he set up the permanent possibility of

g e n u i nely remove h i m from the h i story o f i d e a l i s m . Fi chte h a d sa i d prec i sely t h e s a m e t h i n g . Wit h o u t pla y i n g w i t h words, one might even go so fa r a s to suggest that t h i s i s what makes o f Marx a n d h i s 'materia l i s m o f practice' the most accomplished form o f the i d e a l i s t trad i t i o n , t h e form which enables u s to u nderstand more than any other the lasting v i ta l i t y of i d e a lism right up to the present, precisely beca use that transpo s i t i o n i s close l y lin k e d t o t h e a tt empt t o prolong t h e revolutiona ry experience a n d embod y i t i n modern society, w i t h i t s cla sses a n d social conflicts. To do so would be t o prepare to understand that adopt i n g the standpoint of the proleta ria ns in a state o f 'perma nent' insurrec tion resulted not so much i n p u tting an end to i d e a l i sm, but

representing the proletariat to itself as a 'sub;ect' i n the idea l i s t

sense o f the term ( a n d hence, u l t i ma tely, a s a representation o r a n abstra ction by m e a n s o f w h i c h t h e world, or t h e tra nsforma tion of the w o rld, is once a gain 'interprete d ' : is this n o t exactly what happened when, later, Marxist theorists, armed w i t h the i dea o f c l a s s struggle, were to d e d u c e from i t a priori the 'mean i n g of histo r y ' ? ) . There i s n o t h i n g g ra t uitous abo l l t these d i a l e c t i c a l ga mes. They are closely linked to the history o f the notion of revolution a n d , consequently, have a poli t i c a l aspect as well a s a ph i l o soph i c a l one. F r o m t h e beg i nning o f the modern period - t h a t o f the revo l u t i o n s w h i c h a r e t e r m e d bourge o i s , t h e A n g l o American a n d the F r e n c h - the invention of the subject as the central category of philosophy, w h i c h relates to a ll fields o f concrete experience (science, morality, law, reli g i on, aesthetics) a n d makes poss i b l e t he i r uni fication, i s li n k e d t o the idea that h u m a n i t y moulds . r e d u c a t e s i tself, to t h e idea t h a t it g i ves itself l a w s and, therefore, fi n a lly to the idea that i t liberates itself from the various forms of oppres s i o n , ig norance or superstition, poverty etc. I O A n d the generic subject of this acti vity always h a s two sides t o i t : the one theoret i c a l , t h e other concrete a n d pra ctical. I n K a n t , that subject w a s humallity; i n Fi chte it became at a certa i n po i n t the people, the nation; a n d in Hegel, lastly, it w a s the historical tleoples a s success i v e embo d i ments of the 'world-spi r i t', i . e . the progress of c i v i l i z a t i o n . The fact that M a r x , i n h i s t u r n , recognized the proletariat as the true practical s u b j e c t (we ha v e seen above that it i s the 'people o f the people', authentica l l y h u m a n a n d communa l ) - t h e s u b j e c t w h i c h ' d i s s o l v e s t h e e x i sting o r d e r ' a n d t h u s changes i tself (Selbstf.iitigkeit, Selbsttleriindenmg), while a t the same time chan g i n g the world - a n d that h e used this reco g n i tion (in which the lesson o f immediate experience and the most ancient specu lat i v e tradit i o n a r e superi mposed in a rema rkable way) to assert, in his turn, that the subject is practice, does not, however,

i n i n s t a l l i n g the materialism/idealism d i lemma - the peren n i a l

question o f thei r difference - a t t h e v e r y h e a r t of t h e theory of the proletariat and its pri v i leged h i storical role. Bl lt) with t h i s d i l e m m a , w e m a y confiden t l y expect t h a t ph i l os ophy, h a v i l l g been chased out of the door, w i l l come back in by the window . . .

The reali ty o f the ' h u m a n esscnce' Let us return to the letter of the Theses to ev oke the other g reat question they pose: t h a t of the human essencc. The two are clea r l y l i nked. 'Feuerba ch resolves the reli g i o u s essence into the

hum al e s sence', i .e. h e shows, pa r t i c ularly i n The Essence of . . of 1 8 4 1 , t h a t t h e i d ea o f G o d i s m e r e l y a synth e s i s Chrlstlamty

o f h u m a n perfections, person i fi e d a n d proiected o u t of t h e w o r l d . ' B u t the h u m a n essence i s no abstra ction i nherenr in each single i n d i v i d u a l . I n i rs reality i t i s the ensemble o f social writes das Ensemble der gesellschaftlichen Verhdltlliss e): t h i s thesis has b e e n t h e cause o f a s much debate a s the e l e v e n t h . There a r e many t h i n g s w o r t h y o f comment here, i f we take care to foll o w the letter o f the text. Marx poses t h e q u e s t i o n of the essence of man, or, a t least, a ns wers that q u e s t i o n . What could be more n a t u r a l ? Yet that question, which we m i g h t regard as being const i t u t i v e o f anthro pology, i s not a t all strai g htforward. In a sense, i t i s a s o l d as rela tions' ( i n a sort o f mixture of French a n d G e r m a n ' Marx

28

T H E l ' H [LOSO P H Y OF M A RX

C H A N G I N G T H E W ORLD

29

philosophy. But w h e n , in o u r own day, C l a u d e Levi-Strauss e x p l a i n s that the essence o f man i s the conflict between n a t u r e a n d c u l t u r e ; or w h e n Lacan c o i n s the word

fundamental p h i l o s o p h i c a l question. If we, in fact, make it such, we enter upon a new problematic which w e might, w i t h Althusser, c a l l a theoretical h u m a n i s m . A s t o n i s h i n g a s i t m a y s e e m , s u c h a problematic is r e l a t i v e l y recent and at the point w h e n M a r x w a s writing, it was not very o l d a t a l l , since ir only d a t e s from the e n d of t h e eighteenth century. I n Germany the most important names a r e those o f Kant

parletre

to say t h a t

the essence of man i s constituted t h r o u g h and t h r o u g h b y l a n g u a g e , they p l a c e t h e m s e l v e s i n t h e s a m e tradition a s Aristotle defining m a n by the fact o f his h a v i n g the power o f speech and bei ng a member o f the

polis,

o r St. Augustine defining man

( A n thropologie in

as the 'image a n d resemblance o f God o n earth'. Moreover, i f we take things at a sufficient level o f generality, they are a l l d e a l i n g w i t h the same q u e stio n. from A n t i q u i t y to o u r o w n times, there is a long succession of d e fi n i t i o n s o f human n a t u r e or the h u m a n essence. Marx h i m s e l f w i l l a d v a n c e s e v e r a l , e a c h o f t h e m revolv ing a r o u n d the relation between Volume 1 of

pragmatischer Hinsicht, 1798) ,

Wilhelm v o n H u m b o l d t 1 3 and

Feuerbach, which indicates that the trajectory of theoretical h u m a n i s m connects with t h a t o f idealism and its refutation. The p a r a l l e l i s an i l l u m i n a t i n g one. We see in effect that, where the r i v a l ( s p i r i t u a l i s t , m a t e r i a l i s t ) theories of h u m a n narure are concerned, M a r x w i l l proceed to a critique o f the same order as the one he carried out o n t h e theories o f the subject, o f activity a n d sensuous i n t u i t i o n . To say that, 'in its effective reality' (in

labour

and

consciousness.

In

Capital

he w i l l cire a very characteristic definition

by \\ cnjamin Franklin ( m a n i s ' a toolmaking a n i m a l ' ) , not t o reject it, b u t t o c o m p l e m e n t it b y specifying that technology h a s a history w h i c h is dependent on the ' m o d e o f production', a n d going on t o r e c a l l t h a t neither technology nor technical progress can exist w i t h o u t consciousness, reflection, experimentation and knowledge. 1 1 A n d in

sei12er Wirklichkeit),
r a d i c a l l y to

the h u m a n essence i s the ensemble of social

relations i s clearly n o t to

reject

the question. But it i s to attempt

displace

the way in which it has until now been

understood, not only where 'man' i s concerned, but also as regards 'essence'. Philosophers have formed a false idea of w h a t an essence is ( a n d t h i s error i s so . . . essential to them that one can h a r d l y i m a g i n e a p h i l o s o p h y w i t h o u t it). T h e y have t h o u g h t , firstly, that the essence i s an

The German Ideology,

not long after the

formulation we are examining here, h e wrote:

Men can be dis[Lngulshed from a n ull a i s b y consciousness, b y religion or anything else YOII l i k e . They themselves begin to distingUish themselves from alllllwis a s soon a s they begin to produce their means o f sub sistence, a step which i s conditioned by their physical organisation. By producing their means o f subSistence men are indirectly prodUCing their actual m a terial l i f e . 1 l

idea

or an abstraction ( o n e w o u l d say

today, in a different terminology, a

universal concept),

under

w h i c h may be ranged, in a d e c l i n i n g order of generaliry, specific differences and, fi n a l l y , i n d i v i d u a l differences; a n d , secondly, that this generic abstraction is somehow 'inherent' (innewoh

This is <1 way of s e e k i n g the a n s w e r to t h e question o f the essence of man in things themselves - w h i c h has, indeed, provided a starting-point f o r a w h o l e biological a n d technological anthro pology, b o th M a r x i s t a n d non-Marxist a l i k e .

nend)

in i n d i v i d u a l s of the same genus, either as a q u a l i t y they

possess, by which they may be classified, or even a s a form or a force which causes them to exist a s s o many copies of t h e s a m e model. We can s e e , t h e n , t h e m e a n i n g o f the s t r a n g e e q u a t i o n m a d e b y M a r x . At bottom, the words 'ensemble', 'social' and 'rela tions' a l l say the same t h i n g . The point i s t o reject both o f the p o s i t i o n s ( t h e

Theoretical humanism
Yet a nuance c r u c i a l to understanding the i m p o r t of our text here separates the mere fact of d e fi n i n g man or h u m a n nature from the fact of e.'(piicit'iy 'What is the h u m a n

realist

a n d the

nominalist)

between w h i c h

p h i l o s o p h e r s have genera l l y b e e n d i v i d e d : the one a r g u i n g t h a t the g e n u s o r essence precedes the existence o f i n d i v i d u a l s ; the o t h e r t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s a r e the p r i m a r y reality, from w h i c h u n i v e r s a l s are 'abstracted ' . For, amazingly, n e i t h e r o f t h e s e t w o

posing the q u e s t i o n ' W h a t i s m a n ? ' (or essence ?') and, a fortiori, making t h i s the

30

THE P H I L O S O P H Y OF MARX

C H A N G I N G T H E W O R. L D

31

positions is c a p a b l e o f thinking precisely w h a t i s essential in human existence: the multiple and active

relations

which i n d i Althusser
L O U I S AIthusser (born, Birmandreis, Algeria.

v i d u a l s e s t a b l i s h , w i t h each other ( w h e t h e r o f language, labour, love, reproduction, domination, conflict etc.), and the fact that it is these relations w h i c h define w h a t they h a v e in common, the 'genus'. They d e fi n e this because they constitute it at each moment in m u l t i p l e f o r m s . T h e y thus provide t h e only 'effective' content of the n o t i o n of essence a p p l i e d ro the h u m a n being ( i . e . to h u m a n b e i n g s ) .

The transindividual
Let us not go into the question of whether this point of view is absolutely o r i g i n a l and specific ro M a r x here. What is certain is that it has consequences both in the field of philosophical discllssion ( a t the level o f w h a t is c a l l e d 'ontology'), 14 and in that o f politics. T h e words M a r x uses reject

Ben Brewster, New Left Books, London,

Foucault and Barthes. Acknowledging that Marxism was i n crisis, but refusing to a t tribute the cause (, f that crisis to mere dogmatization, he undertook a re-reading o f Marl(. Borrowing the n o t i on of 'epistemo

o f For Mar.;: and (with Etienne Baliharl Readmg Copltal (u a n s. 1970), A t t ha t pOlin he was one of the leading figures oi 'structuralism', alongside Levi-Strauss, lacan, ill

philosophical debates of the sixties and seventies after the publication

retical works. Those works did, however, occupy a central place in the

the end o f his life (the murder o f his wife, hiS internment in a psych iatric institution; see h i s autobiography, The Future Lasts Il Long Time, trans. Richard Veasey, Chano and Windus, London, 1993) than for his theo

hener k n o w n today by the general public for the tragedies which marked

1918;

died, Paris.

1990)

is

1965

both

the i n d i v i d u a l i s t

p o i n t o f v i e w ( p r i m a c y o f the i n d i v i d u a l a n d , especially, the fiction of an i n d i v i d u a l i ty which c o u l d be defined

in itself,

in

the 'overdttermined contradiction' of the mode o f production and the

as the foundation o f a science of history whose central categories are

M,.xian c ri t i q u e of political economy as a rupture with rhe t/,e(Jretical humanism and historicism of idealist philosophies (including Hegel), and

logical break' from historical epistemology (Bachdard), he interpreted the

isolation, whether in terms of biology, psychology, economic behaviour o r whatever), atld the organicist point o f view (which, today, following A n g l o - A m erican u s a g e , is a l s o c a l l e d the

holis

'structure in dominance' of social formations. Such a science stands opposed to bourgeois ideology, but a t the same: time demonstrates the materiality and historical efficaCity o f ideologies, d e fi n e d as 'the i ma g i n ar y relation of individuals a n d classes t o their conditions of existence'. Just 3S
there is no end of history, so there cannot be any end of ideology,

tic

point o f v i e w : t h e p rimacy o f t h e

whole,

a n d particularly o f

society considered a s a n i n d i v i s i b l e u n i t y o f which i n d i v i d u a l s a r e merely the f u n c t i o n a l m e m b ers).1S M a r x w i l l e m b r a c e the 'monad' of Hobbes a n d Bentham,
nor

the

neither 'grand etre' of

Auguste Comte. I t is significant that Marx (who spoke French almost a s fluently as h e did German) should have resorted to the foreign word 'ensemble' here, dearly i n order to avoid using rhe German

Althusser simultaneously proposed a reevaluation of the lenmist theses philosophy, which he defined as 'class struggle in theory' (Lemn and Philosophy and Other Essays, re a n s . Ben Brewster, New teft Books, London, 1 9 7 1 ) , and he used this to analyse the c on tr a d i ct i on s between 'materialist tendencies' and '1dealist tendencies' within scientific practice
011

'c/as Ganze',

the 'whole' o r totality.

trans. Warren Monrag, Verso, London, 1990). In a later phase, under rhe inAuence of rhe Chinese Cultural Revolution and the M a y 1 9 6 8 move ments, Althusser criticized w h a t h e now considered to be the 'theoreticist deviation' o f his earliest essays, a deviation h e anributed to the infi.uence o f Spinota at the expense of dialectics ('Elements o f SeJf-Cridcism', in Self,CTltrci5m, trans. Grahame Lock, New Left Books, London, Reaffirming the difference between Marxism and humanism, he outlined a general theory o f ideology as [he 'interpellation o f individuals
m

(phIlosophy alrd the Spo"ta1UOus PhIlosophy of the SCientIsts

( l 974),

Perhaps things would b e dearer f o r m a l l y (though not in their content) if we, in our turn, added a word to the text - if need be

Essays

by inventing I h a l word - to characterize the constitutive relation

which displaces the question of rhe h u m a n essence while, at the same time, providing a formal answer to it ( a n d one which t h u s contains i n e m b r y o a n o t h e r problematic t h a n t h a t o f theoretical h u m a n i s m ) , The word does in fact exist, but is to b e found in twentiethcentury thinkers (Kojeve, Simondon, L a c a n . . . ); we have, in fact, to t h i n k h u m a n i t y as a

1976).

as subjects' and as a system o f both public and private institutions ensLlr

ing t he reproduction o f social relations ('Ideology and Ideological State

Apparatuses' ( 1 970), in Essays London, 1 9 8 4 ) .
a"

[deology, trans. Ben Brewster, Verso,

transi11dividual

reality

32

THE P H I L O S O P H Y OF M A R X

CH ANG1NG T H E W O R L D

33

a n d , ultimately, t o t h i n k t r a n s i n d i v i d u a l i t y a s s u c h . 1 6 N o t w h a t i s i d e a l l y ' i n ' each i n d i v i d u a l ( a s a form o r a s u b s t a n c e ) , o r w h a t w o u l d serve, from o u t s i d e , to c l a s s i f y t h a t i n d i v i d u a l , b u t w h a t exists between individuals b y d i n t of t h e i r m u l t i p l e interactions.

relations', a n d t h e t h i r d , e i g h t h a n d eleventh t h e s e s , w h i c h l i n k a l l thought t o revolutionary practice a n d change, a r e , in reality, saying b a s i c a l l y the same t h i n g . Let us risk the expression, then, and say that social relations as designated here are nothing but a n endless transformation, a 'permanent r e v o l u t i o n ' (the term was d o u b tless not invented b y M a r x , but it w o u l d p l a y a decisive

An ontology o f relations
Here, we m u s t a d m i t , a n 'ontology' is t a k i n g shape. However, for the discussion of the relations between the i n d i v i d u a l and the genus, it substitutes a programme of enquiry into this multi plicity o f relations, w h i c h are s o many transitions, transferences o r passages in w h i c h the bond of i n d i v i d u a l s to the community i s formed a n d dissolved, and which, i n its t u r n , constitutes them. What i s most striking in s u c h a perspective is that it establishes a complete reciprocity between these tw. poles, which cannot exist without one another and are therefore in and of themselves mere abstractions, a l b e i t necessary abstractions for thinking the relation o r relat i o n s hi p

role i n his thinking u p to a r o u n d 1 8 5 0 ) . F o r the M a r x of March

1845, it i s not enough

to s a y with Hegel that 'the real i s rational'

and that the rational, o f necessity, becomes reality: one h a s to say that the only thing which is real o r rational is revolution.

Stirner's objection What m o r e could one ask? I have s a i d above, however, that M a r x c o u l d not leave matters there: we now h a v e to understand why this is the case. We s h o u l d not arrive at s u c h an u n d e r s t a n d i n g if we were c o n t e n t merely to show that by substituting practice for the subject, a circle o r logical difficulty is generated, or that there is a danger that the notion of essence w i l l be left in a state of d i s e q u i l i b r i u m , c a u g h t between the internal critique of t r a d i t i o n a l ontology a n d its d i s s o l u t i o n into the multiplicity of concrete investigations o f social r e l a t i o n s . Without d o u b t ,

( Verhaltnis).

A t t h i s p o i n t , speculative a s i t m a y s e e m , w e are in fact closer t h a n ever, b y a characteristic short-c i r c u i t , to the question o f p o l i t i c s . N o t o n l y are t h e relations o f which w e are speaking i n fact nothing other t h a n differen tiated practices, s i n g u l a r actions o f i n d i v i d u a l s o n one another; but this t r a n s i n d i v i d u a l ontology h a s a t least a resonance with statements like the Declaration of

T h e Ger m a12 Ideology is a t e x t v e r y c l o s e i n i n s p i r a t i o n to the Theses on Feuerbach and yet it a l r e a d y s p e a k s another language.
The formal reasons we have just mentioned are not sufficient to explain this.

the Rights of Man a1td the Citize12 (often quite wrongly con
sidered an ' i n d i v i d u a l i s t ' text) a n d , even more, with the practice o f revolutionary movements - a practice which never opposes the i n d i v i d u a l 's self-realization to the interests o f the community, and indeed does not even sepa1'ate these, but always seeks to a c c o m p l i s h the one b y accomplishing the other. for, though i t is true that only i n d i v i d u a l s can, in the last a n a l y s i s , possess rights and formulate d e m a n d s , the w i n n i n g o f those rights o r liberation (even insurrection) is no less necessa r i l y collective. It will d o u btless b e objected that this formulation does n o t d e s c r i b e a n existing state o f affairs or, e v e n less, a system o f institutions, b u t rather a process ( a t l e a s t a s experienced b y those t a k i n g part in i t ) . But this i s exactly what M a r x intends. And in these circumstances one can see that the sixth thesis, w h i c h identifies the h u m a n essence w i t h ' t h e e n s e m b l e o f social

I b e l i e v e there is a very precise c o n j u n c t u r a l r e a s o n f o r it,

but one w h i c h served to bring out a deep-seated problem. Some historians o f Marx's p h i l o s o p h y ( p a r t i c u l a r l y A u gllste C o r n u ) not been aware o f it, m a i n l y because i t is u s u a l l y o n l y the first p art of the text that is r e a d . A l o n g t r a d i t i o n h a s accustomed us to regarding this section ( ' A. Concerning F e u e r b a c h ' ) as a free-stan d i n g exposition of 'historical m a t e r i a l i s m ' , whereas it i s essentially a response, a n d often a d i f fi c u l t one (as r e a d e r s w i l J h a v e l e a r n t t o their cost), t o t h e c h a l l e n g e posed by another theorist. That theorist, the force o f whose argument it is now t i m e to gauge, is M a x Stirner (the p s e u d o n y m o f Caspar Schmidt), the author o f T he Ego and its .wn, p u b l i s h d at the have dearly s e e n this, t h o u g h many have under-estimated or

34

T H E P H I L O S O P H Y OF M A R X

CHANGING THE WORLD

35

end o f 1 8 4 4 . J 7 B u t i t w a s some m o n t h s later, just after the

It is certain t h a t M a r x a n d E n g e l s c o u l d not sidestep t h i s o b j e c t i o n , f o r they aspired to be c r i t i c s essenti a l i s m o f the p h i l o s o p h e r s precisely the

Theses

w e r e written, a n d o n Engels's insistence, that Marx

both o f t h e

idealism and

b e g a n to wrestle w i t h t h a t book. From a t h e o r e t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e w h o is S t i rn e r ? First of all, h e i s a n anarchist, a d e f e n d e r o f the a u t o n o m y o f society -composed of individ uals, all o f w h o m are s i n g u l a r a n d t h e 'owners' o f their bodies, n e e d s and ideas - against the modern State, i n which, as h e sees it, a l l domination is concentrated and which h a s taken over the

and

o f the c o m m u n i st s (more seen t h a t this d u a l

humanist c o m m u n i s t s ) . W e have

perspective w a s a t t h e h e a r t o f t h e category w h i c h h a d just emerged for Marx a s the ' s o l u t i o n ' t o the e n i g m a s o f p h i l o sophy: revolutionary practice. How, t h e n , did h e respond t o t h i s c h a l l e n g e ? B y transforming h i s s y m b o l i c n o t i o n o f ' into a historical a n d s o c i o l o g i c a l concept of

sacred

attributes o f power elaborated by the p o l itical

'praxis' production a n d

theology o f t h e Middle Ages. But, a b o v e a l l , Stirner is a r a d i c a l

b y p o s i n g a question unprecedented in p h i l o s o p h y (even i f t h e term w a s n o t absolutely n e w ) - t h e q u e s t i o n o f i d e o l o gy.

nominalist:

by this we mean that in his view, every 'generality"

every ' u n i v e r s a l concept' is a

fiction concocted

by i n s t i t u t i o n s to ( T h e ) G e r m a n ldcology These two moves are, o f course, closely i n t e r l i n k e d . The one con stantly presupposes the other and t h i s i s what gives

dominate (by organizing, classifying, s i m p l i fying, if not indeed merely by n a m i n g ) the only natural reality, i.e. the m u ltiplicity o f individuals o f w h o m e a c h i s 'unique o f his k i n d ' (hence Stirner's essen t i a l play on words here, which has in fact a long history: w h a t is

proper to

each i n d i v i d u a l is

his/her property ).

The German

We saw a m o m e n t ago that M a r x w a s developing a n o t i o n o f social relation w h i c h , a t l e a s t i n p r i n c i p l e , rejected b o t h n o m i n a l i s m a n d essenti a l i s m . But Stirner's critique poses a formidable challenge to Marx because i t is n o t content merely to target traditional metaphysical 'non-particulars' ( a l l o f them more o r l e s s theologica l : Being, Substance, the l d e a , Reason, G o o d ) , b u t encompasses all universal notions w i t h o u t exception, thereby a n t i c i p a t i n g certain of Nietzsche's arguments and what is today known a s postmodernism. Stirner w a n t s none o f these beliefs, Ideas or 'meta-narratives', whether they concern God or M a n , Church o r State, or R e v o l u t i o n either. A n d there is, indeed, n o l o g i c a l difference between

Jdeology

its coherence, despite its unfinished a n d u n b a l a n c e d

composition ( C h a p t e r 3 on S t i rn er, ' S a i n t M a x ' , a l o n e occupies almost two-thirds o f the work a n d largely consists in verbal jousting w i t h the t y p i c a l l y 'ironic' argumentation o f The Ego and

its Own,

the outcome of w h i c h , from the strictly rhetorical p o i nt

of view, is r a t h e r inconc l u s i v e ) . T h e work is e n t i r e l y organized a r o u n d the notion o f production. taken here in a g e n e r a l sense to refer to any h u m a n a c t i v i t y o f formation a n d transformation o f nature. It i s no exaggeration t o say that, after t h e 'ontology

Christianity, humanity, the people, society, the nation o r tl1e proletariat, a n y more than there is between the righ ts of ma11 or communism : a l l these universal
notions are i n d e e d abstractions which, from Stirner's viewpoint, means that they are fictions. And these fictions are used to substitute for i n d i v i d u a l s and the thought o f i n d i v i d u a l s , w h i c h is w h y Stirner's book w a s t o continue to fuel critiques from both left and right, which argued that n o t h i n g is to b e gained by exchanging the c u l t o f abstract humanity for an equally abstract c u l t of revolution o r revolutionary practice, and that by d o i n g so one may indeed be r u n n i n g the risk o f a n even more perverse d omination.

pI-axis' heralded in the Theses on Feuerbach, The German Ideology sets out an 'ontology o f p r o d u c t i o n ' since, as M a r x himself t e l l s u s , i t is p r o d uction w h i c h shapes man's being ( h i s Sein, to w h i c h h e w i l l oppose h i s consciousness: Bewusst-sein,
of literally, his 'being conscio u s ' ) . It is, more exactly, the prod uction o f h i s own means o f existence, an activity a t o n c e personal a n d c o l l e c t i v e (transind i v i d u a l ) w h i c b transforms h i m at the same t i m e as i t irreversibly transforms nature and w h i c h , i n this way, constitutes 'history'. Conversely, however, M a r x w i l l show that ideology is itself produced, before constituting itself a s an a u t o n o m o u s structure o f production (the 'products' o f which are ideas, collective consciousness: t h i s is t h e object o f the theory o f intellectual l a b o u r ) . The critique of ideology is t h e necessary precondition

36

THE P H I L O S O P H Y O F M A R X

C H A N G I N G THE W O R L D

37

f o r a knowledge o f s o c i a l being a s development o f production: from its immediate forms, linked to the subsistence o f indi viduals, to its m o s t media ted forms, which play o n l y an indirect role in t h e reproduction o f human life. To gain access to t h i s guiding thread o f the w h o l e o f history, it is n o t enough t o contemplate t h e facts; one ca n o n l y g e t to i t thro u g h the critiq u e o f the d o m i n a n t ideo l o gy, b e c a u s e t h i s latter is both a n inversion of rea lity a nd a n a utonomization of the 'intellectual products' in w h i c h the tra ce o f the r e a l origin of idea s h a s been lost a nd w h i c h d e n i e s the very existence o f tha t origin. This is why I s p oke a bove o f a reciproca l pre s u p p o sition. At the same time, however, Stirner's objection ca n be rejected, because the point is no longer to denounce t h e abstra ction of ' u n iversa ls', of 'generalities', of 'idea lities', by showing that t h a t a bstra ction s u b s t i t u t e s i t s e l f for r e a l indivi d u a l s ; it n o w becomes possi b le t o study the genesis of those a b stractions, their produc tion b y i n d ividu a l s , as a function of the collective or social conditions in which they t h i n k a nd relate to one another. A nd, a s a r e s u l t , i n s t e a d of being endlessly faced with an all-or nothing choice (either a ccepting or reiecting a l l a b stra ctions e7Z

history, w h a t w e h a v e h e r e i n f a c t (a s i n Hegel) a r e t h e typical moments o f the process by which history became universalied, became t h e history o f humanity. However, t h e content of the exposition is a s fa r removed a s ca n b e from the Hegelian

objective spirit. For t h a t u n iversa liza tion does not consist in

t h e forma tion o f a Rechtstaat ra t i o n a l l y ex t en din g its po wers over the w h o l e of society a nd 'totalizing' the a c tivities of that society. O n the contrary, s u c h a j uridico-statist u n iversa lity seemed to Marx the ideological inversio7' par excellence o f social rela tions. The poin t is, rather, that history h a s b e c o m e the inter action, t h e interdependence o f all the indivi d u a l s a nd all t h e g r o u p s belonging to h u m a n ity. Marx's erudition, already grea t , w a s m o b ilized to demon stra t e that the c o u n terpart t o the division of la b o ur was the development o f forms of o wn ership (from c o m m u n a l or State o wners h i p to priva te o wnership formally open to a l l) . Each mode of production implies a historical form of a p p ropria tion a nd o wnership, w h i c h is merely a n o ther way o f l o o k i n g a t the ques tion. Consequently, i t is precisely the division of la b o ur which governs t h e constitution a nd dissolution o f the larger a n d larger, less and less 'natural' social gro ups, from primitive communities to classes, b y way o f t h e var i o u s g u i lds, orders or esta tes (Standel . .
.

bloc), one h a s a criterion by w h i c h it is possible to discriminate

between those a b stra ctions which represent rea l k n o w ledg e a n d t h o s e which merely h a v e a f u n c t i o n of misrecognition o r mystification; and, e v e n better, to discri m i n a t e between circum stances I n which t h e use o f a bstra ctions is mystifica tory a nd those in which it is not. The n i h i l i s m inherent in Stirner's position is t h u s averted at a f u nda m e n t a l level. w i t h o u t the need for a radical criti q u e of t h e dominant ideas being contested. Indeed, that need is c l e a r l y recogn ized.

Each of these gro ups, ' d o m i n a n t ' or 'do mina ted', must be

understood, a l l in a l l , a s a two-sided, contradictory reality: both a s a form of rela tive universaliza tion a nd a s a form of limita t i o n or partic u lariza tion o f h u m a n rela t i o n s . T h e i r s e r i e s is therefore merely the grea t process of negation of particularity a nd partic u l a r i s m , but a negation thro ugh the experience a nd complete rea liza tion o f their forms. The sta rting-point of this development w a s the productive activity of h uman beings contending with nature: what Marx

The revolurionary overturning o f history

calls the real premiss (wirkliche Voraussetzun g), which h e stresses at length, against the i l l u s i o n s of a p h i l o s o p h y 'devoid of premises'. I S A s for its end point, that is 'bourgeois/civil' society

The German Ideology takes the form, then, of an account of the

genesis, both logical a nd historical, of social forms, the g u iding threa d of which is the development o f the division of labour. Each new sta g e in the division o f l a b o ur chara cterizes a certain mode of production a nd excha nge - hence a pcriodiza tion w h i c h i s , inevita bly, very reminiscent o f the Hegelian p h i l o s o p h y of history. Rather than a mere narra tive o f the stages o f u n iversal

(biirgerliche Gesellscha{t), which is founded o n the different

forms of 'intercourse' (Verkehr: w h i c h might a l s o b e transla ted as communication) bet ween competing priva te o wners. Or rather, the end point is the c o n tradiction such a society harbours w i t h i n

it. For i n d ivid u a l ity, considered a s a n a b solute, a m o u n t s i n prac tice for t h e masses to an a b s o l u t e precariousness or 'contingency'

38

THE P HILOSOPHY OF M A R X

C HA N GI N G

THE WOR L D

39

of the conditions o f existence, just a s ownership ( o f oneself, of objects) amounts to a generalized dispossession. One o f the great theses of The German Ideolo8Y> taken directly from the liberal tradition but t u r n e d against i t , i s that 'bourgeois' society is irreversibly established once class differ ences prevail over a l l others and in practice sweep them away. The State itself, no matter how overgrown it may seem, is now merely a function of those differences. I t is a t this point that the contradiction between particularism and universality, cultivation and brutishness, openness and exclusion is at its most acute, a n d that between wealth a n d poverty, the universal circulation of goods and the restriction of access to them, the apparently u n l i m i t e d productivity of l a h o u r and the worker's confinement in a narrow specialism becomes explosive. Each i n d i v i d u a l , wretched as he o r she m a y be, h a s become poten tially a representative o f h u m a n k i n d , a n d the function of each group is defined on a world scale. History is then on the point o f e m e r g i n g from its o w n 'prehistory'. The whole argument o f The German Ideology t.ends in fact to demonstrate that this situation is a s stIch intolerable but that, by the development o f its own logic, it contains the premisses of a revolutionary overturning ( U mwiilzung) which would a m o u n t , q u i t e simply, to the substitution of c o m m u n i s m for bourgeoisl c i v i l society. The transition to c o m m u n i s m is therefore imminent once the forms and contradictions of bourgeois/civil society are completely d e v e l o p e d . In fact, the society in which exchange has become universal is also a society in which ' u n i versal devel opment o f lthe] productive forces' has occurred. Throughout the whole of history, the social 'productive forces ' , expressing themselves in all fields, from technology to science and art, are only ever the forces o f many i n d i v i d u al s . But they are henceforth inoperative as the forces of isolated i n d i v i d u a l s ; they can only take shape and exert their effects in a virtually infinite network o f interactions between human beings. The 'resolution' o f the contradiction c a n n o t consist in a return to narrower forms of human activity a n d life, but only in a co!!ective mastery o f the 'totality of the productive forces' .

The proletariat, universal class

This can be p u t another w a y : the proletariat constitutes the

universal class of history, a n idea which is nowhere given more articulate and complete expression in Marx's w o r k than in this
text. The imminence of r e v o l utionary transformation and of communism is, in fact, based on this perfect coincidence in the same present time o f the u n i v ersalization of exchange a n d - ranged against a b o u rgeois class which h a s raised particular interest a s such to u n i v ersality - a 'class' w h i c h has, by contrast,

no particular interest to defend. Deprived of all status and a l l property, a n d therefore o f a n y 'particular q u a l i t y ' (Eigenschaft),
the proletarian poten tially possesses them a l l . l) ractically no longer existing a t all through himself, for 'propertyless' is ei!enturnslos. he exists potentia!!y through all other h u m a n beings. Let u s nOte here that the German In spite of the sarcastic remarks Marx directed at StirneI; it is impossible here n o t t o hear the same play on words a s the latter had used - and a b u s e d . B u t it i s t u r n e d r o u n d i n t h e opposite direction n o w 'private property':
.nly the p ro let ari a n s of t he p r e s e n t da y , who a r e c om p le t el y shut off from all self-activity, ar e iII a p o sit ion to a c hi eve a c ompl ete and no long e r restricted s e l f a c ti v it y, which c on s is t s i n t h e appropriation of a totality of p roduc ti v e forces and in t b e thus pos tul a ted development of a to t a l i ty of c a p a c ities.19
-

against

Negative universality is converted into p o s i t i v e universality, deprivation into appropriation, loss o f i n d i v i d u a l ity into the 'many-sided' development o f i n d i v i d u a l s , each of whom is a u n i q u e manifold of h u m a n relations. Such a reappropriation c a n only occur {or each person if it simultaneously occurs for all. 'Modern universal intercourse can be controlled by i n d i v i d u a l s , therefore, only when controlled by all. '2.0 This explains why the revolution i s n o t j u s t communist in its outcome, b u t also in its form. Wi!! it be said that it must inevitably represent a decrease o f freedom for i n d i v i d u a l s ? e n t h e contrary, i t is t h e true liberation. For bourgeois/civil society destroys freedom at the very moment it p r o c l a i m s it as its p r i n c i p l e ; whereas in communism, which is the revoilltionary overthrow o f that society, freedom becomes effective liberty

40

T H E P H I L O S O P H Y OF M A R X

CHANGING THE WORLD

41

because i t responds to a n intrinsic need for w h i c h that same society has created the conditions. 'In place of t h e old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we s h a l l have a n association, in which the free development o f each is the condition for the free development o f a l l . , l l The thesis o f the proletariat a s 'universal class' t h u s condenses the arguments w h i c h a l l o w Marx to present the condition of the worker, or rather the condition o f the wage-labou rer, a s the fi n a l stage in the whole process o f the d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r - the 'decom position' of civil society.22 It also a l l o w s Marx to read off from the present the imminence o f the communist revolution. The 'party' of the same n a m e , for which, w i t h Engels, he went on to draft the Manifesto, w i l l not be a 'separate' party; it w i l l not have 'interests separate a n d apart from those of the proletariat a s a whole';23 it will not establish 'sectarian principles', but i t w i l l quite s i m p l y be t h i s real movement c o m e t o maturity, become manifest for itself and for society as a whole.

perfection. As f o r poiesis ( f r o m t h e verb poiein: to m a k e ), which the Greeks considered f u n d a m e n t a l l y servile, this w a s 'necessary' action, subject to a l l the constraints of the relationship with nature, with material conditions. The perfection it sought was not that o f man, b u t o f things, o f products for u s e . Here, t h e n , is the b a s i s o f Marx's materialism in The Ge Ideology ( w h i c h is, effectively, a new material i s m ) : not a mere inversion o f the hierarchy - a 'theoretical workerism', if I can p u t it t h u s ( a s h a s been the c h a r g e o f H a n n a h Arendt a n d others24), i.e. a primacy accorded to poiesis over praxis by virtue of its direct relationship with m a t t e r - but the identification of the twO, t h e revolutionary thesis that praxis constantly passes over into

poiesis and vice versa. There is never any effective freedom which
is not also a material transformation, which is not registered historica l l y in exteriority. iut nor is there any work which is not a transformation of self, as though h u m a n beings c o u l d change their conditions of existence while m a i n t a i n i n g a n i n v a r i a n t 'essence'. Now, such a thesis cannot but affect the third term o f the

The u n i t y o f practice At the same time, a theory is also o u t l i n e d here which - though it vigorously rejects the label o f p h i l o s o p h y - nonetheless repre sents a new departure in philosophy. Marx has exited from the

classical triptych: theoria or 'theory' ( w h i c h the whole p h i l o s o p h ical t r a d i t i o n still ' understood i n the etymological sense o f contemplati o n ) . The Theses
0"

Feuerbach h a d rejected all

=

contemplation and identified the criterion o f truth w i t h practice (second t h e s i s ) . As a counterpart to the 'practice production' equation established there, The German Ideology makes a decisive sideways m o v e : it identifies theoria w i t h a 'production o f consciousness'; or, more precisely, w i t h O1%e of the terms of the historical contradiction to w h i c h the production of consciousness gives r i s e . That term is, in fact, ideology, Marx's

exit {rom philosophy. But he has not s i m p l y come back inside . . . We c a n demonstrate this by raising here a very o l d issue in dialectical thought. As 1 have said above, though the notion of praxis o r revolutionary practice declared w i t h unrivalled clarity
that the aim of 'changing the w o r l d ' had put paid to a l l essen tialist philosophy, it w a s s t i l l , paradoxically, l i a b l e to present itself a s another n a m e for the h u m a n essence. This tension increased with the n o t i o n o f production, a s now analysed by Marx. Not o n l y because there i s a whole empirical history o f production ( w h i c h w i l l o b l i g e t h e philosopher t o become a n economist, historian, technologist, ethnologist etc.), b u t , above all, because Marx removed one o f philosophy's most ancient taboos: the radical distinction between praxis and poiesis. Since the Greeks ( w h o made it the privilege o f 'citizens', I . e . o f t h e masters}, praxis h a d been that 'free' action in w h i c h m a n realizes a n d transforms only himself, seeking to attain h i s own

second innovation of 1 8 4 5 , by way o f which he w a s , a s it were,

proposing to philosophy that it view itself in the mirror of practice. B u t could it recognize itself i n that mirror?

3
Ideology or Fetishism: Power and

I D E O L O G Y OR F E T I S H I S M

43

implications. A t the same time, then, a s we explore the prob lematic o f ideology, we s h a l l have to attempt to u n d erstand the reasons which induced M a r x to supplant it, a t least partially, with a different p r o b l e m a t i c .

Subjeclion

Theory a n d practice Philosophy quite evidently h a s not forgiven Marx for

ideology.

It is constantly at p a i n s to s h o w t h a t t h i s is a b a d l y constructed I n this chapter, we once again h a v e several things t o d o . en the one hand, we have to resume the d i s c u s s i o n o f [he theses advanced by M a r x in concept, which h a s no u n a m b i g u o u s meaning and which puts Marx i n contradiction with himself (this is n o t d i f fi c u l t : one has only t o place his irrevocable condemnation o f the i l l u s i o n s a n d speculations .f b o u r g e o i s consciousness, d e l i v e r e d in the n a m e o f the s c i e n c e o f history, alongside the monstrous layer o f ideology that has been b u i l t u p on the names o f the proletariat, communism and Marxism!). Yet philosophy comes back endlessly to this s a m e point: as though, by the very fact of intro d u c i n g this term, Marx had set it the problem it m u s t master i f i t is t o remain philosophy. I

The German Ideology,

in such a w a y as to

clarify the link established between a conception of history based on production a n d a n analysis o f the effect o f ideological

domination in the element o f consciousness.

B u t , on the other hand - for things a r e never simple - we have to understand what is a t stake i n a strange vacillation w i t h i n the concept o f ideology. Contrary to w h a t m i g h t be imagined by a reader today, for whom this has come to be a f a m i l i a r n o t i o n (at the same time a s i t s usage h a s been dispersed i n a l l directions), and who would probably expect that, once invented, it would h a v e developed in a c o n t i n u o u s fashion, this is not what actually happened at a l l . Although he was constantly describing a n d criticizing particular 'ideologies', after 1 8 4 6 and certainly after 1 8 5 2 , Marx never again used this term (it was to be exhumed by Engels twenty-five years later in Anti-Diihring

1 s h a l l return to t h i s later. For the m o m e n t , let

LI S

attempt to

demonstrate how the problematic o f ideology developed in Marx's work. Now, a s 1 have shown, the exposition of

The

German Ideology

i s nor o n l y q u i t e confused, b u t misleading on

this matter. I t reverses the order in which the text was written, relegating the polemical part to a later section a n d opening with the argument on the genesis o f ideology which takes the history of the division of l a b o u r a s its main theme. It then seems that t h e concept o f ideology in fact arises out o f a derivation of the 'superstructure' (the expression is employed o n a t least one occasio n ) from the 'base' constituted by 'real life', by production. It c o u l d essentially be said t o be a theory o f social consciousness

( 1 8 7 8 ) and in Ludwig Fetlerbach mId the End of Classical German Philosophy ( 1 8 8 8 ) , the works w h i c h mark his own
appearance o n the scene o f the history o f M a r x i s m ) . This is n o t to say, however, that the p r o b l e m s identified by the t e r m i d e o l o g y purely and simply disappeared: t h e y would be taken u p again under the heading o f fetis hism, which gained wide currency due to a famous account in Capital. Now, t h i s does not represent a mere terminological variant, but a genuine theoretical alternative, which has undeniable philosophical

(Bewusstsein)

and the point would be to understand how that

011

conscioLl!>Jless could both remain dependent

social being

(Sein), while gaining increasing autonomy from it, t o the point where it caused an unreal, fantastic 'world' to emerge - i .e. one
endowed with apparent a u t o n o m y - which substituted itself for real history. Hence a constitutive gap between consciousness a n d reality, w h i c h a new historical development, overturning t h e pre v i o u s stage, w o u l d i n the e n d close by reintegrating consciousness

42

44

THE P H I L O S O P H Y OF M A R X

I D E O L O G Y OR F E T I S H I S M

45

into life. I t would, t h e n , i n t h e main, be a theory o f misrecogni rion or illusion, the converse of a theory of knowledge. But if one can, with Marx, attempt to describe the 'being' o f ideological consciousness i n this w a y ( a n d i t would not b e very difficult to find many philosophical precedents for such a description - which exp l a i n s the temptation to u s e th ese to flesh o u t that description a n d eliminate its difficultie s ) , o n e cannot understand the objectives Marx was pursuing b y this approach. And it is not possible, either, to explain the particularities of his deductions or the supplementary (epistemological, politic a l) functions he incorporates into it along the way. We thus have to go back a little way beyond the version t h a t i s offered t o u s . I t then becomes clear t h a t t h e problematic o f

The dominant ideology

The theme of domination m u s t thus be at t h e centre of the discussion. Marx does not produce a theory of the constitution of ideologies a s discourses, as particular or general systems of representation and then merely

retrospectively raise

the question

of domination: t h a t q u e s tion is always already included in the elabora tion of the concept. On the other h a n d , he does posit as a point wh olly beyond discussion that,
The ideas o f the ruling class are i n every epoch t h e r u l i n g ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society is a t the same time its ruling i/,Itellectl<al force. T h e class which h a s t h e means o f matenal production a t its disposal, h a s control a t the same time over the means

ideology emerges a t the point where t w O disrincr uestions meet,

each of which was insistent in the preceding years. On the one h a n d , that of the

o f mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of

power of ideas:

a real power, but a paradoxical

one, since it derives not from the ideas themselves, but solely from the forces a n d circumstances which they are able to
0 1 1 . l On the other h a n d , that of

seize abstraction, i . e . , as we have seen,

those w h o lack the means o f mental production are subject t o it. The ruling ideas are n.thing more than the ideal expression of the domina nt m a t e r i a l relationships, t h e d o m i n a n t m a t e r i a l relationships grasped a s ideas; hence o f t h e relationships w h i c h make t h e o n e c l a s s t h e r u l i n g one, therefore, the ideas o f its dominance. The i n d i v i d u a l s composing the ruling class possess, a m o n g .ther things, consciousness, and therefore think.l

of philosophy (bu t this has to be understood in a broad sense, including all lib e r a l discourse, 'ra tionalism' or 'critical th ough t' which now develop in the new space of political opinion, and contribute to excluding the rea! force of t h e people and democ racy from that space, while claiming to represent th em). The combination of these two themes was prompted by Stirner, as a result o f his stress on the funcnon of domination performed by general ideas. Stirner took idealism's thesis - of the omnipotence of ideas which 'rule t h e world' - to extremes. But h e reversed the value-judgement implied in that thesis. As representations of the

We shall see t h a t wh a t t h e y 'think' i s , essentially, the form o f universality. Mingled i n t h e s a m e proposition are, t h e n , a phe nomenological argument ( ' t h e ideal expression', 'the ideas of its d ominance') a n d a purely sociological argument ( t h e material and intellectual 'means of production' a r e in the same hands). This is, to be precise, not Marx's solution to t h e problem of domination, but his reformulation of rhe problem itself. It w o u l d be instructive to confront this problema tic (which plays systematica l l y on the double mea ning of the word 'domi nate': to exercize power a n d to 'prevail' or to extend universally, a mea ning even more clearly perceptible in the German h e rrs

sacred,

ideas d o not liberate, but oppress

individuals. Thus Srirner takes the d e nial of real (political and s ocial) power to the furthest extreme, but demands that the nexus of ideas and power be analysed on its own account. To this question, Marx wa s , for rhe first time in the his tory o f philo s ophy, ro provide an a n swer in terms of

chend),

with the current u s age of the term ideology, Marxist

class:

not in terms of

and non-Ma rxis t alike. We should sec that uses of the term tend to f a l l to one side or other of a classic demarcation lin e , between the

'class consciousness' (an expression which never appears), bu t by according existence to classes on the d u a l plane of the division of labour and consciousness, and therefore thought.

theoretical

(the problematic of error or illusion or, a l ter

natively, of what remains 'unthought ' in a s cientific theory), and the practical (the problematic of consensus, of the s tyle of thin k ing o r value system w h i c h 'cements' the cohesion o f a group or s o cial movement, or which 'legitimates' an established power),

also

making of the

division of society into classes a con dition or a structure of

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whereas M a r x h ad arrempted to get b a c k beyond t h i s meta physical di stinct i o n . T h i s explains why i t i s a l w a y s di fficult to speak o f ideology without imp lying ei ther a p o s i t i v i stdogmatism (ideology i s the other of science), or a h i stori c i s t relativism ( a l l thought i s 'ide o l o g ical' i n t h a t i t expresses t h e ident i t y o f a g r o u p ) . M a r x , for h i s parr, w a s seek i n g rather to effect a c r i t i c a l distinction w i t h i n the v e r y u s e o f the concept o f 'truth' b y relat i n g every statement a n d e v ery carcgory to the condi tions o f its elaboration and the historico-p o l i t i c a l stakes involved. But t h i s a l s o demonstrates t h e extreme d i f fi c u l t y o f ac t u a l l y h o ldi n g t o s u c h a p o s i t i o n , especially b y e m p l o y i n g s u c h categories a s 'being', 'real l i f e ' o r 'abstract i o n ' .

domi n a t i o n : the a b s t raction of consc i o u sness, w h i c h i s an expression o f consc i o u sness's incap acity to act in r e al i t y (the loss o f i ts 'imma n e n c e ' ), becomes the source of a power precisely because it is 'auton omized'. This i s also what, u ltimately, w i l l m a k e i t possible t o identify t h e revo l u t i o n a r y overturning o f the divi sion o f labour w i th the end of ideology. However, for t h i s , ideas der i v i n g from different sources have to b e comb i n e d in a theoretically u n s t a b l e equi l i b r i u m . Marx had recourse, first, to the o ld idea o f a l i e n a t i o n in t h e form assigned it by F e u e r b ach ( a nd with w h i c h , i n actu a l fact, h e w a s to go o n c o n s t a n t l y t s e t t l i n g h i s acco u n t s ' ) , i.e. the splitting o f r e a l exi stence, followed b y the projecti o n a n d a u t o nomiza t i o n o f a 'fantastic reflec t i o n ' compared, a t t i mes, w i th the i m a g i nary creatures o f theology and, a t others, with the spectres o f black

The a u tonomy and l i m i t s o f conscio usness We can turn once a g a i n , then, to the Marxian genesis or consti tution of consciollsness. We are i ndeed d e a l i n g with a mec h a n i sm o f i ll u s i o n here: M a r x takes o v er a system o f metaphors which have their distant origins in Plato (the ' i n v ersion o f reality' in t h e cave or in the optical chamber, the camera obscura ) . 4 But h e does so in such a w a y a s to avoid t w o i n sistent ideas in the p o l i t i c a l field: that o f the ignorance of t h e masses, or the weak ness i nherent i n human nature ( w h i c h m i g h t make it i ncap a b l e o f ach i e v i n g t r u t h ) ; a n d that o f inculcation ( w h i ch would i n d i cate deliberate mani p u l at i o n and h ence the 'omnipo tence' o f the power f u l ) , each o f w h i c h w a s widely deployed b y Enlightenment p h i lo s o p h y in respect o f religious ideas and their function o f legitimating d e s p o t i c regimes. Marx found (or proposed) a n o t h e r path by extending the scheme of the d i v i s i o n of l a b o u r to its fullest extent, in s u c h a w a y as to make i t acc o u n t , successively, for the gap between 'life' a n d 'consci ousness', the contradiction between ' p articu lar' a n d 'general interests' and, lastly, the intensification o f that contradiction i n the estab l i shment o f a n autonomous, though i ndirect, mech a n i sm o f power (the div i s i o n between manu a l and mental labour, the importance of w h ic h I s h a l l d i scuss i n a moment). When t h i s construct i o n i s completed, t h e 'ideo l o g i cal' mech a n i sm, w h ich can equally b e read as a social process, will come to b e seen a s an asto n i s h i n g conversion o f i m p o tence into

magic. H e a l s o h ad recourse to t h i s new idea of i ndiv i d u a l i ty t i nu a l l y b e i n g transformed through c)ut hi story, a n idea we h a v e just watched being born ( o r reborn) between the Theses 0 1 1 Feuerbach and The German Ideology. If we comb i n e the t w o , we g e t t h i s f o r m a l d e fi n i t i o n o f the ide o l o gical process: i t is as relat i o n or as a funct i o n o f soci a l r e l a t i ons w h i c h i s c o n

the alienated existence of the relation between i n d i v i duals

( w h i c h , a s we have seen, Marx refers to, in general, b y t h e term 'i ntercourse' - German Verkehr, French commerce
-

in order to

grasp both its 'producti v e ' and its 'commu n i cative' aspecrs ) . 1 In a sense, everyth i n g is s a id here, yet o n e c a n g o i n to det a i l , i.e. 'relate' h o w t h i s m u s t h a v e occurred i n h i story; a n d th i s i s what M a r x d o e s b y p r o v i d i n g an account ( a t l e a s t in princ i p l e ) of the succes s i o n o f the fo rms o f conscio u s n e s s correspond i n g to the different developme n t a l stages of property a n d the State.

Fictive universality
From the begi n n i n g of history, t h e n , there is a d u a l i t y or tension between thought and the d i vision o f labour (in p h i l o s o p h i c a l l a n g u a g e t h e po les of ' i nter i o r i ty' a nd 'exteri o r i t y ' ) . The o n e i s merely t h e reverse s i d e o f t h e other, i t s reflect i o n b y i n d i v i d u a l s . T h i s i s w h y the limits of commurlication between individuals ( w h a t m i g h t be c a l l e d their practi cal u n iverse) are also the limits

48

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o f their intellectual universe. Before being a question o f interests, this is a question o f situation o r existential horizon. Let u s reiterate that M a r x d i d not produce a theory o f 'class con sciousness' here, in the sense o f a system o f ideas which might be said, consciously o r otherwise, to express t h e 'aims' o f a particular c l a s s . H e produced, rather, a t h e o r y of t h e class character o f consciousness, i . e . o f the limits o f its intelle c tu a l h o r i z o n which reflect o r reproduce the limits to c o m m u n ication i m p o s e d b y the division of society into classes ( o r nations, etc.). T h e basis o f the explanation i s the obstacle to u n i v e rsality inscribed in the conditions o f material life, b e y o n d which it is only possible to t h i n k i n i m a g i n a t i o n . We can see clearly, then, that the more these conditions expand, the more the horizon o f m e n ' s a c t i v i t y ( o r o f their 'intercourse') will c o i n c i d e w i t h t h e totality o f t h e w o r l d and the greater w i l l b e the contradiction between the i m a g i n a r y and the real. Ideological conscious ness is, first, the dream o f an i m p o s s i b l e universality. And we c a n see that the p r o l e t a r i a t w i l l itself occupy a l i m i t position, not so much standing over against ideology a s o n its edge, at the point where, no longer having any outside, it turns around into real historical consciousness. In the face of effective universality, fictive o r abstract u n i ve r s a l i t y h a s no alternative but to disappear. Why then should w e idenrify ideology with the genera lities a n d abstractions o f consciousness ? W h y not, rather, s e e it as a n irremediably particular consciousness? M a r x gives two reasons, essentially) to e x p l a i n how an occupational, n a t i o n a l o r social particularity i s idealized in t h e form of u n i v e r s a l i t y (and, recip rocally, why every 'abstract' u n i v e r s a l a n d every ideal i s the s u b l i m a t i o n o f a p a r t i c u l a r interest). In fact, these reasons are connected, b u t the second i s more o r i g i n a l than the first. The first reason, which derives from R o u s s e a u , is that there i s no historical d i v i s i o n of labour w i t h o u t institutions and, i n particular, w i t h o u t a State ( w e s h a l l come t o s a y without a n

Since the State is the form in which the i n d i v id u a l s o f a r u l i n g class

epoch i s epiromised, i t follows that t h e State me d i a tes i n t h e formation of all common institutions a n d that the institutions receive a political will divorced from its real b a s i s - o n form. H en c e the illusion t h a t l a w is based o n the w i l l , a n d indeed o n the

assert thei r common interests , and in which the who l e civil society of a n

free

will.&

B u t the great s u p p l e m e n t a r y i d e a which M a r x a d d s to his exposition i s the division between mamal and mental labour. In a sense this is imported into the description of a l i e n a t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n , t r a n s f o r m i n g what was m e r e l y a p o t e n t i a l i t y f o r d o m i n a t i o n into effective d o m i n a t i o n . A n d , a s a consequence, it changes the theory of c o n s c i o u s n e s s , wresting it away from any kind of psychology (even a s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g y ) and making it a question o f political anthropology.

Intellectual difference Rather than ' d i v i s i o n of m a n u a l and m e n t a l l a b o u r " I w o u l d prefer to refer t o intellectual difference in g e n e r a l , for w e are d e a l i n g here both with the opposition between several types of l a b o u r - Marx m e n t i o n s commerce, accounting, m a n a g e m e n t a n d actual production - a n d the o p p o s i t i o n between l a b o u r a n d non-labour, 'free' o r unpaid activities in g e n e r a l , which h a v e become the privilege a n d s p e c i a l i s m o f s o m e a n d not others. (In communism, these activities will be accessible to all; a n d , m o r e generally, c o m m u n i s m i s u nt h i n k a b l e w i t h o u t doing away with this division. This theme will become central once again in 1 8 75, in the Critique of the Gotha Programme; i t i s one o f the rare, strictly utopian elements, along with considerations o n future education, to p l a y a n explicit role in Marx.7 Later, as we s h a l l see, the q u e s t i o n o f education a n d its relation of dependency on the c a p i t a l i s t l a b o u r process w i l l become o r o n c e again become - c r u c i a l . ) T h e a n a l y s i s o f int e l l e c t u a l difference takes u s beyond instru m e n t a l i s t conceptions of a n i l l u s i o n o r mystification functioning to serve the material power o f a class. I t lays down the principle o f a domination which i s constituted within t h e fi eld of con sciousness and d i v i d e s i t from itself, p r o d u c i n g effects which a r e themselves m a t e r i a l . Intellectual difference i s b o t h a schema for

al'paratHs). T h e S t a t e i s a manufacturer o f abstractions pre cisely by virtue of the unitary fiction (or consemus) which i t has
to impose
0 11

society. The universalization of particularity i s the

compensation for the constitution o f the State, a fictive com m u n i t y whose power of abstraction compensates for the real l a c k o f community in relations between i n d i v i d u a l s :

so

T H E PHIL O S O P H Y O F M A R X

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57

e x p l a i n i n g t h e world (whence comes the notion o f a m i n d or reason), and a process co-extensive with the w h o l e history o f the division of labour. Marx says this e x p licitly:
Division o f l a b o u r o n l y becomes t r u l y s u c h from t n e moment w h e n a division o f material a n d mental l a b o u r a p p e a r s . . . From this moment onwards consciousness can really flatter itself that i t is something othr than consciousness o f existing practice, that it really represents sometning w i t h o u t representing something real.1

accompanies it from t h e o utset a n d shows itself t o b e indissoci able from t h e instituting o f culture a n d the State. T h i s difference is therefore constantly cultivated by the ' i d e o logists' themselves, but i t is more a h i s t o r ical condition o f their ex istence than their personal creation. To u n d erstand the importance of this idea, we have to make a detour through the phi l o s o p h y o f Hegel.

I ntettectltals and the State

Marx described the proletariat a s a ' u n i v e r s a l class', a mass situated v i r t u a l l y beyond the c o n d ition o f class, the particularity o f t h a t mass bei ng denied in its very conditions o f existence. B u t he c o u l d n o t h a v e formulated t h a t i d e a i f Hegel h a d n o t , i n ' u n i v e r s a l Stand' . 1 0 W h a t are we to understand by this term? It refers to the group of S t a t e functionaries and the new function they were acq uiring with the mod ernization o f t h e State in the wake of the Revolu tion. However, we must b e careful here. From Hegel's viewpoint, rhe role o f f u nctionaries in general is not p u re l y a d m inistr ative, but e s s e n t i a l l y i n t e l l e c t u a l . A n d it i s , correlatively, by their incorporation i n t o t h e State (i.e. into the ' p u b l i c service') that the intellectuals (die Gelehrten: the educated) can discover their true d estiny. F o r it is t h e State, in w h ich the different p a r t i c u l a r interests of c i v i l society have to be made c o m p a t i b l e and raised to the h i g h e r level o f the g e n e r a l interest, which offers them the c o n d i t i o n s for, a n d s u b stance of, their reflective activity. The State which is universal for Hegel 'il1 h i s Philosophy o f Right o f 1 8 2 1 , developed a t h eory o f the

There are, then, a s many histo rical stages to i t as there are to the division o f l a b o u r itself. B u t dearly what most interests Marx is the link connecting the dis t a n t beginnings o f civilization with

current phenomena, when a bourgeois p u b l i c sphere comes into

b e i n g : t h e role o f ideas and ideologue in p o litics, and t h e role played by their relative autonomy in t h e creation o f a general domination which is not that o f a p art i c u l a r group of property owners, but really that of an entire c l a s s . The i l l u s i o n o r 'sem blance, that the rule o f a certain class is only the rule o f certain id eas' (and therefore also the s u b limation o f p a rticular interests in the general interest), is the resu l t o f the activity o f ideologists ( M a r x speaks o f the 'active conceptive ideologists' of the d o m i n a n t c l a s s ) . f o r t h i s to h a p p en, however, those ideologists first have to mystify themselves, 'in their questions', i.e. i n their m()de o f thinking, a n d they can ollly d o this because their w a y o f life, their specific particularity (or 'indepem.lence') engendered by history, provides them with the conditions to d o so. Ideologists are beside their own class, just a s t h e ideas they produce ( R e a s o n , Freedom, Humanity) are beyond s o c i a l p r actices. Shall we say, then, that Marx's analysis amounts, in t h e e n d , to an o u tline o f the p o l itical s o c i o l o g y o f m o d e rn intellec tu a l s (or a n o u tline o f t h e sociology of k n o w l e d g e die Wissens soziologie'), combi n e d with a history of t h e i r formation a n d
-

itself' 'frees' the intellectuals (from b e l i e f a n d t h e various forms of personal depen d e nce), so that they may irl its service, within the whole of society, perform all activity of mediation, or repre
s e n tation, and thus carry a u n i v e rsality w h i c h is as yet abstract to t h e l e v el of 'self-consciousness',
I t m u s t b e ack n o w l e d g e d that this theorization expresses

functio n ? T h a t rea ding w o u l d n o t b e wrong, b u t i t w o u l d , p e r h a p s , be t o o restrictive. In reality, M a r x h a s h i s s i g h t s s e t on a difference w h ich r u n s through the w h o l e o f history a n d which, as s u c h , affects both profes s i o n a l intellectuals a n d no n-inte llectuals. N o i n d i v i d u a l stands outside that d i v ision (any more than h e o r she s t a n d s outside sexual differen ce). In overd etermining class difference in its s uccessive forms, it reveals by t h a t very token the d i m e n s i o n o f domination which

powerfully, and with r e m a r k a b l e anticipation, the sense o f the administrative and e d ucational framework a n d the structure of scientific research and p u b l i c o p i n ion w h ich w o u l d g r a d u a l l y give contemporary states t h e i r c a p a c i t y f o r social 'regulation', i n a m a n n e r a s far removed f r o m pure lib e r a l i sm a s it is from a u t h o ritarianism. If we did n o t bear this i n m i n d , we sho u l d n o t

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understand the e x a c t l y converse power o f the theorization o f ideology in Marx, a s regards either its aims o r the problems it poses. More than a n y ihing, perhaps, the a n a l y s i s of intellectual Gramsci
T h e work of Antonio Gramsci ( 1 8 ' 1 - 1 9 3 7 ) , the greatest o f the inrellectual leaders of the European Communist movemenr after Lenin, consists of three groups of texts which are o f very different status: the Political Writings (selections published by Lawrence and Wish an i n a translation by Quintin Hoare, Voillme 1 , 1977, covering the period 1910-1920 a n d Volume 2 1921-26); the Prison Notebooks written after Gramsci's arrest by the Italian fascist government and published a t the Liberation (selcnions published i n English by Lawrence and Wishart i n 1971 , ed. and tra ns. Quinrin Hoare a n d Geoffrey Nowell Smith); and the correspondence (including Gramsci's Letters (rom Prison, 2. volumes, ed. Frank Rosen garten and trans . R aymond Rosenthal, Columbia University Press, New Yor k , 1 99 4 ) , F a r from Mussolini h a v i n g succeeded i n 'preventing t h i s brain from functioning' , the physical and moral ordeal which Graillsci underwent ulti mate l y yielded an intellectual monument, the suggestive potential of which is still not elChausted (see the works by Christine Suci-Glucksmann . Cramsci and the Stare, trans. David Fcrnbach, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1 9 80; Andre Tosel, Marx ell italiqftes. At/X origines d e la ,hilo sophie italienlle c.l1temporaine. TransEuropRcpress, Mauvezin, 1 9 9 1 ; a n d Andre Tosel, ed., Modemiti d e Gramsd, Diffusion les Belles Letrres, Paris, 1 9 9 2 ) . Gramsci's thought cannot b e summed u p in a few lines. L e t u s n o t e four closely interrelated themes here: I I } in a manner quite alien to the tradi tion of 'dialectical ma teria lism', Gramsci saw Marxism as a 'philosophy of praxis' which he initially interpreted, in the days of the Russian Revolution i n 1 9 1 7 and the Turin 'factory councils' movement, as an affirmation o f the will against the fatalism o f the s o c i a l i s t organizations and, later, as a 'science of politics', Machiavellian in inspiration, the aim of w h i ch was to construct rhe elements of a hege11lowy o f the p roducers; (2) this th eme i s l inked to a 'broadening' of the 'Marxist theory of the State', which does not dispense with class determ ination, but stresses the complementary nature of the 'balance of forces' and the 'consensus' obtamed through cultural institutJ'ons; (3) this explains why Gramsci devoted a considerable part of his unfnished research to a history and analysts o f the function of the different types o f i/.rtellectltal, with a view to reforming the organiC 'bond' which unites them to the masses when a new social class is ill the ascendant; (4) there is also an trhit:al dimension to this critical thinking, not only in its quest for a morality or a 'common sense' fo r the workers which could free them from bourgeois hegemon}" but in its effort to formulate and implement a regulative principle for political acdon whi.:h would be fund amentally secular and directed against all forms of messianic Ideology ( ' pessimism of the i ntelligence, optimism of t h e will')_

difference, provided that it i s conducted both in the register o f knowledge a n d in that o f o r g anization and power, p r o f o u n d l y i l l uminates the n a t u r e o f processes o f domination. It is n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t , o n e w a y o r another, m o s t a u t h e n t i c a l l y p h i l o s o phical Marxists ( l e t u s mention h e r e s u c h diverse figures a s Gramsci, Althusser a n d Sohn-Rethe l ) have always seen the historical ' r e s o l u t i o n ' of that difference a s a fundamental characteristic o f communism. F o r Marx was not content merely to stand the Hege l i a n theses on their head a n d attribute a func tion of s u b j ugation a n d d i v i s i o n to intellectuals ('ideological inculcation', a s the May ' 6 8 movement had it), b u t went right back to the description of the anthropological difference which underlay their activity and the autonomization of their function. That difference is n o t a n a t u r a l one (though it incontestably expresses itself in the distinct functions o f the organism), since it is formed and transformed in history. Nor, however, is i t a difference that is 'instituted', in the sense o f being the p r o d uct o f mere p o l i t i c a l decisions ( t h o u g h i t i s amplified, utilized a n d reproduced b y institutions). I t i s i n h e r e n t i n the culture of successive civiliza t i o n s , between w h i ch i t provides a thread o f continuity. Marx here places this difference more o r less at the same lev e l of generality a s the difference of the sexes or the difference between town a n d country life. Being incorporated into the whole s o c i a l o r g a n ization o f labour, it divides all prac tices a n d a l l i n d iv i d u a l s from themselves (for a practice in the complete sense
-

praxis and poiesis

can b e neither purely

physical n O r purely intellecrual, but must b e a complementarity, a reciprocity of the two aspects ). I f this were not the case, the specialist 'intellectuals' could not become the instrume nts o f a p e r m a n e n t inequality, of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l h i e r a r c h y o f t h e 'dominant' and the 'dominated' (or the 'governing' a n d the 'governed', as Gramsci l a te r p u t i t ) . T h a t is to say they c o u l d n o t , f o r t h e greater p a r t o f history, m a k e that inequality a material condition of labour, exchange, communication a n d association.

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55

T h e a p o r i a o f ideology It remains to ask, then, why Marx did not continue directly a l o n g t h i s p a t h . As I suggested a b o v e , closely with

e n t i r e t y ) , without w h i c h t h e r e is no M a r x i s m , then c e r t a i n l y of

internal

reasons c o m b i n e d h e r e

in this r e g a r d is The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, to w h i c h w e h a v e a l r e a d y referred. We w o u l d r e a l l y need m o r e

s p a c e t o e x a m i n e t h i s t e x t in d e t a i l h e r e . I n i t , [ h e search for a strategy w i t h w h i c h the w o r k i n g c l a s s c a n confront [ h e counter-revolution i s c o m b i n e d w i t h a n e w a n a l y s i s of t h e h i s t o r i c a l g a p b e tw e e n w h a t M a r x calls t h e ' c l a s s i n itself' a n d t h e ' c l a s s for itself', between t h e m e r e fact of similar c o n d i t i o n s o f l i f e a n d a n o r g a n i z e d p o l i t i c a l m o v e m e n t - c o n c e i v e d n o t in terms of consciousness merely l a g g i n g behind life, bur a s an effect of contradictory e c o n o m i c t e n d e n c i e s , w h i c h h e now began to see as promoting

t h e pr o l e t a r i a t a s a ' u n i v e r s a l c l a s s ' . The m o s t fascinating text

con;tmctura{ ones,

w h i c h t h e m s e l v e s i n d i c a t e d what

w a s still abstract or even s p e c u l a t i v e i n M a r x ' s construction, despite his effort to get back t o the materiality of history. G i v e n Marx's conception of the p r o l e t a r i a t , the idea of a n

ideology of the proletariat

( o r of a 'proletarian ideology', later,

as we know, to meet with much s u c c e s s ) is o b v iously d e v o i d o f meaning. I n reality, the concept of the p r o l e t a r i a t is n o t so much that of a p a r t i c u l a r 'class', isolated from tbe w h o l e o f society, a s of a

nOll-class,

t h e formation o f w h i c h immediately

both

the unity of t h e workers

and

precedes t h e d i s s o l u t i o n of all classes and primes t h e revolu tionary process. For this reason, when speaking of it, Marx employs, for preference, the term 'Masse' ( ' m a s s ' o r ' m a s s e s ' ) , which he turns round against the c o n t e m p t u o u s use m a d e o f i t b y bourgeois i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n h i s d a y . J u s t a s t h e proletarian masses a r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y p r o p e r t y l e s s (eigentumslos ), t h e y a r e fundamentally ' w i t h o u t i l l u s i o n s ' f u n d a m e ntally

between t h e m . ! 2 I m m e d i a t e e x p e r i e n c e in France, a s I n Germany o r Britain, was, in a c t u a l fact, to r e v e a l the power n a t i o n a l i s m a n d historical ( r e p u b l i c a n o r i m p e r i a l ) myths a n d e v e n religious f o r m s e x e r t e d o v e r t h e p r o l e t a r i a t , and t h e p o w e r of t h e p o l i t i c a l a n d m i l i t a r y machines of the e s t a b l i s h e d order. H o w was t h e theoretical thesis that t h e c o n d i t i o n s of production of ideology were r a d i c a l l y external to t h e p r o l e t a r i a n condition to be reconciled with the observation o f t h e d a i l y interpene tration of t h e two? It is very r e m a r k a b l e that M a r x never invoked a n implicitly moral notion, such as t h a t of false consciollsness ( a s later e m p l o y e d by Lukacs and o t h e r s ) , just as h e never spoke of p r o l e t a r i a n ideology or class consciousness. B u t t h e difficulty r e m a i n e d a glaring o n e i n his writings and l e d t o the suppression o f t h e very concept of ideology. A n o t h e r factor conspired t o w a r d s this same e n d : the difficulty M a r x experienced in defining

(j{/IISi01lSlos)

about reality,

external to

t h e w o r l d of ideolog>', w h o s e a b s t r a c w i l l s a y [ h e s a m e thing, illustrat

t i o n s a n d i d e a l representations of t h e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n 'do n o t exist' for them. The

Manifesto

ing t h e idea with phrases which h a v e s i n c e become f a m o u s , but which today seem derisory, s u c h a s ' t h e working men h a v e n o h y p o crisies of religion, morality a n d bourgeois law. F o r the same reason, they c o u l d not h a v e ' i d e o l o g u e s ' proposing to instruct or g u i d e them - 'organic i n t e l l e c t u a l s ' , as Gramsci w o u l d later term [ h e m . ( M a r x certainly did not see h i m s e l f as anything of the kind and this p r o d u c e d increasing difficulties when it came to c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g the function of his o w n country. ' I I Similarly, [hey a r e free o f t h e beliefs, hopes o r

b.urgeois politIcal economy

p a r t i c u l a r l y t h a t of t h e c 1 a s s i e s : Quesnay, Smith a n d R i c a r d o - a s 'ideology', since this theoretical discourse, which was ' s c ientific' i n form a n d c l e a r l y i n t e n d e d to p r o v i d e t h e foun d a t i o n s for t h e l i b e r a l p o l i t i c s of the owners of c a p i t a l , did not {all directly into the category of ideology ( c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the a b s t r a c t i o n a n d i n v e r s i o n of the r e a l ) , o r of a m a t e r i a l i s t history o f c iv i l society, g i v e n that it w a s b a s e d o n t h e postulate that b o u r g e o is conditions o f production w e r e e t e r n a l (or that t h e r e l a t i o n between w a g e - l a b o u r e r s a n d c a p i t a l w a s i n v a r i a n t ) . B u t i t w a s precisely t h e n e e d t o extricate h i m s e l f f r o m t h i s d i l e m m a w h i c h was t o l e a d M a r x to i m m e r s e h i m s e l f f o r y e a r s in t h e

theory

within revolutionary practice. Here a g a i n , Engels was to m a k e t h e d e c i s i v e s t e p b y bringing t h e e x p r e s s i o n 'scientific s o c i a l i s m ' into g e n e r a l u s e . ) T h e e v e n t s o f 1 8 4 8 - S 0 were c r u e l l y to e m p h a s i z e h o w far removed t h i s vision w a s from reality. indeed, t h e s e events m i g h t ha v e b e e n sufficient to p r o m p t the a b a n d o n m e n t , i f n o t o f t h e idea of a

universal role

of the proletariat (at the level of world

history a n d t h e r e v olutionary t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of society i n its

56

THE P H I L O S O P H Y OF M A R X

I D E O L O G Y O R. F E T I S H I S M

57

'critique o f p o li t i c a l economy', a crmque fuelled by intensive reading o f S m i t h , Ricardo, Hegel, Malthus, new concept, t h a t of historians a n d K a r l Marx, T h e f e tishism o f t h e commodity and its secret
(Ca,'la/, V o l u m e 1 , Part 1, chapter I, section 4)

statisticians . . . A n d t h a t critique, i n its turn, w a s to throw u p a

commodity fe tishism.

'Commodity feti s h i s m ' T h e theory o f fetishism i s m a i n l y e x p o u n d e d i n Part ene o f Volume I o f Capita ! . 1 3 I t i s not merely a high p o i n t o f Marx's philosophical work, entirely integrated into h i s 'critical' a n d 'scientific' work, b u t o n e o f t h e great theoretical constructions of modern philosophy. I t is notoriously difficult, even though the general idea i s relatively simple. I s h a l l n o t linger here over the origins of the term 'fetishism', its relationship w i t h theories of religion in the eighteenth a n d nineteenth centuries, o r the place which, by t a k i n g u p this term again, Marx occupies o f fetishism in within the history 0 f the question

Whence, then, arises the enigmatic character of the product of labour. as soon as i t assumes the fonn of
a

commodity? Clearly, It ames from this

form itself. T h e e q u a lity of t h e kinds of human labour takes on a p h y s ical form in the equal objectivity of the products of l a b o u r a s values; the measure of t h e expenditure of h u m a n labour-power by its duration takes on the form of the m a gnilUde of the value of the products of labou r; and fi n a l l y the re lati onships b e twe e n the producers, within which the socia l characteristics of t h e i r labours are manifested, t a k e on the form of a social relation between the products of l a b o u r . T h e myterious character o f t h e commodity-form consists Iherefore sim p l y in the fact that the commodity retllects the socinl charact erist ics of men's own labour as objective characteristics of the products of labour themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things. l-Ience i t also reHects the social r e l a tio n of t h e producers to the s u m total of labour as a soci a l relation b e tween objects, a relation which exists a p a r t from a n d outside t h e producers. Through t h i s substitution, the products of l a b o u r become commodities, s e n s u o u s t h i n g s w h i c h a r e at the s a m e time supra senSible or so ciaL In the same way the ImpreSSIOn made by a thmg on the optil;: nerve is perceived not a s a subjectIVe excitation of that nerve but as

ge l 1e ra l .1 4

Nor, for want of space, s h a l l 1 discuss

the function this argument performs in the overall architecture of Capital, a fun ction it fulfils p articularly by its explanation of the 'inverted' f o r m in which, as Marx tells u s , the structural phenomena o f the capitalist mode o f production ( w h i c h a l l relate back to the way expansion in the value of capital feeds on 'living l a b o u r ' ) are perceived a t the 'surface' of economic relations ( i n t h e world o f competition between the different forms o f capital, profit, rent, interest and their respective rates). 1 5 I s h a l l , however, attempt to e x p l a i n the connection w i t h Marx's text of the 'ual legacy w e c a n recognize a s h i s today: on the one hand, the idea o f the reificatioll o f the bourgeois w o r l d in the forms of the generalized ' c o m m odification' of social activities; on the other, the programme o f an analysis of the in structural M a r x i s m . ' T h e fe tishism o f the commodity,' M a r x tells u s , is t h e fact t h a t a 'definite s o c i a l relation between m e n themselves . . . assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation between t h i n g s . ' er, a l t e rn a t i vely, ' t o t h e producers . . . t h e s o c i a l relations between their private labours appear . . . as material

the o bjectIVe form o f a thing outside the eye. In the a c t of seeing, of course. light is really transmitted from one thing, the external object, to another t h mg, the eye. It i s a physical relao'oD between phY$lcal thmgs. As againSt th is, the commodity-form, a n d the value-relation of the products of labour within which It appears, have absolutely no connection with t h e physical natu re of the com modity a n d the material (dmg/ich) relations arising o u t of this. I t I S nothing b u t t h e d e fi n i t e s o c i a l relation between men t h e m selves which assumes h e r e . for them, t h e fantastic f o r m of a relation between th ings. In order, therefore, to find an analogy we must take flight Into the misty realm of religion . There the produl:ts o f the human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed With a life of their own , which

mode of subjection

implied

in the process o f exchange, w h i c h finds its ultimate expression

enter mto relations both with each other a n d with the human race in t he world of wit h the products of men's h a n d s . I call thiS the fetishism which attaches itself t o the products of l a b o u r as soon as th ey are produced as commodities, and i s therefore inseparable from the production of co m m o d it ies .

(Ca/.>lta/,

Volume 1 , t r a n s . l e n Fowkes, PenguinfNew Harmondsworth, 1976, pp. 164-5.)

Left

Re/lJew,

[dil1glichl

relations between persons a n d social relations between t h i n g s . ' 1 6

58

THE P H I L O S O P H Y OF MARX

I D E O L O G Y OR FETISHISM

59

Commodities, produced a n d exchanged, which a r e useful material objects and which, a s such, correspond to i n d i v i d u a l or collective needs, also possess anocher quality, which is i m m at e ri al b u t no le s s o b j e c t i v e : their exchange-v a l u e (generally expressed in the form o f a price, i.e. a s a certain sum o f money). That q u a l ity, which is arrached ro them i n d i v i d u a lly, is therefore i m m e d i a t e l y q u a n t i fi a ble: j u s t a s a c a r weighs 500 k g . , so it i s worth

reference must exist a n d m u s t be ' v e r i fi a b l e ' . The presence of money over against commo dities, as a precondition for their circulation, adds a n element ro t h e fetishism and a l l o w s u s ro u n d erstand why this term is used. If co mmo d ities (food, clothing, machines, raw materials, luxury objects, cultural goods, and even the bodies o f prostitutes - in shorr, the w h o l e world of h u m a n objects produced or consumed) seem t o have a n exchange-value, money, for its pan, seems t o b e e x c h a n g e - v a l u e itself, and by the s a m e roken intrinsically ro possess the p o w e r ro c o m m u n icate ro c o m m o d ities which 'enter i n t o r e l a t i o n with it' that v i n u e or power which characterizes it. T h a t is w h y it is sought for its own sake, h o a r d e d , regarded a s the object o f a u n i v ersal need attended b y fear a n d respect, desire a n d disgust

10,000. Naturally, for a given commodity, t h i s q u a n t i t y varies

according [() time a n d place, a s a function o f competition and other m o r e or less long-term fluctuations. However, far from such v a r i a t i o n s dissipating the appearance of a n intrinsic rela tion between the commodity and its value, they in fact confer on i t a n a d d e d objectivity: i n d i v i d u a l s go ro the marketplace of their own free will, bu t it is not as a result of their decisions that the values (or prices) of c o m m o d ities on the market fluctuate. I t is, rather, the fluctuation o f v a l u e s which determines the c o n d i t i o n s i n w hi c h i n d i v i d u a l s h a v e access r o c o m m o dities. It is, there fore, in the 'objective laws' o f the c i r c u l a t i o n of commodities, governed by changes in value, that h u m a n beings must seek the means o f satisfying their needs and regulating the relations of m u t u a l service a n d t h e c o m m u n i t y o r w o r k i n g re lat i ons w hi c h are mediated by e c o n o m i c relationships or d e p e n d e n t on them. Marx presents this elementary objectivity, which appears a s soon a s a simple relationship with c o m m o d ities on the market exists, a s the starring-point and model o f objectivity of economic phenomena in general a n d their laws; it i s these laws which are studied by political economy, which ceaselessly compares them - either explicitly, by t h e use of mechanical o r d y n a m i c concepts, or implicitly, by the mathematical m e t h o d s it e m p l o y s - with the objectivity of the l a w s of nature. There is o b v iously an immediate relation between this pheno menon ( i n the sense that things 'present themselves' in this way) and the function o f money. I t is a s a price, and therefore a s a n at least potential relation o f exchange with a quantity of money, that exchange-value presents itself. At bottom, that relationship i s not dependent on money actually being spent o r received or even merely heing represented b y a sign ( c r e dit money, bank notes 'given forced currency' e t c . ) : i n the last analysis, especially on the world ( o r u n i v e r s a l ) market which Marx tells us is the true space in which the commodity relation is realized, the monetary

( a u r; sacra {ames: 'the ac c u r sed thirst for g o l d ' , wr o te the La tin

poet V i r g i l i n a famous line quoted b y Ma r x , a n d in Revelation money i s clearly identified with the Beast, i.e. with the d e v i l } . 1 7 This relation o f m o n e y r o commodities, w h i c h ' g i v e s material form ro' their value on the market, is, o f course, supported by i n d i v i d u a l acts of sale and purchase, b u r the personalities of the i n d i v i d u a l s who carry our those acts a r e q u i t e irrelevant ro it; in this connection, they are entirely interchangeable. One m a y therefore construe this relation either as the effect o f a 'supernatural' power o f m o n e y , wh ich creates a n d a n i m a te s t h e movement o f c o m m o dities, embodying i t s o w n imperishable value in the perishable bodies o f commodities; or, on the ocher hand, a s a 'natural' effect of the relation between c o m m o d i t i e s, whi ch establishes an expression o f t h e i r v a l u e s a n d the pro porrions i n which they can be exchanged b y way o f social institutions. I n reality, these t w o conceptions are symmetrical a n d inter dependent: they develop rogether a n d represent two moments of the experience which i n d i v i d u a l s , as 'producer-exchangers', have of the phenomena o f circulation a n d t h e market which constitute the general form of t h e whole o f economic life. This is w h a t M a r x has in m i n d when he describes the perception o f the world o f commodities a s a perception o f ' s e n s u o u s things which a r e a t t he same time supra sensible', in which aspects of the natural and the s u p e r n a t u r a l coexist un ca n n il y , a n d when he declares the c o m m o d i t y a 'mystical' object, full o f 'theo logical niceties' (directly suggesting the comparison of economic

60

THE P H I L O S O P H Y O F M A R X

IDEOLOGY O R FETISHISM

61

language w i th religious discourse}. Contraty [ 0 w h a t Max Weber would later assert, t h e modem world is not 'dis enchanted', bu t enchanted, precisely insofar a s it i s the world of objects o f value and objectified v a l u e s .

active 'appearing' ( b o t h Schein a n d Erscheinung, i . e . both illu sion a n d phenomenon) constitutes a mediation or necessary function without w h i c h , i n given historical conditions, the life o f society would be quite s i m p l y impo ssib l e. To s u ppress the appearance would be to a b o l i s h social relations. This is why Marx attaches p a r t i c u l a r importance to refu t i n g the utopian notion, widespread am ong French and British socialists i n the early nineteenth century (and which w o u l d often be seen again elsewhere), that m o n e y could b e abolished, giving w a y t o work credits o r other forms o f social redistribution, w i t h o u t any attendant transformation of t h e principle of exchange between private production u n i t s . The structure of production a n d circulation which confers a n exchange-value o n the products o f labour forms a single whole, a n d the existence o f money, a 'developed' form of the g e n e r a l e q u i v a l e n t of cornmodities, is one o f the necessary functions o f that structure. To the first stage o f the critique, which consists in dissolving the appearance of objectivity, there m u s t be added, then, another which is, i n actuality, the precon d i t i o n for it, and demonstrates the constitution o f the appearance i11 objectivity. W h a t presents itself as a g i v e n quantitative relation is, i n reality, the expression o f a social relation: units which are independent of one another c a n only determine the degree of necessity o f their labour, t h e proportion o f s o c i a l l a b o u r w h i c h has to be d evoted to each type of useful object a posteriori, by adjusting their production t o ' d e m a n d ' . I t i s the practice o f exchange w hich determines the proportions, b ut it is t h e exchange-values o f the c om m odities which, i n the view of each producer, repre sent in inverted fashion - as though it were a property of 'things' - the relationship between their own l a b o u r and that o f all the other producers. G i v e n t h i s state of affairs, it is i n e v itable t h a t , to t h e i n d i v i d u a l s , their l a b o u r a p p e a r s t o b e 'socialized' by t h e ' v a l u e f o r m ' , instead of t h i s laner showing u p as the expression of a social d i v i s i o n of labour. Hence the formula I quoted above: labours appear . . . as material [dinglichl relations between persons a n d social relations between things.' 'To the producers . . . t h e social relations between their private

T h e necessity o f appearances What, then, is M a r x ' s objective i n describing the phenomenon in this w a y ? I t is twofold. On the one hand, by a movement akin t o a de mystification or demythification, he is concerned to

dissolve

that phenomenon,

to show

that

it is a n appear

ance based, i n t h e last instance, on a ' m isunderstanding'. The phenomena j u s t mentioned (exchange-value considered as a property of obiects, t h e a u t o n o m o u s m o v e m e n t o f c om m odities and prices) will have to be traced back t o a real cause which has been masked a n d the effect of which has been inverted (as in a camera obscura ) . This analysis really cl ears the way for a critique of p o l i t i c a l economy. F o r at t h e very p oint when that discipline, d r i v e n b y a desire t o provide scientific explana tion ( M a r x is o f course thinking h e r e o f the representatives of classical political economy: Smith and particularly Ricardo, whom he is always careful to distinguish from the 'apologists' of capita\), i s setting out to solve t h e enigma of the fluctuations of value by p i n n i n g value down to an ' i n v a r i a n t m e a s u r e ' - the labour-time necessary to produce each commodity - it actually deepens the mystery b y regarding this relation a s a natural (and, consequently, eternal) phenomenon. T h i s is explained by the fact that economic science - which, in accord w i t h the research programme o f the Enlightenment, seeks the objectivity of phe nomena - conceives the appearance as an error or i l l u s i o n , a represen tational defect w h i c h c o u l d be eliminated by observation (chiefly, in this case, by statistics) and deduction. By e xplai ni ng economic p h e n o m e n a i n t e r m s o f laws, the p o w e r of fascination they exert s h o u l d be dissipated. In t h e same way, h a l f a century later, D u r k h e i m was to speak o f 'treating social facts as t h i n g s ' . Now fetishism i s not a s u b j e c t i v e p h e n o m e n o n o r a false perception o f reality, as an optical i l l u s i o n or a superstitious belief would be. I t constitutes, rather, the way in which reality ( a certain form o r social structure) cannot b u t appear. A n d that

M a r x refutes this b y undertaking a thought-experiment which consists i n comparing t h e w a y s o c i ally necessary labour time is apportioned in various different 'modes o f production', s o m e o f

62

T H E P H I L O S O P H Y OF M A R X

I D E O L O G Y OR F E T I S H I S M

63

them historical ( p r i m i t i v e societies based o n subsistence eco nomies, for example, or medieval society based on serfd o m ) , others i m a g i n a r y ( t h e domestic 'economy' o f Robinson Crusoe on his i s l a n d ) , o r hypothetical ( a future c o m m u n i s t society where the a p p o r t i o n i n g o f labour is consciously p l a n n e d ) . It then appears that these relations of production are either free a n d egalitarian, or oppressive a n d based on force, but 'the social relations between i n d i v i d u a l s in the performance of their l a b o u r appear a t all events a s t h e i r o w n personal relations, a n d a r e n o t disguised as s o c i a l relations between t h i n g s , between the prod ucts o f l a b o u r . ' tlI In other words, these societies are, first a n d foremost, societies o f human beings, whether equal or unequal, a n d n o t commodity (or ' m a r k et') societies where human beings serve only as intermediaries.

Secondly, the a i m is to s h o w h o w t h e m a g n i t u d e of the v a l u e o f a commodity c a n be

expressed

in t h e q u a n t i t y o f another,

w h i c h i s properly the 'exchange- v a l u e ' . This is the point w h i c h seemed m o s t d i f fi c u l t a n d m o s t important to M a r x , since this m a d e it possible t o deduce the constitution of a 'general e q u i v a lent', i . e . a 'un iversal' commodity, in such a way t h a t

extracted

f r o m circulation,

all

other commodities express their own

value in it and it, conversely, substitutes auromarically for a l l commod ities or 'p urchases' t h e m a l l . Thirdly a n d lastly ( t h e need for t h i s t h i r d p o i n t is toe often forgotten or, in ot her words, it is often t h o u g h t that, from Marx's point of view, formally d e d u c i n g the necessity o f a 'general equivalent' is in i t s e l f sufficient to e x p l a i n m o n e y ) , the point is to show how this function is

materialized in

a particular

kind o f object (precious m e t a l s ) . Money is then constantly reproduced o r preserved by i t s different economic uses ( u n i t o f

Ge12esis of ideality
ebviously, s u c h a thought-expe r i m e n t is no substitute for

a c c o u n t , m e a n s o f p a y m e n t , being h o a r d e d o r held in 'reserve' e t c . ) . The other s i d e o f t h i s materialization is, t h e n , a process of constant

idea lizatien

o f the monetary mat erial, since it serves

demonstration, b u t merely indicates the need for i t . That demon stration i s one o f the twO results (together with the elucidation o f the process o f exploitation o f wage-labour a s a source o f the expansion o f capital) o n w h i c h M a r x wished to stake his scientific reputation, though apparently without ever having f o u n d a n absolutely d e fi n i t i v e exposition o f it. I t coincides i n fact w i t h the w h o l e o f the flrst p a r t o f here. Firstly, starting out from the 'twofold character' o f l a b o u r ( a s specialized technical activity transforming nature w i t h t h e a i m o f p r o d u c i n g certain useful o b j e c t s a n d a s expenditure o f h u m a n p h y s i c a l a n d m e n t a l force i n g e n e r a l : what M a r x terms

immediately to express a universal form or an ' i d e a ' . I n spite o f i t s technicality a n d difficulties, M a r x ' s argument here is one of the great p h i l o s o p hical expositions o f the forma tion o f 'idealities' or ' u n i v e r s a l s ' and the relationship between these abstract entities a n d h u m a n practices. It is comparable with what Plato, Locke or Hegel h a d proposed o n the subject (and Hegel h a d written that 'logic is the coin o f t h e spirit'), or with what Husserl o r Frege w o u l d later a d v a n c e . From Marx's point o f view, howeveI; there were t w o things more i m p o r t a n t than this. T h e first o f t h e s e - w h i c h makes M a r x ' s w o r k the c u l m i n a t i n g p o i n t o f t b e w h o l e o f classical economy, in its c o n s t a n t opposi tion to

Capital

(chapters 1

to 3 ) . I s h a l l merely present the broad o utlines o f the argument

monetarism

was to demonstrate t h a t 'the r i d d l e o f

concrete labour

and

abstract labeur,

w h i c h are obviously j u s t

the money fetish is therefore the r i d d l e o f t h e commodity fetish',19 or, i n other words, that the abstract form contained i n the relation o f commodities to l a b o u r is the logic o f m o n etary phenomena (and,

t w o different aspects o f the same reality, t h e one i n d i v i d u a l , the o t h e r t r a n s i n d i v i d u a l 0 1" c o l l e c t i v e ) , the p o i n t is to s h o w how t h e c o m m o d i t i e s which are p r o d u c e d become objects o f
a

suf{tcient

to explain

n a t u r a l l y , beyond

twofold

or

' d u a l character' themselves,

being endowed

this, capitalist or fi n a n c i a l phenomena e t c . ) . We may take it that it is this attitude - common, deep down, to M a r x and the classi cal economists - w h i c h , in his eyes, guarantees the 'scientific' character o f their theory. Conversely, i t e x p l a i n s to a large extent

with

utility

(corresponding to certain needs) and value ( t h e

' s u b s t a n c e ' o f w h i c h i s constituted b y the s o c i a l l y necessary l a b o u r time required for t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n ) .

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6S

the common discredit into which they have f a l l e n since t h e n o t i o n of labour as measure o f value h a s been rejected by official economics. The second p o i n t of importance to Marx lays the ground for the critique of political economy. This is the idea that the conditions which m a k e the 'fetishistic' objectifi cation of social relations necessary are entirely historical. T h e y arise w i t h the development of production 'for the market', the products of which only arrive at their final destination (consumption in a l l its forms) through s a l e a n d purchase. T h i s is a process spread over t h o u s a n d s of years which only slowly overtakes one branch of production after another, one society after another. However, with capitalism ( a n d , for Marx, the decisive element here is the transformation of h u m a n labour-power itself into a commodity and, thus, wage-l a b o u r ) , that process rapidly a n d irreve r s i b l y becomes universal. A point of n o r e t u r n has been reached, though this does not mean a point beyond which there can be n o further a d v a n c e : the only progress w h i c h now remains possible consists in the planning o f production, i.e. in society (or the associated producers) taking back i n t o ' s o c i a l control' the expenditure of labour, the technical conditions ror this being created, in fact, by the universal q u a n tification of the economy. The transparency of social relations w i l l then n o longer be a s p o n t a n e o u s condition, as i n primitive societies (where, Marx explains, it has a s its counterpart the mythical representation of the forces of nature - more or less what, in his system, Auguste Comte termed 'fetishism'), but a collective construct. The fetishism of commodities will then a p p e a r a s a long transition between n a t u r e ' s d o m i n ation of m a n a n d man's domination of nature.

without a theory of subjectivity. By rethinking the constitution of social objectivit} Marx at the same time virtually revolution ized the COl1cept of 'subject'. He thus introduced a new element into the discussion of the relations between 'subjectification', 'subjection' a n d 'subjectivity'. W e m u s t remember here that, i n the t r a d i tion of G e r m a n i d e a l i s m since K a n t , the subject h a d b e e n conceived first a n d fore most as a universal consciousness, both set above a l l particular individuals (hence the possibility of identifying it with the Reason of Humanity) a n d present in e a c h of them: w h a t F o u c a u l t w a s later to term the 'em pi rico-transcendental d o u b l e t ' , z o which w e h a v e seen Marx d e n o u n c e a s a mere v a r i a n t of essentialism. S u c h a consciousness 'constitutes the w o r l d ' , i . e . m a k e s i t intelligible by m e a n s o f its o w n categories or forms of representa t i o n - space, time, causality (Critique of Pure Reason,

1781 ) .

This side of that

constitution of the world, K a n t had to set aside the domain of the 'necessary i l l u s i o n s ' of metaphysics or p u r e thought, which did n o t refer to anything i n experience. These were something l i k e the inevitable price to be paid for the capacity of reason to forge abstractions. ieyond this, escaping the constraints of n a t u r e and experience, he situated a 'pure practical reason" i.e. a n u!lconditioned moral freedom, which aspired to constitute a ' k i ngdom of ends' based on mutual respect between persons ( b u t a l l t h e m o r e i m p l a c a b l y subject for t h a t to the i n n e r law of duty, the famous 'categorical imperative'). And even when Hegel, rejecting the separation of the n a t u r a l from the moral world, demonstrated that the experience of consciousness w a s properly located i n historical experience, this schema of the constitution of the world remained d e t e r m i n a n t . It made it possible to under stand why it was, in the end, that spirit or reason which has been lost or a l i e n a t e d in the forms of nature and culture merely, i n its various experiences, returns to itself, to the c o n t e m p l a t i o n of

M a r x a n d i d e a l i s m (reprise) From the strict perspective of the critique o f political economy, we could leave matters there. But t h i s would, as I have said, be to miss what constitutes the philosophical Importance of Marx's text and explains its astonishing legacy. That legacy has d i v i d e d into various different orientations, b u t a l l of these have b e e n based on a recog n i t i o n that there is no theory of objectivity

its own structure, its own ' l o g i c ' . W e c a n n o w s e c t h a t w i t h Marx's argument, by w a y of a n apparently con.tingent d e t o u r through t h e a n a l y s i s of t h e social forms of commodity circulation and the c r i t i q u e of their economic represen tation, the question of objectivity was entirely recast. The mechanism of fetishism is indeed, In one sense, a con stituting of the world: the social world, structured b y relations of exchange, which clearly represents the greater p a r t of the

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67

'nature' i n which h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l s live, t h i n k a n d act today. This is w h y Marx writes that 'the categories o f bourgeois economics' are ' f o r m s of t h o u g h t which are socia l l y v a l i d a n d therefore objective'.2 1 Before i t comes to formulating rules or imperatives, they express a perception o f phenomena, o f the way things 'are there', w i t h o u t it being possible to c h a n g e t h e m at w i l l . B u t i n t h a t perception, t h e r e a l a n d t h e i m a g i n a r y ( w h a t M a r x terms t h e 'suprasensible', t h e 'fantastic f o r m ' o f a u t o n o m o u s commodities w h i c h dominate their p r o d u c e r s ) are i m m ediately combined or, alternatively, [he givenness o f the objects o f experi ence is immediately combined with the n.rf?1 o f behaviour they call forth. Economic calculation, itself bas d on the immense substructure o f measurements, accountings and e v alu at i on s w h i c h individuals im m e r s e d i n t h e world o f commodities m ake ea c h day , provides a fine illustration o f t h i s d u a l it y. It i s based both on the fact that e c o n o m i c objects are a lw a y s already quan tifiable ( ' t h a l is how things are', it is their n a t u r e ) and o n the social imperative to submit them ( a n d the h u m a n activities which produce them) to an e n d l e s s .. uantification a n d rationalization, t r a n s c e n d i n g a n y pre-ordained limit, be it 'natural' o r ' m oral'.

The o n l y 'subject' M a r x speaks o f i s o n e t h a t i s practical, multiple, a n o n y m o u s an d b y definition not conscious o f itself. A non-subject i n fact, namely 'society', i.e. the whole set of activities o f production, e x c h a n g e a n d c o n s u m p t i o n the combined effect o f which is perceptible to each person o u t s i d e himself, a s a 'natural' property o f things. A n d i t is t h i s non subject o r complex o f activities which produces social represen tations of objects a t the s a m e time as it produces representable

objects. The commodity, like money, to say n o t h i n g o f ca p ita l

a n d its various f orm s, is preeminentl y both a representation a n d , a t the same time, an object; it is an object a l w a y s a l r e a d y g i v e n in t h e f o r m o f a represen t a t i o n . B u t , let u s repeat, i f the constitution o f o b j e c t i v i t y i n fetishism does n o t d e p e n d o n the p r i o r givenness o f a subject, a conscious ness o r a reason, it does, b y contt"ast, constitute subjects which are a part o f objectivity itself o r which are, in o t h e r words, given in experience alongside 'things', alongside c o m m o dities, a nd

ill a relation to them. T hese sub jects are not constituent, b ut

constituted; they are q u i t e simp l y 'economic ubjects' or, more exactly, they are all i n d i v i d u a l s who, in bourgeois society, are first o f all e c o n o m i c subjects (sellers and b u y e r s and there fore owners, i f o n l y o f their own labour-power, i .e. owners and

Genesis o f subjectivity
From the s t a n d p o i n t of classical idealism, it might seem that Marx thus merely combined (or, a s it might be, confused) the three viewpoints which were, respectively, those o f science (intelligibility o f p h e n o m ena), metaphysics (necessary illusions o f p u r e t h o u g h t ) , a n d morality o r ' p r a c t i c a l reason' (behavioural i m p erative). But t h e comparison i m m ediately brings O u t the originality o f t h i s theory o f the constitution o f t h e world when set alongside t h o s e which preceded it in the history o f phi lo s o p h y ( a n d which, o f c o u r s e , Marx k n e w i n t i m a t e l y ) : the fact is that it d o e s not arise out o f the a c t i v i t y o f any subject, or at le ast not o f any subject w h i c h can b e c o n c e i v e d i n t e rm s o f a model of consciousness. On the other h a n d , it does constitute subjects o r f o r m s o f subjectivity and consciousness in the very field o f objectivity. f ro m its 'transcendant' o r 'transcendental' posi t i on , subjectivity has shifted into a position o f effect or result of the social process.

sellers of themselves as labour-power - a stupefying 'phantas

magoria', we m a y remark i n passing, b u t o n e which has itself become absolutely ' n a t u r a l ' ) . T h e reversal effected b y Marx is, then, c o m p l ete: the constitution o f the world is not, f o r him, the work of a subject, but a genesis of subjectivity (a form of deter m i n a t e historical subjectivity) as pan ( a n d counterpart) of the social world of objectivity. From this start ing-point, twO lines o f development were possible a n d interpretations tending in each of these directions have been proposed.

'Reification' T h e first of these lines of development i s i l l us t r a t e d by Lukacs's work

History a1zd Class Consciousness, w ritten between 1 9 1 9 and 1922, i n w h i c h the great a n t i t h e s i s between 'reifica

tion' a n d 'proletar i a n consciousness' is expounded.I2 T h i s is both

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T H E P H I L O S O P H Y O F MARX

I D E O L O G Y OR FETISHISM

69

an interpretation o f genius a n d an extrapolation fro m Marx's Lukacs

T h e l o n g a n d dl'amatic c a r e e r of G y i r g y Lukacs, w h o was b o r n i n t o the Jewish aristocracy of Budapest in 1 8 8 5 , used the name Georg [ v o n l Lukacs, a n d wrote t h e whole o f nis w o r k i n German, divides i n t o four broad periods. Tn nis YOlltn, he studied p h i l o s o p h y and sociology in Germany with tne Neo-Kantians and Max Weber and developed an aes thetics inspired by 'anti-capitalist Romanticism' (SoHI and Form ( 1 9 1 0 ) . interest in Jewish mysticism (d. Michael L o w y , Re demp ti on ,md V t. pia , trans. A n n a Bostock, Merlin, London, 1974), togetner with a sustained

text, w hi c h brings o ut its Romantic side ( d oubtless o n account o f the influences to w hi c h Lukacs was subject - particularly Georg Simmel, a u t h o r o f The Ph i losoph y of Money ( 1 90 0 ) and M ax Weber - and his own youthful orientations). Into the idea o f fetishism Lukacs r e a d a total philosophy ( a t once a conception o f kno wledge, politics and history: moreover, the category of totality i s presented b y L u kacs a s the typical category of the d i a lectical m o d e o f t h o u g h t , in opposition to t h e ' a n a l y t i c ' thought o f abstract understanding, the genesis o f which we are precisely able to understand by virtue o f the theory o f r e i fi c a t i o n ) . T h o u g h disavowed by its a u t h o r after t h e revolutionary movements of t h e

Jewisl) Libertarian Th.ught ill C entral Europe, Athlone, London, ( 9 9 2 ) .

He became a Marxist d u r i n g r n e First World War, being especially influ

enced by Rosa Luxemburg and the Spartakusbll l1d, which led h i m to take part in the Hungarian Revolution, becoming People's Commissar for Education

1920s

had ebbed and he was won over to the

(1919).

His

collection

of

essays,

History

and

Class

orthodox Marxism of the Third International, the Lukacsian

theory o f reification was still to have a considerable influence on twentieth-century philosophy. O n the one hand, it lay a t t h e origin o f a good m a n y o f t h e critical Marxisms o f the twentieth century ( p a r t i c u l a r l y o f m a n y o f the favourite themes o f the Frankfurt School, from H o r k h e i m e r and Adorno through to Habermas - themes relating to the critique o f 'modern' o r ' b o u r g e o i s ' r a t i o n a l i t y a n d a l s o to t h e c r i t i q u e o f technology and science a s projects o f n a t u r a l i z a t i o n o f histo r y and the 'life w o r ld'). On the other h a n d , in a series o f p o s t h u m o u s l y p u b l i s h e d lectures, L u c i e n G o l d m a n n w a s able to argue convincingly t h a t direct references to Histmy and Class Consciousness a r e t o b e found i n the last paragraphs o f Heidegger's (unfinished)

Consciousless, publisned in 1 9 2 3 (trans. Rodney Livingstone, Merlin, London, 1 9 7 1 ) , is the most striking auempt ro revive tne Hegelian idea o f a dialectical synthesis o f objectivity a n d slbjectivity, entirely transposed
into the element of 'dass consciousness' and the revolutionary practice of the proletariat, whicn is presented as the culmination o f history.

Condemned by official Marxism (at t n e same time as tne exactly contem

.md Ph il.s ophy . tranS. fred Halliday, New Left Books, London, (970),
tnis w o r k , d e s p i t e being disavowed by its aut nor, was to become t h e overt o r covert source of mucn o f Western 'critical Marxism'. After settling in Moscow i n the early thirties. then returning to socialist H ungary i n 1 9 4 5 , w o r k . w h i c h ranged o v e r t h e theory o f 'critical realism' (The I-Jistorir:ol NOllel, trans. Hannah and Stanley Mitchell, Merlin, London, 1 962), the history of phjlosophy (The Y.rmg Hegel. Studies 1>1 the Relations hetween Lukacs developed a more 'orthodox', erudite a n d systematic body o f

porary and in many respects comparable book by Karl Korsch, Marxism

Dialeclics O>ld Ec.n.mics, trans. Rodney Livingstone, Merlin, London , 1975), a n d politico-philosophical p o l e m i c (The Destl'lIcti.n of Reasorl, trans. Peter Palmer, Merlin, London, 1 9 8 0 : a study of irrationalism in
German philosopny and its role in preparing the intellectual ground for National Soci a l i s m ) . He supported the national revolution led by Nagy

Being and Time

( 1 927)

w hich deal with the q u e s t i o n o f histor

icity,23 We ought therefore to regard this work in part as a response to the ' re volu ti o n a r y historicism' expressed in t h e theory o f reification a n d also, p e r h a p s , a s the beginnings o f a reprise or recuperation by Heidegger o f certain o f Lukacs's themes: i n particular, i n his theory of social anonymity

and, from that p o i n t on, came under strict police surveillance. The two great works o f h i s late period are his AesthetiC!; ( 1 9 6 3 ) and, above all, rhe

Onto logy .(Social Being (publisned p o s t n u m o u s l y in 1 9 7 1 ; English trans lation in 3 volumes by David Fernbach, M e r l i n , London, 1 978-9 ) , in
whicn tne 'self-consc iousness of the human race' is studied a s 'resolution of the relation between teleology and causality' on the basis o f t h e alien ation and dealienation of labour

( das 'Man'), which he sees as characteristic of ' i n a ut h e n t i c ' l i f e , and

Lukacs's theory is based on the idea that, in the world of

later i n h i s theory of the 'en framing' of t h e world b y u t i l i t a r i a n technology. commodity values, subjects are themselves evaluated and, a s a result, transformed into 'things', a point expressed b y the term

(d. Nicolas Tertulian's article. 'Ontologie de Petre social', in DiaiOJnlllre ct'iti'lue du mtl rx ism e, Presses Univtrsitaires de France, Paris, second edition, 1 9 8 5 ) .

VerdinglichUllg (reification), which did not p l a y this role in

Marx. Marx had said t h a t relations between c o m m o d i t i e s

7.

THE PHILOSOrHY O F MARX

I D E O L O G Y OR FETISHISM

71

(equivalence, price, exchange) were e n d o w e d with autonomy and that, a s a result, they not only came to substitute for personal relations, but to represent t ho se relations. L u k acs, for his part, combines two different ideas. The first of these is the i d e a that market-based o bjectivity - that o f economic categories a n d t h e operations t o which they give rise - i s the model o f all ob;ec

a n n i h i l a t i o n , a conception w h i c h repeats a v e r y o l d pattern of mystical thinking, where the end of time is presented as a return to the creative void o f the origins.

tivity, p a r t i c u l a r l y of 'scientific' objectiviry in the bourgeois

world, which would enable us to u n d e r s t a n d w h y the q u a n t i tative sciences o f n a t u r e (mechanics, p h y s i c s ) d e v e l o p in t h e modern era a s commo d i t y relations become generalize d . Those sciences project onto nature a d i s t i n c t i o n between the subj ective and objective which h a s its origin i n practices o f exchange. The second is the idea that objectification - or ration alization as calculation and assessment of v a l u e - extends to all human

Exchange and o b l i g a t i o n : the symbolic in Marx Lukacs's extrapo lation is both b r i l l i a n t and impo r t a n t in its own right, but it has the d r a w b a c k of totally isolating the description o f feti s h i s m from its theoretica l context in Capital. Now, that context suggests a quite different t y p e of interpretation, centred o n questions of law a n d money a n d t h u s l e a d i n g on to w h a t we w o uld t o d a y c a l l the a n a l ysis of s y m b o l i c s t r u c t u r e s (a ter minology Marx c o u l d n o t h a v e used, b u t in w h i c h it is pessible to make explicit what is a t stake i n h i s description o f the d o u b l e language ' s p o k e n ' b y t h e w o r l d of commo dities: t h e language of equivalence a n d measurement, given formal expression in the monetary s i g n , a n d the language o f o b l i g a t i o n a n d contract, formally expressed in l a w ) . This is the second r h i lo s o p h ical legacy to which I h a v e referred. As part of that legacy, I shal l mention t w o works here which are very different, both in their intentions and the conditions in which they were written. The first o f these i s the b o o k Law and Marxism: A General Theory by t h e Soviet l e g a l theorist, E. B. P a s h u k a n i s (who advocated the ' w i t h ering away of the State' and w a s executed d u r i n g the St a l i n i s t terror). This was p u b l ished in work.24 It

activities, i.e. that the commo dity becomes the model a n d the
form of every social o bject. Thus Lukacs d escribes a r a r a d o x : market-based rationality extended to science lS based on a separation of the o bj ective a n d subjective sides o f experience (which m a k e s it possible to

subtract the s u b j ective factor - needs, desires, consciousness

- from the world of n a t u r a l objects and their mathematical l a w s ) ; but this is merely a prelude to the incorporation o f a l l subjectivity i n t o objectivity ( o r t o i t s reduction to t h e status of object, as is revealed by the notion of the ' h uman sciences' or by the tech n i q u e s of management of the ' h u m a n factor' w h i c h have progressively been extended to the w h o l e of society ) . I n reality, this p a r a d o x expresses the extreme state of alienation humanity has reached in capitalism and t his a l l o w s Lukacs to argue, in a manner simi l a r to Marx in The German Ideology ( w hich h e c o u l d not h a v e read at this stage, since t h e t e x t w a s not p u bl i s h e d u n t i l

1924 a n d hence almost a t the same

is an extraordinarily interesting

time as Lukacs's study because

P a s h u k a n i s starts out from the Marxian a n a l y s i s o f the v a l u e form a n d u s e s t h i s to c o n d u c t a n exactly symmetrical a n a l y s i s o f the constitution o f the ' l e g a l subject' i n bourgeois-civil society. (For Pashukanis, who s u b s c ribes here to some extent to the tradition of n a t u r a l right against j u r i d i c a l positivism, for w h i c h every l e g a l norm i s l a i d d o w n b y the State, t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f the j u r i d i c a l edifice is private law, which can p r e c i s e l y b e regarded a s having p a r a l l e l s w i t h commo dity c i r c u l a t i o n . ) .l u s t a s i n d i v i d u a l commodities seem b y n a t u r e t o b e bearers of v a l u e , s o i n d i vi d u a l s engaged i n e x c h a n g e seem b y nature t o b e bearers of w i l l and subjectivity. J u s t a s there is an economic fetishism of

1932},

that revo l u t ionary transformation is

imminent. However, h e form ulates t h e s e arguments i n a much more speculative ( H e g e l i a n a n d Sch e l l i n g i a n ) l a n g u a g e and a d d s a n e l e m e n t o f p o li t i c a l messian ism: t h e proletariat, w h o s e trans formation into a n object is total, is thus destined to become the

subject of the revolutionary change, i . e . the 'subject of history'

(a form u l a coined b y L u ka c s } . By a b o l i s h i n g its own a li e n a t i o n , it b r i n g s h i s t o r y to an end ( o r b e g i n s i t a f r e s h a s a h i s t o r y o f free d o m ) , realizing the philosophical idea of human community

in practice. Thus philosophy might be said to be realized i n its

things, so there i s a j u r i d i c a l fetishism of persons, a n d in r eality

72

THE P H I L O S O P H Y OF M A R X

I D E O L O G Y OR F E T l S H I S M

73

these are o n e a n d the same thing because the contract i s the other side of the exchange and each is presupposed by t h e other. The world lived and perceived on the basis of the expression of value is, in reality, a n economico-juridical world (Marx h a d pointed t h i s out a n d it w a s , indeed, w h a t w a s a t stake i n his critical re-reading of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, the effects of which are present throughout the text o f Capital). More recent analyses, particularly those of Jean-Joseph Goux, allow us to make this point more c1early.l5 The structure common to econ omic and to juridical (and moral) f etishism is

dual and, as philosophers w o uld say, profoundly amphibo logical use Marx makes here of the term 'person'. On t h e one hand, in th eir opposition to 'things' (commodities and money), persons are real individuals who are pre-existent a n d already engaged with others i n a social activity of production; on the other, with these same things, they a r e functions of t h e exchange relation or, alternatively, as Marx has it, juridical 'masks' which individuals have to assume [ 0 be able themselves to be 'bearers' of commodity relations. This might be a rather technical and perhaps also wearisome discussion. But we can point right away
t. a major political issue which is a t stake here - the question of

generalized equivalence, which abstractly and eq ually subjects

individ uals to the form of a circulation (circulation of values,

circulation of obligations). It supposes a code or a measure

- both materialized and idealized - before which 'pa rticularity', individual need, must yield. It is s imply t h a t, in the o n e case, individu<1:lity is exteriorized, becoming an object or value, whereas in the other it is interiorized, becoming a subject or will, and it is indeed this which enables the one to complement the other. This path does not lead to a theory of the subject of history, o r of the transition from the economy (the world of private individ uals) to the community of the future, a s in Lukacs and his successors. B u t o n e can fi n d in Marx the bases for a n analysis o f the modes of subjection - economico-juridical fetishism being o n e of them - which is concerned with the relation between practices and
a

the interpretation o f h u m a n rights. Marx's position on this question clearly changed over time. As Bertrand Binoch e has shown,26 Marx's ' e a r l y ' writings (espe

of the State and On the Jewish Question of 1 843, w h i c h contains t'he famous exegesis of the French Declaration o f the Rights of Mall and the Citizen)
cially the Critique of Hegel's Doctrine combined the influence of Hegel (critique of the metaphysical abstraction of the 'rights of man', w hich were supposed to exist fo r aU eternity and to be valid for every society), and that of B a beuf a n d the egalita rian communists (critiq u e of t h e bour geois character of the universal 'Ma n ' referred to by the Declaration, a l l of whose rights came down to the inalie n a b l e character of property a n d excluded the d u t y of s o c i a l solida rity). Hence, the rights of m a n , separated from those of the citizen, appear there a s the speculative sundering of the h u m a n essence into the reality of inequalities and the fiction of comm unity. This a n a ly sis will undergo profound change, pa rticularly a s a r e s u l t of Marx's polemic with Proudhon a n d h i s critique o f economic liberalism. T h e r e is a n important development in the Grundrisse, in a passage where Marx identifies the e q uation of equality and freedom - the very heart of the ideology of the rights of m a n or 'bourgeois democracy' - with an idealized representation o f the circulation o f commodities and money,

symbolic order constituted

within history. Let u s note here that such a structuralist-inspired reading (which is, of COllrse, itself also an extrapolatio n ) is in fact much closer than Lukacs to the critique of the h u m a n essence a s a generic q u a lity 'inherent' in individ uals, a s formu lated in the Theses
on

Feuerbach. On the other hand, it forces us

to confront Marx at each step in his arguments with the findings of cultural anthropology, legal history a n d p sychoanalysis.

The question of 'human rights' How is it that such different interpreta tions are poss i b l e starting
o ut

which constitutes its 'real

basis' .2' The strict reciprocity of

e q u ality and freedom - unkn o w n to ancient societies a n d denied by medieval ones, whilst moderns by contrast see in it the restoration of human nature - may be deduced f rom the con dition s in which, i n the market, each in divid u a l presents himself to the other a s the bearer of the universal - i.e. of purchasing from l'h e
s a m r.

text? The reply to this question involves o u r

w h o l e conception of the 'critique of political economy' In Marx and it would require, in particular, t h a t we closely examine the

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power a s s u c h . H e i s a m a n ' w i t h o u t a n y particular q u a l i t y ' , whatever h i s s o c i a l status ( k i n g o r p l o u g h m a n ) and personal wealth (banker or w a g e e a rn e r ) .

a n n u l l e d in the a u t o m a t o n . J U S t as value 'in itself' w a s projected into the body of money, so activity, productivity, p h y sical a n d m e n t a l powers are projected i n t o t h i s n e w L e v iathan t h a t is social capital to which, i n quasi-'theological' fashion, t h e y seem to belong 'by nature', since i n d i v i d u a l s o n l y seem to possess

Liberty, equality. property

This privileged l i n k between the form of circulation and the 'system of freedom a n d equality' is i n d e e d preserved in Capital.
I t is precisely the 'properties' (Eigenschaf ten) attributed to i n d i

these things by virtue of that social capital.29 However, the e m p h a s i s p u t on these contradictions neces s a r i l y has its impac t on the m e a n i n g o f ' h u m a n rights ' , since these latter can now be seen both as the language b y w h i c h exploitation is m a s k e d , and t h a t i n w h i c h t h e cl a ss struggle o f the exploited fi n d s exp ression: rather t h a n a t r u t h o r a n illusion, then, we are dealing here w i t h the object of a struggle. And in deed , in the chapter o n 'The Working . a y ' , where the first episodes i n 'the civil war between th e c a p i t a l i s t class and the working class' are related, Capital ironizes o n th e uselessness o f t h e ' p o m p o u s c at alogu e o f the " i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t s o f m a n '' ' , fi n d i n g preferable 'the modest Magna Ca r ta o f the legally limited working day' which allows the workers ' a s a class' to 'compel the passing of a law, an all-powerful social barrier by which they can be prevented from s e l l i n g themselves' to capital.JO But in d e v e loping its r e v o l u tionary perspectives for superseding capitalism, Capital does n o t e n d on the nega t i o n o f i n d i v i d u al f r e e d o m a n d e q u a l i t y ( w h a t p e o p l e w e r e beginning to refer to a t the time a s collectivism), b u t on th e 'negation o f the negation' or, in other words, on ' i n d i v i d u a l property o n the basis of the achievements of t he c a p ita l i s t era' (i.e. th e s o c i a l i z a t i o n o f the m e a n s o f p r o d u c t i o n } . 3 1

v i d u al s b y t h e l a w ( b e g i n n i n g w i t h the property of being a proprietor or Eigentumer this f o u n d i n g play on word s o n c e a g a i n , that we h a v e already seen i n S t i r n e r ) which a r e required
-

for the c i r c u l a t i o n of c o m m o d i t i e s a s a n i n fi n i t e series of exchanges ' b e t w e e n e q u i v a l e n t s ' a n d u n i v e rsalized by bourgeois political discourse a s expressions o f man's essence. We may, therefore, suggest that the general reco g n i t i o n of these rights in a ' c i v i l society' which is g r a d u a l l y a b s o r b i n g the State, a n d is 'a very E d e n of the i n n a t e rights o f m a n ' and ' t h e exdusive realm o f Freedom, E q u a l i t y , Property a n d Bentham'28 (i.e. t he principle o f i n d i v i d u a l u t i l i t y ) , corresponds to the universal extension o f c o m m o d i t y exchanges ( w h a t the classics called 'the great republic o f c o m m e r c e ' ) . W h a t n o w c o n c e r n M a r x , however, are t h e contradictions to which the u n i versality o f this form gives rise. In t h e sphere o f productimz, into which waged workers enter b y contract, as free sellers of their l a b o u r-power, it immediately becomes a n expression o f a power relation: n o t just b y t h e indeterminate series of acts o f violence it masks, b u t b y its constituting a means of breaking down the collective of producers, which is technically necessary to large-scale i n d u s t r y, into a forced juxta position of i n d i v i d u al i t i e s separated one f r o m another. A s we might say, plagiarizing Rousseau, it i s a matter of 'forcing i n d i v i d u a l s to be free'. A t the same t i m e , Marx describes the movement o f capital a s that o f a 'vast a u to m a t o n ' independent o f i n d i v i d u a l s , p e r p e tually 'soaking up' surplus-labour for its o w n self-v a lorization, a n automaton o f w h i c h the capitalists are merely t h e 'conscious' orga n s . The basic reference of the rights o f man to the free will o f i n d i v i d u a l s is, then, cancelled out, exactly a s the social usefuless o f each p a r t i c u l a r labour was

From t h e idol to the fetish C an we now arrive a t an overall assessment o f this d e v elopment in which, following Marx's o w n oscillations, w e h a v e been borne a l o n g from ideology to fetishism a n d the v a r i o u s possible ways of interpreting it? Naturally, any c o m p a r i s o n m u s t take into account both the elements common to th e t w o arguments and the distance separating them: on the o n e hand, a p r o v isional t e x t w h i c h was never published ( e v e n if we find echoes o f its for m u l a t i o n s t h r o u g h o u t Marx's w o r k ) ; on the orher, an argument which Marx worked over a t length and placed at a strategic

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point i n his 'critique o f political e c o n o m y ' . Between the twO, he completely recast his 'scientific' project, changing its terrain, if not its objective, a n d rectified his view of the prospects for social revolution, moving from the idea of its i m m i n e n c e to more long-term conceptions. What the theory of ideology a n d that o f fetishism clearly have i n common is the fact that they attempt to make a connection between, on the one hand, the condition of individuals isolated from o n e another b y the universal extension of the division of labour an d b y competition, a n d , on t h e other, t h e constitution and content of the abstractions ( o r generalities o r universals) which are ' d o m i nant' in the bourgeois era. And also the fact that they seek to analyse the internal contradiction w hi c h develops w i th c a p italism between t h e p r a c t i c a l i n d i v iduality o f i n d i v i d u a l s ( t h e wide r a n g e o f t h e i r s o c i a l relations, t h e scope which modern technology gives them to engage in activities a n d deploy t h e i r specific 'capacities') a n d the theoretical u n i v e r sality o f the notions o f labour, value, property a n d person (which tends to reduce all i n d i v i d u a l s to the condition o f interchangeable representatives o f o n e and the same species o r 'essence'). Lastly, there is in each case the use o f a great logical schema, which M a r x t a k e s from Hegel a n d Feuerbach a n d constantly reworks, b u t never a c t u a l l y a b a n d o n s : the schema o f alienation. Alienation means the forgetting of the real origin of ideas o r generalities, b u r i t a l s o means inversion o f t h e ' r e a l ' relationship between i n d i v iduality and community. The splitting up of the real community o f individ uals i s followed by a projectiOll or transposition o f the social relation onto a n external 'thing" a third t e r m . Only, in the o n e case, that t h i n g is a n 'idol', a n abstract representation which seems to exist a l l on i t s o w n i n the ethereal realm o f ideas (Freedom, Justice, Humanity, L a w ) , whereas i n t h e o t h e r it is a 'fetish', a m a t e r i a l t h i n g which seems to belong to the earth, to nature, while exerting an irresistible power over i n d i v i d u a l s (the commodity and, above all, m o n e y ) . llIt this difference e n t a i l s s o m e remarkable consequences, which develop both w i t h i n Marx's writings a n d i n those of h i s successors ( M a r x i s t a n d n o n - M a r x i s t a l i k e ) . L e t us summarize them schematically by saying that w h a t i s sketched out in The German Ideology is a theory of the constitution of power, whereas what is described in Capital, b y w a y o f its definition of

fetishism, is a m e c h a n i s m of subjection. Obviously, these two p roblems cannot be treated as totally independent, b u t they attract our attention to distinct s o c i a l processes a n d give a different s l a n t t<? o u r reflection on liberation. The altern ative they represent m a y be e x p o u n d e d with regard t o a whole series of different themes. Let u s take the reference to l a b o u r and produ ction, for example. In treating this, the ideology theory p u t s the emphasis on the de negation or forget ting of the material c o n d i t i o n s o f production a n d the constraints imposed by them. In the ideological d o m a i n , all production is denied or is sublimated a n d becomes free 'creation'. This is why thinking on the d i v ision between ma n ua l and mental labour - or intellectual difference - is central here. We have seen that it allowed M a r x to explain the m e c h a n i s m by which class ideological domination i s reproduced a n d legitimated. F o r the theory of fetishism, by contrast, the accent is on the way a l l pro duction is s u b o r d i n a t e d to the reproduction of exchange-value. What becomes central is the form o f commodity c i r c u l a t i o n a n d t h e direct correspondence established there between economic and juridical notions, t h e egalitarian form of exchange and that of the contract, the 'freedom' to buy a n d sell a n d the personal 'freedom' of i n d i v iduals. Or, again, we m i ght show that the p h e n o m e n a of alienation with w h i c h we have de alt here are developed in opposing ways: o n the one side, they a r e of t h e order of belief and have t o do with the 'idealism' o f i n d i v i d u a l s (with the transcenden t values to which they subscribe: G o d , the Nation, the People, o r even the Revolution); on the other, they are of the order of perception a n d have to do with the realism or ' u t i l i t a r i a n i s m ' o f i n d i v i d u a l s ( w i t h t h e manifest r e a l i t i e s o f daily life: u t i l i t y , the p r ice o f things, t he ru le s o f ' n o r m a l ' behaviour). Th is i n itsel f would not be without its political consequences, a s we k n o w that politics (incl uding revolutionary p o l i t i c s ) i s both a question o f ideals and a question of h abit s .

The state o r the market

T h i s difference brings us, finally, to the m a j o r opposition w h i c h encapsulates a l l t h e preceding ones. The theory o f ideology i s

78

T H E P H I l. O S O P H Y O F M A R X

I D E O L O G Y O R FETISHISM

fundamenta l l y a theory of the State ( b y w h i c h w e mean t h e m o d e o f d o m i n a t i o n i nherent i n t h e S t a t e ) , w h e r e a s t h a t o f fetishism i s f u n d a m e n t a l l y a theory o f t h e ma rket ( t h e m o d e o f subjection o r constituti o n o f the ' w o rl d ' o f subjects a n d objects i nherent in the o rga n i za t i o n o f society a s market a n d its domi n a t i o n b y ma rket forces). T h i s d i f ference ca n n o doubt be expla ined by t h e moments at which M a rx developed the two theories, not to mention the di fferent p laces where h e d i d so ( P a ris and L o n d o n , the c a p i t a l o f politics and the c a p i t a l of b u s i ne s s ) , a n d the different i dea he h a d a t each point o f the conditions a n d objectives of the re v o l u t i o nary struggle. From the i d ea of overthro wing a b o u rgeois domi nation w h i c h h a s entered i n to contrad i c t i o n w i t h the deve lopment of civ i l society, we have moved to the i dea of the resolution of a contradiction i n herent in the mode o f socialization produced b y ca p i ta l i s m. The difference is a l s o to b e e x p l a i n e d - t h o u g h the two things are obviously l i nked - by the ma i n sources of his t h i n k i n g , which are also the objects of his criticism . The theory o f fetishism w a s developed in counterpoint to the c r i t i q u e of p o l itical economy, because Marx found in Smith and, more particula rly, i n R i ca rdo an 'anatomy' o f value based enti re l y on the quanti fication of l a b o u r a n d the ' l i bera l ' notion of a n automa t i c re g u l a t i o n of the market b y the p l a y o f i n d i v i d u a l exchanges. On t h e other hand, i f h e theori zed ideology a s a function o f the problem o f the State, this w a s because Hegel, a s we have seen, h a d provided a s t r i k i n g defin i t i o n o f t h e Rechtstaat a s a hegemony exercized over society. So we can now understand the s t r i k i n g fact that the contem porary theorists who all owe someth i n g sse n tial to the Marxian notion of i deology - p a r t i c u l a rly to i t s conception o f t h e

State the 'first ideological po we r' a n d t o uncover t h e la w o f h i s t o r i c a l succession o f t h e ' w o rld-v i e ws' o r forms o f t h e domi nant i de o l o g y which confer their ( re l i g i o u s or juridical) legitimacy o n cla ss-based states. B y contrast, i t i s w i t h i n t h e legacy o f t h e a n a l y s i s of fetishism tha t o n e m u s t l o o k b o t h for the phenomenologies of 'everyday li fe' governed by the logic o f the commod i t y o r b y the symb o l i c s o f v a l u e ( t h e Frankfurt School, Henri Lefebvre, G u y D e b o rd , A g n e s H e l l e r). and for analyses of the social ima g i n a ry structured by the 'language' of money a n d the la w (Maurice Godeli er, Jean-Jose p h Goux, o r Castoria d i s, who substitutes insti t u t i o n s for structures, o r even B a u d ri l l a r d , w h o , a s i t were, stands exchange v a l u e ' ) .

Marx O n h i s head,

by

studying a 'fet i s h i sm o f use v a l u e ' rather than a 'fetishism of

conditio1lS of p r od u c tio l l o f i deo logy o r i deas - inevitably run u p

lectuals' ( G r a m s c i ) , the 'ideological state a p p a ra tuses' (Althusser),

a g a i n s t q u e s t i o n s that a re Hegelian i n o r i g i n : t h e ' o r g a n i c i n tel the 'noblesse d' Etat' a n d ' s y m b o l i c v i olence' (Bourdieu). But even Engels, w h e n h e rediscovered the concept o f ideology in

1 8 8 8 ( i n Ludwig Fellerbach altd the End of

Classical German

Philosop h y ) , a l r e a d y proposed to demonstrate w h a t makes t h e

'graldes ticoles'. Se e Bourdieu, L a noblesse d'etat.: grandes eceles et esprit de cor,s, M in u it, P a r i s , 1 9 8 9 . I Trans. I

.. A reference t o t h o s e 'arisrocrats' of t h e french system educated i n its

T I M E AND P R O G R E S S

81

4
h a v e t h e s a m e general form: e a c h constructs t h e fi c t i o n o f a

Time and Progress: A n other Philosophy of Histor y ?

' n a t u r e ' , d e n i e s historical t i m e , its o w n dependence on transi tory conditions, o r at l e a s t extracts itself from historical time - b y c o n fi n i n g t h a t t i m e to the past, for e x a m p l e . A s Marx writes i n The Poverty o f Philosophy ( 1 8 4 7 )
Economists have a s i n g u l a r method o f procedure. There are o n l y two kinds of institutions for them, the artificial and the n a t u r a l . The insti tutions of feudalism are artificial institutions, those of the bourgeoisie n a t u r a l . !n t h i s they resemble t h e theologians, who likewise establish two k i n d s of religion. Every religion which is not theirs is an invention of men, w h i l e t h e i r o w n is an emanation from G o d . When the economists say that present-day r e l a t i o n s - the relations of bourgeois produc

There i s a danger t h a t the preceding d i s c u s s i o n s will h a v e given

tion -are namral, they imply that these are the relations in which wealth is created and productive forces developed i n conformity with the laws of nature. These relations therefore are themselves natural laws independent of the i n fl u e n c e of time. They are eternal laws which must always govern society. Thus there has been history, b u t there is any. 1
110

[he impression that,

u lti m a t e ly, p h i l o s . p h y i n Marx could never

be said to b e o f a n y t h i n g but preliminary significance. A p a r t f r o m t h e procl a m a t i o n o f a n i m m e d i a t e e x i t f r o m philosophy, what, in fact, could w e be said to find there? The critique o f ideology a n d t h e a n a l y s i s of fetis h i s m . N o w , the first o f these i s the assumption o f a return t o t h e things themselves, a m o v e b a c k beyond t h e abstract consciousness w h i c h h a s been b u i l t upon the origins o f t h a t consciousness i n the d i v i s i o n o f labour being forgotten; whilst the second is the other side of the critique o f political economy, s u s p e n d i n g the a p p e a r a n c e o f objectivity o f c o m m o d i t y f o r m s to g e t back to their social constitution a n d d r a w o u t t h e 'substance' o f value: ' l i v i n g l a b o u r ' . D o e s t h i s mean that, from Marx's po int o f view, a l l there i s to philosophy is t h e c r i t i q u e o f sociological, economic a n d political reason (or unreason)? This is dearly n o t his project. The critique o f ideology o r o f fetishism are already a p a r r o f knowledge. They are a moment in the recognition of the historicity of social

longer

T h e critical moment in Marx's work relates, t h e n , to an o p p o s i t i o n between n a t u r e - or t h e 'metaphysical' p o i n t o f view - a n d history (Gram sci w o u l d later speak o f ' a b s o l u t e h i s t o r i c i s m ' ) . And M a r x ' s philosophy, w h e t h e r o r n o t it is in a finished form, sets itself the task o f t h i n k i n g the materiality of t i m e . But t h i s q u e s t i o n , as w e h a v e a l s o seen, c a n n o t be dissociated from something which Marx sets out again and a g a i n to demonstrate: capitalism a n d 'bourgeo is/civil society' bear w i t h i n them the necessity o f c o m m u n i s m . They are, a s Leibniz would have said, 'heavy with futurity'. A n d that futurity is tomorrow. To a l l appearances, t i m e is j u s t another n a m e for progress, unless it is its formal c o n d i t i o n o f possibility. I t is t h i s q u e s t i o n w h i c h , in conclusion, w e have to examine.

relations ( a n d , consequently - if we remember the program matic equation set o u t in the sixth o f the Theses on Feuerbach
- of the historicity of the ' h u m a n essence'). It is the import

of those critiques that the division of labour, the development o f t h e productive forces, a n d the class struggle m a n i f e s t themselves a s rheir own o p p O Sttes. The theoretical consciollsness auto nomized in ideology, and the spontaneous representation of subjects and o b j e c t s i n d u c e d by the circulation o f commodities,
80

The negation o f the negation The reader w i l l reca ll the passage from the Preface to A

Contributio'1 to the Critique of Political Economy ( 1 8 5 9 ) :

I n the social production
0

f t h e i r existence, men i n e v i t a b l y enter l O t o

definite r e l a t i o n s , w h i c h are independent o f their w i l l , n a m e l y relations of production appropriate to a g i v e n stage i n the development of their

82

THE PHILOSOPHY O F MARX

TIME AND PROGRESS

83

material forces of production . . . A t a certain stage o f development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict . . . with the property relarions within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn rnto their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes I n the ecollomic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure . . . No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of produc tion never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence ha\'e matured withm the framework of the old society. Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks a s it is able to solve, since closer examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation. In broad outline, the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois modes of production may be designated as epochs marking progress in the economic development of society . . l

political power by the working class, technological education, both theoretical and practical, will take its proper place in the schools of the workers. There is also no doubt that those revolutionary ferments whose goal is the abolition of the old division of labour stand i n diametrical contradiction with the capitalist form o f production, a n d the economic situation o f t h e workers which corresponds to that form. However, the development of the contf3dictions of a given historical form of production is the only historical way in which i t can be dissolved and then reconsn-ucted on a new basis.1

In conclusion, let u s q u o t e the f o l l o w i n g passages, to wh ich

we hav e already referred above, wh ich come t o w a r d s t h e e n d o f Volume 1 ;
As soon as this metamorphosis has sufficiently decomposed the old society throughout its depth and breadth, a s soon as the workers have been turned into proletarians, and their means of labour into capital, as soon as the capitalist mode of production stands on its own feet, the further socialization of la bour and the further transformation of the soil and other means of production into socially exploited and therefore communal means of production takes on a new form. What is now to be expropriated is not the self-employed worker, h u t the capitalist who exploits a large number of workers. This expropriation is accomplished through the action of immanent laws of capitalist production itself, through the centralization of capitals . . . Along with the constant decrease i n the number of capitalist magnates, w h o usurp and mono polize all the advantages of this process of transformation, the !Ilass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation a n d exploitation grows; bur with this there also grows the revolt of the working class, a class constantly increasing in numbers, and trained, united and organized by the very mechanism of the capitalist process of production. The mono poly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode o f production which has f!ourished alongside and under it. The centralization of the means of production a n d the socialization of labour reach a point at which they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated . . . capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a natural process, its own negation. This is the negation of the negation."

Let us l o o k a g a m at s o m e striking formulations i n Capital

( 1 8 6 7) :
the germ 0 f the education o f the future i s present i n the factory system; this education will, in the case of every child over a given age, combine productive labour with instruction and gymnastics, not only a s one of the methods of addmg to the efficiency of production, but as the only method of producing fully developed human beings . . . Modern industry never views or treats the existing (orm o f a production process as the definitive one. Its technical hasis is therefore revolutionary, whereas a l l earlicr modes of production were essentially conservative . . . l O i n the other hand, in its capitalist form it reproduces the old division of labour with its ossi6ed particularities. We have seen how this absolute contradiction . . . bursts forth without restra i n t in the ceaseless human sacrifices required from the working class, in the reck less squandering of labour-powers, and in the devastating effects of social anarchy. This is the negative side. But if, at present, variation of labour imposes Itself . . . with the blindly destructive action of a natural l a w that meets w i t h obstacles everywhere, large-scale industry . . makes the Ireplacement of this monstrosity I . I b y the absolute availability ofl the worker for the m a x i m u m number of different kinds of labuur into a question of life and death . . . I T l h e partially developed individual, who is merely the bearer of one specialized social function, must be replaced by tbe totally developed Individual, for whom the different social functions are different moees of activity he takes up in turn . . . ITlhere can he no doubt that, with the inevitable conquest of
. .

The ambiguity of the dialectic

How, c a n we d o u b t , then, that Marx was, in the nineteenth century, between th e t i m e o f S a i n t - S i m o n and t h e a g e o f Jules

84

T H E P H ILOSOP H Y O F M A RX

T I M E A N D PRO G R ESS

85

Ferry, a typical representative of t h e idea ( o r ideology) o f

reveal,

to demonstrate experimentally, the problems inherent

progress?

'There a r e few if a n y intellectual oddities i n our t i m e

i n s u c h a n idea.

more pronounced t h a n t h a t a m o n g Western Marxist scholars w h o seek t o disengage Marx from the evolutionary-progressivist t radition in the nineteenth century,' writes Robert Nisbet i n h i s T h e Marxist ideologies of progress But, first, we must f u l l y assess the p l a c e occupied by Marxism as theory and a s mass movement o r 'faith' in the social history of the idea of progress. If, u n t i l very recently, we have witnessed not only more or less influential doctrines - and who i s to say they d o not still exist? - but something l i k e a collective 'myth' of progress, we owe t h i s fact in very large part to M a r x i s m . It is, above a l l , Marxism which has perpetuated the i d e a t h a t 'those a t the bottom' play a n

History

f the Jdea

f Progress.s

Only, for M a r x , progress i s

neither modernity n o r l i b e r a l i s m nor, e v e n less, i s i t c a p i t a l i s m . Or, rather, 'dialectically', it is c a p i t a l i s m insofar a s capitalism m a k e s socialism i n e v i t a b l e and, conversely, socialism i n s o f a r a s socialism resolves t h e contradictions o f c a p i t a l i s m . N o doubt t h i s is one of t h e causes of t h e philosophical discredit i n t o which the 'materialist conception of history', to which the name of Marx is attached, has fallen today. For we are curren t l y experiencing the decay or

'decadence' of the idea

active

role i n history, by prope l l i n g

of t'rogress,

to use an expression of Georges Canguilhem's.6 I n

themselves forward and p r o p e l l i n g i t o n w a r d s a n d ' u p w a r d s ' , To t h e extent t h a t t h e i d e a of progress i n c l u d e s not j u s t a hope b u t a prior certainty, this conception i s quite i n d i s p e n s a b l e to it, a n d t h e history of t h e twentieth century would be entirely incomprehensible if it were left out of account. A t least since the ordeal of the Great War, civilizations 'have known that they are mortal', as Valery put it, a n d the idea of spontaneous progress has come to seem thoroughly i m p r o b a b l e . , . Thus, only the idea t h a t i t is achieved by the masses aspiring to their own liberation, whether b y revolution or reform, can lend credence to the notion of progress, T h i s has been t h e role played b y Marxism, and we should not be surprised that, at the same time, this preeminence of the conception of progress has a l s o constantly been reinforced w i t h i n it. It i s right to speak here o f Marxism and not simply socialism. The thesis of social progress (of its inevitability, its positive i m p o r t ) is, admittedly, a component of the s o c i a l i s t t r a d i t i o n a s a whole, b o t h i n its ' u t o p i a n ' a n d ' s c i e n t i fi c ' strains, a s can be seen in t h e writings of S a i n t - S i m o n , Proudhon and Henry

t h i s connection, t h e notion o f d i a l e c t i c , i n its Hege l i a n , M a r x i a n o r post-Engels i a n versions ( a s , respectively, t h e d i a l e c t i c of 'spirit', t h e dialectic of ' m o d e s of production' and 'social forma rions', and the ' d i a lectics of nature') occupies a fundamentally ambival e nt position. I t is regarded b y some a s a n alternative to the positivism of progress. Against the schema of a continuous, uniformly ascending progression ('progress is the development of order', said Auguste Comte, w h o acknowledged h i s own debt to the Enlightenment, and particularly to Condorcet), i t ranges the representation of crises, of 'irreconcilable' conflicts, a n d of t h e 'role of violence in history'. From a n o t h e r angle, however, it may be described as the achieved realization of the ideology o f progress (of its irresistible

potency),

since i t might be seen

a s a i m i n g to bring all t h i s 'negativity' into a higher synthesis, to endow it with meaning and place it, 'in the last instance', in the service of what it seemed to contradict. The a i m of this chapter i s to show that things are not, however, so simple a s a mere reversal of value judgements might lead us to suppose. This is the case with regard to Marx's own writings (and it is not his opinions, b u t h i s arguments and research w h i c h are important here). Things are also n o t s o simple because of t h e multiplicity o f questions covered b y the much too cursory notion o f a 'paradigm' of progress. Rather t h a n reading i n Marx the

(Progress and Poverty was p u b l i s h e d in ' 1 8 7 9 ) . But i t was Marxism which, de facto, proposed a d i a l e c t i c a l version o f progress ( i n some w a y s augmenting t h e content o f t h e i d e a ) a n d
George political movements of t h e different E u r o p e a n a n d extra

assured it of w i d e c i r c u l a t i o n a m o n g t h e great social a n d European 'worlds' ,

illustration

(one illustration among

others) of a general idea, the interest i n g thlllg i s to use him to

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THE P H I L O S O P H Y OF M A R X

T I M E A N D P R O G R F. S S

87

Benjamin
W a l t e r Benjamin, w h o w a s born In Berlm I n 1 8 9 2 a n d died at Port-Bou by Franco's police),
IS In

History o f 1'40, speaks o f a M a r x i s t ' h i s t o r i c i s m ' which might be described a s the ( b y de fi nition, v a i n ) attempt to a d o p t f o r the
oppressed the continuous, cumulative vision characteristic o f t h e d o m i n a n t or t h e ' v i c t o r s ' , w h o are s u r e they a r e ' m o v i n g w i t h t he current'? T h i s description (remin iscent, to some extent, of Nietzschean formulations) i n d i s p u t a b l y hits the m a r k . Let us recall t h e t h r e e great instantiations o f Marxist 'progress i v i s m ' . The first is the ideology of German Social Democracy and, more generally, of the Second I n t e rn a t i o n a l . The internal divergences within that ideology - o n the one hand, epistemological ( i t was s p l i t from the outset between a natural istic conception, in w hi c h Marx's teachings were combined with those o f Darwin, a n d a n ethical conception, i n which Marx was re-read through Kantian spectacles); on the other. political (the opposition between r e v isionism - Bernstein a n d J a u r e s - a n d ort hodoxy - Kautsky, P l e k h a n o v a nd L a b ri o l a ) - o n l y bring o u t t he m o r e strongly t h e consensus o n t h e essential p o i n t : certainty a s to the direction i n which history is m o v i n g . T h e second is t h e i d e o l o g y o f S o v i e t C o m m u n i s m a n d ' r e a l socialism'. D u b b e d by A l t h u s s e r a ' p o s t h u m o u s revenge o f the Second International',s this a l s o involves i t s own debates: Stalinist economic d e t e r m i n i s m ; post-St a l i n i s t Marxism gradu ally shifting towards the management o f the status q u o and {Orn between what were at times the t w o antagonistic spheres o f interest of the ' s o c i a l i s t camp' and the 'international Com munist movement'. The most interesting thing here w o u l d he to analyse the extreme tension r u n n i n g th r o ug h this ideology (which to a l a rge degree doubtless e x p l a i n s its attraction), between a project o f resistance to capitalist modernization (if n o t indeed o f a return to the c o m m u n a l modes of life that m odernization destroys), and a project of ultra-modemity, or o f

t 940 (where he committed suicide ra ther t h a n be handed oveno the Gestapo

often mistakenly viewed as a represenrao've of the Frankfurt School (Adorno, Horkheimer, the e a r l y Marcuse and, in more

recent nmes, Habermas), of which he was merely a rerkent, little understood 'fellow traveller'. In his youth, h e was strongly influenced by Georges Sorel, the author of Reflections 011 VIOlence ( 1 906), a n d by Kafka_ He was also a dose friend of t h e theorist a n d historian of J e w i s h mystic:ism, Gershom Scholem. He was later conveHed
[0

Communism by his companion Asia

Lads, a Lithuanian revolutionary, and was for some years a dose friend of Benoit Brecht, with whom h e shared proiects for a polio'ca l l y militant liter atLire. His doctoral thesis o n Tf1e C."cept of Art Crltrcl5rll 1/1 Germal't RomQl/ttcism ( 1 9 1 9 ) and hiS later work on The Origin of German TragIC Oyama ( 1 9 28; co win him
a trans.

cnrity madt, even worse by the Naz, Se l7.ure o f power. The bulk o f his writ to the writer who inspired his m a t u r e work: see Charles Ba" delalre: A Lyric "oet til the Era of High Capita lism , trans. Harry Zohn, New I..e ft Bonks, London. 1 9 7 3 ) , were intended to form part of a work of history, philoso
phy and aesthetil:s on the 'Parisian ar(:ades' within the archite,ture of the

university teaching pOSt a n d hl' was condemned

John Osborne, New Ldt Books, London, 1977) failed

to a

life of inse

ings, which

are

made u p of fragments and essays (several of them devoted

Second Empire, i n whic:h h e was to analyse the combmation o f rationality and the fantastic which made up modern 'everyday life' (the so-caUc of the Nmeteenth Century', Charles Ba .. delalre f'assagellarbelt, the general plan of which i s sketched in 'Paris - the Capital

, pp.

1 5 5-76;

d.

Christme Bud-Glucksmann, Baroqlle Reaso1l: The Aesthetics of Modermty, Sage, London, 1994). After hiS distanc:ing from the Soviet Umon, and m the tragic context of NaZism, his critique of ideologies of progress became 0 [ 1 ented - partic u l a rly In his 'Theses on the Philosophy of History' of 1940 (published
an

lIlUItl/IUIl/OtlS, trans. HarTY Zohn, Fontana, Lo n d o n , 1 9 7 3 ) towards a rellectlon. both political a n d religious i n character, o n tbe Jettt<.elt.

confront one another (d. Michael Lowy, Itedemptt." and Ulepia. chapter

the momem o f rupture wnhm history m which destruco'on and redemption

6 and ConclUSion).

Though

some

years

separated

them,

in

their

different

t h e supersession o f m o d e rn i t y by a 'l e a p forwa r d ' into t h e future o f h u m a n i t y (not j u s t 'electrification plus s o v iets', a s Lenin's slogan of 1920 h a d it, but t h e utopia of th e ' n e w man' and the exploration of the c o s m o s ) . Finally, there i s the i d e o l o g y o f s o ci al i st develo
t, both

ways both Gramsci and Walter Benjamin criticized M a r x i s m unmercifully from w i t h i n f o r having d o n e j u s t this. In his Prisoll Notebooks, Gramsci described the 'economism' o f the Second a n d Third Internationals as
a

fatalism b y which the workers

a n d their orga n i z a t i o n s llad forged a 'subaltern' vision o f the world for themselves, a vision in which emancipation was the inevitable consequence o f technical development. And B e n j a m i n , i n his last text, the Theses on the Philosophy of

a s elaborated in the Thit'd World a n d a s projected onto i t from outside after decol o n i z a t i o n . The important p o i n t here is that there is a Marxist and a non-Marxist v a r i a n t of the idea of development. But the b o u n d a r i e s between the two are not fixed

88

THE P H I L O S O P H Y OF M A R X

T I M E AND P R O G R E S S

89

and there i s rather a constant process o f intellectual a n d political emulation between them. It was by becoming, in the twentieth century, a developmental project for the 'periphery' o f the capi talist world economy (from C h i n a to Cuba by way o f Algeria o r Mozambique), once a g a i n w i t h its reformist a n d revolutionary variants, its hopes a n d its catastrophes, t h a t Marxism best revealed the depth of the tie which b i n d s it to the common core of the progressivist economism developed in the t h i n k i n g of the Enlightenment, from Turgot and Adam S m i t h to S a i n t - S i m o n . B u t i t i s e q u a l l y indisputable that, without the s e m i - r e a l , s e m i i m a g i n a r y challenge represented by the 'Marxist s o l u t i o n ' , the theories o f planning and the State applied to the Third World, would not be presented a s alternative theories o f social develop ment. We can see this very well now that mo netarist liberalism a n d its counterpart, ' h u m a n i t a r i a n interference', have taken complete command. I t was i m p o r t a n t to recall this history, albeit v e r y a l l usively, because it leads us to temper how we view the critique o f p r ogress, o r a t l e a s t n o t to accept all the a p p a r e n t l y self-evident asp e cts o f that c r i t i q u e without some c a u t i o n . T h e fact that the most recent o f all the great versions o f Marxist progress i v i s m was an ideology o f escape from underdevelopment wh ich w a s statist, r a t i o n a l i s t a n d populist, s h o u l d deter u s from flippantly declaring 'the e n d o f the i l l u s i o n s of progress' {rom Europe, or, more generally, from the 'metropolitan heartland' ( o r the 'North'). As though it were once again u p to u s to determine where, when and by whom rationality, productivity and pros perity are to be sought. The functions performed in the history o f the labour mo vement by the image of the forward march o f humanity, a n d by the hope o f one day seeing i n d i v i d u a l f u l fi l m e n t a n d collective s a l v a t i o n c o i n c i d e , a r e also t o p i c s still awaiting a detailed analysis. 9

representation, the replacement o f one ' p a r a d i g m ' by another. Now, these undifferentiated notions are extremely d u b i o u s . C a n there really be s a i d to h a v e been a notion o r a paradigm of progress which h e l d s w a y from t h e philosophy of the Enlightenment through to socialism a n d M a r x i s m ? Nothing is less certain. N o discussion on this point could afford to ignore an a n a l y s i s o f the components of the i d e a of progress, com ponents w h i c h do not c o m b i n e automatically. The representations o f progress whi ch form a t t h e e n d o f t h e eighteenth century p r e s e n t themselves p r i m a r i l y a s theories (or, rather, ideas) of the wholeness o f history, which i s conceived on the lines of a spatio-temporal curve. This gives rise to v a r i o u s different p o ssibilities. T h e wholeness o f h i s t o r y can be grasped in the distinctions d r a w n between its 'stages' and the 'logic' of t h e i r succession. Or, alternatively, i t can be comprehended in terms o f the decisive character o f a pri vileged moment (crisis, revolution, the o verthrow of a regime) affecting the totality o f social relations or the fate of h uman it y. S i m i l a rly, it can be conceived as an i n d e fi n i t e process, with only its general orien tation being laid d o w n (in a famous phrase, Bernstein, the father of revisionism, said: ' t h e u l t i m a t e aim o f s o c i a l i s m is nothing, but the movement is e v e r y t h i n g ' } .l l O r i t can, o n the other h a n d , be defined a s t h e p r o c e s s w h i c h l e a d s t o a n e n d p o i n t : a 'station ary state' of homogeneity or e q u i l i b r i u m (as i n Cournot or John Stuart M i l l ) , or even the 'ultra-imperialism' o f Kautsky - w h o goes m uch further in this than Hegel, t h o u g h all these conservatives, liberals a n d socialists share t h e same image o f the fi n a l resolution o f t e n s i o n s and inequalities. Above all, however, these v a r i o u s w a y s o f representing history as a teleology presuppose the combination o f t w o theses which are independent of one another. The one posits the irreversibility a n d linearity of r i m e . Hence the rejection ( a n d t h e presentation a s mythical or m e t a p h o r i c a l ) o f any idea o f a cyclical or random cosmic time o r political history. Let u s note i m m e d i a t e l y t h a t the

The wholeness o f history The c r i t i q U l o f progress, which i s currently being rendered a commonplace by the 'postmodern' philosophies, lo harbours yet other potential pitfalls. Most o f t e n , it presents itself in a language which is itself historicist: as critique of a d o m i n a n t

direction

of

this

irreversibility

is

not

necessarily

upward:

w h e t h e r o r n e t t h e y d r a w on p h y s i c a l models o f the ' d i s s i p a t i o n o f energy', a l a r g e n u m b e r o f late-nineteenth-century theorists o f h i s t o r y counterpose t h e idea o f decadence t o t h a t o f progress, w h i l e persisting with t h i s same presupposition o f irreversibility (G obineau's Essay on the bleql'4ality of Human Races springs

90

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MARX

T I M E AND P R O G R E S S

91

t o mind here, t h e first part o f which w a s p u b l i s h e d i n

1853

A theory o f evolution ?
The theorists of t h e nineteenth century were i n search of ' l a w s ' of historical change or transition, so as to s i t u a t e m o d e rn society between the past, which the ( i n d u s t r i a l , political a n d even religious) 'revolutions' had relegated to a prehistory of mod ernity, a n d the more or less immediate future, which could be divined from the instability and tensions of the present. The immense majority of them resolved t h i s problem b y adopting evolutionist schemas. To put matters once again in Canguil hem's terminology, evolutionism was the 'scientific ideology' par excellence of the nineteenth century, Le. a site between scientific research programmes and the theoretical

a n d which was later invoked to support a schema o f history based on 'racial struggle' i n opposition to a model based on 'class strugg l e ' ) . To the idea of irrevers i b i l i t y we must a l s o a d d another: that of technical or m o r a l improvement (or a n improvement c o m b i n i n g the t w o ) . T h i s d o e s n o t necessarily mean movement from less to more, or from worse to better, b u t i m p l i e s a positive overa l l balance o f advantages a n d d i s a d v a n tages - what we s h o u l d today describe as a n optimum ( t h i n k of the way the L e i b n i z i a n scheme of the ' b e s t of a l l possible worlds' re-emerges i n the 'progressive' tradition of l i beralism: from Bentham, with his definition o f utility a s the grearest happiness of the greatest n u m b e r of i n d i v i d u a l s , to Rawls roday with his ' d i fference principle', w h i c h states t h a t only those inequalities which improve the situation of the most deprived are

of exchange

and social imaginary (the 'unconscious need for direct access to the t o t a l i t y ' } . 1 5 I n this sense, i t is practically impossible not to be an evolutionist in the nineteenth century, unless one were, once again, to propose a theological alternative to science. Even Nietzsche, who wrote (in The Anti-Christ, b y no m e a n s w h o l l y a v o i d s i t ! B u t t h i s a l s o m e a n s t h a t evolutionism i s t h e intellectual element in which the clash between conformisms a n d attacks on the established order occurs. To regard a l l evolutionisms as being of the same kind is to condemn oneself [0 see the history of ideas merely a s a vast 'night i n which all cows a r c b l a c k ', as Hegel put i t . The important t h i n g is w h a t distinguishes them one from another, the points of heresy a r o u n d which their oppo sitions are organized. The class struggle is not the race struggle, j u s t as the dialectics of Hegel, Fourier or M a r x are not the Spencerian law of increasing 'differentiation' (evolution from the simple to the complex), or the law of the 'recapitulation' of evolution in the development of i n d i v i d u a l s imposed by Haeckel o n all the anthropological disciplines inspired b y biological evolutionism. We c a n now rerurn to M a r x . The specific object to which he applied evolutionary schemas was the history of 'social formations', which h e regarded a s determined by their 'modes of production'. As we have seen above, there is i n his writings a progressive line of evolution of modes of production. This c l a s s i fi e s a l l societies i n terms of an intrinsic criterion: socialization,

iust) . 1 2

Finally, a representation of hisrory a s progress may reinforce the idea of change with that of a constantly increasi'1g capacity to change a n d it is here, particularly, that the emphasis placed on education may come to be linked i n t e rn a l l y with the idea of pmgress. We then come to a fourth component of classical theories of progress which is, in a sense, the most important politically, but which i s also philosophically the most problem atic: the idea t h a t rhe transforma t i o n i s a transformation of one

1 8 8 8 ) that

' ''Progress'' i s merely a m o d e r n i d e a , t h a t is t o say a false i d e a , ' 1 6

self, a self-transformation or, more precisely, a self-mgenderiltg

i n which the a u t o n o m y of subjects i s realized. ! 3 Even the mastery of natural forces and the conquest of the planet's resources must be conceived, in the last analysis, i n this perspective. As Marx s a i d i n the 1844 Manl/scripts, industry and the sciences of nature are 'the open book of the essent i a l powers of m a n ' . 14 As a result, we see re-emerging here the problem of praxis, but in this case what is being conceptualized is not an i n d i v i d u a l , but a collec tive transformation. This is, by definition, a secular idea, or at least one contrary t o any representation of the course of history as the product of a divine will. lut it is not necessa rily incom patible with various transformations of the theological schemas of the ' p l a n ' or 'economy' of nature. The difficulty i s to think this in an immanent way, i.e. without bringing i n a n y force or principle external to the process itself.

92

THE P H I LOSOPHY OF M A R X

TIME AND PROGRESS

93

i.e. the capacity for i n d i v i d u a l s collectively t o control their own condition 5 0 f existence. And that line is a single one, which means n o t only that it a l l o w s u s to determine advances and lags (either

existent teleology a n d yet asserts t h a t t h e m o t o r of transfor m a t i o n i s n o t h i n g other than t h e ' s c i e n t i fi c a l l y observa b l e ' contradictions o f m a t e r i a l Iife. 1 7 It is t h u s n o w o n d e r t h a t it h a s c o n s t a nt l y b e e n subjected to divergent interpretations and been m a d e the object of perennial recastings in the history o f 'historical m a t e r i a l i s m ' . Determination in t h e l a s t instance
The text o f the Preface t o A Conmbuti.n to the Critique of PolitIcal economy of 1 8 5 9 has long been seen as the canonical exposition of the 'materialist conception o f history', even though it is, quite explicitly, o n l y a programme. for better o r worse, MarXIsts h a v e devoted thousands o f pages t o i t . T h e expression, 'determination i n the l a s t instance', w h i c h I t h a s become customary to seek t o clarify o n the basIs o f these pages, i s not employed there as such. It was coined later by Engels: 'the determining element in history is, in the last I n s / a n ce, the production and reproduction o f real life . . . Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the eCOn0I111<: element i s the ollly determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, absurd phrase' (letter to B l oc h , 2 1 September 1 8 9 0, In M a r x a n d Engels, Selected Correspo"dellce, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1 9 7 5 j translation m o d i fi e d ) . Comparison of these twO texts and the commentaries [0 which they have given rise does. however, suggest that Engels's formulation still lacks an element of dear demarcation from economisnl, even tcchnologism, since these 'deviations' have recurred continually i n the application of the Marxian schema o f the detemtination of the different levels or instances 0 f social practice. This dearly has to d o with the fact that, no marter how subtle the dialectici7.a tion o r reciprocal action whkh it licenses between the whole socity ('social formation') and the mode o f production, o r the 'cconomic base' alld the 'politicoideological superstructure', o r the productive forces ana forms o f property, 'dete rmination i n the last instance' ultimately only brmgs out the more absolutely the teleology o f historical development. It IS, then, easy to understand why, at the same tIme u h e wrote 'the lonely hour o f the "last instance" never comes' ('Contradiction and Over deter mination', in For Marx, p. 1 1 3 ) , Althusser proposed to substitute for rhe notions o f rcciprocal action and retroaction o f the superstructurcs on the base, that o f 'overdetermination', which expresses the irreducible complexity o f the 'social whole' posited b y the matcrialist dialectic.

between societies, o r in the course of their p o l i t i c a l history), but

it establishes a necessary relation between the 'beginnings' and the 'end' o f history (even if that end, communism, is conceived a s the beginning of another history). These conceptions have become familiar the world over, a n d M a r x h i m s e l f found some striking formulations to express them. It might even be said that the M a r x i s t tradition has never done a n y t h i n g more than provide a gloss on these formulations, some o f which 1 h a v e mentioned above. Comparing them, we c a n c learly see t h a t the idea of progressive evolution in M a r x is inseparable from a thesis o n the rationality o f history conjuncrures.
or,

i f one prefers, the intelligibility o f i t s forms, tendencies and

A schema o f causality (dialectic I) This t h e s i s is i n i t i a l l y expressed, a s t h e text of t h e Preface to the COlltributioll to the Critique of Political Economy indicates, in the f o r m o f a schema o f historical causality. Being itself not an item o f knowledge, but a p r o g r a m m e o f investigation and e x p l a n a t i o n , it is stated in q u a l i t a t ive, i f not indeed meta p h o r i c a l , terms: 'base' and 'superstructllre', 'productive forces' a n d ' r e l a t i o n s of p r ()dm;tion', ' m a t e ri a l life' a n d 'consciousness' are not realities i n themselves, but categories awaiting concrete application. Some arise directly out of history and political economy, w h e r e a s others a r e i m p o r t e d from the philosophical tradition. This schema o f causality is o f comparable importance
t o other theoretical innovations in the explanation o f reality:

for example, the Aristotelian schema o f the 'four causes'; o r the Newtonian schema o f force o f auracrion, matter ('force o f inertia') and void; o r the D a r w i n i a n schema o f individual v a r i a t i o n a n d ' n a t u r a l selection'; o r the Freudian schema o f t h e agencies o f t h e ' p s y c h i c a l a p p a r a t u s ' . In the f o r m in which we e n c o u n t e r it here, we h a v e to a d m i t t h a t there is within t h i s schema a n almost u n b e a r a b l e tension, since it both entirely subordinates the historical process to a pre-

We s h a l l see that the arguments of Capital add, correctives, then a t l e a s t

a

if n o t

g r e a t e r degree o f c o m p l e x i t y t o t h i s

general s c h e m a . In f a c t , t h o s e arguments s e t out t h e 'process' o r 'development' o f social relations a t three levels o f d i m i n i s h i n g generality.

94

T H E P H i l O S O P H Y OF M A R X

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First o f a l l , a s i n t h e previous text, w e fi n d here t h e l i n e of progress o f the successive modes o f production (Asiatic, slave, feudal, capitalist and communist), which provides a pr inc iple o f intelligibil ity for the succession o f concrete s o c i a l formations. T h i s level is the most o p e n l y fi n alistic: it derives, m o d i fi e d only by a 'materialist inversion" from the way Hegel a n d other philo sophers o f history organized the epochs of universal history ('oriental despotism' becomes the ' A s i a t i c mode of production', the 'ancient world' becomes the ' s l a v e m o d e . . . ' etc.). B u t it is also the most deterministic: n o t o n l y in its linearity, b u t in the w a y it grounds the irreversible time o f history in a law o f the un interrupted development o f the productivity of h u m a n labour. Let us note, however, that this is an o v e r a l l determination and, in its d e t a i l e d working-out, obstacles
ro

were greatly influenced by the Saint-Simonian t r a d i t i o n , m u s t be a b a n d o n e d . T h e p o i n t i s c l e a r l y n o t t o counterpose t h e inher ently progressive m o b i l i t y of the productive forces to the fixi t y o f b o u r g e o i s property ( i n the w a y that K e y n e s o r Schum peter were later to counterpose the entrepreneur o r i n d u s t r i a l i s t to the fi n a n c i a l speculator). W h a t we have here is a g r o w i n g contra diction between t w o tendencies: the socialization o f production (concentration, rationalization, universalization o f technology) and the trend towards the fragmentation o f labour-power, towards super-exploitation, a n d insecurity for the working class. The c las s struggle intervenes crucially, then, as the agency w h i c h effects the necessary process o f r e s o l u t i o n o f the contra diction. O n l y a struggle organized on t h e basis o f t h e 'poverty" 'oppression' a n d 'anger' o f the p r oletarians can 'expropriate the expropriators' a n d lead to the 'negation o f the negatio n ' , i . e . the reappropriation o f their own forces absorbed i n the constant movement o f the v a l o r ization o f c a p i t a l . T h i s p o i n t is a l l t h e m o r e important a s M a r x s p e a k s here o f necessity a n d even o f ineluctable necessity. It is quite evident that this is not the sort of necessity which might be imposed from outside on the working class, but a necessity constituted in its own activity o r practice o f l iberation. The p o l i t i c a l character of the process is u n d e r l i n e d by the i m p l i c i t use o f the m o d e l of t h e F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n - w i t h the m i n o r difference t h a t the domination to be ' s w e p t a w a y ' here is not t h a t o f monarchic power, but the domination o f c a p i t a l i n the organization o f social p r o d u c t i o n . Although it oppresses it, capital is not a n 'outsider' to its people. Indeed, c a p i t a l produces 'its own gravediggers': an i l l u m i n a t i n g , but problematic, a n a l ogy. Finally, M a r x devotes n u m e r o u s a n a l y s e s to a tbird level of development, which is even more specific: the transformation o f the mode o f production itself or, to put it i n o t h e r terms, the process o f a c c u m u l a t i o n . In the central chapters o f Capital devoted to t h e ' p r o d u c t i o n of a b s o l u t e a n d relative s u r p l u s v a l u e ' , t o t h e struggle o v e r t h e w o r k i n g d a y a n d t o t h e v a r i o u s stages o f t h e i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n ( m a n ufacture, m a c h i n o facture, large-scale i n d u s t r y ) , it is not t h e m e r e quantitative result which interests h i m - the increasing c a p i t a l ization of money a n d means of production - but the development o f the workers' s k i l l s , factory legislation, the a n t a g o n i s m between

t h a t development, stagnation

a n d even reversion to an earlier stage are n o t excluded. At this level, the class struggle figures n o t so m u c h a s the principle o f explanation, b u t m o r e a s the o v e r a l l outcome. Each mode o f p r o d u c t i o n h a s its corresponding f o r m s o f property, its mode o f development o f the productive forces, a n d its relations between State a n d economy, a n d tberefore a certain f o r m o f t h e c l a s s s t r u g g l e . T h a t struggle i s not o f t h e s a m e o r d e r when i t is between l o r d s a n d their serfs o r metayers as when i t is between capitalists a n d their workers. 18 The end o r supersession of the c l a s s struggle in a communist society might ultimately be seen a s just one consequence o f this evolution. We come back here to the comparative t a b l e e v o k e d i n the analysis o f c o m m o d i t y fetishism, but t h i s t i m e it is s i m p l y ordered in t i m e . T h e instance o f the class struggle Now, i n Capital, Marx sought to focus o n a much more specific object. And not without reason, since that object brought the necessity o f revolution into play. We are speaking, of course, o f the ' c o n t r a d i c t i o n ' between the relations o f production and the development of the productive forces and the form that contradiction assumes in c a p i t a l i s m . It i s important to read the texts very carefully here. T h e formulations which have been sanctioned by Marxist orthodoxy, following the lead o f E n g e l s i n Anti-Dubring ( b u t a l s o o f M a r x h i m s e l f i n The

Poverty of Pbifosopby a n d the Communist Mmtifes t o ) , w h i c h

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wage-earners a n d capitalist management, the ratio o f employed workers to unemployed (and hence the competition between potential workers), The class struggle intervenes h re in an even more specific way on both sides at once: on the side o f t h e capitalists, a l l o f w h o s e 'methods f o r producing surplus-value' are methods o f exerting pressure o n 'necessary labour' a n d the degree o f autonomy enjoyed by t h e workers; and o n the side o f the proletarians w h o s e resistance t o e x p l o i t a t i o n l e a d s capital endlessly to seek new methods. With the precise result that the class struggle itself becomes a factor o f accumulation, a s can be from the w a y i n which t h e l i m i t a t i o n o f the working day mdlrectly leads to 'scientific' methods o f labour organizatio ? and technological innovation, or to what Marx terms t h e transI tion from 'absolute' to 'relative surplus-value' (Capital, Vol u m e

This is precisely t h e first meaning we c a n give to the idea of dialectic: a logic or form o f explanation specifically adapted to t h e determinant intervention of class struggle i n the very fabric o f history. Althusser w a s right, in this connection, to stress t h e w a y Marx transformed t h e earlier f o r m s o f dialectic - particularly its H e g e l i a n forms (whether w e are speaking o f the 'master-slave' confrontation i n the P henomenology or t h e 'division o f s u b j e c t and object' in t h e Logic). Not t h a t he does not owe anything to those forms (in a sense, he owes everything to them since he never stopped working on t h e m ) , b u t he only does so nsofar a s he inverts the relation between the speculative 'figures' and the concrete a n a lysis o f concrete s i t u a t i o n s ( t o use Lenin's phrase). S i t u a t i o n s do n o t provide i l l u s t r a t i o n s o f pre existing dialectical moments. They are, rather, themselves types o f process or d i a l e c t i c a l develo p m e n t , the series of which may properly be regarded a s open-e n d e d . This, a t least, is the

1, Parts 3 and 4), The class struggle even comes i n from a third side, namely that o f the State, w h i c h is an o b j e c t o f st ruggle for
, the contending class forces, and which the aggravation o f the contradiction causes to intervene in the l a b o u r process itself, i n t h e form o f increasingly organic 'sodal regu l a t i o n ' . 1 9 I f I h a v e g o n e i n t o these rather m o r e technical arguments at some length, it is primarily to convince the reader that the problems of the philosophy of history in Marx sh ? uld not be discussed at the level of the most general declarations, b u t a t t h a t o f analyses, w h i c h i s a l s o t h e level o f t h e m a x i m u m clarifi c a t i o n o f concepts. T h e point is quite simply t o treat M a r x a s a theorist: what g o e s for the f o r m s of consciousness in Hegel als o . applies to the mode o f production in M a r x . 'Reading Capita ' IS

direction in w h i c h Marx's w o r k sets out.

T h e ' b a d side' o f history But this thoroughgoing change o f perspective merely brings o u t all the more c l e a r l y the difficulties, i f not i n d e e d t h e aporias, t h i s p r o j e c t o f rationality e n c o u n t e r s . We h a v e fi r s t to c arify the , , meaning of that project, before returmng to the way In w h i c h , ultimately, the relations between 'progress' a n d ' d i a l e c t i c ' a r e established in Marx. A striking f o r m u l a t i o n can serve a s our guide here: 'History advances by its bad s i d e . ' Marx h a d used this i n The Poverty of , category or form, t r i e d to detect its 'good side', the sl e by which justice was a d v anced.20 But it goes beyond t h a t particular application and r e b o u n d s upon its author: Marx's theory , w a s itself, in his own lifetime, brought up a g a m s t the fact t h a t history advances b y t h e b a d s i d e , the s i d e t h e theory h a d not foreseen, the side w h i c h challenges its representa t i o n o f neces sity a n d , ultimately, challenges the certainty - wh ich it believes it can draw from the facts themselves - that history does indeed

still worthwhile today. But I a l s o w a n t to d r a w the followmg conclusion: i t is precisely the combination o f the three levels of analysis, from the general line o f development o f the w h ? le society to the d a i l y antagonism w i t h i n t h e l a b o u r process, which makes u p what Marx m e a n s by the r a t i o n a l i t y o f historical explanation. To put it in more philosophical ter s, i t follows . from this that Marx resorted less a n d less to pre-exlstmg models o f explanation and increasingly constructed a rationality w h i c h h a d no r e a l precedent. T h a t r a t i o n a l i t y is neither the rationality of mechanics, physiology or b i o l o g i c a l e v o l u tion, nor t h a t of a formal theory of conflict or strategy, though it h a s recourse to a l l o f these from t i m e t o t i m e . In the incessant transformation o f its conditions and forms, the class struggle is its own model.

, Philos.phy against Proud hon, who, in the case o f each SOCial

advance and that it i s not, like life for Macbeth, ' a tale told by
an idiot, full o f sound and fury, signifying nothing'.

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W h e n M a r x deploys h i s irony a t Proudhon's expense, w h a t h e i s d o i n g is rejecting a moralizing, optimistic ( a n d t h u s , ultimately, conformist) version o f h i s t o r y . Proudhon h a d been the first to attempt to a d a p t Hegelian schemas to the develop ment o f 'economic contradictions' and t h e a d v e n t o f social justice. His conception o f the progress o f justice was based o n the i d e a that solidarity a n d freedom w e r e compelling values by virtue o f the very univ ersality they represented. Marx (in 1 8 4 6 ) was a t p a i n s t o remind h i m t h a t history does n o t proceed 'by the good side' - i . e . by virtue o f the i n t r i n s i c force a n d excellence o f h u m a n i s t i c i d e a l s . Nor, even less, is it made b y force of con viction a n d moral education, but b y the ' p a i n of the negative', the clash o f interests, t h e violence o f crises a n d revolutions. I t is n o t so much the epic of r i g h t as the d r a m a o f a civil war between classes, even if that war does not necessarily take a military form. This w a s s t r i c t l y in k e e p i n g with the spirit o f Hegel, w h o m Proudh o n a n d other representatives o f reformism h a d v e r y badly misunderstood in this respect. Now, t h i s is a demonstration w h i c h , precisely because i t i s in accord with t h a t spirit, cannot but give fresh impetus to o u r question. N o t h i n g , ultimately, is m o r e in keeping with the idea o f a guaranteed final outcome than a dialectic o f the 'bad side', understood i n this sense. F o r i t precisely h a s the function o f showing - a n d this i s indeed the case with Hegel - that the rational end of historical development (whether we term it resolution, reconc i l i a t i o n or synthesis) is sufficiently powerful to

Tak i n g this critical t h r u s t t o its extreme, w e come t o a p o s i t i o n f o r m u l a t e d by B e n j a m i n in the n i n t h o f h i s Theses o n the

Philosophy of History, a work we h a v e a l r e a d y cited above:

This i s h o w o n e pictures the a n g e l o f history. H i s face i s t u r n e d toward

the past. Whe r e w e perceive a chain of events, he sees a single catas t r o phe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it i n front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make
has gOt caught in h i s wings with sucb v i o l e n c e that the angel can no

whole what has been smashed. But a storm is b l o w i n g from Paradise; it l o nge r close them. T h i s storm i rr esi st i b l y propels him in t o th e fut u r e

to

skyward. This storm is what we call p r og r e ss . 2 1

w h i c h h i s back is turned, w h i l e t h e p i l e of debris before him grows

History n o t o n l y advances ' b y its b a d s i d e ' , b u t a l s o to the bad side, the side of d o m i n a t i o n and r u i n . This is a text in w h i c h , beyond 'vulgar Marxism' and beyond Marx, one must surely detect a t e r r i b l e i r o n y directed p a r ticularly a g a i n s t that passage i n the Introduction to Hegel's Lectures o n the Philosophy of

History which describes the r u i n of p a s t societies a s the condi

tion of the progress o f spirit, i . e . the conservation o f w h a t was universal i n t h e ' p r i n c i p l e s ' o f those societies.ll P role tarian ideology m i g h t be said to b e based o n t h e blood-stained i l l u s i o n o f resuming a n d c o n t i n u i n g t h i s movement, w h i c h h a s always served n o t to l i b e r a t e t h e e x p l o i t e d b u t to e s t a b l i s h l a w a n d order. There then remains, as t h e only p r o s p e c t o f s a l v a t i o n , the h o p e of a caesura o r an unforeseeable interruption of time, a 'messianic cessation o f h a p p e n i n g ' which would ' b l a s t a s p e c i fi c era out of the homogeneous course o f history' (thesis XVII), a n d offer the dominated, the 'defeated' o f t h e whole of history the improbable chance o f giving a meaning to their scattered, o b s c u r e struggles. A p r o s p e c t w h i c h still presents itself as revo lutionary but not a s dialectical, p r i m a r i l y i n that i t r adi cally disqualifies t h e i d e a o f practice, o r o f l i b e r a t i o n a s transformation b y one's o w n l a b o u r s . Is there, then, a p o s s i b l e p a t h between Hegel's a n d Benjamin's ' b a d sides' f o r a Marxist dialectic? I f t h i s was indeed the case historically, in the sense a t least t h a t but for Marx (and b u t for Marx's difference from Hege l ) , such a c r i t i q u e of Hegel w o u l d never have been made, o u r task m u s t be to investigate t h e extent to which this h i s t o rical singularity fi n d s a corresponding theoretical

come about through its opposite - unreason (violence, p a s s i o n ,

poverty) - a n d , i n t h i s s e n s e , to s u b j ugate o r a b s o r b t h a t oppo site. I t might even b e said, by a c i r c u l a r form o f argument, that i t is the capacity i t displays f o r converting war, suffer ing and injustice into factors of peace, prosperity and justice which p r o v e s t h e potency and universality of this dialectic. I f we can today read Hegel's work as something other than a long 'theodicy' (as h e himself put it, taking the term from L e i b n i z ) - i.e. a d e m o n st r a t i o n t h a t 'evil' in history is a l w a y s p a r t i c u l a r and r e l a t i v e , w h e r e a s t h e p o s i t i v e e n d f o r which it p r e p a r e s t h e ground i s u n i v e r s a l a n d a b s o l u t e - d o w e n o t owe t h i s to t h e w a y i n w h i c h t h a t w o r k h a s been transformed by M a r x ? A n d even more to the way i n which the Marxist transformation of the dialectic h a s historically run u p against its own l i m i t s ?

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formulation. B u t this i s something w e c a n n o t discuss i n isolation from t h e events which c u t across t h e path of theory. Real contradiction (dialectic

'integral', a s i t were - b u t the 'differential', the 'acceleration' effect, and hence the relation o f forces in p l a y at a n y p a r t i c u l a r moment, dete r m i n i n g the direction o f its a d v a n c e . What inter ests him, then, is the w a y that 'labour-power' - i n d i v i d u a l l y a n d , above a l l , collectively - resists a n d tends t o elude the status o f pu re c o m m o d i t y i m p o s e d o n i t by t h e l o g i c o f capital. The i d e a l e n d point o f su c h a l o g i c w o u l d be w h a t M a r x ( o p p o s i n g this to a merely formal 'subsumption' limited to the l a b o u r contract) terms the real submission or ' s u b s u m p t i o n ' o f labour-power: an existence f o r the workers which is wholly determined by the needs o f capital (skilling or de-skilling, unemployment or over work, austerity or forced consumption, as required).23 But that limit point is historically inaccessible. In other words, Marx's analysis tends to bring out t h e element o f material impossibility contained in the capitalist mo d e of p r o d u c t i o n : t h e irreducible minimum its particular ' t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m ' runs lip against and from which the revolutionary practice o f the collective worker in its turn starts out. We h a v e already been told in the Manifesto that the struggle of the workers begins with their very existence. And Capital shows that the first m om e nt of that struggle is the existence of a

n)

As I h a v e pointed out above, M a r x encountered the ' b a d side' o f history at least twice: in 1 8 4 8 and 1 8 7 1 . I suggested that the theory o f Capital was also, in a sense, a long-delayed, remark a b l y developed, but unfinished response to the failure o f the revolutions o f 1 8 4 8 , to the 'decomposition' o f the proletariat which w a s to have 'decomposed' bourgeois society. Is i t so surprising, then, that we can also read there the internal critique of the idea of progress ? Marx hardly e v e r uses this term (Fortschritt, Fortgang) in Capital, except to counterpose to it, in t h e spirit of Fourier, the picture of the cyclical ravages of c a p i t a l i s m (the 'orgiastic' squandering o f resources and human lives that is its ' r a t i o n a l i t y ' ) . H e only u s e s i t , t h e n , in an ironic s e n s e : so long as t h e contra diction between the 'socialization o f the productive forces' and the 'desocialization' of h u m a n beings is not resolved, the talk o f progress to be found i n bourgeois p h i l o s o p h y a n d political economy can never b e anything but a mockery a n d a mystifica tion. But the contradiction can only be resolved - or d i m i n i s h e d - by a change in t h e developmental tendency, b y t h e affirmation o f a counter-tendertcy. This is where the second aspect emerges: w h a t interests M a r x is not progress, b u t t h e process, w h i c h he m a k e s t h e dialectical concept par excellence. Progress is not something given or pre programmed; it can only resul t from the development of the antagonisms w h i c h comprise the process a n d , a s a consequence, it is always relative to those antagonisms. Now, process is neither a moral (spiritualist) concept, n o r an economic ( n aturalist) one. It i s a logical and political concept: the more logical for being built o n a return to the idea - going back beyond Hegel - t h a t contrad ictions a r e irreconcilable; the m o r e political f o r h a v i n g to seek its 'real conditions', a n d thus its necessity, in its apparent opposite: the s p h e r e o f l a b o u r a n d e c o n o m i c life. We may express all this in a different w a y , employing a math ematical metaphor Marx used a great deal: what interests h i m is n o r s o much the general form the graph o f history takes - the

collective of workers, either in t h e factory or enterprise o r outside i t i n t h e t o w n o r city, i n politics ( b u t i n reality a l w a y s between these t w o spaces, m o v i n g from t h e o n e to t h e o t h e r ) . It
is a presupposition o f the ' w a g e f o r m ' that workers
are

treated

exclusively a s i n d i v i d u a l persons, so that their labour-power c a n be bought a n d s o l d a s a t h i n g o f greater or lesser v a l u e , so that they can be 'disciplined' and 'made respon sib l e'. B u t the collec tive is a n ever self-renewing precondition o f production itself. III reality, there are always two overlapping coflectives o f workers, made u p of the same i n d i v i d u a l s (or almost) and yet incompati ble: a capital-collective and a proletariat-collective. Without the latter, engendered b y t h e resistance to capitalist collectivization, the capitalist 'autocrat' c o u l d n o t himself e x i s t .

Towards historicity
This is the second sense of the 'dialectic' in Ma rx, which refines the first. The capitalist mode o f production - the 'basis' o f w h i c h

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i s also 'revolutionary' - cannot b u t change. The question then becomes: change in what direction? lts movement, says Marx, is an endlessly deferred i m p o s s i b i l i t y . Not a moral impossibility o r a 'contradiction in terms', b u t what might b e c a l l e d a real

reversal is not a reduction, s t i l l less the s u b s t i t u t i o n of a n a t u r a l determinism f o r h i s t o r i c a l causality. O n c e a g a i n , a s i n t h e Theses

on

F eu erba ch , we h a v e left behind t h e alternative of subjectivism

and 'old materia l i s m ' , b u t this time we h a v e done so on firmly materialist or, in a n y event, immanent lines. In this regard, contradiction is a more decisive operator than praxis (which it nonetheless i n c l u d e s ) . However, t h i s d o e s n o t remove t h e q u e s t i o n o f h o w a c o n c e p t i o n o f h i s t o r i c i t y as ' r e a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n ' , d e v eloping a m o n g contemporary tendencies, c o u l d c o e x i s t w i t h a representation o f the 'totality of histOry' made up of evolutiona.ry stages a. n d successive revo l u t i o n s . It even renders it more acute. Now, in

contradiction, equally d istinct from b o t h a purely form a l contra

diction (abstract terms which exclude each other by d e fi n i t i o n ) , a n d a mere real opposition ( o f e x t e r n a l forces a c t i n g in opposite directions, where one can calculate the outcome o r the point of e q u i l i b r i u m ) . 2 4 The entire o r i g i n ality o f the Marxist dialectic lies, then, i n the possibility o f unreserv edly t h i n k i n g that con tradiction ;s Itot an ,2,pearatlce, even 'in the final tally' . r 'at i n fi n ity'. I t i s not even a ' r u s e ' o f nature, like Kantian u ns o c ia b le
sociability, o r a 'ruse' of reason, l i k e Hege l i a n alienation.

1 8 7 1 , M a r x once a g a i n encountered t h e ' b a d side' of history a n d ,

a s I h a v e s a i d , t h e p ractical r e s u l t w a s t h e interruption o f h i s enterprise. He d i d n o t stop w o r k i n g , b u t from t h a t moment o n h e w a s certain t h a t h e c o u l d no longer ' fi n i s h ' h i s work, t h a t h e c o u l d n o t c o m e to a ' c o n c l u s i o n ' . There would be n o cone/usion. It is, however, worthwhile examining the

Labour-power k e e p s on b e i n g transformed into a commodity and thereby enters the form o f the capitalist collective (which, in the strong s e n s e , is capital itself as a ' s o c i a l r e l a t i o n ' ) . Yet such a process involves an incoercible r e s i d u e , both in the i n d i v i d u a l s a n d in t h e collective ( o n c e a g a i n , t h i s o p p o sition does n o t seem pertinent). A n d it is this material i m p o s s i b ility w h i c h inscribes the reversal o f the capitalist tendency i n necessity, whatever the point at which it occurs. T h e three questions o f contradiction, t emp o ra l i ty a n d s oc i a l
izati011 are, therefore, strictly i n d i s s o c i a b l e . We can clearly see

rectifications

prompted by t h i s new s i t u a t i o n . We k n o w of at least two. One w a s conjointly determined b y Bakunin's a t t a c k on the 'Marxist dictatorship' w i t h i n the International a n d b y M a r x ' s disagree ment with the draft programme drawn up by L i e b k n e c h t and Bebel in 1 8 7 5 for the unification congress o f German socialists. That rectification led t o the raising o f w h a t came to be k n o w n w i t h i n Marxism as t h e q u e s t i o n o f ' t r a n s i t i o n ' . T h e o t h e r recti fication, which followed immed iately, arose out of the need to reply to theorists o f R u s s i a n p o p ulism a n d socialism w h o questioned Marx on the future of the ' r ur a l commune'

what is a t stake here: it is what the p h i l o s o p h i c a l tradition since D i l t h e y and Heidegger has called a theory of h i st ori c i t y. W h a t w e mean b y t h i s is t h a t the problems o f fi n a l i t y or meaning, which are posed at the level o f the course o f the history o f humanity considered imaginarily as a totality - brought together in a single ' I d e a ' o r a s i n g l e g r a n d narrative - are replaced by problems o f cau sality or o f reciprocal action on the p a r t o f the 'forces o f h i s t o r y ' - problems w h i c h a r e posed at every moment, in every

(obshchina ) . Here the question o f ' n o n - c a p i t a l i s t development'

w a s posed. Neither rectification put in d o u b t the schema of causality. But both induced a degree o f wavering in the relation o f M a r x a n d h i s d ia l e c t i c to t h e representation o f time.

present. The importance of M a r x in t h i s connection is that, no

doubt for the first time since Spinoza's conatus ('effort' ) , the question of historicity (or of the 'differential' of the movement, i n s t a b ility a n d tension w i t h i n the present which are carrying it towards its own transformatio n ) is posed in the element of practice, and n o t in that of consciousness, posed on the basis of production a n d the c o n d itions o f production, not o f repre sentation a n d the life of the m i n d . Now, in spite of the cries of alarm uttered preventively b y i d e a l i s m , it turns out that this

T h e t r u t h o f economism (dialectic

III )

In t h e year s f o l l o w i n g the repression o f t h e C o m m u n e a n d the dissolution of the I n r e rn a t i o n a l (officially announced in 1 87 6 , but i n practice a r e a l i t y after t h e H a g u e Congress o f 1 87 2 ) , i t became very clear t h a t t h e 'proletarian politics' M a r x regarded

104

T H E I' H I L O S e P H Y OF M A R X

T I M E AND P R O G R E S S

105

imse f a advocating, and for w h i c h h e believed h e wa s provid

m g sCientific foundations w i t h Capital, had no sure foothold i n the ideological configuration o f the ' l a b o u r ' o r 'revolutionary'

so many activists subscribe to other ideologies or other 'systems', why an organization or an is necessary, over against

institution

the bourgeois State, to educate t h e m and instil discipline in them. Certainl},. we are a l o n g wa}' here from the 'universal class' heralding the imminent arrival of c o m m u n i s m .

m ovments. The dominant tendencies were reformist a nd syn . dlcahst, whether parliamentary or anti-parliamentary . The most significant event, in this connection, was the formation of t he 'Marxist' parties, foremost a m o n g them the German Social Democrats . After the death of Lassa l l e (Marx's old rival and like h i m , a leader of the 1848 revolution) a n d the esta blishmen

T h e withering away

of the State

of the German Reich, they had come together a s a single party a t the Gotha Congress, with Marx's disciples, Bebel and Lieb kn cht, ta ing the lead. Marx read their draft programme, . which was msplred by 'scientific socialism', and discovered that being built around the i d e a of a 'people's stare' it i

The Randglosse1l (marginal notes) o n B a k u n i n and on the Gotha Program me giv o direct answer to this question . But they . do prOVide an m d l r e c t response by introducing the notion of transition:
Between c a i t a l i S t a n d c o m m u n i s t society lies a period o f revelutionary o f transition in the p o l i t i c a l sphere and i n [his period the State can o n l y take t h e form of a transformation from one to the other. There i s a corresponding period

(Volksstaat),

fact combined a utopianism of total redistribution of the social product to t h e workers with a 'state religion' which did not even e c1ude nationalism . Now, h e had shortly before been very violently attacked by Bakunin, who had denounced Marxism

reuohttienary di'tatershlp of the proletariat.27

or

its twofold dictatorial a m b i t i o n , its aim being, as he saw

It, to achieve a 'scientific' dictatorship of the leaders over the ['ank-and-file (the party being modelled on the State i t claimed to combat) a nd a 'social' dictatorship of the 'workers' over the other exploited classes (the peasants, in particular), and thus o f industrial nations over agrarian ones like Russia. M a r x thus found h i m s e l f trapped between t h e Scylla o f his opponents and the Charybdis o f his supporrers.25 At the very point when Matxism wa s presenting itself as the means by which the revo lutionary class could escape the perennial dilemma of mere incorporation into the 'democratic' w i n g of bourgeois politics or

And, shortly before, Marx outlines a distinction between two phases of communist society, one in which commodity exchange a d t he wage fo : m are s t i l l dominant a s the principles o f orga . mz tlon o f sO lal I bour, another in w h i c h 'the enslaving . . subjugation o f mdlvlduals to the division of labour' h a s 'dis appeared' and in which 'labour is n o longer just a means of keeping alive, but has itself become a vital need', which will make i t possible once and for all to transcend 'the narrow horizon o f bourgeois right' a nd order social relations by the principle: 'from each according to h i s abilities, to e ac h according to h is . nee d s I. ' . 28 T h ese m d ICatiOnS, ta k en as a whole, constitute an advance description of the withering away

anti-polit cal anarchism (or anarcho-syndica l i s m ) , the question

once agam arose of whether, strictly speaking, there was such a thing as a Marxist politics. Now, in a way, Marx anticipated t h e answer to this question. There could be n o Marxist politics other than that which arose from the movement historr itself a n d h e took as h i s example . he direct democracy . mvented by t h e P a r i s Commune, the 'polit Ical form at last discovered under which to work o u t the o f a new definition o f {he dictatorship

of the State

in the

transition to communism or, more exactly, an anticipation of the historical moment (however long it may last) i n which a mass politics will unfold which has as its content t h e withering away o f the State. The tradition o f orthodox Marxism ( a n d particularly that of state Marxism i n the socialist countries from the late twenties onwards) read these indications as a n embryonic theory o f the

economical emancipation o f labour',26 which h e made the core

stages or phases of the 'period of transition' to the 'class

less' societ}', a theory which culminated in the definition of

of the proletariat. But that

answer does n o t enable us to understand why so many workers,

socialism

- as di st i nct

from communism

as a specific 'mode

T H E P H I L O S O P H Y OF M A R X
o f production', a conception w h i c h has since collapsed w i t h the socialist States themselves and their systems. Quite apart from its legitimation functions ( w h a t Marx w o u l d have termed i ts 'apologetic' functions), this use fitted q u i t e n a t urally into an evolutionist schema. I do not believe t h i s w a s w h a t M a r x himself had i n m i n d . The idea of a ' s o c i a l i s t m o d e of production' totally contradicts his representation of communism as a n alter
native to capitalism, for which capitalism itself would create the

TIME

AND PROGRESS

107

categories o f Russian readers o f Capital. O n t h e o n e side were those w h o inferred from rhe l a w of the historical tendency o f capitalist accumulation (expropriation o f t h e s m a l l producers by capital, followed by the expropriation of capital by the workers ) , which was presented by Marx as 'historically inevit able', that the development of capitalism i n Russia was a prior condition for socialism; on the other, those who saw i n the vitality of the co-operative 'rural commune' the germ of what we would today call a 'non-capitalist development', prefiguring communism. Marx gave a first theoretical response to t h i s in

conditions. As for the idea of a post-revolutionary 'socialist State' or 'people's State', this reproduces almost exactly w h a t Marx criticized i n Bebel a n d Liebknecht, as H e n r i Lefebvre h a s so clearly demonst:rated . 2 O n t h e o t b e r hand, it i s clea r that the space cleared 'between capitalist and communist society', here described i n terms of periods or pbases, is the proper space of politics. All these terms do notbing but translate the return of revoluti01lary politics on this occasion as an organized
-

18 77.30 Vera Zasulich, one of the leaders of t h e 'Emancipation

of Labour' group, once again sought his opinion o n the subject in r 8 8 1 . We k n o w t h e four rough drafts he made of a reply, only a very succinct version of which was sent in the e n d . l l A single idea recurs in each of these texts. What is very striking is t h a t t h a t idea - whether or n o t i t w a s correct - i s perfectly clear. What is no less s t r i k i n g is the fact tha t Marx had t he greatest difficulty not in formulating it, but in accepting it himself.32 Firstly, the law of the historical historical circumstances:
We have to come down from the realms of pure theory to Russian the dissolunon o f c o m m u n a l property in Russia cannet under any circumstances prove that necessity using my eXpOSition of the inevitable course of events i n Western Europe. They would have to provide new arguments, quite indepeodenr of the developmei!lts

i:lctivity

into evolutionary time. A s if that time w a s to open up

or stretch out to make way, 'between' the present and the future, for a practical anticipation of the 'classless society' in the material conditions of the old one (what Lenin, in a logically revealing formula, was to term a 'State/non-State', clearly thereby marking its statlls as a question, not a n answer). Equidistant from the idea of imminence and from that of a progressive maturation, the 'transition' foreseen here by Marx is a political figure representing historical time's 'non-contemporaneity' with itself, but a figure which remains inscribed by h i m i n
prot';sionality.

tendency o f capitalist

accutfllt l ation presented in Capital does not apply irrespective of

reality to discuss this . . . those who believe I n the historical necessity of

advanced.ll

The Russian commu'ne

Secondly, the rural commune (established by the Czarist government after the abolition of serfdom i n 1 8 6 1 ) has w i t h i n i t a l a t e n t contradiction ( a n 'intimate d u a l i s m ' ) , between t h e non-market e c o n o m y a nd production for the market, which i s most l i k e l y to be aggravated a n d e x p l o i t e d by the State a n d t h e capitalist system a n d w h i c h w i l l l e a d to t h e dissolUlion o f t h e c o m m u n e ( i . e . the transformation of s o m e peasants i n t o entre preneurs and others i n t o an agricultural or i n d u s t r i a l proletariat)

A comparable opening-up c a n be found i n the correspondence Marx carried on some years later with the representatives of Russian populism and socialism . Scarcely had he finished defending himself against Bakunin's charge that be intended to create
a

hegemony o f the industrially developed countries over

the 'under-developed' ones ( i n the Preface to the first edition of

if the process is n o t interrupted: 'To save the Russian c o m m u n e ,

a Russian revolution is necessary.' Thirdly and lastly, the communal form ('a social grouping of fl'ee men, not attached by blood ties'), w h i c h h a d been preserved

Capital, we may recall, he had written t h a t the ' m o r e developed

industrially' showed ' t h e less developed . . . the image of its own future'), when he was called on to settle a quarrel between two

108

THE P H I L O S O P H Y O F M ARX

T I M E AN D P R OG RE S S

109

b y a peculiar evolution ('a u n i q u e situation unprecedented in history'), was, he wrote, an archaism, b u t that archaism might serve in the 'regeneration of R u s s i a n society', i.e. in the con struction o f a communist society, avoiding the 'antagonisms', 'crises" 'conflicts' a n d 'disasters' which h a d characterized the development o f capitalism in the West, given [hat that commu nal form was 'contemporary' (a term to which Marx insistently returns) with the most developed forms of capitalist production, the techniques o f which it would b e able to borrow from the surrounding ' m i l i e u ' . W h a t i s proposed in these texts, then, is t h e i d e a o f a concrete multiplicity of paths of historical development. But t h a t idea is indissociable from the more a b s t r a c t hypothesis that in t h e history of different social formations there is a m u l t i p l i c i t y o f 'rimes', e a c h contemporary w i t h o n e another, some o f w h i c h p r e s e n t themselves a s a c o n t i n u o u s progress i o n , whereas others effect a 'short-circu it' between the most ancient and the most recent. This 'overdetermination', a s A l t husse r would later term it, is the very form assumed by the s;,tgttlarit)' o f history. It does n o t follow a pre-existing p l a n , b u t results from the way in w h i c h distinct h i s t o r i c o - p o l i t i c a l u n i t s , i m m e r s e d in a single ' m i lieu' ( o r co-ex isting in a single 'prese n t ' ) , r e a c t to the tendencies of the mode o f production. Engels
The collaboration o f Friedrich Engels

(1820-85)

w i t h M a rx over forty

years rules out any Manichean distinctions le.g. between M a r x [he 'good dialectician' and Engels the 'bad materialist'}, b u t does not prevent us from recogniOl'ing Engels's intellectual orig inality, or assessing the extenr of rhe transformation he wrought on the M a rxist problema tic. The major moments o f his intervention came in 1844, when he published The
Condition of the Working Class in England, which conrains a much more complete version o f the critique o f wage-labour as alienation of

A n ti-evolutionism ?
' A n d so, by an astonishing turnabout, i n J u c e d by a question from outside ( a s well as the doubts about the exactness of certain of his f o r m u l a t i o n s prompted by the application 'Marxists' were currently m a k i n g of t h e m ) , Marx's economism gave b i r t h to its opposite: a set of a/tti-evolutionist hypotheses. This irony of theory i s what we might term the third p h a s e o f the dialectic in Marx. Surely it is clear, then, that there i s a latent convergence between the replies to B a k u n i n a n d Bebel and the reply to Vera Zasulich. The one is, a s i t were, t h e converse of the other: in the one case, the new a l w a y s has to make its way in what are s t i l l the o l d 'conditions', after a p o l i t i c a l rupture has occurred; in the Other, the old must short-circuit the most recent, exploiting its g a i n s 'against the current'.

tion practically amounted to the COil verse o f the theses o f The Gennall [deo/ogy; far from ideology being 'without a histoty of its own', it formed part of a history of thought, the g uiding thread of which was the contradiction between idealism and materialism, a comradiction over determined by the opposition between the 'metaphysical' mode o f think ing (what Hegel had called understanding LVerstandll and the 'dialectical' mode (which Hegel had termed reason rVernunft l ) . Clearly, the aim here was to provide Marxism with a guarantee o f scientificity in the face of the challenge from academic philosop hy. However, this project remained in abeyance, partly on account o f its intrinsic aporias and partly because this was not the main problem to be coo.fronted. That was the enigma of /Jroletarurn ideology, o r the com/llWtif world-view, as Engels preferred to call it, since thIS enabled him to avoid rhe difficulty of the n o r i o n of a 'materialist ideology'. His last texts (from l.ildwig,j'euerbach mid the End of Classical Germall Philo s ophy, published in 1 8 8 8 , to 'On the History of Early Christianity' 1 1 8 , + - 5 1 and the article 'Lawyers' Socialism', wrirren with Kautsky in 1 8 8 6 ) discuss two aspects of this problem together: the succession of the 'do minant world-views' - Le. the transition fronl religious to secular (essentially juridical) thinking and thence to a political visioll o f the world based on class struggle - and the mechanism by which collective 'beliefs' are formed in the relationship between the masses and the State. Historical materialism was, in this way, provided both with an object and a closure.

the human essence than in Marx's wrirings o f the same date, and in the period after 1875. I n reality, i t was Engels who set about giving a systematic form to 'historical materialism' a nd, in order to do s o , linking togeth e r revolutionary strategy, coniunctural analyses a n d t h e critique o f p o liti cal economy. The most interesting aspect f r o m o u r p o i n t o f view i s his reprise of the c.lIcept o f ideology from Anti-Diihring ( 1 8 78) onwards. Engels gives a ptimarily epistemological definitior. of ideology, c;:el1tJ:ed on the appearal\ce of the notions of law and motality as 'eternal verities'. In the draft manuscripts he produced in the same period, wh.ich were later ( 1 9 3 5 1 published as 'Dialectics and Natute' (see Di<lledics of Nature, trans. Clemens Duct, lawrence and Wishart, l o ndon, 1940), that defini

ZIO

THE PHILOSOPHY O F MARX

T I M E AND P R O G R E S S

111

Surely i t is a l s o the case t h a t these propositions, which in p a r t remained p r i v a t e , clandestine and w h i c h were half-erased, a r e i n implicit contradiction, i f n o t with t h e a n a l y s e s o f real contradic tion in Capital, then a t least w i t h some o f the terms Marx used twenty years earlier in the Lenin as philoso pher ?
F r o m the moment 'dialectical materialism' w a s identified w i t h 'Marxism Leninism' (as the embalmed body of the 'founder' w a s placed i n the from the 47 volumes of his Collected Works by thousands of commen tators - became something other than a philosophy. In fact, it became an obligatory reference point which alone conferred the right to speak. Today, the converse applies ( a recent exegete regards Lenininism as a psychopathological phenomenon: see Dominique Colas, I.e Leninisme, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1 9 8 2 ) , and it w i l l be a long time before anyone can really study Lenin's argumentation in its context and i. specific economy. Within French Marxism, two otherwise diametrically opposed philo sophers have each proposed free interprerations o f Lenin's relationship with philosophy. Henri Lefebvre (author o f POU t connaitre La pensee de mausoleum in Moscow's Red Square), the thought of Lenin - extracted

1 8 5 9 Preface,

when he h a d presented

his c a u s a l schema a s something closely a l l i e d t o the image of a s i n g l e l i n e of development of u n i v e r s a l history. 'No s o c i a l order is e v e r destroyed before all t h e p r o d u c t i v e forces for whi ch it is sufficient h a v e b e e n developed . . . Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such t a s k s a s it is a b l e to solve,' he wrote then.34 Now, he writes:
Bur this is too little for m y critic. I t is absolutely n e c e s s a r y for him
to

metamorphose m y historical sketch of the genesis o f c a p i t a l i s m

in Western E u r o p e i n t o a historico-philosophical t h e o r y o f g e n e r a l d e v e l o p m e n t , i m p o s e d b y fate o n all peoples, w h a t e v e r t h e h i s t o r i c a l circumstances i n w h i c h t h e y are p l a c e d , i n order

to

eventually attain

this e c o n o m i c f o r m arion w h i c h , w i t h a t r e m e n d o u s l e a p o f t h e p r o d u c t i v e forces o f s o c i a l l a b o u r , a s s u r e s t h e m o s t integral d e v e l o p m e nt of every industrial producer. But I beg his p a r d o n . This does m e honour a n d y e t puts m e
to tOO

much

Leni,le, BorJas, Paris, 1 9 5 7 a n d editor, with Norbert Gutermann, of Lenin's Cahiers sur la dialectique de Hezel, N R F, Paris, 1 9 3 8 ) drew mainly on the unpublished writings of 1 9 1 5 - 1 6 in which Lenin looked to the philosophical classics - particularly Hegel, but also Clausewitz - for the means to think war 'dialectically', as a process in which political con tra dicrions cominued to have their effects. Louis Althusser (Lenin and Phil.so/}hy anli ethel' SS4}'S, New Left Books, London, 1 9 7 1 ) , whose

s h a m e a t the s a m e time

T h u s events

strikingly a n a l o g o u s , but occurring i n different historical m i l i e u x , l e d t o q u i t e d i s p a r a t e results. By s t u d y i n g each o f these evolutions o n i t s o w n , a n d t h e n c o m p a r i n g them, o n e w i l l e a s i l y d i s c o v e r the key to the p h e n o m e n o n , but i t w i l l never be a r r i v e d a t b y e m p l o y i n g the all-purpose f o r m u l a o f a g e n e r a l historico-p h i l o s o p h i c a l theory w h o s e s u p r e m e v i r t u e consists i n b e i n g supra-historical.J5

analyses were continued by Dominique Lecourt (Une elise et son enjeu, Maspero, Paris, 1 9 7 3 ) , sought via a new reading of Materialism and Empino-Criticism ( 1 9 0 8 ) for the elements of a 'practical' conception o f philosophy, as the marking o u t o f a l i n e o f demarcation between materi alism and idealism in the complexity o f intellectual conjunctures, in which science and politics a r e mutually determinant. There are, however, other philosophical moments in Lenin, the most

Just as there is no capitalism 'in general', but only a 'historical capitalism',36 c o m p rising the encounter o f - and conflict between - many capitalisms, so there is no u n i v e r s a l history, only s i n g u l a r historicities. We can thus n o t avoid asking whether such a rectification does not necessarily h a v e repercussions upon t h e other aspects o f 'his torical materialism' - particularly on the way in which the

interesting o f which are without d o u b t : ( 1 ) t h e recasting of the i d e a o f the proletadat as 'universal class', which i s attempted i n What i s t o b e done? ( 1 9 0 2 } i n a way that r u n s counter to the idea of 'revolutionary spontaneity' and towards that of the intellectual leadership of the democratic revolution (against this position, see Rosa LLlxemburg's reply, after the 1 9 0 5 Revolution, i n The Mass Strike, the l'oliticall'arty anti the Trade U'lions 1 1 9 06j). 12 ) at the other exrreme, his rheoretical work o n the contradictions of the socialist revolution ('State' and 'non-State', waged and free labout), which runs from initial uropianism (The State alld Revolution of '1 9 1 7 ) to his last thoughts o n co-operation ('On Co-operation" 1 9 2 3 ) . On this question, see also Roben Linhart, Lenine, les paysar.rs. Taylor (l5ditions du Seuil, Paris, 1 9 76) a n d Moshe Lewin, Lenin's I,ast Struggle, trans. A . M . Sheridan-Smitb, Faber a n d Fabr, London, 1 ' 6 9 ) .

1859

Preface described t h e 'transformation' o f rhe 'superstructure' a s the mechanical consequence o f 'the changes o f t h e economic foundations' o r base. Indeed, what ae 'milieu', 'alternative', 'dualism" and ' p o l i t i c a l transition" i f n o t concepts or metaphors which require u s to think that the State and ideology react back on the economy - if t h e y do n o t indeed constitute, in certain circumstances, the very basis upon whic h the tendencies o f t h e

112

THE PHILOSOPHY O F M A R X

5
'base' o p e rate? B u t doubtless n o theorist, when h e has effectively found something new, can re-cast his own t h i n k i n g : h e does n o t h a v e t h e strength to d o i t , or t h e willpower, o r t h e 'time' . . . Others w i l l d o t h a t . A n d it is worth n o t i n g here that the 'recip rocal a c t i o n of ideology', the true notion of econ o mis m (i.e. the fact that the tendencies o f the economy are only realized through their opposite: ideologies, 'world-views', including that o f the p roletarians), was precisely Engels's research programme in the late 1 8 8 0 s . And it is true that, a hundred years later, once again facing u p to t h e bad side of history, M a r x ists are still beavering away at this p r o b l e m . Readers w h o h a v e followed me so far w i l l w ish, I a m sure, to express ( a t least) two criticisms. Firstly, they will b e t h i n k i n g , y o u have proceeded from a n account o f Marx's ideas to a discussion 'with M a r x " but h a v e d o n e so w i t h o u t clearly marking the t r a n s i t i o n . H e n c e y o u r r e a d i n e s s to project ' v o i c e s ' into the t e x t a n d t o interpret i t s s i l e n c e s o r a t least what it does not f u l l y s p e l l o u t . Secondly, t h e y w i l l a d d , y o u h a v e n o t r e a l l y provided a n
accoun t o f Marx's doctrine: i f we did n o t k n o w i t from else

Science and Revolutio n

where, we have not l e a r n t how h e defined the c l a s s struggle, how h e justified the thesis of i t s universality and its role a s the 'motor of histor.y', how h e demonstrated that the crisis o f capitalism is i n e v itable and that the o n l y possible outcome is socialism (or c o m m u n i s m ) , etc. Nor, by the same token, have you provided us with a n y way of knowing where a n d in w h a t ways he went wrong, whether anything in Marxism can b e 'salvaged', whether it is compatible or incompatible with democracy, ecology, bioethics etc. I s h a l l begin with t h i s last criticism and s h a l l unreservedly plead guilty. Having chosen to concern m y self with t h e way Marx worked in philosophy, and p h i l o s o p h y in Marx, I h a d to leave aside not

just

the 'systemic' perspective, but the doctrinal

a l s o . P h i l o s o p h y is not doctrinal . It does n o t consist in opinions, theorems o r laws of nature, consciousness or history; and certainly n o t i n stating the m o st general of those opinions o r l a w s . This p o i n t is particularly important, s i n c e t h e i d e a o f a
113

114

T H E l' H I L O S O P H Y O F M A R X

S C I E N C E AND R E V O L U T I O N

115

'general synthesis', i n w h i c h t h e class struggle i s aniculated wi t h economics, anthropology, p o li t i c s a n d epistemology, is purely and simply the model which, i n the form o f ' d i a m a t ' , was u n t i l recently the official doctrine o f the international communist movement (and, it must be said, a great many critics o f diamat share this same ideal o f 'generalization' - doing so, indeed, with no greater subtlety) . That form of thinking is, of course, inter esting in itself from the standpoint of the history o f ideas. And there i s some encouragemem for it in certain o f Marx's writings a n d even more i n those o f Engels ( w h o had to contend with the competing claims o f the 'theories o f knowledge', 'philosophies o f n a t u r e ' and 'sciences o f c u lt u r e ' of t h e last t h i r d o f the nineteenth century), It found some of its most fervent admirers among the neo-Thomists o f the Pontifical University (this amazing episode is documented i n Stanislas Breton's De Rome a Paris, Itil1eraire

The German Ideology, where i t coincides w i t h t h e division of

labour a nd with 'intercourse' (Verkehr, commerce) o r c om m un i ca t i o n, w h i c h a re forms o f development of the productive forces. We might say tha t , i n t h e one case, t h e h u m a n community (communism) comes about by the total evacuation of the old world; i n the other, by the plenitude of t h e n e w one, which is in fact already here. In the one case, revolutionary practice takes absolute priority over a l l thought ( t r u t h is merely one of its moments). I n the other, that practice is, if n o t s u b j e c t to thought, a t least presented i n a l l its various ramifications b y a science o f history . Revolution and science (revolution i n science, science o f revolutio n ) : these are the terms of an alternative wh ic h , deep down, was never resolved by Marx. This al so m e a n s that he never accepted sacrificing the one to the other, w h i c h is a mark of h i s intellectual intransigence . The second pathway is grafted on to the preceding one and runs from a critique o f the illusions an d pretensions of 'con sciousness', to a problematic of the constitution of the subject in the forms o f its alienation (an alienation i n 'things', the fetishism o f commodity circulatio n , but also an alienation in 'the person', the fetishism o f the juridical process - though I recognize that the status of the 'person' in Marx is profoundly uncertain). T h i s second p a t h is n o t a l i n e a r o n e , but forks off i n a remarkable fashion ( w i t h the abandonment of the term 'ideology'). It moves through a series o f analy ses: the 'social h ori z on ' of consciousness ( w h i c h is thar ot transindividual relations and their historical limitation); 'mtellectual difference' - an d thus domination both

p!JiLosophiq tl e ) . l
Turning m y back resolutely o n t h e idea of doctrine, I have sought to pwblematize some o f the questions which governed Marx's thought. For i f it is true, as he h i m s e l f suggested in

The German Ideology,2 that where there is 'mystification', i t is

'in [the1 very questions' asked before it is in the answers, must we not take i t that this applies a fortiori to demystification, i.e. to knowledge? I have therefore attempted to re-examine from within the theoretical impetus which ceaselessly 'shifts the angle' of these questions. To this end, I have chosen to take three path ways through Marx's work which seemed to me to afford the greatest insight (though other choices were certainly possible).

Three philosophic 1 pathways The first of these, setting out from the critique o f the classical definitions - both spiritualist-idealist and materialist-sensualist - o f the 'human essence' (what Althusser termed 'theoretical humanism', though one might also call i t speculative anthro pology), leads to the problematic of social relations . The price to be paid for this move is a significant oscillation between a radically negative, activist point of view - that of the Theses 0 1 1 Fe/erbach, whe r e t h e social relation is merely t h e actualization o f praxis - and a constructive, positive point of view - that o f

outside thought a nd within it; and, lastly, the symbolic structure o f equivalence between individuals an d their 'properties', w h i c h
is common to commodity exchange a n d ( p r i v a t e ) law. finally, there is a third pathway, running from the invention o f a schema o f causality ( w h ich is materialist in t h e sense th a t i t overturns t h e primacy o f consciousness o r spiritual forces i n the explanation o f history, b u t assigns those things a place as 'medi ations', as subordinate instances i n the hierarchy o f effectivity of the mode o f productio n ) towards a dialectic of temporality,

immanent i n the play o f the forces of history ( w h i c h are not t h i n g s ! ) , There are several outlines of this dialectic in Marx, the
m a i n one being t h a t o f 'real contradic t i o n ' , i . e . the tendencies a nd counter-tendencies to socia lization, or the antagonistic

116

T H E PHILOSOPHY OF MARX

S C I E N C E AND R E V O L U T I O N

117

realizations o f the collective, each one enwrapped i n the other, which occupies a large part of Capital. B u t i f we do not m i n d t a k i n g a few r i s k s i n t h e reading of Marx's l a s t texts, w e s h o u l d a l s o accord f u l l importance t o the i d e a of the transition from capitalism to commu nism (here the 'moment' of revo l u t i o n a r y practice m a k e s its spectacular return into the space t h a t had been occupied by the 'science o f s o c i a l formations'), a n d also to the i d e a o f alternative, singular paths of development, an i d e a which i n itself represents the rudiments o f a n internal c r i t i q u e of evolutio n i s m . The difficulty w i t h t h i s third pathway is that the temporal dialectic brought o u t here is the opposite of the one which predominates in most of Marx's general texts (though these are, ultimately, few in n u m b e r ) : the idea of a universal history o f h u m a n i t y , o f a n ascending, uniformly progressive l i n e o f evolu tion of modes o f production and social formations. We have to be honest here a n d admit that this 'materialist' and 'dialectical' evolutionism is just as Marxist a s the a n a l y s i s o f 'real contra diction' - and even that, historically, there is more justification for identifying it with Marxism. This was doubtless what Marx had in mind when h e uttered his famous remark (wittici s m ? ) : ' If anything is certain, it is that I myself a m not a Marxist' (reported by Engels to Bernstein in a letter of November

that w e position ourselves at a remove from doctrine, that we accord primacy to concepts and problematize the movement of their construction, deconstruction a n d reconstruction. B u t

I b e l i e v e we h a v e to t a k e a further s t e p a n d , w i t h o u t fear o f in
coherence, say t h a t that doctrine does n o t exist. Where, i n fact, could i t be said to b e ? In which texts? 'He did not h a v e the time', as w e know, a n d w e are speaking here of something that goes way beyond any distinction between a young or old M a r x , Marx as philosopher o r Marx as s c i e n t i s t . A l l w e have are resumes (the ] 8 5 9 Prefa c e ) , manifestoes (grandiose ones), out lines w h i c h are long a n d articulate, but which never arrive at final conclusions a n d which - as we w o u l d do well to remember here - Marx himself never published (The German Ideology, the

Grundrisse of

1857-58).

There is no doctrine; there are o n l y

fragments ( a n d , elsewhere, a n a l y s e s , demonstr a t i o n s ) .

I w o u l d not w i s h t o b e misunderstood i n t h i s : I a m n o t s a y i n g
that M a r x i s a 'postmodernist' avant fa lettre a n d I d o not mean to argue that his thought represents a deliberate pursuit of the u n fi n i s h e d . I a m tempted, rather, to believe that he never, in fact, h a d the t i m e to construct a doctrine because the process of

rectification went faster. Nor only d i d that process anticipate

his conclusions, it anticipated the critique of those conclusions. O u t of intellectual obsessiveness? Perhaps, but that obsession was subordinated to a twofold ethic: a theorist's (scientist's) ethic a n d a revolutionary's ethic. We encounter the same terms once a g a i n . He was too m u c h the theorist to 'botch' h i s con clusions, too much the revolutionary either to bow to reverses of fortune or to ignore catastrophes a n d carry on as though nothing had happened. And too m u c h the scientist and the revolutionary to surrender to the hope for a messiah (though it is indisputable that such a hope was partly i m p l i e d i n his t h i n k i n g . B u t a theorist o r politician i s not defined b y what they repress, even i f their energy derives in p a r t from it and even if what is repressed - e.g. the religious d i m e n s i o n - is part of what most surely reaches the ears of their 'disciples' or 'successors ' ) . So w e have the right then t o interpret t h e implications of what

1 8 82};3

and

Gramsci too, when he wrote his 1 9 1 7 arricle, 'The Revolution against "Capital", (another witticism), except that Capital is precisely t h e text by Marx which d i s p l a y s the liveliest tension between the two points of view.4 What is at stake in a l l this i s clearly whether, a s Volume 3 of Capital has i t , i n a formula entirely consonant with the idealist tradition in the philosophy of history, the post-ca pitalist classless society will be the passage from 'the realm of necessity' to the 'realm of freedom' ;s or whether the (present) struggle for c o m m u n i s m represents a necessary

development of freedom ( i . e . the inscription of a movement o f

liberation in its own specific m a t e r i a l conditions).

Incomplete works But let us return ro the first objection which might be directed at me. I have said that reading Marx a s a philosopher presupposes

Marx wrote. N o t to consider the fragments of h i s discourse as cards to be infinitely reshuffled at will, but, nonetheless, t o take a foothold in his 'problematics' a n d 'axiomatics' - in other words. in his 'philosophies' - and push these to their conclusions

118

THE PH1LOSOPHY OF M A R X

SCIENCE AND REVOLUTION

119

(to find the contradictions, limits a n d openings t o whi ch they l e a d ) . Thus, i n a n entirely n e w conjuncture, w e find what we can d o with and against Marx. Much of what is sketched out in his writings is far from having found its definitive form. Much of w h a t roday appears impotent, or criminal, or merely outdated in ' M a r x is m ' was already so - i f I dare put it this way - before Marx, since it was not a n invention of Marxism. However, even i f he had only confronted the question of the alternative to the ' d o m i n a n t mode of production' at

(conflictua l ) bond between Marxism a n d political organizations is dissolved, this does not mean it w i l l be easier for it to trans form itself into a n academic philosophy, i f only because the academy itself w i l l take a long time to perform the analysis of its own anti-Marxism. Here again, the positive and the negative are suspended: the very future of a n academic philosophy is uncertain and the part which ideas taken from Marx might play in the resolution of this other crisis cannot be determined a priori. We do, however, have to advance some hypotheses and this brings me to the reasons which lead me t o think, a s I said a t the beginning, that Marx w i l l still be read and studied in various places in the rwenty-first century. Each of these, as will become evident, is also a reason to oppose M a r x , but to d o so in a rela tion of 'determinate negation', i . e . by d r a w i n g from his work questions which can only be developed by taking t h e opposite view, on particular points, to the arguments he advances.

the very

heart

of that

mode

(which is also, more than ever, a mode of circulation, communi cation a n d representation), w e would still have a use for h i m !

F o r a n d against Marx We do, nevertheless, have to recognize that Marxism i s a n i m p r o b a b l e philosophy today. T h i s h a s to d o with t h e fact t h a t M a r x ' s p h i l o s o p h y i s engaged i n the l o n g and difficult process of separation from 'historical Marxism', a process in whi ch the obstacles accumulated by a century of ideological utilization have to be surmounte d . It cannot, however, be right for that philosophy to seek to return to its starting-point; it must, rather, learn from its own history and transform itself a s it surmounts those obstacles. Those w h o wish today to philosophize in M a r x n o r o n l y c o m e after h i m , b u t come after Marxism: they c a n n o t be content merely to register t h e caesura M a r x created, but m u s t also think o n t h e ambivalence of t h e effects t h a t caesura produced - both in its proponents a n d its opponents. This is also bound up with the fact that Marx's philosophy today cannot be either a n organizational doctrine or a n academic philosophy. That is t o say, i t must b e out of step with any institution. The century-long cycle to which I have referred ( 1 8 90-1990) certainly marks the e n d of any m u t u a l attachment between Marx's philosophy a n d a n organization of whatever kind, a n d hence, a fortiori, between that philosophy and
a

Firstly, a living practice of philosophy is always a confron

tation with non-philosophy. The history of philosophy is composed of processes of renewal whose significance has a l w a y s depended u p o n the indigestibility of the exteriority w i t h w h i c h philosophy has h a d to contend. The d isplacement M a r x inflicted on the categories of the dialectic is one of the clearest examples of this 'migration' of philosophical thought, which leads it to reconstruct the very form of its discourse starting out from its other. But that displacement, resolutely as it was undertaken, is not complete: a n d it is not even near to being so, for the foreign land that has to be reached here - namely, history - is ceaselessly changing its configuration. Let us say t h a t humanity cannot abandon a problem which i t has not yet solved.

Secondly,

historicity - since this i s what we a r e speaking of

- is one of the m o s t open questions of the present rime. This is so because, among other things, the universalization of the social relation heralded in the philosophies of history i s now a

State.

fait accompli: there is n o w o n e s i n g l e s p a c e of technologies a n d

politics, of communications a n d p o w e r r e l a t i o n s . But t h a t universalization is neither a humanization nor a rationalization. It coincides with exclusions a n d splits more violent than before. If we put aside the moral discourses w h i c h counter this s i t u a t i o n w i t h the refo r m u l a t i o n of juridical a n d religious principles, there are, it seems, only two possi bilities: either to return to the idea

This means Marxism will no longer be able to function a s a n enterprise o f legitimation: t h i s is a negative precondition of its vitality. So far as positive preconditions are concerned, that depends on the part Marx's concepts w i l l play in the critique of o t h e r enterprises of legitimation. B u t just because the

120

THE PHILOSOPHY OF M A R X

SCIENCE A N D REVOLUTION

121

o f t h e ' w a r o f each against a l l ' (referred t o b y Hobbes), w h i c h requires t h e creation of a n external p o w e r o f constraint; or to plunge historicity into the element of nature (which seems to be an emergent tendency in the current revival of vitalist philosophies). There is a third possibility, which Marx sketched out: to think the change of historical institutions (or, more precisely, the 'change o f change', and thus the alternative to immediately observable changes) , o n the basis o f the relations of force which are immanent in them, i n a way t h a t is not merely retrospective but, above a l l , prospective, or, i f one prefers the term, conjunctural. Here, against the models of linear evolution and overthrow, alternately adopred by Marx and periodically rediscovered by his successors, we have to liberate the third notion w h i c h gradually took shape within his writings: the notion of tendency and its internal contradiction.

positions here: philosophy w i l l be " M a r x i s t " a s l o n g as, for it, the q uestion of truth is a question of a n a l y s i n g t h e fictions of universality w h i c h i t raises to a u t o n o m o u s status; but it first has to be 'Marxist' against Marx, to make the denegation of t h e ideology in M a r x t h e first o b j e c t of i t s critique.

Fourthly, Marx's p h i l o s o p h y is, between Hegel a n d Freud, the

example of a modem ontology of relations, or, a s I have expressed it here, of the transindividual. T h i s means t h a t it locates itself

beyond the opposition between i n d i v i d u a l i s m (even 'methodo

logical' i n d i v i d u a l i s m ) and organicism (or 'sociologism'), per mitting us to retrace the history and demonstrate the ideological functions of those positions. B u t this is not sufficient to charac terize its otiginality, since relations can be thought either i n the m ode of interiority o r in that of exteriority or, indeed, once again, in terms of naturalness. I n contemporary philosophy, these would be illustrated by the theme of intersubjectivity, on the one hand (there is no isolated 'subject' representing the world to itself, but rather an originary community of many s u b j e c t s ) ; and by that of

Thirdly, a critical philosophy i s not just a reflection on the

unexpected in history; it has to t h i n k its own determination as an intellectual activity ( i . e . it has to be, according to a very o l d formula, a ' t h o u g h t of thought' or the ' i d e a of the i d e a ' ) . I n this regard, M a r x is in the most unstable p o s s i b l e situation a s a result of the theorization of ideology he outlined. I have said above that philosophy h a s not forgiven h i m for this concept, or h a s done s o only grudgingly, which makes it something of a permanent a n d at times openly declared nuisance (a good recent example is Paul Ricoeur's book Lectures on Ideology and Utopia) . ' The thing is that ideology points to t h e element in itself is formed, not just as something

complexity, on the other ( t h e most a l l u r i n g expositions of this

are based metaphorically on t h e new a l l i a nce between physics and biology). Marx is not reducible to either of these positions. This is because the transindividual was fundamentally conceived in Marx a s a correlate of the class struggle, the 'ultimate' social structure which simultaneously d i v i d e s l a b o u t; thought and politics. Philosophizing for and against Marx here means posing the q uestion n o t of the 'end of class struggle' - t h e eternal pious w i s h of social harmony - but of its internal limits, i.e. the forms of the transindividual w h i c h , w h i l e intersecting w i t h it a t a l l points, remain absolutely irreducible t o i t . T h e question o f the great 'anthropological differences' which are comparable to 'intellectual difference' (beginning w i t h sexual difference) may serve a s a guide here. But it might also be that, even in distancing ourselves from Marx to this extent, the model of articula tion between a problematic of modes of production (or of the 'economy' in the general sense of the term) and a problematic of the mode of subjection ( a n d therefote of the constitu tion of the 'subject' a s an effect of symbolic structures) remains a constantly necessary reference - precisely because it expresses that d u a l rejection of subjectivism a n d naturalism w h i c h periodically brings philosophy back towards the idea of dialectics.

which philosophy

'unthought' within it, but a s a relation to social interests and intellectual difference itself, a relation forever irred ucible to a simple opposition between reason a n d unreason. For philo sophy ideology is t h e materialist n a m e o f its own finitude. However, the most flagrant of Marxism's shortcomings h a s been precisely the blind spot which its own ideological functioning, its own idealization of the 'meaning o f history', and its own transformation into a secular mass, party and State religion have represented for it. We have seen that a t least one of the causes of this situation relates to the way i n which Marx, in his y o u t h ,

couflterposed ideology t o the revolutionary practice of t h e pro

letariat, at the same time elevating t h a t class into a n absolute. This is why we must simultaneously defend two antithetical

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THE P H I L O S O P H Y OF M A R X

Fifthly a n d finally, I have tried t o show that theorizing social relations is, in Marx, the counterpart of the primacy accorded ro revolutionary practice ('changing the world', 'countervailing tendency', 'change in change'). It is first of a l l the reciprocity established between the individual a n d the collective in the movement of liberatory, egalitarian insurrection w hich is trans individual. The incompressible m i n i m u m of individuality and sociality that Marx describes with regar d to capitalist exploita tion is a fact of resistance to d o m i n a t i o n which, a s he wished t o show, d i d not have to be invented or incited, since it h a d always already begun. We may take it that it was in order to ground this argument that he took over a periodization of universal history which allowed him to conceive the struggle of 'those a t the bottom' a s arising from the very core of collective history. We must, however, take one step further for, if Marx had merely been the t h i n k e r of revolt, the sense of his constant opposition to utopianism would be completely lost. That oppo sition never sought to be a return to a standpoint which could not encompass the insurrectional a n d imaginative power repre sented by the utopian spirit. It will be even less like such a return if we recognize ideology a s the element - the very stuff - of politics, renouncing once and for all the positivistic vein in Marxism. But this will simply emphasize a l l the more the element of questioning contained in Marx's dual anti-utopian thrust, one strand of which goes by the [lame o f 'praxis', the other by that of 'dialectic'. This is w h a t I have called action i n the present and what I have attempted to analyse as a theoretical knowledge of the material conditions which constitute the 'present'. Having long designated the reduction of rebellion to science, o r vice versa, it may now be that the dialectic w i l l simply come to designate the infinitely open question of their conjunctiofl (the term is used by Jean-Claude M i l n e r in his book Consta t ) . 7 This i s n o t to restrict Marx to a m o r e modest programme, but to grant him for many years to come t h e role of inescapable 'go-between' for philosophy a n d politics.

Notes

1 . Marxist Philosophy or Marx's Philosophy?

1 . See
Georges Labica, 'Marxisme', and in b"ydopaedia du UnilJersafis, (Gerard

S,.pp{ertlent 2, 1 9 8 0 ; and the articles ' M a r x isme' ( L a b i c a ) , ' Ma t e r i a l isme d i a iectique' Bensussa n ) , in Labica a n d Bensussan, eds, DictiolllUlirc critiqrle d,. lItarx (pierre Macherey) ' Crise marxisme'

isrtle, secon d edition, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1 9 8 5 . Fowkes, in Surveys fl'OrtI Exile, Penguin New

2 . Karl Marx, 'The Eighteenth Brumaire o f Louis Bonapa rte', trans. Ben
worth,

3.

Cf. Jean-Paul Same, Search for a Method, trans. Hazel E. Barnes, Vintage, New York, 1 9 6 8 .

1973,

pp.

143-249.

Left

Review, Harmonds

Marx

and

a mo ng h i s successors, see my article in L a b i c a a n d Sensussan, e ds, Dic models of revolution is to be found

In

pp . 62-9 8. 4. On the vicissitudes of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' in Marx a n d

Rello/ntions

of

Engels,

1848, P e n g u i n / New Left Review, Harmondsworth, 1973,

'Manifesto

of the

Communist

Party',

in

The

tlonnarre critique du marxisme. The best presentation of Marx's d ifferent Background in Marx, Monthly Review I'ress, New York, 1963. Stanley Moore, Three Tactics: The

2. Changing the Wor l d : From Praxis 1.

To these we must a d d the
Se t

to

Production
The text w h i c h

o f reading notes p u b l i s h e d in the new

Marx.Engels GesartltausgaJ.e (Volume IVIZ, Berlin,

n o t e s . An English translation by Rodney Livingstone a n d Gregor Senton can Harmondsworth, 1 9 7 5 , p p . 279-400. be found in Marx, f Arly Writillgs,

p u t together from the most M f u l l y composed" portions of these working Penguin/New Left Review,

is k n o w n by the title Okoflortlisch-phi/osophische M.tlUskripte is, i n fact,

1981).

123

124

NOTES

NOTES

125

2. The Theses were p u b l i s h e d i n 1 8 8 8 b y Engels, i n a somewhat corrected verSion, as an a p p e n d i x to his own essay Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of

Classical German Ph,losophy.

3. Also p u b l i s h e d posthumously in 1 9 3 2 . The first part of t h i s work i s a l s o entided "Feuerbach" a n d it w o u l d not be l o n g before du's c a m e materialism", aside from t h e works o f Engels.
(0

h a t Aristotle h a d A term coined i n t h e eighteen th century t o refer t o w which he identi d n a , called the "science o f first principle s a n d first causes" from particu distinct s a 0'1), he (on being" s a fied with thinking o n "being

14.

be

regarded as t h e most systematic of t h e general exposin-ons of "hisrorical

4.

Georges Labica,

Karl Marx. Le

Theses

sur Feuerbach, Presses

Universnaires de France, Paris, 1 9 8 7 . Lablca gives the text of the tWO German versions of the Theses and provides a French translation.

5 . Ludwig Feuerbach,

The

Essence of Chrlstilm ity, trans. George Eliot,

lar kinds of being. et epanou lssement de 1 5 . Cf. Louis Dumont , Homo aequalts 1. Genese h o m Marx, " i n spite w for 1977, Paris, llimard, a G que, eco'lomi /'ideo/ogie Starting o u t from differ o f appeara nces . . . i s essentia lly i n d i v i dualisti c " . a l y t i c a l Marxis m " , ent premisse s, one of t h e main represen tatives of U A n . 0 f Marx, Cambrid ge J o n Elster, reaches a s i m i l a r conclusi on ( M a k mg sense /a de (TheoTre Bidet Jacques does Universi ty Press, Cambrid ge, 1 9 8 5 ) , as de France, taires Universi Presses marche, Ie t e Marx de suiui modemite, Paris, 1 9 9 0 ) .

Harper and R o w , N e w York a n d London, L 9 5 7 . 6 . A reference to Qualld dire c'e$t t a ire, t h e French translation of Austin'S How t o d o thmgs with words j t r a n s . l .

J.L

7. A n d r e Breron,
Manifestoes

of

"Speech

ro

t h e Congress of

writers"

( 1 9 3 5 ) , in

Surrealism, trans. R i c h a r d Seaver a n d Helen R . Lane,

to

University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1 9 7 2 , pp. 234-4 1 . 8 . Thanks, i n p a n k u l a l',

Jonath an Cape, London , 1 9 7 1 . 1 8 . The German Ideo logy , p . 4 8 .

psychiq ue et collec1 6 . See, especial ly, Gilbert Simond on, L'indilli duation tIlle, Aubier, Paris, 1 9 8 9 . T . Byingto n, 1 7 . M a x Stirner, The Ego and its Own, trans. Steven

the studies of Michel Espagne and Gerard

Bensussan on Moses Hess, the future theorist of Zionism, who was then a socialist very close ro M a r x a n d Engels, both of w h o m , l i k e h i m , s a w the discovery of communism as the "solution of t h e riddle o f hisrory". See Gerard Bensussan, Moses Hess, la ph,losoph,e, Ie so c ialism e (183'-1845), Presses Universitaires d e France, Paris, 1985; see also Michel Espagne's edition of Hess's DIe europalsche Triarchre i n French rranslation: 8erlin,

2 1 . ' M a n i festo o f t h e Commu nist Party', p . 87. a n d with w h i c h 2 2 . " A class which i n a l l nations h a s t h e same interest l l y r i d o f a l l t h e old world nationa lity i s a l r e a d y d e a d ; a c l a s s w h i c h i s r e a German Ideology, a n d at the same time stands pitted against i t " (The 2 3 . ' M a n i festo o f t h e Communist Party', p . 79. 24. H a n n a h Arendt, The Huma1l C01lditiotl, Chicago University Press, Chicago a n d london, 1 9 5 8 . See also a COnlmentary by Andre Tosel, paradigmes?, in L'Esprit d e SCiSSI01l. E.tudes sllr Marx, G ramsci. Llfkdcs, Universite de Besanc;on, Diffusion Les Belles Lcnres, Paris, 1 9 9 1 . "Materialisme de la production, materialisme de la p r a r i q u e : un ou deux

1 9 . I b i d . , p p . 92-3. 2 Ibid., p. 93.

p. 78).

Paris, LO/ldres
1988.

(l .a
.

Triarchie europeemfe), Editions du Leror, Tusson,

OTlgme et deIJeloppemellt ",tematiOltal de la terminolose commwr.lalltaITe premarxlste des Ittop,stes (lUX 1Ieo-babollvistes 1785-1842, 2 volumes,
Schriften a u s dem K a r l . M a r:c,.Haus, Tner, 1 9 8 9 . 1 0 . See K a m , "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketc h " , U W h a t i s orien tation in thinking?", and U An answer
to

9 . See Jacques Grandjonc, Commun/smeIKommlmismusICommwl/sm:

the

question:

What

is

Enlightenment?", i n H a n s Reiss, ed., Ka"t, Political Writings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, second edition, 1 9 9 1 .

3. I deo lo gy

or Fetishism: Power a n d Subjection

Harmondsworrh, 1 9 7 6 , p. 2 8 6 .

Marx, Cap/IiII, Volume I , trans. Ben Fo wkes, PenguinlNew Left /telllew, 1 2 . The Gem/all ideology: Part One, e d . a n d trans.

1 1 . See chapter 7 : "The Labour Process a n d the Valorization Process", i n

L A s we k n o w , Marx d i d n o t i n v e n t the term 'ideology', w h i c h w a s

coined, o f course, by t h e French Ideolog//es l a n d a p p a r e n t l y first used b y and 1 8 1 5 ) . It was not even Marx who first reversed its use from positive to negative, a move w h i c h i s sometimes attnbuted to Napoleon. For a detailed analysis o f the problem, see Patrick Quantin, Les Origines de i'ldeo Destutt de Tracy, w h o s e Elen/er.'ts d'ideologie first a p p e a r e d between 1 804

C.l

A n h u r , Lawrence

and Wishart, london, 1 9 7 0 , p. 42.

b e a r s his

1 3 . In 1 8 1 0 H u m b o l d t had founded the University of Berlin which roday

name. I-lis m a j o r linguistic and philosophical monographs
on

gie,

Economica, Paris, 1 9 8 7 . Beyond its immediate sources, the term has a whole philosophical genealogy w h i c h , via locke a n d Bacon, takes us back to two opposing ancient sources: the P l a t o n i c forms (eide) a n d the 'simulacra'

Dillersity of Humti:ll Lmlguage Structure and lts Influence

Cambridge, 1 9 8 8 ) .

appeared after his death i ll

1 8 3 5 (see Humboldt, 011 taltgUtfge: The

the Me",tal

Dellelopment of Maflkind. trans. Peter Heath, Cambridge University Press,

(eidola) of E p i curean philosophy.

2 . 'Clearly the w e a p o n o f criticism cannot replace [he criticism o f weapons,

126

NOTES

NOTES

127

a n d matenal force must be overthrown b y materi a l force. B u t theory also becomes a material force once it has gripped the masses' ('Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction'). nu-s article first appeared in 1 8 4 3 i n the Delltsch-FranOSlsche Jahrbiicher published Marx, Early Wrltmgs, p. 2 5 1 . ) 3. The Germall ideo/ogy, p . 64. 4. Paris, 1 9 7 3 .
m

M a r x et la repetition historique, Presses U n iversitaires d e France, Paris, litterature?, Presses U n i v ersitaires de France, Paris, 1 9 9 0 .

1 9 7 8 and Pierre Macherey, 'Figures de I ' h o m m e d'en b a s ' . A quo, pense la 1 3 . The section o n 'The Fetishism o f t h e C o m m o d i r y a n d its Secret' forms

Pans by Marx

and Ruge. (The text here i s taken from the translation by Gregor B e n t o n i n

chapter 2, 'The Process o f Exchange', where the correspondence between p lace

the conclusion

to

c h a p t e r 1. It is, in reality, all o f a piece with the short

economic and juridical categon'es i s presented. Both o f these occupy the ('The Commodity') and the concrete ('Money, or the Circulation of Commodities' ) . 1 4 . A \C r y precise a n d clear account o f a l l this i s given by Alfonso Iacono, Le Fetichisme. Histoire d'u/! Uni versitaires de France, Paris, 1992. Engels), ' T h e T r i n i t y Formula', w h i c h d r a w s a l i n e o f demarcation between 'classical' and ' v ulgar' economists and concludes as follows:
Capital-profit lor better stili capital-interes t), land-groundre m , labour-wages, u e and this economic trinity as <he c o n nection bctwen the components of v ,d capitalist the of the ystification m completes sources, its d n a general in wealth mode of producti on, the rei!icalion of social relations. and the immedlate l:oales cence of the marerial relations of producn on W i th theIr h l s [ Qrl c a l and soc ial
In

See

S a r ah
to

Kofman. Camera obscura. De

l 'I deo logie ,

E ditions Gali!ee.

- eSSEntial

i n Hegelian logic; -

of the med,at,on

between the abstract

S. Daring

plagiarize Hahermas here, o n e m i g h t say t h a t f o r t h e M a r x

see

o f The German Ideology, consciousness i s cl e a r l y from t h e outset a 'com mUnicative action'. We can tions between t h is i n t h e descripn'on he offers o f the rela and language: 'language is practical consciousness

t h e recent work Presses

co,,,ept,

consciousness that exists also for other men, and for that reason alone it really exists for me personally as well; language, like consciousness, o n l y :lrises from the need, t h e necessity, o f intercourse w i t h other men ical or morai llorm. O n the other hand,
. .

15.

On t h i s question, s e e chapter 48 o f Capital, V o l u m e 3 (published b y

'

(The

German Ideology, p . 5 1 ) . But that action is not subject a priori to any log ology or in ternal finality, as expressed by the identity o f the notions of 'life', ' p r o d u c t i o n ' , 'labour' and 'history'. See JUrgen Habermas, The Theory of Reason and the

it

remains indissoci a b l e from a tele

Volume 2 , Lifeluorld alld System: A Critique of Functio7ta/ist Reason (Beacon Press, Boston, 1 9 87). 6. Th e German Ideology, p . 80.

C.mtmm;Calir'e ActiO/I, trans. Thomas McCarthy: Velume t , Ratiotlaltzation o f Society (Beacon Press, Bosto n , 1 9 8 4 ) ;

7. Etienne Balibar, 'Di vi s i o n d u trav a i l manuel et intellectuel', in Dic llOtmazre Critique du marxisme; the Fourierist influence on Marx (and Engels) is very strong here Owen. 8 . The German Ideology, pp. 5 1 - 2 .
9. This

specifiCity: the bew i tche d , dls[Qrted a n d upside down w o r l d haunted by Monsieur Ie Caplta l and Madame la Terre, w h o are at the same rime social charcter$ and mere things. It i s the gteat ment of cla sSical economics to have dissolved this false appearanee and deception. thiS autonomizatio n and ossifica tion of the diff e r e nt social elements o f wealth vis-ii-vis one another, thiS persom6callon of things and reificao'on of <he relations of production, thiS re lig i on of everyday life . . , (Marx. ea"iti1l, Vo l u m e 3, tr a n s . David Fernbach, PenguIn! Ne,., uft Review. Harmondsw orth, 1 9 9 1 , pp. 968-9.)

FourIer, Petite Bibliotheque Payot, Paris, 1 9 7 8 ) , as also is that of Robert

(d.

S i m o n e Debout, L'utopie de Charles

I s h a l l return below to me question of the merits of classical economics. 1 6 . Capital, Volume I , pp. 1 6 5 - 6 . 17. The Latin word s a c e r h a s t h e d u a l r e l i g i o u s m e a n i n g o f 'sacred' a n d 'accursed'. The best account o f how commodity a n d monetary circulation engenders fetishistic appearances is p r ovided b y Suzanne De Brunhoff in ' L e langage des marchandt'ses" Les Rapports sociales, Paris, 1967. Paris, 1979. See also by the same author, La Mom/aie chez Marx, Editions

i s genera l l y

recognized Kegan

as h a v i n g London,

been 1972.

founded

by

Karl

Mannheim; see his ldeo/ogy and Utopia ( 1 93 6 ) , trans. L. Wirth and E. Habermas, K7101uledge and H'lman Interests, trans. Jeremy ]. Shapiro, Beacon Press, Boston, 1 9 7 1 . Shils, Routledge and Paul, See also JUrgen

d'argent,

PUG/Maspero,

10.

The word '$tand' translates into English, depending on the context,

a

Hegel, see The I'hilosophy of RIght, trans. T . M . K n o x , Clarendon Press,

as rank, status or estate. For

description o f the role o f intellectuals in

18. Capital, V o l u m e 1, p. 1 7 0 .

Oxford, 1942. For an analysis of the later dev elopments of this problem

a Max Weber, E d i t i o n s de M i n u i t , P a r i s, 1 9 9 2 . II. 'Manifesto o f the Communist Party', p . 8 4 _

12.

atic, see Catherine Colliot-Thelene, Le Desel!(:hanteme7lt de l't.tat de Hegel

20.

Michel Foucault, The Ordet' o fThings. A n Archaeology o f the Human Sciences, Vintage Books, New York, 1 9 7 3 , p . 3 2 2 . 2 1 . Capital, V o l u m e I , p. 1 6 9 . 22. Georg Lukacs, History a7ld Class COnsciouslless. Studies in Marxist DIalectics, trans. Rodney L ivingstone, Merlin, London, 1 9 7 1 . 23. Lucien Goldmann,

1 9 . Ibid., p . 1 8 7 .

The Eighteenth Brumaire i s the text i n which M a r x essays a descrip

tion of the historical Imaginary o f the masses. See Paul-l.aurent Assoun,

Lukacs

alld

Heidegger,

Towards

New

128

NOTES

NOTES

129

Philosophy, trans. W i l l i a m
Boston, 1 9 7 7 .

Q.

Boelhower, Routledge a n d Kegan P a u l ,

1 3 . 'Since t h e whole o f what is called world history i s nothing more than

the creation o f man through h u m a n labour, a n d t h e development o f nature mediated birth, of his process of emergence' ( M a r x , 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts', Early Writings, p. for man, he therefore has palpable a n d incontrovertible proof of h i s self

Einhorn, Pluto, London, 1 9 8 3 . 26. I n his shorr work,

24. E. B. P a s h u k a n i s , UJwa,uJ Marxism: A GeneralTheory, t r a n s . Barbara

2 5 . I n Freud, Marx. economle et symbo/ique, Editions d u Seuil, Paris, 1 97 3 .

Critiques

des

droits d e

['homme,

U mversitaires de France, Paris, 1 9 8 9 .

Presses

357).

Harmondsworth, 1 9 7 3 , p. 245. 28. CapItal, Volume 1 , p. 280.

27. M a r x , GrulIdrisse, trans. Martin Nicolaus, Penguin/New Left Relllew,

14. Ibid., p. 354. 1 5 . Georges Canguilhem. ' W h a t i s a scientific i d e o l o g y ? ' ( 1 970}, i n Ideology a n d Rationality i n t h e History of the Life Sciences, trans. A r t h u r
of evolutionism before and after Darwin is given i n Canguilhem, Georges Goldhammer, MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1 9 8 8 . An excellent account

30. Ibid., pp. 4 1 2 - 1 6 . J 1. Ibid., p. 929.

section 4, 'The Factory'.

29. Ibid., p p . 544-53: chapter 1 5 , 'Machinery a n d Large-Scale Industry',

/'ellolution au XIX" sieele, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1 9 8 5 ;

Librairie Vrin, Paris, 1 9 8 3 .

Lapassade, Jacques Piquemal a n d Jacques U1mann, D u dellefoppement a

see

also Yvette Conry, ed., De Darwlrt all darwmisme: science et Ideologle, 1 6 . 'The Anti-Christ', i n Twilight o f the Idols a n d the Anti-Christ, trans.

4. Time a n d Progress: Another Philosophy

o f History?
I . ' T h e Poverty o f Philosophy', i n K a r l M a r x a n d Friedrich Engels,
Collected Works, Volume 6, Lawrence and Wishart, London,
p. 174. 2 . Preface
to

R . J . Hollingdale, Penguin, Harmondswonh, 1 9 9 0 , p. 1 2 8 . 1 7 . 'The bourgeois mode o f production i s the l a s t antagonistic form o f the social process of production - antagonistic not in the sense of i n d i v i d u a l antagonism, b u t of a n antagonism that emanates from t h e i n d i v i d u a l s ' bourgeois society create also t h e m a t e r i a l conditions for a solution o f this antagonism. T h e prehistory o f h u m a n society accordingly closes with this social formation' (Preface to A Contributton to the Critique of PolItical

s o c i a l conditions o f existence - b u t t h e p r o d u c t i v e forces developing w i t h i n

1976,

A ContTibution to the CrItIque of Political Economy,

Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1 9 7 1 , pp. 20-1 .

'coPlomy, p p . 21-22). 18. CapItal,

pp. 344 ff.

3 . Capital, Volume 1, p p . 6 1 4 - 1 9 . 4 . I b I d . , p p . 928-9.

'The Voracious Appetite f o r Surplus L a b o u r . Manufacturer and Boyar', 19. Capital, Volume I , chapter 1 5 , section 9 : 'The Health and Education

V o l u m e 1 , chapter

1 0 , 'The Working D a y ' , section 2:

5 . Basic Books, New York, 1 9 8 0 .

6 . 'La decadence de I'idee de progres', Rel/ue d e meraphysiqlte e t de

morale , 4 , 1 9 87.

Clauses of the Factory Acts. The General Extension of Factory Legislation in England', pp. 610-35. I t is the I t a l i a n socalled 'operaista' school which has been the most vigorous i n stressing this aspect of Marx's thought: d. Mano T rami, .perai e capitale, E i n a u d i , T u r i n , 1 9 7 1 and An tonio Negri, La classe oll'riere contre retat, ditions Galilee, Pans, 1 9 7 8 . See also the debate between Nicos Poulantzas (PolItICal Power and Social Classes, New Left Books, London, 1 9 7 3 ) and R a l p h M i l i b a n d (Marxism and PolitICS, State' i n t h e c l a s s struggle. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977) on the 'relative autonomy of t h e

pp. 258, 260.

7. JIlwn inari01ls, trans. Harry Zohn, Fontana/Collins, Glasgow, 1 973, 8. In his 'Reply
[0

Brewster, New Left Books, London, 1 9 7 6 , p. 8 9 . into a n evolutionist language,

see

John Lewis', Essays in Self-Criticism, trans. Ben

9. On t h e w a y Marxism transcnbed t h e revolutionary idea o f s o c i a lizarion Jean Robelin, Marxisme et social,sat,on,

see

Meridiens-Klincksie<;:k, Paris, 1 9 8 9 . On socialist images of the future in

the nineteenth and twen tieth centuries,

tiviste, f'resses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1 9 9 3 .

Marc Angenot, L'Utopie collee

1 0 . C f . Jean-Franryois Lyotard, The Postmodem Condition, trans. Geoff Bennington and B r i a n Massumi, Minnesota University Press, Minneapo lis,

20. ' I t is always the bad side that in the end t r i u m p h s over the good side.

I t is the bad side that produces the movement which makes history, by
providing a struggle' ( M a r x and Engels, Collected Works, Volume 6,

1984. 1 1 . EL'o/utionar,' Socialism: A Crrticism al1d Affirmation, trans. Edith C .

Harvey, Schocken Books, N e w York, 1 9 6 1 , p . 2 0 2 . 12. J o h n Rawls, A Theory of Jr4stice, Oxford University Press, Oxford,

p. 174).

2 1 . IIhlminations, p p . 2 5 9 - 6 0. 22. 'IWje w a l k a m i d s t t h e r u i n s . . . W e a r e dealing here with the category of the negative . . . and we cannot fail to notice how all t h a t is finest and noblest in the history of the world is immolated upon its altar . . . In the

1973.

130

NOTES

NOTES

131

rise a n d fall o f a l l thi ngs i t discerns a n enterprise a t w h i c h the entire h u m a n race has l a b o u r e d ' (Lectures 1 9 7 5 , pp. 32, 4 3 ) . 2 3 . Capital, V o l u m e 1 , chapter 1 6 , 'Absolute a n d Relative Surplus V alue" P r o d u c t i o n ' , P I' . 9 4 - 1 0 8 4 .
017

3 2 . A t t h e same time, Engels was out l in i ng sioti l a r consideations o n t h e basis o f h i s r e a d i n g o f t h e works o f t h e h istorian Georg M a u r e r o n a n c i e n t Germa n i c c o m m u n i t i e s (see ' T h e Gens a m o n g Celts a n d Germans', i n Engels, The Origin of the Family. Private Property and the State, Penguin edition, Harmondsworth, 1 9 8 5 , a n d the commentary b y Michael Lowy and Robert Sayre, Revolte tt melancholie. Le romalZtisme a cOntre-COl4rant

the Philosophy of World History.

Introduction, trans. H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge U n i versity Press, Cambri dge,

p p . 643-54. Cf. a lso A ppend i x , ' R e s u l t s o f t h e Immediate Process o f

de la modernite, Payor, Paris, 1 9 9 2 , pp. 1 2 8 f f . ) . These works are, h o w

ever, still d o m i n a t e d b y the i n R u e n c e o f t h e a nt h ro p o logica l e v o l u t i o n i s m o f L e w i s M o r g a n (Ancient Society, 1 8 77) whom M a r x g r eatly a d m i ed. reprimed i n G o d elier. 3 5 . 'Letter pp. 293-4. to

2 4 . T h e possi b i l i t y o f t h i n k in g a ' r e a l c o n r r a d i c t i o n ' is t h e touchstone o f

dialectique,

the Marxist dialectic. Cf. H e n r i Lefebvl'e, Logique formelle e t logique third e d i t i o n , E ditions Sociales, Paris, 1 9 8 2 and Pierre Raymond, Materialisme dialectiqlle et logique, M aspero, P a r i s , 1 9 7 7 . The

3 3 . T h i s a n d subsequent quotations are h o m t h e letter t o V era Zasulich, a s

3 4 . Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, p . 1 . 6 .

p o s s i b i lity has been vigorously co nteste d , p a rticu la rl y by Lucio Colletti in

'Marxism and the Dialectic', New Left Review 9 3 , September/October

.techestlJenitiye

Zapiski',

Selected

Correspondence,

I 975, pp. 3-29. The contribution of Althusser precisely consisted i n re

2 5 . T h e essential documents here a r e t w o sets of n o t e s p r o d uced b y M a r x , k n o w n respectively a s t h e 'Conspectus o f B a k u n i n's Statism and Anarch),'
( 1 874-5) a n d the 'Critique of the Gotha Programme' (offcia l title: ' M a r g i n a l Notes o n the Programme o f the German Workers' Party)

fo r m u l a t i ng this p o s s i b i l i t y .

36. C f.. Immanuel Wallerstein, Historical Capitalism , V erso, L o n d o n , 1 9 8 3 .

(J

5 . Science and Revolution

1 . Desclee de Brouwer, Paris, 1 9 9 2 .

875). 2 . The German Ideology: Part One, p . 4 0 . 3 . The remark w a s o r i g i n a l l y m a d e t o Lafargue i n French a n d is reported in a letter from E nge l s to B e r nstein of 2-3 November 1 8 8 2 , Marx a n d Engels, Collected Works, V o l ume 4 6 , p . 3 5 6 . 4 . A tran s l a tio n o f r h i s article is p u b l i s h e d i n A n t o n i o Gramsci, Selections

The former remained u n p u h l ished u n t i l they a p pea red i n t h e twentieth century with other manuscripts of Marx ( n o t ab l y in Volume X V lII of the

Marx-Engels 'X'erke, Die t z. Verla g, Berlin, 1 9 6 4 ) . The latter, w h i c h were

communicated privately to the leaders o f German Social Democracy (Marx stated that i n t h e e n d he considered i t pointless to make them p u b l ic, since the socialist workers had read into the draft programme som ething it did nor c o n t a i n , n a mel y a rev o l u t i o n a ry pl atform ) , were p u bl i s hed twenty years later b y Engels a s a pendant to his own 'Critique of the Erfurt Programme' ( 1 8 9 2 J . Both rexts are printed i n Karl Marx, The First 1974, pp. 3 3 3 - 5 9 . 2 6 . 'The C i v i l W a r i n France: Address of t h e General C o u n c i l ' , i n The First 2 7 . The First bzternational alld After, p . 3 5 5 . 2 8 . Ibid., p. 347. 2 9 . Henri Lefebvre, D e l'ftat, Volume 2: Theorle marxiste de I'Etat de Hegel a M a o, U n i o n Generale d ' E ditio ns, Paris, 1 9 7 6 . 3 0 . T h e text i n q u e s t i o n is t h e 'Letter t o Otechestvenl1iye Zapiski' ( a l s o k n o w n as the 'Letter t o M i k h a i l o v s k y ' ) : s e e Marx/Engels, Selected Corres

{rom Political Writings 1 9 1 0 - 1 9 2 0 , Lawrence a n d Wishart, L o n d o n ,

1 9 7 7 , p p . 34-7. 5 . Capital, V olume 3, p . 9 5 9 . See also Engels, Anti-Diihring: Herr Euge/z

Illtemational and After, Penguin/New Left RelJiew, Harmondsworth,

Diihring's Revolution ill Science, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1 9 4 7 .

p p . 3 4 3 -4 .

6 . Columbia University Press, N e w Y o r k , 1 9 8 6 . 7. V erdier, Paris, 1 9 9 2 .

171temational and After, p . 2 1 2 .

pOlldeltce, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1 9 7 5 , p p . 2 9 1 - 4 .

3 1 . ' D e a r Citizeness, a nervous illness t h a t 1 h a v e been suffering from periodic a l l y for t h e last ten years has prvenred me from rep l y i ng earlier

to your letter . . . ' (Marx to Vera Zasulich, i n Maurice Godelier, e d . , Sur

Jes socletes precapztalistes.

French. Marx had l earned

CERM/ E ditions Sociales, 1 9 7 ' , p p . 3 1 8- 4 2 ) . A l l these lerters are in

to

Te,.:tes choislS de Marx, E1tgeis,

Lenine,

read R u s s i a n , but did not write it.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL GUIDE

133

B i h l i . g r a p h i c a l G u i de

and which led h i m to 'rework' his concepts rather than finish h i s books. There are, then, many unpublished works, some of which have sub seljuently become 'works' a s important a s the finished texts. On the other hand, the publication of those texts (the selection of which are considered to be essential and the manner i n which they are presented and even divided up) has a l w a y s been a n issue in political struggles between different 'tendencies' - powerful State, party and even academic apparatuses. Publication of a Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe (complete works o f Marx a n d Engels, abbreviated to MEGA) h a s been violently interrupted on two begun after the Russian Revolution by Ryazanov, and then when 'real occasions, first i n the 1 9 3 0 5 , when the Stalinist regime crushed the project

socialism' collapsed i n the USSR and GDR, halting (temporarily?) the

production of a 'MEGA mark II'. There i s therefore nothing neutral abollt

Finding one's way around the enormous bibliography of the works o f M a r x , his successors a n d h i s commentatOrs has become a difficult under taking on its own account. Apart from a few specialist librarians, no o n e can now c l a i m a complete command of a l l the m a t e r i a l available, even i n a single language. (The decline in t h e popularity of Marxism, w h i c h , it should be s a i d , varies very considerably from country to country, has n o t improved this simarion, since the effect h a s been t h a t m a n y texts a n d editions - including recent ones a n d n o t necessarily those of least merit - have become impossible to fi n d . ) I n spite o f these obstacles, I s h a l l try to point here to a number of articles, hooks and reference works which flesh out the references provided i n the main text. Priority w i l l be accorded to texts which originally appeared in French, but a number of works from other countries, for which there is no French equivalent, w i l l a l s o be l isted .

A n English edition of the Collected W o rk s o f M a r x a n d Engels i n fifty volumes, jointly prepared by Lawrence and Wishart (London), International Publishers (New York) a n d Progress Publishers (Moscow), in . collaboration with the Institute of Marxism-Leninism i n Moscow, COIll menced publication in 1 9 7 5 . A Selected Works i n three volumes appeared from Progress Publishers in 1969-70, as did a revised edition o f Selected CorrespollJence in 1 9 7 5 . An excellent anthology of Marx's Selected
Writings, edited by David McLellan, was published by Oxford Uni versity Press i n 1 9 77. Translations o f most o f Marx a n d Engels's i n d i v i d u a l works have been released under the imprint of Lawrence and Wishart o r Progress Publishers. Perhaps the most useful edition o f Marx a v a i l a b l e i n English is the Pelican Marx Library, which is intermediate between the Selected and Collected Works. Published, under the general editorship of Quintin Hoare, by Penguin Books in association with New Left Review, it comprises the following:

choosing a particular edition: i t is often the case that works o f the s a m e title d o not, in reality, contain precisely the same text. The most commonly used edition of the German original texts is the Marx-Engels Werke published by Dietz Verlag o f Berlin (38+2 volumes, 1 9 6 1-68).

1 . Works by Marx
There i s a twofold problem here. O n [he one hand, Marx's work remained unfinished. As I have pointed o u t above, there are various reasons for this: t h e external constraints on M a r x ' s work, its intrinsic difficulties and a n intellectual attitude w h i c h meanr constantly c a l l i n g h i s results i n r o question
I would like to thank Gregory Elliot for providing the information on

( 1 ) Early Writings, ed. and introd. Lucio Colletti, trans. Gregor lenton and Rodney Livingstone, Harmondsworth, 1 9 7 5 . Includes the Cn'tiqlle of
Hegefs Doctrine of the State, O n the Jewish Questior.r, A C o n t r i b u ti o n to the C ritique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. I n tr. du c t io n and the

English editions o f Marx's work. This replaces comments O r l French trans lations of Marx given i n the original edition of this book. In the additional bibliographical information that follows, the works listed are genera l l y those which figure i n the original edition a n d are thus, o necessity, predominantly French. [Tra/ls.l

1 8 5 9 Preface to A Contribution to t h e Critique of Political Economy and the Theses Off

Feuerbach.

Economic and Philosophical M a n u scrip ts , as w e l l as the

132

(2) Political Writings i n three volumes, ed. and introd. David Fernbach, trans. B e n Fowkes, Paul Jackson et a l . : Volume 1, T he Rev.ilti01ls of 1 848, Harmondswonh, 1 9 7 3 ; Volume 2, Surveys from Exile, Harmondsworth, 1 9 7 3 ; Volume 3 , The First I'Jternatiollal and After, Harmondsworth, 1974.

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These include t h e Manifesto of the Communist Party, The Class Struggles in France, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, The Civil War ill France, and the Critique of the Gotha Programme.

3 . Additional references for the chapters o f the

present work

draft}, trans. with a Foreword by Martin N i c o l a u s , Harmondsworth, 1 9 7 3 .

( 3 ) Gmndrisse: Foundatl'ons of the Critique of Political Economy (rough

Marxist Philosophy o r Marx's Philosophy?

Paul-Laurent Assoun a n d Gerard Raulet, Marxisme e t tMone critique, Centre d'etudes c t d e recherches marxistes, S u r la dialectique, E d i t i o n s L u c i o Colletti, Marxism and Hegel, t r a n s . Lawrence Garner, N e w Left M a x H o r k h e i m e r , Critical Them'Y" Selected Essays, C o n t i n u u m , New Books, London, 1 9 7 3 . Sodales, P a r i s , 1 9 7 7 . Payot, Paris, 1 9 7 8 .

Volume 2 , trans. D a v i d Fernbach, Harmondswoth, 1 9 7 8 ; Volume 3 , trans. David Fernbach, Harmondsworth, 1 9 8 I .

Ernest Mandel: Volume 1 , trans. Ben fowkes, Harmondsworrh, 1 9 7 6 ;

( 4 ) Capital: A Cn'tique of Political Economy i n three volumes, introd.

2 . General works
There i s no good recent biography o f Marx i n French. The fol l o w i n g may p r o fi t a b l y be consulted: Franz Mehring, Karl Marx: The Story of His Life, trans. Edward David Ryazanov, Karl Marx a n d l'riedrich Engels, trans. j o s h u a Kunitz, M o n t h l y Review Press, New York, 1 9 7 3 . j e a n B r u h a t , Marx e t Engels, Union Generale d'Editions, P a r i s , 1 9 7 1 . between Marx and Engels. Fitzgerald, Harvester, Brighton, 1 9 8 1 .

K a r l Kaursky, Ethics a n d t h e Materialist C oncep t of History, trans. J o h n B . Askew, Charles H . Kerr, Chicago, 1 9 0 6 . Karl Korsch, Marxism a n d Philosophy, trans. Fred H a l l i d a y , New Left Karel Kosik, Dialectics of the Concrete: A study B o o k s , London, 1 970.
on

York, 1 9 8 2 .

\Y/orld, D. RddeJ, Booton/Dordrecht, 1 9 7 6 . Georges Labica, L e Marxisme-Len inisme, Bruno H u i s m a n Editions Paris , ' 1984. Henri Lefebvre, Metaphilosop l7ie, E d i t i o n s de M i n u i t , Paris, 1 9 6 5 . Paris, 1 9 7 0 .

Problems of Man and

It i s interesting to complement t h i s reading w i t h the Corresponderu;e On Marx's intellectual development, the essential work remains Auguste

- - , Proble-mes actuels d u marxisme, Presses Universitaires d e France, M a o TseTung, f'ive Essays on I'hi!osophy, Foreign L a n g u a g e s Press, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Adllentures of the Dialectic, trans. Joseph Bien, Kostas Papaioannou, D e Marx et dll marxisme, Gallimard, P a r i s , 1 9 8 3 . Lawrence a n d Wishart, London, 1 9 6 9 . Northwestern University Press, Evanston ( I l l i n o i s ) , 1 9 7 3 . Peking, 1 9 77.

de ie/messe. 1.a gauche hegelienne 18 l 8-182011844, Presses U n i v ersitaires de France ( P U F ) , Paris, 1 9 5 5 ; V o l u m e 2: Du liberalisme dbnocratique au communisme.

Cornu, Karl Marx et Friedrich Ellgels, Volume 1, Les Allltes d'enfance et

Volume 4 : L a Formatien du matbialisme historique, PUF, Paris, 1 9 7 0 . Marx a n d Engels, s e e Georges H a u p t , ' F r o m M a r x
to

1842-44, PUF, P a r i s. 1 9 5 8 ; Volume 3: Marx Ii Paris, PUF, Paris, 1 9 6 1 ;

La

Gazette rher.lane.

Les A lmales ftanco-allemalldes,

G . V . P l e k h a n o v , l'undamental Problems o f Marxism, trans. j u l i u s Katzer, M a x i m i l i e n R u b e l , Rubel o n Karl Marx. l'ive Essays, e d . j . O ' M a l l e y and J. u i e n Seve, Une illtrodlctietl Ii la philosophie marxiste, E d i t i o n s Sociales, joseph Paris, 1 9 8 0 . Stalin, Dialectical and Historic,t/ Materialism, International K. A l g o z i n , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1 9 8 1 .

On t h e constitution o f the n o t i o n o f ' M a r x i s m ' , a n d the reactions o f Marxism', i n Aspects

p u b l i s h e d b y E i n a u d i o f T u r i n ' m five volumes, e n t i t l e d Storia del marxismo (ed. E .

Press, Cambridge, 1 9 8 6 . The best general history o f Marxism i s t h e o n e

of lntemational Socialism, trans. Peter Fawcett, Cambridge University

The History of Marxism, Volume 1 , Marxism ill Marx's Day, Harvester, Brighton, 1 9 8 2 . Also worthy of attention are: Leszek K o l a k o w s k i , Main Currents of Marxism: Its Rise, Growth and Dissolution, V o l u m e s 1 a n d 2,

j.

H o b s b a w m et a l . ) . The first v o l u m e is translated into English a s

Pub lishers, New Y ork, 1 9 4 0 .

Changing the World: from P r a x i s to Production

Shlomo Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1 9 6 8 . Avineri,

Clarendon, Oxford, 1 9 7 8 ; a n d Rene Gallissot, ed_, Les Ave.ltures dt, marxisme, Syros, Paris, 1 9 8 4 .

The Social a n d Political Thought

of 1<ar! Marx,

provided by Andre Tosel, ' Le developpement du m a r x i s m e en Europe occi P!eiade, V o l u m e dentale depuis 1 9 1 7 ' , i n Histoire de la phi/osophie, Er.rcyclopedie de La

A n excellent account o f t h e history of Western p h i l o s o p h i c a l Marxism is

Ernst Bloch, Natural Law and Humalt Dignity, trans. D e n n i s j . Schmidt, - - , The Principle of Hope, V o l u m e I , trans. Neville Plaice e t a 1 . , B a s i l Blackwell, O x f o r d , 1 9 8 6 . MIT Press, C a m b r i d g e ( M a s s . ) / L o n d o n , 1 9 8 6 .

3,

G a l l i m a r d , Paris, 1974.

I36

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137

Olivier Bloch, L e Malerialisme, Presses Univecsitaires d e France, Paris, 1985. Bernard Bourgeois, Ph,losoph,e e t drolts d e l'homme d e Kant a Marx, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1 9 9 0 . Franois Furet, Marx e t l a re'olutlOn {ram;aise, Flammarion , Paris, 1 9 8 6 . Montaigne, Paris, 1 9 7 1 . Pans, 1 974.

-- , The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: A n lnqlwy into a Categot-y of Bourgeois Society ( 1 9 6 2 ) , trans. Thomas Burger, Polity M a n in j a y , The Dialectical Imagination, H e in e m ann, L o ndon, 1 9 7 3 . Karl Korsch, Karl Marx, R u s s e l l a n d Russell, New Y o r k , 1 96 5 . jean-Marie Vincent, La theoTle critique de I'ecole de Francfort, Editions Galilee, Paris, 1 9 7 6 . M o r e specifically o n i d e o l o g y a n d t h e question of power, see; Marc Auge, Pouvoirs de me, POUIIOlfS de mort. IntroductIon a une a"thro pologie de la repression, F l a m m a r i o n , Paris, 1 9 7 7 . A l a i n B a d i o u and fran,.ois Balmes, De I'ideolog,e, Maspero, Paris, 1 9 7 6 . Pierre B o u r d i e u a n d j e a n Passeron, Reprod,.u:tioll i n Education, Society and Culture, trans. Richard Nice, revised e d i t i o n , Sage, l ondon, 1 9 9 0 .
--

Press, Cambridge, 1 98 9 .

Jose-Artur G i ann o u i , Origines de 10

dialectique d u travail, Aubiec

jacques M i c h e l , Marx et l a societe furidiqlle, Publisud, 1 9 8 3 .

Jacques Grandjonc, Marx et les communistes allemands il Paris, Maspero, Gerard Gran el, L 'Endural ce de la pensee, Pion, Paris, 1 9 6 8 . Martin Heldegger, 'Lctter o n H u m a n i s m ' , i n Basic WrItings, e d . David Michel Henry, Marx: A Philosophy Jean Hyppolite, Studies
O lZ

Jean Gramer, Pense' la praxIs, Aubier, Paris, 1 9 8 0 . Krell, R o u tledge and Kegan P a u l , London, 1 977.

McLoughlin, In d i a n a Un iversity Press, Bloomington, 1 9 8 3 . Marx and Hegel, trans. J o hn O'Neill, I leinernallll, L o n d o n , 1 9 6 9 .

of

Human Reality, nans. Kathleen

, Ce qlle parler v e u t dire. L'economie des echanges IirJgltistiqlles,

Georges L a b i c a , Marxism a/Ill the ,""tat/s

a n d Martin Ryle, Harvester, Brighton, 1 9 8 0 . Paris, 1 9 8 6 .

of Philosophy,

trans. K a t e Soper

Regis D e b r a y , Critique o f Political Reasor" trans. David Ma<:ey, Verso, G a l v an o D e l l a Volpe, Critique o f Taste, trans. M i c h a e l Caesar, New Left Books, London, 1 9 7 8 . Gerard D u p n l t , e d . , Analyse d e I'ideologie, Paris, 1 9 8 1 -8 3 .
two

Fayard, Paris, 1 9 8 2 .

Solange Mercier-j o s a , Retollr sr.tr Ie iel4Tole Marx, Meridiens-Klincksieck, C l a u d e M a infroy, Sur la Revelullon fra ll,oise. Ecrits de Karl Marx et Pierre N a v i l l e , D e ['alienation ti l a lomssance, Marcel Riviere, Paris, 1 9 5 7 . 1970. A l a i n F a u r e a n d jacques Ranciere, La parole ouvriere 1 8 3 0- 1 8 5 1 , Union Lucien S ev e , Marxism and the Theory of Humall Personality, t r a n s . David Paven, Lawrence a n d Wishart, L o n d o n , 1 9 7 5 . 1989. Iisabeth Sledziewski, Rel.oluIIO" S d u slljet, Meridiens-Klincksieck, Paris, Generale d'ditions, Paris, 1 9 7 6 . F,,'edTlch crlgels, ditions Sociales. Paris, 1 9 7 0 .

London, 1 9 8 3 .

volumes, Editions G a l i l e e ,
sur

Republished as [ e Nouveall Leviathan, V o l u m e I , Anthropos, Paris,

Georges L a b i c a . Le Paradigme d u Grand-Hornu. Essa, PEC-La Breche, Paris, 1 9 8 7 .

I'ideologle,

Claude Lefort, 'L'ere de I'ideologie', Encyclopaedia unlllersalis, V o l u m e 1 8 , O r g a n u m , Paris, 1 9 6 8 . S o l a n g e Mercier-Josa, Pour lire Hegel e t MarA, ditions Sociales, PariS, 1980. P a u l Ricoeur, From Text to Action: Essays I n Hermeneutics II, trans. f'atrick Tort, Marx et Ie probleme de I'ideologie. Le modele egypticn, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1 9 8 8 . K a t hleen Blaney a n d John B. T h o m p son , Athlon e . London, 1 9 9 1 .

Ideology or Fetishism: Power al1d Subjection

In addition
to

More specifically o n fe ti s h i s m a n d the question o f t h e subject, see: jean B a u d rillard, For a Critique of the PolitICal Economy of the SIgn, trans. Charles Levin, Telos Press, S t Louis, 1 9 8 1 . jacques Bidet, Q ue faire d u Capital? Mcllt!flaux p o u r la refo"datiorl du marxismc, Klincksieck, Paris, 1 9 8 5 . G u y Debord, The Society
0 f the

the works already mentioned, see:

T. W. Adorno and M a x Horkhelnler, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. M i h i d e Bertrand, L e statut d e la religion ,het Marx et E/Igels, ditions Sociales, Paris, 1 9 7 9 . Cornelius Casroriadis, The ImagilJary J o h n Cummings, Allen Lane, L o n d o n , 1 9 7 3 .

Institution o f Society,

Spectacle, trans. D o n a l d Nicholson-Smith,

trans.

Zone Books, Cambridge (Mass.), 1 9 9 3 . Maurice Godelier, Rationality a n d irrationality i n Economics, trans. Brian Pearce, New Leh Books, L o n d o n , 1 972. -- , Perspectives in Marxist Anthropology, trans. Robert Brain, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1 9 7 7 .

Kathleen maney, Pdity, Carnbridge, 1 9 8 7 . Jurgen Habermas, 'Technology a n d Science a s " I d e o l o g y " ' , i n Toward a Shapiro, H e i n e m ann, London, 1 9 7 1 . RatlOTolal Society: Student Protest, Science a n d Politics, [rans. jeremy j .

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139

Jean-joseph G o u x , Lej iconoc/astes, Editions d u Seuil, Paris, 1 9 7 8 . 1976.

Agnes Heller, The The01Y o f Need in Marx, Allison & Busby, London,

Umberto Melotti, Ma7x and the ThIrd World, trans. P a t Rainsford, Macmillan, London, 1 9 7 7 . A n r o n i o Negri, Mal"X Beyond Marx: Lessons on the Grundrisse, trans. Pierre R a y m o n d , lA reSIstible fatallte d e I'hlSfolTe, j . E . Hallier/Albin Michel, Paris, 1 9 8 2 . Yves Schwam, ExperIence e t C01lnalSsance dll traVQlI. Presented Georges E m m a nuel C a n g uilhem, Postface by Bernard B ourgeois, Sociales/Messidor, Paris, 1 9 8 8 . Terray, Marxism by ditions Mary Harry Cleaver et aI., ed . jim Fleming, Pluto, London, 1 9 9 1 .

Henri Lefebvre, CTltiqlce de l a vie qllotidie?me, 3 volumes, L'Arche, Paris, 1 9 8 1 (nrst v o lume has been translated as Critique of Everyday

Life. Volume 1 : /t.ltroductioll, trans. J o h n M oore, Verso, L o n d o n ,

1991).

Jean-Franlrois Lyotard, Derives Q partir de Marx e t FrelCd, Union Generale d'ditions, Paris, 1973 (partial English translation in

Driftworks,

Semiotex t(e), New York, 1 9 8 4 ) . Gyorgy Markus, l.J2ngll4ge and Prod,cetion: A CrittqlCe of the Parad,gms, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1 9 8 6 . Jacques R a n ciere, 'The C o n c e p t o f "Critique" and t h e " C r itique o f P o litical Economy" (From t h e Ma/letcripts of 1 8 4 4 to Capitan', trans. Bell Brewster, i n Routledge, Londoll Ali Rattansi, cd., Ideology. Method a1ld Marx, New York, 1 9 8 9 . Karl P o l a n y i , The Great Trallsformatioll, Beacon Press, Boston, 1 9 5 7 .

and 'Primitille'

SOCIetIes,

trans.

Klopper, M o n t h l y Review Press, New York, 1 9 7 2 .

Lucien Sebag, Marxisme e t strucluralisme, U n i o n Generale

and

d'Edirlons,

Jean.Marie

Paris, 1964.

Vincent, Fetichisme e t societe, Anrhropos, Paris, 1 9 7 3 .

Time a n d Progress: Another Philosophy of History?

Louis Alth usser, 'Marxism is not a H i storicism', in Readblg Cap ital, trans. Ben Brewster, New Left B o oks, London, 1970. !'erry Anderson, 'The Ends o f History', i n A ZOlle of Engageme/lt, Verso, London, 1 9 9 2 .

Tom Andreani, D e fa sOCIete ci I'histoire, 2 volumes ( 1 . us concepts com

m ICilS

productIon), Meridiens-Klincksieck, Paris, 1 9 8 9 . Ernst Bloch, The Principle o f Hope, 3 v olumes, trans. Neville Plaice et a l . ,
Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1 9 8 6 . Nikolai Bukharin,

ci tOllte societe; 2 . ies Concepts tralTshistoriqlles. Les modes de

Historical

Materialism:

System

of

SOCIology ,

University o f Michigan I>ress, A n n Arbor, 1 9 6 9 . G . A . C o hen, Karl Marx's Theory o f HistOl),: A Defelice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1 9 7 8 .

Benjamin Coriat,
1976. Michel Henry,

Science, techllique e t cllpital, Editions d u Seuil, Pans,

Andre Gorl, Critlq/le d e l a diUlsioll d u travail, J:.ditions d u Seuil, Paris, 1 9 7 3 .

G a l l i m a r d , Pat'is, 1 9 76 . Amonio Labriola, Essays

Marx,

Volume
011

2:

UlIe philosophie

de

i'eco ll omie,

Charles H. Kerr, Chicago,

1908.

the Materialist COllceptio1 o f History,

ou

Karl Marx, M i k h a i l B a k u n i n , Socia/isme autoritalre

libertaire, 2

v olumes, e d . Georges Ribell, U n i o n Generale d'Editions, Paris, 1 9 7 5 .

Pno!fiding a lucid and accessible intr:oductiol!l ta Marx, complet-e with pedagogical bQl,es, a chrol!lalagy and guides to f:I:JIi'tberroeading,Etiel!ll!le BaliliJaf makes the mast difficult areas af:his philosophy easy to understand. Orneaf:the most irnfluential French philosophers to !:lave emerged fram the 1960s, Balibar brings a lifetime ot study, and expertise to create a brillial!ltl~ c@rnciseportrait @f Marx that will ~nitiate the student and infuigue the scholar. Heexamines all'the key areas ot Marx's writings, including his ear-Iywo~ks, 1iheCommunist Manifeste, The German Ideology and Capital, e*plaining their wide~ historical and theonetical eentext Making clear such c@l!Iceptsas class struggle,ideflll@!!JY,lhumanism,pragr:ess.detenminism, commodity fetishism and the state, Balibaf includes brie~ yet incisive. biographical studies @1 key Mal'*ists such as Althusser, Gramsci, EQgelsand Lenin. Ihe Philosophy a! MalXwill became the standard guide to Marx's thought. ETIENNE BAlli BAR is P~(:)fessor of Philos@phy at tile Unblersity of Paris- X. He is the author ot Reading 'Capital' (with touts Althusseu), Race Nation Class (with lmmanuel Waller:stein~, Spinoza and Patitics, Masses, Glasses and Ideas and Politics and the Other Soene.

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