Institute of Education University of London

Planning for Education and Development

Effectiveness and Efficiency in Guatemala's Conditional Cash Transfer Programme: Evaluation of the MIFAPRO Planning Process

Joseph Collins

MA Educational Planning, Economics and International Development

Executive Summary In 2008 the incumbent President Alvaro Colom established the MIFAPRO conditional cash transfer programme under the auspices of the executive office aimed at i) poverty alleviation and ii) tackling low investment in human development amongst the poorest Guatemalans. The policy was a response to Guatemala's persistently poor performance in human development indices. Human development is seen as a necessary condition for greater economic competitiveness as well as fundamental to equality. In April 2012 incoming President Molina continued the programme with only minor changes under the name Mi Bono Seguro, ending one policy cycle and offering an opportunity to evaluate the programme and recommend modifications. This report finds that whilst MIFAPRO represented strong political will towards the two stated goals its effectiveness has been hampered by poorly designed and inappropriately targeted transfers. While the policy goals clearly remain prevalent to the new government this report looks at the planning stage that followed the initial decision process and suggests major efficiency savings could be made to the existing system. The main recommendations of this report are A) to introduce per child transfers and B) to institute a graduated rather than flat transfer. These changes are predicted to increase internal efficiency and more effectively fulfil the policy aims.

Country Background Guatemala is a country with a troubled history involving a recent civil war and a long history of inequality: the Mi Familia Progresa programme (hereafter MIFAPRO) cannot be understood in isolation, rather it must be seen and evaluated within the difficult context from which it emerged, and which it was designed to tackle. The 1996 Peace Accord put an end to a 35 year civil war that claimed over 200,000 lives (83% indigenous peoples) and displaced nearly 1 million Guatemalans 1. The Centre for Justice and Accountability reports that 93% of atrocities were carried out by government and paramilitary forces during the conflict, leading to high levels of mistrust and scepticism regarding state authority and intentions. Indeed Gaia finds strong evidence that such mistrust inhibits the credibility of MIFAPRO and advises greater transparency and accountability to address such concerns (2009: 12). Such destabilising events have reinforced a long history of inequality stretching back to the times of Spanish colonization; to quote the 2009 World Bank Poverty Assessment "[f]or many years, Guatemalan economy and society have been characterized by very high levels of poverty, lagging social indicators and extreme inequality. Indeed, virtually every study of the country's situation during the 1970's, 1980's and 1990s noted that, among Latin American and Caribbean countries, Guatemala's level of poverty and social indicators surpassed only those of Haiti" (vii). Those social indicators continue to paint a bleak picture to policy makers as Guatemala was ranked 131st in the 2011 Human Development Index (HDI) by UNDP, while the 2007 Gini Index prepared by the CIA scored Guatemala at just 55.1%2.

Education and Opportunity in Guatemala Of specific interest to this report are the state of the education sector and the inequality of opportunity that poor education perpetuates. This report draws in part on the rationale in the World Bank report Measuring Inequality of Opportunities in Latin
1

Figures are based on the UN-sponsored Historical Clarification Commission report as reported by CJA at http://www.cja.org/article.php?list=type&type=294. 2 All references to HDI are taken from the UNDP official website. Available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/ Last accessed 09/01/13 CIA Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2172.html. 09/01/13

America and the Caribbean' that sought to measure and bring into policy focus the basic opportunities available for children (Barros et al. 2009). The authors behind the World Bank report argue that to ensure sustained national growth and to reduce intergenerational poverty governments must ensure access to basic services, irrespective of race, gender or location as a matter of priority. This paper therefore follows Barros et al. in defining basic opportunities as a subset of goods and services for children, such as access to education, to safe water, or to vaccinations, that are critical in determining opportunity for economic advancement in life" (ibid: 3). The importance of access to education as a key determinant of opportunity can be seen explicitly in goal two of the MDGs, as well in the literature pertaining to the EFA movement. Education levels play a major role in both UN and World Bank development indices and education opportunity is considered a human right. The concepts of human capital and the returns to education provide further justification for government intervention. The human capital theory suggests that economic growth is partly explained by increases in education in the populace and therefore education policies form an important tool in government anti-poverty planning (OECD 2002: 135). Upon election the Colom governments 2008 Education Plan recognised rights established in the Constitution and the 1996 Peace Accords that education should be available to all Guatemalans irrespective of race, gender or location. In the milestone agreement that ended the civil war education was to be mandatory to grade 9 and all state education at mandatory levels made free (Ministry of Education: 26). The government identified Integral Equality in education as a policy focus within its Plan de Accion3 which later became formalised in its 2008-2012 Education Plan: two of the five policy areas identified in the paper refer explicitly to equalising opportunity 4 (Ibid: 22). The conditional cash transfer (CCT) scheme implemented in 2008 can therefore be seen as an important government initiative to improve (and evaluated for its success in expanding) equal opportunity in access to education.

3
4

An official statement of intent for the first 100 days in office. (Ministry of Education 2008: 18). The five general policies are: 1. Progress towards quality education. 2. Extend education coverage, especially to those in extreme poverty and vulnerable situations. 3. Social justice through educational equity and school retention. 4. Strengthen bilingual, multicultural education 5. Implement a transparent management model that meets the needs of the education community Translation from original Spanish by author.

Education equality in Guatemala is certainly in need of improving. In the previously referenced World Bank report, that based its results on two surveys conducted in 2000 and 2006, Guatemala was bottom of all Latin American and Caribbean countries (LAC) for education. Guatemala was given a HOI for education of 51% while the LAC average was 76. Nearby Honduras scored 62% despite having a significantly lower GDP, while the regional leaders Chile and Jamaica registered scores of 90% apiece. The report, which measures equality of access in a country, demonstrates that as late as 2006 access to education in Guatemala was palpably unequal and it is clear that in the years preceding the introduction of MIFAPRO there was pressing need for such a targeted intervention. Such inequalities gave rise to the governments second general policy, to extend education coverage, especially to those in extreme poverty and vulnerable situations and policy three, to achieve social justice through educational equity and school retention (Ibid: 22). MIFAPRO became one of the principal programmes of the Colom government to fulfil its educational goals (Ibid: 18).

MIFAPRO: A Demand-Side Intervention A CCT is a demand-side intervention that seeks to offset the high marginal costs and other factors affecting investment in education amongst the poorest members of society. As a result of pro-poor provision initiatives since the end of the civil war the World Bank was able to assert in the lead-up to the launch of MIFAPRO that "[s]upply-side shortage in primary and secondary education does not seem to be a critical problem" (2009: 68). While a country may provide the physical space required for education it is important to understand the multiple factors affecting the concept of access' 5. In 2006 supply issues were cited as reasons for less than 4% of non-enrolment in secondary school, yet enrolment figure remained below 40% as late as 2009 (World Bank 2009: 54). Policies such as MIFAPRO that seek to address factors constricting investment in human development and interact with the demands of the indigent have the potential to break intergenerational cycles of low development and are thus favoured by many LAC countries and supported by the literature of the World Bank and UN.
5

These factors are addressed in greater detail than space allows here in Poor Economics (2011: 76)

MIFAPRO: An Outline In 2008 the incumbent President Alvaro Colom established a conditional cash transfer programme aimed at i) poverty alleviation and ii) tackling low investment in human development amongst the poorest Guatemalans (Ministry of Education 2008: 18). The governments 2009 Letter of Intent to the IMF identifies MIFAPRO as one of its key initiatives for protecting the poor and encouraging economic growth through human capital investment (Ministry of Finance 2009: 8). The scheme involved two separate cash transfers for health and education; each worth 150 Quetzales (c.19 USD6) to families with children aged 6-15 conditional on the beneficiary fulfilling certain responsibilities. An additional 100 Quetzales was available for nutritional supplements to families with children under 6. This report will focus on the education component of the scheme, which ran largely independently of the health-based transfer. To be eligible to receive the transfer families first had to fulfil certain poverty criteria and then fulfil certain conditionalities. The selection of beneficiaries was a two-stage process. Initially the government employed a geographical model: 46 municipalities were initially chosen for inclusion expanding to 1367 by 2010 (Gaia 2009: 8). Due to the need to maximize the limited resources available to the programme the government then included a proxy means test (PMT) within the regions selected in order to isolate the indigent members of each community. The families selected for the education transfer were those identified as living in poverty with children aged 6-158. Once selected the beneficiaries had to ensure that all their children of school-going age attend school at least 80% of the time (Ibid, 2009: 7). They were then eligible for a flat transfer of 150 Quetzales irrespective of the number or age of the dependent children. This transfer was not inflation-index linked and has remained constant since 2008 (Ibid: 10). In 2010 the CCT (including health, education and nutrition) represented 0.32% GDP and helped 22.6% of the total population, but only 39.7% of the poor, which
6

Based on conversion rate retrieved from xe.com on 08/01/2013. Transfer details come from Gaia, 2009. 7 Out of a total of 333 municipalities nationally 8 Further discussion of the targeting can be found in Gaia page 9

suggests both significant progress since the 2008 launch, and also significant margin for improvement in reaching the most needy (Ibid). The education programme itself was reaching the families of over two million children by 2010 and 93% of beneficiaries fulfilled their obligations (UNDP 2011: 25).

Policy Decision While not absolute the power of the President in the Guatemalan system is extensive and the executive office is able to enact laws in an exclusionary manner while overshadowing congress (Gaia 2009: 6). It is therefore unsurprising if not entirely desirable that the MIFAPRO policy-making stage was characterised by a personalistic/synoptic process. According to Haddad's consolidated model of the dimensions of policy-making the decision process can be categorised as either based on a personalistic drive, or on a bureaucratic impetus (Haddad and Demsky 1995: 21). Given that the project was conceived and implemented without reference to Parliament by the executive office, and was initially governed through a newly inaugurated Social Cohesion Council chaired by the first lady, MIFAPRO certainly falls within this category (Gaia 2009: 5). Such personalistic approaches invariably have both positive and negative dimensions. A 2009 report by the International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG) identified long-term sustainability through political change as a major challenge of CCTs in Latin America. Indeed, as a result of the personalistic nature of its creation, MIFAPRO was so synonymous with the President and First Lady that it was transferred to the Ministry of Education at the end of 2009 in an attempt to legitimise it in the face of criticism that it was a political tool (Gaia 2009: 6). One important positive was the quick and decisive mobilisation of resources and political will; in a country with such a poor record in tackling inequalities the speed of resource mobilisation and scope of coverage is admirable. As noted after two years of implementation MIFAPRO was reaching well over 2 million children in over half the municipalities nationwide. Haddad and Demsky further classify the decision process as synoptic or incremental (19). The IPC-IG paper criticises the lack of effective coordination between the health and education branches at the launch of MIFAPRO resulting from

the haste of the synoptic decision making process. A further example of an eventual programme weakness caused by the synoptic approach is that MIFAPRO was funded by a public trust with funds expropriated from the general welfare budget; threatening MIFAPROs claims to legitimacy and its long-term viability as it lacked a stable budget (Gaia 2009: 7). Analysis later in the report reveals further problems resulting from the synoptic, rational planning model used. The governments desire to be seen to be proactive in achieving its goals resulted in the rapid design and implementation of the programme without a random control trial or thorough investigation. This has, it will be argued, led to an inefficient and poorly targeted transfer system.

The Report The analysis conducted below is goal-orientated, and we seek to answer two fundamental questions; "What were the goals of the reform? How successful was the reform in achieving them?" (Williams 2005: 229). Whilst imperfect the policy-making stage did produce pro-poor goals and selected an intervention that seems particularly well suited to achieving those objectives and so tackling the problems in the Guatemalan education system. The World Bank's Poverty Assessment 2009 states that "Programs like CCTs are an excellent vehicle to achieve" an improvement in "the human capital and opportunities available" to the poorest Guatemalans (2009: 7). The UN report on CCTs in Latin America supports this view, asserting, these programmes generally succeed in channelling the income transfers to the most needy and therefore represent one of the most redistributive categories of social public investment (Cecchini and Madariagi 2011: 34). The incoming governments decision to maintain the transfers demonstrates both the continued relevance of the policy objectives and the broad international consensus that well-designed CCT interventions represent a good use of public funds. The new governments decision to maintain the scheme under the new name of Mi Bono Seguro also provides an opportunity for analysis of the original model after one complete policy cycle (see Figure 1 below).

The remainder of this report therefore conducts and builds upon a SWOT analysis9 (available in full in the appendix) to review the planning process, analyse the 2008-2012 programme and make recommendations for incremental changes to improve efficiency and help reach the governments stated goals. The reader should consider this paper as part of an ongoing review process, and as such we will allude to several recommendations from other reports in our own review.

Framework We use as a framework for our evaluation the model of strategic planning proposed by the IIEP that identifies four stages: analysis, planning, implementation and evaluation. What is significant about the model that is depicted schematically below is that it emphasises that strategic planning is characterised by being iterative and flexible; that "planning does not stop when plan implementation starts" (IIEP 2010: 14). This report forms an important stage in the ongoing planning process; that of evaluation designed to feedback into the new administrations programme modifications. This should not represent an endnote to MIFAPRO, but rather be part of "an indicative, living framework that allows for adjustments in light of new developments" (italics in original. Ibid: 2). In such a way lessons from both the initial strategic planning stage and appropriate empirical data can be used to ensure greater efficiency of Mi Bono Seguro through incremental adjustments, thus providing the poorest in Guatemala with the maximum opportunities possible.

Figure 1

The Strategic Management Cycle, IIEP

In a review of strategic planning SWOT analysis was one of the most popular tools utilised by the 113 companies interviewed, reinforcing the practical use and importance of a tool ubiquitous in literature relating to strategic planning. From: Glaister and Falshaw (1999). Strategic Plannning: Still Going Strong. Long Range Planning, 32 (1), 107-116.

(Chang 2008 p4)

Though numerous frameworks and rationales exist for advising planners the imprecise nature of the education sector and the complexity of CCT interventions recall the suggestion of Haddad and Demsky that strategic planning is appropriate for "large-scale policies and broad resource allocations" (2005: 18). Haddad suggests strategic planning is the most appropriate course when high complexity, an imprecise decision environment, and broad decision criteria interact (Ibid: 19). The IIEPs Gwang-Chol Chang asserts "Strategic planning is an approach which is relevant to all kinds of organizations simply because all organizations have long-term goals to reach and, since resources are always limited, they have to find the most efficient way to attain these" (2008: 8). These arguments are true both when originally choosing a planning framework and adopting one through which to analyse an existing programme.

Key SWOT Findings: Rather than reviewing the entire planning process this report focuses on the strategic design of the transfer, which is seen as a major weakness and opportunity for

improvement by the new government. The SWOT analysis identified the following major weaknesses in the planning stage of MIFAPRO: A) The decision to provide a fixed transfer with no consideration of family size is seen in this report as a major weakness to have emerged from the strategic stage of planning and, it will be argued, undermined the effectiveness and strategy of the entire programme. B) Closely linked to point A the decision to provide a flat transfer to students irrespective of age was identified as an area within the planning phase that lead to significant deadweight costs. It also failed to properly reflect the demand-side factors affecting education or take into account variable opportunity costs. This report does not claim comprehensiveness, but rather seeks to make applicable recommendations based on empirical evidence and best practice. To this end we focus solely on the structure of the benefit provided in MIFAPRO.

The Transfer One of the key decisions taken during the strategic planning phase was determining the amount and structure of the benefit. The eventual transfer was set at 150 Quetzales per eligible family; this was a flat transfer, meaning that the amount did not vary according to the age of the children and fixed in that no consideration was made of the number of children in the family. Given the limited capacity of the government to accurately monitor the beneficiaries the decision to implement such a transfer represents a practical recognition of operational shortcomings.

A- Per Family Transfers: Effectiveness The information required to implement a per-pupil scheme is considerable: the chosen simple fixed structure initially allowed the scheme to expand, gain support

and reach almost one quarter of the population. By 2012 however the required informational framework was largely in place: PMTs have been conducted among the target population and monitoring of family adherence to conditions occurs. With such an operational framework in place we argue that capacity has greatly increased and that with an improved Management and Information System, which is a priority in itself according to a World Bank report (2011: 5), will allow improved beneficiary targeting and monitoring. This report argues that the decision to adopt a fixed transfer limits the effectiveness of the scheme in achieving its two main goals: i) Tackling poverty. The use of a fixed transfer that pays no consideration to family composition ignores the marginal cost of providing for each additional child. CCTs aim to relieve consumption poverty by providing cash transfers to beneficiaries, increasing income amongst the indigent and thereby increasing consumption. Consumption poverty is seen as a key problem facing developing nations and one that reinforces intergenerational poverty, as such per capital consumption features prominently in both UN and World Bank human development indicators. Furthermore the World Bank Poverty Assessment' reports that in Guatemala as "the household size increases, the per capita consumption decreases, indicating the need for variable transfers (2009: 18). Page 67 of the same report indicates " given that poorer families often are those with more kids, a fixed transfer per household would mean a lower per capita transfer to these household [sic]." As one of the governments goals in establishing the transfer is to minimise the impacts of consumption poverty by providing a cash infusion the decision to limit the amount fails to properly support those in most need and inhibits the success of the scheme. A 2011 UNDP assessment of MIFAPRO notes that no justification was given for the decision to provide only one transfer per family, or for setting the transfer at Q.300 (including both health and education). It found that based on average family size the mean transfer of MIFAPRO was reduced to just Q.50 or $6 per capita, well below the level required to change consumption patterns (25). Gaia suggests that the Q.150 education transfer represents 10% of the monthly consumption cost of an extremely poor family (2009: 7). When one considers the situation for a family with

four or more children the transfer may not represent a large enough investment to improve consumption patterns amongst the target population. ii) Reversing low investment in human development. The fixed transfer may also fail to encourage those families with multiple children to invest in education, thereby undermining the second goal. The rationale behind the CCT is that education is not cost neutral (even if tuition is free) and that the transfer is necessary to compensate families for the lost earnings of any child attending school (their opportunity cost). In consideration of such opportunity costs the World Bank suggests that in Guatemala a transfer per child has the advantage of ensuring that the family has an incentive to send all their kids to school (2009: 67). In 2011 the transfer of Q.300 represented 4.7 days paid labour at the legal minimum salary of Q63.70. The UNDP also notes that decisions to set transfers at a percentage of the minimum salary are often employed by national governments, and whilst no official data regarding the transfer sum decision process exists there is a strong suggestion that the same rationale was at work here (2011: 25). The type of synoptic, rational approach to planning based on empirical data suggested here often experiences a disconnect from realities on the ground (Williams 2005: xxxii) and while Q.300 does represent a large enough transfer to encourage attendance in small families (especially as minimum salaries rarely reflect income in the informal sector) it does not offset the opportunity cost involved in educating every child in larger families. It is important at this point to reinforce that each child of school age must attend for the family to receive the benefit under the current system. Recommendation: The trade-off between extending coverage to as wide a population as possible and providing sufficient support to achieve the stated goals is part of any CCT scheme. This report suggests that in order to achieve the goals of increasing investment in human development and reducing the burdens of poverty the new government should modify the structure of the benefit. We argue that to be an effective incentive, and to truly modify consumption patterns the transfer should be per child, rather than a flat amount. We would also argue that, in-line with other schemes in the region, Mi Bono Seguro should also reduce the strictness of the

conditionalities attached 10: the benefit should be available to the parent of any student fulfilling the scheme, even if they have siblings who opt-out. These changes obviously presents a major increase in total programme costs. This will necessitate the continued use of geographical and PMT selection criteria to limit the total pool covered by the scheme; while this will invariably lead to imperfect coverage and exclusions we argue that the benefits of properly targeted, sufficiently large transfers serve the goals of the government better than a broader scheme that reaches larger numbers but is ineffective in achieving its aims. As discussed previously the scheme currently represents 0.32% GDP, below the regional average of 0.40% and dwarfed by the 1.17% invested by Ecuador (see figure 2).

Figure 2

from Cecchini and Madariagi 2011: 104 B- Flat Transfer: Efficiency

10

A review of the conditionalities attached to each programme is conducted by Cecchini and Madariagi (2011: 85-100)

The same logic seen in point A was in evidence when considering the strategic decision to offer a flat transfer irrespective of the age of the recipient. The information gaps in Guatemala in 2008 initially inhibited the implementation of the type of graduated payment scheme used successfully in Mexico (Ibid: 49). Again, this decision was understandable in the context of the organisational capacity of the government, however the analysis below will show it greatly reduces the internal efficiency of the programme and works contrary to goal two. This report argues that along with concessions to operational capacity errors in design were made as a result of the synoptic approach adopted under pressure to show results. The limited data set consulted meant insufficient attention was paid to enrolment statistics and reasons for non-attendance in the target population. We argue that introducing a graduated payment scheme and making greater use of nonmonetary benefit could achieve significant efficiency savings, as well as significant improvement in human development amongst older children. i) Defining the target group According to ECLAC figures primary net enrolment in 2008 (the year MIFAPRO was launched) were 95.4% while secondary enrolment registered just 39.8% (The regional average was 93.5% and 72.7% respectively). Such figures strongly indicated a need to concentrate on increasing secondary enrolment, and suggested limited marginal returns from increasing primary investment. Such conclusions are in-line with recommendations by the World Bank that any new resources should be diverted to secondary schooling (2009: 47). Net Enrolment Rates* 2006 94.8 38.1 2008 95.4 39.8 2010 96.9 50.1

Primary Secondary

* Source= 2011 ECLAC Statistical Yearbook

Currently 50% of education spending goes to the primary sector, which in part represents a high reliance on public provision but also represents a wider bias to the primary sector in accordance with international targets such as EFA and the MDGs. Though often marginalised in favour of primary education years 7-9 are mandatory

and guaranteed in the Peace Accords to all, yet the World Bank reports that just 9.5% of the extreme poor attend secondary education (2009: xii). In primary education the difference in attendance between children from families in the poorest quintile and those in the richest was just 4.2% in 2010. According to the World Bank Net enrolment rates for primary have almost no relationship to the household economic status... Economic conditions do not seem to have a strong effect during the first six years of education (Ibid: 50). However, the same income groupings experience a 24.1% difference when considering secondary education in the same year. Supporting the World Bank finding that Secondary net enrolment rates are strongly correlated to levels of consumption and differences have increased over time (Ibid: 51)

School attendance percentages by per capita household income+ Quintile 1 86.4 55.1 62.4 Quintile 5 98.3 84.3 87.3 86.5 Difference 11.9 4.2 32.2 24.1

2008* Primary Secondary 2008 2010

2010** 80.1

* Source= 2009 ECLAC Statistical Yearbook ** Source= 2011 ECLAC Statistical Yearbook + Methodological changes in data collection between 2008 and 2010 make multi-year comparison impossible

With primary attendance rates at over 80% before the scheme started the transfer has very high deadweight costs (i.e. transfers to those who would have attended school without the cash). While any transfer to the poor fulfils goal one, by tackling poverty, we argue that large cash transfers aimed at students of primary age do not increase investment in human capital. While in absolute terms enrolment in primary school has increased by 1.5% the data above suggests no discernible increase amongst the poorest children. Unfortunately due to lack of monitoring and benchmarking it is impossible to accurately track the specific impact of the intervention but the statistical data above supports our hypothesis. ii) Understanding demand

World Bank data collected between 2000 and 2006 shows that 63.4% of students cite economic factors as their primary reason for not having enrolled in secondary school. This contrasts to just 9.6% of primary students motivated to drop out of school for economic reasons. Over 80% of the poorest quintile already attend school, and for those students that do not money appears a major motivating or inhibiting factor for less than 10%. This evidence further suggests that flat transfers of Q.150 to all children from 6-11 are inefficient at lower levels and possibly insufficient for older children. Modifications made to the programme to include extended use of nutritional supplements could have significant impact on the 26% of the poor absent from primary school for health reasons. Under MIFAPRO the nutrition benefits stopped at 6 when the child entered school and moved into the education scheme (Cecchini and Madariagi 2011: 15). This report suggests that reducing the value of the monetary transfer for primary children and replacing a significant portion of this with nutritional supplements to combat poor health would increase both efficiency (by reducing deadweight costs) and effectiveness by truly targeting demand-side issues of schooling. By reducing the transfer value for primary children the excess could be used to restructure the scheme with greater transfers to higher levels to reflect the higher opportunity costs incurred by older students (Ibid: 15). The low levels of attendance at secondary school as well as the high prevalence of money-related absences strongly indicate that such a reform could secure higher returns by altering the investment of existing funds.

Figure 3 Reasons for dropping out and not enrolling in school, 2006

from World Bank 2009: 54 Recommendation: We argue that reducing the transfer at lower levels and increasing it incrementally will have a positive impact on investments to education. Successful systems such as OPORTUNIDADES11 in Mexico that account for this in their benefit structure more closely match the realities of their beneficiaries lives. These changes would result in the available resources being allocated as efficiently as possible in producing the desired output (i.e. increased investment in education). By responding to changing marginal costs and the multiple factors affecting education attendance we believe a graduated scheme involving wider use of nutritional supplements will also be more effective in attaining its goals by enabling more children to stay in school for longer. Invariably in any redistribution of funding one group must lose. Such decisions are not made easily, nor with brutal disregard for the losers, rather in recognition that "[t]he critical question is not whether a particular option is beneficial but which options are most beneficial, given the state of the education system, [and the policy] goals" (Williams 2005: 177). We would only add to this the state of public finances.
11

A brief but succinct overview by the World Bank can be found http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/reducingpoverty/case/119/summary/Mexico-Oportunidades %20Summary.pdf . Accessed 12/01/13

at

Conclusion A SWOT analysis of the MIFAPRO programme between 2008 and 2012 revealed two weaknesses in the planning phase of the Colom administrations strategic plan that form the basis of this analysis. These weaknesses are found to be the following: A) The decision to provide a fixed transfer with no consideration of family size, which we argue undermined the effectiveness and strategy of the programme. B) The decision to provide a flat transfer to students irrespective of age lead to significant deadweight costs, reducing internal efficiency. It also failed to properly reflect the decision process of the target population or take account of the higher opportunity costs associated with later years of education. After an analysis of the existing benefit structure and planning process this report makes the following key recommendations to feedback into the benefit design of the next cycle of the strategic planning process: 1) That the transfer be unfixed: The total sum allocated to each family should reflect the marginal cost per child in the context of both reducing poverty consumption and encouraging investment in human development. 1b) That the transfer be made available to all eligible children irrespective of adherence to the programme of siblings. 2) That the transfer be variable: The sum allocated per child should also reflect the variable opportunity costs born by the family and child. 2b) That the cash transfer is partially replaced at lower levels with nutritional supplements to better reflect educational demand and barriers to access. As a focal point of the previous administrations plan to achieve Integral Equality by tackling low human development and intergenerational poverty MIFAPRO was an important part of Guatemalas social safety net. President Molinas decision to retain the CCT is a demonstration of the political and public support

enjoyed by the programme, as well as a validation of the 2008 policy goals and the intervention chosen. The reincarnation of MIFAPRO as Mi Bono Seguro represents a second policy cycle in which planners can critically evaluate the programme and recommend incremental changes to ensure the programmes sustainability and success. This paper argues that a combination of the changes above could improve both the internal efficiency of the programme and its effectiveness in achieving its two overriding goals.

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