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Article X. Local Government Magtajas v. Pryce Properties, 234 SCRA 255 (1994) Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 42 (1995) Garcia v. Commission on Elections, 227 SCRA 100 (1993) Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium, 474 SCRA 258 (2005) Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 295 SCRA 438 (1998) Pandi v. Court of Appeals, 380 SCRA 157 (2002) Sema v. Comelec, 558 SCRA 700 (2008) Article XI. Accountability of Public Officers Estrada v. Desierto, supra Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, 452 SCRA 714 (2005) Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, 643 SCRA 198 (2011) Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corp., 575 SCRA 23 (2008) Argana v. Republic, 443 SCRA 184 (2004) Collantes v. Court of Appeals, 517 SCRA 561 (2007) Article XII. National Economy and Patrimony Garcia v. Board of Investments, 191 SCRA 288 (1990) Lee Hong Hok v. David, 48 SCRA 372 (1972) Carino v. Insular Government, 41 Phil. 935 (1909) Republic v. Quasha, 46 SCRA 160 (1972) Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 (1947) Laurel v. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797 (1990) Cheesman v. IAC, 193 SCRA 93 (1991) Hulst v. PR Builders, 532 SCRA 74 (2007); 566 SCRA 333 (2008) Philippine Banking Corp. v. Lui She, 21 SCRA 52 (1967) Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 409 (1997) La Bugal-BLaan Tribal Association v. Ramos, 445 SCRA 1 (2004) Cruz v. Sec. of DENR, 347 SCRA 128 (2000) Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. COA, 651 SCRA 146 (2011) Article X. Local Government G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994 MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners, vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, respondents. Aquilino G. Pimentel, Jr. and Associates for petitioners. R.R. Torralba & Associates for private respondent. CRUZ, J.: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious elements echoed the objection and so did the women's groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city. The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., one of the herein private respondents, renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season. The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353 reading as follows: ORDINANCE NO. 3353 AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF CASINO. BE IT ORDAINED by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro, in session assembled that: Sec. 1. That pursuant to the policy of the city banning the operation of casino within its territorial jurisdiction, no business permit shall be issued to any person, partnership or corporation for the operation of casino within the city limits. Sec. 2. That it shall be a violation of existing business permit by any persons, partnership or corporation to use its business establishment or portion thereof, or allow the use thereof by others for casino operation and other gambling activities. Sec. 3. PENALTIES. Any violation of such existing business permit as defined in the preceding section shall suffer the following penalties, to wit: a) Suspension of the business permit for sixty (60) days for the first offense and a fine of P1,000.00/day b) Suspension of the business permit for Six (6) months for the second offense, and a fine of P3,000.00/day

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c) Permanent revocation of the business permit and imprisonment of One (1) year, for the third and subsequent offenses. Sec. 4. This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days from publication thereof. Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93 reading as follows: ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93 AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREFOR. WHEREAS, the City Council established a policy as early as 1990 against CASINO under its Resolution No. 2295; WHEREAS, on October 14, 1992, the City Council passed another Resolution No. 2673, reiterating its policy against the establishment of CASINO; WHEREAS, subsequently, thereafter, it likewise passed Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of Business Permit and to cancel existing Business Permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of CASINO; WHEREAS, under Art. 3, section 458, No. (4), sub paragraph VI of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Rep. Act 7160) and under Art. 99, No. (4), Paragraph VI of the implementing rules of the Local Government Code, the City Council as the Legislative Body shall enact measure to suppress any activity inimical to public morals and general welfare of the people and/or regulate or prohibit such activity pertaining to amusement or entertainment in order to protect social and moral welfare of the community; NOW THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council in session duly assembled that: Sec. 1. The operation of gambling CASINO in the City of Cagayan de Oro is hereby prohibited. Sec. 2. Any violation of this Ordinance shall be subject to the following penalties: a) Administrative fine of P5,000.00 shall be imposed against the proprietor, partnership or corporation undertaking the operation, conduct, maintenance of gambling CASINO in the City and closure thereof; 6. It had no option but to follow the ruling in the case of Basco, et al. v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 53 in disposing of the issues presented in this present case. PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation , 4 this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to the national economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the government, next only to the BIR and the Bureau of Customs. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows: Sec. 3. This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days after its publication in a local newspaper of general circulation. Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was denied on July 13, 1993. 2 Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now before us in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 3 They aver that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that: 1. Under existing laws, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro does not have the power and authority to prohibit the establishment and operation of a PAGCOR gambling casino within the City's territorial limits. 2. The phrase "gambling and other prohibited games of chance" found in Sec. 458, par. (a), sub-par. (1) (v) of R.A. 7160 could only mean "illegal gambling." 3. The questioned Ordinances in effect annul P.D. 1869 and are therefore invalid on that point. 4. The questioned Ordinances are discriminatory to casino and partial to cockfighting and are therefore invalid on that point. 5. The questioned Ordinances are not reasonable, not consonant with the general powers and purposes of the instrumentality concerned and inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State. b) Imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year or a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 or both at the discretion of the court against the manager, supervisor, and/or any person responsible in the establishment, conduct and maintenance of gambling CASINO.

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Sec. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically declares that: Sec. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: (1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city government, and in this connection, shall: xxx xxx xxx (v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for habitual drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and maintenance of houses of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money or property, drug addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic materials or publications, and such other activities inimical to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city; This section also authorizes the local government units to regulate properties and businesses within their territorial limits in the interest of the general welfare. 5 The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos because they involve games of chance, which are detrimental to the people. Gambling is not allowed by general law and even by the Constitution itself. The legislative power conferred upon local government units may be exercised over all kinds of gambling and not only over "illegal gambling" as the respondents erroneously argue. Even if the operation of casinos may have been permitted under P.D. 1869, the government of Cagayan de Oro City has the authority to prohibit them within its territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the Local Government Code. It is submitted that this interpretation is consonant with the policy of local autonomy as mandated in Article II, Section 25, and Article X of the Constitution, as well as various other provisions therein seeking to strengthen the character of the nation. In giving the local government units the power to prevent or suppress gambling and other social problems, the Local Government Code has recognized the competence of such communities to determine and adopt the measures best expected to promote the general welfare of their inhabitants in line with the policies of the State. The petitioners also stress that when the Code expressly authorized the local government units to prevent and suppress gambling and other prohibited games of chance, like craps, baccarat, blackjack and roulette, it meant all forms of gambling without distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos. 6 Otherwise, it would have expressly excluded from the scope of their power casinos and other forms of gambling authorized by special law, as it could have easily done. The fact that it did not do so simply means that the local government units are permitted to prohibit all kinds of gambling within their territories, including the operation of casinos. The adoption of the Local Government Code, it is pointed out, had the effect of modifying the charter of the PAGCOR. The Code is not only a later enactment than P.D. 1869 and so is deemed to prevail in case of inconsistencies between them. More than this, the powers of the PAGCOR under the decree are expressly discontinued by the Code insofar as they do not conform to its philosophy and provisions, pursuant to Par. (f) of its repealing clause reading as follows: (f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding the effect of the Local Government Code on P.D. 1869, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the petitioners, in accordance with the direction in the Code calling for its liberal interpretation in favor of the local government units. Section 5 of the Code specifically provides: Sec. 5. Rules of Interpretation. In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply: (a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned;

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xxx xxx xxx (c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community; . . . (Emphasis supplied.) Finally, the petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically harmful and cite various provisions of the Constitution and several decisions of this Court expressive of the general and official disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the State policies on the family and the proper upbringing of the youth and, as might be expected, call attention to the old case of U.S. v. Salaveria, 7 which sustained a municipal ordinance prohibiting the playing of panguingue. The petitioners decry the immorality of gambling. They also impugn the wisdom of P.D. 1869 (which they describe as "a martial law instrument") in creating PAGCOR and authorizing it to operate casinos "on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines." This is the opportune time to stress an important point. The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. 8 That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicibility of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice. The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of Ordinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City. And we shall do so only by the criteria laid down by law and not by our own convictions on the propriety of gambling. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions 9 has held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements: 1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute. 2) It must not be unfair or oppressive. 3) It must not be partial or discriminatory. 4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade. 5) It must be general and consistent with public policy. 6) It must not be unreasonable. We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners are less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such games of chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the section is clear and unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word "gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed. We could stop here as this interpretation should settle the problem quite conclusively. But we will not. The vigorous efforts of the petitioners on behalf of the inhabitants of Cagayan de Oro City, and the earnestness of their advocacy, deserve more than short shrift from this Court. The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners have an ingenious answer to this misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that have changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance admittedly cannot prevail against a statute. Their theory is that the change has been made by the Local Government Code itself, which was also enacted by the national lawmaking authority. In their view, the decree has been, not really repealed by the Code, but merely "modified pro tanto" in the sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino over the objection of the local government unit concerned. This modification of P.D. 1869 by the Local Government Code is permissible because one law can change or repeal another law. It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting that the decree has only been "modified pro tanto," they are actually arguing that it is already dead, repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the Code has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its operations may now be not only prohibited by the local government unit; in fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by Section 458 of the Code if the word "shall" as used therein is to be given its accepted meaning. Local government units have now no choice but to prevent and suppress gambling, which in the petitioners' view includes both legal and illegal gambling. Under this construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulate or centralize as they must all be prohibited by the local government units pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this situation, PAGCOR cannot continue to exist except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longer be able to exercise its powers as a prime source of government revenue through the operation of casinos. It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the repealing clause, conveniently discarding the rest of the provision which painstakingly mentions the specific laws or the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified) by the Code. Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them. A reading of the entire repealing clause, which is reproduced below, will disclose the omission:

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Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code," Executive Order No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby repealed. (b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees, orders, instructions, memoranda and issuances related to or concerning the barangay are hereby repealed. (c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act. No. 5447 regarding the Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidential Decree No. 436 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect. (d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs locallyfunded projects. (e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Code: Sections 2, 16, and 29 of Presidential Decree No. 704; Sections 12 of Presidential Decree No. 87, as amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended; and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 972, as amended, and (f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intention. In Lichauco & Co. v. Apostol, 10 this Court explained: The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed on the assumption that if the act of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the lawmaking power to abrogate the prior law, this intention must be given effect; but there must always be a sufficient revelation of this intention, and it has become an unbending rule of statutory construction that the intention to repeal a former law will not be imputed to the Legislature when it appears that the two statutes, or provisions, with reference to which the question arises bear to each other the relation of general to special. There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869. On the contrary, as the private respondent points out, PAGCOR is mentioned as the source of funding in two later enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309, creating a Board of Claims under the Department of Justice for the benefit of victims of unjust punishment or detention or of violent crimes, and R.A. 7648, providing for measures for the solution of the power crisis. PAGCOR revenues are tapped by these two statutes. This would show that the PAGCOR charter has not been repealed by the Local Government Code but has in fact been improved as it were to make the entity more responsive to the fiscal problems of the government. It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect as the handiwork of a coordinate branch of the government. On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the case before us. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is to hold that under the Local Government Code, local government units may (and indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in such laws must be read into the Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally effective and mutually complementary. This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern concept; it is probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so. The petitioners' suggestion that the Code authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction between these two forms of gambling without a clear indication that this is the will of the legislature. Plausibly, following this theory, the City of Manila could, by mere ordinance, prohibit the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office from conducting a lottery as authorized by R.A. 1169 and B.P. 42 or stop the races at the San Lazaro Hippodrome as authorized by R.A. 309 and R.A. 983. In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of arriving at the conclusion urged on us by the petitioners that the ordinances in question are valid. On the contrary, we find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the character and force of a statute, as well as the public policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general. The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature. 11

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This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, 12 which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. The Court understands and admires the concern of the petitioners for the welfare of their constituents and their apprehensions that the welfare of Cagayan de Oro City will be endangered by the opening of the casino. We share the view that "the hope of large or easy gain, obtained without special effort, turns the head of the workman" 13 and that "habitual gambling is a cause of laziness and ruin." 14 In People v. Gorostiza, 15 we declared: "The social scourge of gambling must be stamped out. The laws against gambling must be enforced to the limit." George Washington called gambling "the child of avarice, the brother of iniquity and the father of mischief." Nevertheless, we must recognize the power of the legislature to decide, in its own wisdom, to legalize certain forms of gambling, as was done in P.D. 1869 and impliedly affirmed in the Local Government Code. That decision can be revoked by this Court only if it contravenes the Constitution as the touchstone of all official acts. We do not find such contravention here. We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the Local Government Code, which empowers the local government units to prevent or suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by law. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered. Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE HERCULANO TECH, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 70, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BINANGONAN RIZAL; FLEET DEVELOPMENT, INC. and CARLITO ARROYO; THE MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE AURELIO C. TRAMPE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 163, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG; MANILA MARINE LIFE BUSINESS RESOURCES, INC. represented by, MR. TOBIAS REYNALD M. TIANGCO; MUNICIPALITY OF TAGUIG, METRO MANILA and/or MAYOR RICARDO D. PAPA, JR., respondents. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ALEJANDRO A. MARQUEZ, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 79, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; GREENFIELD VENTURES INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and R. J. ORION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 162, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA; IRMA FISHING & TRADING CORP.; ARTM FISHING CORP.; BDR CORPORATION, MIRT CORPORATION and TRIM CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; BLUE LAGOON FISHING CORP. and ALCRIS CHICKEN GROWERS, INC.; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; AGP FISH VENTURES, INC., represented by its PRESIDENT ALFONSO PUYAT; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE EUGENIO S. LABITORIA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 161, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA; SEA MAR TRADING CO. INC.; EASTERN LAGOON FISHING CORP.; MINAMAR FISHING CORP.; MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 120865-71 December 7, 1995 LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs.

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HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.: It is difficult for a man, scavenging on the garbage dump created by affluence and profligate consumption and extravagance of the rich or fishing in the murky waters of the Pasig River and the Laguna Lake or making a clearing in the forest so that he can produce food for his family, to understand why protecting birds, fish, and trees is more important than protecting him and keeping his family alive. How do we strike a balance between environmental protection, on the one hand, and the individual personal interests of people, on the other? Towards environmental protection and ecology, navigational safety, and sustainable development, Republic Act No. 4850 created the "Laguna Lake Development Authority." This Government Agency is supposed to carry out and effectuate the aforesaid declared policy, so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns, in the act clearly named, within the context of the national and regional plans and policies for social and economic development. Presidential Decree No. 813 of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos amended certain sections of Republic Act No. 4850 because of the concern for the rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay, combined with current and prospective uses of the lake for municipal-industrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries, and the like. Concern on the part of the Government and the general public over: the environment impact of development on the water quality and ecology of the lake and its related river systems; the inflow of polluted water from the Pasig River, industrial, domestic and agricultural wastes from developed areas around the lake; the increasing urbanization which induced the deterioration of the lake, since water quality studies have shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same; and the floods in Metropolitan Manila area and the lakeshore towns which will influence the hydraulic system of Laguna de Bay, since any scheme of controlling the floods will necessarily involve the lake and its river systems, likewise gave impetus to the creation of the Authority. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4850 was amended to read as follows: Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the national policy to promote, and accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns hereinafter referred to as the region, within the context of the national and regional plans and policies for social and economic development and to carry out the development of the Laguna Lake region with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. 1 Special powers of the Authority, pertinent to the issues in this case, include: Sec. 3. Section 4 of the same Act is hereby further amended by adding thereto seven new paragraphs to be known as paragraphs (j), (k), (l), (m), (n), (o), and (p) which shall read as follows: xxx xxx xxx (j) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, to engage in fish production and other aquaculture projects in Laguna de Bay and other bodies of water within its jurisdiction and in pursuance thereof to conduct studies and make experiments, whenever necessary, with the collaboration and assistance of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, with the end in view of improving present techniques and practices. Provided, that until modified, altered or amended by the procedure provided in the following subparagraph, the present laws, rules and permits or authorizations remain in force; (k) For the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in Laguna de Bay, the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue new permit for the use of the lake waters for any projects or activities in or affecting the said lake including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like, and to impose necessary safeguards for lake quality control and management and to collect necessary fees for said activities and projects: Provided, That the fees collected for fisheries may be shared between the Authority and other government agencies and political sub-divisions in such proportion as may be determined by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Authority's Board: Provided, further, That the Authority's Board may determine new areas of fishery development or activities which it may place under the supervision of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources taking into account the overall development plans and programs for Laguna de Bay and related bodies of water: Provided, finally, That the Authority shall subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines promulgate such rules and regulations which shall govern fisheries development activities in Laguna de Bay which shall take into consideration among others the following: socioeconomic amelioration of bonafide resident fishermen whether individually or collectively in the form of cooperatives, lakeshore town development, a master plan for fishpen construction and operation, communal fishing ground for lake shore town residents, and preference to lake shore town residents in hiring laborer for fishery projects; (l) To require the cities and municipalities embraced within the region to pass appropriate zoning ordinances and other regulatory measures necessary to carry out the objectives of the Authority and enforce the same with the assistance of the Authority;

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(m) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, to exercise water rights over public waters within the Laguna de Bay region whenever necessary to carry out the Authority's projects; (n) To act in coordination with existing governmental agencies in establishing water quality standards for industrial, agricultural and municipal waste discharges into the lake and to cooperate with said existing agencies of the government of the Philippines in enforcing such standards, or to separately pursue enforcement and penalty actions as provided for in Section 4 (d) and Section 39-A of this Act: Provided, That in case of conflict on the appropriate water quality standard to be enforced such conflict shall be resolved thru the NEDA Board. 2 To more effectively perform the role of the Authority under Republic Act No. 4850, as though Presidential Decree No. 813 were not thought to be completely effective, the Chief Executive, feeling that the land and waters of the Laguna Lake Region are limited natural resources requiring judicious management to their optimal utilization to insure renewability and to preserve the ecological balance, the competing options for the use of such resources and conflicting jurisdictions over such uses having created undue constraints on the institutional capabilities of the Authority in the light of the limited powers vested in it by its charter, Executive Order No. 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the Authority and named and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region". Also, pertinent to the issues in this case are the following provisions of Executive Order No. 927 which include in particular the sharing of fees: Sec 2. Water Rights Over Laguna de Bay and Other Bodies of Water within the Lake Region: To effectively regulate and monitor activities in the Laguna de Bay region, the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. For the purpose of this Executive Order, the term "Laguna de Bay Region" shall refer to the Provinces of Rizal and Laguna; the Cities of San Pablo, Pasay, Caloocan, Quezon, Manila and Tagaytay; the towns of Tanauan, Sto. Tomas and Malvar in Batangas Province; the towns of Silang and Carmona in Cavite Province; the town of Lucban in Quezon Province; and the towns of Marikina, Pasig, Taguig, Muntinlupa, and Pateros in Metro Manila. Sec 3. Collection of Fees. The Authority is hereby empowered to collect fees for the use of the lake water and its tributaries for all beneficial purposes including but not limited to fisheries, recreation, municipal, industrial, agricultural, navigation, irrigation, and waste disposal purpose; Provided, that the rates of the fees to be collected, and the sharing with other government agencies and political subdivisions, if necessary, shall be subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Authority's Board, except fishpen fee, which will be shared in the following manner; 20 percent of the fee shall go to the lakeshore local governments, 5 percent shall go to the Project Development Fund which shall be administered by a Council and the remaining 75 percent shall constitute the share of LLDA. However, after the implementation within the threeyear period of the Laguna Lake Fishery Zoning and Management Plan, the sharing will be modified as follows: 35 percent of the fishpen fee goes to the lakeshore local governments, 5 percent goes to the Project Development Fund and the remaining 60 percent shall be retained by LLDA; Provided, however, that the share of LLDA shall form part of its corporate funds and shall not be remitted to the National Treasury as an exception to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1234. (Emphasis supplied) It is important to note that Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 813 defined the term "Laguna Lake" in this manner: Sec 41. Definition of Terms. (11) Laguna Lake or Lake. Whenever Laguna Lake or lake is used in this Act, the same shall refer to Laguna de Bay which is that area covered by the lake water when it is at the average annual maximum lake level of elevation 12.50 meters, as referred to a datum 10.00 meters below mean lower low water (M.L.L.W). Lands located at and below such elevation are public lands which form part of the bed of said lake. Then came Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters because R.A. 7160 provides: Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges. (a) Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefor in accordance with the provisions of this Section. (b) The Sangguniang Bayan may: (1) Grant fishing privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussel or other aquatic beds or bangus fry areas, within a definite zone of the municipal waters, as determined by it; . . . . (2) Grant privilege to gather, take or catch bangus fry, prawn fry or kawag-kawag or fry of other species and fish from the municipal waters by nets, traps or other fishing gears to

9
marginal fishermen free from any rental fee, charges or any other imposition whatsoever. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 447. Power, Duties, Functions and Compensation. . . . . xxx xxx xxx (XI) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, grant exclusive privileges of constructing fish corrals or fishpens, or the taking or catching of bangus fry, prawn fry or kawag-kawag or fry of any species or fish within the municipal waters. xxx xxx xxx Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens and fishcages to the consternation of the Authority. Unregulated fishpens and fishcages, as of July, 1995, occupied almost one-third of the entire lake water surface area, increasing the occupation drastically from 7,000 hectares in 1990 to almost 21,000 hectares in 1995. The Mayor's permit to construct fishpens and fishcages were all undertaken in violation of the policies adopted by the Authority on fishpen zoning and the Laguna Lake carrying capacity. To be sure, the implementation by the lakeshore municipalities of separate independent policies in the operation of fishpens and fishcages within their claimed territorial municipal waters in the lake and their indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits have already saturated the lake area with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake. In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Authority served notice to the general public that: In compliance with the instructions of His Excellency PRESIDENT FIDEL V. RAMOS given on June 23, 1993 at Pila, Laguna pursuant to Republic Act 4850 as amended by Presidential Decree 813 and Executive Order 927 series of 1983 and in line with the policies and programs of the Presidential Task Force on Illegal Fishpens and Illegal Fishing, the general public is hereby notified that: 1. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay Region, which were not registered or to which no application for registration and/or permit has been filed with Laguna Lake Development Authority as of March 31, 1993 are hereby declared outrightly as illegal. 2. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures so declared as illegal shall be subject to demolition which shall be undertaken by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing. 3. Owners of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal shall, without prejudice to demolition of their structures be criminally charged in accordance with Section 39-A of Republic Act 4850 as amended by P.D. 813 for violation of the same laws. Violations of these laws carries a penalty of imprisonment of not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand Pesos or both at the discretion of the court. All operators of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal in accordance with the foregoing Notice shall have one (1) month on or before 27 October 1993 to show cause before the LLDA why their said fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures should not be demolished/dismantled. One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the concerned owners of the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures within 10 days from receipt thereof, otherwise, demolition shall be effected. Reacting thereto, the affected fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the Authority before various regional trial courts, to wit: (a) Civil Case No. 759-B, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal, filed by Fleet Development, Inc. and Carlito Arroyo; (b) Civil Case No. 64049, for Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 162, Pasig, filed by IRMA Fishing and Trading Corp., ARTM Fishing Corp., BDR Corp., MIRT Corp. and TRIM Corp.; (c) Civil Case No. 566, for Declaratory Relief and Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 163, Pasig, filed by Manila Marine Life Business Resources, Inc. and Tobias Reynaldo M. Tianco; (d) Civil Case No. 556-M, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, filed by AGP Fishing Ventures, Inc.; (e) Civil Case No. 522-M, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, filed by Blue Lagoon and Alcris Chicken Growers, Inc.; (f) Civil Case No. 554-, for Certiorari and Prohibition, Regional Trial Court, Branch 79, Morong, Rizal, filed by Greenfields Ventures Industrial Corp. and R.J. Orion Development Corp.; and (g) Civil Case No. 64124, for Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Pasig, filed by SEA-MAR Trading Co., Inc. and Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corp. and Minamar Fishing Corporation. The Authority filed motions to dismiss the cases against it on jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss were invariably denied. Meanwhile, temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary mandatory injunction were issued in Civil Cases Nos. 64124, 759 and 566 enjoining the Authority from demolishing the fishpens and similar structures in question. Hence, the herein petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, G.R. Nos. 120865-71, were filed by the Authority with this court. Impleaded as parties-respondents are concerned regional trial courts and respective private parties, and the municipalities and/or respective Mayors of Binangonan, Taguig and Jala-jala, who issued permits for the construction and operation of fishpens in Laguna de Bay. The Authority sought the following reliefs, viz.: (A) Nullification of the temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary injunction issued in Civil Cases Nos. 64125, 759 and 566; (B) Permanent prohibition against the regional trial courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases involving the Authority which is a co-equal body;

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(C) Judicial pronouncement that R.A. 7610 (Local Government Code of 1991) did not repeal, alter or modify the provisions of R.A. 4850, as amended, empowering the Authority to issue permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay and that, the Authority the government agency vested with exclusive authority to issue said permits. By this Court's resolution of May 2, 1994, the Authority's consolidated petitions were referred to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision, dated June 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Authority's consolidated petitions, the Court of Appeals holding that: (A) LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial agencies of government whose decision or order are appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA charter does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial functions insofar as fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the power to grant permits devolved to and is now vested with their respective local government units concerned. Not satisfied with the Court of Appeals decision, the Authority has returned to this Court charging the following errors: 1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PROBABLY COMMITTED AN ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY IS NOT A QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCY. 2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT R.A. 4850 AS AMENDED BY P.D. 813 AND E.O. 927 SERIES OF 1983 HAS BEEN REPEALED BY REPUBLIC ACT 7160. THE SAID RULING IS CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES AND JURISPRUDENCE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. 3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE POWER TO ISSUE FISHPEN PERMITS IN LAGUNA DE BAY HAS BEEN DEVOLVED TO CONCERNED (LAKESHORE) LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS. We take a simplistic view of the controversy. Actually, the main and only issue posed is: Which agency of the Government the Laguna Lake Development Authority or the towns and municipalities comprising the region should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned? Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 813, and Section 2 of Executive Order No. 927, cited above, specifically provide that the Laguna Lake Development Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region, including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a definite zone of the municipal waters. We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not necessarily repeal the aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region. The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categorically expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed. It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority constitutes a special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law." 3 Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied repeals are not favored and as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. 4 Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the Authority should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991. Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which are environmental protection, navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication that the legislative intent is for the Authority to proceed with its mission. We are on all fours with the manifestation of petitioner Laguna Lake Development Authority that "Laguna de Bay, like any other single body of water has its own unique natural ecosystem. The 900 km lake surface water, the eight (8) major river tributaries and several other smaller rivers that drain into the lake, the 2,920 km basin or watershed transcending the boundaries of Laguna and Rizal provinces, greater portion of Metro Manila, parts of Cavite, Batangas, and Quezon provinces, constitute one integrated delicate natural ecosystem that needs to be protected with uniform set of policies; if we are to be serious in our aims of attaining sustainable development. This is an exhaustible natural resource a very limited one which requires judicious management and optimal utilization to ensure renewability and preserve its ecological integrity and balance."

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"Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a national policy geared towards the protection, conservation, balanced growth and sustainable development of the region with due regard to the inter-generational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this part of the earth. The authors of Republic Act 4850 have foreseen this need when they passed this LLDA law the special law designed to govern the management of our Laguna de Bay lake resources." "Laguna de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts of management policies where lakeshore local government units exercise exclusive dominion over specific portions of the lake water. The garbage thrown or sewage discharged into the lake, abstraction of water therefrom or construction of fishpens by enclosing its certain area, affect not only that specific portion but the entire 900 km of lake water. The implementation of a cohesive and integrated lake water resource management policy, therefore, is necessary to conserve, protect and sustainably develop Laguna de Bay." 5 The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. This is evident from the fact that Section 149 of the New Local Government Code empowering local governments to issue fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power Of Local Government Units." On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aquaculture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region (Section 2, Executive Order No. 927) and for lake quality control and management. 6 It does partake of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all State powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the Authority which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay. There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 provides for the proper sharing of fees collected. In respect to the question as to whether the Authority is a quasi-judicial agency or not, it is our holding that, considering the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4850 and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, and the ruling of this Court in Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 304, 306, which we quote: xxx xxx xxx As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant of power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region, public corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region. xxx xxx xxx . . . . While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter, as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency. there is no question that the Authority has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a "cease and desist order" and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay. The Authority's pretense, however, that it is co-equal to the Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against it may only be instituted before the Court of Appeals cannot be sustained. On actions necessitating the resolution of legal questions affecting the powers of the Authority as provided for in its charter, the Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction. In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it. Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid licensing authority will render nugatory its avowed purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake Region. Otherwise stated, the abrogation of this power would render useless its reason for being and will in effect denigrate, if not abolish, the Laguna Lake Development Authority. This, the Local Government Code of 1991 had never intended to do. WHEREFORE, the petitions for prohibition, certiorari and injunction are hereby granted, insofar as they relate to the authority of the Laguna Lake Development Authority to grant fishing privileges within the Laguna Lake Region.

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The restraining orders and/or writs of injunction issued by Judge Arturo Marave, RTC, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal; Judge Herculano Tech, RTC, Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal; and Judge Aurelio Trampe, RTC, Branch 163, Pasig, Metro Manila, are hereby declared null and void and ordered set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The Municipal Mayors of the Laguna Lake Region are hereby prohibited from issuing permits to construct and operate fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures within the Laguna Lake Region, their previous issuances being declared null and void. Thus, the fishing permits issued by Mayors Isidro B. Pacis, Municipality of Binangonan; Ricardo D. Papa, Municipality of Taguig; and Walfredo M. de la Vega, Municipality of Jala-jala, specifically, are likewise declared null and void and ordered cancelled. The fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures put up by operators by virtue of permits issued by Municipal Mayors within the Laguna Lake Region, specifically, permits issued to Fleet Development, Inc. and Carlito Arroyo; Manila Marine Life Business Resources, Inc., represented by, Mr. Tobias Reynald M. Tiangco; Greenfield Ventures Industrial Development Corporation and R.J. Orion Development Corporation; IRMA Fishing And Trading Corporation, ARTM Fishing Corporation, BDR Corporation, Mirt Corporation and Trim Corporation; Blue Lagoon Fishing Corporation and ALCRIS Chicken Growers, Inc.; AGP Fish Ventures, Inc., represented by its President Alfonso Puyat; SEA MAR Trading Co., Inc., Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corporation, and MINAMAR Fishing Corporation, are hereby declared illegal structures subject to demolition by the Laguna Lake Development Authority. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur. G.R. No. 111511 October 5, 1993 ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LUCILA PAYUMO, ET AL., respondents. Alfonso M. Cruz Law Offices for petitioners. Romulo C. Felizmea, Crisostomo Banzon and Horacio Apostol for private respondents. Whereas, the majority of all the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, after a serious and careful deliberation have decided to adopt this resolution for the recall of the incumbent provincial governor Garcia for loss of confidence; Now, therefore, be it resolved, as it is hereby resolved that having lost confidence on the incumbent governor of Bataan, Enrique T. Garcia, recall proceedings be immediately initiated against him; Resolved further, that copy of this resolution be furnished the Honorable Commission on Elections, Manila and the Provincial Election Supervisor, Balanga, Bataan. One hundred forty-six (146) names appeared in Resolution No. 1 but only eighty (80) carried the signatures of the members of the PRA. Of the eighty (80) signatures, only seventy-four (74) were found genuine. 3 The PRAC of the province had a membership of one hundred forty-four (144) 4 and its majority was seventy-three (73). On July 7, 1993, petitioners filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition to deny due course to said Resolution No. 1. Petitioners alleged that the PRAC failed to comply with the "substantive and procedural requirement" laid down in Section 70 of R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of We shall first unfurl the facts. Petitioner Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of the province of Bataan in the May 11, 1992 elections. In the early evening of July 1993, some mayors, vice-mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the province met at the National Power Corporation compound in Bagac, Bataan. At about 12:30 A.M of the following day, July 2, 1993, they proceeded to the Bagac town plaza where they constituted themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of petitioner Garcia. The mayor of Mariveles, Honorable Oscar, de los Reyes, and the mayor of Dinalupihan, the Honorable Lucila Payumo, were chosen as Presiding Officer and Secretary of the Assembly, respectively. Thereafter, the Vice-Mayor of Limay, the Honorable Ruben Roque, was recognized and he moved that a resolution be passed for the recall of the petitioner on the ground of "loss of confidence." 1 The motion was "unanimously seconded." 2 The resolution states: RESOLUTION NO. 1 Whereas, the majority of all the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly in the Province of Bataan have voluntarily constituted themselves for the purpose of the recall of the incumbent provincial governor of the province of Bataan, Honorable Enrique T. Garcia pursuant to the provisions of Section 70, paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991; Whereas, the total number of all the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly in the province of Bataan is One Hundred and Forty- Six (146) composed of all mayors, vice-mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of all the 12 towns of the province of Bataan;

PUNO, J.: The EDSA revolution of 1986 restored the reality that the people's might is not a myth. The 1987 Constitution then included people power as an article of faith and Congress was mandated to p ass laws for its effective exercise. The Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted providing for two (2) modes of initiating the recall from office of local elective officials who appear to have lost the confidence of the electorate. One of these modes is recall through the initiative of a preparatory recall assembly. In the case at bench, petitioners assail this mode of initiatory recall as unconstitutional. The challenge cannot succeed.

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1991. In a per curiam Resolution promulgated August 31, 1993, the respondent COMELEC dismissed the petition and scheduled the recall elections for the position of Governor of Bataan on October 11 , 1993. Petitioners then filed with Us a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to annul the said Resolution of the respondent COMELEC on various grounds. They urged that section 70 of R.A. 7160 allowing recall through the initiative of the PRAC is unconstitutional because: (1) the people have the sole and exclusive right to decide whether or not to initiate proceedings, and (2) it violated the right of elected local public officials belonging to the political minority to equal protection of law. They also argued that the proceedings followed by the PRAC in passing Resolution No. I suffered from numerous defects, the most fatal of which was the deliberate failure to send notices of the meeting to sixty-five (65) members of the assembly. On September 7, 1993, We required the respondents to file their Comments within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days. 5 On September 16, 1993, We set petition for hearing on September 21, 1993 at 11 A.M. After the hearing, We granted the petition on ground that the sending of selective notices to members of the PRAC violated the due process protection of the Constitution and fatally flawed the enactment of Resolution No. 1. We ruled: xxx xxx xxx After deliberation, the Court opts not to resolve the alleged constitutional infirmity of sec. 70 of R.A. No. 7160 for its resolution is not unavoidable to decide the merits of the petition. The petition can be decided on the equally fundamental issues of: (1) whether or not all the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly were notified of its meeting; and (2) assuming lack of notice, whether or not it would vitiate the proceedings of the assembly including its Resolution No. 1. The failure to give notice to all members of the assembly, especially to the members known to be political allies of petitioner Garcia was admitted by both counsels of the respondents. They did not deny that only those inclined to agree with the resolution of recall were notified as a matter of political strategy and security. They justified these selective notices on the ground that the law does not specifically mandate the giving of notice. We reject this submission of the respondents. The due process clause of the Constitution requiring notice as an element of fairness is inviolable and should always be considered as part and parcel of every law in case of its silence. The need for notice to all the members of the assembly is also imperative for these members represent the different sectors of the electorate of Bataan. To the extent that they are not notified of the meeting of the assembly, to that extent is the sovereign voice of the people they represent nullified. The resolution to recall should articulate the majority will of the members of the assembly but the majority will can be genuinely determined only after all the members of the assembly have been given a fair opportunity to express the will of their constituents. Needless to stress, the requirement of notice is indispensable in determining the collective wisdom of the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly. Its non-observance is fatal to the validity of the resolution to recall petitioner Garcia as Governor of the province of Bataan. The petition raises other issues that are not only prima impressionis but also of transcendental importance to the rightful exercise of the sovereign right of the people to recall their elected officials. The Court shall discuss these issues in a more extended decision. In accord with this Resolution, it appears that on September 22, 1993, the Honorable Mayor of Dinalupihan, Oscar de los Reyes again sent Notice of Session to the members of the PRAC to "convene in session on September 26, 1993 at the town plaza of Balanga, Bataan at 8:30 o'clock in the morning." 6 From news reports, the PRAC convened in session and eighty-seven (87) of its members once more passed a resolution calling for the recall of petitioner Garcia. 7 On September 27, 1993, petitioners filed with Us a Supplemental Petition and Reiteration of Extremely Urgent Motion for a resolution of their contention that section 70 of R.A. 7160 is unconstitutional. We find the original Petition and the Supplemental Petition assailing the constitutionality of section 70 of R.A. 7160 insofar as it allows a preparatory recall assembly initiate the recall of local elective officials as bereft of merit. Every law enjoys the presumption of validity. The presumption rests on the respect due to the wisdom, integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative, by which the law is passed, and the Chief Executive, by whom the law is approved, 8 For upholding the Constitution is not the responsibility of the judiciary alone but also the duty of the legislative and executive. 9 To strike down a law as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute permits. 10 The annulment cannot be decreed on a doubtful, and arguable implication. The universal rule of legal hermeneutics is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a law. 11 Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of office. The people's prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of their sovereign power and in the absence of constitutional restraint, the power is implied in all governmental operations. Such power has been held to be indispensable for the proper administration of public affairs. 12 Not undeservedly, it is frequently described as a fundamental right of the people in a representative democracy. 13 Recall is a mode of removal of elective local officials made its maiden appearance in our 1973 Constitution. 14 It was mandated in section 2 of Article XI entitled Local Government, viz: Sec. 2. The Batasang Pambansa shall enact a local government code which may not thereafter be amended except by a majority vote of all its Members, defining a more responsive and accountable local government structure with an effective system of recall, allocating among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for the qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. However, any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose. (Emphasis supplied) The Batasang Pambansa then enacted BP 337 entitled "The Local Government Code of 1983." Section 54 of its Chapter 3 provided only one mode of initiating the recall elections of local elective officials, i.e.,

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by petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the total number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned, viz: Sec. 54. By Whom Exercised; Requisites. (1) The power of recall shall be exercised by the registered voters of the unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs. (2) Recall shall be validly initiated only upon petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the total number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned based on the election in which the local official sought to be recalled was elected. Our legal history does not reveal any instance when this power of recall as provided by BP 337 was exercised by our people. In February 1986, however, our people more than exercised their right of recall for they resorted to revolution and they booted of office the highest elective officials of the land. The successful use of people power to remove public officials who have forfeited the trust of the electorate led to its firm institutionalization in the 1987 Constitution. Its Article XIII expressly recognized the Role and Rights of People's Organizations, viz: Sec. 15. The State shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means. People's organizations are bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to promote the public interest and with identifiable leadership, membership, and structure. Sec. 16. The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by laws, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms. Section 3 of its Article X also reiterated the mandate for Congress to enact a local government code which "shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum. . .," viz : Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsible and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. In response to this constitutional call, Congress enacted R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect on January 1, 1992. In this Code, Congress provided for a second mode of initiating the recall process through a preparatory recall assembly which in the provincial level is composed of all mayors, vice-mayors and sanggunian members of the municipalities and component cities. We quote the pertinent provisions of R.A. 7160, viz: CHAPTER 5 RECALL Sec. 69. By Whom Exercised. The power of recall for loss of confidence shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs. Sec. 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. (a) Recall may be initiated by a preparatory recall assembly or by the registered voters of the local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs. (b) There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in every province, city, district, and municipality which shall be composed of the following: (1) Provincial Level. all mayors, vice-mayors and sanggunian members of the municipalities and component cities; (2) City level. All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the city; (3) Legislative District level. In cases where sangguniang panlalawigan members are elected by district, all elective municipal officials in the district; in cases where sangguniang panglungsod members are elected by district , all elective barangay officials in the district; and (4) Municipal level. All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the municipality. (c) A majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members may convene in session in a public place and initiate a recall proceeding against any elective official in the local government unit concerned. Recall of provincial, city, or municipal officials shall be validly initiated through a resolution adopted by a majority of all the members of the preparatory recall assembly concerned during its session called for the purpose. (d) Recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official may be validly initiated upon petition of at least twenty-five (25) percent of the total number

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of registered voters in the local government unit concerned during the election which in the local official sought to be recalled was elected. Sec. 71. Election Recall Upon the filing of a valid resolution petition for with the appropriate local office of the Comelec, the Commission or its duly authorized representative shall set the date of the election on recall, which shall not be later than thirty (30) days after the filing of the resolution or petition recall in the case of the barangay, city, or municipal officials, forty-five (45) days in the case of provincial officials. The official or officials sought to be recalled shall automatically be considered as duly registered candidate or candidates to the pertinent positions and, like other candidates, shall be entitled to be voted upon. Sec. 72. Effectivity of Recall. The recall of an elective local official shall be effective only upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election on recall. Should the official sought to be recalled receive the highest number of votes, confidence in him is thereby affirmed, and he shall continue in office. Sec. 73. Prohibition from Resignation. The elective local official sought to be recalled shall not be allowed to resign while the recall process is in progress. Sec. 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence. (b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding regular election. A reading of the legislative history of these recall provisions will reveal that the idea of empowering a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the recall from office of local elective officials originated from the House of Representatives A reading of the legislative history of these recall provisions will reveal that the idea of empowering a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the recall from office of local elective officials, originated from the House of Representatives and not the Senate. 15 The legislative records reveal there were two (2) principal reasons why this alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses. 16 Our lawmakers took note of the undesirable fact that the mechanism initiating recall by direct action of the electorate was utilized only once in the City of Angeles, Pampanga, but even this lone attempt to recall the city mayor failed. Former Congressman Wilfredo Cainglet explained that this initiatory process by direct action of the people was too cumbersome, too expensive and almost impossible to implement. 17 Consequently, our legislators added in the a second mode of initiating the recall of local officials thru a preparatory recall assembly. They brushed aside the argument that this second mode may cause instability in the local government units due to its imagined ease. We have belabored the genesis of our recall law for it can light up many of the unillumined interstices of the law. In resolving constitutional disputes, We should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs. Prescinding from this proposition, We shall now resolve the contention of petitioners that the alternative mode of allowing a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the process of recall is unconstitutional. It is first postulated by the petitioners that "the right to recall does not extend merely to the prerogative of the electorate to reconfirm or withdraw their confidence on the official sought to be recalled at a special election. Such prerogative necessarily includes the sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceedings or not." 18 We do not agree. Petitioners cannot point to any specific provision of the Constitution that will sustain this submission. To be sure, there is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the "sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections. 19 Neither did it prohibit the adoption of multiple modes of initiating recall elections. The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum . . ." By this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates. The power given was to select which among the means and methods of initiating recall elections are effective to carry out the judgment of the electorate. Congress was not straightjacketed to one particular mechanism of initiating recall elections. What the Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to be chosen by Congress should be effective. Using its constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it wise to enact an alternative mode of initiating recall elections to supplement the former mode of initiation by direct action of the people. Congress has made its choice as called for by the Constitution and it is not the prerogative of this Court to supplant this judgment. The choice may be erroneous but even then, the remedy against a bad law is to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law. 20 Petitioners also positive thesis that in passing Resolution 1, the Bataan Preparatory Recall Assembly did not only initiate the process of recall but had de facto recalled petitioner Garcia from office, a power reserved to the people alone. To quote the exact language of the petitioners: "The initiation of a recall through the PRA effectively shortens and ends the term of the incumbent local officials. Precisely, in the case of Gov. Garcia, an election was scheduled by the COMELEC on 11 October 1993 to determine who has the right to assume the unexpired portion of his term of office which should have been until June 1995. Having been relegated to the status of a mere candidate for the same position of governor (by operation of law) he has, therefore, been effectively recalled." 21 In their Extremely Urgent Clarificatory Manifestation, 22 petitioners put the proposition more bluntly stating that a "PRA resolution of recall is the re call itself." Again, the contention cannot command our concurrence. Petitioners have misconstrued the nature of the initiatory process of recall by the PRAC. They have embraced the view that initiation by the PRAC is not initiation by the people. This is a misimpression for initiation by the PRAC is also initiation by the people, albeit done indirectly through their representatives. It is not constitutionally impermissible for the people to act through their elected representatives. Nothing less than the paramount task of drafting our Constitution is delegated by the people to their representatives, elected either to act as a constitutional convention or as a congressional constituent assembly. The initiation of a recall process is a lesser act and there is no rhyme or reason why it cannot be entrusted to and exercised by the elected representatives of the people. More far out is petitioners' stance that a PRA resolution of recall is the

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recall itself. It cannot be seriously doubted that a PRA resolution of recall merely, starts the process. It is part of the process but is not the whole process. This ought to be self evident for a PRA resolution of recall that is not submitted to the COMELEC for validation will not recall its subject official. Likewise, a PRA resolution of recall that is rejected by the people in the election called for the purpose bears no effect whatsoever. The initiatory resolution merely sets the stage for the official concerned to appear before the tribunal of the people so he can justify why he should be allowed to continue in office. Before the people render their sovereign judgment, the official concerned remains in office but his right to continue in office is subject to question. This is clear in section 72 of the Local Government Code which states that "the recall of an elective local official shall be effective only upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election on recall." We shall next settle the contention of petitioners that the disputed law infracts the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioners asseverate: 5.01.2. It denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws for the local officials constituting the majority party can constitute itself into a PRA and initiate the recall of a duly elected provincial official belonging to the minority party thus rendering ineffectual his election by popular mandate. Relevantly, the assembly could, to the prejudice of the minority (or even partyless) incumbent official, effectively declare a local elective position vacant (and demand the holding of a special election) for purely partisan political ends regardless of the mandate of the electorate. In the case at bar, 64 of the 74 signatories to the recall resolution have been political opponents of petitioner Garcia, not only did they not vote for him but they even campaigned against him in the 1992 elections. Petitioners' argument does not really assail the law but its possible abuse by the members of the PRAC while exercising their right to initiate recall proceedings. More specifically, the fear is expressed that the members of the PRAC may inject political color in their decision as they may initiate recall proceedings only against their political opponents especially those belonging to the minority. A careful reading of the law, however, will ineluctably show that it does not give an asymmetrical treatment to locally elected officials belonging to the political minority. First to be considered is the politically neutral composition of the preparatory recall assembly. Sec. 70 (b) of the Code provides: Sec. 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. (a) Recall may be initiated by a preparatory recall assembly or by the registered voters of the local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs. (b) There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in every province, city, district, and municipality which shall be composed of the following: (1) Provincial level. All mayors, vice-mayors and sanggunian members of the municipalities and component cities; (2) City level. All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the city; (3) Legislative District Level. In cases where sangguniang panlalawigan members are elected by district, all elective municipal officials in the district; and in cases where sangguniang panglungsod members are elected by district, all elective barangay officials in the district; and (4) Municipal level. All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the municipality. Under the law, all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang members of the municipalities and component cities are made members of the preparatory recall assembly at the provincial level. Its membership is not apportioned to political parties. No significance is given to the political affiliation of its members. Secondly, the preparatory recall assembly, at the provincial level includes all the elected officials in the province concerned. Considering their number, the greater probability is that no one political party can control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of the Code provides that the only ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss of confidence of the people. The members of the PRAC are in the PRAC not in representation of their political parties but as representatives of the people. By necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot be premised on mere differences in political party affiliation. Indeed, our Constitution encourages multi-party system for the existence of opposition parties is indispensable to the growth and nurture of democratic system. Clearly then, the law as crafted cannot be faulted for discriminating against local officials belonging to the minority. The fear that a preparatory recall assembly may be dominated by a political party and that it may use its power to initiate the recall of officials of opposite political persuasions, especially those belonging to the minority, is not a ground to strike down the law as unconstitutional. To be sure, this argument has long been in disuse for there can be no escape from the reality that all powers are susceptible of abuse. The mere possibility of abuse cannot, however, infirm per se the grant of power to an individual or entity. To deny power simply because it can be abused by the grantee is to render government powerless and no people need an impotent government. There is no democratic government that can operate on the basis of fear and distrust of its officials, especially those elected by the people themselves. On the contrary, all our laws assume that officials, whether appointed or elected, will act in good faith and will perform the duties of their office. Such presumption follows the solemn oath that they took after assumption of office, to faithfully execute all our laws. Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the recall process by a preparatory recall assembly will not be corrupted by extraneous influences. As explained above, the diverse and distinct composition of the membership of a preparatory recall assembly guarantees that all the sectors of the electorate province shall be heard. It is for this reason that in Our Resolution of September 21, 1993, We held that notice to all the members of the recall assembly is a condition sine qua non to the validity of its proceedings. The law also requires a qualified majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members to convene in session and in a public place. It also requires that the recall resolution by the said majority must be adopted during its session called for the purpose. The underscored words carry distinct legal meanings and purvey some of the parameters limiting the power of the members of a preparatory recall assembly to initiate recall proceedings. Needless to state, compliance with these requirements is necessary, otherwise, there will be no valid resolution of recall which can be given due course by the COMELEC.

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Furthermore, it cannot be asserted with certitude that the members of the Bataan preparatory recall assembly voted strictly along narrow political lines. Neither the respondent COMELEC nor this Court made a judicial inquiry as to the reasons that led the members of the said recall assembly to cast a vote of lack of confidence against petitioner Garcia. That inquiry was not undertaken for to do so would require crossing the forbidden borders of the political thicket. Former Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a major author of the subject law in his book The Local Government Code of 1991: The Key to National Development, stressed the same reason why the substantive content of a vote of lack of confidence is beyond any inquiry, thus: There is only one ground for the recall of local government officials: loss of confidence. This means that the people may petition or the Preparatory Recall Assembly may resolve to recall any local elective officials without specifying any particular ground except loss of confidence. There is no need for them to bring up any charge of abuse or corruption against the local elective officials who are the subject of any recall petition. In the case of Evardone vs. Commission on Elections, et al., 204 SCRA 464, 472 (1991), the Court ruled that "loss of confidence" as a ground for recall is a political question. In the words of the Court, "whether or not the electorate of the municipality of Sulat has lost confidence in the incumbent mayor is a political question. Any assertion therefore that the members of the Bataan preparatory recall assembly voted due to their political aversion to petitioner Garcia is at best a surmise. Petitioners also contend that the resolution of the members of the preparatory recall assembly subverted the will of the electorate of the province of Bataan who elected petitioner Garcia with a majority of 12,500 votes. Again, the contention proceeds from the erroneous premise that the resolution of recall is the recall itself. It refuses to recognize the reality that the resolution of recall is a mere proposal to the electorate of Bataan to subject petitioner to a new test of faith. The proposal will still be passed upon by the sovereign electorate of Bataan. As this judgment has yet to be expressed, it is premature to conclude that the sovereign will of the electorate of Bataan has been subverted. The electorate of Bataan may or may not recall petitioner Garcia in an appropriate election. If the electorate re-elects petitioner Garcia, then the proposal to recall him made by the preparatory recall assembly is rejected. On the other hand, if the electorate does not re-elect petitioner Garcia, then he has lost the confidence of the people which he once enjoyed. The judgment will write finis to the political controversy. For more than judgments of courts of law, the judgment of the tribunal of the people is final for "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." In sum, the petition at bench appears to champion the sovereignty of the people, particularly their direct right to initiate and remove elective local officials thru recall elections. If the petition would succeed, the result will be a return to the previous system of recall elections which Congress found should be improved. The alternative mode of initiating recall proceedings thru a preparatory recall assembly is, however, an innovative attempt by Congress to remove impediments to the effective exercise by the people of their sovereign power to check the performance of their elected officials. The power to determine this mode was specifically given to Congress and is not proscribed by the Constitution. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the original Petition and the Supplemental Petition assailing the constitutionality of section 70 of R.A. 7160 insofar as it allows a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the recall process are dismissed for lack of merit. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur. Grio-Aquino, J., is on leave. G.R. No. 154993 October 25, 2005 LUZ R. YAMANE, in her capacity as the CITY TREASURER OF MAKATI CITY, Petitioner, vs. BA LEPANTO CONDOMINUM CORPORATION, Respondent. DECISION Tinga, J.: Petitioner City Treasurer of Makati, Luz Yamane (City Treasurer), presents for resolution of this Court two novel questions: one procedural, the other substantive, yet both of obvious significance. The first pertains to the proper mode of judicial review undertaken from decisions of the regional trial courts resolving the denial of tax protests made by local government treasurers, pursuant to the Local Government Code. The second is whether a local government unit can, under the Local Government Code, impel a condominium corporation to pay business taxes.1 While we agree with the City Treasurers position on the first issue, there ultimately is sufficient justification for the Court to overlook what is essentially a procedural error. We uphold respondents on the second issue. Indeed, there are disturbing aspects in both procedure and substance that attend the attempts by the City of Makati to flex its taxing muscle. Considering that the tax imposition now in question has utterly no basis in law, judicial relief is imperative. There are fewer indisputable causes for the exercise of judicial review over the exercise of the taxing power than when the tax is based on whim, and not on law. The facts, as culled from the record, follow. Respondent BA-Lepanto Condominium Corporation (the "Corporation") is a duly organized condominium corporation constituted in accordance with the Condominium Act,2 which owns and holds title to the common and limited common areas of the BA-Lepanto Condominium (the "Condominium"), situated in Paseo de Roxas, Makati City. Its membership comprises the various unit owners of the Condominium. The Corporation is authorized, under Article V of its Amended By-Laws, to collect regular assessments from its members for operating expenses, capital expenditures on the common areas, and other special assessments as provided for in the Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions of the Condominium.

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On 15 December 1998, the Corporation received a Notice of Assessment dated 14 December 1998 signed by the City Treasurer. The Notice of Assessment stated that the Corporation is "liable to pay the correct city business taxes, fees and charges," computed as totaling P1,601,013.77 for the years 1995 to 1997.3 The Notice of Assessment was silent as to the statutory basis of the business taxes assessed. Through counsel, the Corporation responded with a written tax protest dated 12 February 1999, addressed to the City Treasurer. It was evident in the protest that the Corporation was perplexed on the statutory basis of the tax assessment. With due respect, we submit that the Assessment has no basis as the Corporation is not liable for business taxes and surcharges and interest thereon, under the Makati [Revenue] Code or even under the [Local Government] Code. The Makati [Revenue] Code and the [Local Government] Code do not contain any provisions on which the Assessment could be based. One might argue that Sec. 3A.02(m) of the Makati [Revenue] Code imposes business tax on owners or operators of any business not specified in the said code. We submit, however, that this is not applicable to the Corporation as the Corporation is not an owner or operator of any business in the contemplation of the Makati [Revenue] Code and even the [Local Government] Code.4 Proceeding from the premise that its tax liability arose from Section 3A.02(m) of the Makati Revenue Code, the Corporation proceeded to argue that under both the Makati Code and the Local Government Code, "business" is defined as "trade or commercial activity regularly engaged in as a means of livelihood or with a view to profit." It was submitted that the Corporation, as a condominium corporation, was organized not for profit, but to hold title over the common areas of the Condominium, to manage the Condominium for the unit owners, and to hold title to the parcels of land on which the Condominium was located. Neither was the Corporation authorized, under its articles of incorporation or by-laws to engage in profit-making activities. The assessments it did collect from the unit owners were for capital expenditures and operating expenses.5 The protest was rejected by the City Treasurer in a letter dated 4 March 1999. She insisted that the collection of dues from the unit owners was effected primarily "to sustain and maintain the expenses of the common areas, with the end in view [sic] of getting full appreciative living values [sic] for the individual condominium occupants and to command better marketable [sic] prices for those occupants" who would in the future sell their respective units.6 Thus, she concluded since the "chances of getting higher prices for well-managed common areas of any condominium are better and more effective that condominiums with poor [sic] managed common areas," the corporation activity "is a profit venture making [sic]". 7 From the denial of the protest, the Corporation filed an Appeal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.8 On 1 March 2000, the Makati RTC Branch 57 rendered a Decision9 dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. Accepting the premise laid by the City Treasurer, the RTC acknowledged, in sadly risible language: Herein appellant, to defray the improvements and beautification of the common areas, collect [sic] assessments from its members. Its end view is to get appreciate living rules for the unit owners [sic], to give an impression to outsides [sic] of the quality of service the condominium offers, so as to allow present owners to command better prices in the event of sale.10 With this, the RTC concluded that the activities of the Corporation fell squarely under the definition of "business" under Section 13(b) of the Local Government Code, and thus subject to local business taxation.11 From this Decision of the RTC, the Corporation filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of Appeals. Initially, the petition was dismissed outright 12 on the ground that only decisions of the RTC brought on appeal from a first level court could be elevated for review under the mode of review prescribed under Rule 42.13 However, the Corporation pointed out in its Motion for Reconsideration that under Section 195 of the Local Government Code, the remedy of the taxpayer on the denial of the protest filed with the local treasurer is to appeal the denial with the court of competent jurisdiction.14 Persuaded by this contention, the Court of Appeals reinstated the petition.15 On 7 June 2002, the Court of Appeals Special Sixteenth Division rendered the Decision16 now assailed before this Court. The appellate court reversed the RTC and declared that the Corporation was not liable to pay business taxes to the City of Makati.17 In doing so, the Court of Appeals delved into jurisprudential definitions of profit,18 and concluded that the Corporation was not engaged in profit. For one, it was held that the very statutory concept of a condominium corporation showed that it was not a juridical entity intended to make profit, as its sole purpose was to hold title to the common areas in the condominium and to maintain the condominium.19 The Court of Appeals likewise cited provisions from the Corporations Amended Articles of Incorporation and Amended By-Laws that, to its estimation, established that the Corporation was not engaged in business and the assessment collected from unit owners limited to those necessary to defray the expenses in the maintenance of the common areas and management the condominium.20 Upon denial of her Motion for Reconsideration,21 the City Treasurer elevated the present Petition for Review under Rule 45. It is argued that the Corporation is engaged in business, for the dues collected from the different unit owners is utilized towards the beautification and maintenance of the Condominium, resulting in "full appreciative living values" for the condominium units which would command better market prices should they be sold in the future. The City Treasurer likewise avers that the rationale for business taxes is not on the income received or profit earned by the business, but the privilege to engage in business. The fact that the Corporation is empowered "to acquire, own, hold, enjoy, lease, operate and maintain, and to convey sell, transfer or otherwise dispose of real or personal property" allegedly qualifies "as incident to the fact of [the Corporations] act of engaging in business.22 The City Treasurer also claims that the Corporation had filed the wrong mode of appeal before the Court of Appeals when the latter filed its Petition for Review under Rule 42. It is reasoned that the decision of the Makati RTC was rendered in the exercise of original jurisdiction, it being the first court which took cognizance of the case. Accordingly, with the Corporation having pursued an erroneous mode of appeal, the RTC Decision is deemed to have become final and executory. First, we dispose of the procedural issue, which essentially boils down to whether the RTC, in deciding an appeal taken from a denial of a protest by a local treasurer under Section 195 of the Local Government Code, exercises "original jurisdiction" or "appellate jurisdiction." The question assumes a measure of importance to this petition, for the adoption of the position of the City Treasurer that the mode of review of

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the decision taken by the RTC is governed by Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure means that the decision of the RTC would have long become final and executory by reason of the failure of the Corporation to file a notice of appeal.23 There are discernible conflicting views on the issue. The first, as expressed by the Court of Appeals, holds that the RTC, in reviewing denials of protests by local treasurers, exercises appellate jurisdiction. This position is anchored on the language of Section 195 of the Local Government Code which states that the remedy of the taxpayer whose protest is denied by the local treasurer is "to appeal with the court of competent jurisdiction."24 Apparently though, the Local Government Code does not elaborate on how such "appeal" should be undertaken. The other view, as maintained by the City Treasurer, is that the jurisdiction exercised by the RTC is original in character. This is the first time that the position has been presented to the court for adjudication. Still, this argument does find jurisprudential mooring in our ruling in Garcia v. De Jesus,25 where the Court proffered the following distinction between original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction: "Original jurisdiction is the power of the Court to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time under conditions provided by law. Appellate jurisdiction is the authority of a Court higher in rank to re-examine the final order or judgment of a lower Court which tried the case now elevated for judicial review."26 The quoted definitions were taken from the commentaries of the esteemed Justice Florenz Regalado. With the definitions as beacon, the review taken by the RTC over the denial of the protest by the local treasurer would fall within that courts original jurisdiction. In short, the review is the initial judicial cognizance of the matter. Moreover, labeling the said review as an exercise of appellate jurisdiction is inappropriate, since the denial of the protest is not the judgment or order of a lower court, but of a local government official. The stringent concept of original jurisdiction may seemingly be neutered by Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1 of which lists a slew of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial tribunals or their officers whose decisions may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. However, the basic law of jurisdiction, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129),27 ineluctably confers appellate jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals over final rulings of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission, by explicitly using the phrase "appellate jurisdiction." 28 The power to create or characterize jurisdiction of courts belongs to the legislature. While the traditional notion of appellate jurisdiction connotes judicial review over lower court decisions, it has to yield to statutory redefinitions that clearly expand its breadth to encompass even review of decisions of officers in the executive branches of government. Yet significantly, the Local Government Code, or any other statute for that matter, does not expressly confer appellate jurisdiction on the part of regional trial courts from the denial of a tax protest by a local treasurer. On the other hand, Section 22 of B.P. 129 expressly delineates the appellate jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts, confining as it does said appellate jurisdiction to cases decided by Metropolitan, Municipal, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Unlike in the case of the Court of Appeals, B.P. 129 does not confer appellate jurisdiction on Regional Trial Courts over rulings made by non-judicial entities. From these premises, it is evident that the stance of the City Treasurer is correct as a matter of law, and that the proper remedy of the Corporation from the RTC judgment is an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 to the Court of Appeals. However, we make this pronouncement subject to two important qualifications. First, in this particular case there are nonetheless significant reasons for the Court to overlook the procedural error and ultimately uphold the adjudication of the jurisdiction exercised by the Court of Appeals in this case. Second, the doctrinal weight of the pronouncement is confined to cases and controversies that emerged prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9282, the law which expanded the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). Republic Act No. 9282 definitively proves in its Section 7(a)(3) that the CTA exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review on appeal decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases original decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their originally or appellate jurisdiction. Moreover, the provision also states that the review is triggered "by filing a petition for review under a procedure analogous to that provided for under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure." 29 Republic Act No. 9282, however, would not apply to this case simply because it arose prior to the effectivity of that law. To declare otherwise would be to institute a jurisdictional rule derived not from express statutory grant, but from implication. The jurisdiction of a court to take cognizance of a case should be clearly conferred and should not be deemed to exist on mere implications, 30 and this settled rule would be needlessly emasculated should we declare that the Corporations position is correct in law. Be that as it may, characteristic of all procedural rules is adherence to the precept that they should not be enforced blindly, especially if mechanical application would defeat the higher ends that animates our civil procedurethe just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. 31 Indeed, we have repeatedly upheldand utilized ourselvesthe discretion of courts to nonetheless take cognizance of petitions raised on an erroneous mode of appeal and instead treat these petitions in the manner as they should have appropriately been filed.32 The Court of Appeals could very well have treated the Corporations petition for review as an ordinary appeal. Moreover, we recognize that the Corporations error in elevating the RTC decision for review via Rule 42 actually worked to the benefit of the City Treasurer. There is wider latitude on the part of the Court of Appeals to refuse cognizance over a petition for review under Rule 42 than it would have over an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. Under Section 13, Rule 41, the stated grounds for the dismissal of an ordinary appeal prior to the transmission of the case records are when the appeal was taken out of time or when the docket fees were not paid.33 On the other hand, Section 6, Rule 42 provides that in order that the Court of Appeals may allow due course to the petition for review, it must first make a prima facie finding that the lower court has committed an error that would warrant the reversal or modification of the decision under review.34 There is no similar requirement of a prima facie determination of error in the case of ordinary appeal, which is perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.35 Evidently, by employing the Rule 42 mode of review, the Corporation faced a greater risk of having its petition rejected by the Court of Appeals as compared to having filed an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. This was not an error that worked to the prejudice of the City Treasurer. We now proceed to the substantive issue, on whether the City of Makati may collect business taxes on condominium corporations. We begin with an overview of the power of a local government unit to impose business taxes.

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The power of local government units to impose taxes within its territorial jurisdiction derives from the Constitution itself, which recognizes the power of these units "to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy."36 These guidelines and limitations as provided by Congress are in main contained in the Local Government Code of 1991 (the "Code"), which provides for comprehensive instances when and how local government units may impose taxes. The significant limitations are enumerated primarily in Section 133 of the Code, which include among others, a prohibition on the imposition of income taxes except when levied on banks and other financial institutions.37 None of the other general limitations under Section 133 find application to the case at bar. The most well-known mode of local government taxation is perhaps the real property tax, which is governed by Title II, Book II of the Code, and which bears no application in this case. A different set of provisions, found under Title I of Book II, governs other taxes imposable by local government units, including business taxes. Under Section 151 of the Code, cities such as Makati are authorized to levy the same taxes fees and charges as provinces and municipalities. It is in Article II, Title II, Book II of the Code, governing municipal taxes, where the provisions on business taxation relevant to this petition may be found.38 Section 143 of the Code specifically enumerates several types of business on which municipalities and cities may impose taxes. These include manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, dealers of any article of commerce of whatever nature; those engaged in the export or commerce of essential commodities; contractors and other independent contractors; banks and financial institutions; and peddlers engaged in the sale of any merchandise or article of commerce. Moreover, the local sanggunian is also authorized to impose taxes on any other businesses not otherwise specified under Section 143 which the sanggunian concerned may deem proper to tax. The coverage of business taxation particular to the City of Makati is provided by the Makati Revenue Code ("Revenue Code"), enacted through Municipal Ordinance No. 92-072. The Revenue Code remains in effect as of this writing. Article A, Chapter III of the Revenue Code governs business taxes in Makati, and it is quite specific as to the particular businesses which are covered by business taxes. To give a sample of the specified businesses under the Revenue Code which are not enumerated under the Local Government Code, we cite Section 3A.02(f) of the Code, which levies a gross receipt tax : (f) On contractors and other independent contractors defined in Sec. 3A.01(q) of Chapter III of this Code, and on owners or operators of business establishments rendering or offering services such as: advertising agencies; animal hospitals; assaying laboratories; belt and buckle shops; blacksmith shops; bookbinders; booking officers for film exchange; booking offices for transportation on commission basis; breeding of game cocks and other sporting animals belonging to others; business management services; collecting agencies; escort services; feasibility studies; consultancy services; garages; garbage disposal contractors; gold and silversmith shops; inspection services for incoming and outgoing cargoes; interior decorating services; janitorial services; job placement or recruitment agencies; landscaping contractors; lathe machine shops; management consultants not subject to professional tax; medical and dental laboratories; mercantile agencies; messsengerial services; operators of shoe shine stands; painting shops; perma press establishments; rent-a-plant services; polo players; school for and/or horse-back riding academy; real estate appraisers; real estate brokerages; photostatic, white/blue printing, Xerox, typing, and mimeographing services; rental of bicycles and/or tricycles, furniture, shoes, watches, household appliances, boats, typewriters, etc.; roasting of pigs, fowls, etc.; shipping agencies; shipyard for repairing ships for others; shops for shearing animals; silkscreen or T-shirt printing shops; stables; travel agencies; vaciador shops; veterinary clinics; video rentals and/or coverage services; dancing schools/speed reading/EDP; nursery, vocational and other schools not regulated by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, (DECS), day care centers; etc.39 Other provisions of the Revenue Code likewise subject hotel and restaurant owners and operators40, real estate dealers, and lessors of real estate41 to business taxes. Should the comprehensive listing not prove encompassing enough, there is also a catch-all provision similar to that under the Local Government Code. This is found in Section 3A.02(m) of the Revenue Code, which provides: (m) On owners or operators of any business not specified above shall pay the tax at the rate of two percent (2%) for 1993, two and one-half percent (2 %) for 1994 and 1995, and three percent (3%) for 1996 and the years thereafter of the gross receipts during the preceding year.42 The initial inquiry is what provision of the Makati Revenue Code does the City Treasurer rely on to make the Corporation liable for business taxes. Even at this point, there already stands a problem with the City Treasurers cause of action. Our careful examination of the record reveals a highly disconcerting fact. At no point has the City Treasurer been candid enough to inform the Corporation, the RTC, the Court of Appeals, or this Court for that matter, as to what exactly is the precise statutory basis under the Makati Revenue Code for the levying of the business tax on petitioner. We have examined all of the pleadings submitted by the City Treasurer in all the antecedent judicial proceedings, as well as in this present petition, and also the communications by the City Treasurer to the Corporation which form part of the record. Nowhere therein is there any citation made by the City Treasurer of any provision of the Revenue Code which would serve as the legal authority for the collection of business taxes from condominiums in Makati. Ostensibly, the notice of assessment, which stands as the first instance the taxpayer is officially made aware of the pending tax liability, should be sufficiently informative to apprise the taxpayer the legal basis of the tax. Section 195 of the Local Government Code does not go as far as to expressly require that the notice of assessment specifically cite the provision of the ordinance involved but it does require that it state the nature of the tax, fee or charge, the amount of deficiency, surcharges, interests and penalties. In this case, the notice of assessment sent to the Corporation did state that the assessment was for business taxes, as well as the amount of the assessment. There may have been prima facie compliance with the requirement under Section 195. However in this case, the Revenue Code provides multiple provisions on business taxes, and at varying rates. Hence, we could appreciate the Corporations confusion, as expressed in its protest, as to the exact legal basis for the tax.43 Reference to the local tax ordinance is vital, for the power of local government units to impose local taxes is exercised through the appropriate ordinance enacted by the sanggunian, and not by the Local Government Code alone.44 What determines tax liability is the tax ordinance, the Local Government Code being the enabling law for the local legislative body.

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Moreover, a careful examination of the Revenue Code shows that while Section 3A.02(m) seems designed as a catch-all provision, Section 3A.02(f), which provides for a different tax rate from that of the former provision, may be construed to be of similar import. While Section 3A.02(f) is quite exhaustive in enumerating the class of businesses taxed under the provision, the listing, while it does not include condominium-related enterprises, ends with the abbreviation "etc.", or "et cetera". We do note our discomfort with the unlimited breadth and the dangerous uncertainty which are the twin hallmarks of the words "et cetera." Certainly, we cannot be disposed to uphold any tax imposition that derives its authority from enigmatic and uncertain words such as "et cetera." Yet we cannot even say with definiteness whether the tax imposed on the Corporation in this case is based on "et cetera," or on Section 3A.02(m), or on any other provision of the Revenue Code. Assuming that the assessment made on the Corporation is on a provision other than Section 3A.02(m), the main legal issue takes on a different complexion. For example, if it is based on "et cetera" under Section 3A.02(f), we would have to examine whether the Corporation faces analogous comparison with the other businesses listed under that provision. Certainly, the City Treasurer has not been helpful in that regard, as she has been silent all through out as to the exact basis for the tax imposition which she wishes that this Court uphold. Indeed, there is only one thing that prevents this Court from ruling that there has been a due process violation on account of the City Treasurers failure to disclose on paper the statutory basis of the taxthat the Corporation itself does not allege injury arising from such failure on the part of the City Treasurer. We do not know why the Corporation chose not to put this issue into litigation, though we can ultimately presume that no injury was sustained because the City Treasurer failed to cite the specific statutory basis of the tax. What is essential though is that the local treasurer be required to explain to the taxpayer with sufficient particularity the basis of the tax, so as to leave no doubt in the mind of the taxpayer as to the specific tax involved. In this case, the Corporation seems confident enough in litigating despite the failure of the City Treasurer to admit on what exact provision of the Revenue Code the tax liability ensued. This is perhaps because the Corporation has anchored its central argument on the position that the Local Government Code itself does not sanction the imposition of business taxes against it. This position was sustained by the Court of Appeals, and now merits our analysis. As stated earlier, local tax on businesses is authorized under Section 143 of the Local Government Code. The word "business" itself is defined under Section 131(d) of the Code as "trade or commercial activity regularly engaged in as a means of livelihood or with a view to profit."45 This definition of "business" takes on importance, since Section 143 allows local government units to impose local taxes on businesses other than those specified under the provision. Moreover, even those business activities specifically named in Section 143 are themselves susceptible to broad interpretation. For example, Section 143(b) authorizes the imposition of business taxes on wholesalers, distributors, or dealers in any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature. It is thus imperative that in order that the Corporation may be subjected to business taxes, its activities must fall within the definition of business as provided in the Local Government Code. And to hold that they do is to ignore the very statutory nature of a condominium corporation. The creation of the condominium corporation is sanctioned by Republic Act No. 4726, otherwise known as the Condominium Act. Under the law, a condominium is an interest in real property consisting of a separate interest in a unit in a residential, industrial or commercial building and an undivided interest in common, directly or indirectly, in the land on which it is located and in other common areas of the building.46 To enable the orderly administration over these common areas which are jointly owned by the various unit owners, the Condominium Act permits the creation of a condominium corporation, which is specially formed for the purpose of holding title to the common area, in which the holders of separate interests shall automatically be members or shareholders, to the exclusion of others, in proportion to the appurtenant interest of their respective units.47 The necessity of a condominium corporation has not gained widespread acceptance48, and even is merely permissible under the Condominium Act.49 Nonetheless, the condominium corporation has been resorted to by many condominium projects, such as the Corporation in this case. In line with the authority of the condominium corporation to manage the condominium project, it may be authorized, in the deed of restrictions, "to make reasonable assessments to meet authorized expenditures, each condominium unit to be assessed separately for its share of such expenses in proportion (unless otherwise provided) to its owners fractional interest in any common areas."50 It is the collection of these assessments from unit owners that form the basis of the City Treasurers claim that the Corporation is doing business. The Condominium Act imposes several limitations on the condominium corporation that prove crucial to the disposition of this case. Under Section 10 of the law, the corporate purposes of a condominium corporation are limited to the holding of the common areas, either in ownership or any other interest in real property recognized by law; to the management of the project; and to such other purposes as may be necessary, incidental or convenient to the accomplishment of such purpose.51 Further, the same provision prohibits the articles of incorporation or by-laws of the condominium corporation from containing any provisions which are contrary to the provisions of the Condominium Act, the enabling or master deed, or the declaration of restrictions of the condominium project.52 We can elicit from the Condominium Act that a condominium corporation is precluded by statute from engaging in corporate activities other than the holding of the common areas, the administration of the condominium project, and other acts necessary, incidental or convenient to the accomplishment of such purposes. Neither the maintenance of livelihood, nor the procurement of profit, fall within the scope of permissible corporate purposes of a condominium corporation under the Condominium Act. The Court has examined the particular Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of the Corporation, and these documents unmistakably hew to the limitations contained in the Condominium Act. Per the Articles of Incorporation, the Corporations corporate purposes are limited to: (a) owning and holding title to the common and limited common areas in the Condominium Project; (b) adopting such necessary measures for the protection and safeguard of the unit owners and their property, including the power to contract for security services and for insurance coverage on the entire project; (c) making and adopting needful rules and regulations concerning the use, enjoyment and occupancy of the units and common areas, including the power to fix penalties and assessments for violation of such rules; (d) to provide for the maintenance, repair, sanitation, and cleanliness of the common and limited common areas; (e) to provide and contract

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for public utilities and other services to the common areas; (f) to contract for the services of persons or firms to assist in the management and operation of the Condominium Project; (g) to discharge any lien or encumbrances upon the Condominium Project; (h) to enforce the terms contained in the Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions of the Project; (i) to levy and collect those assessments as provided in the Master Deed, in order to defray the costs, expenses and losses of the condominium; (j) to acquire, own, hold, enjoy, lease operate and maintain, and to convey, sell transfer, mortgage or otherwise dispose of real or personal property in connection with the purposes and activities of the corporation; and (k) to exercise and perform such other powers reasonably necessary, incidental or convenient to accomplish the foregoing purposes. 53 Obviously, none of these stated corporate purposes are geared towards maintaining a livelihood or the obtention of profit. Even though the Corporation is empowered to levy assessments or dues from the unit owners, these amounts collected are not intended for the incurrence of profit by the Corporation or its members, but to shoulder the multitude of necessary expenses that arise from the maintenance of the Condominium Project. Just as much is confirmed by Section 1, Article V of the Amended By-Laws, which enumerate the particular expenses to be defrayed by the regular assessments collected from the unit owners. These would include the salaries of the employees of the Corporation, and the cost of maintenance and ordinary repairs of the common areas.54 The City Treasurer nonetheless contends that the collection of these assessments and dues are "with the end view of getting full appreciative living values" for the condominium units, and as a result, profit is obtained once these units are sold at higher prices. The Court cites with approval the two counterpoints raised by the Court of Appeals in rejecting this contention. First, if any profit is obtained by the sale of the units, it accrues not to the corporation but to the unit owner. Second, if the unit owner does obtain profit from the sale of the corporation, the owner is already required to pay capital gains tax on the appreciated value of the condominium unit.55 Moreover, the logic on this point of the City Treasurer is baffling. By this rationale, every Makati City car owner may be considered as being engaged in business, since the repairs or improvements on the car may be deemed oriented towards appreciating the value of the car upon resale. There is an evident distinction between persons who spend on repairs and improvements on their personal and real property for the purpose of increasing its resale value, and those who defray such expenses for the purpose of preserving the property. The vast majority of persons fall under the second category, and it would be highly specious to subject these persons to local business taxes. The profit motive in such cases is hardly the driving factor behind such improvements, if it were contemplated at all. Any profit that would be derived under such circumstances would merely be incidental, if not accidental. Besides, we shudder at the thought of upholding tax liability on the basis of the standard of "full appreciative living values", a phrase that defies statutory explication, commonsensical meaning, the English language, or even definition from Google. The exercise of the power of taxation constitutes a deprivation of property under the due process clause,56 and the taxpayers right to due process is violated when arbitrary or oppressive methods are used in assessing and collecting taxes.57 The fact that the Corporation did not fall within the enumerated classes of taxable businesses under either the Local Government Code or the Makati Revenue Code already forewarns that a clear demonstration is essential on the part of the City Treasurer on why the Corporation should be taxed anyway. "Full appreciative living values" is nothing but blather in search of meaning, and to impose a tax hinged on that standard is both arbitrary and oppressive. The City Treasurer also contends that the fact that the Corporation is engaged in business is evinced by the Articles of Incorporation, which specifically empowers the Corporation "to acquire, own, hold, enjoy, lease, operate and maintain, and to convey, sell, transfer mortgage or otherwise dispose of real or personal property."58 What the City Treasurer fails to add is that every corporation organized under the Corporation Code59 is so specifically empowered. Section 36(7) of the Corporation Code states that every corporation incorporated under the Code has the power and capacity "to purchase, receive, take or grant, hold, convey, sell, lease, pledge, mortgage and otherwise deal with such real and personal property . . . as the transaction of the lawful business of the corporation may reasonably and necessarily require . . . ."60 Without this power, corporations, as juridical persons, would be deprived of the capacity to engage in most meaningful legal relations. Again, whatever capacity the Corporation may have pursuant to its power to exercise acts of ownership over personal and real property is limited by its stated corporate purposes, which are by themselves further limited by the Condominium Act. A condominium corporation, while enjoying such powers of ownership, is prohibited by law from transacting its properties for the purpose of gainful profit. Accordingly, and with a significant degree of comfort, we hold that condominium corporations are generally exempt from local business taxation under the Local Government Code, irrespective of any local ordinance that seeks to declare otherwise. Still, we can note a possible exception to the rule. It is not unthinkable that the unit owners of a condominium would band together to engage in activities for profit under the shelter of the condominium corporation.61 Such activity would be prohibited under the Condominium Act, but if the fact is established, we see no reason why the condominium corporation may be made liable by the local government unit for business taxes. Even though such activities would be considered as ultra vires, since they are engaged in beyond the legal capacity of the condominium corporation62, the principle of estoppel would preclude the corporation or its officers and members from invoking the void nature of its undertakings for profit as a means of acquitting itself of tax liability. Still, the City Treasurer has not posited the claim that the Corporation is engaged in business activities beyond the statutory purposes of a condominium corporation. The assessment appears to be based solely on the Corporations collection of assessments from unit owners, such assessments being utilized to defray the necessary expenses for the Condominium Project and the common areas. There is no contemplation of business, no orientation towards profit in this case. Hence, the assailed tax assessment has no basis under the Local Government Code or the Makati Revenue Code, and the insistence of the city in its collection of the void tax constitutes an attempt at deprivation of property without due process of law. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs. G.R. No. 133495 September 3, 1998

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BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR., respondents. This is a petition for certiorari brought to set aside the resolution, dated My 7, 1998, of the COMELEC and to seek a declaration that private respondent is disqualified to serve another term as mayor of Pateros, Metro Manila. Petitioner contends that private respondent Capco's service as mayor from September 2, 1989 to June 30, 1992 should be considered as service for one full term, and since he thereafter served from 1992 to 1998 two more terms as mayor, he should be considered to have served three consecutive terms within the contemplation of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution and 43(b) of the Local Government Code. Petitioner stresses the fact that, upon the death of Mayor Cesar Borja on September 2, 1989, private respondent became the mayor and thereafter served the remainder of the term. Petitioner argues that it is irrelevant that private respondent became mayor by succession because the purpose of the constitutional provision in limiting the number of terms elective local officials may serve is to prevent a monopolization of political power. This contention will not bear analysis. Article X, 8 of the Constitution provides: Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. This provision is restated in 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160): Sec. 43. Term of Office. . . . (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. . . . First, to prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only policy embodied in the constitutional provision in question. The other policy is that of enhancing the freedom of choice of the people. To consider, therefore, only stay in office regardless of how the official concerned came to that office whether by election or by succession by operation of law would be to disregard one of the purposes of the constitutional provision in question. Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Article X, 8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for local and legislative officials. Instead, they adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the same position in the of the succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term. 4 Monsod warned against "prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will

MENDOZA, J.: This case presents for determination the scope of the constitutional provision barring elective local officials, with the exception of barangay officials, from serving more than three consecutive terms. In particular, the question is whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit. Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years ending June 30, 1998. 1 On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco's disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that. On April 30, 1998, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private respondent Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros. 2 However, on motion of private respondent the COMELEC en banc, voting 5-2, reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections. 3 The majority stated in its decision: In both the Constitution and the Local Government Code, the three-term limitation refers to the term of office for which the local official was elected. It made no reference to succession to an office to which he was not elected. In the case before the Commission, respondent Capco was not elected to the position of Mayor in the January 18, 1988 local elections. He succeeded to such office by operation of law and served for the unexpired term of his predecessor. Consequently, such succession into office is not counted as one (1) term for purposes of the computation of the three-term limitation under the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Accordingly, private respondent was voted for in the elections. He received 16,558 votes against petitioner's 7,773 votes and was proclaimed elected by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.

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choose" as a result of the proposed absolute disqualification, considering that the draft constitution contained provisions "recognizing people's power." 5 Commissioner Blas F. Ople, who supported the Monsod proposal, said: The principle involved is really whether this Commission shall impose a temporary or a perpetual disqualification on those who have served their terms in accordance with the limits on consecutive service as decided by the Constitutional Commission. I would be very wary about this Commission exercising a sort of omnipotent power in order to disqualify those who will already have served their terms from perpetuating themselves in office. I think the Commission achieves its purpose in establishing safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms. We do put a cap on consecutive service in the case of the President, six years, in the case of the Vice-President, unlimited; and in the case of the Senators, one reelection. In the case of the Members of Congress, both from the legislative districts and from the party list and sectoral representation, this is now under discussion and later on the policy concerning local officials will be taken up by the Committee on Local Governments. The principle remains the same. I think we want to prevent future situations where, as a result of continuous service and frequent reelections, officials from the President down to the municipal mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest in their positions and to accumulate those powers and perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these posts to members of their families in a subsequent election. I think that is taken care of because we put a gap on the continuity or the unbroken service of all of these officials. But where we now decide to put these prospective servants of the people or politicians, if we want to use the coarser term, under a perpetual disqualification, I have a feeling that we are taking away too much from the people, whereas we should be giving as much to the people as we can in terms of their own freedom of choice. . . . 6 Other commissioners went on record against "perpetually disqualifying" elective officials who have served a certain number of terms as this would deny the right of the people to choose. As Commissioner Yusup R. Abubakar asked, "why should we arrogate unto ourselves the right to decide what the people want?" 7 Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino spoke in the same vein when she called on her colleagues to "allow the people to exercise their own sense of proportion and [rely] on their own strength to curtail power when it overreaches itself." 8 Commissioner Teodoro C. Bacani stressed: "Why should we not leave [perpetual disqualification after serving a number of terms] to the premise accepted by practically everybody here that our people are politically mature? Should we use this assumption only when it is convenient for us, and not when it may also lead to a freedom of choice for the people and for politicians who may aspire to serve them longer?"
9

of a prolonged stay in office. The second is the idea of election, derived from the concern that the right of the people to choose those whom they wish to govern them be preserved. It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of election. This is clear from the following exchange in the Constitutional Commission concerning term limits, now embodied in Art. VI, 4 and 7 of the Constitution, for members of Congress: MR. GASCON. I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the second term. We will allow the Senator to rest for a period of time before he can run again? MR. DAVIDE. That is correct. MR. GASCON. And the question that we left behind before if the Gentlemen will remember was: How long will that period of rest be? Will it be one election which is three years or one term which is six years? MR. DAVIDE. If the Gentlemen will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo expressed the view that during the election following the expiration of the first 12 years, whether such election will be on the third year or on the sixth year thereafter, this particular member of the Senate can run. So, it is not really a period of hibernation for six years. That was the Committee's stand. 10 Indeed a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people should be allowed to choose those whom they please to govern them. 11 To bar the election of a local official because he has already served three terms, although the first as a result of succession by operation of law rather than election, would therefore be to violate this principle. Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, 8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of "the term of office of elective local officials" and bars "such official[s]" from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective local official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that "voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected." The term served must therefore be one "for which [the official concerned] was elected." The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective local official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration. Reference is made to Commissioner Bernas' comment on Art. VI, 7, which similarly bars members of the House of Representatives from serving for more than three terms. Commissioner Bernas states that "if one is elected Representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no matter

Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. The first is the notion of service of term, derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a result

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how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed." 12 This is actually based on the opinion expressed by Commissioner Davide in answer to a query of Commissioner Suarez: "For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected would have to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion of the term is already considered one term? So, half a term, which is actually the correct statement, plus one term would disqualify the Senator concerned from running? Is that the meaning of this provision on disqualification, Madam President?" Commissioner Davide said: "Yes, because we speak of "term," and if there is a special election, he will serve only for the unexpired portion of that particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms for the Members of the Lower House." 13 There is a difference, however, between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member of the House of Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is removed from office. The vice-mayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. 14 On the other hand, the Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. 15 In a real sense, therefore, such Representative serves a term for which he was elected. As the purpose of the constitutional provision is to limit the right to be elected and to serve in Congress, his service of the unexpired term is rightly counted as his first term. Rather than refute what we believe to be the intendment of Art. X, 8 with regard to elective local officials, the case of a Representative who succeeds another confirms the theory. Petitioner also cites Art. VII, 4 of the Constitution which provides for succession of the Vice-President to the Presidency in case of vacancy in that office. After stating that "The President shall not be eligible for any reelection," this provision says that "No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time." Petitioner contends that, by analogy, the vice-mayor should likewise be considered to have served a full term as mayor if he succeeds to the latter's office and serves for the remainder of the term. The framers of the Constitution included such a provision because, without it, the Vice-President, who simply steps into the Presidency by succession, would be qualified to run President even if he has occupied that office for more than four years. The absence of a similar provision in Art. X, 8 on elective local officials throws in bold relief the difference between the two cases. It underscores the constitutional intent to cover only the terms of office to which one may have been elected for purposes of the three-term limit on local elective officials, disregarding for this purpose service by automatic succession. There is another reason why the Vice-President who succeeds to the Presidency and serves in that office for more than four years is ineligible for election as President. The Vice-President is elected primarily to succeed the President in the event of the latter's death, permanent disability, removal, or resignation. While he may be appointed to the cabinet, his becoming, so is entirely dependent on the good graces of the President. In running for Vice-President, he may thus be said to also seek the Presidency. For their part, the electors likewise choose as Vice-President the candidate who they think can fill the Presidency in the event it becomes vacant. Hence, service in the Presidency for more than four years may rightly be considered as service for a full term. This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor. Under the Local Government Code, he is the presiding officer of the sanggunian and he appoints all officials and employees of such local assembly. He has distinct powers and functions, succession to mayorship in the event of vacancy therein being only one of them. 16 It cannot be said of him, as much as of the Vice-President in the event of a vacancy in the Presidency, that, in running for vice-mayor, he also seeks the mayorship. His assumption of the mayorship in the event of vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the application of any term limit. To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. This point can be made clearer by considering the following cases or situations: Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason of the death of the incumbent. Six months before the next election, he resigns and is twice elected thereafter. Can he run again for mayor in the next election? Yes, because although he has already first served as mayor by succession and subsequently resigned from office before the full term expired, he has not actually served three full terms in all for the purpose of applying the term limit. Under Art. X, 8, voluntary renunciation of the office is not considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term only if the term is one "for which he was elected." Since A is only completing the service of the term for which the deceased and not he was elected, A cannot be considered to have completed one term. His resignation constitutes an interruption of the full term. Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first term, he is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that, can he run for one more term in the next election? Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively. In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two conditions for the application of the disqualification provisions have not concurred, namely, that the local official concerned has been elected three consecutive times and that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the first case, even if the local official is considered to have served three full terms notwithstanding his resignation before the end of the first term, the fact remains that he has not been elected three times. In the second case, the local official has been elected three consecutive times, but he has not fully served three consecutive terms. Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by succession involves a total failure of the two conditions to concur for the purpose of applying Art. X, 8. Suppose he is twice elected after that term, is he qualified to run again in the next election? Yes, because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term

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because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor. To consider C in the third case to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. If the vice-mayor turns out to be a bad mayor, the people can remedy the situation by simply not reelecting him for another term. But if, on the other hand, he proves to be a good mayor, there will be no way the people can return him to office (even if it is just the third time he is standing for reelection) if his service of the first term is counted as one for the purpose of applying the term limit. To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the Constitutional Commission that while the people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 116850 April 11, 2002 On September 15, 1993, Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor Mahid M. Mutilan issued Office Order No. 07 designating Saber also as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. On August 12, 1993, Sani filed a complaint6 with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Sur, Branch 10, Marawi City challenging the August 9, 1993 Memorandum transferring him to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City, alleging that he is the holder of a permanent appointment as provincial health officer of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. On October 5, 1993, Saber filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for quo warranto with prayer for preliminary injunction, claiming that he is the lawfully designated Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. On October 14, 1993, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Pandi from further discharging the functions and duties as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. On October 25, 1993, Pandi and Macacua filed their comment on the petition and opposition to the application for writ of preliminary injunction. On October 29, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 133 transferring the powers and functions of the Department of Health in the region to the Regional Government of the ARMM. On November 6, 1993, Macacua, again in her capacity as DOH-ARMM Secretary-Designate, issued a Memorandum reiterating Pandis designation as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, as well as Sanis detail to the Regional Office of the DOH-ARMM in Cotabato City. On November 19, 1993, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing by Saber of a P100,000.00 bond. On November 24, 1993, Pandi and Macacua filed a motion for reconsideration or recall of the writ of preliminary injunction. With an offer of a P200,000.00 counter-bond, Pandi and Macacua moved on December 13, 1993 to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals denied both motions. On December 8, 1993, Sani filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for intervention accompanied by a complaint in intervention. Pandi, Macacua and Saber opposed the same. On March 21, 1994, Pandi and Macacua filed a motion seeking the dismissal of Sabers petition, on the ground that the issues therein had become moot and academic. Pandi and Macacua cited as reason the enactment by the ARMM Regional Assembly of the Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 25, otherwise known as the ARMM Local Government Code ("ARMM Local Code" for brevity), as well as the execution of the Memorandum of Agreement dated March 14, 1994 between the DOH of the National Government and the ARMM Regional Government.7 On April 15, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision.8 In a resolution dated August 16, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied Pandi and Macacuas motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration of the decision.9 The Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals held that Saber is the lawfully designated Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. The Court of Appeals ruled that Lanao del Sur Governor Mahid Mutilan has the power and

DR. LAMPA I. PANDI and DR. JARMILA B. MACACUA, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and DR. AMER A. SABER, respondents. CARPIO, J.: The Case This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 15, 19941 and its resolution dated August 16, 1994.2 The Court of Appeals granted the Petition for a Writ of Quo Warranto3 filed against petitioners Dr. Lampa I. Pandi and Dr. Jarmila B. Macacua ("Pandi" and "Macacua", respectively, for brevity) in favor of respondent Dr. Amer A. Saber ("Saber" for brevity). The Court of Appeals declared Saber entitled to the position of Officer-in-Charge of the Integrated Provincial Health Office-Amai Pakpak General Hospital ("IPHO-APGH" for brevity), Lanao del Sur. The Facts On August 9, 1993, Macacua, in her capacity as Regional Director4 and as Secretary5 of the Department of Health of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao ("DOH" and "ARMM", respectively, for brevity), issued a Memorandum designating Pandi, who was then DOH-ARMM Assistant Regional Secretary, as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. In the same Memorandum, Macacua detailed Dr. Mamasao Sani ("Sani" for brevity), then the provincial health officer of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City.

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authority to appoint the provincial health officer under Section 47810 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160, the "1991 LGU Code" for brevity). The Court of Appeals declared: "xxx. Accordingly, health services including hospitals, which used to be under the central authority of the Department of Health were devolved to the local government units (Art. 25, Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code of 1991; Sec. 17, RA 7160). Pertinently, Sec. 478 of RA No. 7160 makes mandatory for provincial governments "the appointment of a health officer" and under Article 115 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations, it is specifically provided that the "Provincial Health Officer" is one of the "mandatory appointive provincial officials." There is thus, no doubt in the mind of the Court that the authority and power to appoint the Provincial Health Officer is vested by law in the Provincial Governor."11 (Emphasis supplied) The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the issuance of Executive Order No. 133, and the Memorandum of Agreement entered between the DOH of the National Government and the ARMM pursuant to Executive Order No. 133, did not render moot and academic the issues raised in the proceedings before it. The Court of Appeals explained: "xxx. Mere devolution of the powers and functions of the DOH to the ARMM does not authorize Dr. Macacua as Secretary of the DOH-ARMM to make the questioned designation. Sections 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of Executive Order 133 which provide for the transfer of certain powers and functions of the DOH to the ARMM, speak of administrative supervision and control and other functions which do not in any manner relate to the power of appointment and designation of the Provincial Health Officer, which under the law is clearly vested in the provincial chief executive."12 Neither did the Court of Appeals give credence to Pandi and Macacuas argument that the passage of the ARMM Local Code puts to rest the issues in the instant case. The Court of Appeals stated: "While Section 457 (b) and (d) of MMA Act No. 25 state that: "(b) In addition thereto, the governor may appoint a provincial natural resources and environment officer, a provincial cooperative officer, a provincial architect and a provincial information officer. "Provided, that the governor shall submit a list of at least three (3) qualified recommendees to the autonomous regional government for appointment, according to Civil Service Law to the positions of a Provincial Health Officer, a Provincial Social Welfare and Development Officer, a Provincial Agriculturist, a Provincial Natural Resources and Environment Officer, and a Provincial Tourism Officer, to be paid by regional funds. x-x-x x-x-x x-x-x "(d) Unless otherwise provided herein, heads of the departments and offices shall be appointed by the governor with the concurrence of the majority of all the sangguniang panlalawigan members, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations. x x x" it is opined that the above provisions should be interpreted to conform to or should otherwise be not contrary to the Organic Act (RA 6734) for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."13 The Court of Appeals maintained that the Organic Act of 1989 and the ARMM Local Code could not prevail over the 1991 LGU Code. The Court of Appeals interpreted Section 457 (b) and (d) of the ARMM Local Code to mean that it is the ARMM Regional Governor, and not the Provincial Governor, who exercises a recommendatory prerogative in the appointment of the provincial health officer. The Court of Appeals declared: "Section 1 of Article V (on "Powers of Government") of Republic Act 6734 provides: "SECTION 1. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions for the proper governance and development of all the constituent units within the Autonomous Region consistent with the constitutional policy on regional and local autonomy and decentralization: Provided, That nothing herein shall authorize the diminution of the powers and functions already enjoyed by the local government units." Also, Section 18, Article VIII of the same Organic Act states: "SECTION 18. Subject to the exceptions provided for in this Organic Act, the regional Governor shall have control of all the regional executive commissions, boards, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. The Regional Governor shall exercise general supervision over the local government units within the Autonomous Region: Provided, however, That nothing herein shall authorize the diminution of the powers and functions already enjoyed by local government units." From the above-cited provisions of the Organic Act for ARMM, it is clear that nothing therein should be construed to authorize and empower the Regional Government and the Regional Governor for that matter to diminish, much less, render nugatory the powers and functions already enjoyed by the local government units. Inasmuch as the local chief executive of the province already enjoys the mandatory power to appoint the Provincial Health Officer under Republic Act 7160, it is believed that Section 457 (b) and (d) of MMA Act 25 was not intended to diminish the power of the Provincial Governor to appoint/designate the Provincial Health Officer for his province. Accordingly, Section 457 (b) merely grants to the Regional Governor recommendatory prerogative over appointments for the position of Provincial Health Officer."14 The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that there is nothing in Section 18,15 Chapter 5, Title IX, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 which explicitly or even impliedly vests in Macacua, as DOHARMM Secretary, the power to make such an appointment or designation.

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The Court of Appeals further ruled that Article 46516 of the 1991 LGU Code, which limits the appointing power of the Provincial Governor to provincial officials and employees paid mainly from provincial funds, refers to employees whose appointments are not otherwise provided in the Code. Since the provincial health officer is a mandatory appointive provincial officer under Section 478 of the 1991 LGU Code, the limitation in Article 465 cannot apply to the appointment or designation of a provincial health officer even if his salary is paid from national or regional funds. The Court of Appeals also found that Sanis permanent appointment is that of "Provincial Health Officer (R-05 5th Step) in the Office of the Regional Health Director, Regional Health Office No. XII, Cotabato City x x x." Sani was merely on detail to the position of provincial health officer of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. Sani could not claim a vested right or entitlement to permanence in that office. Moreover, the incumbent Provincial Governor of Lanao del Sur, as the appointing authority for all positions made mandatory in the organizational structure of the provincial government, did not appoint or designate Sani to the position of provincial health officer. Accordingly, for lack of merit, the Court of Appeals denied Sanis motion to intervene. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals declared that: "WHEREFORE, the Writ of Quo Warranto is GRANTED and petitioner, Dr. Amer A. Saber, is hereby declared entitled to the position of Officer-in-Charge of the Integrated Provincial Health Office. The preliminary injunction heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. SO ORDERED."17 Hence, this petition. The Issues The petitioners raise the following issues: 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SABER IS THE LEGALLY DESIGNATED OFFICER-IN-CHARGE OF THE IPHO-APGH, LANAO DEL SUR, PURSUANT TO SECTION 478 OF THE 1991 LGU CODE MAKING MANDATORY FOR PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS THE APPOINTMENT OF A HEALTH OFFICER, AND VESTING IN GOVERNOR MAHID MUTILAN OF LANAO DEL SUR THE POWER AND AUTHORITY TO APPOINT THE PROVINCIAL HEALTH OFFICER; 2. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 133 DATED OCTOBER 29, 1993, THE ARMM LOCAL CODE, AND THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (NATIONAL) AND THE ARMM, DID NOT RENDER MOOT AND ACADEMIC THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE PETITION; 3. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL GOVERNOR OF THE ARMM HAS ONLY A RECOMMENDATORY PREROGATIVE IN THE APPOINTMENT OF PROVINCIAL HEALTH OFFICER UNDER SECTION 457 OF THE ARMM LOCAL CODE; 4. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORGANIC ACT OF 1989 IS AN EXCEPTION TO THE 1991 LGU CODE AND THAT THE FORMER PREVAILS OVER THE LATTER; 5. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE DECISION IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 32242; AND 6. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN APPROVING THE BOND POSTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT WITHOUT AFFORDING THE PETITIONERS OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON OR EXCEPT TO ITS SUFFICIENCY OR OF THE SURETY OR SURETIES THEREON, AND IN ISSUING A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WITHOUT HEARING. The Ruling of the Court The Court finds the petition meritorious. All the issues raised by petitioners can be reduced into three basic questions. First, whether an incumbent provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur can be assigned to another province and if so, who can order such assignment. Second, who can designate the Officer-in-Charge in the provincial health office of Lanao del Sur - the Provincial Governor or the ARMM Secretary of Health. Third, who is empowered to appoint the provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur - the Provincial Governor, the Regional Governor or the ARMM Secretary of Health. The answers to these questions require an examination of the laws before and after the enactment of the Organic Act of 1989. The relevant laws cover five periods. The first period is the time prior to the enactment of the Organic Act of 1989. The second period is the time after the enactment of the Organic Act of 1989 but before the adoption of the 1991 LGU Code. The third period is the time after the enactment of the 1991 LGU Code but before the adoption of the ARMM Local Code. The fourth period is the time after the adoption of the ARMM Local Code but before the enactment of the Organic Act of 2001. The fifth period is the time after the enactment of the Organic Act of 2001. First Period: Prior to the Organic Act of 1989 Prior to the passage of the Organic Act of 1989, the law governing the appointment of provincial health officers was found in Executive Order No. 119,18 then the charter of the Department of Health, issued on January 30, 1987 by then President Corazon C. Aquino. The provincial health office was an agency of the Ministry of Health, and the Minister of Health was the appointing power of provincial health officers. Section 17 of Executive Order No. 119 provided as follows: "Section 17. Provincial Health Office. The integrated Provincial Health Office created under Executive Order No. 851 shall remain as the Ministry agency in the province. It shall exercise

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supervision and control over district health offices and other field units of the Ministry in the province, except those otherwise placed under the Ministry proper or directly under the Regional Health Office. The Provincial Health Office shall be headed by a Provincial Health Officer. x x x. The Provincial Health Officer and Assistant Provincial Health Officer shall be appointed by the Minister to a region, and their assignment to a province shall be made by the Minister on recommendation of the Regional Director." (Emphasis supplied) Under Section 17 of Executive Order No. 119, a provincial health officer is appointed to "a region" and not to a province. The Minister of Health, upon recommendation of the Regional Director, can assign the provincial health officer to any province within the region. The Local Government Code of 1984 (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, or the "1984 LGU Code" for brevity) did not include the provincial health officer as an official of the provincial government. Section 199 of the 1984 LGU Code stated that: "Sec. 199. Officials of the Provincial Government. (1) There shall be in each province a governor, a vice-governor, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, a provincial secretary, a provincial treasurer, a provincial assessor, a provincial budget officer, a provincial engineer, a provincial agriculturist and a provincial planning and development coordinator." The enumeration of provincial officials in Section 199 clearly excluded the provincial health officer. Although called the provincial health officer, this official was not a provincial government official but a national government official appointed by the Minister of Health and paid entirely from national funds. Under the 1984 LGU Code, the Provincial Governor could appoint only "heads of offices and other employees of the provincial government" whose salaries came mainly from provincial funds, unless the law made him the appointing power regardless of where the salaries of the appointees were sourced. Section 203 of the 1984 LGU Code provided that: "Sec. 203. Provincial Governor as Chief Executive of the Province; Powers and Duties . - (1) The governor shall be the chief executive of the provincial government and shall exercise such powers and duties as provided in this Code and other laws. (2) The governor shall: (a) x x x; xxx (e) Appoint the heads of offices and other employees of the provincial government whose salaries are entirely or mainly paid out of the provincial funds and whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint ; x x x." (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the Minister of Health appointed all provincial health officers who were in reality national government officials paid entirely from national funds. The appointment of a provincial health officer was to a specific region, and the Minister (later renamed Secretary) could assign him to any province within the region upon recommendation of the Regional Director. This was the state of the law immediately prior to the effectivity of the Organic Act of 1989. Second Period: After the Organic Act of 1989 Congress enacted the Organic Act of 1989 on August 1, 1989 and the President signed it into law on August 21, 1989. The creation of the ARMM itself took effect on November 19, 1989 when a majority of the ARMM residents voted in a plebiscite to create the autonomous region. Section 3, Article III of the Organic Act of 1989 provided as follows: "Sec. 3. The Regional Government shall adopt a policy on local autonomy whereby regional powers shall be devolved to local government units where appropriate: Provided, however, that until a regional law implementing this provision is enacted, the Local Government Code shall be applicable." (Emphasis supplied) At the time of the effectivity of the Organic Act of 1989, the 1984 LGU Code was the existing law governing local government units. Thus, the 1984 LGU Code applied to the ARMM until the Regional Government adopted its own regional local government code. This meant that provincial health officers were not officials of the provincial government since the 1984 LGU Code did not list the provincial health officer as a provincial government official. Under the Organic Act of 1989, the power of the Secretary of Health to appoint provincial health officers to a region, and to assign them to any province within the region, was not immediately devolved to the Regional Government. Section 4, Article XIX of the Organic Act of 1989 immediately placed certain line agencies and offices of the national government under the supervision and control of the Regional Government upon the organization of the Autonomous Region following the election of the Regional Governments first set of regional officials on February 12, 1990. However, other line agencies and offices of the national government, including the regional offices of the Department of Health, were not immediately placed under the supervision and control of the Regional Government. Section 4, Article XIX of the Organic Act of 1989 provided that: "Sec. 4. Upon the organization of the Autonomous Region, the line agencies and offices of the National Government dealing with local government, social services, science and technology, labor, natural resources, and tourism, including their personnel, equipment, properties and budgets, shall be immediately placed under the control and supervision of the Regional Government. Other National Government offices and agencies in the Autonomous Region, which are not excluded under paragraph (9), Section 2, Article V of this Organic Act, together with their personnel, equipment, properties and budgets, shall be placed under the control and supervision of the Regional Government pursuant to a schedule prescribed by the Oversight

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Committee mentioned in Section 3, Article XIX of this Organic Act: Provided, however, That the transfer of these offices and agencies and their personnel, equipment, properties and budget shall be accomplished within six (6) years from the organization of the Regional Government. (Emphasis supplied) x x x." It was not until October 29, 1993, when then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 133, that the regional offices of the Department of Health in the ARMM were placed under the supervision and control of the Regional Government. Executive Order No. 133 was the operative act that actually transferred the powers and functions of the Department of Health, together with its regional personnel, equipment, properties, and budgets, to the Regional Government. Thus, until the effectivity of Executive Order No. 133, the Secretary of Health of the National Government continued to appoint provincial health officers in the ARMM, with the authority to assign a provincial health officer to any province within the region. This was the state of the law after the passage of the Organic Act of 1989 until the effectivity of Executive Order No. 133. A few months after the effectivity of the Organic Act of 1989, the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 took effect on November 24, 1989. The reason for this delayed effectivity is that R.A. No. 6622 directed that "[T]his Code shall take effect two years after its publication in the Official Gazette." The Revised Administrative Code retained the power of the Secretary of Health to appoint provincial health officers who remained national government officials. Section 19, Chapter 5, Title IX, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code provides that: "SEC. 19. Provincial Health Office. The Provincial Health Office shall be the Department agency in the province. x x x. The Provincial Health Office shall be headed by a Provincial Health Officer. x x x. The Provincial Health Officers and Assistant Provincial Health Officers shall be appointed by the Secretary to a region, and their assignment to a province shall be made by the Secretary on recommendation of the Regional Health Director." The foregoing Section is practically a reenactment of Section 17 of Executive Order No. 119, the former charter of the Department of Health. Nevertheless, the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, although a later law than the Organic Act of 1989, did not alter the terms of the devolution under the Organic Act of 1989. An ordinary statute, whether general or special, cannot amend an organic act that provides for an autonomous region which under the Constitution may only be created, and therefore changed, through a plebiscite called for the purpose. Under Section 3, Article XVIII of the Organic Act of 1989, any amendment to the Organic Act required the approval of a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose within the constituent units of the ARMM. Section 3 of Article XVIII provides as follows: "Sec 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall become effective only when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90) days after the approval of such amendment or revision." Unless this amendatory process is followed, no subsequent law can amend or revise the Organic Act of 1989. In any event, with respect to the appointment and assignment of provincial health officers, the Revised Administrative Code did not change the existing law applicable to the ARMM under the Organic Act of 1989. The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, however, applies to the ARMM on matters not covered by the devolution under the Organic Act of 1989. These matters are: (a) foreign affairs; (b) national defense; (c) postal service; (d) coinage and fiscal and monetary policies; (e) administration of justice; (f) quarantine; (g) customs and tariff; (h) citizenship; (i) naturalization, immigration and deportation; (j) general auditing, civil service, elections; (k) foreign trade; (l) maritime, land and air transportation and communications affecting areas outside of the ARMM; (m) patents, trademarks, tradenames, and copyrights. 19 Still, nothing in the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 can reduce or diminish powers and functions devolved or to be devolved to the ARMM under the Organic Act of 1989. Third Period: After the Local Government Code of 1991 The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160, or the "1991 LGU Code" for brevity) took effect on January 1, 1992. Unlike the 1984 LGU Code, the 1991 LGU Code made, for the first time, the provincial health officers one of the officials of the provincial government to be appointed by the provincial governor if his salary came mainly from provincial funds. Section 463 of the 1991 LGU Code states that: "Section 463. Officials of the Provincial Government. (a) There shall be in each province a governor, a vice-governor, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, a secretary to the sangguniang panlalawigan, a provincial treasurer, a provincial assessor, a provincial accountant, a provincial engineer, a provincial budget officer, a provincial planning and development coordinator, a provincial legal officer, a provincial administrator, a provincial health officer, a provincial social welfare and development officer, a provincial general services officer, a provincial agriculturist, and a provincial veterinarian. x x x. (d) Unless otherwise provided herein, heads of departments and offices shall be appointed by the governor with the concurrence of the majority of all the sangguniang panlalawigan members, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations . The sangguniang panlalawigan shall act on the appointment within fifteen (15) days from the date of its submission; otherwise the same shall be deemed confirmed." (Emphasis supplied) The proviso in Section 463 (d) refers to Section 465 of the 1991 LGU Code which limits the appointing power of the provincial governor to officials and employees paid mainly from provincial funds. Section 465 provides as follows: "Section 465. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) x x x.

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(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the province and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the provincial governor shall: (1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the provincial government, and in this connection, shall: (i) x x x. x x x. (v) Appoint all officials and employees whose salaries and wages are wholly or mainly paid out of provincial funds and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in this Code, as well as those he may be authorized by law to appoint ; x x x." (Emphasis supplied) The 1991 LGU Code, however, although a later law like the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, did not amend the Organic Act of 1989 because the Organic Act could only be amended through the ratification process laid out in the Organic Act itself. Section 526 of the 1991 LGU Code provides that: "Section 526. Application of this Code to Local Government Units in the Autonomous Regions. This Code shall apply to all provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays in the autonomous regions until such time as the regional government concerned shall have enacted its own local government code." Section 526, however, should apply only to autonomous regions created after the effectivity of the 1991 LGU Code, or in the absence of a statute governing a specific situation within a region. Otherwise, Section 526 of the 1991 LGU Code will collide directly with Section 3, Article XVIII of the Organic Act of 1989. Thus, even after the passage of the 1991 LGU Code, the Secretary of Health continued to be the appointing power of provincial health officers who remained national government officials. The Secretary of Health also continued to exercise the authority to assign provincial health officers to any province within the region. This situation, however, was only temporary, arising from the need for a phased transfer of the personnel, equipment, properties and budgets of the Department of Health in the ARMM to the Regional Government pursuant to Section 4, Article XIX of the Organic Act of 1989. On October 29, 1993, Executive Order No. 133 was issued, finally transferring the powers and functions of the Department of Health in the autonomous region to the Regional Government. Section 2 of Executive Order No. 133 stated that: "Sec 2. General Powers and Functions. The following powers and functions of the Department of Health (DOH), as enumerated in Section 4 of Executive Order No. 119, series of 1987, shall be transferred to the Autonomous Regional Government (ARG) subject to the specific conditions or limitations provided in this Executive Order. x x x." Notably, Executive Order No. 133 referred to the powers and functions of the Department of Health under Executive Order No. 119 and not under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 because Executive Order No. 119 was the existing charter of the Department of Health at the time of the effectivity of the Organic Act of 1989. Executive Order No. 133 was issued upon recommendation 20 of the Oversight Committee created by Section 3 of the Organic Act of 1989 "for the purpose of supervising the transfer to the Autonomous Region of such powers and functions vested in it by this Organic Act x x x." Section 3 of the Organic Act mandated the President to "act on the report and recommendations" of the Oversight Committee within ninety days after receipt thereof. The devolved powers under the Organic Act of 1989, as implemented by Executive Order No. 133, included the power of supervision and control over provincial health officers, as well as the power to appoint provincial health officers. The power of supervision and control, previously exercised by the Secretary of Health, carried with it the authority to assign provincial health officers to any province within the region pursuant to Section 17 of Executive Order No. 119. Assignment within a region of personnel appointed to a region is an administrative matter exercised by the head of office who is vested with the power of supervision and control over the office. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 133 provided as follows: Sec. 3. Functions of Department Secretary to be Transferred. Hereunder are the authority and responsibilities of the Secretary of the Department of Health which shall be vested in the Head of the Regional Department of Health (Regional DOH): a. x x x; x x x; c. Exercise supervision and control over the functions and activities of the Regional Department within the autonomous region; x x x. (Emphasis supplied) Upon the effectivity of Executive Order No. 133, the administrative authority of the Secretary of Health to assign provincial health officers to any province within a region was transferred to the ARMM Secretary of Health as the regional counterpart of the national Secretary of Health. This transfer of administrative authority to the Regional Secretary was essential to insure the continuation of vital health services to residents in the ARMM. There could be no gap or lacuna in the transfer of administrative authority from the National Government to the Regional Government because basic and essential services were involved that affected the lives of people. This is the reason why Section 3 of Executive Order No. 133 expressly stated that "the authority and responsibility of the Secretary of the Department of Health x x x shall be vested in the Head of the Regional Department of Health."

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On the other hand, the power to appoint provincial health officers, previously conferred by law on the Secretary of Health, was devolved to the Regional Governor. The Organic Act of 1989 devolved specified powers of the National Government to the three branches of the Regional Government, executive power being devolved to the Regional Governor, legislative power to the Regional Assembly and judicial power to the Shariah and tribal courts. Section 2, Article IV of the Organic Act of 1989 provided that: "Sec. 2. The powers devolved to the Autonomous Region shall be exercised through the Regional Assembly, the Regional Governor, and the special courts as provided in this Act." Moreover, Section 1, Article VIII of the Organic Act of 1989 expressly vested executive power in the Regional Governor: "Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in a Regional Governor who shall be elected at large by direct vote of the people of the Autonomous Region." The Regional Governor therefore acquired certain executive powers that the President of the Philippines and the Secretary of Health used to exercise prior to the Organic Act of 1989, subject to the limitations on the devolved powers under the Organic Act.As the holder of executive power, the Regional Governor was made the appointing power in the executive branch of the Regional Government in accordance with Section 17 of Article VIII of the Organic Act of 1989: "Sec. 17. The Regional Governor shall appoint, in addition to the members of the Cabinet, their deputies, the chairmen and members of the commissions and the heads of bureaus of the Regional Government, and those whom he may be authorized by regional law to appoint. The Regional Assembly may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers or officials lower in rank in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards." The appointing powers of the Regional Governor were those expressly granted to him under the Organic Act of 1989, as well as those that he might be granted pursuant to regional law. The Regional Assembly could also enact a law authorizing regional department heads, like the ARMM Secretary of Health, to appoint lower officials. The power to appoint provincial health officers is one that the Regional Assembly could thus grant by law to the Regional Secretary of Health. However, the Regional Assembly has not enacted a law authorizing the Regional Secretary of Health to appoint provincial health officers. Since the power to appoint must be expressly conferred by law, and cannot be implied from the power of supervision and control, this ruled out the Regional Secretary of Health as the appointing power of provincial health officers. Significantly, the power to appoint provincial health officers is not one of the powers transferred to the Regional Secretary of Health under Executive Order No. 133. On the other hand, the Regional Governor is the official to whom the executive powers of the national government have been expressly devolved. This is clear from the language of Section 2, Article IV of the Organic Act of 1989 when it stated that the "powers devolved to the Autonomous Region shall be exercised through the Regional Assembly, the Regional Governor, and the special courts provided in this Act." It is understood that, unless otherwise provided in the Organic Act of 1989, the Regional Governor would exercise the devolved executive powers, the Regional Assembly the devolved legislative powers, and the Shariah and tribal courts the devolved judicial powers. Again, there could be no gap or lacuna in the devolution of powers from the National Government to the Regional Government because the exercise of these powers was essential to the maintenance of basic services for the general welfare. As provided in Section 2 (9), Article V of the Organic Act of 1989, part of the devolved powers were the "[P]owers, functions and responsibilities exercised by the departments of the National Government," except those expressly excluded like foreign affairs, national defense and security, postal services and others mentioned in the Organic Act. Since the Department of Health was not excluded, the power to appoint provincial health officers, previously vested in the Secretary of the Department of Health, was indisputably one of the executive powers devolved to the Regional Government to be exercised by the Regional Governor. Until the Regional Assembly enacts a law authorizing some other ARMM executive official to appoint provincial health officers, the power to appoint provincial health officers would remain with the Regional Governor pursuant to the devolution of powers under the Organic Act of 1989 as implemented by Executive Order No. 133. The provincial health officers, after being devolved to the Regional Government, became regional officials upon the effectivity of Executive Order No. 133. Fourth Period: After the ARMM Local Code On January 25, 1994, the Regional Assembly enacted the ARMM Local Code which was approved by the Regional Governor on March 3, 1994. Section 457 of the ARMM Local Code provides that: "Sec. 457. Officials of the Provincial Government. (a) There shall be in each province a governor, a vice-governor, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, a secretary to the sangguniang panlalawigan, a provincial treasurer, a provincial assessor, a provincial accountant, a provincial planning and development coordinator, a provincial legal officer, a provincial administrator, a provincial health officer, x x x. (b) In addition thereto, the governor may appoint a provincial population officer, a provincial natural resources and environment officer, x x x. Provided, that the governor shall submit a list of at least three (3) qualified recommendees to the autonomous regional government for appointment, according to Civil Service law to the positions of a Provincial Health Officer, a Provincial Social Welfare and Development Officer, a Provincial Agriculturist, a Provincial Natural Resources and Environment Officer, and a Provincial Tourism Officer, to be paid by regional funds." (c) x x x (d) Unless otherwise provided herein, heads of departments and offices shall be appointed by the governor with the concurrence of the majority of all the sangguniang panlalawigan members, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations. The sangguniang panlalawigan shall act on the appointment within fifteen (15) days from the date of its submission; otherwise the same shall be deemed confirmed." (Emphasis supplied)

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Under the ARMM Local Code, the provincial health officer in the ARMM, previously a regional official, has also become a provincial government official, catching up with the status of provincial health officers outside of the ARMM. The Regional Governor appoints the provincial health officer from a list of three recommendees of the Provincial Governor. The ARMM Local Code provides that the salary of the provincial health officer shall be paid from regional funds. The ARMM Local Code also states that if the salary of the provincial health officer comes mainly from provincial funds, the Provincial Governor is the appointing power. The power of the Regional Governor to appoint provincial officials applies only to provincial officials "paid by regional funds." Section 459 of the ARMM Local Code expressly provides that: "Sec. 459. The Chief Executive. Powers, Duties, Functions, and Compensation. (a) The provincial governor, as the chief executive of the provincial government, shall exercise such powers and perform such duties and functions as provided by this Code and other laws. (b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the province and its inhabitants, the provincial governor shall: (1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the provincial government and in this connection, shall: xxx (v) Appoint all officials and employees whose salaries and wages are wholly or mainly paid out of provincial funds and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in this Code, as well as those he may be authorized by law to appoint ; (Emphasis supplied) x x x." The ARMM Local Code must be interpreted liberally in favor of the powers of the provincial governor as against those of the Regional Governor. Section 5 (a) of the ARMM Local Code mandates that: "Sec. 5. Rules of Interpretation. In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply: (a) Any provision on the power of the autonomous government and its local government units shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of the devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned; (Emphasis supplied) x x x." Consequently, if a province can afford and is willing to shoulder the salary of its provincial health officer, then the Provincial Governor becomes the appointing power in place of the Regional Governor since this will favor the devolution of power to a lower local government unit. Section 459 of the ARMM Local Code vests in the Provincial Governor the power to exercise supervision and control over all provincial government officials. The conversion of the provincial health officer from a regional government official to a provincial government official under Section 457 of the ARMM Local Code placed the provincial health officer under the supervision and control of the Provincial Governor. Consequently, with the passage of the ARMM Local Code the Regional Secretary of Health lost the authority to assign provincial health officers to other provinces within the region. The state of the law after the enactment of the ARMM Local Code became more favorable to Provincial Governors, at least with respect to the appointment and assignment of provincial health officers. While before the appointment of provincial health officers was solely the prerogative of the Regional Governor, now a Provincial Governor has the power to recommend three nominees. The Regional Governor can appoint only from among the three nominees of the Provincial Governor even though the salary of the provincial health officer comes from regional funds. Likewise, while before the Regional Secretary of Health could assign provincial health officers to other provinces within the region, this authority of the Regional Secretary ceased to exist. Since a provincial health officer was now appointed to a specific province, he could no longer be assigned to another province without his consent. Moreover, the Provincial Governor now exercises supervision and control over the provincial health officer who has become a provincial government official. Finally, if the provincial government assumes payment of the salary of the provincial health officer, then the Provincial Governor becomes the appointing power of such provincial official. Fifth Period: The Organic Act of 2001 Republic Act No. 9054 ("Organic Act of 2001" for brevity) took effect on August 14, 2001, the date of its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose within the constituent units of the ARMM. The Organic Act of 2001 incorporates the salient features of the Peace Agreement entered into between the National Government and the Moro National Liberation Front on September 2, 1996. 21 The Organic Act of 2001 is a completely new autonomy act for Muslim Mindanao since it totally replaced the Organic Act of 1989. It is not an ordinary amendment but a total substitution since the Organic Act of 2001 is as comprehensive as the Organic Act of 1989. The Organic Act of 2001 expressly adopted, as a minimum, the devolution under the 1991 LGU Code. This gave the local government units within ARMM the same devolved powers, functions and tax-sharing entitlements enjoyed by local government units outside of the ARMM. Section 3, Article III of the Organic Act of 2001 provides that: "Sec 3. Devolution of Powers. x x x. The Regional Assembly may not pass any law to diminish, lessen, or reduce the powers, functions, and shares in the internal revenue taxes of the said local government units as provided by Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991." (Emphasis supplied)

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To stress the importance of this legislative policy, the provisions of Section 3 of Article III are reiterated in Section 1 of Article IV of the same Organic Act, to wit: "Section 1. Powers and Functions. x x x. The Regional Government may enact its own regional administrative code and regional local government code consistent with the Constitution. The powers and functions already vested upon and the shares of the national taxes provided by Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, to provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays in the autonomous region shall not be reduced." (Emphasis supplied) Congress expressly made the devolved powers and functions under the 1991 LGU Code as the basic minimum for all local government units in the ARMM precisely to put them on equal footing with local government units outside of the ARMM. Congress was aware that the 1991 LGU Code took effect after the Organic Act of 1989 became law, and therefore the devolved powers and functions under the 1991 LGU Code could not have been incorporated into the Organic Act of 1989. Congress was also aware that the Supreme Court had ruled, in Matalam vs. Pangandaman,22 that the 1991 LGU Code "being a general law, may not be made to prevail over a special law or code" like the ARMM Local Code. Section 3 of Article III and Section 1 of Article IV of the Organic Act of 2001 corrected this imbalance in the devolved powers and functions between local government units within and those outside of the ARMM. In contrast, the Organic Act of 1989 adopted, as a minimum, the devolution under the 1984 LGU Code which was the existing local government code at that time. Under the Organic Act of 1989, the Regional Assembly could not diminish or reduce the powers, functions and responsibilities that the local government units "already enjoyed" at the time of the effectivity of the Organic Act of 1989. This did not prevent, however, Congress from subsequently increasing the share in national taxes of local government units within the ARMM to the same level as that of local government units outside of the ARMM. Such increase in allotment of national taxes did not amend or revise in any way the Organic Act of 1989 since the formula for the tax sharing is found in the 1991 LGU Code, not in the Organic Act of 1989. There was still, however, the issue of whether the Regional Government could reduce the share of local government units in national taxes as provided in the 1991 LGU Code. With the passage of the Organic Act of 2001, this issue has been resolved in favor of local government units in the ARMM. The passage of the Organic Act of 2001 means that the powers and functions of a Provincial Governor under the 1991 LGU Code are now enjoyed, as a minimum, by a Provincial Governor in the ARMM. Thus, the Provincial Governor appoints the provincial health officer if the latters salary comes from provincial funds. If the provincial health officers salary comes mainly from regional funds, then the ARMM Local Code applies, in which case the Regional Governor is the appointing power but he must appoint only from among the three nominees of the Provincial Governor. Moreover, the Provincial Governor exercises supervision and control over the provincial health officer because the ARMM Local Code has classified him as a provincial government official. This is now the present state of the law on the appointment of provincial health officers in the ARMM. This is actually the same as the law after the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code but prior to the passage of the Organic Act of 2001. The only difference is that the Regional Assembly cannot amend the ARMM Local Code to reduce or diminish this power of the Provincial Governor because this devolved power, emanating from the 1991 LGU Code, is now part of the Organic Act of 2001. Application of the law to the designation of Saber Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor Mahid M. Mutilan designated Saber as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHOAPGH, Lanao del Sur, on September 15, 1993. On this date the provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur was still a national government official paid entirely from national funds. The provincial health officer was still appointed by the national Secretary of Health to a region and not to a province. The Secretary of Health exercised supervision and control over the provincial health officer. The Secretary of Health was also the official authorized by law to assign the provincial health officer to any province within the region. Indisputably, on September 15, 1993, Provincial Governor Mutilan had no power to designate Saber as Officer-in-Charge of IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. Consequently, the designation of Saber as such Officer-in-Charge is void. The provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur became a provincial government official only after the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, which was enacted by the Regional Assembly on January 25, 1994 and approved by the Regional Governor on March 3, 1994. Prior to the ARMM Local Code but after the issuance of Executive Order No. 133, the Regional Governor appointed the provincial health officer while the Regional Secretary of Health could assign the provincial health officer to any province within the ARMM. The Provincial Governor had no power to appoint or even designate the Officer-in-Charge of the provincial health office. The Court of Appeals reliance on Section 478 of the 1991 LGU Code as Provincial Governor Mutilans authority to appoint Saber is misplaced. Section 478 of the 1991 LGU Code, which provides that "[T]he appointment of a health officer shall be mandatory for provincial, city and municipal governments," is not a grant of power to governors and mayors to appoint local health officers. It is simply a directive that those empowered to appoint local health officers are mandated to do so. In short, the appointment of local health officers, being essential for public services, is a mandatory obligation on the part of those vested by law with the power to appoint them. Moreover, as explained earlier, the 1991 LGU Code did not amend the Organic Act of 1989. Application of the law to the appointment and transfer of Sani Sani was appointed provincial health officer by then Secretary of Health Alfredo R.A. Bengzon on January 1, 1988. He was appointed as "Provincial Health Officer (R-05 5th Step), Office of the Regional Health Director, Regional Health Office No. XII, Cotabato City." Sani was appointed provincial health officer in Region XII since at that time Executive Order No. 119, the charter of the Department of Health, expressly stated that provincial health officers were to be appointed to a region. The Secretary of Health, upon recommendation of the Regional Director, could assign provincial health officers to any province within the region. In Miclat vs. Ganaden,23 this Court held that: "While the doctrine x x x to the effect that the transfers of officers against their will amount to a removal, the same is predicated upon the theory that said officers are appointed to particular stations and as such cannot be transferred without their consent. x x x. The case before us, however, does not involve any appointment to any particular station. It merely concerns an assignment to a station made in the interest of the service. x x x."

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Consequently, Sani cannot claim any security of tenure as provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur because he was never appointed to that office. Macacua, in her capacity as Regional Director and ARMM Secretary of Health, detailed Sani to the DOHARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City on August 9, 1993. As of that date, the powers and functions of the Department of Health were not yet transferred to the Regional Government, and the Secretary of Health of the National Government still exercised the power to assign the provincial health officers in the ARMM. Consequently, the August 9, 1993 directive of Macacua detailing or assigning Sani to the Regional Office in Cotabato City is void. However, on November 6, 1993, Macacua issued another Memorandum reiterating Sanis detail or assignment to the Regional Office in Cotabato City. This second Memorandum was issued after the issuance of Executive Order No. 133 which expressly transferred "supervision and control over all functions and activities of the Regional Department of Health" to "the Head of the Regional Department of Health." In Gen. Renato de Villa vs. City of Bacolod ,24 this Court ruled that the power of administrative control encompasses the power to transfer personnel who under the law may be reassigned to other stations. The second detail or assignment of Sani to the Regional Office in Cotabato, issued on November 6, 1993, is within the authority of Macacua as Regional Secretary of Health. Thus, the second detail of Sani is valid. Application of the law to the designation of Pandi Macacua, as Regional Director and Regional Secretary of Health, designated Pandi Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, on August 9, 1993 and again on November 6, 1993. The designation dated August 9, 1993 is void since the Regional Secretary at that time did not yet exercise supervision and control over the provincial health offices of the ARMM. However, the designation of Pandi on November 6, 1993 is valid since at that time Executive Order No. 133 had already been issued vesting in the Regional Secretary of Health supervision and control over all functions and activities of the Department of Health in the ARMM. The designation of Pandi, however, while valid is only temporary in nature, good until a new designation or a permanent appointment is made. As Regional Secretary of Health, Macacua was, as of November 6, 1993, the official vested by law to exercise supervision and control over all provincial health offices in the ARMM. The Regional Secretary, by virtue of Executive Order No. 133, assumed the administrative powers and functions of the Secretary of Health of the National Government with respect to provincial health offices within the ARMM. The official exercising supervision and control over an office has the administrative authority to designate, in the interest of public service, an Officer-in-Charge if the office becomes vacant. Macacua, therefore, had the authority on November 6, 1993 to designate an Officer-in-Charge in the provincial health office of Lanao del Sur pending the appointment of the permanent provincial health officer. After the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, the Regional Secretary of Health lost the authority to make such a designation. Under the ARMM Local Code, the provincial health officer became for the first an official of the provincial government even though he is appointed by the Regional Governor and draws his salary from regional funds. The ARMM Local Code vests in the Provincial Governor the power to "exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the provincial government." Upon the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, the power of supervision and control over the provincial health officer passed from the Regional Secretary to the Provincial Governor. From then on the Provincial Governor began to exercise the administrative authority to designate an Officer-in-Charge in the provincial health office pending the appointment of a permanent provincial health officer. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 15, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 32242 is SET ASIDE. The designation on September 15, 1993 of Dr. Amer A. Saber as Officer-in-Charge of the Integrated Provincial Health Office of Lanao del Sur is declared void. On the other hand, the designation on November 6, 1993 of Dr. Lampa I. Pandi as Officer-in-Charge of the Integrated Provincial Health Office of Lanao del Sur, and the assignment on November 6, 1993 of Dr. Mamasao Sani to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City, are declared valid. No costs. SO ORDERED. Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur. G.R. No. 177597 July 16, 2008

BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 178628 PERFECTO F. MARQUEZ, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case These consolidated petitions1 seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated 10 May 2007, of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of the legislative district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.2 The Facts The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities. 3 Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054). 4 Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, it is not

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part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held in November 1989. On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,5 enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. MMA Act 201 provides: Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, and Upi are hereby separated from the Province of Maguindanao and constituted into a distinct and independent province, which is hereby created, to be known as the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. xxxx Sec. 5. The corporate existence of this province shall commence upon the appointment by the Regional Governor or election of the governor and majority of the regular members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The incumbent elective provincial officials of the Province of Maguindanao shall continue to serve their unexpired terms in the province that they will choose or where they are residents: Provided, that where an elective position in both provinces becomes vacant as a consequence of the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, all incumbent elective provincial officials shall have preference for appointment to a higher elective vacant position and for the time being be appointed by the Regional Governor, and shall hold office until their successors shall have been elected and qualified in the next local elections; Provided, further, that they shall continue to receive the salaries they are receiving at the time of the approval of this Act until the new readjustment of salaries in accordance with law. Provided, furthermore, that there shall be no diminution in the number of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the mother province. Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes Cotabato as a part thereof, shall remain. Later, three new municipalities6 were carved out of the original nine municipalities constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second legislative district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao. The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006. On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to "clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province" under MMA Act 201. In answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao." Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of the COMELECs Law Department under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007,7 provides in pertinent parts: Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to adopt the recommendation of the Law Department that pending the enactment of the appropriate law by Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao. (Emphasis supplied) However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.8 On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City)." 91avvphi1 In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for Representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City," prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution10 and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.11 Thus, Sema asserted that the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7902 which maintained the status quo in Maguindanaos first legislative district despite the COMELECs earlier directive in Resolution No. 7845 designating Cotabato City as the lone component of Maguindanaos reapportioned first legislative district.12 Sema further claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC usurped Congress power to create or reapportion legislative districts. In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), chose not to reach the merits of the case and merely contended that (1) Sema wrongly availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because the COMELEC issued the same in the exercise of its administrative, not quasi-judicial, power and (2) Semas prayer for the writ of prohibition in G.R. No. 177597 became moot with the proclamation of respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen (respondent Dilangalen) on 1 June 2007 as representative of the legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City. In his Comment, respondent Dilangalen countered that Sema is estopped from questioning COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because in her certificate of candidacy filed on 29 March 2007, Sema indicated that she was seeking election as representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan including Cotabato City." Respondent Dilangalen added that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is constitutional because it did not apportion a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative districts in Maguindanao but merely renamed Maguindanaos first legislative district. Respondent Dilangalen further claimed that the COMELEC could not reapportion Maguindanaos first legislative district to make Cotabato City its sole component unit as the power to reapportion legislative districts lies exclusively with Congress, not to mention that Cotabato City does not meet the minimum population requirement under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for the creation of a legislative district within a city.13

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Sema filed a Consolidated Reply controverting the matters raised in respondents Comments and reiterating her claim that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902. In the Resolution of 4 September 2007, the Court required the parties in G.R. No. 177597 to comment on the issue of whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province. The parties submitted their compliance as follows: (1) Sema answered the issue in the affirmative on the following grounds: (a) the Court in Felwa v. Salas14 stated that "when a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment"; (b) Section 462 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) "affirms" the apportionment of a legislative district incident to the creation of a province; and (c) Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution mandate the apportionment of a legislative district in newly created provinces. (2) The COMELEC, again represented by the OSG, apparently abandoned its earlier stance on the propriety of issuing Resolution Nos. 07-0407 and 7902 and joined causes with Sema, contending that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is "self-executing." Thus, every new province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly is ipso facto entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives even in the absence of a national law; and (3) Respondent Dilangalen answered the issue in the negative on the following grounds: (a) the "province" contemplated in Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is one that is created by an act of Congress taking into account the provisions in RA 7160 on the creation of provinces; (b) Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 withheld from the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to enact measures relating to national elections, which encompasses the apportionment of legislative districts for members of the House of Representatives; (c) recognizing a legislative district in every province the ARMM Regional Assembly creates will lead to the disproportionate representation of the ARMM in the House of Representatives as the Regional Assembly can create provinces without regard to the requirements in Section 461 of RA 7160; and (d) Cotabato City, which has a population of less than 250,000, is not entitled to a representative in the House of Representatives. On 27 November 2007, the Court heard the parties in G.R. No. 177597 in oral arguments on the following issues: (1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, is constitutional; and (2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province. 15 In compliance with the Resolution dated 27 November 2007, the parties in G.R. No. 177597 filed their respective Memoranda on the issues raised in the oral arguments.16 On the question of the constitutionality of Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, the parties in G.R. No. 177597 adopted the following positions: (1) Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is constitutional (a) as a valid delegation by Congress to the ARMM of the power to create provinces under Section 20 (9), Article X of the Constitution granting to the autonomous regions, through their organic acts, legislative powers over "other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region" and (b) as an amendment to Section 6 of RA 7160.17 However, Sema concedes that, if taken literally, the grant in Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to "prescribe standards lower than those mandated" in RA 7160 in the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.18 Thus, Sema proposed that Section 19 "should be construed as prohibiting the Regional Assembly from prescribing standards x x x that do not comply with the minimum criteria" under RA 7160.19 (2) Respondent Dilangalen contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional on the following grounds: (a) the power to create provinces was not among those granted to the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution and (b) the grant under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower than those mandated in Section 461 of RA 7160 on the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause; and (3) The COMELEC, through the OSG, joined causes with respondent Dilangalen (thus effectively abandoning the position the COMELEC adopted in its Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September 2007) and contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional because (a) it contravenes Section 10 and Section 6,20 Article X of the Constitution and (b) the power to create provinces was withheld from the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. On the question of whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province, Sema and respondent Dilangalen reiterated in their Memoranda the positions they adopted in their Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September 2007. The COMELEC deemed it unnecessary to submit its position on this issue considering its stance that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The pendency of the petition in G.R. No. 178628 was disclosed during the oral arguments on 27 November 2007. Thus, in the Resolution of 19 February 2008, the Court ordered G.R. No. 178628 consolidated with G.R. No. 177597. The petition in G.R. No. 178628 echoed Sema's contention that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902 depriving the voters of Cotabato City of a representative in the House of Representatives. In its Comment to the petition in G.R. No. 178628, the COMELEC, through the OSG, maintained the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 as a temporary measure pending the enactment by Congress of the "appropriate law." The Issues The petitions raise the following issues: I. In G.R. No. 177597:

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(A) Preliminarily (1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper to test the constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902; and (2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted the petition in G.R. No. 177597. (B) On the merits (1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and (2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such province. II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid for maintaining the status quo in the first legislative district of Maguindanao (as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City [formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City]"), despite the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding Cotabato City). The Ruling of the Court The petitions have no merit. We rule that (1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void; and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid. On the Preliminary Matters The Writ of Prohibition is Appropriate to Test the Constitutionality of Election Laws, Rules and Regulations The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by "any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions."21 On the other hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person to perform an act "which the law specifically enjoins as a duty."22 True, the COMELEC did not issue Resolution No. 7902 in the exercise of its judicial or quasi-judicial functions.23 Nor is there a law which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to exclude from canvassing the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City." These, however, do not justify the outright dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 because Sema also prayed for the issuance of the writ of Prohibition and we have long recognized this writ as proper for testing the constitutionality of election laws, rules, and regulations. 24 Respondent Dilangalens Proclamation Does Not Moot the Petition There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalens proclamation as winner in the 14 May 2007 elections for representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City" mooted this petition. This case does not concern respondent Dilangalens election. Rather, it involves an inquiry into the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, as well as the constitutionality of MMA Act 201 and Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. Admittedly, the outcome of this petition, one way or another, determines whether the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of the district of "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City" will be included in the canvassing of ballots. However, this incidental consequence is no reason for us not to proceed with the resolution of the novel issues raised here. The Courts ruling in these petitions affects not only the recently concluded elections but also all the other succeeding elections for the office in question, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional Assembly to create in the future additional provinces. On the Main Issues Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides: Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected. There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction,25 subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, "only x x x an Act of Congress" can create provinces, cities or municipalities.261avvphi1

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Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers because the power to create local government units is not one of the express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies. 27 In the present case, the question arises whether the delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with any provision of the Constitution. There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, "Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x." Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district because once the citys population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district. For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district. The threshold issue then is, can Congress validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts for the House of Representatives? The answer is in the negative. Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned Only by an Act of Congress Under the present Constitution, as well as in past28 Constitutions, the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides: SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. xxxx (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. (4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section. (Emphasis supplied) Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC,29 we held that the "power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws," and thus is vested exclusively in Congress. This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body. The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM Organic Act, as amended. Thus, Section 20, Article X of the Constitution provides: SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over: (1) Administrative organization; (2) Creation of sources of revenues; (3) Ancestral domain and natural resources; (4) Personal, family, and property relations; (5) Regional urban and rural planning development; (6) Economic, social, and tourism development;

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(7) Educational policies; (8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and (9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region. Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress. On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act, provides, " The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power x x x except on the following matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x x." Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a legislative district, the first representative is always elected in the "next national elections" from the effectivity of the law.30 Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official.31 It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a national office. To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMMs territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional Assemblys legislative powers "[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x." The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff Kabunsuan, recognized the exclusive nature of Congress power to create or reapportion legislative districts by abstaining from creating a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan. Section 5 of MMA Act 201 provides that: Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes Cotabato City as a part thereof, shall remain. (Emphasis supplied) However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that "each province shall have at least one representative." Thus, the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without a legislative district is unconstitutional. Sema, petitioner in G.R. No. 177597, contends that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides: Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. (Emphasis supplied) and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution, which states: Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created or where the city, whose population has so increased, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election. (Emphasis supplied) serve as bases for the conclusion that the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, created on 29 October 2006, is automatically entitled to one member in the House of Representatives in the 14 May 2007 elections. As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes the statement in Felwa that "when a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment." The contention has no merit. First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695), creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and providing for congressional representation in the old and new provinces, was unconstitutional for "creati[ng] congressional districts without the apportionment provided in the Constitution." The Court answered in the negative, thus: The Constitution ordains: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one hundred and twenty Members who shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one Member. The Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. Each representative district shall comprise as far as practicable, contiguous and compact territory." Pursuant to this Section, a representative district may come into existence: (a) indirectly, through the creation of a province for "each province shall have at least one member" in the House of Representatives; or (b) by direct creation of several representative districts within a province. The requirements concerning the apportionment of representative districts and the territory thereof refer only to the second method of creation of representative districts, and do not apply to those incidental to the creation of provinces, under the first method. This is deducible, not only from the general tenor of the

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provision above quoted, but, also, from the fact that the apportionment therein alluded to refers to that which is made by an Act of Congress. Indeed, when a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district, comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment. There is no constitutional limitation as to the time when, territory of, or other conditions under which a province may be created, except, perhaps, if the consequence thereof were to exceed the maximum of 120 representative districts prescribed in the Constitution, which is not the effect of the legislation under consideration. As a matter of fact, provinces have been created or subdivided into other provinces, with the consequent creation of additional representative districts, without complying with the aforementioned requirements.32 (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because (1) it validly created legislative districts "indirectly" through a special law enacted by Congress creating a province and (2) the creation of the legislative districts will not result in breaching the maximum number of legislative districts provided under the 1935 Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the present case because in Felwa the new provinces were created by a national law enacted by Congress itself. Here, the new province was created merely by a regional law enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly. What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does not emanate alone from Congress power to reapportion legislative districts, but also from Congress power to create provinces which cannot be created without a legislative district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is created by operation of the Constitution because the Constitution provides that "each province shall have at least one representative" in the House of Representatives. This does not detract from the constitutional principle that the power to create legislative districts belongs exclusively to Congress. It merely prevents any other legislative body, except Congress, from creating provinces because for a legislative body to create a province such legislative body must have the power to create legislative districts. In short, only an act of Congress can trigger the creation of a legislative district by operation of the Constitution. Thus, only Congress has the power to create, or trigger the creation of, a legislative district. Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to Shariff Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will leave Cotabato City as the lone component of the first legislative district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a legislative district by itself because as of the census taken in 2000, it had a population of only 163,849. To constitute Cotabato City alone as the surviving first legislative district of Maguindanao will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which requires that "[E]ach city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand x x x, shall have at least one representative." Second. Semas theory also undermines the composition and independence of the House of Representatives. Under Section 19,33 Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160, namely: minimum annual income of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of 2,000 square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000.34 The following scenarios thus become distinct possibilities: (1) An inferior legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly can create 100 or more provinces and thus increase the membership of a superior legislative body, the House of Representatives, beyond the maximum limit of 250 fixed in the Constitution (unless a national law provides otherwise); (2) The proportional representation in the House of Representatives based on one representative for at least every 250,000 residents will be negated because the ARMM Regional Assembly need not comply with the requirement in Section 461(a)(ii) of RA 7160 that every province created must have a population of at least 250,000; and (3) Representatives from the ARMM provinces can become the majority in the House of Representatives through the ARMM Regional Assemblys continuous creation of provinces or cities within the ARMM. The following exchange during the oral arguments of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 highlights the absurdity of Semas position that the ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces: Justice Carpio: So, you mean to say [a] Local Government can create legislative district[s] and pack Congress with their own representatives [?] Atty. Vistan II:35 Yes, Your Honor, because the Constitution allows that. Justice Carpio: So, [the] Regional Assembly of [the] ARMM can create and create x x x provinces x x x and, therefore, they can have thirty-five (35) new representatives in the House of Representatives without Congress agreeing to it, is that what you are saying? That can be done, under your theory[?] Atty. Vistan II: Yes, Your Honor, under the correct factual circumstances. Justice Carpio: Under your theory, the ARMM legislature can create thirty-five (35) new provinces, there may be x x x [only] one hundred thousand (100,000) [population], x x x, and they will each have one representative x x x to Congress without any national law, is that what you are saying? Atty. Vistan II:

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Without law passed by Congress, yes, Your Honor, that is what we are saying. xxxx Justice Carpio: So, they can also create one thousand (1000) new provinces, sen[d] one thousand (1000) representatives to the House of Representatives without a national law[,] that is legally possible, correct? Atty. Vistan II: Yes, Your Honor.36 (Emphasis supplied) Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in Article X on regional autonomy,37 nor Congress in enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended these disastrous consequences that certainly would wreck the tri-branch system of government under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this. The Constitution empowered Congress to create or reapportion legislative districts, not the regional assemblies. Section 3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution which states, "[A]ny province that may hereafter be created x x x shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member," refers to a province created by Congress itself through a national law. The reason is that the creation of a province increases the actual membership of the House of Representatives, an increase that only Congress can decide. Incidentally, in the present 14th Congress, there are 21938 district representatives out of the maximum 250 seats in the House of Representatives. Since party-list members shall constitute 20 percent of total membership of the House, there should at least be 50 party-list seats available in every election in case 50 party-list candidates are proclaimed winners. This leaves only 200 seats for district representatives, much less than the 219 incumbent district representatives. Thus, there is a need now for Congress to increase by law the allowable membership of the House, even before Congress can create new provinces. It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited "[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x." The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM Government is established "within the framework of the Constitution." This follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which mandates that the ARMM "shall be created x x x within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." The present case involves the creation of a local government unit that necessarily involves also the creation of a legislative district. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of the creation of municipalities and barangays that does not comply with the criteria established in Section 461 of RA 7160, as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, because the creation of such In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void. Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the geographic and legislative district of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID. Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. SO ORDERED. municipalities and barangays does not involve the creation of legislative districts. We leave the resolution of this issue to an appropriate case.

ARTICLE XI: ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

G.R. No. 146710-15

March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.

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---------------------------------------G.R. No. 146738 March 2, 2001 the petitioner.4 Four days later, or on October 17, former President Corazon C. Aquino also demanded that the petitioner take the "supreme self-sacrifice" of resignation.5 Former President Fidel Ramos also joined the chorus. Early on, or on October 12, respondent Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Services6 and later asked for petitioner's resignation.7 However, petitioner strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign. The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers, members of the Council of Senior Economic Advisers, resigned. They were Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala, former Prime Minister Cesar Virata, former Senator Vicente Paterno and Washington Sycip. 8 On November 2, Secretary Mar Roxas II also resigned from the Department of Trade and Industry.9 On November 3, Senate President Franklin Drilon, and House Speaker Manuel Villar, together with some 47 representatives defected from the ruling coalition, Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.10 The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment11 signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative Fuentebella.12 On November 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.13 The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December 7, the impeachment trial started.14 The battle royale was fought by some of the marquee names in the legal profession. Standing as prosecutors were then House Minority Floor Leader Feliciano Belmonte and Representatives Joker Arroyo, Wigberto Taada, Sergio Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar Moreno, Salacnib Baterina, Roan Libarios, Oscar Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and Antonio Nachura. They were assisted by a battery of private prosecutors led by now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez and now Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo. Serving as defense counsel were former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, former Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice Estelito P. Mendoza, former City Fiscal of Manila Jose Flaminiano, former Deputy Speaker of the House Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother, Atty. Raymund Fortun. The day to day trial was covered by live TV and during its course enjoyed the highest viewing rating. Its high and low points were the constant conversational piece of the chattering classes. The dramatic point of the December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank. She testified that she was one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature "Jose Velarde" on documents involving a P500 million investment agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000.15 After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas. When it resumed on January 2, 2001, more bombshells were exploded by the prosecution. On January 11, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who served as petitioner's Secretary of Finance took the witness stand. He alleged that the petitioner jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider trading.16 Then came the fateful day of January 16, when by a vote of 11-1017 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President.18 The ruling made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the eleven (11) senators.

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent. PUNO, J.: On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. The warring personalities are important enough but more transcendental are the constitutional issues embedded on the parties' dispute. While the significant issues are many, the jugular issue involves the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in a democracy, Philippine style. First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in the office of the President. In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Some ten (10) million Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he would rescue them from life's adversity. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.1 The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., then the Senate Minority Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled "I Accuse." He accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from Governor Singson from November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was referred by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the Committee on Justice (then headed by Senator Renato Cayetano) for joint investigation.2 The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Order and Security, then headed by Representative Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the expos of Governor Singson. On the other hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the petitioner. Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement in behalf of the Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking petitioner to step down from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern. 3 Two days later or on October 13, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines joined the cry for the resignation of

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On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering their collective resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment tribunal.19 Senator Raul Roco quickly moved for the indefinite postponement of the impeachment proceedings until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue of resignation of the public prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted the motion.20 January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A 10-kilometer line of people holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation. Students and teachers walked out of their classes in Metro Manila to show their concordance. Speakers in the continuing rallies at the EDSA Shrine, all masters of the physics of persuasion, attracted more and more people.21 On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m., Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine.22 In the presence of former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and hundreds of thousands of cheering demonstrators, General Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support to this government."23 A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning announcement. 24 Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their posts.25 Rallies for the resignation of the petitioner exploded in various parts of the country. To stem the tide of rage, petitioner announced he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the highly controversial second envelope.26 There was no turning back the tide. The tide had become a tsunami. January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power started at Malacaang'' Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive Secretary. Secretary Edgardo Angara, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito Banayo, Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez, head of the Presidential Management Staff, negotiated for the petitioner. Respondent Arroyo was represented by now Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, now Secretary of Finance Alberto Romulo and now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez.27 Outside the palace, there was a brief encounter at Mendiola between pro and anti-Estrada protesters which resulted in stone-throwing and caused minor injuries. The negotiations consumed all morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine. At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines.28 At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacaang Palace.29 He issued the following press statement:30 "20 January 2001 STATEMENT FROM PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society. It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country. I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people. MABUHAY! (Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA" It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter:31 "Sir: By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. (Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA" A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m. on January 20.23 Another copy was transmitted to Senate President Pimentel on the same day although it was received only at 9:00 p.m.33 On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers the duties of the Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC, to wit: "A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take her Oath of Office as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice Acting on the urgent request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a

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letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001, which request was treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolve unanimously to confirm the authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001.1wphi1.nt This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper party." Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and special envoys. 34 Recognition of respondent Arroyo's government by foreign governments swiftly followed. On January 23, in a reception or vin d' honneur at Malacaang, led by the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio Antonio Franco, more than a hundred foreign diplomats recognized the government of respondent Arroyo.35 US President George W. Bush gave the respondent a telephone call from the White House conveying US recognition of her government.36 On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker of the House of Representatives.37 The House then passed Resolution No. 175 "expressing the full support of the House of Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines."38 It also approved Resolution No. 176 "expressing the support of the House of Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations and expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the nation's goals under the Constitution." 39 On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management Act. A few days later, she also signed into law the Political Advertising ban and Fair Election Practices Act.41 On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice President. 42 The next day, February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the nomination of Senator Guingona, Jr.43 Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan Ponce Enrile, and John Osmena voted "yes" with reservations, citing as reason therefor the pending challenge on the legitimacy of respondent Arroyo's presidency before the Supreme Court. Senators Teresa Aquino-Oreta and Robert Barbers were absent.44 The House of Representatives also approved Senator Guingona's nomination in Resolution No. 178.45 Senator Guingona, Jr. took his oath as Vice President two (2) days later. 46 On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio and has been terminated.47 Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated "for the record" that she voted against the closure of the impeachment court on the grounds that the Senate had failed to decide on the impeachment case and that the resolution left open the question of whether Estrada was still qualified to run for another elective post.48 Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyo's public acceptance rating jacked up from 16% on January 20, 2001 to 38% on January 26, 2001.49 In another survey conducted by the ABSCBN/SWS from February 2-7, 2001, results showed that 61% of the Filipinos nationwide accepted President Arroyo as replacement of petitioner Estrada. The survey also revealed that President Arroyo is accepted by 60% in Metro Manila, by also 60% in the balance of Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55% in Mindanao. Her trust rating increased to 52%. Her presidency is accepted by majorities in all social
40

classes: 58% in the ABC or middle-to-upper classes, 64% in the D or mass class, and 54% among the E's or very poor class.50 After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for Government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property, plunder, etc.; (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption. A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer to the aforementioned complaints against him. Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted." Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution." Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6, required the respondents "to comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001." On February 13, the Court ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the respondents' comments "on or before 8:00 a.m. of February 15." On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-hour hearing. Before the hearing, Chief Justice Davide, Jr.51 and Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban52 recused themselves on motion of petitioner's counsel, former Senator Rene A. Saguisag. They debunked the charge of counsel Saguisag that they have "compromised themselves by indicating that they have thrown their weight on one side" but nonetheless inhibited themselves. Thereafter, the parties were given the short period of five (5) days to file their memoranda and two (2) days to submit their simultaneous replies. In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and press statement for "Gag Order" on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court resolved:

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"(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution; (2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under pain of being cited for contempt to refrain from making any comment or discussing in public the merits of the cases at bar while they are still pending decision by the Court, and (3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent Ombudsman from resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in his office against petitioner, Joseph E. Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news reports that the respondent Ombudsman may immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing held on February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and academic."53 The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar were deemed submitted for decision. The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are: I Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy. II Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President. III Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution. IV Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity. We shall discuss the issues in seriatim. I "x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question. Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non justiciability on the ground of a political question's presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of 'political questions', not of 'political cases'." In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for a firmer delineation of the inner and outer perimeters of a political question.57 Our leading case is Tanada v. Cuenco,58 where this Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. 59 Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction.60 With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Whether or not the cases At bar involve a political question Private respondents54 raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political question, and hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. They contend that shorn of its embroideries, the cases at bar assail the "legitimacy of the Arroyo administration." They stress that respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency through people power; that she has already taken her oath as the 14th President of the Republic; that she has exercised the powers of the presidency and that she has been recognized by foreign governments. They submit that these realities on ground constitute the political thicket, which the Court cannot enter. We reject private respondents' submission. To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift the shroud on political question but its exact latitude still splits the best of legal minds. Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the political question doctrine which rests on the principle of separation of powers and on prudential considerations, continue to be refined in the mills of constitutional law. 55 In the United States, the most authoritative guidelines to determine whether a question is political were spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case or Baker v. Carr,56 viz:

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Constitution trimming the so called political thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section 18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in limpid language to "x x x review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or the extension thereof x x x." Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano v. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.61 and related cases62 to support their thesis that since the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo, they present a political question. A more cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that they are inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that the government of former President Aquino was the result of a successful revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than the Freedom Constitution63 declared that the Aquino government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people "in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended." In is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the government of respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in character . The oath that she took at the EDSA Shrine is the oath under the 1987 Constitution.64 In her oath, she categorically swore to preserve and defend the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the powers of the presidency under the authority of the 1987 Constitution. In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate. Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos. Denial of these rights was one of the reasons of our 1898 revolution against Spain. Our national hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the clarion call for the recognition of freedom of the press of the Filipinos and included it as among "the reforms sine quibus non."65 The Malolos Constitution, which is the work of the revolutionary Congress in 1898, provided in its Bill of Rights that Filipinos shall not be deprived (1) of the right to freely express his ideas or opinions, orally or in writing, through the use of the press or other similar means; (2) of the right of association for purposes of human life and which are not contrary to public means; and (3) of the right to send petitions to the authorities, individually or collectively." These fundamental rights were preserved when the United States acquired jurisdiction over the Philippines. In the Instruction to the Second Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900 issued by President McKinley, it is specifically provided "that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances." The guaranty was carried over in the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1966.66 Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution,67 and the 197368 Constitution. These rights are now safely ensconced in section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, viz: "Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances." The indispensability of the people's freedom of speech and of assembly to democracy is now selfevident. The reasons are well put by Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual fulfillment; second, it is an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth; third, it is essential to provide for participation in decision-making by all members of society; and fourth, it is a method of achieving a more adaptable and hence, a more stable community of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus."69 In this sense, freedom of speech and of assembly provides a framework in which the "conflict necessary to the progress of a society can take place without destroying the society."70 In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,71 this function of free speech and assembly was echoed in the amicus curiae filed by the Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar Association which emphasized that "the basis of the right of assembly is the substitution of the expression of opinion and belief by talk rather than force; and this means talk for all and by all."72 In the relatively recent case of Subayco v. Sandiganbayan,73 this Court similar stressed that " it should be clear even to those with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign people assemble to petition for redress of grievances, all should listen. For in a democracy, it is the people who count; those who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers." Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II,74 and section 875 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section 1176 of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison,77 the doctrine has been laid down that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . ." Thus, respondent's in vocation of the doctrine of political question is but a foray in the dark. II Whether or not the petitioner Resigned as President We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this issue as posing a political question. Indeed, it involves a legal question whose factual ingredient is determinable from the records of the case and by resort to judicial notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the Constitution which provides: "Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President, the Vice President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the

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House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified. x x x." The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the Public. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. 78 The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacaang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President. To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is important to follow the succession of events after the expos of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigated. The more detailed revelations of petitioner's alleged misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon investigation spiked the hate against him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in the House of Representatives which initially was given a near cipher chance of succeeding snowballed. In express speed, it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of the House of Representatives. Soon, petitioner's powerful political allies began deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit as Secretary of Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon and former Speaker Villar defected with 47 representatives in tow. Then, his respected senior economic advisers resigned together with his Secretary of Trade and Industry. As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the people's call for his resignation intensified. The call reached a new crescendo when the eleven (11) members of the impeachment tribunal refused to open the second envelope. It sent the people to paroxysms of outrage. Before the night of January 16 was over, the EDSA Shrine was swarming with people crying for redress of their grievance. Their number grew exponentially. Rallies and demonstration quickly spread to the countryside like a brush fire. As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner. The window is provided in the "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," the diary of Executive Secretary Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer.79 The Angara Diary reveals that in the morning of January 19, petitioner's loyal advisers were worried about the swelling of the crowd at EDSA, hence, they decided to create an ad hoc committee to handle it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his small office at the presidential residence and exclaimed: "Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo has defected.)" 80 An hour later or at 2:30 p.m., the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would not be a candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time . At 3:00 p.m., General Reyes joined the sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the resignation of the petitioner and dramatically announced the AFP's withdrawal of support from the petitioner and their pledge of support to respondent Arroyo. The seismic shift of support left petitioner weak as a president. According to Secretary Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of "dignified exit or resignation."81 Petitioner did not disagree but listened intently.82 The sky was falling fast on the petitioner. At 9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel repeated to the petitioner the urgency of making a graceful and dignified exit. He gave the proposal a sweetener by saying that petitioner would be allowed to go abroad with enough funds to support him and his family.83 Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave the country.84 At 10:00 p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara, "Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days to a week in the palace."85 This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time. The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up Secretary Angara and requested, "Ed, magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng (let's cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and orderly transfer of power."86 There was no defiance to the request. Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again, we note that at this stage, the problem was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied. The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at 12:20 a.m. of January 20, that fateful Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three (3) points: (1) the transition period of five days after the petitioner's resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his family, and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name of the petitioner. 87 Again, we note that the resignation of petitioner was not a disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact. According to Secretary Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the petitioner on the three points and the following entry in the Angara Diary shows the reaction of the petitioner, viz: "x x x I explain what happened during the first round of negotiations. The President immediately stresses that he just wants the five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelope to clear his name. If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday. The President says. "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don't want any more of this it's too painful. I'm tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.) I just want to clear my name, then I will go."88 Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he said "x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit." "Ayoko na" are words of resignation.

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The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the Angara Diary, the following happened: "Opposition's deal 7:30 a.m. Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms. Macapagal's spokesperson) Rene Corona. For this round, I am accompanied by Dondon Bagatsing and Macel. Rene pulls out a document titled "Negotiating Points." It reads: '1. The President shall sign a resignation document within the day, 20 January 2001, that will be effective on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the Presidency of the Republic of the Philippines. 2. Beginning to day, 20 January 2001, the transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence, and persons designated by the Vice President to various positions and offices of the government shall start their orientation activities in coordination with the incumbent officials concerned. 3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police shall function under the Vice President as national military and police authority effective immediately. 4. The Armed Forced of the Philippines, through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the security of the President and his family as approved by the national military and police authority (Vice President). 5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second envelope in connection with the alleged savings account of the President in the Equitable PCI Bank in accordance with the rules of the Senate, pursuant to the request to the Senate President. Our deal We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads: The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective principals, agree and undertake as follows: '1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, at which time President Joseph Ejercito Estrada will turn over the presidency to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. '2. In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed security and safety of their person and property throughout their natural lifetimes. Likewise, President Estrada and his families are guarantee freedom from persecution or retaliation from government and the private sector throughout their natural lifetimes. '3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate sitting as an impeachment court will authorize the opening of the second envelope in the impeachment trial as proof that the subject savings account does not belong to President Estrada. '4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January 2001 and 24 January 2001 (the 'Transition Period"), the incoming Cabinet members shall receive an appropriate briefing from the outgoing Cabinet officials as part of the orientation program. During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function Vice President (Macapagal) as national military and police authorities. Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and PNP director general shall obtain all the necessary signatures as affixed to this agreement and insure faithful implementation and observance thereof. Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in "Annex A" heretofore attached to this agreement."89 The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will be noted that during this second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period. According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement, which was premised on the resignation of the petitioner was further refined. It was then, signed by their side and he was ready to fax it to General Reyes and Senator Pimentel to await the signature of the United Opposition. However, the signing by the party of the respondent Arroyo was aborted by her oath-taking. The Angara diary narrates the fateful events, viz;90 "xxx 11:00 a.m. Between General Reyes and myself, there is a firm agreement on the five points to effect a peaceful transition. I can hear the general clearing all these points with a group he is with. I hear voices in the background. Agreement. The agreement starts: 1. The President shall resign today, 20 January 2001, which resignation shall be effective on 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the presidency of the Republic of the Philippines. This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through the Chief of Staff, as approved by the national military and police authorities Vice President (Macapagal).

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xxx The rest of the agreement follows: 2. The transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence on 20 January 2001, wherein persons designated by the Vice President to various government positions shall start orientation activities with incumbent officials. '3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the safety and security of the President and his families throughout their natural lifetimes as approved by the national military and police authority Vice President. '4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under the Vice President as national military and police authorities. '5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the second envelope in the impeachment trial, the contents of which shall be offered as proof that the subject savings account does not belong to the President. The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in Annex "B" heretofore attached to this agreement. 11:20 a.m. I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene Pimentel our agreement, signed by our side and awaiting the signature of the United opposition. And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the Supreme Court has decided that Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is President and will be sworn in at 12 noon. 'Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang agreement (why couldn't you wait? What about the agreement)?' I asked. Reyes answered: 'Wala na, sir (it's over, sir).' I ask him: Di yung transition period, moot and academic na?' And General Reyes answers: ' Oo nga, I delete na natin, sir (yes, we're deleting the part).' Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that there was a double cross. But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision on resignation since this matter is already moot and academic. Within moments, Macel erases the first provision and faxes the documents, which have been signed by myself, Dondon and Macel, to Nene Pimentel and General Reyes. I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled that Chief Justice Davide will administer the oath to Gloria at 12 noon. The President is too stunned for words: Final meal 12 noon Gloria takes her oath as president of the Republic of the Philippines. 12:20 p.m. The PSG distributes firearms to some people inside the compound. The president is having his final meal at the presidential Residence with the few friends and Cabinet members who have gathered. By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the first line of defense at Mendiola. Only the PSG is there to protect the Palace, since the police and military have already withdrawn their support for the President. 1 p.m. The President's personal staff is rushing to pack as many of the Estrada family's personal possessions as they can. During lunch, Ronnie Puno mentions that the president needs to release a final statement before leaving Malacaang. The statement reads: At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society. It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country. I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people. MABUHAY!"' I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to General Reyes for the signatures of the other side, as it is important that the provisions on security, at least, should be respected.

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It was curtain time for the petitioner. In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the part tense. It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave dated January 20, 2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to the said letter, viz: "Sir. By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting president. (Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada" To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery.91 The pleadings filed by the petitioner in the cases at bar did not discuss, may even intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during the week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint of its existence when he issued his final press release. It was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in his press release that he was temporarily unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of government to respondent Arroyo for the time bearing. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press released, still, it commands scant legal significance. Petitioner's resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his reputation by the people. There is another reason why this Court cannot given any legal significance to petitioner's letter and this shall be discussed in issue number III of this Decision. After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that he could not resign as a matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz: "Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminals or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery." A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any comfort to the petitioner. RA No. 3019 originated form Senate Bill No. 293. The original draft of the bill, when it was submitted to the Senate, did not contain a provision similar to section 12 of the law as it now stands. However, in his sponsorship speech, Senator Arturo Tolentino, the author of the bill, "reserved to propose during the period of amendments the inclusion of a provision to the effect that no public official who is under prosecution for any act of graft or corruption, or is under administrative investigation, shall be allowed to voluntarily resign or retire."92 During the period of amendments, the following provision was inserted as section 15: "Sec. 15. Termination of office No public official shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under the Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery. The separation or cessation of a public official form office shall not be a bar to his prosecution under this Act for an offense committed during his incumbency." 93 The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the legality of the second paragraph of the provision and insisted that the President's immunity should extend after his tenure. Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar Senate Bill No. 293, was thereafter passed. Section 15 above became section 13 under the new bill, but the deliberations on this particular provision mainly focused on the immunity of the President, which was one of the reasons for the veto of the original bill. There was hardly any debate on the prohibition against the resignation or retirement of a public official with pending criminal and administrative cases against him. Be that as it may, the intent of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being used by a public official as a protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against him and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no person can be compelled to render service for that would be a violation of his constitutional right.94 A public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative or criminal investigation or prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings against him. He cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution. There is another reason why petitioner's contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the records show that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed, the respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation of the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting President.

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Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against petitioner when he resigned. III Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President. We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. As aforestated, the inability claim is contained in the January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the same day to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella. Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal is that "Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of article VII."95 This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President. An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides: "SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President. Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President. Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call. 3. If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office." That is the law. Now, the operative facts: 1. 2. Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate President and Speaker of the House; Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20, 2001 at about 12:30 p.m.; Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. 175;96

On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 17697 which states: "RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION'S GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHEREAS, as a consequence of the people's loss of confidence on the ability of former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police and majority of his cabinet had withdrawn support from him; WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the Supreme Court, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as President of the Philippines on 20 January 2001 before Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.; WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the international community had extended their recognition to Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines; WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused a policy of national healing and reconciliation with justice for the purpose of national unity and development; WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the government cannot be achieved if it is divided, thus by reason of the constitutional duty of the House of Representatives as an institution and that of the individual members thereof of fealty to the supreme will of the people, the House of Representatives must ensure to the people a stable, continuing government and therefore must remove all obstacles to the attainment thereof;

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WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of Representatives to exert all efforts to unify the nation, to eliminate fractious tension, to heal social and political wounds, and to be an instrument of national reconciliation and solidarity as it is a direct representative of the various segments of the whole nation; WHEREAS, without surrending its independence, it is vital for the attainment of all the foregoing, for the House of Representatives to extend its support and collaboration to the administration of Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and to be a constructive partner in nation-building, the national interest demanding no less: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the House of Representatives , To express its support to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, to extend its congratulations and to express its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the Nation's goals under the Constitution. Adopted, (Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR. Speaker This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 24, 2001. (Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO Secretary General" On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 17898 which states: "RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo; WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting separately; WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines; (Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO Secretary General" (4) Also, despite receipt of petitioner's letter claiming inability, some twelve (12) members of the Senate signed the following: "RESOLUTION WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the nation an opportunity for meaningful change and challenge; WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome awesome challenges the nation needs unity of purpose and resolve cohesive resolute (sic) will; WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum for vital legislative measures in unity despite diversities in perspectives; WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new government of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and resolve to discharge and overcome the nation's challenges." 99 On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82100 which states: (Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR. Speaker This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on February 7, 2001. WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence and courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism; WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statesmanship, having served the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the Philippines qualities which merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of Representatives, That the House of Representatives confirms the nomination of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as the Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines. Adopted,

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"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SEM. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES WHEREAS, there is vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo; WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting separately; WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines; WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence and courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism; WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statemanship, having served the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the land - which qualities merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm the nomination of Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines. Adopted, (Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR. President of the Senate This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001. (Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO Secretary of the Senate" On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution No. 83101 which states: "RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the Senate recognize that the Impeachment Court is functus officio and has been terminated. Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment Court on Monday, January 15, Tuesday, January 16 and Wednesday, January 17, 2001 be considered approved. Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment Court including the "second envelope" be transferred to the Archives of the Senate for proper safekeeping and preservation in accordance with the Rules of the Senate. Disposition and retrieval thereof shall be made only upon written approval of the Senate president. Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished copies of this Resolution. Adopted, (Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. President of the Senate This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001. (Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO Secretary of the Senate" (5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 "certifying to the existence of vacancy in the Senate and calling on the COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the Senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.' (6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by respondent Arroyo as President. (7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from any sector of government, and without any support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his inability to govern is only momentary. What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada. Is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability. The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as president of the Philippines. Following Taada v. Cuenco,102 we hold that this Court cannot exercise its judicial power or this is an issue "in regard to which full discretionary authority

55
has been delegated to the Legislative xxx branch of the government." Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr,103 there is a "textually demonstrable or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it." Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of inability to discharge the power and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue, which cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers. In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court. IV Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil. Before resolving petitioner's contentions, a revisit of our legal history executive immunity will be most enlightening. The doctrine of executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case law. In the 1910 case of Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crosfield,104 the respondent Tiaco, a Chinese citizen, sued petitioner W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. J.E. Harding and C.R. Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the Secret Service of the City of Manila, respectively, for damages for allegedly conspiring to deport him to China. In granting a writ of prohibition, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Johnson, held: " The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no authority to touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his office, do what he will, unimpeded and unrestrained. Such a construction would mean that tyranny, under the guise of the execution of the law, could walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free from interference of courts or legislatures. This does not mean, either that a person injured by the executive authority by an act unjustifiable under the law has n remedy, but must submit in silence. On the contrary, it means, simply, that the governors-general, like the judges if the courts and the members of the Legislature, may not be personally mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in the performance of his official duties. The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the mater is properly presented to it and the occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the GovernorGeneral illegal and void and place as nearly as possible in status quo any person who has been deprived his liberty or his property by such act. This remedy is assured to every person, however humble or of whatever country, when his personal or property rights have been invaded, even by the highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary can not do is mulct the Governor-General personally in damages which result from the performance of his official duty, any more than it can a member of the Philippine Commission of the Philippine Assembly. Public policy forbids it. Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be personally sued at all in relation to acts which he claims to perform as such official. On the contrary, it clearly appears from the discussion heretofore had, particularly that portion which touched the liability of judges and drew an analogy between such liability and that of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he acts in a case so plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be said to have exercised discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to act. What is held here is that he will be protected from personal liability for damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also when he is without authority, provided he actually used discretion and judgement, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, in determining the question of his authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of his authority was one over which two men, reasonably qualified for that position, might honestly differ; but he s not protected if the lack of authority to act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its determination. In such case, be acts, not as Governor-General but as a private individual, and as such must answer for the consequences of his act." Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not granted immunity from suit, viz "xxx. Action upon important matters of state delayed; the time and substance of the chief executive spent in wrangling litigation; disrespect engendered for the person of one of the highest officials of the state and for the office he occupies; a tendency to unrest and disorder resulting in a way, in distrust as to the integrity of government itself."105 Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific provision on executive immunity. Then came the tumult of the martial law years under the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the 1973 Constitution was born. In 1981, it was amended and one of the amendments involved executive immunity. Section 17, Article VII stated: "The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure. The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of this Constitution. In his second Vicente G. Sinco professional Chair lecture entitled, "Presidential Immunity and All The King's Men: The Law of Privilege As a Defense To Actions For Damages," 106 petitioner's learned counsel, former Dean of the UP College of Law, Atty. Pacificao Agabin, brightened the modifications effected by this constitutional amendment on the existing law on executive privilege. To quote his disquisition: "In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by enlarging and fortifying the absolute immunity concept. First, we extended it to shield the President not only form civil claims but also from criminal cases and other claims. Second, we enlarged its scope so that it would cover even acts of the President outside the scope of official duties. And third, we broadened its coverage so as to include not only the President but also other persons, be

56
they government officials or private individuals, who acted upon orders of the President. It can be said that at that point most of us were suffering from AIDS (or absolute immunity defense syndrome)." The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of this Marcosian concept of executive immunity in the 1973 Constitution. The move was led by them Member of Parliament, now Secretary of Finance, Alberto Romulo, who argued that the after incumbency immunity granted to President Marcos violated the principle that a public office is a public trust. He denounced the immunity as a return to the anachronism "the king can do no wrong."107 The effort failed. The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from office by the People Power revolution in 1986. When the 1987 Constitution was crafted, its framers did not reenact the executive immunity provision of the 1973 Constitution. The following explanation was given by delegate J. Bernas vis:108 "Mr. Suarez. Thank you. The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that the President shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigation's, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigation's almost daily? Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that during his tenure he is immune from suit. Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here. Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution was to make that explicit and to add other things. Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any more query, Madam President. I think the Commissioner for the clarifications." We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio." 109 Since, the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a This is in accord with our ruling In Re: Saturnino Bermudez111 that 'incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. His reliance on the case of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan112 and related cases113 are inapropos for they have a different factual milieu. We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with posttenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser. 114 Indeed, critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon,115 US President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixon's associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct Justice and other offenses, which were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's Watergate Hotel during the 972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was named an unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground, among others, that the President was not subject to judicial process and that he should first be impeached and removed from office before he could be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that "when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice." In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald,116 the US Supreme Court further held that the immunity of the better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz:110 "xxx Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the President, for example, and the President resigns before judgement of conviction has been rendered by the impeachment court or by the body, how does it affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped? Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his resignation would render the case moot and academic. However, as the provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may continue in the ordinary courts."

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president from civil damages covers only "official acts." Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones117 where it held that the US President's immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct. There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust.118 It declared as a state policy that "the State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruptio."119 it ordained that "public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."120 It set the rule that 'the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, latches or estoppel."121 It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court.122 It created the office of the Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to "investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust improper or inefficient."123 The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy.124 These constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioner's claim that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency. V Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set file the criminal cases violation of his right to due process. There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases. 125 The British approach the problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat.126 The American approach is different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial; probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc. This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the trials or annul convictions in high profile criminal cases.127 In People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,128 later reiterated in the case of Larranaga vs. court of Appeals, et al.,129 we laid down the doctrine that: "We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances accused's right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the criminal field xxx. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other offcourt publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose there impartially. xxx xxx xxx. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard offcourt evidence and on-camera performances of parties to litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality. At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at a bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellants as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity, which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.' We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon. Raul de Leon, etc.130 and its companion cases, viz: "Again petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while undergoing preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early invocation considering the substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation. xxx The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes, its excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in the telecommunications industry. For sure, few cases can match the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated even today. Commentators still bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime. Indeed, even the principal actors in the case the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their sympathizers have

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participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press and public. In the seminal case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was xxx a. The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice demonstrates conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions based on secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic value of public trials was recognized when a shocking crime occurs a community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility and emotion. To work effectively, it is important that society's criminal process satisfy the appearance of justice,' Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L ED 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be provided by allowing people to observe such process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under this Nation's system of justice, Cf., e,g., Levine v. United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038. The freedoms of speech. Press and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment, share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government. In guaranteeing freedom such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as give meaning to those explicit guarantees; the First Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the context of trials, that the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time the First Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also relevant, having been regarded not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which the draftsmen deliberately linked it. A trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally and representatives of the media have a right to be present, and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place. Even though the Constitution contains no provision which be its terms guarantees to the public the right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal trial is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment: without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press be eviscerated. et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation was conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity." (emphasis supplied) Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman . Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.131 He needs to show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.1wphi1.nt The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with bias. To quote petitioner's submission, the respondent Ombudsman "has been influenced by the barrage of slanted news reports, and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed at him by the mobs."132 News reports have also been quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases of the petitioner133 and it is postulated that the prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their superior. Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigation prosecutors the independence to make their own findings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their superiors.134 They can be reversed but they can not be compelled cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes that the findings of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before the proper court.

b.

c.

Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino,

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VI. Epilogue 1. A word of caution to the "hooting throng." The cases against the petitioner will now acquire a different dimension and then move to a new stage - - - the Office of the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from the majority for instant justice will hit a higher decibel while the gnashing of teeth of the minority will be more threatening. It is the sacred duty of the respondent Ombudsman to balance the right of the State to prosecute the guilty and the right of an accused to a fair investigation and trial which has been categorized as the "most fundamental of all freedoms."135 To be sure, the duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice and less to prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that the preliminary investigation of the petitioner shall have a circus-free atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint against what Lord Bryce calls "the impatient vehemence of the majority." Rights in a democracy are not decided by the mob whose judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason. Nor are rights necessarily resolved by the power of number for in a democracy, the dogmatism of the majority is not and should never be the definition of the rule of law. If democracy has proved to be the best form of government, it is because it has respected the right of the minority to convince the majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of multiformity of thoughts, however offensive they may be, is the key to man's progress from the cave to civilization. Let us not throw away that key just to pander to some people's prejudice. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. 2. 3. Sexual harassment against Rayvi Padua-Varona; Mulcting money from confidential employees James Alueta and Eden Kiamco; and Oppression against all employees in not releasing the P7,200.00 benefits of OMBVisayas employees on the date the said amount was due for release. the Office of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, herein private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed the following:

The complainants further requested that an officer-in-charge from the OMB-Manila be appointed to manage their office to prevent the Deputy Ombudsman from harassing witnesses and wielding his influence over them. To underscore the seriousness of their intentions, they threatened to go on a mass leave of absence, and in fact took their cause to the media.[3] The subsequent events, as stated by the Ombudsman and adopted by the Court of Appeals,[4] are as follows: The Ombudsman immediately proceeded to the OMB-Visayas office in Cebu City to personally deal with the office rebellion. Reaching Cebu, the Ombudsman was informed by Petitioner that Petitioner wanted to proceed to Manila, apparently because of his alienation and the fear for reprisal from his alleged lady victims husbands. Petitioner in fact already had a ticket for the plane leaving two hours later that day. The Ombudsman assented to the quick movement to Manila for Petitioners safety and the interest of the Offices operations. Subsequently, the Ombudsman installed Assistant Ombudsman Nicanor J. Cruz as the Officer-in-Charge of OMB-Visayas. Acting on the formal complaint against petitioner, the Ombudsman directed his Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) to conduct a verification and fact-finding investigation on the matter. The FFIB, later in its Report, found the evidence against Petitioner strong on the charges of acts of extortion, sexual harassment and oppression. The FFIB report was referred by the Ombudsman to a constituted Committee of Peers composed of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, The Special Prosecutor and the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military. The Committee of Peers initially recommended that the investigation be converted into one solely for purposes of impeachment. However, this recommendation was denied by the Ombudsman after careful study, and following the established stand of the Office of the Ombudsman that the Deputy Ombudsmen and The Special Prosecutor are not removable through impeachment. As succintly (sic) stated by the Ombudsman in his Memorandum dated March 27, 2000 (in reiteration of the March 13, 2000 Order of Overall Deputy Ombudsman) Acting on your query as to whether or not the Ombudsman confirms or affirms the disapproval by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr., of your recommendation to conduct instead an investigation of the complaint against Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica solely for the purpose of impeachment, I hereby confirm the action of disapproval. xxx

[G.R. No. 146486. March 4, 2005] OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND FORMER DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS ARTURO C. MOJICA, respondents. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and alternatively, an original special civil action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals of 18 December 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 58460 entitled, Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas v. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, Over-all Deputy Ombudsman Margarito Gervacio, Jr. and the Committee of Peers composed of Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero, Deputy Ombudsman Rolando Casimiro and Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo. The case had its inception on 29 December 1999, when twenty-two officials and employees of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman (OMB) for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a formal complaint[2] with

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Moreover, as demonstrated in many previous cases against Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman Manuel B. Casaclang, Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero, Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo and former Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa, the official position of the Office is that the Constitution, R.A. 6770 and the Supreme Court in Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, 19 May 1988, exclude the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor from the list of impeachable officials and the Jarque case involves Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto as respondent, hence, the mention therein of the Deputy Ombudsmen is merely an obiter dictum. Two of your present members in fact participated in the investigation of the previous Mojica cases and thereafter recommended the dismissal thereof for lack of merit. In the same Memorandum, the Ombudsman directed the Committee of Peers to evaluate the merits of the case and if warranted by evidence, to conduct administrative and criminal investigation(s) immediately thereafter. Upon evaluation, the Committee recommended the docketing of the complaint as criminal and administrative cases. The Committee of Peers Evaluation dated 30 March 2000, stated as follows: On the basis of the foregoing facts, duly supported with sworn-statements executed by all concerned parties, the undersigned members of the COP find sufficient cause to warrant the conduct of preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication against Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica for the following criminal and administrative offenses, namely: I. CRIMINAL Violation of Section 3, paragraph[s] (b) and (e) of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act); Violation of R.A. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995), II. ADMINISTRATIVE a. b. c. d. e. Dishonesty Grave Misconduct Oppression Conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service Directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of his Office; (Section 22, paragraphs (A), (C), (N), (T) and (U), Rule XIV of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987.) 1. . . . issuing a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) upon the filing of the petition to enjoin and restrain the respondents, (the Ombudsman, the Over-all Deputy Ombudsman, the Committee of Peers, and the Special Prosecutor) their agents and representatives, from suspending the petitioner (herein private respondent Mojica); 2. thereafter, converting said TRO into a Writ of Preliminary Injunction; 3. after hearing, a decision be rendered declaring the following acts of the Ombudsman null and void ab initio: a. detailing and assigning indefinitely the petitioner to OMB-Manila in a [special] capacity, thus effectively demoting/suspending petitioner, and preventing him from preparing his defense; b. authorizing or directing the docketing of the complaints against the petitioner, which is equivalent to authorizing the filing of the administrative and/or criminal cases against the petitioner, who is an impeachable official; Subsequently, the COP issued an Order[7] in OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 finding prima facie evidence against Mojica and requiring him to submit an answer to the above-mentioned offenses within ten days, as well as his counter-affidavit and supporting evidence.[8] Aggrieved, the private respondent filed a petition[9] for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals praying that a resolution be issued: Accordingly, let the instant case be docketed separately, one for the criminal case and another for the administrative case covering all the offenses specified above and, thereafter, a formal investigation be simultaneously and jointly conducted by the Committee of Peers, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 7. Accordingly, on 6 April 2000, the Committee of Peers (COP) directed the herein private respondent Mojica in OMB-0-00-0615 entitled, Padua-Varona v. Mojica, for violation of Republic Act No. 7877 (AntiSexual Harassment Act of 1995) and Sec. 3, par. (b) and (c) of Rep. Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) to submit his controverting evidence. On 10 April 2000, the complainants in OMB-0-00-0615 filed a Motion to Place Respondent Under Preventive Suspension,[5] claiming that the offenses for which private respondent Mojica was charged warranted removal from office, the evidence against him was strong, and that Mojicas continued stay in office would prejudice the case, as he was harassing some witnesses and complainants to recant or otherwise desist from pursuing the case. On the same date, the Ombudsman issued a Memorandum[6] to the COP, directing them to conduct administrative proceedings in OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 entitled, OMB Visayas Employees v. Mojica (for dishonesty, grave misconduct, oppression, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of his office), and submit a recommendation on the propriety of putting Mojica under preventive suspension.

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c. denying the request of petitioner for leave of absence, which acts were done without lawful authority, in a malevolent and oppressive manner and without jurisdiction. On 04 May 2000, the Court of Appeals resolved to grant the prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and required the Ombudsman to comment and show cause why no writ of preliminary injunction should be issued, which reads in part: Meanwhile, to maintain the status quo and in order to forestall the petition at bench from becoming moot and academic, and considering that upon examination of the records we believe that there is an urgent need for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to prevent great and irreparable injury that would result to herein petitioner before the matter could be heard on notice, the herein respondents, their agents and representatives acting for and in their behalf or under their authority, are hereby enjoined and restrained from proceeding with the hearing of the Motion to Place Respondent Under Preventive Suspension dated April 10, 2000, which hearing is set on May 9, 2000 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon and/or from conducting any further proceedings relative to the suspension from (o)ffice of the herein petitioner until further order and/or notice from this Court.[10] Nevertheless, on 6 June 2000, the COP issued an Order[11] in both OMB-0-00-0615 and OMB-ADM-000-0316 to the effect that having failed to submit the required counter-affidavits despite the lapse of seventeen days from the expiration of the extended reglementary period for filing the same, respondent Mojica was deemed to have waived his right to present his evidence. The COP thus deemed both criminal and administrative cases submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence on record. Thus, on 13 June 2000, the private respondent thus filed an urgent motion[12] before the Court of Appeals to enjoin the Ombudsman from taking any action whatsoever in the criminal and administrative cases aforementioned. The following day, the private respondent filed another urgent motion, this time praying that the Court of Appeals issue an order requiring the Ombudsman to show cause why it should not be cited for contempt for failing to conform with the 4 May 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals. On 20 June 2000, the Court of Appeals directed[13] the Ombudsman to comment on the above pleadings, and to comply with the formers Temporary Restraining Order of 4 May 2000. The parties subsequently exchanged various pleadings that culminated in a Resolution[14] by the Court of Appeals on 5 July 2000 that, among other things, directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining all therein respondents from taking any action whatsoever in cases No. OMB-0-000615 (criminal) and No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 (administrative) against Mojica, and deemed the instant petition submitted for resolution on the merits upon the submission of the comment or explanation on the appellate courts show cause Resolution of 20 June 2000. Meanwhile, on 19 June 2000, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military directed the private respondent Mojica ostensibly to answer a different set of charges for violation of Art. 266 and Sec. 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 (OMB-00-0-1050) and for grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service[15] (OMB-ADM-0-00-0506). Feeling that this was merely an attempt at circumventing the directives of the Court of Appeals, Mojica filed an urgent motion before the Court of Appeals for respondents to show cause again why they should not be cited for contempt. By way of opposition, the Ombudsman pointed out that the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the appellate court was against any action taken in cases No. OMB-0-00-0615 and No. OMB-ADM-0-000316, and not against any new cases filed against the private respondent thereafter. The Ombudsman further pointed out that since Mojicas term of office had already expired as of 6 July 2000, the private respondent could no longer invoke his alleged immunity from suit. On 14 August 2000, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military issued an order deeming that cases No. OMB-0-00-1050 and No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0506 had been deemed submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence at hand. On 17 August 2000, the private respondent filed an urgent motion for the immediate issuance of an order enjoining the Ombudsman from taking any further action whatsoever in OMB-ADM-0-00-0506 and OMB-0-00-1050.[16] On 18 December 2000, despite the expiration of private respondent Mojicas term of office, the Court of Appeals nevertheless rendered the assailed Decision[17] on the grounds of public interest. In essence, the appellate court held that although the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the commentaries of noted jurists, all indicate that a Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable official, it was nevertheless constrained to hold otherwise on the basis of this Courts past rulings. Thus, the dispositive portion thereof reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the order of the Committee of Peers in its Evaluation dated March 30, 2000 directing the docketing separately of the criminal case as well as the administrative case against the petitioner is hereby SET ASIDE and DECLARED NULL AND VOID. Accordingly, the complaints in Criminal Case No. OMB-0-00-0615 and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316, respectively, filed against the petitioner are hereby DISMISSED. All acts or orders of the Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman and the Committee of Peers, subjecting the petitioner [herein private respondent] to criminal and administrative investigations, or pursuant to such investigations, are likewise hereby DECLARED INVALID.[18] Thereupon, on 15 January 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and alternatively, an original special civil action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the same rules, of the above decision, on the following grounds: I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ERRONEOUSLY RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT, AS THEN DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS, IS AN IMPEACHABLE OFFICIAL, CONSIDERING THAT THE PLAIN TEXT OF SEC. 2, ART. XI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AS WELL AS THE INTENT OF THE FRAMERS THEREOF, EXCLUDES A DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FROM THE LIST OF IMPEACHABLE OFFICIALS. II

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THE PRINCIPLE OF STARE DECISIS ET NON QUIETA MOVERE MAY NOT BE INVOKED TO PERPETUATE AN ERRONEOUS OBITER DICTUM. III THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS NO JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE DISMISSAL OF A CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST A RETIRED DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, WHICH IS STILL PENDING PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION BEFORE PETITIONER OMBUDSMAN.[19] At the outset, it bears noting that instead of assailing the Court of Appeals Decision solely by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner lodged the present petition alternatively as an original special civil action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the same rules. It is settled that the appeal from a final disposition of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a special civil action under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 45 is clear that the decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceeding involved, may be appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. Under Rule 45, the reglementary period to appeal is fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or denial of motion for reconsideration.[20] The records show that following the petitioners receipt on 5 January 2001 of a copy the Court of Appeals Decision, it filed the present petition on 16 January 2001, well within the reglementary period so indicated. We go now into the substantive aspect of this case, where we are presented an attack upon a prior interpretation of Article XI, Sec. 2 in relation to Article XI, Sec. 8 of our Constitution. The interpretation in question first appears in Cuenco v. Fernan,[21] a disbarment case against then Associate Justice Marcelo Fernan filed by Atty. Miguel Cuenco, a former member of the House of Representatives, where we held in part: There is another reason why the complaint for disbarment here must be dismissed. Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7)(1) of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from office only by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution). To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Members incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Article XI [2], id.), a majority of the members of the Commission on Elections (Article IX [C] [1] [1] in relation to Article XI [2], id.), and the members of the Commission on Audit who are not certified public accountants (Article XI [D] [1] [1], id.), all of whom are constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine Bar. (Emphasis supplied.) Barely two months later, we issued another Resolution in In Re: Raul M. Gonzales,[22] concerning the same charges for disbarment brought against Justice Fernan, wherein we cited the above ruling to underscore the principle involved in the case, that [a] public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer.[23] In 1995, we subsequently anchored our Resolution in Jarque v. Desierto,[24] a disbarment case against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, on the above ruling, adding that: . . . [T]he court is not here saying that the Ombudsman and other constitutional officers who are required by the Constitution to be members of the Philippine Bar and are remova[ble] only by impeachment, are immunized from liability possibly for criminal acts or for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or other claimed misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is here a fundamental procedural requirement which must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. The Ombudsman or his deputies must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Ombudsman be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively e.g., in disbarment proceedings for any wrong or misbehavior which may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings. (Emphasis supplied) Finally, in Lastimosa-Dalawampu v. Deputy Ombudsman Mojica and Graft Investigator Labella ,[25] the Court, citing its Resolution in Jarque v. Desierto,[26] dismissed, in a minute resolution, the complaint for disbarment against the herein private respondent Mojica in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, stating that: Anent the complaint for disbarment against respondent Arturo C. Mojica in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, suffice it to state that a public officer whose membership in the Philippine Bar is a qualification for the office held by him and removable only by impeachment cannot be charged with disbarment during his membership (In Re: Raul M. Gonzales, 160 SCRA 771, 774 [1988]; Cuenco vs. Fernan, 158 SCRA 29, 40 [1988]). And we have held in the case of Jarque vs. Desierto (A.C. No. 4509, En Banc Resolution December 5, 1995), that the Ombudsman or his deputies must first be removed from office via impeachment before they may be held to answer for any wrong or misbehavior which may be proven against them in disbarment proceedings. The above Resolution was subsequently made the basis of the appellate courts assailed Decision of 18 December 2000. Thus, in holding that a Deputy Ombudsman is an impeachable officer, the appellate court stated that it had to defer to the loftier principle of adherence to judicial precedents, otherwise known as the doctrine of Stare Decisis.... necessary for the uniformity and continuity of the law and also to give stability to society.[27] Nevertheless, the court a quo took pains to point out that the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the opinions of constitutional law experts all indicate that the Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer.

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Is the Deputy Ombudsman, then, an impeachable officer? Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, states that: Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. To determine whether or not the Ombudsman therein mentioned refers to a person or to an office, reference was made by the appellate court to the Records of the Constitutional Commission, as well as to the opinions of leading commentators in constitutional law. Thus: . . . It appears that the members of the Constitutional Commission have made reference only to the Ombudsman as impeachable, excluding his deputies. The pertinent portions of the record read, to wit: ... MR. REGALADO. Yes, thank you. MR. MONSOD. Madam President. On Section 10, regarding the Ombudsman, there has been concern aired by Commissioner Rodrigo about who will see to it that the Ombudsman will perform his duties because he is something like a guardian of the government. This recalls the statement of Juvenal that while the Ombudsman is the guardian of the people, Quis custodiet ipsos custodies, who will guard the guardians? I understand here that the Ombudsman who has the rank of a chairman of a constitutional commission is also removable only by impeachment. MR. ROMULO. MR. REGALADO. MR. MONSOD. That is the intention, Madam President. Only the Ombudsman? Only the Ombudsman. MR. MONSOD. We feel that an officer in the Ombudsman, if he does his work well, could be stepping on a lot of toes. We would really prefer to keep him there but we would like the body to vote on it, although I would like to ask if we still have a quorum, Madam President. THE PRESIDENT. Do we have a quorum? There are members who are in the lounge. The Secretary-General and the pages conduct an actual count of the Commissioners present. THE PRESIDENT. We have a quorum. THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Monsod is recognized. MR. MONSOD. We regret we cannot accept the amendment because we feel that the Ombudsman is at least on the same level as the Constitutional Commissioners and this is one way of insulating it from politics. MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, to make the members of the Ombudsman removable only by impeachment would be to enshrine and install an officer whose functions are not as delicate as the others whom we wanted to protect from immediate removal by way of an impeachment. MR. REGALADO. Yes, but my concern is whether or not he is removable only by impeachment, because Section 2 enumerates the impeachable officials, and it does not mention public officers with the rank of constitutional commissioners. MR. ROMULO. But we do mention them as the Ombudsman is mentioned in that enumeration. We used the word Ombudsman because we would like it to be his title; we do not want him called Chairman or Justice. We want him called Ombudsman. ... (Records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, July 26, 1986, pp. 273-274) MR. DAVIDE. I will not insist. On lines 13 and 14, I move for the deletion of the words and the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman should not be placed on the level of the President and the Vice-President, the members of the judiciary and the members of the Constitutional Commissions in the matter of removal from office.

MR. REGALADO. So not his deputies, because I am concerned with the phrase have the rank of. We know, for instance, that the City Fiscal of Manila has the rank of a justice of the Intermediate Appellate Court, and yet he is not a part of the judiciary. So I think we should clarify that also and read our discussions into the Record for purposes of the Commission and the Committee. MR. ROMULO. Yes. If I may just comment: the Ombudsman in this provision is a rank in itself really. That is how we look at it. But for purposes of government classification and salary, we thought we have to give him a recognizable or an existing rank as a point of reference more than anything else.

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MR. MONSOD. May we restate the proposed amendment for the benefit of those who were not here a few minutes ago. MR. DE LOS REYES. Madam President, parliamentary inquiry. I thought that amendment was already covered in the amendment of Commissioner Rodrigo. One of those amendments proposed by Commissioner Rodrigo was to delete the word Ombudsman and, therefore, we have already voted on it. MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, may I comment on that. THE PRESIDENT. Yes, the Gentleman may proceed. MR. DAVIDE. The proposed amendment of Commissioner Rodrigo was the total deletion of the Office of the Ombudsman and all sections relating to it. It was rejected by the body and, therefore, we can have individual amendments now on the particular sections. THE PRESIDENT. The purpose of the amendment of Commissioner Davide is not just to include the Ombudsman among those officials who have to be removed from office only on impeachment. Is that right? MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Madam President. MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote on the amendment, may I ask a question? THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized. MR. RODRIGO. The Ombudsman, is this only one man? MR. DAVIDE. Only one man. MR. RODRIGO. Not including his deputies. MR. MONSOD. No. ... (Ibid., p. 305, emphasis supplied) Constitution is exclusive. In their belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. Foremost among them is the erudite Justice Isagani A. Cruz (ret.), who opined: The impeachable officers are the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman. (see Art. XI, Sec. 2) The list is exclusive and may not be increased or reduced by legislative enactment. The power to impeach is essentially a non-legislative prerogative and can be exercised by the Congress only within the limits of the authority conferred upon it by the Constitution. This authority may not be expanded by the grantee itself even if motivated by the desire to strengthen the security of tenure of other officials of the government. It is now provided by decree (see P.D. No. 1606) that justices of the Sandiganbayan may be removed only through process of impeachment, the purpose evidently being to withdraw them from the removal power of the Supreme Court. This prohibition is of dubious constitutionality. In the first place, the list of impeachable officers is covered by the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Secondly, Article VIII, Section 11, of the Constitution states that all judges of inferior courts and this would include the Sandiganbayan are under the disciplinary power of the Supreme Court and may be removed by it. This view is bolstered by the last sentence of Article XI, Section 2, which runs in full as follows: Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. (Cruz, Isagani A., Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., pp. 333334) Equally worth noting is the opinion of no less than Rev. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., himself who was a member of the Constitutional Commission which drafted the 1987 Constitution, (who) asserted: Q. A. Is the list of officers subject to impeachment found in Section 2 exclusive? As presently worded, yes.

(Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., The 1987 Philippine Constitution, A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 401) Last but certainly not the least is the equally erudite Representative Antonio B. Nachura himself, who, as a professor of law, commented that the enumeration of impeachable officers in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, is exclusive. (Nachura, Antonio B., Outline/Reviewer in Political Law, 1998 ed., p. 192)[28] From the foregoing, it is immediately apparent that, as enumerated in Sec. 2 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, only the following are impeachable officers: the President, the Vice President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman.[29]

Moreover, this Court has likewise taken into account the commentaries of the leading legal luminaries on the Constitution as to their opinion on whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of them agree in unison that the impeachable officers enumerated in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986

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How then to explain our earlier pronouncement in Cuenco v. Fernan, as later cited in In Re: Raul M. Gonzales, Jarque v. Desierto and Lastimosa-Dalawampu v. Dep. Ombudsman Mojica and Graft Investigator Labella? By way of reiteration, said Resolution reads in part: . . . To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Members incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI [2] of the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Article XI [2]), . . . all of whom are constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine Bar.[30] (Emphasis supplied) In cross-referencing Sec. 2, which is an enumeration of impeachable officers, with Sec. 8, which lists the qualifications of the Ombudsman and his deputies, the intention was to indicate, by way of obiter dictum, that as with members of this Court, the officers so enumerated were also constitutionally required to be members of the bar. A dictum is an opinion that does not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and made without argument, or full consideration of the point. Mere dicta are not binding under the doctrine of stare decisis.[31] The legal maxim "stare decisis et non quieta movere" (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled) states that where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.[32] The succeeding cases of In Re: Raul M. Gonzales and Jarque v. Desierto do not tackle the impeachability of a Deputy Ombudsman either. Nor, for that matter, does Lastimosa-Dalawampu v. Deputy Ombudsman Mojica and Graft Investigator Labella, which, as previously mentioned, is a minute resolution dismissing a complaint for disbarment against the herein private respondent on the basis of the questioned obiter in Cuenco v. Fernan and the succeeding cases without going into the merits. Thus, where the issue involved was not raised nor presented to the court and not passed upon by the court in the previous case, the decision in the previous case is not stare decisis of the question presented.[33] As to whether or not the private respondent, then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, may be held criminally and/or administratively liable, we likewise resolve the issue in favor of the petitioner. The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office.[34] Hence, the moment he is no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar to his criminal prosecution in the courts.[35] Nor does retirement bar an administrative investigation from proceeding against the private respondent, given that, as pointed out by the petitioner, the formers retirement benefits have been placed on hold in view of the provisions of Sections 12[36] and 13[37] of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. WHEREFORE, the Order of the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2000 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaints in Criminal Case No. OMB-0-00-0615 and Administrative Case No. OMBADM-0-00-0316 are hereby REINSTATED and the Office of the Ombudsman is ordered to proceed with the investigation relative to the above cases. SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur. .R. No. 193459 February 15, 2011

MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ Petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTAO, EVELYN PESTAO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN MANANZAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY. EDRE OLALIA, ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE'S LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE); and JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), Respondents. FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., Respondent-Intervenor. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner), challenges via petition for certiorari and prohibition the Resolutions of September 1 and 7, 2010 of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice (public respondent). Before the 15th Congress opened its first session on July 26, 2010 (the fourth Monday of July, in accordance with Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution) or on July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe and Evelyn Pestao (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint1 against petitioner, upon the endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.2 A day after the opening of the 15th Congress or on July 27, 2010, Atty. Marilyn Barua-Yap, Secretary General of the House of Representatives, transmitted the impeachment complaint to House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr.3 who, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.4 On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed another impeachment complaint5 against petitioner with a resolution of endorsement by Party-List Representatives Neri Javier

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Colmenares, Teodoro Casio, Rafael Mariano, Luzviminda Ilagan, Antonio Tinio and Emerenciana de Jesus.6 On even date, the House of Representatives provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress. By letter still of even date,7 the Secretary General transmitted the Reyes groups complaint to Speaker Belmonte who, by Memorandum of August 9, 2010, 8 also directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business. On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of the Committee on Rules,9 instructed Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr., Deputy Secretary General for Operations, through Atty. Cesar Pareja, Executive Director of the Plenary Affairs Department, to include the two complaints in the Order of Business,10 which was complied with by their inclusion in the Order of Business for the following day, August 11, 2010. On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to public respondent.11 After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time. Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published on September 2, 2010. On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the September 1, 2010 Resolution of public respondent. Public respondent refused to accept the motion, however, for prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner to await the notice for her to file an answer to the complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to each of the 55 members of public respondent. After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,12 sufficient in substance. The determination of the sufficiency of substance of the complaints by public respondent, which assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of whether valid judgment to impeach could be rendered thereon. Petitioner was served also on September 7, 2010 a notice directing her to file an answer to the complaints within 10 days.13 Six days following her receipt of the notice to file answer or on September 13, 2010, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition with application for injunctive reliefs. The following day or on September 14, 2010, the Court En Banc RESOLVED to direct the issuance of a status quo ante order14 and to require respondents to comment on the petition in 10 days. The Court subsequently, by Resolution of September 21, 2010, directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file in 10 days its Comment on the petition The Baraquel group which filed the first complaint, the Reyes group which filed the second complaint, and public respondent (through the OSG and private counsel) filed their respective Comments on September 27, 29 and 30, 2010. Speaker Belmonte filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene dated October 4, 2010 which the Court granted by Resolution of October 5, 2010. Under an Advisory15 issued by the Court, oral arguments were conducted on October 5 and 12, 2010, followed by petitioners filing of a Consolidated Reply of October 15, 2010 and the filing by the parties of Memoranda within the given 15-day period. The petition is harangued by procedural objections which the Court shall first resolve. Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. They argue that public respondent was not exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two impeachment complaints as it was exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature, 16 and that its function is inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary investigation. 17 These same arguments were raised in Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives. 18 The argument that impeachment proceedings are beyond the reach of judicial review was debunked in this wise: The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride." But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. xxxx There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Taada v.

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Angara, in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda, this Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra, it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson, it held that the act of the House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Taada v. Cuenco, it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly. Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.19 (citations omitted; italics in the original; underscoring supplied) Francisco characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as the expanded certiorari jurisdiction20 of this Court reflects, includes the power to "determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."21 In the present case, petitioner invokes the Courts expanded certiorari jurisdiction, using the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition as procedural vehicles. The Court finds it well-within its power to determine whether public respondent committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of its functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the Court. Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in this instance, but simply upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will. 22 Respondents do not seriously contest all the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review, as they only assert that the petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of the proceedings before public respondent. Public respondent argues that when petitioner filed the present petition23 on September 13, 2010, it had not gone beyond the determination of the sufficiency of form and substance of the two complaints. An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of ripeness. 24 The question of ripeness is especially relevant in light of the direct, adverse effect on an individual by the challenged conduct.25 In the present petition, there is no doubt that questions on, inter alia, the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate interpretation. The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable officer within a period of one year. And so the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issue whether public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its two assailed Resolutions. Petitioner basically anchors her claim on alleged violation of the due process clause (Art. III, Sec. 1) and of the one-year bar provision (Art. XI, Sec 3, par. 5) of the Constitution. Due process of law Petitioner alleges that public respondents chairperson, Representative Niel Tupas, Jr. (Rep. Tupas), is the subject of an investigation she is conducting, while his father, former Iloilo Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., had been charged by her with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. To petitioner, the actions taken by her office against Rep. Tupas and his father influenced the proceedings taken by public respondent in such a way that bias and vindictiveness played a big part in arriving at the finding of sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints against her. The Court finds petitioners allegations of bias and vindictiveness bereft of merit, there being hardly any indication thereof. Mere suspicion of partiality does not suffice.26 The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body itself. So GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunications Phils.27 teaches: First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution or decision. Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not speak and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body x x x. 28 In the present case, Rep. Tupas, public respondent informs, did not, in fact, vote and merely presided over the proceedings when it decided on the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints. 29 Even petitioners counsel conceded during the oral arguments that there are no grounds to compel the inhibition of Rep. Tupas. JUSTICE CUEVAS:

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Well, the Committee is headed by a gentleman who happened to be a respondent in the charges that the Ombudsman filed. In addition to that[,] his father was likewise a respondent in another case. How can he be expected to act with impartiality, in fairness and in accordance with law under that matter, he is only human we grant him that benefit. JUSTICE MORALES: JUSTICE MORALES: Is he a one-man committee? JUSTICE CUEVAS: He is not a one-man committee, Your Honor, but he decides. JUSTICE MORALES: Do we presume good faith or we presume bad faith? JUSTICE CUEVAS: We presume that he is acting in good faith, Your Honor, but then (interrupted) JUSTICE MORALES: So, that he was found liable for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, does that mean that your client will be deprived of due process of law? JUSTICE CUEVAS: No, what we are stating, Your Honor, is that expectation of a client goes with the Ombudsman, which goes with the element of due process is the lack of impartiality that may be expected of him. JUSTICE MORALES: But as you admitted the Committee is not a one-man committee? JUSTICE CUEVAS: That is correct, Your Honor. JUSTICE MORALES: JUSTICE MORALES: So, why do you say then that there is a lack of impartiality? That called for a voluntary inhibition. Is there any law or rule you can cite which makes it mandatory for the chair of the committee to inhibit given that he had previously been found liable for violation of a law[?] JUSTICE CUEVAS: There is nothing, Your Honor. In our jurisprudence which deals with the situation whereby with that background as the material or pertinent antecedent that there could be no violation of the right of the petitioner to due process. What is the effect of notice, hearing if the judgment cannot come from an impartial adjudicator.30 (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Petitioner contends that the "indecent and precipitate haste" of public respondent in finding the two complaints sufficient in form and substance is a clear indication of bias, she pointing out that it only took public respondent five minutes to arrive thereat.lawphi1 An abbreviated pace in the conduct of proceedings is not per se an indication of bias, however. So Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice31 holds: Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. For ones prompt dispatch may be anothers undue haste. The orderly administration of justice remains as the paramount and constant consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each case. The presumption of regularity includes the public officers official actuations in all phases of work. Consistent with such presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to present contradictory evidence other than a mere tallying of days or numerical calculation. This, petitioners failed to discharge. The swift completion of the Investigating Panels initial task cannot be relegated as shoddy or shady without discounting the presumably regular performance of not just one but five state prosecutors.32 (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied) Petitioner goes on to contend that her participation in the determination of sufficiency of form and substance was indispensable. As mandated by the Impeachment Rules, however, and as, in fact, conceded by petitioners counsel, the participation of the impeachable officer starts with the filing of an answer. JUSTICE CUEVAS: Because if anything before anything goes (sic) he is the presiding officer of the committee as in this case there were objections relative to the existence of the implementing rules not heard, there was objection made by Congressman Golez to the effect that this may give rise to a constitutional crisis.

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Is it not that the Committee should first determine that there is sufficiency in form and substance before she is asked to file her answer (interrupted) JUSTICE CUEVAS: That is correct, Your Honor. JUSTICE MORALES: During which she can raise any defenses she can assail the regularity of the proceedings and related irregularities? JUSTICE CUEVAS: Yes. We are in total conformity and in full accord with that statement, Your Honor, because it is only after a determination that the complaint is sufficient in form and substance that a complaint may be filed, Your Honor, without that but it may be asked, how is not your action premature, Your Honor, our answer is- no, because of the other violations involved and that is (interrupted).33 (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Rule III(A) of the Impeachment Rules of the 15th Congress reflects the impeachment procedure at the Committee-level, particularly Section 534 which denotes that petitioners initial participation in the impeachment proceedings the opportunity to file an Answer starts after the Committee on Justice finds the complaint sufficient in form and substance. That the Committee refused to accept petitioners motion for reconsideration from its finding of sufficiency of form of the impeachment complaints is apposite, conformably with the Impeachment Rules. Petitioner further claims that public respondent failed to ascertain the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints on the basis of the standards set by the Constitution and its own Impeachment Rules. 35 The claim fails. The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is an exponent of the express constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the House of Representatives which committed such determinative function to public respondent. In the discharge of that power and in the exercise of its discretion, the House has formulated determinable standards as to the form and substance of an impeachment complaint. Prudential considerations behoove the Court to respect the compliance by the House of its duty to effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any contravention of the minimum constitutional guidelines. Contrary to petitioners position that the Impeachment Rules do not provide for comprehensible standards in determining the sufficiency of form and substance, the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there must be a "verified complaint or resolution," 36 and that the substance requirement is met if there is "a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee."37 Notatu dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is made necessary. This requirement is not explicitly found in the organic law, as Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution basically merely requires a "hearing."38 In the discharge of its constitutional duty, the House deemed that a finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an impeachment complaint is vital "to effectively carry out" the impeachment process, hence, such additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules. Petitioner urges the Court to look into the narration of facts constitutive of the offenses vis--vis her submissions disclaiming the allegations in the complaints. This the Court cannot do. Francisco instructs that this issue would "require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. x x x x Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power[.]"39 Worse, petitioner urges the Court to make a preliminary assessment of certain grounds raised, upon a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the complaints, which involve matters of defense. In another vein, petitioner, pursuing her claim of denial of due process, questions the lack of or, more accurately, delay in the publication of the Impeachment Rules. To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3, 2010, public respondent provisionally adopted the Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress and thereafter published on September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules, admittedly substantially identical with that of the 14th Congress, in two newspapers of general circulation.40 Citing Taada v. Tuvera,41 petitioner contends that she was deprived of due process since the Impeachment Rules was published only on September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise tacks her contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that "Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Public respondent counters that "promulgation" in this case refers to "the publication of rules in any medium of information, not necessarily in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation."42 Differentiating Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations 43 which held that the Constitution categorically requires publication of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, public respondent explains that the Impeachment Rules is intended to merely enable Congress to effectively carry out the purpose of Section 3(8), Art. XI of Constitution. Blacks Law Dictionary broadly defines promulgate as

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To publish; to announce officially; to make public as important or obligatory. The formal act of announcing a statute or rule of court. An administrative order that is given to cause an agency law or regulation to become known or obligatory.44 (emphasis supplied) While "promulgation" would seem synonymous to "publication," there is a statutory difference in their usage. The Constitution notably uses the word "promulgate" 12 times.45 A number of those instances involves the promulgation of various rules, reports and issuances emanating from Congress, this Court, the Office of the Ombudsman as well as other constitutional offices. To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms "promulgate" and "publish," the case of the Judiciary is in point. In promulgating rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the Court has invariably required the publication of these rules for their effectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments is concerned, however, promulgation means "the delivery of the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication." 46 Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution contains a similar provision directing Congress to "promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates" in the presidential and vice presidential elections. Notably, when Congress approved its canvassing rules for the May 14, 2010 national elections on May 25, 2010, 47 it did not require the publication thereof for its effectivity. Rather, Congress made the canvassing rules effective upon its adoption. In the case of administrative agencies, "promulgation" and "publication" likewise take on different meanings as they are part of a multi-stage procedure in quasi-legislation. As detailed in one case,48 the publication of implementing rules occurs after their promulgation or adoption. Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understoodthat is, to make known. Generalia verba sunt generaliter inteligencia. What is generally spoken shall be generally understood. Between the restricted sense and the general meaning of a word, the general must prevail unless it was clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be used.49 Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict "promulgation" to "publication," the former should be understood to have been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication. It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Court is in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution. Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is but one avenue for Congress to make known its rules. Jurisprudence emphatically teaches that x x x in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. In the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.50 (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted) Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it could have stated so as categorically as it did in the case of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, per Neri. Other than "promulgate," there is no other single formal term in the English language to appropriately refer to an issuance without need of it being published. IN FINE, petitioner cannot take refuge in Neri since inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution where there is a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of procedure. Significantly notable in Neri is that with respect to the issue of publication, the Court anchored its ruling on the 1987 Constitutions directive, without any reliance on or reference to the 1986 case of Taada v. Tuvera.51 Taada naturally could neither have interpreted a forthcoming 1987 Constitution nor had kept a tight rein on the Constitutions intentions as expressed through the allowance of either a categorical term or a general sense of making known the issuances. From the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, then Commissioner, now retired Associate Justice Florenz Regalado intended Section 3(8), Article XI to be the vehicle for the House to fill the gaps in the impeachment process. MR. REGALADO. Mr. Presiding Officer, I have decided to put in an additional section because, for instance, under Section 3 (2), there is mention of indorsing a verified complaint for impeachment by any citizen alleging ultimate facts constituting a ground or grounds for impeachment. In other words, it is just like a provision in the rules of court. Instead, I propose that this procedural requirement, like indorsement of a complaint by a citizen to avoid harassment or crank complaints, could very well be taken up in a new section 4 which shall read as follows: THE CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE ITS RULES ON IMPEACHMENT TO EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES THEREOF. I think all these other procedural requirements could be taken care of by the Rules of Congress.52 (emphasis and underscoring supplied) The discussion clearly rejects the notion that the impeachment provisions are not self-executing. Section 3(8) does not, in any circumstance, operate to suspend the entire impeachment mechanism which the Constitutional Commission took pains in designing even its details. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and

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practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that . . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-selfexecuting . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.53 (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings taken prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in cases where impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution would already run or even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the 15-day period of publication prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House would already violate the Constitution for its inaction on the impeachment complaints pending the completion of the publication requirement. Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules on impeachment is aimed at "effectively carry[ing] out the purpose" of impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion when the House deemed it proper to provisionally adopt the Rules on Impeachment of the 14th Congress, to meet the exigency in such situation of early filing and in keeping with the "effective" implementation of the "purpose" of the impeachment provisions. In other words, the provisional adoption of the previous Congress Impeachment Rules is within the power of the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the avowed purpose. Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, merely aid or supplement the procedural aspects of impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may be given retroactive application to pending actions. "It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws."54 In the present case, petitioner fails to allege any impairment of vested rights. It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of legislation where the rights of witnesses are involved, impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the punishment of the offender.55 Even Neri concedes that the unpublished rules of legislative inquiries were not considered null and void in its entirety. Rather, x x x [o]nly those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and effective.56 (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Petitioner in fact does not deny that she was fully apprised of the proper procedure. She even availed of and invoked certain provisions57 of the Impeachment Rules when she, on September 7, 2010, filed the motion for reconsideration and later filed the present petition. The Court thus finds no violation of the due process clause. The one-year bar rule Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: "No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year." Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent. On the other hand, public respondent, respondent Reyes group and respondent-intervenor submit that the initiation starts with the filing of the impeachment complaint and ends with the referral to the Committee, following Francisco, but venture to alternatively proffer that the initiation ends somewhere between the conclusion of the Committee Report and the transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. Respondent Baraquel group, meanwhile, essentially maintains that under either the prevailing doctrine or the parties interpretation, its impeachment complaint could withstand constitutional scrutiny. Contrary to petitioners asseveration, Francisco58 states that the term "initiate" means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.59 The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice. Petitioner misreads the remark of Commissioner Joaquin Bernas, S.J. that "no second verified impeachment may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action" 60 which contemplates a situation where a first impeachment complaint had already been referred. Bernas and Regalado, who both acted as amici curiae in Francisco, affirmed that the act of initiating includes the act of taking initial action on the complaint. From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third61 of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. 62 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

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The Court, in Francisco, thus found that the assailed provisions of the 12th Congress Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings Sections 1663 and 1764 of Rule V thereof "clearly contravene Section 3(5) of Article XI since they g[a]ve the term initiate a meaning different from filing and referral."65 Petitioner highlights certain portions of Francisco which delve on the relevant records of the Constitutional Commission, particularly Commissioner Maambongs statements66 that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. Petitioner fails to consider the verb "starts" as the operative word. Commissioner Maambong was all too keen to stress that the filing of the complaint indeed starts the initiation and that the Houses action on the committee report/resolution is not part of that initiation phase. Commissioner Maambong saw the need "to be very technical about this,"67 for certain exchanges in the Constitutional Commission deliberations loosely used the term, as shown in the following exchanges. MR. DAVIDE. That is for conviction, but not for initiation. Initiation of impeachment proceedings still requires a vote of one-fifth of the membership of the House under the 1935 Constitution. MR. MONSOD. A two-thirds vote of the membership of the House is required to initiate proceedings. MR. DAVIDE. No. for initiation of impeachment proceedings, only one-fifth vote of the membership of the House is required; for conviction, a two-thirds vote of the membership is required. xxxx MR. DAVIDE. However, if we allow one-fifth of the membership of the legislature to overturn a report of the committee, we have here Section 3 (4) which reads: No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. So, necessarily, under this particular subsection, we will, in effect, disallow one-fifth of the members of the National Assembly to revive an impeachment move by an individual or an ordinary Member. MR. ROMULO. Yes. May I say that Section 3 (4) is there to look towards the possibility of a very liberal impeachment proceeding. Second, we were ourselves struggling with that problem where we are faced with just a verified complaint rather than the signatures of one-fifth, or whatever it is we decide, of the Members of the House. So whether to put a period for the Committee to report, whether we should not allow the Committee to overrule a mere verified complaint, are some of the questions we would like to be discussed. MR. DAVIDE. We can probably overrule a rejection by the Committee by providing that it can be overturned by, say, one-half or a majority, or one-fifth of the members of the legislature, and that such overturning will not amount to a refiling which is prohibited under Section 3 (4). Another point, Madam President. x x x68 (emphasis and underscoring supplied) An apparent effort to clarify the term "initiate" was made by Commissioner Teodulo Natividad: MR. NATIVIDAD. How many votes are needed to initiate? MR. BENGZON. One-third. MR. NATIVIDAD. To initiate is different from to impeach; to impeach is different from to convict. To impeach means to file the case before the Senate. MR. REGALADO. When we speak of "initiative," we refer here to the Articles of Impeachment . MR. NATIVIDAD. So, that is the impeachment itself, because when we impeach, we are charging him with the Articles of Impeachment. That is my understanding.69 (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Capping these above-quoted discussions was the explanation of Commissioner Maambong delivered on at least two occasions: [I] MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the body. As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging the words because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.70 (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied) [II]

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MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only with keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States regarding impeachment. I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of its provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of impeachment OF the committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded." I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified complaint of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam President.71 (emphasis and underscoring supplied) To the next logical question of what ends or completes the initiation, Commissioners Bernas and Regalado lucidly explained that the filing of the complaint must be accompanied by the referral to the Committee on Justice, which is the action that sets the complaint moving. Francisco cannot be any clearer in pointing out the material dates. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period. 72 (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied) These clear pronouncements notwithstanding, petitioner posits that the date of referral was considered irrelevant in Francisco. She submits that referral could not be the reckoning point of initiation because "something prior to that had already been done,"73 apparently citing Bernas discussion. The Court cannot countenance any attempt at obscurantism. What the cited discussion was rejecting was the view that the Houses action on the committee report initiates the impeachment proceedings. It did not state that to determine the initiating step, absolutely nothing prior to it must be done. Following petitioners line of reasoning, the verification of the complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House steps done prior to the filing would already initiate the impeachment proceedings. Contrary to petitioners emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution mentions is impeachment "proceedings." Her reliance on the singular tense of the word "complaint"74 to denote the limit prescribed by the Constitution goes against the basic rule of statutory construction that a word covers its enlarged and plural sense.75 The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the candle of impeachment proceedings. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle. A restrictive interpretation renders the impeachment mechanism both illusive and illusory. For one, it puts premium on senseless haste. Petitioners stance suggests that whoever files the first impeachment complaint exclusively gets the attention of Congress which sets in motion an exceptional once-a-year mechanism wherein government resources are devoted. A prospective complainant, regardless of ill motives or best intentions, can wittingly or unwittingly desecrate the entire process by the expediency of submitting a haphazard complaint out of sheer hope to be the first in line. It also puts to naught the effort of other prospective complainants who, after diligently gathering evidence first to buttress the case, would be barred days or even hours later from filing an impeachment complaint. Placing an exceedingly narrow gateway to the avenue of impeachment proceedings turns its laudable purpose into a laughable matter. One needs only to be an early bird even without seriously intending to catch the worm, when the process is precisely intended to effectively weed out "worms" in high offices which could otherwise be ably caught by other prompt birds within the ultra-limited season. Moreover, the first-to-file scheme places undue strain on the part of the actual complainants, injured party or principal witnesses who, by mere happenstance of an almost always unforeseeable filing of a first impeachment complaint, would be brushed aside and restricted from directly participating in the impeachment process. Further, prospective complainants, along with their counsel and members of the House of Representatives who sign, endorse and file subsequent impeachment complaints against the same impeachable officer run the risk of violating the Constitution since they would have already initiated a second impeachment proceeding within the same year. Virtually anybody can initiate a second or third impeachment proceeding by the mere filing of endorsed impeachment complaints. Without any public notice that could charge them with knowledge, even members of the House of Representatives could not

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readily ascertain whether no other impeachment complaint has been filed at the time of committing their endorsement. The question as to who should administer or pronounce that an impeachment proceeding has been initiated rests also on the body that administers the proceedings prior to the impeachment trial. As gathered from Commissioner Bernas disquisition76 in Francisco, a proceeding which "takes place not in the Senate but in the House"77 precedes the bringing of an impeachment case to the Senate. In fact, petitioner concedes that the initiation of impeachment proceedings is within the sole and absolute control of the House of Representatives.78 Conscious of the legal import of each step, the House, in taking charge of its own proceedings, must deliberately decide to initiate an impeachment proceeding, subject to the time frame and other limitations imposed by the Constitution. This chamber of Congress alone, not its officers or members or any private individual, should own up to its processes. The Constitution did not place the power of the "final say" on the lips of the House Secretary General who would otherwise be calling the shots in forwarding or freezing any impeachment complaint. Referral of the complaint to the proper committee is not done by the House Speaker alone either, which explains why there is a need to include it in the Order of Business of the House. It is the House of Representatives, in public plenary session, which has the power to set its own chamber into special operation by referring the complaint or to otherwise guard against the initiation of a second impeachment proceeding by rejecting a patently unconstitutional complaint. Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those motions that shall be decided without debate, but any debate thereon is only made subject to the five-minute rule.79 Moreover, it is common parliamentary practice that a motion to refer a matter or question to a committee may be debated upon, not as to the merits thereof, but only as to the propriety of the referral.80 With respect to complaints for impeachment, the House has the discretion not to refer a subsequent impeachment complaint to the Committee on Justice where official records and further debate show that an impeachment complaint filed against the same impeachable officer has already been referred to the said committee and the one year period has not yet expired, lest it becomes instrumental in perpetrating a constitutionally prohibited second impeachment proceeding. Far from being mechanical, before the referral stage, a period of deliberation is afforded the House, as the Constitution, in fact, grants a maximum of three session days within which to make the proper referral. As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an impeachment proceeding deals with deadlines. The Constitution states that "[a] verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter." In the present case, petitioner failed to establish grave abuse of discretion on the allegedly "belated" referral of the first impeachment complaint filed by the Baraquel group. For while the said complaint was filed on July 22, 2010, there was yet then no session in Congress. It was only four days later or on July 26, 2010 that the 15th Congress opened from which date the 10-day session period started to run. When, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, Speaker Belmonte directed the Committee on Rules to include the complaint in its Order of Business, it was well within the said 10-day session period. 81 There is no evident point in rushing at closing the door the moment an impeachment complaint is filed. Depriving the people (recall that impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic) of reasonable access to the limited political vent simply prolongs the agony and frustrates the collective rage of an entire citizenry whose trust has been betrayed by an impeachable officer. It shortchanges the promise of reasonable opportunity to remove an impeachable officer through the mechanism enshrined in the Constitution. But neither does the Court find merit in respondents alternative contention that the initiation of the impeachment proceedings, which sets into motion the one-year bar, should include or await, at the earliest, the Committee on Justice report. To public respondent, the reckoning point of initiation should refer to the disposition of the complaint by the vote of at least one-third (1/3) of all the members of the House.82 To the Reyes group, initiation means the act of transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.83 To respondent-intervenor, it should last until the Committee on Justices recommendation to the House plenary.84 The Court, in Francisco, rejected a parallel thesis in which a related proposition was inputed in the therein assailed provisions of the Impeachment Rules of the 12th Congress. The present case involving an impeachment proceeding against the Ombudsman offers no cogent reason for the Court to deviate from what was settled in Francisco that dealt with the impeachment proceeding against the then Chief Justice. To change the reckoning point of initiation on no other basis but to accommodate the socio-political considerations of respondents does not sit well in a court of law. x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. This doctrine, which is really "adherence to precedents," mandates that once a case has been decided one way, then another case involving exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same manner. This doctrine is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions. As the renowned jurist Benjamin Cardozo stated in his treatise The Nature of the Judicial Process: It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between another. "If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement, material and moral, of my rights." Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the courts.85 As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated "when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow."86 Allowing an expansive construction of the term "initiate" beyond the act of referral allows the unmitigated influx of successive complaints, each having their own respective 60-session-day period of disposition from referral. Worse, the Committee shall conduct overlapping hearings until and unless the disposition of one of the complaints ends with the affirmance of a resolution for impeachment or the overriding 87 of a contrary resolution (as espoused by public respondent), or the House transmits the Articles of

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Impeachment (as advocated by the Reyes group),88 or the Committee on Justice concludes its first report to the House plenary regardless of the recommendation (as posited by respondent-intervenor). Each of these scenarios runs roughshod the very purpose behind the constitutionally imposed one-year bar. Opening the floodgates too loosely would disrupt the series of steps operating in unison under one proceeding. The Court does not lose sight of the salutary reason of confining only one impeachment proceeding in a year. Petitioner concededly cites Justice Adolfo Azcunas separate opinion that concurred with the Francisco ruling.89 Justice Azcuna stated that the purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: "to prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do its principal task [of] legislation," with main reference to the records of the Constitutional Commission, that reads: MR. ROMULO. Yes, the intention here really is to limit. This is not only to protect public officials who, in this case, are of the highest category from harassment but also to allow the legislative body to do its work which is lawmaking. Impeachment proceedings take a lot of time. And if we allow multiple impeachment charges on the same individual to take place, the legislature will do nothing else but that.90 (underscoring supplied) It becomes clear that the consideration behind the intended limitation refers to the element of time, and not the number of complaints. The impeachable officer should defend himself in only one impeachment proceeding, so that he will not be precluded from performing his official functions and duties. Similarly, Congress should run only one impeachment proceeding so as not to leave it with little time to attend to its main work of law-making. The doctrine laid down in Francisco that initiation means filing and referral remains congruent to the rationale of the constitutional provision. Petitioner complains that an impeachable officer may be subjected to harassment by the filing of multiple impeachment complaints during the intervening period of a maximum of 13 session days between the date of the filing of the first impeachment complaint to the date of referral. As pointed out during the oral arguments91 by the counsel for respondent-intervenor, the framework of privilege and layers of protection for an impeachable officer abound. The requirements or restrictions of a one-year bar, a single proceeding, verification of complaint, endorsement by a House member, and a finding of sufficiency of form and substance all these must be met before bothering a respondent to answer already weigh heavily in favor of an impeachable officer. Aside from the probability of an early referral and the improbability of inclusion in the agenda of a complaint filed on the 11th hour (owing to pre-agenda standard operating procedure), the number of complaints may still be filtered or reduced to nil after the Committee decides once and for all on the sufficiency of form and substance. Besides, if only to douse petitioners fear, a complaint will not last the primary stage if it does not have the stated preliminary requisites. To petitioner, disturbance of her performance of official duties and the deleterious effects of bad publicity are enough oppression. Petitioners claim is based on the premise that the exertion of time, energy and other resources runs directly proportional to the number of complaints filed. This is non sequitur. What the Constitution assures an impeachable officer is not freedom from arduous effort to defend oneself, which depends on the qualitative assessment of the charges and evidence and not on the quantitative aspect of complaints or offenses. In considering the side of the impeachable officers, the Constitution does not promise an absolutely smooth ride for them, especially if the charges entail genuine and grave issues. The framers of the Constitution did not concern themselves with the media tolerance level or internal disposition of an impeachable officer when they deliberated on the impairment of performance of official functions. The measure of protection afforded by the Constitution is that if the impeachable officer is made to undergo such ride, he or she should be made to traverse it just once. Similarly, if Congress is called upon to operate itself as a vehicle, it should do so just once. There is no repeat ride for one full year. This is the whole import of the constitutional safeguard of one-year bar rule. Applicability of the Rules on Criminal Procedure On another plane, petitioner posits that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own Impeachment Rules, the same rules she earlier chastised. In the exercise of the power to promulgate rules "to effectively carry out" the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution, the House promulgated the Impeachment Rules, Section 16 of which provides that "the Rules of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as far as practicable, apply to impeachment proceedings before the House." Finding that the Constitution, by express grant, permits the application of additional adjective rules that Congress may consider in effectively carrying out its mandate, petitioner either asserts or rejects two procedural devices. First is on the "one offense, one complaint" rule. By way of reference to Section 16 of the Impeachment Rules, petitioner invokes the application of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which states that "[a] complaint or information must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses." To petitioner, the two impeachment complaints are insufficient in form and substance since each charges her with both culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust. She concludes that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own rules. Petitioner adds that heaping two or more charges in one complaint will confuse her in preparing her defense; expose her to the grave dangers of the highly political nature of the impeachment process; constitute a whimsical disregard of certain rules; impair her performance of official functions as well as that of the House; and prevent public respondent from completing its report within the deadline. Public respondent counters that there is no requirement in the Constitution that an impeachment complaint must charge only one offense, and the nature of impeachable offenses precludes the application of the above-said Rule on Criminal Procedure since the broad terms cannot be defined with the same precision required in defining crimes. It adds that the determination of the grounds for impeachment is an exercise of political judgment, which issue respondent-intervenor also considers as non-justiciable, and to which the Baraquel group adds that impeachment is a political process and not a criminal prosecution, during which criminal prosecution stage the complaint or information referred thereto and cited by petitioner, unlike an impeachment complaint, must already be in the name of the People of the Philippines.

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The Baraquel group deems that there are provisions92 outside the Rules on Criminal Procedure that are more relevant to the issue. Both the Baraquel and Reyes groups point out that even if Sec. 13 of Rule 110 is made to apply, petitioners case falls under the exception since impeachment prescribes a single punishment removal from office and disqualification to hold any public office even for various offenses. Both groups also observe that petitioner concededly and admittedly was not keen on pursuing this issue during the oral arguments. Petitioners claim deserves scant consideration. Without going into the effectiveness of the suppletory application of the Rules on Criminal Procedure in carrying out the relevant constitutional provisions, which prerogative the Constitution vests on Congress, and without delving into the practicability of the application of the one offense per complaint rule, the initial determination of which must be made by the House93 which has yet to pass upon the question, the Court finds that petitioners invocation of that particular rule of Criminal Procedure does not lie. Suffice it to state that the Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the "Articles of Impeachment." 94 It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one impeachable offense. The second procedural matter deals with the rule on consolidation. In rejecting a consolidation, petitioner maintains that the Constitution allows only one impeachment complaint against her within one year. Records show that public respondent disavowed any immediate need to consolidate. Its chairperson Rep. Tupas stated that "[c]onsolidation depends on the Committee whether to consolidate[; c]onsolidation may come today or may come later on after determination of the sufficiency in form and substance," and that "for purposes of consolidation, the Committee will decide when is the time to consolidate[, a]nd if, indeed, we need to consolidate."95 Petitioners petition, in fact, initially describes the consolidation as merely "contemplated."96 Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion, did not yet order a consolidation, the Court will not venture to make a determination on this matter, as it would be premature, conjectural or anticipatory.97 Even if the Court assumes petitioners change of stance that the two impeachment complaints were deemed consolidated,98 her claim that consolidation is a legal anomaly fails. Petitioners theory obviously springs from her "proceeding = complaint" equation which the Court already brushed aside. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010 of public respondent, the House of Representatives Committee on Justice, are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on September 14, 2010 is LIFTED. SO ORDERED. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice NACHURA, J.: It is a fundamental principle in the law of public officers that a duty owing to the public in general cannot give rise to a liability in favor of particular individuals.1 The failure to perform a public duty can constitute an individual wrong only when a person can show that, in the public duty, a duty to himself as an individual is also involved, and that he has suffered a special and peculiar injury by reason of its improper performance or non-performance.2 By this token, the Court reconsiders its June 19, 2007 Decision 3 in this case. As culled from the said decision, the facts, in brief, are as follows: On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654), which took effect on July 3, 1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands 'Champion," "Hope," and "More" were considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1, 1993, or two days before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying "Champion," "Hope," and "More" as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. RMC 37-93 in effect subjected "Hope," "More," and "Champion" cigarettes to the provisions of RA 7654, specifically, to Sec. 142, (c) (1) on locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55%, and which imposes an ad valorem tax of "55% provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack." On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A. Deoferio, Jr. sent via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but it was addressed to no one in particular. On July 15, 1993, Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93. On July 20, 1993, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration requesting the recall of RMC 37-93, but was denied in a letter dated July 30, 1993. The same letter assessed respondent for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis of RMC 37-93) and demanded payment within 10 days from receipt thereof. On August 3, 1993, respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which on September 30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining the implementation of RMC 37-93. In its decision dated August 10, 1994, the CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and unenforceable and further enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax assessment issued pursuant to RMC No. 37-93. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and finally by this Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals. It was held, among others, that RMC 37-93, has fallen short of the requirements for a valid administrative issuance. G.R. No. 141309 December 23, 2008

LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, petitioner, vs. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondent. RESOLUTION

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On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against petitioner in her private capacity. Respondent contended that the latter should be held liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending that: (1) respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts; (2) the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith; and (3) the certification against forum shopping was signed by respondent's counsel in violation of the rule that it is the plaintiff or the principal party who should sign the same. On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioner's motion to dismiss holding that to rule on the allegations of petitioner would be to prematurely decide the merits of the case without allowing the parties to present evidence. It further held that the defect in the certification against forum shopping was cured by respondent's submission of the corporate secretary's certificate authorizing its counsel to execute the certification against forum shopping. x x x x xxxx The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. However, same was dismissed on the ground that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith. The appellate court ratiocinated that Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is the general law on the civil liability of public officers while Article 32 of the Civil Code is the special law that governs the instant case. Consequently, malice or bad faith need not be alleged in the complaint for damages. It also sustained the ruling of the RTC that the defect of the certification against forum shopping was cured by the submission of the corporate secretary's certificate giving authority to its counsel to execute the same.4 [Citations and underscoring omitted.] In the aforesaid June 19, 2007 Decision, we affirmed the disposition of the Court of Appeals (CA) and directed the trial court to continue with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK.5 Petitioner, on July 20, 2007, subsequently moved for the reconsideration of the said decision. 6 After respondent filed its comment, the Court, in its April 14, 2008 Resolution, 7 denied with finality petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Undaunted, petitioner filed, on April 29, 2008 her Motion to Refer [the case] to the Honorable Court En Banc.8 She contends that the petition raises a legal question that is novel and is of paramount importance. The earlier decision rendered by the Court will send a chilling effect to public officers, and will adversely affect the performance of duties of superior public officers in departments or agencies with rule-making and quasi-judicial powers. With the said decision, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue will have reason to hesitate or refrain from performing his/her official duties despite the due process safeguards in Section 228 of the National Internal Revenue Code.9 Petitioner hence moves for the reconsideration of the June 19, 2007 Decision.10 In its June 25, 2008 Resolution,11 the Court referred the case to the En Banc. Respondent consequently moved for the reconsideration of this resolution. We now resolve both motions. There are two kinds of duties exercised by public officers: the "duty owing to the public collectively" (the body politic), and the "duty owing to particular individuals, thus: 1. Of Duties to the Public. - The first of these classes embraces those officers whose duty is owing primarily to the public collectively --- to the body politic --- and not to any particular individual; who act for the public at large, and who are ordinarily paid out of the public treasury. The officers whose duties fall wholly or partially within this class are numerous and the distinction will be readily recognized. Thus, the governor owes a duty to the public to see that the laws are properly executed, that fit and competent officials are appointed by him, that unworthy and ill-considered acts of the legislature do not receive his approval, but these, and many others of a like nature, are duties which he owes to the public at large and no one individual could single himself out and assert that they were duties owing to him alone. So, members of the legislature owe a duty to the public to pass only wise and proper laws, but no one person could pretend that the duty was owing to himself rather than to another. Highway commissioners owe a duty that they will be governed only by considerations of the public good in deciding upon the opening or closing of highways, but it is not a duty to any particular individual of the community. These illustrations might be greatly extended, but it is believed that they are sufficient to define the general doctrine. 2. Of Duties to Individuals. - The second class above referred to includes those who, while they owe to the public the general duty of a proper administration of their respective offices, yet become, by reason of their employment by a particular individual to do some act for him in an official capacity, under a special and particular obligation to him as an individual. They serve individuals chiefly and usually receive their compensation from fees paid by each individual who employs them. A sheriff or constable in serving civil process for a private suitor, a recorder of deeds in recording the deed or mortgage of an individual, a clerk of court in entering up a private judgment, a notary public in protesting negotiable paper, an inspector of elections in passing upon the qualifications of an elector, each owes a general duty of official good conduct to the public, but he is also under a special duty to the particular individual concerned which gives the latter a peculiar interest in his due performance.12 In determining whether a public officer is liable for an improper performance or non-performance of a duty, it must first be determined which of the two classes of duties is involved. For, indeed, as the eminent Floyd R. Mechem instructs, "[t]he liability of a public officer to an individual or the public is based upon and is co-extensive with his duty to the individual or the public. If to the one or the other he owes no duty, to that one he can incur no liability."13

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Stated differently, when what is involved is a "duty owing to the public in general", an individual cannot have a cause of action for damages against the public officer, even though he may have been injured by the action or inaction of the officer. In such a case, there is damage to the individual but no wrong to him. In performing or failing to perform a public duty, the officer has touched his interest to his prejudice; but the officer owes no duty to him as an individual.14 The remedy in this case is not judicial but political.15 The exception to this rule occurs when the complaining individual suffers a particular or special injury on account of the public officer's improper performance or non-performance of his public duty. An individual can never be suffered to sue for an injury which, technically, is one to the public only; he must show a wrong which he specially suffers, and damage alone does not constitute a wrong.16 A contrary precept (that an individual, in the absence of a special and peculiar injury, can still institute an action against a public officer on account of an improper performance or non-performance of a duty owing to the public generally) will lead to a deluge of suits, for if one man might have an action, all men might have the likethe complaining individual has no better right than anybody else.17 If such were the case, no one will serve a public office. Thus, the rule restated is that an individual cannot have a particular action against a public officer without a particular injury, or a particular right, which are the grounds upon which all actions are founded.18 Juxtaposed with Article 3219 of the Civil Code, the principle may now translate into the rule that an individual can hold a public officer personally liable for damages on account of an act or omission that violates a constitutional right only if it results in a particular wrong or injury to the former. This is consistent with this Court's pronouncement in its June 19, 2007 Decision (subject of petitioner's motion for reconsideration) that Article 32, in fact, allows a damage suit for "tort for impairment of rights and liberties."20 It may be recalled that in tort law, for a plaintiff to maintain an action for damages for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed the plaintiff, meaning a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. Indeed, central to an award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law.21 Thus, in Lim v. Ponce de Leon,22 we granted the petitioner's claim for damages because he, in fact, suffered the loss of his motor launch due to the illegal seizure thereof. In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,23 we upheld the right of petitioner to the recovery of damages as there was an injury sustained by him on account of the illegal withholding of his horserace prize winnings. In the instant case, what is involved is a public officer's duty owing to the public in general. The petitioner, as the then Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, is being taken to task for Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 37-93 which she issued without the requisite notice, hearing and publication, and which, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals,24 we declared as having "fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance."25 A public officer, such as the petitioner, vested with quasi-legislative or rule-making power, owes a duty to the public to promulgate rules which are compliant with the requirements of valid administrative regulations. But it is a duty owed not to the respondent alone, but to the entire body politic who would be affected, directly or indirectly, by the administrative rule. Furthermore, as discussed above, to have a cause of action for damages against the petitioner, respondent must allege that it suffered a particular or special injury on account of the non-performance by petitioner of the public duty. A careful reading of the complaint filed with the trial court reveals that no particular injury is alleged to have been sustained by the respondent. The phrase "financial and business difficulties"26 mentioned in the complaint is a vague notion, ambiguous in concept, and cannot translate into a "particular injury." In contrast, the facts of the case eloquently demonstrate that the petitioner took nothing from the respondent, as the latter did not pay a single centavo on the tax assessment levied by the former by virtue of RMC 37-93. With no "particular injury" alleged in the complaint, there is, therefore, no delict or wrongful act or omission attributable to the petitioner that would violate the primary rights of the respondent. Without such delict or tortious act or omission, the complaint then fails to state a cause of action, because a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. 27 A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.28 The remedy of a party whenever the complaint does not allege a cause of action is to set up this defense in a motion to dismiss, or in the answer. A motion to dismiss based on the failure to state a cause of action in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein. However, the hypothetical admission is limited to the "relevant and material facts well-pleaded in the complaint and inferences deducible therefrom. The admission does not extend to conclusions or interpretations of law; nor does it cover allegations of fact the falsity of which is subject to judicial notice." 29 The complaint may also be dismissed for lack of cause of action if it is obvious from the complaint and its annexes that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief.30 The June 19, 2007 Decision and the dissent herein reiterates that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, the liability of the public officer may accrue even if he/she acted in good faith, as long as there is a violation of constitutional rights, citing Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,31 where we said: Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioners, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of duties.32 The complaint in this case does not impute bad faith on the petitioner. Without any allegation of bad faith, the cause of action in the respondent's complaint (specifically, paragraph 2.02 thereof) for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code would be premised on the findings of this Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals (CIR v. CA),33 where we ruled that RMC No. 37-93, issued by petitioner in her capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, had "fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance." This is a logical inference. Without the decision in CIR v. CA, the bare allegations in the complaint that respondent's rights to due process of law and to equal protection of the laws were violated by the petitioner's administrative issuance would be conclusions of law, hence not hypothetically admitted by petitioner in her motion to dismiss.

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But in CIR v. CA, this Court did not declare RMC 37-93 unconstitutional; certainly not from either the due process of law or equal protection of the laws perspective. On due process, the majority, after determining that RMC 37-93 was a legislative rule, cited an earlier Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC No. 10-86) requiring prior notice before RMC's could become "operative." However, this Court did not make an express finding of violation of the right to due process of law. On the aspect of equal protection, CIR v. CA said: "Not insignificantly, RMC 37-93 might have likewise infringed on uniformity of taxation;" a statement that does not amount to a positive indictment of petitioner for violation of respondent's constitutional right. Even if one were to ascribe a constitutional infringement by RMC 37-93 on the nonuniformity of tax provisions, the nature of the constitutional transgression falls under Section 28, Article VI-not Section 1, Article III-of the Constitution. This Court's own summation in CIR v. CA: "All taken, the Court is convinced that the hastily promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance," does not lend itself to an interpretation that the RMC is unconstitutional. Thus, the complaint's reliance on CIR v. CA-which is cited in, and a copy of which is annexed to, the complaint-as suggestive of a violation of due process and equal protection, must fail. Accordingly, from the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that paragraph 2.02 of respondent's complaint loses the needed crutch to sustain a valid cause of action against the petitioner, for what is left of the paragraph is merely the allegation that only respondent's "Champion", "Hope" and "More" cigarettes were reclassified. If we divest the complaint of its reliance on CIR v. CA, what remains of respondent's cause of action for violation of constitutional rights would be paragraph 2.01, which reads: 2.01. On or about July 1, 1993, defendant issued Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 (hereinafter referred to as RMC No. 37-93) reclassifying specifically "Champion", "Hope" and "More" as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand. A copy of the aforesaid circular is attached hereto and made an integral part hereof as ANNEX "A". The issuance of a circular and its implementation resulted in the "deprivation of property" of plaintiff. They were done without due process of law and in violation of the right of plaintiff to the equal protection of the laws. (Italics supplied.) But, as intimated above, the bare allegations, "done without due process of law" and "in violation of the right of plaintiff to the equal protection of the laws" are conclusions of law. They are not hypothetically admitted in petitioner's motion to dismiss and, for purposes of the motion to dismiss, are not deemed as facts. In Fluor Daniel, Inc. Philippines v. EB. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd.,34 this Court declared that the test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. In the instant case, since what remains of the complaint which is hypothetically admitted, is only the allegation on the reclassification of respondent's cigarettes, there will not be enough facts for the court to render a valid judgment according to the prayer in the complaint. Furthermore, in an action for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code premised on violation of due process, it may be necessary to harmonize the Civil Code provision with subsequent legislative enactments, particularly those related to taxation and tax collection. Judicial notice may be taken of the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and of the law creating the Court of Tax Appeals. Both statutes provide ample remedies to aggrieved taxpayers; remedies which, in fact, were availed of by the respondent-without even having to pay the assessment under protest-as recounted by this Court in CIR v. CA, viz.: In a letter, dated 19 July 1993, addressed to the appellate division of the BIR, Fortune Tobacco requested for a review, reconsideration and recall of RMC 37-93. The request was denied on 29 July 1993. The following day, or on 30 July 1993, the CIR assessed Fortune Tobacco for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00. On 03 August 1993, Fortune Tobacco filed a petition for review with the CTA.35 The availability of the remedies against the assailed administrative action, the opportunity to avail of the same, and actual recourse to these remedies, contradict the respondent's claim of due process infringement. At this point, a brief examination of relevant American jurisprudence may be instructive. 42 U.S. Code 1983, a provision incorporated into the Civil Rights Act of 1871, presents a parallel to our own Article 32 of the Civil Code, as it states: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, usage, or any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress. This provision has been employed as the basis of tort suits by many petitioners intending to win liability cases against government officials when they violate the constitutional rights of citizens. Webster Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Investigation,36 has emerged as the leading case on the victim's entitlement to recover money damages for any injuries suffered as a result of flagrant and unconstitutional abuses of administrative power. In this case, federal narcotics officers broke into Bivens' home at 6:30 a.m. without a search warrant and in the absence of probable cause. The agents handcuffed Bivens, searched his premises, employed excessive force, threatened to arrest his family, subjected him to a visual strip search in the federal court house, fingerprinted, photographed, interrogated and booked him. When Bivens was brought before a United States Commissioner, however, charges against him were dismissed. On the issue of whether violation of the Fourth Amendment "by a federal agent acting under color of authority gives rise to a cause of action for damages consequent upon his constitutional conduct," the U.S. Supreme Court held that Bivens is entitled to recover damages for injuries he suffered as a result of the agents' violation of the Fourth Amendment. A number of subsequent decisions have upheld Bivens. For instance, in Scheuer v. Rhodes,37 a liability suit for money damages was allowed against Ohio Governor James Rhodes by petitioners who represented three students who had been killed by Ohio National Guard troops at Kent State University

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as they protested against U.S. involvement in Vietnam. In Wood v. Strickland,38 local school board members were sued by high school students who argued that they had been deprived of constitutional due process rights when they were expelled from school for having spiked a punch bowl at a school function without the benefit of a full hearing. In Butz v. Economou,39 Economou, whose registration privilege as a commodities futures trader was suspended, without prior warning, by Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz, sued on a Bivens action, alleging that the suspension was aimed at "chilling" his freedom of expression right under the First Amendment. A number of other cases40 with virtually the same conclusion followed. However, it is extremely dubious whether a Bivens action against government tax officials and employees may prosper, if we consider the pronouncement of the U.S. Supreme Court in Schweiker v. Chilicky,41 that a Bivens remedy will not be allowed when other "meaningful safeguards or remedies for the rights of persons situated as (is the plaintiff)" are available. It has also been held that a Bivens action is not appropriate in the civil service system42 or in the military justice system.43 In Frank Vennes v. An Unknown Number of Unidentified Agents of the United States of America ,44 petitioner Vennes instituted a Bivens action against agents of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) who alleged that he (Vennes) owed $250,000 in tax liability, instituted a jeopardy assessment, confiscated Vennes' business, forced a total asset sale, and put Vennes out of business, when in fact he owed not a dime. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, ruled: The district court dismissed these claims on the ground that a taxpayer's remedies under the Internal Revenue Code preclude such a Bivens action. Vennes cites to us no contrary authority, and we have found none. Though the Supreme Court has not addressed this precise question, it has strongly suggested that the district court correctly applied Bivens: When the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration, we have not created additional Bivens remedies. xxxx Congress has provided specific and meaningful remedies for taxpayers who challenge overzealous tax assessment and collection activities. A taxpayer may challenge a jeopardy assessment both administratively and judicially, and may sue the government for a tax refund, and have authorized taxpayer actions against the United States to recover limited damages resulting from specific types of misconduct by IRS employees. These carefully crafted legislative remedies confirm that, in the politically sensitive realm of taxation, Congress's refusal to permit unrestricted damage action by taxpayers has not been inadvertent. Thus, the district court correctly dismissed Vennes's Bivens claims against IRS agents for their tax assessment and collection activities. In still another Bivens action, instituted by a taxpayer against IRS employees for alleged violation of due process rights concerning a tax dispute, the U.S. District Court of Minnesota said: In addition, the (Tax) Code provides taxpayers with remedies, judicial and otherwise, for correcting and redressing wrongful acts taken by IRS employees in connection with any collection activities. Although these provisions do not provide taxpayers with an allencompassing remedy for wrongful acts of IRS personnel, the rights established under the Code illustrate that it provides all sorts of rights against the overzealous officialdom, including, most fundamentally, the right to sue the government for a refund if forced to overpay taxes, and it would make the collection of taxes chaotic if a taxpayer could bypass the remedies provided by Congress simply by bringing a damage suit against IRS employees. 45 American jurisprudence obviously validates the contention of the petitioner. Finally, we invite attention to Section 227, Republic Act No. 8424 (Tax Reform Act of 1997), which provides: Section 227. Satisfaction of Judgment Recovered Against any Internal Revenue Officer. When an action is brought against any Internal Revenue officer to recover damages by reason of any act done in the performance of official duty, and the Commissioner is notified of such action in time to make defense against the same, through the Solicitor General, any judgment, damages or costs recovered in such action shall be satisfied by the Commissioner, upon approval of the Secretary of Finance, or if the same be paid by the person sued shall be repaid or reimbursed to him. No such judgment, damages or costs shall be paid or reimbursed in behalf of a person who has acted negligently or in bad faith, or with willful oppression. Because the respondent's complaint does not impute negligence or bad faith to the petitioner, any money judgment by the trial court against her will have to be assumed by the Republic of the Philippines. As such, the complaint is in the nature of a suit against the State.46 WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the June 19, 2007 Decision and DENY respondent's motion for reconsideration of the June 25, 2008 Resolution. Civil Case No. CV-97-341-MK, pending with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 147227 November 19, 2004

MARIA REMEDIOS ARGANA, DONATA ALMENDRALA VDA. DE ARGANA, LUIS ARGANA, JR., PEREGRINO ARGANA, ESTATE OF GELACIO ARGANA, EUFROCINIO NOFUENTE, AMPARO ARGANA NOFUENTE, JUANITO ROGELIO, MILAGROS ARGANA ROGELIO, MARIA FELICIDAD ARGANA, MARIA DOROTEA ARGANA, REFEDOR SOUTH GOLD PROPERTY MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

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DECISION To be retained by the late Mayor Argana's heirs Owned by the Mayor's Brothers and Sisters TINGA, J.: Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari assailing the Resolution dated April 11, 2000 and the Order dated February 22, 2001 of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, in Civil Case No. 0026. 1 On July 29, 1987, respondent Republic of the Philippines filed with the Sandiganbayan a Petition for Forfeiture of alleged ill-gotten assets and properties of the late Maximino A. Argana, who served as Mayor of the Municipality of Muntinlupa2 from 1964 to 1967 and from 1972 until his death in 1985. On October 28, 1998, the Sandiganbayan remanded the case to the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) for the conduct of an inquiry. In 1990, the case was reactivated in the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners Maria Remedios Argana, Donata Almendrala Vda. De Argana, Luis Argana, Jr., Peregrino Argana, Estate of Gelacio Argana, Eufrocinio Nofuente, Amparo Argana Nofuente, Juanito Rogelio, Milagros Argana Rogelio, Maria Felicidad Argana, Maria Dorotea Argana, and Refedor South Gold Property Management & Development Corporation filed a series of motions, including a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of the lack of authority of the PCGG to institute the case on behalf of respondent. This issue eventually reached this Court and was decided in favor of respondent on September 29, 1994.3 Petitioners, in their Answer, denied that the properties sought to be forfeited by respondent were unlawfully acquired by the deceased Mayor and/or by petitioners. Still, to avoid a protracted litigation, petitioners exerted efforts to settle the case amicably with respondent through the PCGG. After a series of motions were again filed by petitioners, the Sandiganbayan finally set the case for pretrial on November 26, 1997, but the pre-trial was reset several times in view of the manifestation of the parties that they were in the process of negotiating a compromise. On August 7, 1997, petitioners' offer of compromise was accepted by the PCGG in its Resolution No. 97180-A.4 Thereafter, the PCGG conducted an evaluation of the properties offered for settlement by petitioners. In a Memorandum dated August 18, 1997, Mauro J. Estrada, Director of the PCGG Research and Development Program, recommended the inclusion of another tract of land 5 belonging to petitioners among the properties which would be subject of the compromise. On September 18, 1997, respondent, represented by PCGG Commissioners Reynaldo S. Guiao and Herminio A. Mendoza entered into a Compromise Agreement with petitioners, represented by petitioner Maria Felicidad Argana. Petitioners conveyed, ceded and released in favor of respondent a total of 361.9203 hectares of agricultural land in Pangil and Famy, Laguna, or 75.12% of the properties subject of litigation, in consideration of the dismissal or withdrawal of all pending civil, criminal and administrative cases filed, litigated or investigated by respondent against them. The remainder was distributed as follows: Foreclosed by Los Baos Rural Bank Owned by Other Persons 9.88% 5.53% 1.24% 8.23% 24.88%

47.78

26.6

5.9

39.64

120.05

In a letter dated October 7, 1997,7 the PCGG informed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) of the signing of the Compromise Agreement and requested the OSG to file the appropriate motion for approval thereof with the Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, the OSG requested for clarification from the PCGG if the compromise agreement included all the sequestered assets of petitioners subject of litigation. In response to the request, PCGG informed the OSG in a letter dated February 4, 19988 that the properties mentioned in the Compromise Agreement comprise all the sequestered assets subject of litigation, and reiterated that it entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners because it believed that the evidence might not be sufficient to warrant continuing the prosecution of Civil Case No. 0026 and that it is to the best interest of the government to accept the offer of petitioners.9 On May 27, 1998, then President of the Republic of the Philippines Fidel V. Ramos approved the Compromise Agreement between petitioners and respondent.10 On June 4, 1998,11 the OSG filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement. Petitioners expressed their conformity to the motion on June 15, 1998. After conducting hearings on the motion, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Decision on July 31, 1998 approving the Compromise Agreement and rendering judgment in accordance with the terms thereof.12 However, on October 5, 1998, respondent, through the OSG and the PCGG, filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Rescind Compromise Agreement and to Set Aside Judgment by Compromise (Motion to Rescind). Respondent prayed for the rescission of the Compromise Agreement or reformation thereof after a renegotiation with petitioners. Respondent contended that the partition of the properties in the Compromise Agreement was grossly disadvantageous to the government and that there was fraud and insidious misrepresentation by petitioners in the distribution and partition of properties, to the damage and prejudice of the government. According to respondent, there was fraud and insidious misrepresentation because petitioners proposed to divide the propertieswith 75% accruing to the government and the remaining 25% going to petitioners and their other creditorsbased on the total land area of the properties instead of on their value. As a result, the government obtained only Three Million Six Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos (P3,620,000.00) worth of land, while petitioners received almost Four Billion Pesos (P4,000,000,000.00) worth. Petitioners filed an Answer to the Motion to Rescind and contended that the July 31, 1998 Decision of the Sandiganbayan could no longer be annulled because it had already become final and executory; that

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respondent's counsel had no authority to file the motion; and that the motion was defective because it did not include a Certification against Forum-Shopping. They also argued that there was no agreement to divide the properties by a 75% to 25% ratio in favor of the government. What they proposed to cede to the government by way of compromise were their properties in Pangil covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-4044 and T-4009 and those in Famy, Laguna covered by TCT Nos. T-3813 to T-3817 and T-4104, 4106 and 4108, not a specific percentage of the properties subject of litigation. 13 In its Resolution dated September 22, 1999, the Sandiganbayan treated the Motion to Rescind as a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure and set the motion for hearing. On April 11, 2000, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution granting respondent's motion to rescind and setting aside the Decision dated July 31, 1998. The Sandiganbayan held that the Motion to Rescind was filed on time on October 5, 1998, the working day immediately following October 4, 1998, which was a Sunday and the 60th day after respondent received the July 31, 1998 Decision on August 5, 1998. It also ruled that the presumption that the OSG had authority to file the Motion to Rescind was not overcome by petitioners. Under Republic Act No. 1379,14 the filing and prosecution of cases for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired property is a function of the OSG. Petitioners failed to show proof that pleadings or motions filed by lawyers of the government or the PCGG must first be approved by the PCGG En Banc and by the President of the Republic. The Sandiganbayan likewise held that respondent was not required to file a certification against forum-shopping because the motion to rescind was not an initiatory pleading. 15 With respect to the issue of fraud, it held that there was extrinsic fraud in the execution of the Compromise Agreement. The Sandiganbayan stated: The values were deliberately omitted to make it appear that the Compromise Agreement adheres to the 75%-25% ratio broadly adopted by the PCGG in compromising cases of illgotten wealth. It was this 75%-25% mode of compromise, with the greater share of 75% going to the government that misled the Court to believe, as We did believe, that the Compromise Agreement was fair, reasonable and advantageous to the Government. What was projected to be a 75%-25% ratio was in reality a 00.15%-99.85% ratio, with 99.85% going to the Arganas. This is unconscionable and immoral. And since it results in a transaction grossly disadvantageous and immoral to the government, it is against the law as being violative of Section 3(g) of Republic Act 3019. In the instant case, fraud of an extrinsic character exists because the representatives of plaintiff Republic in the PCGG connived with defendants in hiding the assessed or market values of the properties involved, so as to make it appear that the Compromise Agreement adhered to the 75%-25% ratio adopted by the PCGG in entering into compromise of cases involving the recovery of ill-gotten wealth. Through their infidelity, those in the PCGG who handled or were closely involved with the case during the last days of the previous administration fraudulently gave the Compromise Agreement a semblance of fairness and official acceptability. They sold plaintiff Republic down the river by entering into an agreement grossly disadvantageous to the government. For while plaintiff Republic got 00.15% (00.15074) of the estimated value of all the properties involved in this case, defendants almost ran away with 99.85% (99.84526) of their value. This is patently unfair. It is no compromise but a virtual sell-out. It could not have been pulled off without the connivance or collusion of those responsible for the case in the PCGG. Instead of protecting the interest of the government, they connived at its defeatalmost.16 Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated May 9, 2000 and a Supplement to said motion dated May 30, 2000. Petitioners also filed an Urgent Motion for Voluntary Inhibition dated May 18, 2000 praying that the members of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan voluntarily inhibit themselves from hearing and resolving the petitioners' pending motions. On February 22, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued two Orders, one denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration,17 and the other, denying the motion for voluntary inhibition.18 Hence, petitioners filed the present petition on April 27, 2001. Respondent filed its Comment on October 22, 2001. On November 12, 2001, the Court issued a Resolution giving due course to the petition and requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda.19 Respondent filed its Memorandum on January 29, 2002. Petitioners filed theirs on February 26, 2002. In their respective memoranda, the parties reiterated the arguments in their earlier pleadings. Specifically, petitioners raise the following arguments: (A) The Sandiganbayan (Third Division) denied Petitioners their right to substantive and procedural due process when it refused to voluntarily inhibit itself from further hearing the instant case. (B) The PCGG lawyers had no authority to ask for the rescission of the subject Compromise Agreement without the consent of the PCGG En Banc and the President of the Republic of the Philippines. (C) The Motion to Rescind, which was treated by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) as a Petition for Relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, is fatally defective because 1. It was not filed by a party to the case, i.e., it was filed by counsel without the client's authority. 2. It was filed out of time. 3. It was filed sans any supporting Affidavit of Merit. 4. It lacked the required Certification on Non-Forum Shopping.

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(D) There is no factual or legal basis for the finding of fraud by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division). (E) Upon approval of the Compromise Agreement, the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) lost jurisdiction over the case, including the authority to rescind said Compromise Agreement and to set aside the judgment based thereon. (F) The Sandiganbayan (Third Division) lacked authority to alter a contract by construction or to make a new contract for the parties. (G) Since the Compromise Agreement had already been implemented, rescission cannot be availed of.20 Petitioners contend that the members of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan should have inhibited themselves from resolving petitioners' motion for reconsideration because from the tenor of the April 11, 2000 Order of the court granting respondent's motion to rescind, it was evident that the Sandiganbayan had already prejudged the properties subject of litigation as having been unlawfully acquired.21 Petitioners likewise assert that the property value of a property offered for the amicable settlement of a case is not always material in determining the validity of a compromise agreement. They point out that what impelled the PCGG to enter into a compromise agreement with them was PCGG's perception that its evidence against petitioners was weak and might not be sufficient to justify maintaining the case against them.22 In addition, petitioners insist that the Motion to Rescind which was treated by the Sandiganbayan as a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 is fatally defective for (i) lack of authority of respondent's lawyers to file the same; (ii) having been filed out of time; (iii) non-submission of an Affidavit of Merit; and (iv) non-submission of a Certification against Forum-Shopping.23 It is argued by petitioners that the Sandiganbayan should have denied respondent's Motion to Rescind outright for having been filed without authority from the PCGG En Banc and the President of the Republic, both of whom earlier approved and authorized the execution of the Compromise Agreement. According to petitioners, after final judgment has been rendered in a case, an attorney has no implied authority from his client to seek material or substantial alterations or modifications in such judgment. 24 Petitioners claim that the Motion to Rescind was filed only on October 5, 1998, or beyond sixty (60) days from the time the Sandiganbayan promulgated its July 31, 1998 Decision approving the Compromise Agreement.25 In support of their petition, petitioners cite Section 3 of Rule 38 which requires that the petition for relief be filed within sixty (60) days after the party seeking the relief learns of the judgment or final order to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered. They also invoke the case of Samonte v. Samonte26 where the Court held that a judgment upon compromise is deemed to have come to the knowledge of the parties on the very day it is entered. 27 It is further argued by petitioners that the Sandiganbayan's finding that the settlement between petitioners and respondent was attended by fraud has no factual or legal basis. Petitioners point out that the property values cited by respondent in its Motion to Rescind were based solely on the estimates of the PCGG lawyers and no evidence of the valuation of the properties were presented before the Sandiganbayan to establish fraud. They also contend that the Sandiganbayan had no legal basis for taking judicial notice of the fact that agricultural land in rural areas such as Famy and Pangil, Laguna is much cheaper and is usually sold by the hectare, while land in Metro Manila and in nearby municipalities such as Muntinlupa is more valuable and sold per square meter. Petitioners insist that knowledge of the valuation of property is not a condition sine qua non for the validity of a compromise agreement. 28 Petitioners also assert that the Sandiganbayan did not have jurisdiction to annul the Compromise Agreement because its July 31, 1998 Decision had already become final and executory. Moreover, as a contract validly entered into by the parties, the Compromise Agreement had binding effect and authority on the parties thereto even if it were not judicially approved.29 Petitioners likewise contend that the Sandiganbayan cannot alter the Compromise Agreement which is a valid and binding contract between themselves and respondent and impose the additional requirement that "the moneys, properties or assets involved in the compromise must be fully disclosed and described not only as to the number or area (in case of real properties) but also as to their exact location, classification, appraised and fair market value, liens and encumbrances, whether titled or not, etc., so as to leave no room for doubt that all the parties, the Court and the public know exactly what each party is giving or taking away, and under what specific terms and conditions."30 According to them, the imposition of this requirement would be beyond the scope of the Sandiganbayan's authority.31 Lastly, petitioners argue that the Compromise Agreement can no longer be rescinded because it had already been implemented. In support of this argument, petitioners claim that on September 22, 1997, or four days after the signing of the agreement, they delivered to the PCGG the original TCTs of the properties ceded to respondent under the agreement.32 Respondent, through the OSG, contends that the Sandiganbayan's April 11, 2000 Resolution which granted the motion to rescind the Compromise Agreement and set aside its July 31, 1998 Decision cannot be the proper subject of a Petition for Certiorari. According to respondent, petitioners were not without any other remedy from the adverse ruling of the Sandiganbayan, and they should have gone to trial and reiterated their special defenses.33 Respondent also maintains that the Sandiganbayan did not err in denying petitioners' motion for voluntary inhibition of its members because petitioners' allegations of partiality and bias were not supported by clear and convincing evidence.34 It is also argued by respondent that there is no rule or law requiring that pleadings or motions filed by lawyers of the government or the PCGG must first be approved by the PCGG En Banc and by the President of the Republic.35 Anent the alleged procedural infirmities in the filing of the Motion to Rescind, respondent asserts that it complied with the reglementary period for the filing of a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 and that it is not an initiatory pleading which is required to be accompanied by a Certification against Forum-Shopping.36

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Respondent disagrees with the contention of petitioners that the Sandiganbayan already lost jurisdiction over the case when it rendered its Decision on the Compromise Agreement on July 31, 1998 considering that the decision is immediately executory since there is no appeal from such judgment. According to respondent, the Rules of Court does recognize the jurisdiction of the court which rendered a decision over a petition for relief from the same decision, and does not distinguish whether the judgment is based on the evidence presented or on a compromise agreement. Moreover, as an exception to the general rule that the court which rendered judgment on the compromise cannot modify such compromise, the court may order modifications thereon when the parties consent to such modification or when there is a hearing to determine the presence or absence of vitiated consent.37 Respondent adds that the Sandiganbayan did not make a new contract for the parties but simply declared their Compromise Agreement null and void with the net effect of continuing the case from where it left off.38 Respondent insists that a compromise agreement which is unconscionable, shocking to the mind and contrary to law and public policy, such as that entered into by it with petitioners, is null and void. A void compromise agreement vests no rights and creates no obligations. Considering that the compromise agreement sought to be declared void in this case is one which is prejudicial to the government, it is the Court's duty to strike it down as null and void.39 It is argued by respondent that while it did not present additional evidence after it filed the Motion to Rescind, it submitted the motion on the basis of all the verified pleadings and papers on record. Respondent likewise claims that the Sandiganbayan did not err in taking judicial notice of the fact that agricultural lands in the provinces, such as the lands titled in petitioners' names in Famy and Pangil, Laguna, are much cheaper than lands in urban areas such as those in Muntinlupa City. Respondent insists that such fact is a matter of public knowledge and may be taken judicial notice of under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court.40 Respondent also points out that petitioners expressly admitted in their Answer to the Motion to Rescind that the value of the properties which they ceded to respondent under the Compromise Agreement is less than the value of the properties retained by them.41 Respondent claims that there was fraud of an extrinsic character because its representatives in the PCGG connived with petitioners in concealing the assessed or market values of the properties subject of the Compromise Agreement to make it appear that the latter adhered to the 75%-25% ratio adopted by the PCGG in entering into compromise of cases involving the recovery of ill-gotten wealth. It is pointed out by respondent that the OSG was in fact initially reluctant to file the motion for approval of the compromise agreement with the Sandiganbayan because the Compromise Agreement only mentioned the areas of the properties but conspicuously failed to mention the property values thereof. Respondent explained: On October 7, 1997, the PCGG forwarded to the OSG a copy of the Compromise Agreement between the Republic and the Arganas in SB Civil Case No. 0026, with a request that the OSG file a motion with the Sandiganbayan for the approval of the said Compromise Agreement. On November 7, 1997, in reply to the letter of PCGG, the OSG with then Solicitor General Silvestre H. Bello III as signatory, wrote the PCGG requesting it to submit to the OSG clarification on the provision in the compromise agreement that the properties mentioned therein comprise all the sequestered assets subject of the litigation considering that in the petition filed by the Republic, it is alleged that the late mayor Argana acquired no less than 251 OCTs/TCTs in Muntinlupa and the neighboring towns plus some other ill-gotten properties. The OSG likewise opined that the Compromise Agreement must first be submitted to the President for his approval before submitting it to the Sandiganbayan. On February 10, 1998, the OSG received a reply from the PCGG, through Commissioner Herminio Mendoza, reiterating that the PCGG has decided to enter into the compromise agreement because it believes that the evidence may not be sufficient to warrant continuing prosecution of Civil Case No. 0026 against the Arganas. With respect to OSG's request for clarification, the PCGG furnished the OSG a copy of the report conducted by the PCGG Research and Development Department whereby it is stated that there are 324 OCTs/TCTs evaluated representing real properties of the late Mayor Argana with a total land area of 481.77422 hectares out of which the Republic will get 361.9203 hectares or 75.12% of the total land area under the Compromise Agreement. No mention, however, was made as to the value of the properties to be ceded to the Republic and the properties to be retained by the Arganas. On March 2, 1998, the OSG, through then Solicitor General Romeo C. dela Cruz, again wrote the PCGG reiterating its previous position that before submitting the compromise agreement to the Sandiganbayan for approval, it must first be submitted to the President of the Philippines for his approval as required in par. 6 of the Compromise Agreement. The OSG also reiterated its request for clarification regarding the properties covered by the compromise agreement as the Report submitted to it made mention of 361.9203 hectares or 75.12% out of the total land area of 481.71422 hectares to be ceded to the Republic, and 24.88% to be retained by the Arganas, no mention whatsoever was made of the kind of land, location and value of the respective areas. On June 2, 1998, the OSG received a letter dated May 29,1998 from then Commissioner Herminio A. Mendoza forwarding it copy of the approval by then President Fidel Ramos of the Compromise Agreement. With respect to its query, it was stated therein that the PCGG is unable to determine the value of the land to be ceded to the Republic and those to be retained by the Arganas because of the big number of the parcels of the land located mainly in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila and Laguna and/or the lack of available records showing their respective values for tax purposes. The PCGG reiterated their request that the OSG file with the Sandiganbayan in SB Civil Case No. 0026 a motion for the approval of the compromise agreement. Obviously, through such a scheme, those in the PCGG then who handled or were involved with the case fraudulently gave the Compromise Agreement a semblance of fairness and official acceptability, but in truth, it was grossly disadvantageous to the government. The motion to approve compromise agreement was filed by the OSG out of courtesy as the PCGG was able to get the approval of then Pres. Fidel V. Ramos but not because it (OSG) totally approved the same after an independent evaluation of the report. 42 (Emphasis in the original.)

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Finally, respondent argues that the Compromise Agreement had not yet been implemented. Although petitioners delivered the TCTs covering the lots ceded to respondent under the terms of the compromise on September 22, 1997, such delivery could not have the effect of implementation of the Compromise Agreement because the contract was submitted to the Sandiganbayan for approval only on June 15, 1998. The Compromise Agreement expressly required that in order for it to be effective, it must be approved by the President of the Republic and of the Sandiganbayan.43 The issues for the Court's resolution are as follows: 1) Whether a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy; 2) Whether the OSG and the PCGG lawyers have authority to file the Motion to Rescind on behalf of respondent; 3) Whether the Motion to Rescind, which was treated by the Sandiganbayan as a petition for relief, complied with the requirements of Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; 4) Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the Motion to Rescind and in setting aside its Decision dated July 31, 1998; and 5) Whether the members of the Sandiganbayan's Third Division should have inhibited themselves from resolving petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. The Court shall first tackle the first, second, third and fifth issues since these involve procedural matters. The Court does not agree with respondent's contention that a petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the February 22, 2001 Order of the Sandiganbayan which affirmed its earlier directive to set the case against petitioners for pre-trial following the annulment of its judgment by compromise agreement. A special civil action for certiorari may be instituted when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.44 The Court has previously held that an order setting the case for further proceedings, issued after the original judgment rendered pursuant to a compromise agreement is set aside, is an interlocutory order and is therefore not appealable. 45 Since no appeal is available against such an order, the proper remedy to assail it is a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy taken by petitioners is therefore proper. Petitioners' contention that the Motion to Rescind filed by the lawyers of the PCGG and of the OSG should have been treated by the Sandiganbayan as a mere scrap of paper because the motion was filed without the authority of the PCGG En Banc and of the President of the Republic has no legal basis. There is no requirement under the law that pleadings and motions filed by lawyers of the government or the PCGG must first be approved by the PCGG En Banc and by the President of the Philippines. More importantly, R.A. No. 1379 expressly authorizes the OSG to prosecute cases of forfeiture of property unlawfully acquired by any public officer or employee.46 It must be remembered that it was the OSG which filed Civil Case No. 0026 for the forfeiture of petitioners' allegedly ill-gotten wealth, and that the Compromise Agreement between petitioners and respondent was an amicable settlement of that case. By filing an action for rescission of the Compromise Agreement based on extrinsic fraud, the OSG was merely performing its legal duty to recover the wealth purportedly amassed unlawfully by the late Mayor Argana during his terms as Mayor of Muntinlupa. The Motion to Rescind was filed precisely because the PCGG, as respondent's authorized representative in the compromise, discovered that the execution of the Compromise Agreement was attended by fraud and sought the help of the OSG which in turn is the duly authorized government agency to represent respondent in forfeiture cases under R.A. No. 1379. Hence, the Sandiganbayan correctly upheld the authority of the OSG, assisted by the PCGG, in filing the Motion to Rescind. The Court also finds that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in granting the Motion to Rescind, which it treated as a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 3 thereof prescribes the periods within which the petition for relief must be filed: Time for filing petition; contents and verification. A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken, and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. The Court has previously held that as applied to a judgment based on compromise, both the sixty (60)day and six (6)-month reglementary periods within which to file a petition for relief should be reckoned from the date when the decision approving the compromise agreement was rendered because such judgment is considered immediately executory and entered on the date that it was approved by the court.47 Applying the foregoing rule to the present case, the sixty (60)-day period should be counted from July 31, 1998, the date of the Sandiganbayan Decision granting the Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement. The sixtieth day from July 31, 1998 is September 29, 1998. The Motion to Rescind was filed by the OSG only on October 5, 1998, clearly several days after the sixtieth day from the rendition of the July 31, 1998 Decision. This notwithstanding, the Court finds that no grave abuse can be ascribed to the Sandiganbayan in admitting the Motion to Rescind as a petition for relief was timely filed. Although as a general rule, the party filing a petition for relief must strictly comply with the sixty (60)-day and six (6)-month reglementary periods under Section 3, Rule 38,48 it is not without exceptions. The Court relaxed the rule in several cases49 and held that the filing of a petition for relief beyond the sixty 60-day period is not fatal so long as it is filed within the six (6)-month period from entry of judgment. 50 The Court notes that the filing of the Motion to Rescind on October 5, 1998 was indeed seven days beyond the sixty 60-day period but still well within the six (6)-month period from entry of judgment. Moreover, the case involves an alleged fraud committed against the Republic, and thus justifies the liberal interpretation of procedural laws by the Sandiganbayan.

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Petitioners' claim that respondent failed to attach an affidavit of merit to its Motion to Rescind is belied by the record of the case. Petitioners in fact attached, as Annex "N" of their Petition for Certiorari, a copy of the respondent's Motion to Rescind. The Affidavit of Merit signed by Dennis M. Taningco, the counsel of the PCGG in Civil Case No. 0026, was attached to the Motion to Rescind. In any case, the Court in Mago v. Court of Appeals51 held that the absence of an affidavit of merit does not always result in the denial of the petition for relief, so long as the facts required to be set out in the affidavit appear in the verified petition. The oath which forms part of the petition elevates it to the same category as an affidavit. 52 Neither was it necessary for respondent to attach a Certification against Forum-Shopping to the Motion to Rescind. As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the Motion to Rescind, which in effect was a petition for relief, is not an initiatory pleading which requires the inclusion of a Certification against ForumShopping. Section 2, Rule 38 requires that a petition for relief must be filed with the court which rendered the judgment or order sought to be set aside, and in the same case wherein the judgment or order was rendered. If the court finds that the allegations in the petition for relief are true, it shall set aside the judgment and try the principal case upon the merits as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted. 53 Clearly, then, a petition for relief is not an initiatory pleading in a new case which would require the filing by the petitioner therein of a Certification of Non- Forum Shopping. The Court also finds no abuse of discretion by the Sandiganbayan in denying petitioners' Urgent Motion for Voluntary Inhibition. As explained in Gutang v. Court of Appeals, 54 the import of the rule on voluntary inhibition is that the decision of a judge on whether or not to inhibit is left to his or her sound discretion and conscience, based on his or her rational and logical assessment of the case where the motion for inhibition is filed. It implies that in addition to pecuniary interest, relationship, or previous participation in the matter under litigationwhich are grounds for mandatory inhibition under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Courtthere might be other causes that could diminish the objectivity of the judge, thus warranting his or her inhibition. Petitioners' claim of bias and partiality on the part of the Sandiganbayan justices who issued the April 11, 2000 Resolution, evaluated in light of the resolution itself, is evidently more imagined than real. To say, as is petitioners' wont, that a judge who throws out a party's motion in the language employed by the Sandiganbayan in the questioned Resolution is necessarily prejudiced, is to be indiscriminate and precipitate. Petitioners' assertion that the April 11, 2000 Resolution was harshly worded and evinced prejudgment of the case in respondent's favor is easily disproved by a reading of the Resolution in its entirety. As will be discussed hereafter, the Sandiganbayan's pronouncement that the Compromise Agreement was grossly disadvantageous and prejudicial to the government is supported by the facts on record. In charging the Sandiganbayan with forejudgment when it said that "all it takes to prove the case is evidence that the properties are manifestly out of proportion to the late Mayor Maximino A. Argana's salary and to his other lawful income and other legitimately acquired income,"55 petitioners have taken the statement out of context. The Sandiganbayan made the statement in relation to its bewilderment as to why the PCGG expressed difficulty in prosecuting the case against the late Mayor Argana in spite of the presumption regarding unexplained wealth in Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The Sandiganbayan therefore had legal and factual grounds to deny petitioners' motion for inhibition. Anent the propriety of the Sandiganbayan's nullification of the Compromise Agreement on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the Court holds that no error nor grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed to the Sandiganbayan for ruling that the execution of the Compromise Agreement was tainted with fraud on the part of petitioners and in connivance with some PCGG officials. A circumspect review of the record of the case reveals that fraud, indeed, was perpetuated upon respondent in the execution of the Compromise Agreement, the assessed or market values of the properties offered for settlement having been concealed from the reviewing authorities such as the PCGG En Banc and even the President of the Republic. The discussion of the Sandiganbayan on the nature and extent of the fraud perpetuated upon respondent in the execution of the Compromise Agreement is clear and convincing: Noticeable from the documents submitted to the court after the decision approving the Compromise Agreement was promulgated is the fact that only the percentage of sharing based on area was mentioned and brought to the attention of the PCGG en banc and the Solicitor General. The value of the properties was never, and not even once, mentioned. Thus, in the Memorandum of Director Mauro J. Estrada of the PCGG Research and Development Department to the PCGG Chairman, dated August 18, 1997, the following exposition appears: "12. On July 10, 1996, the Arganas submitted a proposal for Compromise Agreement (copy attached, per Annex "J") that would cede by donation about 231 hectares of agricultural lands to the government, Xerox copies of nine (9) TCTs attached therewith, enumerated as follows: "TCT No. T-3813 T-8314 T-8315 T-8316 T-8317 T-4104 T-4106 T-4108 T-4044 Area in Square Meters 47,908 47,461 30,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 38,550 31,618 1,137,361 883,355 2,306,253 Sq. Meters 230,6253 Hectares "Another big tract of land located at Matikiw, Pangil, Laguna, consisting of 131,2950 hectares covered by TCT No. T-4009, per Annex "K" may be considered for inclusion in the proposed compromise settlement. The reason for this is that this land is being eyed by the DAR for distribution under the CARP. As a whole, the government may be able to acquire about 361.9203 hectares of land equivalent to 75.12% of the 481.7742 hectares of land of sequestered real estate property belonging to the Arganas and other owners. Location Famy, Laguna -do-do-do-do-do-do-doSan Isidro & Banilan, Pangil, Laguna

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"However, of the 481.7742 hectares covered by a sequestration order, the late Mayor Argana owns about 409.50817 hectares and possibly the heirs are willing to cede 361.9203 hectares which is equivalent to 88.38%, retaining 47.5887 hectares or 11.62% of what they owned. "E. EVALUATION "1) As presented in Annex "L", page 13, the total area of real estate property sequestered aggregated to 481.7742 hectares accounted as follows: Total Area Sequestered Accounted as Follows: a) owned by Mayor Maximino Argana b) Owned by his Brothers & Sisters c) Foreclosed by Los Baos Rural Bank d) Owned by Other Persons TOTAL 100.00% 75.12% 9.88% 1.24% 8.23% 100.00% 409.50817 has. 26.6318 has. 39.64865 has. 481.77422 has. a) To be ceded the Government b) To be retained by the late Mayor Argana's Heirs c) Owned by his Brothers & Sisters d) Foreclosed by Los Baos Rural Bank e) Owned by Other Persons Total 75.12% 9.88% 5.53% 1.24% 8.23% 100.00%

"However, since the late Mayor Argana owns 409.50817 hectares sequestered and may possibly cede 361.9203 hectares, the percentage share of the government would be 88.38% of the 409.50817 hectares actually registered in his name and his children. "G. RECOMMENDATION "The PCGG wanted to recover as much as it could and as fast as possible, while the Arganas wanted to buy peace without admitting guilt. In order to avoid further lengthy litigation and to put an end to an almost ten-year unresolved sequestration issue, and to expedite recovery so that the remaining assets may be used to contribute to the national recovery, the 230.6253 hectares of land covered by nine (9) TCTs (Nos. T-3813, T-3814, T-3815, T-3816, T-3817, T4104, T-4106, T-4108 and T-4044) offered by the Arganas be favorably considered, on condition that another real estate property covered by TCT No. T-4009, located at Matikiw, Pangil, Laguna, consisting of 131.2950 hectares, be included and to be ceded to the government. All other lots sequestered should be freed from the sequestration order. "As a whole, the government stands to acquire about 361.9203 hectares out of the 409.50817 hectares registered in the name of Sps. Maximino A. Argana, REFEDOR, and their children, equivalent to 88.38%. The remaining 11.62% or 47.58787 hectares will be retained by the latter. "For the consideration of the Commission. Signed MAURO J. ESTRADA" (Record, v. 6, pp. 776-78) (Underlining supplied)

"2) Out of the total area of 481.77422 hectares covered by a sequestration order, about 409.50817 hectares are owned by the late Mayor Argana. The other lots are owned by his brothers and sisters (26.6318 hectares), foreclosed by Los Baos Rural Bank (5.9856 hectares), and registered and/or acquired by other persons (39.64865 hectares). In the event that the other big area consisting of 131.2950 hectares of land is included in the compromise settlement in favor of the government, a total of 361-50817 (sic) hectares of land would comprise about 88.38 % of the 409.50817 hectares registered in the name of the late Mayor Argana. 3) However, as a whole the 361.9203 hectares to be ceded to the government is equivalent to 75.12% of the 481.77422 hectares sequestered by PCGG as presented above. Since the late mayor owns 409.50817 hectares to the government, the percentage share of the government would be 88.38 % and the remaining 11.62 % may be retained by the heirs of the late Mayor Argana, equivalent to 47.58787 hectares. "F. SUMMARY "The family of the late Mayor Maximino A. Argana offered to cede to the government a total of 230.62553 hectares of land covered by nine (9) TCTs. Another property, however, consisting of 131.2950 hectares may be considered for inclusion which would increase to 361.9203 hectares of land that may be ceded to the government. "In the event that the 361.9203 hectares are finally considered and acceptable by both parties, the PCGG and the Arganas, the 481.77422 hectares of sequestered property would be accounted as follows: Total Area Sequestered Accounted as follows: 100.00%

.... The value of the properties must have been raised or even discussed during the several years that the properties were held under sequestration. Yet, not even the PCGG bothered to produce any tax declaration, assessment or appraisal to show the assessed or fair market value of the properties. . . . .

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Again in another Memorandum of Director Mauro J. Estrada to PCGG Counsel Edgardo L. Kilayko, dated February 2, 1988, the properties were listed according to the name of the owner, certificate of title, area in square meters, location and percentages in relation to the whole. Obvious from the listing is the absence of a column to indicate the value of the properties or their classification. . . . The percentage based solely on area, was clearly emphasized, as shown by the following portions of said Memorandum: "Out of the 409.50817 hectares registered in the name of Spouses Maximo A. Argana and Donata A. Argana as presented above, 361.9203 hectares covering eleven (11) TCTs are to be ceded to the government under the compromise agreement signed by Argana and the Commission in the latter part of 1997. The 361.9203 hectares to be ceded to the government is equivalent to 75.12 % of the total area of 481.77422 hectares, as presented below: x x x" (Record, v. 6, p. 1739) (underlining supplied) "As a whole, there are 324 TCTs/OCTs covering a total area of 481.77422 hectares, out of which the heirs of the late Mayor agreed to cede 361.9203 hectares equivalent to 75.12 % of the total area. Sometime. In August 1997, the Commission agreed to accept the offer by concluding a compromise agreement with the heirs of the late Mayor." (Record, v. 6, p. 1739) (underlining supplied) .... Costs against petitioners. . . . The values were deliberately omitted to make it appear that the Compromise Agreement adheres to the 75%-25% ratio broadly adopted by the PCGG in compromising cases of illgotten wealth. It was this 75%-25% mode of compromise, with the greater share of 75% going to the government that misled the Court to believe, as We did believe, that the Compromise Agreement was fair, reasonable and advantageous to the Government. . . . . . . What was projected to be a 75%-25% ratio was in reality a 00.15%-99.85% ratio, with 99.85% going to the Arganas. This is unconscionable and immoral. And since it results in a transaction grossly disadvantageous and immoral to the government, it is against the law as being violative of Section 3(g) of Republic Act 3019. ... In the instant case, fraud of an extrinsic character exists because the representatives of plaintiff Republic in the PCGG connived with defendants in hiding the assessed or market values of the properties involved, so as to make it appear that the Compromise Agreement adhered to the 75%-25% ratio adopted by the PCGG in entering into compromise of cases involving the recovery of ill-gotten wealth. Through their infidelity, those in the PCGG who handled or were closely involved with the case during the last days of the previous administration fraudulently gave the Compromise Agreement a semblance of fairness and official acceptability. They sold plaintiff Republic down the river by entering into an agreement grossly disadvantageous to the government. For while plaintiff Republic got 00.15% (00.15074) SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur. G.R. No. 169604 March 6, 2007 of the estimated value of all the properties involved in this case, defendants almost ran away with 99.85% (99.84526) of their value. This is patently unfair. It is no compromise but a virtual sell-out. It could not have been pulled off without the connivance or collusion of those responsible for the case in the PCGG. Instead of protecting the interest of the government, they connived at its defeatalmost.56 (Emphasis in the original.) It is evident from the foregoing that the ruling of the Sandiganbayan is grounded on facts and on the law. The Court sees no reason to depart from the conclusions drawn by the Sandiganbayan on the basis of its findings, especially considering that the three justices comprising the Sandiganbayan's Third Division conducted a thorough examination of the documents submitted by the parties to this case, heard the testimonies of the parties' witnesses and observed their deportment during the hearing on the Motion to Rescind. Moreover, it is an established rule that the State cannot be estopped by the mistakes of its agents. 57 Respondent cannot be bound by a manifestly unjust compromise agreement reviewed on its behalf and entered into by its representatives from the PCGG who apparently were not looking after respondent's best interests. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Resolution dated April 11, 2000 of the Sandiganbayan granting the Motion to Rescind Compromise Agreement and to Set Aside Judgment by Compromise and setting the case for pre-trial, as well as the Order dated February 22, 2001 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, are hereby AFFIRMED.

NELSON P. COLLANTES, Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondents. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. A final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law; and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. 1

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What would happen, however, if two separate decisions, irreconcilably conflicting with each other, both attained finality? Quite clearly, to hold that both decisions are immutable and unalterable would cause not only confusion and uncertainty, but utter bewilderment upon the persons tasked to execute these judgments. This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the Decision2 dated 10 March 2005 and the Resolution3 dated 31 August 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 78092. The undisputed facts of this case are summarized by the Court of Appeals: Petitioner Nelson Collantes (hereafter, Collantes) was conferred Career Executive Service Eligibility on 29 February 1996. Then President Fidel V. Ramos accorded him the rank of Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) II on 10 February 1997. More than a year later, he was appointed as Undersecretary for Peace and Order of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). With the change of administration, Collantes allegedly received word from persons close to then President Ejercito Estrada to give up his position so that the President could unreservedly appoint his key officials. As such, Collantes relinquished his post at the DILG. Thereafter, on 1 July 1998, President Estrada appointed Collantes to the controversial post Undersecretary for Civilian Relations of the Department of National Defense (DND). As it happened, his stint in the DND was short lived. Collantes was supposedly ordered by then Secretary Orlando Mercado to renounce his post in favor of another presidential appointee, General Orlando Soriano. In deference to the Presidents prerogative, he resigned from office believing that he will soon be given a new assignment. Unfortunately, Collantes was not given any other post in the government, as in fact, he received a letter from President Estrada terminating his services effective 8 February 1999. Consequently, on 24 March 1999, Collantes requested the assistance of the Career Executive Service Board relative to the termination of his services as Undersecretary for Civilian Relations of the DND invoking his right to security of tenure as a CESO. The termination of Collantes services, notwithstanding, President Estrada accorded Collantes the highest rank in the CES ranking structure, CESO Rank I, on 17 July 1999. But then, despite this promotion in rank, Collantes did not receive new appointment, and worse, the President appointed Mr. Edgardo Batenga to the much coveted position of Undersecretary for Civilian Relations of the DND. Taking definite action on the matter, Collantes instituted a Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus before Us on 29 January 2001, docketed as C.A. G.R. SP NO. 62874. Collantes maintained that he was constructively dismissed from work, without any cause and due process of law, and thus, his position in the DND was never vacated at all. Accordingly, he prayed that the appointment of Mr. Edgardo Batenga be nullified, and that he be reinstated to his former position with full back salaries. Notably, Collantes also sought for appointment to a position of equivalent rank commensurate to his CESO Rank I if reinstatement to his former position is no longer legally feasible. Meanwhile, on 13 August 2001, the CSC favorably acted on Collantes letter-request issuing Resolution No. 011364, and thereby holding that Collantes relief as Undersecretary of DND amounted to illegal dismissal as he was not given another post concomitant to his eligibility. Then, on 30 August 2001, We rendered Our Decision in C.A. G.R. SP No. 62874 dismissing the Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus filed by Collantes. Significantly, We pronounced: "By such actuations of the petitioner, the Court finds that he has (sic) effectively resigned from his position as Undersecretary of the DND, and the public respondents are under no compulsion to reinstate him to his old position. xxxx "In this case, petitioner has undoubtedly shown his intention to relinquish his public office, and has in fact surrendered such post to the Chief Executive, who, on the other hand, has shown his acceptance of the same by appointing a new person to the position relinquished by the petitioner. xxxx Quo warranto, it must be pointed out, is unavailing in the instatnt case, as the public office in question has not been usurped, intruded into or unlawfully held by the present occupant. Nor does the incumbent undersecretary appear to have done or suffered an act which forfeits his assumption. (Section 1, Rule 66, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). Furthermore, it appears that the action for quo warranto, assuming it is available, has already lapsed by prescription, pursuant to Section 11 of the pertinent Rule ... xxxx WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus is hereby DISMISSED." The controversy reached the Supreme Court as G.R. No. 149883. Nevertheless, the case was considered closed and terminated when Collantes manifested his desire not to pursue his appeal and withdraw his Petition for Review on Certiorari. Thereafter, Collantes moved for the execution of CSC Resolution No. 011364, which was accordingly granted through CSC Resolution No. 020084 dated 15 January 2002 "directing the DND to give Collantes a position where his eligibility is appropriate and to pay his backwages and other benefits from the time of his termination up to his actual reinstatement." In a Letter dated 7 February 2002, the Legal Affairs Division of the DND, through Atty. Leticia A. Gloria, urged the CSC to revisit its Resolutions which were entirely in conflict with Our 30 August 2001 Decision in C.A. G.R. SP NO. 62874, which has attained finality pursuant to the Supreme Courts Resolution in G.R. No. 149883. Consequently, in complete turnabout from its previous stance, the CSC issued Resolution No. 021482 dated 12 November 2002 declaring that had it been properly informed that a Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus was then pending before Us, it would have refrained from ruling on Collantes quandary, thus:

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"WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs Leticia A. Gloria of the department of National Defense (DND) is hereby GRANTED and CSC Resolutions Nos. 01-1364 dated August 13, 2001 and 02-0084 dated January 15, 2002 are reversed. Accordingly, pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals, Nelson P. Collantes is deemed effectively resigned from his position as Undersecretary of the DND." Forthwith, Collantes moved for a reconsideration of this Resolution, but was denied by the CSC in the second assailed Resolution No. 030542 dated 5 May 2003.4 On 18 July 2003, herein petitioner Collantes then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals praying for the reversal of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolutions No. 021482 and No. 030542. Before the Court of Appeals can decide this case, however, petitioner was appointed as General Manager of the Philippine Retirement Authority on 5 August 2004. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari in the assailed 10 March 2005 Decision: WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. No grave abuse of discretion may be imputed against the Civil Service Commission for rendering Resolution Nos. 021482 and 030542, dated 12 November 2002 and 5 May 2003, respectively. No pronouncement as to costs.5 The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied in the assailed 31 August 2005 Resolution.6 Petitioner filed the present Petition for Review, seeking the reversal of the foregoing Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. In view of his 5 August 2004 appointment, however, petitioners prayer is now limited to seeking the payment of backwages and other benefits that may have been due him from the time of his alleged dismissal on 8 February 1999 to his appointment on 5 August 2004. Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration: A. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT HELD THAT THE DECISION IN CA-G.R. NO. 62874 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS IS A BAR TO IMPLEMENT THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION DATED AUGUST 14, 2001. B. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DID NOT FIND THAT THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REVERSED ITS VERY OWN DECISION WHICH HAS LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND IN FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. C. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE RESOLUTION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION WHICH HELD THAT PETITIONER MAY BE REMOVED FROM HIS POSITION AS UNDERSECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE WITHOUT THE CONCOMITANT TRANSFER TO A POSITION EQUIVALENT IN RANK OR BE REMOVED THEN, BE FLOATED PERPETUALLY, WHICH IS TANTAMOUNT TO A CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL, IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE AS A CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE ELIGIBLE. 7 Both petitioner and herein respondents CSC and Department of National Defense (DND) invoke the doctrine of immutability of final judgments. Petitioner claims that the 13 August 2001 Resolution of the CSC, which held that petitioner "was illegally removed as Undersecretary of the Department of National Defense and therefore x x x should be given a position where his eligibility is appropriate or sufficient," has attained finality. Petitioner adds that, not only has there been no appeal or motion for reconsideration filed within the allowable periods, the CSC even granted the Motion for Execution filed by petitioner in its Order dated 15 January 2002. Petitioner thereby invokes our ruling that, before a writ of execution may issue, there must necessarily be a final judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding.8 Petitioner also faults the CSC for ruling on a mere letter filed by Atty. Leticia Gloria of the DND, which petitioner claims is fatally defective for failure to comply with the procedural due process clause of the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and the Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service which require notice to adverse parties. 9 Respondents, on the other hand, invoke the same doctrine of immutability of final judgments, this time with respect to the 30 August 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus filed by petitioner. This Court of Appeals Decision became final and executory when petitioner withdrew the Motion for Extension to File a Petition for Review on Certiorari he filed with this Court.10 Forum Shopping, Res Judicata, and Litis Pendentia Our rules on forum shopping are meant to prevent such eventualities as conflicting final decisions as in the case at bar. We have ruled that what is important in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues.11 More particularly, the elements of forum shopping are: (a) identity of parties or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.12 Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata);

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and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata). 13 If the forum shopping is not considered willful and deliberate, the subsequent cases shall be dismissed without prejudice on one of the two grounds mentioned above. However, if the forum shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions shall be dismissed with prejudice. 14 Petitioner disputes respondents claim, and the CSCs ruling, 15 that he had lodged two separate actions. Petitioner explains that he never filed a case before the CSC. He merely sought the assistance of the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) in a letter-request dated 24 March 1999. Said letter-request, petitioner claims, did not ask for any ruling. Petitioner claims that, considering that two years had already lapsed without any response from the CESB, he filed on 23 January 2001 his Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus with the Court of Appeals. Petitioner was surprised when he learned through the 8 February 2001 letter of the CESB that, on 29 November 2000, it referred petitioners request to the CSC for appropriate action. 16 Petitioner was not required to submit any pleading in support of his request. Apparently, the CSC treated the letterrequest as a complaint or petition over which it could exercise its adjudicative powers, as it issued its 13 August 2001 Resolution declaring petitioner to have been illegally removed as Undersecretary of the DND, and should therefore be given a position appropriate or sufficient for his eligibility. 17 As stated above, the Court of Appeals Decision dismissing the Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus was rendered 17 days later, on 30 August 2001. Petitioner filed with this Court a motion for an extension of time within which to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari, but he later submitted a Manifestation for the withdrawal of this motion as he decided not to pursue his appeal.18 Instead, petitioner filed with the CSC on 25 October 2001 a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution, 19 which the CSC granted on 15 January 2002.20 In repeatedly asserting that he did not file two separate actions, petitioner is arguing, without stating it categorically, that he cannot be held liable for forum shopping. However, what one cannot do directly cannot be done indirectly. Petitioner had been aware, through the 8 February 2001 letter of the CESB, that his request for assistance was referred to the CSC on 29 November 2000 for appropriate action. From that point on, he knew that two government agencies the CSC and the Court of Appeals were simultaneously in the process of reaching their respective decisions on whether petitioner was entitled to reinstatement or to a position appropriate to his eligibility. Therefore, it cannot be denied that petitioner knew, from the moment of receipt of the 8 February 2001 letter of the CESB, that he had effectively instituted two separate cases, and whatever original intention he had for his letter-request is, by then, forgotten. Petitioner subsequently proceeded to act like a true forum shopper he abandoned the forum where he could not get a favorable judgment, and moved to execute the Resolution of the forum where he succeeded. Petitioners above actuation is, in fact, a violation of his certification against forum shopping with the Court of Appeals, a ground for dismissal of actions distinct from forum shopping itself. As petitioner knew from the receipt of the CESB letter that another claim was pending in a quasi-judicial agency concerning these issues, he was bound by his certification with the Court of Appeals to report such fact within five days from his knowledge thereof. This circumstance of being surprised by the discovery of another pending claim with another court or quasi-judicial agency is the very situation contemplated by letter (c) in the first paragraph of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court: Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. (Emphases supplied.) Petitioner, however, further asserts that the issues brought in the Petition for Certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals on 18 July 2003 and the Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus filed on 29 January 2001 are distinct, and that the Decision of the Court of Appeals in the latter cannot constitute res judicata with respect to the former.21 Petitioner claims that the issues, remedies and reliefs in the two cases are different, citing as basis the textbook definitions of quo warranto, certiorari and mandamus. Petitioner further claims that: There is a clear distinction between the right of petitioner to the position of Undersecretary for Civilian Relations and his right to be re-appointed to another position of equivalent rank, in view of his CESO I status. The former issue may have been resolved by the Court of Appeals when it ruled that petitioner Collantes had "effectively resigned from his position as Undersecretary of the DND, and the public respondents are under no compulsion to reinstate him to his old position." The latter issue, or the right of petitioner Collantes to be given a new assignment fitting to his CESO I rank, arises from his right to security of tenure as a Career Executive Service Eligible, and not from his appointment to the DND.22 This allegedly clear distinction springs from petitioners claim that he resigned from his position, but not from his rank as a Career Executive Service Officer (CESO). Petitioner claims that, as a CESO, there is a "great difference between (1) resigning from ones position and (2) resigning or relinquishing ones rank, as position is different from ones rank. POSITION refers to the particular or specific office from which one may be appointed. RANK, on the other hand, refers not to a particular position but to the class to which one belongs in the hierarchy of authority in an organization or bureaucracy."23 Petitioner cites Cuevas v. Bacal24: [S]ecurity of tenure to members of the CES does not extend to the particular positions to which they may be appointed --- a concept which is applicable only to the first and second-level employees in the civil service --- but to the rank to which they are appointed by the President. xxxx Mobility and flexibility in the assignment of personnel, the better to cope with the exigencies of public service, is thus the distinguishing feature of the Career Executive Service. x x x. and General v. Roco25: In addition, it must be stressed that the security of tenure of employees in the career executive service (except first and second-level employees in the civil service), pertains only to rank and not to the office or

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to the position to which they may be appointed. Thus, a career executive service officer may be transferred or reassigned from one position to another without losing his rank which follows him wherever he is transferred or reassigned. In fact, a CESO suffers no diminution of salary even if assigned to a CES position with lower salary grade, as he is compensated according to his CES rank and not on the basis of the position or office he occupies. While there is indeed a distinction between position and rank, such that a CESO may be transferred or reassigned from one position to another without losing his rank, there can be no distinction between resigning from a position and resigning from a rank. The rank of a CESO is deactivated upon separation from the government service, which includes the resignation of a CESO from his position. The CESB has clarified this concept of being in the inactive status in its Resolution No. 554, series of 2002: Rule II xxxx 7. CESO in Inactive Status - is a CESO who no longer occupies a position in the CES as a result of any of the modes of separation from the government service, provided that such separation is not due to dismissal from the service for cause. xxxx Rule IV Section 1. Modes of Deactivating a CES Rank. There are three (3) modes by which the CES Rank of a CESO may be deactivated from the CES: 1. Acceptance of a position by virtue of an appointment outside the coverage of the CES; 2. Dropping from the rolls of government officials and employees; and 3. Other modes of separation from the CES, provided that separation from the CES resulting from dismissal from the service for cause and after due process shall result in the loss of CES rank and shall not be considered as a mode of deactivation. xxxx Sec. 2. Effect of Deactivation of CES Rank. A CESO whose CES rank has been deactivated by the Board loses all the rights and privileges accorded to him/her by law on account of his/her CES rank. Likewise, it would be absurd for us to rule that a civil servant who resigns from his position can compel the President to appoint him to another position. Such a ruling would effectively derogate the discretion of the appointing authority,26 as it will give the CESO the option to choose which position he or she wants, by the simple expediency of resigning from the position he or she does not want. In sum, there is an identity of issues in the two cases which resulted in the two conflicting final and executory decisions. But while, as stated above, the second petition can be dismissed on the ground of either res judicata or non-compliance with the undertakings in petitioners certification against forum shopping, these grounds can only be invoked when the case is still pending. As petitioner points out, the Resolution of the CSC had already become final and executory. The 30 August 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals, however, has also attained finality. Hence, we go back to the main issue in this petition: which of the two final and executory decisions should be given effect, the 30 August 2001 Court of Appeals Decision dismissing the petitioners Petition for Quo Warranto, or the 13 August 2001 CSC Resolution declaring petitioner Collantes to be illegally removed as Undersecretary of the DND? Two Conflicting Final and Executory Decisions Jurisprudence in the United States offers different solutions to this problem: Where there have been two former actions in which the claim or demand, fact or matter sought to be religated has been decided contrarily, the rule that, where there is an estoppel against an estoppel, it "setteth the matter at large" has been applied by some authorities, and in such case both parties may assert their claims anew. Other authorities have held that, of two conflicting judgments on the same rights of the same parties, the one which is later in time will prevail, although it has also been held that the judgment prior in time will prevail. It has been held that a decision of a court of last resort is binding on the parties, although afterward, in another cause, a different principle was declared. 27 There are thus three solutions which we can adopt in resolving the case at bar: the first is for the parties to assert their claims anew, the second is to determine which judgment came first, and the third is to determine which of the judgments had been rendered by a court of last resort. As there are conflicting jurisprudence on the second solution, it is appropriate for this Court to adopt either the first or the third solution. The first solution involves disregarding the finality of the two previous judgments and allowing the parties to argue on the basis of the merits of the case anew. The third solution merely involves the determination of which judgment has been rendered by this Court, the court of last resort in this jurisdiction. Adopting the third solution will result in the denial of this Petition for Certiorari. Whereas the finality of the 13 August 2001 CSC Resolution came about by the failure to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal within the proper reglementary periods, the finality of the 30 August 2001 Court of Appeals Decision was by virtue of the 12 November 2001 Resolution 28 of this Court which declared the case closed and terminated upon the manifestation of petitioner that he decided not to pursue his appeal and was thus withdrawing the motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari. The better solution, however, is to let the parties argue the merits of the case anew, and decide the case on the basis thereof. We can do this either by remanding the case to a lower court, or by resolving the issues in this disposition. The latter recourse is more appropriate, for three reasons: (1) all the facts, arguments, and pleadings in support of the parties contentions are now before us, with the parties advancing the very same contentions as those in this Petition; (2) a remand to the Court of Appeals

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would entail asking the latter to resolve the very same issues it had passed upon twice; and (3) a remand to the Court of Appeals would only entail another unnecessary delay in the termination of the case when the case is now ripe for adjudication before us. The merits of the case are the focus of petitioners third assignment of error in the present petition. Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed a grave and reversible error when it upheld the resolution of the CSC which allegedly effectively held "that petitioner may be removed from his position as Undersecretary of the Department of National Defense without the concomitant transfer to a position equivalent in rank or be removed then, be floated perpetually, which is tantamount to a constructive dismissal, in violation of his right to security of tenure as a career executive service eligible." 29 Petitioners arguments presuppose that he had been removed from his position as Undersecretary of the DND. He, however, did not present any evidence to that effect, whether in this Petition or in his earlier Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus with the Court of Appeals. If he is implying that he was removed from office by virtue of his account that he was approached by persons close to President Joseph Estrada who asked him to relinquish his post, which he did, then this Petition must fail, for, by his own deliberate deed, he resigned from his position. There are no special legal effects when a resignation is one of a courtesy resignation. The mere fact that the President, by himself or through another, requested for someones resignation does not give the President the obligation to appoint such person to another position. A courtesy resignation is just as effectual as any other resignation. There can be no implied promises of another position just because the resignation was made out of courtesy. Any express promise of another position, on the other hand, would be void, because there can be no derogation of the discretion of the appointing power,30 and because its object is outside the commerce of man.31 As held by the Court of Appeals in its 30 August 2001 Decision: In the first place, petitioner has not established by any quantum of certainty the veracity of his claim that he was promised an equivalent position in the government. Assuming, however, that such promise was true, petitioner, as a ranking member of the bureaucracy, ought to have known that such promise offers no assurance in law that the same would be complied with. The time-honored rule is that public office is a public trust, and as such, the same is governed by law, and cannot be made the subject of personal promises or negotiations by private persons.32 WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. No costs. SO ORDERED. THE BOARD OF INVESTMENTS, THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, LUZON PETROCHEMICAL CORPORATION, and PILIPINAS SHELL CORPORATION, respondents. Abraham C. La Vina for petitioner. Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for Luzon Petrochemical Corporation. Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Board of Investments (BOI)/Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) approving the transfer of the site of the proposed petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and the shift of feedstock for that plant from naphtha only to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). This petition is a sequel to the petition in G.R. No. 88637 entitled "Congressman Enrique T. Garcia v. the Board of Investments", September 7, 1989, where this Court issued a decision, ordering the BOI as follows: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The Board of Investments is ordered: (1) to publish the amended application for registration of the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, (2) to allow the petitioner to have access to its records on the original and amended applications for registration, as a petrochemical manufacturer, of the respondent Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, excluding, however, privileged papers containing its trade secrets and other business and financial information, and (3) to set for hearing the petitioner's opposition to the amended application in order that he may present at such hearing all the evidence in his possession in support of his opposition to the transfer of the site of the BPC petrochemical plant to Batangas province. The hearing shall not exceed a period of ten (10) days from the date fixed by the BOI, notice of which should be served by personal service to the petitioner through counsel, at least three (3) days in advance. The hearings may be held from day to day for a period of ten (10) days without postponements. The petition for a writ of prohibition or preliminary injunction is denied. No costs. (Rollo, pages 450-451) However, acting on the petitioner's motion for partial reconsideration asking that we rule on the import of P.D. Nos. 949 and 1803 and on the foreign investor's claim of right of final choice of plant site, in the light of the provisions of the Constitution and the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, this Court on October 24, 1989, made the observation that P.D. Nos. 949 and 1803 "do not provide that the Limay site should be the only petrochemical zone in the country, nor prohibit the establishment of a petrochemical plant elsewhere in the country, that the establishment of a petrochemical plant in Batangas does not violate P.D. No. 949 and P.D. No. 1803.

Article XII. National Economy and Patrimony

G.R. No. 92024 November 9, 1990 CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA (Second District of Bataan), petitioner, vs.

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Our resolution skirted the issue of whether the investor given the initial inducements and other circumstances surrounding its first choice of plant site may change it simply because it has the final choice on the matter. The Court merely ruled that the petitioner appears to have lost interest in the case by his failure to appear at the hearing that was set by the BOI after receipt of the decision, so he may be deemed to have waived the fruit of the judgment. On this ground, the motion for partial reconsideration was denied. A motion for reconsideration of said resolution was filed by the petitioner asking that we resolve the basic issue of whether or not the foreign investor has the right of final choice of plant site; that the nonattendance of the petitioner at the hearing was because the decision was not yet final and executory; and that the petitioner had not therefor waived the right to a hearing before the BOI. In the Court's resolution dated January 17, 1990, we stated: Does the investor have a "right of final choice" of plant site? Neither under the 1987 Constitution nor in the Omnibus Investments Code is there such a 'right of final choice.' In the first place, the investor's choice is subject to processing and approval or disapproval by the BOI (Art. 7, Chapter II, Omnibus Investments Code). By submitting its application and amended application to the BOI for approval, the investor recognizes the sovereign prerogative of our Government, through the BOI, to approve or disapprove the same after determining whether its proposed project will be feasible, desirable and beneficial to our country. By asking that his opposition to the LPC's amended application be heard by the BOI, the petitioner likewise acknowledges that the BOI, not the investor, has the last word or the "final choice" on the matter. Secondly, as this case has shown, even a choice that had been approved by the BOI may not be 'final', for supervening circumstances and changes in the conditions of a place may dictate a corresponding change in the choice of plant site in order that the project will not fail. After all, our country will benefit only when a project succeeds, not when it fails. (Rollo, pp. 538-539) Nevertheless, the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied. A minority composed of Justices Melencio-Herrera, Gancayco, Sarmiento and this ponente voted to grant the motion for reconsideration stating that the hearing set by the BOI was premature as the decision of the Court was not yet final and executory; that as contended by the petitioner the Court must first rule on whether or not the investor has the right of final choice of plant site for if the ruling is in the affirmative, the hearing would be a useless exercise; that in the October 19, 1989 resolution, the Court while upholding validity of the transfer of the plant site did not rule on the issue of who has the final choice; that they agree with the observation of the majority that "the investor has no final choice either under the 1987 Constitution or in the Omnibus Investments Code and that it is the BOI who decides for the government" and that the plea of the petitioner should be granted to give him the chance to show the justness of his claim and to enable the BOI to give a second hard look at the matter. Thus, the herein petition which relies on the ruling of the Court in the resolution of January 17, 1990 in G.R. No. 88637 that the investor has no right of final choice under the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Investments Code. Under P.D. No. 1803 dated January 16, 1981, 576 hectares of the public domain located in Lamao, Limay, Bataan were reserved for the Petrochemical Industrial Zone under the administration, management, and ownership of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC). The Bataan Refining Corporation (BRC) is a wholly government owned corporation, located at Bataan. It produces 60% of the national output of naphtha. Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) and applied with BOI for registration as a new domestic producer of petrochemicals. Its application specified Bataan as the plant site. One of the terms and conditions for registration of the project was the use of "naphtha cracker" and "naphtha" as feedstock or fuel for its petrochemical plant. The petrochemical plant was to be a joint venture with PNOC. BPC was issued a certificate of registration on February 24, 1988 by BOI. BPC was given pioneer status and accorded fiscal and other incentives by BOI, like: (1) exemption from taxes on raw materials, (2) repatriation of the entire proceeds of liquidation investments in currency originally made and at the exchange rate obtaining at the time of repatriation; and (3) remittance of earnings on investments. As additional incentive, the House of Representatives approved a bill introduced by the petitioner eliminating the 48% ad valorem tax on naphtha if and when it is used as raw materials in the petrochemical plant. (G.R. No. 88637, September 7, 1989, pp. 2-3. Rollo, pp. 441-442) However, in February, 1989, A.T. Chong, chairman of USI Far East Corporation, the major investor in BPC, personally delivered to Trade Secretary Jose Concepcion a letter dated January 25, 1989 advising him of BPC's desire to amend the original registration certification of its project by changing the job site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas. The reason adduced for the transfer was the insurgency and unstable labor situation, and the presence in Batangas of a huge liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) depot owned by the Philippine Shell Corporation. The petitioner vigorously opposed the proposal and no less than President Aquino expressed her preference that the plant be established in Bataan in a conference with the Taiwanese investors, the Secretary of National Defense and The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. Despite speeches in the Senate and House opposing the Transfer of the project to Batangas, BPC filed on April 11, 1989 its request for approval of the amendments. Its application is as follows: "(l) increasing the investment amount from US $220 million to US $320 million; (2) increasing the production capacity of its naphtha cracker, polythylene plant and polypropylene plant; (3) changing the feedstock from naphtha only to "naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas;" and (4) transferring the job site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas. (Annex B to Petition; Rollo, p. 25) Notwithstanding opposition from any quarters and the request of the petitioner addressed to Secretary Concepcion to be furnished a copy of the proposed amendment with its attachments which was denied

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by the BOI on May 25, 1989, BOI approved the revision of the registration of BPC's petrochemical project. (Petition, Annex F; Rollo, p. 32; See pp. 4 to 6, Decision in G.R. No. 88637; supra.) BOI Vice-Chairman Tomas I. Alcantara testifying before the Committee on Ways and Means of the Senate asserted that: The BOI has taken a public position preferring Bataan over Batangas as the site of the petrochemical complex, as this would provide a better distribution of industries around the Metro Manila area. ... In advocating the choice of Bataan as the project site for the petrochemical complex, the BOI, however, made it clear, and I would like to repeat this that the BOI made it clear in its view that the BOI or the government for that matter could only recomend as to where the project should be located. The BOI recognizes and respect the principle that the final chouce is still with the proponent who would in the final analysis provide the funding or risk capital for the project. (Petition, P. 13; Annex D to the petition) This position has not been denied by BOI in its pleadings in G.R. No. 88637 and in the present petition. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides: SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. There is before us an actual controversy whether the petrochemical plant should remain in Bataan or should be transferred to Batangas, and whether its feedstock originally of naphtha only should be changed to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas as the approved amended application of the BPC, now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation (LPC), shows. And in the light of the categorical admission of the BOI that it is the investor who has the final choice of the site and the decision on the feedstock, whether or not it constitutes a grave abuse of discretion for the BOI to yield to the wishes of the investor, national interest notwithstanding. We rule that the Court has a constitutional duty to step into this controversy and determine the paramount issue. We grant the petition. First, Bataan was the original choice as the plant site of the BOI to which the BPC agreed. That is why it organized itself into a corporation bearing the name Bataan. There is available 576 hectares of public land precisely reserved as the petrochemical zone in Limay, Bataan under P.D. No. 1803. There is no need to buy expensive real estate for the site unlike in the proposed transfer to Batangas. The site is the result of careful study long before any covetous interests intruded into the choice. The site is ideal. It is not unduly constricted and allows for expansion. The respondents have not shown nor reiterated that the alleged peace and order situation in Bataan or unstable labor situation warrant a transfer of the plant site to Batangas. Certainly, these were taken into account when the firm named itself Bataan Petrochemical Corporation. Moreover, the evidence proves the contrary. Second, the BRC, a government owned Filipino corporation, located in Bataan produces 60% of the national output of naphtha which can be used as feedstock for the plant in Bataan. It can provide the feedstock requirement of the plant. On the other hand, the country is short of LPG and there is need to import the same for use of the plant in Batangas. The local production thereof by Shell can hardly supply the needs of the consumers for cooking purposes. Scarce dollars will be diverted, unnecessarily, from vitally essential projects in order to feed the furnaces of the transferred petrochemical plant. Third, naphtha as feedstock has been exempted by law from the ad valorem tax by the approval of Republic Act No. 6767 by President Aquino but excluding LPG from exemption from ad valorem tax. The law was enacted specifically for the petrochemical industry. The policy determination by both Congress and the President is clear. Neither BOI nor a foreign investor should disregard or contravene expressed policy by shifting the feedstock from naphtha to LPG. Fourth, under Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, it is the duty of the State to "regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities." The development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos is mandated in Section 19, Article II of the Constitution. In Article 2 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 "the sound development of the national economy in consonance with the principles and objectives of economic nationalism" is the set goal of government. Fifth, with the admitted fact that the investor is raising the greater portion of the capital for the project from local sources by way of loan which led to the so-called "petroscam scandal", the capital requirements would be greatly minimized if LPC does not have to buy the land for the project and its feedstock shall be limited to naphtha which is certainly more economical, more readily available than LPG, and does not have to be imported. Sixth, if the plant site is maintained in Bataan, the PNOC shall be a partner in the venture to the great benefit and advantage of the government which shall have a participation in the management of the project instead of a firm which is a huge multinational corporation. In the light of all the clear advantages manifest in the plant's remaining in Bataan, practically nothing is shown to justify the transfer to Batangas except a near-absolute discretion given by BOI to investors not only to freely choose the site but to transfer it from their own first choice for reasons which remain murky to say the least. And this brings us to a prime consideration which the Court cannot rightly ignore. Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution provides that: xxx xxx xxx

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The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. xxx xxx xxx Every provision of the Constitution on the national economy and patrimony is infused with the spirit of national interest. The non-alienation of natural resources, the State's full control over the development and utilization of our scarce resources, agreements with foreigners being based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country and the regulation of foreign investments in accordance with national goals and priorities are too explicit not to be noticed and understood. A petrochemical industry is not an ordinary investment opportunity. It should not be treated like a garment or embroidery firm, a shoe-making venture, or even an assembler of cars or manufacturer of computer chips, where the BOI reasoning may be accorded fuller faith and credit. The petrochemical industry is essential to the national interest. In other ASEAN countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, the government superintends the industry by controlling the upstream or cracker facility. In this particular BPC venture, not only has the Government given unprecedented favors, among them: (1) For an initial authorized capital of only P20 million, the Central Bank gave an eligible relending credit or relending facility worth US $50 million and a debt to swap arrangement for US $30 million or a total accommodation of US $80 million which at current exchange rates is around P2080 million. (2) A major part of the company's capitalization shall not come from foreign sources but from loans, initially a Pl Billion syndicated loan, to be given by both government banks and a consortium of Philippine private banks or in common parlance, a case of 'guiniguisa sa sariling manteca.' (3) Tax exemptions and privileges were given as part of its 'preferred pioneer status.' (4) Loan applications of other Philippine firms will be crowded out of the Asian Development Bank portfolio because of the petrochemical firm's massive loan request. (Taken from the proceedings before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee). but through its regulatory agency, the BOI, it surrenders even the power to make a company abide by its initial choice, a choice free from any suspicion of unscrupulous machinations and a choice which is undoubtedly in the best interests of the Filipino people. The Court, therefore, holds and finds that the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the change of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final say is in the investor all other circumstances to the contrary notwithstanding. No cogent advantage to the government has been shown by this transfer. This is a repudiation of the independent policy of the government expressed in numerous laws and the Constitution to run its own affairs the way it deems best for the national interest. One can but remember the words of a great Filipino leader who in part said he would not mind having a government run like hell by Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation. In this case, it is not even a foreign government but an ordinary investor whom the BOI allows to dictate what we shall do with our heritage. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The decision of the respondent Board of Investments approving the amendment of the certificate of registration of the Luzon Petrochemical Corporation on May 23, 1989 under its Resolution No. 193, Series of 1989, (Annex F to the Petition) is SET ASIDE as NULL and VOID. The original certificate of registration of BPC' (now LPC) of February 24, 1988 with Bataan as the plant site and naphtha as the feedstock is, therefore, ordered maintained. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-30389 December 27, 1972 PEDRO LEE HONG HOK, SIMEON LEE HONG HOK, ROSITA LEE HONG HOK and LEONCIO LEE HONG HOK, petitioners, vs. ANIANO DAVID, THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. Augusto A. Pardalis for petitioners. Luis General, Jr. for respondent Aniano David. Office of the Solicitor General for other respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:p Petitioners 1 in this appeal by certiorari would have us reverse a decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming a lower court judgment dismissing their complaint to have the Torrens Title 2 of respondent Aniano David declared null and void. What makes the task for petitioners quite difficult is that their factual support for their pretension to ownership of such disputed lot through accretion was rejected by respondent Court of Appeals. Without such underpinning, they must perforce rely on a legal theory, which, to put it mildly, is distinguished by unorthodoxy and is therefore far from persuasive. A grant by the government through the appropriate public officials 3 exercising the competence duly vested in them by law is not to be set at naught on the premise, unexpressed but implied, that land not otherwise passing into private ownership may not be disposed of by the state. Such an assumption is at war with settled principles of constitutional law. It cannot receive our assent. We affirm.

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The decision of respondent Court of Appeals following that of the lower court makes clear that there is no legal justification for nullifying the right of respondent Aniano David to the disputed lot arising from the grant made in his favor by respondent officials. As noted in the decision under review, he "acquired lawful title thereby pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application in accordance with which an order of award and for issuance of a sales patent was made by the Director of Lands on June 18, 1958, covering Lot 2892 containing an area of 226 square meters, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the Naga Cadastre. On the basis of the order of award of the Director of Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which OCT No. 510 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City to defendant-appellee Aniano David on October 21, 1959. According to the Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of the sales application of Aniano David and during all the proceedings in connection with said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is fatal to them because after the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein.... Under Section 38 of Act 496 any question concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should be raised within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title based thereon becomes indefeasible.... In this case the land in question is not a private property as the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have always sustained the public character thereof for having been formed by reclamation.... The only remedy therefore, available to the appellants is an action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud. In this case we do not see any fraud committed by defendantappellant Aniano David in applying for the purchase of the land involved through his Miscellaneous Sales Application No. MSA-V-26747, entered in the records of the Bureau of Lands [Miscellaneous Sales] Entry No. V-9033, because everything was done in the open. The notices regarding the auction sale of the land were published, the actual sale and award thereof to Aniano David were not clandestine but open and public official acts of an officer of the Government. The application was merely a renewal of his deceased wife's application, and the said deceased occupied the land since 1938." 4 On such finding of facts, the attempt of petitioners to elicit a different conclusion is likely to be attended with frustration. The first error assigned predicated an accretion having taken place, notwithstanding its rejection by respondent Court of Appeals, would seek to disregard what was accepted by respondent Court as to how the disputed lot came into being, namely by reclamation. It does not therefore call for any further consideration. Neither of the other two errors imputed to respondent Court, as to its holding that authoritative doctrines preclude a party other than the government to dispute the validity of a grant and the recognition of the indefeasible character of a public land patent after one year, is possessed of merit. Consequently, as set forth at the outset, there is no justification for reversal. 1. More specifically, the shaft of criticism was let loose by petitioner aimed at this legal proposition set forth in the exhaustive opinion of then Justice Salvador Esguerra of the Court of Appeals, now a member of this Court: "There is, furthermore, a fatal defect of parties to this action. Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent (Lucas vs. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157; Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carlo, G.R. No. L-12485, July 31, 1959). This was not done by said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre after claiming it as their private property. The cases cited by appellants are not in point as they refer to private registered lands or public lands over which vested rights have been acquired but notwithstanding such fact the Land Department subsequently granted patents to public land applicants." 5 Petitioner ought to have known better. The above excerpt is invulnerable to attack. It is a restatement of a principle that dates back to Maninang v. Consolacion, 6 a 1908 decision. As was there categorically stated: "The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside, the defendant can not question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government." 7 The above citation was repeated ipsissimis verbis in Salazar v. Court of Appeals. 8 Bereft as petitioners were of the right of ownership in accordance with the findings of the Court of Appeals, they cannot, in the language of Reyes v. Rodriguez, 9 "question the [title] legally issued." 10 The second assignment of error is thus disposed of. 2. As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not of outright rejection, of the well-known distinction in public law between the government authority possessed by the state which is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty, and its capacity to own or acquire property, it is not inappropriate to pursue the matter further. The former comes under the heading of imperium and the latter of dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution. Dean Pound did speak of the confusion that existed during the medieval era between such two concepts, but did note the existence of res publicae as a corollary to dominium." 11 As far as the Philippines was concerned, there was a recognition by Justice Holmes in Cario v. Insular Government, 12 a case of Philippine origin, that "Spain in its earlier decrees embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown...." 13 That was a manifestation of the concept of jura regalia, 14 which was adopted by the present Constitution, ownership however being vested in the state as such rather than the head thereof. What was stated by Holmes served to confirm a much more extensive discussion of the matter in the leading case of Valenton v. Murciano, 15 decided in 1904. One of the royal decrees cited was incorporated in the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias 16 in these words: "We having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies and all lands, territories, and possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us according as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys audiences, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish." 17 It could therefore be affirmed in Montano v. Insular Government" 18 that "as to the unappropriated public lands constituting the public domain the sole power of legislation is vested in Congress, ..." 19 They continue to possess that character until severed therefrom by state grant. 20 Where, as in this case, it was found by the Court of Appeals that the disputed lot was the result of reclamation, its being correctly categorized as public land is undeniable. 21 What was held in Heirs of Datu Pendatun v. Director of Lands 22 finds application. Thus: "There being no evidence whatever that the property in question was ever acquired by the applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title or by any other means for the acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be public domain." 23 For it is well-settled "that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government." 24 It is indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. 25 The most

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recent restatement of the doctrine, found in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, follows: 26 "The applicant, having failed to establish his right or title over the northern portion of Lot No. 463 involved in the present controversy, and there being no showing that the same has been acquired by any private person from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, the property is and remains part of the public domain." 27 To repeat, the second assignment of error is devoid of merit. 3. The last error assigned would take issue with this portion of the opinion of Justice Esguerra: "According to the Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of the sales application of Aniano David and during all the proceedings in connection with said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is fatal to them because after the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein ... Under Section 38 of Act 496 any question concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should be raised within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title based thereon becomes indefeasible ..." 28 Petitioners cannot reconcile themselves to the view that respondent David's title is impressed with the quality of indefeasibility. In thus manifesting such an attitude, they railed to accord deference to controlling precedents. As far back as 1919, in Aquino v. Director of Lands, 29 Justice Malcolm, speaking for the Court, stated: "The proceedings under the Land Registration Law and under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the same in that both are against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial proceedings, and for both the decree of registration issued is conclusive and final." 30 Such a view has been followed since then. 31 The latest case in point is Cabacug v. Lao. 32 There is this revealing excerpt appearing in that decision: "It is said, and with reason, that a holder of a land acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated than that of an owner of registered property. Not only does a free patent have a force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor the right to repurchase within a period of five years." 33 It is quite apparent, therefore, that petitioners' stand is legally indefensible. WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of January 31, 1969 and its resolution of March 14, 1969 are affirmed. With costs against petitioners-appellants. Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur. G.R. No. 2869 March 25, 1907 Mateo Cario, the appellant herein, on the 23d of February, 1904, filed his petition in the Court of Land Registration praying that there be granted to him title to a parcel of land consisting of 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, and situated in the town of Baguio, Province of Benguet, together with a house erected thereon and constructed of wood and roofed with rimo, and bounded as follows: On the north, in lines running 1,048 metes and 20 decimeters with the lands of Sepa Cario, H. Phelps Whitmarsh, and Calsi; on the east, in lines running 991 meters and 50 decimeters with the land of Kuidno, Esteban Gonzales, and of the Civil Government; on the south, in lines of 115 meters and 60 decimeters, with the lands of Talaca; and on the west, in lines running 982 meters and 20 decimeters, with the lands of Sisco Cario and Mayengmeng. By order of the court the hearing of this petition, No. 561, and that of Antonio Rebollo and Vicente Valpiedad filed under No. 834, were heard together for the reason that the latter petition claimed a small portion of land included in the parcel set out in the former petition. The Insular Government opposed the granting of these petitions, alleging that the whole parcel of land is public property of the Government and that the same was never acquired in any manner or through any title of egresion from the State. After trial, and the hearing of documentary and oral proof, the court of Land Registration rendered its judgment in these terms: Therefore the court finds that Cario and his predecessors have not possessed exclusively and adversely any part of the said property prior to the date on which Cario constructed the house now there that is to say, for the years 1897 and 1898, and Cario held possession for some years afterwards of but a part of the property to which he claims title. Both petitions are dismissed and the property in question is adjudged to be public land. (Bill of exceptions, p. 15.) The conclusions arrived at the set forth in definite terms in the decision of the court below are the following: From the testimony given by Cario as well as from that of several of the witnesses for the Government it is deduced, that in or about the year 1884 Cario erected and utilized as a domicile a house on the property situated to the north of that property now in question, property which, according to the plan attached to expediente No. 561, appears to be property belonging to Donaldson Sim; that during the year 1893 Cario sold said house to one Cristobal Ramos, who in turn sold the same to Donaldson Sim, moving to and living on the adjoining property, which appears on the plan aforesaid to be the property of H. Phelps Whitmarsh, a place where the father and the grandfather of his wife, that is to say, Ortega and Minse, had lived . . .. In or about the years 1898 Cario abandoned the property of Whitmarsh and located on the property described in the plan attached to expediente No. 561, having constructed a house thereon in which he now lives, and which house is situated in the center of the property, as is indicated on the plan; and since which time he has undoubtedly occupied some portion of the property now claimed by him. (Bill of exceptions, pp. 11 and 12.)

MATEO CARIO, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee. Coudert Brothers for appellant. Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee. ARELLANO, C.J.:

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1. Therefore it is evident that this court can not decree the registration of all of the superficial extension of the land described in the petition and as appears on the plan filed herein, such extension containing 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, inasmuch as the documentary evidence accompanying the petition is conclusive proof against the petitioners; this documentary proof consists of a possessory information under date of March 7, 1901, and registered on the 11th day of the same month and year; and, according to such possessory information, the land therein described contains an extension of only 28 hectares limited by "the country road to the barrio of Pias," a road appearing on the plan now presented and cutting the land, as might be said, in half, or running through its center from north to south, a considerable extension of land remaining on the other side of the said road, the west side, and which could not have been included in the possessory information mentioned. 2. As has been shown during the trial of this case, this land, of which mention is made in said possessory information, and upon which is situated the house now actually occupied by the petitioner, all of which is set forth as argument as to the possession in the judgment, is "used for pasture and sowing," and belongs to the class called public lands. 3. Under the express provisions of law, a parcel of land, being of common origin, presumptively belonged to the State during its sovereignty, and, in order to perfect the legitimate acquisition of such land by private persons, it was necessary that the possession of the same pass from the State. And there is no evidence or proof of title of egresion of this land from the domain of the Spanish Government, nor is there any possessory information equivalent to title by composicion or under agreement. 4, The possessory information filed herein is not the title to property authorized in substitution for that of adjustment by the royal decree of February 13, 1894, this being the last law or legal disposition of the former sovereignty applicable to the present subject-matter of common lands: First, for the reason that the land referred to herein is not covered nor does it come within any one of the three conditions required by article 19 of the said royal decree, to wit, that the land has been in an uninterrupted state of cultivation during a period of six years last past; or that the same has been possessed without interruption during a period of twelve years and has been in a state of cultivation up to the date of the information and during the three years immediately preceding such information; or that such land had been possessed openly without interruption during a period of thirty or more years, notwithstanding the land had not been cultivated; nor is it necessary to refer to the testimony given by the two witnesses to the possessory information for the following reason: Second, because the possessory information authorized by said royal decree or last legal disposition of the Spanish Government, as title or for the purpose of acquiring actual proprietary right, equivalent to that of adjustment with the Spanish Government and required and necessary at all times until the publication of said royal decree was limited in time to one year, in accordance with article 21, which is as follows: " A period of one year, not to be extended, is allowed to verify the possessory informations which are referred to in articles 19 and 20. After the expiration of this period of the right of the cultivators and persons in possession to obtain gratuitous title thereto lapses and the land together with full possession reverts to the state, or, as the case may be, to the community, and the said possessors and cultivators or their assigns would simply have rights under universal or general title of average in the event that the land is sold within a period of five years immediately following the cancellation. The possessors not included under this chapter can only acquire by time the ownership and title to unappropriated or royal lands in accordance with common law." 5. In accordance with the preceding provisions, the right that remained to Cario, if it be certain that he was the true possessor of the land in question, was the right of average in case the Government or State could have sold the same within the period of five years immediately following for example, if the denouncement of purchase had been carried out by Felipe Zafra or any other person, as appears from the record of the trial of the case. Aside from this right, in such event, his possession as attested in the possessory information herein could not, in accordance with common law, go to show any right of ownership until after the expiration of twenty years from the expiration of twenty years from the verification and registry of the same in conformity with the provisions of article 393 of the Mortgage Law and other conditions prescribe by this law. 6. The right of possession in accordance with common law that is to say, civil law remains at all times subordinate to the Spanish administrative law, inasmuch as it could only be of force when pertaining to royal transferable or alienable lands, which condition and the determination thereof is reversed to the government, which classified and designated the royal alienable lands for the purpose of distinguishing them from those lands strictly public, and from forestry lands which could at no time pass to private ownership nor be acquired through time even after the said royal decree of February 13, 1894. 7. The advent of the new sovereignty necessarily brought a new method of dealing with lands and particularly as to the classification and manner of transfer and acquisition of royal or common lands then appropriated, which were thenceforth merely called public lands, the alienation of which was reserved to the Government, in accordance with section 12 and 13 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, 1 and in conformity with other laws enacted under this act of Congress by the Philippine Commission prescribing rules for the execution thereof, one of which is Act No. 648, 2 herein mentioned by the petitioner, in connection with Act No. 627,3 which appears to be the law upon which the petition herein is founded. 8. Section 6 of Act No. 627 admits prescription, in accordance with the provisions contained in Act No. 190, as a basis for obtaining the right of ownership. "The petitioners claims title under the period of prescription of ten years established by that act, as well as by reason of his occupancy and use thereof from time immemorial." (Allegation 1.) But said act admits such prescription for the purpose of obtaining title and ownership to lands "not exceeding more that sixteen hectares in extent." (Sec. 6 of said act.) The land claimed by Cario is 40 hectares in extent, if we take into consideration his petition, or an extension of 28 hectares, according to the possessory information, the only thing that can be considered. Therefore, it follows that the judgment denying the petition herein and now appealed from was strictly in accordance with the law invoked herein. 9. And of the 28 hectares of land as set out in the possessory information, one part of same, according to the testimony of Cario, belongs to Vicente Valpiedad, the extent of which is not determined. From all of which it follows that the precise extent has not been determined in the trial of this case on which judgment might be based in the event that the judgment and title be declared in favor of the petitioner, Mateo Cario. And we should not lose sight of the fact that, considering the intention of Congress in granting ownership and title to 16 hectares, that Mateo Cario and his children have already exceeded such amount in various acquirements of lands, all of which is shown in different cases decided by the said Court of Land Registration, donations or gifts of land that could only have been made efficacious as to the conveyance thereof with the assistance of these new laws. By reason of the findings set forth it is clearly seen that the court below did not err: 1. In finding that Mateo Cario and those from whom he claims his right had not possessed and claimed as owners the lands in question since time immemorial;

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2. In finding that the land in question did not belong to the petitioner, but that, on the contrary, it was the property of the Government. (Allegation 21.) Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant. After the expiration of twenty days from the notification of this decision let judgment be entered in accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter let the case be remanded to the court from whence it came for proper action. So ordered. Torres, Mapa, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur. Johnson, J., reserves his vote. G.R. No. L-30299 August 17, 1972 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and/or THE SOLICITOR GENERAL petitioners, vs. WILLIAM H. QUASHA, respondent. Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner. Quasha, Asperilla Blanco, Zafra & Tayag for respondent. prohibits the transfer of private agricultural land to non-Filipinos, except by hereditary succession; and assuming, without conceding, that Quasha's acquisition was valid, any and all rights by him so acquired "will expire ipso facto and ipso jure at the end of the day on 3 July 1974, if he continued to hold the property until then, and will be subject to escheat or reversion proceedings" by the Republic. After hearing, the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Judge Pedro A. Revilla presiding) rendered a decision, dated 6 March 1969, in favor of plaintiff, with the following dispositive portion: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that acquisition by the plaintiff on 26 November 1954 of, the private agricultural land described in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 36862 in his name was valid, and that plaintiff has a right to continue in ownership of the said property even beyond July 3, 1974. Defendants appealed directly to this Court on questions of law, pleading that the court below erred: (1) In ruling that under the Parity Amendment American citizens and American owned and/or controlled business enterprises "are also qualified to acquire private agricultural lands" in the Philippines; and (2) In ruling that when the Parity Amendment ceases to be effective on 3 July 1974, "what must be considered to end should be the right to acquire land, and not the right to continue in ownership of land already acquired prior to that time." As a historical background, requisite to a proper understanding of the issues being litigated, it should be recalled that the Constitution as originally adopted, contained the following provisions: Article XIII CONSERVATION AND UTILIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES Section 1. All Agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water right for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant. Section 2. No private corporation or association may acquire, lease, or hold public agricultural lands in excess of one thousand and twenty-four hectares, nor may any

REYES J. B. L., J.:p This case involves a judicial determination of the scope and duration of the rights acquired by American citizens and corporations controlled by them, under the Ordinance appended to the Constitution as of 18 September 1946, or the so-called Parity Amendment. The respondent, William H. Quasha, an American citizen, had acquired by purchase on 26 November 1954 a parcel of land with the permanent improvements thereon, situated at 22 Molave Place, in Forbes Park, Municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal, with an area of 2,616 sq. m. more or less, described in and covered by T. C. T. 36862. On 19 March 1968, he filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as its Civil Case No. 10732, wherein he (Quasha) averred the acquisition of the real estate aforesaid; that the Republic of the Philippines, through its officials, claimed that upon expiration of the Parity Amendment on 3 July 1974, rights acquired by citizens of the United States of America shall cease and be of no further force and effect; that such claims necessarily affect the rights and interest of the plaintiff, and that continued uncertainty as to the status of plaintiff's property after 3 July 1974 reduces the value thereof, and precludes further improvements being introduced thereon, for which reason plaintiff Quasha sought a declaration of his rights under the Parity Amendment, said plaintiff contending that the ownership of properties during the effectivity of the Parity Amendment continues notwithstanding the termination and effectivity of the Amendment. The then Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo (and later on his successors in office, Felix V. Makasiar and Felix Q. Antonio) contended that the land acquired by plaintiff constituted private agricultural land and that the acquisition violated section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which

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individual acquire such lands by purchase in excess of one hundred and forty-four hectares, or by lease in excess of one thousand and twenty-four hectares, or by homestead in excess of twenty-four hectares. Lands adapted to grazing not exceeding two thousand hectares, may be leased to an individual, private corporation, or association. xxx xxx xxx Section 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. Article XIV GENERAL PROVISIONS Section 8. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under the laws of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. No franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporation, except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the public interest so requires. The nationalistic spirit that pervaded these and other provisions of the Constitution are self-evident and require no further emphasis. From the Japanese occupation and the reconquest of the Archipelago, the Philippine nation emerged with its industries destroyed and its economy dislocated. It was described in this Court's opinion in Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Guerrero, et al., L-20942, 22 September 1967, 21 SCRA 181, 187, penned by Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in the following terms: It was fortunate that the Japanese Occupation ended when it did. Liberation was hailed by all, but the problems faced by the legitimate government were awesome in their immensity. The Philippine treasury was bankrupt and her economy prostrate. There were no dollar-earning export crops to speak of; commercial operations were paralyzed; and her industries were unable to produce with mills, factories and plants either destroyed or their machineries obsolete or dismantled. It was a desolate and tragic sight that greeted the victorious American and Filipino troops. Manila, particularly that portion south of the Pasig, lay in ruins, its public edifices and business buildings lying in a heap of rubble and numberless houses razed to the ground. It was in fact, next to Warsaw, the most devastated city in the expert opinion of the then General Eisenhower. There was thus a clear need of help from the United States. American aid was forthcoming but on terms proposed by her government and later on accepted by the Philippines. The foregoing description is confirmed by the 1945 Report of the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs to the United States Congress: When the Philippines do become independent next July, they will start on the road to independence with a country whose commerce, trade and political institutions have been very, very seriously damaged. Years of rebuilding are necessary before the former physical conditions of the islands can be restored. Factories, homes, government and commercial buildings, roads, bridges, docks, harbors and the like are in need of complete reconstruction or widespread repairs. It will be quite some while before the Philippine can produce sufficient food with which to sustain themselves. The internal revenues of the country have been greatly diminished by war. Much of the assessable property basis has been destroyed. Foreign trade has vanished. Internal commerce is but a faction of what it used to be. Machinery, farming implements, ships, bus and truck lines, inter-island transportation and communications have been wrecked. Shortly thereafter, in 1946, the United States 79th Congress enacted Public Law 3721, known as the Philippine Trade Act, authorizing the President of the United States to enter into an Executive Agreement with the President of the Philippines, which should contain a provision that The disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils,; all forces and sources of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and the operation of public utilities shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the United States and to all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by United States citizens. and that: The President of the United States is not authorized ... to enter into such executive agreement unless in the agreement the Government of the Philippines ... will promptly take such steps as are necessary to secure the amendment of the Constitution of the Philippines so as to permit the taking effect as laws of the Philippines of such part of the provisions of section 1331 ... as is in conflict with such Constitution before such amendment. The Philippine Congress, by Commonwealth Act No. 733, authorized the President of the Philippines to enter into the Executive Agreement. Said Act provided, inter alia, the following: ARTICLE VII 1. The disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, mineral, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and other natural

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resources of the Philippines, and the operation of public utilities, shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the United States and to all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by United States citizens, except that (for the period prior to the amendment of the Constitution of the Philippines referred to in Paragraph 2 of this Article) the Philippines shall not be required to comply with such part of the foregoing provisions of this sentence as are in conflict with such Constitution. 2. The Government of the Philippines will promptly take such steps as are necessary to secure the amendment of the constitution of the Philippines so as to permit the taking effect as laws of the Philippines of such part of the provisions of Paragraph 1 of this Article as is in conflict with such Constitution before such amendment. Thus authorized, the Executive Agreement was signed on 4 July 1946, and shortly thereafter the President of the Philippines recommended to the Philippine Congress the approval of a resolution proposing amendments to the Philippine Constitution pursuant to the Executive Agreement. Approved by the Congress in joint session, the proposed amendment was submitted to a plebiscite and was ratified in November of 1946. Generally known as the Parity Amendment, it was in the form of an Ordinance appended to the Philippine Constitution, reading as follows: Notwithstanding the provision of section one, Article Thirteen, and section eight, Article Fourteen, of the foregoing Constitution, during the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into by the President of the Philippines with the President of the United States on the fourth of July, nineteen hundred and forty-six, pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered Seven hundred and thirty-three, but in no case to extend beyond the third of July, nineteen hundred and seventy-four, the disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coals, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and the operation of public utilities, shall, if OPEN to any person, be open to citizens of the United States and to all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States in the same manner as to and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines. A revision of the 1946 Executive Agreement was authorized by the Philippines by Republic Act 1355, enacted in July 1955. The revision was duly negotiated by representatives of the Philippines and the United States, and a new agreement was concluded on 6 September 1955 to take effect on 1 January 1956, becoming known as the Laurel-Langley Agreement. This latter agreement, however, has no direct application to the case at bar, since the purchase by herein respondent Quasha of the property in question was made in 1954, more than one year prior to the effectivity of the Laurel-Langley Agreement.. I Bearing in mind the legal provisions previously quoted and their background, We turn to the first main issue posed in this appeal: whether under or by virtue of the so-called Parity Amendment to the Philippine Constitution respondent Quasha could validly acquire ownership of the private residential land in Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal, which is concededly classified private agricultural land. Examination of the "Parity Amendment", as ratified, reveals that it only establishes an express exception to two (2) provisions of our Constitution, to wit: (a) Section 1, Article XIII, re disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain and other natural resources of the Philippines; and (b) Section 8, Article XIV, regarding operation of public utilities. As originally drafted by the framers of the Constitution, the privilege to acquire and exploit agricultural lands of the public domain, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and to operate public utilities, were reserved to Filipinos and entities owned or controlled by them: but the "Parity Amendment" expressly extended the privilege to citizens of the United States of America and/or to business enterprises owned or controlled by them. No other provision of our Constitution was referred to by the "Parity Amendment"; nor Section 2 of Article XIII limiting the maximum area of public agricultural lands that could be held by individuals or corporations or associations; nor Section 5 restricting the transfer or assignment of private agricultural lands to those qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain (which under the original Section 1 of Article XIII meant Filipinos exclusively), save in cases of hereditary succession. These sections 2 and 5 were therefore left untouched and allowed to continue in operation as originally intended by the Constitution's framers. Respondent Quasha argues that since the amendment permitted United States citizens or entities controlled by them to acquire agricultural lands of the public domain, then such citizens or entities became entitled to acquire private agricultural land in the Philippines, even without hereditary succession, since said section 5 of Article XIII only negates the transfer or assignment of private agricultural land to individuals or entities not qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Clearly, this argument of respondent Quasha rests not upon the text of the Constitutional Amendment but upon a mere inference therefrom. If it was ever intended to create also an exception to section 5 of Article XIII, why was mention therein made only of Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV and of no other? When the text of the Amendment was submitted for popular ratification, did the voters understand that three sections of the Constitution were to be modified, when only two sections were therein mentioned? A reading of Sections 1 and 4 of Article XIII, as originally drafted by its farmers, leaves no doubt that the policy of the Constitution was to reserve to Filipinos the disposition, exploitation development or utilization of agricultural lands, public (section 1) or private (section 5), as well as all other natural resources of the Philippines. The "Parity Amendment" created exceptions to that Constitutional Policy and in consequence to the sovereignty of the Philippines. By all canons of construction, such exceptions must be given strict interpretation; and this Court has already so ruled in Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Guerrero, et al., L-20942, 22 September 1967, 21 SCRA 181, per Justice Enrique M. Fernando: While good faith, no less than adherence to the categorical wording of the Ordinance, requires that all the rights and privileges thus granted to Americans and business enterprises owned and controlled by them be respected, anything further would not be warranted. Nothing less would suffice but anything more is not justified.

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The basis for the strict interpretation was given by former President of the University of the Philippines, Hon. Vicente G. Sinco (Congressional Record, House of Representatives, Volume 1, No. 26, page 561): It should be emphatically stated that the provisions of our Constitution which limit to Filipinos the rights to develop the natural resources and to operate the public utilities of the Philippines is one of the bulwarks of our national integrity. The Filipino people decided to include it in our Constitution in order that it may have the stability and permanency that its importance requires. It is written in our Constitution so that it may neither be the subject of barter nor be impaired in the give and take of politics. With our natural resources, our sources of power and energy, our public lands, and our public utilities, the material basis of the nation's existence, in the hands of aliens over whom the Philippine Government does not have complete control, the Filipinos may soon find themselves deprived of their patrimony and living as it were, in a house that no longer belongs to them. The true extent of the Parity Amendment, as understood by its proponents in the Philippine Congress, was clearly expressed by one of its advocates, Senator Lorenzo Sumulong: It is a misconception to believe that under this amendment Americans will be able to acquire all kinds of natural resources of this country, and even after the expiration of 28 years their acquired rights cannot be divested from them. If we read carefully the language of this amendment which is taken verbatim from the Provision of the Bell Act, and, which in turn, is taken also verbatim from certain sections of the Constitution, you will find out that the equality of rights granted under this amendment refers only to two subjects. Firstly, it refers to exploitation of natural resources, and secondly, it refers to the operation of public utilities . Now, when it comes to exploitation of natural resources, it must be pointed out here that, under our Constitution and under this amendment, only public agricultural land may be acquired, may be bought, so that on the supposition that we give way to this amendment and on the further supposition that it is approved by our people, let not the mistaken belief be entertained that all kinds of natural resources may be acquired by Americans because under our Constitution forest lands cannot be bought, mineral lands cannot be bought, because by explicit provision of the Constitution they belong to the State, they belong to our Government, they belong to our people. That is why we call them rightly the patrimony of our race. Even if the Americans should so desire, they can have no further privilege than to ask for a lease of concession of forest lands and mineral lands because it is so commanded in the Constitution. And under the Constitution, such a concession is given only for a limited period. It can be extended only for 25 years, renewable for another 25. So that with respect to mineral or forest lands, all they can do is to lease it for 25 years, and after the expiration of the original 25 years they will have to extend it, and I believe it can be extended provided that it does not exceed 28 years because this agreement is to be effected only as an ordinance and for the express period of 28 years. So that it is my humble belief that there is nothing to worry about insofar as our forest and mineral lands are concerned. Now, coming to the operation of public utilities, as every member of the Congress knows, it is also for a limited period, under our Constitution, for a period not exceeding 50 years. And since this amendment is intended to endure only for 28 years, it is my humble opinion that when Americans try to operate public utilities they cannot take advantage of the maximum provided in the Constitution but only the 28 years which is expressly provided to be the life of this amendment . There remains for us to consider the case of our public agricultural lands. To be sure, they may be bought, and if we pass this amendment, Americans may buy our public agricultural lands, but the very same Constitution applying even to Filipinos, provides that the sale of public agricultural lands to a corporation can never exceed one thousand and twenty-four hectares. That is to say, if an American corporation, and American enterprise, should decide to invest its money in public agricultural lands, it will be limited to the amount of 1,024 hectares, no more than 1,024 hectares' (Emphasis supplied). No views contrary to these were ever expressed in the Philippine Legislature during the discussion of the Proposed Amendment to our Constitution, nor was any reference made to acquisition of private agricultural lands by non-Filipinos except by hereditary succession. On the American side, it is significant to observe that the draft of the Philippine Trade Act submitted to the House of Representatives by Congressman Bell, provided in the first Portion of Section 19 the following: SEC. 19. Notwithstanding any existing provision of the constitution and statutes of the Philippine Government, citizens and corporations of the United States shall enjoy in the Philippine Islands during the period of the validity of this Act, or any extension thereof by statute or treaty, the same rights as to property, residence, and occupation as citizens of the Philippine Islands ... But as finally approved by the United States Congress, the equality as to " property residence and occupation" provided in the bill was eliminated and Section 341 of the Trade Act limited such parity to the disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of lands of the public domain, and other natural resources of the Philippines (V. ante, page 5 of this opinion). Thus, whether from the Philippine or the American side, the intention was to secure parity for United States citizens, only in two matters: (1) exploitation, development and utilization of public lands, and other natural resources of the Philippines; and (2) the operation of public utilities. That and nothing else. Respondent Quasha avers that as of 1935 when the Constitution was adopted, citizens of the United States were already qualified to acquire public agricultural lands, so that the literal text of section 5 must be understood as permitting transfer or assignment of private agricultural lands to Americans even without hereditary succession. Such capacity of United States citizens could exist only during the American sovereignty over the Islands. For the Constitution of the Philippines was designed to operate even beyond the extinction of the United States sovereignty, when the Philippines would become fully independent. That is apparent from the provision of the original Ordinance appended to the Constitution as originally approved and ratified. Section 17 of said Ordinance provided that: (17) Citizens and corporations of the United States shall enjoy in the Commonwealth of the Philippines all the civil rights of the citizens and corporations, respectively, thereof. (Emphasis supplied)

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The import of paragraph (17) of the Ordinance was confirmed and reenforced by Section 127 of Commonwealth Act 141 (the Public Land Act of 1936) that prescribes: Sec. 127. During the existence and continuance of the Commonwealth, and before the Republic of the Philippines is established, citizens and corporations of the United States shall enjoy the same rights granted to citizens and corporations of the Philippines under this Act. thus clearly evidencing once more that equal rights of citizens and corporations of the United States to acquire agricultural lands of the Philippines vanished with the advent of the Philippine Republic. Which explains the need of introducing the "Parity Amendment" of 1946. It is then indubitable that the right of United States citizens and corporations to acquire and exploit private or public lands and other natural resources of the Philippines was intended to expire when the Commonwealth ended on 4 July 1946. Thereafter, public and private agricultural lands and natural resources of the Philippines were or became exclusively reserved by our Constitution for Filipino citizens. This situation lasted until the "Parity Amendment", ratified in November, 1946, once more reopened to United States citizens and business enterprises owned or controlled by them the lands of the public domain, the natural resources of the Philippines, and the operation of the public utilities, exclusively, but not the acquisition or exploitation of private agricultural lands, about which not a word is found in the Parity Amendment..Respondent Quasha's pretenses can find no support in Article VI of the Trade Agreement of 1955, known popularly as the Laurel-Langley Agreement, establishing a sort of reciprocity rights between citizens of the Philippines and those of the United States, couched in the following terms: ARTICLE VI 2. The rights provided for in Paragraph I may be exercised, in the case of citizens of the Philippines with respect to natural resources in the United States which are subject to Federal control or regulations, only through the medium of a corporation organized under the laws of the United States or one of the States hereof and likewise, in the case of citizens of the United States with respect to natural resources in the public domain in the Philippines only through the medium of a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines and at least 60% of the capital stock of which is owned or controlled by citizens of the United States. This provision, however, does not affect the right of citizens of the United States to acquire or own private agricultural lands in the Philippines or citizens of the Philippines to acquire or own land in the United States which is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and not within the jurisdiction of any state and which is not within the public domain. The Philippines reserves the right to dispose of the public lands in small quantities on especially favorable terms exclusively to actual settlers or other users who are its own citizens. The United States reserves the right to dispose of its public lands in small quantities on especially favorable terms exclusively to actual settlers or other users who are its own citizens or aliens who have declared their intention to become citizens. Each party reserves the right to limit the extent to which aliens may engage in fishing, or engage in enterprises which furnish communications services and air or water transport. The United States also reserves the right to limit the extent to which aliens may own land in its outlying territories and possessions, but the Philippines will extend to American nationals who are residents of any of those outlying territories and possessions only the same rights, with respect to, ownership of lands, which are granted therein to citizens of the Philippines. The rights provided for in this paragraph shall not, however, be exercised by either party so as to derogate from the rights previously acquired by citizens or corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the other party. The words used in Article VI to the effect that ... This provision does not affect the right of citizen of the United States to acquire or own private agricultural lands in the Philippines , or citizens of the Philippines to acquire or own land in the United States which is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States ... must be understood as referring to rights of United States citizens to acquire or own private agricultural lands before the independence of the Philippines since the obvious purpose of the article was to establish rights of United States and Filipino citizens on a basis of reciprocity. For as already shown, no such right to acquire or own private agricultural lands in the Philippines has existed since the independent Republic was established in 1946. The quoted expressions of the Laurel-Langley Agreement could not expand the rights of United States citizens as to public agricultural lands of the Philippines to private lands, when the Parity Amendment and the Constitution authorize such United States citizens and business entities only to acquire and exploit agricultural lands of the public domain. If the reopening of only public lands to Americans required a Constitutional Amendment, how could a mere Trade Agreement, like the LaurelLangley, by itself enable United States citizens to acquire and exploit private agricultural lands, a right that ceased to exist since the independence of the Philippines by express prescription of our Constitution? We turn to the second issue involved in this appeal: On the assumption that respondent Quasha's purchase of the private agricultural land involved is valid and constitutional, will or will not his rights expire on 3 July 1974? For the solution of this problem, We again turn to the "Parity Amendment". Under it, Notwithstanding the provision of section one, Article Thirteen, and section eight, Article Fourteen, of the foregoing Constitution, during the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into by the President of the Philippines with the President of the United States on the fourth of July, nineteen hundred and forty-six, pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered Seven hundred and thirty-three, but in no case to extend beyond the third of July, nineteen hundred and seventy-four, the disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coals, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and the operation of public utilities, shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the United states and to all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States in the same manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the

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Philippines or corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied) It is easy to see that all exceptional rights conferred upon United States citizens and business entities owned or controlled by them, under the Amendment, are subject to one and the same resolutory term or period: they are to last "during the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into on 4 July 1946", "but in no case to extend beyond the, third of July, 1974". None of the privileges conferred by the "Parity Amendment" are excepted from this resolutory period. This limitation of time is in conformity with Article X, Section 2, of the Philippine Trade Act of 1946, as embodied in Commonwealth Act No. 733. It says: ARTICLE X 2. This Agreement shall have no effect after 3 July 1974. It may be terminated by either the United States or the Philippines at any time, upon not less than five years' written notice. It the President of the United States or the President of the Philippines determines and proclaims that the other Country has adopted or applied measures or practices which would operate to nullify or impair any right or obligation provided for in this Agreement, then the Agreement may be terminated upon not less than six months' written notice. Respondent Quasha argues that the limitative period set in the "Parity Amendment" should be understood not to be applicable to the disposition, or correlative acquisition, of alienable agricultural lands of the public domain, since such lands can be acquired in full ownership, in which event, under Article 428 of the Civil Code of Philippines ART, 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it. and that since any period or condition which produces the effect of loss or deprivation of valuable rights is in derogation of due process of law, there must be "a law which expressly and indubitably limits and extinguishes the ownership of non-citizens over private agricultural lands situated in the Philippines validly acquired under the law existing at the time of acquisition." Strangely enough, this argument ignores the provisions of the "Parity Amendment" prescribing that the disposition and exploitation, etc. of agricultural lands of the public domain are in no case to extend beyond the third of July 1974. This limitation already existed when Quasha in 1954 purchased the Forbes Park property, and the acquisition was subject to it. If the Philippine government can not dispose of its alienable public agricultural lands beyond that date under the "Parity Amendment", then, logically, the Constitution, as modified by the Amendment, only authorizes either of two things: (a) alienation or transfer of rights less than ownership or (b) a resoluble ownership that will be extinguished not later than the specified period. For the Philippine government to dispose of the public agricultural land for an indefinite time would necessarily be in violation of the Constitution. There is nothing in the Civil Law of this country that is repugnant to the existence of ownership for a limited duration; thus the title of a "reservista" (ascendant inheriting from a descendant) in reserva troncal, under Article 891 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, is one such owner, holding title and dominion, although under condition subsequent; he can do anything that a genuine owner can do, until his death supervenes with "reservataries surviving", i.e., relatives within the third degree (Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 661, 695). In truth, respondent himself invokes Article 428 of the Civil Code to the effect that "the owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law". One such limitation is the period fixed on the "Parity Amendment", which forms part of the Constitution, the highest law of the land. How then can he complain of deprivation of due process? That the legislature has not yet determined what is to be done with the property when the respondent's rights thereto terminate on 3 July 1974 is irrelevant to the issues in this case. The law, making power has until that date full power to adopt the apposite measures, and it is expected to do so. One last point: under the "Parity Amendment" the disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of lands of the public domain, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and the operation of public utilities are open to citizens of the United States and to all forms of business enterprises owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States while under the Philippine Constitution (section 1, Article XIII, and section 8, Article XIV) utilization of such lands, natural resources and public utilities are open to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens ... It is thus apparent that American business enterprises are more favored than Philippine organization during the period of parity in that, first, they need not be owned by American citizens up to 60% of their capital; all that is required is that they be controlled by United States citizens, a control that is attained by ownership of only 51% a of the capital stock; and second, that the control by United States citizens may be direct or indirect (voting trusts, pyramiding, etc.) which indirect control is not allowed in the case of Philippine nationals. That Filipinos should be placed under the so-called Parity in a more disadvantageous position than United States citizens in the disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of the public lands, forests, mines, oils and other natural resources of their own country is certainly rank injustice and inequity that warrants a most strict interpretation of the "Parity Amendment", in order that the dishonorable inferiority in which Filipinos find themselves at present in the land of their ancestors should not be prolonged more than is absolutely necessary. FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is hereby reversed and set aside; and judgment is rendered declaring that, under the "Parity Amendment" to our Constitution, citizens of the United States and corporations and business enterprises owned or controlled by them can not acquire and own, save in cases of hereditary succession, private agricultural

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lands in the Philippines and that all other rights acquired by them under said amendment will expire on 3 July 1974. Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur. Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., took no part. G.R. No. L-630 November 15, 1947 residential lots to aliens. The herein respondent-appellee was naturally one of the registers of deeds to obey the new circular, as against his own stand in this case which had been maintained by the trial court and firmly defended in this Court by the Solicitor General. If we grant the withdrawal, the the result would be that petitioner-appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case, not by a decision of this Court, but by the decision or circular of the Department of Justice, issued while this case was pending before this Court. Whether or not this is the reason why appellant seeks the withdrawal of his appeal and why the Solicitor General readily agrees to that withdrawal, is now immaterial. What is material and indeed very important, is whether or not we should allow interference with the regular and complete exercise by this Court of its constitutional functions, and whether or not after having held long deliberations and after having reached a clear and positive conviction as to what the constitutional mandate is, we may still allow our conviction to be silenced, and the constitutional mandate to be ignored or misconceived, with all the harmful consequences that might be brought upon the national patromony. For it is but natural that the new circular be taken full advantage of by many, with the circumstance that perhaps the constitutional question may never come up again before this court, because both vendors and vendees will have no interest but to uphold the validity of their transactions, and very unlikely will the register of deeds venture to disobey the orders of their superior. Thus, the possibility for this court to voice its conviction in a future case may be remote, with the result that our indifference of today might signify a permanent offense to the Constitution. All thse circumstances were thoroughly considered and weighted by this Court for a number of days and the legal result of the last vote was a denial of the motion withdrawing the appeal. We are thus confronted, at this stage of the proceedings, with our duty, the constitutional question becomes unavoidable. We shall then proceed to decide that question. Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows: Article XIII. Conservation and utilization of natural resources. SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inaguration of the Government established uunder this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no licence, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water "power" in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant. The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and its language, embraces all lands of any kind of the public domain, its purpose being to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the Nation. When, therefore, this provision, with reference to lands of the public domain, makes mention of only agricultural, timber and mineral lands, it means that all lands of the public domain are classified into said three groups, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. And this classification finds corroboration in the circumstance that at the time of the

ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee. Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha of petitioner-appellant. First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Carreon for respondent-appellee. Marcelino Lontok appeared as amicus curies. MORAN, C.J.: Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of 1941, the registration of which was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila by means of a consulta, and that court rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds, from which Krivenko appealed to this Court. There is no dispute as to these facts. The real point in issue is whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land. It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is unnecessary, there being a motion to withdraw the appeal which should have been granted outright, and reference is made to the ruling laid down by this Court in another case to the effect that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question if its judgment may be made to rest upon other grounds. There is, we believe, a confusion of ideas in this reasoning. It cannot be denied that the constitutional question is unavoidable if we choose to decide this case upon the merits. Our judgment cannot to be made to rest upon other grounds if we have to render any judgment at all. And we cannot avoid our judgment simply because we have to avoid a constitutional question. We cannot, for instance, grant the motion withdrawing the appeal only because we wish to evade the constitutional; issue. Whether the motion should be, or should not be, granted, is a question involving different considerations now to be stated. According to Rule 52, section 4, of the Rules of Court, it is discretionary upon this Court to grant a withdrawal of appeal after the briefs have been presented. At the time the motion for withdrawal was filed in this case, not only had the briefs been prensented, but the case had already been voted and the majority decision was being prepared. The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever, and the Solicitor General was agreeable to it. While the motion was pending in this Court, came the new circular of the Department of Justice, instructing all register of deeds to accept for registration all transfers of

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adoption of the Constitution, that was the basic classification existing in the public laws and judicial decisions in the Philippines, and the term "public agricultural lands" under said classification had then acquired a technical meaning that was well-known to the members of the Constitutional Convention who were mostly members of the legal profession. As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175, 182), this Court said that the phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which phrase is also to be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means "those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral for timber lands." This definition has been followed in long line of decisions of this Court. (See Montano vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 593; Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159; Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of the Philippines, 40 Phil., 10.) And with respect to residential lands, it has been held that since they are neither mineral nor timber lands, of necessity they must be classified as agricultural. In Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government (13 Phil., 159, 163), this Court said: Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted into a field, and planted with all kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining or forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the classification of agricultural land, not because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, but because it was originally agricultural and may again become so under other circumstances; besides, the Act of Congress contains only three classification, and makes no special provision with respect to building lots or urban lands that have ceased to be agricultural land. In other words, the Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not only whether it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes. But whatever the test might be, the fact remains that at the time the Constitution was adopted, lands of the public domain were classified in our laws and jurisprudence into agricultural, mineral, and timber, and that the term "public agricultural lands" was construed as referring to those lands that were not timber or mineral, and as including residential lands. It may safely be presumed, therefore, that what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known classification and its technical meaning then prevailing. Certain expressions which appear in Constitutions, . . . are obviously technical; and where such words have been in use prior to the adoption of a Constitution, it is presumed that its framers and the people who ratified it have used such expressions in accordance with their technical meaning. (11 Am. Jur., sec. 66, p. 683.) Also Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. [U.S.], 386; 1 Law. ed., 648; Bronson vs. Syverson, 88 Wash., 264; 152 P., 1039.) It is a fundamental rule that, in construing constitutions, terms employed therein shall be given the meaning which had been put upon them, and which they possessed, at the time of the framing and adoption of the instrument. If a word has acquired a fixed, technical meaning in legal and constitutional history, it will be presumed to have been employed in that sense in a written Constitution. (McKinney vs. Barker, 180 Ky., 526; 203 S.W., 303; L.R.A., 1918 E, 581.) Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute in which they are used, the rule of construction requires that the words used in such statute should be construed according to the sense in which they have been so previously used, although the sense may vary from strict literal meaning of the words. (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.) Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution must be construed as including residential lands, and this is in conformity with a legislative interpretation given after the adoption of the Constitution. Well known is the rule that "where the Legislature has revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted, such a revision is to be regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so revised conforms to the Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102.) Soon after the Constitution was adopted, the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and 60 thereof permit the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to associations or corporations controlled by such citizens, which is equivalent to a solemn declaration that residential lots are considered as agricultural lands, for, under the Constitution, only agricultural lands may be alienated. It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141, "alienable or disposable public lands" which are the same "public agriculture lands" under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial and for other puposes. This simply means that the term "public agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its broad or general meaning, as used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are neither timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are stricly agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural puposes; lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or lands for other purposes. The fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino citizens, is a conclusive indication of their character as public agricultural lands under said statute and under the Constitution. It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land Act No. 2874, aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential puposes, but after the Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation. And, again, prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of Public Land Act No. 2874, land of the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could be sold or leased to aliens, but after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may only be leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for the purposes referred to. The exclusion of sale in the new Act is undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation, and this again is another legislative construction that the term "public agricultural land" includes land for residence purposes. Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the interpretation given by the Executive Department of the Government. Way back in 1939, Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos, in answer to a query as to "whether or not the phrase 'public agricultural lands' in section 1 of Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution may be interpreted to include residential, commercial, and industrial lands for purposes of their disposition," rendered the following short, sharp and crystal-clear opinion:

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Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the Philippines into agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted since the enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the term 'agricultural public lands' and, therefore, acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme Court of the Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the phrase 'agricultural public lands' means those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral lands. This definition has been followed by our Supreme Court in many subsequent case. . . . Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be included in one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of necessity, therefore, they must be classified as agricultural. Viewed from another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are agricultural or not, the character of the land is the test (Odell vs. Durant, 62 N.W., 524; Lorch vs. Missoula Brick and Tile Co., 123 p.25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of the land to cultivation for agricultural purposes by ordinary farming methods which determines whether it is agricultural or not (State vs. Stewart, 190 p. 129). Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands, no reason is seen why a piece of land, which may be sold to a person if he is to devote it to agricultural, cannot be sold to him if he intends to use it as a site for his home. This opinion is important not alone because it comes from a Secratary of Justice who later became the Chief Justice of this Court, but also because it was rendered by a member of the cabinet of the late President Quezon who actively participated in the drafting of the constitutional provision under consideration. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 598.) And the opinion of the Quezon administration was reiterated by the Secretary of Justice under the Osmea administration, and it was firmly maintained in this Court by the Solicitor General of both administrations. It is thus clear that the three great departments of the Government judicial, legislative and executive have always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, mineral and timber, and that agricultural lands include residential lots. Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be aliented," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows: Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is intended to insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1. Both sections must, therefore, be read together for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. It must be noticed that the persons against whom the prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same persons who under section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." And the subject matter of both sections is the same, namely, the non-transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens. Since "agricultural land" under section 1 includes residential lots, the same technical meaning should be attached to "agricultural land under section 5. It is a rule of statutory construction that "a word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention appears." (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.) The only difference between "agricultural land" under section 5, is that the former is public and the latter private. But such difference refers to ownership and not to the class of land. The lands are the same in both sections, and, for the conservation of the national patrimony, what is important is the nature or class of the property regardless of whether it is owned by the State or by its citizens. Reference is made to an opinion rendered on September 19, 1941, by the Hon. Teofilo Sison, then Secretary of Justice, to the effect that residential lands of the public domain may be considered as agricultural lands, whereas residential lands of private ownership cannot be so considered. No reason whatsoever is given in the opinion for such a distinction, and no valid reason can be adduced for such a discriminatory view, particularly having in mind that the purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony, and private residential lands are as much an integral part of the national patrimony as the residential lands of the public domain. Specially is this so where, as indicated above, the prohibition as to the alienable of public residential lots would become superflous if the same prohibition is not equally applied to private residential lots. Indeed, the prohibition as to private residential lands will eventually become more important, for time will come when, in view of the constant disposition of public lands in favor of private individuals, almost all, if not all, the residential lands of the public domain shall have become private residential lands. It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5, the words "no land of private ownership" were used and later changed into "no agricultural land of private ownership," and lastly into "no private agricultural land" and from these changes it is argued that the word "agricultural" introduced in the second and final drafts was intended to limit the meaning of the word "land" to land actually used for agricultural purposes. The implication is not accurate. The wording of the first draft was amended for no other purpose than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties. The words "no land" of the first draft, unqualified by the word "agricultural," may be mistaken to include timber and mineral lands, and since under section 1, this kind of lands can never be private, the prohibition to transfer the same would be superfluous. Upon the other hand, section 5 had to be drafted in harmony with section 1 to which it is supplementary, as above indicated. Inasmuch as under section 1, timber and mineral lands can never be private, and the only lands that may become private are agricultural lands, the words "no land of private ownership" of the first draft can have no other meaning than "private agricultural land." And thus the change in the final draft is merely one of words in order to make its subject matter more specific with a view to avoiding the possible confusion of ideas that could have arisen from the first draft. If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they may

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validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General's Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question. One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution and which was embodied in the report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other Natural Resources of the Constitutional Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests, and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation. They should, therefore, be preserved for those under the sovereign authority of that nation and for their posterity." (2 Aruego, Framing of the Filipino Constitution, p. 595.) Delegate Ledesma, Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural Development of the Constitutional Convention, in a speech delivered in connection with the national policy on agricultural lands, said: "The exclusion of aliens from the privilege of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a necessary part of the Public Land Laws of the Philippines to keep pace with the idea of preserving the Philippines for the Filipinos." (Emphasis ours.) And, of the same tenor was the speech of Delegate Montilla who said: "With the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be understood that our God-given birthright should be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands . . .. Lands and natural resources are immovables and as such can be compared to the vital organs of a person's body, the lack of possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening of life. If we do not completely antionalize these two of our most important belongings, I am afraid that the time will come when we shall be sorry for the time we were born. Our independence will be just a mockery, for what kind of independence are we going to have if a part of our country is not in our hands but in those of foreigners?" (Emphasis ours.) Professor Aruego says that since the opening days of the Constitutional Convention one of its fixed and dominating objectives was the conservation and nationalization of the natural resources of the country. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p 592.) This is ratified by the members of the Constitutional Convention who are now members of this Court, namely, Mr. Justice Perfecto, Mr. Justice Briones, and Mr. Justice Hontiveros. And, indeed, if under Article XIV, section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even operate a small jitney for hire, it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own a pieace of land. This constitutional intent is made more patent and is strongly implemented by an act of the National Assembly passed soon after the Constitution was approved. We are referring again to Commonwealth Act No. 141. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity. Said section reads as follows: SEC. 120. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain under this Act; to corporations organized in the Philippine Islands authorized therefor by their charters, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land, or permanent improvements thereon, or any interest therein, as to their own citizens, only in the manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the same are in force but not thereafter. SEC. 121. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former Public Land Act or of any other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippine Islands with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations, or associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act; to corporate bodies organized in the Philippine Islands whose charters may authorize them to do so, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of the countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land or pemanent improvements thereon or any interest therein, as to their own citizens, and only in the manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the same are in force, but not thereafter: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts, nor to lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes, while used for such purposes: Provided, further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to persons,corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of five years, under the penalty of such property reverting to the Government in the contrary case." (Public Land Act, No. 2874.) It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in these section refers to all private lands, whether strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land which had not been acquired by any of the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in these two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be transferred to aliens except "upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens were granted the right to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity. Then came the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 was passed, sections 122 and 123 of which read as follows: SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain under this Act or to corporations organized in the Philippines authorized thereof by their charters. SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations or associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose charters authorize them to do so: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts: Provided, further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to persons, corporations or associations not legally

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capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of five years; otherwise, such property shall revert to the Government. These two sections are almost literally the same as sections 120 and 121 of Act No. 2874, the only difference being that in the new provisions, the right to reciprocity granted to aliens is completely stricken out. This, undoubtedly, is to conform to the absolute policy contained in section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which, in prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural lands to aliens, grants them no right of reciprocity. This legislative construction carries exceptional weight, for prominent members of the National Assembly who approved the new Act had been members of the Constitutional Convention. It is said that the lot question does not come within the purview of sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, there being no proof that the same had been acquired by one of the means provided in said provisions. We are not, however, diciding the instant case under the provisions of the Public Land Act, which have to refer to land that had been formerly of the public domain, otherwise their constitutionality may be doubtful. We are deciding the instant case under section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which is more comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it prohibits the transfer to alien of any private agricultural land including residential land whatever its origin might have been. And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved Republic Act No. 133 which allows mortgage of "private real property" of any kind in favor of aliens but with a qualification consisting of expressly prohibiting aliens to bid or take part in any sale of such real property as a consequence of the mortgage. This prohibition makes no distinction between private lands that are strictly agricultural and private lands that are residental or commercial. The prohibition embraces the sale of private lands of any kind in favor of aliens, which is again a clear implementation and a legislative interpretation of the constitutional prohibition. Had the Congress been of opinion that private residential lands may be sold to aliens under the Constitution, no legislative measure would have been found necessary to authorize mortgage which would have been deemed also permissible under the Constitution. But clearly it was the opinion of the Congress that such sale is forbidden by the Constitution and it was such opinion that prompted the legislative measure intended to clarify that mortgage is not within the constitutional prohibition. It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude aliens, admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites where they may build their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity. We are satisfied, however, that aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire. For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs. Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur. I G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990 SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, vs. RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS, as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and CATALINO MACARAIG, as Executive Secretary, respondents. G.R. No. 92047 July 25, 1990 DIONISIO S. OJEDA, petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MACARAIG, JR., ASSETS PRIVATIZATION TRUST CHAIRMAN RAMON T. GARCIA, AMBASSADOR RAMON DEL ROSARIO, et al., as members of the PRINCIPAL AND BIDDING COMMITTEES ON THE UTILIZATION/DISPOSITION PETITION OF PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES IN JAPAN, respondents. Arturo M. Tolentino for petitioner in 92013.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives and agents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306 Roppongi, 5-Chome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan scheduled on February 21, 1990. We granted the prayer for a temporary restraining order effective February 20, 1990. One of the petitioners (in G.R. No. 92047) likewise prayes for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to fully disclose to the public the basis of their decision to push through with the sale of the Roppongi property inspire of strong public opposition and to explain the proceedings which effectively prevent the participation of Filipino citizens and entities in the bidding process. The oral arguments in G.R. No. 92013, Laurel v. Garcia, et al. were heard by the Court on March 13, 1990. After G.R. No. 92047, Ojeda v. Secretary Macaraig, et al. was filed, the respondents were required to file a comment by the Court's resolution dated February 22, 1990. The two petitions were consolidated on March 27, 1990 when the memoranda of the parties in the Laurel case were deliberated upon. The Court could not act on these cases immediately because the respondents filed a motion for an extension of thirty (30) days to file comment in G.R. No. 92047, followed by a second motion for an extension of another thirty (30) days which we granted on May 8, 1990, a third motion for extension of time granted on May 24, 1990 and a fourth motion for extension of time which we granted on June 5, 1990 but calling the attention of the respondents to the length of time the petitions have been pending. After the comment was filed, the petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 asked for thirty (30) days to file a reply. We noted his motion and resolved to decide the two (2) cases.

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The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956, the other lots being: (1) The Nampeidai Property at 11-24 Nampeidai-machi, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo which has an area of approximately 2,489.96 square meters, and is at present the site of the Philippine Embassy Chancery; (2) The Kobe Commercial Property at 63 Naniwa-cho, Kobe, with an area of around 764.72 square meters and categorized as a commercial lot now being used as a warehouse and parking lot for the consulate staff; and (3) The Kobe Residential Property at 1-980-2 Obanoyama-cho, Shinohara, Nada-ku, Kobe, a residential lot which is now vacant. The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese government for national development projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during World War II. The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550 million would be payable in twenty (20) years in accordance with annual schedules of procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese governments (Article 2, Reparations Agreement). Rep. Act No. 1789, the Reparations Law, prescribes the national policy on procurement and utilization of reparations and development loans. The procurements are divided into those for use by the government sector and those for private parties in projects as the then National Economic Council shall determine. Those intended for the private sector shall be made available by sale to Filipino citizens or to one hundred (100%) percent Filipino-owned entities in national development projects. The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government under the Second Year Schedule and listed under the heading "Government Sector", through Reparations Contract No. 300 dated June 27, 1958. The Roppongi property consists of the land and building "for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy" (Annex M-D to Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 503). As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai on July 22, 1976 when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since that time. A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the subject of a lease agreement with a Japanese firm - Kajima Corporation which shall construct two (2) buildings in Roppongi and one (1) building in Nampeidai and renovate the present Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai. The consideration of the construction would be the lease to the foreign corporation of one (1) of the buildings to be constructed in Roppongi and the two (2) buildings in Nampeidai. The other building in Roppongi shall then be used as the Philippine Embassy Chancery. At the end of the lease period, all the three leased buildings shall be occupied and used by the Philippine government. No change of ownership or title shall occur. (See Annex "B" to Reply to Comment) The Philippine government retains the title all throughout the lease period and thereafter. However, the government has not acted favorably on this proposal which is pending approval and ratification between the parties. Instead, on August 11, 1986, President Aquino created a committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan through Administrative Order No. 3, followed by Administrative Orders Numbered 3A, B, C and D. On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. The four properties in Japan including the Roppongi were specifically mentioned in the first "Whereas" clause. Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot. The property has twice been set for bidding at a minimum floor price of $225 million. The first bidding was a failure since only one bidder qualified. The second one, after postponements, has not yet materialized. The last scheduled bidding on February 21, 1990 was restrained by his Court. Later, the rules on bidding were changed such that the $225 million floor price became merely a suggested floor price. The Court finds that each of the herein petitions raises distinct issues. The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 objects to the alienation of the Roppongi property to anyone while the petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 adds as a principal objection the alleged unjustified bias of the Philippine government in favor of selling the property to non-Filipino citizens and entities. These petitions have been consolidated and are resolved at the same time for the objective is the same - to stop the sale of the Roppongi property. The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 raises the following issues: (1) Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine Government?; and (2) Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property? Petitioner Dionisio Ojeda in G.R. No. 92047, apart from questioning the authority of the government to alienate the Roppongi property assails the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296 in making the property available for sale to non-Filipino citizens and entities. He also questions the bidding procedures of the Committee on the Utilization or Disposition of Philippine Government Properties in Japan for being discriminatory against Filipino citizens and Filipinoowned entities by denying them the right to be informed about the bidding requirements. II In G.R. No. 92013, petitioner Laurel asserts that the Roppongi property and the related lots were acquired as part of the reparations from the Japanese government for diplomatic and consular use by the Philippine government. Vice-President Laurel states that the Roppongi property is

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classified as one of public dominion, and not of private ownership under Article 420 of the Civil Code (See infra). The petitioner submits that the Roppongi property comes under "property intended for public service" in paragraph 2 of the above provision. He states that being one of public dominion, no ownership by any one can attach to it, not even by the State. The Roppongi and related properties were acquired for "sites for chancery, diplomatic, and consular quarters, buildings and other improvements" (Second Year Reparations Schedule). The petitioner states that they continue to be intended for a necessary service. They are held by the State in anticipation of an opportune use. (Citing 3 Manresa 65-66). Hence, it cannot be appropriated, is outside the commerce of man, or to put it in more simple terms, it cannot be alienated nor be the subject matter of contracts (Citing Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 Phil. 20 [1915]). Noting the non-use of the Roppongi property at the moment, the petitioner avers that the same remains property of public dominion so long as the government has not used it for other purposes nor adopted any measure constituting a removal of its original purpose or use. The respondents, for their part, refute the petitioner's contention by saying that the subject property is not governed by our Civil Code but by the laws of Japan where the property is located. They rely upon the rule of lex situs which is used in determining the applicable law regarding the acquisition, transfer and devolution of the title to a property. They also invoke Opinion No. 21, Series of 1988, dated January 27, 1988 of the Secretary of Justice which used the lex situs in explaining the inapplicability of Philippine law regarding a property situated in Japan. The respondents add that even assuming for the sake of argument that the Civil Code is applicable, the Roppongi property has ceased to become property of public dominion. It has become patrimonial property because it has not been used for public service or for diplomatic purposes for over thirteen (13) years now (Citing Article 422, Civil Code) and because the intention by the Executive Department and the Congress to convert it to private use has been manifested by overt acts, such as, among others: (1) the transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai (2) the issuance of administrative orders for the possibility of alienating the four government properties in Japan; (3) the issuance of Executive Order No. 296; (4) the enactment by the Congress of Rep. Act No. 6657 [the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law] on June 10, 1988 which contains a provision stating that funds may be taken from the sale of Philippine properties in foreign countries; (5) the holding of the public bidding of the Roppongi property but which failed; (6) the deferment by the Senate in Resolution No. 55 of the bidding to a future date; thus an acknowledgment by the Senate of the government's intention to remove the Roppongi property from the public service purpose; and (7) the resolution of this Court dismissing the petition in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee, et al., G.R. No. 87478 which sought to enjoin the second bidding of the Roppongi property scheduled on March 30, 1989. III In G.R. No. 94047, petitioner Ojeda once more asks this Court to rule on the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296. He had earlier filed a petition in G.R. No. 87478 which the Court dismissed on August 1, 1989. He now avers that the executive order contravenes the constitutional mandate to conserve and develop the national patrimony stated in the Preamble of the 1987 Constitution. It also allegedly violates: (1) The reservation of the ownership and acquisition of alienable lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens. (Sections 2 and 3, Article XII, Constitution; Sections 22 and 23 of Commonwealth Act 141).itc-asl (2) The preference for Filipino citizens in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony (Section 10, Article VI, Constitution); (3) The protection given to Filipino enterprises against unfair competition and trade practices; (4) The guarantee of the right of the people to information on all matters of public concern (Section 7, Article III, Constitution); (5) The prohibition against the sale to non-Filipino citizens or entities not wholly owned by Filipino citizens of capital goods received by the Philippines under the Reparations Act (Sections 2 and 12 of Rep. Act No. 1789); and (6) The declaration of the state policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Section 28, Article III, Constitution). Petitioner Ojeda warns that the use of public funds in the execution of an unconstitutional executive order is a misapplication of public funds He states that since the details of the bidding for the Roppongi property were never publicly disclosed until February 15, 1990 (or a few days before the scheduled bidding), the bidding guidelines are available only in Tokyo, and the accomplishment of requirements and the selection of qualified bidders should be done in Tokyo, interested Filipino citizens or entities owned by them did not have the chance to comply with Purchase Offer Requirements on the Roppongi. Worse, the Roppongi shall be sold for a minimum price of $225 million from which price capital gains tax under Japanese law of about 50 to 70% of the floor price would still be deducted. IV The petitioners and respondents in both cases do not dispute the fact that the Roppongi site and the three related properties were through reparations agreements, that these were assigned to the government sector and that the Roppongi property itself was specifically designated under the Reparations Agreement to house the Philippine Embassy. The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the Philippine government and the Japanese government. There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is

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not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropration. (Taken from 3 Manresa, 66-69; cited in Tolentino, Commentaries on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1963 Edition, Vol. II, p. 26). The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are: ART. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership. ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks shores roadsteads, and others of similar character; (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property. The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some public service. Has the intention of the government regarding the use of the property been changed because the lot has been Idle for some years? Has it become patrimonial? The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]). The respondents enumerate various pronouncements by concerned public officials insinuating a change of intention. We emphasize, however, that an abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to repair and improve the property (See Heirs of Felino Santiago v. Lazaro, 166 SCRA 368 [1988]). Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on correct legal premises. A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of the Roppongi property's original purpose. Even the failure by the government to repair the building in Roppongi is not abandonment since as earlier stated, there simply was a shortage of government funds. The recent Administrative Orders authorizing a study of the status and conditions of government properties in Japan were merely directives for investigation but did not in any way signify a clear intention to dispose of the properties. Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an "authority to sell", does not have a provision in its text expressly authorizing the sale of the four properties procured from Japan for the government sector. The executive order does not declare that the properties lost their public character. It merely intends to make the properties available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case of a sale, lease or other disposition. It merely eliminates the restriction under Rep. Act No. 1789 that reparations goods may be sold only to Filipino citizens and one hundred (100%) percent Filipino-owned entities. The text of Executive Order No. 296 provides: Section 1. The provisions of Republic Act No. 1789, as amended, and of other laws to the contrary notwithstanding, the above-mentioned properties can be made available for sale, lease or any other manner of disposition to nonFilipino citizens or to entities owned by non-Filipino citizens. Executive Order No. 296 is based on the wrong premise or assumption that the Roppongi and the three other properties were earlier converted into alienable real properties. As earlier stated, Rep. Act No. 1789 differentiates the procurements for the government sector and the private sector (Sections 2 and 12, Rep. Act No. 1789). Only the private sector properties can be sold to endusers who must be Filipinos or entities owned by Filipinos. It is this nationality provision which was amended by Executive Order No. 296. Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657 (the CARP Law) which provides as one of the sources of funds for its implementation, the proceeds of the disposition of the properties of the Government in foreign countries, did not withdraw the Roppongi property from being classified as one of public dominion when it mentions Philippine properties abroad. Section 63 (c) refers to properties which are alienable and not to those reserved for public use or service. Rep Act No. 6657, therefore, does not authorize the Executive Department to sell the Roppongi property. It merely enumerates possible sources of future funding to augment (as and when needed) the Agrarian Reform Fund created under Executive Order No. 299. Obviously any property outside of the commerce of man cannot be tapped as a source of funds. The respondents try to get around the public dominion character of the Roppongi property by insisting that Japanese law and not our Civil Code should apply. It is exceedingly strange why our top government officials, of all people, should be the ones to insist that in the sale of extremely valuable government property, Japanese law and not Philippine law should prevail. The Japanese law - its coverage and effects, when enacted, and exceptions to its provision is not presented to the Court It is simply asserted that the lex loci rei sitae or Japanese law should apply without stating what that law provides. It is a ed on faith that Japanese law would allow the sale. We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of

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conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined (See Salonga, Private International Law, 1981 ed., pp. 377-383); and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply. In the instant case, none of the above elements exists. The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply. The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable. We see no point in belaboring whether or not this opinion is correct. Why should we discuss who can acquire the Roppongi lot when there is no showing that it can be sold? The subsequent approval on October 4, 1988 by President Aquino of the recommendation by the investigating committee to sell the Roppongi property was premature or, at the very least, conditioned on a valid change in the public character of the Roppongi property. Moreover, the approval does not have the force and effect of law since the President already lost her legislative powers. The Congress had already convened for more than a year. Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that the Roppongi property is no longer of public dominion, there is another obstacle to its sale by the respondents. There is no law authorizing its conveyance. Section 79 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 provides Section 79 (f ) Conveyances and contracts to which the Government is a party. In cases in which the Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a party to any deed or other instrument conveying the title to real estate or to any other property the value of which is in excess of one hundred thousand pesos, the respective Department Secretary shall prepare the necessary papers which, together with the proper recommendations, shall be submitted to the Congress of the Philippines for approval by the same. Such deed, instrument, or contract shall be executed and signed by the President of the Philippines on behalf of the Government of the Philippines unless the Government of the Philippines unless the authority therefor be expressly vested by law in another officer. (Emphasis supplied) The requirement has been retained in Section 48, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292). SEC. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following: (1) For property belonging to and titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, by the President, unless the authority therefor is expressly vested by law in another officer. (2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines but titled in the name of any political subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or instrumentality. (Emphasis supplied) It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. Resolution No. 55 of the Senate dated June 8, 1989, asking for the deferment of the sale of the Roppongi property does not withdraw the property from public domain much less authorize its sale. It is a mere resolution; it is not a formal declaration abandoning the public character of the Roppongi property. In fact, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is conducting hearings on Senate Resolution No. 734 which raises serious policy considerations and calls for a fact-finding investigation of the circumstances behind the decision to sell the Philippine government properties in Japan. The resolution of this Court in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee, et al., supra, did not pass upon the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296. Contrary to respondents' assertion, we did not uphold the authority of the President to sell the Roppongi property. The Court stated that the constitutionality of the executive order was not the real issue and that resolving the constitutional question was "neither necessary nor finally determinative of the case." The Court noted that "[W]hat petitioner ultimately questions is the use of the proceeds of the disposition of the Roppongi property." In emphasizing that "the decision of the Executive to dispose of the Roppongi property to finance the CARP ... cannot be questioned" in view of Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657, the Court did not acknowledge the fact that the property became alienable nor did it indicate that the President was authorized to dispose of the Roppongi property. The resolution should be read to mean that in case the Roppongi property is re-classified to be patrimonial and alienable by authority of law, the proceeds of a sale may be used for national economic development projects including the CARP. Moreover, the sale in 1989 did not materialize. The petitions before us question the proposed 1990 sale of the Roppongi property. We are resolving the issues raised in these petitions, not the issues raised in 1989.

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Having declared a need for a law or formal declaration to withdraw the Roppongi property from public domain to make it alienable and a need for legislative authority to allow the sale of the property, we see no compelling reason to tackle the constitutional issues raised by petitioner Ojeda. The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions unless these questions are properly raised in appropriate cases and their resolution is necessary for the determination of the case (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]). The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other ground such as the application of a statute or general law (Siler v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, [1909], Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 [1941]). The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 states why the Roppongi property should not be sold: The Roppongi property is not just like any piece of property. It was given to the Filipino people in reparation for the lives and blood of Filipinos who died and suffered during the Japanese military occupation, for the suffering of widows and orphans who lost their loved ones and kindred, for the homes and other properties lost by countless Filipinos during the war. The Tokyo properties are a monument to the bravery and sacrifice of the Filipino people in the face of an invader; like the monuments of Rizal, Quezon, and other Filipino heroes, we do not expect economic or financial benefits from them. But who would think of selling these monuments? Filipino honor and national dignity dictate that we keep our properties in Japan as memorials to the countless Filipinos who died and suffered. Even if we should become paupers we should not think of selling them. For it would be as if we sold the lives and blood and tears of our countrymen. (Rollo- G.R. No. 92013, p.147) The petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 also states: Roppongi is no ordinary property. It is one ceded by the Japanese government in atonement for its past belligerence for the valiant sacrifice of life and limb and for deaths, physical dislocation and economic devastation the whole Filipino people endured in World War II. It is for what it stands for, and for what it could never bring back to life, that its significance today remains undimmed, inspire of the lapse of 45 years since the war ended, inspire of the passage of 32 years since the property passed on to the Philippine government. Roppongi is a reminder that cannot should not be dissipated ... (Rollo92047, p. 9) It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos veterans and civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and related properties will eventually be NARVASA, J.:p This appeal concerns the attempt by an American citizen (petitioner Thomas Cheesman) to annul for lack of consent on his part the sale by his Filipino wife (Criselda) of a residential lot and building to Estelita Padilla, also a Filipino. Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were married on December 4, 1970 but have been separated since February 15,1981. 1 On June 4, 1974, a "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights" was executed by Armando Altares conveying a parcel of unregistered land and the house thereon (at No. 7 Neptune Street, Gordon Heights, Olongapo City) in favor of "Criselda P. Cheesman, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Thomas Cheesman, and residing at Lot No. 1, Blk. 8, Filtration Road, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City . . ." 2 Thomas Cheesman, although aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife. 3 sold is a policy determination where both the President and Congress must concur. Considering the properties' importance and value, the laws on conversion and disposition of property of public dominion must be faithfully followed. WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions are GRANTED. A writ of prohibition is issued enjoining the respondents from proceeding with the sale of the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan. The February 20, 1990 Temporary Restraining Order is made PERMANENT. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Bidin, Grio-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 74833 January 21, 1991 THOMAS C. CHEESMAN, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ESTELITA PADILLA, respondents. Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. for petitioner. Benjamin I. Fernandez for private respondent.

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Thereafterand again with the knowledge of Thomas Cheesman and also without any protest by him tax declarations for the property purchased were issued in the name only of Criselda Cheesman and Criselda assumed exclusive management and administration of said property, leasing it to tenants. 4 On July 1, 1981, Criselda Cheesman sold the property to Estelita M. Padilla, without the knowledge or consent of Thomas Cheesman. 5 The deed described Criselda as being" . . . of legal age, married to an American citizen,. . ." 6 Thirty days later, or on July 31, 1981, Thomas Cheesman brought suit in the Court of First Instance at Olongapo City against his wife, Criselda, and Estelita Padilla, praying for the annulment of the sale on the ground that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and consent. 7 An answer was filed in the names of both defendants, alleging that (1) the property sold was paraphernal, having been purchased by Criselda with funds exclusively belonging to her ("her own separate money"); (2) Thomas Cheesman, being an American, was disqualified to have any interest or right of ownership in the land; and (3) Estelita Padilla was a buyer in good faith. 8 During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed upon certain facts which were subsequently set out in a pre-trial Order dated October 22, 1981, 9 as follows: 1. Both parties recognize the existence of the Deed of Sale over the residential house located at No. 7 Granada St., Gordon Heights, Olongapo City, which was acquired from Armando Altares on June 4, 1974 and sold by defendant Criselda Cheesman to Estelita Padilla on July 12, 1981; and 2. That the transaction regarding the transfer of their property took place during the existence of their marriage as the couple were married on December 4, 1970 and the questioned property was acquired sometime on June 4,1974. The action resulted in a judgment dated June 24, 1982, 10 declaring void ab initio the sale executed by Criselda Cheesman in favor of Estelita M. Padilla, and ordering the delivery of the property to Thomas Cheesman as administrator of the conjugal partnership property, and the payment to him of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. 11 The judgment was however set aside as regards Estelita Padilla on a petition for relief filed by the latter, grounded on "fraud, mistake and/or excusable negligence" which had seriously impaired her right to present her case adequately. 12 "After the petition for relief from judgment was given due course," according to petitioner, "a new judge presided over the case." 13 Estelita Padilla filed a supplemental pleading on December 20, 1982 as her own answer to the complaint, and a motion for summary judgment on May 17, 1983. Although there was initial opposition by Thomas Cheesman to the motion, the parties ultimately agreed on the rendition by the court of a summary judgment after entering into a stipulation of facts, at the hearing of the motion on June 21, 1983, the stipulation being of the following tenor: 14 (1) that the property in question was bought during the existence of the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant Criselda P. Cheesman; (2) that the property bought during the marriage was registered in the name of Criselda Cheesman and that the Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights executed by the former owner-vendor Armando Altares in favor of Criselda Cheesman made no mention of the plaintiff; (3) that the property, subject of the proceedings, was sold by defendant Criselda Cheesman in favor of the other defendant Estelita M. Padilla, without the written consent of the plaintiff. Obviously upon the theory that no genuine issue existed any longer and there was hence no need of a trial, the parties having in fact submitted, as also stipulated, their respective memoranda each praying for a favorable verdict, the Trial Court 15 rendered a "Summary Judgment" dated August 3, 1982 declaring "the sale executed by . . . Criselda Cheesman in favor of . . . Estelita Padilla to be valid," dismissing Thomas Cheesman's complaint and ordering him "to immediately turn over the possession of the house and lot subject of . . . (the) case to . . . Estelita Padilla . . ." 16 The Trial Court found that 1) the evidence on record satisfactorily overcame the disputable presumption in Article 160 of the Civil Codethat all property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership "unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife"and that the immovable in question was in truth Criselda's paraphernal property; 2) that moreover, said legal presumption in Article 160 could not apply "inasmuch as the husband-plaintiff is an American citizen and therefore disqualified under the Constitution to acquire and own real properties; and 3) that the exercise by Criselda of exclusive acts of dominion with the knowledge of her husband "had led . . . Estelita Padilla to believe that the properties were the exclusive properties of Criselda Cheesman and on the faith of such a belief she bought the properties from her and for value," and therefore, Thomas Cheesman was, under Article 1473 of the Civil Code, estopped to impugn the transfer to Estelita Padilla. Thomas Cheesman appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. There he assailed the Trial Court acts (1) of granting Estelita Padilla's petition for relief, and its resolution of matters not subject of said petition; (2) of declaring valid the sale to Estelita Padilla despite the lack of consent thereto by him, and the presumption of the conjugal character of the property in question pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code; (3) of disregarding the judgment of June 24, 1982 which, not having been set aside as against Criselda Cheesman, continued to be binding on her; and (4) of making findings of fact not supported by evidence. All of these contentions were found to be without merit by the Appellate Tribunal which, on January 7, 1986, promulgated a decision (erroneously denominated, "Report") 17 affirming the "Summary Judgment complained of," "having found no reversible error" therein.

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Once more, Thomas Cheesman availed of the remedy of appeal, this time to this Court. Here, he argues that it was reversible error for the Intermediate Appellate Court 1) to find that the presumption that the property in question is conjugal in accordance with Article 160 had been satisfactorily overcome by Estelita Padilla; 18 2) to rule that Estelita Padilla was a purchaser of said property in good faith, it appearing: a) that the deed by which the property was conveyed to Criselda Cheesman described her as "married to Thomas C. Cheesman," as well as the deed by which the property was later conveyed to Estelita Padilla by Criselda Cheesman also described her as "married to an American citizen," and both said descriptions had thus "placed Estelita on knowledge of the conjugal nature of the property;" and b) that furthermore, Estelita had admitted to stating in the deed by which she acquired the property a price much lower than that actually paid "in order to avoid payment of more obligation to the government;" 19 3) to decline to declare that the evidence did not warrant the grant of Estelita Padilla's petition for relief on the ground of "fraud, mistake and/or excusable negligence;" 20 4) to hold that Thomas Cheesman had waived his objection to Estelita's petition for relief by failing to appeal from the order granting the same; 5) to accord to Estelita Padilla a relief other than that she had specifically prayed for in her petition for relief, ie., "the restoration of the purchase price which Estelita allegedly paid to Criselda;" 21 and 6) to fail to declare that Thomas Cheesman's citizenship is not a bar to his action to recover the lot and house for the conjugal partnership. 22 Such conclusions as that (1) fraud, mistake or excusable negligence existed in the premises justifying relief to Estelita Padilla under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, or (2) that Criselda Cheesman had used money she had brought into her marriage to Thomas Cheesman to purchase the lot and house in question, or (3) that Estelita Padilla believed in good faith that Criselda Cheesman was the exclusive owner of the property that she (Estelita) intended to and did in fact buyderived from the evidence adduced by the parties, the facts set out in the pleadings or otherwise appearing on recordare conclusions or findings of fact. As distinguished from a question of lawwhich exists "when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts" "there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts;" 23 or when the "query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation; to each other and to the whole and the probabilities of the situation." 24 Now, it is axiomatic that only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised in a petition for the review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals presented to this Court. 25 As everyone knows or ought to know, the appellate jurisdiction of this Court is limited to reviewing errors of law, accepting as conclusive the factual findings of the lower court upon its own assessment of the evidence. 26 The creation of the Court of Appeals was precisely intended to take away from the Supreme Court the work of examining the evidence, and confine its task to the determination of questions which do not call for the reading and study of transcripts containing the testimony of witnesses. 27 The rule of conclusiveness of the factual findings or conclusions of the Court of Appeals is, to be sure, subject to certain exceptions, 28 none of which however obtains in the case at bar. It is noteworthy that both the Trial Court and the Intermediate Appellate Court reached the same conclusions on the three (3) factual matters above set forth, after assessment of the evidence and determination of the probative value thereof. Both Courts found that the facts on record adequately proved fraud, mistake or excusable negligence by which Estelita Padilla's rights had been substantially impaired; that the funds used by Criselda Cheesman was money she had earned and saved prior to her marriage to Thomas Cheesman, and that Estelita Padilla did believe in good faith that Criselda Cheesman was the sole owner of the property in question. Consequently, these determinations of fact will not be here disturbed, this Court having been cited to no reason for doing so. These considerations dispose of the first three (3) points that petitioner Cheesman seeks to make in his appeal. They also make unnecessary an extended discussion of the other issues raised by him. As to them, it should suffice to restate certain fundamental propositions. An order of a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) granting a petition for relief under Rule 38 is interlocutory and is not appealable. Hence, the failure of the party who opposed the petition to appeal from said order, or his participation in the proceedings subsequently had, cannot be construed as a waiver of his objection to the petition for relief so as to preclude his raising the same question on appeal from the judgment on the merits of the main case. Such a party need not repeat his objections to the petition for relief, or perform any act thereafter (e.g., take formal exception) in order to preserve his right to question the same eventually, on appeal, it being sufficient for this purpose that he has made of record "the action which he desires the court to take or his objection to the action of the court and his grounds therefor." 29 Again, the prayer in a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 is not necessarily the same prayer in the petitioner's complaint, answer or other basic pleading. This should be obvious. Equally obvious is that once a petition for relief is granted and the judgment subject thereof set aside, and further proceedings are thereafter had, the Court in its judgment on the merits may properly grant the relief sought in the petitioner's basic pleadings, although different from that stated in his petition for relief. Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." 30 Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. 31 In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal,

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this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have. As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property cannot, and will not, at this stage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out militate, on high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired or any part thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money used for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is not now inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise. An equally decisive consideration is that Estelita Padilla is a purchaser in good faith, both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court having found that Cheesman's own conduct had led her to believe the property to be exclusive property of the latter's wife, freely disposable by her without his consent or intervention. An innocent buyer for value, she is entitled to the protection of the law in her purchase, particularly as against Cheesman, who would assert rights to the property denied him by both letter and spirit of the Constitution itself. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur. When respondent failed to comply with its verbal promise to complete the project by June 1995, the spouses Hulst filed before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) a complaint for rescission of contract with interest, damages and attorney's fees, docketed as HLRB Case No. IV6071196-0618. On April 22, 1997, HLURB Arbiter Ma. Perpetua Y. Aquino (HLURB Arbiter) rendered a Decision 2 in favor of spouses Hulst, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the complainant, rescinding the Contract to Sell and ordering respondent to: 1) Reimburse complainant the sum of P3,187,500.00, representing the purchase price paid by the complainants to P.R. Builders, plus interest thereon at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the time complaint was filed; 2) Pay complainant the sum of P297,000.00 as actual damages; 3) Pay complainant the sum of P100,000.00 by way of moral damages; 4) Pay complainant the sum of P150,000.00 as exemplary damages; 5) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and for other litigation expenses; and 6) Cost of suit. G.R. No. 156364 September 3, 2007 SO ORDERED.3 Meanwhile, spouses Hulst divorced. Ida assigned her rights over the purchased property to petitioner. 4 From then on, petitioner alone pursued the case. DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 dated October 30, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60981. The facts: Jacobus Bernhard Hulst (petitioner) and his spouse Ida Johanna Hulst-Van Ijzeren (Ida), Dutch nationals, entered into a Contract to Sell with PR Builders, Inc. (respondent), for the purchase of a 210-sq m residential unit in respondent's townhouse project in Barangay Niyugan, Laurel, Batangas. On August 21, 1997, the HLURB Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution addressed to the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas directing the latter to execute its judgment. 5 On April 13, 1998, the Ex-Officio Sheriff proceeded to implement the Writ of Execution. However, upon complaint of respondent with the CA on a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, the levy made by the Sheriff was set aside, requiring the Sheriff to levy first on respondent's personal properties. 6 Sheriff Jaime B. Ozaeta (Sheriff) tried to implement the writ as directed but the writ was returned unsatisfied. 7 On January 26, 1999, upon petitioner's motion, the HLURB Arbiter issued an Alias Writ of Execution. 8 On March 23, 1999, the Sheriff levied on respondent's 15 parcels of land covered by 13 Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)9 in Barangay Niyugan, Laurel, Batangas.10

JACOBUS BERNHARD HULST, petitioner, vs. PR BUILDERS, INC., respondent.

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In a Notice of Sale dated March 27, 2000, the Sheriff set the public auction of the levied properties on April 28, 2000 at 10:00 a.m..11 Two days before the scheduled public auction or on April 26, 2000, respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Levy with the HLURB on the ground that the Sheriff made an overlevy since the aggregate appraised value of the levied properties at P6,500.00 per sq m is P83,616,000.00, based on the Appraisal Report12 of Henry Hunter Bayne Co., Inc. dated December 11, 1996, which is over and above the judgment award.13 At 10:15 a.m. of the scheduled auction date of April 28, 2000, respondent's counsel objected to the conduct of the public auction on the ground that respondent's Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Levy was pending resolution. Absent any restraining order from the HLURB, the Sheriff proceeded to sell the 15 parcels of land. Holly Properties Realty Corporation was the winning bidder for all 15 parcels of land for the total amount of P5,450,653.33. The sum of P5,313,040.00 was turned over to the petitioner in satisfaction of the judgment award after deducting the legal fees.14 At 4:15 p.m. of the same day, while the Sheriff was at the HLURB office to remit the legal fees relative to the auction sale and to submit the Certificates of Sale15 for the signature of HLURB Director Belen G. Ceniza (HLURB Director), he received the Order dated April 28, 2000 issued by the HLURB Arbiter to suspend the proceedings on the matter.16 Four months later, or on August 28, 2000, the HLURB Arbiter and HLURB Director issued an Order setting aside the sheriff's levy on respondent's real properties,17 reasoning as follows: While we are not making a ruling that the fair market value of the levied properties is PhP6,500.00 per square meter (or an aggregate value of PhP83,616,000.00) as indicated in the Hunter Baynes Appraisal Report, we definitely cannot agree with the position of the Complainants and the Sheriff that the aggregate value of the 12,864.00-square meter levied properties is only around PhP6,000,000.00. The disparity between the two valuations are [sic] so egregious that the Sheriff should have looked into the matter first before proceeding with the execution sale of the said properties, especially when the auction sale proceedings was seasonably objected by Respondent's counsel, Atty. Noel Mingoa. However, instead of resolving first the objection timely posed by Atty. Mingoa, Sheriff Ozaete totally disregarded the objection raised and, posthaste, issued the corresponding Certificate of Sale even prior to the payment of the legal fees (pars. 7 & 8, Sheriff's Return). While we agree with the Complainants that what is material in an execution sale proceeding is the amount for which the properties were bidded and sold during the public auction and that, mere inadequacy of the price is not a sufficient ground to annul the sale, the court is justified to intervene where the inadequacy of the price shocks the conscience (Barrozo vs. Macaraeg, 83 Phil. 378). The difference between PhP83,616,000.00 and Php6,000,000.00 is PhP77,616,000.00 and it definitely invites our attention to look into the proceedings had especially so when there was only one bidder, the HOLLY PROPERTIES REALTY CORPORATION represented by Ma, Chandra Cacho (par. 7, Sheriff's Return) and the auction sale proceedings was timely objected by Respondent's counsel (par. 6, Sheriff's Return) due to the pendency of the Urgent Motion to Quash the Writ of Levy which was filed prior to the execution sale. Besides, what is at issue is not the value of the subject properties as determined during the auction sale, but the determination of the value of the properties levied upon by the Sheriff taking into consideration Section 9(b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure x x x. xxxx It is very clear from the foregoing that, even during levy, the Sheriff has to consider the fair market value of the properties levied upon to determine whether they are sufficient to satisfy the judgment, and any levy in excess of the judgment award is void (Buan v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 424). x x x x18 (Emphasis supplied). The dispositive portion of the Order reads: WHEREFORE, the levy on the subject properties made by the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC of Tanauan, Batangas, is hereby SET ASIDE and the said Sheriff is hereby directed to levy instead Respondent's real properties that are reasonably sufficient to enforce its final and executory judgment, this time, taking into consideration not only the value of the properties as indicated in their respective tax declarations, but also all the other determinants at arriving at a fair market value, namely: the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the particular case of lands, their size, shape or location, and the tax declarations thereon. SO ORDERED.19 A motion for reconsideration being a prohibited pleading under Section 1(h), Rule IV of the 1996 HLURB Rules and Procedure, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA on September 27, 2000. On October 30, 2002, the CA rendered herein assailed Decision 20 dismissing the petition. The CA held that petitioner's insistence that Barrozo v. Macaraeg21 does not apply since said case stated that "when there is a right to redeem inadequacy of price should not be material" holds no water as what is obtaining in this case is not "mere inadequacy," but an inadequacy that shocks the senses; that Buan v. Court of Appeals22 properly applies since the questioned levy covered 15 parcels of land posited to have an aggregate value of P83,616,000.00 which shockingly exceeded the judgment debt of only around P6,000,000.00. Without filing a motion for reconsideration,23 petitioner took the present recourse on the sole ground that: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ARBITER'S ORDER SETTING ASIDE THE LEVY MADE BY THE SHERIFF ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES.24 Before resolving the question whether the CA erred in affirming the Order of the HLURB setting aside the levy made by the sheriff, it behooves this Court to address a matter of public and national importance

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which completely escaped the attention of the HLURB Arbiter and the CA: petitioner and his wife are foreign nationals who are disqualified under the Constitution from owning real property in their names. Section 7 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides: Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. (Emphasis supplied). The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire lands of the public domain." The 1987 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of lands of the public domain for Filipino citizens 25 or corporations at least 60 percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos. 26 Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands; hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands.27 Since petitioner and his wife, being Dutch nationals, are proscribed under the Constitution from acquiring and owning real property, it is unequivocal that the Contract to Sell entered into by petitioner together with his wife and respondent is void. Under Article 1409 (1) and (7) of the Civil Code, all contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law or public policy and those expressly prohibited or declared void by law are inexistent and void from the beginning. Article 1410 of the same Code provides that the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. A void contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect.28 It does not create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation.29 Generally, parties to a void agreement cannot expect the aid of the law; the courts leave them as they are, because they are deemed in pari delicto or "in equal fault."30 In pari delicto is "a universal doctrine which holds that no action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or to recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or damages for its violation; and where the parties are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against the other."31 This rule, however, is subject to exceptions32 that permit the return of that which may have been given under a void contract to: (a) the innocent party (Arts. 1411-1412, Civil Code); 33 (b) the debtor who pays usurious interest (Art. 1413, Civil Code);34 (c) the party repudiating the void contract before the illegal purpose is accomplished or before damage is caused to a third person and if public interest is subserved by allowing recovery (Art. 1414, Civil Code);35 (d) the incapacitated party if the interest of justice so demands (Art. 1415, Civil Code);36 (e) the party for whose protection the prohibition by law is intended if the agreement is not illegal per se but merely prohibited and if public policy would be enhanced by permitting recovery (Art. 1416, Civil Code);37 and (f) the party for whose benefit the law has been intended such as in price ceiling laws (Art. 1417, Civil Code) 38 and labor laws (Arts. 1418-1419, Civil Code).39 It is significant to note that the agreement executed by the parties in this case is a Contract to Sell and not a contract of sale. A distinction between the two is material in the determination of when ownership is deemed to have been transferred to the buyer or vendee and, ultimately, the resolution of the question on whether the constitutional proscription has been breached. In a contract of sale, the title passes to the buyer upon the delivery of the thing sold. The vendor has lost and cannot recover the ownership of the property until and unless the contract of sale is itself resolved and set aside.40 On the other hand, a contract to sell is akin to a conditional sale where the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor's obligation to transfer title is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event, so that if the suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed.41 In other words, in a contract to sell, the prospective seller agrees to transfer ownership of the property to the buyer upon the happening of an event, which normally is the full payment of the purchase price. But even upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition, ownership does not automatically transfer to the buyer. The prospective seller still has to convey title to the prospective buyer by executing a contract of absolute sale.42 Since the contract involved here is a Contract to Sell, ownership has not yet transferred to the petitioner when he filed the suit for rescission. While the intent to circumvent the constitutional proscription on aliens owning real property was evident by virtue of the execution of the Contract to Sell, such violation of the law did not materialize because petitioner caused the rescission of the contract before the execution of the final deed transferring ownership. Thus, exception (c) finds application in this case. Under Article 1414, one who repudiates the agreement and demands his money before the illegal act has taken place is entitled to recover. Petitioner is therefore entitled to recover what he has paid, although the basis of his claim for rescission, which was granted by the HLURB, was not the fact that he is not allowed to acquire private land under the Philippine Constitution. But petitioner is entitled to the recovery only of the amount of P3,187,500.00, representing the purchase price paid to respondent. No damages may be recovered on the basis of a void contract; being nonexistent, the agreement produces no juridical tie between the parties involved.43 Further, petitioner is not entitled to actual as well as interests thereon,44 moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. The Court takes into consideration the fact that the HLURB Decision dated April 22, 1997 has long been final and executory. Nothing is more settled in the law than that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it was made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.45 The only recognized exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.46 None of the exceptions is present in this case. The HLURB decision cannot be considered a void judgment, as it was rendered by a tribunal with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint.47 Ineluctably, the HLURB Decision resulted in the unjust enrichment of petitioner at the expense of respondent. Petitioner received more than what he is entitled to recover under the circumstances. Article 22 of the Civil Code which embodies the maxim, nemo ex alterius incommode debet lecupletari (no man ought to be made rich out of another's injury), states:

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Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. The above-quoted article is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the provisions of which were formulated as basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order; designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience; guides for human conduct that should run as golden threads through society to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice. 48 There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.49 A sense of justice and fairness demands that petitioner should not be allowed to benefit from his act of entering into a contract to sell that violates the constitutional proscription. This is not a case of equity overruling or supplanting a positive provision of law or judicial rule. Rather, equity is exercised in this case "as the complement of legal jurisdiction [that] seeks to reach and to complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so."50 The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in this case is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution. Equity jurisdiction aims to do complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of the inflexibility of its statutory or legal jurisdiction.51 The sheriff delivered to petitioner the amount of P5,313,040.00 representing the net proceeds (bidded amount is P5,450,653.33) of the auction sale after deducting the legal fees in the amount of P137,613.33.52 Petitioner is only entitled to P3,187,500.00, the amount of the purchase price of the real property paid by petitioner to respondent under the Contract to Sell. Thus, the Court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may validly order petitioner to return the excess amount of P2,125,540.00. The Court shall now proceed to resolve the single issue raised in the present petition: whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the HLURB Order setting aside the levy made by the Sheriff on the subject properties. Petitioner avers that the HLURB Arbiter and Director had no factual basis for pegging the fair market value of the levied properties at P6,500.00 per sq m or P83,616,000.00; that reliance on the appraisal report was misplaced since the appraisal was based on the value of land in neighboring developed subdivisions and on the assumption that the residential unit appraised had already been built; that the Sheriff need not determine the fair market value of the subject properties before levying on the same since what is material is the amount for which the properties were bidded and sold during the public auction; that the pendency of any motion is not a valid ground for the Sheriff to suspend the execution proceedings and, by itself, does not have the effect of restraining the Sheriff from proceeding with the execution. Respondent, on the other hand, contends that while it is true that the HLURB Arbiter and Director did not categorically state the exact value of the levied properties, said properties cannot just amount to P6,000,000.00; that the HLURB Arbiter and Director correctly held that the value indicated in the tax declaration is not the sole determinant of the value of the property. The petition is impressed with merit. If the judgment is for money, the sheriff or other authorized officer must execute the same pursuant to the provisions of Section 9, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, viz: Sec. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. (a) Immediate payment on demand. - The officer shall enforce an execution of a judgment for money by demanding from the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. x x x (b) Satisfaction by levy. - If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution, giving the latter the option to immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option, the officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment. The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal or real property of the judgment obligor which has been levied upon. When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the personal or real property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees. Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest in either real or personal property, may be levied upon in like manner and with like effect as under a writ of attachment (Emphasis supplied).53 Thus, under Rule 39, in executing a money judgment against the property of the judgment debtor, the sheriff shall levy on all property belonging to the judgment debtor as is amply sufficient to satisfy the judgment and costs, and sell the same paying to the judgment creditor so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the amount of the judgment debt and costs. Any excess in the proceeds shall be delivered to the judgment debtor unless otherwise directed by the judgment or order of the court.54 Clearly, there are two stages in the execution of money judgments. First, the levy and then the execution sale.

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Levy has been defined as the act or acts by which an officer sets apart or appropriates a part or the whole of a judgment debtor's property for the purpose of satisfying the command of the writ of execution.55 The object of a levy is to take property into the custody of the law, and thereby render it liable to the lien of the execution, and put it out of the power of the judgment debtor to divert it to any other use or purpose.56 On the other hand, an execution sale is a sale by a sheriff or other ministerial officer under the authority of a writ of execution of the levied property of the debtor.57 In the present case, the HLURB Arbiter and Director gravely abused their discretion in setting aside the levy conducted by the Sheriff for the reason that the auction sale conducted by the sheriff rendered moot and academic the motion to quash the levy. The HLURB Arbiter lost jurisdiction to act on the motion to quash the levy by virtue of the consummation of the auction sale. Absent any order from the HLURB suspending the auction sale, the sheriff rightfully proceeded with the auction sale. The winning bidder had already paid the winning bid. The legal fees had already been remitted to the HLURB. The judgment award had already been turned over to the judgment creditor. What was left to be done was only the issuance of the corresponding certificates of sale to the winning bidder. In fact, only the signature of the HLURB Director for that purpose was needed58 a purely ministerial act. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard for or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.59 In the present case, all the requirements of auction sale under the Rules have been fully complied with to warrant the issuance of the corresponding certificates of sale. And even if the Court should go into the merits of the assailed Order, the petition is meritorious on the following grounds: Firstly, the reliance of the HLURB Arbiter and Director, as well as the CA, on Barrozo v. Macaraeg60 and Buan v. Court of Appeals61 is misplaced. The HLURB and the CA misconstrued the Court's pronouncements in Barrozo. Barrozo involved a judgment debtor who wanted to repurchase properties sold at execution beyond the one-year redemption period. The statement of the Court in Barrozo, that "only where such inadequacy shocks the conscience the courts will intervene," is at best a mere obiter dictum. This declaration should be taken in the context of the other declarations of the Court in Barrozo, to wit: Another point raised by appellant is that the price paid at the auction sale was so inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court. Supposing that this issue is open even after the oneyear period has expired and after the properties have passed into the hands of third persons who may have paid a price higher than the auction sale money, the first thing to consider is that the stipulation contains no statement of the reasonable value of the properties; and although defendant' answer avers that the assessed value was P3,960 it also avers that their real market value was P2,000 only. Anyway, mere inadequacy of price which was the complaint' allegation is not sufficient ground to annul the sale. It is only where such inadequacy shocks the conscience that the courts will intervene. x x x Another consideration is that the assessed value being P3,960 and the purchase price being in effect P1,864 (P464 sale price plus P1,400 mortgage lien which had to be discharged) the conscience is not shocked upon examining the prices paid in the sales in National Bank v. Gonzales, 45 Phil., 693 and Guerrero v. Guerrero, 57 Phil., 445, sales which were left undisturbed by this Court. Furthermore, where there is the right to redeem as in this case inadequacy of price should not be material because the judgment debtor may re-acquire the property or else sell his right to redeem and thus recover any loss he claims to have suffered by reason of the price obtained at the execution sale. x x x x (Emphasis supplied).62 In other words, gross inadequacy of price does not nullify an execution sale. In an ordinary sale, for reason of equity, a transaction may be invalidated on the ground of inadequacy of price, or when such inadequacy shocks one's conscience as to justify the courts to interfere; such does not follow when the law gives the owner the right to redeem as when a sale is made at public auction,63 upon the theory that the lesser the price, the easier it is for the owner to effect redemption. 64 When there is a right to redeem, inadequacy of price should not be material because the judgment debtor may re-acquire the property or else sell his right to redeem and thus recover any loss he claims to have suffered by reason of the price obtained at the execution sale.65 Thus, respondent stood to gain rather than be harmed by the low sale value of the auctioned properties because it possesses the right of redemption. More importantly, the subject matter in Barrozo is the auction sale, not the levy made by the Sheriff. The Court does not sanction the piecemeal interpretation of a decision. To get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and resorted to, but the decision must be considered in its entirety.66 As regards Buan, it is cast under an entirely different factual milieu. It involved the levy on two parcels of land owned by the judgment debtor; and the sale at public auction of one was sufficient to fully satisfy the judgment, such that the levy and attempted execution of the second parcel of land was declared void for being in excess of and beyond the original judgment award granted in favor of the judgment creditor. In the present case, the Sheriff complied with the mandate of Section 9, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, to "sell only a sufficient portion" of the levied properties "as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and the lawful fees." Each of the 15 levied properties was successively bidded upon and sold, one after the other until the judgment debt and the lawful fees were fully satisfied. Holly Properties Realty Corporation successively bidded upon and bought each of the levied properties for the total amount of P5,450,653.33 in full satisfaction of the judgment award and legal fees.67 Secondly, the Rules of Court do not require that the value of the property levied be exactly the same as the judgment debt; it can be less or more than the amount of debt. This is the contingency addressed by Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In the levy of property, the Sheriff does not determine the exact valuation of the levied property. Under Section 9, Rule 39, in conjunction with Section 7, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, the sheriff is required to do only two specific things to effect a levy upon a realty: (a) file

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with the register of deeds a copy of the order of execution, together with the description of the levied property and notice of execution; and (b) leave with the occupant of the property copy of the same order, description and notice.68 Records do not show that respondent alleged non-compliance by the Sheriff of said requisites. Thirdly, in determining what amount of property is sufficient out of which to secure satisfaction of the execution, the Sheriff is left to his own judgment. He may exercise a reasonable discretion, and must exercise the care which a reasonably prudent person would exercise under like conditions and circumstances, endeavoring on the one hand to obtain sufficient property to satisfy the purposes of the writ, and on the other hand not to make an unreasonable and unnecessary levy.69 Because it is impossible to know the precise quantity of land or other property necessary to satisfy an execution, the Sheriff should be allowed a reasonable margin between the value of the property levied upon and the amount of the execution; the fact that the Sheriff levies upon a little more than is necessary to satisfy the execution does not render his actions improper.70 Section 9, Rule 39, provides adequate safeguards against excessive levying. The Sheriff is mandated to sell so much only of such real property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees. In the absence of a restraining order, no error, much less abuse of discretion, can be imputed to the Sheriff in proceeding with the auction sale despite the pending motion to quash the levy filed by the respondents with the HLURB. It is elementary that sheriffs, as officers charged with the delicate task of the enforcement and/or implementation of judgments, must, in the absence of a restraining order, act with considerable dispatch so as not to unduly delay the administration of justice; otherwise, the decisions, orders, or other processes of the courts of justice and the like would be futile. 71 It is not within the jurisdiction of the Sheriff to consider, much less resolve, respondent's objection to the continuation of the conduct of the auction sale. The Sheriff has no authority, on his own, to suspend the auction sale. His duty being ministerial, he has no discretion to postpone the conduct of the auction sale. Finally, one who attacks a levy on the ground of excessiveness carries the burden of sustaining that contention.72 In the determination of whether a levy of execution is excessive, it is proper to take into consideration encumbrances upon the property, as well as the fact that a forced sale usually results in a sacrifice; that is, the price demanded for the property upon a private sale is not the standard for determining the excessiveness of the levy.73 Here, the HLURB Arbiter and Director had no sufficient factual basis to determine the value of the levied property. Respondent only submitted an Appraisal Report, based merely on surmises. The Report was based on the projected value of the townhouse project after it shall have been fully developed, that is, on the assumption that the residential units appraised had already been built. The Appraiser in fact made this qualification in its Appraisal Report: "[t]he property subject of this appraisal has not been constructed. The basis of the appraiser is on the existing model units."74 Since it is undisputed that the townhouse project did not push through, the projected value did not become a reality. Thus, the appraisal value cannot be equated with the fair market value. The Appraisal Report is not the best proof to accurately show the value of the levied properties as it is clearly self-serving. Therefore, the Order dated August 28, 2000 of HLURB Arbiter Aquino and Director Ceniza in HLRB Case No. IV6-071196-0618 which set aside the sheriff's levy on respondent's real properties, was clearly issued with grave abuse of discretion. The CA erred in affirming said Order. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 30, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60981 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated August 28, 2000 of HLURB Arbiter Ma. Perpetua Y. Aquino and Director Belen G. Ceniza in HLRB Case No. IV6-0711960618 is declared NULL and VOID. HLURB Arbiter Aquino and Director Ceniza are directed to issue the corresponding certificates of sale in favor of the winning bidder, Holly Properties Realty Corporation. Petitioner is ordered to return to respondent the amount of P2,125,540.00, without interest, in excess of the proceeds of the auction sale delivered to petitioner. After the finality of herein judgment, the amount of P2,125,540.00 shall earn 6% interest until fully paid. SO ORDERED. Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-17587

September 12, 1967

PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION, representing the estate of JUSTINA SANTOS Y CANON FAUSTINO, deceased, plaintiff-appellant, vs. LUI SHE in her own behalf and as administratrix of the intestate estate of Wong Heng, deceased, defendant-appellant. Nicanor S. Sison for plaintiff-appellant. Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta for defendant-appellant.

CASTRO, J.: Justina Santos y Canon Faustino and her sister Lorenzo were the owners in common of a piece of land in Manila. This parcel, with an area of 2,582.30 square meters, is located on Rizal Avenue and opens into Florentino Torres street at the back and Katubusan street on one side. In it are two residential houses with entrance on Florentino Torres street and the Hen Wah Restaurant with entrance on Rizal Avenue. The sisters lived in one of the houses, while Wong Heng, a Chinese, lived with his family in the restaurant. Wong had been a long-time lessee of a portion of the property, paying a monthly rental of P2,620. On September 22, 1957 Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property as her sister died with no other heir. Then already well advanced in years, being at the time 90 years old, blind, crippled and an invalid, she was left with no other relative to live with. Her only companions in the house were her 17 dogs and 8 maids. Her otherwise dreary existence was brightened now and then by the visits of Wong's four children who had become the joy of her life. Wong himself was the trusted man to whom she delivered various amounts for safekeeping, including rentals from her property at the corner of Ongpin and Salazar streets and the rentals which Wong himself paid as lessee of a part of the Rizal Avenue

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property. Wong also took care of the payment; in her behalf, of taxes, lawyers' fees, funeral expenses, masses, salaries of maids and security guard, and her household expenses. "In grateful acknowledgment of the personal services of the lessee to her," Justina Santos executed on November 15, 1957 a contract of lease (Plff Exh. 3) in favor of Wong, covering the portion then already leased to him and another portion fronting Florentino Torres street. The lease was for 50 years, although the lessee was given the right to withdraw at any time from the agreement; the monthly rental was P3,120. The contract covered an area of 1,124 square meters. Ten days later (November 25), the contract was amended (Plff Exh. 4) so as to make it cover the entire property, including the portion on which the house of Justina Santos stood, at an additional monthly rental of P360. For his part Wong undertook to pay, out of the rental due from him, an amount not exceeding P1,000 a month for the food of her dogs and the salaries of her maids. On December 21 she executed another contract (Plff Exh. 7) giving Wong the option to buy the leased premises for P120,000, payable within ten years at a monthly installment of P1,000. The option, written in Tagalog, imposed on him the obligation to pay for the food of the dogs and the salaries of the maids in her household, the charge not to exceed P1,800 a month. The option was conditioned on his obtaining Philippine citizenship, a petition for which was then pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. It appears, however, that this application for naturalization was withdrawn when it was discovered that he was not a resident of Rizal. On October 28, 1958 she filed a petition to adopt him and his children on the erroneous belief that adoption would confer on them Philippine citizenship. The error was discovered and the proceedings were abandoned. On November 18, 1958 she executed two other contracts, one (Plff Exh. 5) extending the term of the lease to 99 years, and another (Plff Exh. 6) fixing the term of the option of 50 years. Both contracts are written in Tagalog. In two wills executed on August 24 and 29, 1959 (Def Exhs. 285 & 279), she bade her legatees to respect the contracts she had entered into with Wong, but in a codicil (Plff Exh. 17) of a later date (November 4, 1959) she appears to have a change of heart. Claiming that the various contracts were made by her because of machinations and inducements practiced by him, she now directed her executor to secure the annulment of the contracts. On November 18 the present action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The complaint alleged that the contracts were obtained by Wong "through fraud, misrepresentation, inequitable conduct, undue influence and abuse of confidence and trust of and (by) taking advantage of the helplessness of the plaintiff and were made to circumvent the constitutional provision prohibiting aliens from acquiring lands in the Philippines and also of the Philippine Naturalization Laws." The court was asked to direct the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel the registration of the contracts and to order Wong to pay Justina Santos the additional rent of P3,120 a month from November 15, 1957 on the allegation that the reasonable rental of the leased premises was P6,240 a month. In his answer, Wong admitted that he enjoyed her trust and confidence as proof of which he volunteered the information that, in addition to the sum of P3,000 which he said she had delivered to him for safekeeping, another sum of P22,000 had been deposited in a joint account which he had with one of her maids. But he denied having taken advantage of her trust in order to secure the execution of the contracts in question. As counterclaim he sought the recovery of P9,210.49 which he said she owed him for advances. Wong's admission of the receipt of P22,000 and P3,000 was the cue for the filing of an amended complaint. Thus on June 9, 1960, aside from the nullity of the contracts, the collection of various amounts allegedly delivered on different occasions was sought. These amounts and the dates of their delivery are P33,724.27 (Nov. 4, 1957); P7,344.42 (Dec. 1, 1957); P10,000 (Dec. 6, 1957); P22,000 and P3,000 (as admitted in his answer). An accounting of the rentals from the Ongpin and Rizal Avenue properties was also demanded. In the meantime as a result of a petition for guardianship filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, the Security Bank & Trust Co. was appointed guardian of the properties of Justina Santos, while Ephraim G. Gochangco was appointed guardian of her person. In his answer, Wong insisted that the various contracts were freely and voluntarily entered into by the parties. He likewise disclaimed knowledge of the sum of P33,724.27, admitted receipt of P7,344.42 and P10,000, but contended that these amounts had been spent in accordance with the instructions of Justina Santos; he expressed readiness to comply with any order that the court might make with respect to the sums of P22,000 in the bank and P3,000 in his possession. The case was heard, after which the lower court rendered judgment as follows: [A]ll the documents mentioned in the first cause of action, with the exception of the first which is the lease contract of 15 November 1957, are declared null and void; Wong Heng is condemned to pay unto plaintiff thru guardian of her property the sum of P55,554.25 with legal interest from the date of the filing of the amended complaint; he is also ordered to pay the sum of P3,120.00 for every month of his occupation as lessee under the document of lease herein sustained, from 15 November 1959, and the moneys he has consigned since then shall be imputed to that; costs against Wong Heng. From this judgment both parties appealed directly to this Court. After the case was submitted for decision, both parties died, Wong Heng on October 21, 1962 and Justina Santos on December 28, 1964. Wong was substituted by his wife, Lui She, the other defendant in this case, while Justina Santos was substituted by the Philippine Banking Corporation. Justina Santos maintained now reiterated by the Philippine Banking Corporation that the lease contract (Plff Exh. 3) should have been annulled along with the four other contracts (Plff Exhs. 4-7) because it lacks mutuality; because it included a portion which, at the time, was in custodia legis; because the contract was obtained in violation of the fiduciary relations of the parties; because her consent was obtained through undue influence, fraud and misrepresentation; and because the lease contract, like the rest of the contracts, is absolutely simulated. Paragraph 5 of the lease contract states that "The lessee may at any time withdraw from this agreement." It is claimed that this stipulation offends article 1308 of the Civil Code which provides that "the contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them."

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We have had occasion to delineate the scope and application of article 1308 in the early case of Taylor v. Uy Tieng Piao.1 We said in that case: Article 1256 [now art. 1308] of the Civil Code in our opinion creates no impediment to the insertion in a contract for personal service of a resolutory condition permitting the cancellation of the contract by one of the parties. Such a stipulation, as can be readily seen, does not make either the validity or the fulfillment of the contract dependent upon the will of the party to whom is conceded the privilege of cancellation; for where the contracting parties have agreed that such option shall exist, the exercise of the option is as much in the fulfillment of the contract as any other act which may have been the subject of agreement. Indeed, the cancellation of a contract in accordance with conditions agreed upon beforehand is fulfillment.2 And so it was held in Melencio v. Dy Tiao Lay 3 that a "provision in a lease contract that the lessee, at any time before he erected any building on the land, might rescind the lease, can hardly be regarded as a violation of article 1256 [now art. 1308] of the Civil Code." The case of Singson Encarnacion v. Baldomar 4 cannot be cited in support of the claim of want of mutuality, because of a difference in factual setting. In that case, the lessees argued that they could occupy the premises as long as they paid the rent. This is of course untenable, for as this Court said, "If this defense were to be allowed, so long as defendants elected to continue the lease by continuing the payment of the rentals, the owner would never be able to discontinue it; conversely, although the owner should desire the lease to continue the lessees could effectively thwart his purpose if they should prefer to terminate the contract by the simple expedient of stopping payment of the rentals." Here, in contrast, the right of the lessee to continue the lease or to terminate it is so circumscribed by the term of the contract that it cannot be said that the continuance of the lease depends upon his will. At any rate, even if no term had been fixed in the agreement, this case would at most justify the fixing of a period 5 but not the annulment of the contract. Nor is there merit in the claim that as the portion of the property formerly owned by the sister of Justina Santos was still in the process of settlement in the probate court at the time it was leased, the lease is invalid as to such portion. Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property upon the death of her sister Lorenzo on September 22, 1957 by force of article 777 of the Civil Code. Hence, when she leased the property on November 15, she did so already as owner thereof. As this Court explained in upholding the sale made by an heir of a property under judicial administration: That the land could not ordinarily be levied upon while in custodia legis does not mean that one of the heirs may not sell the right, interest or participation which he has or might have in the lands under administration. The ordinary execution of property in custodia legis is prohibited in order to avoid interference with the possession by the court. But the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the result of the pending administration, in no wise stands in the way of such administration. 6 It is next contended that the lease contract was obtained by Wong in violation of his fiduciary relationship with Justina Santos, contrary to article 1646, in relation to article 1941 of the Civil Code, which disqualifies "agents (from leasing) the property whose administration or sale may have been entrusted to them." But Wong was never an agent of Justina Santos. The relationship of the parties, although admittedly close and confidential, did not amount to an agency so as to bring the case within the prohibition of the law. Just the same, it is argued that Wong so completely dominated her life and affairs that the contracts express not her will but only his. Counsel for Justina Santos cites the testimony of Atty. Tomas S. Yumol who said that he prepared the lease contract on the basis of data given to him by Wong and that she told him that "whatever Mr. Wong wants must be followed." 7 The testimony of Atty. Yumol cannot be read out of context in order to warrant a finding that Wong practically dictated the terms of the contract. What this witness said was: Q Did you explain carefully to your client, Doa Justina, the contents of this document before she signed it? A I explained to her each and every one of these conditions and I also told her these conditions were quite onerous for her, I don't really know if I have expressed my opinion, but I told her that we would rather not execute any contract anymore, but to hold it as it was before, on a verbal month to month contract of lease. Q But, she did not follow your advice, and she went with the contract just the same? A She agreed first . . . Q Agreed what? A Agreed with my objectives that it is really onerous and that I was really right, but after that, I was called again by her and she told me to follow the wishes of Mr. Wong Heng. xxx xxx xxx

Q So, as far as consent is concerned, you were satisfied that this document was perfectly proper? xxx xxx xxx

A Your Honor, if I have to express my personal opinion, I would say she is not, because, as I said before, she told me "Whatever Mr. Wong wants must be followed." 8 Wong might indeed have supplied the data which Atty. Yumol embodied in the lease contract, but to say this is not to detract from the binding force of the contract. For the contract was fully explained to Justina Santos by her own lawyer. One incident, related by the same witness, makes clear that she voluntarily consented to the lease contract. This witness said that the original term fixed for the lease was 99 years but that as he doubted the validity of a lease to an alien for that length of time, he tried to persuade her to enter instead into a lease on a month-to-month basis. She was, however, firm and

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unyielding. Instead of heeding the advice of the lawyer, she ordered him, "Just follow Mr. Wong Heng."9 Recounting the incident, Atty. Yumol declared on cross examination: Considering her age, ninety (90) years old at the time and her condition, she is a wealthy woman, it is just natural when she said "This is what I want and this will be done." In particular reference to this contract of lease, when I said "This is not proper," she said "You just go ahead, you prepare that, I am the owner, and if there is any illegality, I am the only one that can question the illegality."10 Atty. Yumol further testified that she signed the lease contract in the presence of her close friend, Hermenegilda Lao, and her maid, Natividad Luna, who was constantly by her side.11 Any of them could have testified on the undue influence that Wong supposedly wielded over Justina Santos, but neither of them was presented as a witness. The truth is that even after giving his client time to think the matter over, the lawyer could not make her change her mind. This persuaded the lower court to uphold the validity of the lease contract against the claim that it was procured through undue influence. Indeed, the charge of undue influence in this case rests on a mere inference 12 drawn from the fact that Justina Santos could not read (as she was blind) and did not understand the English language in which the contract is written, but that inference has been overcome by her own evidence. Nor is there merit in the claim that her consent to the lease contract, as well as to the rest of the contracts in question, was given out of a mistaken sense of gratitude to Wong who, she was made to believe, had saved her and her sister from a fire that destroyed their house during the liberation of Manila. For while a witness claimed that the sisters were saved by other persons (the brothers Edilberto and Mariano Sta. Ana)13 it was Justina Santos herself who, according to her own witness, Benjamin C. Alonzo, said "very emphatically" that she and her sister would have perished in the fire had it not been for Wong.14 Hence the recital in the deed of conditional option (Plff Exh. 7) that "[I]tong si Wong Heng ang siyang nagligtas sa aming dalawang magkapatid sa halos ay tiyak na kamatayan", and the equally emphatic avowal of gratitude in the lease contract (Plff Exh. 3). As it was with the lease contract (Plff Exh. 3), so it was with the rest of the contracts (Plff Exhs. 4-7) the consent of Justina Santos was given freely and voluntarily. As Atty. Alonzo, testifying for her, said: [I]n nearly all documents, it was either Mr. Wong Heng or Judge Torres and/or both. When we had conferences, they used to tell me what the documents should contain. But, as I said, I would always ask the old woman about them and invariably the old woman used to tell me: "That's okay. It's all right."15 But the lower court set aside all the contracts, with the exception of the lease contract of November 15, 1957, on the ground that they are contrary to the expressed wish of Justina Santos and that their considerations are fictitious. Wong stated in his deposition that he did not pay P360 a month for the additional premises leased to him, because she did not want him to, but the trial court did not believe him. Neither did it believe his statement that he paid P1,000 as consideration for each of the contracts (namely, the option to buy the leased premises, the extension of the lease to 99 years, and the fixing of the term of the option at 50 years), but that the amount was returned to him by her for safekeeping. Instead, the court relied on the testimony of Atty. Alonzo in reaching the conclusion that the contracts are void for want of consideration. Atty. Alonzo declared that he saw no money paid at the time of the execution of the documents, but his negative testimony does not rule out the possibility that the considerations were paid at some other time as the contracts in fact recite. What is more, the consideration need not pass from one party to the other at the time a contract is executed because the promise of one is the consideration for the other. 16 With respect to the lower court's finding that in all probability Justina Santos could not have intended to part with her property while she was alive nor even to lease it in its entirety as her house was built on it, suffice it to quote the testimony of her own witness and lawyer who prepared the contracts (Plff Exhs. 4-7) in question, Atty. Alonzo: The ambition of the old woman, before her death, according to her revelation to me, was to see to it that these properties be enjoyed, even to own them, by Wong Heng because Doa Justina told me that she did not have any relatives, near or far, and she considered Wong Heng as a son and his children her grandchildren; especially her consolation in life was when she would hear the children reciting prayers in Tagalog.17 She was very emphatic in the care of the seventeen (17) dogs and of the maids who helped her much, and she told me to see to it that no one could disturb Wong Heng from those properties. That is why we thought of the ninety-nine (99) years lease; we thought of adoption, believing that thru adoption Wong Heng might acquire Filipino citizenship; being the adopted child of a Filipino citizen.18 This is not to say, however, that the contracts (Plff Exhs. 3-7) are valid. For the testimony just quoted, while dispelling doubt as to the intention of Justina Santos, at the same time gives the clue to what we view as a scheme to circumvent the Constitutional prohibition against the transfer of lands to aliens. "The illicit purpose then becomes the illegal causa"19 rendering the contracts void. Taken singly, the contracts show nothing that is necessarily illegal, but considered collectively, they reveal an insidious pattern to subvert by indirection what the Constitution directly prohibits. To be sure, a lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an alien the right to buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship. As this Court said in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds:20 [A]liens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire. But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, 21 this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land ( jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of the right to dispose of it ( jus disponendi) rights the sum total of which make up ownership. It is just as if today the possession is transferred, tomorrow, the use, the next day, the disposition, and so on, until ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made up are consolidated in an alien. And yet this is just exactly what the parties in this case did within the space of one year, with the result that Justina

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Santos' ownership of her property was reduced to a hollow concept. If this can be done, then the Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the Philippines, as announced in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,22 is indeed in grave peril. It does not follow from what has been said, however, that because the parties are in pari delicto they will be left where they are, without relief. For one thing, the original parties who were guilty of a violation of the fundamental charter have died and have since been substituted by their administrators to whom it would be unjust to impute their guilt.23 For another thing, and this is not only cogent but also important, article 1416 of the Civil Code provides, as an exception to the rule on pari delicto, that "When the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has paid or delivered." The Constitutional provision that "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines"24 is an expression of public policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos. As this Court said in Krivenko: It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude aliens admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites where they may build their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity . . . . For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs.25 That policy would be defeated and its continued violation sanctioned if, instead of setting the contracts aside and ordering the restoration of the land to the estate of the deceased Justina Santos, this Court should apply the general rule of pari delicto. To the extent that our ruling in this case conflicts with that laid down in Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun 26 and subsequent similar cases, the latter must be considered as pro tanto qualified. The claim for increased rentals and attorney's fees, made in behalf of Justina Santos, must be denied for lack of merit. And what of the various amounts which Wong received in trust from her? It appears that he kept two classes of accounts, one pertaining to amount which she entrusted to him from time to time, and another pertaining to rentals from the Ongpin property and from the Rizal Avenue property, which he himself was leasing. With respect to the first account, the evidence shows that he received P33,724.27 on November 8, 1957 (Plff Exh. 16); P7,354.42 on December 1, 1957 (Plff Exh. 13); P10,000 on December 6, 1957 (Plff Exh. 14) ; and P18,928.50 on August 26, 1959 (Def. Exh. 246), or a total of P70,007.19. He claims, however, that he settled his accounts and that the last amount of P18,928.50 was in fact payment to him of what in the liquidation was found to be due to him. He made disbursements from this account to discharge Justina Santos' obligations for taxes, attorneys' fees, funeral services and security guard services, but the checks (Def Exhs. 247-278) drawn by him for this purpose amount to only P38,442.84. 27 Besides, if he had really settled his accounts with her on August 26, 1959, we cannot understand why he still had P22,000 in the bank and P3,000 in his possession, or a total of P25,000. In his answer, he offered to pay this amount if the court so directed him. On these two grounds, therefore, his claim of liquidation and settlement of accounts must be rejected. After subtracting P38,442.84 (expenditures) from P70,007.19 (receipts), there is a difference of P31,564 which, added to the amount of P25,000, leaves a balance of P56,564.3528 in favor of Justina Santos. As to the second account, the evidence shows that the monthly income from the Ongpin property until its sale in Rizal Avenue July, 1959 was P1,000, and that from the Rizal Avenue property, of which Wong was the lessee, was P3,120. Against this account the household expenses and disbursements for the care of the 17 dogs and the salaries of the 8 maids of Justina Santos were charged. This account is contained in a notebook (Def. Exh. 6) which shows a balance of P9,210.49 in favor of Wong. But it is claimed that the rental from both the Ongpin and Rizal Avenue properties was more than enough to pay for her monthly expenses and that, as a matter of fact, there should be a balance in her favor. The lower court did not allow either party to recover against the other. Said the court: [T]he documents bear the earmarks of genuineness; the trouble is that they were made only by Francisco Wong and Antonia Matias, nick-named Toning, which was the way she signed the loose sheets, and there is no clear proof that Doa Justina had authorized these two to act for her in such liquidation; on the contrary if the result of that was a deficit as alleged and sought to be there shown, of P9,210.49, that was not what Doa Justina apparently understood for as the Court understands her statement to the Honorable Judge of the Juvenile Court . . . the reason why she preferred to stay in her home was because there she did not incur in any debts . . . this being the case, . . . the Court will not adjudicate in favor of Wong Heng on his counterclaim; on the other hand, while it is claimed that the expenses were much less than the rentals and there in fact should be a superavit, . . . this Court must concede that daily expenses are not easy to compute, for this reason, the Court faced with the choice of the two alternatives will choose the middle course which after all is permitted by the rules of proof, Sec. 69, Rule 123 for in the ordinary course of things, a person will live within his income so that the conclusion of the Court will be that there is neither deficit nor superavit and will let the matter rest here. Both parties on appeal reiterate their respective claims but we agree with the lower court that both claims should be denied. Aside from the reasons given by the court, we think that the claim of Justina Santos totalling P37,235, as rentals due to her after deducting various expenses, should be rejected as the evidence is none too clear about the amounts spent by Wong for food29 masses30 and salaries of her maids.31 His claim for P9,210.49 must likewise be rejected as his averment of liquidation is belied by his own admission that even as late as 1960 he still had P22,000 in the bank and P3,000 in his possession. ACCORDINGLY, the contracts in question (Plff Exhs. 3-7) are annulled and set aside; the land subject-matter of the contracts is ordered returned to the estate of Justina Santos as represented by the Philippine Banking Corporation; Wong Heng (as substituted by the defendant-appellant Lui She) is

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ordered to pay the Philippine Banking Corporation the sum of P56,564.35, with legal interest from the date of the filing of the amended complaint; and the amounts consigned in court by Wong Heng shall be applied to the payment of rental from November 15, 1959 until the premises shall have been vacated by his heirs. Costs against the defendant-appellant. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Angeles, JJ., concur. G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997 MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents. b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS . . . . K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions are met: BELLOSILLO, J.: The FiIipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, 1 is in oked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution. The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. 2 In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITTSheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC 1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on Privatization)/OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate Counsel) are obtained. 3 Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. 4 In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33.000.000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad . . . 5 which respondent GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm. On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it by the First Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae. In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders: a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other type of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the Manila Hotel. . . .

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capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a governmentowned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies. 7 It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. 8 Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said provision to Operate, there must be existing laws "to lay down conditions under which business may be done." 9 Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State. Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding. Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which provides that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place. Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner. We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. 10 It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. 11 Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. 12 A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. 13 As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. 14 This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that . . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which

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could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. 15 Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not selfexecuting, as they quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the Committee on Style. If the wording of "PREFERENCE" is given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," can it be understood as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we not make it clear? To qualified Filipinos as against aliens? THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word "QUALIFIED?". MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as against whom? As against aliens or over aliens? MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word "QUALIFIED" because the existing laws or prospective laws will always lay down conditions under which business may be done. For example, qualifications on the setting up of other financial structures, et cetera (emphasis supplied by respondents) MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style. MR. NOLLEDO Yes, 16 Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting other further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the selfexecuting nature of constitutional provisions. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a selfexecuting constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a selfexecuting provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. 17 Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not selfexecuting. 18 The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be selfexecuting in one part and non-self-executing in another. 19 Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely statements of principles and policies, which are basically not self-executing and only placed in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation 20 speaks of constitutional provisions on personal dignity, 21 the sanctity of family life, 22 the vital role of the youth in nation-building 23 the promotion of social justice, 24 and the values of education. 25 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance 26 refers to the constitutional provisions on social justice and human rights 27 and on education. 28 Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato 29 cites provisions on the promotion of general welfare, 30 the sanctity of family life, 31 the vital role of the youth in nation-building 32 and the promotion of total human liberation and development. 33 A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest that they are only principles upon which the legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur. On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission 34 explains The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to out rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of out race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people.

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We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. 35 When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Manila Hotel has become a landmark a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino, Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930's. It was the site of the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government. it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality. 36 The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City. 37 During World War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a military headquarters. When the American forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places fro their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950's and 1960's, the hotel became the center of political activities, playing host to almost every political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup d' etat where an aspirant for vice-president was "proclaimed" President of the Philippine Republic. For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents' claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. 38 The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in Our Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized. MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo amendment. And the amendment would consist in substituting the words "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" with the following: "CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS. xxx xxx xxx MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we have to raise a question. Suppose it is a corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, do we not give it preference? MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino. What about a corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens? MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President. MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention? MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the preference should only be 100-percent Filipino. MR: DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" may refer only to individuals and not to juridical personalities or entities. MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President. 39 xxx xxx xxx MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read again. MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." And the word "Filipinos" here, as intended by the proponents, will include not only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or entities fully-controlled by Filipinos. 40 The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to please restate his amendment so that I can ask a question. MR. NOLLEDO. "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL

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ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." MR FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a preference? MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously. MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be preferred? MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes." MR. FOZ. Thank you, 41 Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of "MUST," it will be "SHALL THE STATE SHALL GlVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This embodies the so-called "Filipino First" policy. That means that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of concessions, privileges and rights covering the national patrimony. 42 The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the subject provision was still further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo 43 Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the "Pro-Filipino" bias in all economic concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy . . . This provision was never found in previous Constitutions . . . . The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be counter productive and inimical to the common good. In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a "qualified foreigner" end a "qualified Filipino," the latter shall be chosen over the former." Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another hotel company, or it has an overall management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel. 44 The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the subject provision is not self-executory and requires implementing legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear constitutional provision by the government itself is only too distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of the Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation have juridical life of their own and can be the source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a defense that arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the Constitution, even before Congress acts provided that there are discoverable legal standards for executive action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by its own understanding of the constitutional command and of applicable laws. The responsibility for reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not the sole prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every time the executive is confronted by a constitutional command. That is not how constitutional government operates. 45 Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument again is at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a "state action." In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered "state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a "public function;" (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of "state action." Without doubt therefore the transaction. although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command. 46 When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three(3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State. It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the "Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere

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tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties. Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being. Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [if] for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. 47 Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself. In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is, omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law. This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum. The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioner's matching bid did the latter have a cause of action. Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has been finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have not been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for decisions perceived as obstacles to economic progress and development . . . in connection with a temporary injunction issued by the Court's First Division against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements were published in a major daily to the effect that injunction "again demonstrates that the Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle to doing business here. Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism. 48 Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved. 49

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Nationalism is inherent, in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican state, with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom all government authority emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic concept. Protection of foreign investments, while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of nationalism. 50 The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted many of the most important events in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state function to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul a place with a history of grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a country. 51 This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the historical landmark this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation's soul for some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos Manila Hotel and all that it stands for is sold to a nonFilipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the nation's cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution. WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 127882 January 27, 2004 BUGOY, represented by his father UNDERO D. BUGOY, ROGER M. DADING, represented by his father ANTONIO L. DADING, ROMY M. LAGARO, represented by his father TOTING A. LAGARO, MIKENY JONG B. LUMAYONG, represented by his father MIGUEL M. LUMAYONG, RENE T. MIGUEL, represented by his mother EDITHA T. MIGUEL, ALDEMAR L. SAL, represented by his father DANNY M. SAL, DAISY RECARSE, represented by her mother LYDIA S. SANTOS, EDWARD M. EMUY, ALAN P. MAMPARAIR, MARIO L. MANGCAL, ALDEN S. TUSAN, AMPARO S. YAP, VIRGILIO CULAR, MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, JULIA REGINA CULAR, GIAN CARLO CULAR, VIRGILIO CULAR, JR., represented by their father VIRGILIO CULAR, PAUL ANTONIO P. VILLAMOR, represented by his parents JOSE VILLAMOR and ELIZABETH PUA-VILLAMOR, ANA GININA R. TALJA, represented by her father MARIO JOSE B. TALJA, SHARMAINE R. CUNANAN, represented by her father ALFREDO M. CUNANAN, ANTONIO JOSE A. VITUG III, represented by his mother ANNALIZA A. VITUG, LEAN D. NARVADEZ, represented by his father MANUEL E. NARVADEZ, JR., ROSERIO MARALAG LINGATING, represented by her father RIO OLIMPIO A. LINGATING, MARIO JOSE B. TALJA, DAVID E. DE VERA, MARIA MILAGROS L. SAN JOSE, SR., SUSAN O. BOLANIO, OND, LOLITA G. DEMONTEVERDE, BENJIE L. NEQUINTO, 1 ROSE LILIA S. ROMANO, ROBERTO S. VERZOLA, EDUARDO AURELIO C. REYES, LEAN LOUEL A. PERIA, represented by his father ELPIDIO V. PERIA,2 GREEN FORUM PHILIPPINES, GREEN FORUM WESTERN VISAYAS, (GF-WV), ENVIRONMETAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE CENTER (ELAC), PHILIPPINE KAISAHAN TUNGO SA KAUNLARAN NG KANAYUNAN AT REPORMANG PANSAKAHAN (KAISAHAN),3 KAISAHAN TUNGO SA KAUNLARAN NG KANAYUNAN AT REPORMANG PANSAKAHAN (KAISAHAN), PARTNERSHIP FOR AGRARIAN REFORM and RURAL DEVELOPMENT SERVICES, INC. (PARRDS), PHILIPPINE PART`NERSHIP FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES IN THE RURAL AREAS, INC. (PHILDHRRA), WOMEN'S LEGAL BUREAU (WLB), CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES, INC. (CADI), UPLAND DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE (UDI), KINAIYAHAN FOUNDATION, INC., SENTRO NG ALTERNATIBONG LINGAP PANLIGAL (SALIGAN), LEGAL RIGHTS AND NATURAL RESOURCES CENTER, INC. (LRC), petitioners, vs. VICTOR O. RAMOS, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), HORACIO RAMOS, DIRECTOR, MINES AND GEOSCIENCES BUREAU (MGB-DENR), RUBEN TORRES, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, and WMC (PHILIPPINES), INC. 4 respondents. DECISION CARPIO-MORALES, J.: The present petition for mandamus and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942, 5 otherwise known as the PHILIPPINE MINING ACT OF 1995, along with the Implementing Rules and Regulations issued pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order 96-40, and of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into on March 30, 1995 by the Republic of the Philippines and WMC (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP), a corporation organized under Philippine laws. On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 279 6 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for largescale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of

LA BUGAL-B'LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its Chairman F'LONG MIGUEL M. LUMAYONG, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, PONCIANO BENNAGEN, JAIME TADEO, RENATO R. CONSTANTINO, JR., F'LONG AGUSTIN M. DABIE, ROBERTO P. AMLOY, RAQIM L. DABIE, SIMEON H. DOLOJO, IMELDA M. GANDON, LENY B. GUSANAN, MARCELO L. GUSANAN, QUINTOL A. LABUAYAN, LOMINGGES D. LAWAY, BENITA P. TACUAYAN, minors JOLY L.

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the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. In entering into such proposals, the President shall consider the real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country that will be realized, as well as the development and use of local scientific and technical resources that will be promoted by the proposed contract or agreement. Until Congress shall determine otherwise, largescale mining, for purpose of this Section, shall mean those proposals for contracts or agreements for mineral resources exploration, development, and utilization involving a committed capital investment in a single mining unit project of at least Fifty Million Dollars in United States Currency (US $50,000,000.00). 7 On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources."8 R.A. No. 7942 defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining operations,9 outlines the procedure for their filing and approval,10 assignment/transfer11 and withdrawal,12 and fixes their terms.13 Similar provisions govern financial or technical assistance agreements.14 The law prescribes the qualifications of contractors15 and grants them certain rights, including timber,16 water17 and easement18 rights, and the right to possess explosives.19 Surface owners, occupants, or concessionaires are forbidden from preventing holders of mining rights from entering private lands and concession areas.20 A procedure for the settlement of conflicts is likewise provided for.21 The Act restricts the conditions for exploration,22 quarry23 and other24 permits. It regulates the transport, sale and processing of minerals,25 and promotes the development of mining communities, science and mining technology,26 and safety and environmental protection.27 The government's share in the agreements is spelled out and allocated, 28 taxes and fees are imposed,29 incentives granted.30 Aside from penalizing certain acts,31 the law likewise specifies grounds for the cancellation, revocation and termination of agreements and permits.32 On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and Manila Times, two newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect.33 Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the President entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. 34 On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996. On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, 35 giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt36 to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter.37 Petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order. They allege that at the time of the filing of the petition, 100 FTAA applications had already been filed, covering an area of 8.4 million hectares,38 64 of which applications are by fully foreignowned corporations covering a total of 5.8 million hectares, and at least one by a fully foreign-owned mining company over offshore areas.39 Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction: I x x x in signing and promulgating DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the latter being unconstitutional in that it allows fully foreign owned corporations to explore, develop, utilize and exploit mineral resources in a manner contrary to Section 2, paragraph 4, Article XII of the Constitution; II x x x in signing and promulgating DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the latter being unconstitutional in that it allows the taking of private property without the determination of public use and for just compensation; III x x x in signing and promulgating DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the latter being unconstitutional in that it violates Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution; IV x x x in signing and promulgating DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the latter being unconstitutional in that it allows enjoyment by foreign citizens as well as fully foreign owned corporations of the nation's marine wealth contrary to Section 2, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution; V x x x in signing and promulgating DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the latter being unconstitutional in that it allows priority to foreign and fully foreign owned corporations in the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources contrary to Article XII of the Constitution; VI x x x in signing and promulgating DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the latter being unconstitutional in that it allows the inequitable sharing of wealth contrary to Sections [sic] 1, paragraph 1, and Section 2, paragraph 4[,] [Article XII] of the Constitution; VII x x x in recommending approval of and implementing the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement between the President of the Republic of the Philippines and Western Mining Corporation Philippines Inc. because the same is illegal and unconstitutional.40

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They pray that the Court issue an order: (a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any application for Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements; (b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942 as unconstitutional and null and void; (c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act contained in DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional and null and void; and (d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement issued to Western Mining Philippines, Inc. as unconstitutional, illegal and null and void.41 Impleaded as public respondents are Ruben Torres, the then Executive Secretary, Victor O. Ramos, the then DENR Secretary, and Horacio Ramos, Director of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau of the DENR. Also impleaded is private respondent WMCP, which entered into the assailed FTAA with the Philippine Government. WMCP is owned by WMC Resources International Pty., Ltd. (WMC), "a wholly owned subsidiary of Western Mining Corporation Holdings Limited, a publicly listed major Australian mining and exploration company."42 By WMCP's information, "it is a 100% owned subsidiary of WMC LIMITED."43 Respondents, aside from meeting petitioners' contentions, argue that the requisites for judicial inquiry have not been met and that the petition does not comply with the criteria for prohibition and mandamus. Additionally, respondent WMCP argues that there has been a violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts. After petitioners filed their reply, this Court granted due course to the petition. The parties have since filed their respective memoranda. WMCP subsequently filed a Manifestation dated September 25, 2002 alleging that on January 23, 2001, WMC sold all its shares in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (Sagittarius), a corporation organized under Philippine laws.44 WMCP was subsequently renamed "Tampakan Mineral Resources Corporation." 45 WMCP claims that at least 60% of the equity of Sagittarius is owned by Filipinos and/or Filipino-owned corporations while about 40% is owned by Indophil Resources NL, an Australian company. 46 It further claims that by such sale and transfer of shares, "WMCP has ceased to be connected in any way with WMC."47 By virtue of such sale and transfer, the DENR Secretary, by Order of December 18, 2001, 48 approved the transfer and registration of the subject FTAA from WMCP to Sagittarius. Said Order, however, was appealed by Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. (Lepanto) to the Office of the President which upheld it by Decision of July 23, 2002.49 Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Office of the President by Resolution of November 12, 2002,50 Lepanto filed a petition for review51 before the Court of Appeals. Incidentally, two other petitions for review related to the approval of the transfer and registration of the FTAA to Sagittarius were recently resolved by this Court. 52 It bears stressing that this case has not been rendered moot either by the transfer and registration of the FTAA to a Filipino-owned corporation or by the non-issuance of a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction to stay the above-said July 23, 2002 decision of the Office of the President. 53 The validity of the transfer remains in dispute and awaits final judicial determination. This assumes, of course, that such transfer cures the FTAA's alleged unconstitutionality, on which question judgment is reserved. WMCP also points out that the original claimowners of the major mineralized areas included in the WMCP FTAA, namely, Sagittarius, Tampakan Mining Corporation, and Southcot Mining Corporation, are all Filipino-owned corporations,54 each of which was a holder of an approved Mineral Production Sharing Agreement awarded in 1994, albeit their respective mineral claims were subsumed in the WMCP FTAA; 55 and that these three companies are the same companies that consolidated their interests in Sagittarius to whom WMC sold its 100% equity in WMCP.56 WMCP concludes that in the event that the FTAA is invalidated, the MPSAs of the three corporations would be revived and the mineral claims would revert to their original claimants.57 These circumstances, while informative, are hardly significant in the resolution of this case, it involving the validity of the FTAA, not the possible consequences of its invalidation. Of the above-enumerated seven grounds cited by petitioners, as will be shown later, only the first and the last need be delved into; in the latter, the discussion shall dwell only insofar as it questions the effectivity of E. O. No. 279 by virtue of which order the questioned FTAA was forged. I Before going into the substantive issues, the procedural questions posed by respondents shall first be tackled. REQUISITES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW When an issue of constitutionality is raised, this Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) The existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) A personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) The exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) The constitutional question is the lis mota of the case. 58 Respondents claim that the first three requisites are not present. Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that "(j)udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." The power of judicial review, therefore, is limited to the determination of actual cases and controversies. 59

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An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, 60 lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.61 The power does not extend to hypothetical questions62 since any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. 63 "Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged,64 alleging more than a generalized grievance.65 The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."66 Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing. 67 Petitioners traverse a wide range of sectors. Among them are La Bugal B'laan Tribal Association, Inc., a farmers and indigenous people's cooperative organized under Philippine laws representing a community actually affected by the mining activities of WMCP, members of said cooperative, 68 as well as other residents of areas also affected by the mining activities of WMCP.69 These petitioners have standing to raise the constitutionality of the questioned FTAA as they allege a personal and substantial injury. They claim that they would suffer "irremediable displacement"70 as a result of the implementation of the FTAA allowing WMCP to conduct mining activities in their area of residence. They thus meet the appropriate case requirement as they assert an interest adverse to that of respondents who, on the other hand, insist on the FTAA's validity. In view of the alleged impending injury, petitioners also have standing to assail the validity of E.O. No. 279, by authority of which the FTAA was executed. Public respondents maintain that petitioners, being strangers to the FTAA, cannot sue either or both contracting parties to annul it.71 In other words, they contend that petitioners are not real parties in interest in an action for the annulment of contract. Public respondents' contention fails. The present action is not merely one for annulment of contract but for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioners allege that public respondents acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the FTAA, which they submit is unconstitutional. As the case involves constitutional questions, this Court is not concerned with whether petitioners are real parties in interest, but with whether they have legal standing. As held in Kilosbayan v. Morato:72 x x x. "It is important to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.["] (FRIEDENTHAL, KANE AND MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 328 [1985]) Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence, the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." (Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7 L.Ed.2d 633 [1962].) As earlier stated, petitioners meet this requirement. The challenge against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40 likewise fulfills the requisites of justiciability. Although these laws were not in force when the subject FTAA was entered into, the question as to their validity is ripe for adjudication. The WMCP FTAA provides: 14.3 Future Legislation Any term and condition more favourable to Financial &Technical Assistance Agreement contractors resulting from repeal or amendment of any existing law or regulation or from the enactment of a law, regulation or administrative order shall be considered a part of this Agreement. It is undisputed that R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40 contain provisions that are more favorable to WMCP, hence, these laws, to the extent that they are favorable to WMCP, govern the FTAA. In addition, R.A. No. 7942 explicitly makes certain provisions apply to pre-existing agreements. SEC. 112. Non-impairment of Existing Mining/Quarrying Rights. x x x That the provisions of Chapter XIV on government share in mineral production-sharing agreement and of Chapter XVI on incentives of this Act shall immediately govern and apply to a mining lessee or contractor unless the mining lessee or contractor indicates his intention to the secretary, in writing, not to avail of said provisions x x x Provided, finally, That such leases, production-sharing agreements, financial or technical assistance agreements shall comply with the applicable provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. As there is no suggestion that WMCP has indicated its intention not to avail of the provisions of Chapter XVI of R.A. No. 7942, it can safely be presumed that they apply to the WMCP FTAA. Misconstruing the application of the third requisite for judicial review that the exercise of the review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity WMCP points out that the petition was filed only almost two years after the execution of the FTAA, hence, not raised at the earliest opportunity. The third requisite should not be taken to mean that the question of constitutionality must be raised immediately after the execution of the state action complained of. That the question of constitutionality has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later.73 A contrary rule would mean that a law, otherwise unconstitutional, would lapse into constitutionality by the mere failure of the proper party to promptly file a case to challenge the same. PROPRIETY OF PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS

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Before the effectivity in July 1997 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 2 of Rule 65 read: SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to desist from further proceeding in the action or matter specified therein. Prohibition is a preventive remedy.74 It seeks a judgment ordering the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal.75 The petition for prohibition at bar is thus an appropriate remedy. While the execution of the contract itself may be fait accompli, its implementation is not. Public respondents, in behalf of the Government, have obligations to fulfill under said contract. Petitioners seek to prevent them from fulfilling such obligations on the theory that the contract is unconstitutional and, therefore, void. The propriety of a petition for prohibition being upheld, discussion of the propriety of the mandamus aspect of the petition is rendered unnecessary. HIERARCHY OF COURTS The contention that the filing of this petition violated the rule on hierarchy of courts does not likewise lie. The rule has been explained thus: Between two courts of concurrent original jurisdiction, it is the lower court that should initially pass upon the issues of a case. That way, as a particular case goes through the hierarchy of courts, it is shorn of all but the important legal issues or those of first impression, which are the proper subject of attention of the appellate court. This is a procedural rule borne of experience and adopted to improve the administration of justice. This Court has consistently enjoined litigants to respect the hierarchy of courts. Although this Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give a party unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. The resort to this Court's primary jurisdiction to issue said writs shall be allowed only where the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify such invocation. We held in People v. Cuaresma that: A becoming regard for judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only where there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket x x x. 76 [Emphasis supplied.] The repercussions of the issues in this case on the Philippine mining industry, if not the national economy, as well as the novelty thereof, constitute exceptional and compelling circumstances to justify resort to this Court in the first instance. In all events, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal standing when paramount public interest is involved. 77 When the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, this Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.78 II Petitioners contend that E.O. No. 279 did not take effect because its supposed date of effectivity came after President Aquino had already lost her legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution. And they likewise claim that the WMC FTAA, which was entered into pursuant to E.O. No. 279, violates Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution because, among other reasons: (1) It allows foreign-owned companies to extend more than mere financial or technical assistance to the State in the exploitation, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils, and even permits foreign owned companies to "operate and manage mining activities." (2) It allows foreign-owned companies to extend both technical and financial assistance, instead of "either technical or financial assistance." To appreciate the import of these issues, a visit to the history of the pertinent constitutional provision, the concepts contained therein, and the laws enacted pursuant thereto, is in order. Section 2, Article XII reads in full: Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into coproduction, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

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The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish-workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources. The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution. THE SPANISH REGIME AND THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE The first sentence of Section 2 embodies the Regalian doctrine or jura regalia. Introduced by Spain into these Islands, this feudal concept is based on the State's power of dominium, which is the capacity of the State to own or acquire property.79 In its broad sense, the term "jura regalia" refers to royal rights, or those rights which the King has by virtue of his prerogatives. In Spanish law, it refers to a right which the sovereign has over anything in which a subject has a right of property or propriedad. These were rights enjoyed during feudal times by the king as the sovereign. The theory of the feudal system was that title to all lands was originally held by the King, and while the use of lands was granted out to others who were permitted to hold them under certain conditions, the King theoretically retained the title. By fiction of law, the King was regarded as the original proprietor of all lands, and the true and only source of title, and from him all lands were held. The theory of jura regalia was therefore nothing more than a natural fruit of conquest.80 The Philippines having passed to Spain by virtue of discovery and conquest, earlier Spanish decrees declared that "all lands were held from the Crown."82 The Regalian doctrine extends not only to land but also to "all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of the earth."83 Spain, in particular, recognized the unique value of natural resources, viewing them, especially minerals, as an abundant source of revenue to finance its wars against other nations. 84 Mining laws during the Spanish regime reflected this perspective.85 THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION AND THE CONCESSION REGIME By the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain ceded "the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands" to the United States. The Philippines was hence governed by means of organic acts that were in the nature of charters serving as a Constitution of the occupied territory from 1900 to 1935. 86 Among the
81

principal organic acts of the Philippines was the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, more commonly known as the Philippine Bill of 1902, through which the United States Congress assumed the administration of the Philippine Islands.87 Section 20 of said Bill reserved the disposition of mineral lands of the public domain from sale. Section 21 thereof allowed the free and open exploration, occupation and purchase of mineral deposits not only to citizens of the Philippine Islands but to those of the United States as well: Sec. 21. That all valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the Philippine Islands, both surveyed and unsurveyed, are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration, occupation and purchase, and the land in which they are found, to occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United States or of said Islands: Provided, That when on any lands in said Islands entered and occupied as agricultural lands under the provisions of this Act, but not patented, mineral deposits have been found, the working of such mineral deposits is forbidden until the person, association, or corporation who or which has entered and is occupying such lands shall have paid to the Government of said Islands such additional sum or sums as will make the total amount paid for the mineral claim or claims in which said deposits are located equal to the amount charged by the Government for the same as mineral claims. Unlike Spain, the United States considered natural resources as a source of wealth for its nationals and saw fit to allow both Filipino and American citizens to explore and exploit minerals in public lands, and to grant patents to private mineral lands.88 A person who acquired ownership over a parcel of private mineral land pursuant to the laws then prevailing could exclude other persons, even the State, from exploiting minerals within his property.89 Thus, earlier jurisprudence90 held that: A valid and subsisting location of mineral land, made and kept up in accordance with the provisions of the statutes of the United States, has the effect of a grant by the United States of the present and exclusive possession of the lands located, and this exclusive right of possession and enjoyment continues during the entire life of the location. x x x. x x x. The discovery of minerals in the ground by one who has a valid mineral location perfects his claim and his location not only against third persons, but also against the Government. x x x. [Italics in the original.] The Regalian doctrine and the American system, therefore, differ in one essential respect. Under the Regalian theory, mineral rights are not included in a grant of land by the state; under the American doctrine, mineral rights are included in a grant of land by the government.91 Section 21 also made possible the concession (frequently styled "permit", license" or "lease") 92 system.93 This was the traditional regime imposed by the colonial administrators for the exploitation of natural resources in the extractive sector (petroleum, hard minerals, timber, etc.).94 Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area.95 Thus, the concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the country's natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction.96 In consideration for the right to exploit a natural resource, the concessionaire either pays rent or royalty, which is a fixed percentage of the gross proceeds.97

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Later statutory enactments by the legislative bodies set up in the Philippines adopted the contractual framework of the concession.98 For instance, Act No. 2932,99 approved on August 31, 1920, which provided for the exploration, location, and lease of lands containing petroleum and other mineral oils and gas in the Philippines, and Act No. 2719,100 approved on May 14, 1917, which provided for the leasing and development of coal lands in the Philippines, both utilized the concession system.101 THE 1935 CONSTITUTION AND THE NATIONALIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES By the Act of United States Congress of March 24, 1934, popularly known as the Tydings-McDuffie Law, the People of the Philippine Islands were authorized to adopt a constitution.102 On July 30, 1934, the Constitutional Convention met for the purpose of drafting a constitution, and the Constitution subsequently drafted was approved by the Convention on February 8, 1935.103 The Constitution was submitted to the President of the United States on March 18, 1935.104 On March 23, 1935, the President of the United States certified that the Constitution conformed substantially with the provisions of the Act of Congress approved on March 24, 1934.105 On May 14, 1935, the Constitution was ratified by the Filipino people.106 The 1935 Constitution adopted the Regalian doctrine, declaring all natural resources of the Philippines, including mineral lands and minerals, to be property belonging to the State.107 As adopted in a republican system, the medieval concept of jura regalia is stripped of royal overtones and ownership of the land is vested in the State.108 Section 1, Article XIII, on Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources, of the 1935 Constitution provided: SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant. The nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the country was one of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention.109 One delegate relates: There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the state's power to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization. The delegates of the Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it was continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine. The adoption of the principle of state ownership of the natural resources and of the Regalian doctrine was considered to be a necessary starting point for the plan of nationalizing and conserving the natural resources of the country. For with the establishment of the principle of state ownership of the natural resources, it would not be hard to secure the recognition of the power of the State to control their disposition, exploitation, development or utilization.110 The nationalization of the natural resources was intended (1) to insure their conservation for Filipino posterity; (2) to serve as an instrument of national defense, helping prevent the extension to the country of foreign control through peaceful economic penetration; and (3) to avoid making the Philippines a source of international conflicts with the consequent danger to its internal security and independence. 111 The same Section 1, Article XIII also adopted the concession system, expressly permitting the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources. Grants, however, were limited to Filipinos or entities at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos.lawph!l.ne+ The swell of nationalism that suffused the 1935 Constitution was radically diluted when on November 1946, the Parity Amendment, which came in the form of an "Ordinance Appended to the Constitution," was ratified in a plebiscite.112 The Amendment extended, from July 4, 1946 to July 3, 1974, the right to utilize and exploit our natural resources to citizens of the United States and business enterprises owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States:113 Notwithstanding the provision of section one, Article Thirteen, and section eight, Article Fourteen, of the foregoing Constitution, during the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into by the President of the Philippines with the President of the United States on the fourth of July, nineteen hundred and fortysix, pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered Seven hundred and thirty-three, but in no case to extend beyond the third of July, nineteen hundred and seventy-four, the disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coals, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and the operation of public utilities, shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the United States and to all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States in the same manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines. The Parity Amendment was subsequently modified by the 1954 Revised Trade Agreement, also known as the Laurel-Langley Agreement, embodied in Republic Act No. 1355.114 THE PETROLEUM ACT OF 1949 AND THE CONCESSION SYSTEM In the meantime, Republic Act No. 387,115 also known as the Petroleum Act of 1949, was approved on June 18, 1949.

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The Petroleum Act of 1949 employed the concession system for the exploitation of the nation's petroleum resources. Among the kinds of concessions it sanctioned were exploration and exploitation concessions, which respectively granted to the concessionaire the exclusive right to explore for116 or develop117 petroleum within specified areas. Concessions may be granted only to duly qualified persons 118 who have sufficient finances, organization, resources, technical competence, and skills necessary to conduct the operations to be undertaken. 119 Nevertheless, the Government reserved the right to undertake such work itself.120 This proceeded from the theory that all natural deposits or occurrences of petroleum or natural gas in public and/or private lands in the Philippines belong to the State.121 Exploration and exploitation concessions did not confer upon the concessionaire ownership over the petroleum lands and petroleum deposits.122 However, they did grant concessionaires the right to explore, develop, exploit, and utilize them for the period and under the conditions determined by the law.123 Concessions were granted at the complete risk of the concessionaire; the Government did not guarantee the existence of petroleum or undertake, in any case, title warranty.124 Concessionaires were required to submit information as maybe required by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including reports of geological and geophysical examinations, as well as production reports.125 Exploration126 and exploitation127 concessionaires were also required to submit work programs.lavvphi1.net Exploitation concessionaires, in particular, were obliged to pay an annual exploitation tax,128 the object of which is to induce the concessionaire to actually produce petroleum, and not simply to sit on the concession without developing or exploiting it.129 These concessionaires were also bound to pay the Government royalty, which was not less than 12% of the petroleum produced and saved, less that consumed in the operations of the concessionaire.130 Under Article 66, R.A. No. 387, the exploitation tax may be credited against the royalties so that if the concessionaire shall be actually producing enough oil, it would not actually be paying the exploitation tax.131 Failure to pay the annual exploitation tax for two consecutive years,132 or the royalty due to the Government within one year from the date it becomes due,133 constituted grounds for the cancellation of the concession. In case of delay in the payment of the taxes or royalty imposed by the law or by the concession, a surcharge of 1% per month is exacted until the same are paid. 134 As a rule, title rights to all equipment and structures that the concessionaire placed on the land belong to the exploration or exploitation concessionaire.135 Upon termination of such concession, the concessionaire had a right to remove the same.136 The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was tasked with carrying out the provisions of the law, through the Director of Mines, who acted under the Secretary's immediate supervision and control. 137 The Act granted the Secretary the authority to inspect any operation of the concessionaire and to examine all the books and accounts pertaining to operations or conditions related to payment of taxes and royalties.138 The same law authorized the Secretary to create an Administration Unit and a Technical Board.139 The Administration Unit was charged, inter alia, with the enforcement of the provisions of the law. 140 The Technical Board had, among other functions, the duty to check on the performance of concessionaires and to determine whether the obligations imposed by the Act and its implementing regulations were being complied with.141 Victorio Mario A. Dimagiba, Chief Legal Officer of the Bureau of Energy Development, analyzed the benefits and drawbacks of the concession system insofar as it applied to the petroleum industry: Advantages of Concession. Whether it emphasizes income tax or royalty, the most positive aspect of the concession system is that the State's financial involvement is virtually risk free and administration is simple and comparatively low in cost. Furthermore, if there is a competitive allocation of the resource leading to substantial bonuses and/or greater royalty coupled with a relatively high level of taxation, revenue accruing to the State under the concession system may compare favorably with other financial arrangements. Disadvantages of Concession. There are, however, major negative aspects to this system. Because the Government's role in the traditional concession is passive, it is at a distinct disadvantage in managing and developing policy for the nation's petroleum resource. This is true for several reasons. First, even though most concession agreements contain covenants requiring diligence in operations and production, this establishes only an indirect and passive control of the host country in resource development. Second, and more importantly, the fact that the host country does not directly participate in resource management decisions inhibits its ability to train and employ its nationals in petroleum development. This factor could delay or prevent the country from effectively engaging in the development of its resources. Lastly, a direct role in management is usually necessary in order to obtain a knowledge of the international petroleum industry which is important to an appreciation of the host country's resources in relation to those of other countries.142 Other liabilities of the system have also been noted: x x x there are functional implications which give the concessionaire great economic power arising from its exclusive equity holding. This includes, first, appropriation of the returns of the undertaking, subject to a modest royalty; second, exclusive management of the project; third, control of production of the natural resource, such as volume of production, expansion, research and development; and fourth, exclusive responsibility for downstream operations, like processing, marketing, and distribution. In short, even if nominally, the state is the sovereign and owner of the natural resource being exploited, it has been shorn of all elements of control over such natural resource because of the exclusive nature of the contractual regime of the concession. The concession system, investing as it does ownership of natural resources, constitutes a consistent inconsistency with the principle embodied in our Constitution that natural resources belong to the state and shall not be alienated, not to mention the fact that the concession was the bedrock of the colonial system in the exploitation of natural resources. 143 Eventually, the concession system failed for reasons explained by Dimagiba: Notwithstanding the good intentions of the Petroleum Act of 1949, the concession system could not have properly spurred sustained oil exploration activities in the country, since it assumed that such a capitalintensive, high risk venture could be successfully undertaken by a single individual or a small company.

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In effect, concessionaires' funds were easily exhausted. Moreover, since the concession system practically closed its doors to interested foreign investors, local capital was stretched to the limits. The old system also failed to consider the highly sophisticated technology and expertise required, which would be available only to multinational companies.144 A shift to a new regime for the development of natural resources thus seemed imminent. PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 87, THE 1973 CONSTITUTION AND THE SERVICE CONTRACT SYSTEM The promulgation on December 31, 1972 of Presidential Decree No. 87, otherwise known as The Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972 signaled such a transformation. P.D. No. 87 permitted the government to explore for and produce indigenous petroleum through "service contracts."146 "Service contracts" is a term that assumes varying meanings to different people, and it has carried many names in different countries, like "work contracts" in Indonesia, "concession agreements" in Africa, "production-sharing agreements" in the Middle East, and "participation agreements" in Latin America.147 A functional definition of "service contracts" in the Philippines is provided as follows: A service contract is a contractual arrangement for engaging in the exploitation and development of petroleum, mineral, energy, land and other natural resources by which a government or its agency, or a private person granted a right or privilege by the government authorizes the other party (service contractor) to engage or participate in the exercise of such right or the enjoyment of the privilege, in that the latter provides financial or technical resources, undertakes the exploitation or production of a given resource, or directly manages the productive enterprise, operations of the exploration and exploitation of the resources or the disposition of marketing or resources.148 In a service contract under P.D. No. 87, service and technology are furnished by the service contractor for which it shall be entitled to the stipulated service fee.149 The contractor must be technically competent and financially capable to undertake the operations required in the contract.150 Financing is supposed to be provided by the Government to which all petroleum produced belongs. In case the Government is unable to finance petroleum exploration operations, the contractor may furnish services, technology and financing, and the proceeds of sale of the petroleum produced under the contract shall be the source of funds for payment of the service fee and the operating expenses due the contractor.152 The contractor shall undertake, manage and execute petroleum operations, subject to the government overseeing the management of the operations.153 The contractor provides all necessary services and technology and the requisite financing, performs the exploration work obligations, and assumes all exploration risks such that if no petroleum is produced, it will not be entitled to reimbursement.154 Once petroleum in commercial quantity is discovered, the contractor shall operate the field on behalf of the government.155 P.D. No. 87 prescribed minimum terms and conditions for every service contract.156 It also granted the contractor certain privileges, including exemption from taxes and payment of tariff duties, 157 and permitted the repatriation of capital and retention of profits abroad.158
151 145

Ostensibly, the service contract system had certain advantages over the concession regime.159 It has been opined, though, that, in the Philippines, our concept of a service contract, at least in the petroleum industry, was basically a concession regime with a production-sharing element. 160 On January 17, 1973, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos proclaimed the ratification of a new Constitution.161 Article XIV on the National Economy and Patrimony contained provisions similar to the 1935 Constitution with regard to Filipino participation in the nation's natural resources. Section 8, Article XIV thereof provides: Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant. While Section 9 of the same Article maintained the Filipino-only policy in the enjoyment of natural resources, it also allowed Filipinos, upon authority of the Batasang Pambansa, to enter into service contracts with any person or entity for the exploration or utilization of natural resources. Sec. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources of the Philippines shall be limited to citizens, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of which is owned by such citizens. The Batasang Pambansa, in the national interest, may allow such citizens, corporations or associations to enter into service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other forms of assistance with any person or entity for the exploration, or utilization of any of the natural resources. Existing valid and binding service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other forms of assistance are hereby recognized as such. [Emphasis supplied.] The concept of service contracts, according to one delegate, was borrowed from the methods followed by India, Pakistan and especially Indonesia in the exploration of petroleum and mineral oils. 162 The provision allowing such contracts, according to another, was intended to "enhance the proper development of our natural resources since Filipino citizens lack the needed capital and technical know-how which are essential in the proper exploration, development and exploitation of the natural resources of the country."163 The original idea was to authorize the government, not private entities, to enter into service contracts with foreign entities.164 As finally approved, however, a citizen or private entity could be allowed by the National Assembly to enter into such service contract.165 The prior approval of the National Assembly was deemed sufficient to protect the national interest.166 Notably, none of the laws allowing service contracts were passed by the Batasang Pambansa. Indeed, all of them were enacted by presidential decree. On March 13, 1973, shortly after the ratification of the new Constitution, the President promulgated Presidential Decree No. 151.167 The law allowed Filipino citizens or entities which have acquired lands of the public domain or which own, hold or control such lands to enter into service contracts for financial,

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technical, management or other forms of assistance with any foreign persons or entity for the exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of said lands.168 Presidential Decree No. 463,169 also known as The Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974, was enacted on May 17, 1974. Section 44 of the decree, as amended, provided that a lessee of a mining claim may enter into a service contract with a qualified domestic or foreign contractor for the exploration, development and exploitation of his claims and the processing and marketing of the product thereof. Presidential Decree No. 704170 (The Fisheries Decree of 1975), approved on May 16, 1975, allowed Filipinos engaged in commercial fishing to enter into contracts for financial, technical or other forms of assistance with any foreign person, corporation or entity for the production, storage, marketing and processing of fish and fishery/aquatic products.171 Presidential Decree No. 705 (The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines), approved on May 19, 1975, allowed "forest products licensees, lessees, or permitees to enter into service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other forms of assistance . . . with any foreign person or entity for the exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of the forest resources." 173 Yet another law allowing service contracts, this time for geothermal resources, was Presidential Decree No. 1442,174 which was signed into law on June 11, 1978. Section 1 thereof authorized the Government to enter into service contracts for the exploration, exploitation and development of geothermal resources with a foreign contractor who must be technically and financially capable of undertaking the operations required in the service contract. Thus, virtually the entire range of the country's natural resources from petroleum and minerals to geothermal energy, from public lands and forest resources to fishery products was well covered by apparent legal authority to engage in the direct participation or involvement of foreign persons or corporations (otherwise disqualified) in the exploration and utilization of natural resources through service contracts.175 THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND TECHNICAL OR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AGREEMENTS After the February 1986 Edsa Revolution, Corazon C. Aquino took the reins of power under a revolutionary government. On March 25, 1986, President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3,176 promulgating the Provisional Constitution, more popularly referred to as the Freedom Constitution. By authority of the same Proclamation, the President created a Constitutional Commission (CONCOM) to draft a new constitution, which took effect on the date of its ratification on February 2, 1987. 177 The 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian doctrine. The first sentence of Section 2, Article XII states: "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State." Like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it, the 1987 Constitution, in the second sentence of the same provision, prohibits the alienation of natural resources, except agricultural lands.
172

The third sentence of the same paragraph is new: "The exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." The constitutional policy of the State's "full control and supervision" over natural resources proceeds from the concept of jura regalia, as well as the recognition of the importance of the country's natural resources, not only for national economic development, but also for its security and national defense.178 Under this provision, the State assumes "a more dynamic role" in the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources.179 Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources. By such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of public domain through "license, concession or lease" is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.180 Having omitted the provision on the concession system, Section 2 proceeded to introduce "unfamiliar language":181 The State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Consonant with the State's "full supervision and control" over natural resources, Section 2 offers the State two "options."182 One, the State may directly undertake these activities itself; or two, it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or entities at least 60% of whose capital is owned by such citizens. A third option is found in the third paragraph of the same section: The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish-workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. While the second and third options are limited only to Filipino citizens or, in the case of the former, to corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos, a fourth allows the participation of foreign-owned corporations. The fourth and fifth paragraphs of Section 2 provide: The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources. The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution. Although Section 2 sanctions the participation of foreign-owned corporations in the exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources, it imposes certain limitations or conditions to agreements with such corporations.

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First, the parties to FTAAs. Only the President, in behalf of the State, may enter into these agreements, and only with corporations. By contrast, under the 1973 Constitution, a Filipino citizen, corporation or association may enter into a service contract with a "foreign person or entity." Second, the size of the activities: only large-scale exploration, development, and utilization is allowed. The term "large-scale usually refers to very capital-intensive activities."183 Third, the natural resources subject of the activities is restricted to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the intent being to limit service contracts to those areas where Filipino capital may not be sufficient.184 Fourth, consistency with the provisions of statute. The agreements must be in accordance with the terms and conditions provided by law. Fifth, Section 2 prescribes certain standards for entering into such agreements. The agreements must be based on real contributions to economic growth and general welfare of the country. Sixth, the agreements must contain rudimentary stipulations for the promotion of the development and use of local scientific and technical resources. Seventh, the notification requirement. The President shall notify Congress of every financial or technical assistance agreement entered into within thirty days from its execution. Finally, the scope of the agreements. While the 1973 Constitution referred to "service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other forms of assistance" the 1987 Constitution provides for "agreements. . . involving either financial or technical assistance." It bears noting that the phrases "service contracts" and "management or other forms of assistance" in the earlier constitution have been omitted. By virtue of her legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution,185 President Aquino, on July 10, 1987, signed into law E.O. No. 211 prescribing the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals. The omission in the 1987 Constitution of the term "service contracts" notwithstanding, the said E.O. still referred to them in Section 2 thereof: Sec. 2. Applications for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources, including renewal applications and applications for approval of operating agreements and mining service contracts, shall be accepted and processed and may be approved x x x. [Emphasis supplied.] The same law provided in its Section 3 that the "processing, evaluation and approval of all mining applications . . . operating agreements and service contracts . . . shall be governed by Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and their implementing rules and regulations. . . ." As earlier stated, on the 25th also of July 1987, the President issued E.O. No. 279 by authority of which the subject WMCP FTAA was executed on March 30, 1995. On March 3, 1995, President Ramos signed into law R.A. No. 7942. Section 15 thereof declares that the Act "shall govern the exploration, development, utilization, and processing of all mineral resources." Such declaration notwithstanding, R.A. No. 7942 does not actually cover all the modes through which the State may undertake the exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources. The State, being the owner of the natural resources, is accorded the primary power and responsibility in the exploration, development and utilization thereof. As such, it may undertake these activities through four modes: The State may directly undertake such activities. (2) The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations. (3) Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens. (4) For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance.186 Except to charge the Mines and Geosciences Bureau of the DENR with performing researches and surveys,187 and a passing mention of government-owned or controlled corporations,188 R.A. No. 7942 does not specify how the State should go about the first mode. The third mode, on the other hand, is governed by Republic Act No. 7076189 (the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991) and other pertinent laws.190 R.A. No. 7942 primarily concerns itself with the second and fourth modes. Mineral production sharing, co-production and joint venture agreements are collectively classified by R.A. No. 7942 as "mineral agreements."191 The Government participates the least in a mineral production sharing agreement (MPSA). In an MPSA, the Government grants the contractor 192 the exclusive right to conduct mining operations within a contract area193 and shares in the gross output.194 The MPSA contractor provides the financing, technology, management and personnel necessary for the agreement's implementation.195 The total government share in an MPSA is the excise tax on mineral products under Republic Act No. 7729,196 amending Section 151(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.197 In a co-production agreement (CA),198 the Government provides inputs to the mining operations other than the mineral resource,199 while in a joint venture agreement (JVA), where the Government enjoys the greatest participation, the Government and the JVA contractor organize a company with both parties having equity shares.200 Aside from earnings in equity, the Government in a JVA is also entitled to a share in the gross output.201 The Government may enter into a CA202 or JVA203 with one or more contractors. The Government's share in a CA or JVA is set out in Section 81 of the law:

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The share of the Government in co-production and joint venture agreements shall be negotiated by the Government and the contractor taking into consideration the: (a) capital investment of the project, (b) the risks involved, (c) contribution of the project to the economy, and (d) other factors that will provide for a fair and equitable sharing between the Government and the contractor. The Government shall also be entitled to compensations for its other contributions which shall be agreed upon by the parties, and shall consist, among other things, the contractor's income tax, excise tax, special allowance, withholding tax due from the contractor's foreign stockholders arising from dividend or interest payments to the said foreign stockholders, in case of a foreign national and all such other taxes, duties and fees as provided for under existing laws. All mineral agreements grant the respective contractors the exclusive right to conduct mining operations and to extract all mineral resources found in the contract area.204 A "qualified person" may enter into any of the mineral agreements with the Government.205 A "qualified person" is any citizen of the Philippines with capacity to contract, or a corporation, partnership, association, or cooperative organized or authorized for the purpose of engaging in mining, with technical and financial capability to undertake mineral resources development and duly registered in accordance with law at least sixty per centum (60%) of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines x x x.206 The fourth mode involves "financial or technical assistance agreements." An FTAA is defined as "a contract involving financial or technical assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources."207 Any qualified person with technical and financial capability to undertake large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources in the Philippines may enter into such agreement directly with the Government through the DENR.208 For the purpose of granting an FTAA, a legally organized foreign-owned corporation (any corporation, partnership, association, or cooperative duly registered in accordance with law in which less than 50% of the capital is owned by Filipino citizens)209 is deemed a "qualified person."210 Other than the difference in contractors' qualifications, the principal distinction between mineral agreements and FTAAs is the maximum contract area to which a qualified person may hold or be granted.211 "Large-scale" under R.A. No. 7942 is determined by the size of the contract area, as opposed to the amount invested (US $50,000,000.00), which was the standard under E.O. 279. Like a CA or a JVA, an FTAA is subject to negotiation. 212 The Government's contributions, in the form of taxes, in an FTAA is identical to its contributions in the two mineral agreements, save that in an FTAA: The collection of Government share in financial or technical assistance agreement shall commence after the financial or technical assistance agreement contractor has fully recovered its pre-operating expenses, exploration, and development expenditures, inclusive.213 III Having examined the history of the constitutional provision and statutes enacted pursuant thereto, a consideration of the substantive issues presented by the petition is now in order. THE EFFECTIVITY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 279 Petitioners argue that E.O. No. 279, the law in force when the WMC FTAA was executed, did not come into effect. E.O. No. 279 was signed into law by then President Aquino on July 25, 1987, two days before the opening of Congress on July 27, 1987.214 Section 8 of the E.O. states that the same "shall take effect immediately." This provision, according to petitioners, runs counter to Section 1 of E.O. No. 200,215 which provides: SECTION 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.216 [Emphasis supplied.] On that premise, petitioners contend that E.O. No. 279 could have only taken effect fifteen days after its publication at which time Congress had already convened and the President's power to legislate had ceased. Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the validity of E.O. No. 279 was settled in Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran, supra. This is of course incorrect for the issue in Miners Association was not the validity of E.O. No. 279 but that of DAO Nos. 57 and 82 which were issued pursuant thereto. Nevertheless, petitioners' contentions have no merit. It bears noting that there is nothing in E.O. No. 200 that prevents a law from taking effect on a date other than even before the 15-day period after its publication. Where a law provides for its own date of effectivity, such date prevails over that prescribed by E.O. No. 200. Indeed, this is the very essence of the phrase "unless it is otherwise provided" in Section 1 thereof. Section 1, E.O. No. 200, therefore, applies only when a statute does not provide for its own date of effectivity. What is mandatory under E.O. No. 200, and what due process requires, as this Court held in Taada v. Tuvera,217 is the publication of the law for without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis n[eminem] excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. While the effectivity clause of E.O. No. 279 does not require its publication, it is not a ground for its invalidation since the Constitution, being "the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation," is deemed written in the law.218 Hence, the due process clause,219 which, so Taada held, mandates the publication of statutes, is read into Section 8 of E.O. No. 279. Additionally, Section 1 of E.O. No. 200 which provides for publication "either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines," finds suppletory application. It is significant to note that E.O. No. 279 was actually published in the Official Gazette220 on August 3, 1987. From a reading then of Section 8 of E.O. No. 279, Section 1 of E.O. No. 200, and Taada v. Tuvera, this Court holds that E.O. No. 279 became effective immediately upon its publication in the Official Gazette on August 3, 1987.

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That such effectivity took place after the convening of the first Congress is irrelevant. At the time President Aquino issued E.O. No. 279 on July 25, 1987, she was still validly exercising legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution.221 Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution explicitly states: Sec. 6. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is convened. The convening of the first Congress merely precluded the exercise of legislative powers by President Aquino; it did not prevent the effectivity of laws she had previously enacted. There can be no question, therefore, that E.O. No. 279 is an effective, and a validly enacted, statute. SR. TAN. So those are the safeguards[?] THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE WMCP FTAA MR. VILLEGAS. Yes. There was no law at all governing service contracts before. Petitioners submit that, in accordance with the text of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, FTAAs should be limited to "technical or financial assistance" only. They observe, however, that, contrary to the language of the Constitution, the WMCP FTAA allows WMCP, a fully foreign-owned mining corporation, to extend more than mere financial or technical assistance to the State, for it permits WMCP to manage and operate every aspect of the mining activity. 222 Petitioners' submission is well-taken. It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of constitutions that the instrument must be so construed as to give effect to the intention of the people who adopted it.223 This intention is to be sought in the constitution itself, and the apparent meaning of the words is to be taken as expressing it, except in cases where that assumption would lead to absurdity, ambiguity, or contradiction.224 What the Constitution says according to the text of the provision, therefore, compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say.225 Accordingly, following the literal text of the Constitution, assistance accorded by foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oils should be limited to "technical" or "financial" assistance only. WMCP nevertheless submits that the word "technical" in the fourth paragraph of Section 2 of E.O. No. 279 encompasses a "broad number of possible services," perhaps, "scientific and/or technological in basis."226 It thus posits that it may also well include "the area of management or operations . . . so long as such assistance requires specialized knowledge or skills, and are related to the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources."227 This Court is not persuaded. As priorly pointed out, the phrase "management or other forms of assistance" in the 1973 Constitution was deleted in the 1987 Constitution, which allows only "technical or financial assistance." Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.228 As will be shown later, the management or operation of mining activities by foreign contractors, which is the primary feature of service contracts, was precisely the evil that the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to eradicate. Respondents insist that "agreements involving technical or financial assistance" is just another term for service contracts. They contend that the proceedings of the CONCOM indicate "that although the SR. TAN. Thank you, Madam President.230 [Emphasis supplied.] WMCP also cites the following statements of Commissioners Gascon, Garcia, Nolledo and Tadeo who alluded to service contracts as they explained their respective votes in the approval of the draft Article: MR. GASCON. Mr. Presiding Officer, I vote no primarily because of two reasons: One, the provision on service contracts. I felt that if we would constitutionalize any provision on service contracts, this should always be with the concurrence of Congress and not guided only by a general law to be promulgated by Congress. x x x.231 [Emphasis supplied.] x x x. MR. GARCIA. Thank you. I vote no. x x x. Service contracts are given constitutional legitimization in Section 3, even when they have been proven to be inimical to the interests of the nation, providing as they do the legal loophole for the exploitation of our natural resources for the benefit of foreign interests. They constitute a serious negation of Filipino control on the use and disposition of the nation's natural resources, especially with regard to those which are nonrenewable.232 [Emphasis supplied.] xxx MR. NOLLEDO. While there are objectionable provisions in the Article on National Economy and Patrimony, going over said provisions meticulously, setting aside prejudice and personalities will reveal that the article contains a balanced set of provisions. I hope the forthcoming Congress will implement such provisions taking into account that Filipinos should terminology 'service contract' was avoided [by the Constitution], the concept it represented was not." They add that "[t]he concept is embodied in the phrase 'agreements involving financial or technical assistance.'"229 And point out how members of the CONCOM referred to these agreements as "service contracts." For instance: SR. TAN. Am I correct in thinking that the only difference between these future service contracts and the past service contracts under Mr. Marcos is the general law to be enacted by the legislature and the notification of Congress by the President? That is the only difference, is it not? MR. VILLEGAS. That is right.

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have real control over our economy and patrimony, and if foreign equity is permitted, the same must be subordinated to the imperative demands of the national interest. x x x. It is also my understanding that service contracts involving foreign corporations or entities are resorted to only when no Filipino enterprise or Filipino-controlled enterprise could possibly undertake the exploration or exploitation of our natural resources and that compensation under such contracts cannot and should not equal what should pertain to ownership of capital. In other words, the service contract should not be an instrument to circumvent the basic provision, that the exploration and exploitation of natural resources should be truly for the benefit of Filipinos. Thank you, and I vote yes.233 [Emphasis supplied.] x x x. MR. TADEO. Nais ko lamang ipaliwanag ang aking boto. Matapos suriin ang kalagayan ng Pilipinas, ang saligang suliranin, pangunahin ang salitang "imperyalismo." Ang ibig sabihin nito ay ang sistema ng lipunang pinaghaharian ng iilang monopolyong kapitalista at ang salitang "imperyalismo" ay buhay na buhay sa National Economy and Patrimony na nating ginawa. Sa pamamagitan ng salitang "based on," naroroon na ang free trade sapagkat tayo ay mananatiling tagapagluwas ng hilaw na sangkap at tagaangkat ng yaring produkto. Pangalawa, naroroon pa rin ang parity rights, ang service contract, ang 60-40 equity sa natural resources. Habang naghihirap ang sambayanang Pilipino, ginagalugad naman ng mga dayuhan ang ating likas na yaman. Kailan man ang Article on National Economy and Patrimony ay hindi nagpaalis sa pagkaalipin ng ating ekonomiya sa kamay ng mga dayuhan. Ang solusyon sa suliranin ng bansa ay dalawa lamang: ang pagpapatupad ng tunay na reporma sa lupa at ang national industrialization. Ito ang tinatawag naming pagsikat ng araw sa Silangan. Ngunit ang mga landlords and big businessmen at ang mga komprador ay nagsasabi na ang free trade na ito, ang kahulugan para sa amin, ay ipinipilit sa ating sambayanan na ang araw ay sisikat sa Kanluran. Kailan man hindi puwedeng sumikat ang araw sa Kanluran. I vote no.234 [Emphasis supplied.] This Court is likewise not persuaded. As earlier noted, the phrase "service contracts" has been deleted in the 1987 Constitution's Article on National Economy and Patrimony. If the CONCOM intended to retain the concept of service contracts under the 1973 Constitution, it could have simply adopted the old terminology ("service contracts") instead of employing new and unfamiliar terms ("agreements . . . involving either technical or financial assistance"). Such a difference between the language of a provision in a revised constitution and that of a similar provision in the preceding constitution is viewed as indicative of a difference in purpose. 235 If, as respondents suggest, the concept of "technical or financial assistance" agreements is identical to that of "service contracts," the CONCOM would not have bothered to fit the same dog with a new collar. To uphold respondents' theory would reduce the first to a mere euphemism for the second and render the change in phraseology meaningless. An examination of the reason behind the change confirms that technical or financial assistance agreements are not synonymous to service contracts. [T]he Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose. 236 As the following question of Commissioner Quesada and Commissioner Villegas' answer shows the drafters intended to do away with service contracts which were used to circumvent the capitalization (60%-40%) requirement: MS. QUESADA. The 1973 Constitution used the words "service contracts." In this particular Section 3, is there a safeguard against the possible control of foreign interests if the Filipinos go into coproduction with them? MR. VILLEGAS. Yes. In fact, the deletion of the phrase "service contracts" was our first attempt to avoid some of the abuses in the past regime in the use of service contracts to go around the 60-40 arrangement. The safeguard that has been introduced and this, of course can be refined is found in Section 3, lines 25 to 30, where Congress will have to concur with the President on any agreement entered into between a foreign-owned corporation and the government involving technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development and utilization of natural resources.237 [Emphasis supplied.] In a subsequent discussion, Commissioner Villegas allayed the fears of Commissioner Quesada regarding the participation of foreign interests in Philippine natural resources, which was supposed to be restricted to Filipinos. MS. QUESADA. Another point of clarification is the phrase "and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." In the 1973 Constitution, this was limited to citizens of the Philippines; but it was removed and substituted by "shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." Was the concept changed so that these particular resources would be limited to citizens of the Philippines? Or would these resources only be under the full control and supervision of the State; meaning, noncitizens would have access to these natural resources? Is that the understanding? MR. VILLEGAS. No, Mr. Vice-President, if the Commissioner reads the next sentence, it states: Such activities may be directly undertaken by the State, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens.

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So we are still limiting it only to Filipino citizens. x x x. MS. QUESADA. Going back to Section 3, the section suggests that: The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources may be directly undertaken by the State, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreement with . . . corporations or associations at least sixty per cent of whose voting stock or controlling interest is owned by such citizens. Lines 25 to 30, on the other hand, suggest that in the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of natural resources, the President with the concurrence of Congress may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations even for technical or financial assistance. I wonder if this part of Section 3 contradicts the second part. I am raising this point for fear that foreign investors will use their enormous capital resources to facilitate the actual exploitation or exploration, development and effective disposition of our natural resources to the detriment of Filipino investors. I am not saying that we should not consider borrowing money from foreign sources. What I refer to is that foreign interest should be allowed to participate only to the extent that they lend us money and give us technical assistance with the appropriate government permit. In this way, we can insure the enjoyment of our natural resources by our own people. MR. VILLEGAS. Actually, the second provision about the President does not permit foreign investors to participate. It is only technical or financial assistance they do not own anything but on conditions that have to be determined by law with the concurrence of Congress. So, it is very restrictive. If the Commissioner will remember, this removes the possibility for service contracts which we said yesterday were avenues used in the previous regime to go around the 60-40 requirement.238 [Emphasis supplied.] The present Chief Justice, then a member of the CONCOM, also referred to this limitation in scope in proposing an amendment to the 60-40 requirement: MR. DAVIDE. May I be allowed to explain the proposal? MR. MAAMBONG. Subject to the three-minute rule, Madam President. MR. DAVIDE. It will not take three minutes. The Commission had just approved the Preamble. In the Preamble we clearly stated that the Filipino people are sovereign and that one of the objectives for the creation or establishment of a government is to conserve and develop the national patrimony. The implication is that the national patrimony or our natural resources are exclusively reserved for the Filipino people. No alien must be allowed to enjoy, exploit and develop our natural resources. As a matter of fact, that principle proceeds from the fact that I voted in favor of the Jamir proposal because it is not really exploitation that we granted to the alien corporations but only for them to render financial or technical assistance. It is not for them to enjoy our natural resources. Madam President, our natural resources are depleting; our population is increasing by leaps and bounds. Fifty years from now, if we will allow these aliens to exploit our natural resources, there will be no more natural resources for the next generations of Filipinos. It may last long if we will begin now. Since 1935 the aliens have been allowed to enjoy to a certain extent the exploitation of our natural resources, and we became victims of foreign dominance and control. The aliens are interested in coming to the Philippines because they would like to enjoy the bounty of nature exclusively intended for Filipinos by God. And so I appeal to all, for the sake of the future generations, that if we have to pray in the Preamble "to preserve and develop the national patrimony for the sovereign Filipino people and for the generations to come," we must at this time decide once and for all that our natural resources must be reserved only to Filipino citizens. Thank you.239 [Emphasis supplied.] The opinion of another member of the CONCOM is persuasive240 and leaves no doubt as to the intention of the framers to eliminate service contracts altogether. He writes: Paragraph 4 of Section 2 specifies large-scale, capital-intensive, highly technological undertakings for which the President may enter into contracts with foreign-owned corporations, and enunciates strict conditions that should govern such contracts. x x x. This provision balances the need for foreign capital and technology with the need to maintain the national sovereignty. It recognizes the fact that as long as Filipinos can formulate their own terms in their own territory, there is no danger of relinquishing sovereignty to foreign interests. Are service contracts allowed under the new Constitution? No. Under the new Constitution, foreign investors (fully alien-owned) can NOT participate in Filipino enterprises except to provide: (1) Technical Assistance for highly technical enterprises; and (2) Financial Assistance for large-scale enterprises. The intent of this provision, as well as other provisions on foreign investments, is to prevent the practice (prevalent in the Marcos government) of skirting the 60/40 equation using the cover of service contracts.241 [Emphasis supplied.] Furthermore, it appears that Proposed Resolution No. 496,242 which was the draft Article on National Economy and Patrimony, adopted the concept of "agreements . . . involving either technical or financial assistance" contained in the "Draft of the 1986 U.P. Law Constitution Project" (U.P. Law draft) which was taken into consideration during the deliberation of the CONCOM.243 The former, as well as Article XII, as adopted, employed the same terminology, as the comparative table below shows: our natural resources are gifts from God to the Filipino people and it would be a breach of that special blessing from God if we will allow aliens to exploit our natural resources.

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DRAFT OF THE UP LAW CONSTITUTION PROJECT

PROPOSED RESOLUTION NO. 496 OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION

ARTICLE XII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

grant. The National Assembly may by law allow small scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens. The National Assembly, may, by two-thirds vote of all its members by special law provide the terms and conditions under which a foreign-owned corporation may enter into agreements with the government involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, or utilization of natural resources. [Emphasis supplied.]

the measure and limit of the grant. The Congress may by law allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. The President with the concurrence of Congress, by special law, shall provide the terms and conditions under which a foreign-owned corporation may enter into agreements with the government involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources. [Emphasis supplied.]

measure and limit of the grant. The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish-workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. The President may enter into agreements with foreignowned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources. [Emphasis supplied.] The President shall notify the Congress of every contract

Sec. 1. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, flora and fauna and other natural resources of the Philippines are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. Such activities may be directly undertaken by the state, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, production sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or corporations or associations sixty per cent of whose voting stock or controlling interest is owned by such citizens for a period of not more than twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In case as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the

Sec. 3. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. Such activities may be directly undertaken by the State, or it may enter into coproduction, joint venture, production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or corporations or associations at least sixty per cent of whose voting stock or controlling interest is owned by such citizens. Such agreements shall be for a period of twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such term and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries or industrial uses other than the development for water power, beneficial use may be

Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or productionsharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twentyfive years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In case of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the

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contracts. If the service contractor happens to be a foreign corporation, the contract would also run counter to the constitutional provision on nationalization or Filipinization, of the exploitation of our natural resources.245 [Emphasis supplied. Underscoring in the original.] Professor Merlin M. Magallona, also a member of the working group, was harsher in his reproach of the system: x x x the nationalistic phraseology of the 1935 [Constitution] was retained by the [1973] Charter, but the essence of nationalism was reduced to hollow rhetoric. The 1973 Charter still provided that the exploitation or development of the country's natural resources be limited to Filipino citizens or corporations owned or controlled by them. However, the martial-law Constitution allowed them, once these resources are in their name, to enter into service contracts with foreign investors for financial, technical, management, or other forms of assistance. Since foreign investors have the capital resources, the actual exploitation and development, as well as the effective disposition, of the country's natural resources, would be under their direction, and control, relegating the Filipino investors to the role of second-rate partners in joint ventures. Through the instrumentality of the service contract, the 1973 Constitution had legitimized at the highest level of state policy that which was prohibited under the 1973 Constitution, namely: the exploitation of the country's natural resources by foreign nationals. The drastic impact of [this] constitutional change becomes more pronounced when it is considered that the active party to any service contract may be a corporation wholly owned by foreign interests. In such a case, the citizenship requirement is completely set aside, permitting foreign corporations to obtain actual possession, control, and [enjoyment] of the country's natural resources.246 [Emphasis supplied.] Accordingly, Professor Agabin recommends that: Recognizing the service contract for what it is, we have to expunge it from the Constitution and reaffirm ownership over our natural resources. That is the only way we can exercise effective control over our natural resources. This should not mean complete isolation of the country's natural resources from foreign investment. Other contract forms which are less derogatory to our sovereignty and control over natural resources like technical assistance agreements, financial assistance [agreements], co-production agreements, joint ventures, production-sharing could still be utilized and adopted without violating constitutional provisions. In other words, we can adopt contract forms which recognize and assert our sovereignty and ownership over natural resources, and where the foreign entity is just a pure contractor instead of the beneficial owner of our economic resources.247 [Emphasis supplied.] Still another member of the working group, Professor Eduardo Labitag, proposed that: 2. Service contracts as practiced under the 1973 Constitution should be discouraged, instead the government may be allowed, subject to authorization by special law passed by an extraordinary majority to enter into either technical or financial assistance. This is justified by the fact that as presently worded in the 1973 Constitution, a service contract gives full control over the contract area to the service contractor,

entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.

The insights of the proponents of the U.P. Law draft are, therefore, instructive in interpreting the phrase "technical or financial assistance." In his position paper entitled Service Contracts: Old Wine in New Bottles?, Professor Pacifico A. Agabin, who was a member of the working group that prepared the U.P. Law draft, criticized service contracts for they "lodge exclusive management and control of the enterprise to the service contractor, which is reminiscent of the old concession regime. Thus, notwithstanding the provision of the Constitution that natural resources belong to the State, and that these shall not be alienated, the service contract system renders nugatory the constitutional provisions cited."244 He elaborates: Looking at the Philippine model, we can discern the following vestiges of the concession regime, thus: 1. Bidding of a selected area, or leasing the choice of the area to the interested party and then negotiating the terms and conditions of the contract; (Sec. 5, P.D. 87) 2. Management of the enterprise vested on the contractor, including operation of the field if petroleum is discovered; (Sec. 8, P.D. 87) 3. Control of production and other matters such as expansion and development; (Sec. 8) 4. Responsibility for downstream operations marketing, distribution, and processing may be with the contractor (Sec. 8); 5. Ownership of equipment, machinery, fixed assets, and other properties remain with contractor (Sec. 12, P.D. 87); 6. Repatriation of capital and retention of profits abroad guaranteed to the contractor (Sec. 13, P.D. 87); and 7. While title to the petroleum discovered may nominally be in the name of the government, the contractor has almost unfettered control over its disposition and sale, and even the domestic requirements of the country is relegated to a pro rata basis (Sec. 8). In short, our version of the service contract is just a rehash of the old concession regime x x x. Some people have pulled an old rabbit out of a magician's hat, and foisted it upon us as a new and different animal. The service contract as we know it here is antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources restated in the same article of the [1973] Constitution containing the provision for service

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for him to work, manage and dispose of the proceeds or production. It was a subterfuge to get around the nationality requirement of the constitution.248 [Emphasis supplied.] In the annotations on the proposed Article on National Economy and Patrimony, the U.P. Law draft summarized the rationale therefor, thus: 5. The last paragraph is a modification of the service contract provision found in Section 9, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution as amended. This 1973 provision shattered the framework of nationalism in our fundamental law (see Magallona, "Nationalism and its Subversion in the Constitution"). Through the service contract, the 1973 Constitution had legitimized that which was prohibited under the 1935 constitutionthe exploitation of the country's natural resources by foreign nationals. Through the service contract, acts prohibited by the Anti-Dummy Law were recognized as legitimate arrangements. Service contracts lodge exclusive management and control of the enterprise to the service contractor, not unlike the old concession regime where the concessionaire had complete control over the country's natural resources, having been given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource and, in effect, having been assured of ownership of that resource at the point of extraction (see Agabin, "Service Contracts: Old Wine in New Bottles"). Service contracts, hence, are antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, as well as the constitutional provision on nationalization or Filipinization of the exploitation of our natural resources. Under the proposed provision, only technical assistance or financial assistance agreements may be entered into, and only for large-scale activities. These are contract forms which recognize and assert our sovereignty and ownership over natural resources since the foreign entity is just a pure contractor and not a beneficial owner of our economic resources. The proposal recognizes the need for capital and technology to develop our natural resources without sacrificing our sovereignty and control over such resources by the safeguard of a special law which requires two-thirds vote of all the members of the Legislature. This will ensure that such agreements will be debated upon exhaustively and thoroughly in the National Assembly to avert prejudice to the nation.249 [Emphasis supplied.] The U.P. Law draft proponents viewed service contracts under the 1973 Constitution as grants of beneficial ownership of the country's natural resources to foreign owned corporations. While, in theory, the State owns these natural resources and Filipino citizens, their beneficiaries service contracts actually vested foreigners with the right to dispose, explore for, develop, exploit, and utilize the same. Foreigners, not Filipinos, became the beneficiaries of Philippine natural resources. This arrangement is clearly incompatible with the constitutional ideal of nationalization of natural resources, with the Regalian doctrine, and on a broader perspective, with Philippine sovereignty. The proponents nevertheless acknowledged the need for capital and technical know-how in the largescale exploitation, development and utilization of natural resources the second paragraph of the proposed draft itself being an admission of such scarcity. Hence, they recommended a compromise to reconcile the nationalistic provisions dating back to the 1935 Constitution, which reserved all natural resources exclusively to Filipinos, and the more liberal 1973 Constitution, which allowed foreigners to participate in these resources through service contracts. Such a compromise called for the adoption of a new system in the exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources in the form of technical agreements or financial agreements which, necessarily, are distinct concepts from service contracts. The replacement of "service contracts" with "agreements involving either technical or financial assistance," as well as the deletion of the phrase "management or other forms of assistance," assumes greater significance when note is taken that the U.P. Law draft proposed other equally crucial changes that were obviously heeded by the CONCOM. These include the abrogation of the concession system and the adoption of new "options" for the State in the exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources. The proponents deemed these changes to be more consistent with the State's ownership of, and its "full control and supervision" (a phrase also employed by the framers) over, such resources. The Project explained: 3. In line with the State ownership of natural resources, the State should take a more active role in the exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources, than the present practice of granting licenses, concessions, or leases hence the provision that said activities shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. There are three major schemes by which the State could undertake these activities: first, directly by itself; second, by virtue of co-production, joint venture, production sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or corporations or associations sixty per cent (60%) of the voting stock or controlling interests of which are owned by such citizens; or third, with a foreign-owned corporation, in cases of large-scale exploration, development, or utilization of natural resources through agreements involving either technical or financial assistance only. x x x. At present, under the licensing concession or lease schemes, the government benefits from such benefits only through fees, charges, ad valorem taxes and income taxes of the exploiters of our natural resources. Such benefits are very minimal compared with the enormous profits reaped by theses licensees, grantees, concessionaires. Moreover, some of them disregard the conservation of natural resources and do not protect the environment from degradation. The proposed role of the State will enable it to a greater share in the profits it can also actively husband its natural resources and engage in developmental programs that will be beneficial to them. 4. Aside from the three major schemes for the exploration, development, and utilization of our natural resources, the State may, by law, allow Filipino citizens to explore, develop, utilize natural resources in small-scale. This is in recognition of the plight of marginal fishermen, forest dwellers, gold panners, and others similarly situated who exploit our natural resources for their daily sustenance and survival. 250 Professor Agabin, in particular, after taking pains to illustrate the similarities between the two systems, concluded that the service contract regime was but a "rehash" of the concession system. "Old wine in new bottles," as he put it. The rejection of the service contract regime, therefore, is in consonance with the abolition of the concession system. In light of the deliberations of the CONCOM, the text of the Constitution, and the adoption of other proposed changes, there is no doubt that the framers considered and shared the intent of the U.P. Law proponents in employing the phrase "agreements . . . involving either technical or financial assistance." While certain commissioners may have mentioned the term "service contracts" during the CONCOM deliberations, they may not have been necessarily referring to the concept of service contracts under the 1973 Constitution. As noted earlier, "service contracts" is a term that assumes different meanings to different people.251 The commissioners may have been using the term loosely, and not in its technical and legal sense, to refer, in general, to agreements concerning natural resources entered into by the

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Government with foreign corporations. These loose statements do not necessarily translate to the adoption of the 1973 Constitution provision allowing service contracts. It is true that, as shown in the earlier quoted portions of the proceedings in CONCOM, in response to Sr. Tan's question, Commissioner Villegas commented that, other than congressional notification, the only difference between "future" and "past" "service contracts" is the requirement of a general law as there were no laws previously authorizing the same.252 However, such remark is far outweighed by his more categorical statement in his exchange with Commissioner Quesada that the draft article "does not permit foreign investors to participate" in the nation's natural resources which was exactly what service contracts did except to provide "technical or financial assistance."253 In the case of the other commissioners, Commissioner Nolledo himself clarified in his work that the present charter prohibits service contracts.254 Commissioner Gascon was not totally averse to foreign participation, but favored stricter restrictions in the form of majority congressional concurrence. 255 On the other hand, Commissioners Garcia and Tadeo may have veered to the extreme side of the spectrum and their objections may be interpreted as votes against any foreign participation in our natural resources whatsoever. WMCP cites Opinion No. 75, s. 1987,256 and Opinion No. 175, s. 1990257 of the Secretary of Justice, expressing the view that a financial or technical assistance agreement "is no different in concept" from the service contract allowed under the 1973 Constitution. This Court is not, however, bound by this interpretation. When an administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law; and the administrative interpretation of the law is at best advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.258 In any case, the constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs with foreign-owned corporations is an exception to the rule that participation in the nation's natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. As Commissioner Villegas emphasized, the provision is "very restrictive."259 Commissioner Nolledo also remarked that "entering into service contracts is an exception to the rule on protection of natural resources for the interest of the nation and, therefore, being an exception, it should be subject, whenever possible, to stringent rules."260 Indeed, exceptions should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exception.261 With the foregoing discussion in mind, this Court finds that R.A. No. 7942 is invalid insofar as said Act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase "financial and technical agreements" in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, it actually treats these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law. Section 33, which is found under Chapter VI (Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement) of R.A. No. 7942 states: SEC. 33. Eligibility.Any qualified person with technical and financial capability to undertake large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources in the Philippines may enter into a financial or technical assistance agreement directly with the Government through the Department. [Emphasis supplied.] "Exploration," as defined by R.A. No. 7942, means the searching or prospecting for mineral resources by geological, geochemical or geophysical surveys, remote sensing, test pitting, trending, drilling, shaft sinking, tunneling or any other means for the purpose of determining the existence, extent, quantity and quality thereof and the feasibility of mining them for profit.262 A legally organized foreign-owned corporation may be granted an exploration permit,263 which vests it with the right to conduct exploration for all minerals in specified areas, 264 i.e., to enter, occupy and explore the same.265 Eventually, the foreign-owned corporation, as such permittee, may apply for a financial and technical assistance agreement.266 "Development" is the work undertaken to explore and prepare an ore body or a mineral deposit for mining, including the construction of necessary infrastructure and related facilities. 267 "Utilization" "means the extraction or disposition of minerals."268 A stipulation that the proponent shall dispose of the minerals and byproducts produced at the highest price and more advantageous terms and conditions as provided for under the implementing rules and regulations is required to be incorporated in every FTAA.269 A foreign-owned/-controlled corporation may likewise be granted a mineral processing permit.270 "Mineral processing" is the milling, beneficiation or upgrading of ores or minerals and rocks or by similar means to convert the same into marketable products.271 An FTAA contractor makes a warranty that the mining operations shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 7942 and its implementing rules272 and for work programs and minimum expenditures and commitments.273 And it obliges itself to furnish the Government records of geologic, accounting, and other relevant data for its mining operation.274 "Mining operation," as the law defines it, means mining activities involving exploration, feasibility, development, utilization, and processing.275 The underlying assumption in all these provisions is that the foreign contractor manages the mineral resources, just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. Furthermore, Chapter XII of the Act grants foreign contractors in FTAAs the same auxiliary mining rights that it grants contractors in mineral agreements (MPSA, CA and JV).276 Parenthetically, Sections 72 to 75 use the term "contractor," without distinguishing between FTAA and mineral agreement contractors. And so does "holders of mining rights" in Section 76. A foreign contractor may even convert its FTAA into a mineral agreement if the economic viability of the contract area is found to be inadequate to justify largescale mining operations,277 provided that it reduces its equity in the corporation, partnership, association or cooperative to forty percent (40%).278 Finally, under the Act, an FTAA contractor warrants that it "has or has access to all the financing, managerial, and technical expertise. . . ."279 This suggests that an FTAA contractor is bound to provide

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some management assistance a form of assistance that has been eliminated and, therefore, proscribed by the present Charter. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation, the abovecited provisions of R.A. No. 7942 have in effect conveyed beneficial ownership over the nation's mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto. Moreover, the same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 60%-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine natural resources. In sum, the Court finds the following provisions of R.A. No. 7942 to be violative of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution: (1) The proviso in Section 3 (aq), which defines "qualified person," to wit: Provided, That a legally organized foreign-owned corporation shall be deemed a qualified person for purposes of granting an exploration permit, financial or technical assistance agreement or mineral processing permit. (2) Section 23,280 which specifies the rights and obligations of an exploration permittee, insofar as said section applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement, (3) Section 33, which prescribes the eligibility of a contractor in a financial or technical assistance agreement; (4) Section 35,281 which enumerates the terms and conditions for every financial or technical assistance agreement; (5) Section 39,282 which allows the contractor in a financial and technical assistance agreement to convert the same into a mineral production-sharing agreement; (6) Section 56,283 which authorizes the issuance of a mineral processing permit to a contractor in a financial and technical assistance agreement; The following provisions of the same Act are likewise void as they are dependent on the foregoing provisions and cannot stand on their own: (1) Section 3 (g),284 which defines the term "contractor," insofar as it applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement. Section 34, which prescribes the maximum contract area in a financial or technical assistance agreements; Section 36,286 which allows negotiations for financial or technical assistance agreements;
285

Section 37,287 which prescribes the procedure for filing and evaluation of financial or technical assistance agreement proposals; Section 38,288 which limits the term of financial or technical assistance agreements; Section 40,289 which allows the assignment or transfer of financial or technical assistance agreements; Section 41,290 which allows the withdrawal of the contractor in an FTAA; The second and third paragraphs of Section 81,291 which provide for the Government's share in a financial and technical assistance agreement; and Section 90,292 which provides for incentives to contractors in FTAAs insofar as it applies to said contractors; When the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them.293 There can be little doubt that the WMCP FTAA itself is a service contract. Section 1.3 of the WMCP FTAA grants WMCP "the exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilise[,] process and dispose of all Minerals products and by-products thereof that may be produced from the Contract Area."294 The FTAA also imbues WMCP with the following rights: (b) to extract and carry away any Mineral samples from the Contract area for the purpose of conducting tests and studies in respect thereof; (c) to determine the mining and treatment processes to be utilised during the Development/Operating Period and the project facilities to be constructed during the Development and Construction Period; (d) have the right of possession of the Contract Area, with full right of ingress and egress and the right to occupy the same, subject to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 512 (if applicable) and not be prevented from entry into private ands by surface owners and/or occupants thereof when prospecting, exploring and exploiting for minerals therein; xxx (f) to construct roadways, mining, drainage, power generation and transmission facilities and all other types of works on the Contract Area;

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(g) to erect, install or place any type of improvements, supplies, machinery and other equipment relating to the Mining Operations and to use, sell or otherwise dispose of, modify, remove or diminish any and all parts thereof; (h) enjoy, subject to pertinent laws, rules and regulations and the rights of third Parties, easement rights and the use of timber, sand, clay, stone, water and other natural resources in the Contract Area without cost for the purposes of the Mining Operations; xxx (i) have the right to mortgage, charge or encumber all or part of its interest and obligations under this Agreement, the plant, equipment and infrastructure and the Minerals produced from the Mining Operations; x x x. 295 All materials, equipment, plant and other installations erected or placed on the Contract Area remain the property of WMCP, which has the right to deal with and remove such items within twelve months from the termination of the FTAA.296 Pursuant to Section 1.2 of the FTAA, WMCP shall provide "[all] financing, technology, management and personnel necessary for the Mining Operations." The mining company binds itself to "perform all Mining Operations . . . providing all necessary services, technology and financing in connection therewith,"297 and to "furnish all materials, labour, equipment and other installations that may be required for carrying on all Mining Operations."298> WMCP may make expansions, improvements and replacements of the mining facilities and may add such new facilities as it considers necessary for the mining operations. 299 These contractual stipulations, taken together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring must be struck down. In arguing against the annulment of the FTAA, WMCP invokes the Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments between the Philippine and Australian Governments, which was signed in Manila on January 25, 1995 and which entered into force on December 8, 1995. x x x. Article 2 (1) of said treaty states that it applies to investments whenever made and thus the fact that [WMCP's] FTAA was entered into prior to the entry into force of the treaty does not preclude the Philippine Government from protecting [WMCP's] investment in [that] FTAA. Likewise, Article 3 (1) of the treaty provides that "Each Party shall encourage and promote investments in its area by investors of the other Party and shall [admit] such investments in accordance with its Constitution, Laws, regulations and investment policies" and in Article 3 (2), it states that "Each Party shall ensure that investments are accorded fair and equitable treatment." The latter stipulation indicates that it was intended to impose an obligation upon a Party to afford fair and equitable treatment to the investments of the other Party and that a failure to provide such treatment by or under the laws of the Party may constitute a breach of the treaty. Simply stated, the Philippines could not, under said treaty, rely upon the inadequacies of its own laws to deprive an Australian investor (like [WMCP]) of fair and equitable treatment by invalidating [WMCP's] FTAA without likewise nullifying the service contracts entered into before the enactment of RA 7942 such as those mentioned in PD 87 or EO 279. This becomes more significant in the light of the fact that [WMCP's] FTAA was executed not by a mere Filipino citizen, but by the Philippine Government itself, through its President no less, which, in entering into said treaty is assumed to be aware of the existing Philippine laws on service contracts over the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources. The execution of the FTAA by the Philippine Government assures the Australian Government that the FTAA is in accordance with existing Philippine laws.300 [Emphasis and italics by private respondents.] The invalidation of the subject FTAA, it is argued, would constitute a breach of said treaty which, in turn, would amount to a violation of Section 3, Article II of the Constitution adopting the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. One of these generally accepted principles is pacta sunt servanda, which requires the performance in good faith of treaty obligations. Even assuming arguendo that WMCP is correct in its interpretation of the treaty and its assertion that "the Philippines could not . . . deprive an Australian investor (like [WMCP]) of fair and equitable treatment by invalidating [WMCP's] FTAA without likewise nullifying the service contracts entered into before the enactment of RA 7942 . . .," the annulment of the FTAA would not constitute a breach of the treaty invoked. For this decision herein invalidating the subject FTAA forms part of the legal system of the Philippines.301 The equal protection clause302 guarantees that such decision shall apply to all contracts belonging to the same class, hence, upholding rather than violating, the "fair and equitable treatment" stipulation in said treaty. One other matter requires clarification. Petitioners contend that, consistent with the provisions of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, the President may enter into agreements involving "either technical or financial assistance" only. The agreement in question, however, is a technical and financial assistance agreement. Petitioners' contention does not lie. To adhere to the literal language of the Constitution would lead to absurd consequences.303 As WMCP correctly put it: x x x such a theory of petitioners would compel the government (through the President) to enter into contract with two (2) foreign-owned corporations, one for financial assistance agreement and with the other, for technical assistance over one and the same mining area or land; or to execute two (2) contracts with only one foreign-owned corporation which has the capability to provide both financial and technical assistance, one for financial assistance and another for technical assistance, over the same mining area. Such an absurd result is definitely not sanctioned under the canons of constitutional construction. 304 [Underscoring in the original.] Surely, the framers of the 1987 Charter did not contemplate such an absurd result from their use of "either/or." A constitution is not to be interpreted as demanding the impossible or the impracticable; and unreasonable or absurd consequences, if possible, should be avoided.305 Courts are not to give words a meaning that would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences and a literal interpretation is to be

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rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results.306 That is a strong argument against its adoption.307 Accordingly, petitioners' interpretation must be rejected. The foregoing discussion has rendered unnecessary the resolution of the other issues raised by the petition. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court hereby declares unconstitutional and void: (1) The following provisions of Republic Act No. 7942: (a) The proviso in Section 3 (aq), (b) Section 23, (c) Section 33 to 41, (d) Section 56, (e) The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, and (f) Section 90. (2) All provisions of Department of Environment and Natural Resources Administrative Order 96-40, s. 1996 which are not in conformity with this Decision, and (3) The Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and WMC Philippines, Inc. SO ORDERED. EN BANC G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000 PER CURIAM: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules). In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.1 In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit. On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUMWESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor. IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor. RESOLUTION

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents. HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU

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unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part. On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition. On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed. On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed. The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted. Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution: "(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands; "(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples; "(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands; "(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains; (5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands; "(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and "(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation." 2 Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.3 In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution. 4 These provisions are: "(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands; "(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates; "(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples; "(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and "(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples."5 Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution. 6

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Petitioners pray for the following: "(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid; "(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules; "(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998; "(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and "(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the States constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources."7 After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows: Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371. Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug. As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED. Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion G.R. No. 177131 June 7, 2011

BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent. DECISION LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: The jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit (COA) over the Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) is the subject matter of this controversy that reached us via petition for prohibition1 filed by the BSP under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court. In this petition, the BSP seeks that the COA be prohibited from implementing its June 18, 2002 Decision,2 its February 21, 2007 Resolution,3 as well as all other issuances arising therefrom, and that all of the foregoing be rendered null and void. 4 Antecedent Facts and Background of the Case This case arose when the COA issued Resolution No. 99-0115 on August 19, 1999 ("the COA Resolution"), with the subject "Defining the Commissions policy with respect to the audit of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines." In its whereas clauses, the COA Resolution stated that the BSP was created as a public corporation under Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 460 and Republic Act No. 7278; that in Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission,6 the Supreme Court ruled that the BSP, as constituted under its charter, was a "government-controlled corporation within the meaning of Article IX(B)(2)(1) of the Constitution"; and that "the BSP is appropriately regarded as a government instrumentality under the 1987 Administrative Code."7 The COA Resolution also cited its constitutional mandate under Section 2(1), Article IX (D). Finally, the COA Resolution reads: NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the COMMISSION PROPER HAS RESOLVED, AS IT DOES HEREBY RESOLVE, to conduct an annual financial audit of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, and express an opinion on whether the financial statements which include the Balance Sheet, the Income Statement and the Statement of Cash Flows present fairly its financial position and results of operations. xxxx

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BE IT RESOLVED FURTHERMORE, that for purposes of audit supervision, the Boy Scouts of the Philippines shall be classified among the government corporations belonging to the Educational, Social, Scientific, Civic and Research Sector under the Corporate Audit Office I, to be audited, similar to the subsidiary corporations, by employing the team audit approach.8 (Emphases supplied.) The BSP sought reconsideration of the COA Resolution in a letter9 dated November 26, 1999 signed by the BSP National President Jejomar C. Binay, who is now the Vice President of the Republic, wherein he wrote: It is the position of the BSP, with all due respect, that it is not subject to the Commissions jurisdiction on the following grounds: 1. We reckon that the ruling in the case of Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. (G.R. No. 80767) classifying the BSP as a government-controlled corporation is anchored on the "substantial Government participation" in the National Executive Board of the BSP. It is to be noted that the case was decided when the BSP Charter is defined by Commonwealth Act No. 111 as amended by Presidential Decree 460. However, may we humbly refer you to Republic Act No. 7278 which amended the BSPs charter after the cited case was decided. The most salient of all amendments in RA No. 7278 is the alteration of the composition of the National Executive Board of the BSP. The said RA virtually eliminated the "substantial government participation" in the National Executive Board by removing: (i) the President of the Philippines and executive secretaries, with the exception of the Secretary of Education, as members thereof; and (ii) the appointment and confirmation power of the President of the Philippines, as Chief Scout, over the members of the said Board. The BSP believes that the cited case has been superseded by RA 7278. Thereby weakening the cases conclusion that the BSP is a government-controlled corporation (sic). The 1987 Administrative Code itself, of which the BSP vs. NLRC relied on for some terms, defines government-owned and controlled corporations as agencies organized as stock or non-stock corporations which the BSP, under its present charter, is not. Also, the Government, like in other GOCCs, does not have funds invested in the BSP. What RA 7278 only provides is that the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, offices, agencies and instrumentalities can from time to time donate and contribute funds to the BSP. xxxx Also the BSP respectfully believes that the BSP is not "appropriately regarded as a government instrumentality under the 1987 Administrative Code" as stated in the COA resolution. As defined by Section 2(10) of the said code, instrumentality refers to "any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter." The BSP is not an entity administering special funds. It is not even included in the DECS National Budget. x x x It may be argued also that the BSP is not an "agency" of the Government. The 1987 Administrative Code, merely referred the BSP as an "attached agency" of the DECS as distinguished from an actual line agency of departments that are included in the National Budget. The BSP believes that an "attached agency" is different from an "agency." Agency, as defined in Section 2(4) of the Administrative Code, is defined as any of the various units of the Government including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, government-owned or controlled corporation or local government or distinct unit therein. Under the above definition, the BSP is neither a unit of the Government; a department which refers to an executive department as created by law (Section 2[7] of the Administrative Code); nor a bureau which refers to any principal subdivision or unit of any department (Section 2[8], Administrative Code). 10 Subsequently, requests for reconsideration of the COA Resolution were also made separately by Robert P. Valdellon, Regional Scout Director, Western Visayas Region, Iloilo City and Eugenio F. Capreso, Council Scout Executive of Calbayog City.11 In a letter12 dated July 3, 2000, Director Crescencio S. Sunico, Corporate Audit Officer (CAO) I of the COA, furnished the BSP with a copy of the Memorandum 13 dated June 20, 2000 of Atty. Santos M. Alquizalas, the COA General Counsel. In said Memorandum, the COA General Counsel opined that Republic Act No. 7278 did not supersede the Courts ruling in Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission, even though said law eliminated the substantial government participation in the selection of members of the National Executive Board of the BSP. The Memorandum further provides: Analysis of the said case disclosed that the substantial government participation is only one (1) of the three (3) grounds relied upon by the Court in the resolution of the case. Other considerations include the character of the BSPs purposes and functions which has a public aspect and the statutory designation of the BSP as a "public corporation". These grounds have not been deleted by R.A. No. 7278. On the contrary, these were strengthened as evidenced by the amendment made relative to BSPs purposes stated in Section 3 of R.A. No. 7278. On the argument that BSP is not appropriately regarded as "a government instrumentality" and "agency" of the government, such has already been answered and clarified. The Supreme Court has elucidated this matter in the BSP case when it declared that BSP is regarded as, both a "government-controlled corporation with an original charter" and as an "instrumentality" of the Government. Likewise, it is not disputed that the Administrative Code of 1987 designated the BSP as one of the attached agencies of DECS. Being an attached agency, however, it does not change its nature as a government-controlled corporation with original charter and, necessarily, subject to COA audit jurisdiction. Besides, Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the Constitution provides that COA shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.14 Based on the Memorandum of the COA General Counsel, Director Sunico wrote:

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In view of the points clarified by said Memorandum upholding COA Resolution No. 99-011, we have to comply with the provisions of the latter, among which is to conduct an annual financial audit of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines.15 In a letter dated November 20, 2000 signed by Director Amorsonia B. Escarda, CAO I, the COA informed the BSP that a preliminary survey of its organizational structure, operations and accounting system/records shall be conducted on November 21 to 22, 2000.16 Upon the BSPs request, the audit was deferred for thirty (30) days. The BSP then filed a Petition for Review with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order before the COA. This was denied by the COA in its questioned Decision, which held that the BSP is under its audit jurisdiction. The BSP moved for reconsideration but this was likewise denied under its questioned Resolution. 17 This led to the filing by the BSP of this petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order against the COA. The Issue As stated earlier, the sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether the BSP falls under the COAs audit jurisdiction. The Parties Respective Arguments The BSP contends that Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission is inapplicable for purposes of determining the audit jurisdiction of the COA as the issue therein was the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission over a case for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice filed by certain BSP employees.18 While the BSP concedes that its functions do relate to those that the government might otherwise completely assume on its own, it avers that this alone was not determinative of the COAs audit jurisdiction over it. The BSP further avers that the Court in Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission "simply stated x x x that in respect of functions, the BSP is akin to a public corporation" but this was not synonymous to holding that the BSP is a government corporation or entity subject to audit by the COA. 19 The BSP contends that Republic Act No. 7278 introduced crucial amendments to its charter; hence, the findings of the Court in Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission are no longer valid as the government has ceased to play a controlling influence in it. The BSP claims that the pronouncements of the Court therein must be taken only within the context of that case; that the Court had categorically found that its assets were acquired from the Boy Scouts of America and not from the Philippine government, and that its operations are financed chiefly from membership dues of the Boy Scouts themselves as well as from property rentals; and that "the BSP may correctly be characterized as non-governmental, and hence, beyond the audit jurisdiction of the COA." It further claims that the designation by the Court of the BSP as a government agency or instrumentality is mere obiter dictum.20 As stated in petitioners third argument, BSPs assets and funds were never acquired from the government. Its operations are not in any way financed by the government, as BSP has never been included in any appropriations act for the government. Neither has the government invested funds with BSP. BSP, has not been, at any time, a user of government property or funds; nor have properties of the government been held in trust by BSP. This is precisely the reason why, until this time, the COA has not attempted to subject BSP to its audit jurisdiction. x x x.25 To summarize its other arguments, the BSP contends that it is not a government-owned or controlled corporation; neither is it an instrumentality, agency, or subdivision of the government. In its Comment,26 the COA argues as follows: 1. The BSP is a public corporation created under Commonwealth Act No. 111 dated October 31, 1936, and whose functions relate to the fostering of public virtues of citizenship and patriotism and the general improvement of the moral spirit and fiber of the youth. The manner of creation and the purpose for which the BSP was created indubitably prove that it is a government agency. 2. Being a government agency, the funds and property owned or held in trust by the BSP are subject to the audit authority of respondent Commission on Audit pursuant to Section 2 (1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. The BSP maintains that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7278 suggest that "governance of BSP has come to be overwhelmingly a private affair or nature, with government participation restricted to the seat of the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports."21 It cites Philippine Airlines Inc. v. Commission on Audit22 wherein the Court declared that, "PAL, having ceased to be a government-owned or controlled corporation is no longer under the audit jurisdiction of the COA."23 Claiming that the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 7278 constituted a supervening event that changed the BSPs corporate identity in the same way that the governments privatization program changed PALs, the BSP makes the case that the government no longer has control over it; thus, the COA cannot use the Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission as its basis for the exercise of its jurisdiction and the issuance of COA Resolution No. 99-011.24 The BSP further claims as follows: It is not far-fetched, in fact, to concede that BSPs funds and assets are private in character. Unlike ordinary public corporations, such as provinces, cities, and municipalities, or government-owned and controlled corporations, such as Land Bank of the Philippines and the Development Bank of the Philippines, the assets and funds of BSP are not derived from any government grant. For its operations, BSP is not dependent in any way on any government appropriation; as a matter of fact, it has not even been included in any appropriations for the government. To be sure, COA has not alleged, in its Resolution No. 99-011 or in the Memorandum of its General Counsel, that BSP received, receives or continues to receive assets and funds from any agency of the government. The foregoing simply point to the private nature of the funds and assets of petitioner BSP. xxxx

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3. Republic Act No. 7278 did not change the character of the BSP as a government-owned or controlled corporation and government instrumentality.27 The COA maintains that the functions of the BSP that include, among others, the teaching to the youth of patriotism, courage, self-reliance, and kindred virtues, are undeniably sovereign functions enshrined under the Constitution and discussed by the Court in Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission. The COA contends that any attempt to classify the BSP as a private corporation would be incomprehensible since no less than the law which created it had designated it as a public corporation and its statutory mandate embraces performance of sovereign functions.28 The COA claims that the only reason why the BSP employees fell within the scope of the Civil Service Commission even before the 1987 Constitution was the fact that it was a government-owned or controlled corporation; that as an attached agency of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), the BSP is an agency of the government; and that the BSP is a chartered institution under Section 1(12) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, embraced under the term government instrumentality. 29 The COA concludes that being a government agency, the funds and property owned or held by the BSP are subject to the audit authority of the COA pursuant to Section 2(1), Article IX (D) of the 1987 Constitution. In support of its arguments, the COA cites The Veterans Federation of the Philippines (VFP) v. Reyes, 30 wherein the Court held that among the reasons why the VFP is a public corporation is that its charter, Republic Act No. 2640, designates it as one. Furthermore, the COA quotes the Court as saying in that case: In several cases, we have dealt with the issue of whether certain specific activities can be classified as sovereign functions. These cases, which deal with activities not immediately apparent to be sovereign functions, upheld the public sovereign nature of operations needed either to promote social justice or to stimulate patriotic sentiments and love of country. xxxx Petitioner claims that its funds are not public funds because no budgetary appropriations or government funds have been released to the VFP directly or indirectly from the DBM, and because VFP funds come from membership dues and lease rentals earned from administering government lands reserved for the VFP. The fact that no budgetary appropriations have been released to the VFP does not prove that it is a private corporation. The DBM indeed did not see it fit to propose budgetary appropriations to the VFP, having itself believed that the VFP is a private corporation. If the DBM, however, is mistaken as to its conclusion regarding the nature of VFP's incorporation, its previous assertions will not prevent future budgetary appropriations to the VFP. The erroneous application of the law by public officers does not bar a subsequent correct application of the law.31 (Citations omitted.) The COA points out that the government is not precluded by law from extending financial support to the BSP and adding to its funds, and that "as a government instrumentality which continues to perform a vital function imbued with public interest and reflective of the governments policy to stimulate patriotic sentiments and love of country, the BSPs funds from whatever source are public funds, and can be used solely for public purpose in pursuance of the provisions of Republic Act No. [7278]."32 The COA claims that the fact that it has not yet audited the BSPs funds may not bar the subsequent exercise of its audit jurisdiction. The BSP filed its Reply33 on August 29, 2007 maintaining that its statutory designation as a "public corporation" and the public character of its purpose and functions are not determinative of the COAs audit jurisdiction; reiterating its stand that Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission is not applicable anymore because the aspect of government ownership and control has been removed by Republic Act No. 7278; and concluding that the funds and property that it either owned or held in trust are not public funds and are not subject to the COAs audit jurisdiction. Thereafter, considering the BSPs claim that it is a private corporation, this Court, in a Resolution 34 dated July 20, 2010, required the parties to file, within a period of twenty (20) days from receipt of said Resolution, their respective comments on the issue of whether Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended by Republic Act No. 7278, is constitutional. In compliance with the Courts resolution, the parties filed their respective Comments. In its Comment35 dated October 22, 2010, the COA argues that the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended, is not determinative of the resolution of the present controversy on the COAs audit jurisdiction over petitioner, and in fact, the controversy may be resolved on other grounds; thus, the requisites before a judicial inquiry may be made, as set forth in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals,36 have not been fully met.37 Moreover, the COA maintains that behind every law lies the presumption of constitutionality.38 The COA likewise argues that contrary to the BSPs position, repeal of a law by implication is not favored.39 Lastly, the COA claims that there was no violation of Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution with the creation or declaration of the BSP as a government corporation. Citing Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Commission on Audit,40 the COA further alleges: The true criterion, therefore, to determine whether a corporation is public or private is found in the totality of the relation of the corporation to the State. If the corporation is created by the State as the latters own agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying out its governmental functions, then that corporation is considered public; otherwise, it is private. x x x.41 For its part, in its Comment42 filed on December 3, 2010, the BSP submits that its charter, Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended by Republic Act No. 7278, is constitutional as it does not violate Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution. The BSP alleges that "while [it] is not a public corporation within the purview of COAs audit jurisdiction, neither is it a private corporation created by special law falling within the ambit of the constitutional prohibition x x x."43 The BSP further alleges: Petitioners purpose is embodied in Section 3 of C.A. No. 111, as amended by Section 1 of R.A. No. 7278, thus:

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xxxx A reading of the foregoing provision shows that petitioner was created to advance the interest of the youth, specifically of young boys, and to mold them into becoming good citizens. Ultimately, the creation of petitioner redounds to the benefit, not only of those boys, but of the public good or welfare. Hence, it can be said that petitioners purpose and functions are more of a public rather than a private character. Petitioner caters to all boys who wish to join the organization without any distinction. It does not limit its membership to a particular class of boys. Petitioners members are trained in scoutcraft and taught patriotism, civic consciousness and responsibility, courage, self-reliance, discipline and kindred virtues, and moral values, preparing them to become model citizens and outstanding leaders of the country. 44 The BSP reiterates its stand that the public character of its purpose and functions do not place it within the ambit of the audit jurisdiction of the COA as it lacks the government ownership or control that the Constitution requires before an entity may be subject of said jurisdiction.45 It avers that it merely stated in its Reply that the withdrawal of government control is akin to privatization, but it does not necessarily mean that petitioner is a private corporation.46 The BSP claims that it has a unique characteristic which "neither classifies it as a purely public nor a purely private corporation";47 that it is not a quasi-public corporation; and that it may belong to a different class altogether. 48 The BSP claims that assuming arguendo that it is a private corporation, its creation is not contrary to the purpose of Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution; and that the evil sought to be avoided by said provision is inexistent in the enactment of the BSPs charter,49 as, (i) it was not created for any pecuniary purpose; (ii) those who will primarily benefit from its creation are not its officers but its entire membership consisting of boys being trained in scoutcraft all over the country; (iii) it caters to all boys who wish to join the organization without any distinction; and (iv) it does not limit its membership to a particular class or group of boys. Thus, the enactment of its charter confers no special privilege to particular individuals, families, or groups; nor does it bring about the danger of granting undue favors to certain groups to the prejudice of others or of the interest of the country, which are the evils sought to be prevented by the constitutional provision involved.50 Finally, the BSP states that the presumption of constitutionality of a legislative enactment prevails absent any clear showing of its repugnancy to the Constitution.51 The Ruling of the Court After looking at the legislative history of its amended charter and carefully studying the applicable laws and the arguments of both parties, we find that the BSP is a public corporation and its funds are subject to the COAs audit jurisdiction. The BSP Charter (Commonwealth Act No. 111, approved on October 31, 1936), entitled "An Act to Create a Public Corporation to be Known as the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, and to Define its Powers and Purposes" created the BSP as a "public corporation" to serve the following public interest or purpose: Sec. 3. The purpose of this corporation shall be to promote through organization and cooperation with other agencies, the ability of boys to do useful things for themselves and others, to train them in scoutcraft, and to inculcate in them patriotism, civic consciousness and responsibility, courage, selfreliance, discipline and kindred virtues, and moral values, using the method which are in common use by boy scouts. Presidential Decree No. 460, approved on May 17, 1974, amended Commonwealth Act No. 111 and provided substantial changes in the BSP organizational structure. Pertinent provisions are quoted below: Section II. Section 5 of the said Act is also amended to read as follows: The governing body of the said corporation shall consist of a National Executive Board composed of (a) the President of the Philippines or his representative; (b) the charter and life members of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines; (c) the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Philippine Scouting Foundation; (d) the Regional Chairman of the Scout Regions of the Philippines; (e) the Secretary of Education and Culture, the Secretary of Social Welfare, the Secretary of National Defense, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Youth and Sports, and the Secretary of Local Government and Community Development; (f) an equal number of individuals from the private sector; (g) the National President of the Girl Scouts of the Philippines; (h) one Scout of Senior age from each Scout Region to represent the boy membership; and (i) three representatives of the cultural minorities. Except for the Regional Chairman who shall be elected by the Regional Scout Councils during their annual meetings, and the Scouts of their respective regions, all members of the National Executive Board shall be either by appointment or cooption, subject to ratification and confirmation by the Chief Scout, who shall be the Head of State. Vacancies in the Executive Board shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining members, subject to ratification and confirmation by the Chief Scout. The by-laws may prescribe the number of members of the National Executive Board necessary to constitute a quorum of the board, which number may be less than a majority of the whole number of the board. The National Executive Board shall have power to make and to amend the by-laws, and, by a two-thirds vote of the whole board at a meeting called for this purpose, may authorize and cause to be executed mortgages and liens upon the property of the corporation. Subsequently, on March 24, 1992, Republic Act No. 7278 further amended Commonwealth Act No. 111 "by strengthening the volunteer and democratic character" of the BSP and reducing government representation in its governing body, as follows: Section 1. Sections 2 and 3 of Commonwealth Act. No. 111, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 2. The said corporation shall have the powers of perpetual succession, to sue and be sued; to enter into contracts; to acquire, own, lease, convey and dispose of such real and personal estate, land grants, rights and choses in action as shall be necessary for corporate purposes, and to accept and receive funds, real and personal property by gift, devise, bequest or other means, to conduct fund-raising activities; to adopt and use a seal, and the same to alter and destroy; to have offices and conduct its business and affairs in Metropolitan Manila and in the regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays of the Philippines, to make and adopt by-laws, rules and regulations not inconsistent with this Act and the laws of the Philippines, and generally to do all such acts and things, including the establishment of regulations for the election of associates and successors, as may be necessary to carry into effect the provisions of this Act and promote the purposes of said corporation: Provided, That said corporation shall have no power to issue certificates of stock or to declare or pay dividends, its objectives and purposes being solely of benevolent character and not for pecuniary profit of its members.

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"Sec. 3. The purpose of this corporation shall be to promote through organization and cooperation with other agencies, the ability of boys to do useful things for themselves and others, to train them in scoutcraft, and to inculcate in them patriotism, civic consciousness and responsibility, courage, selfreliance, discipline and kindred virtues, and moral values, using the method which are in common use by boy scouts." Sec. 2. Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended, is hereby repealed and in lieu thereof, Section 4 shall read as follows: "Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall be the Chief Scout of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines." Art. 44. The following are juridical persons: Sec. 3. Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended, are hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 5. The governing body of the said corporation shall consist of a National Executive Board, the members of which shall be Filipino citizens of good moral character. The Board shall be composed of the following: "(a) One (1) charter member of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines who shall be elected by the members of the National Council at its meeting called for this purpose; "(b) The regional chairmen of the scout regions who shall be elected by the representatives of all the local scout councils of the region during its meeting called for this purpose: Provided, That a candidate for regional chairman need not be the chairman of a local scout council; "(c) The Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports; "(d) The National President of the Girl Scouts of the Philippines; "(e) One (1) senior scout, each from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao areas, to be elected by the senior scout delegates of the local scout councils to the scout youth forums in their respective areas, in its meeting called for this purpose, to represent the boy scout membership; "(f) Twelve (12) regular members to be elected by the members of the National Council in its meeting called for this purpose; "(g) At least ten (10) but not more than fifteen (15) additional members from the private sector who shall be elected by the members of the National Executive Board referred to in the immediately preceding paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) at the organizational meeting of the newly reconstituted National Executive Board which shall be held immediately after the meeting of the National Council wherein the twelve (12) regular members and the one (1) charter member were elected. xxxx (1) The State and its political subdivisions; (2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law ; (3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member. (Emphases supplied.) The BSP, which is a corporation created for a public interest or purpose, is subject to the law creating it under Article 45 of the Civil Code, which provides: Art. 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding article are governed by the laws creating or recognizing them. Private corporations are regulated by laws of general application on the subject. Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are governed by the provisions of this Code concerning partnerships. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.) The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows that it was created in order to implement a State policy declared in Article II, Section 13 of the Constitution, which reads: ARTICLE II - DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs. Evidently, the BSP, which was created by a special law to serve a public purpose in pursuit of a constitutional mandate, comes within the class of "public corporations" defined by paragraph 2, Article 44 of the Civil Code and governed by the law which creates it, pursuant to Article 45 of the same Code. "Sec. 8. Any donation or contribution which from time to time may be made to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines by the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, offices, agencies or instrumentalities or by a foreign government or by private, entities and individuals shall be expended by the National Executive Board in pursuance of this Act. The BSP as a Public Corporation under Par. 2, Art. 2 of the Civil Code There are three classes of juridical persons under Article 44 of the Civil Code and the BSP, as presently constituted under Republic Act No. 7278, falls under the second classification. Article 44 reads:

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The BSPs Classification Under the Administrative Code of 1987 The public, rather than private, character of the BSP is recognized by the fact that, along with the Girl Scouts of the Philippines, it is classified as an attached agency of the DECS under Executive Order No. 292, or the Administrative Code of 1987, which states: TITLE VI EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS Chapter 8 Attached Agencies SEC. 20. Attached Agencies. The following agencies are hereby attached to the Department: xxxx (12) Boy Scouts of the Philippines; (13) Girl Scouts of the Philippines. The administrative relationship of an attached agency to the department is defined in the Administrative Code of 1987 as follows: BOOK IV THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH Chapter 7 ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONSHIP SEC. 38. Definition of Administrative Relationship. Unless otherwise expressly stated in the Code or in other laws defining the special relationships of particular agencies, administrative relationships shall be categorized and defined as follows: xxxx (3) Attachment. (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and the attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by having the department represented in the governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation or agency. (Emphasis ours.) As an attached agency, the BSP enjoys operational autonomy, as long as policy and program coordination is achieved by having at least one representative of government in its governing board, which in the case of the BSP is the DECS Secretary. In this sense, the BSP is not under government SECTION 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged. The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. Private enterprises, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall be encouraged to broaden the base of their ownership. The scope and coverage of Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution can be seen from the aforementioned declaration of state policies and goals which pertains to national economy and patrimony and the interests of the people in economic development. Section 16, Article XII deals with "the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations," 52 which should be done through a general law enacted by Congress, provides for an exception, that is: if the corporation is government owned or controlled; its creation is in the interest of the common good; and it meets the test of economic viability. The rationale behind Article XII, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution was explained in Feliciano v. Commission on Audit,53 in the following manner: The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private corporations except by a general law applicable to all citizens. The purpose of this constitutional provision is to ban private corporations created by special charters, which historically gave certain individuals, families or groups special privileges denied to other citizens.54 (Emphasis added.) It may be gleaned from the above discussion that Article XII, Section 16 bans the creation of "private corporations" by special law. The said constitutional provision should not be construed so as to prohibit the creation of public corporations or a corporate agency or instrumentality of the government intended to serve a public interest or purpose, which should not be measured on the basis of economic viability, but according to the public interest or purpose it serves as envisioned by paragraph (2), of Article 44 of the Civil Code and the pertinent provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987. control or "supervision and control." Still this characteristic does not make the attached chartered agency a private corporation covered by the constitutional proscription in question. Art. XII, Sec. 16 of the Constitution refers to "private corporations" created by government for proprietary or economic/business purposes At the outset, it should be noted that the provision of Section 16 in issue is found in Article XII of the Constitution, entitled "National Economy and Patrimony." Section 1 of Article XII is quoted as follows:

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The BSP is a Public Corporation Not Subject to the Test of Government Ownership or Control and Economic Viability The BSP is a public corporation or a government agency or instrumentality with juridical personality, which does not fall within the constitutional prohibition in Article XII, Section 16, notwithstanding the amendments to its charter. Not all corporations, which are not government owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private corporations as there exists another distinct class of corporations or chartered institutions which are otherwise known as "public corporations." These corporations are treated by law as agencies or instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the tests of ownership or control and economic viability but to different criteria relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and objectives and their administrative relationship to the government or any of its Departments or Offices. Classification of Corporations Under Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution on National Economy and Patrimony The dissenting opinion of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, citing a line of cases, insists that the Constitution recognizes only two classes of corporations: private corporations under a general law, and government-owned or controlled corporations created by special charters. We strongly disagree. Section 16, Article XII should not be construed so as to prohibit Congress from creating public corporations. In fact, Congress has enacted numerous laws creating public corporations or government agencies or instrumentalities vested with corporate powers. Moreover, Section 16, Article XII, which relates to National Economy and Patrimony, could not have tied the hands of Congress in creating public corporations to serve any of the constitutional policies or objectives. In his dissent, Justice Carpio contends that this ponente introduces "a totally different species of corporation, which is neither a private corporation nor a government owned or controlled corporation" and, in so doing, is missing the fact that the BSP, "which was created as a non-stock, non-profit corporation, can only be either a private corporation or a government owned or controlled corporation." Note that in Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission, the BSP, under its former charter, was regarded as both a government owned or controlled corporation with original charter and a "public corporation." The said case pertinently stated: While the BSP may be seen to be a mixed type of entity, combining aspects of both public and private entities, we believe that considering the character of its purposes and its functions, the statutory designation of the BSP as "a public corporation" and the substantial participation of the Government in the selection of members of the National Executive Board of the BSP, the BSP, as presently constituted under its charter, is a government-controlled corporation within the meaning of Article IX (B) (2) (1) of the Constitution. We are fortified in this conclusion when we note that the Administrative Code of 1987 designates the BSP as one of the attached agencies of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports ("DECS"). An "agency of the Government" is defined as referring to any of the various units of the Government including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, government-owned or -controlled corporation, or local government or distinct unit therein. "Government instrumentality" is in turn defined in the 1987 Administrative Code in the following manner: Instrumentality - refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations. The same Code describes a "chartered institution" in the following terms: Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the State. We believe that the BSP is appropriately regarded as "a government instrumentality" under the 1987 Administrative Code. It thus appears that the BSP may be regarded as both a "government controlled corporation with an original charter" and as an "instrumentality" of the Government within the meaning of Article IX (B) (2) (1) of the Constitution. x x x.55 (Emphases supplied.) The existence of public or government corporate or juridical entities or chartered institutions by legislative fiat distinct from private corporations and government owned or controlled corporation is best exemplified by the 1987 Administrative Code cited above, which we quote in part: Sec. 2. General Terms Defined. Unless the specific words of the text, or the context as a whole, or a particular statute, shall require a different meaning: xxxx (10) "Instrumentality" refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations. xxxx (12) "Chartered institution" refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges and the monetary authority of the State. (13) "Government-owned or controlled corporation" refers to any agency organized as a stock or nonstock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in

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nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) per cent of its capital stock: Provided, That government-owned or controlled corporations may be further categorized by the Department of the Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and the Commission on Audit for purposes of the exercise and discharge of their respective powers, functions and responsibilities with respect to such corporations. Assuming for the sake of argument that the BSP ceases to be owned or controlled by the government because of reduction of the number of representatives of the government in the BSP Board, it does not follow that it also ceases to be a government instrumentality as it still retains all the characteristics of the latter as an attached agency of the DECS under the Administrative Code. Vesting corporate powers to an attached agency or instrumentality of the government is not constitutionally prohibited and is allowed by the above-mentioned provisions of the Civil Code and the 1987 Administrative Code. Economic Viability and Ownership and Control Tests Inapplicable to Public Corporations As presently constituted, the BSP still remains an instrumentality of the national government. It is a public corporation created by law for a public purpose, attached to the DECS pursuant to its Charter and the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not a private corporation which is required to be owned or controlled by the government and be economically viable to justify its existence under a special law. The dissent of Justice Carpio also submits that by recognizing "a new class of public corporation(s)" created by special charter that will not be subject to the test of economic viability, the constitutional provision will be circumvented. However, a review of the Record of the 1986 Constitutional Convention reveals the intent of the framers of the highest law of our land to distinguish between government corporations performing governmental functions and corporations involved in business or proprietary functions: THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Foz is recognized. MR. FOZ. Madam President, I support the proposal to insert "ECONOMIC VIABILITY" as one of the grounds for organizing government corporations. x x x. MR. OPLE. Madam President, the reason for this concern is really that when the government creates a corporation, there is a sense in which this corporation becomes exempt from the test of economic performance. We know what happened in the past. If a government corporation loses, then it makes its claim upon the taxpayers money through new equity infusions from the government and what is always invoked is the common good. x x x Therefore, when we insert the phrase "ECONOMIC VIABILITY" together with the "common good," this becomes a restraint on future enthusiasts for state capitalism to excuse themselves from the responsibility of meeting the market test so that they become viable. x x x. xxxx THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Quesada is recognized. MS. QUESADA. Madam President, may we be clarified by the committee on what is meant by economic viability? THE PRESIDENT. Please proceed. MR. MONSOD. Economic viability normally is determined by cost-benefit ratio that takes into consideration all benefits, including economic external as well as internal benefits. These are what they call externalities in economics, so that these are not strictly financial criteria. Economic viability involves what we call economic returns or benefits of the country that are not quantifiable in financial terms. x x x. xxxx MS. QUESADA. So, would this particular formulation now really limit the entry of government corporations into activities engaged in by corporations? MR. MONSOD. Yes, because it is also consistent with the economic philosophy that this Commission approved that there should be minimum government participation and intervention in the economy. MS. QUESDA. Sometimes this Commission would just refer to Congress to provide the particular requirements when the government would get into corporations. But this time around, we specifically mentioned economic viability. x x x. MR. VILLEGAS. Commissioner Ople will restate the reason for his introducing that amendment. MR. OPLE. I am obliged to repeat what I said earlier in moving for this particular amendment jointly with Commissioner Foz. During the past three decades, there had been a proliferation of government corporations, very few of which have succeeded, and many of which are now earmarked by the Presidential Reorganization Commission for liquidation because they failed the economic test. x x x. xxxx MS. QUESADA. But would not the Commissioner say that the reason why many of the governmentowned or controlled corporations failed to come up with the economic test is due to the management of these corporations, and not the idea itself of government corporations? It is a problem of efficiency and effectiveness of management of these corporations which could be remedied, not by eliminating government corporations or the idea of getting into state-owned corporations, but improving management which our technocrats should be able to do, given the training and the experience. MR. OPLE. That is part of the economic viability, Madam President. MS. QUESADA. So, is the Commissioner saying then that the Filipinos will benefit more if these government-controlled corporations were given to private hands, and that there will be more goods and services that will be affordable and within the reach of the ordinary citizens?

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MR. OPLE. Yes. There is nothing here, Madam President, that will prevent the formation of a government corporation in accordance with a special charter given by Congress. However, we are raising the standard a little bit so that, in the future, corporations established by the government will meet the test of the common good but within that framework we should also build a certain standard of economic viability. xxxx THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Padilla is recognized. MR. PADILLA. This is an inquiry to the committee. With regard to corporations created by a special charter for government-owned or controlled corporations, will these be in the pioneer fields or in places where the private enterprise does not or cannot enter? Or is this so general that these government corporations can compete with private corporations organized under a general law? MR. MONSOD. Madam President, x x x. There are two types of government corporations those that are involved in performing governmental functions, like garbage disposal, Manila waterworks, and so on; and those government corporations that are involved in business functions. As we said earlier, there are two criteria that should be followed for corporations that want to go into business. First is for government corporations to first prove that they can be efficient in the areas of their proper functions. This is one of the problems now because they go into all kinds of activities but are not even efficient in their proper functions. Secondly, they should not go into activities that the private sector can do better. MR. PADILLA. There is no question about corporations performing governmental functions or functions that are impressed with public interest. But the question is with regard to matters that are covered, perhaps not exhaustively, by private enterprise. It seems that under this provision the only qualification is economic viability and common good, but shall government, through government-controlled corporations, compete with private enterprise? MR. MONSOD. No, Madam President. As we said, the government should not engage in activities that private enterprise is engaged in and can do better. x x x.56 (Emphases supplied.) Thus, the test of economic viability clearly does not apply to public corporations dealing with governmental functions, to which category the BSP belongs. The discussion above conveys the constitutional intent not to apply this constitutional ban on the creation of public corporations where the economic viability test would be irrelevant. The said test would only apply if the corporation is engaged in some economic activity or business function for the government. It is undisputed that the BSP performs functions that are impressed with public interest. In fact, during the consideration of the Senate Bill that eventually became Republic Act No. 7278, which amended the BSP Charter, one of the bills sponsors, Senator Joey Lina, described the BSP as follows: Senator Lina. Yes, I can only think of two organizations involving the masses of our youth, Mr. President, that should be given this kind of a privilege the Boy Scouts of the Philippines and the Girl Scouts of the Philippines. Outside of these two groups, I do not think there are other groups similarly situated. The Boy Scouts of the Philippines has a long history of providing value formation to our young, and considering how huge the population of the young people is, at this point in time, and also considering the importance of having an organization such as this that will inculcate moral uprightness among the young people, and further considering that the development of these young people at that tender age of seven to sixteen is vital in the development of the country producing good citizens, I believe that we can make an exception of the Boy Scouting movement of the Philippines from this general prohibition against providing tax exemption and privileges.57 Furthermore, this Court cannot agree with the dissenting opinion which equates the changes introduced by Republic Act No. 7278 to the BSP Charter as clear manifestation of the intent of Congress "to return the BSP to the private sector." It was not the intent of Congress in enacting Republic Act No. 7278 to give up all interests in this basic youth organization, which has been its partner in forming responsible citizens for decades. In fact, as may be seen in the deliberation of the House Bills that eventually resulted to Republic Act No. 7278, Congress worked closely with the BSP to rejuvenate the organization, to bring it back to its former glory reached under its original charter, Commonwealth Act No. 111, and to correct the perceived ills introduced by the amendments to its Charter under Presidential Decree No. 460. The BSP suffered from low morale and decrease in number because the Secretaries of the different departments in government who were too busy to attend the meetings of the BSPs National Executive Board ("the Board") sent representatives who, as it turned out, changed from meeting to meeting. Thus, the Scouting Councils established in the provinces and cities were not in touch with what was happening on the national level, but they were left to implement what was decided by the Board.58 A portion of the legislators discussion is quoted below to clearly show their intent: HON. DEL MAR. x x x I need not mention to you the value and the tremendous good that the Boy Scout Movement has done not only for the youth in particular but for the country in general. And that is why, if we look around, our past and present national leaders, prominent men in the various fields of endeavor, public servants in government offices, and civic leaders in the communities all over the land, and not only in our country but all over the world many if not most of them have at one time or another been beneficiaries of the Scouting Movement. And so, it is along this line, Mr. Chairman, that we would like to have the early approval of this measure if only to pay back what we owe much to the Scouting Movement. Now, going to the meat of the matter, Mr. Chairman, if I may just the Scouting Movement was enacted into law in October 31, 1936 under Commonwealth Act No. 111. x x x [W]e were acknowledged as the third biggest scouting organization in the world x x x. And to our mind, Mr. Chairman, this erratic growth and this decrease in membership [number] is because of the bad policy measures that were enunciated with the enactment or promulgation by the President before of Presidential Decree No. 460 which we feel is the culprit of the ills that is flagging the Boy Scout Movement today. And so, this is specifically what we are attacking, Mr. Chairman, the disenfranchisement of the National Council in the election of the national board. x x x. And so, this is what we would like to be appraised of by the officers of the Boy [Scouts] of the Philippines whom we are also confident, have the best interest of the Boy Scout Movement at heart and it is in this spirit, Mr. Chairman, that we see no impediment towards working together, the Boy Scout of the Philippines officers working together with the House of Representatives in coming out with a measure that will put back the vigor and enthusiasm of the Boy Scout Movement. x x x.59 (Emphasis ours.)

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The following is another excerpt from the discussion on the House version of the bill, in the Committee on Government Enterprises: HON. AQUINO: x x x Well, obviously, the two bills as well as the previous laws that have created the Boy Scouts of the Philippines did not provide for any direct government support by way of appropriation from the national budget to support the activities of this organization. The point here is, and at the same time they have been subjected to a governmental intervention, which to their mind has been inimical to the objectives and to the institution per se, that is why they are seeking legislative fiat to restore back the original mandate that they had under Commonwealth Act 111. Such having been the experience in the hands of government, meaning, there has been negative interference on their part and inasmuch as their mandate is coming from a legislative fiat, then shouldnt it be, this rhetorical question, shouldnt it be better for this organization to seek a mandate from, lets say, the government the Corporation Code of the Philippines and register with the SEC as non-profit non-stock corporation so that government intervention could be very very minimal. Maybe thats a rhetorical question, they may or they may not answer, ano. I dont know what would be the benefit of a charter or a mandate being provided for by way of legislation versus a registration with the SEC under the Corporation Code of the Philippines inasmuch as they dont get anything from the government anyway insofar as direct funding. In fact, the only thing that they got from government was intervention in their affairs. Maybe we can solicit some commentary comments from the resource persons. Incidentally, dont take that as an objection, Im not objecting. Im all for the objectives of these two bills. It just occurred to me that since you have had very bad experience in the hands of government and you will always be open to such possible intervention even in the future as long as you have a legislative mandate or your mandate or your charter coming from legislative action. xxxx MR. ESCUDERO: Mr. Chairman, there may be a disadvantage if the Boy Scouts of the Philippines will be required to register with the SEC. If we are registered with the SEC, there could be a danger of proliferation of scout organization. Anybody can organize and then register with the SEC. If there will be a proliferation of this, then the organization will lose control of the entire organization. Another disadvantage, Mr. Chairman, anybody can file a complaint in the SEC against the Boy Scouts of the Philippines and the SEC may suspend the operation or freeze the assets of the organization and hamper the operation of the organization. I dont know, Mr. Chairman, how you look at it but there could be a danger for anybody filing a complaint against the organization in the SEC and the SEC might suspend the registration permit of the organization and we will not be able to operate. HON. AQUINO: Well, that I think would be a problem that will not be exclusive to corporations registered with the SEC because even if you are government corporation, court action may be taken against you in other judicial bodies because the SEC is simply another quasi-judicial body. But, I think, the first point would be very interesting, the first point that you raised. In effect, what you are saying is that with the legislative mandate creating your charter, in effect, you have been given some sort of a franchise with this movement. MR. ESCUDERO: Yes. HON. AQUINO: Exclusive franchise of that movement? MR. ESCUDERO: Yes. Section 8. Any donation or contribution which from time to time may be made to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines by the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, offices, agencies or instrumentalities shall be expended by the Executive Board in pursuance of this Act.lawph!1 HON. AQUINO: Well, thats very well taken so I will proceed with other issues, Mr. Chairman. x x x. 60 (Emphases added.) Therefore, even though the amended BSP charter did away with most of the governmental presence in the BSP Board, this was done to more strongly promote the BSPs objectives, which were not supported under Presidential Decree No. 460. The BSP objectives, as pointed out earlier, are consistent with the public purpose of the promotion of the well-being of the youth, the future leaders of the country. The amendments were not done with the view of changing the character of the BSP into a privatized corporation. The BSP remains an agency attached to a department of the government, the DECS, and it was not at all stripped of its public character. The ownership and control test is likewise irrelevant for a public corporation like the BSP. To reiterate, the relationship of the BSP, an attached agency, to the government, through the DECS, is defined in the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. The BSP meets the minimum statutory requirement of an attached government agency as the DECS Secretary sits at the BSP Board ex officio, thus facilitating the policy and program coordination between the BSP and the DECS. Requisites for Declaration of Unconstitutionality Not Met in this Case The dissenting opinion of Justice Carpio improperly raised the issue of unconstitutionality of certain provisions of the BSP Charter. Even if the parties were asked to Comment on the validity of the BSP charter by the Court, this alone does not comply with the requisites for judicial review, which were clearly set forth in a recent case: When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on the part of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.61 (Emphasis added.) Thus, when it comes to the exercise of the power of judicial review, the constitutional issue should be the very lis mota, or threshold issue, of the case, and that it should be raised by either of the parties. These requirements would be ignored under the dissents rather overreaching view of how this case should have been decided. True, it was the Court that asked the parties to comment, but the Court cannot be the one to raise a constitutional issue. Thus, the Court chooses to once more exhibit restraint in the exercise of its power to pass upon the validity of a law. Re: the COAs Jurisdiction Regarding the COAs jurisdiction over the BSP, Section 8 of its amended charter allows the BSP to receive contributions or donations from the government. Section 8 reads:

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The sources of funds to maintain the BSP were identified before the House Committee on Government Enterprises while the bill was being deliberated, and the pertinent portion of the discussion is quoted below: MR. ESCUDERO. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The question is the sources of funds of the organization. First, Mr. Chairman, the Boy Scouts of the Philippines do not receive annual allotment from the government. The organization has to raise its own funds through fund drives and fund campaigns or fund raising activities. Aside from this, we have some revenue producing projects in the organization that gives us funds to support the operation. x x x From time to time, Mr. Chairman, when we have special activities we request for assistance or financial assistance from government agencies, from private business and corporations, but this is only during special activities that the Boy Scouts of the Philippines would conduct during the year. Otherwise, we have to raise our own funds to support the organization. 62 The nature of the funds of the BSP and the COAs audit jurisdiction were likewise brought up in said congressional deliberations, to wit: HON. AQUINO: x x x Insofar as this organization being a government created organization, in fact, a government corporation classified as such, are your funds or your finances subjected to the COA audit? MR. ESCUDERO: Mr. Chairman, we are not. Our funds is not subjected. We dont fall under the jurisdiction of the COA. HON. AQUINO: All right, but before were you? MR. ESCUDERO: No, Mr. Chairman. MR. JESUS: May I? As historical backgrounder, Commonwealth Act 111 was written by then Secretary Jorge Vargas and before and up to the middle of the Martial Law years, the BSP was receiving a subsidy in the form of an annual a one draw from the Sweepstakes. And, this was the case also with the Girl Scouts at the Anti-TB, but then this was and the Boy Scouts then because of this funding partly from government was being subjected to audit in the contributions being made in the part of the Sweepstakes. But this was removed later during the Martial Law years with the creation of the Human Settlements Commission. So the situation right now is that the Boy Scouts does not receive any funding from government, but then in the case of the local councils and this legislative charter, so to speak, enables the local councils even the national headquarters in view of the provisions in the existing law to receive donations from the government or any of its instrumentalities, which would be difficult if the Boy Scouts is registered as a private corporation with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Government bodies would be estopped from making donations to the Boy Scouts, which at present is not the case because there is the Boy Scouts charter, this Commonwealth Act 111 as amended by PD 463. xxxx HON. AMATONG: Mr. Chairman, in connection with that. THE CHAIRMAN: Yeah, Gentleman from Zamboanga. HON. AMATONG: There is no auditing being made because theres no money put in the organization, but how about donated funds to this organization? What are the remedies of the donors of how will they know how their money are being spent? MR. ESCUDERO: May I answer, Mr. Chairman? THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, gentleman. MR. ESCUDERO: The Boy Scouts of the Philippines has an external auditor and by the charter we are required to submit a financial report at the end of each year to the National Executive Board. So all the funds donated or otherwise is accounted for at the end of the year by our external auditor. In this case the SGV.63 Historically, therefore, the BSP had been subjected to government audit in so far as public funds had been infused thereto. However, this practice should not preclude the exercise of the audit jurisdiction of COA, clearly set forth under the Constitution, which pertinently provides: Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other governmentowned or controlled corporations with original charters and their subsidiaries; and (d) such nongovernmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are required by law of the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. x x x. 64 Since the BSP, under its amended charter, continues to be a public corporation or a government instrumentality, we come to the inevitable conclusion that it is subject to the exercise by the COA of its audit jurisdiction in the manner consistent with the provisions of the BSP Charter. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice