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GLOBAL SHARING
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INSIDE THIS ISSUE: Head Injury Electric burns Finger Laceration LPG and LNG contact Contact averted Leg Injury Caption Winner 2 2 2 3 3 4 4
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GLOBAL SHARING
DPA will circulate the Inexperienced personnel should incident and lessons learnt. be closely monitored during their He will advise vessel to early days onboard. isolate work areas.
GLOBAL SHARING Property damage: Collision LPG with LNG vessel in Tokyo By
THE INCIDENT
Our LPG/C was enroute to Kawasaki, Japan for loading Propylene. Her passage plan was to follow Uraga Suido and Nakanose Traffic Routes and finally head towards Tsurumi Passage Pilot boarding area. At 1210 hrs, she commenced altering to her next course 338T slowly and observed a LNG/C on her starboard bow at a distance of about 3nm indicating a CPA of 0.4 nm, passing astern. The LNG/C was outbound from Chiba with a pilot on board and escorted by two tugs. By the time heading of the LPG/C vessel reached 357T she stopped altering to port and continued on a northerly heading. At 1214 hrs, the tugs called on VHF Channel 16, asking our vessel to stop immediately. The Master stopped engine and FINDING a very close quarter situation immediately put on astern movement to avoid collision; however, at 1220 hrs, the LPG/C vessel collided on the port side mid-ship region of the LNG/C. evident:
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LESSONS LEARNT
1. Following non-compliance with COLREG was o Rule 5 Ineffective lookout to appraise the situation. o Rule 7 Inadequate use of RADAR/ Automatic Tracking Aid to appraise the situation. Lack of appreciation of apparent change in bearing when approaching a large target at a close range. o Rule 8 Inadequate action to avoid close-quarter situation/ collision o Rule 15 Crossing ahead of stand on vessel, when circumstances required otherwise. o Rule 16 Failing to take appropriate action to avoid the collision as a give way vessel o Rule 17 Adequate collision avoidance actions by the LNG vessel as a Stand-on vessel were not evident when she found that collision could not be avoided by the action of the give way vessel alone, 2. Standard parameters like experience and formal training certification, compliance to matrix are not necessarily a guaranteed deterrent towards untoward incidents occurrence; 3. Importance of proper look out, tracking of targets in the vicinity and effective monitoring of traffic movements are crucial irrespective of conducive weather/ visibility condition and/ or familiarity with the area. 4. The possibility of failing to apply the knowledge in practice even for experienced seafarers cannot be ruled out. 5. There is no substitute to continual motivation and retraining of the floating staff.
After the collision both the vessels were safe with no personal injury and/ or pollution. However there were structural damages
LESSONS LEARNT
Prompt action of the Bridge team prevented further escalation of the near miss into an incident. In Singapore, anchorages are congested with ships anchored very close to each other often at 2-2.5cables parallel distance from each other. During slack water, tidal streams vary at small distances & ships head in different directions and swinging also vary considerably. The anchor watches at Singapore demand high situational awareness & extreme vigilance especially at slack water, it would help to establish nearby ships approximate turning circle at flood tide when ships head in similar direction. Any significant change of aspect together with closing distance should warrant extra precaution & all necessary preventive actions including calling anchor stations, preparing the engines, requesting Pilot, drawing attention of other ships, rigging fenders etc.
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GLOBAL SHARING
LESSON LEARNT
After a thorough investigation and root cause analysis, it was determined that the type of wire rope (make and dimension) were not of the requirements in the manual. The supplier mistakenly gave an ungalvanized wire rope of undersized diameter than the specification ordered hence the failure due to rapid tension build up and pre-mature deterioration. The C/E and/or duty engineer failed to check the wire rope prior to installation which was done in the dry-dock several months earlier. Shipyard workers installed the wire rope without knowledge of the required specifications as it was supplied by the ship operator. Corrective action was the immediate replacement to the correct specification of wire rope and checking of all wire rope bought with said supplier and installed on board
MESSAGE TO INDUSTRY
Accidents often occur when various safety barriers fail one after the other. In this case the requisition was incorrect, the supply was not correct, the wire was not matched with existing certificates, supervision was found superficial. Companies should have procedures in place to match supplies, and monitor same, especially to critical identified safety equipment. Third parties need supervision by Ship-staff.
POSTED BY G SACHDEVA
SINGAPORE 089316
. INDUSTRY
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Disclaimer: The articles and views presented here are from contributions by participants in the Shell Safety Seminar. The author or the compa ny bears no responsibility for w hat is stated he rein. This new sletter is for information onl y a nd an effort to share incidents w ith a view to promote safety across the industr y.
ACCIDENTS
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