JEBSENS MARITIME INC., represented by MS. ARLENE ASUNCION and/or ALLIANCE MARINE SERVICES, LTD.

, Petitioners,

G.R. No. 191491

Present:

According to Dr. Vicaldo, respondent had a history of hypertension and diabetes and was at risk of developing a stroke, coronary artery disease and congestive heart failure. He likewise stated that respondents ailment was aggravated by his work as a seaman and that he was no longer fit for work. For said reason, respondent requested for financial assistance from petitioners but the latter denied his request. Constrained, he filed a complaint for sickness benefits against petitioners before the NLRC, alleging that he had been suffering from chest pains and difficulty of breathing since July 2003 when he was on board petitioners vessel. Despite knowing his bad physical co ndition upon repatriation, the petitioners did not give him any financial assistance. Thus, he prayed that petitioners be ordered to reimburse him for his medical expenses and pay him sickness allowance amounting to US$3,224.00, including damages and attorneys fees. Petitioners countered that respondent was not entitled to disability benefits because his repatriation was not due to medical reasons but due to the expiration of his employment contract. Petitioners basically argued that, under the POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), a seafarer was entitled to disability benefits only if he had suffered a work-related illness during the term of his contract. On June 30, 2005, after due hearing, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a decision ordering petitioners to pay, jointly and severally, respondent the Philippine peso equivalent of US$60,000.00 representing total permanent disability compensation benefits for US$3,224.00 sickness allowance, and 10% attorneys fees. On appeal, however, the NLRC reversed the LA decision and denied respondents claim for disability benefits. The NLRC reasoned out that respondent failed to present substantial evidence proving that he had suffered any illness while on board or after disembarking from petitioners vess el. Respondents motion for reconsideration was later denied. Not satisfied with the NLRC decision, respondent appealed before the CA. On September 16, 2009, the CA rendered a decision setting aside the ruling of the NLRC. The appellate court stated that respondent was able to prove by substantial evidence that his work as a seafarer caused his hypertensive cardiovascular disease or, at least, was a relevant factor in contracting his illness. The CA explained that as Lead Operator, respondent performed multi-tasking functions which required excessive physical and mental effort. Moreover, he was also exposed to the perils of the sea and was made to endure unpredictable and extreme climate changes in the daily performance of his job. The CA also took judicial notice of the fact that overseas workers suffer a great degree of emotional strain while on duty on board vessels because of their being separated from their families for the duration of their contract. The CA was of the strong view that the inherent di fficulties in respondents job definitely caused his illness. The CA added that because of the nature of his work, the illness suffered by respondent contributed to the aggravation of his injury which was pre-existing at the time of his employment. Finally, the CA ruled that respondent is entitled to claim total and permanent disability benefits because of the undisputed doctors findings that he is now unfit to resume work as a seaman in any capacity, which clearly constitutes a permanent and total disability as defined by law. Not in conformity with the CA decision, petitioners filed this petition for review praying for its reversal raising this lone ISSUE WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING FULL DISABILITY BENEFITS TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.

- versus -

VELASCO, JR., J.,Chairperson, PERALTA,

ENRIQUE UNDAG, Respondent.

ABAD, MENDOZA, and PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated:

December 14, 2011 x -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION MENDOZA, J.: This petition for review assails the September 16, 2009 Decision[1] and the March 3, 2010 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA), which set aside the October 17, 2005 and January 24, 2006 Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), dismissing the complaint of respondent Enrique Undag (respondent) for disability benefits. Records bear out that respondent was hired as Lead Operator on board the vessel FPSO Jamestown owned by Alliance Marine Services, Ltd. and managed by its local agent, Jebsens Maritime, Inc. (petitioners). Respondents contract with petitioners was for a period of four (4) months with a basic salary of US$806.00 a month. He was deployed on March 24, 2003 and eventually repatriated to the Philippines on July 18, 2003 after his contract with the petitioners had expired. On September 24, 2003, about two months after repatriation, he went to see a physician, Dr. Efren Vicaldo (Dr. Vicaldo), for a physical check-up and was diagnosed to have Hypertensive cardiovascular disease, Atrial Fibrillation, Diabetes Mellitus II, Impediment Grade X (20.15%). 1

In advocacy of their position, petitioners argue that the CA committed a reversible error in awarding respondent disability benefits on the principal ground that there are numerous substantial and competent evidence on record which clearly establish the fact that respondent was guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation, hence, forfeiting his right to any benefits under the POEA contract. For one, respondent intentionally lied when he declared that he was not suffering from a previous medical condition in his pre-employment medical examination (PEME). Specifically, he failed to disclose the fact that he was suffering from diabetes and heart problem, which is a clear case of concealment. Secondly, respondents illnesses were not acquired during the term of his contract with petitioners. He had no evidence showing that he acquired the heart problem and hypertension while he was on board the vessel. The fact that respondent passed his PEME does not automatically mean that he suffered his illness on board the vessel or that the same was not pre-existing. Third, the Labor Code provision on permanent disability is not applicable in a claim for disability benefits under the POEA contract. Respondents Position Respondent counters that petitioners never raised the issue of fraudulent misrepresentation before the labor tribunals despite being given the opportunity to do so. Hence, they are estopped from raising it for the first time on appeal. At any rate, he claims that he did not commit any fraud or misrepresentation because he underwent a stringent PEME,which included a blood and urine examination, conducted by the company-designated physician. His illness, therefore, was not preexisting. In any case, the pre-existence of an illness is not a bar for the compensability of a seafarers illness. His non-compliance with the mandatory 3-day reporting upon signoff is irrelevant because it only applies to a seafarer who has signed off from the vessel for medical reasons. Moreover, respondent argues that a repatriation due to a finished contract does not preclude a seafarer from recovery of benefits, as the only requirement is that the disease must be a consequence or a result of the work performed. He has shown by substantial evidence that his cardiovascular disease was work-related. The strenuous work conditions that he experienced while on sea duty coupled with his usual encounter with the unfriendly forces of nature increased the risk of contracting his heart ailment. Lastly, he asserts that his disability is permanent and total because he has been declared to be unfit for sea duty for which he is entitled to recover attorneys fees and litigation costs under Article 2208. THE COURTS RULING No substantial evidence that illness was work-related Entitlement of seamen on overseas work to disability benefits is a matter governed, not only by medical findings, but by law and by contract. The material statutory provisions are Articles 191 to 193 under Chapter VI (Disability Benefits) of the Labor Code, in relation with Rule X of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Book IV of the Labor Code. By contract, the POEA-SEC, as provided under Department Order No. 4, series of 2000 of the Department of Labor and Employment, and the parties Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) bind the seaman and his employer to each other.[3] Deemed incorporated in every Filipino seafarers contract of employment, denominated as POEA-SEC or the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract, is a set of standard provisions established and implemented by the POEA, called the Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels, which contain the minimum requirements prescribed by the government for 2

the employment of Filipino seafarers. Section 20(B), paragraph 6, of the 2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions provides: SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS xxx B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS

The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows: Xxx 6. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either injury or illness the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 32 of this Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted. Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, two elements must concur for an injury or illness to be compensable. First, that the injury or illness must be work-related; and second, that the workrelated injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarers employment contract. The 2000 POEA Amended Standard Terms and Conditions defines "work-related injury" as "injury(ies) resulting in disability or death arising out of and in the course of employment" and "workrelated illness" as "any sickness resulting in disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied." These are: SECTION 32-A. OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES

For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied: 1) The seafarers work must involve the risks described herein; 2) The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarers exposure to the described risks; 3) The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and 4) There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.

Sec. 32-A(11) of the 2000 POEA Amended Standard Terms and Conditions explicitly considers a cardiovascular disease as an occupational disease if the same was contracted under working conditions that involve any of the following risks

a) If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment, there must be proof that an acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reasons of the nature of his work. b) The strain of the work that brings about an acute attack must be sufficient severity and must be followed within 24 hours by the clinical signs of cardiac insult to constitute causal relationship. c) If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before being subjected to strain at work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship.

3. Upon sign off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed onehundred twenty (120) days. For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a postemployment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his returnexcept when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits. [Emphases and underscoring supplied] While the rule is not absolute, there is no credible explanation from respondent why he failed to comply with the mandatory rule considering his claim that in July, 2003, he was suffering from chest pain, shortness of breath and fatigue. An award of disability benefit to a seaman in this case, despite non-compliance with strict mandatory requirements of the law, cannot be sustained. The rationale behind the rule can easily be divined. Within three days from repatriation, it would be fairly easier for a physician to determine if the illness was work-related or not. After that period, there would be difficulty in ascertaining the real cause of the illness. To ignore the rule would set a precedent with negative repercussions because it would open the floodgates to a limitless number of seafarers claiming disability benefits. It would certainly be unfair to the employer who would have difficulty determining the cause of a claimants illness considering the passage of time. In such a case, the employers would have no protection against unrelated disability claims. Respondent claims that the 3-day mandatory rule is not applicable as it is only for those who were repatriated for medical reasons. This could only mean that he had no medical reason then. In his pleadings, he claimed that sometime in July 2003, he showed manifestations of a heart disease as he suddenly felt chest pains, shortness of breath and fatigability. [10] He, however, failed to disclose when exactly in July 2003 that he felt those manifestations whether before or after his repatriation on July 18, 2003. If it was before the said date, he should have submitted himself to a medical examination three days after repatriation. The Courts ruling is not novel. In the past, the Court repeatedly denied the payment of disability benefits to seamen who failed to comply with the mandatory reporting and examination requirement. Lately, in the recent case of Alex C. Cootauco v. MMS Phil. Maritime Services, Inc., [11] it was written: For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a postemployment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.

Consequently, for cardiovascular disease to constitute an occupational disease for which the seafarer may claim compensation, it is incumbent upon said seafarer to show that he developed the same under any of the three conditions identified above.[4] In labor cases as in other administrative proceedings, substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion is required. The oftrepeated rule is that whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence.[5] Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. The evidence must be real and substantial, and not merely apparent; for the duty to prove work-causation or work-aggravation imposed by law is real and not merely apparent.[6] In this case, the Court is of the considered view that respondent failed to prove that his ailment was work-related and was acquired during his 4-month sea deployment. Respondent claims that sometime in July 2003, he showed manifestations of a heart disease when he suddenly felt chest pains, shortness of breath and fatigability.[7] He, however, never substantiated such claim. He never showed any written note, request or record about any medical check-up, consultation or treatment. Similarly, he failed to substantiate his allegation that after his arrival in Manila on July 18, 2003, he reported to petitioners office on July 31, 2003 to seek medical consultation for the discomfort he was experiencing but petitioners ignored him. [8] He also alleged that on August 4, 2003, more or less sixteen (16) days after arriving in Manila, he underwent a physical and laboratory examination at the Maritime Clinic for International Service, Inc. conducted by petitioners where he was declared to be unfit for sea duty. Again, there is no record of this except his self-serving claim. What is on record is that on September 24, 2003, respondent surfaced demanding payment of disability benefits. Respondent failed to comply with the mandatory 3-day rule More importantly, respondent failed to comply with the mandatory 3-day medical examination deadline provided in Section 20(B), paragraph (3) of the 2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels. As earlier stated, it was only on September 24, 2003, or more than two (2) months after his arrival in Manila, that he sought a medical opinion from Dr. Vicaldo who declared him unfit to work as a seaman due to hypertensive cardiovascular disease, atrial fibrillation and diabetes mellitus II.[9] Section 20(B), paragraph (3) of the 2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels, reads: Section 20(B), paragraph (3) thereof states: X x x. 3

As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three working days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. Applying the above provision of Section 20(B), paragraph (3), petitioner is required to undergo post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days from arrival, except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period would suffice. In Maunlad Transport, Inc. v. Manigo, Jr., this Court explicitly declared that it is mandatory for a claimant to be examined by a company-designated physician within three days from his repatriation. The unexplained omission of this requirement will bar the filing of a claim for disability benefits. The NLRC and the Court of Appeals determined that petitioner did not observe the established procedure as there is no proof at all that he reported to the office of the respondents. We see no reason to depart from their findings. While petitioner remains firm that he reported to the office of the respondents for mandatory reporting, the records are bereft of any proof to fortify his claim. The onus probandi falls on petitioner to establish or substantiate such claim by the requisite quantum of evidence. There is absolutely no evidence on record to prove petitioners claim that he reported to respondents office for mandatory reportorial requirement. Petitioner therefore failed to adduce substantial evidence as basis for the grant of relief. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

mandatory reporting requirement without justifiable cause shall result in forfeiture of the right to claim the compensation and disability benefits provided under the POEA-SEC. [Emphases and underscoring supplied] WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 16, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals and its March 3, 2010 Resolution are hereby REVERSED andSET ASIDE, and the October 17, 2005 and January 24, 2006 Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission are REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.

The Court reiterated the same ruling in the case of Coastal Safeway Marine Services, Inc. vs. Elmer T. Esguerra,[12] where it was written: For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a postemployment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his returnexcept when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties. The foregoing provision has been interpreted to mean that it is the company-designated physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman's disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of the latter's employment. Concededly, this does not mean that the assessment of said physician is final, binding or conclusive on the claimant, the labor tribunal or the courts. Should he be so minded, the seafarer has the prerogative to request a second opinion and to consult a physician of his choice regarding his ailment or injury, in which case the medical report issued by the latter shall be evaluated by the labor tribunal and the court, based on its inherent merit. For the seamans claim to prosper, however, it is mandatory that he should be examined by a company-designated physician within three days from his repatriation. Failure to comply with this 4

MARCIANO L. MASANGCAY, Petitioner,

G. R. No. 172800 Present:

and Resolution[5] dated 30 June 2005 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and ordering the latter to dismiss NLRC CA No. 041053-04 [NLRC-NCR OFW Case No. (M)03-10-264900] entitled Marciano Masangcay vs. Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc., and/or Michael Estaniel and Ventnor Navigation, Inc.

- versus YNARES-SANTIAGO, The factual antecedents of the present petition are: TRANS-GLOBAL MARITIME AGENCY, INC. AND VENTNOR NAVIGATION, INC., Respondents. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, AZCUNA,* CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ. Ventnor is a foreign company based in Liberia and engaged in maritime commerce. It is represented in the Philippines by its manning agent, and co-respondent herein, Trans-Global, a corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws.

Promulgated:

On 2 September 2002, petitioner Marciano Masangcay (Masangcay) was hired by Ventnor, through its manning agent, Trans-Global, as an oiler on M/T Eastern Jewel, an oil tanker. His employment was to run for a period of seven (7) months; and he was to receive, inter alia, a basic monthly salary of US$445.00.[6]

October 17, 2008 x--------------------------------------------------x

Twenty-one days later, or on 23 September 2002, while on board M/T Eastern Jewel, Masangcay noticed a reddish discoloration of his urine upon micturation (urination). This happened several times and later became associated with bouts of left lower abdominal pain radiating to the loin area.[7]

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Docking at the nearest port, on 4 October 2002, Masangcay was brought to the Fujairah Hospital, Fujairah, United Arab Emirates, because of lower abdominal pain and left loin pain of ten (10) days duration with difficulty in urinating.[8] The attending physician at said hospital diagnosed him to be suffering from renal failure due to multiple renal stones on the left kidney with bilateral hydronephrosis with dilation of ureters and pelvicalyceal system. [L]eft nephrostomy or better removal of the right pelvi-ureteric calculus[9] was the recommended treatment but Masangcay refused surgical intervention and insisted on being repatriated back to the Philippines instead.

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is the Decision[2] dated 10 February 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91393, entitled Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc. and Ventnor Navigation, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission and Marciano Masangcay, as well as the appellate courts Resolution[3] dated 30 May 2006 in the same case.

Upon his arrival in Manila on 7 October 2002, Masangcay was immediately referred to Trans-Globals designated physician, Dr. Mary Ann D. Barrientos (Dr. Barrientos) of the Associated Medical and Clinical Services, Inc. for evaluation. In turn, she referred him to one of the urologists at the Makati Medical Center (MMC) for a consult and eventual management because his blood test results showed elevated BUN[10] and Creatinine levels and his urinalysis revealed an active infection.

In the questioned decision, the Court of Appeals granted the petition filed by respondents Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc. (Trans-Global) and Ventnor Navigation, Inc. (Ventnor); and issued the writ of certiorari, thereby, annulling and setting aside the Resolution[4] dated 28 April 2005 5

From the 21st until the 26th of October 2002, Masangcay was hospitalized at the MMC for the treatment of his Non-Functional Right Kidney and Left Pelvolithiasis[11]; which included the following medical procedures:

Cystoscopy[12] Bilateral RGP Left Double J Stenting Left ESWL[13] Sometime in the first week of March 2003,[21] Masangcay was asked to report back to the office of Trans-Global for deployment line-up. He was also asked to undergo medical examination in view of his impending deployment. When Masangcay reported to the premises of Trans-Global, however, he was informed by the Port Captain that he (Masangcay) can no longer be deployed due to negative reports about him coming from its principal, Ventnor.

During one of Masangcays subsequent follow-ups, Dr. Francisco Agustin, Jr., his attending physician, requested a CT scan of his upper abdomen to asses the status of his (Masangcay) right kidney, even though the urinalysis showed no more trace of blood. The result of the scan revealed an obstructing urethrolithiasis on the right kidney with secondary hydronephrosis, i.e., a poorly functioning right kidney where the flow of urine is obstructed by the presence of kidney stones. Due to the aforementioned result, the removal of the non-functioning right kidney was advised but Masangcay refused.

More than six months later, or on 16 October 2003, however, armed with a Medical Certificate issued by one Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo (Dr. Vicaldo), a cardiologist, Masangcay instituted a [22] complaint against Trans-Global and Ventnor, including Trans-Globals President, Michael Estaniel, before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for the payment of disability benefit, damages and attorneys fees.

Masangcay was then referred to Dr. Reynaldo C. de la Cruz of the National Kidney and Transplant Institute (NKTI) for a second opinion. Thereat, due to right ureterolithiasis,[14] said physician confirmed the need for another operation; thus, on the 17th until the 23rd of December 2002, Masangcay was admitted and confined at the NKTI for the following medical procedures, viz:

The abovementioned Dr. Vicaldos Medical Certificate[23] dated 31 July 2003 contained the following findings:

Ureterolithiasis,[24] right CYSTOSCOPIC REMOVAL OF DOUBLE-J STENT, LEFT BILATERAL RETROGRADE PYELOGRAM URETEROLITHOTOMY,[15] RIGHT Pelvolithiasis, left S/P Ureterolithotomy, right S/P ESWL, left Renal insufficiency The foregoing medical procedures proved successful as evidenced by a repeat examination of Masangcays urine, done on 8 January 2003, which yielded a negative result for the presence of blood. Impediment grade III (78.36%)

On 29 January 2003, upon follow-up, Dr. dela Cruz pronounced[16] Masangcay fit to resume work[17] as all his laboratory examinations showed normal results. Accordingly, on 30 January 2003, Trans-Globals designated physician, Dr. Barrientos of the Associated Medical & Clinical Services, Inc., declared Masangcay fit to go back to work after a regular medical examination and pegged the disability period of the latter to be from 3 October 2002 until 3 February 2003.[18]

Dr. Vicaldo justified the finding of Impediment Grade III (78.36%) in this wise:

This patient/seaman presented with a history of abdominal pain, painful and bloody urination on September 2002. He was confined in Dubai UAE on October 3-6, 2002 where work up showed elevated creatinine, right ureteral stone and left renal pelvic stone. He was advised surgery but opted to be repatriated back to the Philippines. On repatriation, he was confined at Makati Medical Center on October 8, 2002 where he underwent ESWL, left.

On 21 February 2003, Trans-Global, in behalf of Ventnor, paid Masangcay his full 120 days Sick Leave pay of Ninety Five Thousand Five Hundred Sixty Four and 52/100 (P95,564.52) Pesos[19] representing One Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy Nine Dollars and 60/100 (US$1,779.60) U.S. Dollars, as well as all his medical and hospital expenses, professional fees of his attending physicians, the total amount of which reached One Hundred Seventy Four Thousand Seventy Five and 10/100 (P174,075.10) Pesos.[20] 6

On December 17-23, 2003, he was confined at National Kidney Institute and he underwent right ureterolithotomy. He is now unfit to resume work as seaman in any capacity.

5.

His illness is considered work aggravated. He needs regular monitoring of his renal function for deterioration and possible recurrence of kidney stones. His right kidney is non-functioning and his left kidney has impaired function. Theres a likelihood that he would need dialysis in the future. He cannot land a gainful employment given his medical background. His renal insufficiency can cause secondary hypertension with associated target organ involvement.

In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer during the term of employment caused by either injury or illness, the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 30 of this Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted.

In view of the above-quoted provision, Masangcay alleged that his illness was contracted during the term of his Contract of Employment. He likewise prayed for moral and exemplary damages in view of the respondents supposed deliberate and wanton refusal to pay his claims.

Masangcay is claiming disability benefit under Section 20(b), paragraph 5 of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Revised Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels, as amended by Memorandum Circular No. 55, Series of 1996, which is deemed integrated in every contract of employment of Filipino seafarers on ocean-going vessels, and which provides:

Rebutting Masangcays complaint, Trans-Global, Ventnor, and Estaniel, the respondents therein, countered that [s]ince complainant had fully recovered and was pronounced fit for employment, his claim for disability benefits has no basis[25]; that [t]he right to compensation for disability arises only when it is shown that the seafarer is disabled on account of an illness or injury suffered while in the employ of his employer[26]; that, in this case, the company-designated physician had certified that complainant is fit for employment[27]; that assuming arguendo but without admitting that their assessments and findings, including Dr. Barrientos, are disputed, however, under Sec. 20B, there must be a third doctor chosen by both parties who should resolved the issue and make a decision thereon[28]; and that [a]bsent such determination, the complaint is premature and without basis since it is that third doctors decision which will be considered as final.

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

xxxx

In a Decision[29] dated 15 April 2004, Labor Arbiter Daisy G. Cauton-Barcelona found Masangcays complaint meritorious and ordered Trans -Global, Ventnor, and Estaniel to pay Masangcay the amount of Thirty Nine Thousand One Hundred Eighty U.S. Dollars (US$39,180.00) representing the latters disability benefit at Impediment Grade III (78.36 %). The decretal part of said decision reads:

B.

COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS

The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:

WHEREFORE, as above-discussed, the respondents are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the complainant his disability benefit at Impediment Grade III (78.36%) in the amount of US$39,180.00 or its Philippine Peso equivalent at the time of payment plus ten (10%) percent of the total monetary award as and for attorneys fees.

xxxx

The labor arbiter opined that the compensability of an ailment does not depend on whether or not the injury or disease was pre-existing at the time of employment, but rather, if the injury or disease was related to or was aggravated by Masangcays work. The labor arbiter gave great weight to the medical opinion of Dr. Vicaldo rather than that of Trans-Globals designated physicians 7

considering that respondents accredited doctors opinion has (sic) more than meets the eye and should not be taken at face value. For most often than not, they are palpably self-serving and bias (sic) in favor of the employer and certainly cannot be considered independent.

The National Labor Relations Commission is ORDERED to dismiss NLRC CA No. 041053-04 [NLRC-NCR OFW Case No. (M)03-10-2649-00], entitled Marciano Masangcay v. Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc. and/or Michael Estaniel and Ventnor Navigation, Inc. considering that the claimant was already full (sic) paid the benefits to which he was lawfully entitled to.[31]

On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter albeit with modification. The dispositive portion of the Commissions Resolution dated28 April 2005 states that: The Court of Appeals reasoned in its decision that: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATION in that the individual respondent-appellant [Estaniel] is absolved from any or all liabilities arising from the controversy.[30]

The NLRC dismissed the claim against Estaniel for the reason that Masangcay failed to adduce evidence that the President of Trans-Global acted with malice and bad faith in denying his (Masangcay) disability benefit claim. The subsequent joint motion for reconsideration of Trans-Global and Ventnor was denied by the Commission for lack of merit in an Resolution dated 30 June 2005.

When it affirmed the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC arbitrarily set aside the fact that Masangcay was precluded from any entitlement to disability benefits after he was already fully recovered and declared to be fit for employment by the company-designated physician. Under the Standard Terms, supra, the right to compensation for disability arises only when the seafarer has been disabled on account of his illness or injury that he suffered while in the employ of his employer; otherwise, gross injustice would result to the petitioners.

xxxx

Undaunted, Trans-Global and Ventnor filed an original action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the NLRC for affirming the decision of the labor arbiter.

In a Decision promulgated on 10 February 2006, the appellate court granted the petition for certiorari of Trans-Global and Ventnor. It nullified and set aside the challengedResolutions of the NLRC for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The fallo of the said judgment reads:

The NLRC could not simply sweep away the opinions of Dr. Barrientos and Dr. Agustin, as well s that of Dr. dela Cruz, by generalizing that companydesignated or company-referred physicians were often biased in favor of the company and that their opinions were self-serving without specifically indicating how their specific findings were biased and why such opinions were self-serving. The generalization was, at the very least, most unfair to Dr. Agustin and Dr. dela Cruz, specialists in urology that covered the ailment of Masangcay. But, above all, the arbitrariness and capriciousness became even more blatant in the face of the fact that such company-designated or company-referred physicians had themselves personally attended to, examined and treated Masangcay in a professional capacity. Thereby, their findings and conclusions were far from speculation and conjecture.

WHEREFORE, the PETITION FOR CERTIORARI is GIVEN DUE COURSE. xxxx The RESOLUTION of the National Labor Relations Commission promulgated on April 28, 2005 in NLRC CA No. 041053-04 [NLRC-NCR OFW Case No. (M)03-10-2649-00], entitled Marciano Masangcay v. Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc. and/or Michael Estaniel and Ventnor Navigation, Inc.; and the ORDER of June 30, 2005 are NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE.

Worst of all, the NLRC did not require the opinion of a third doctor after Dr. Vicaldo (as Masangcays chosen physician) had disagreed with the findings and opinions of the company-designated physician. Yet, the NLRC needed to do so, in the face of the clear requirement of Sec. 20B, Standard Terms, that: If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer. The third doctors decision shall be final and binding on both parties. The omission underscored 8

the commission of manifest grave abuse of discretion consisting in the arbitrariness and capriciousness on the part of the NLRC.[32]

The appellate court, thus, found that:

A priori, from a reading of the foregoing arguments laid out by Masangcay, it is quite apparent that this petition is raising questions of facts as we are asked to revisit anew the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Masangcay is fundamentally assailing the appellate courts finding that the evidence on record is insufficient to establish his entitlement to disability benefits. In effect, he would have us sift through the data on record and pass upon whether or not there is sufficient basis to hold Trans-Global and Ventnor accountable for refusing to pay him his disability benefits under the POEAs Revised Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels, which is deemed written in his contract of employment. This clearly involves a factual inquiry, the determination of which is the statutory function of the NLRC.[35]

In fine, Masangcay was not entitled to anything more than what he was already paid by the petitioners. As we noted earlier, the petitioners spent P209.533.10 for his confinement and surgery; and paid to him his full 120 days sick leave benefits totaling US$1,779.60.[33]

Elementary is the principle that this Court is not a trier of facts; only errors of law are generally reviewed in petitions for review on certiorari criticizing decisions of the Court of Appeals. Questions of fact are not entertained.[36] And in labor cases, this doctrine applies with greater force.[37] Factual questions are for labor tribunals to resolve.

Masangcays motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 30 May 2006.

Considering, however, the conflicting findings of the labor arbiter and NLRC on one hand, and the Court of Appeals on the other, this Court is impelled to resolve the factual issues in this case along with the legal ones.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court premised on the following arguments: The fundamental issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not Masangcay is entitled to disability benefits on account of his present condition. I. We rule in the negative. IN LIGHT OF THE RECENT DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN CRYSTAL SHIPPING, INC., (AND/OR) A/S STEIN LINE BERGEN VS. DEO P. NATIVIDAD, (SIC) G.R. NO. 154798, OCTOBER 20, 2005, PETITIONER SHOULD BE DEEMED TO BE SUFFERING FROM PERMANENT DISABILITY AND THUS ENTITLED TO DISABILITY BENEFITS UNDER THE POEA STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT AND TO ATTORNEYS FEES.

II.

In his Petition, Masangcay argued that since his disability lasted for more than 120 days, i.e., from 3 October 2002 until 3 February 2003, he is deemed to be already permanently disabled. Citing Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad,[38] Masangcay made a case that in compensation proceedings, the fitness or unfitness of a seafarer should not be construed in its medical significance but rather on the inability of the seafarer to perform his customary work. In his case, he averred that [t]here is no dispute that petitioners illness was suffered during the term of his contract of employment and on board the respondents vessel. And concludes that because of Sec. 20(b), paragraph 5 of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Revised Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels, integrated in his contract of employment, [h]e is this (sic) entitled to disability benefits x x x.

IN COMPENSATION PROCEEDINGS AS IN THE INSTANT CASE, THE DISABILITY OF PETITIONER MUST BE CONSTRUED NOT IN ITS MEDICAL SIGNIFICANCE BUT ON HIS INABILITY TO PERFORM HIS CUSTOMARY WORK.[34]

On the other hand, in their Comment to the Petition, Trans-Global and Ventnor maintained that the manner of determining liability and the extent of the liability of the employer in c ase of an injury or illness contracted by a seafarer is set forth in the POEA Standard Employment Contract. As set forth in Sec. 20(b) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract, the employer-vessel owner/principal shall be liable for disability benefits to the seafarer only in case the latter was declared disabled by the company designated physician in view of a work-related illness or injury that 9

he suffered onboard the vessel. Since petitioner-seafarer was declared FIT TO WORK by the company designated physician, clearly then he is not entitled to disability benefits under the POEA Standard Employment Contract. With respect to the Crystal Shipping case referred to by Masangcay, Trans-Global and Ventnor refute such citation as the facts and circumstances present in said case are not herein availing.

xxxx

6.

As with all other kinds of worker, the terms and conditions of a seafarers employment is governed by the provisions of the contract he signs at the time he is hired. But unlike that of others, deemed written in the seafarers contract is a set of standard provisions set and implemented by the POEA, called the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels, which are considered to be the minimum requirements acceptable to the government for the employment of Filipino seafarers on board foreign ocean-going vessels. The issue of whether Masangcay can legally demand and claim disability benefits from Trans-Global and Ventnor for an illness that became apparent during his contract of employment with the shipping company, is governed by the provisions of the POEA Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels; hence, it is said standard terms and conditions which are relevant and need to be construed in the present case. Considering that Masangcay was employed on 3 September 2002, it is the 2000 POEA Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels[39] that is considered appended in his contract of employment and is controlling for purposes of resolving the issue at hand and not the 1996 POEA Revised Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels[40] as alluded to by Masangcay.

In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either injury or illness the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 32 of this Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted. [Emphasis supplied.]

Evident from the afore-quoted provision is that the permanent total or partial disability suffered by a seafarer during the term of his contract must be caused by work-relatedillness or injury. In other words, to be entitled to compensation and benefits under said provision, it is not sufficient to establish that the seafarers illness or injury has rendered him permanently or partially disabled, but it must also be shown that there is a causal connection between the seafarers illness or injury and the work for which he had been contracted for.

Taking into consideration the arguments of the parties, the contract provisions, as well as the law and jurisprudence on the matter, we rule in favor of Trans-Global and Ventnor.

Accordingly, in order to hold Trans-Global and Ventnor liable for payment of his claims under Sec. 20(b), paragraph 6, of the 2000 POEA Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels, Masangcay must prove that he is suffering from permanent total or partial disability due to a work-related illness occurring during the term of his contract. Proof that he not only acquired or contracted his illness during the term of his employment contract is clearly not enough; Masangcay must also present evidence that such infirmity was work-related, or at the very least aggravated by the conditions of the work for which he was contracted for.

Under Sec. 20(b), paragraph 6, of the 2000 POEA Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels, viz: In the case of Rio v. Employees Compensation Commission, this Court had the occasion to state that a claimant must submit such proof as would constitute a reasonable basis fo r concluding either that the conditions of employment of the claimant caused the ailment or that such working conditions had aggravated the risk of contracting that ailment. What kind and quantum of evidence would constitute an adequate basis for a reasonable man (not necessarily a medical scientist) to reach one or the other conclusion, can obviously be determined only on a case-to-case basis. That evidence must, however, be real and substantial, and not merely apparent; for the duty to prove workcausation or work-aggravation imposed by existing law is real x x x not merely apparent.[41]

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

xxxx

B.

COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS The burden is clearly upon Masangcay to present substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, showing a reasonable connection that the nature of his employment or working conditions between the conditions of his work and his illness, i.e., renal failure, uremia[42] and/or nephrolithiasis[43]; or that the risk of contracting the same was increased by his working conditions. This, he did not do. If truth be told, Masangcay does not even assert that his illness is work-related and/or was, at the minimum, aggravated by his working conditions at the M/T Eastern Jewel. 10

The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:

an occupational disease. A compensable occupational disease must satisfy several conditions, to wit: There is no substantiation that the progression of his ailment was brought about largely by the conditions of his job as an oiler. His medical history and/or records prior to his deployment as an oiler in M/T Eastern Jewel were neither presented nor alluded to in order to demonstrate that the working conditions on board said vessel increased the risk of contracting renal failure, chronic or otherwise.

SECTION 32-A. OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES

To demonstrate just how bare the records are with respect to the illness with which Masangcay is allegedly afflicted, we cannot even make a definitive statement whether he had merely been afflicted with renal stones, or he is suffering from the more serious disease of chronic renal failure. The two physicians who issued their respective medical certificates have conflicting findings.

For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied:

(1) (2) But even assuming that Masangcay is suffering from chronic renal failure, it still does not entitle him to compensation and benefits for a permanent disability. (3) In Harrisons Principles of Internal Medicine,[44] chronic renal failure is described as a result of progressive and irreversible destruction of nephrons, regardless of cause (citation omitted). [45] This diagnosis implies that glomerular filtration rate (GFR) is known to have been reduced for at least 3 to 6 months. Often a gradual decline in GFR occurs over a period of years.[46] It is, therefore, highly improbable that Masangcays chronic renal failure developed in just a months time, the length of time he was on board M/T Eastern Jewel before the symptoms became manifest.

The seafarers work must involve the risks described herein; The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarers exposure to the described risks; The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.

(4)

But other than Masangcays bare avowal of entitlement just because an illness became manifest during his contract of employment, there is nothing on record to substantiate the same and would have justified an award of compensation on top of the aid or assistance already extended to him by Trans-Global and Ventnor.

It is of no moment that Masangcay passed his pre-employment medical examination. It is probable that the pre-employment medical examination conducted on him could not have divulged his illness for which he had been brought to the Fujairah Hospital in the United Arab Emirates, considering the fact that most, if not all, of such medical examinations are not so exploratory. [47] The decrease of GFR, which is an indicator of chronic renal failure, is measured thru the renal function test.[48] In pre-employment examination, the urine analysis (urinalysis), which is normally included, measures only the creatinine,[49] the presence of which cannot conclusively indicate chronic renal failure.

Masangcay asserts that by virtue of our pronouncement in Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad[50] that [i]n disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of ones earning capacity, [51] he is entitled to disability benefits under his contract of employment.

Moreover, chronic renal failure, is neither listed as a disability under Sec. 32 of the 2000 POEA Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels; nor an occupational disease under Sec. 32-A thereof, which provides for the schedule of disability or impediment for injuries suffered and diseases including occupational diseases or illness.

We are not persuaded. Masangcay cannot invoke a single line declared by this Court in another case under a totally different factual context.

Under Sec. 32 of the POEA Amended Standard Terms and Conditions, it is the loss of a kidney, i.e., its removal, that is compensated, and not merely the presence and subsequent removal of kidney stones. And under Sec. 32-A of the same, Masangcays illness cannot also be classified as 11

The only similarity between the two cases, Crystal Shipping and the present petition, is the fact that the seafarers in both have the same personal physician, Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo, a cardiologist, who declared them permanently disabled to return to work. Other than that, the factual circumstances of the Crystal Shipping case are poles apart from that attendant to the case at bar. In the former, there was no question as whether or not the seafarer is entitled to disability benefits as in fact Crystal Shipping, et al. offered to pay disability benefits. The only issue therein referred to the degree of disability and impediment grade to which the seafarer was to be classified; or, put simply, how much disability benefit was he entitled to. The seafarer in said case had been employed as a Chief Mate of an ocean-going vessel when he complained of coughing and hoarseness and was later diagnosed

with thyroid cancer. The company-designated physician and seafarers physician were both in agreement that the seafarer had been rendered disabled by his illness; they only differed in their assessments of the degree and the impediment grade of such disability in accordance with the schedule of disability or impediment for injuries suffered and diseases including occupational diseases or illness contracted under Sec. 32 of the 1996 POEA Revised Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels.[52] In contrast, Trans-Global and Ventnor are contesting the right of Masangcay to claim disability benefits as the company-designated physicians have certified the latter fit to return to work, not to mention the fact that he was not suffering from a work-related and/or work-aggravated illness.

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctors decision shall be final and binding on both parties.

Without the opinion of a third doctor, we are constrained to make a ruling based on the evidences submitted by the parties and made part of the records of this case, which included the medical certifications of their respective physicians.

The Court notes that any dispute as to Masangc ays state of health or the exact nature of the illness from which he is suffering could have easily been resolved had the parties stayed true to the provisions of Sec. 20(b), paragraph 3 of the 2000 POEA Amended Standard Terms and Conditions, which declares that:

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

All told, except for the bare assertion that he is no longer fit to work due to the illness that became manifest during his contract of employment with Trans-Global and Ventnor, Masangcay makes no allegation, much less presents no proof, that the illness was caused or aggravated by his employment. The evidence on record is totally bare of essential facts on how he contracted or developed such disease and on how and why his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the same. Consequently, the labor arbiter and the NLRC had no basis at all to rule that Masangcay is deserving of other disability benefits espoused by Sec. 20(b), paragraph 6 of the 2000 POEA Amended Standard Terms and Conditions other than that already extended to him by Trans-Global and Ventnor.

xxxx

B.

COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated 10 February 2006 and Resolution dated 30 May 2006both of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91393 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner Marciano L. Masangcay. SO ORDERED.

The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:

xxxx

3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment , the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance x x x until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the companydesignated physician x x x

xxxx

12

JESUS E. VERGARA, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 172933 The petitioner was a member of the Associated Marine Officers and Seamans Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP). AMOSUP had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with Atlantic Marine, represented in this case by Hammonia. The petitioner left the Philippines on April 15, 2000 to rendezvous with his ship and to carry out therein his work as a pumpman. In August 2000, while attending to a defective hydraulic valve, he felt he was losing his vision. He complained to the Ship Captain that he was seeing black dots and hairy figures floating in front of his right eye. His condition developed into a gradual visual loss. The ships medical log entered his condition as internal bleeding in the eye or glaucoma. [4] He was given eye drops to treat his condition. The petitioner went on furlough in Port Galveston, Texas and consulted a physician who diagnosed him to be suffering from vitreal hemorrhage with small defined area of retinal traction. Differential diagnosis includes incomplete vitreal detachment ruptured macro aneurism and valsulva retinopathy.[5] He was advised to see an ophthalmologist when he returned home to the Philippines. He was sent home on September 5, 2000 for medical treatment. The company-designated physician, Dr. Robert D. Lim of the Marine Medical Services of the MetropolitanHospital, confirmed the correctness of the diagnosis at Port Galveston, Texas. Dr. Lim then referred the petitioner to an ophthalmologist at the Chinese General Hospital who subjected the petitioners eye to focal laser treatment on November 13, 2000; vitrectomy with fluid gas exchange on December 7, 2000; and a second session of focal laser treatment on January 13, 2001. On January 31, 2001, the ophthalmologist pronounced the petitioner fit to resume his seafaring duties per the report of Dr. Robert D. Lim, Medical Coordinator.[6] The petitioner then executed a certificate of fitness for work in the presence of Dr. Lim. [7] Claiming that he continued to experience gradual visual loss despite the treatment, he sought a second opinion from another ophthalmologist, Dr. Patrick Rey R. Echiverri, who was not a company-designated physician. Dr. Echiverri gave the opinion that the petitioner was not fit to work as a pumpman because the job could precipitate the resurgence of his former condition. On March 20, 2001, the petitioner submitted himself to another examination, this time by Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo, a physician who was not also designated by the company. Dr. Vicaldo opined that although the petitioner was fit to work, he had a Grade X (20.15%) disability which he considered as permanent partial disability. Armed with these two separate diagnoses, the petitioner demanded from his employer payment of disability and sickness benefits, pursuant to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract Governing the Employment of all Filipino Seamen on Board Ocean-going Vessels (POEA Standard Employment Contract), and the existing CBA in the company. The company did not heed his demand, prompting the petitioner to file a complaint for disability benefits, sickness allowance, damages and attorneys f ees, docketed as NLRC NCR OFW Case No. (M) 01-050809-00. On January 14, 2003, Labor Arbiter Madjayran H. Ajan rendered a decision in the petitioners favor.[8] The Arbiter ordered Hammonia and Atlantic Marine to pay the petitioner, jointly and severally, sickness allowance of US$ 2,568.00 and disability benefits of US$ 60,000.00 under the CBA, and 10% of the monetary award in attorneys fees. The respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which rendered a decision on March 19, 2004 reversing the Labor Arbiters ruling.[9] It dismissed the complaint on the ground that the petitioner had been declared fit to resume sea duty and was not entitled to any disability benefit. By resolution, the NLRC denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.[10] 13

Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, versus TINGA, VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ.

Promulgated: HAMMONIA MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and ATLANTIC MARINE LTD., Respondents. October 6, 2008

x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION BRION, J.:

Seaman Jesus E. Vergara (petitioner) comes to us through this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] with the plea that we set aside for being contrary to law and jurisprudence the Decision[2] promulgated on March 14, 2005 and the Resolution[3] promulgated on June 7, 2005 by the Court of Appeals (CA), both issued in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 85347 entitled Jesus E. Vergara v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND On April 4, 2000, petitioner was hired by respondent Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc. (Hammonia) for its foreign principal, respondent Atlantic Marine Ltd., (Atlantic Marine). He was assigned to work on board the vessel British Valour under contract for nine months, with a basic monthly salary of US$ 642.00.

The petitioner thereafter sought relief from the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The CA dismissed the petition in a Decision promulgated on March 14, 2005,[11] and likewise denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration. [12] Hence, the present petition. THE PETITION The petitioner contends that the CA erred in denying him disability benefits contrary to existing jurisprudence, particularly the ruling of this Court in Crystal Shipping Inc., A/S Stein Line Bergen v. Deo P. Natividad,[13] and, in strictly interpreting the POEA Standard Employment Contract and the CBA between the parties on the matter of who determines a seafarers disability. The petitioner particularly questions the CA decision for giving credit to the certification by the company-designated physician, Dr. Robert Lim, that declared him fit to work. [14] On the assumption that he was indeed fit to work, he submits that he should have been declared to be under permanent total disability because the fit-to-work declaration was made more than 120 days after he suffered his disability. The petitioner laments that the CA accorded much weight to the company-designated physicians declaration that he was fit to work.[15] He considers this a strict and parochial interpretation of the POEA Standard Employment Contract and the CBA. While these documents provide that it is the company doctor who must certify a seafarer as permanently unfit for further sea service, this literal interpretation, to the petitioner, is absurd and contrary to public policy; its effect is to deny and deprive the ailing seaman of his basic right to seek immediate attention from any competent physician. He invokes in this regard our ruling in German Marine Agencies, Inc. et al., v. National Labor Relations Commission.[16] In a different vein, the petitioner impugns the pronouncement of Dr. Robert Lim, the companydesignated physician, that he was fit to resume sea duties as of January 31, 2001 since Dr. Lim did not personally operate on and attend to him when he was treated; he had been under the care of an ophthalmologist since September 6, 2000. The petitioner points out that there is nothing in the record to substantiate the correctness of Dr. Lims certification; neither did the attending eye specialist issue any medical certification, progress report, diagnosis or prognosis on his eye condition that could be the basis of Dr. Lims certification. The petitioner stresses that Dr. Lims certification was not based on his first hand findings as it was issued in his capacity as the Medical Coordinator of the Metropolitan Hospital.[17] He also points out that Dr. Lim is not an eye specialist. To the petitioner, it is the competence of the attending physician and not the circumstance of his being company-designated that should be the key consideration in determining the true status of the health of the patient/seaman. He seeks to rebut Dr. Lims certification through the opinion of his private ophthalmologist, Dr. Patrick Rey R. Echiverri that he would not advise him to do heavy work; he would not also be able to perform tasks that require very detailed binocular vision as the right eyes visual acuity could only be corrected to 20/30 and near vision to J3 at best.[18] The petitioner likewise relies on the assessment and evaluation of Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo that he suffers from partial permanent disability with a Grade X (20.15%) impediment and is now unfit to work as a seaman.[19] The petitioner disputes the respondent companies claim that he is no longer disabled after his visual acuity had been restored to 20/20; it is fallacious because it views disability more in its medical sense rather than on its effect on the earning capacity of the seaman. Citing supporting jurisprudence, the petitioner posits that in disability compensation, it is the inability to work resulting in the impairment of ones earning capacity that is compensated, not the injury itself. He maintains that even if his visual acuity is now 20/20 as alleged by the company-designated physician, he can nevertheless no longer perform his customary work as pumpman on board an ocean-going vessel 14

since the job involves a lot of strain that could again cause his vitreous hemorrhage. This limitation impairs his earning capacity so that he should be legally deemed to have suffered permanent total disability from a work-related injury. In this regard, the petitioner cites as well his unions CBA[20] whose paragraph 20.1.5 provides that: 20.1.5 Permanent Medical Unfitness - A seafarer whose disability is assessed at 50% or more under the POEA Employment Contract shall, for the purpose of this paragraph is regarded as permanently unfit for further sea service in any capacity and entitled to 100% compensation, i.e., US$ 80,000 for officers and US$ 60,000 for ratings. Furthermore, any seafarer assessed at less than 50% disability under the Contract but certified as permanently unfit for further sea services in any capacity by the company doctor, shall also be entitled to 100% compensation. Finally, the petitioner contends that because there is doubt as to the accuracy of the medical opinion of the company-designated physician, the doubt should be resolved in his favor, citing Sy v. Court of Appeals,[21] as well as Article 4 of the Labor Code.[22] THE CASE FOR RESPONDENTS In a memorandum[23] filed on December 20, 2007, respondents Hammonia and Atlantic Marine entreat this Court to dismiss the petition under the following arguments: 1. The provisions of the POEA Standard Employment Contract and the CBA between the parties clearly provide that the assessment of the company-designated physician should be accorded respect. 2. There are no legal or factual bases for the petitioners claim of total and permanent disability benefits as he was declared fit to work. 3. 4. The petitioners reliance on the Crystal Shipping v. Natividad[24] case is misplaced. The petitioner is not entitled to attorneys fees.

The respondents anchor their case on their compliance with the law and the existing CBA as applied to the petitioners circumstances. They point out that upon the petitioners repatriation, he was immediately referred to an ophthalmologist who scheduled him for observation and regular monitoring preparatory to possible vitrectomy. He was prescribed medication in the meantime. On November 13, 2000, the petitioner underwent laser treatment of the right eye, which he tolerated well. His vitrectomy, scheduled on November 22, 2000, was deferred because he was noted to have accentuated bronchovascular marking on his chest x-ray, and mild chronic obstructive pulmonary disease as revealed by his pulmonary function test. He was given medication for his condition and was advised to stop smoking. The petitioner was cleared for surgery on November 29, 2000. He underwent vitrectomy with fluid gas exchange and focal laser treatment of his affected eye on December 7, 2000. He tolerated the procedure well. His condition stabilized and he was discharged for management as an outpatient on December 9, 2000. On December 13, 2000, the petitioners vision was 20/40 (r) and 20/20 (l) with correction and slight congestion observed in his right eye. His vision improved to 20/25 (r) and 20/20 (l) by December 20, 2000 although a substantial lesion was observed and contained by laser markings.

This remained constant and by January 11, 2001, no sign of vitreous hemorrhage was noted on fundoscopy. On January 13, 2001, petitioner underwent his second session of laser treatment and he again tolerated the procedure well. By January 31, 2001, his visual acuity was improved to 20/20 for both eyes, with correction. He was prescribed eyeglasses and was found fit to resume his sea duties. The petitioner executed a certificate of fitness for work under oath, witnessed by Dr. Robert Lim, the company-designated physician who had declared the petitioner fit to work based on the opinion of the handling eye specialist.[25] The respondents anchor their objection to the grant of disability benefits on Dr. Lims certification. They dispute the petitioners contention that the medical certifications and assessments by the petitioners private physicians - Dr. Echiverri and Dr. Vicaldo - should prevail. The respondents object particularly to the petitioners claim that Dr. Lims assessment is not authoritative because Dr. Lim does not appear to be an eye specialist. [26]They point out that the issue of Dr. Lims qualifications and competence was never raised at any level of the arbitration proceedings, and, therefore, should not be entertained at this stage of review. They submit that if the petitioner truly believed that the company-designated physician was incompetent, he should have raised the matter at the earliest possible opportunity, or at the time he accepted Dr. Lims assessment. On the contrary, they point out that the petitioner concurred with the assessment of the company-designated physician by executing a certificate of fitness to work. [27] The respondents likewise question the petitioners reliance on Art. 20.1.5 of the CBA for his claim that he is entitled to 100% disability compensation since his doctors, Echiverri and Vicaldo, declared him unfit to work as a seaman although his disability was determined to be only at Grade X (20.15%), a partial permanent disability. They contend that the petitioners position is contrary to what the cited provision provides as the CBA[28] specifically requires a company doctor to certify a seafarer as permanently unfit for service in any capacity. The respondents bewail the petitioners attempt to have this Court find him permanently disabled because he was under the medication and care of the company -designated physician for over four (4) months or more than 120 days. They cite Section 20 B of petitioners POEA Standard Employment Contract whose relevant portion states:[29] 3. Upon sign-off from vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of his permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician, but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days. xxx In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either injury or illness the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 30 of his Contract. The respondents then point out that Section 30 provides a schedule of disability for injuries, disease or illness contracted. Any item in the schedule classified under Grade I constitutes total and permanent disability entitled to a disability allowance equivalent to US$60,000 (US$50,000 x 120%). They consider reliance on this Courts ruling in Crystal Shipping v. Natividad;[30] Government Service Insurance System v. Cadiz;[31] and Ijares v. Court of Appeals,[32] to be misplaced with respect to the advocated conversion of the petitioners medical condition from temporary to permanent disability. The respondents stress that in the present case, the petitioner had been accorded the necessary medical treatment, including laser treatment by company-designated physicians, that restored his visual acuity to 20/20. He was declared fit to work upon his return to the full possession 15

of all his physical and mental faculties and after he was cleared of all impediments. They contend as well that all that the petitioner could present in support of his claim for total permanent disability was the Grade X disability assessment issued by his private physician, Dr. Vicaldo, that he is now unfit to work as seaman. They point out that Dr. Vicaldo himself is not an eye specialist. Finally, the respondents insist that neither factual nor legal basis exists for pe titioners claim of Grade I total and permanent disability benefits. Factually, the petitioner was declared fit to work by the company-designated physician. Legally, only blindness or total and permanent loss of vision of both eyes is considered a Grade I disability under the terms of the POEA Standard Employment Contract. Under its Section 30 on the portion on Eyes, only total and permanent loss of vision of both eyes can be considered as Grade I disability, not the petitioners claimed impairment of vision in the right eye. THE COURTS RULING We find no merit in the petition. The Governing Law and Rules. Entitlement to disability benefits by seamen on overseas work is a matter governed, not only by medical findings but, by law and by contract. The material statutory provisions are Articles 191 to 193 under Chapter VI (Disability Benefits) of the Labor Code, in relation with Rule X of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Book IV of the Labor Code. By contract, Department Order No. 4, series of 2000 of the Department of Labor and Employment (the POEA Standard Employment Contract) and the parties CBAbind the seaman and his employer to each other. By way of background, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), through the POEA, has simplified the determination of liability for work-related death, illness or injury in the case of Filipino seamen working on foreign ocean-going vessels.[33] Every seaman and the vessel owner (directly or represented by a local manning agency) are required to execute the POEA Standard Employment Contract as a condition sine qua non prior to the deployment for overseas work. The POEA Standard Employment Contract is supplemented by the CBA between the owner of the vessel and the covered seamen. A notable feature of the POEA Standard Employment Contract is Section 31 its provision on the Applicable Law. It provides: Any unresolved dispute, claim or grievance arising out of or in connection with this Contract, including the annexes shall be governed by the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, international conventions, treaties and convenants where the Philippines is a signatory. Through this provision, the DOLE skirted any possible issue regarding the law that should govern the terms and conditions of employment of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going vessels that have no significant Philippine presence and that hardly see Philippine waters. Thus, with the POEA Standard Employment Contract, there is no doubt that in case of any unresolved dispute, claim or grievance arising out of or in connection with the contract, Philippine laws shall apply. In real terms, this means that the shipowner an employer operating outside Philippine jurisdiction does not subject itself to Philippine laws, except to the extent that it concedes the coverage and application of these laws under the POEA Standard Employment Contract. On the matter of disability, the employer is not subject to Philippine jurisdiction in terms of being compelled to contribute to the State Insurance Fund that, under the Labor Code, Philippine employers are obliged to support. (This Fund, administered by the Employees Compensation Commission, is the source of work-related compensation payments for work-related deaths, injuries, and illnesses.) Instead, the

POEA Standard Employment Contract provides its own system of disability compensation that approximates (and even exceeds) the benefits provided under Philippine law. [34] The standard terms agreed upon, as above pointed out, are intended to be read and understood in accordance with Philippine laws, particularly, Articles 191 to 193 of the Labor Code and the applicable implementing rules and regulations in case of any dispute, claim or grievance. In this respect and in the context of the present case, Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code provides that: x x x The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent: (1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise provided in the Rules; xxx The rule referred to - Rule X, Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations implementing Book IV of the Labor Code - states: Period of entitlement. (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of such disability. If caused by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except where such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the System may declare the total and permanent status at anytime after 120 days of continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions as determined by the System. [Underscoring ours] These provisions are to be read hand in hand with the POEA Standard Employment Contract whose Section 20 (3) states: Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days. As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment.[35] For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work.[36] He receives his basic wage during this period[37] until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws.[38] If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. [39] The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his medical condition. Thus, upon petitioners return to the country for medical treatment, both he and the respondent company acted correctly in accordance with the terms of the POEA Standard Employment Contract and the CBA; he reported to the company-designated doctor for treatment and the latter properly referred him to an ophthalmologist at the Chinese GeneralHospital. No dispute existed on the medical treatment the petitioner received, to the point that the petitioner executed a certificate of fitness for work based on the assessment/certification by the company-designated physician. 16

Problems only arose when despite the certification, the petitioner sought second and third opinions from his own doctors, one of whom opined that he could no longer resume work as a pumpman while the other recognized a Grade X (20.15%) partial permanent disability. Based on these opinions, the petitioner demanded that he be paid disability and sickness benefits; when the company refused, the demand metamorphosed into an actual case before the NLRC Arbitration Branch. As we outlined above, a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so declared by the company physician within the periods he is allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability. In the present case, while the initial 120-day treatment or temporary total disability period was exceeded, the company-designated doctor duly made a declaration well within the extended 240-day period that the petitioner was fit to work. Viewed from this perspective, both the NLRC and CA were legally correct when they refused to recognize any disability because the petitioner had already been declared fit to resume his duties. In the absence of any disability after his temporary total disability was addressed, any further discussion of permanent partial and total disability, their existence, distinctions and consequences, becomes a surplusage that serves no useful purpose. A twist that directly led to the filing of this case is the issue of whose medical pronouncement should be followed given that the company-designated physician had declared the petitioner fit for work with a certification of fitness duly executed by the latter, while the petitioners physicians gave qualified opinions on his medical situation. The POEA Standard Employment Contract and the CBA clearly provide that when a seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury while on board the vessel, his fitness or unfitness for work shall be determined by the company-designated physician. If the physician appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the company-designated physicians assessment, the opinion of a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer to be the decision final and binding on them. [40] Thus, while petitioner had the right to seek a second and even a third opinion, the final determination of whose decision must prevail must be done in accordance with an agreed procedure. Unfortunately, the petitioner did not avail of this procedure; hence, we have no option but to declare that the company-designated doctors certification is the final determination that must prevail. We do so mindful that the company had exerted real effort to provide the petitioner with medical assistance, such that the petitioner finally ended with a 20/20 vision. The company-designated physician, too, monitored the petitioners case from the beginning and we cannot simply throw out his certification, as the petitioner suggested, because he has no expertise in ophthalmology. Under the facts of this case, it was the company-designated doctor who referred the petitioners case to the proper medical specialist whose medical results are not essentially disputed; who monitored the petitioners case during its progress; and who issued his certification on the basis of the medical records available and the results obtained. This led the NLRC in its own ruling to note that: x x x more weight should be given to the assessment of degree of disability made by the company doctors because they were the ones who attended and treated petitioner Vergara for a period of almost five (5) months from the time of his repatriation to the Philippines on September 5, 2000 to the time of his declaration as fit to resume sea duties on January 31, 2001, and they were privy to petitioner Vergaras case from the very beginning, which enabled the company-designated doctors to acquire a detailed knowledge and familiarity with petitioner Vergaras medical condition which thus enabled them to reach a more accurate evaluation of the degree of any disability which petitioner Vergara might have sustained. These are not mere company doctors. These doctors are independent medical practitioners who passed the rigorous requirements of the employer and are more likely to protect the interest of the employer against fraud.

Moreover, as between those who had actually attended to petitioner Vergara throughout the duration of his illness and those who had merely examined him later upon his recovery for the purpose of determining disability benefits, the former must prevail. We note, too, as the respondent company aptly observed, that the petitioner never raised the issue of the company-designated doctors competence at any level of the arbitration proceedings, only at this level of review. On the contrary, the petitioner accepted his assessment of fitness and in fact issued a certification to this effect. Under these circumstances, we find the NLRC and the CAs conclusions on the petitioners fitness to work, based on the assessment/certification by the company -designated physician, to be legally and factually in order. As a last point, the petitioner has repeatedly invoked our ruling in Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad,[41] apparently for its statement that the respondent in the case was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability. This declaration of a permanent total disability after the initial 120 days of temporary total disability cannot, however, be simply lifted and applied as a general rule for all cases in all contexts. The specific context of the application should be considered, as we must do in the application of all rulings and even of the law and of the implementing regulations. Crystal Shipping was a case where the seafarer was completely unable to work for three years and was undisputably unfit for sea duty due to respondents need for regular medical check -up and treatment which would not be available if he were at sea.[42] While the case was not clear on how the initial 120-day and subsequent temporary total disability period operated, what appears clear is that the disability went beyond 240 days without any declaration that the seafarer was fit to resume work. Under the circumstances, a ruling of permanent and total disability was called for, fully in accordance with the operation of the period for entitlement that we described above. Viewed from this perspective, the petitioner cannot cite the Crystal Shipping ruling as basis for his claim for permanent total disability. Additionally and to reiterate what we pointed out above regarding the governing rules that affect the disability of Filipino seafarers in ocean-going vessels, the POEA Standard Employment Contract provides its own Schedule of Disability or Impediment for Injuries Suffered and Diseases Including Occupational Diseases or Illness Contracted (Section 32); Disability Allowances (a subpart of Section 32); and its own guidelines on Occupational Diseases (Section 32-A) which cannot be disregarded in considering disability compensation and benefits. All these read in relation with applicable Philippine laws and rules should also be taken into account in considering and citing Crystal Shipping and its related line of cases as authorities. In light of the above conclusions, we see no need to discuss the petitioners other submissions that the lack of disability has rendered moot, particularly the existence of doubt that the petitioner insists should be resolved in his favor. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

ALLEM MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and WALLEM SHIPMANAGEMENT HONGKONG, LIMITED, Petitioners,

G.R. No. 163838 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and TIBURCIO D. DELA CRUZ, Promulgated: Respondents. September 25, 2008 x----------------------------------------------------------x DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the May 28, 2004 Court of Appeals (CA) Decision,[1] which affirmed with modification the May 26, 2003 Decision[2] and October 30, 2003 Resolution[3] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on the claim for disability benefits of Tiburcio D. dela Cruz (respondent) against Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. (WMSI) and Wallem Shipmanagement Hongkong Limited, (WSHL). The material facts are of record. Petitioner WMSI, acting as manning agent of petitioner WSHL, hired respondent as messman under an employment contract which provides: 1.1. Duration of Contract: 9 Months 1.2. Position: Messman 1.3. Basic Monthly Salary: US$407.00 1.4. Hours Work: 44 Hours/Week 1.5. Overtime: US$226.2/mo.for 85 hrs. 1.6. Vacation Leave with Pay US$2.66/hr. Excess Overtime US2.66/hr. 1.7. Point of Hire MANILA Seniority Pay US5.25/Month

of

The terms and conditions of the Revised Employment contract [POEA-SEC] governing the employment of Filipino seafarers approved per Department Order No. 33 and Memorandum Circular No. 55, series of 1996, shall be strictly and faithfully observed.[4] Respondent was deployed on November 1, 1999[5] to board his vessel M/V Vanadis at Fujairah, United Arab Emirates where his work as messman involved manually carrying and loading seastores/supplies. Sometime in March 2000, respondent complained of pain on his left groin radiating to his lower back area. He was examined in Fujairah by petitioners accredited physician, who issued a medical certificate that respondent was not fit to resume sea duties.[6] Thus, on March 22, 2000, respondent was repatriated to the Philippines where, from March 23, 2000 through November 22, 2000, he was examined and treated at the Metropolitan Hospital under Dr. Robert D. Lim and other physicians accredited with petitioners.

17

Petitioners paid for the costs of respondent's treatment.[7] They also paid him sickness allowance equivalent to his monthly wage, but only for the period of 120 days or from March 23, 2000 to July 24, 2000.[8] On November 22, 2000, Dr. Lim issued the following medical report: This is a follow-up report on Mr. Tiburcio dela Cruz diagnosed to have disc dessication, L3-4 and L4-L5 decompression laminectomy, L4-L5 on May 27, 2000. Patient was initially seen here at Metropolitan Hospital on March 23, 2000. He has been under the care of our orthopedic surgeon. He is now asymptomatic. Our orthopedic surgeon opines that patient is now fit to work. He was pronounced fit to resume sea duties as of November 22, 2000. Final diagnosis Disc dessication, L3-L4 and L4-L5 - S/P Decompression Laminectomy, L4-L5.[9] (Emphasis supplied) Respondent signed a Certificate of Fitness for Work whereby he released petitioners from any liability for his injury.[10] On August 2, 2001, respondent filed with the NLRC Arbitration Branch (Labor Arbiter) a Complaint against petitioners for payment of permanent total disability benefits in the amount of US$50,000.00.[11] Claiming that the November 22, 2000 fit-to-work medical report issued by Dr. Lim was false, respondent argued that he was actually suffering from a total permanent disability as established by the following evidence: first, he was certified not fit to work by petitioners' accredit physician in Fuijairah (Annex C);[12] andsecond, the Overseas Workers' Welfare Administration (OWWA) issued to him an Impediment Grade Medical Evaluation Report (Annex E), which stated that he was suffering from an impediment grade six and that he was entitled to 50% disability benefits.[13] Petitioners disputed the factual basis of respondents claim.[14] In a Decision dismissing the complaint, the Labor Arbiter (LA) held that Dr. Lim's medical report was conclusive, because the latter was the company-designated physician who actually examined and treated respondent for eight months.[15] Dr. Lim's findings could not be overturned by a contrary medical report issued by a doctor at OWWA who did not actually examine respondent but merely referred to earlier medical reports on the latter's condition prior to treatment.[16] Neither can Dr. Lim's findings be outweighed by the medical report issued in Fujairah months before respondent underwent treatment in the Philippines.[17] Respondent appealed to the NLRC which issued a Decision dated May 26, 2003 reversing the LA Decision and partly granting respondent's claim, thus: x x x To our mind, complainant-appellant submitted substantial and preponderant evidence to support his claim for disability pay taking into consideration the fact that it was the company physician inFujairah, designated by respondent-appellee [herein petitioners] Wallem Shipmanagement Limited itself who declared respondent unfit for duty, which declaration held ground even after the lapse of the 120 days treatment period. We also considered the fact that complainant-appellant was never again summoned for sea duty by respondents-appellees, a fact which likewise reasonably lead to the conclusion that he is no longer fit for work. The only thing left is the determination of the rightful amount which complainantappellant [herein respondent] shall be entitled to receive under the circumstances of the instant case. We cannot, however, award total or one hundred percent disability pay in favor of complainant [herein respondent] for lack of basis for such amount. Submitted by complainant18

appellant [herein respondent] on record is an Impediment grade of Six (6) issued by the Overseas Worker's Welfare Administration (OWWA), an agency tasked to provide or facilitate welfare benefits for both seabased and landbased overseas Filipino workers. xxxx WHEREFORE, after extended and careful deliberations on both factual circumstances and legal conclusions herein considered, the assailed decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 14 September 2001 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondentsappellees [herein petitioners] are ordered to pay complainant-appellant [herein respondent] his disability benefit in the amount of twenty-five thousand U.S. dollars (US$25,000.00) or its Philippine peso equivalent at the time of actual payment plus attorney's fees of twenty-five percent (25%) of said amount or an aggregate sum of thirty-seven thousand five hundred U.S. Dollars (US$37,500.00) or its equivalent in Philippine pesos at the time of actual payment. SO ORDERED.[18] (Emphasis supplied) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the NLRC denied it.[19] Petitioners questioned the NLRC decision and resolution before the CA but the latter affirmed the same, albeit with modification, to wit: WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 26, 2003 rendered by the public respondent National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC CA No. 030814-02 (NLRC OFW (M) 200106-278-30) is hereby AFFIRMED with modification that the twenty-five (25%) percent attorney's fees is hereby DELETED. SO ORDERED.[20] Without first filing a motion for reconsideration from the CA Decision, petitioners sought its reversal by the Court on the following grounds: 5.1. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it refused to correct or to reverse the palpably erroneous interpretation made by the National Labor Relations Commission of Section 20 [B]{3} of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels. 5.1.1. Section 20[B][3] of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels could not have been intended to force or to constrain shipowner's accredited doctors to either declare an ailing seafarer fit to resume sea duties or permanently disabled within a period of one hundred twenty (120) days. To interpret Section 20 [B][3] of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels as forcing or constraining ship-owners' accredited doctors to either declare an ailing seafarer fit to resume sea duties or permanently disabled within a period of only one hundred twenty (120) days would be to defeat the very purpose of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels which is to ensure that Filipino seafarers are able to obtain the best possible terms of employment. 5.2. Had the Honorable Court of Appeals, in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the subject petition for certiorari filed before it, chosen to correct or to reverse the palpably erroneous interpretation made by the National Labor Relations Commission of Section 20

[B][3] of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels, it would have been left with no recourse but to affirm the Decision dated 22 October 2001 issued by the Hon. Labor Arbiter Napoleon M. Menese. 5.2.1. The evidence adduced by the parties before the Hon. Labor Arbiter Napoleon M. Menese very plainly establishes the lack of merit of respondent's claim for disability compensation.[21] Petitioners' recourse is in vain. The terms and conditions of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) which the parties incorporated into their employment contract grant respondent compensation and benefits should he suffer from an illness or injury, subject to the following conditions: Section 20-B. Compensation and Benefits for Injury or Illness. - The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows: 1. The employer shall continue to pay the seafarer his wages during the time he is on board the vessel. 2. If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a foreign port, the employer shall be liable for the full cost of such medical, serious dental, surgical and hospital treatment as well as board and lodging until the seafarer is declared fit to work or to be repatriated. However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention arising from said injury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the employer until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been established by the company-designated physician. 3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the companydesignated physician, but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days. For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits. (Emphasis supplied) The NLRC interpreted Section 20-B(3) to mean that if a seafarer is repatriated on the basis of a certification issued by a company-designated physician overseas that said seafarer is not fit to resume sea duties, such finding shall remain valid until the seafarer is declared fit to work by the company-designated physician in the Philippines; but if, after 120 days from the repatriation of the seafarer, no such fit-to-work declaration is made by the companydesignated physician in the Philippines, the presumption will arise that the seafarer suffered from a permanent disability based on the earlier not-fit-to-work assessment made by the company-designated physician overseas. In the case of respondent, the NLRC ruled that the assessment by petitioners' accredited physician in Fujiarah that respondent was not fit to work held sway because Dr. Lim failed to overturn such finding within 120 days from respondent's repatriation.[22] The CA sustained this view of the NLRC.[23] 19

In disputing the foregoing interpretation of the CA and the NLRC, petitioners argue that the initial assessment made by a company-designated physician abroad is intended for no other purpose than to determine whether a seafarer should be repatriated or not.[24] Such initial assessment cannot influence any decision on the fitness of a seafarer to perform sea duties for, under Section 20-B(3), it is only the local company-designated physician -- in the present case, Dr. Lim -- who can pronounce whether the seafarer suffers from some disability.[25] Moreover, petitioners contend that, contrary to the view adopted by the CA and the NLRC, Section 20-B(3) does not set any time limit within which the local company-designated physician should issue an assessment, just as there is no time limit within which the seafarer can avail himself of treatment free of cost. The 120-day limit found in Section 20-B(3) refers merely to the period within which the seafarer shall be paid sickness allowance, but it has nothing to do with when the latter should be assessed fit or not fit for duty. Petitioners explain that if it is made mandatory on the company-designated physician to declare within 120-days that the seafarer is fit or not fit for duty, the effect would be to also restrict to a period of 120 days the entitlement of said seafarer to free medical treatment.[26] The Court agrees with the result of the CA decision, but differs with the CA's adoption of the NLRC interpretation of Section 20-B(3), just as it disagrees with petitioners' interpretation of said provision. The more accurate view of Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC is that espoused by respondent. In his Comment[27] and Memorandum,[28] respondent cited Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission[29] in which the Court referred to the definition of permanent disability under the Labor Code to interpret Section 20-B(3), thus: The standard employment contract for seafarers was formulated by the POEA pursuant to its mandate under E.O. No. 247 to "secure the best terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers and ensure compliance therewith" and to "promote and protect the well-being of Filipino workers overseas." Section 29 of the 1996 POEA SEC itself provides that "[a]ll rights and obligations of the parties to [the] Contract, including the annexes thereof, shall be governed by the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, international conventions, treaties and covenants where the Philippines is a signatory." Even without this provision, a contract of labor is so impressed with public interest that the New Civil Code expressly subjects it to "the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects." Thus, the Court has applied the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability to the case of seafarers x x x.[30] There are three kinds of disability benefits under the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. No. 626: (1) temporary total disability, (2) permanent total disability, and (3) permanent partial disability. Section 2, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code differentiates the disabilities as follows: Sec. 2. Disability.-- (a) A total disability is temporary if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period not exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules. (b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules. (c) A disability is partial and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee suffers a permanent partial loss of the use of any part of his body. (Emphasis supplied)

Applying the foregoing definition of permanent disability, the Court therein held that, notwithstanding the certification issued by the company-designated physician that in 8-10 months the seafarer therein may already work as a pianist, the fact remains that for the past 11 to 13 months, the latter had not been able to perform his customary work as a drummer, and this, by itself, already constitutes permanent total disability. The foregoing concept of permanent disability has been consistently employed by the Court in subsequent cases involving seafarers, such as in Crystal Shipping, Inc. v.Natividad, in which it was reiterated that permanent disability means the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days.[31] Also in Philmare, Inc. v. Suganob,[32] notwithstanding the opinion of the company-designated physician that the seafarer therein was fit to work provided he regularly took his medication, the Court held that the latter suffered from permanent disability in view of evidence that he had been unable to work as chief cook for more than 7 months. Similarly, in Micronesia Resources v.Cantomayor[33] and United Philippine Lines, Inc. and/or Holland America Line, Inc. v. Beseril,[34] the Court declared the seafarers therein to have suffered from a permanent disability after taking evidence into account that they had remained under treatment for more than 120 days, and were unable to work for the same period. Thus, it is not accurate to state -- as the CA and the NLRC did that respondent is presumed permanently disabled just because, after 120 days from his repatriation due to injury, he was not declared fit to resume sea duty by Dr. Lim. Nor would it be correct for petitioners to claim that respondent does not suffer from permanent disability just because at the end of an 8-month period of evaluation and treatment, Dr. Lim had declared him fit to work. Rather, the true test of whether respondent suffered from a permanent disability is whether there is evidence that he was unable to perform his customary work as messman for more than 120 days. Under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC, it is a requirement sine qua non to the filing of a claim for disability benefit that the claimant seafarer be examined by a company-designated physician within three days from his repatriation. But whatever medical report said company-designated physician may issue will not be conclusive on the claimant, for the latter may dispute said report by promptly consulting a physician of his own choice. However, neither the medical report issued by the company-designated physician nor the medical report issued by claimant's physician of choice is binding on the labor tribunals and the courts, for both reports will have to be evaluated based on their inherent merit.[35] In a number of cases, the Court disregarded the medical report issued by the company-designated physician that the seafarer was fit to work in view of evidence of record that the latter had in fact been unable to engage in his regular work for more than 120 days.[36] Indeed, the records of the present case are replete with evidence that respondent was unable to resume work as messman for more than 120 days from his repatriation. The evidence consist of medical records that from March 23 to 27, 2000, respondent underwent EMG-NCV of the lumbar area and renal ultrasound but the results in both were negative.[37] On April 10, 2000, respondent underwent EMG-NCV and Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the lumbosacral spine, and the result showed that he suffered from a mild disc dessication bulging L3-L4, L4-L5,[38] for which he was advised to continue physical therapy for another month.[39] On May 26, 2000, respondent was admitted forlaminectomy and discectomy, after which he remained confined in the hospital where he was placed in a chairback brace for immobilization and provided occupational and physical therapy. It was only on June 7, 2000 that he was discharged.[40] Over several weeks, respondent regularly returned for check up with Dr. Lim who advised him to continue rehabilitation.[41] Upon check up on July 14, 2000, respondent complained of lumbosacral pain, for which he was advised to continue physical therapy.[42] On that occasion, Dr. Lim expressly stated in his medical report that [b]ased on his present medical condition, patient will not be fit to resume sea duties in approximately 2-3 months time.[43] On July 28, 2000, respondent complained of the same pain and was advised to undergo re-evaluation and repeat EMG-NCV studies.[44] Thus, on August 18, 2000, Dr. Lim again issued his finding that [based] on his present medical condition, patient will not be fit to resume sea duties for the next two months barring unforeseen events.[45] In all, respondent was under medical evaluation and treatment for almost eight months. During that period, he was unable to resume his work as messman. In fact, twice within that period, Dr. Lim certified that he was not fit to resume sea duties. Certainly, the foregoing evidence conclusively established that respondent had suffered from a permanent disability. 20

As to whether respondent's permanent disability was total or partial, the Court cannot alter the concurrent finding of the CA and the NLRC, as respondent did not appealtherefrom. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 28, 2004 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 168862

April 30, 2008

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner, vs. EMMANUEL P. CUNTAPAY, respondent. DECISION NACHURA, J.: This petition for review stems from the Court of Appeals' Decision 1 dated May 17, 2005, and Resolution dated July 8, 2005, which granted the respondent's claim for compensation under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 626, as amended, or the Employees' Compensation Law. Respondent Emmanuel P. Cuntapay entered the government service on November 17, 1975 as an Architectural Draftsman of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). He rose from the ranks and was promoted on October 22, 1999 as Architect V (Chief, Architectural Division, Bureau of Design of the DPWH). An Architect V generally performs the following duties: (1) Supervises, coordinates, and provides direction and work assignments in the Division; (2) Does final review and checking of projects/papers from the Division prior to [submission] to higher authorities; (3) Provides direction in the formulation of architectural design guidelines and standards, architectural/sanitary design specifications, terms of reference and other pertinent documents for architectural and related engineering design services; (4) Confers/meets with representative of using agencies regarding the project requirements for the architectural and engineering design services; (5) Prepares and recommends action on cases referred to the Division regarding the implementation of the National Building Code (NBC);

(6) Participates in the deliberation in the formulation and information dissemination of the implementing rules and regulations of the NBC; and, (7) Performs such other duties and functions that may be assigned from time to time. 2 Aside from being the Chief of the Architectural Division of the Bureau of Design, the respondent was also designated Overall Head of the Technical Staff of the National Building Code Development Office (NBCDO) in a concurrent capacity. In addition, he was designated Representative to the National Steering Committee for the National Urban Development and Housing Framework 19992004, and Alternate Representative to the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons Board.3 On April 8, 2003, while attending a meeting of the National Building Code Board of Consultants at the DPWH Architectural Division, the respondent suddenly experienced difficulty in breathing. Upon the advice of Dr. Shirley Reyes, the DPWH resident physician, the respondent underwent electrocardiogram (ECG) test at the DPWH clinic. The ECG test disclosed that there was an irregularity in the respondent's heartbeat. For this reason, Dr. Reyes advised the respondent to seek hospital services. Heeding the advice, the respondent immediately proceeded to the Philippine Heart Center where he was admitted at about two o'clock in the afternoon of the same day. 4 Dr. Jose G. Abad-Santos, the respondent's attending physician, diagnosed his illness as acute myocardial infarction. The respondent then underwent "aortocoronary bypass" operation. He was discharged from the hospital on April 18, 2003.5 Afterwards, he underwent cardiac rehabilitation on an out-patient basis. All in all, the respondent spent P411,127.00 for his hospital bills and other medical expenses. Consequently, the respondent filed with the petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) a claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 626, as amended. However, in a letter dated February 16, 2004, the GSIS denied the claim on the ground that there was no substantial proof that the nature of his job increased the development of the claimed illness. 6 Upon denial of his request for reconsideration by the GSIS, the respondent interposed an appeal with the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC). In its November 12, 2004 Decision, the ECC affirmed the findings of the GSIS and subsequently dismissed the respondent's appeal. The ECC held that A circumspect review of the records however failed to show any causal link between his present occupation and his ailment. As explained medically, the development of IHD or otherwise termed as CAD is caused by atherosclerosis, the hardening of the inner lining of arteries. Smoking, hypertension, diet and diabetes are factors that cause atherosclerosis. Based on the etiology established by medical science, hypertension is the sole risk factor in the development of CAD to be considered as work-related. Under Annex A of the Implementing Rules on Employees' Compensation, hypertension is compensable provided it causes end-organ damage to the heart, eyes, brain or kidneys and is substantiated by diagnostic and laboratory test results. As regard (sic) appellant's case, however, nowhere in the records is there a showing that he has a history of hypertension that could predispose him to contract his cardiovascular disease. 7 21

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the ECC, thus: UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the petition for review is GRANTED. The November 12, 2004 Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. GM-16487-0803-04 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED to pay petitioner Emmanuel P. Cuntapay's full claim for compensation benefits under PD No. 626, as amended. Without costs in this instance. SO ORDERED.8 In so ruling, the appellate court stressed that the law only requires a reasonable work connection and not direct causal connection, and that it is enough that the hypothesis on which the claim is based is probable. It then held that the probability existed that the respondent's illness was due to work-related stress considering his assigned duties at that time.9 On July 8, 2005, the CA denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. 10 Thus, this petition raising the following issues: I. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER'S AILMENT - CORONARY ARTERY DISEASE (CAD), S/P, MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION -MAY BE CONSIDERED WORK-CONNECTED. II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT HAS PRESENTED POSITIVE PROOF, THROUGH A REAL AND SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, THAT THE NATURE OF HIS WORK AND HIS WORKING CONDITIONS AS ARCHITECT V HAS (sic) INCREASED THE RISK OF CONTRACTING HIS CLAIMED AILMENT.11 The petition is meritorious. For a sickness to be compensable, the claimant must prove either (1) that the sickness is the result of an occupational disease listed under the Rules on Employees' Compensation and the conditions set therein are satisfied; or (2) that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the claimant's working condition.12 ECC Resolution No. 432 dated July 20, 1977 includes cardio-vascular or heart diseases in the list of occupational diseases and enumerates the conditions under which they are considered work-related and, thus, compensable, viz.: (a) If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment, there must be proof that an acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reasons of the nature of his/her work. (b) The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and must be followed within 24 hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac [injury] to constitute causal relationship.

(c) If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before being subjected to strain at work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his/[her] work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship. In a number of cases,13 the Court already declared that myocardial infarction is included in this category. Myocardial infarction is the clinical term for a heart attack. It is caused by occlusion (blockage) of the coronary artery (atherosclerosis) or a blood clot (coronary thrombosis), resulting in the partial or total blockage of one of the coronary arteries. When this occurs, the heart muscle (myocardium) does not receive enough oxygen.14 The petitioner argues, on one hand, that the respondent's case does not fall under any of the three instances enumerated in ECC Resolution No. 432 because there was no showing that he was suffering from a heart disease, or that the strain of work prior to the 24-hour period of time when he suffered the heart attack was of sufficient severity, or that he was asymptomatic to the subject ailment.15 On the other hand, the respondent avers that the circumstances of his illness satisfy the conditions under paragraphs (b) and (c) of ECC Resolution No. 432. 16 He points out that the allegation that he has no history of hypertension is belied by the clinical abstract which shows that prior to his confinement he experienced three episodes of chest pain.17 We agree with the petitioner, considering that there was, indeed, no proof that any of said conditions has been satisfied. In particular, there was no evidence to show that respondent was previously diagnosed with a heart ailment or that he was under a severe strain of work sufficient to have caused the heart attack since a board meeting could hardly inflict such a severe strain. Moreover, from the evidence at hand, we cannot safely conclude that the respondent's case falls under paragraph (c). While it is true that the clinical abstract showed that on the day prior to the incident respondent experienced three episodes of chest pains, this alone would not satisfy the requirements of paragraph (c), more specifically the condition that the claimant must have shown signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted. To successfully recover compensation for his heart ailment, the respondent must therefore prove, through substantial evidence, that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the nature of his work and working conditions. Thus, the respondent posits that the underlying cause of his illness is stress caused by the performance of his numerous duties as Chief of the Architectural Division of the Bureau of Design and as representative to different committees. To show how stressful his work was, he submitted in evidence minutes of the meetings that he attended since January 2000. The petitioner disputes this allegation on the ground that, based on respondent's diagnostic test result which showed that he had a high cholesterol level, the cause of the heart attack was hypercholesterolemia - the main cause of atherosclerosis resulting in coronary artery disease and myocardial infarction.18 Six primary risk factors have been identified with the development of atherosclerotic coronary artery disease and myocardial infarction: hyperlipidemia or high blood cholesterol, diabetes mellitus, hypertension or high blood pressure, smoking, male gender, and family history of atherosclerotic arterial disease.19 In Government Service Insurance System v. Cuanang,20 while the Court recognized stress as one of the predisposing factors of myocardial infarction, it also noted that "stress appears to be associated with elevated blood pressure." The ECC, for its part, does not seem to treat stress as a separate risk factor for myocardial infarction. In fact, in its decision, it stated that hypertension is the sole risk factor in the development of a coronary artery disease that is considered work-related.21 Some references,22 however, include stress as a risk factor, distinct from hypertension. 23

Noticeably, the record is devoid of any medical information on the cause of respondent's acute myocardial infarction which could help the Court determine whether there was a causal link between the respondent's allegedly stressful work and his ailment. A physician's report would have been the best evidence of work-connection of workmen's ailments.24 Medical evidence is particularly vital where the causal connection is not clearly apparent to an ordinary person 25 or readily observable or discoverable without medical examination26 for it is not our task to determine where the connection lies. The claimant must show, at least, by substantial evidence that the development of the disease was brought about largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job. What the law requires is a reasonable work connection and not a direct causal relation. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable.27 Probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings.28And probability must be reasonable;29 hence, it should, at least, be anchored on credible information. Moreover, a mere possibility will not suffice; a claim will fail if there is only a possibility that the employment caused the disease. 30 The absence of any medical information stating that the respondent's illness could have been caused by stress and not by any other factor reduces the respondent's claim of work connection to a mere possibility. Such deficiency restrains the Court from concluding that the respondent's illness is compensable. Contrarily, in Cuanang, the expert opinion of a physician was presented in evidence and it was specifically stated therein that the employee's acute myocardial infarction could be the consequence of her chronic hypertension vis--vis her rheumatic heart disease. This expert opinion, together with the information that stress appears to be associated with elevated blood pressure, provided the Court with the link that tied the employee's sickness to her work as a teacher. Finally, we reiterate here that, with prudence and judicial restraint, a tribunal's zeal in bestowing compassion should yield to the precept in administrative law that absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion, courts are loathe to interfere with and should respect the findings of quasi-judicial agencies in fields where they are deemed and held to be experts due to their special technical knowledge and training.31 Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to which the tens and millions of workers and their families look for compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases and deaths occur. 32 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88038 dated May 17, 2005, and Resolution dated July 8, 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission dated November 12, 2004 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

22

KLAVENESS MARITIME AGENCY, INC., and TORVALD KLAVENESS CO., A/S, Petitioners,

G.R. No. 168560

Present:

Anthony Allas (the deceased), a seafarer, was employed by petitioner Klaveness Maritime Agency, Inc. in various capacities and under different contracts of employment from 4 June 1990 to 20 September 1999. Prior to his last contract (for the period 1 February 1999 to 20 September 1999), he experienced painful urination which the company-designated physician suspected to be urinary tract infection and for which he was given a prescription. While aboard Probo Koala, the deceased allegedly occasionally suffered from painful urination, sometimes exhibiting traces of blood in his urine, but the pain would subside after taking the prescribed medication.

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO, - versus CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. BENEFICIARIES OF THE LATE SECOND OFFICER ANTHONY S. ALLAS, represented by CHERYL Z. ALLAS, Respondents. January 28, 2008 The deceaseds heirs, respondents herein, filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for death and compensation benefits under the POEA Standard Employment Contract (Standard Contract)[5] and/or NIS CBA and for attorneys fees. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. According to the Labor Arbiter, the deceaseds death could not be compensated for because the same did not occur during the term of his employment contract. Likewise, it was not shown that his illness was work-related.[6]On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters Decision dated 30 December 2003.[7] A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC.[8] Promulgated: By 9 August 2000, the deceaseds condition worsened with the cancer reaching the advanced stage and spreading through his chest and abdomen. He died on 5 March 2001, leaving behind a wife and two minor children. The cause of death was listed as cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to urinary bladder cancer with metastasis.[4] After the completion of his contract, the deceased sought a second opinion on his condition, this time from a private specialist in urology-surgery. It was then discovered that he was suffering from urinary bladder cancer. On 6 January 2000, he underwent a partial cystectomy for the removal of the malignant mass. The private physician assured him that with follow-up treatment and management, he would be subsequently cured and be fit to work. About three months after the surgery, the deceased sought another deployment with petitioner. He was, however, refused employment because he was declared medically unfit when the company-designated physician noted his ailment and recent surgery.

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This treats of the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84794 entitled, Beneficiaries of the Late Second Officer Anthony S. Allas, represented by Cheryl Z. Allas versus National Labor Relations Commission, Klaveness Maritime Agency, Inc. and Torvald Klaveness & Co., A/S . promulgated on 31 January 2005 and 16 June 2005, respectively, which reversed the 30 December 2003 Resolution[3] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via an original action for certiorari, with the heirs imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC when it denied their claim for death benefits. The appellate court granted the petition, ruling that compensability under the Standard Contract should be understood to cover an illness which led to the death of a seafarer occurring during the term of the employment contract, and should not be limited to death occuring during the term of his employment. It held that while the exact cause of cancer was still unknown, it is a disease which is not contracted and developed overnight but rather progresses in different stages. Thus, there was a likelihood that the disease was contracted by the deceased while he was onboard one of petitioners ships.[9] The Court of Appeals ordered:

x x x Accordingly, the private respondent is ordered to pay the petitioners the amount FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS (US$50,000), SEVEN THOUSAND DOLLARS (US$7,000), for each of the two minor children and ONE 23

THOUSAND DOLLARS (US$1,000) as burial allowance, pursuant to Section 20(A) of the POEA-prescribed Standard Employment Contract.

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

SO ORDERED.[10]

A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH

Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the decision, but its motion was denied by the Court of Appeals.[11]

1. In the case of work-related death of the seafarer during the term of his contract the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of Fifty Thousand US dollars (US$50,000) and an additional amount of Seven Thousand US dollars (US$7,000) to each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four (4) children, at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.

Petitioner now claims that it is erroneous on the part of the Court of Appeals to reverse the decision of the NLRC because the same is supported by substantial evidence contained in the records of the case. Moreover, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC concur in their factual findings upon which both based their similar conclusions. In addition, petitioner argues that the Standard Contract provides death benefits only to beneficiaries of seafarers who die during the term of the contract. Thus the heirs are not entitled to death benefits because the deceased died more than one and a half years after completion of the contract. It claims that the statements about the deceaseds condition during the term of his contract (i.e., bouts of painful urination) are hearsay, being based merely on what the deceased told his wife. Besides, the deceased failed to inform his superiors about the pain he was suffering from while aboard the ship, thus, he was not properly diagnosed and appropriately treated. Moreover, the fit to work declaration in the deceaseds Pre -employment Medical Examination (PEME) is not a conclusion that he was free from any ailment prior to his deployment, the PEME not being exploratory in nature. Finally, petitioner claims that Allas heirs failed to adduce any evidence that the risk of contracting bladder cancer was increased by his working conditions.[12]

xxx

4. The other liabilities of the employer when the seafarer dies as a result of work-related injury or illness during the term of employment are as follows:

a.

The employer shall pay the deceaseds beneficiary all outstanding obligations due the seafarer under this Contract.

In their Comment,[13] respondents invoke the liberal interpretation of the provisions of the Standard Contract, particularly Section 20 (A) 4 thereof, such that it should be read to mean that it is sufficient that the illness which led to the death occurred during the term of the employment contract, and that the illness which led to the death need not be work-connected.

b.

The resolution of the case hinges on one ultimate question of law, which is, whether, under the Standard Contract, the death of a seafarer after the term of his contract entitles his heirs to death benefits.

The employer shall transport the remains and personal effects of the seafarer to the Philippines at employers expense except if the death occurred in a port where local government laws or regulations do not permit the transport of such remains. In this case death occurs at sea, the disposition of the remains shall be handled or dealt with in accordance with the masters best judgment. In all cases, the employer/master shall communicate with the manning agency to advi[c]e for disposition of seafarers remains.

The answer is no. The petition is therefore meritorious.

c.

The employer shall pay the beneficiaries of the seafarer the Philippine currency equivalent to the amount of One Thousand US dollars (US$1,000) for burial expenses at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.(Emphasis supplied)[14]

Central to the resolution of the case are the provisions of Section 20 of the Standard Contract, which read: This Court, in Gau Sheng Phils., Inc. v. Joaquin, Hermogenes v. Osco Shipping Services, Inc.,[15] and Prudential Shipping and Management Corporation v. Sta. Rita,[16] declared that in order 24

to avail of death benefits, the death of the employee should occur during the effectivity of the employment contract. As stated in Prudential, The death of a seaman during the term of employment makes the employer liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits. Once it is established that the seaman died during the effectivity of his employment contract, the employer is liable. However, if the seaman dies after the termination of his contract of employment, his beneficiaries are not entitled to the death benefits enumerated above.[17]

septecalmia, pulmonary congestion, multiple intestinal obstruction secondary to multiple adhesions.[24] In the said case, the Court allowed recovery of death benefits after finding that there was a reasonable connection between the seafarers job and his lung infection which developed into septicemia and caused his death.

Even if we are to consider the possibility of compensation for the death after the termination of the employment contract on account of a work-related illness, the outcome of this case would still not be akin to our resolution in Wallem. In the said case, there appears to be substantial evidence that the seafarer was suffering from the illness while he was still on-board and that said illness was the reason for the termination of the employment contract. There is none in the case at bar.

It is therefore error on the part of the Court of Appeals to declare that x x x Section 20(A)4 should be read to mean that it is sufficient that the illness which led to the death occurred during the term of the employment contract.[18] It is an interpretation clearly not in accord with the decisions of this Court.

The deceaseds last contract with petitioners was finished uneventfully on 20 September 1999. He died on 5 March 2001, one and a half years after the termination of his employment. His heirs, therefore, are not entitled to death benefits under the Standard Contract.

The deceased suffered from, and died due to, urinary bladder cancer. While cancer of the epithelial lining of the bladder (papilloma of the bladder)[25] is listed as an occupational disease in Section 32-A of the Standard Contract, it is not clear that this is the type of cancer that the deceased suffered from. In addition, Section 32-A lays down several conditions before a disability or death may be considered compensable, to wit:

SECTION 32-A OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES

In justifying the grant of death benefits, the heirs rely on the cases of Seagull Ship Management and Transport, Inc. v. NLRC,[19] NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. v. NLRC,[20] Interorient Maritime Enterprises , Inc. v. NLRC[21] and Wallem Maritime Services Inc. v. NLRC.[22] However, a review of the said cases reveals that they are not applicable to the instant case.

For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied:

1.

The seafarers work must involve the risks described herein;

Seagull Ship Management and NFD International Manning Agents are about seafarers claims for disability, and not death, benefits after repatriation. On the other hand,Interorient Maritime concerns the death of a seafarer who was killed in-transit while being repatriated. In the said case, a seafarer who was suffering from a mental disorder was shot when he attempted to attack a policeman while at a stopover in Bangkok, Thailand. He was already repatriated and was heading to Manila when the incident occurred. The Court, finding that the death was not due to his willful act, and noting that the responsibility of the employer is to see to it that the seafarer is duly repatriated to the point of hiring (Manila), ruled that the seafarers death is compensable. Otherwise stated, when said seafarer died, his contract was still in effect since termination of employment occurs when the seafarer signs off from the vessel and arrives at the point of hire. [23]

2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafare rs exposure to the described risks; 3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; 4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.[26]

Meanwhile, the case of Wallem Maritime Services Inc. is about a seafarer whose employment contract was preterminated due to mutual consent. The Court found that said seafarers discharge was due to his already deteriorating physical condition, as buttressed by the fact that he was hospitalized two days after his arrival in the Philippines and that he died three months after, the cause of his death being septicemia, disseminated intravascular coagulatio ns, 25

Bladder cancer refers to any of the several types of malignant growths of the urinary bladder. The most common symptoms of bladder cancer include blood in the urine (hematuria), pain or burning sensation during urination without evidence of urinary tract infection, and change in bladder habits, such as having to urinate more often or feeling the strong urge to urinate without producing much urine. However, these symptoms are nonspecific and may be linked with other conditions that have nothing to do with cancer,[27]such as benign tumors, bladder stones, an overactive bladder, or an enlarged prostate.[28] It is not yet known what causes most bladder cancers, but experts have identified major risk factors such as smoking, working in industries which use aromatic amines, as well as those in the

rubber, leather, textile, paint product and printing companies. Other workers with increased risk include painters, hairdressers, machinists, printers and truck drivers (exposure to diesel fumes). Race, increasing age, gender, chronic bladder inflammation, personal history of bladder cancer, bladder birth defects, genetics, chemotherapy and radiation therapy are also risk factors for bladder cancer.[29]

G.R. No. 124208

January 28, 2008

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF ABRAHAM CATE, represented by DOROTHY CATE, respondents. X----------------------------------------------- X G.R. No. 124275 January 28, 2008

The deceased allegedly suffered bouts of painful urination while on-board petitioners vessel. The pain would however subside upon the taking of pain relievers. Nevertheless, in the absence of substantial evidence, we cannot conclude that the pain was due to cancer. After all, painful urination is non specific to cancer and may be linked to other conditions. Moreover, there was no indication that petitioner was made aware of such painful spells while the deceased was onboard. Respondents were unable to adduce evidence that the deceaseds work exposed him to the chemicals suspected to increase the risks of acquiring bladder cancer. Neither were they able to prove that his bladder cancer was acquired during his employment. As we earlier noted, ones predisposition to develop cancer is affected not only by ones work, but also by many factors outside of ones working environment. In the absence of substantial evidence, the deceaseds working conditions cannot be assumed to have increased the risk of contracting bladder cancer. While it is true that labor contracts are impressed with public interest and the provisions of the POEA Standard Employment Contract must be construed fairly, reasonably and liberally in favor of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels,[30] we should always be mindful that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed with in the light of established facts, the applicable law, and existing jurisprudence.[31]

EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF ABRAHAM CATE, represented by DOROTHY CATE,respondents. DECISION AZCUNA, J.: These two consolidated cases are petitions for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on March 13, 1996, which reversed and set aside the Decision of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) dated September 7, 1995 denying private respondents claim for compensation benefits of the late Abraham Cate under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 626, as amended. The facts are as follows: On March 6, 1974, Abraham Cate (Abraham) joined the military service as a Rifleman of the Philippine Navy. In 1975, he was designated as Action Clerk. On February 22, 1986, he was transferred to the now defunct Philippine Constabulary with the rank of Technical Sergeant and was later promoted to Master Sergeant. On January 2, 1991, he was absorbed in the Philippine National Police (PNP) with the rank of Senior Police Officer IV (SPO4). In 1993, Abraham complained of a mass on his left cheek which gradually increased in size. A biopsy was done at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH). The histopath report revealed that he was suffering from Osteoblastic Osteosarcoma. He was admitted at the PGH payward, and on October 28, 1993, he underwent "Total Maxillectomy with Orbital Exenteration," which operation removed the mass on his left cheek. In April 1994, another biopsy revealed the recurrence of the ailment. On June 9, 1994, Abraham underwent debulking of the recurrent tumor at the PGH. Post-operative course was uneventful and he underwent radiotherapy.1 On December 1, 1994, Abraham was compulsorily retired from the PNP. 2 On December 20, 1994, Abraham filed a claim for income benefits with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) under P.D. No. 626,3 as amended.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84794 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The 30 December 2003 Resolution of the NLRC is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

26

In a letter dated December 27, 1994, GSIS denied the claim on the ground that Osteosarcoma is not considered an occupational disease under P.D. No. 626, and there is no showing that his duties as SPO4 in the Armed Forces of the Philippines had increased the risk of contracting said ailment.4 GSIS denied Abrahams request for reconsideration of the decision in a letter dated March 22, 1995. On May 2, 1995, Abraham died at the age of 45. He was survived by his wife, Dorothy Cate, and two children. The heirs of Abraham appealed the decision of GSIS to the ECC. In a Decision dated September 7, 1995, ECC affirmed the decision of GSIS and dismissed the case for lack of merit. It ruled: After a careful examination of the records of the instant claim, we concur with the decision of the respondent system that appellants claim is bereft of mer it. Definitely, the ailment of herein appellant is not included in the list of occupational diseases, under the rules implementing PD 626, as amended. However, even if appellants ailment is not an occupational disease, the present law on compensation allows certain diseases to be compensable if it is sufficiently proven that the risk of contracting it is increased by the working conditions. Unfortunately for Abraham Cate, he failed to present proofs that will establish that the development of his ailment is traceable to his work and working conditions as a soldier of the defunct Philippine Constabulary and later as member of the Philippine National Police. Our conclusion is supported by the findings of the Commissions Medical Division which show that Osteosarcoma is the most common primary bone tumor. It is an aggressive tumor, characterized usually by rapid growth and early pulmonary metastasis. In most common cases of osteogenic sarcoma, no definite etiology can be determined. From the foregoing medical discussion, it is very clear that appellants employment as member of the Philippine National Police had no direct nor causal relationship with the contraction of appellants ailment. This being the case, the death benefits prayed for by herein appellant under the Employees Compensation Law (PD 626, as amended), cannot be given due course. 5 The heirs of Abraham filed a petition for review of the decision of ECC with the CA. In a Decision promulgated on March 13, 1996, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of ECC. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Petition for Review is GIVEN DUE COURSE and is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the respondent Employees Compensation Commission dated September 7, 1975 is ordered REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered declaring the ailment of the late Abraham Cate compensable under PD 626, as amended. No pronouncement as to cost. SO ORDERED.6 The CA ruled that Osteosarcoma is compensable on the ground that the Employees Compensation Act is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to our working men, and should, therefore, be liberally construed in favor of the applicant. It stated that Abrahams failure to present evidence on 27

the causal relation of the illness to his working conditions is due to the lack of available proof. To deny compensation to Osteosarcoma victims who will be unable to produce such proof is unrealistic, illogical and unfair. On a very exceptional circumstance, the rule on compensability should be relaxed. In the meantime that the origin and cause of Osteosarcoma are unknown, the benefit of the doubt should be resolved in favor of the claim since employees compensation is based on social security principles. It hoped for a second look on the issue of compensability to those suffering Osteosarcoma or a similar disease whose cause is unascertained. The CA cited the dissenting opinions of former Supreme Court Justice Abraham F. Sarmiento and Justice Edgardo L. Paras in the case of Raro v. Employees Compensation Commission7 where Justice Sarmiento opined that compassion is reason enough to grant compensation benefits to the petitioner therein, a Mining Recorder at the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences, who suffered from cancer (brain tumor). Justice Paras opined that doubts must generally be resolved in favor of the employee whenever compensation for disease is concerned, and that it would be absurd to throw upon therein petitioner the burden of showing that her work either caused or aggravated the disease, particularly when both the GSIS and ECC profess ignorance of the causes of the disease. The GSIS and ECC separately filed a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA. The two petitions were consolidated per Resolution dated September 4, 1996. The main issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the ailment of the late Abraham is compensable under the present law on employees compensation. Petitioners aver that the applicable law in Abrahams case is the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation which is explained in Tanedo v. ECC,8 thus: Awards of compensation benefits for death or disability can now no longer be made to rest on presumption, but on a showing that the causative disease is among those listed by the ECC, or on substantial evidence that the risk of contracting said disease is increased by the employees working conditions. Petitioners allege that private respondents tried to establish a preliminary link between the illness and the employment of Abraham by speculating that since Abraham did some dirty jobs during his stint as a rifleman in the Philippine Navy, he was exposed to some elements like virus which could have contributed more or less to the development of his ailment. Petitioners argue that such allegation cannot be the basis of a finding that Abrahams ailment had a causal connection with his employment and working conditions. Nor can it be said that the nature of his work had increased the risk of contracting his ailment. The illness is not prevalent in the Philippine Navy or the PNP. Even under the less stringent evidentiary norm of substantial evidence obtaining in employees compensation proceedings, private respondents failed to adduce such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support their claim. Art. 1679 (l), Chapter 1, Title II, Book Four of the Labor Code of the Philippines, defines sickness as "any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the [Employees Compensation Commission], or any illness caused by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions." The same provision empowers ECC to determine and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment.

Under Sec. 1 (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, "[f]or the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions." The decision of the ECC is instructive: After a careful examination of the records of the instant claim, we concur with the decision of the respondent system that appellants claim is bereft of merit. Definitely, the ailment of herein appellant is not included in the list of occupational diseases, under the rules implementing PD 626, as amended. However, even if appellants ailment is not an occupational disease, the present law on compensation allows certain diseases to be compensable if it is sufficiently proven that the risk of contract it is increased by the working conditions. Unfortunately, for Abraham Cate, he failed to present proofs that will establish that the development of his ailment is traceable to his work and working conditions as a soldier of the defunct Philippine Constabulary and later as member of the Philippine National Police.10 In this case, Osteosarcoma is not listed as an occupational disease in the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. Hence, it is supposed to be upon the claimant or private respondents to prove by substantial evidence that the risk of contracting Osteosarcoma was increased by the working conditions of the late Abraham. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.11 The records show that Abraham failed to present evidence to establish that the development of his ailment was traceable to his working conditions in the Philippine Navy, the now defunct Philippine Constabulary and the PNP. Further, private respondents allegation in their petition for review with the CA that Abraham, as a rifleman in the Philippine Navy, may have been exposed to elements like a virus which could have contributed to his ailment does not satisfy the requirement of substantial evidence. The rule is that awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations and presumptions as the claimant must prove a positive thing.12 The application of the rules would mean that absent any proof that the risk of contracting the ailment was increased by the working conditions of the late Abraham, private respondents would not be entitled to compensation. Considering, however, that it is practically undisputed that under the present state of science, the proof referred by the law to be presented by the deceased private respondent claimant was unavailable and impossible to comply with, the condition must be deemed as not imposed. For this reason, the CA held, thus: In all due respect and with the least of intention of committing contempt and discourtesy but rather solely moved by the time-honored principle that the Employees Compensation Act is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to our working men (Santos v. ECC, 221 SCRA 182 [1993] and that labor, social welfare legislations should be liberally construed in favor of the applicant (Tira v. ECC, 208 SCRA 834 [1992]), We have to rule in favor of herein petitioners. The plight of any cancer patient deserves some serious considerations. We were not to be told that no one is a willing victim of cancer. Inflicted with this dreadful malady, the patient suffers from the trauma of an impending death not to mention the high cost of medical 28

attendance required, only to prolong ones agony and the hopelessness of any definite cure simply because the origin and cause of cancer are farfetched unresolved. The present case at bench is no different. Petitioners failure to present positive evidence of a causal relation of the illness and his working conditions is due to the pure and simple lack of available proof to be offered in evidence. Verily, to deny compensation to osteosarcoma victims who will definitely be unable to produce a single piece of proof to that effect, is unrealistic, illogical and unfair. At the very least, on a very exceptional circumstance, the rule on compensability should be relaxed and be allowed to apply to such situations. To disallow the benefit will even more add up to the sufferings, this time, for the ignorance of the inability of mankind to discover the real truth about cancer. It is not the intention of this decision to challenge the wisdom of the Raro case. What is being hoped for is to have a second look on the issue of compensability of those inflicted with osteosarcoma or like disease, where the origin or cause is still virtually not ascertained. The protection of the stability and integrity of the State Insurance Fund against non-compensable claims, is much to be desired. Nonetheless, to allow the presumption of compensability to Osteosarcoma victims, will not adversely prejudice such state policy. In fact, it will give more meaning to the very purpose and essence of the State Insurance Fund. Upon the other hand, to deny the claim will not only defeat the very reason for its creation but will likewise turn down benefits to the intended rightful beneficiary thereof. As employees compensation is based on social security principles. We believe that in the meantime that osteosarcomas cause and origin are not yet unearthed, the benefit of the doubt should be resolved in favor of the claim. In main, We subscribe to the more compassionate and humane considerations contained in the dissenting opinions of Justices Sarmiento and Paras in the same Raro case and We quote: "It must be likewise be noted that the petitioner is suffering from cancer (brain tumor), whose cause medical science is yet to unravel. It would then be asking too much to make her prove that her illness was cause by work or aggravated by it, when experts themselves are ignorant as to what brings it about. I do not believe, finally, that the question is a matter of legislation. Compassion, it is my view, is reason enough." (J. Sarmiento) "While brain tumor is not expressly or specifically referred to as an occupational disease, and while admittedly it precise causes are still unknown, We may say that the disease is akin to cancer of the brain and should therefore be regarded as either compensable or borderline case. At any rate, the precise work of the petitioner at the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences consisted of the following: "As Mining Recorded II, to record and file mining instruments and documents in the Mining Recorders Section and to type correspondence and other documents pertaining to the same action. (See Petitioners Brief, Rollo, p. 13). It will readily be seen that her work required at times mental concentration. Whether this is specifically causative of brain tumor is of course still unknown but doubts must generally be resolved in favor whenever compensation for disease is concerned. It would certainly be absurd to throw upon petitioner the burden of showing that her work either caused or aggravated the disease, particularly when both the GSIS and ECC profess ignorance themselves of the causes of the disease." (Justice Paras).13

Stated otherwise, before the amendment, the law simply did not allow compensation for the ailment of respondent. It is under this set-up that the Raro case was decided. However, as the ECC decision noted, the law was amended and now "the present law on compensation allows certain diseases to be compensable if it is sufficiently proven that the risk of contracting is increased by the working conditions."14 It, therefore, now allows compensation subject to requirement of proving by sufficient evidence that the risk of contracting the ailment is increased by the working conditions. As earlier noted, however, in the specific case of respondent, the requirement is impossible to comply with, given the present state of scientific knowledge. The obligation to present such as an impossible evidence must, therefore, be deemed void.15 Respondent, therefore, is entitled to compensation, consistent with the social legislations intended beneficial purpose. In fine, the Court sees no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED.No costs.SO ORDERED.

and Employment's Department Order No. 33 and the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration's Memorandum Circular No. 55, both Series of 1996 (1996 POEA SEC), were to be strictly and faithfully observed.[6] Under the contract, petitioner was to work as Musician II on board SS "Enchanted Isle," a vessel owned and operated by respondent principal, for ten (10) months, at a basic monthly salary of US$857.00, overtime rate of US$257.00 per month and vacation leave with pay of three (3) days per month. After petitioner passed the pre-employment medical examination, he joined the vessel and started performing his job as a drummer in December 1997. On March 16, 1998, while the vessel was docked at the port of Cancun, Mexico, petitioner went ashore to attend to some personal matters. While walking, petitioner suddenly felt severe chest pain and shortness of breath. He returned to the vessel and experienced another such episode on the same evening. When his chest pain recurred the following day, he went to the vessel's infirmary where he again suffered from chest pain. Petitioner was brought and confined for seven (7) days at the Grand Cayman Island Hospital. His pain worsened upon physical exertion but improved with rest. Thus, he was instructed to refrain from performing any kind of physical activity and to have a complete bed rest. He rejoined the vessel on March 24, 1998. Upon the vessel's arrival at the port of New Orleans, Louisiana, U.S.A., petitioner was brought to the West Jefferson Medical Center for a more thorough check-up and evaluation. Dr. S. Kedia's "impression" was that petitioner's chest pains were "probable secondary to severe coronary artery disease."[7] Dr. Armengol Porta conducted a physical examination on petitioner, including a coronary angiogram,[8] and found that he had several blockages in his coronary arteries. A triple coronary artery bypass was performed on petitioner on April 2, 1998 by a Dr. Everson. On April 8, 1998, petitioner was transferred to the Marine Medical Unit for observation. After twelve (12) days of confinement, petitioner's cardiologist found him "not fit for sea duty" and recommended for him to be "[r]epatriated to home port for follow up with a cardiologist."[9] He was repatriated to Manila on April 23, 1998. In a letter dated April 27, 1998, Henry P. Desiderio, the manager of the Crewing Administration and Business Development Department of respondent agency, referred petitioner to the American Outpatient Clinic for medical check-up.[10] On May 13, 1998, petitioner, through counsel, sent a formal communication[11] to respondent agency demanding payment of unpaid wages, sickness allowance and permanent total disability benefits. The demand, however, was refused. In a letter dated June 25, 1998 addressed to the manager of respondent agency, Jose Enrique P. Desiderio, the company-designated physician, Dr. Leticia C. Abesamis, of the American Outpatient Clinic wrote, viz: Mr. B. Remigio who had Coronary Bypass (6x) abroad last April 2, 1998 has completed his cardiac rehabilitation here at the Phil. Heart Center. Stress done on June 23, 1998 shows functional capacity at 8 METS. Lately he has been complaining of epigastric discomfort from Ecotrin. He has been on ulcer regimen. probably

BERNARDO REMIGIO, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 159887 Present: PUNO, J., Chairman, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CORONA, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ.

-versus-

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, C.F. SHARP CREW Promulgated: MGT., INC. & NEW COMMODORE CRUISE LINE, INC.,[1] Respondents. April 12, 2006 x--------------------------------------------------x DECISION PUNO, J.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision[2] and resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 67782 which affirmed the March 22, 2001 Resolution[4] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), awarding sickness allowance of US$3,400.00 to petitioner but denying his claim for disability benefits. The facts are undisputed. On November 27, 1997, petitioner Bernardo Remigio entered into a Contract of Employment[5] with respondent C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. (respondent agency), for and in behalf of its foreign principal, co-respondent New Commodore Cruise Line, Ltd. (respondent principal). The contract provided that the terms and conditions of the standard employment contract governing the employment of all seafarers, approved per Department of Labor 29

He may go back to sea duty as piano player or guitar player after 8-10 more months.

He was unfit from April 27, 1998 to June 25, 1998.[12] (emphases supplied)

On November 12, 1998, petitioner filed the instant complaint [13] for (a) recovery of permanent total disability benefits amounting to US$60,000.00; (b) actual and compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity in the amount of US$154,260.00; and (c) moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.[14] Private respondents made an offer to settle the case at US$30,000.00 as evidenced by fax letters, to which petitioner made a counter-proposal of US$40,000.00.[15] No agreement was reached as the parties proceeded to submit their respective position papers and supporting evidence. In support of his claims, petitioner submitted copies of: a) his Contract of Employment with private respondents; b) communication of respondent principal to respondent agency informing the latter about petitioner's "heart attack," repatriation and replacement; c) History and Physical Report of petitioner and Procedure Report of his cardiac catheterization; d) receipts from a drugstore and the Philippine Heart Center; e) 2D Echocardiogram-Color Doppler Report; f) filled up form of the Exercise Testing and Cardiac Rehabilitation Laboratory of the Philippine Heart Center showing the results of the tests done on petitioner; and g) the Discharge Summary of the Marine Medical Unit.[16] On the other hand, private respondents submitted copies of: a) the Contract of Employment; b) referral letter dated April 27, 1998 of respondent agency to the American Outpatient Clinic; c) demand letter dated May 13, 1998 of petitioner's counsel; and d) medical report of Dr. Leticia C. Abesamis of the American Outpatient Clinic addressed to the manager of respondent agency. [17] On September 15, 1999, Labor decision,[18] the dispositive portion of which states: Arbiter Manuel R. Caday rendered his

The CA likewise did not find substantial evidence to prove that the heart ailment incurred by petitioner during the term of his employment resulted to his disability, i.e., rendered him incapable of further seeking employment as a musician or to follow a substantially gainful occupation. It noted that petitioner's medical records abroad never mentioned that his heart ailment resulted to a disability. Petitioner's reliance on Dr. Abesamis's letter dated June 25, 1998 that he (petitioner) was "unfit from April 27, 1998 to June 25, 1998" was found as insufficient to prove that petitioner's earning capacity was either lost or diminished. The statement that petitioner "may go back to sea duty as piano player or guitar player after 8-10 more months" was likewise found as insufficient to prove that petitioner was actually "sidelined" or that it was impossible for him to work and earn as a musician during the 8-10 months that he was not on board the vessel. Finally, it considered that heart ailment is not included among the compensable sicknesses and injuries under the 1996 POEA SEC. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration with the CA was denied. [23] Hence, this petition in which petitioner prays that he be awarded US$60,000.00 as permanent total disability benefits, US$3,428.00 as sickness allowance, attorney's fees and costs of suit. He assigns as lone error, the following: THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DISMISSING PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT AND DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS CONTRARY TO LAW.[24]

The main issue is whether petitioner is entitled to permanent total disability benefits. At the outset, private respondents' contention that the instant petition must be dismissed outright for being grounded on a question of fact must be rejected. The issue of whether petitioner is entitled to permanent total disability benefits is a question of law as it calls for the correct application of the law and jurisprudence on disability benefits to the established facts on record. [25] It raises the following sub-issues, to wit: 1. Whether heart ailment suffered during the term of the contract is compensable under the 1996 POEA SEC even if there is no proof of workconnection; and 2. Whether the concept of permanent total disability under the Labor Code applies to the case of a seafarer's claim for disability benefits under the 1996 POEA SEC.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondents jointly and severally to pay complainant, his sickness allowance in the amount of US$3,400.00. All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
[19]

In ruling that petitioner is not entitled to disability benefits, Labor Arbiter Caday noted that the Schedule of Disability or Impediment for Injuries Suffered and Diseases or Illness Contracted under Section 30 of the 1996 POEA SEC does not provide for the payment of compensation benefits in cases of cardiac catheterization or heart bypass. Even assuming that it was included, he held that no medical report was presented to show that petitioner's disability was total and permanent as to be classified under Grade 1 of the said schedule of disability. Nonetheless, petitioner's claim for sickness allowance was granted as there was no showing that private respondents paid petitioner's basic wages after his repatriation, as provided under Section 20, B(3) of the 1996 POEA SEC. Petitioner was awarded US$3,400.00 as sickness allowance, computed on the basis of his monthly wage of US$850.00 multiplied by four (4) months. On appeal by petitioner, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in toto.[20] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC's resolution, to no avail. Accordingly, he filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order with the CA. [21] On March 31, 2003, the CA dismissed the petition.[22]

First. In ruling that petitioner is not entitled to permanent total disability benefits, the Labor Arbiter and the CA considered that "cardiac catheterization," "heart bypass," or "heart ailment" is not found in the Schedule of Disability or Impediment for Injuries Suffered and Diseases or Illness Contracted under Section 30 of the 1996 POEA SEC. Petitioner contends that the schedule of disability under Section 30 of the 1996 POEA SEC is not exclusive. Heart ailment, though not listed in the schedule, is compensable. Private respondents, on the other hand, concede that while petitioner's illness is not listed under the 1996 POEA SEC, "this does not mean that the same is not compensable."[26] However, since "heart ailment" is not listed under Section 30 of the 1996 POEA SEC, it is not an "occupational disease." It was therefore incumbent upon petitioner to prove by substantial evidence that his illness was work-related. Having failed to do so, he is not entitled to disability benefits. We find merit in petitioner's argument. 30

Petitioner bases his claim for disability benefits under Section 20 in relation to Sections 30 and 30-A of the 1996 POEA SEC, viz: Sec. 20. Compensation and Benefits xxx B. Compensation and Benefits for Injury or Illness The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows: xxx 5. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer during the term of employment caused by either injury or illness[,] the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 30 of [t]his Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted. Sec. 30. SCHEDULE OF DISABILITY OR IMPEDIMENT FOR INJURIES SUFFERED AND DISEASES OR ILLNESS CONTRACTED xxx CHEST-TRUNK-SPINE 1. Fracture of four (4) or more ribs resulting to severe limitation of chest expansion - Gr. 6 2. Fracture of four (4) or more ribs with intercostal neuralgia resulting in moderate limitation of chest expansion - Gr. 9 3. Slight limitation of chest expansion due to simple rib functional without myositis or intercostal neuralgia - Gr. 12 4. Fracture of the dorsal or lumber spines resulting to severe or total rigidity of the trunk or total loss of lifting power of heavy objects - Gr. 6 5. Moderate rigidity or two thirds (2/3) loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk - Gr. 8 6. Slight rigidity or one third (1/3) loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk Gr. 11 7. Injury to the spinal cord as to make walking impossible without the aid of a pair of crutches - Gr. 4

8. Injury to the spinal cord as to make walking impossible even with the aid of a pair of crutches - Gr. 1 9. Injury to the spinal cord resulting to incontinence of urine and feces - Gr. 1 xxx NOTE: Any item in the schedule classified under Grade 1 shall be considered or shall constitute total and permanent disability. Sec. 30-A. SCHEDULE OF DISABILITY ALLOWANCES Impediment Grade 1 2 3 4 Rate x Rate x Rate x Rate x Rate x Rate x Rate x Rate x Rate x Rate x 14 Maximum Rate: US$50,000 To be paid in Philippine Currency equivalent at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment. (emphases supplied) 68.66% 58.96% 50.00% 41.80% 33.59% 26.12% 20.15% 14.93% 10.45% 6.72% 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Maximum Rate x Impediment Maximum Rate x Maximum Rate x Maximum Rate x Maximum 120.00% 88.81% 78.36% Maximum Maximum Maximum Maximum Maximum Maximum Maximum Maximum Maximum 3.74%

"Disability" is generally defined as "loss or impairment of a physical or mental function resulting from injury or sickness."[27] Clearly, "disability" is not synonymous with "sickness" or "illness," the former being a potential effect of the latter. The schedule in Sec. 30 of the POEA SEC is a Schedule of Disability or Impediment for Injuries Suffered and Diseases or Illness Contracted. It is not a list of compensable sicknesses. Unlike the 2000 POEA SEC,[28] nowhere in the 1996 POEA SEC is there a list of "Occupational Diseases." The unqualified phrase "during the term" in Section 20(B) of the 1996 POEA SEC covers all injury or illness occurring in the lifetime of the contract. The injury or illness need not be shown to be work-related. In Sealanes Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, [29] we categorically held: The argument of petitioners that since cancer of the pancreas is not an occupational disease it was incumbent upon Capt. Arante to prove that his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the same, is not meritorious. It must be noted that his claims arose from the stipulations of the standard format contract entered into between him and SEACORP which, per 31

Circular No. 2, Series of 1984[30] of respondent POEA was required to be adopted and used by all parties to the employment of any Filipino seamen (sic) on board any ocean-going vessel. His claims are not rooted from the provisions of the New Labor Code as amended. Significantly, under the contract, compensability of the death or illness of seam[e]n need not be dependent upon whether it is work connected or not. Therefore, proof that the working conditions increased the risk of contracting a disease or illness, is not required to entitle a seaman who dies during the term thereof by reason of such disease or illness, of the benefits stipulated thereunder which are, under Section C(2) of the same Circular No. 2, separate and distinct from, and in addition to whatever benefits which the seaman is entitled to under Philippine laws. (emphasis supplied)

collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects."[38] Thus, the Court has applied the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability to the case of seafarers. In Philippine Transmarine Carriers v. NLRC,[39] seaman Carlos Nietes was found to be suffering from congestive heart failure and cardiomyopathy and was declared as unfit to work by the company-accredited physician. The Court affirmed the award of disability benefits to the seaman, citing ECC v. Sanico,[40] GSIS v. CA,[41] and Bejerano v. ECC[42] that "disability should not be understood more on its medical significance but on the loss of earning capacity. Permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that [he] was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of [his] mentality and attainment could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness." It likewise cited Bejerano v. ECC,[43] that in a disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity. The same principles were cited in the more recent case of Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad.[44] In addition, the Court cited GSIS v. Cadiz[45] and Ijares v. CA[46]that "permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body." Finally. Applying the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability to the facts on record, is petitioner entitled to permanent total disability benefit? Petitioner contends that the certification of the company-designated physician that he may go back to sea duty as a piano or guitar player after 8-10 months even if his job was a drummer proves that he suffered from permanent total disability and thus entitled to permanent total disability benefits of US$60,000.00 under the 1996 POEA SEC. Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that: 1) petitioner did not present any proof that he suffered from permanent total disability, i.e., that his earning power is now reduced and that he is incapable of performing remunerative employment; 2) petitioner did not present any medical certificate showing that he suffered any disability; 3) on the contrary, the company-designated physician attested that petitioner could return to further sea duty; 4) even if he could not go back to sea duty, this does not mean that his earning capacity is impaired since as a musician, he may still perform on land; and 5) having admitted that he was a heavy smoker, petitioner is disqualified under Section 20(d) of the 1996 POEA SEC from recovering compensation for any incapacity or disability he suffered. There are three kinds of disability benefits under the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. No. 626: (1) temporary total disability, (2) permanent total disability, and (3) permanent partial disability. Section 2, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code differentiates the disabilities as follows: Sec. 2. Disability.-- (a) A total disability is temporary if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period not exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules. (b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X[47] of these Rules. (c) A disability is partial and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee suffers a permanent partial loss of the use of any part of his body. (emphasis supplied) 32

This principle was reiterated in the recent case of Seagull Shipmanagement and Transport, Inc. v. NLRC.[31] While indeed, the Labor Code's provisions on disability benefits under the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) require the element of work-relation for an illness to be compensable, the 1996 POEA SEC giving a more liberal provision in favor of the seafarer must apply. As a rule, stipulations in an employment contract not contrary to statutes, public policy, public order or morals have the force of law between the contracting parties. [32] In controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements and writing should be resolved in the formers favor.[33] The policy is to extend the doctrine to a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the law, in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection of labor. [34] Second. Is the Labor Code's concept of permanent total disability applicable to the case at bar? Petitioner claims to have suffered from permanent total disability as defined under Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code, viz: Art. 192 (c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent: (1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise provided in the Rules; xxx

Petitioner likewise cites Vicente v. ECC and Abaya, Jr. v. ECC, both of which were decided applying the Labor Code provisions on disability benefits. Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that petitioner erred in applying the definition of "permanent total disability" under the Labor Code and cases decided under the ECC as the instant case involves a contractual claim under the 1996 POEA SEC. Again, we rule for petitioner. The standard employment contract for seafarers was formulated by the POEA pursuant to its mandate under E.O. No. 247 to "secure the best terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers and ensure compliance therewith" and to "promote and protect the well-being of Filipino workers overseas."[37] Section 29 of the 1996 POEA SEC itself provides that "[a]ll rights and obligations of the parties to [the] Contract, including the annexes thereof, shall be governed by the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, international conventions, treaties and covenants where the Philippines is a signatory." Even without this provision, a contract of labor is so impressed with public interest that the New Civil Code expressly subjects it to "the special laws on labor unions,

[35]

[36]

In Vicente v. ECC:

[48]

piano or guitar player means that the likelihood of petitioner returning to his usual work as a drummer was practically nil. From this, it is pristine clear that petitioner's disability is total and permanent. Private respondents' contention that it was not shown that it was impossible for petitioner to play the drums during the 8-10 months that he was on land is specious. To our minds, petitioner's unfitness to work attached to the nature of his job rather than to its place of performance. Indeed, playing drums per se requires physical exertion, speed and endurance. It demands the performance of hitting strokes and repetitive movements that petitioner, having undergone a triple coronary bypass, has become incapacitated to do. The possibility that petitioner could work as a drummer at sea again does not negate the claim for permanent total disability benefits. In the same case of Crystal Shipping, Inc., we held: Petitioners tried to contest the above findings [of permanent total disability] by showing that respondent was able to work again as a chief mate in March 2001. (citation omitted) Nonetheless, this information does not alter the fact that as a result of his illness, respondent was unable to work as a chief mate for almost three years. The law does not require that the illness should be incurable. What is important is that he was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability.[56] (emphasis supplied)

x x x the test of whether or not an employee suffers from permanent total disability is a showing of the capacity of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred. Thus, if by reason of the injury or sickness he sustained, the employee is unable to perform his customary job for more than 120 days and he does not come within the coverage of Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensability (which, in more detailed manner, describes what constitutes temporary total disability), then the said employee undoubtedly suffers from permanent total disability regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. (emphases supplied)

A total disability does not require that the employee be absolutely disabled, or totally paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury must be such that the employee cannot pursue her usual work and earn therefrom.[49] On the other hand, a total disability is considered permanent if it lasts continuously for more than 120 days.[50] Thus, in the very recent case of Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad,[51] we held: Permanent disability is inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.[52] x x x Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do.[53] It does not mean absolute helplessness. In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity.[54]

That the company-designated physician did not specify that petitioner suffered from any disability should not prejudice petitioner's claim for disability benefits. In the first place, it is well to note that it was respondent agency which referred petitioner to the American Outpatient Clinic giving only the specific instruction that the designated physician indicate in the medical report "the estimated treatment period and the exam conducted."[57] Moreover, what is important is that the facts stated in the medical report clearly constitute permanent total disability as defined by law. It is well-settled that strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation and disability benefits.[58]Disability should not be understood more on its medical significance but on the loss of earning capacity.[59] As in the case of Crystal Shipping, Inc.,[60] an award of permanent total disability benefits in the petition at bar would be germane to the purpose of the benefit, which is to help the employee in making ends meet at the time when he is unable to work. We do not agree that petitioner's admission that he was a heavy smoker is enough ground to disqualify him from entitlement to disability compensation under Section 20(D) of the 1996 POEA SEC, viz: Section 20.D. No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death of the seafarer resulting from his willful or criminal act, provided however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to the seafarer.

Applying the foregoing standards, we find that petitioner suffered from permanent total disability. It is undisputed that petitioner started to suffer chest pains on March 16, 1998 and was repatriated on April 23, 1998 after having been found as "not fit for duty." The medical report dated June 25, 1998 of the company-designated physician, Dr. Abesamis, establishes the following facts, viz: a) petitioner underwent a coronary bypass on April 2, 1998; b) petitioner was "unfit" from April 27, 1998 (date of referral) to June 25, 1998 (date of medical report); c) petitioner may not return to sea duty within 8-10 months after June 25, 1998; and d) petitioner may return to sea duty as a piano or guitar player after 8-10 months from June 25, 1998. These facts clearly prove that petitioner was unfit to work as drummer for at least 11-13 months -- from the onset of his ailment on March 16, 1998 to 8-10 months afterJune 25, 1998. This, by itself, already constitutes permanent total disability. What is more, private respondents were well aware that petitioner was working for them as a drummer, as proven by the communication of respondent principal to respondent agency referring to petitioner as " DRUMMER WITH OUR ENCHANTED ISLE QUARTET."[55] Thus, the certification that petitioner may go back specifically as a 33

We have held that a worker brings with him possible infirmities in the course of his employment and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of the employees, he takes them as he finds them and assumes the risk of liability.[61] In the case at bar, it is noteworthy that petitioner's habit of smoking was not a consideration when private respondents hired petitioner. It was likewise not shown that petitioner suffered from any form of ailment prior to the heart ailment he suffered during the course of his employment with private respondents. While smoking may contribute to the development of a heart ailment, heart ailment may

be caused by other factors such as working and living under stressful conditions. Thus, private respondents' peremptory presumption, that petitioner's habit of smoking heavily was the willful act which caused his illness and resulting disability, without more, cannot suffice to bar petitioner's claim for disability benefits. Ruling otherwise would run contrary to the constitutional mandate to extend full protection to labor. Having suffered from permanent total disability, petitioner is entitled to US$60,000.00 which is the amount due for permanent total disability under Section 30-A of the 1996 POEA SEC. As to the claim for sickness allowance, petitioner prays that private respondents be held jointly and severally liable to pay him US$3,428.00, as opposed to the award of the Labor Arbiter, as affirmed by the NLRC and the CA, of only US$3,400.00. We find this claim warranted by the undisputed fact on record that petitioner's basic salary is US$857.00 per month.[62] Multiplying the 120-day sickness allowance due petitioner on the basis of the correct monthly rate of US$857.00, he should be awarded US$3,428.00 as sickness allowance. Under Article 2208 of the New Civil Code, attorney's fees can be recovered in actions for the recovery of wages of laborers and actions for indemnity under employer's liability laws. Attorney's fees is also recoverable when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest. Such conditions being present in the case at bar, we find that an award of attorney's fees is warranted. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 67782 dated March 31, 2003 and August 14, 2003, respectively, areREVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private respondents are held jointly and severally liable to pay petitioner: a) permanent total disability benefits of US$60,000.00 at its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment; b) sickness allowance of US$3,428.00 at its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment; and c) attorney's fees of ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award at its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment. Costs against private respondents. SO ORDERED.

The Antecedents Bestow Ocean Unia Trading Pte. Ltd. (Bestow) is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines through its agent Gau Sheng Philippines, Inc. (Gau Sheng), a licensed manning agency. On June 8, 1993, Roberto L. Joaquin signed a contract with Bestow, through Gau Sheng, under which he was hired as a fisherman on board the MV Bestow Ocean with a salary of US$250, with working time of forty-eight hours a week for a period of one year. 3 Roberto boarded the vessel on September 23, 1993. After twenty-eight (28) days at sea, he fell ill and had to be repatriated to the Philippines on October 21, 1993, per his request. Upon his arrival in the Philippines, he and his wife, Estella Joaquin, went to the office of Gau Sheng and requested medical treatment for his illness and financial assistance, which was, however, rejected. They went home to Pangasinan, their home province. Robertos illness worsened and he had to be confined and treated at the Villaflor Hospital in Dagupan City. He later became an outpatient at the National Kidney Institute. On August 25, 1994, or eight (8) months after his repatriation, he succumbed to chronic renal failure. 4 Estella filed a complaint before the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) 5 against Gau Sheng and Bestow for death compensation, docketed as POEA Case No. ADJ(M) 94-08-2608.6 She claimed that she and her children by her deceased husband were entitled to compensation, considering that her husband became ill during his employment with Bestow and died during the effectivity of their contract. She invoked Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1994 of the POEA. 7 For their part, Bestow and Gau Sheng denied any liability for the death of Roberto, contending that it was impossible for the latter to have acquired and developed chronic renal failure on board the vessel MV Bestow Ocean for a period of less than a month. They averred that the complainant failed to prove that Roberto contracted the said illness while on board the said vessel and that the risk of contracting the said illness was increased by his working conditions. Moreover, the Employees Compensation Commission did not include chronic renal failure as an occupational disease. They pointed out that Roberto was given financial assistance for his medical check-up, and that Memorandum Circular No. 5 did not apply to Roberto because he died eight (8) months after he was repatriated.8 Ruling of the Labor Arbiter On February 28, 1997, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a decision declaring Robertos death compensable and holding Gau Sheng and Bestow solidarily liable for the payment of death compensation to the complainant: In fine, respondents are liable in solidum to the complainant in the following amounts less whatever had already been extended to him by way of financial assistance. a) death benefits in the sum of US$1,000.00 or its peso equivalent;

G.R. No. 144665

September 8, 2004

GAU SHENG PHILS., INC. and BESTOW OCEAN UNIA TRADING PTE. LTD., petitioners, vs. ESTELLA JOAQUIN, respondent. DECISION CALLEJO, SR., J.: Before us for review is the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54596, holding the petitioners solidarily liable for compensation arising from the death of Roberto L. Joaquin. 34

b) four (4) months pay at US$200 a month or US$1,000 or its peso equivalent; and c) medical expenses incurred in the Philippines which was not quantified.

CONFORMABLY WITH THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondents in solidum to pay the complainant the peso equivalent of the disposition above which is hereby incorporated herein less the amount of financial assistance already received by complainant.9 The LA declared that Roberto was already suffering from chronic renal failure while on board the vessel MV Bestow Ocean and was repatriated to the Philippines while his contract was subsisting. He rejected the claim of Gau Sheng and Bestow that Roberto was already suffering from kidney renal failure even before his employment, as the latter was issued a clean bill of health by the designated physician who conducted a physical examination on him prior to embarkation. The LA based the award on the POEA Standard Employment Contract in force at the time of Robertos death. Gau Sheng and Bestow appealed the decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). In a Resolution dated July 26, 1999, the NLRC granted the appeal and dismissed the complaint: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is hereby given due course. This case should be, as it is, hereby dismissed for lack of merit. 10 The NLRC ruled that under Subsection 4-C, Section C, Part II of the POEA Standard Employment Contract,11Roberto was required to submit to a post-medical examination conducted by the companydesignated physician, but failed to do so. It held that aside from the death certificate indicating that Roberto died of chronic renal failure, the complainant failed to present any medical certificate or any documentary evidence to support her claim for death compensation. Further, Roberto was repatriated twenty-eight (28) days after his deployment and died of chronic renal failure several months thereafter; although his pre-employment medical examination showed that he was fit to work, it did not necessarily mean that he did not have kidney trouble before he sought employment from Bestow. Since there was no evidence to show that he contracted the disease during the term of his employment, the same cannot be said to be compensable. The NLRC, likewise, pointed out that the death benefits awarded to the four children of Roberto had no basis because the complainant failed to show their filiation. 12 Aggrieved, Estella filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54596. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals The CA, in a decision dated April 28, 2000, reversed and set aside the July 26, 1999 Resolution of the NLRC. The dispositive portion is quoted, infra: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated July 26, 1999 is SET ASIDE, and the decision of Labor Arbiter Melquiades Sol D. Del Rosario is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as follows: "In fine, private respondents, Gau Sheng Phils., and Bestow Ocean Unia Trading Pte., Ltd., are liable in solidum to the complainant in the following amounts less whatever had already been extended to him by way of financial assistance:

a) death benefit in the sum of US$11,000 or its peso equivalent; b) funeral benefit in the sum of US$1,000 or its peso equivalent; and c) four (4) months pay at US$250 a month or US$1,000 or its peso equivalent."13 In reversing the resolution of the NLRC, the CA ruled that the compensability of an ailment does not depend on whether the injury or disease is work-related or aggravated his condition. It stressed that in order for an employee to recover compensation, it is not required that an employee be in perfect condition or health at the time he received the ailment or that he be free from disease. 14 Citing the case of More Maritime Agencies, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 15 the CA stated that while the employer is not the insurer of the health of his employees, he takes them as he finds them; he assumes the risk of having a weakened condition aggravated by some injury which might not hurt or bother a perfectly normal, healthy person. If the injury is the proximate cause of his death or disability for which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the employee is unimportant and recovery may be had for injury, independent of any pre-existing weakness or disease. The CA went on to say that there was at least a reasonable c onnection between Robertos job and his kidney infection, which eventually developed into chronic renal failure and ultimately caused his death. The CA also held that Robertos failure to comply with the seventy -two-(72)-hour post-medical examination, as required by the provisions of the POEA Standard Employment Contract, cannot be used to avoid payment of death compensation benefits. Estella could not be expected to travel from Lingayen, Pangasinan to Manila to inform Gau Sheng and Bestow of her husbands condition. The CA stressed that the POEA Standard Employment Contract is designed primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels. Its provision must, therefore, be construed and applied fairly, reasonably and liberally or for the benefit of the seamen and their dependents. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was dismissed. Hence, the instant petition. The Present Petition The petitioners allege that the appellate court committed the following errors: I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE THE COMMISSIONS DECISION, THERE BEING NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE COMMISSION. II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DEATH OF ROBERTO JOAQUIN WAS COMPENSABLE FOR LACK OF FACTUAL BASIS. III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING DEATH BENEFITS. BURIAL BENEFITS AND THE AMOUNT EQUIVALENT TO FOUR (4) MONTHS SALARY OF ROBERTO JOAQUIN.16 35

According to the petitioners, the respondent failed to show that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying her claim. The petitioners emphasize that the cause of Robertos death was not among those listed as compensable under the POEA Standard Employment Contract. Considering that Roberto himself requested for his release from the contract of employment and was, thus, repatriated on October 21, 1993, he was no longer an employee of the petitioners at the time of his death. They contend that the respondent failed to show that Robertos death was compensable, and that his death certificate is insufficient to show that he was ill when he was repatriated; that he was admitted to the hospital for the same illness; and that said illness caused his death. The petitioners stress that Robertos failure to comply with the post-medical examination requirement under Subsection 4-C, Section C, Part II of the POEA Standard Employment Contract prevented the allowance of the respondents claim for death compensation. For her part, Estella, the respondent, insists that the CA had judiciously resolved the pivotal issue of the compensability of Robertos death; hence, it did not commit any error in ruling that it was compensable.lavvphil.net The pivotal issue for resolution is whether or not Robertos death is compensable.

d. The employer shall pay the seaman his basic wages from the time he leaves the vessel for medical treatment. After discharge from the vessel, the seaman is entitled to one hundred percent (100%) of his basic wages until he is declared fit to work of the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician, but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days. For this purpose, the seaman shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by the company-designated physician within THREE WORKING DAYS upon his return EXCEPT WHEN HE IS PHYSICALLY INCAPACITATED TO DO SO, IN WHICH CASE A WRITTEN NOTICE TO THE AGENCY WITHIN THE SAME PERIOD IS DEEMED AS COMPLIANCE. FAILURE OF THE SEAMAN TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY REPORTING REQUIREMENT SHALL RESULT IN HIS FORFEITURE OF THE RIGHT TO CLAIM THE ABOVE BENEFITS.19 In order to give effect to the aforequoted benefits, it must be shown that the employee died during the effectivity of the contract of employment. Per Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1989, as incorporated in the Standard Employment Contract Governing the Employment of All Filipino Seamen On Board Ocean-Going Vessels, employment is deemed terminated in the following instances: SECTION H. TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT

In petitions for review, only questions of law may be raised, except, if the factual findings of the appellate court are mistaken, absurd, speculative, conjectural, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings culled by the court of origin.17 Due to the irreconcilable findings of the LA and the CA on the one hand, and the NLRC on the other, we are constrained to review the petition. A review of Robertos employment contract revealed that provision number two (2) specifically provided that the terms and conditions of the revised employment contract for seafarers approved by the POEA/DOLE on July 14, 1989 under Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1989, and amendments shall apply.18 Pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1989, as incorporated in the Standard Employment Contract Governing the Employment of All Filipino Seamen On Board Ocean-Going Vessels, which was in force during the employment of Roberto, the beneficiaries of an employee who died during the effectivity of the contract may claim compensation and benefits in case of death during the term of his contract: 7. Compensation and Benefits: a. In case of death of the seaman during the term of his contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the PHILIPPINE CURRENCY EQUIVALENT TO THE AMOUNT OF: c. IN ALL CASES, THE EMPLOYER SHALL PAY THE BENEFICIARIES OF SEAMEN THE PHILIPPINE CURRENCY EQUIVALENT TO THE AMOUNT OF US$1,000 FOR BURIAL EXPENSES AT THE EXCHANGE RATE PREVAILING DURING THE TIME OF PAYMENT.

The employment of the seaman shall cease upon expiration of the contract period indicated in the Crew Contract unless the Master and the Seaman, by mutual consent, IN WRITING, agree to an early termination. IN WHICH CASE THE SEAMAN IS ENTITLED TO EARNED WAGES AND BENEFITS ONLY.20 Upon the mutual consent of Roberto and the petitioners, he (Roberto) was repatriated on October 21, 1993, or merely twenty-eight (28) days after he was deployed. Thus, his employment had been effectively terminated on that particular date. Based on Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1989, Section 5(a), as incorporated in the Standard Employment Contract Governing the Employment of All Filipino Seamen On Board Ocean-Going Vessels, Roberto is only entitled to earned wages and benefits. Considering that his employment had been terminated on October 21, 1993, he was no longer an employee of the petitioners when he died on June 25, 1994. Thus, the CA erred in applying Section 7 of Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1989. Moreover, death compensation benefits cannot be awarded unless there is substantial evidence showing that (a) the cause of Robertos death was reasonably connected with his work; or (b) the sickness for which he died is an accepted occupational disease; or (c) his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease for which he died. 21 We note that Roberto died of chronic renal failure, 22 a disease not listed as a compensable illness under Appendix 1 of the Standard Employment Contract. In fact, the list is limited only to the loss of kidney and spleen and residuals of impairment of intra-abdominal organs which require regular aid and attendance that will unable the worker to seek any gainful employment and hernia secondary to trauma or strain. Similarly, the Employees Compensation Commission does not list chronic renal failure as an occupational disease.23 For the increased risk theory to apply in compensation cases, we held in Rio v. Employees Compensation Commission24 that the claimant must adduce reasonable proof between the work of the deceased and the cause of his death, or that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the deceaseds working conditions: 36

Under the Labor Code, as amended, the beneficiaries of an employee are entitled to death benefits if the cause of death is sickness listed as occupational disease by the ECC; or any other illness caused by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions. The primary and antecedent causes of Virgilio Rios death are not listed as occupational diseases. Hence, petitioner should have presented substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, showing that the nature of her husbands employment or working conditions increased the risk of uremia, chronic renal failure or chronic glomerulonephritis. This, the petitioner failed to do. Petitioner did not adduce any proof of a reasonable connection between the work of the deceased and the cause of his death. There was no showing that the progression of the disease was brought about largely by the conditions in Virgilios job. Indeed, petitioner presented no medical history, records or physicians report, in order to substantiate her claim that the working conditions at the Port Area increased the risk of uremia, renal failure or glomerulonephritis. As we ruled in Sante v. Employees Compensation Commission, "x x x a claimant must submit such proof as would constitute a reasonable basis for concluding either that the conditions of employment of the claimant caused the ailment or that such working conditions had aggravated the risk of contracting that ailment. What kind and quantum of evidence would constitute an adequate basis for a reasonable man (not necessarily a medical scientist) to reach one or the other conclusion, can obviously be determined only on a case-to-case basis. That evidence must, however, be real and substantial, and not merely apparent; for the duty to prove work-causation or work-aggravation imposed by existing law is real x x x not merely apparent. "25 It, thus, behooved the respondent to show a reasonable connection between Robertos work and the cause of his death; or that the risk of contracting chronic renal failure was increased by Robertos working conditions. The respondent must submit such proof as would constitute as a reasonable basis for concluding either that the conditions of employment of the claimant caused the ailment or that such working conditions had aggravated the risk of contracting that ailment. However, the respondent failed to do so. There is no showing that the progression of the disease was brought about largely by the conditions in Robertos job as a fisherman. His medical history, medical records, or physicians reports, were not even presented in order to substantiate the respondents claim that the working conditions on board MV Bestow Ocean increased the risk of contracting chronic renal failure. In Harrisons Principles of Internal Medicine, chronic renal failure is described in the following manner: Chronic renal failure results from progressive and irreversible destruction of nephrons, regardless of cause (Chap. 237). This diagnosis implies that GFR is known to have been reduced for at least 3 to 6 months (see Table 233-1). Often a gradual decline in GFR occurs over a period of years. Proof of chronicity is also provided by the demonstration of bilateral reduction of kidney size by scout film, ultrasonography, intravenous pyelography, or tomography. Other findings of long-standing renal failure, such as renal osteodyastrophy or symptoms of uremia, also help to establish this syndrome. Several laboratory abnormalities are often regarded as reliable indicators of chronicity of renal disease, such as anemia, hyperphosphatemia or hypocalcemia, but there are not specific (Chap. 235). In contrast, the finding of broad casts in the urinary sediment (Chap. 44) is specific for chronic 37

renal failure, the wide diameters of these casts reflecting the compensatory dilation and hypertrophy of surviving nephrons. Protenuria is a frequent but nonspecific finding, as is hematuria. Chronic obstructive uropathy polycystic and medullary cystic disease, analgesic nephrophaty, and the inactive end stage of any chronic tubulointerstitial nephrophaty are conditions in which the urine often contains little or no protein cells, or casts even though nephron destruction has progressed to chronic renal failure.26 We do not agree with the respondents claim that by the issuance of a clean bill of health to Roberto, made by the physicians selected/accredited by the petitioners, it necessarily follows that the illness for which her husband died was acquired during his employment as a fisherman for the petitioners. The pre-employment medical examination conducted on Roberto could not have divulged the disease for which he died, considering the fact that most, if not all, are not so exploratory.27 The decrease of GFR, which is an indicator of chronic renal failure, is measured thru the renal function test. 28 In preemployment examination, the urine analysis (urinalysis), which is normally included, measures only the creatinine,29 the presence of which cannot conclusively indicate chronic renal failure. The respondent claims that Roberto was repatriated due to illness. She relates that upon Robertos arrival in the Philippines, he was already seriously ill and that his body was bloated. 30 She, however, failed to adduce substantial evidence that the aforesaid illness which led to Robertos request to be repatriated was also the same disease that caused his death. Neither was it shown that Robertos illness at the time he was repatriated was related to the cause of his death. In the absence of substantial evidence, Robertos working conditions cannot be assumed to have increased the risk of contracting chronic renal failure. In its July 26, 1999 Resolution, the NLRC stated that the respondent should have submitted Roberto to a post-medical examination within three (3) working days upon his return or in case of his incapacity, a written notice to the agency within the same period, in accordance with Section 4-C, Section C, Part II of the Standard Employment Contract. While we agree with the CA that compliance with Section 4-C, Section C, Part II of the Standard Employment Contract can be dispensed with, there must be a basis for the award of death compensation. The death of a seaman several months after his repatriation for illness does not necessarily mean that (a) the seaman died of the same illness; (b) his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the illness which caused his death; and (c) the death is compensable, unless there is some reasonable basis to support otherwise. The respondent insists that as held by the CA, Robertos condition prevented him from undergoing a medical examination and that she could not be expected to travel from Lingayen, Pangasinan to Manila to notify the petitioners of her husbands condition. This may well have been the case; however, without a post-medical examination or its equivalent to show that the disease for which Roberto died was contracted during his employment or that his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the aforesaid ailment, the petitioners cannot be made liable for death compensation. Similarly, the other benefits, such as burial benefits and those allegedly owing to the deceaseds children cannot be made, especially considering that the respondent failed to substantiate her claim that the four (4) children are the minor children of deceased. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54596 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The July 26, 1999 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission is hereby REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 142392. September 26, 2000]

"Petitioner filed on March 9, 1999, a "PETITION FOR REVIEW" under Rule 43 of the 1997 Civil Procedure with a "MOTION TO LITIGATE AS PAUPER LITIGANT". On March 18, 1999, this Court granted the Petitioner's "Motion to Litigate as Pauper" and ordered the Public Respondent to file its Comment on the Petition. The Public Respondent did file its Comment on the Petition. "The Petitioner insists in her Petition at bench that the nature of her employment and the working conditions in her place of employment exacerbated the risks of contracting Atherosclerotic Heart disease, Atrial Fibrillation, Cardiac arrhythmia. Hence, the Public Respondent committed a reversible error in finding and declaring that Petitioner did not contract the disease that bedeviled her due to her work and working conditions and that Petitioner's nature of employment did not predispose her to contract the disease and, hence, the Petitioner was not entitled to her claim."[3] On October 25, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition, ruling that petitioner's illness was not compensable because petitioner failed to adduce substantial evidence proving any of the conditions of compensability.[4] Hence, this appeal.[5] The issues in this appeal are whether petitioner's illness is compensable, as work-related, and whether there was sufficient evidence of compensability. We reverse the appealed decision. Petitioner's illness is compensable. "Under the Labor Code, as amended, the law applicable to the case at bar, in order for the employee to be entitled to sickness or death benefits, the sickness or death resulting therefrom must be or must have resulted from either (a) any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or (b) any illness caused by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions."[6] In other words, "for a sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the said sickness must be an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of said Rules,[7] otherwise, the claimant or employee concerned must prove that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working condition." [8] The Court of Appeals ruled that "atherosclerotic heart disease, atrial fibrillation, cardiac arrhythmia" from which petitioner suffered falls under the classification "cardiovascular diseases" and under Resolution No. 432, dated July 20, 1977 of the Employees' Compensation Commission, cardiovascular disease is listed as compensable occupational disease provided that substantial evidence is adduced to prove any of the following conditions: "a) If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment there must be proof that an acute exacerbation clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reason of the nature of his work. "b) The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and must be followed within twenty four (24) hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac insult to constitute causal relationship. "c) If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before subjecting himself to strain of work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship."[9] In this case, petitioner has shown by uncontroverted evidence that in the course of her employment, due to work related stress, she suffered from severe chest pains which caused her to take a rest, per physician's advice, and ultimately to resign from her employment. She was diagnosed 38

DOMINGA A. SALMONE, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, respondents.

DECISION PARDO, J.: The case before the Court is an appeal via certiorari from the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dismissing petitioner's appeal from the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission[2] affirming the denial by the Social Security System of her claim for compensation benefits under P. D. No. 626, as amended. The Employees' Compensation Commission denied petitioner's claim because there was no substantial evidence showing that her illness--atherosclerotic heart disease, atrial fabrillation and cardiac arrhythmia--was occupational or work-connected in her position for fourteen (14) years as overall custodian and officer in charge of the sewing department (of her employer Paul Geneve Entertainment Corporation), in constant exposure to physical stress and emotional and psychological pressure causing chest pains and bouts of cardiac arrhythmia. The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows: "Sometime in 1982, the Petitioner was employed as sewer by the Paul Geneve Entertainment Corporation, a corporation engaged in the business of sewing costumes, gowns and casual and formal dresses. She was later promoted as the officer-in-charge and the over-all custodian in the Sewing Department, more particularly the procurement of all the materials needed by the Sewing Department as well as insuring the quality of the products from the sewing department. "Sometime in the early part of 1996, Petitioner started to feel chest pains. In April, 1996, she filed a leave of absence from work as the chest pains became unbearable. Per results of Petitioner's Medical examination conducted by Dr. Claudio Saratan, Jr., Medical Specialist I, holding clinic at the Manila Sanitarium in Pasay City, and in St. Claire's Hospital at Dian Street corner Boyle, Manila, Petitioner was found suffering from Atherosclerotic heart disease, Atrial Fibrillation, Cardiac Arrhythmia (Annex "D", Petition). Upon recommendation of her doctor, Petitioner resigned from her work hoping that with a much-needed complete rest, she will be cured. "Petitioner later filed a disability claim with the SSS from the Employees' Compensation Fund, under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. The SSS denied Petitioner's claim. The Petitioner filed on August 27, 1998, a "Motion for Reconsideration" with the SSS but the latter denied Petitioner's motion. Dissatisfied, the Petitioner appealed from the said Decision to the Public Respondent. On January 15, 1999, the Public Respondent rendered a Decision denying her appeal, the decretal portion of which reads: "WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent System appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, and this case DISMISSED for want of merit." (at p. 28, Rollo)

as suffering from "atherosclerotic heart disease, atrial fibrillation, cardiac arrhythmia" which, as heretofore stated, is included within the term cardiovascular diseases.[10] Indisputably, cardiovascular diseases, which, as herein above-stated include atherosclerotic heart disease, atrial fibrillation, cardiac arrhythmia, are listed as compensable occupational diseases in the Rules of the Employees' Compensation Commission, hence, no further proof of casual relation between the disease and claimant's work is necessary. [11] Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was no substantial evidence supporting the finding that petitioner's illness was an occupational disease compensable under P. D. No. 626, as amended. The degree of proof required under P. D. No. 626, is merely substantial evidence, which means, "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."[12] The claimant must show, at least, by substantial evidence that the development of the disease is brought largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job. What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable. Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection. Probability, not certainty, is the touchtone.[13] WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari and REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52027 dismissing the appeal from the denial of petitioner's claim by the Employees Compensation Commission. In lieu thereof, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission and orders the Social Security System to pay petitioner full disability benefits as provided for under P. D. No. 626, as amended. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 136453

September 21, 2000

PETRITA Y. BONILLA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents. DECISION PARDO, J.: The case before the Court is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals that denied petitioner's appeal from the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission affirming the denial by the Government Service Insurance System of her claim for compensation benefits under P. D. No. 626, as amended. The Government Service Insurance System denied petitioner's claim because her illness--"Rhegmatogenous Retinal Detachment, OD"--is neither listed as an occupational ailment nor work connected or the risk of contracting it was increased by the nature of her employment.1 The facts, taken from the findings of the Court of Appeals, are as follows: Petitioner was born on March 2, 1941, in Cantilan, Surigao del Sur. She joined the government service on June 05, 1959, as stenographer in the Court of First Instance, Surigao City. On August 11, 1970, she transferred to the Court of First Instance of Manila, where she served as court stenographer until 1987. On August 03, 1987, she transferred to the Senate of the Philippines as Legislative Staff Officer IV, and on July 01, 1989, she was promoted to her present position of Legislative Staff Officer V. During the first week of April 1995, she experienced sudden blurring of vision on her right eye. On April 28, 1995, she underwent "Scleral Buckling surgery, OD" and was discharged on April 30, 1995, with the following diagnosis: "Rhegmatogenous retinal detachment, OD." 2 On June 08, 1995, petitioner filed with the Government Service Insurance System a claim for compensation benefits under P. D. No. 626, as amended. On June 15, 1995, the Government Service Insurance System denied the claim on the ground that her ailment was not an occupational disease, and neither was there any showing that her position as Legal (sic) Staff Officer V at the Senate, Manila had increased the risk of contracting said ailment.3 On July 12, 1995, petitioner underwent "cyropexy of retinal break, OS" after which she was diagnosed suffering from "Latice Degeneration with silent retinal break, OS".4 On appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission, on January 26, 1996, the latter affirmed the ruling holding that petitioner's ailment was not precipitated by her employment as the etiology of her ailment points to degenerative changes in each eye which means that said ailment is degenerative in nature and not inherent among legal officers.5

39

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals via petition for review.6 On July 28, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision denying the petition, ruling that petitioner has not come up with relevant evidence to substantiate her submission that her ailment is work connected or related to qualify her for employee compensation benefits under P. D. No. 626, as amended.7 Hence, this appeal.8 At issue in this appeal is whether petitioner's illness is work connected or the risk of contracting the ailment was increased by the working conditions so as to entitle her to compensation for total partial disability under P. D. No. 626, as amended. We rule that petitioner's illness is work-connected and thus compensable. We reverse the appealed decision.

No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 132558 May 9, 2000 BEBERISA RIO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.: Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, under which petitioner seeks compensation benefits defines compensable sickness as "any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions."9 "Rhegmatogenous Retinal Detachment" from which petitioner suffered is not listed as an occupational disease. However, this will not bar petitioner's claim for benefits under the law if claimant adduces substantial evidence that the risk of contracting the illness is increased by the working conditions to which an employee is exposed to. In short, petitioner must show proof of reasonable work-connection of the ailment and her employment.10 In this case, petitioner has shown by uncontroverted evidence that since 1988, in the course of her employment with the Senate as Legislative Staff Officer V, not Legislative Legal Officer, as stated by the Government Service Insurance System in denying her claim, she suffered from hypertension caused by stress and tension during employment as court stenographer and legislative staff officer, which is an admitted cause of retinal detachment.11Consequently, the very nature of petitioner's ailment substantiates its work connection and increased risk. Reasonable work connection suffices for compensability. Probability, not certainty is the touchstone.12 Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was no relevant evidence supporting the finding that petitioner's illness was a disease proven as work connected or the risk of contracting the disease was increased by her working conditions, compensable under P. D. No. 626, as amended. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation. The degree of proof required under P. D. 626, is merely substantial evidence, which means, "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 13 WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari and REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 40890 that denied petitioner's claim for compensation benefits by the Government Service Insurance System. In lieu thereof, the Court grants petitioner's claim and orders the Government Service Insurance System to pay petitioner total partial disability benefits as provided under P. D. No. 626, as amended. Death benefits under the Labor Code, as amended, are awarded only when the cause of death is listed as an occupational disease by the Employees' Compensation Commission, or when the claimant presents proof that the working conditions increased the risk of contracting the fatal disease. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the June 30, 1997 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)2 in CA-GR SP No. 41257. The dispositive portion of the challenged CA Decision reads: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission is AFFIRMED, and the petition DISMISSED.3 The Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) affirmed by the CA disposed as follows: Based on the foregoing medical findings, it would appear that the etiology of deceased's ailment which caused his death is not attributable to his employment. Since the ailment is not deemed work-connected, the instant claim for death benefits cannot be given due course. WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Social Security System appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, and the instant case is dismissed for want of merit. 4 Petitioner also assails the January 29, 1998 Resolution5 of the appellate court denying reconsideration.

40

The Facts Virgilio T. Rio Sr., husband of herein petitioner, was employed by Allied Port Services Inc. as stevedore since July, 1982. His duties included: (1) handling of steel cargoes; (2) loading and unloading of silica sand; (3) handling, loading and unloading of lumber products; (4) supervising other stevedores; and (5) performing other related work.6 On July 19, 1992, Virgilio Rio collapsed while working at the South Harbor, Manila. He was rushed to the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) because of "melena, fever, chills and abdominal pains 8 days [prior to confinement] . . . ." He died three days later. According to the Medical Certificate issued by Fe B. Bais, chief of the PGH Medical Records Division, the cause of death was "uremia [secondary] to chronic renal failure. Chronic glomerulonephritis. . . ."7 Petitioner Beberisa Rio, his spouse, filed a claim for death benefits before the Social Security System (SSS). However, the SSS denied the claim in this wise:8 The cause of death of your husband cannot be considered work-connected because based on the clinical abstract you submitted, your husband had already on and off attack of edema and hypertension which are signs of kidney disease even before his employment with the company.9 On appeal, the ECC affirmed the findings of the SSS. 10 Ruling that petitioner failed to present relevant evidence to establish the causal connection between the deceased's ailment and his work as stevedore, the ECC held: Moreover, medical evaluation suggests that Uremia is the sine qua non of chronic renal failure. It results from the retention in the blood of urea and other end products of metabolism normally excreted into the urine. Chronic Renal Failure on the other hand, is a toxic clinical condition associated with renal insufficiency and retention in the blood of nitrogenous waste products. It may be due to the following: a) nephritis

Ruling of the Court of Appeals In affirming the ECC, the Court of Appeals ruled: Since petitioner failed to establish any causal connection of the disease which led to the death of her husband with the nature of his working conditions, and, in particular, that said working condition had increased the risk of contracting the disease, then the claim for death benefits must fail. The former law on compensation, the Workmen's Compensation Act, was replaced by a novel scheme in the New Labor Code under the title "Employees" Compensation and State Insurance Fund.' The new law discarded, among others, the concept of "presumption of compensability and aggravation" and substituted one based on social security principles. The purpose was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and employee's right to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability. . . . While as a rule, labor and social welfare legislation should be liberally construed in favor of the applicant, such liberal construction of labor laws may not be applied where the pertinent provisions of law are clear and leave no room for interpretation. 1 Hence, this Petition for Review. 14 Issue The lone issue submitted for this Court's resolution is: Whether . . . petitioner's claim for death benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended, shall prosper under the increased risk theory. 15 This Court's Ruling b) congestive heart failure The Petition has no merit. c) couch syndrome Main Issue: d) poison Compensability of Rio's Death (Reference: Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, 11th Edition p. 1155). Based on the foregoing medical findings, it would appear that the etiology of deceased's ailment which caused his death is not attributable to his employment. Since the ailment is not deemed work-connected, the instant claim for death benefits cannot be given due course. 11 Under the Labor Code, as amended, 16 the beneficiaries of an employee are entitled to death benefits if the cause of death is a sickness listed as occupational disease by the ECC; or any other illness caused by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions. 17 The primary and antecedent causes of Virgilio Rio's death are not listed as occupational diseases. Hence, petitioner should have presented substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, showing that the nature of her 41

After the ECC denied the Motion for Reconsideration,

12

petitioner appealed to the CA.

husband's employment or working conditions increased the risk of uremia, chronic renal failure or chronic glomerulonephritis. 18 This the petitioner failed to do. Petitioner did not adduce any proof of a reasonable connection between the work of the deceased and the cause of his death. There was no showing that the progression of the disease was brought about largely by the conditions in Virgilio's job. Indeed, petitioner presented no medical history, records or physician's report in order to substantiate her claim that the working conditions at the Port Area increased the risk of uremia, renal failure or glomerulonephritis. 19 As we ruled in Sante v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 20 ". . . a claimant must submit such proof as would constitute a reasonable basis for concluding either that the conditions of employment of the claimant caused the ailment or that such working conditions had aggravated the risk of contracting that ailment. What kind and quantum of evidence would constitute an adequate basis for a reasonable man (not necessarily a medical scientist) to reach one or the other conclusion, can obviously be determined only on a case-to-case basis. That evidence must, however, be real and substantial, and not merely apparent; for the duty to prove work-causation or work-aggravation imposed by existing law is real . . . not merely apparent." At most, petitioner merely claims that: . . . The nature of his work required physical strength in handling cargoes and at the same time giving full attention in supervising his men as the group's leadman assigned at Del Pan Area. It is worth mentioning that in the place where the deceased was assigned, there were no available comfort rooms to enable him to answer the "call of nature". In effect, delayed urination was a reality, coupled with the fact that being the leadman of his group, his continuing physical presence at the work's premises was indispensable. . . . 21 Such bare allegation does not ipso facto make Virgilio's death compensable. Awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations or presumptions. 22 The beneficiaries must present evidence to prove a positive proposition. 2 While this Court has ruled that the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries, 24 it is likewise important to note that such sympathy must be balanced by the equally vital interest of denying undeserving claims for compensation. "Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers and their families to look to for compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases and deaths occur." 25 In this case, this Court has no other course but to apply the clear provisions of the law. 26 WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 105854

August 26, 1999

ANIANO E. IJARES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondent. PURISIMA, J.: At bar is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals 1, dated April 13, 1992, and the denial of the motion for reconsideration dated June 11, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 26910. The facts that matter are as follows: Petitioner was employed by the government on March 16, 1955 as a Researcher in the Institute of National Language of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). In 1983, he was diagnosed by Dr. Merlin B. Consing, a Phthisiologist, to have PTB Minimal and Emphysema. Since then, he has undergone medical treatment. From May 1 to 31, 1985, petitioner went on sick leave due to chronic emphysema. On June 1, 1985, he availed of early retirement under Presidential Decree No. 1146 bringing to a close thirty (30) years of public service. He was sixty (60) years old at the time of his retirement. Sometime in 1988, petitioner was confined at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) due to Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Diseases, Emphysema, PTB class IV and S/P Pneumothorax, Right. He underwent a Pulmonary Function Test which indicated Severe Obstructive Ventilatory Pattern unresponsive to Bronchodilator. Dr. Leon James Young of the UP-PGH Medical Center found petitioner be suffering from Permanent Total Disability.1wphi1.nt On January 5, 1989, petitioner filed with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) a claim for Permanent Total Disability benefits under P. D. No. 626. After his ailment was evaluated medically compensable he was only granted Permanent Partial Disability compensation, equivalent to a period of nineteen (19) months beginning June 1, 1985 to December 31, 1986. His subsequent request for an award of his original claim was denied by the System on the ground that the petitioner was already awarded the maximum benefits commensurate to the degree of his disability at the time of retirement. The matter was elevated to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) which, in due, time affirmed the finding of the GSIS, ratiocinating thus: After going over the records of the case under consideration, we agree with the decision of the respondent System in denying appellant's claim for additional compensation. Under the ECC Schedule of Compensation, appellant was already awarded the maximum benefits commensurate to the degree of his disability at the time of his retirement from the service. The confinement of appellant at the Philippine General Hospital sometime in January, 1988 due to PTB, minimal with Pulmonary Emphysema, Bilateral, could not be attributed to his employment considering that he retired from the service on June 1, 1985, hence, the risk of his employment aggravating his PTB was unlikely. For any progression of a retired employee's condition after the date of his retirement is no longer within the compensatory coverage of P. D. 626, as amended, since severance of an employee-employer relationship results to the release of the State Insurance Fund from any liability in the event of sickness and resulting disability or death after such retirement or separation from the service. Thus, 42

claim of appellant for additional compensation benefits could not be given favorable consideration. On appeal, the Court of Appeals came out with the assailed decision affirming the disposition of the respondent Commission. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration suffered the same fate. Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition for review on certiorari theorizing that:2 A. Respondent Court erred in finding that Rule XI Section 1 of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation and the case of FLORANTE E. DALUYON VS. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION (G.R. No. 85133, 15 October 1992) do not apply. B. Respondent Court erred in finding that the ailment acquired during employment, the continuation and consequent aggravation of the same resulting to confinement in a hospital and evaluation by a physician that his patient was permanently totally disabled is not compensable as Permanent Total Disability because there is no employee-employer relationship. C. Respondent Court erred in finding that the grant of permanent partial disability is sufficient proof that petitioner is still fit for work, and modern medicine may easily heal such ailment. D. Respondent Court erred in finding that since petitioner's ailment has no specific relationship with his work, although he was already granted Permanent Partial Disability benefits, he should not be allowed Permanent Total benefits. E. The Respondent Court erred in finding that liberal interpretation of labor laws does not apply to all cases. F. The Respondent Court erred that the decision of the ECC is supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner also posed the legal issues:3 1. Whether an ailment lasting more than One Hundred Twenty (120) days as provided for by Section 2 (a and b), Rule VII and Section 1 (b), Rule X of the Amended Rules On Employees Compensation should be classified as Permanent Total Disability. 2. Whether a work-connected illness, acquired during employment, to which Permanent Partial Disability benefits were granted in 1989 and award of the original claim of Permanent Total Disability benefits denied due to the severance of employee-employer relationship, should be considered as caused by the conditions of work. In a nutshell, petitioner, under the aforestated assignment of errors and the legal issues posited for resolution, faults the Court of Appeals for not adjudging him entitled to his original income benefits claim for Permanent Total Disability and not Permanent Partial Disability as found by the respondent Commission. 43

The assigned errors and legal issues, being closely allied will be discussed jointly. Petitioner anchors his position on the fact that he was unable to perform any gainful occupation for a period exceeding 120 days by reason of his illness. It is his submission that his illness was acquired during his employment with the government, the same illness which caused him to avail of an early retirement in 1985 and to be confined in 1988 at the Philippine General Hospital. Further, petitioner theorizes that the diagnosis by his physician, Dr. Leon James Young, declaring him to be permanently and totally disabled should have prodded the Commission to grant his original claim. On the other hand, the respondent Commission maintains that the petitioner is not entitled to the benefits of an employee who is permanently and totally disabled, citing in support of its finding, Section 2 (a), Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, to wit: Sec. 2. Period of entitlement. (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of such disability. If caused by an injury or ill sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except where injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the system may declare the total and permanent status at any time after 120 days of continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions as determined by the System. It is thus contended that the mere inability to perform gainful occupation for a period exceeding 120 days due to his illness or injury does not entitle him (petitioner) to the benefits claimed. Respondent Commission also seeks to deny further liability to the petitioner on account of the non-compensable nature of the illness of the latter, alleging that the confinement of petitioner at the PGH sometime in 1988 due to the same ailment could not be attributed to his employment considering that he retired from the service on June 1, 1985. According to the respondent Commission, the risk of his employment aggravating his PTB was unlikely, for any progression of a retired employee's condition after the date of his retirement is no longer within the compensatory coverage of P. D. 626, as amended, since severance of an employee-employer relationship results in the release of the State Insurance Fund from any liability in the event of sickness and resulting disability or death after such retirement or separation from the service.4 The petition is impressed with merit. Employee's disability under the Labor Code is classified into three distinct categories: (a) temporary total disability; (b) permanent total disability; and (c) permanent partial disability. 5 Likewise, Section 2, Rule VII of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation provides:6 Sec. 2. Disability (a) A total disability is temporary if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period not exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules. (b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules. (c) A disability is partial and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee suffers a permanent partial loss of the use of any part of his body.

Rule XI of the same Amended Rules provide: Sec. 1. Condition to entitlement. (a) x x x xxx xxx

deterioration of petitioners condition resulting to his 1988 confinement could not be attributed to his employment considering that he retired from the service on June 1, 1985. Petitioner's claim cannot be defeated by the mere fact of his separation from the service. The ruling in De la Torre vs. Employees Compensation Commission10 has settled this point as follows: We do not find merit in the contention of the Solicitor General, in his comment to this petition, that since the deceased had contracted her sickness five years after retirement when no employer-employee relationship exists, the deceased cannot claim compensation, inasmuch as such employer-employee relationship is the jurisdictional foundation for the recovery of compensation. Such contention rests on a wrong premise. As heretofore stated, the deceased contracted her essential hypertension during her employment and not five years after her retirement. The fact that the essential hypertension of the deceased got worse at the time she was already out of service is without moment. The main consideration for its compensability is that her essential hypertension was contracted during and by reason of her employment; and any non-work related factor that contributed to its aggravation is immaterial. To hold that the finding of Dr. Leon James Young concerning petitioner's permanent and total disability was useful only for purposes of determining the petitioner's entitlement to hospitalization benefits under Article 185 and 189 of PD. No 626 and therefore has no bearing on the determination of whether petitioner was entitled to permanent total disability under Article 192 of the same Decree is to trivialize the significance of the physicians medical opinion as to the degree of petitioner's ailment. It has been resolved in many cases of similar nature that the doctor's certification as to the nature of claimant's disability may be given credence as he normally, would not make a false certification.11 And no physician who is aware of the far reaching and serious effect that his statements would cause on a money claim filed with a government agency, would issue certifications indiscriminately without even minding his own interests and protection.12 The Court finds as devoid of any basis on record the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that modern medicine can easily heal petitioner's particular ailment if he is really taking all the care of a diligent patient. While it may be true that the law on disability benefits does not preclude the possibility that one who receives benefits under a permanent total disability may eventually be gainfully employed or recover from his permanent total disability, thus suspending the benefits, 13 such possibility however does not justify the denial of a claim for a permanent total disability which rightfully pertains to the claimant. To block subject claim on that ground would be premature. It bears stressing, once more, this Court's abiding concern for the welfare of government workers, especially those in the rank and file, whose patience, industry and dedication to duty have gone unheralded, but who, in spite of every little recognition, plod on dutifully to perform their appointed tasks. It is for this reason that the sympathy on the law, by its own terms, requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor. 14 WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 26910 is SET ASIDE and the petitioner is hereby declared entitled to benefits under Permanent Total Disability. No pronouncement as to costs.1wphi1.nt SO ORDERED.

(b) The following total disabilities shall be considered permanent; (1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X hereof; (2) Complete loss of sight of both eyes; (3) Loss of two limbs at or above the ankle or wrist; (4) Permanent complete paralysis of two limbs; (5) Brain injury resulting in incurable imbecility or insanity; and (6) Such cases as determined by the System and approved by the Commission. In GSIS vs. Court of Appeals et al.,7 the Court held that while "permanent total disability" invariably results in an employee's loss of work or inability to perform his usual work, "permanent partial disability," on the other hand, occurs when an employee loses the use of any particular anatomical part of his body which disables him to continue with his former work. Stated otherwise, the test of whether or not an employee suffers from "permanent total disability" is a showing of the capacity of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred. Thus, if by reason of the injury or sickness he sustained, the employee is unable to perform his customary job for more than 120 days and he does not come within the coverage of Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation (which, in a more detailed manner, describes what constitutes temporary total disability), then the subject employee undoubtedly suffers from "permanent total disability" regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. It is abundantly clear that petitioner's disability cannot be considered as anything less than permanent and total. As attested to by the declaration of his physician and his medical history, it does not appear that petitioner comes within the coverage of Rule X which should, in effect, only provide for entitlement to temporary total disability benefits. In an unbroken line of cases, this Court has succinctly and categorically ruled that the early retirement of an employee due to work-related ailment proves that indeed the employee was disabled totally to further perform his assigned task, and to deny permanent total disability benefits when he was forced to retire would render inutile and meaningless the social justice precept guaranteed by the Constitution.8 Where the employee was forced to retire at an early age due to his illness, and illness persisted even after retirement, resulting in his present unemployment, such condition amounts to total disability which should entitle him to the maximum benefits allowed by law.9 No amount of dodging by the respondent System will alter the undeniable fact that the illness of petitioner was contracted while he was still in the service. This much is established as a result of the grant to him by the System of permanent partial disability, after inevitably ruling on the compensable nature of said illness. It is therefore specious to uphold respondent Commission's stance that the 44

G.R. No. 86020 August 5, 1994 RAMON CORPORAL, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,respondents. Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.

death is non-work-connected as contemplated under the law" and neither did her job as a teacher increase the risk of contracting her ailment (Rollo, p. 25). Petitioner appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC). The ECC requested the GSIS to re-evaluate petitioner's claim and to finally determine compensability, with instruction that in case the claim is denied once more by the System, the entire record of the case be elevated to the ECC. The GSIS reiterated its denial of petitioner's claim. On September 7, 1988, the ECC rendered a decision also denying petitioner's claim. It said: Medical studies show that Prolapsed Uterus may occur in infants and nulliparous women as well as multiparas. Defects in innervation and in the basic integrity of the supporting structures account(s) for prolapse(d) in the first two and childbirth trauma for the latter. The cervix usually elongates because the weight of the nagging vaginal tissues pulls it downward, whereas the attached but weak cardinal ligaments tend(s) to support it. In third degree or complete prolapse(d) both the cervix and the body of the uterus have passed through the introitus and the entire vaginal canal is inverted. (Obstetrics and Gynecology, Wilson, Beecham, Carrington, 3rd Edition, p. 585). On the other hand Acute Coronary Insufficiency are terms often used to describe a syndrome characterized by prolonged substernal pain, usually not relieved by vasodilators of a short period of rest due to a more severe inadequacy of coronary circulation. The symptoms in this condition are more intense and prolonged than in angina pectoris, but abnormal ECG and other laboratory findings associated with myocardial infarction are absent. The syndrome is covered by a temporary inability of one's coronary arteries to supply sufficient oxygenated blood to the heart muscle. (Merck, Manual of Diagnosis & Therapy, pp. 100-101). Based on the above medical discussion of the subject ailments, we believe that the development of the fatal illness has no relation whatsoever with the duties and working conditions of the late teacher. There is no showing that the nature of her duties caused the development of prolapse of the uterus. The ailment was a complication of childbirth causing profuse vaginal bleeding during the late stage. We also consider Acute Coronary Insufficiency as non-work-connected illness for the reason that it is caused by temporary inability of one coronary arteries (sic) to supply oxygenated blood to the heart muscle. There is no damage to heart muscle. In view thereof, we have no recourse but to sustain respondent's denial of the instant claim (Rollo, pp. 29-31). Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition, asserting compensability of the death of his wife. II Petitioner contends that although prolapsed uterus is not one of occupational diseases listed by the ECC, his claim should proper under the increased risk theory. He anchors such claim on the fact that as early as January 1984 or before Norma's fifth pregnancy, he had noticed a spherical tissue which appeared like a tomato protruding out of Norma's vagina and rectum. He avers that such condition was attributable to Norma's long walks to and from her place of teaching Banadero Elementary School, which is situated on the side of the Mayon Volcano. Moreover, the roads leading to the 45

QUIASON, J.: This is a petition for certiorari questioning the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission which denied petitioner's claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. I Norma Peralta Corporal was employed as a public school teacher with assignment in Juban, Sorsogon. On November 28 to November 30, 1977, she was confined at the Esteves Memorial Hospital for acute coronary insufficiency and premature ventricular contractions. On June 30, 1983, she was assigned to the Banadero Elementary School in Daraga, Albay. Norma had to walk three kilometers to and from said school as no transportation was available to ferry her and other teachers from the national highway to the school. During her fourth pregnancy, Norma suffered a complete abortion and was hospitalized for two days at the Albay Provincial Hospital. After her maternity leave, Norma reported back to work. In March of 1984, she again conceived. However, in September of the same year, she was transferred to the Kilicao Elementary School, where she had to walk more than one kilometer of rough road. On December 2, 1984, she gave birth to a baby boy with the help of a "hilot." An hour later, she was rushed to the Immaculate Conception Hospital due to profuse vaginal bleeding. She underwent a hysterectomy but unfortunately, she died on the same day due to "shock, severe hemorrhage" resulting from a "prolapse(d) uterus post partum." Norma was 40 years old when she died. Her husband, Ramon Corporal, petitioner herein, filed a claim for compensation benefit with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). The GSIS denied petitioner's claim thus: Please be advised that on the basis of the proofs and evidences (sic) submitted to the System, the cause of death of your wife, Shock secondary to Severe Hemorrhage, Uterine PROLAPSE is not considered an occupational disease as contemplated under the above-mentioned law (P.D. No. 626). Neither was there any showing that her position as Teacher, MECS, Albay had increased the risk of contracting her ailment (Rollo, p. 23). Petitioner filed several motions for the reconsideration of the denial of his claim to no avail, because a re-evaluation of the claim by the Medical Evaluation and Underwriting Group of the GSIS showed that there was "no basis to alter its previous action of denial for the same reason . . . that her cause of

school are full of ruts and rocks, and, during the rainy season, are flooded and slippery. Petitioner asserts that inspite of these, Norma continued to discharge her duties as a public servant, notwithstanding her pregnancy and her prolapsed uterus. Petitioner also contends that the findings of the respondents contravene the constitutional provision on social justice. He alleges that since the workmen's compensation law is a social legislation, its provisions should be interpreted liberally in favor of the employees whose rights it intends to protect. Under P.D. No. 626, as amended, for sickness and the resulting death of an employee to be compensable, the claimant must show either: (a) that it is a result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation with the conditions set therein satisfied; or (b) that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions (Santos v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 221 SCRA 182 [1993]; Quizon v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 203 SCRA 426 [1991]). Clearly, then, the principle of aggravation and presumption of compensability under the old Workmen's Compensation Act no longer applies (Latagan v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 213 SCRA 715 [1992]). Since petitioner admits that his wife died of an ailment which is not listed as compensable by the ECC and he merely anchors his claim on the second rule, he must positively show that the risk of contracting Norma's illness was increased by her working conditions. Petitioner failed to satisfactorily discharge the onus imposed by law. The fact that Norma had to walk six kilometers everyday and thereafter, a shorter distance of more than one kilometer just to reach her place of work, was not sufficient to establish that such condition caused her to develop prolapse of the uterus. Petitioner did not even present medical findings on the veracity of his claim that Norma had a tomato-like spherical tissue protruding from her vagina and rectum. Norma developed prolapse of the uterus because she was multiparas, or one who had more than one child, and quite beyond the safe child-bearing age when she gave birth to her fifth child she was already forty years old.Novak's Textbook on Gynecology describes prolapse of the uterus (descensus uteri) as follows: An extremely common condition, being far more frequent in elderly than in young patients. This is explained by the increasing laxity and atony of the muscular and fascial structures in later life. The effects of childbirth injuries may thus make themselves evident, in the form of uterine prolapse, many years after the last pregnancy. Pregnancies in a prolapsed uterus may lead to numerous complications, as noted by Piver and Spezia. The important factor in the mechanism of the prolapse is undoubtedly injury or overstretching of the pelvic floor, and especially of the cardinal ligaments (Mackenrodt) in the bases of the broad ligaments. Combined with this there is usually extensive injury to the perineal structures, producing marked vaginal relaxation and also frequent injury to the fascia or the anterior or posterior vaginal walls, with the production of cystocele or rectocele. Usually, various combinations of these conditions are seen, although at times little or no cystocele or rectocele is associated with the prolapse.Occasional cases are seen for that matter, in women who have never borne children, and in these the prolapse apparently represents a hernia of the uterus through a defect in the pelvic fascial floor(Emphasis supplied). 46

The 1986 Current Medical Diagnosis & Treatment also describes the condition as follows: Uterine prolapse most commonly occurs as a delayed result of childbirth injury to the pelvic floor (particularly the transverse cervical and uterosacral ligaments). Unrepaired obstetric lacerations of the levator musculature and perineal body augment the weakness. Attenuation of the pelvic structures with aging and congenital weakness can accelerate the development of prolapse. The determination of whether the prolapse of Norma's uterus developed before or after her fifth pregnancy is therefore immaterial since this illness is the result of the physiological structure and changes in the body on pregnancy and childbirth. With the evidence presented in support of the claim, petitioner's prayer cannot be granted. While as a rule labor and social welfare legislation should be liberally construed in favor of the applicant, (Tria v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 208 SCRA 834 [1992]), there is also the rule that such liberal construction and interpretation of labor laws may not be applied where the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and P.D. No. 626, as amended, are clear and leave no room for interpretation. The Court commiserates with the petitioner and his children for the loss of a loved one. We also recognize the importance of the services rendered by public elementary school teachers inspite of their meager salaries which are not proportionate to their immense responsibility in molding the values and character of the youth in this country (De Vera v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 133 SCRA 685 [1984]). But under the legal milieu of the case, we can only suggest, not mandate, that respondents grant ex gratia some form of relief to their members similarly situated as petitioner's wife. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 100376-77 June 17, 1994 DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, GODOFREDO MORILLO, JR., SUNDAY BACEA, ALFREDO COS and ROGELIO VILLANUEVA, respondents. Vicente T. Cuison for petitioner. Tamondong, Wong, Cos, & Associates for private respondent. PADILLA, J.: This petition for review on certiorari (here treated as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, Rules of Court) seeks to reverse and set aside the Resolution dated 11 June 1991 of respondent National

Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") in NLRC NCR Case Nos. 00-09-03383-87 and 00-10-0356287, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, the dispositive part of which reads: Accordingly, the Banks motion for reconsideration is hereby denied. The responsible officers of the Bank and its counsel are hereby warned, under pain of contempt, that we shall not tolerate their further delaying the execution of the subject award. 1 Private respondents Godofredo Morillo, Sunday Bacea, Alfredo Cos and Rogelio Villanueva were hired as security guards by Confidential Investigation and Security Corporation ("CISCOR") on 19 May 1981, 21 August 1984, 22 January 1985, and 27 November 1985, respectively. In the course of their employment, private respondents were assigned to secure the premises of CISCORs clients, among them, the herein petitioner, Development Bank of the Philippines ("DBP") which, in turn, assigned private respondents to secure one of its properties or assets, the Riverside Mills Corporation. On 11 August 1987, private respondent Villanueva resigned from CISCOR. On 15 August 1987, private respondents Morillo, Bacea and Cos followed suit in resigning from CISCOR. Thereafter, private respondents claimed from CISCOR the return of their cash bond and payment of their 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay. For failure of CISCOR to grant their claims, private respondents Villanueva and Cos filed against CISCOR and its President/Manager Ernesto Medina NLRC NCR Case No. 00-10-3562-87 on 13 October 1987, while private respondents Morillo and Bacea filed NLRC NCR Case No. 00-09-3383-87 on 29 September 1987. In said two (2) cases, private respondents sought recovery of their cash bond, payment of 13th month pay, and their fiveday service incentive leave pay. The two (2) cases were consolidated and assigned to Labor Arbiter Crescencio Iniego. In their position paper filed on 23 November 1987, private respondents (as complainants) alleged that they tendered their resignations in August 1987 upon the assurance of CISCOR that they would be paid the cash benefits due them. For failure of CISCOR to comply, private respondents claimed violations committed by CISCOR and Medina, specifically, the non-payment of their 13th month pay, five (5) day service incentive leave pay from the date of employment to the time of their separation, non-refund of their cash bond, non-payment of legal holiday pay and rest day pay. On the other hand, CISCOR and Medina in their position paper filed on 3 March 1988 admitted that private respondents were former security guards of CISCOR. They added, however, that sometime in 1987, petitioner allegedly formed its own security agency and pirated private respondents who tendered their voluntary resignations from CISCOR. Thereafter, when private respondents sought from CISCOR the return of their cash bond deposit, payment of 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay, CISCOR explained to private respondents that in view of the claim of petitioner that it incurred losses when private respondents and their other co-security guards secured the premises of Riverside Mills Corporation, private respondents, prior to the payment of their claims, were asked to first secure an individual/agency clearance from petitioner to show that no losses were incurred while they were guarding Riverside Mills Corporation. Instead of getting such clearance from the petitioner, private respondents secured their clearance from CISCORs detachment commander. Hence, for failure to secure the required clearance, private respondents cash bond deposit, their proportionate 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay were withheld to answer for liabilities incurred while private respondents were guarding Riverside Mills Corporation. On 10 March 1988, CISCOR filed a motion with leave to implead petitioner bank and averred therein that in view of its contract with the petitioner whereby, for a certain service fee, CISCOR undertook to 47

guard petitioners premises, both CISCOR and petitioner, under the Labor Code, are jointly and severally liable to pay the salaries and other statutory benefits due the private respondents, petitioner being an indispensable party to the case. On 11 March 1988, Labor Arbiter Iniego issued an order granting the aforesaid motion and including petitioner as one of the respondents therein. To this, private respondents filed their opposition and alleged, among others, that petitioner, not being an employer of the private respondents, was not a proper, necessary or indispensable party to the case. In answer, petitioner filed its position paper alleging therein that it was not made a respondent by the herein private respondents in their complaint, and that none of the original parties to the case (private respondents and CISCOR/Medina) interposed any claim against the petitioner. It further stated that it cannot be held liable to the claim of private respondents because there was no failure on the part of CISCOR and Medina to pay said claims. If CISCOR had apparently failed to pay private respondents claims, it was only due to the failure of private respondents to secure their individual clearance of accountability or agency clearance that there were no losses incurred while they were guarding Riverside Mills Corporation. On 12 July 1988, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive part of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondents Confidential Investigation and Security Corporation, Mr. Ernesto Medina and Development Bank of the Philippines to pay the complainants the corresponding salary differential due them to be computed for the last three (3) years from the time they stopped working with the respondents sometime in August 1987. Confidential Investigation and Security Corporation is further ordered to return to the complainants their respective cash bond cited in this decision within a period of ten (10) days from receipt hereof. 2 From the above decision, CISCOR and Medina appealed to the NLRC. Petitioner likewise filed its Motion for Reconsideration/Appeal and prayed for the Labor Arbiter to modify his decision and make CISCOR and Medinasolely liable for the claims of private respondents, and to declare the award for salary differentials as null and void. In its Resolution of 24 January 1991, the NLRC held the petitioner DBP, CISCOR and Medina, as jointly and severally liable, the pertinent part of which reads: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified. All the respondents (Confidential Investigation and Security Corporation, Ernesto Medina and the Development Bank of the Philippines) are hereby adjudged jointly and severally liable to the admitted claims for 13th month pay, 5 days incentive leave, and refund of cash bond, and accordingly, immediate execution is hereby directed against any of the aforesaid respondents without prejudice to their having lawful recourse against each other. Anent the award of wage differential and the claim for rest day and legal holiday pay, the same are hereby remanded to the Arbitration Branch of origin for further hearing with the directive that it be completed in 20 days from the Arbitration Branchs receipt of this Order. 3 Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, with petitioner DBP raising the following issues:

1. Whether or not the DBP is really liable for any of the claims of private respondents; 2. Whether or not the NLRC (or the Labor Arbiter) correctly applied Article 106 of the Labor Code; and 3. Whether or not the wage differential, rest day and legal holiday pay could and should be adjudicated in this case. The threshold and, in the ultimate analysis, the decisive issue raised by the present petition is whether petitioner was correctly held jointly and severally liable, alongside CISCOR and Medina, for the payment of the private respondents salary differentials, 13th month pay, service incentive lea ve pay, rest day pay, legal holiday pay, and the refund of their cash deposit. Petitioner posits that it is not the employer of private respondents and should thus not be held liable for the latters claims. In addition, it avers that it was not properly i mpleaded as it was CISCOR and Medina who filed the motion to implead petitioner, and not the private respondents, as complainants therein. Petitioner even goes further by countering that, assuming arguendo, it was the indirect employer of private respondents, Article 106 of the Labor Code 4 cannot be applied to the present case as there was no failure on the part of CISCOR and Medina, as direct employer, to pay the claims of private respondents, but only a failure on the part of the latter to present the proper clearance to pave the way for the payment of the claims. It emphasizes that the term "fails" in Article 106 of the Labor Code implies insolvency or unwillingness of the direct employer to pay, which cannot be said of CISCOR and Medina as they have m anifested their willingness to pay private respondents claims after they have presented proper clearance from accountability. We are not persuaded by petitioners arguments. Petitioners interpretation of Article 106 of the Labor Code is quite misplaced. Nothing in said Article 106 indicates that insolvency or unwillingness to pay by the contractor or direct employer is a prerequisite for the joint and several liability of the principal or indirect employer. In fact, the rule is that in job contracting, the principal is jointly and severally liable with the contractor. The statutory basis for this joint and several liability is set forth in Articles 107 5 and 109 6 in relation to Article 106 of the Labor Code. 7 There is no doubt that private respondents are entitled to the cash benefits due them. The petitioner is also, no doubt, liable to pay such benefits because the law mandates the joint and several liability of the principal and the contractor for the protection of labor. In Eagle Security Agency, Inc. vs. NLRC, this Court, explaining the aforesaid liability, held: This joint and several liability of the contractor and the principal is mandated by the Labor Code to assure compliance of the provisions therein including the statutory minimum wage [Article 99, Labor Code]. The contractor is made liable by virtue of his status as direct employer. The principal, on the other hand, is made the indirect employer of the contractors employees for purposes of paying the employees their wages should the contractor be unable to pay them. This joint and several liability facilitates, if not guarantees, payment of the workers performance of any work, task, job or project, thus giving the workers ample protection as mandated by the 1987 Constitution [See Article II Sec. 18 and Article XIII Sec. 3]. 8

Neither may petitioner argue that it was not properly impleaded and hence, should not be made liable to the claims of private respondents. On this matter, petitioner cannot be absolved from responsibility. We sustain respondent Commissions holding that: Anent the Banks first issue, what we actually have here is a "Third -Party Complaint", defined by Section 12, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court as "a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action, called the third-party defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponents claim" (emphasis ours). Since Rule I, Section 3 of our 1986 Revised NLRC Rules adopts suppletorily the Rules of Court "in the interest of expeditious labor justice and whenever practicable and convenient" with the Security Agencys impleading the Bank for indemnity and subrogation considering that the complainants worked with the Bank "to safeguard their premises, properties and their person" (Record, p. 76), such a third-party complaint would therefore be proper. That the bank has not disputed liability on the admitted claims, but professes merely subsidiary, instead of solidary liability, we find its position here all the more, untenable. 9 Finally, petitioner submits that wage differential, rest day and legal holiday pay should not be adjudicated in this case. The respondent Commission, however, observed: Regarding the question of wage differential, we note that the complaint (Record, p. 1), as well as the complainants Position Paper (Record, pp. 5-10) do not mention about any wage differential claim. We do not therefore see any basis with which we may, on sight, affirm the said award. We note though that complainants position paper save technical arguments (that after all are not binding to us in this jurisdiction), sufficiently claims rest day and legal holiday pay, claims that were not strongly refuted by respondents. Impressed, although not convincingly, that the award on wage differential could have referred to the complainants claim for rest day and legal holiday pay, we therefore see the need to have the said claims subjected to further hearing but for a limited period of 20 days. 10 We note that in the present case, there is no claim for wage differentials either in the complaints or in the position paper filed by private respondents before the labor arbiter. Accordingly, no relief may be granted on such matter. We, however, agree with the respondent Commission in its stand that private respondents are entitled to rest day and holiday pay (aside from the refund of their cash bond and the payment of their 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay for 1989). Private respondents position paper submitted before the labor arbiter properly raised the two (2) issues (rest and holiday pay) and included the same in their prayer for relief. The computation of the amount due each individual security guard can be made during the additional hearings ordered by the Commission. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned resolution of the respondent NLRC is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the additional hearing ordered by the NLRC shall not include wage differentials but shall be confined to legal holiday and rest day pay. Execution shall forthwith proceed as to the NLRC awards of 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay and return of private respondents cash bond. Petitioner and CISCOR/Medina are ORDERED to pay jointly and severally the claims of private respondents, as finally awarded by the NLRC, without prejudice to the right of reimbursement which petitioner or CISCOR/Medina may have against each other. SO ORDERED. 48

G.R. No. 90267 December 21, 1993 PERLITA LOPEZ, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondents. Bernardo M. Norada for petitioner. The Legal Services Group for respondent GSIS.

She then elevated the case to the ECC for review, which affirmed the decision rendered by the GSIS and dismissed the same. The sole issue for us to resolve is whether or not respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the cause of death of petitioner's husband is not work connected and therefore it is not compensable under P.D. No. 626. Respondent ECC argued that based on the certification issued by the school principal, Lopez at the time of the accident was supposed to report for duty to help in the enrollment of the 4th year class, but he opted to remain at his house to finish the project. Hence, respondent ECC contends, that the claim for death benefits failed to satisfy the conditions set forth under Sec. 1 (a), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. Said rule states: For an injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident, satisfying all the following conditions: 1 The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; 2. The employee must have been performing his official functions; and 3. If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order from its superior. The Employees Compensation Act is a social legislation whose primordial purpose is to provide amelioration of the working class of our society. As held in the case of Nitura v. Employees Compensation Commission, 201 SCRA 278 (1991): As an official agent charged by law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by the Constitution, the ECC should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection with the incident. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations should be resolved in favor of labor. In the case of Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. v. Quiroz, 16 SCRA 784 (1966), we held: xxx xxx xxx

QUIASON, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Article 181 of the Labor Code and Section 16 of the Interim Rules of 1983 of the decision of respondent Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) dated June 28, 1989 in ECC Case No. 4331 entitled "Perlita Lopez v. Government Service Insurance System," which affirmed the denial by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) of the claim for death benefits under P.D. No. 626, to claimant-petitioner, Perlita Lopez. Petitioner's late husband, Pedro Lopez, was employed as a public school teacher at the Urdaneta National High School, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, from July 1, 1973 until his untimely demise on May 27, 1987. On April 27, 1987, a memorandum was issued to Pedro Lopez by the head of the school's Science Department and noted by Lino A. Caringal, Sr. the principal, which reads: In view of your long and competent teaching experience as a PHYSICS Teacher and in anticipation with (sic) the forthcoming Division Search for Outstanding Improvised Secondary Science Equipment for Teachers to be held at the TAP Bldg. in Lingayen, Pangasinan on October 8 and 9, 1987, you are hereby designated to prepare the MODEL DAM, UNHS official entry to said contest. In this connection, you are further advised to complete this MODEL DAM on or before scheduled date of the contest (Rollo, p. 54; emphasis supplied). Lopez complied with his superior's instruction and constructed an improvised electric micro-dam, which he took home to enable him to finish it before the deadline. On May 27, 1987, at around 6:30 A.M., while he was engrossed in his project, he in contact with a live wire was electrocuted. He was immediately brought to a clinic for emergency treatment but was pronounced dead on arrival. The death certificate showed that he died of cardiac arrest due to accidental electrocution. Petitioner then filed a claim for death benefits with the GSIS, which was denied on the ground that her husband's death did not arise out and in the course of employment. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. 49

An injury or accident befalls a man "in the course of" his employment, if it occurs while he is doing what a man may reasonably do within a time during which he is employed, and at a place where he may reasonably be during the time, 13 NACCA LAW JOURNAL 28-29, And it "arises out of" the work of the employer, when it results from a risk or reasonably inherent in or incidental to the conduct of such work or business.

"In the course of" points to the place and circumstances under which the accident takes place and the time when it occurs. Of the two phrases on work connection, "in the course of" is deemed broader than "arising out of" (Fernandez and Quiason, Labor Standards and Welfare Legislation, 1964 ed., pp. 563-564). While the death of Pedro Lopez took place in his house and not in his official work station, which is the school, he was still discharging his function as the one in-charge of the project. He was constrained to finish the project within a specific period of time and he could only do so if he worked overtime in his house. The death of petitioner's husband is service-connected even if it happened during the summer vacation. He was still under the employ of the government and there still existed an employeremployee relationship although teachers do not report for duty during that period (Pepito v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 78 SCRA 35 [1977] ). It can even be said that the conditions set forth under sec. 1, par. (a), Rule III of the amended Rules on Employees Compensation, have been complied with. The said rule requires that the injury must have been sustained by the employee at "the place where his work requires him to be" and if the injury is sustained elsewhere the employees "must have been executing an order from his superior." Inasmuch as Lopez had to finish the project on the time for the contest scheduled on October 5 and 9, 1987, it can be implied that Lopez was given permission, if not direction, to perform his work at his house. Respondent ECC cannot rely on the fact that Lopez had been ordered by the school principal to report for duty to assist in the enrollment of the fourth-year students on the day of the accident. Lopez was electrocuted at 6:30 A.M. while he was working on the model he was asked to build. To claim that he should have been in school at the time he died in order to entitle his widow any compensation benefits, is to strain good sense and logic. For an injury to be compensable it is not important that the cause therefor shall have taken place within the purview of his employment, performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental thereto, the injury sustained by reason thereof falls within the protection of the law regardless of the place of injury (ECC Implementing Rules and Regulations, Rule III, Sec. 1; ECC Resolution No. 2799, July 25, 1984; Enao v. Employees Compensation Commission, 135 SCRA 660 [1985]). The thrust of social justice is compassion for the poor. By denying under the peculiar circumstances the claim of the petitioner for benefits arising from the death of her husband, public respondents ignored this public policy and committed a grave abuse of discretion. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the decision of respondent Employees Compensation Commission is REVERSED. The Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED to pay the death benefits to petitioner, with legal rate of interest from the filing of the claim until it is fully paid, attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the award and costs of suit. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 89222. April 7, 1993. CARMEN SANTOS, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Philippine Navy), respondents. Public Attorney's Office for petitioner. The Government Corporate Counsel for the Government Service Insurance System. SYLLABUS 1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION; COMPENSABLE SICKNESS; DEFINED. The law defines compensable sickness as any illness definitely accepted as occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions. For sickness and the resulting death of an employee to be compensable, the claimant must show either: (1) that it is a result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation with the conditions set therein satisfied: or (2) if not so listed, that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE WHEN AN ILLNESS IS NOT LISTED IN THE TABLE OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES; CASE AT BAR. Where the claimant's illness is not listed in the Table of Occupational Diseases embodied in Annex A of the Rules on Employees' Compensation, said claimant must positively prove that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. Cirrhosis of the liver is not listed as an occupational disease. Nevertheless, in the very recent case of Librea v. Employees' Compensation Commission (G.R. No. 58879, 203 SCRA 545 [119]). We do not pretend to be an expert in the realm of medical discipline. However, We cannot discount the fact that the cause of death of petitioner's husband could very well be related to his previous working conditions. Even the Commission volunteered the theory that post necrotic cirrhosis show that of the many types of advanced liver injury, one cause may be due to toxins. As a welder, Francisco was exposed to heat, gas fumes and chemical substances coming from the burning electrodes caused by welding. Generally, the metal burned is iron. In the course thereof, other compounds and oxides, such as carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, sulfur and phosphorus, may be emitted in the process of welding, depending on the kind of material used and extend of corrosion of the metal worked on. These vaporized metals are inhaled by the welder in the process and significantly in this case, Francisco had to do welding jobs within enclosed compartments. Research shows that ingestion or inhalation of small amounts of iron over a number of years may lead to siderosis. Acute poisoning brings about circulatory collapse which may occur rapidly or be delayed to 48 hours with liver failure. These are industrial hazards to which Francisco was exposed. And in the long course of time, 32 years at that, his continuous exposure to burned electrodes and chemicals emitted therefrom would likely cause poisoning and malfunction of the liver. 3. ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE OF COMPENSABILITY; EXPLAINED. The leading doctrine on compensability is that laid down in the case of Raro v. Employees' Compensation Commission, where this court said "There is a widespread misconception that the poor employee is still arrayed against the might and power of his rich corporate employer. Hence, he must be given all kinds of favorable presumptions. This is fallacious. It is now the trust fund and not the employer which suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law. The employer joins the employee in trying to have their claims approved. The employer is spared the problem of proving a negative proposition 50

that the disease was not caused by employment." The decision of this Court in Raro v. ECC (172 SCRA 845) in effect supersedes the cases with conclusions different from that stated therein, such as Nemaria v. ECC, 155 SCRA 166 (1987); Ovenson v. ECC, 156 SCRA 21 (1987); Mercado v. ECC, 127 SCRA 664 (1984). The reason behind the present doctrine is that the New Labor Code has abolished the presumption of compensability for illness contracted by a worker during employment. To be entitled to disability benefits, the claimant has to present evidence to prove that his ailment was the result of, or the risk of contracting the same were aggravated by working conditions or the nature of his work. 4. ID.; ID.; PROVISIONS THEREIN SHALL BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF LABOR. While the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act may have been abandoned under the new Labor Code, the liberality of the law in general in favor of the working man still prevails. The Employees' Compensation Act is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to the working man and woman in our society. The Employees' Compensation Commission, as the agency tasked with implementing the social justice mandate guaranteed by the Constitution, should be more liberal in resolving compensation claims of employees especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection to the cause of death. this interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor. The policy is to extend the applicability of PD 626 to a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the state to give maximum aid and protection to labor. DECISION NOCON, J p: Is liver cirrhosis an illness which is compensable? This is the question put forth by petitioner, Carmen Santos, whose husband died of liver cirrhosis while still a civilian employee of the Philippine Navy. Francisco Santos was employed as welder at the Philippine Navy and its Naval Shipyard as early as March 22, 1955. He spent the last 32 years of his life in the government service, the first year as a welder helper and the last two years as shipyard assistant. On December 29, 1986, Francisco was admitted at the Naval Station Hospital in Cavite City, on complaint that he was having epigastric pain and been vomiting blood 2 days prior to his hospitalization. His case was diagnosed as bleeding Peptic Ulcer disease (PUD), cholelithiasis and diabetes mellitus. On January 11, 1987, he died, the cause of which as indicated in the Death Certificate was liver cirrhosis. Mrs. Carmen A. Santos filed a claim for the death benefit of her husband, Francisco, on January 28, 1987, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. However, on a letter dated April 30, 1987, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), denied the claim on the ground that upon proofs and evidence submitted, Francisco's ailment cannot be considered an occupational disease as contemplated under P.D. 626, as amended. Mrs. Santos then sought the assistance of the Commander of NASCOM, PN, who in turn wrote the GSIS requesting for a favorable action on her claim. Said letter also substantiated petitioner's claim that her husband's duties as Senior Welder, assigned at the Structural Branch of the Naval Shipbuilding Facility, required him to perform delicate welding jobs inside compartments of naval 51

vessels, like compartmentation bulk heads; CIC rooms; officers and PO's quarters; fuel, lube oil and fresh water tanks, where he was exposed to heat and inhalation of burning chemical substances and gas fumes coming from burning welding electrodes. Despite such endorsement, petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied, upon claim of the GSIS that Francisco's job as a welder would instead cause lung disease rather than liver cirrhosis. On appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC), the Commission affirmed the denial of the GSIS on petitioner's claim relying on the fact that the diagnosis on Francisco's illness did not specify the type of cirrhosis which caused his death. Nevertheless, the Commission took cognizant of the fact that the deceased employee did not have a previous history of alcoholism, hepatitis or a previous history of biliary condition which could give a clue to the nature of cirrhosis he had. We find merit in this petition. The law defines compensable sickness as any illness definitely accepted as occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions. For sickness and the resulting death of an employee to be compensable, the claimant must show either: (1) that it is a result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation with the conditions set therein satisfied; or (2) if not so listed, that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. 1 Where the claimant's illness is not listed in the Table of Occupational Diseases embodied in Annex A of the Rules of Employees' Compensation, said claimant must positively prove that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. 2 Cirrhosis of the liver is not listed as an occupational disease. Nevertheless, in the very recent case of Librea v. Employees' Compensation Commission 3 We took a liberal stand and based on the evidence presented, pronounced the said sickness compensable. In the cited case, a Division Physical Education Supervisor, who likewise spent the last 32 years of his life in public service was adjudged entitled to the benefits of the ECC, upon his death due to liver cirrhosis. In the said case, the ECC denied the claim of the heirs on the ground that the abundant stress and strain experienced by the deceased employee were too farfetched to cause the development of liver cirrhosis. According to the medical research made by the Commission in the case, portal cirrhosis or cirrhosis of the liver occurs chiefly in males in their late middle life. Malnutrition is believed to be a predisposing factor if not the primary etiologic factor, and may account for its prevalence among alcoholics. This chronic disease characterized by increased connective tissue that spreads from the portal spaces, distorts the liver architecture thereby impairing liver functions. 4 In granting the petition, the Court correlated the fact that the deceased experienced untold sufferings in the course of his inspection of barrio schools and that he became malnourished because of the scarcity of food in the places he travelled to. All these factors were found to have contributed to the weakening of his health rendering him susceptible to malnutrition and eventually to contracting liver cirrhosis. In the case at bar, the Commission said that liver cirrhosis may be classified by a mixture of etiologically and morphologically defined entities as follows:

1) Alcoholic cirrhosis, chronic alcoholism is a major cause of alcohol cirrhosis. The amount and duration of ethanol ingestion rather than the type of alcoholic beverage of the pattern of ingestion, appear to be an important determinant of liver injury. Nutritional factors may augment the detrimental effects of chronic alcohol ingestion on the liver. 2) Post necrotic cirrhosis is the final pathway of many types of advanced liver injury of both specific and unknown causes. Viral hepatitis, (hepatitis B, Non A, Non B) may be an antecedent. Other causes are drugs, toxins and alcoholic liver disease and primary biliary cirrhosis. 3) Biliary cirrhosis results from injury to or prolonged obstruction of either the intrahepatic or extrahepatic biliary system. 4) Cardiac cirrhosis prolonged severe right-sided congestive heart failure may lead to chronic liver injury and cardiac cirrhosis. 5) Metabolic, hereditary, drug-related and other types. We do not pretend to be an expert in the realm of medical discipline. However, We cannot discount the fact that the cause of death of petitioner's husband could very well be related to his previous working conditions. Even the Commission volunteered the theory that post necrotic cirrhosis show that of the many types of advanced liver injury, one cause may be due to toxins. As a welder, Francisco was exposed to heat, gas fumes and chemical substances coming from the burning electrodes caused by welding. Generally, the metal burned is iron. In the course thereof, other compounds and oxides, such as carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, sulfur and phosphorus, may be emitted in the process of welding, depending on the kind of material used and extent of corrosion of the metal worked on. These vaporized metals are inhaled by the welder in the process and significantly in this case, Francisco had to do welding jobs within enclosed compartments. Research shows that ingestion or inhalation of small amounts of iron over a number of years may lead to siderosis. Acute poisoning brings about circulatory collapse which may occur rapidly or be delayed to 48 hours with liver failure. 5 These are industrial hazards to which Francisco was exposed. And in the long course of time, 32 years at that, his continuous exposure to burned electrodes and chemicals emitted therefrom would likely cause poisoning and malfunction of the liver. The leading doctrine on compensability is that laid down in the case of Raro v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 6 where this Court said: "There is a widespread misconception that the poor employee is still arrayed against the might and power of his rich corporate employer. Hence, he must be given all kinds of favorable presumptions. This is fallacious. It is now the trust fund and not the employer which suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law. The employer joins the employee in trying to have their claims approved. The employer is spared the problem of proving a negative proposition that the disease was not caused by employment." The decision of this Court in Raro in effect supersedes the cases with conclusions different from that stated therein, such as Nemaria v. ECC, 155 SCRA 166 (1987); Ovenson v. ECC, 156 SCRA 21 (1987); Mercado v. ECC, 127 SCRA 664 (1984).

The reason behind the present doctrine is that the New Labor Code has abolished the presumption of compensability for illness contracted by a worker during employment. To be entitled to disability benefits, the claimant has to present evidence to prove that his ailment was the result of, or the risk of contracting the same were aggravated by working conditions or the nature of his work. 7 However, while the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act may have been abandoned under the new Labor Code, the liberality of the law in general in favor of the working man still prevails. 8 The Employees' Compensation Act is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to the working man and woman in our society. The Employees' Compensation Commission, as the agency tasked with implementing the social justice mandate guaranteed by the Constitution, should be more liberal in resolving compensation claims of employees especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection to the cause of death. 9 This interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor." 10 The policy is to extend the applicability of PD 626 to a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the state to give maximum aid and protection to labor. 11 Premises considered, We find the petition meritorious. Liver cirrhosis, although not one among those listed as compensable ailment, as considered in the case at bar as covered under the Act, on the ground that the nature of the work of petitioner's husband, exposed him to the risk of contracting the same. WHEREFORE, petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission is REVERSED. SO ORDERED.

52

DECISION [G.R. No. 55741. September 11, 1992.] BELLOSILLO, J.:

LUZ LATAGAN, Petitioner, v. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Philippine Navy), Respondents. SYLLABUS 1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION ACT; COMPENSABILITY OF ILLNESSES; PRESUMPTION OF COMPENSABILITY UNDER THE WORKMENS COMPENSATION LAW, ABANDONED. Under the old law, once it was established that the illness supervened during employment, there existed a rebuttable presumption that such illness arose out of the employment or was at least aggravated by it. Consequently, the employer assumed, by force of this presumption, the burden of establishing the contrary by substantial evidence. But this rule has been abandoned under the compensation scheme in the present Labor Code, which took effect 1 January 1975. 2. ID.; LABOR CODE; COMPENSABLE SICKNESS; DEFINED. Article 167, par. (1) of the Labor Code, as amended, defines a compensable sickness as "illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission or any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LUNG CANCER, AN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE ONLY TO VINYL CHLORIDE WORKERS AND PLASTIC WORKERS. Contrary to petitioners assertion, the cause of her husbands death, bronchogenic carcinoma, is not an occupational disease. Her reliance on Avendao, where cancer of the lungs was listed as occupational disease, is misplaced because lung cancer, as shown in the list therein, is occupational only in respect to "vinyl chloride workers" and "plastic workers."cralaw virtua1aw library 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; BRONCHOGENIC CARCINOMA (LUNG CANCER), NOT COMPENSABLE FOR FAILURE TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH WORK-CONNECTION. A careful review of the records show that petitioner did not present any evidence to establish work connection. She relied solely on the theory of aggravation and presumption of compensability under the old compensation law. In the absence of proof, and none appears on record, We cannot conclude that the employment of the decedent increased the risk of his contracting the disease, bronchogenic carcinoma. 5. ID.; ID.; LABOR CLAIMS; DUE PROCESS NOT DENIED WHERE CLAIMANT WAS AFFORDED FAIR AND REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE WORK-CONNECTION OF HER HUSBAND DEATH. Petitioner, in the instant case, was afforded the fair and reasonable opportunity to prove that her husbands death was work-connected. The respondent agencies appear to have taken into account her application for death benefits, her supporting documents, her motion for reconsideration of the denial of her claim, and her appeal before respondent ECC. Unfortunately, however, We cannot like respondents find any legal justification for a favorable award on her claim.

Petitioner, a pauper litigant, 1 seeks compensation benefits under P.D. 626 for the death of her husband, T/Sgt. Josue A. Latagan, who was employed in the Philippine Navy from 1949 up to the time he died in 1978. She claims that his fatal ailment known as bronchogenic carcinoma was caused by his employment, and that the risk of contracting the disease was aggravated by the working conditions attendant to his duties as gunnersmate in the Philippine Navy.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red The medical history of the deceased is narrated in the medical summary report 2 issued by his attending physician thus "This is the case of Josue A. Latagan . . . who was admitted for the first time on February 23, 1976 because of chest pains . . . started 3 months prior to admission as cough, chest pains and body weakness . . . associated with loss of weight and insomnia . . . having low grade afternoon fevers . . . asthmatic and hypertensive since 1955 . . . A chest X-ray . . . revealed findings consistent with Bronchogenic Ca with metastasis . . . referred to the EENR Service for several times because of Otitis Media . . . transferred from Ward 10B (Tumor Service) to Ward 21, where patient expired after almost 2 years of stay in the hospital . . . Laboratory: . . Scalene node biopsy: Fibro-Collagenous tissue with slight evidence of fibrosis. "Serial Chest X-ray, February 23, 1976: Homogenous density involving the medial segment of the right lobes as well as multiple rounded densities seen on both intraclavicular regions. These were the same findings on repeat Chest X-ray done May, 1976. Impression then was Bronchogenic Carcinoma with metastasis lung lesion. A repeat Chest X-ray done March 77 revealed progression of the parenchymal lesions in the left lung field. The right hemithorax was now homogenously dense throughout without significant shift on the mediatinal shadow. Impression then was hydro-thorax, right, with probable concommitant atelectatic lobes or segments, probably secondary to bronchogenic Ca with involvement of the left lung. A repeat Chest X-ray done in July 77 revealed same findings, this time with pleural effusion, massive, right."cralaw virtua1aw library Petitioners husband died on 29 January 1978. Subsequently, she filed a claim for deat h benefits with the Survivorship Benefits Department, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). On 14 March 1978, GSIS denied her claim, and on 15 December 1978 her motion for reconsideration. On 27 September 1979, respondent Employees Compensation Comm ission (ECC), in ECC Case No. 1221, rendered a decision on appeal 3 affirming the denial by GSIS, thus "After a careful perusal of the records, we find no reason to reverse the decision of the respondent System. When the illness is admittedly not an occupational disease, the law requires proof that the risk of contracting the illness is increased by the working conditions. As already ruled by the respondent System, substantial evidence must show that the development of the ailment which caused the death of appellants husband was brought about largely by the conditions present in the decedents employment. The evidence, however, failed to warrant a reversal of the respondent Systems denial decision . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library Petitioner now assails the denial of her claim for death benefits on the ground that respondent ECC committed reversible error in sustaining the position of GSIS that the fatal ailment of her husband was not an occupational disease, hence, not compensable, and in affirming the denial sans formal hearing. It is the position of petitioner that bronchogenic carcinoma, otherwise known as lung cancer, is regarded as an occupational disease. She invokes Avendao v. EEC 4 which held:chanrobles virtual 53

lawlibrary "The respondent ECC itself, in its comment dated January 5, 1978 in the case of Cristobal v. ECC, Et. Al. (No. L-49280, April 30, 1980), admitted that it has expanded its list of occupational diseases, including certain types of cancer, and, while considering that such types of cancer have no known etiology, still they are regarded as occupational, thus: It may not be amiss to mention that the ECC has time and again expanded the list of occupational diseases. This comes about after continuing studies made by the ECC. Indeed, cancer has already been included as a qualified occupational disease in certain cases -Occupational Disease: . . .17. Cancer of the lungs, liver and brain; Nature of Employment . . . Vinyl chloride workers, plastic workers. Worth noting is the fact that the above types of cancer have no known etiology. Yet, they are regarded as occupational. The clear implication is that the law merely requires a reasonable work connection." Unfortunately for petitioner, the Avendao doctrine is not availing in the case at bar since the ruling applied the old Workmens Compensation Act. The illness therein was contracted prior to the effectivity of the New Labor Code. Under the old law, once it was established that the illness supervened during employment, there existed a rebuttable presumption that such illness arose out of the employment or was at least aggravated by it. Consequently, the employer assumed, by force of this presumption, the burden of establishing the contrary by substantial evidence. 5 But this rule has been abandoned under the compensation scheme in the present Labor Code, which took effect 1 January 1975. Article 167, par. (l), of the Labor Code, as amended, defines a compensable sickness as "illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission or any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is empowered to determine and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment." Thus, in Tanedo v. Employees Compensation Commission, 6 this Court ruled:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary "Neither may an award in petitioners favor be justified upon any presumption that illness causing death or disability arose out of the employment or was at least aggravated by such employment. That presumption was laid down by the old statute. It is however now a thing of the past, abolished on effectivity of the new law on January 1, 1975. Awards of compensation benefits for death or disability can now no longer be made to rest on presumption, but on a showing that the causative disease is among those listed by ECC, or on substantial evidence that the risk of contracting said disease is increased by the employees working conditions."cralaw virtua1aw library The records show that T/Sgt. Josue A. Latagan died on 29 January 1978, or about three years after the effectivity of the Labor Code. There is no showing that his illness was contracted prior to the effectivity of the new law, in which case, the presumptions of compensability and aggravation under the old law would have applied. What is clear is that the decedent was admitted to the hospital for the first time on 23 February 1976 for chest pains, and that such condition started, according to the attending physician, three (3) months before his admission to the hospital. Contrary to petitioners assertion, the cause of her husbands death, bronchogenic carcinoma, is not an occupational disease. Her reliance on Avendao, where cancer of the lungs was listed as occupational disease, is misplaced because lung cancer, as shown in the list therein, is occupational only in respect to "vinyl chloride workers" and "plastic workers." 7 Admittedly, petitioner failed to present substantial evidence to prove that the decedents working conditions as gunnersmate increased the risk of his contracting the fatal illness. Consequently, We quote with approval the findings of respondent ECC ". . . According to medical authorities, bronchogenic carcinoma is the commonest primary malignant 54

tumor of the lung and it is rapidly fatal if untreated. It is predominantly a disease of the male sex, about 90% of all tumors occurring in men. In this sex, it is the commonest cause of death from cancer. Approximately 95% of all cases occur between the ages of 40 and 70. Etiology: The incidence of carcinoma has been reported to be unusually high among workers in chromate, uranium, arsenic, certain nickel and copper ores in which arsenic occurs as an impurity, and in asbestos. Apparently all types of dust cannot be incriminated because the incidence is not higher in miners with anthracosilicosis. Wynder and Graham in the USA and Don and Hill in England reported a higher incidence of cancer of the lung among heavy cigarette smokers. Shortly after this, Hammond and Hore showed that the incidence of death rate from cancer of the lung were higher among heavy cigarette smokers. Thus, there appears to be a definite relationship between cigarette smoking and cancer of the lung. (Reference: C.A. Moyer: Surgery, Principles and Practice: Lippincott: P.A. 3rd ed., 1965; p. 1348). "Based on the aforementioned findings, it is very clear that the disease involved in the instant case, bronchogenic carcinoma, is neither causally related to the occupation of the deceased nor to the working conditions attendant to his employment. It cannot also be attributed to his duties as a gunnersmate and his inhalation of gunpowder in the armory. (Letter of the Surviving-spouse, dated May 8, 1979). Even his attending physician, Dr. Rolando Villaroma, did not attempt to comment on whether the ailment of the deceased was directly caused by his duties and conditions of work. Moreover, the additional evidences in the form of a certification issued by Lt. Willie Vergara, Chief Policy and Development Program Branch, N-5 Division, PN, failed to elaborate on the factors which may have caused the contraction of the questioned ailment. Due to the circumstances surrounding this case which strongly militate against the claim, particularly appellants failure to relate the decedents ailment and employment appellants claim for compensation must fail." 8 Indeed, a careful review of the records show that petitioner did not present any evidence to establish work connection. She relied solely on the theory of aggravation and presumption of compensability under the old compensation law. In the absence of proof, and none appears on record, We cannot conclude that the employment of the decedent increased the risk of his contracting the disease. 9 As regards the contention of petitioner that she was denied a formal hearing and thus deprived of an opportunity to present additional substantial evidence to support her claim, Our ruling in Sulit v. ECC 10 is enlightening "The filing with the GSIS of a claim for income benefits is in its inception not an adversary proceeding. The claim is filed on a prescribed form. The claimant may present with the claim supporting papers or proof that the disability or death was work-connected or that the risk of contracting the disease involved in the claim was increased by the working conditions. "The claim is processed by the GSIS. No formal hearing is required in the processing of the claim. "If after processing, the GSIS finds, as in this case, that on its face the claim has no basis, then it is rejected outright. The claim becomes controversial when the claimant appeals to the Employees Compensation Commission, or when an aggrieved party appeals from the Commission to this Court (Arts. 180 and 181, Labor Code; Secs. 3 to 5, Rule XVIII and sec. 1, Rule XVII, Amended Rules on Employees Compensation."cralaw virtua1aw library Petitioner, on the instant case, was afforded the fair and reasonable opportunity to prove that her husbands death was work-connected. The respondent agencies appear to have taken into account her application for death benefits, her supporting documents, her motion for reconsideration of the denial of her claim, and her appeal before respondent ECC. Unfortunately, however, We cannot like respondents find any legal justification for a favorable award on her claim.cralawnad WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the decisions of respondents Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and Employees Compensation Commission (ECC)

are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

farming and poultry but now that I am fully recovered I have decided to go back to government service and dedicated (sic) the rest of my life to the Postal Service, my first love. The above-quoted request for reemployment was however denied due to lack of a vacancy. On February 25, 1988 or about four (4) years after his retirement, petitioner wrote the GSIS another letter asking for a conversion of his disability benefits from permanent partial to permanent total, on the ground that he still had recurrent attacks of fainting, accompanied by headache and occasional loss of consciousness, amnesia and his consequential in ability to perform his official duties. Petitioner supported this claim with two medical certificates attesting that there is a recurrence of petitioner's ailment. In a letter dated April 22, 1988, the GSIS denied the request of petitioner on the ground that his case does not satisfy the criteria for permanent total disability. Two subsequent letters of reconsideration of the denial of his claim were sent by petitioner to the GSIS but were likewise denied with the explanation that "the amount of benefit granted to petitioner is already commensurate to the degree of his disability at the time he was separated from the service based on the evidences submitted and physical examination administered on him" and that "petitioner's disability benefit was based on his physical condition at the time he was separated from the service and not from contingencies that arose after he was separated from the service." (Comment of respondent GSIS, p. 4) Upon his request, petitioner's case was elevated for review to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) which affirmed the decision of the GSIS. Aggrieved, petitioner instituted the present petition for certiorari. It is admitted that the GSIS found the Ischemic Heart Disease suffered by petitioner to be compensable, as in fact he was awarded permanent partial disability benefits equivalent to eight (8) months salary beginning October 1, 1984. Thus, there is no more question as to whether or not the cause of the disability is work or service-connected. Thus, the issues left for Us to resolve are the following: 1) whether or not petitioner's disability benefits may be converted from permanent partial to permanent total, and 2) whether or not the Workmen's Compensation Law must be liberally construed in his favor. Petitioner's case is covered by Sec. 2, Rule VII of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, which provides that "a disability is permanent partial if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee suffers a permanent partial loss of the use of any part of his body." Based on the aforecited rule, petitioner's ailment was classified as permanent partial disability and not a temporary total disability since his ailment did not result in total loss or impairment of his physical or mental functions as a result of his illness. Thus, granting that he had recovered, that is, that his partial disability was only temporary and not permanent, any recurrence meant that his original condition of permanent partial disability merely recurred. Therefore, his ailment cannot be reclassified as permanent total disability if it merely recurred. Besides, Ischemic Heart Disease, the disability for which petitioner has already been compensated and which he claims to have recurred, is a partial and not a total disability. Petitioner cannot take comfort under the second rule laid down in Sec. 2 of Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation that at any time after 120 days, as may be warranted by the 55

G.R. No. 96787 May 8, 1992 PEDRO TRIA, petitioners, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,respondents. Agustin V. Velante for petitioner. PARAS, J.: This petition seeks to annul and set aside the decision dated September 13, 1990 of the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 4661, entitled "Pedro Tria vs. Government Service Insurance System (Bureau of Posts)" which affirmed the decision of the respondent Government Service Insurance System, hereinafter referred to as GSIS, denying petitioner's request for conversion of his disability benefits from Permanent Partial Disability (PPD) to Permanent Total Disability (PTD) under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 626, as amended. The undisputed facts of the case are as follows: Petitioner entered the Bureau of Posts as a letter carrier in August, 1964. He was promoted to the rank of Postmaster I in November, 1987 and served said government entity for almost twenty (20) years until his retirement on October 1, 1984. Medical records showed that several months before his retirement, petitioner began to experience recurring attacks of fainting accompanied by headache, occasional loss of consciousness and amnesia. Upon consultation with a private medical practitioner, petitioner's ailment was diagnosed as Ischemic Heart Disease. The electrocardiogram (ECG) subsequently taken of petitioner by the GSIS' medical clinic showed a tracing of non-specific ST-R changes. Consequently, petitioner filed on April 26, 1985, a claim for compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended, and was awarded permanent partial disability benefits for a period of eight (8) months from October, 1984 up to May, 1985. Not satisfied with such award, petitioner sent a series of letters to the GSIS claiming additional benefits. The GSIS denied his requests. Thereafter, in a letter dated April 10, 1987 and addressed to the Regional Director, Postal Region IV, San Pablo City, petitioner sought to re-enter the postal service. Said letter reads: After my retirement, I undertook a thorough medical treatment and I am happy to report to you that I fully recovered last 1985. Since then I have been engaged in

degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions to be determined by the GSIS, the GSIS may declare disability total and permanent, because (1) the provision specifically refers to a "continuous temporary total disability," and (2) the GSIS has made no declaration finding petitioner's disability to be total. The disability allegedly suffered by petitioner after he was already granted benefits and after he had left the service cannot be regarded as a total disability, whether temporary or permanent. "A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a period exceeding 120 days except as provided for in Rule X of these Rules,"(emphasis supplied) (Sec. 2, Rule VII, Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation) Section 2 of Rule X of the same rules reads: Sec. 2. . . . xxx xxx xxx However, the System may declare the total and permanent status at any time after 120 days of continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions as determined by the System. (emphasis supplied) Viewed in the light of the aforequoted rules, petitioner's ailment could not have been classified as temporary total disability which could be converted to permanent total disability. The claimed conversion is thus untenable and cannot be granted. Moreover, it will be recalled that when petitioner sought his re-employment with the Bureau of Posts in April, 1987, he categorically stated in his letter to the Regional Director, Postal Region IV that he has "fully recovered" from his ailment as of 1985 and he had been engaged in farming and poultryraising. It must be stressed, however, that after petitioner was denied re-entry in the service due to lack of a vacancy, he requested the GSIS for a conversion of his disability benefits from permanent partial to permanent total. To support this claim, petitioner presented two medical certificates, one dated February 15, 1988 and the other dated January 23, 1991, issued by the Municipal Health Officer of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, both of which certify that petitioner had a recurrence of his ailment in 1985 and recommend that he be granted total disability benefits. It must be emphasized that the contents of the medical certificate directly and flatly contradict the allegations made by petitioner in his letter for re-employment. While petitioner admits having "fully recovered" for the period beginning the year 1985 up to at least April 10, 1987, the doctor certifies that petitioner's illness has continued unabated since 1984 and the same totally incapacitated him from gainful occupation. The doctor certifies that petitioner had a recurrence of the heart ailment from 1984 to 1988. While normally the courts give credence to a doctor's certification as to the nature of a claimant's disability, We are hesitant to do the same in this case where petitioner himself submits an absolutely contradictory evidence. Certainly, the inconsistent evidence presented by petitioner is detrimental to his cause. Also, petitioner stated in the same letter for re-employment that he has since 1985 been engaged in farming and raising poultry, which are apparently more taxing than being a postmaster. These 56

circumstances would show that his ailment resulted merely in partial disability, not in temporary total disability if the inability to perform gainful employment exceeds 120 days. It may not be amiss to stress too that petitioner's inability to get re-employed was not due to any ailment but due to lack of a job vacancy. Even assuming that petitioner's ailment had indeed recurred, it must be pointed out that such a recurrence must have been caused by new and distinct attendant conditions and not on account of circumstances related to his previous employment. Petitioner can no longer be compensated for these new and distinct causes which are not work-connected. The causes are not work-connected but may be precipitated by his inability to find employment due to lack of job availability. Thus, Sec. 2(b), Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, which covers the rules on temporary total disability, provides that: After an employee has fully recovered from an illness as duly certified to by the attending physician, the period covered by any relapse he suffers, or recurrence of his illness, which results in disability and is determined to be compensable, shall be considered independent of, and separate from, the period covered by the original disability in the computation of his income benefit for temporary total disability. The recurring ailment is thus considered separate illness from the original one. And as aptly argued by the Solicitor General, the statement in the above-said rule that "the recurrence of his illness . . . is determined to be compensable" could only mean that a separate determination must be made whether the recurring ailment is compensable or not. In the case at bar, petitioner has already been awarded permanent partial disability benefits while being employed as postmaster of the Bureau of Posts. The recurrence, if any, of his ailment many years after his retirement (particularly after the rejection of his April 10, 1987 letter for reemployment), would be considered a completely new illness which arose long after his service and was caused by circumstances not connected with his previous employment, and, therefore, could not have been brought about as a result of unusual strain or fatigue by reason of the nature or quality of his work. The case of Vicente vs. ECC, 193 SCRA 190 cannot be squarely applied here because in said case it was held that petitioner Vicente's disability should have been classified as permanent total and not permanent partial based on clear findings that the illness suffered by petitioner after he was already granted partial disability benefits "was a direct result of his other ailments as previously diagnosed (before his retirement)." In the present case, however, the alleged recurrence of petitioner's illness has not been established by clear and convincing evidence. His application for re-entry in the service casts serious doubts on, if not wholly discredited the medical certificates attesting to the alleged recurrence of his ailment. Further, petitioner has, by his own admission, gainfully engaged himself in industrial activity during the period he was allegedly suffering from ailment, as he stated that he was engaged in farming and raising poultry. Such allegation negates petitioner's claim that he was or is suffering from permanent total disability. Finally, while the Court has consistently ruled that labor, social and welfare legislation should be liberally construed in favor of the applicant, We cannot do the same in the present case. The GSIS very clearly ruled that the ailment suffered by petitioner merely falls under the category of permanent partial disability. Besides, with petitioner's admission, there is no recurrence of any disability to speak of which can be the basis of any conversion of disability benefits.

After a careful review of the records of the case, it seems clear to Us and We quite agree with the Solicitor General that what prompted petitioner to ask for a conversion of his disability benefits was "not a perennial heart ailment but the grim prospect of losing a source of income, the limited disability pension, and the rejection of his application." The medical certificate was an afterthought intended to legitimize petitioner's request for conversion. (Rejoinder of respondent GSIS, p. 9) Likewise, on January 1, 1975, the former law on compensation, the Workmen's Compensation Act, was replaced by a novel scheme in the New Labor Code under the title "Employees' Compensation and State Insurance Fund." The new law discarded, among others, the concept of 'presumption of compensability and aggravation' and substituted one based on social security principles. The new system is administered by social insurance agencies the GSIS and the SSS under the ECC. The purpose was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and employee's right to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability. (Sulit v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483 [1980]; Raro vs. ECC, 172 SCRA 845; and Sante vs. ECC, 174 SCRA 557). WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs. SO ORDERED.

the Brent Hospital, where he was attended to by Dr. Arcadio Salazar, who medically diagnosed his illness as Chronic Obstructive Lung Disease Emphysema with severe asthmatic component. The medical certificate issued by Dr. Salazar states that petitioner was admitted three (3) times to Brent Hospital in the year 1985, not including the petitioner's confinement at Brent Hospital on 6-9 December 1985, for treatment of chronic obstructive lung disease. Dr. Salazar, in the same medical certificate, classified petitioner's disability as permanent total. 2 Due to his disability, petitioner was forced to retire at the age of sixty-two (62) on 31 December 1985 and received the sum of P60,890.57 corresponding to five (5) years lump sum of his annuity. 3 In the year 1987, petitioner was again confined at the Zamboanga Regional Hospital on the following dates: 1. 27 February 1987 up to 2 March 1987; 2. 23 April 1987 up to 26 April 1987; 3. 5 May 1987 up to 18 May 1987. 4 Subsequently, petitioner filed a claim for compensation benefits with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), which was favorably acted upon. The GSIS awarded petitioner Bejerano benefits for temporary total disability for the period of 6-9 December 1985 and permanent partial disability from January 1986 to July 1987. 5

G. R. No. 84777 January 30, 1992 JOSE A. BEJERANO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent. Public Attorney's Office for petitioner. The Government Corporate Counsel for GSIS.

Not satisfied with the award, petitioner in a letter dated 17 March 1987 requested the GSIS for a change of the classification of his disability benefits from permanent partial to permanent total. Such request was denied by the GSIS, which prompted petitioner to file, on 13 July 1987, a request for reconsideration of the earlier denial of his request for the conversion of his disability benefits from permanent partial to permanent total. 6 On 29 September 1987, the GSIS again denied petitioner's request. 7 This denial was appealed by the petitioner to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) in a letter dated 8 October 1987. On 5 July 1988, the ECC ruled that the disability benefits previously awarded to the petitioner were already commensurate to the degree of the petitioner's disability. In affirming the GSIS decision, the ECC declared, in part, that: . . . Appellant's disability could not be considered permanent total disability in the sense that he is not completely incapable of engaging in gainful occupation. . . . 8 Hence, this petition. The only issue to be resolved is whether petitioner's disability would entitle him to compensation benefits corresponding to permanent total disability. Petitioner contends that there is substantial evidence showing that his disability is permanent and total. On the other hand, respondent ECC argues that the petitioner's disability was classified by respondent as permanent partial because the criteria for permanent total disability, as laid down by the medical guidelines of the Commission, were not satisfied. Respondent maintains that 57

PADILLA, J.: Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision of respondent Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) affirming the award of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to petitioner Jose Bejerano of temporary total disability benefits for the period of 6-9 December 1985 and permanent partial disability benefits for nineteen (19) months corresponding to the period from January 1986 to July 1987.* Petitioner Jose Bejerano was a cash supervisor of the Development Bank of the Philippines, Zamboanga City Branch Office. He retired at the age of sixty-two (62), after having served the bank for almost twenty-nine (29) years. 1 Medical records disclose that sometime in 1985, petitioner complained of dyspnea or shortness of breath accompanied by productive cough. He was admitted to

"disability should be understood more on its medical significance rather than loss of earning capacity." 9 We find for petitioner. Respondent ECC's contention that "disability should be understood more on its medical significance rather than loss of earning capacity" is without basis in jurisprudence. Precedents in earlier cases show that disability is intimately related to one's earning capacity. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that "permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of a similar nature that she was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of her mentality and attainment could do." 10 It does not mean state of absolute helplessness, but inability to do substantially all material acts necessary to prosecution of an occupation for remuneration or profit in substantially customary and usual manner. 11 Permanent total disability is the lack of ability to follow continuously some substantially gainful occupation without serious discomfort or pain and without material injury or danger to life. 12 It is therefore clear from the aforecited rulings that the loss of one's earning capacity determines the disability compensation one is entitled to. Thus, this Court ruled: In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity (Ulibas vs. Republic, 83 SCRA 819; Roma vs. WCC, 80 SCRA 1270). 13 A thorough examination of the records convinces us that petitioner's claim is substantiated with enough evidence to show that his disability is permanent and total. First, the attending physician during the petitioner's treatment on 6-9 December 1985 at Brent Hospital, Zamboanga Branch, Dr. Arcadio Salazar, diagnosed petitioner's condition as Chronic Obstructive Lung Disease and classified petitioner's disability as permanent and total. 14 Second, the Medical Examiner's report on Claim for Disability Benefits dated 26 August 1987 prepared by Medical Examiner Silvester L. Martinez also classified petitioner's disability as total and permanent and described the symptoms of petitioner's illness as follows: Shortness of breath, difficulty of walking distances longer than ten (10) meters without having respiratory problems; inability to walk a flight of stairs without intervals of rest. 15 Again, in another medical certificate dated 8 June 1988 issued by Dr. Arcadio Salazar, the petitioner's disability was classified as total and permanent for the following reasons: 1. The patient has a tendency to develop acute exacerbation of his ailment resulting in frequent hospitalizations (1985 to 1987);

2. The patient's condition stabilizes only on strict confinement at home; 3. The physical capacity of the patient has deteriorated markedly. He could walk a distance of only 10 meters before dyspnea develops; 4. The patient is confined at home and under continuous medication. 16 It is evident from the foregoing that, as per his physician's opinion, petitioner is totally incapacitated from engaging in any gainful occupation, and that therefore his disability is permanent and total. In earlier cases, this Court ruled that the physician's report of sickness or accident substantiates the disability claim. 17 In one case, this Court ruled that a doctor's certification as to the nature of claimant's disability may be given credence as he would not normally make a false certification for the sake of a lowly school teacher. 18 According to this Court: . . . No physician in his right mind and who is aware of the far-reaching and serious effect that his statements would cause on a money claim filed with a government agency, would issue certifications indiscriminately without even minding his own interests and protection. In fact, if he were not sure of what he was certifying to, then he would not have issued the second certification on July 12, 1979, knowing fully well that he would be perpetuating an erroneous or false report. Under normal circumstances, he would not sacrifice his medical career for the sake of a lowly public school teacher. 19 It is also of importance to note that petitioner was forced to retire at the age of 62 because of his physical condition. This, again, is another indication that petitioner's disability is permanent and total. As held by this Court, "the fact of an employee's disability is placed beyond question with the approval of the employee's optional retirement, for such is authorized only when the employee is "physically incapable to render sound and efficient service" . . ." 20 "Finally, denying petitioner's permanent total disability benefit, who for more than twenty (20) years had rendered his best service unblemished and only because his ailments forced him to retire, would subvert the very essence of the Workmen's Compensation Act to implement the social justice provision of the Constitution." 21 WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission is MODIFIED and the GSIS is hereby ordered to pay petitioner compensation benefits for permanent total disability effective January 1986, which is the start of the period when his earning capacity was impaired due to his disability. SO ORDERED.

58

G.R. No. 96844 January 23, 1992 REMUS A. DIOPENES, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) (Development Bank of the Philippines) and the EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION (ECC), respondents. Salvador T. Sabio for petitioner.

1978 as high blood pressure with left hemiplegia which persisted up to the present" and said that the degree of disability was "total and permanent." 7 Despite these reports, the GSIS denied the petitioner's request, holding that since the hemiplegia was contracted after his retirement, he was not entitled to the benefits claimed. Echoing this finding, the ECC stressed that the petitioner's "hemiplegia occured two years after he retired from the service" and thus could not be considered service-connected under the Employees' Compensation Law. There is no evidence that the hemiplegia occurred two years after the petitioner's retirement, as concluded by the respondents. On the contrary, the three doctors who examined the petitioner were one in the finding that the disability began in 1978 and continued even after the petitioner's retirement in 1985. Significantly, one of these doctors was the medical officer of the GSIS itself in Bacolod and Iloilo. All of these doctors actually examined the petitioner. By contrast, the conclusion of the GSIS medical staff in Manila was based on an arm-chair evaluation by doctors who had not personally examined the petitioner. Even if the Petitioner did suffer a second attack after his retirement, as the respondents contend, this supervening event would not defeat his claim. The reason is that the second stroke was only the consequence of the first stroke which he suffered in 1978, when he was still in the service. There is no question that that first stroke was service-connected as categorically admitted in the Employees Report made by the GSIS thus: Immediately prior to his CVA attack on April 8, 1978, employee was supervising court cases of DBP, he being on special detail at Catarman DBP, Northern Samar, from his regular position as Assistant Branch Attorney, DBP Dumaguete Branch. He was in his office preparing pleadings to be filed in court in order to meet the deadline set by the Rules of Court in the numerous court collection cases of the DBP Catarman, which prior to and during the attack of his CVA, employee was working overtime to beat the prescriptive period of filing same in court; the tension thereof triggered his CVA on April 8, 1978. 8 The following ruling in Mondejar v. Workmen's Compensation Commission 9 is applicable to the case at bar: It is also noteworthy as stated in the referee's decision that because of his illnesses brought about by his work and his first attack in 1972, petitioner's condition had worsened to such an extent that he was constrained to retire at age 60 on August 13, 1974, soon after which he suffered in January, 1973 his second and near-fatal attack which "reduced him to a complete wreck" in the commission's own language. This second attack was but the consequence of the illnesses which he suffered in the course of his employment. It is patent, therefore, that contrary to the commission's speculation, these illnesses were the "precipitating factors that triggered the stroke" which were "attributable to his employment" and consequently petitioner's claim to compensation under the Act must be upheld, in accordance with the law and settled jurisprudence. Furthermore, it should be noted that the GSIS had earlier granted the petitioner temporary total disability benefits for 240 days and permanent partial disability for nineteen months, thus in effect acknowledging that he was suffering from permanent total disability. Under Section 192 of the Labor 59

CRUZ, J.: Two years after his retirement, Remus A. Diopenes filed an application for the conversion of his compensation benefits from permanent partial disability to permanent total disability. The application was rejected by the Government Service Insurance System, which held that it had no more jurisdiction over the matter because the applicant was no longer in the service. 1 On appeal, this decision was affirmed by the Employees' Compensation Commission on the ground that the alleged permanent total disability was not service-connected. 2 Dissatisfied, the petitioner has come to this Court for relief. Diopenes joined the government service in 1959 as a clerk and eventually rose to Branch Attorney of the Development Bank of the Philippines in Catarman, Northern Samar. On April 5, 1978, he suffered a stroke and was found to have sustained a cardio-vascular accident (CVA) with light hemiparesis. He was hospitalized from May 8 to June 15, 1978, and went on sick leave of absence from February 28 to March 1, 1979. As a result of the CVA, the GSIS granted the petitioner compensation for temporary total disability for 240 days from May 1 to December 26, 1978, 3 and permanent partial disability for 19 months beginning January 1, 1986, until July 1, 1987. 4 On December 28, 1985, the petitioner retired. When on November 23, 1986, he requested the change in his compensation benefits, he was required by the GSIS to undergo not only one but three medical examinations. The first examination was conducted by Dr. Victor L. Cortez, Chief of the Gov. Valeriano M. Gatuslao Memorial Hospital, who diagnosed the petitioner's ailment as "post CVA with residual left hemiplegia," referring to the earlier stroke in 1978. The medical report described as total and permanent the patient's "left hemiparesis (which) has persisted since then up to the present." 5 The second examination was conducted by Dr. Felix Jardenico, GSIS medical officer for its branches in Iloilo and Bacolod, who found that the left side of the petitioner's body had been paralyzed since 1978 and recommended that "the claim of Atty. Remus A. Diopenes, former Branch Attorney, DBP, Catarman Branch, Northern Samar, be given preferential and favorable consideration and the action thereat be done soonest." 6 The third examination was conducted by Dr. Lucila Lazaro, resident physician of the Corazon Locsin Montelibano Memorial Hospital, who reported that the petitioner started his illness as early as "April

Code, "(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days" shall be deemed "total and permanent." We agree with the Solicitor General that the petitioner's request should not have been denied by the respondents. Their posture cannot be sustained against the uncontroverted medical evidence that the petitioner's incipient permanent and total disability was incurred during his incumbency in the government service and merely continued and aggravated after his retirement. The GSIS and the ECC should be commended for their vigilance against unjustified claims that will only deplete the funds intended to be disbursed for the benefit only of deserving disabled employees. Nevertheless, we should caution against a too-strict interpretation of the rules lest it result in the withholding of full assistance from those whose capabilities have been diminished if not completely impaired as a consequence of their service in the government. A humanitarian impulse, dictated by no less than the Constitution itself under the social justice policy, calls for a liberal and sympathetic approach to the legitimate appeals of disabled public servants like the herein petitioner. Compassion for them is not a dole but a right. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged decisions of the Government Service Insurance System and the Employees' Compensation Commission are SET ASIDE and petitioner Remus A. Diopenes is declared to be entitled to permanent total disability benefits under Article 192 of the Labor Code and shall be compensated accordingly. It is so ordered.

Sometime in 1978, Eufronio Librea began to complain of a gradual loss of appetite, enlargement of the abdomen and severe anemia, often prompting him to go on sick leave. On July 2, 1980, he had to be admitted and confined at the Jimenez Memorial Hospital in Lipa City, where his ailment was diagnosed as cirrhosis of the liver in its terminal stage. He died of that ailment on July 28, 1980. Dr. Jesus Inciong, the attending physician, affirmatively certified that the illness may have been directly caused by the nature of the duties of the deceased. 2 Subsequently, petitioner filed a claim for death compensation benefits with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). The claim was disapproved on October 27, 1980, based on the evaluation that the ailment which caused the death is not work-connected. On November 28, 1980, petitioner sent a letter requesting for a reconsideration of the denial, attesting that the nature of her late husband's work as a teacher and later as a supervisor was very strenuous physically and mentally because being a physical education supervisor, he made it a point to inspect regularly all districts in his assigned Division including those in the remote barrios to attend to the physical education needs of the schools; that in the process, he had to contend himself with adverse weather conditions, extra-ordinary mental and physical fatigue due to the inaccessibility of some of these places a the scarcity of transportation facilities; and finally, that most of the time he was subjected to irregular meals and unhygienic eating habits due to lack of facilities; that his activities were not confined to the Division as he had to organize and participate in regional and national sports meet which required hectic schedules which factors weakened his state of health and rendered him susceptible to a fatal disease. The GSIS, however, did not have a change of heart and still denied the claim stressing that the cited conditions of work are not causally connected to the illness. Petitioner sought a review of the denial before the respondent Commission which affirmed the decision of the GSIS and dismissed the case. Hence, this petition. The issue to be resolved is whether the death of Eufronio Librea due to cirrhosis of the liver is compensable. Specifically, whether the work and nature of his duties increased the risk of contracting the fatal disease. The etiology of cirrhosis of the liver is explained by the GSIS Medical Services as follows: Portal cirrhosis or cirrhosis of the liver occurs chiefly in males in late middle life. Malnutrition is believed to be a predisposing factor if not primary etiologic factor, and may account for its prevalence among alcoholics. This is a chronic disease characterized by increased connective tissue that spreads from the portal spaces, distorting liver architecture and impairing liver functions. 3 The denial of the claim by the GSIS is based on its conclusion that there was no work-connection between the disease and the duties performed by Eufronio Librea. Thus: . . . The conditions mentioned will not cause liver cirrhosis. Irregularity of meal intake per se, will not cause liver cirrhosis. Malnutrition as a predisposing, or a primary etiology of cirrhosis is caused by diet deficient in protein and specifically in choline and not as a result of meal irregularity (Merck Manual, p. 1076 and Cecil's Textbook of Medicine, p. 881). The possibility that nutritional deficiency might play an important role was proposed on the basis of frequent association of 60

G.R. No. 58879 November 14, 1991 EXPEDITA LIBREA, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Ministry of Education and Culture), respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:p This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated October 1, 1981 rendered by the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 1801, entitled "Expedita Librea, Appellant, versus Government Service Insurance System (Ministry of Education and Culture), Respondent", dismissing the claim of petitioner for death under P.D. No. 626, as amended. Petitioner is the widow of Eufronio Librea who served as a public school teacher at the Division of Public Schools in Lipa City since July 1, 1948 until his death on July 28, 1980, after thirty-two (32) years of public service. From an ordinary classroom teacher, Eufronio Librea successfully earned promotions to Assistant Principal in 1959; Principal I in July, 1970; District Guidance Coordinator; and finally, Division Physical Education Supervisor on November 14, 1974, his last post before his death. 1

cirrhosis with alcoholism and nutritional deficiency and of the favorable therapeutic response of patients with cirrhosis to highly nutritious diet. 4 In affirming the denial, respondent Employees' Compensation Commission reasoned as follows: Viewed in the light of the foregoing medical principles, we cannot reverse the respondent GSIS's decision inasmuch as the genesis of the said ailment is not causally-related to the decedent's work and working conditions as physical education supervisor of the Ministry of Education and Culture. The decedent's duties such as training of athletes and reaching barrio schools in Lipa City, although admittedly abound with stress and strain, are too farfetched to have caused the development of liver cirrhosis. Similarly, irregular intake of meals contrary to the belief of appellant, is not an accepted medical predisposing cause to the development of liver cirrhosis. 5 Petitioner, however, assails the denial of the claim as arbitrary and contrary to the liberal spirit of the law on employees compensation, contending that: Respondent Commission's denial of the claim for compensation on the ground that the cause of death of Eufronio Librea is not work-connected, is arbitrary and not in accord with prevailing jurisprudence. The Commission completely ignored the nature and conditions of employment of the decedent which could have predisposed him to contract the fatal ailment. It is not disputed that the late Eufronio Librea started in the government service some thirty-two (32) years ago free from any physical or mental illness. It was only during the period of his employment that the symptoms of his illness manifested which could logically be traceable to his employment. It is likewise undisputed that decedent's employment exposed him to tremendous physical and mental stress from the time he started as an ordinary teacher up to the time of his death. During the few years that he was a physical education supervisor, the late Eufronio Librea experienced untold sufferings in the course of his inspections of barrio schools to attend to the physical education activities of the schools. More often than not, he was malnourished because he was forced by circumstances to eat whatever available food there was. This nutritional deficiency might have been the culprit in the development of his liver ailment. Again, in time of athletic meets, he had to prepare the teams for sports competition which undoubtedly involved physical and emotional strain as well as exposure to adverse weather conditions. All these employment factors might have conspired to weaken the body resistance of the decedent and made him susceptible to cirrhosis of the liver. At this point, it is to be reiterated that in the decision itself, it recognized malnutrition to be a predisposing factor if not a primary etiology factor in the development of cirrhosis of the liver. Certainly, it need not be emphasized that the late Eufronio Librea was subjected to this risk which is very common to his calling as a teacher. . . . 6 We rule for the petitioner. While the contention of petitioner that the death is compensable since the fatal illness of her husband was contracted only after his long years of service appears to be premised on the old rule of presumed compensability under the prior compensation act, we find merit in the contention that the duties and functions of the late Eufronio Librea as a teacher and later as a district supervisor for thirty-two years may have rendered him susceptible to contracting the fatal illness. 61

The rule under the applicable law 7 is that in order for the employee to be entitled to sickness or death benefits, the sickness or death resulting therefrom must be, or must have resulted from either (a) any illness definitely accepted as an occupation disease listed by the Commission; or (b) any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. 8 To establish compensability under the second rule, known as the theory of increased risk, it must be shown that an illness or the fatal disease is caused by employment and the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. 9 In the case at bar, the fatal disease suffered by the late Eufronio Librea is cirrhosis of the liver. Since it is not listed as an occupational disease, the claimant must show that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the work or working conditions of the deceased. According to the GSIS, the disease is common and occurs chiefly in males in late middle life. Malnutrition is believed to be a predisposing factor if not a primary etiologic factor. Respondent ECC explains that malnutrition as a predisposing, or a primary factor in liver cirrhosis is caused by diet deficient in protein and specifically in choline. It is therefore clear that diet deficiency is an etiologic factor of cirrhosis of the liver. The duties of the late Eufronio Librea as a teacher and later as a physical education supervisor is admittedly fraught with mental and physical strain as he had to supervise remote barrio schools in farflung areas in the district where he was assigned in the course of which he experienced missing meals, if not hunger, and insufficient food. His wife attests to this. She even went further and admitted that her husband was malnourished as a result of the multifarious activities entailed in his work. With these premises, to our mind there is sufficient basis for the inference that he must have suffered nutritional deficiency particularly protein deficiency, which is a predisposing if not a primary factor in the development of cirrhosis of the liver. Indeed, even the attending physician is of the opinion that the fatal illness must have been directly caused by the nature of the duties of the deceased. Petitioner emphasized that during the last few years that her husband was a physical education supervisor, Eufronio Librea experienced untold sufferings in the course of his inspections of barrio schools to attend to the physical education activities of the schools and that he was malnourished because of scarcity of food in the places he travelled to. In addition, her husband had to organize and prepare his Division for the national sport meet. All these may have indeed weakened the state of health of Eufronio Librea and rendered him susceptible to malnutrition and consequently to contracting cirrhosis of the liver. It cannot be denied that there are times when one is so engrossed in his duties to the point of overlooking the most basic of needs such as nutritious food. It is not fair to speculate as the counsel for the GSIS seems to insinuate 10 that the decedent's cirrhosis of the liver may have been contracted due to alcoholism. There is nothing in the record to support this speculation, and in the absence of any finding to the contrary, the late Eufronio Librea must be presumed not prone to taking alcoholic liquor. 11 On the other hand, there is the consistent affirmation by the wife of the deceased to the effect that in the course of performing the physically and mentally demanding work of her deceased husband, the latter suffered food deficiency and malnutrition. appears therefore that only malnutrition could have caused the illness of the deceased, and in view of the uncontroverted claim of the wife of Librea that her husband suffered malnourishment in the latter stage of his thirty-two years of devoted public service, it would be unfair to deny compensability. It is of common knowledge that our public school teachers are among the lowly-paid public servants. Thus, it is not farfetched to state that some teachers, especially those with families to support, have very little to spare for their own personal food. Indeed, given our depressed economic realities, malnutrition is not confined to children but even to adults and more so to family breadwinners. In the case at bar, the wife of the late teacher admitted that her husband suffered nutritional deficiency.

Considering the foregoing facts, it cannot be denied that there is sufficient evidence to substantiate the claim that the work of Eufronio Librea increased the risk of contracting the fatal disease. This opinion is shared by the attending physician who examined Librea at the hospital and who affirmatively certified that the nature of Eufronio Librea's duties caused the development of cirrhosis of the liver. As we have already ruled, a physician's report is the best evidence of work-connection of workmen's ailments and can be the basis for an award even if the physician was not presented as a witness. 12 The reason for the rule is that the attending physician is in the best position to judge possible causal relation between the illness and the work performed, and normally, he would not make a false certification for the sake of a lowly teacher. 13 The conclusion of the medical division of respondent Commission that there is no proof of direct causal connection is not conclusive upon us. We have ruled that findings of doctors and chief medical officer of the GSIS and ECC who are not experts are not binding on the Supreme Court. 14 Respondent Commission should have appreciated Eufronio Librea's more than thirty years of devoted public service, which earned him the successive promotions to greater responsibilities, performing the strenuous and demanding task of a public school teacher. What the Court said in one case bears reiterating: . . . As the agents charged by the law to implement the social justice guarantee secured by both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more liberal attitude in deciding claims for compensation especially where there is some basis in the facts in inferring a work-connection. This should not be confused with the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. While these doctrines may have been abandoned under the new Labor Code (the constitutionally of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is significant that the liberality of the law, in general, still subsists. 15 WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of respondent ECC is hereby set aside and the Government Service Insurance System is ordered to pay petitioner the sums of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) as death benefits, One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) as funeral expenses and One Thousand and Two Hundred Pesos (P1,200,00) as attorney's fees. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 87590 November 12, 1991 PURIFICACION R. QUIZON, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, and PHILIPPINE AIR FORCE, respondents. Public Attorney's Office for petiticner.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p Petitioner, mother of Rolando R. Quizon, a Technical Sergeant of the Philippine Air Force, seeks a reversal of the Decision 1 of 23 November 1988 of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) denying her claim for death benefits arising out of the death of Rolando due to the absence of conclusive proof that he died of cardio-pulmonary arrest secondary to cerebro-vascular accident. The factual and procedural antecedents in this case are as follows: Rolando Quizon joined the Philippine Air Force on 30 June 1967. He was assigned to the Southern Command in Zamboanga City. On 15 December 1981, he was promoted to the rank of Technical Sergeant and held such position until his demise on 17 July 1986. He had been on continuous active duty since his enlistment Medical records show that on 15 July 1986 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, due to his inability to speak, stand up or walk, Rolando was brought by his fellow soldiers to the Regional Unified Command General Hospital in Camp Navarro, Zamboanga City. As shown in the Clinical History prepared by the Medical Officer thereat, Maj. Jose del Rosario, dated 23 July 1986, the following were the findings made, the medicines given, and the course taken at the ward until Rolando died on 17 July 1986: This is a case of Tsgt. Rolando R. Quizon who was brought in at this hospital by his fellow soldiers on 15 July 1986 at 2100H because of inability to talk, walk or stand up after they allegedly claimed the patient had been drinking the night prior to this confinement. On P.E. the patient is semi-unconscious with a blood pressure of 110/70mm Hq EENT, pupils readed (sic) to light normally, not dilated nor (sic) constricted. Heart is normal GUT-there is involuntary micturition Reflexes Knee jerk absent. Plantan or Babinoks reflex is hyperactive in both. Medicines given or ordered: D5LR, Bemtex-CO2 inhalation and a close observation was done. An indwelling catheter retained. On 16th July 1986 Pen G. Sodium 3,000,000 "U" was started of 6 hrs I-V-T.T. ANST. Anaroxyl and Bipyrine in action were also administered, Constant follow-up of I-V-Fs using Normosol -M Suction of throat and oral secretion was done. CBC & Urinalysis were ordered.

62

Course in the Ward: On 17th July 1986 at 0830H the patient developed severe coma with no urine out put a (sic) anymore. Pupils appears (sic) dilated with a blood pressure of 120/80 mm Hq. At 1420H there was no respiration nor ( sic) cardiac sounds whatsoever, there was complete uremia. At 1440H a Cardio pulmonary resuscitation was done with the following findings: BP/0/0 mm Hq C R-Absent Pupils dilated Nailbeds Cyanotic Pronounced Death: Cardio Pulmonary/Arrest secondary to cerebro-Vascular Accident. 2 As stated in said history, the cause of death is cardio-pulmonary arrest secondary to cerebro-vascular accident. Petitioner filed a claim for payment of benefits with the GSIS. 3 At the back of the claim, Maj. del Rosario wrote in his own hand the clinical history, and on the space for diagnosis, he made the following entry: Cardio-Pulmonary arrest secondary to cerebro-vascular (CVA) accident. 4 In a Summary of Finding and Recommendation evaluated and reviewed on 21 October 1986, the Medical Services Center of the GSIS denied due course to the claim "since there is no conclusive proof that the claimant died of above illness," and that "there was not (sic) ecg done to the claimant while he was still alive. There was no history of hypertension, or any record of treatment or by hospitalization for hypertension." 5 The "above illness" referred to is cardio-pulmonary arrest secondary to CVA. Petitioner appealed this denial to the ECC. In its decision of 23 November 1988, 6 ECC sustained the GSIS, holding: We scrutinized the records of this case and uphold the respondent's denial decision. It is very clear that appellant was apparently well as the records show that there was no history that he was treated or hospitalized for hypertension, and no ECG was done to prove the existence of a heart disease, hypertension or CVA, during his stint as serviceman of the Philippine Air Force. Without these proofs, this claim cannot be given due course. The information given by his fellow soldiers that the deceased has (sic) been drinking alcoholic drinks the night before his confinement, led us to conclude that the excessive intake of alcohol had aggravated the death of the former soldier. This claim therefore, does not fall within the purview of P.D. 626, as amended. 63

IN VIEW THEREOF, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, and this instant case is dismissed. SO ORDERED. Hence, this petition for review raising this lone issue: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT(S) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THIS CLAIM DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF P.D. 626, AS AMENDED. 7 Petitioner argues that respondents' ruling to the effect that there was no substantial proof that Rolando died of cerebro-vascular accident, an illness included in the List of Occupational Diseases and thus compensable, is not supported by the records of this case, On the contrary, the Clinical History issued by the attending government physician of the hospital where Rolando was confined and later died, categorically stated that the cause of death was cardio-pulmonary arrest secondary to cerebro-vascular accident. Petitioner further contends that respondents' conclusion that Rolando's death was aggravated by excessive intake of alcoholic drinks the night prior to his confinement is not supported by evidence. The Clinical History prepared by Maj. del Rosario makes no observation that Rolando was indeed drunk. It does not indicate the percentage of alcohol in the deceased's body to determine whether or not he was intoxicated. Respondents' only basis for assuming the intoxication of the deceased was the allegation of his fellow soldiers which was not even reduced into writing and, therefore, should not have been taken into consideration in the absence of any medical examination that would lead one to conclude that there was an excessive intake of alcohol. In Our Resolution of 12 February 1990, We required the respondents to comment on the petition. 8 In the Comment filed on 6 April 1990 for respondent ECC, 9 the Office of the Solicitor General argues that although it is true that death arising from cerebro-vascular accident is among the occupational diseases included in Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, compensation may be granted subject to the following conditions: a. There must be a history, which should be proved, or trauma at work (to the head specially) due to unusual and extra-ordinary physical or mental strain or event. or undue exposure to noxious gases in industry. b. There must be a direct connection between the trauma or exertion in the course of the employment and the worker's collapse. c. If the trauma or exertion then and there caused a brain hemorrhage, the injury may be considered as arising from work. 10 Respondent ECC submits that there is no showing in the records that the foregoing conditions concur in the instant case, hence the claim for compensation must be denied. In Our Resolution of 17 April 1991, 11 We ordered the Comment of respondent GSIS expunged from the records for having been filed out of time notwithstanding the numerous extensions given by this

Court, gave due to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda, which GSIS complied with on 7 May 199112 and the petitioner on 24 May 1991. Respondent ECC was allowed to adopt its Comment as its Memorandum. In its Memorandum, the GSIS argues that no reversible error was committed by respondents since: (1) Petitioner failed to prove casual relation between the death of the deceased and his work as technical sergeant in the Philippine Air Force. Furthermore, she failed to show compliance with the conditions for compensability set forth in the Implementing Rules. (2) Payment of Petitioner's claim is prohibited by Section 1, Rule IV of the Amended Rules on Employees'Compensation which reads, to wit: 1. Limitation. No compensation shall be allowed to the employee or his dependents when theinjury, sickness, disability or death was occasioned by any of the following: (1) his intoxication; (2) his willful intention to injure or kill himself or another; or (3) his notorious negligence. (Emphasis supplied) From the foregoing, it is quite clear that respondents have adopted new theories to justify their respective prior actions. When the case was at their level, they denied the claim for reasons other than that which they now espouse before Us. GSIS disapproves. the claim primarily because "there is no conclusive proof 'that the claimant died of the above illness meaning cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to cerebro-vascular accident. In upholding the GSIS' denial, the ECC ruled, in effect, that for recovery of claims there should be proof that there was a history that Rolando was treated or hospitalized for hypertension, and that an ECG was done to prove the existence of a heart disease, hypertension or CVA during his stint as serviceman of the Philippine Air Force. None was offered. Besides, the "excessive intake of alcohol," as he had been drinking alcoholic drinks the night before his confinement per information given by his fellow soldiers, had aggravated his death. Before Us, however, the GSIS pursues a new tack: denial of the claim because petitioner failed to prove the causal relation between the death of Rolando and his work as Technical Sergeant of the Philippine Air Force and show the compliance with the conditions for compensability. Moreover, it is alleged that payment of the claim is prohibited by Section 1, Rule IV of the Amended Rules aforesaid because of Rolando's intoxication. On the other hand, ECC demands proof of concurrence of the conditions for compensability of cerebro-vascular accident. If respondents GSIS and ECC had already in mind these theories at the time they separately acted on the claim, they should have expressly asserted them instead of treating the claim in a cavalier fashion, leaving the petitioner at a loss as to why the death of her son, who had served his country for nineteen (19) years, would be for naught. Under the law, 13 a compensable sickness means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions. Otherwise stated, for sickness and the resulting death of an employee to be compensable, the claimant must show either: (1) that it is a result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation with the conditions set therein satisfied; or (2) if not so listed, that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. 14 64

Undoubtedly, cerebro-vascular accident is an occupational disease in Annex "A" of the Amended Rules. In such a case, proof of causal relation between the disease which resulted in Rolando's death and his work is notnecessary. In Rodriguez vs. ECC, 15 We ruled: If the disease is listed in the Table of Occupational Diseases embodied in Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees' Compensation, no proof of causation is required. ... In Abellara vs. Secretary of Labor, 16 We held: . . . The new scheme of employees' compensation establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of employers based on the salaries of their employees and applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's compensation. The open ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. . . . It is to be noted, however, that although cerebro-vascular accident is a listed occupational disease, its compensability requires compliance with all conditions set forth in the Rules, to wit: (a) there must be a history, which should be proved, of trauma at work (to the head specially) due to unusual and extraordinary physical and mental strain or event, or undue exposure to noxious gases in industry, (b) there must be a direct connection between the trauma or exertion in the course of the employment and the cerebro-vascular attack, and (c) the trauma or exertion then and there caused a brain hemorrhage. In short, cerebro-vascular accident is a qualifiedoccupational disease. Only substantial evidence is required to prove the concurrence of the conditions. This is consistent with the liberal interpretation accorded the provisions of the Labor Code and the social justice guarantee in favor of the workers.17 For, it is a well-settled rule that in carrying out and interpreting these provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules, the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration, and any doubt as to its proper interpretation and application must be resolved in favor of the employee whose rights must be protected. 18 The foregoing notwithstanding, where there is no compliance whatsoever with any of the conditions set forth in the Rules, as in this case, We cannot justify a pronouncement of compensability. However, it is apparent from the records of the case that the GSIS acted on the claim solely on the basis of the evaluation of the clinical history prepared by Maj. del Rosario. Petitioner was not given the opportunity to submit any other evidence or be heard. As earlier stated, the denial was made in a very cavalier fashion. There was undue haste in denying the claim. Worse, despite an absence of credible basis, the GSIS and ECC have in effect, although unintentionally, blackened the memory of Rolando by insinuating that excessive intake of alcohol, or intoxication, as bluntly put by the GSIS in its Memorandum, caused or aggravated his death. This is a rather unfair attribution which Rolando can no longer rebut as death has sealed his lips. Petitioner was deprived of due process. The demands of simple justice, taken in the light of the compassionate policy towards labor which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances, 19 dictate that under the circumstances obtaining in this case, where it is shown beyond cavil of doubt that Rolando did in fact die of cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to a cerebro-vascular accident, which is a listed occupational disease, petitioner be allowed to present evidence to prove the concurrence of the conditions for compensability of the subject disease.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING ASIDE the Resolution of the GSIS denying due course to the claim of petitioner and the challenged Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission of 23 November 1988 in ECC Case No. 3365, and REMANDING this case to the Employees' Compensation Commission for further proceedings, more specifically for the reception of petitioner's evidence on the basis of which it shall render a decision.No pronouncement as to costs.IT IS SO ORDERED.

On May 19, 1981, the National Seamen Board ruled in favor of the petitioner holding that the presumption of death cannot be applied in the case of Julio Lucero because the four-year period provided for by Article 391(1) of the Civil Code had not yet expired. On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission, the decision of the National Seamen Board was affirmed. Not satisfied with the decision, respondent Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. filed with the Court a petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of the respondent Commission docketed as G.R. No. 60101. On August 31, 1983, this Court in the said case, rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the ruling of the respondent Commission. This Court however stated therein that petitioner, Josephine Lucero, is entitled to death benefits. Petitioner then filed her claim with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) contending that although the loss of the vessel M/V Eastern Minicon occurred on February 16, 1980, the presumption of death of Julio Lucero will occur only after four (4) years under the Civil Code so that the death benefits that should be awarded to her should be in the amount based on the new Standard Format for Filipino seamen which became effective on February 1, 1984. On May 16, 1985, the POEA rendered a decision which ruled that petitioner's claim for death benefits should be based on the Old Standard Format, which was the applicable rule in 1980 when the loss of the vessel M/V Eastern Minicon and its crew occurred. The decision partly states: Paragraph 2 of Section D of the Old Standard Format provides as follows:

G.R. No. 74197 October 28, 1991 JOSEPHINE L. LUCERO, petitioner, vs. HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., respondents. Linsangan Law Office for petitioner. Jimenea, Dala & Zaragoza for private respondent.

MEDIALDEA, J.:p This is petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission, which dismissed the appeal of petitioner from the decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for having been filed out of time. xxx xxx xxx The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: Julio Lucero was hired on October 31, 1979 by the Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., respondent company, as Master of the vessel M/V Eastern Minicon. On February 16, 1980, while enroute from Hongkong to Manila, the said vessel encountered rough weather which prompted Captain Lucero to send three urgent messages to respondent company in Manila asking for immediate assistance and informing the latter that the ship's crew shall be abandoning the vessel anytime. Thereafter, nothing more was heard or seen of the vessel and its crew. When all search and rescue operations failed, the insurer of the M/V Eastern Minicon confirmed the loss of the vessel. The bodies of Lucero and that of the other crew members were never recovered. Hence, respondent company paid the death benefits to the heirs of the crew members. Lucero's wife, petitioner herein, refused the payment by respondent company of the death benefits. On July 16, 1980, she filed instead a complaint with the National Seamen Board for payment of accrued monthly allotments and for continued payment thereof until the vessel shall have returned to Manila. 65

2. In lieu of paragraph 1 above, the liability of employer of a Philippine registered vessel and vessel bareboat chartered to a Philippine shipping company shall be governed by existing Philippine laws over and above the benefits granted under Philippine laws on social security and employees compensation benefits provided that Philippine registered vessel and any vessel bareboat chartered to a Philippine company shall be manned by full Filipino Crew.

We find that as to the contention of complainant that she had to wait for four (4) years before she could file the present claim for death benefits because the presumption of death will only occur after the lapse of four (4) years after the last voyage of the vessel which was on February 16, 1980, this matter has been ruled upon by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 60101 in its Decision of August 31, 1983, stating to wit: There is thus enough evidence to show the circumstances attending the loss and disappearance of the M/V Eastern Minicon and its crew. The foregoing facts, quite logically, are sufficient to lead Us to a normal certainty that the vessel had sunk and that the persons aboard had perished with it. Upon this premise, the rule on presumption of death under Article 391(1) of the Civil Code must yield to the rule of preponderance of evidence. With this ruling, in relation to the ruling of the National Seamen Board in the cases filed by the heirs of the other crewmembers of M/V EASTERN MINICON, as aforecited, we are left with no other conclusion but that the accrual of the complainant's cause of action regarding her claim for death benefits would legally

be reckoned at the time of the loss of the vessel and her crew which was on February 18, 1980. . . . There is similarly no basis for us to apply the New Standard Format, as invoked by complainant, because the same does not provide of a case whereby it can be given a retroactive effect. What the complainant therefore can only recover, under the circumstances and under the facts of the case, is the sum of P12,000.00 and the peso equivalent of US $500 as death compensation benefits and compensation for loss of personal effects, respectively. CONFORMABLY TO THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered ordering the respondent Company to pay to the complainant the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS Philippine Currency as death benefits and the sum of FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS (US $500.00), or its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment, as compensation for loss of personal effects; and to pay to complainant's counsel on record. Atty. Pedro L. Linsangan, the amount equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total award due the complainant in this case, representing attorney's fees. Payment of these amounts should be coursed through this Office. Complainant's claim for moral and exemplary damages is hereby DENIED for lack of jurisdiction. SO ORDERED. (pp. 35-36, Rollo) Petitioner appealed to the respondent Commission. On October 23, 1985, the latter issued a resolution which reads in part: Records show that a copy of the assailed decision was received by complainant, through counsel, on May 29, 1985, but the appeal was filed on June 11, 1985 (by registered mail) which is beyond the reglementary period adverted to above. Failure to comply with this requirement, which vitiates the appeal, this Commission cannot give due course to the same. WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby dismissed for being filed out of time. SO ORDERED. (p. 53, Rollo) Hence, this petition was filed with the petitioner alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission. The issues to be resolved in this petition are: 1) whether or not the appeal of petitioner was properly dismissed by respondent Commission on ground of late filing and 2) whether or not petitioner is entitled to death benefits in the amount based on the new Standard Format which became effective in 1984, four years after the loss of the vessel and death of petitioner's husband. Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that although her counsel received a copy of the decision of the POEA on May 29, 1985, the tenth or last day to appeal to the respondent Commission fell on a Saturday, June 8, 1985; so that when petitioner's counsel filed the appeal on June 11, 1985, a 66

Tuesday, the appeal was filed only one (1) day late since it should have been filed on June 10, 1985 which was Monday. Petitioner also submits that the failure to file a timely appeal was due to fraud, accident, mistake and excusable negligence since the lawyer handling the case was under medication for hypertension during that time and therefore cannot properly attend to the appeal of the case. Petitioner's contention is devoid of merit. The ten (10)-day period for appeal to the NLRC contemplates calendar days and not working days (Vir-jen Shipping v. NLRC, et al., G.R. Nos. 5801112, July 20, 1982, 115 SCRA 347; Firestone v. Lariosa, G.R. No. 70479, February 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 187). This general rule however is not without an exception. Where the 10th or last day to appeal falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the appeal may be filed on the next succeeding business day (SM Agri and General Machineries v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 74806, January 9, 1989, 169 SCRA 20; Imperial Victory Shipping Agency v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 84672, August 5, 1991). However, we noted in these cases the fact that Saturday, unless declared a holiday, is considered a business day and therefore, if the last day to appeal falls on a Saturday, the act is still due on that day and not on the next succeeding business day. In the case at bar, the last day for petitioner to appeal was June 8, 1985 which was a Saturday. When petitioner filed her appeal on June 11, 1985, which was already a Tuesday, the decision of the POEA had become final and executory as the appeal was two days late of the 10-day reglementary period. It is settled that the perfection of appeal is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional (Narag v. NLRC, No. 69628, October 28, 1987, 155 SCRA 199). The argument of petitioner that since the lawyer handling her case was sick during the time the appeal should have been promptly filed, the procedural rules on appeal should be liberally construed in her favor so as not to deny her due process, cannot be given credence. Firstly, petitioner's counsel on record is the law firm itself and not only one of its lawyers. If the lawyer who was assigned to handle the case became physically incapable to attend to it, then it is the duty and responsibility of the law firm, being the counsel on record, to be vigilant of the developments of its clients' cases. Secondly, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor part of due process. It is a statutory right and not a constitutional right (Tropical Homes Inc. v. National Housing Authority, No. L-48672, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 540; Victorias Milling v. Office of Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, No. 73705, August 27, 1987, 153 SCRA 317). Although this Court had allowed the filing of appeal in some cases where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it, this liberal practice is done only when it would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of the court's equity jurisdiction. When the petitioner's case is unmeritorious, as in the case at bar, the relaxation of the rules shall not be allowed. This brings us to the second issue raised by petitioner as to the amount of death benefits to which she is entitled. Petitioner submits that she is entitled to the amount of P220,000.00 as death benefits, based on the Standard Format which became effective in 1984. The rule is settled that the material date in determining the amount of death compensation benefits is the date of death of the seaman, not the amount provided by law at the time of payment (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 84672, August 5, 1991). In the case at bar, the amount pegged under the Standard Format at the time of the seaman's death which was computed by the POEA as P12,000.00 as death benefits and the peso equivalent of US $500.00 as compensation for loss of personal effects, should be the amount awarded to petitioner and not the amount provided for in the new Standard Format which took effect after the death of petitioner's husband. Besides, the delay in the recovery of the death compensation benefits is attributable to petitioner and not to respondent corporation (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency v. NLRC, supra). ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED and the resolution of respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated October 23, 1985 is hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 89217 September 4, 1991 JUANITA NITURA, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (PHILIPPINE ARMY), respondents. Public Attorney's Office for petitioner. Jose T. Apolo and Cesar R. Vidal for G.S.I.S PARAS, J.:p This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of respondent Employees' Compensation Commission (hereinafter referred to as ECC for brevity) dated May 24, 1989 in ECC Case No. 3470 entitled "Juanita Nitura, Appellant, vs. Government Service Insurance System (Philippine Army), Respondent", which affirmed the denial by the Government Service Insurance System (hereinafter referred to as GSIS for brevity) of the claim of herein petitioner Juanita Nitura for the benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, on account of the death of her son, Pfc. Regino S. Nitura. The facts of the case are as follows: The deceased Pfc. Regino S. Nitura, 681349 PA, started his military service on October 5, 1978 when he was caged for military training in the Philippine Army. At the time of his death on March 3, 1986, he was assigned to the "D" Coy 44th Inf. Bn., lst Inf. (TABAK) Division, stationed at Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte. In the evening of March 2, 1986, he was instructed to go to Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City, which is more or less one (1) kilometer from the Command Post of his Company, to check on several personnel of the Command who were then attending a dance party. This instruction was attested to by his Battalion Commander, Col. Loreto M. Deus, 0-90573 Inf. (GSC) PA in his affidavit dated July 8, 1986 (Annex "A" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 15). On his way back to the camp, he passed, crossed and fell from a hanging wooden bridge connects Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City and Barangay Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte, his head hitting the stony portion of the ground. His death certificate (Annex 'B" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 16) shows that he died of "cardiorespiratory arrest, shock, traumatic due to hemorrhage, intracranial due to severe concussion of the brain due to accidental fall". Herein petitioner Juanita Nitura filed a death claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, with the GSIS. In a letter dated October 27, 1986 signed by Oscar R. Marcelino, Manager, Employees' Compensation Department (Annex "C" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 17), petitioner's claim was denied on the ground that the condition for compensability, that the injury and the resulting disability or death must be the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, has not been satisfied. Her request for reconsideration was likewise denied on the ground that her son was not at his place of work nor performing his official function as a PA soldier when the accident occurred (Annex "D" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 18). On July 15, 1987, petitioner's claim was elevated to the respondent ECC for review and docketed as ECC Case No. 3470. 67

As aforementioned, respondent ECC affirmed the denial of petitioner's claim by the GSIS. Respondent ECC reasoned out that: The deceased was not at his place of work nor was he performing his official function as member of the Philippine Army when the incident occurred. He was, as appellant admits, coming from a dance party. Despite appellant's contention, recreation is no longer an employee's duty nor is it connected to the performance of an employee's official function. For to rule otherwise, would negate Rule III, Section 1. Furthermore, even assuming that attending a dance party is still a workconnected activity, we believe that the deceased acted with notorious negligence, for although he was already intoxinated, he still proceeded to attend the dance at a nearby barrio with full knowledge that it would be dangerous to cross the hanging bridge in the dark. (ECC Decision, Rollo, p. 23). Hence, this petition. The sole issue in the case at bar is whether or not the death of Pfc. Regino S. Nitura is compensable pursuant to the applicable statutes and regulations. Respondent ECC avert that it is undisputed that when the incident happened, the late Pfc. Regino S. Nitura had just come from a dance party and was on his way back to the camp. Attending a dance party is not a part of an employee's duty nor is it connected with the performance of his official functions. To rule otherwise would negate the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, that for the injury to be compensable, it must be the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. While his Battalion Commander, Col. Loreto Deus attested to the fact that the deceased was instructed to check on several personnel of the command then attending the dance party, he failed to state in his affidavit the reason why the deceased was given such instruction. This is fatal to petitioner's case as it cannot be determined if the instruction was indeed official and had something to do with his duties as a soldier. Respondent ECC insisted that even assuming that the deceased was performing his duty when the incident occurred, he was at that time intoxinated and acted with notorious negligence in crossing the bridge. These facts according to the respondent ECC bar petitioner's claim for benefits pursuant to Section 1, Rule IV of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation which provides that: Section 1. Limitation No compensation shall be allowed to the employee or his dependents when the injury, sickness, disability or death was occasioned by any of the following: (1) his intoxication; (2) his willful attention to injure or kill himself or another; or (3) his notorious negligence.

(Memorandum for Public Respondent, Rollo, pp. 107-109). Public respondent ECC concurs with public respondent GSIS that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment as it happened when the deceased was crossing the bridge after attending a dance party. Although the deceased had been instructed to check on several personnel of the command then attending the party, the incident happened after the same had purportedly been accomplished. The ECC continues assuming that he was not notoriously negligent in crossing the bridge, still, the same cannot be removed from the prohibitive mantle of Section 1, Rule IV of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation which considers the employee's intoxication as a ground for denial of the claim (Memorandum for Respondent GSIS, Rollo, pp. 119-121). The petition is impressed with merit. In resolving this issue in a similar case, this Court ruled that the Employees' Compensation Act is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to the working men and women in our surety. While the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act may have been abandoned under the New Labor Code, it is significant that the liberality of the law in general in favor of the working man still subsists. As an official agent charged by law to implement social justice guaranteed and affirmed by the Constitution, the ECC should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection with the incident. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations should be resolved in favor of labor." The policy then is to extend the applicability of the decree (P.D. 626) to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder, which includes protection to employees for a reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the work premises (Lazo v. ECC, 186 SCRA 574-575 [1990]). Section 1, Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation provides that: Section 1. Grounds (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all the following conditions: (1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work require him to be; (2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and (3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order of the employer. The concept of a "work place" referred to cannot always be literally applied to a soldier in active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker in an assembly line in a factory or a clerk in a particular fixed office. A soldier must go where his company is stationed (Hinoguin v. ECC, 172 SCRA 350 [1990]). In the case at bar, Pfc. Nitura's station was at Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte. But then his presence at the site of the accident was with the permission of his superior officer having been directed to go to Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City. In carrying out said directive, he had to pass by the hanging bridge which connects the two places. As held in the Hinoguin case (supra.), a 68

place where soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer. As to the question of whether or not he was performing an official function at the time of the incident, it has been held that a soldier on active duty status is really on a 24 hours a day official duty status and is subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, seven (7) days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status. Thus, a soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to have clearly and unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by going on an approved vacation leave. Even vacation leaves may, it must be remembered, be pre-terminated by superior orders (Hinoguin v. ECC, supra.). In the instant case, the deceased was neither on vacation leave nor on an overnight pass when the incident occurred. In fact, he was directed by his superior to check on several personnel of the command then attending the dance party, as attested to by his Battalion Commander. Hence, since Pfc. Nitura was not on vacation leave, he did not effectively cease performing "official functions." More than that, it was correctly pointed out by petitioner Juanita Nitura that the contention of the GSIS and the ECC that the deceased did not sustain the injury while performing the instructions of his superior would put to naught an actual fact-finding and evaluation undertaken by the military that the death of Pfc. Regino S. Nitura was in line of duty. She pointed out that the Line of Duty Board of Officers which convened on March 4, 1986 at the Hqs. 44th W Bn 1st Inf. (TABAK) Division, PA at Anastacio, Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte made the following findings: ... a careful analysis of the situation surrounding the death of Pfc. Regino S. Nitura 681349 PA of the Delta Coy 44th Inf. Bn., IID PA proves that he was performing official duties with this unit. (Annex "F" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 24). Hence, General Orders No. 109 dated November 19, 1986 declared that: 3. Death of Private First Class Regino S. Nitura 681349, Philippine Army of 44th Infantry Batallion, lst Infantry Division, Philippine Army who died on March 3,1986 due to cardiorespiratory arrest at Katipunan, San Jose, Zamboanga del Norte is declared in Line of Duty. (Annex "G" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 25). Consequently, Leon O. Ridao Assistant Secretary, Legal Affairs, in his 3rd Indorsement to the Administrator, Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, dated January 26, 1988 (Annex 'H" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 26) ordered the payment of the death gratuity under the provisions of Republic Act NO. 610, as amended, to his rightful heirs, as may be determined by the Claims Division, OTJAG AFP (Memorandum for the Petitioner, Rollo, pp. 9395). With regard respondents' contention that the claim is precluded by the fact that the deceased was drunk and acted with notorious negligence, it has been held that even if it could be shown that a person drank intoxicating liquor it is incumbent upon the person invoking drunkenness as a defense to show that said person was extremely drunk. This is so because a person may take as much as several bottles of beer or several glasses of hard liquor and still remain sober and unaffected by the alcoholic drink. Thus, intoxication which does not incapacitate the employee from following his occupation is not sufficient to defeat the recovery of compensation, although intoxication may be a contributory cause to his injury. It must be shown that the intoxication was the proximate cause of death or injury and the burden of proof lies on him who raises drunkenness as a defense (Vda. de

Yohanan v. Balena and WCC, 78 SCRA 348 [1977]). While it may be admitted that the deceased drank intoxicating liquor at the dance party, respondents ECC and GSIS have not established that the state of drunkenness of the deceased is the proximate cause of his death. On the other hand, notorious negligence has been defined as something more than mere or simple negligence or contributory negligence; it signifies a deliberate act of the employee to disregard his own personal safety. Disobedience to rules, orders, and/or prohibition does not in itself constitute notorious negligence, if no intention can be attributed to the injured to end his life (Luzon Stevedoring Corporation v. WCC, 105 SCRA 675 [1981] reiterating Paez v. WCC, 7 SCRA 588 [1963]). As stressed by the petitioner, it was not shown that the deceased had any intention to end his life. Crossing a hanging bridge may seem dangerous to an ordinary man but the deceased was a soldier who had been trained and prepared for this kind of work. As explained by his mother, petitioner herein, the deceased had seen the worse and was not afraid or intimidated by the fact that he had to pass through a hanging bridge. Facing danger had become second nature to him (Rollo, pp. 98-99). PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED, the decision of respondent ECC dated May 24, 1989 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petitioner and the illegimate minor children of the deceased, namely Regina and Rogian, are AWARDED the full benefits pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. SO ORDERED.

On the basis of the accident in 1979, the petitioner claimed for compensation benefit with the GSIS. He was awarded temporary total disability benefits from September 5 to 29, 1979 and was thereafter granted permanent partial disability benefit for a period of twenty five (25) months. After receipt of the corresponding monetary benefits from the System, the petitioner asked for additional benefits on the ground of permanent total disability under PD 626, claiming that he was also gradually losing vision of his left eye. This was denied by the GSIS on the ground that he had already previously received the maximum which could be awarded to him under the law. Furthermore, the condition of his left eye which allegedly had normal vision did not satisfy the criteria for a grant of permanent total disability benefits. The petitioner then elevated his case to the ECC which later affirmed the decision of the GSIS on November 10, 1988. (The petitioner was however notified of such decision only on January 8. 1989). Unaware of the denial of his claim, the petitioner sought the help of this Court praying for the additional benefits. Consequently, in a resolution dated February 10, 1988, the Court denied the petition for being premature but at the same time directed the ECC to act speedily on the claim pending with it. Later, the petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the Court's resolution attaching to it the decision of the ECC.

G.R. No. 84846 August 5, 1991 JESUS D. AGUJA, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, ET AL., respondents. Ariel F. Aguirre, Roberto Y. Mabulay and Cesar R. Vidal for GSIS. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p The petitioner, as a pauper litigant, seeks the review of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) decision dated November 10, 1987 denying his claim for additional benefits under P.D. 626, as amended on account of his eye injury. Jesus D. Aguja worked as a janitor in the Office of the Municipal Treasurer in Libmanan, Camarines Sur. While he was cleaning the office toilet sometime in April, 1979, the bottle of muriatic acid he was using suddenly fell to the floor, causing the contents to splash all over. Some of the acid hit the petitioner's right eye which caused gradual loss of vision, finally culminating in blindness. The petitioner's left eye was not blinded, but it contracted pterygium nasal side with visions of 20/40", per certification of Dr. Delfin M. Rosales, an eye, ear, nose and throat (EENT) specialist in Naga City causing a disturbance of vision. Notwithstanding his blindness on the right eye, the petitioner continued to work but retired finally from service on February 26, 1982.

Thus, on June 15, 1988, the Court resolved to reconsider its February 10, 1988 resolution and revived the case. The respondents, ECC and GSIS were required to file their comments. On September 15, 1990, the Court issued another resolution, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows: Considering the foregoing, the Court Resolved to require petitioner Aguja to submit satisfactory medical proof on the condition of his left eye and whether the same is still capable of treatment and to what extent. Since he is a pauper litigant who cannot even afford the services of a lawyer, he may go to the nearest government hospital which has a competent eye doctor, present a copy of this Court's resolution, and request for the necessary medical certificate. (Rollo, p. 95) In a later resolution dated November 26, 1990, the Court directed the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) to assist the petitioner in this case specifically in obtaining the required medical certificate with respect to the condition of the petitioner's left eye necessary for the resolution of the claim. The issue now before the Court is whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the additional compensation prayed for. Petitioner Aguja is claiming for additional benefits because "his left eye with PTERYGIUM is slowly and gradually losing sight. As of now, he can not recognize people beyond one (1) meter. It is possible he may also totally lose his vision."

69

To be entitled to an income benefit for permanent total disability, the following conditions must be satisfied: Section 1. Condition of entitlement. (a) An employee shall be entitled to an income benefit for permanent total disability if all of the following conditions are satisfied: 1) He has been duly reported to the System; 2) He sustains the permanent total disability as a result of the injury or sickness; and 3) The System has been duly notified of the injury or sickness which caused his disability. (Sec. l(a) Rule XI, Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation) The public respondents denied the petitioner's claim on the basis of the 1985 finding that only the right eye was blind at the time while the left eye was not. The respondents ruled that the petitioner is not qualified for permanent total disability benefits but only permanent partial disability which the petitioner has already received. It must be stressed that the petitioner is claiming for additional benefits because of the gradual loss of vision of his left eye which the public respondents never considered anymore in evaluating his claim. From the records of the case, there is sufficient basis for granting the petition. The medical certificate submitted to this Court with respect to the condition of the petitioner's left eye reveals the following results: - CATARACT IMMATURE O.S. - OCCLUSIO-PUPILLAE O.D. WITH IRIDODIALYSIS O.D. SECONDARY CHEMICAL BURNS - PTERYGIUM (Rollo, p. 115) Medical authorities disclose that: CATARACT IMMATURE - is an opacity of the crystalline eye lens or of its capsule. (DORLAND, Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 24th Edition, 1965) - any cataract in the beginning stages, or one which affects only a part of the lens or its covering.

(MALOY, Medical Dictionary for Lawyers, 2nd edition, 1951). OCCLUSIO-PUPILLAE - is the closure of the opening in the iris of the eye by formation of an opaque membrane. IRIDODIALYSIS - is the separation or loosening of the iris from its attachment. PTERYGIUM - a triangular fleshy mass of thickened conjunctiva occurring usually at the inner side of the eyeball, covering part of the cornea and causing a disturbance of vision. (Dorland, Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 24th edition, 1965) Clearly, from the above findings, the petitioner's left eye is indeed gradually losing vision. The left eye was found to be burned which only goes to show that the present condition can be traced back to the accident which occurred in April, 1979 and no other. There is no showing that there was any supervening event which may have caused the blindness of the left eye. Undeniably, the injury was caused by the splashing of muriatic acid while the janitor was cleaning the government building's toilet. This accident not only blinded the right eye but also "compromised" the left eye. According to the medical certificate issued in 1985, a pterygium was already growing on the nasal side of the left eye. In such a case, the injury caused on the left eye is considered as work-connected; hence, compensable. The fact that the aggravation occurred after the petitioner's retirement does not militate against his claim for additional benefits. There is no question that the proximate cause of the apparent but gradual loss of vision of the left eye was the accidental fall of the bottle of muriatic acid. The presence of secondary chemical burns on the left eye as stated in the medical certificate buttresses the assumption that the injury of the left eye was also caused by the accident in 1979. The causal connection between the resulting disability and the petitioner's work is beyond civil. In Belarmino v. ECC, 185 SCRA 304 [1990], we stated that: ... Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimant's own negligence or misconduct (I Larson Workmen's Compensation Law 3279 [1972]. Simply stated, all the medical consequences and sequels that flow from the primary injury are compensable. (Ibid.) A person's disability might not emerge at one precise moment in time but rather over a period of time (See Jimenez v. ECC, G.R. No. 79193, November 28, 1989, En Banc Minute Resolution). It is possible that an injury which at first was considered to be temporary may later on become permanent or one who suffers a partial disability becomes totally and permanently disabled from the same cause as in the case at bar. Unfortunately, the petitioner's permanent disability has further deteriorated affecting also the vision of his left eye. The aggravation of petitioner's condition arose from the same injury or disability. The petitioner was compelled to retire from work on account of the blindness of his right eye. With the gradual loss of vision of his left eye, it would even be more difficult, if not impossible for the petitioner to be gainfully employed now. As stated in numerous cases, "total disability does not mean a state of absolute helplessness, but disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work or a work of similar nature, that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attachments could do. (Abaya v. ECC, 176 SCRA 507 [1989]; Orlino v. ECC, G.R. No. 85015, March 29,1990 En Banc Minute Resolution, Marcelino v. Seven Up Bottling Co., 47 SCRA 343 [1972]; Landicho v. WCC and Canlubang Sugar Estate, 89 SCRA 147 [1979]) To deny the petitioner, the benefits prayed for would 70

certainly be contrary to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code (Lazo v. ECC, 186 SCRA 569 [1990]. We hold, therefore, that the petitioner is entitled to a conversion of his disability benefits from permanent partial to permanent total. The compensation benefits shall be determined in accordance with Section 5, of Rule XI of the Amended Rules on Employment's Compensation providing as follows: For contingencies which occurred before May 1, 1979, the limitation of P12,000 or 5 years, whichever comes first, shall be enforced. Since the petitioner has already received income benefits under permanent partial disability the public respondent shall pay only the difference between the two. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Employees' Compensation Commission decision dated November 10, 1988 is SET ASIDE and REVERSED. The respondents are ordered to pay compensation benefits as stated above. SO ORDERED,

His medical records show that as early as 1977, Prospero Naval was already suffering from bronchiectasis, emphysema and hypertension. On 24 June 1985, he was hospitalized in the Mother Seton Hospital upon a complaint of "on and off" difficulty of breathing, easy fatigue and cough associated with weight loss, under the management of a certain Dr. Ruben Chavez. His condition did not improve compelling him to retire at the early age of fifty-five (55). On account of his disability, Naval filed a claim for compensation benefits with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Acting on the claim, the GSIS awarded the petitioner permanent partial disability benefits for eight (8) months starting on 1 January 1986 on account of his essential hypertension. Petitioner's other ailments, bronchiectasis and emphysema, were not considered workconnected, hence, were held not compensable. Petitioner requested for a reconsideration of the System's decision awarding only permanent partial disability benefits. He insisted in his claim that he is entitled to permanent total disability benefits, considering that he was evaluated to be under permanent and total disability for the purpose of retirement by the GSIS itself. The request for reconsideration was not given due course by the GSIS, hence, petitioner appealed to the respondent Commission. His appeal before the Commission was dismissed; hence, the present petition for review. In resolving the appeal, respondent Commission, considered only essential hypertension suffered by petitioner as work-connected. It held that the other ailments, namely bronchiectasis and emphysema, were not the result of petitioner's employment but were largely attributable to cigarette-smoking by petitioner as medically determined by the GSIS. Referring to petitioner's medical records, respondent Commission declared that his permanent total disability may have been brought about by these two (2) non-work related illnesses, for which reason he is not entitled to the claimed benefits. According to respondent Commission, Article 166 of PD 442 provides for compensation only for work-connected disability or death. In the present case, the Commission held that petitioner was properly compensated for his work-related ailment, namely, essential hypertension. Petitioner submits that even if bronchiectasis and emphysema were not considered work-connected, yet he was found to be suffering from Essential Hypertension by the GSIS itself when it acted favorably on his disability claim on 4 June 1986. Hence, he maintains that he is entitled to a lifetime of monthly income benefits as provided in Article 192 of the Labor Code. 2 A year after June 1986, he said he was again examined and found by a cardiologist of the Philippine Heart Center for Asia, Dr. Esperanza Icasas Cabral, to be suffering from bronchiectasis, emphysema and hypertension. The same doctor certified that his disability is considered permanent and total. 3 On the other hand, the Solicitor General counters that petitioner was awarded, on account of his essential hypertension, partial disability benefits for eight (8) months starting on 1 January 1986, which is considered the maximum benefit allowed under P.D. 626 for said disease, and that the denial of his claim for permanent total disability benefits was based on the finding of the Chief Medical Examiner of the GSIS that bronchiectasis and emphysema were causes of his permanent total disability. These ailments, the Solicitor General points out, were found by both the GSIS and the Commission to be due to petitioner's chronic cigarette-smoking and were not work-connected. Both the GSIS and the Commission maintain that petitioner failed to present evidence to prove that it was hypertension, and not the non-work-related illnesses of bronchiectasis and emphysema, which caused his permanent total disability. Since under the Labor Code, the burden is on the petitioner to prove that it was his newly-acquired hypertension, and not his more advanced but non-work-related illnesses of bronchiectasis and emphysema, which caused his permanent total disability, petitioner's failure to overcome said burden of proof calls for a dismissal of this petition.

G.R. No. 83568 July 18, 1991 PROSPERO NAVAL, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,respondents. Elpidio M. Borja for petitioner. The Government Corporate Counsel for respondent GSIS. PADILLA, J.:p In this petition for review, petitioner seeks the reversal and annulment of the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission (Commission for brevity), dated 10 May 1988, 1 denying permanent total disability benefits to petitioner. The facts, as culled from the decision of the respondent Commission, are as follows: Petitioner, Prospero Naval, started his government service on 1 July 1950 when he was appointed Clerk in the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Camarines Sur. Five (5) years later, he transferred to the ACCFA, Naga City, where he held the position of Audit Examiner until 5 February 1962 when he transferred to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), Naga Branch, where he started as a clerk-typist. He served the DBP for nineteen (19) years, earning for himself several promotions, from bookkeeper to Financial Planning Supervisor, Accountant and finally as Chief of the Planning Staff. He was holding the last mentioned position at the time of his retirement on 31 December 1985. 71

The main issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not respondent Commission erred in affirming the decision of the GSIS which denied total permanent disability benefits to petitioner. In denying petitioner total permanent disability benefits, respondent Commission relied on the finding that petitioner's bronchiectasis and emphysema were not work-related but the result of chronic cigarette-smoking as determined by the Chief Medical Examiner of the GSIS. Since said ailments were not work-related, the Commission denied compensation for permanent total disability, pursuant to Article 166 of PD 442 (Labor Code), as amended.4 However, the Commission concurred with the GSIS that essential hypertension, of which petitioner was also suffering, was compensable. He was thus granted permanent partial disability benefits for eight (8) months starting 1 January 1985, which benefits petitioner actually received. The new Labor Code has abolished the presumption of compensability for illnesses contracted by a worker during employment. 5 Indeed, to be entitled to disability benefits, petitioner had to present evidence to prove that his ailments, bronchiectasis, emphysema and hypertension, were the results of, or the risk of contracting the same were aggravated by, working conditions or the nature of his work. Unfortunately, except for a sweeping statement that his "long years of service in the government exposed him to dust and the elements and to viruses, mycoplasmas and bacteria," petitioner failed to prove that bronchiectasis and emphysema were work-related. Besides, these two (2) ailments, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, are not listed as occupational diseases in the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. Sensing that his argument to justify compensability for his lung ailments was unconvincing, it is then urged by petitioner that the said lung ailments were not really the causes of his permanent total disability but hypertension.6 He alleges that after his medical treatment of these two (2) ailments, bronchiectasis and emphysema, he was still able to work efficiently for six (6) years and earned two (2) promotions, namely, Chief, Planning Staff (1983) and Chief, Collection and Acquired Assets Division which position he was holding when he was forced to retire on 31 December 1985. According to petitioner, the duties and functions of these last two (2) positions held by him were the causes of his hypertension which rendered him permanently and totally disabled. The records do not support the aforesaid argument of petitioner. It is apparent from the evidence he presented,i.e., the medical certificate of Dr. Esperanza Icasas-Cabral and the Action on Disability Claim, that his lung ailments were always mentioned together with essential hypertension. In fact, as observed by public respondent, petitioner's lung diseases are mentioned or listed first, thereby indicating that the said lung diseases are the primary causes of petitioner's claimed permanent and total disability. As for essential hypertension The term essential hypertension has been employed to indicate those cases of hypertension for which a specific endocrine or renal basis cannot be found, and in which the neural element may be only a mediator of other influences. Since even this latter relationship is not entirely clear, it is more properly listed for the moment in the category of unknown etiology. The term essential hypertension defines simply by failing to define; hence it is of limited use except as an expression of our inability to understand adequately the forces at work. 7 Simply put, the term essential hypertension is commonly used to describe a rise in the blood pressure of an individual when no specific factor is attributed to its development. We do not believe that essential hypertension alone caused petitioner's total and permanent disability. As abovestated, bronchiectasis and emphysema were found by the GSIS Medical Director 72

to have been caused by petitioner's chronic cigarette-smoking. These ailments, together with essential hypertension, contributed to his weakened bodily condition. Petitioner himself admits that after he was treated of these two (2) ailments, i.e., bronchiectasis and emphysema, his health did not improve and was, in fact, aggravated by the development of essential hypertension as the years passed. 8 The nature and condition of this work cannot be said to have caused or contributed to his hypertension. The positions he held prior to his retirement did not entail stressful activity. They were "desk jobs." As a division chief, he was not exposed to the elements or exerted physical strain such as driving a taxicab (Abana vs. Quisumbing, 22 SCRA 1278); or like a school teacher whose strenuous work of teaching school children of tender age or assignment to barrios for community work therein contributed to or aggravated his ailments (De Castro vs. Republic, 75 SCRA 372). While ample jurisprudence has indeed established that where an illness or disease intervened or was contracted by the employee in the course of his employment, said employee is entitled to disability compensation, yet, said decisions were promulgated under the former Workmen's Compensation Act where the presumption of compensability was the rule. Under the Labor Code, petitioner has the burden of proving that his illness is work-related and hence compensable. We agree with the counsel for respondent GSIS that no evidence was adduced by petitioner to show that he would still be permanently and totally disabled even in the absence of his non-work connected lung ailments of emphysema and bronchiectasis. The respondent Employees' Compensation Commission, therefore, did not err in affirming the decision of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Employees' Compensation Commission denying petitioner's claim for permanent total disability benefits, is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 95595 July 8, 1991 JOSE DE GUIA, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,respondents. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:p This Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and Article 181 of the Labor Code (Pres. Decree No. 442, as amended), filed by petitioner on his own behalf, challenges the Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the finding of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) that petitioner's ailment "Proliferative Diabetic Retinopathy with Vitreous Hemorrhage" is not compensable. Petitioner was first employed as storekeeper by the Bureau of Internal Revenue on 23 March 1956. He later earned several promotions as Assistant Agent, Assistant Examiner, Revenue Examiner II, and Senior Revenue Examiner on 7 December 1977, until he became, on 1 August 1985, a Supervising Revenue Enforcement Officer, which position he held when disability forced him to retire at age 61 on 1 January 1988.

Petitioner claims that sometime in 1982, he experienced loss of vision for which he consulted an eye specialist who diagnosed his visual impairment as "the result of continuous visual insult in the pursuit for his duties, wherein cataract and vitreous hemorrhage sets in as complication of both eyes" (Annex A, Petition). Laser photo-coagulation was prescribed and rendered in 1983 by another eye specialist of the Eye Referral Center who found petitioner to be suffering from "Proliferative Diabetic Retinopathy with Vitreous Hemorrhage" (Petition, pp. 3-4). On 8 August 1986, he underwent panretinal photo-coagulation at the Southeastern Eye Center of North Carolina, U.S.A. (ibid.). On 19 June 1987, he filed a claim for compensation benefits under Pres. Decree No. 626. On 3 July 1987, the GSIS denied his claim on the ground that petitioner's underlying ailment, "diabetes mellitus," is not listed as an occupational disease and that it has not been shown that the nature of his work had increased the risk of his contracting his eye ailment. This Decision was affirmed by the ECC on 17 January 1990, which ruled: Our medical research shows that diabetes mellitus is a disorder of carbohydrate metabolism which may be classified into primary and secondary metabolism which may be classified into primary and secondary type. Genetic susceptibility plays a role in the pathogenesis of the primary type. The secondary type may be due to pancreatic disease, hormonal abnormalities, drugs and chemicals, insulin receptor, abnormalities, genetic syndromes and other factors. Complications of the disease involve the eye, kidney, nerves, blood vessels and other organs. (Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, Braunwald, et al. 11th Edition). We have conducted a thorough study of the facts of the case and after a careful analysis of the evidence submitted, we believe appellant's claim does not fall within the purview of the Employees Compensation Law (P.D. 626, as amended). The records of the instant case is (sic) bereft of evidence which would show a causal relation between the ailment (diabetes mellitus) and appellant's former employment and working conditions. The case cannot, therefore, be considered as compensable. (Rollo, pp. 18-19) Unsuccessful below, petitioner is now before us. Petitioner alleges that, as Revenue Examiner, he spent endless hours in examining voluminous income tax returns which subjected him to constant physical and mental stress (Petition, p. 7). Citing the case of Millora v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al. (G.R. No. 69572, 28 July 1986, 143 SCRA 151), he claims that these stresses in employment are medically recognized as predisposing factors in the development of diabetes (Rollo, pp. 11-12). We are constrained to reject petitioner's submissions. Under the Labor Code, in order that an employee may be entitled to sickness benefits, they must have resulted from any illness (a) definitely accepted as an occupational disease, or (b) caused by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. Inasmuch as petitioner's "diabetic retinopathy" and its underlying ailment, "diabetes mellitus," are not listed in the Table of Occupational Diseases embodied in Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees' Compensation, petitioner is required to prove a positive proposition, which is, that the risk of 73

contracting the disease is increased by working conditions (Rodriguez v. ECC, G.R. No. 46454, 28 September 1989, 178 SCRA 30). That burden of proof, petitioner has failed to discharge. Petitioner's "diabetic retinopathy" is a complication linked with his diabetic condition, from which he was suffering for twenty-five (25) years. The very medical terminology emphasizes that complication. In other words, petitioner's eye condition was not contracted by reason of his employment but came about as a complication of an underlying disease. Neither can it be said, therefore, that the risk of contracting the eye ailment was increased by his working conditions for irrespective of those conditions, the complication could have set in. The underlying ailment, "diabetes mellitus" is neither work connected. It is a metabolic and a familial disease to which one is pre-disposed by reason of heredity, obesity or old age. While petitioner states that no one in his family is suffering from the illness, genetic susceptibility is a factor that stretches from generation to generation. And even assuming that petitioner has satisfactorily proven that he is not predisposed to the disease due to heredity, he has not shown that he is not predisposed thereto due to old age or obesity. Stated otherwise, irrespective of the type of work that petitioner had been engaged in, he could have contracted diabetes. We thus find no causal relation between petitioner's basic illness, "diabetes mellitus" and its complication "diabetic retinopathy" with his employment and working conditions nor can we say that the nature of his work had increased the risk of his contracting either ailment. The medical certificate (Annex A, Petition), issued in 1982, which certified that "visual impairment was the result of continuous visual insult in the pursuit of his duties, " and that "cataract and vitreous hemorrhage sets in ascomplications of both eyes," carefully avoided any mention of the cause of the complications, i.e., the patient's diabetic condition. It was the diagnosis of "diabetic retinopathy" made by the Eye Referral Center that pinpointed the exact ailment. While, indeed, in the case of Millora (supra), it was recognized that physical and emotional stresses could be predisposing factors to the development of diabetes, that was because it was shown therein that the claimant was not predisposed to "diabetes mellitus" by reason of old age, obesity or heredity. Similar proof is wanting herein. What has been established is that petitioner had been suffering from diabetes for no less than twenty-five (25) years, which means even before he became a Revenue Examiner, when he alleges that he was subjected to physical and emotional stresses. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the judgment under review is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 89168 May 14, 1991 ROSA LENTEJAS, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent. Paul B. Lentejas for petitioner. RESOLUTION FELICIANO, J.:p

a) For the injury and the resulting death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following conditions: 1. the employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; 2. the employee must have been performing his official function petitions: 3. if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer. xxx xxx xxx

Victorio Lentejas, the husband of petitioner Rosa Lentejas, entered the government service on 13 January 1968 as Maintenance "Capataz" at the Bureau of Public Highways in Calbayog City, Western Samar. He rose from the ranks until he became a maintenance foreman in 1978, a construction foreman in 1979, and eventually general foreman at the City Engineer's Office of Calbayog City. His official working hours were from 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. On 25 July 1984, Victorio as general foreman of the City Engineer's Office, went to Barangay Banti, Tinambacan District, Calbayog City, there to inspect work being done on a damaged seawall protecting the shoreline against encroachment by the sea. At around 4:30 P.M., being then (according to the police report) on his way home from that place, Victorio was suddenly attacked and stabbed with a knife by Arnulfo Luaton who inflicted upon him multiple stab wounds on different parts of the body causing his instantaneous death. Police investigation showed that the killing was brought about by a personal grudge. The deceased Victorio and the killer Arnulfo were owners of adjoining lots situated in San Vicente St., Tinambacan District, Calbayog City and they were in disagreement as to the correct boundary between their respective lots. About six (6) months earlier, petitioner and Arnulfo's father had a heated argument regarding this boundary dispute. Because of Victorio's death, petitioner as the surviving spouse filed with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) a claim for compensation benefits under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. The GSIS denied her claim upon the ground that the killing was not work-connected since the motive of the assailant in slaying her husband was a personal grudge. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which motion was denied by the GSIS. This denial was elevated by the petitioner to public respondent Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC). The ECC, however, in its decision dated 24 May 1989, affirmed the decision of the GSIS denying petitioner's claim for compensation benefits on the same basis that the cause of Victorio's death was not work-connected. Deliberating on the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, the Court believes that the decision of the ECC should be reversed and petitioner's claim for compensation benefits granted. Under, the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation promulgated by the ECC and relating to both government and private sector employees, more particularly Section 1 of Rule III, the requirements for compensability of an injury and the resulting death are as follows:

It is not disputed that on 24 July 1984, Victorio Lentejas, a general foreman at the City Engineer's Office, Calbayog City, was assigned the task of inspecting the construction or rehabilitation work then in process on the damaged seawall along the shoreline of Barangay Banti. While he was on his way from Barangay Banti, Arnulfo Luaton attacked and stabbed him with deadly effect. He was dead when the police reached the scene of the crime; the circumstances of Victorio's death were related by an eyewitness to the police officers. Thus, there was no definite evidence to show that the deceased was actually on his way home at the time of the attack upon him. The killing took place at 4:30 P.M., that is, during the deceased's official hours of work and hence, Victorio might well have been on his way back to the City Engineer's Office when he was set upon and killed. He was, in other words, on official time and in the course of performing his official functions when he was attacked. The deceased was at a place where his work required him to be, that is, at Barangay Banti and there is no evidence to show that the route he took leaving the situs of the damaged seawall was not a usual or convenient route from that place. He was not, to borrow a phrase from the common law of torts, on "a frolic of his own." 1 In a line of cases, this Court has held that an injury sustained by the employee while on his way to or from his place of work, and which is otherwise compensable, is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment. In Vda. de Torbela V. Employees' Compensation Commission, 2 the Court held: It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he was on his way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran, Negros Occidental where the School of which he was the principal was located and that at the time of the accident he had in his possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his residence on the eve of his death. The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is going to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment. 3 In Alano v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 4 the Court had before it the following facts: Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee during her lifetime, worked as principal of Salinap Community School in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Her tour of duty was from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A.M., 74

while she was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to the school, she was bumped and run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted in her instantaneous death. She is survived by her four sons and a daughter. xxx xxx xxx 5 and held as follows: In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school principal's being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there. 6 The Vda. de Torbela and Alano cases were reiterated in Vano v. Government Service Insurance System. 7In the very recent case of Lazo v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 8 the deceased, a security guard of the Central Bank, was injured when the passenger jeepney he was riding on his way home from work turned turtle. In awarding compensation, the Court held that: In the case at bar, it can be seen that petitioner left his station at the Central Bank several hours after his regular time off, because the reliever did not arrive, and so petitioner was asked to go on overtime. After permission to leave was given, he went home. There is no evidence on record that petitioner deviated from his usual, regular homeward route or that interruptions occurred in the journey. While the presumption of compensability in theory of aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Acts (under which the Baldebrin case was decided) may have been abandoned under the new labor code it is significant that the liberality of the law in general in favor of the working man still subsists. As agent charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by the Constitution, the Employees Compensation Commission should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability, especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection to the accident. 9 We note that under the foregoing cases, it is quite clear that although Victorio might have been on his way home from Barangay Banti at the time he was attacked and killed by Arnulfo Luaton, that circumstance did not by itself operate to render his death non- compensable. We note, at the same time, that in all the cases noted above fromVda. de Torbela to Lazo, the events which caused or precipitated injury or death did not involve the intentional inflicting of harm or injury or death upon the employee concerned. In the instant case, however, as noted earlier, Victorio's death was the result of a murderous assault upon him. Thus, the precise technical issue here is whether or not the circumstance that Victorio's death was the result of a criminal attack by another person, not a member of the staff of the Calbayog City Engineer's Office, had the effect of rendering his death noncompensable although such death had occurred in the course of performance of official functions. After careful examination of the Vda. de Torbela, Alano and Lazo cases, we believe and so hold that the case at bar falls within the scope of the rule set out in those cases. There is no question that the 75

deceased in the instant case did not foresee, and could not have foreseen, the attack on himself when he undertook to go to Barangay Banti to inspect and oversee the municipal construction work then on-going in that place. In so far as the mind and will of the victim were concerned, the homicidal intent on the part of Arnulfo Luaton was as external and fortuitous an event as a speeding mini-bus or a recklessly negligent jeepney driver. In other words, we do not think that the third person's criminal intent should be regarded as a supervening cause having the effect of nullifying the circumstance that, when Victorio was attacked and killed, he was where his work required him to be and that he was then in the course of performing his official duties. It seems pertinent to note that inflicting physical injuries or death through negligence constitutes a criminal offense both under the Revised Penal Code (Article 365) and a special statute (Republic Act No. 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code), just as much as homicide or murder. ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to GRANT due course to the Petition for Review, to TREAT the Comment of respondent Commission as its Answer, and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission dated 24 May 1989. The case is hereby REMANDED to the ECC and the GSIS for disposition conformably with this Resolution.

G.R. No. 92803 March 22, 1991 MALLI A. HATTA HATAIE (Deceased), Substituted by EDWIN O. HATTA, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,respondents. Rogelio P. Vestal for petitioner. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:p This Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and Article 181 of the Labor Code (Pres. Decree No. 442, as amended), challenges the Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the finding of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) that petitioners ailment, neovascular glaucoma, is not compensable. Petitioner entered government service as legal aide in September, 1958. He became an administrative assistant of the PCAPE until it was abolished by Executive Order No. 90 on 12 August 1964. On 18 August 1964, he transferred to the Bureau of Customs as Senior Executive Assistant. He was promoted to various positions until he became a Collector of Customs on 1 January 1987, which position he held until his retirement on 1 June 1988. Prior to his retirement, or sometime in 1985, Petitioner experienced blurring of vision accompanied by eye pain and photophobia diagnosed as neovascular glaucoma. Because of deteriorating vision, he underwent four (4) eye operations without success. Thus, he filed with the GSIS a disability benefit claim under Pres. Decree No. 626. On 10 June 1988, the GSIS denied his claim, which decision was affirmed by the ECC on 14 February 1990, with the following conclusions:

A meticulous review of the records, convinced us of the propriety of the decision of the respondent GSIS, in denying the instant claim for benefits. We agree with the System that based on our medical findings, glaucoma is a disease of the eye characterized by increased intraocular tension which can cause impairment of vision ranging from slight abnormalities to absolute blindness. It may either be primary or secondary. The initial causes of glaucoma are not known. Advanced age, arteriosclerosis, vasomotor instability, hyperopia and heredity are among the predisposing factors. As above-mentioned, the underlying cause of glaucoma is clearly a non-workrelated factor as it is chiefly due to the structure of the eye itself. There is no proof, therefore, to establish the compensability of the illness in relation to the appellant's occupation as a Collector of Customs of the port of Manila. Neither was there an increased risk in the working conditions. Hence, the disease in the instant case cannot be considered compensable. That denial has precipitated this Petition, to which we resolved to give due course and to decide. In the interim, in view of the death of the original petitioner on 23 July 1990, this Court allowed the executor of his estate, Edwin O. Hatta, to be substituted in his stead (Rollo, p. 77). To be entitled to disability benefits under the Employees' Compensation Law (Book Four, Title II, Labor Code, as amended by PD No. 626), there must be "loss or impairment of a physical or mental function" which has resulted from injury "arising out of or in the course of employment," or from "any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions" (Art. 167 [n], [k] and [l], as amended further by PD No. 1368). Inasmuch as neovascular glaucoma is not listed in the Table of Occupational Diseases embodied in Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees' Compensation, petitioner is required to prove a positive proposition, that is, that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions (Rodriguez vs. ECC, G.R. No. 46454, 28 September 1989, 178 SCRA 30). Petitioner alleges that as Head of the Legal and Investigation Staff of the Bureau of Customs from 1977 to 25 January 1987 and before he was detailed to the Office of the Deputy Commissioner of Customs, his work entailed the reading of voluminous documents, a significant amount of which required the use of strong light or of a magnifying glass and as a result, he experienced constant severe eye strain which developed into neovascular glaucoma (Rollo, p. 5). He also submits that glaucoma has always been held to be compensable, citing the cases of Poral vs. ECC, G.R. No. 62284, 31 August 1984, 131 SCRA 602; Sabino vs. ECC, G.R. No. 63921, 20 February 1984, 127 SCRA 715; De Guzman vs. GSIS, ECC, No. 3591, 9 November 1988; Loyola vs. GSIS, G.R. No. 89097, 24 August 1990. We find ourselves unable to sustain Petitioner's submissions. Neovascular glaucoma is classified as secondary glaucoma (De Castro, FD, et al., "Neovascular Glaucoma in Filipinos," Philippine Journal on Opthalmology, Vol. 14, No. 4, Oct.-Dec. 1982, p. 92). It is caused by another eye disease or injury (Taber Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary, 1988; Miller and Keane Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Medicine, Nursing and Allied Health, 1983). Petitioner, however, has not shown that his ailment was caused or even preceded by another eye disease or injury. Severe eye strain due to reading could not be classified as a disease, e.g., infection, or as an injury, e.g., trauma, that causes or contributes to the development of neovascular glaucoma. Neither 76

has Petitioner established satisfactorily that said strain increased the risk of his having contracted said ailment or that it had caused, contributed, or increased the risk of his contracting any other eye disease or injury, which might have developed into neovascular glaucoma. Petitioner's reliance on the cases he has mentioned is misplaced. The Poral and Sabino cases (1984), supra, which allowed compensation benefits to teachers afflicted with glaucoma, are no longer applicable now. Those cases ruled that glaucoma is compensable, not because it was shown that such ailment is work-related but because it was presumed compensable under the old Workmen's Compensation Act, if the ailment occurred or was aggravated in the course of employment. That law was repealed, however, on 1 January 1975 by Pres. Decree No. 626. Besides, those cases speak of primary glaucoma and not neovascular glaucoma, which is secondary. In De Guzman vs. GSIS, supra, an ECC case, which Petitioner also invokes, compensation was allowed for glaucoma by the Commission itself because it was proven therein that the applicant's eye had been hit by the corner of the door of his superior's car. The connection between the injury and the ailment of glaucoma was evident inasmuch as immediately after the incident, the claimant therein started complaining of diminution of vision of the affected eye. Clearly, this injury (trauma) contributed in the development of, or caused glaucoma. Neither is the case of Loyola vs. GSIS, supra, applicable for although the ailment therein was diagnosed as cataract with glaucoma, two different eye diseases, the illness that was actually held as compensable was cataract. It adopted the ruling in Jarillo v. Employees' Compensation, et al., (No. 52058, February 25, 1982, 112 SCRA 265), where senile cataract alone was held to be work-related and compensable, since the nature of the construction worker's duties therein, which exposed him to sun glare and heat, and excessive dirt and dust, increased the risk of his contracting cataract. 1 Similarly, in Loyola, the work of the employee involved, that of District Supervisor of the Department of Education, acting as athletic manager in charge of sports and development, was considered as having contributed to, if not aggravated, his illness because of his exposure to the environment. In contrast to the case at bar, there is no relation between Petitioner's work as Collector of Customs and the illness of neovascular glaucoma with which he was afflicted. We are constrained, accordingly, to deny review of the questioned judgment in the absence of proof establishing causal relationship of neovascular glaucoma to Petitioner's occupation nor was the risk of contracting the same increased by his working conditions. WHEREFORE, this Petition is DENIED, and the Decision of respondent Employees' Compensation Commission is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 91777 February 19, 1991 ANDRES MALIMATA, substituted by Mrs. Corazon Malimata, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,respondents. GRIO-AQUINO, J.:p Petitioner seeks a review of the decision dated October 4, 1989 of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 4083, denying her husband's (Andres Malimata) claim for additional disability benefits and her own claim for death benefits upon his demise during the pendency of the case. Andres Malimata was a Court Aide III of the Supreme Court when he retired from the government service on April 1, 1985 at the age of 59 after having served the Government for 38 years. Malimata's illness started in January, 1985. He complained of difficulty of breathing associated with chest pain, cough and easy fatigability. Dr. A. Reyes Jr. of the Manila Medical Center, after a proper work-up of the case, diagnosed his illness as Hypertensive Arteriosclerotic Heart Disease. Because of his ailment, Malimata's retirement from the service four months later, for permanent total disability, was approved by the Supreme Court. A claim for compensation benefits under PD 626, as amended, was subsequently filed by Malimata with the GSIS.It was ruled as service-connected and compensable by the System. However, he was awarded Permanent Partial Disability (PPD) benefits for nineteen (19) months only, or for the period from April, 1985 to October, 1986. On December 10, 1986, Malimata asked the System for additional benefits on the ground that since the Supreme Court approved his retirement for Permanent Total Disability because of his ailment, there was no reason for the System to stop his monthly pension. The GSIS, however, informed him that no additional benefits could be paid to him after October, 1986 because his ailment hypertensive arteriosclerotic heart disease was evaluated as a permanent partial disability payable for nineteen (19) months only. On October 23, 1987, Malimata again requested for additional benefits due to Rheumatoid Arthritis which he allegedy contracted before and after his retirement. Appellant's plea for reconsideration was not acted upon favorably by the GSIS for the reason that this alleged ailment (rheumatoid arthritis) was not work-connected. Neither was it shown that the nature of his work as a laborer of the court increased the risk of contracting it. On June 5, 1988, while the case was pending appeal in the ECC, Malimata died, leaving his widow to pursue his case and claim death benefits for his demise. On October 4, 1989, the ECC affirmed the decision of the GSIS and dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. On March 6, 1990, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari in this Court. 77

On behalf of the ECC, the Solicitor General filed a Comment which the Government Corporate Counsel adopted for the GSIS also. The only issue in this case is whether or not Andres Malimata was entitled to compensation for Permanent Total Disability so that he should have continued to receive disability benefits after October, 1986 until he died on June 5, 1988 (a period of 20 months). The GSIS and the ECC appear to have glossed over the fact that the Supreme Court had approved Malimata's retirement from the service on the ground of permanent total disability. That notwithstanding, the GSIS granted him permanent partial disability benefits only. Permanent total disability is lack of ability to follow continuously some substantial gainful occupation without serious discomfort or pain and without material injury to health or danger to life (Medina vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, 128 SCRA 349). Malimata's disability was permanent and total because his illness which was diagnosed as Hypertensive Arteriosclerotic Heart Disease with angina and lung congestion (Annex B), rendered him incapable of working as a laborer without suffering chest pains, coughing and fatigue, and endangering his life, as in fact the same ailment eventually caused his death. In view of our finding that Malimata was entitled to permanent total disability benefits from the date of his retirement until his death (Sec. 2, Rule XI, Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation), it is no longer necessary to determine his entitlement to additional benefits due to rheumatoid arthritis which he allegedly suffered before and after his retirement. With respect to petitioner's claim for death benefits, the applicable provision of law is Section 3, Rule XIII of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation which provides: Sec. 3. Amount of benefit. (a) In the case of primary beneficiaries, the monthly income benefit shall be equivalent to the monthly income benefit for permanent total disability, which shall be guaranteed for five years, increased by ten percent for each dependent child but not exceeding 5, beginning with the youngest and without substitution: Provided that, the aggregate monthly benefit payable in the case of the GSIS shall in no case exceed the monthly wage or salary actually received by the employee at the time of his death; and provided further, that the minimum income benefit shall not be less than fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00). The death benefit shall be paid during the entire period for which they are entitled thereto. If the employee has been receiving income benefits for permanent total disability at the time of his death, the primary beneficiaries shall be paid the monthly income benefit equivalent to eighty percent plus the dependent's pension equivalent to 10 percent thereof for every dependent child but not exceeding five counted from the youngest and without substitution. (b) In the case of secondary beneficiaries, the income benefit is payable in monthly pension which shall not exceed the period of 60 months and the aggregate income benefit shall not be less than P15,00.00. If the employee has been receiving monthly income benefit for permanent total disability at the time of his death, the secondary beneficiaries shall be paid the

monthly pension, excluding the dependent's pension of the remaining balance of the five year guaranteed period. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 4083 gravely abused its discretion in denying Malimata's claim for permanent total disability income benefits. Its decision in ECC Case No. 4083 is hereby reversed and set aside, and another one is entered ordering GSIS to pay to Corazon Malimata, as surviving spouse of the late Andres Malimata, the amount of permanent total disability income benefits due the latter from November, 1986 when his disability pension was stopped, up to June 5, 1988 when he passed away, plus the death benefits due her as primary beneficiary of the said deceased government employee. SO ORDERED.

Cardiomegaly; Left Ventricular Hypertrophy; and classified him as being under "permanent total disability."
3

and

The petitioner's application for income benefits claim payment was granted but only for permanent partial disability (PPD) compensation or for a period of nineteen months starting from August 16, 1981 up to March 1983. 4 On March 14, 1983, the petitioner requested the General Manager of the GSIS to reconsider the award given him and prayed that the same be extended beyond nineteen months invoking the findings of his attending physician, as indicated in the latter's Certification. 5 As a consequence of his motion for reconsideration, and on the basis of the "Summary of Findings and Recommendation" 6 of the Medical Services Center of the GSIS, the petitioner was granted the equivalent of an additional four (4) months benefits. 7 Still unsatisfied, the petitioner again sent a letter to the GSIS Disability Compensation Department Manager on November 6, 1986, insisting that he (petitioner) should be compensated no less than for "permanent total disability." On June 30, 1987, the said manager informed the petitioner that his request had been denied. Undaunted, the petitioner sought reconsideration and as a result of which, on September 10, 1987, his case was elevated to the respondent Employees Compensation Commission (ECC). Later, or on October 1, 1987, the petitioner notified the respondent Commission that he was confined at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center for "CVA probably thrombosis of the left middle cerebral artery."8 There was nothing he could do but wait and hope.

G.R. No. 85024 January 23, 1991 DOMINGO VICENTE, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent. Olandesca Law Offices for petitioner. SARMIENTO, J.:p Central to this petition for certiorari which assails the decision 1 dated August 24, 1988 of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 3764, affirming the decision of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), is the question on whether the petitioner suffers from permanent total disability as he claims, or from permanent partial disability as held by the respondent Commission. The undisputed facts of the case are as follows: The petitioner, Domingo Vicente, was formerly employed as a nursing attendant at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center in Quezon City. On August 5, 1981, at the age of forty-five, and after having rendered more than twenty-five years of government service, he applied for optional retirement (effective August 16, 1981) under the provisions of Section 12(c) of Republic Act No. 1616, giving as reason therefor his inability to continue working as a result of his physical disability. 2 The petitioner likewise filed with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) an application for "income benefits claim for payment" under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 626, as amended. Both applications were accompanied by the necessary supporting papers, among them being a "Physician's Certification" issued by the petitioner's attending doctor at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center, Dr. Avelino A. Lopez, M.D., F.P.C.S., ** F.I.C.S. *** (Section Chief, General, Thoracic & Peripheral Surgery, Surgical Department, Veterans Medical Center, Hilaga Avenue, Quezon City), who had diagnosed the petitioner as suffering from: Osteoarthritis, Hypertensive multiple; Disease; 78

Finally, on August 24, 1988, the respondent rendered a decision affirming the ruling of the GSIS Employees' Disability Compensation and dismissed the petitioner's appeal. Hence this recourse. Before us, the petitioner maintains that his disability is "permanent total" and not "permanent partial" as classified by the respondent Commission. In support of his position, the petitioner points to the clinical evaluation and certification earlier adverted to issued by his attending physicians at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center. He likewise contends that contrary to the respondent's ruling, his subsequent confinement in the hospital from August 31, 1987 to September 6, 1987, when he was found suffering from "CVA probably thrombosis," was a direct result of his other ailments as previously diagnosed (before his retirement) by his attending physician and the Personnel Physician of the Center, Dr. Salud C. Palattao. On the other hand, the respondent Commission argues that the petitioner only suffers from "permanent partial disability" and not from "permanent total disability." The findings of the petitioner's attending physician is not binding on the GSIS, nor on the Commission, as the proper evaluation of an employee's degree of disability exclusively belongs to the GSIS medical experts who have specialized on the subject. The petition is impressed with merit. Employee's disability under the Labor Code is classified into three distinct categories: (a) temporary total disability;9 (b) permanent total disability; 10 and (c) permanent partial disability. 11 Likewise, in Section 2, Rule VII of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, it is provided that:

Cardiovascular

Sec. 2. Disability(a) A total disability is temporary if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period not exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided in Rule X of these Rules. (b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules. (c) A disability is partial permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee suffers a permanent partial loss of the use of any part of his body. Here, there is no question that the petitioner is not under "temporary total disability" as defined by law. The respondent Commission's decision classifying the petitioner's disability as "permanent partial" attests, albeit indirectly, to this fact. Our focus therefore, as stated earlier, is only in resolving out whether the petitioner suffers from "permanent total disability" as he claims, or from "permanent partial disability" as the respondent Commission would have us believe. On the subject of "permanent total disability," the Court has stated, on several occasions, that: Other authoritative comments on the coverage of the term "permanent total disability" as used in the Workmen's Compensation Act, are (a) Comments and Annotations on the Workmen's Compensation Act by Severo M. Pucan and Cornelio R. Besinga, that "total disability does not mean a state of absolute helplessness, but means disablement of the employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or a work of similar nature, that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could do;" (b) Philippine Labor and Social Legislation by Justice Ruperto Martin, that "permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of a similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any other kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could do . . .;" and (c) Labor Standards and Welfare Legislation by Perfecto Fernandez and Camilo Quiason that "permanent total disability means an incapacity to perform gainful work which is expected to be permanent. This status does not require a condition of complete helplessness. Nor is it affected by the performance of occasional odd jobs" (cited in Marcelino vs. Seven-up Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 47 SCRA 343). 12 It may therefore be inferred from the Court's pronouncements that while "permanent total disability" invariably results in an employee's loss of work or inability to perform his usual work, "permanent partial disability," on the other hand, occurs when an employee loses the use of any particular anatomical part of his body which disables him to continue with his former work. Stated otherwise, the test of whether or not an employee suffers from "permanent total disability" is a showing of the capacity of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred. Thus, if by reason of the injury or sickness he sustained, the employee is unable to perform his customary job for more than 120 days and he does not come within the coverage of Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensability (which, in a more detailed manner, describes what constitutes temporary total disability), then the said employee undoubtedly suffers from "permanent total disability" regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.

In the case at bar, the petitioner's permanent total disability is established beyond doubt by several factors and circumstances. Noteworthy is the fact that from all available indications, it appears that the petitioner's application for optional retirement on the basis of his ailments had been approved. The decision of the respondent Commission even admits that the petitioner "retired from government service at the age of 45." 13 Considering that the petitioner was only 45 years old when he retired and still entitled, under good behavior, to 20 more years in service, the approval of his optional retirement application proves that he was no longer fit to continue in his employment. 14 For optional retirement is allowed only upon proof that the employee-applicant is already physically incapacitated to render sound and efficient service. 15 Further, the appropriate physicians of the petitioner's employer, the Veterans Memorial Medical Center, categorically certified that the petitioner was classified under permanent total disability. On this score, "the doctor's certification as to the nature of the claimant's disability may be given credence as he normally would not make a false certification." 16 And, "[N]o physician in his right mind and who is aware of the far-reaching and serious effect that his statements would cause on a money claim filed with a government agency, would issue certifications indiscriminately without even minding his own interests and protection." 17 The fact that the petitioner was granted benefits amounting to the equivalent of twenty-three months shows that the petitioner was unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days. This kind of disability is precisely covered by Section 2(b), Rule VII of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensability which we again quote, to wit: Sec. 2. Disability(a) . . . (b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of those Rules. xxx xxx xxx There being no showing, as we mentioned earlier, that the petitioner's disability is "temporary total" as defined by the law, the inescapable conclusion is that he suffers from permanent total disability. The court takes this occasion to stress once more its abiding concern for the welfare of government workers, especially the humble rank and file, whose patience, industry, and dedication to duty have often gone unheralded, but who, in spite of very little recognition, plod on dutifully to perform their appointed tasks. It is for this reason that the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries, and the law, by its own terms, 18 requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor. It is likewise for this reason that the Court disposes of this case and ends a workingman's struggle for his just dues. WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission is SET ASIDE and another one is hereby ENTERED declaring the petitioner to be suffering from permanent total disability. Respondent Employees' Compensation Commission is accordingly ORDERED to award the petitioner the benefits corresponding to his permanent total disability. SO ORDERED.

79

G.R. No. 94167 January 21, 1991 MABUHAY SHIPPING SERVICES, INC. AND SKIPPERS MARITIME CO., LTD., petitioners, vs. HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION) AND CECILIA SENTINA, respondents. Victorino Alba for petitioners. Rodolfo B. Dizon for private respondent.

SO ORDERED. 2 A motion for reconsideration and/or appeal was filed by petitioners which the respondent First Division of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) disposed of in a resolution dated March 31, 1990 dismissing the appeal and affirming the appealed decision. 3 A motion for reconsideration thereof filed by petitioners was denied by said public respondent in a resolution dated June 29, 1990. Hence, the herein petition for certiorari wherein the following grounds are invoked: The Hon. NLRC, gravely abused its discretion in holding that "The payment of Death Compensation Benefit only requires that the seaman dies during the term of the contract, and no other." That the Hon. NLRC, gravely abused its discretion in holding that even if the subject seaman's death resulted from the fight he himself created, such nonetheless does not constitute a "deliberate or wilfull act on his own life." That the Hon. NLRC, gravely abused its discretion in holding, that the death of the late 4/Engr Romulo Sentina is compensable. 4 The petition is impressed with merit.

GANCAYCO, J.:p The employer is exempted from liability for burial expenses for a seaman who commits suicide. How about in a case of one who ran amuck or who in a state of intoxication provoked a fight as a result of which he was killed? Is the employer similarly exempt from liability? This is the issue in this case. Romulo Sentina was hired as a 4th Engineer by petitioner Mabuhay Shipping Services, Inc. (MSSI) for and in behalf of co-petitioner, Skippers Maritime Co., Ltd. to work aboard the M/V Harmony I for a period of one year. He reported for duty aboard said vessel on July 13, 1987. On January 16, 1988 at about 3 p.m., while the vessel was docked alongside Drapetona Pier, Piraeus, Greece, Sentina arrived aboard the ship from shore leave visibly drunk. He went to the messhall and took a fire axe and challenged those eating therein. He was pacified by his shipmates who led him to his cabin. However, later he went out of his cabin and proceeded to the messhall. He became violent. He smashed and threw a cup towards the head of an oiler Emmanuel Ero, who was then eating. Ero touched his head and noticed blood. This infuriated Ero which led to a fight between the two. After the shipmates broke the fight, Sentina was taken to the hospital where he passed away on January 17, 1988. 1 Ero was arrested by the Greek authorities and was jailed in Piraeus. On October 26, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint against petitioners with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for payment of death benefits, burial expenses, unpaid salaries on board and overtime pay with damages docketed as POEA Case No. (M) 88-10-896. After submission of the answer and position papers of the parties a decision was rendered by the POEA on July 11, 1989, the dispositive part of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering Mabuhay Shipping Services, Inc. and Skippers Maritime Co., Ltd. to pay complainant Cecilia S. Sentina the sum of TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P230,000.00) representing the deceased's death benefit and burial compensation, the sum of THREE HUNDRED FIFTY US DOLLARS (US$350.00) or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing unpaid shipboard pay and fixed overtime pay plus ten percent (10%) of the total judgment award by way of and as attorney's fees. All other claims are ordered dismissed 80

Part II, Section C, No. 6 of the POEA Standard Format for Filipino seamen employed in ocean going vessels states that No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death resulting from a deliberate or willful act on his own life by the seaman, provided however that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to the seamen. The same provision of the standard format also provides In case of death of the seaman during the term of his contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the amount of xxx xxx xxx b. P210,000.00 for other officers including radio operators and master electrician. (Memo Circular No. 5 effective March 1, 1986) In interpreting the aforequoted provision in its decision, the POEA held that payment of death compensation benefits only requires that the seaman should die during the term of the contract and no other. It further held that the saving provision relied upon by petitioners refers only to suicide where the seaman deliberately and intentionally took his own life. 5

Public respondent in affirming the said POEA decision made the following disquisition It is not difficult for us to understand the intent of the aforequoted "Part II, Section C, No. 6 of the POEA Standard Format" that to avoid death compensation, two conditions must be met: a) the subject death much have resulted "from a deliberate or willful act on his own life by the seaman;" and b) such death "directly attributable to the seaman" must have been proven by the "employer." Thus, even if arguendo, the appellants may successfully prove that the subject seaman's death resulted from the fight he himself created, such, nonetheless does not constitute a "deliberate or willful act on his own life." On this ground alone, the instant appeal would already fail. 6 The mere death of the seaman during the term of his employment does not automatically give rise to compensation. The circumstances which led to the death as well as the provisions of the contract, and the right and obligation of the employer and seaman must be taken into consideration, in consonance with the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. There are limitations to the liability to pay death benefits. When the death of the seaman resulted from a deliberate or willful act on his own life, and it is directly attributable to the seaman, such death is not compensable. No doubt a case of suicide is covered by this provision. By the same token, when as in this case the seaman, in a state of intoxication, ran amuck, or committed an unlawful aggression against another, inflicting injury on the latter, so that in his own defense the latter fought back and in the process killed the seaman, the circumstances of the death of the seaman could be categorized as a deliberate and willful act on his own life directly attributable to him. First he challenged everyone to a fight with an axe. Thereafter, he returned to the messhall picked up and broke a cup and hurled it at an oiler Ero who suffered injury. Thus provoked, the oiler fought back The death of seaman Sentina is attributable to his unlawful aggression and thus is not compensable. Even under Article 172 of the Labor Code, the compensation for workers covered by the Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund are subject to the limitations on liability. Art. 172. Limitations of liability. The State Insurance Fund shall be liable for the compensation to the employee or his dependents except when the disability or death was occasioned by the employee's intoxication, willful intent to injure or kill himself or another, notorious negligence, or otherwise provided under this Title. Private respondent pointed out that petitioner MSSI endorsed the claim for compensation of private respondents. Said petitioner admits this fact but asserts that it was not favorably acted upon by its principal, petitioner Skippers Maritime Co., Inc. because of the circumstances that led to the death of Sentina. 81

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of the POEA dated July 11, 1989 and the resolutions of public respondent dated May 31, 1990 and June 29, 1990 affirming the same are hereby set aside and another judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 84812 October 5, 1990 SEALANES MARINE SERVICES, INC. AND MARINE & TRANSPORTATION SERVICES (SAUDIA), LTD.,petitioners, vs. THE HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION AND EVELYN F. ARANTE, respondents. Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioners. Manuel T. Collado for private respondent. MEDIALDEA, J.: Sometime in April, 1986, Capt. Santiago Arante, Jr., husband of private respondent, applied for a job with the office of Southeast Asia Shipping Corp. (SEASCORP), the manning agent of petitioner, Marine and Transportation Services (SAUDIA), Ltd. (MATTS). Having passed the usual interview and after the company physician declared him physically fit for the job, he was hired on May 13, 1986, as master of M/V "Zuluf 8" a vessel owned by petitioner MATTS, for a period of one (1) year with a fixed monthly salary of US$800.00 and US$300.00 as overtime pay. On May 20, 1986, Capt. Arante left Manila for Saudi Arabia to join the vessel and started working thereat upon arrival on May 21, 1986. While working on board said vessel on July 19, 1986, he felt a severe pain in his abdomen and on the same day he was confined at As-Salama Hospital in Al-Khobar, Saudi Arabia. His sickness was diagnosed as "gastro-duodenitis." Upon the request of MATTS, he was discharged from the hospital on July 21, 1986. At about 8:00 in the morning of July 31, 1986, while the vessel was refuelling at West Pier, Rastamura, he was relieved as master and at 2:00 p.m. of the same day, he received instructions to return to the Philippines and he was given a plane ticket. He protested to the manning superintendent of the vessel who told him that a telex had been sent to SEASCORP in Manila instructing it to arrange for his medical check-up upon arrival. Before he left the vessel, MATTS computed his earned wages totalling US$1,239.00. However, MATTS deducted the amount of US$344.00 paid for his plane ticket from Dharan to Manila. Upon arrival, he reported to the office of the president of SEASCORP. He was told that the company will not shoulder his hospitalization expenses but he was referred to the company physician who in turn referred him to the University of the East Ramon Magsaysay (UERM) hospital where he was admitted on August 6, 1986. He was medically examined and was found to be suffering from "non-functioning GALL BLADDER" due to NIDDM (Non-Insulin Dependent Diabetic Mellitus). He was discharged on August 13, 1986 but he was advised to have weekly medical check-up. He was again confined at St. Paul's Hospital in Iloilo City on September 2, 1986 and discharged on September 13, 1986. He was readmitted at the UERM hospital on January 8, 1987 where additional medical analysis revealed that he was suffering from cancer of the pancreas. On January 31, 1987, he filed a complaint with the POEA against SEASCORP and petitioner MATTS for illness allowance, hospitalization expenses, separation pay due to illness/sickness, reimbursement expenses for medicine and refund of air fare expenses. He was transferred to the Manila Medical

Center on March 11, 1987 and then to the Iloilo Doctors Hospital on March 20, 1987 where he died on June 29, 1987. By reason of his death, his wife, herein private respondent, pursued the complaint. Petitioner Sealanes Marine Services Inc. was likewise substituted for respondent SEASCORP because it assumed all monetary liabilities of SEASCORP that may arise by reason of its being a manning agent of petitioner MATTS. On March 16, 1988, then POEA Administrator Tomas Achacoso rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which ordered petitioner to pay private respondent, 1. The sum of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P250,000.00) as death compensation; 2. The sum of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) as burial allowance (sic); 3. The sum of SIXTY SEVEN THOUSAND FORTY FIVE PESOS & 73/100 (P67,045.73) as reimbursement of duly proved medical/hospitalization expenses; 4. The sum of THREE HUNDRED FORTY FOUR US DOLLARS (US$344.00) or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the time of payment, as airticket refund; 5. The sum of FOUR THOUSAND FOR HUNDRED US DOLLARS (US$4,400.00) or its Philippine peso equivalent at the time of payment, representing sickness' wages for 120 days; 6. For and as attorney's fees, the sum equivalent to 5% of the total judgment award. (pp. 32-33,Rollo) Administrator Achacoso justified his award stating that the compensability of the illness of Capt. Arante Jr., which he contracted while his contract with MATTS was in force, is not dependent upon whether or not it is work connected and it is sufficient that he contracted the same during the term of his contract. He discarded petitioners' defense that Capt. Arante was dismissed for cause after a work evaluation report. He found the report unworthy of consideration and even doubtful because Capt. Arante was not informed about it and he was merely recommended to be replaced but which was not carried out because he was allowed to work until July 31, 1986, the date when he was repatriated. He concluded that even if his relation with MATTS was severed by reason of this repatriation, MATTS' obligations to pay Mrs. Arante, illness wages, medical and hospitalization expenses, death benefits and burial expenses under the standard format of the employment contract of her husband remained in force. Petitioner appealed the decision to respondent commission which affirmed the same on June 30, 1988 (pp. 53-58,Rollo). Hence the petition. Petitioners claim that respondent commission rendered the questioned decision with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and that said decision is not in accordance with existing laws and applicable jurisprudence. They allege that the illness of Capt. Arante is not compensable because he was suffering therefrom prior to his employment with MATTS; that his disease is of 82

unknown origin which strikes people in all walks of life, employed or unemployed (Milano v. EEC, 142 SCRA 52, 55) and is detectable only at its advanced stages (Vda. de Tumolva v. EEC, 141 SCRA 78, 83) and therefore, it cannot be said that his work at the vessel increased the risk of contracting the disease; and that the pre-employment medical examination of Capt. Arante did not rule out the possibility that his disease existed before he was hired. Petitioners further contend that the conclusion of Administrator Achacoso, which was adopted by respondent commission that it was while working on board the vessel particularly on July 19, 1986 when Capt. Arante contracted his illness unreasonably disregarded the fact that he died of cancer of the pancreas because his illness diagnosed on July 19, 1986 as gastro-duodenitis with manifested symptom and later on discovered to be non-functioning gall bladder due to NIDDM were all the result of the metastatic spread of cancer of the pancreas which is non-compensable. Petitioners assert that gastro-duodenitis can be traced from cancer of the pancreas. Gastro-duodenitis is a disease involving both the stomach and the duodenum (p. 470, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 1973 Ed.); that the head of the pancreas is cradled next to the duodenum just past the stomach and a tumor mass in this organ may be detected by seeing its pressure effect on the abdomen (p. 60, Family Health & Medical Guide, 1980 Ed.); that radiologic procedure may show the encroachment of the pancreatic lesion on other organs (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 8th Ed., p. 1644); and changes in the configuration of the abdominal loop of the stomach rarely appear early but are merely signs of advanced disease (Ibid, p. 1644). Petitioners added that the initial sickness of Capt. Arante (gastro-duodenitis) which was later diagnosed to be non-functioning gall bladder due to NIDDM and uncovered thereafter as cancer of the pancreas only shows that he had cancer before he was employed with MATTS considering that before diagnosis is made obvious by massive or metastatic growth, cancer is suggested by a finding of an enlarged gall bladder (Harrison, Principles of International Medicine, p. 1644) and patients with gall bladder problems may have jaundice with or without additional symptoms (Ibid, p. 63) for jaundice which co-exists with cancer of the body of the pancreas (Tumulva v. EEC, supra) is a symptom of one of a number of different diseases and disorders of the liver, gall bladder and blood (Miller Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Medical and Nursing, p. 505). Petitioners further allege that the illness of Arante is not an occupational disease, therefore, he had the burden of proving that his working condition increased the risk of contracting the disease. They also assail the literal interpretation of the so-called standard format contract which was the basis of the award to Capt. Arante as unreasonable and destructive of the fundamental precept that the law in protecting the rights of the laborer authorize neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer (PAL v. PALEA, 57 SCRA 489). According to them, the entire award would wipe out the entire capital of petitioner SEALANES despite the fact that it was able to employ Arante for only two (2) months before he died. Petitioners further allege that MATTS had the right to legally terminate the services of Arante even before his contract expired because of his incapacity. To petitioners, the rule formulated by the POEA as contained in Sec. D, Part II of POEA standard format contract for seamen to the effect that compensability of the death/illness of seamen need not be dependent upon whether it is work connected or not as it is sufficient that it was contracted during the term of the employment contract, is dangerous and oppressive. They claim that E.O. No. 797, the law creating the POEA does not authorize the latter to determine the amount of death compensation that is distinct and substantially different from the rules on the same matter under the Labor Code and that the Executive Order does not provide a sufficient standard on how POEA should enforce its own rules and neither does it contain specific limitations on how the rules should be implemented by it and so, Memorandum Circular No. 2 series of 1984 issued pursuant to said Executive Order, which imposed the adoption of a standard format contract for seamen and making them liable for the payment of inordinate sums such as those awarded to private respondent violates the principle of undue delegation of legislative power.

Private respondent maintains that the findings of fact by respondent commission are supported by evidence and therefore entitled to respect by this Court; that the POEA standard format contract for seamen particularly Section C, Part II thereof does not require that the illness of her husband be work connected to be compensable considering the ruling of the Court in NB Shipping Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 83299, January 23, 1989, that the standard format for overseas workers on board foreign-going vessels which govern the relation between petitioner and its principal on the one hand, and the deceased on the other, does not require that the illness or injury causing death or disability be an occupational disease or that the working conditions shall have increased the risk of contracting the disease as it is sufficient that the disease or disability occurred during the term of employment (pp. 184-85, Rollo); that the standard format contract was the result of tripartism between the government, manning industry and the seafarers, who were represented during the deliberation thereof before its formulation. The issues to be resolved are: a) whether or not POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1984 violates the principle of undue delegation of legislative powers; b) whether or not the sickness and eventual death of Capt. Arante is compensable under the provisions of the so called standard format contract for seamen formulated by the POEA pursuant to E.O. No. 797, the law creating it. Petitioners' assertions that Memorandum Circular No. 2 is violative of the principle of undue delegation of legislative powers and that POEA cannot independently formulate rules, such as those contained in the standard format contract in question, which are substantially different from those established by the Labor Code, are untenable. In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. POEA, G.R. No. 76633, October 18, 1988, 166 SCRA 533 where this issue was raised, it was held: But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation. The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797, reading as follows: ". . . The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA)." As to the alleged lack of sufficient standard to guide respondent POEA in the exercise of its authority provided for in Executive Order No. 797, the Court in the same case said: Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases * without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to 83

protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices." We now come to the second issue. Section D, Par II of the standard format contract for seamen, provides that the compensability of the death or illness of seamen need not be dependent upon whether it is work connected or not as it is sufficient that it was contracted during the term of the employment contract (p. 29, Rollo). There is no controversy as to the fact that the immediate cause of Capt. Arante's death was "pancreatic CA; antecedent cause pancreatic CA of the head; metastatic DM, secondary; underlying cause severe anemia." (p. 25, Rollo) As a general rule, cancer is a disease of still unknown origin which strikes people in all walks of life, employed or unemployed. Cancer of the pancreas, the disease which caused the death of the husband of private respondent, as the Court held in Vda. de Tumolva v. EEC, has the following characteristics: G. Adenocarcinoma of Pancreas, Cancer of the pancreas is increasing in frequency. It usually develops between age 40 and 60. The disease is rarely curable because it has extended or metastasized by the time it is detected . . . (Schrock, Handbook of Surgery, 7th Ed., p. 332). Pancreas, Malignant tumors arise from the ducts and acinar cells as adenocarcinoma. Adenocarcinoma in the head of the pancreas usually cause painless jaundice, anorexia, nausea and weight loss. A tumor in the body of the pancreas causes gnawing pain which radiates to the back and is worse after the patient eats and when he lies down; weight loss and anorexia are late consequences. Tumors in the tail of the pancreas are often silent until they spread locally, especially to the spleen. Prognosis is very poor since pancreatic tumors are advanced when detected. Metastases to the stomach, liver and lung are common. (Berkow, Supra, p. 830) Severity of Problem. Fifty percent of those with pancreatic cancer die in less than three months from the time of diagnosis. Two percent or less survive for three years. Usually the cancer is so well advanced when detected that little can be done to fight it. (Pescar, Medical Ref. Library: Symptoms and Illness, p. 76). (141 SCRA 78, 82) As aforesaid in the same case, cancer of the pancreas is one of those rare diseases which are already at their advanced stages when detected such that the chances for their effective cure become nil and there are no findings that this illness does not progress gradually. From the foregoing, it is clear that Capt. Arante could not have contracted cancer of the pancreas while working on board the vessel for only two (2) months. The conclusion is inevitable that when he was diagnosed to be suffering from gastro-duodenitis, the same was merely the result of the metastatic spread of his original disease of cancer of the pancreas. It cannot be said that the disease, which caused his death, occurred during his employment. The pre-employment medical examination conducted upon him could not have divulged his disease considering the fact that most, if not all, such examinations are not so exploratory. Therefore, it would be unfair to hold petitioners liable for the amount of death compensation provided for under the standard format contract for such award is unwarranted under the circumstances. It cannot be denied however, that Capt. Arante started manifesting symptoms of his sickness and he became ill while working on board the vessel. Under the standard format contract, which governs the

relation between (SEACORP) and its principal MATTS on the one-hand and the deceased on the other, the latter is entitled to certain benefits among which are: reimbursement of duly proven hospitalization and medical expenses, which, as in this case, is the amount of P67,045.73; burial expenses in the fixed amount of P20,000.00 (Sec. C[2-c]); expenses in case of repatriation by reason of injury or illness, equivalent to US$344.00, the amount deducted by petitioner MATTS from the total wages of the deceased in payment of his airplane ticket (Sec. 4[4-d]); and the amount of US$1,100.00 as illness allowance for a period of 120 days (Sec. 4 [4-c]). Petitioner SEALANES cannot escape liability under the contract as it has assumed responsibility for all claims that may arise thereunder. The argument of petitioners that since cancer of the pancreas is not an occupational disease it was incumbent upon Capt. Arante to prove that his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the same, is not meritorious. It must be noted that his claims arose from the stipulations of the standard format contract entered into between him and SEACORP which, per Circular No. 2, Series of 1984 of respondent POEA was required to be adopted and used by all parties to the employment of any Filipino seamen on board any ocean-going vessel. His claims are not rooted from the provisions of the New Labor Code as amended. Significantly, under the contract, compensability of the death or illness of seaman need not be dependent upon whether it is work connected or not. Therefore, proof that the working conditions increased the risk of contracting a disease or illness, is not required to entitle a seaman who dies during the term thereof by reason of such disease or illness, of the benefits stipulated thereunder which are, under Section C(2) of the same Circular No. 2, separate and distinct from, and in addition to whatever benefits which the seaman is entitled to under Philippine laws. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED in so far as the assailed decision awarded death compensation in the amount of P250,000.00 is concerned, which is hereby SET ASIDE. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in all other respects. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on October 12, 1988 is hereby LIFTED. SO ORDERED.

Department of Labor for rheumatoid arthritis which was allegedly caused by prolonged standing and other physical stress arising from classroom duties. In an order dated November 20, 1975, the regional office of the Department of Labor dismissed petitioner's claim on the ground that "only those illness (sic) which affect the earning power of the employee and deprive him of his livelihood are compensable. In other words, as long as an employee is able to continue working and receives his pay, he is not entitled to compensation." (Rollo, p. 8). Petitioner's claim for reimbursement of medical expenses, being ancillary to the compensation claim, was also dismissed. On December 20, 1975, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned Order but the same was denied. Thereafter, the case was elevated to the respondent Commission for review. On January 30, 1976, respondent Commission rendered a decision dismissing petitioner's claim for lack of merit. Hence, the present action. On December 6, 1989, the Court's Second Division referred the instant case to this Division (Rollo, p. 65). The sole issue in the case at bar is whether petitioner's ailment is compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended. We rule in the affirmative. Rheumatoid arthritis is an occupational disease of public school teachers normally associated with the nature and character of their occupation (Menez v. Employees' Compensation Commission (97 SCRA 87 [1980]; Dimaano v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 78 SCRA 510 [1977]). Morever, it is not disputed that petitioner's illness supervened as a result of, and aggravated by, the nature of her employment. Thus, the legal presumption of compensability arises (Sec. 44, Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended) and the burden of proof shifts to the employer to show otherwise (Cayaba v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 102 SCRA 346 [1981]; Guevarra v. Republic, 77 SCRA 292 [1977]; Buyco v. Secretary of Labor, 146 SCRA 361 [1986] and cases cited).itc-asl In the case at bar, respondent Commission offered no evidence to controvert the illness of petitioner as shown by the physician's report ( Rollo, p. 16) save its bare pronouncement that rheumatoid arthritis is not compensable. However, in view of the factual finding of respondent Commission that in all of petitioner's sick leaves, petitioner was paid in full of all her salaries during the period of her leave of absence, compensation benefits would be unavailing. This is so because: Workmen's compensation refers to liability for compensation for loss resulting from injury, disability or death of the workingman through industrial accident or disease. It is based on incapacity or disability for work, and hence on the loss or impairment of the employee's earning capacity in the employment at which he was engaged when injured, the compensation payments being in lieu of wages or based on the loss thereof and on the idea of providing means of subsistence to the employees during the time when his earning capacity has been partially or entirely destroyed. In other words, as long as the employee is able to work and receives his pay even if he is suffering from illness, he is not entitled to compensation. (Central Azucarera Don Pedro v. de Leon, 101 Phil. 1141 [1959]); Lombo v. Standard Cigarette Manufacturing Co., 58 SCRA 750 [1974]).

G.R. No. L-43664 July 2, 1990 MELITONA GERSALINO, petitioner, vs. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Edmundo G. Manlapao for petitioner. BIDIN, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission which affirmed the order of the Department of Labor dismissing the claim of petitioner for compensation benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended. Petitioner is a public school teacher assigned at Kabankalan, Negros Occidental since 1962. On April 14, 1971, she filed a claim for disability compensation benefit with the Regional Office of the 84

Nevertheless, inasmuch as Section 13 of Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, requires the employer to defray the medical and hospital expenses for ailments compensable under the law, petitioner is therefore entitled to reimbursement of expenses incurred in curing his injury. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision under review is hereby SET ASIDE and respondent Commission (now Employees' Compensation Commission) is hereby ordered to reimburse petitioner of her medical and hospital expenses duly supported by receipts submitted during the hearing, with legal interest thereon from April 14, 1971 until full payment thereof. SO ORDERED.

the service. What was paid to you up to January 21, 1988, seven months after his death on June 17, 1987 is the balance of the five years guaranteed period (January 21, 1983 to January 21, 1988). Please be guided accordingly. Very truly yours, SGD. Manager 2 FELICISIMO M. FERNANDEZ

The case was appealed (ECC Case No. 4630) to the Employees' Compensation Commission. In a decision dated April 12, 1989, approved unanimously in a meeting held on April 12, 1989 under Resolution No. 89-04-0130 and certified correct by Executive Director Jorge B. Contreras, 3 the Commission affirmed the decision of the GSIS and dismissed the case. G.R. No. 88573 June 25, 1990 CONSORCIA F. MANUZON, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE (Mindanao State University MSU, Marawi City), respondents. Public Attorney's Office for petitioner. GANCAYCO, J.: Both parties argue that the only issue in this case is whether or not an employee who has been declared or acknowledged by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) as permanently and totally disabled, who was forced to retire from the service and who died four and a half (4-) years later, this time of a different but related ailment, is entitled to death benefits under Article 194(b) of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. In a letter dated March 20, 1988, petitioner requested the GSIS for a continued pension considering that her husband died of a lingering illness which was found to be work connected by the GSIS and that her husband became paralyzed while in service. Her husband was granted monthly pension, but it stopped in 1985. She was granted additional pension up to January of 1988 only. 1 The GSIS denied petitioner's request in the letter dated June 10, 1988, as follows: Madam: This has further reference to your request for continuance of your monthly pension under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, which ended on January 21, 1988. In this connection, please be informed that no additional benefit could be paid to you in view of the fact that your husband's death due to Myocardial Infraction was evaluated not compensable having occurred 4- years after his retirement from 85 The antecedents of the case alleged by petitioner and not disputed by public respondents are as follows: Petitioner's late husband started his government service as a national language researcher in December 1957 at the Institute of National Language. Later he transferred to the Mindanao State University in Marawi City as an instructor in June 1974. He rose to become assistant professor and he was holding this position when in October 1982 disaster struck. He was hospitalized at the Mindanao Sanitarium and Hospital for hemiparesis (R). His attending physician, Dr. Levi H. Pagunzan described the patient's complaint, thus: Chief Complaints Hemiparesis (R) The present condition started a few hours prior to admission when he was found just lying in bed in his room, unable to move his (R) side, urinary incontinance and spasm of (R) upper and lower extremities. No medication was given and admission was rough. The diagnosis of the doctor was cardio-vascular accident hemorrhage. Subsequently, Mr. Manuzon underwent rehabilitation at the National Orthopedic Hospital. His physician Dr. Sylvia Velasco diagnosed his illness as "Hemiparesis (L) Post CVA thrombosis." Because of his illness, Mr. Manuzon retired from the service effective January 22, 1983. For this ailment, hemiparesis, post cardio vascular attack, the System recommended Mr. Manuzon for temporary total disability benefit from January 22, 1983, up to February 24, 1983 and permanent total disability benefit from Feb. 25, 1983 up to December 1983. Subsequently, the System recommended that his PTD benefits be continued to January 198(4). This was subsequently extended to January 1985. On June 17, 1987, Mr. Manuzon died of acute myocardial infraction.

Mrs. Manuzon, herein petitioner filed an Income benefits Claim for Payment in behalf of herself and her 4 minor children for the death of her husband. The System on July 3, 1987 recommended payment of additional permanent total disability benefits from February 1985 up to the end of the guaranteed period. However, the death claim was disapproved by the System on the ground that the contingency occurred after retirement where there is no longer an employeremployee relationship. On appeal with the Employees Compensation Commission, respondent ECC affirmed the adverse decision of the GSIS for the following reasons: "... For a cardio vascular attack or myocardial infraction, to be compensable under the Employees Compensation rules, any of the following conditions must be satisfied: 1. If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment, there must be proof that an acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reason of the nature of his work. 2. The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and must be followed within twentyfour hours by the clinical signs of a cordial injury to constitute causal relationship. 3. If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before subjecting himself to strain at work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship. None of these conditions had been satisfied in the instant case, obviously because the (death) occurred more than four years after his retirement from the service. Further, the myocardial infraction which caused his death, is a different illness and cannot be considered a complication of the cardio vascular attack for which the deceased had been properly and fully compensated with Permanent Total Disability up to the guaranteed period. 4 Petitioner now claims that a proper interpretation of Article 194(b) of Presidential Decree No. 626 will entitle her dead husband to death benefits in favor of primary beneficiaries. The petition is meritorious. Article 194(b) of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, provides: b. Under such-regulations as the Commission may approve, the System shall pay to the primary beneficiaries upon the death of a covered employee who is under permanent total disability under this title, eighty percent of the monthly 86

income benefit and his dependents to the dependents' pension:Provided, that the marriage must have been validly subsisting at the time of disability: ... Provided, finally, that the minimum death benefit shall not be less than fifteen thousand pesos. We agree with the interpretation of the Solicitor General that generally speaking, the term "covered employee" refers to an employee who at the time of his death is still an employee covered by the GSIS. 5 At the same time, we cannot ignore the implementing Rules and Regulations of the Employees Compensation Commission that to be entitled to death benefits, the employee need not be an actual employee of the public or private sector at the time of his death; he can be a retired employee whose retirement was brought about by permanent disability. The rules are as follows: Sec. 3(a), Rule XIII. "... If the employee has been receiving income benefits for permanent total disability at the time of his death, the primary beneficiaries shall be paid the monthly income benefit equivalent to eighty percent plus the dependent's pension equivalent to 10 per cent thereof for every dependent child but not exceeding five counted from the youngest and without substitution." Sec. 3(b), Rule XIII. "... If the employee has been receiving monthly income benefit for permanent total disability at the time of death, the secondary beneficiaries shall be paid the monthly pension excluding the dependent's pension of the remaining balance of the five year guaranteed period." We agree that a permanent and totally disabled employee who is receiving pension cannot work. He was compelled to retire from the service because of disability that was work-oriented. Permanent total disability means an incapacity to perform gainful work which is expected to be permanent. The covered employee referred to in Section 194(b) Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, includes an employee who has retired from work because of permanent and total disability and who subsequently dies. Article 194(b) applies to a retired person as contemplated in Art. 194(d) which allows for funeral benefits upon the death of a covered employee or permanently totally disabled pensioner. We interpret this social legislation in favor of the employee. Any doubt as to its proper interpretation must be resolved in favor of the employee whose rights must be protected. In this case, the Employees Compensation Commission denied petitioner's claim because the cause of death, myocardial infraction, came four and one half years after his retirement caused by workoriented paralysis arising from cerebrovascular attack. The reasoning of both public respondents is that his death was not caused by a work-oriented cause. We believe otherwise. The evidence clearly shows that during his employment, the deceased suffered from a stroke, a cardio vascular accident. It was caused by "thrombosis," or blockage of arteries. He had to retire because of paralysis caused by that cardio vascular attack when he was an assistant professor. He died after his compulsory retirement due to total disability, caused by cardio vascular attack or myocardial infraction. Stated otherwise, the cause of his compulsory retirement due

to paralysis arising from cardio vascular accident is closely related to the cause of his death, which was also a cardio vascular attack or myocardial infraction. That heart disease developed when he was still working as a professor. It caused his paralysis and his total permanent disability. The disease was work-oriented because of the nature of his employment as a professor. The same disease eventually caused his death, contrary to the conclusion of both the GSIS and the Employees Compensation Commission. The Court holds that the heirs of Mr. Manuzon are entitled to the benefits they are claiming. This Court is aware that death benefits must be granted to the primary beneficiaries of the decedent to help the family of a permanent and totally disabled person who was so disabled because of causes that are work-oriented. The rule applies all the more when that disabled person later dies because of the same cause or related cause. WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Government Service Insurance System and the Employees Compensation Commission in E.C.C. Case No. 4630 are REVERSED, and a new one is rendered declaring and directing that death benefits be granted to petitioner, including dependent's pension for children who were minors at the time of their father's death in 1987, until they reach the age of 21 pursuant to Article 194(b) of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, funeral benefits in the amount of P3,000.00 pursuant to Article 194(cc) of the same law, and all other benefits to which petitioner and her children are entitled under the said decree. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.

employees' compensation law for her PTB, essential hypertension and rheumatoid arthritis which she allegedly contracted sometime in 1973. The respondent GSIS denied her claim as follows: Our records show that you have retired from the government service effective June 3, 1974. We wish to inform you that the GSIS as an administering agency of the Employees' Compensation Program under the aforementioned Decree, has jurisdiction only for claims of government employees who were still in the service on or after January 1, 1975. (ECC Decision, p. 2; supra.) Vistal filed the present petition for certiorari principally based on the grounds that her cause of action is covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428) and that her ailments are compensable. The Solicitor General, the GSIS and the ECC all agree with petitioner that her claim is governed by the Workmen's Compensation Act. Indeed, the governing law is determined by the date on which the claimant contracted his illness. Thus, where an ailment supervened before the new employees' compensation law took effect, the governing law is the old Workmen's Compensation Act. On the other hand, where an ailment occurred after January 1, 1975, the new law on employees' compensation applies. This is so provided in Article 208 of P.D. 442, as amended by P.D. 626 and Section l(c), Rule 111 of the Rules implementing P.D. 626, which are herein quoted: Art. 208. Applicability. This Title shall apply only to injury, sickness, disability or death occurring on or after January 1, 1975 (P.D. 626, as Amended). Only injury or sickness that occurred on or after January, 1976 and the resulting disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules. (Sec. l(c), Rule 111, Amended Rules on Employees Compensation) Whether or not petitioner's claim has already prescribed, the Solicitor General is of the view that the same had been filed wen within the ten-year prescriptive period. The law and jurisprudence limit the period of filing of any cause of action under the Workmen's Compensation Act (WCA) to ten (10) years. This is so because any claim under the WCA creates an obligation. Pursuant to Article 1144 of the Civil Code, an action upon an obligation created by law must be brought within ten years from the time such right of action accrues. Even the respondent ECC admits that it erred in applying the provisions of Article 1144 of the Civil Code on prescriptive period. Respondents' record shows that petitioner's ailments accrued in 1973 without any specific date being stated therein. Accordingly, under the time-honored doctrine that any doubt must be resolved in favor of the worker, petitioner's claim for compensation, filed on September 9, 1983, must be construed as having been filed within the allowable period of ten (10) years from accrual of cause of action. Whether or not petitioner's claim is compensable or not, the Solicitor General likewise maintained the same view as that of petitioner. He argues that since there is no dispute that petitioner contracted pulmonary tuberculosis, essential hypertension and rheumatoid arthritis during her employment as a teacher, the same being admitted in the ECC decision of January 7, 1987, it may be concluded that such ailments, having been contracted while employed are caused directly or indirectly by the nature of the duties of a teacher or that the risk of contracting the same is aggravated by the working habits necessitated by the demands of job efficiency. Under the Workmen's Compensation Act, an employee is entitled to compensation benefits when he contracts an illness directly caused by such employment, or aggravated by or the result of the nature of such employment (Section 2, Act No. 3428, amended). itc-asl Moreover, the principle of 87

G.R. No. 79009 July 20, 1990 ARCADIA VISTAL, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Department of Education, Culture & Sports), respondents. Wilfredo T. Mayol for petitioner. MEDIALDEA, J.: This petition seeks to reverse the decision dated January 7, 1987 of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 2679 entitled Arcadia Vistal v. Government Service Insurance System (Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports) which dismissed petitioner's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the same having been filed beyond the ten-year prescriptive period for filing. The pertinent ruling of the ECC is herein quoted, to wit: In the case at bar, appellant contracted her ailments early 1973 long before the Decree came into effect in 1975. Hence, her case is covered by the old workmen's compensation law. Nonetheless, she could not pursue her case under the old law because her cause of action had already prescribed, because she filed her claim on September 9, 1983 ten (10) years after her cause of action accrued. (ECC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 17) Vistal was an elementary grades teacher of the MECS Division of Bohol who retired on June 3, 1974 at the age of 61. On September 9, 1983, she filed a claim for disability benefits under the present

presumption of compensability, although rebuttable by substantial evidence to the contrary, obtained under said law (Section 44, Act 3428, as amended). In any event, it has been held that tuberculosis may be considered an occupational disease or workconnected in such occupations as that of a teacher, laborer, driver, land inspector and other similar occupations; hence compensable (See Laginlin v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, G.R. No. L-45785, March 21, 1988,159 SCRA 91). Noteworthy also is the case of Reyes v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. L-48122, February 21, 1989 wherein petitioner's claim for compensation was denied by the Workmen's Compensation Commission on the ground that rheumatoid arthritis combined with essential hypertension had not disabled her from working. In reversing the decision, this Court held that the retirement of a public school teacher on the ground of disability could not have been approved had she not complied with the conditions for optional retirement that she is physically incapacitated to render efficient service. Optional retirement of claimant for disability benefits is an indication of physical incapacity to render efficient service. In the case at bar, petitioner also retired at the age of 61. It is clear, therefore, that petitioner's ailments are compensable. As to who should be legally bound to pay the claim, respondent GSIS avers that its jurisdiction covers only claims governed by the new employees' compensation law (P.D. 442, as amended by P.D. 626) in view of the explicit provision of Article 208 of said law that the same "shall apply only to injury, sickness, disability or death occurring on or after January 1, 1975." Inasmuch as the case had been adjudged compensable under Workmen's Compensation Act, under which law the employers themselves are the ones primarily and principally liable to pay the claims of their own employees, this Court held in Corales v. ECC, G.R. L-44063, November 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 136 as follows: In the light of the foregoing, in the cases of Corales, Villones, Caneja and Barga and other similar cases where the decisions had already become final and executory, the GSIS shall remain liable to pay the respective petitionersclaimants the decreed awards in the said cases, without prejudice to the right of the Government Service Insurance System to reimbursement from the respective employers of the claimants or petitioners, because said cases were adjudged compensable pursuant to the Workmens' Compensation Act as they cover ailments initially contracted prior to the effectivity of the New Labor Code, even if said cases were filed after the effectivity of said Code. In all other cases where the decisions decreed awards under the Workmen's Compensation Act for ailments initially contracted prior to the effectivity of the New Labor Code, although the claims were filed thereafter, but said decisions have not yet become final, the awards shall be paid by the respective employers of the claimants. In Mallari v. Employees' Compensation Commission and Government Service Insurance, G.R. 88204, February 26, 1990, Third Division (Minute Resolution) this Court upheld the position of the GSIS when it ordered the employer of petitioner therein, the Integrated National Police, to pay the permanent total disability benefits, the medical and hospital expenses duly supported by proper receipts, the attorney's fees and the administrative costs, petitioner's ailment being compensable under the old Workmen's Compensation Act.

ACCORDINGLY, this petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission is hereby SET ASIDE. The Department of Education, Culture and Sports is hereby ORDERED: 1. To pay petitioner the sum of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00) PESOS as maximum compensation under the law; 2. To pay petitioner P600.00 as attorney's fees; and 3. To pay the administrative costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 78617 June 18, 1990 SALVADOR LAZO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES), respondents. Oscar P. Paguinto for petitioner. PADILLA, J.: This is an appeal from the decision of the respondent Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 2883 which affirmed the dismissal of petitioner's claim for compensation against the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). The petitioner, Salvador Lazo, is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines assigned to its main office in Malate, Manila. His regular tour of duty is from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. On 18 June 1986, the petitioner rendered duty from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. But, as the security guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive, the petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, when he asked permission from his superior to leave early in order to take home to Binangonan, Rizal, his sack of rice. On his way home, at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, the passenger jeepney the petitioner was riding on turned turtle due to slippery road. As a result, he sustained injuries and was taken to the Angono Emergency Hospital for treatment. He was later transferred to the National Orthopedic Hospital where he was confined until 25 July 1986. For the injuries he sustained, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under PD 626, as amended. His claim, however, was denied by the GSIS for the reason that It appears that after performing your regular duties as Security Guard from 2:00 P.M. to 10:00 P.M. on June 18, 1986, you rendered overtime duty from 10:00 88

P.M. to 5:06 A.M. of the following day; that at about 5:06 A.M. after asking permission from your superior you were allowed to leave the Office to do certain personal matter that of bringing home a sack of rice and that, while on your way home, you met a vehicular accident that resulted to (sic) your injuries. From the foregoing informations, it is evident that you were not at your work place performing your duties when the incident occurred. 1 It was held that the condition for compensability had not been satisfied. Upon review of the case, the respondent Employees Compensation Commission affirmed the decision since the accident which involved the petitioner occurred far from his work place and while he was attending to a personal matter. Hence, the present recourse. The petitioner contends that the injuries he sustained due to the vehicular accident on his way home from work should be construed as "arising out of or in the course of employment" and thus, compensable. In support of his prayer for the reversal of the decision, the petitioner cites the case of Pedro Baldebrin vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 2 where the Court awarded compensation to the petitioner therein who figured in an accident on his way home from his official station at Pagadian City to his place of residence at Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur. In the accident, petitioner's left eye was hit by a pebble while he was riding on a bus. Respondents claim that the Baldebrin ruling is a deviation from cases earlier decided and hence, not applicable to the present case. The Court has carefully considered the petition and the arguments of the parties and finds that the petitioner's submission is meritorious. Liberally interpreting the employees compensation law to give effect to its compassionate spirit as a social legislation 3 in Vda. de Torbela u. ECC, 4 the Court held: It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he was on his way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran, Negros Occidental where the school of which he was the principal was located and that at the time of the accident he had in his possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his residence on the eve of his death. The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is going to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment. Again in Alano v. ECC, 5 it was reiterated: Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee during her lifetime, worked as principal of Salinap Community School in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Her tour of duty was from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A-M., while she was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to the school, she was bumped and run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted in her instantaneous death. ...

In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school principal's being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there. More recently, in Vano vs. GSIS & ECC, 6 this Court, applying the above quoted decisions, enunciated: Filomeno Vano was a letter carrier of the Bureau of Posts in Tagbilaran City. On July 31, 1983, a Sunday, at around 3:30 p.m. Vano was driving his motorcycle with his son as backrider allegedly on his way to his station in Tagbilaran for his work the following day, Monday. As they were approaching Hinawanan Bridge in Loay, Bohol, the motorcycle skidded, causing its passengers to be thrown overboard. Vano's head hit the bridge's railing which rendered him unconscious. He was taken to the Engelwood Hospital where he was declared dead on arrival due to severe hemorrhage. We see no reason to deviate from the foregoing rulings. Like the deceased in these two (2) aforementioned cases, it was established that petitioner's husband in the case at bar was on his way to his place of work when he met the accident. His death, therefore, is compensable under the law as an employment accident. In the above cases, the employees were on their way to work. In the case at bar, petitioner had come from work and was on his way home, just like in the Baldebrin case, where the employee "... figured in an accident when he was ping home from his official station at Pagadian City to his place of residence at Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur ...." 7 Baldebrin, the Court said: The principal issue is whether petitioner's injury comes within the meaning of and intendment of the phrase 'arising out of and in the course of employment.'(Section 2, Workmen's Compensation Act). InPhilippine Engineer's Syndicate, Inc. vs. Flora S. Martin and Workmen's Compensation Commission,4 SCRA 356, We held that 'where an employee, after working hours, attempted to ride on the platform of a service truck of the company near his place of work, and, while thus attempting, slipped and fell to the ground and was run over by the truck, resulting in his death, the accident may be said to have arisen out of or in the course of employment, for which reason his death is compensable. The fact standing alone, that the truck was in motion when the employee boarded, is insufficient to justify the conclusion that he had been notoriously negligent, where it does not appear that the truck was running at a great speed.'And, in a later case, Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 26 SCRA 102, 103, We ruled that '(e)mployment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. (Emphasis supplied)

89

In the case at bar, it can be seen that petitioner left his station at the Central Bank several hours after his regular time off, because the reliever did not arrive, and so petitioner was asked to go on overtime. After permission to leave was given, he went home. There is no evidence on record that petitioner deviated from his usual, regular homeward route or that interruptions occurred in the journey. While the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act (under which the Baldebrin case was decided) may have been abandoned under the New Labor Code, 8 it is significant that the liberality of the law in general in favor of the workingman still subsists. As agent charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by the Constitution, the Employees Compensation Commission should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability, especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection to the accident. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that 'all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.' The policy then is to extend the applicability of the decree (PD 626) to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor. 9 There is no reason, in principle, why employees should not be protected for a reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the employer's premises. 10 If the Vano ruling awarded compensation to an employee who was on his way from home to his work station one day before an official working day, there is no reason to deny compensation for accidental injury occurring while he is on his way home one hour after he had left his work station. We are constrained not to consider the defense of the street peril doctrine and instead interpret the law liberally in favor of the employee because the Employees Compensation Act, like the Workmen's Compensation Act, is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to the working men and women in our society. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be remanded to the ECC and the GSIS for disposition in accordance with this decision. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 90204 May 11, 1990 MANUEL BELARMINO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,respondents. GRIO-AQUINO, J.: This seven-year-old case involves a claim for benefits for the death of a lady school teacher which the public respondents disallowed on the ground that the cause of death was not work-connected. Before her death on February 19, 1982, petitioner's wife, Oania Belarmino, was a classroom teacher of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports assigned at the Buracan Elementary School in Dimasalang, Masbate (p. 13, Rollo). She had been a classroom teacher since October 18, 1971, or for eleven (11) years. Her husband, the petitioner, is also a public school teacher. On January 14, 1982, at nine o'clock in the morning, while performing her duties as a classroom teacher, Mrs. Belarmino who was in her 8th month of pregnancy, accidentally slipped and fell on the classroom floor. Moments later, she complained of abdominal pain and stomach cramps. For several days, she continued to suffer from recurrent abdominal pain and a feeling of heaviness in her stomach, but, heedless of the advice of her female co-teachers to take a leave of absence, she continued to report to the school because there was much work to do. On January 25, 1982, eleven (11) days after her accident, she went into labor and prematurely delivered a baby girl at home (p. 8, Rollo). Her abdominal pains persisted even after the delivery, accompanied by high fever and headache. She was brought to the Alino Hospital in Dimasalang, Masbate on February 11, 1982. Dr. Alfonso Alino found that she was suffering from septicemia post partum due to infected lacerations of the vagina. She was discharged from the hospital after five (5) days on February 16, 1982, apparently recovered but she died three (3) days later. The cause of death was septicemia post partum. She was 33 years old, survived by her husband and four (4) children, the oldest of whom was 11 years old and the youngest, her newborn infant (p. 9, Rollo). On April 21, 1983, a claim for death benefits was filed by her husband. On February 14, 1984, it was denied by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) which held that 'septicemia post partum the cause of death, is not an occupational disease, and neither was there any showing that aforesaid ailment was contracted by reason of her employment. . . . The alleged accident mentioned could not have precipitated the death of the wife but rather the result of the infection of her lacerated wounds as a result of her delivery at home" (p. 14 Rollo). On appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission, the latter issued Resolution No. 3913 dated July 8, 1988 holding: We agree with the decision of the system, hence we dismiss this appeal. Postpartum septicemia is an acute infectious disease of the puerperium resulting from the entrance into the blood of bacteria usually streptococci and their toxins which cause dissolution of the blood, degenerative changes in the organs and the symptoms of intoxication. The cause of this condition in the instant case was the infected vaginal lacerations resulting from the decedent's delivery of her child 90

which took place at home. The alleged accident in school could not have been the cause of septicemia, which in this case is clearly caused by factors not inherent in employment or in the working conditions of the deceased. (pp. 1415, Rollo.) Hence, this petition for review. After a careful consideration of the petition and the annexes thereof, as well as the comments of the public respondents, we are persuaded that the public respondents' peremptory denial of the petitioner's claim constitutes a grave abuse of discretion. Rule III, Section 1 of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation enumerates the grounds for compensability of injury resulting in disability or death of an employee, as follows: Sec. 1. Grounds (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following conditions: (1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; (2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and (3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer. (b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. (c) Only injury or sickness that occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules. The illness, septicemia post partum which resulted in the death of Oania Belarmino, is admittedly not listed as an occupational disease in her particular line of work as a classroom teacher. However, as pointed out in the petition, her death from that ailment is compensable because an employment accident and the conditions of her employment contributed to its development. The condition of the classroom floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall and suffer injury as a result. The fall precipitated the onset of recurrent abdominal pains which culminated in the premature termination of her pregnancy with tragic consequences to her. Her fall on the classroom floor brought about her premature delivery which caused the development of post partum septicemia which resulted in death. Her fall therefore was the proximate or responsible cause that set in motion an unbroken chain of events, leading to her demise. . . . what is termed in American cases the proximate cause, not implying however, as might be inferred from the word itself, the nearest in point of time or 91

relation, but rather, [is] the efficient cause, which may be the most remote of an operative chain. It must be that which sets the others in motion and is to be distinguished from a mere preexisting condition upon which the effective cause operates, and must have been adequate to produce the resultant damage without the intervention of an independent cause. (Atlantic Gulf vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 166,171.) The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. (Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181.) Thus in Enriquez v. WCC, 93 SCRA 366, 372, this Court ruled: . . . Verily, the right to compensation extends to disability due to disease supervening upon and proximately and naturally resulting from a compensable injury (82 Am. Jur. 132). Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to complainants own negligence or misconduct ( I Larson Workmen's Compensation Law 3-279 [1972]). Simply stated, all the medical consequences and sequels that flow from the primary injury are compensable. (Ibid.) Mrs. Belarmino's fall was the primary injury that arose in the course of her employment as a classroom teacher, hence, all the medical consequences flowing from it: her recurrent abdominal pains, the premature delivery of her baby, her septicemia post partum and death, are compensable. There is no merit in the public respondents' argument that the cause of the decedent's post partum septicemia "was the infected vaginal lacerations resulting from the decedent's delivery of her child at home" for the incident in school could not have caused septicemia post partum, . . . the necessary precautions to avoid infection during or after labor were (not) taken" (p. 29, Rollo). The argument is unconvincing. It overlooks the fact that septicemia post partum is a disease of childbirth, and premature childbirth would not have occurred if she did not accidentally fall in the classroom. It is true that if she had delivered her baby under sterile conditions in a hospital operating room instead of in the unsterile environment of her humble home, and if she had been attended by specially trained doctors and nurses, she probably would not have suffered lacerations of the vagina and she probably would not have contracted the fatal infection. Furthermore, if she had remained longer than five (5) days in the hospital to complete the treatment of the infection, she probably would not have died. But who is to blame for her inability to afford a hospital delivery and the services of trained doctors and nurses? The court may take judicial notice of the meager salaries that the Government pays its public school teachers. Forced to live on the margin of poverty, they are unable to afford expensive hospital care, nor the services of trained doctors and nurses when they or

members of their families are in. Penury compelled the deceased to scrimp by delivering her baby at home instead of in a hospital. The Government is not entirely blameless for her death for it is not entirely blameless for her poverty. Government has yet to perform its declared policy "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all (Sec. 7, Art. II, 1973 Constitution and Sec. 9, Art. II, 1987 Constitution). Social justice for the lowly and underpaid public school teachers will only be an empty shibboleth until Government adopts measures to ameliorate their economic condition and provides them with adequate medical care or the means to afford it. "Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society" (PLDT v. Bucay and NLRC, 164 SCRA 671, 673). By their denial of the petitioner's claim for benefits arising from the death of his wife, the public respondents ignored this imperative of Government, and thereby committed a grave abuse of discretion. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The respondents Employees Compensation Commission and the Government Service Insurance System are ordered to pay death benefits to the petitioner and/or the dependents of the late Oania Belarmino, with legal rate of interest from the filing of the claim until it is fully paid, plus attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the award, and costs of suit. SO ORDERED.

while repairing the university's shop building, a falling piece of wood hit and broke Benarao's spinal cord resulting in his temporary disability which lasted for one hundred fifty (150) days. A claim for compensation benefits was filed by him before public respondent WCC, docketed as WCC Case No. R-13632 against Nazareno. On 5 April 1974, an award of Three Thousand Five Hundred Twelve Pesos and Fifty One Centavos (P3,512.51) was rendered in Benarao's favor. 1 More than five (5) months thereafter, or on 9 October 1974, Benarao, thru a "Memorandum of Settlement" entered into by him and Nazareno, accepted the amount of One Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P1,200.00) as final, complete and full settlement of the award he (Benarao) previously obtained. 2 Later, Nazareno appealed from the order or award granting compensation benefits to Benarao. Nazareno reasoned, among others, that under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 3 he could not be made liable for Benarao's claim because his (Nazareno's) contract with the Silliman University was merely a "labor only" contract and that his capital was below P1,000.00. 4 After a review of the petition, the WCC rendered a decision on 28 July 1975, finding the petitioner university liable for the compensation claim of Benarao. 5 The following statements in the WCC decision were the basis of the ruling against Silliman University, to wit: We hold that Silliman University was the statutory employer and therefore liable for the compensation claim (Republic v. WCC, et al., L-22650, April 28, 1967). Whether the term used to describe the kind of actual work of the claimant at the time of the accident was 'remodelling' or 'repairing', such services of a carpenter are indispensable in any institution of learning. ... . It is evident that what was entered into by and between Petronilo (Nilo) Nazareno and the Silliman University was labor-only contract. That made Petronilo Nazareno virtually a laborer if not an agent of Silliman University. WHEREFORE, the award appealed from should be, as it is hereby SET ASIDE, and a new decision entered finding the Silliman University the statutory employer of the claimant liable to pay the latter's compensation benefits ... . Thereafter, a writ of execution dated 8 October 1976 was served by the Department of Labor upon petitioner University in the amount of Three Thousand Five Hundred Twelve Pesos and Fifty one Centavos (P3,512.51 ) 6followed by an alias writ of execution issued on 21 February 1977. 7 In response to said writs of execution, an Urgent Motion to Quash was not resolved by the Writ of Execution was filed by petitioner 8 on the ground that the school never became a party in WCC Case No. R07-13632 and, therefore, the WCC did not acquire jurisdiction over it. It further alleged that the 'University had no knowledge or information of an existing compensation case against it, as it never received copies of any complaint, summons, award or decision. The said Urgent Motion to Quash was not resolved by the Department of Labor which instead delivered to petitioner in November 1976, a copy of the WCC decision i.e. the 28 July 1975 decision in WCC Case No. R08-13632, 9 and basis of the questioned writs of execution. Hence this petition for certiorari.
10

G.R. No. L-46613 February 26, 1990 SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY, petitioner, vs. LUCIO BENARAO, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Region VII, and the SECRETARY OF LABOR, respondents. Jose V. Montebon, Jr. for petitioner. Fructuoso S. Villarin for private respondent. PADILLA, J.: In this petition for certiorari, Silliman University, an educational institution duly organized and registered under Philippine laws with principal office at Dumaguete City, seeks the annulment of a decision rendered by the Workmen's Compensation Commission (WCC, for brevity) on 28 July 1975, solely on jurisdictional grounds. The antecedents are uncontroverted: Private respondent Lucio Benarao was employed as a carpenter, on a piece work basis, for Silliman University thru a job contract executed between the latter and Petronilo Nazareno. On 29 May 1969, 92

Public respondent WCC submitted its Comment reiterating the statements it made in the 28 July 1975 decision. 11Private respondent Benarao likewise filed his Comment wherein he averred that the filing

of the instant petition is premature in the absence of a prior motion for reconsideration of the questioned WCC decision. 12 The vital issue in the instant case centers on the jurisdiction of the WCC over petitioner Silliman University. We find the petition impressed with merit. The WCC's second decision dated 28 July 1975 is void for two (2) evident reasons. First, it was a substantial amendment of a prior ruling which had already become final and, in fact, already executed. Second, it is a decision rendered in violation of the rules on jurisdiction and due process. It will be noted that the first WCC award was issued on 25 April 1974. While an appeal therefrom was interposed by Nazareno (respondent therein), this was after he had entered into a settlement agreement with Benarao (claimant) on 9 October 1974 or more than five (5) months after said WCC award. The next event that took place was the rendition by the WCC of a second decision in the same case dated 28 July 1975, or after one (1) year and three (3) months from the date of the first decision. Given the above antecedents, there is no other way but to view the second decision as an entire reversal of the first ruling, which could no longer be disturbed. And, Nazareno had unconditionally settled his liability thru the execution of the "Memorandum of Settlement", the existence of which was never denied nor its validity questioned. A portion of the said memorandum reads as follows: ... and by way of full settlement of the claim of Lucio Benarao, and to his entire satisfaction, Petronilo Nazareno, by these presents, tenders and presents the amount of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00) unto Lucio Benarao, who hereby accepts and acknowledges this amount, and further states that this said amount represents final, complete and full settlement of whatever award he might obtain from his claim ... The above stipulations point to only one thing, i.e. the award of the WCC on 25 April 1974 was accepted by the parties thereto. And this acceptance of said award, on the part of Nazareno, rendered his later appeal therefrom moot from the beginning. It should also be stated that during the hearings in the case, there was no instance when Nazareno challenged the averment that he was Benarao's employer. Why then was he later allowed for the first time to invoke numerous non-jurisdictional defenses in his petition for review before the respondent Commission He is deemed to have renounced his right to controvert the claim for the reason that he never denied being Benarao's employer and more, because of his voluntary discharge of hability in his capacity as employer of the claimant. But even assuming arguendo that the Commission could still alter its first ruling, the 28 July 1975 decision is still null and void for having been issued without any jurisdiction first acquired over Silliman University and for lack of due process. Records show that the respondents never contested the allegation of petitioner that it was never notified of any disability claim filed against it. Pertinent to this issue is a section in the Workmen's Compensation Act, to wit: Section 49. Procedure. Any dispute or controversy concerning compensation under this Act shall be submitted to the Commissioner as provided herein. 93

... He shall cause reasonable notice of such hearing to be given to each party interested, in service upon him personally or mailing a copy thereof to him ... . All parties in interest shall have the right to be present at any hearing in person or by counsel or by any other agent or representative, to present such testimony as may be pertinent to the controversy before the Commissioner and to crossexamine the witness against them. ... Quite clearly, the above provision was not followed vis-a-vis Silliman University. Fully aware that the latter was not made a party to the case at the instance of either Benarao, the claimant, or Nazareno, the respondent Commission nevertheless held it liable for the payment of disability benefits. At the very least, WCC should have notified the petitioner of its involvement in the case before it rendered any decision against it; WCC should have given petitioner an opportunity to refute the burden clearly being shifted to it, as required by due process. As petitioner never became a party to the case, logically, it can not be bound by the judgment subsequently rendered against it by the respondent WCC which, in the first place, acquired no jurisdiction over it. Lastly, it is incorrect to state that since petitioner had not resorted to a prior motion for reconsideration of the decision, subject of controversy, its filing of the instant petition for certiorari is procedurally erroneous. While we support respondent Benarao's reasoning that a motion for reconsideration is needed to enable a judicial body issuing the questioned order, in the first instance, to pass upon and correct its mistakes without the intervention of a higher court, we, however, held in BA Finance Corporation v. Pineda, et al. 13 that in case of a final order or judgment, a motion for reconsideration, prior to taking an appeal, is not always required. In the case at bar, the 28 July 1975 order was not interlocutory; it was a final one as it disposed of the action for compensation benefits and there was nothing more to be done in the proceedings as to the merits of the case. On the other hand, in the cases cited by respondent Benarao, 14 in his effort to justify and support his arguments, the orders complained of were merely interlocutory and, therefore, a motion for reconsideration had to be filed before certiorari could be availed of. Likewise, the theory of exhaustion of administrative remedies can not be invoked or applied where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal (as in the present case) amounting to lack of jurisdiction. 15 Having ruled that the questioned decision of 28 July 1975 is a void judgment, we do not find any need to resolve or even discuss the matter of whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between Benarao and Silliman University. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 28 July 1975 decision of respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 80157. February 6, 1990.] AMALIA NARAZO, Petitioner, v. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Provincial Governors Office, Negros Occidental), Respondents. Citizens Legal Assistance Office for petitioner.

that her husbands delayed urination gave rise to the development of his ailments, for lack of medical bases. All that petitioner has shown, according to the ECC, are mere aggravation, and not workconnection causes. 5 Rule III, section 1, paragraph 3(b) of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, defines a "compensable sickness" as any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the ECC or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. 6 The ECC is empowered to determine and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment. 7 Thus, a sickness or death caused by said sickness is compensable if the same is listed as an occupational disease. If it is not so listed, compensation may still be recovered if the illness was aggravated by employment. However, it is incumbent upon the claimant to show proof that the risk of contracting the illness was increased by his working conditions. The death of petitioners husband was caused by "Uremia due to obstructive nephropathy and benign prostatic hypertrophy," which is admittedly not among those listed as occupational diseases. 8 As per finding of the ECC, "Uremia is a toxic clinical condition characterized by restlessness, muscular twitchings, mental disturbance, nausea, and vomiting associated with renal insufficiency brought about by the retention in blood of nitrogeneous urinary waste products." One of its causes is the obstruction in the flow of urinary waste products. 9 Under the circumstances, the burden of proof was upon petitioner to show that the conditions under which her deceased husband was then working had increased the risk of contracting the illness which caused his death.cralawnad To establish compensability under the increased risk theory, the claimant must show proof of reasonable work-connection, not necessarily direct causal relation. The degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence which means such relevant evidence as will support a decision, or clear and convincing evidence. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable. To require proof of actual causes or factors which lead to an ailment would not be consistent with the liberal interpretation of the Labor Code and the social justice guarantee in favor of the workers. 10 Although strict roles of evidence are not applicable, yet the basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence cannot be disregarded. 11 The nature of the work of the deceased as Budget Examiner in the Office of the Governor dealt with the detailed preparation of the budget, financial reports and review and/or examination of the budget of other provincial and municipal offices. Full concentration and thorough study of the entries of accounts in the budget and/or financial reports were necessary, such that the deceased had to sit for hours, and more often that not, delay and even forego urination in order not to interrupt the flow of concentration. In addition, tension and pressure must have aggravated the situation. In the case of Ceniza v. ECC, 12 the Court held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph ". . . . It may be added that teachers have a tendency to sit for hours on end, and to put off or postpone emptying their bladders when it interferes with their teaching hours or preparation of lesson plans. From human experience, prolonged sitting down and putting off urination result in stagnation of the urine. This encourages the growth of bacteria in the urine, and affects the delicate balance between bacterial multiplication rates and the host defense mechanisms. Delayed excretion may permit the retention and survival of micro-organisms which multiply rapidly, and infect the urinary tract. These are predisposing factors to pyelonephritis and uremia. Thus, while We may concede that these illnesses are not directly caused by the nature of the duties of a teacher, the risk of contracting the same is certainly aggravated by their working habits necessitated by demands of job efficiency."cralaw virtua1aw library Under the foregoing circumstances, we are persuaded to hold that the cause of death of petitioners 94

DECISION

PADILLA, J.: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) dated 19 May 1987, 1 denying petitioners claim for compensation benefits under PD 626, as amended, for the death of her husband, Geronimo Narazo. Geronimo Narazo was employed for thirty eight (38) years as Budget Examiner in the Office of the Governor, Province of Negros Occidental. His duties included preparation of the budget of the Province, financial reports and review or examination of the budget of some provincial and municipal offices.chanrobles.com : virtual law library On 14 May 1984, Narazo died at the age of fifty seven (57). His medical records show that he was confined three (3) times at the Doa Corazon L. Montelibano Hospital in Bacolod City, for urinary retention, abdominal pain and anemia. He was thereafter diagnosed to be suffering from "obstructive nepropathy due to benign prostatic hypertrophy", commonly known as "Uremia."cralaw virtua1aw library Petitioner, as the widow of the deceased, filed a claim with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for death benefits for the death of her husband, under the Employees Compensation Law (PD 626, as amended). However, said claim was denied on the ground that the cause of death of Narazo is not listed as an occupational disease, and that there is no showing that the position and duties of the deceased as Budget Examiner had increased the risk of contracting "Uremia." 2 Petitioner moved for reconsideration of said decision, claiming that although the cause of her husbands death is not considered as an occupational disease, nevertheless, his job as Budget Examiner which required long hours of sedentary work, coupled with stress and pressure, caused him many times to delay urination, which eventually led to the development of his ailments. The GSIS denied said motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the Employees Compensation Commission affirmed the decision of the GSIS on the ground that the ailments of the deceased could not be attributed to employment factors and as impressed by medical experts, benign prostatic hypertrophy is quite common among men over fifty (50) years of age, regardless of occupation, while uremia is a complication of obstructive nephtropathy due to benign prostatic hypertrophy; 3 hence, this petition. Petitioner avers that the nature, length of time, and circumstances of the occupation of the deceased were not considered in determining whether the work of the said deceased had increased the risks of contracting the ailments which caused his death. The work of the deceased, which required long sedentary work under pressure, aggravated the risk of contracting the disease leading to his hospital confinement and death. 4 In controversion, the ECC argues that petitioner failed to show proof that the disease which caused the death of her husband is work-connected; and that no credence could be given to petitioners claim

husband is work-connected, i.e. the risk of contracting the illness was aggravated by the nature of the work, so much so that petitioner is entitled to receive compensation benefits for the death of her husband. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Employees Compensation Commission denying petitioners claim for benefits under PD 626, as amended, arising from the death of her husband, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad SO ORDERED.

1. that the employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; 2. that the employee must have been performing his official functions; and 3. if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for his employer. (p. 22, Rollo) Crispina Vano's requests for reconsideration were denied by the GSIS, consequently, the case was elevated to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) for appropriate review under ECC Case No. 2658.

G.R. No. 81327 December 4, 1989 CRISPINA VANO, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, (Bureau of Posts) and EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents. Severino B. Estonina for petitioner. The Government Corporate Counsel for GSIS. PARAS, J.: The only issue in this case is whether or not the death of petitioner's husband, Filomeno Vano is compensable under the Employees' Compensation Law. Filomeno Vano was a letter carrier of the Bureau of Posts in Tagbilaran City. On July 31, 1983, a Sunday, at around 3:30 p.m. Vano was driving his motorcycle with his son as backrider allegedly on his way to his station in Tagbilaran for his work the following day, Monday. As they were approaching Hinawanan Badge in Loay, Bohol, the motorcycle skidded, causing its passengers to be thrown overboard. Vano's head hit the bridge's railing which rendered him unconscious. He was taken to the Engelwood Hospital where he was declared dead on arrival due to severe hemorrhage. Vano's widow, Crispina Vano, filed a death benefit claim under PD 626, as amended, with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). On April 6, 1984, the GSIS denied the claim, citing the following reason: It appears on record that your husband was on his way to his station when he died in a vehicular accident he figured in a Sunday, July 31, 1983. Obviously, the accident occurred outside of his time and place of work; neither was he performing official duties at the time of its occurrence. Accordingly, the conditions for compensability in accordance with the law have not been satisfied, to wit: 95

In a Decision dated October 13, 1987, the ECC affirmed the decision denying the claim of Crispina Vano because: Under the Employees' Compensation law, injuries resulting from accidents while an employee is going to and from the place of work is not compensable. Some exceptions, however, are: when the injury is sustained at a place proximate to the work-place, when the employee meets the accident while riding in a company vehicle and when he is on special errand for his employer. (Section 1, Rule III of the Amended Rules of Employees' Compensation) We note that the case at bar does not fall under any of the foregoing exceptions. In fact, the subject employee's accident happened on a Sunday, a non-working day. In the light of the foregoing, we cannot but affirm respondent's denial of the claim. (pp. 13-15, Rollo; p. 2, Decision, ECC Case No. 2658) The petitioner then came to this Court on a petition for review on certiorari. She alleges that since her husband was precisely commuting from his hometown to Tagbilaran City, where he would report for duty as letter carrier the following day, when he met the accident, then his consequent death should be compensated. The respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) reiterates its views and contends that the present provision of law on employment injury is different from that provided in the old Workmen's Compensation Act and is "categorical in that the injury must have been sustained at work while at the workplace or elsewhere while executing an order from the employer." (Rollo, p. 69) For its part, the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission stood firm in asserting that the death of Filomeno Vano is not the result of an employment accident as contemplated by law hence petitioner is clearly not entitled to her claim for death benefits. The case of Vda. de Torbela vs. Employees' Compensation Commission (96 SCRA 260, 263, 264) supports petitioner's contention of compensability. In the said case, this Court held: It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he was on his way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran, Negros Occidental where the school of which he was the principal was located and that

at the time of the accident he had in his possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his residence on the eve of his death. The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place of work, while he is going to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment. The same ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of Alano vs. Employees' Compensation Commission(158 SCRA, 669, 672): In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school principal's being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there. We see no reason to deviate from the foregoing rulings. Like the deceased in these two (2) aforementioned cases, it was established that petitioner's husband the case at bar was on his way to his place of work when he met the accident. His death, therefore, is compensable under the law as an employment accident. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and the Government Service Insurance System is ordered to pay petitioner the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00)) as death benefit and the sum of One Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P1,200.00) as attorney's fees. SO ORDERED.

On January 28, 1976, petitioner filed a claim for death compensation under the Labor Code with respondent Government Service Insurance System (hereinafter referred to as GSIS). In a letterdecision dated February 23, 1976, the GSIS denied the claim finding that the cause of the death of petitioner's husband is not an occupational disease since the nature of his duties as a teacher, as well as the working conditions of his employment, could not have directly caused his ailment which eventuated in his subsequent death. 1 Petitioner's motion for reconsideration, dated August 11, 1976, was denied upon the finding that the evidence failed to establish that the decedent's employment had any causal relationship with the contraction of the ailment and there was no showing that the same directly arose therefrom or resulted from the nature thereof. 2 A second motion for reconsideration filed on October 18, 1976 having been denied by the GSIS, petitioner's claim was elevated for review to the respondent commission where it was docketed as ECC Case No. 0266. On March 16, 1977, respondent commission affirmed the ruling of the GSIS and denied the claim of petitioner. The case is now before us on a petition for review. The applicable rule established in law and jurisprudence concerning claims based on the provisions of the Labor Code on employees' compensation, particularly on death benefits under Article 194, is that they must result from an occupational disease. A compensable disease means any illness accepted and listed by the Employees' Compensation Commission or any illness caused by the employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same was increased by the working conditions. 3 If the disease is listed in the Table of Occupational Diseases embodied in Annex A of the Rules on Employees' Compensation, no proof of causation is required. However, if it is not so listed, it has been held that the employee, this time assisted by his employer, is required to prove, a positive proposition, that is, that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. The fact that the cause of the disease was not positively identified does not dispense with this burden of proof. 4 The observations heretofore made do not mean that proof of direct causal relation is indispensably required. It is enough that the claimant adduces proof of reasonable work connection, whereby the development of the disease was brought about largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job. Strict rules of evidence are not demanded, the degree of proof required being merely substantial evidence, which has been held to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. 5 After the surgical operation performed by Dr. Arturo de Vera, he gave the clinical impression that the deceased was suffering from "Intestinal Obstruction Partial, due to Lipomatosis of the Colon and Adhesion," explained by respondent commission as follows: ... As established in medical science, intestinal obstruction is a condition in which the passage of intestinal contents is arrested or seriously impaired. This is due to causes which are either mechanical, vascular or neurogenic. Mechanical causes are intrinsic factors as adhesions and tumors, such as what happened in the instant case, and hernia, and such factors as impacted foreign body or feces, parasites and gallstones. Vascular causes include embolism or trombosis of a large blood vessel. The neurogenic causes consist of those seen in pneumonia and peritonitis and following abdominal surgery or injuries to the spinal cord. (The Merck Manual-8th edition: Principles of Internal Medicine by Harrison). ... 6 Public respondent GSIS in its letter-decision also gave this explanation to petitioner: 96

G.R. No. L-46454 September 28, 1989 NICETAS C. RODRIGUEZ, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (BUREAU OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION), respondent. Rodrigo V. Coquia for petitioner. REGALADO, J.: Petitioner's late husband, Hector P. Rodriguez, was a public school teacher assigned at Salaan Elementary School in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. On November 19, 1975 he went on sick leave and was confined at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital after complaining of severe stomach pains accompanied by nausea and vomiting, later diagnosed as "Intestinal Lipomatosis of the Large Colon with Obstruction of the Ascending Colon." His ailment called for a surgical operation which was performed on November 27,1975 but this proved unavailing. A few days thereafter, on December 2, 1975, he expired.

Intestinal Obstruction is failure of progression of intestinal contents due to mechanical causes or to inadequacy of intestinal muscular activity. In your husband's case, it was due to Lipomatosis and Adhesions. Lipomata are benigned (sic) tumors characteristically found in middle adult life, although they may have been growing slowly for many years before making clinical mischief. They arise from adipose or fatty tissue anywhere in the body. The mesentery of the colon contains a large amount of such tissue and this may produce obstruction by compression of the intestinal wall. Worthy of note is the fact that the abdomen of your late husband was markedly obese. 7 Petitioner does not dispute the fact that the principal duties of her husband as a classroom teacher alone would not have any connection with his disease. However, she posits that the deceased's auxiliary activities as a classroom teacher directly affected his physical constitution and indubitably caused him to have sustained some trauma in his abdominal cavity and other parts of the body. According to petitioner, the deceased was a member of the basketball team of the public school teachers in their school for the last five years prior to his death and had served as a coach in basketball for three years. He was also said to have been an active member of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines serving as committee chairman of Unit 671 of the Pangasinan council. 8 It is our considered view that the circumstances alleged by the petitioner and the evidence she presented are not enough to discharge the required quantum of proof, liberal as it is. There is no clear evidence as to when the disease commenced and supervened; the tumors which developed in the deceased's colon may have been growing for many years even before he was employed as a teacher. Neither was there any indication as to what really caused the disease: in fact, the nature of the disease as described militate against a finding of a causal nexus. The "trauma" that was supposed to have caused or at least contributed to the disease was neither satisfactorily clarified nor adequately proved. Surely, the activities relied upon by the petitioner, being outside the regular or primary functions of a teacher, could not have been done every working day. It is safe to assume that they were done only for certain limited periods of time and on isolated occasions as, for instance, during competitions. Thus, it cannot be said that decedent's work as a teacher exposed him to hazards different or greater from those involved in ordinary or normal life-styles. There is no showing that he did not engage in other extraneous activities, aside from playing basketball or being a member of the Boy Scouts. Of further note is the observation that the abdomen of the deceased was markedly obese, which circumstance may also have been a causative or contributive factor considering the etiological and pathological particulars of said ailment. Additionally, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that said co-curricular activities can be considered as "hazards," as theorized by petitioner, exposure to the same was on the voluntary choice of the deceased. As pointed out by respondent commission, the decision to engage therein was at decedent's option since, not forming part of his work as teacher, there was no compulsion on him to participate in said activities. UNDER THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the instant petition is DENIED and the decision of respondent Employees' Compensation Commission is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-64255 August 16, 1989 EVARISTO ABAYA, JR., petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent. Citizens Legal Assistance Office for petitioner. CRUZ, J.: After serving the government in various capacities for 38-1/2 years, Evaristo Abaya, Jr. retired as a principal teacher at the age of 60 on October 15, 1975. Thereafter, pursuant to PD No. 626, he applied with the Government Service Insurance System for medical services, appliance and supplies and permanent total disability benefits. The basis of his application was his claimed serviceconnected ailment, initially diagnosed as cardio-vascular disease and aggravating later for cerebral encephalopathy secondary to hypertension. On June 3, 1976, the GSIS rejected his application on the ground that his ailment was not an occupational disease. Upon appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission, the case was on April 19, 1978, remanded to the GSIS for reception of additional evidence showing that the applicant's illness was work-connected. On June 17, 1979, the GSIS delivered to the petitioner a check in the amount of P l,218.25, representing his permanent partial disability benefits for the period from October 15,1975, to March 1976. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, the petitioner appealed once again to the ECC, which this time sustained the GSIS. He then sought assistance from this Court in a lengthy letter where he explained his claim and bolstered it with citations of case digests reported in various issues of the Manila Daily Bulletin. Realizing his need for professional assistance, we referred him to the Citizens Legal Assistance Office, which thereafter prepared and submitted the herein petition for him. The only issue before us is whether the petitioner's ailment is permanent total or permanent partial. Permanent total disability was described by the Court in Landicho v. Workmen's Compensation Commission 1 as follows: Other authoritative comments on the coverage of the term 'permanent total disability as used in the Workmen's Compensation Act, are (a) Comments and Annotations on the Workmen's Compensation Act by Severo M. Pucan and Cornelio R. Besinga that total disability does not mean a state of absolute helplessness, but means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or a work of similar nature, that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could do; (b) Philippine Labor and Social Legislation by Justice Ruperto Martin, that 'permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of a similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any other kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could do . . .' and (c) Labor Standards and Welfare Legislation by Perfecto Fernandez and Camilo Quiason that permanent total disability means an incapacity to perform gainful work which is expected to be permanent. This status does not require a condition of complete helplessness. Nor is it affected by the performance of occasional odd jobs' (cited in Marcelino vs. Seven-up Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 47 SCRA 343).lwph1.t 97

Permanent partial disability, on the other hand, is defined as follows: A disability is partial permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee suffers a permanent partial loss of the use of any part of his body. 2 It is important to consider that the petitioner opted to retire when he was only 60 years of age although he was entitled to continue during good behavior for five more years. This fact, it is urged, should indicate that he was no longer able to cope with his work because of his illness. It is also noted that the GSIS paid him what it called his partial permanent benefits for a total of 150 days. Our attention is called to Section 2, Rule 7 of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, providing that "a total disability is permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days." In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that the description of the petitioner's ailment does not by itself prove that he has been permanently and totally disabled. He also argues that the evaluation of the nature and duration of the employee's illness is vested solely in the GSIS whose findings should be respected. Dismissing the certification made by the petitioner's attending physician, he contends that "a mere general statement by his physician that he has been rendered permanently and totally disabled by his illness is not sufficient to serve as a basis for granting him permanent and total disability benefits under Art. 192. The public respondent has apparently forgotten that in Bello v. Workmen's Compensation Commission 3 we held that "the doctor's certification as to the nature of the claimant's disability may be given credence as he normally would not make a false certification." This ruling was a reiteration of Marte v. Employees Compensation Commission, 4 where the Court said: No physician in his right mind and who is aware of the far reaching and serious effect that his statements would cause on a money claim filed with a government agency, would issue certifications indiscriminately without even minding his own interests and protection. . . .Under normal circumstances, he would not sacrifice his medical career for the sake of a lowly public school teacher. We find that this case is similar to Gonzaga v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 5 where the petitioner was forced to retire from her work as a teacher, at the age of 49, "as a direct consequence of her hypertension and ametropia," or dimness of vision. The Court, in reversing the public respondent there, held inter alia: Petitioner could not in all honesty be deemed entitled to merely partial disability benefit; because she has been forced out of work and has been rendered incapable of further pursuing her usual job which is teaching. It was not only her "ability to perform her usual task" which was impaired, and her "efficiency and competence for work as well as earning capacity" which was reduced; but ultimately, herein petitioner had to let go of her job as a teacher. She was forced to retire because her illness rendered her incapable of teaching (Landicho v. WCC, et al., supra; Marcelino v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of the Philippines, supra). Furthermore, the fact of an employee's disability is placed beyond question with the approval of the employee's optional retirement for such is authorized only when the employee is "physically incapable to render sound and efficient service" 98

under C.A. 186, as amended by Republic Act 4968 in conjunction with Memorandum Circular No. 133 of the Office of the President on October 19, 1967 (Faicol v. WCC and Republic of the Philippines, 93 SCRA 811 [1979]; Roma v. WCC and Bureau of Public Schools, 80 SCRA 170 [1977]; Romero v. WCC and Bureau of Public Schools, 77 SCRA 842 [1977]). When an employee is forced to ask for retirement ahead of schedule, not because of old age, but primarily of his weakened bodily condition due to illness contracted in the course of her employment, she should be given compensation for her inability to work during the remaining days before her scheduled retirement, aside from the benefit a received by her (Villaflor v. Republic of the Philippines, 98 SCRA 383 [1980]; Almaiz v. WCC, 85 SCRA 144 [1978]; Bello v. WCC, 80 SCRA 153 [1977]; Marcelino v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of the Philippines, supra). There is no reason to digress from this ruling. In fact, the herein petitioner's ailments are even more serious than in Gonzaga, and he has even worked longer for the government. We hold, therefore, that the petitioner is entitled to permanent total compensation benefits to be determined in accordance with Section 5, Rule XI of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation providing as follows: For contingencies which occurred before May 1, 1979, the limitation of P 12,000.00 or 5 years, whichever comes first, shall be enforced. And as the record is silent as to the petitioner's monthly salary we hereby fix the said compensation in the maximum amount of P12,000.00. We also hold that the petitioner is entitled to reimbursement for his expenses incurred for medical services, appliances and other supplies in connection with his ailment, conformably to Section 4, Rule VII of the Amended Rules on Employees' compensation. This is the least we can do for this faithful civil servant who was disabled in line of duty and deserves the recognition and assistance of a grateful government. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the public respondent is ORDERED: (1) to pay petitioner disability compensation benefits in the amount of P12,000.00; and (2) to reimburse petitioner his expenses incurred for medical services, hospitalization, medicines, appliances and other supplies, as supported by the proper receipts. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 71604 August 11, 1989 JOSE B. ATIENZA, petitioner, vs. PHILIMARE SHIPPING AND EQUIPMENT SUPPLY, TRANS OCEAN LINER (Pte) LTD., PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents. Linsangan Law Office for petitioner. Prudencio Cruz for private respondents.

event "of death of the seaman during the term of his contract, over and above the benefits for which the Philippine Government is liable under Philippine law. 9 The petitioner argues that the Standard Format prescribed only the minimum benefits and does not preclude the parties from stipulating for higher compensation. That may be true enough. But the point is that the parties in this case did not provide for such higher benefits as the parties did in the Norse case. There was no stipulation in the Crew Agreement of January 3, 1981, that the employee would be entitled to whichever greater insurance benefits were offered by either Philippine law or the foreign law; on the contrary, it was plainly provided that insurance benefits would be determined according to the NSB Standard Format then in force. The consequence is that the petitioner cannot now claim a higher award than the compensation prescribed in the said format. As We said in Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corporation v. NLRC: 10

CRUZ, J.: The facts of this case are not disputed. Even the legal issues are simple and are soon resolved. Joseph B. Atienza was engaged by Philimare Shipping and Equipment Supply, as agent for Trans Ocean Liner Pte. Ltd. of Germany, based on Singapore, to work as Third Mate on board the MV Tibati for the stipulated compensation of US$850.00 a month from January 20, 1981 to January 20, 1982. 1 The, Crew Agreement signed by the parties on January 3, 1981, provided for insurance benefits "as per NSB Standard Format" and was validated and approved by the National Seamen Board on January 14,1981. 2 On May 12, 1981, Atienza died as a result of an accident which befell him while working on the vessel in Bombay, India. 3 In due time, his father, the herein petitioner, filed a claim for death benefits computed at the rate of 36 months times the seaman's monthly salary plus ten per cent thereof in accordance with the Workmen's Compensation Law of Singapore, for a total of $30,600.00. The, private respondents, while admitting liability, contended that this was limited to only P40,000.00 under Section D(1) of the NSB Standard Format. On November 6, 1984, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration sustained the private respondent and held that the applicable law was Philippine law. 4 On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission except that it increased the award to P75,000.00 pursuant to NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71, Series of 1981. 5 In the petition before us, we are asked to reverse the public respondent on the ground that Singaporean law should have been applied in line with our ruling in Norse Management Co. v. National Seamen Board, 6 where the foreign law was held controlling because it provided for greater benefits for the claimant. For their part, the private respondents question the application of NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71, Series of 1981, which they say became effective after the seaman's death. 7 On the first issue, our ruling is that Norse is not applicable to the present petition. The, reason is that in that case, it was specifically stipulated by the parties in the Crew Agreement that "compensation shall be paid to employee in accordance with and subject to the limitations of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the Philippines or the Workmen's Insurance Law of the registry of the vessel, whichever is greater. 8 That was why the higher benefits prescribed by the foreign law were awarded. By contrast, no such stipulation appears in the Crew Agreement now under consideration. Instead, it is clearly stated therein that the insurance benefits shall be "as per NSB Standard Format," in the 99 We hold that the shipboard employment contract is controlling in this case. The contract provides that the beneficiaries of the seaman are entitled to P20,000.00 over and above the benefits' for which the Philippine Government is liable under Philippine Law. Hongkong law on workmen's compensation is not the applicable law. The, case of Norse Management Co. v. National Seaman Board, G.R. No. 54204, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 486 cannot be a precedent because it was expressly stipulated in the employment contract in that case that the workmen's compensation payable to the employee should be in accordance with Philippine Law or the Workmen's Insurance Law of the country where the vessel is registered "whichever is greater." The next issue involves the effectivity of NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71, which appears to have been retroactively applied by the NLRC in increasing the compensation from P40,000.00 The amended award was based by the POEA on NSB Memorandum Circular No. 46, which became effective in 1979. 11 The NLRC, apparently laboring under the belief that Memorandum Circular No. 71 was already effective at the time of the seaman's death on May 12, 1981, increased the death benefits to P75,000.00 as provided thereunder. The fact, though, is that the new rule became effective only in December 1981, as certified by the POEA itself, 12 or seven months after Atienza's fatal accident. On the petitioner's claim that the award should be adjusted in view of the decrease in the purchasing power of the Philippine peso, it suffices to cite the following relevant ruling of the Court in Sta. Rita and Well Run Maritime SA Ltd. v. NLRC: 13 Regarding the third contention of the petitioners, the records show that when Sta. Rita died on September 14, 1981, NSB Memorandum Circular No. 46 (Series of 1979) was the applicable law. Pursuant to this circular, in case of a seaman's death during the terms of his contract, the company shall pay his beneficiaries the amount of P30,000.00. On November 18, 1981 or more than one month after Sta. Rita's death the administrative regulations were amended to increase death compensation for seamen to P50,000.00, effective December 1, 1981. Considering that the applicable law governing death compensation for seamen at the time of Sta. Rita's death was Memorandum Circular No. 46, Series of 1979, the petitioner's liability should be limited to P30,000.00. Moreover, if manning

agents or shipping corporations secure employer's insurance to cover their liabilities for death, total disability and sickness of officers and ratings on board foreign going vessels, the extent of the coverage is based on the applicable law at the time. It would be unjust to compel them to pay benefits based on a law not yet in effect at the time the contingency occurs. WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC dated 15 July 1985 is SET ASIDE and that of the POEA is REINSTATED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

On 9 November 1966, Mansueta through another counsel, Atty. Gaspar Tagle filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, claiming that she had not consented to the filing of the motion to dismiss, not having understood its contents, that she never had intention of asking for dismissal of her claim and had not received any pecuniary benefits by reason of the said dismissal; that the said dismissal had prejudiced her interest and that of her children. The Acting Referee denied the motion for having been filed out of time. This order of denial was served on the petitioners' through their new counsel on 1 February 1967. On 6 February 1967, petitioner interposed a Petition for Review on the following grounds, namely: that the order dismissing the claim was null and void considering that the motion to dismiss dated 29 September 1966 was filed without the authority of Mansueta and her children; that the Acting Referee's order dated 29 September 1966 did not start the running of the period to file the petition for review since the same was not served on petitioners' counsel; that the Petition for Review was filed under the provisions of Section 38 of the Rules of Court which had supplemental effect under Section 2, Rule 7 of the Rules of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. This Petition for Review (or for relief) remained formally unacted upon despite the fact that the Commission in October 1971 remanded the case to its Regional Office No. 4 for further proceedings. Several years went by without any further proceedings being taken. On 29 November 1974, petitioners refiled their claim which was docketed as RO-4-WC Case No. 160991. A copy of the refiled claim was furnished to private respondent corporation which, on 14 January 1975, filed its Employer's Report of Accident or Sickness controverting petitioner's claim on grounds of "(a) lack of employer-employee relationship; (b) cause of death not service-connected; and (c) claim is timebarred." The Acting Referee then required the parties to file their respective affidavits. Only petitioner Mansueta filed her affidavit to which she attached a certification of her marriage to the deceased and the baptismal certificates of her minor children. Respondent corporation filed nothing. In his decision 2 dated 25 August 1975, the Acting Referee awarded to petitioners the sum of P5,990.40 as compensation benefits, P200.00 as burial expenses and P300.00 as attorney's fees. Not satisfied with the decision, private respondent corporation filed with the Workmen's Compensation Commission a motion for reconsideration on the ground of pendency of another, similar claim filed by petitioners. In its decision 3 dated 29 November 1975, the Workmen's Compensation Commission reversed the decision of the Acting Referee. The Commission ruled that there was no causal connection between the work of the deceased and the cause of his death, petitioners having failed to show that the deceased was incapacitated for work prior to his death; and, that the Certificate of Marriage and the Baptismal Certificates submitted by petitioners were insufficient to prove their relationship with and filiation to the deceased. Petitioners filed two (2) motions for reconsideration both of which were denied by the Secretary and the Acting Secretary of the Department of Labor, respectively. In the instant Petition for Review, the petitioners assail the decision of the Commission for not having entertained their two (2) motions for reconsideration although meritorious. In turn, respondent company urges that, under the provisions of the Labor Code, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Commission dated 29 November 1975 was filed out of time, having been filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period. It must be observed that petitioners' claim was filed under the pertinent provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act and not of the Labor Code, and that under the former Act, the reglementary period was fifteen (15) days. 100

G.R. No. L-48576 August 11, 1989 MANSUETA T. TIBULAN, MARIO TIBULAN and ULYSSES TIBULAN, petitioners, vs. HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, Acting Minister of Labor, and LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION,respondents. Romualdo M. Jubay for petitioners. Manuel C. Peralta for respondent Lusteveco. FELICIANO, J.: Petitioners here seek to set aside (a) a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission dated 29 November 1975 which reversed the Decision of the Acting Referee awarding to petitioner Mansueta Tibulan and her children Mario and Ulysses, both surnamed Tibulan, compensation benefits by reason of the death of Pedro Tibulan, as well as (b) the orders dated 19 July 1977 and 7 June 1978 of the Secretary and Acting Secretary of the Department of Labor denying petitioners' first and second Motions for Reconsideration, respectively. Pedro Tibulan started working for private respondent Luzon Stevedoring Corporation as Barge Patron of one of its barges sometime in 1930, and remained there until his death in 1965. In 1963, he began to suffer from high blood pressure, hypertension and heart ailment. On 23 December 1965, when Pedro Tibulan returned home from work, he complained to his wife of chest and stomach pains. The latter brought him to the Philippine General Hospital for treatment. Pedro died the very next day. The cause of his death was diagnosed as myocardial infarction, aortic insufficiency and hypertension. 1 On 13 September 1966, in representation of herself and her two (2) minor children, Mansueta Tibulan through her then counsel, Atty. Felizardo Moreno, filed a claim for compensation benefits under the pertinent provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428, as amended) docketed as Case No. RO-4-WC-5412. On 29 September 1966, without any authority from Mansueta, Atty. Moreno filed a motion to dismiss claiming that the filing of said motion was authorized by petitioner Mansueta and that petitioner was no longer interested in prosecuting her claim against respondent company. The Acting Referee granted said motion in his order dated 29 September 1966.

The records show that while the claim was pending before the Commission, Atty. Hermoso, petitioners' previous counsel, was appointed to the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) and at the time the decision was received in his house on 22 December 1975, he was away at Mactan Airbase serving as its Provost Court Officer. It was only on 5 January 1976, when he came back to Manila that he had learned of said decision. Consequently, he was able to file the motion for reconsideration only on 13 January 1976. In view of this excusable negligence, we believe that the period should be considered to have had started to run from 6 January 1976 and not from 22 December 1975. Under this view, the first motion for reconsideration may be regarded as filed seasonably. As is well-known, the Workmen's Compensation Act is a piece of social welfare legislation which seeks to give effect to the concept of social justice, 4 and the provisions of which should accordingly be liberally construed in favor of the employee or the claimant. 5 The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not petitioners are entitled to the compensation benefits under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. It appears that petitioners' claim was not just denied by the Commission on the ground of lack of causal connection between Pedro's death and the conditions of his work, but also for the reason that the petitioners had allegedly failed to establish their relationship to the deceased. As observed, however, petitioner Mansueta Tibulan had in fact attached to her affidavit filed with the Acting Referee several documents to support her claim, namely: a medical certificate, the baptismal certificates of petitioners Mario and Ulysses Tibulan, a certification of Mansueta's marriage to the deceased issued by the parish priest who had solemnized the marriage. Mansueta had also attached to her motion for reconsideration which she had filed with the Commission copies of the birth certificates of Mario and Ulysses Tibulan. The totality of this evidence was, in this case, quite sufficient to establish petitioners' relationship to the deceased. In any case, it is merely commonplace to note that strict observance of the technical rules of evidence is not properly demanded in Workmen's Compensation cases. 6 Moreover, respondent corporation did not present any evidence controverting petitioners' documentation. Respondent company, whatever else it may have stated in its earlier "Employer's Report of Accident and Sickness," does not dispute before this Court that Pedro Tibulan had been in its employ as Barge Patron during his lifetime. The records further show that Pedro's illness had begun in 1963 while still employed by the respondent company. Considering that the claim was filed under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, petitioners are entitled to the presumption of compensability which, under the provisions of said act, arise under the aforementioned circumstances. 7 Because Pedro Tibulan's illness is presumed to be compensable, his employer, respondent corporation, had the burden of controverting and overcoming such presumption with competent evidence showing that the deceased's illness was not in fact work-connected and had in fact not been aggravated by the conditions of his employment. We do not believe that respondent company was successful in discharging the burden of disproving the work-relatedness of Pedro Tibulan's illness. Respondent company merely argued that because the deceased was occupying a supervisory position, therefore, the cause of his death could not be directly traceable to his employment. To overcome the legal presumption of compensability, evidence must do more than merely create a doubt. 8 In the instant case, no substantial doubt was generated by respondent company's contention. Upon the other hand, the petitioners claimed that the conditions under which Pedro Tibulan had served as Barge Patron had some connection with the emergence and development of the disease which caused his death. Petitioners pointed out that the deceased had worked for respondent company for almost thirty-five (35) years, from 1930 up to his death on 24 December 1965. The 101

barge to which the deceased was assigned was being used to transport heavy cargoes up and down and around the Pasig River and had under his supervision only two (2) sailors. These conditions lead us to the inference that while the position of the deceased was not one requiring mainly manual labor, nonetheless, he could not have avoided strenuous physical activity in carrying out his duties. Certainly, the captain or patron of a cargo barge was not expected to, and would not have been allowed to, live his life behind a desk. Further, it appears that when Pedro Tibulan first joined respondent company, he was in fact in good health. Where an employee entered employment in good health and suffered an illness in the course of employment which illness he never had before said employment, he has in his favor the statutory presumption that his disease or illness is compensable. Once more, respondent corporation was unable to overturn the applicable statutory presumption of compensability and of the work-related character of Pedro Tibulan's illness. 9 Finally, since respondent company failed to submit any affidavit or counter-affidavit to the Acting Referee as required by the provisions of Department Order No. 3, it must be deemed to have renounced its right to challenge petitioners' claim and to have waived all non-jurisdictional defenses. 10 The Acting Referee's award in 1975 in favor of petitioners was clearly in order. It is difficult to understand why private respondent corporation should have felt compelled to appeal that award which came after the claim had been pending for nine (9) years; that appeal was frivolous and insubstantial. It is even more difficult to comprehend the reversal of that award by the Commission in a decision notable only for its failure to apply the simple and widely-known statutory presumption of compensation, and which compelled petitioners to come to this Court and which resulted in the further prolongation of this case. Under these circumstances, petitioners are entitled to legal interest on the amount of the original award computed from the date of rendition of that award by the Acting Referee. 11 WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is GRANTED and the Decision dated 29 November 1975 of respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission in WCC Case No. R04-160991 the Order of the Secretary of the Department of Labor dated 19 July 1977 and the Order dated 7 June 1978 by the Acting Secretary of the Department of Labor are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent Luzon Stevedoring Corporation is hereby DIRECTED to pay petitioners the award rendered by the Acting Referee on 25 August 1975 in the amount of P5,990.40 as compensation benefits and P200.00 as funeral expense, together with legal interest on these amounts computed from 25 August 1975 until full payment thereof and 10% ofthe resulting aggregate amount as attorney's fees. Costs against public and private respondents. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-62641 June 30, 1989 CASIANO MAGISTRADO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (PHILIPPINE NAVY), respondents. FERNAN, C.J.: Petitioner seeks to reverse and set aside the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission which affirmed the denial by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) of petitioner's claim for compensation benefits for permanent total disability. Petitioner Casiano Magistrado spent thirty (30) yearsof his life in the Philippine Navy first as a Serviceman and later on as Chief Petty Officer. He retired on February 21, 1979 at the age of 51 due to illness. Symptoms of his renal ailment first appeared five (5) years after his enlistment in the Navy. He experienced a burning sensation and dysuria while urinating. Later on, corn-sized stones and whitish discharges were found present in his urine. These symptoms recurred through the years and came to a point when he had to undergo nephrectomy of the right kidney. To make matters worse, a stone 0.05 cm. in diameter was detected over the lower pole of the left kidney. In 1978, on complaints of lumbar pains, frequency of urination, persistent pyria and terminal dysuria, petitioner sought confinement in the AFP Medical Center in Quezon City. Tests (KUB IVP) revealed that the stone over the lower pole of the left kidney had increased in size to about 3.0 cms. in diameter. His right kidney was no longer functioning. He was diagnosed as suffering from chronic pyelonephritis (L) with Status Post Nephrectomy (R) . Due to this malady he sought retirement from the service. He filed a claim for compensation benefits for permanent total disability with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). The same was denied on the ground that his ailment was not an occupational disease and neither was the risk of contracting the same increased by his employment condition An appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission yielded the same result for the decision of the GSIS was affirmed by the former. Hence the instant appeal, raising the following issues: I WHETHER OR NOT THE ILLNESS OF CHRONIC PYELONEPHRITIS WHICH CAUSED THE PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY OF PETITIONER, CASIANO MAGISTRADO, IS COMPENSABLE UNDER THE THEORY OF INCREASED RISK AS PROVIDED IN PD 626, AS AMENDED. II. WHETHER OR NOT SAID PETITIONER'S AILMENT IS ALSO COMPENSABLE UNDER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT (ACT 3428) CONSIDERING THAT THE ONSET OF SAID ILLNESS OCCURRED PRIOR TO JANUARY 1, 1975 BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES. 102

Petitioner alleges among others that during his stint as a serviceman in the Philippine Navy, he was assigned to some of the remotest islands of the Philippines. While stationed in the southernmost island of Tawi-Tawi to monitor the reported smuggling in the area, he and the other members of his navy group had to survive on water derived from polluted wells. They also had to bear the sweltering heat of the islands during the day due to scant vegetation and the biting cold during the night. On several occasions, his team had to be on board a vessel for weeks where the food and water supply had to be rationed. Since he was not in a position to choose his place of assignment, petitioner suffered untold hardships during his term as a serviceman. Lt. Colonel Eugenio Batalla, the attending physician of the petitioner certified that since stone diseases along geneto-urinary tract could be influenced by food and water, members of the AFP are predisposed to this because of their assignment and mission to anywhere in the Philippines or even abroad. We find these pieces of evidence sufficient to support compensability of pyelonephritis . Under P.D. No. 626 as amended, there are two ground is for the compensability of an illness, namely: [1] that the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the rules and regulations implementing said decree, with the conditions set therein satisfied; and [2] that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. Petitioner deposits his claim under the second ground, that is, the theory of increased risk wherein to establish compensability, the claimant must show proof of work connection. 1 The degree of proof required under P.D. 626 is merely substantial evidence, which means, "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 2 The claimant must show, at least, by substantial evidence that the development of the disease is brought largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job. "What the law requires is a reasonable work connection and not a direct causal relation." 3From the foregoing discussion and the evidence presented, we find sufficient ground to support compensability of pyelonephritis under P.D. No. 626. Moreover, it will be noted that petitioner's illness had its onset prior to January 1, 1975 or before the effectivity of the Labor Code. It is now well-settled that the governing law in the prosecution of a cause of action which has accrued prior to the effectivity of a new law shall be the law enforced at the time of the accrual of said cause of action." 4 Symptoms of petitioner's pyelonephritis manifested themselves as early as 1954. Since the Workmen's Compensation Law was then in full force and effect then, it should govern the present case based on the principle that "rights accrued and vested while a statute was in force ordinarily survive its repeal." 5 It is the finding of respondent ECC itself that the ailment of the petitioner supervened during his employment with the Philippine Navy. "Under the WCA when there is a showing that the ailment was contracted in the course of his employment, the presumption of compensability arises and the burden of proof is shifted to the employer to prove by substantial evidence that the illness did not arise from such employment or was at least aggravated by it." 6Respondent GSIS did not rebut the presumption that petitioner's claim is compensable. 7 Neither is the allegation of public respondent that the action has prescribed, tenable. In Corales v. ECC, L-44063, February 27, 1979, the Supreme Court held:

. . . Article 292 of the New Labor Code which requires that workmen's compensation claims accruing prior to the New Labor Code shall be filed with the appropriate regional offices of the Department of Labor not later than March 31, 1975 otherwise they shall forever be barred does not apply to petitioner who filed his claim on August 4, 1975 with GSIS: because we have repeatedly held that the prescriptive period for claims which accrued under the Workmen's Compensation Act as amended is ten (10) years, it being a right founded on statute. Petitioner's right accrued as early as September 1965 and hence is a vested right. It is not disputed that the petitioner's illness supervened in the course of his service in the Philippine Navy. His illness manifested itself in 1954 and gradually recurred through the years until his retirement. Such incontrovertible facts call for the application of the presumption that the illness arose out of or was at least aggravated by the nature of the decedent's employment, hence, compensable. As held in the case of Cenabe v. ECC, 97 SCRA 338, "to deny petitioner, who had actually served the government for at least 25 years what is rightfully due him under the facts obtaining, is to emasculate the very objective of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amendeda social legislation designed to effectuate and implement the social justice guarantee of the Constitution." In the case at bar the petitioner had served the government for at least 30 years under such working conditions which could easily disturb the equilibrium of his bodily defenses against diseases. To deny him what is due him would be blatantly unfair and unjust. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed and respondent ECC is hereby ordered to pay petitioner the benefits allowed him by the Workmen's Compensation Law. SO ORDERED.

compelled him to seek medical attention at the Baguio General Hospital where he was confined from 6 to 14 May 1981 and from 17 to 25 June 1981. Dr. Servando Liban, attending physician of Severino T. Sante at the said hospital, diagnosed the latter's illness as amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. 1 Severino Sante's condition continued to deteriorate. He was then forced to retire from his employment on 1 October 1981. He thereafter filed a claim for disability benefits under the Labor Code as amended by P.D. No. 626. The Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") however denied his claim upon the ground that his illness was not among those listed under the Regulations of the Workmen's Compensation Commission as an occupational disease, and that he had failed to present evidence showing that the conditions under which he worked as a driver of the Ministry of Public Works and Highways had increased the risk of his contracting that ailment. Upon appeal by Severino Sante, the Employees' Compensation Commission ("ECC") affirmed the decision of the GSIS. In an order dated 6 November 1985, the ECC held that the GSIS had correctly ruled that Severino Sante's illness, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, was not an occupational disease in respect of his particular job as a driver. The ECC went on to say that since the illness was not listed as an occupational disease, claimant Severino Sante must show proof that the risk of contracting that illness had been increased by his working conditions. The ECC noted that the claimant had not submitted any such proof. Accordingly, the ECC remanded the records of the case back to the GSIS for reception of additional evidence from claimant Sante and thereafter for re-evaluation by GSIS and determination of whether the illness of Sante was a compensable one under the theory of aggravation of risk Meantime, however, Severino died on 23 February 1984. Petitioner Dionisia Sante picked up and continued to prosecute Severino's claim. On 15 February 1988, petitioner Dionisia Sante wrote to the GSIS requesting the latter to reconsider its stand on the basis of the Supreme Court decision in Mercado, Jr. vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, 2 Which held according to petitioner, that when the cause of the disease is unknown, there is no duty to prove the causal link between the deceased's working conditions and the ailment. GSIS, in a letter dated 24 March 1988, advised petitioner that her request could not be acted upon in view of her failure to present factual and medical evidence to show a link between the disease and the decedent's working conditions. On 12 April 1988, petitioner wrote to the ECC again requesting re-evaluation of her earlier claim and once more invoking Mercado, Jr. vs. Employees' Compensation Commission. The ECC referred petitioner's letter to the GSIS. Petitioner, however, instead of presenting additional evidence before the GSIS, filed the present Petition for Certiorari. The sole issue presented by this case is whether or not petitioner has a duty to establish facts and circumstances showing that her late husband's illness had been caused or aggravated by the conditions under which he had worked as a driver of the Ministry of Public Works and Highways, even though the cause of his disease was still unknown. Petitioner stresses that the cause of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis is not known to medical science and quotes the following material: Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis implies muscle wasting combined with signs of damage to the cortico-spinal tracts in the lateral columns of the spinal cord. It is common for wasting of the arms to be followed by spasticity of the legs, but rarely the latter may be present feature (sic). There is no sensory loss, which is a point of distinction from many other causes of progressive spastic paraparesis .... . . . The speed of deterioration varies greatly but few patients have more than three years from the first symptom, bulbar paralysis being obviously the most dangerous as it immediately threatens life. No cause has been found or 103

G.R. No. L-84415 June 29, 1989 DIONISIA C. SANTE, in representation of her deceased husband SEVERINO T. SANTE, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent. FELICIANO, J.: Severino T. Sante, husband of petitioner Dionisia C. Sante, was, before his death on 23 February 1984, a driver of the then Ministry of Public Works and Highways, stationed in San Fernando, La Union. Severino Sante started his government service as a mechanic/helper in July 1962. Sometime in 1979, Severino Sante experienced the physical weakening of his right hand, which condition gradually progressed to include his right upper arm. Two years later, he experienced difficulty in breathing and speaking, and algo dysphagia or difficulty in swallowing. This condition

reasonably conjectured .... (Matthews and Miller, Diseases of the Nervous System, Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications, 1975, p. 286. . . . The disease runs a slow course, but makes steady progress. It lasts an average of 3-4 years and ends lethally. The cause of the disease is unknown; there are some indications that it is of infectious nature. (Mozorov and Romasanko, Neuropathology and Psychiatry, Moscow: Peace Publishers, p. 95.) Petitioner, however, invokes the decision of this Court in Mercado, Jr. vs. Employees' Compensation Commission: . . . The point is that it is grossly inequitable to require as a condition for an award of compensation that the claimant demonstrate that his ailment-the cause or origin of which is unknown to and undetermined even by medical science-was, in fact caused or the risk of contracting the same enhanced by his working conditions. Plainly, the condition would be an impossible one, especially considering that said claimant is most probably not even conversant with the intricacies of medical science and the claimant invariably bereft of the material resources to employ medical experts to demonstrate the connection between the cause and the disease. Considering the liberal character of the employment compensation schemes the impossible condition should be deemed as not having been imposed. (139 SCRA, pp. 275-276.) Petitioner also relies upon the case of Flaviano Nemaria v. Employees' Compensation Commission and Government Service Insurance System, 3 where this Court stated: Thus the requirement that the disease was caused or aggravated by the employment or work applies only to an illness where the cause can be determined or proved. Where the cause is unknown or cannot be ascertained, no duty to prove the link exists. For certainly, the law does not demand an impossibility. We must note at once that Mercado, Jr. and Nemaria, to the extent they dispense with proof of workconnection as a requirement for payment of compensation, have been reversed and set aside by this Court in the recent case ofRaro v. Employees' Compensation Commission . 4 The claimant in Raro was a clerk in the Bureau of Mines and Geosciences. She had been diagnosed as suffering from a brain tumor which impaired her memory, sense of time, vision and reasoning power. Her claim for compensation was denied by the GSIS, a denial which was affirmed by the ECC Petitioner there argued that, on the basis of the same doctrine embodied in Mercado Jr. and Nemaria, since medical science had not yet positively Identified the causes of various types of cancer, there was no obligation on the part of the claimant for disability benefits to prove that the risk of contracting those types of cancer had been aggravated by the conditions of employment of petitioner. The Supreme Court in Raro ruled that: The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing-that the illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working condition. To say that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal 104

requirement that proof must be adduced. The existence of proof cannot be presumed. xxx xxx xxx To understand why the 'presumption of compensability together with the host of decisions interpreting the 'arising out of and in the course of employment' provision of the defunct law has been stricken from the present law, one has to go into the distinctions between the old workmen's compensation law and the present scheme. On January 1, 1975, the Workmen's Compensation Act was replaced by a novel scheme under the new Labor Code. The new law discarded, among others, the concepts of 'presumption of compensability' and 'aggravation' and substituted a system based on security principles. The present system is also administered by social insurance agencies-the Government Service Insurance System and Social Security System-under the Employees' Compensation Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmens compensation and the employee's right to receive separation for work-connected death or disability. (Sulit v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483 [1980]; Armena v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851 [1983]; Erese v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 138 SCRA 192 [1985]; De Jesus v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92 [1986]; Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al., G.R. No. 65680, May 11, 1988). Instead of an adversarial contest by the worker or his family against the employer, we now have a social insurance scheme where regular premiums are paid by employers to a trust fund and claims are paid from the trust fund to those who can prove entitlement. xxx xxx xxx The non-adversarial nature of the employees compensation proceedings is crucial to an understanding of the present scheme. There is a widespread misconception that the poor employee is still arrayed against the might and power of his rich corporate employer. Hence, he must be given all kinds of favorable presumptions. This is fallacious. It is now the trust fired and not the employer which suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law. The employer joins its employees in trying to have their claims approved. The employer is spared the problem of proving a negative proposition that the disease was not caused by employment. It is a government institution which protects the stability and integrity of the State Insurance Fund against the payment of non-compensable claims. The employee, this time assisted by his employer, is required to prove a positive proposition, that the risk of controlling the disease is increased by the working conditions. The social insurance aspect of the present law is the other important feature which distinguishes it from the old and familiar system. Employees' compensation is based on social security principles. All covered employers throughout the country are required by law to contribute fixed and regular premiums or contributions to a trust fund for their employees. Benefits are

paid from this trust fund At the time the amount of contributions was being fixed, actuarial studies were undertaken. The actuarially determined number of workers who would probably file claims within any given year is important in insuring the stability of the trust fund and making certain that the system can pay benefits when due to all who are entitled and in the increased amounts fixed by law. We have no actuarial expertise in the Court. If diseases not intended by the law to be compensated are inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is endangered. Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers and their families look for compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases, and deaths occur. As earlier stated, if increased contributions or premiums must be paid in order to give benefits to those who are now excluded, it is Congress which should amend the law after proper actuarial studies. This Court cannot engage in judicial legislation on such a complex subject with such far reaching implications. We trust that the public respondent and the Social Security System are continually evaluating the actuarial soundness of the trust funds they administer: In this way, more types of cancers and other excluded diseases may be included in the list of covered occupational diseases. Or legislation may be recommended to Congress either increasing the contribution rates of employers, increasing benefit payments, or making it easier to prove entitlement. We regret that these are beyond the powers of this Court to accomplish. For the guidance of the administrative agencies and practicing lawyers concerned, this decision expressly supersedes the decisions in Panotes v. Employees' Compensation Commission (128 SCRA 473 [1984]); Mercado v. Employees' Compensation Commission (127 SCRA 664 [1984]); Ovenson v. Employees' Compensation Commission (156 SCRA 21 [1987]); Nemaria v. Employees' Compensation Commission (155 SCRA 166 [1987]) and other cases with conclusions different from those stated above. (Emphasis supplied) Since amyotrophic lateral sclerosis is not included in the of occupational diseases which forms part of the present Amended Rules of the ECC, and because petitioner did not present to the GSIS additional evidence showing that the deceased Severino Sante's working conditions as a driver at the Ministry of Public Works and Highways had aggravated the risk of contracting that illness, we must regretfully deny petitioner's claim. We agree, however, with the Solicitor General that petitioner should be given another opportunity to present whatever evidence she may have to show work-connection or work-aggravation. It will be seen that while Raro held that under the law as it stands today, the claimant must prove a positive thing-that is, that the illness was caused by the conditions of employment or that the risk of contracting such ailment was increased by such working condition, the court in Raro did not require that work-causation or work-connection be proved by direct evidence. We believe that what the court in Raro required is that a claimant must submit such proof as would constitute a reasonable basis for concluding either that the conditions of employment of the claimant caused the ailment or that such working conditions had aggravated the risk of contracting that ailment. What kind and quantum of evidence would constitute an adequate basis for a reasonable man (not necessarily a medical scientist) to reach one or the other conclusion, can obviously be determined only on a case-to-case basis. That evidence must, however, be real and substantial, and not merely apparent; for the duty to 105

prove work-causation or work-aggravation imposed by existing law is real (and this is the thrust of Raro) not merely apparent. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED and the Order of the Employees' Compensation Commission dated 6 November 1985 is hereby AFFIRMED. This decision is without prejudice to the right of petitioner to present additional evidence to prove the work-connected character of the illness of her late husband. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-51543 June 6, 1989 EMILIA VDA. DE INGUILLO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and the GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Ministry of Education and Culture), respondents. Teonarde V. Inguillo for petitioner. The Government Corporate Counsel for respondent GSIS. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: A review is sought herein of the Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) affirming that of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) denying the claim for death benefits filed by the widow of a public school janitor, who died of cancer of the esophagus and pneumonia. Petitioner's husband, the late Enrique V. Inguillo, during his lifetime, worked as a janitor at the E. Jacinto Elementary School in Tondo, Manila. He was in the government service for thirty-one (31) years. From 24 February to 5 June 1978, he was confined at the Veteran's Memorial Hospital on "complaints of difficulty in swallowing of food, solid and liquid, accompanied by chest pains difficulty of breathing, fever and productive cough." He died on 20 June 1978, at the age of 52, the cause of death being attributed to "Terminal malignancy, Poorly differentiated Esophageal Edenocarcinoma with Bone and Cervical Metastasis, Pneumonia" (Certificate of Death, Annex "A", Petition). The surviving spouse, Emilia Inguillo, filed a claim for death benefits with the GSIS. The claim was denied on the ground that the cause of death, cancer of the esophagus, is not an occupational disease. A motion for reconsideration of the GSIS decision having been denied, claimant-petitioner appealed to respondent ECC. On 9 August 1979 respondent ECC affirmed the GSIS denial and dismissed petitioner's claim.

Hence, this petition for review. Petitioner's position is anchored on the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, particularly, on the rule on controversion, the presumption of compensability, and the principle of aggravation. Considering, however, that the deceased was confined in the hospital from 24 February 1978 to 5 June 1978, and that he later died on 20 June 1978, and absent any evidence as to when his ailment was contracted, it is the new Labor Code that becomes the governing law. As specifically provided in Article 208 of said Code, its provisions cover "injury, sickness, disability or death occurring on or after January 1, 1975." The recent case of Rosales vs. ECC (G.R. No. 46443, June 28, 1988) implemented that provision when it held that "in workmen's compensation cases, the governing law is determined by the date on which the claimant contracted his illness." The concepts relied on by petitioner under the former Workmen's Compensation Act, therefore, have ceased to apply, having been expressly discarded under the compensation scheme in the new Labor Code (Sarmiento vs. ECC, et al., G.R. No. 65680, May 11, 1988). We come now to the primary issue, that is, whether or not the death of petitioner's husband is compensable under the Labor Code. Article 167(l) of the Labor Code defines compensable "sickness" thus: (l) 'Sickness' means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is empowered to determine and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment (PD 1368, May 1, 1978) Section l(b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation further amplifies: (b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex 'A' of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. Definitely, "esophageal edenocarcinoma with bone and cervical metastasis" can not be considered as an occupational disease since it is not one of those listed under Annex "A' of the mentioned Rules. In the recent case of Raro vs. Employees' Compensation Commission (G.R. No. 58445, April 27, 1989), it was held that cancer ailments, except for a specified few, are not compensable. It is a disease that strikes people in general. The nature of a person's employment appears to have no relevance. In Navalta vs. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No. 46684, April 27, 1988), this Court further elucidated that unless it be shown that a particular form of cancer is caused by specific working conditions (e.g. chemical fumes, nuclear radiation, asbestos dust, etc.) we can not conclude that it was the employment which increased the risk of contracting the disease. We note, however, that respondent ECC failed to adequately take into consideration that there was another cause of death, which was "pneumonia." Under the same Annex "A" of the Amended Rules 106

on Employees' Compensation, pneumonia is a qualifiedly occupational disease "under all the following conditions:" (a) There must be an honest and definite history of wetting and chilling during the course of employment, also industrial injury to the chest wall with or without rib fracture, or inhalation of noxious gases, fumes and other deleterious substances in the place of work. (b) There must be a direct connection between the offending agent or event and the worker's illness. (c) The signs of consolidation should appear soon (within a few hours) and the symptoms of initial chilling and fever should at least be twenty-four (24) hours after the injury. (d) The patient must present one of the following findings within a few days of the accident: (1) Severe chill and fever. (2) Headache and pain, agonizing in character in the side. (3) Short, dry painful cough with blood-tinged expectoration. (4) Physical signs of consolidation with fine rales (ECC Resolution No. 432 dated July 20, 1988). Noteworthy is the fact that the decedent's complaint of "difficulty in swallowing of food, solid and liquid" was accompanied by "chest pains, difficulty of breathing, fever and productive cough." The latter are clearly some of the above-specified symptoms of pneumonia, which by itself can also be a killer disease (Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, 8th ed., pp. 802-804). Further, a review of the deceased's work activities, as janitor, will show that they included the regular use of "deleterious substances" such as muriatic acid, the fumes from which are inhaled when used in cleaning and clearing of toilet bowls and unclogging of toilet pipes and plumbing connections. The deceased also performed other varied manual work such as sweeping, scrubbing and mopping school corridors, with the resultant inhalation of a lot of dust, lifting heavy objects, painting classrooms, preparing seats for pupils during school programs, as well as going to and from his place of work thus exposing him to occasional "wetting and chilling" from downpours and rains. The combination of all these, coupled with thefact that the decedent was working in Tondo, a depressed and congested area characterized by unsanitary conditions and heavy pollution, must have lowered his resistance to fight the microbes causative of pneumonia. The risk of contracting the said disease, therefore, was increased by his working conditions, thereby satisfying an additional condition for compensability. While, concededly, "all" of the qualifying conditions to consider pneumonia compensable do not concur, there is substantial compliance therewith, added to the fact that punctilious adherence to stringent technical rules may be relaxed in the interest of the working man, who has less in life, and in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor (Acosta vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, L-55464, November 12, 1981, 109 SCRA 209).

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED, and public respondents are hereby ordered to pay petitioner and/or her heirs the proper benefits for the death of Enrique V. Inguillo, plus attorney's fees of ten (10%) percent of the amount recoverable. No costs. SO ORDERED.

The logbook of the vessel for September 1, 1984 contains the following entry made by Peralta himself, regarding a fight between Singian and another member of the crew: That at 2130 Hrs. Romeo Singian creating trouble towards Wilfredo Robles hitting him on face and was immediately pacified by Wilfredo Brosas, messman and Catalino Gavilla, 2nd Mate, That at about 2200 Hrs. I the Master Josefino Peralta had called the attention of both Singian and Robles but R. Singian turned down my order to talk to me and to have it peacify (sic). I still calmly decided that he (R. Singian) was just drunk so I did not give much weigh (sic) on that matter. (Exh. B, p. 30, Rollo.) The logbook for September 14, 1984, the date when Singian disembarked from the vessel, contains the following entry made by Peralta also: That I, The Master, J. Peralta have noticed/observed for the past 4 days Ch. Eng. Singian was always under the influence of liquor. That he leaves during the day and return on board in the evening. He was always drunk without considering all his duties on board the vessel. That I have called his attention regarding this matter but to my dismay that I have decided to repatriate him to Manila with a cause of insubordination, drunkness (sic), but I fear he will create again trouble and fearing lost (sic) of life to crew and myself. (Exh. C, p. 31, Rollo.) The seaman's certificate (Annex D) which was handed to Singian by Peralta before Singian disembarked at Sluiskil, Holland, moments before the ship lifted anchor and headed for Bombay, India, shows the following entries therein: 1. that Singian embarked on March 13, 1984 and disembarked on September 14, 1984; 2. that his discharge was "with cause;" and 3. that he was "repatriated with cause." The POEA Administrator found that: ... complainant was not informed of the reasons for his dismissal before or at the time he was disembarked; that instead, the Master deceived him into believing that he was merely being transferred to another vessel by showing him a telex. This is established by the letters of Vidad and Domingo and by the statement in the Master's report to the effect that complainant was repatriated 'secretly.' It should be noted that Vidad and Domingo never retracted the portion of their letters regarding the fakeness of the telex. It cannot be overemphasized that the dismissal of an employee, in this case, a seaman, is no trifling matter; that the date, time and circumstances of the act/acts claimed to constitute just causes for the dismissal should be stated; that the seaman should be informed of the cause/s for his dismissal, and given a chance to be heard; and that finally, the dismissal should be in accordance with the 107

G.R. No. 84712 May 15, 1989 SEAHORSE MARITIME CORPORATION and SEAHORSE SHIPPING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION and ROMEO C. SINGIAN, respondents. Manuel T. Collado for petitioners. Merito R. Fernandez for private respondent. GRINO-AQUINO, J.: The petitioner seeks a review of the decision of the NLRC in POEA Case No. (M) 84-12-1099, entitled "Romeo C. Singian vs. Seahorse Maritime Corporation and/or Seahorse Shipping Corporation, and Josefino P. Peralta," affirming that of the POEA which found that the complainant Romeo C. Singian was illegally dismissed as Chief Engineer of the vessel M/V "UNAMONTE" belonging to the petitioner, SEAHORSE MARITIME CORPORATION, and held both the shipowner and its manning agent, petitioner SEAHORSE SHIPPING CORPORATION, solidarily liable to pay Singian's unpaid salary for the half-month period of September 1 to 14, 1984, as well as his sales for the unexpired portion of his one-year employment contract. The only issue in this case is whether or not Singian was illegally dismissed without cause and without due process. The reasons stated by the master of the vessel, Josefino Peralta, for dismissing Singian and repatriating him were: 1. Being always under the influence of liquor/drunkenness; 2. Leaving the vessel during the day and returning only at night; repeatedly leaving the vessel even during working hours; 3. Insubordination; disobeying the Master when the Master ordered him to discuss the incident when he hit Robles; 4. Creating trouble by hitting a fellow crewmember (Robles). (p. 61, Rollo.)

terms and conditions of the POEA Standard Format and the law and jurisprudence on the matter. (p. 61, Rollo.) The POEA concluded that Singian was dismissed without due process (Annex L) or, as found by the NLRC, "unceremoniously" (Annex N). Singian was not informed of the cause or causes of his dismissal. He was not investigated nor given a chance to air his side. To top it all, his dismissal was shrouded in secrecy and executed, through deceit. A fake telex prepared by the Dutch representative of the shipowner was shown by Peralta to Singian to make him believe that he was being called home for reassignment to another vessel, but the truth was that no such summons had been received from the home office. The Seaman's Certificate that Peralta gave Singian did not specify the cause of his discharge. The manner of dismissing Singian violated Article 277, Sec. 33(b) of the Labor Code which provides: (b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected against dismiss except for a just or authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on the employer. The Secretary of Labor and Employment may suspend the effects of the termination pending resolution of the dispute in the event of a prima facie finding by the appropriate official of the Department of Labor and Employment before whom such dispute is pending that the termination may cause a serious labor dispute or is in implementation of a mass lay-off. However, the causes of Singian's dismiss were not seriously controverted. The entries in the logbook of the vessel regarding the fight between Singian and Robles on September 1, 1984, as recorded by Peralta, showed that Singian was given to drunkenness, violent temper and insubordination. After his fight with Robles, he ignored Peralta's invitation "to talk to me and to have it peacify" (sic). (p. 30, Rollo.) The master's charge, that Singian often neglected his duties in the vessel by absenting himself all day, and returning to the ship drunk at night, was not fabricated. They were not denied by Singian. Singian's companions signed an affidavit attesting to the truth of the master's charges against Singian (Annex E, p. 33, Rollo). Although they apologized to Singian for having signed the statement, none of them alleged that the charges were trumped-up. One of them, R. Domingo, indirectly admitted the truth of the charges when he opined that they were not sufficient cause for Singian's dismissal. In his letter to Singian, he said: ... Ang nakalagay sa affidavit ay sinasabing alis ka daw ng alis sa barko arawgabi at hindi mo daw asikaso and Engine Department. Unbecoming ka daw. 108

Naisip ko nga ay mababaw na dahilan ito para ikaw ay pauwiin. Wala namang masama kung ikaw man ay lumabas ng lumabas, natural lang sa marino ang lumabas, isa pa ay wala namang problema sa makina kahit ikaw ay lumabas. Wala naman tayong bad record o trouble sa Engine room, anytime na kailangan nila ang makina ay ready tayo, di ba? Kaya malabo ang ibinibintang sa iyo ni Capt. Peralta. lyon nga ang affidavit na pinapirmahan rin Capt. Peralta sa amin, sabi nila Chief Mate ay non-sense daw iyon at hindi sapat para pauwiin ang isang tao. (p. 3, Exh. B. Singian's Comment.) Serious misconduct in the form of drunkenness and disorderly and violent behavior, habitual neglect of duty, and insubordination or willful disobedience of the lawful orders of his superior officer, are just causes for the dismissal of an employee (Art. 282, Labor Code). The dismissal of Singian for those causes was lawful. But the very nature of those causes impelled Peralta to resort to duplicity in discharging Singian from his vessel. He feared that Singian might react violently if informed to his face that he was being discharged for cause. That was what Capt. Peralta meant when he wrote in the logbook: "I fear he will create again trouble and fearing lost (sic) of life to crew and myself' (Exh. C, p. 31, Rollo). Since his dismissal was for just causes, Singian is not entitled to separation pay or the salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract. He is entitled only to his unpaid salary for September I to 15,1984. However, the NLRC and the POEA were correct in finding that Singian's dismissal was effected without due process, i.e., without written notice to him of the charges against him and without a formal investigation where he could have defended himself personally or through a representative. For failure to comply with the requirements of due process in terminating Singian's services, the petitioners are solidarily liable to indemnify him in the sum of P1,000 as damages, conformably with the decision of this Court in Wenphil Corporation vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 80587, Feb. 8,1989 where We ruled: ... Where the private respondent, who appears to be of violent temper, caused trouble during office hours and even defied his superiors as they tried to pacify him, he should not be rewarded with re-employment and back wages. It may encourage him to do even worse and will render a mockery of the rules of discipline that employees are required to observe. Under the circumstances, the dismissal of the private respondent for just cause should be maintained. He has no right to return to his former employment. However, the petitioner must nevertheless be held to account for failure to extend to private respondent his right to an investigation before causing his dismissal. The rule is explicit as above discussed. The dismissal of an employee must be for just or authorized cause and after due process.Petitioner committed an infraction of the second requirement. Thus, it must be imposed a sanction for its failure to give a formal notice and conduct an investigation as required by law before dismissing petitioner from employment. Consider the circumstances of this case petitioner must indemnify the private respondent the amount of P1,000.00, the measure of this award depends on the facts of each case and the gravity of the omission committed by the employer. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of the NLRC ordering the petitioners to pay Singian US$7,150.00 as the salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract

and attorney's fees, is set aside. Petitioners are ordered to pay solidarily to private respondent Romeo Singian his unpaid salary of US$800 for the period of September 1-14, 1984 and an indemnity of P1,000. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

2. Whether the presumption of compensability is absolutely inapplicable under the present compensation laws when a disease is not listed as occupational disease. (p. 17, Rollo) The key argument of the petitioner is based on the fact that medical science cannot, as yet, positively identify the causes of various types of cancer. It is a disease that strikes people in general. The nature of a person's employment appears to have no relevance. Cancer can strike a lowly paid laborer or a highly paid executive or one who works on land, in water, or in the bowels of the earth. It makes the difference whether the victim is employed or unemployed, a white collar employee or a blue collar worker, a housekeeper, an urban dweller or a resident of a rural area. It is not also correct to say that all cancers are not compensable. The list of occupational diseases prepared by the Commission includes some cancers as compensable, namely Occupational Diseases Nature of Employment xxx xxx xxx xxx 16. Cancer of stomach and other Woodworkers, wood products lymphatic and blood forming vessels; industry carpenters, nasal cavity and sinuses and employees in pulp and paper mills and plywood mills. 17. Cancer of the lungs, liver Vinyl chloride workers, and brain plastic workers. (Annex A, Amended Rules on Employees Compensation) The petitioner questions the above listing. We see no arbitrariness in the Commission's allowing vinyl chloride workers or plastic workers to be compensated for brain cancer. There are certain cancers which are reasonably considered as strongly induced by specific causes. Heavy doses of radiation as in Chernobyl, USSR, cigarette smoke over a long period for lung cancer, certain chemicals for specific cancers, and asbestos dust, among others, are generally accepted as increasing the risks of contracting specific cancers. What the law requires for others is proof. The first thing that stands in the way of the petition is the law itself. Presidential Decree No. 422, as amended, the Labor Code of the Philippines defines "sickness" as follows: ART. 167. Definition of Terms. As used in this Title unless the context indicates otherwise: xxx xxx xxx

G.R. No. L-58445 April 27, 1989 ZAIDA G. RARO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences), respondents. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: Jurisprudence on the compensability of cancer ailments has of late become a source of confusion among the claimants and the government agencies enforcing the employees' compensation law. The strongly lingering influence of the principles of 94 presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" found in the defunct Workmen's Compensation Act but expressly discarded under the present compensation scheme has led to conflict and inconsistency in employees' compensation decisions. The problem is attributable to the inherent difficulty in applying the new principle of "proof of increased risk." There are two approaches to a solution in cases where it cannot be proved that the risk of contracting an illness not listed as an occupational disease was increased by the claimant's working conditions. The one espoused by the petitioner insists that if a claimant cannot prove the necessary work connection because the causes of the disease are still unknown, it must be presumed that working conditions increased the risk of contracting the ailment. On the other hand, the respondents state that if there is no proof of the required work connection, the disease is not compensable because the law says so. The petitioner states that she was in perfect health when employed as a clerk by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences at its Daet, Camarines Norte regional office on March 17, 1975. About four years later, she began suffering from severe and recurrent headaches coupled with blurring of vision. Forced to take sick leaves every now and then, she sought medical treatment in Manila. She was then a Mining Recorder in the Bureau. The petitioner was diagnosed at the Makati Medical Center to be suffering from brain tumor. By that time, her memory, sense of time, vision, and reasoning power had been lost. A claim for disability benefits filed by her husband with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) was denied. A motion for reconsideration was similarly denied. An appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission resulted in the Commission's affirming the GSIS decision. The following issues are raised in this petition: 1. Whether brain tumor which causes are unknown but contracted during employment is compensable under the present compensation laws.

(1) Sickness means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is by working conditions. For this purpose, the Co on is empowered to determine and approve 109

occupational and work- related illnesses that may be considered compensable sable based on hazards of employment. (PD 1368, May 1, 1978). Section 1 (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation clearly defines who are entitled. It provides: SECTION 1. xxx xxx xxx (b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease under Annex A of these rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increase by the working conditions . (Emphasis supplied) The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing the illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. To say that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal requirement that proof must be adduced. The existence of otherwise non-existent proof cannot be presumed . In Navalta v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No. 46684, April 27, 1988) this Court recognized the fact that cancer is a disease of still unknown origin which strikes; people in all walks of life, employed or unemployed. Unless it be shown that a particular form of cancer is caused by specific working conditions (e. g. chemical fumes, nuclear radiation, asbestos dust, etc.) we cannot conclude that it was the employment which increased the risk of contracting the disease . To understand why the "Presumption of compensability" together with the host of decisions interpreting the "arising out of and in the course of employment" provision of the defunct law has been stricken from the present law, one has to go into the distinctions between the old workmen's compensation law and the present scheme. On January 1, 1975, the Workmen's Compensation Act was replaced by a novel scheme under the new Labor Code. The new law discarded, among others, the concepts of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" and substituted a system based on social security principles. The present system is also administered by social insurance agencies the Government Service Insurance System and Social Security System under the Employees' Compensation Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's right to receive reparation for work- connected death or disability. (Sulit v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483 [1980]; Armena v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851 [1983]; Erese v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 138 SCRA 192 [1985]; De Jesus v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92 [1986]; Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al., GR No. 65680, May 11, 1988). Instead of an adversarial contest by the worker or his family against the employer, we now have a social insurance scheme where regular premiums are paid by employers to a trust fund and claims are paid from the trust fund to those who can prove entitlement.

In Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission (supra), we affirmed the validity of the new law by explaining the present system as follows: We cannot give serious consideration to the petitioner's attack against the constitutionality of the new law on employee's compensation. It must be noted that the petitioner filed his claim under the provisions of this same law. It was only when his claim was rejected that he now questions the constitutionality of this law on appeal by certiorari. The Court has recognized the validity of the present law and has granted and rejected claims according to its provisions. We find in it no infringement of the worker's constitutional rights. xxx xxx xxx The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of employers based on the salaries of their employees. The injured worker does not have to litigate his right to compensation. No employer opposes his claim There is no notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a claim with a new neutral Employees' Compensation Commission which then determines on the basis of the employee's supporting papers and medical evidence whether or not compensation may be paid. The payment of benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration is low. The amount of death benefits has also been doubled. On the other hand, the employer's duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to the scheme. It does not look for insurance companies to meet sudden demands for compensation payments or set up its own fund to meet these contingencies. It does not have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims. The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's compensation. The Commission administers and settles claims from a fired under its exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the compensation process and it has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. The open ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits. Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on presumption of compensability and controversion cease to have importance. The lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which called for equalization through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now absent. xxx xxx xxx The petitioner's challenge is really against the desirability of the new law. There is no serious attempt to assail it on constitutional grounds.

110

The wisdom of the present scheme of workmen's compensation is a matter that should be addressed to the President and Congress, not to this Court. Whether or not the former workmen's compensation program with its presumptions, controversions, adversarial procedures, and levels of payment is preferable to the present scheme must be decided by the political departments. The present law was enacted in the belief that it better complies with the mandate on social justice and is more advantageous to the greater number of working men and women. Until Congress and the President decide to improve or amend the law, our duty is to apply it. (at pp. 4, 5, and 6) The non-adversarial nature of employees' compensation proceedings is crucial to an understanding of the present scheme. There is a widespread misconception that the poor employee is still arrayed against the might and power of his rich corporate employer. Hence, he must be given all kinds of favorable presumptions. This is fallacious. It is now the trust fund and not the employer which suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law. The employer joins its employees in trying to have their claims approved. The employer is spared the problem of proving a negative proposition that the disease was not caused by employment. It is a government institution which protects the stability and integrity of the State Insurance Fund against the payment of noncompensable claims. The employee, this time assisted by his employer, is required to prove a positive proposition, that the risk of contracting the is increased by working conditions. The social insurance aspect of the present law is the other important feature which distinguishes it from the old and familiar system. Employees' compensation is based on social security principles. All covered employers throughout the country are required by law to contribute fixed and regular premiums or contributions to a trust fund for their employees. Benefits are paid from this trust fund. At the time the amount of contributions was being fixed, actuarial studies were undertaken. The actuarially determined number of workers who would probably file claims within any given year is important in insuring the stability of the said fund and making certain that the system can pay benefits when due to all who are entitled and in the increased amounts fixed by law. We have no actuarial expertise in this Court. If diseases not intended by the law to be compensated are inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is endangered. Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to winch the tens of millions of workers and their families look for compensation whenever covered accidents, salary and deaths occur. As earlier stated, if increased contributions or premiums must be paid in order to give benefits to those who are now excluded, it is Congress which should amend the law after proper actuarial studies. This Court cannot engage in judicial legislation on such a complex subject with such far reaching implications. We trust that the public respondents and the Social Security System are continually evaluating the actuarial soundness of the trust funds they administer. In this way, more types of cancers and other excluded diseases may be included in the list of covered occupational diseases. Or legislation may be recommended to Congress either increasing the contribution rates of employers, increasing benefit payments, or making it easier to prove entitlement. We regret that these are beyond the powers of this Court to accomplish. For the guidance of the administrative agencies and practising lawyers concerned, this decision expressly supersedes the decisions in Panotes v. Employees' Compensation Commission [128 SCRA 473 (1984)]; Mercado v. Employees' Compensation Commission [127 SCRA 664 (1984)]; Ovenson v. Employees' Compensation Commission [156 SCRA 21 (1987)]; Nemaria v. 111

Employees' Compensation Commission [155 SCRA 166 (1987)] and other cases with conclusions different from those stated above. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED The questioned decision of the public respondents is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 84307 April 17, 1989 CIRIACO HINOGUIN petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Armed Forces of the Philippines), respondents. Alexander A. Acain for petitioner. FELICIANO, J.: This Petition for Review is directed against the Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission ("ECC") in ECC Case No. 3275 (Ciriaco Hinoguin v. Government Service Insurance System [Armed Forces of the Philippines]) which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") denying petitioner's claim for compensation benefit on account of the death of petitioner's son, Sgt. Lemick G. Hinoguin The deceased, Sgt. Hinoguin started his military service in 1974, when he was called to military training by the Philippine Army. He later on enlisted in the Philippine Army as a private first class. At the time of his death on 7 August 1985, he was holding the rank of Sergeant per Special Order P4200, HPA dated 15 October 1985, in "A" company 14th Infantry Battalion, 5 th Infantry Division, PA. The Headquarters of the 14th Infantry Battalion was located at Bical, Muoz, Nueva Ecija. Sgt. Hinoguin was Detachment Non-Commissioned Officer at Capintalan, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, "A" Company being stationed at Carranglan, Nueva Ecija. On 1 August 1985, Sgt. Hinoguin and two (2) members of his Detachment, Cpl. Rogelio Clavo and Dft. Nicomedes Alibuyog, sought permission from Captain Frankie Z. Besas, Commanding Officer of "A" Company to go on overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva Viscaya, "to settle [an] important matter thereat." 1 Captain Besas orally granted them permission to go to Aritao and to take their issued firearms with them, considering that Aritao was regarded as "a critical place " 2 that is, it had peace and order problems due to the presence of elements of the New People's Army ("NPA!') in or in the vicinity of Aritao. Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog left Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, about noon on 1 August 1985 and arrived in Aritao, Nueva Viscaya, about 1:30 o'clock P.M. on the same day. 3 They proceeded to the home of Dft. Alibuyog's parents where they had lunch. About 4:00 o'clock P.M., the three (3) soldiers with a fourth man, a civilian and relative of Dft. Alibuyog, had some gin and beer,

finishing a bottle of gin and two (2) large bottles of beer. Three hours later, at about 7:00 o'clock P.M., the soldiers left the Alibuyog home to return to their Company Headquarters. They boarded a tricycle, presumably a motor-driven one, Sgt. Hinoguin and Cpl. Clavo seating themselves in the tricycle cab while Dft. Alibuyog occupied the seat behind the driver. Upon reaching the poblacionof Aritao, Dft. Alibuyog dismounted, walked towards and in front of the tricycle cab, holding his M-16 rifle in his right hand, not noticing that the rifle's safety lever was on semi automatic (and not on "safety"). He accidentally touched the trigger, firing a single shot in the process and hitting Sgt. Hinoguin, then still sitting in the cab, in the left lower abdomen. The Sergeant did not apparently realize immediately that he had been hit; he took three (3) steps forward, cried that he had been hit and fell to the ground. His companions rushed Sgt. Hinoguin to a hospital in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, for treatment. Their Company Commander, Capt. Besas, hurried to the hospital upon being notified of the shooting and there talked with the wounded Sergeant. The latter confirmed to Capt. Besas that he had indeed been accidentally shot by Dft. Alibuyog Sgt. Hinoguin was later moved to the AFP Medical Center in Quezon City and there he died on 7 August 1985. The Death Certificate lists "septic shock" as immediate cause of death, and "generalized septicemia of peritonitis" as antecedent cause, following his sustaining a gunshot wound. An investigation conducted by H.Q., 14th Infantry Battalion on 11 August 1985 concluded that the shooting of Sgt. Hinoguin was "purely accidental in nature." 4 On 19 November 1985, a "Line of Duty Board of Officers" was convened by H.Q. 14th Infantry Battalion, "to determine Line of Duty Status of [the] late Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin 640407 (Inf.) PA, a member of "A" Co., 14IB, 5 ID, PA who died ... due to Gun Shot Wound as a result of an accidental fire (sic) committed by Dft. Nicomedes Alibuyog 085-5009 (Inf.) PA ... ." After receiving and deliberating . g on the Investigation Report dated 11 August 1985 together with the sworn statements of witnesses Alibuyog, Clavo and Besas, and after some further questioning of Capt. Besas, the Line of Duty Board reached the following conclusion and recommendation: Sgt. Hinoguin was then the designated Detachment Commander of Capintalan detachment. On or about 011300H August 1985 Dft. Alibuyog invited Sgt. Hinoguin and Cpl. Clavo to his home to celebrate at Aritao, Nueva Viscaya. They asked permission to go on overnight and to allow them to carry their firearms with them because the place where they were going is critical. They were given such permission verbally by their Commanding Officer. The death of Sgt. Hinoguin was purely accidental as the Investigation Report presented here proved beyond reasonable [doubt] the fact that Dft. Alibuyog had no grudge either [against] Cpl. Clavo or Sgt. Hinoguin RECOMMENDATION: The recommendation written by the Chairman and unanimously voted for by the members contain the following: The Board after a thorough deliberation on presented evidences declares that the Death of Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin 640407 (Inf.) PA is in Line of Duty. The Board recommend farther that all benefits due the legal dependents of the late Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin be given. 5 (Emphasis supplied) Sometime in March 1986, petitioner filed his claim for compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626 (as amended), claiming that the death of his son was work-connected and therefore compensable. This 112

was denied 6 by the GSIS on the ground that petitioner's son was not at his work place nor performing his duty as a soldier of the Philippine Army at the time of his death. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which Motion was, however, denied by the GSIS. This denial was confirmed by the Workmen's Compensation Commission ("WCC") in a Decision dated 24 May 1988 which stated that: [F]rom the recital of the facts therein [we found it] very difficult for us to perceive where the work-connection of the events that led to appellant's son's death lies. Under the law, death resulting from injury is considered compensable if it arises out of and in the course of employment. Definitely, the death of Hinoguin did not arises out of employment. Clearly, the facts showed that he was not on his place of work nor was he performing official functions. On the contrary, he was on pass and had just came from a merrymaking when accidentally shot by his companion, 7 (Emphasis supplied) The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the death of Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin is compensable under the applicable statute and regulations. Considering that Sgt. Hinoguin died on 7 August 1985, the applicable law is to be found in Book Four, Title III of the Labor Code, as amended. It may be noted at the outset that under Article 167 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended and Section 4 (b) (1) of Rule I of the Amended (Implementing) Rules on Employees' Compensation, the term "employee" includes a "member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines." Rule XIII entitled "Death", of the Amended (Implementing) Rules provides in part as follows: SECTION 1. Conditions to Entitlement. (a) The beneficiaries of a deceased employee shall be entitled to an income benefit if all of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) The employee had been duly reported to the System; (2) He died as a result of injury or sickness; and (3) The System has been duly notified of his death, as well as the injury or sickness which caused his death. His employer shall be liable for the benefit if such death occurred before the employee is duly reported for coverage of the System. xxx xxx xxx Article 167 (k) of the Labor Code as amended defines a compensable "injury" quite simply as "any harmful change in the human organism from any accident arising out of and in the course of the employment." The Amended (Implementing) Rules have, however, elaborated considerably on the simple and succinct statutory provision. Rule III, Section 1 (a) reads: SECTION 1. Grounds. (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following grounds:

(1) The employee must have been injured at the place work requires him to be; (2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and (3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer. xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied) It will be seen that because the Amended (Implementing) Rules are intended to apply to all kinds of employment, such rules must be read and applied with reasonable flexibility and comprehensiveness. The concept of a "work place" referred to in Ground 1, for instance, cannot always be literally applied to a soldier on active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker in an assembly line in a factory or a clerk in a particular fixed office. Obviously, a soldier must go where his company is stationed. In the instant case, Aritao, Nueva Viscaya was not, of course, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija. Aritao being approximately 1-1/2 hours away from the latter by public transportation. But Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog had permission from their Commanding Officer to proceed to Aritao, and it appears to us that a place which soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer. We note that the three (3) soldiers were on an overnight pass which, notably, they did not utilize in full. They were noton vacation leave. Moreover, they were required or authorized to carry their firearms with which presumably they were to defend themselves if NPA elements happened to attack them while en route to and from Aritao or with which to attack and seek to capture such NPA elements as they might encounter. Indeed, if the three (3) soldiers had in fact encountered NPAs while on their way to or from Aritao and been fired upon by them and if Sgt. Hinoguin had been killed by an NPA bullet, we do not believe that respondent GSIS would have had any difficulty in holding the death a compensable one. Turning to the question of whether Sgt. Hinoguin was performing official functions at the time he sustained the gunshot wound, it has already been pointed out above that the Line of Duty Board of Officers of the 14th Infantry Battalion Headquarters had already determined that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin had occurred "in line of duty." It may be noted in this connection that a soldier on active duty status is really on 24 hours a day official duty status and is subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, 7 days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status (which Sgt. Hinoguin was not). 'Thus, we think that the work-connected character of Sgt. Hinoguins injury and death was not effectively precluded by the simple circumstance that he was on an overnight pass to go to the home of Dft. Alibuyog, a soldier under his own command. Sgt. Hinoguin did not effectively cease performing "official functions" because he was granted a pass. While going to a fellow soldier's home for a few hours for a meal and some drinks was not a specific military duty, he was nonetheless in the course of performance of official functions. Indeed, it appears to us that a soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to have clearly and unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by, e.g., going on an approved vacation leave. 8 Even vacation leave may, it should be remembered, be preterminated by superior orders. More generally, a soldier in the Armed Forces must accept certain risks, for instance, that he will be fired upon by forces hostile to the State or the Government. That is not, of course, the only ask that he is compelled to accept by the very nature of his occupation or profession as a soldier. Most of the persons around him are necessarily also members of the Armed Forces who carry firearms, too. In 113

other words, a soldier must also assume the risk of being accidentally fired upon by his fellow soldiers. This is reasonably regarded as a hazard or risk inherent in his employment as a soldier. We hold, therefore, that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin that resulted from his being hit by an accidental discharge of the M-16 of Dft. Alibuyog, in the circumstances of this case, arose out of and in the course of his employment as a soldier on active duty status in the Armed Forces of the Philippines and hence compensable. It may be well to add that what we have written above in respect of performance of official functions of members of the Armed Forces must be understood in the context of the specific purpose at hand, that is, the interpretation and application of the compensation provisions of the Labor Code and applicable related regulations. It is commonplace that those provisions should, to the extent possible, be given the interpretation most likely to effectuate the beneficient and humanitarian purposes infusing the Labor Code. ACCORDINGLY, the Decision of the GSIS taken through its Claim Review Committee dated 20 November 1986 and the Decision dated 24 May 1988 of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 3275, are hereby REVERSED and the GSIS is hereby DIRECTED to award all applicable benefits in respect of the death of Sgt. Lemick G. Hinoguin, to petitioner. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-42808 January 31, 1989 ROSARIO VDA. DE SUANES, petitioner, vs. THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Bureau of Public Highways), respondents. Dante Q. Barbosa for petitioner. Jose A. Oliveros for respondent Provincial Engineer of Batangas. The Solicitor General for public respondent. FELICIANO, J.: The petitioner asks the Court to review and set aside the decision dated 31 December 1975 of the Workmen's Compensation Commission (WCC) R04-WC Case No. 163691, entitled Rosario Vda. de Suanes, claimant versus Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of Public Highways), respondent. Artemio A. Suanes was a government employee for most of his life. From 1933 to 1945, he served as market collector of the Municipal Government of the Municipality of Rosario, Batangas. He served as a Municipal Councilor in Rosario, Batangas from 1956 to 1959. From 2 January 1964 until 30 June 1970, Artemio was a construction capataz of the Bureau of Public Highways (BPH), Batangas

Provincial Office. His Service Record 1further shows that thereafter, from 1 July 1970 up to the time of his death on 21 June 1973. Artemio Suanes was a construction capataz in the Office of the Provincial Engineer, Batangas Province. The certificate of death issued by Dr. Salvacion Altamira of the Magsino General Hospital in Lipa City, Batangas, attributed Artemio's demise to 'Cardio-respiratory Arrest due to Cerebrovascular Accident'. 2 On 5 March 1975, petitioner, as surviving spouse of Artemio Suanes, filed with Regional Office No. IV of the Workmen's Compensation Unit (WCU), Department of Labor, a claim for compensation under the applicable provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428, as amended). In this claim, the decedent's illness was described as "Internal Hemorrhage due to Hypertension. 3 Petitioner's claim was referred by the WCU to the BPH which, however, controverted the claim of petitioner. In a letter dated 26 June 1975, BPH asserted that there was "[l]ack of causative relation of the illness alleged in [petitioner's] claim with the nature of the decedent's employment" and that petitioner had failed to comply with the requirements of Section 24, Act No. 3428, as amended, regarding the giving of notice and subsequent filing of claim. BPH, further, asked the WCU Regional Officeto dismiss petitioner's claim upon the ground that claim had been filed against the wrong party, Artemio's employer at the time of his death being the Provincial Engineer's Office of the Provincial Government of Batangas, rather than the BPH. In an Order dated 29 August 1975, the Referee of the WCU dismissed petitioner's claim "for lack of interest, claimant having failed to appear for the scheduled hearing despite notice. 4 Petitioner moved, 5 on 24 September 1975, to set aside the order of dismissal, denying that she had lost interest in the prosecution of her claim and asserting that she had left her old address at No. 73-J Panay Ave., Quezon City having moved to a new address at 2829 Felix Huertas St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, and that she had left her new forwarding address at her old residence but that apparently no one had received the WCU notice of hearing or that no one at the old address had informed the process server of the claimant's new address. The respondent Commission denied petitioner's Motion to Set Aside the Order of Dismissal upon the ground that that Motion had not been accompanied by an affidavit of merits setting forth the facts constituting fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence as required under the Rules of the Commission. 6 Hence, the present Petition, which was filed on 15 March 1976. Petitioner claims that respondent Commission erred in denying her Motion to Set Aside the Order of Dismissal, since there was no law which required an affidavit of merits to be attached to her Motion, and that she had a valid claim for death benefits considering that at the time of her husband's death, he was a permanent employee of the BPH and considering further that the compensable nature of his death had not been effectively controverted by the BPH. The BPH upon the other hand, took the position that an affidavit of merits was an indispensable requirement for setting aside the order of dismissal and that, in any case, there was no employer-employee relationship between Artemio Suanes and the BPH at the time of the former's death since he was then employed by the office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas Province. Nine years later, on 29 February 1985, this Court issued a Resolution which, after reciting very briefly the facts described above, went on to state that: A perusal of the copies of the Statement of Service Record in the government of the late Artemio A. Suanes and of the Information for Membership Insurance in 114

the Government Service Insurance System shows that said Artemio A. Suanes was employed as construction capataz of the Provincial Engineer's Office of Batangas and not an employee of respondent Bureau of Public Highways, particularly the Office of the Highways District Engineer in Batangas. ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to consider the Provincial Engineer of Batangas as IMPLEADED party respondent, to direct the Clerk of Court to FURNISH him with a copy of the Petition for Review and to REQUIRE him to file a comment thereon within ten (10) days from receipt. ... (Emphasis supplied) We consider first the procedural issue of whether or not petitioner's Motion to Set Aside the Order of Dismissal issued by the WCC Referee was properly denied simply upon the ground that it had not been accompanied by an affidavit of merits. We believe that this issue has to be resolved in favor of the petitioner. Section 3 of Rule 22 of the Rules of the respondent Commission provides as follows: Sec. 3. Time for Filing Petition; Contents and Verification. The petition under Section I hereof must be verified, filed within thirty (30) days after the petitioner learns-of the decision, award, or order or other proceedings sought to be set aside and not more than three (3) months after such decision or award was entered or such proceedings were taken, and must be accompanied with (sic) affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake' or excusable negligence relied upon and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. x x x x x x x x x. (Emphasis supplied) There is no dispute that petitioner did not attach an affidavit of merits to her Motion to Set Aside the Order of Dismissal. It scarcely needs to be pointed out, however, that the basic purpose of such a requirement was to enable the Commission to evaluate the merits of the Motion or Petition to set aside the dismissal order. Petitioner did clearly allege in her Motion the grounds she relied upon for setting aside the order dismissing her claim for failure to attend the scheduled hearing: (a) she had failed to attend the scheduled hearing because the notice of said hearing was sent to her old address and not to her new forwarding address and hence was not received by her; and (b) her husband was a permanent employee of the BPH whose death was compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act. To our mind, the allegations in petitioner's Motion constituted substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 3 of Rule 22 of the Commission's Rules. That petitioner's Motion was not a sworn motion is not a fatal defect in the circumstances of this case. There is no suggestion in the record that petitioner had not in fact changed her address or that she had not left her forwarding address at her old residence. If the Commission felt that an affidavit of merit was absolutely indispensable to enable it to resolve petitioner's Motion, then the Commission should have required petitioner to supplement her Motion with an affidavit of merit or to simply verify her Motion, instead of dismissing that Motion out of hand. We believe that there is here an appropriate occasion for invoking the principle that rules should not be so interpreted as to "sacrifice substantial rights in the sophisticated altar of technicalities with [consequent] impairment of [the] sacred principle of justice, 7 a principle which is embodied in the Rules of the Commission itself. Section 1 of Rule 10 of the Commission provides as follows: Rule 10. General Rule to Govern Proceedings

Section 1. The hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy in workmen's compensation cases shall be without regard to technicalities, legal forms and technical rules on evidence. Substantial evidence shall be sufficient to support a decision, order or award. The next issue to be resolved relates to the legal consequences if any, of the fact that petitioner's claim had been originally filed against "the Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of Public Highways)' and not against the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas Province, the employer of Artemio Suanes at the time of his death. Once more, we believe that this issue should be resolved in favor of petitioner, in line with the principle which enjoins a liberal rather than a technical view of pleading and procedure in Workmen's Compensation cases. It is true that the petitioner's original claim (on a mimeographed form of the Workmen's Compensation Commission) named the BPH as the decedent's employer. However, in her Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal, petitioner designated the Republic of the Philippines. as the respondent, while parenthetically referring to the Bureau of Public Highways, as part of the caption which the Commission itself had adopted in R04-WC Case No. 163691. It is appropriate to recall that the "Republic of the Philippines" or "Government of the Republic of the Philippines" is a comprehensive term which has been defined in Section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code, in the following manner: xxx xxx xxx The Government of the Republic of the Philippines' is a term which refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the function of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the central Government or the provincial or municipal branches or other form of local government. xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the BPH, which is an instrumentality of the Central or National Government and the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas, and office under the supervision of the Chief Executive Officer (the Governor) of the Province of Batangas, are both governmental offices and both are embraced in the term Republic of the Philippines,' for purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The funds of the BPH and the fund of the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas, are equally government funds. It must be recalled that the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Act are extended not only to employees in the private sector but also to all officials and employees of both the national government and of provincial, municipal and other local governments. Section 3 of Act No. 3812, as amended, provides: Section 3. Applicable to Government. This Act shall also be applicable to all officials, employees and laborers in the service of the National Government and its political subdivisions and instrumentalities: Provided, however, that officials, laborers and employees insured with the Government Service Insurance System, 115

and their dependents when entitled to the benefits of the said insurance system shall, in addition to the same, be entitled to the benefits granted by this Act.' (Italics supplied) The BPH was quite aware of the fact that Artemio Suanes, previously an employee of the BPH, was, just before his death, an employee of the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas Province. The BPH conveyed this fact to the respondent Commission, when it (BPH) notified the Commission through the Office of the Solicitor General of the filing of the claim against the BPH. In a "third indorsement, August 6, 1975' to the WCU, the BPH said: Respectfully returned thru the Honorable Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Manila, to the Chief, Workmen's Compensation Section, Department of Labor, Regional Office No. IV, Manila, the within papers relative to the claim for compensation in R04-WC Cass No. 16391, filed by Mrs. ROSARIO VDA. DE SUANES, widow of ARTEMIO SUANES, alleged to be a former ConstructionCapataz under the Office of the Highway District Engineer, Batangas City, inviting attention to the 2nd indorsement dated July 25, 1975 of the District Engineer of Batangas City informing that the decedent was an employee of the Batangas Provincial Engineer's Office at the time of his death. It is informed that officials and employees of the Provincial Engineer's Office are not under the administrative jurisdiction of this Department but under the Executive Head of the Province to which they are assigned. In view thereof, it is requested that steps be taken to dismiss the case against the Republic of the Philippines (BPH) for lack of employee-employer relationship. xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied) Since both the BPH and the WCU are presumed to know the law-in this case, the Workmen's Compensation statute including Section 3 thereof-one or the other office or the Office of the Solicitor General, should have notified the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas Province of the filing of the claim by petitioner and referred such claim to that office. Instead, the BPH simply asked for the dismissal of the case against the BPH 'for lack of employee-employer relationship" and, worse, neglected to inform petitioner of the asserted lack of an employer-employee relationship between the decedent and the BPH and where the claim should have been filed. In fact, petitioner's claim was denied by the Referee, as already noted, not on the ground of lack of an employeremployee relationship between the BPH and Artemio Suanes but rather because of petitioner's failure to attend a scheduled hearing and her failure to attach to her Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal an affidavit of merits. Both the respondent Commission and the WCU Referee failed to inform petitioner of her error in designating the specific employer of her deceased husband, and in effect waited for this Court to issue its Resolution of 29 February 1985 considering the Provincial Engineer of Batangas as having been impleaded as a party respondent. In view of the foregoing circumstances and considering particularly that no prejudice was sustained by the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas Province by the misdirecting of petitioner's claim, we hold that the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas Province may be held liable on petitioner's claim.

The respondent Provincial Engineer of Batangas Province, in his Comment dated 8 April 1985, asserts that petitioner's claim against his office has already prescribed. The ordinary rule is that the statutory right to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act prescribes in ten (10) years 8 counted from the time of accrual of the claim, in this case from the time of the death of Artemio Suanes. Artemio Suanes died, as noted earlier, on 21 June 1973; the court impleaded the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas Province on 29 February 1985, i.e., about twelve (12) years later. We do not, however, believe that petitioner's claim may be so cavalierly defeated, given the circumstances of this case. In the first place, petitioner's original claim was filed, again as already noted, on 5, March 1975. While this original claim designated the wrong employer, we believe that, given the insistent demands of substantial justice in this case, such original claim should be regarded, as we hereby so regard it, as having effectively tolled the running of the prescriptive period. We note that the petitioner lost no time in filing her Petition for Review with this Court on 15 March 1976 when her claim was denied by the respondent Commission on 13 December 1975. This Court was able formally to rectify the erroneous designation of the respondent BPH only after almost nine (9) years from filing of the Petition for Review. Under the principle of nunc pro tunc, we do not believe that this failure to act earlier on the part on the Court itself may be allowed to prejudice the petitioner. The defense of prescription must, therefore, be rejected. Turning, finally, to the merits of petitioner's claim, there is no dispute about the fact that Artemio's ailment supervened in the course of his employment either with the BPH or the Office of the Batangas Provincial Engineer. It is well settled that, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 9 petitioner is accordingly relieved of the burden of proving causation between the illness and the employment in view of the legal presumption that said illness arose out of the decedent's employment. 10 The burden of proving non-compensability of the cause of death is shifted to the employer. Respondent Batangas Provincial Engineer had failed to discharge this burden. Indeed, none of the respondents even attempted to present any evidence to rebut the presumption of compensability; all of them chose to rely upon the formal defenses discussed above. But those defenses do not constitute evidence to overthrow the statutory presumption. In legal effect, no evidence was introduced by the respondents to offset that legal presumption. The Court, therefore, is left with no alternative but to rule in favor of petitioner's claim. 11 WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 31 December 1975 of respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission is hereby REVERSED. The Petitioner is hereby AWARDED the Pl,500.00 claimed as reimbursement for the doctors, medical and hospital bills incurred in connection with the decedent's last illness, in addition to any other applicable death benefits under Act No. 3428, as amended. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Department of the Government Service Insurance System, dated 23 August 1976, which denied petitioner's claim for benefits. Petitioner, at the time of his retirement on 31 July 1976, was an employee of the Development Bank of the Philippines, Ilagan, Isabela, specifically, a Collateral and File Clerk. Prior to holding said position, he held the positions of clerk-typist, clerk-stenographer and collection clerk, respectively, in the same bank. On 6 to 10 April 1976, petitioner was confined in the University of Santo Tomas Hospital where his ailment was diagnosed as Rheumatoid Arthritis. Following his disability, petitioner filed on 12 August 1976 with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) a claim for employees' compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626. His application was denied on 23 August 1976. 1 Petitioner twice moved to reconsider the denial of his claim with the GSIS, but the latter denied both motions for reconsideration. On appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC), the order of denial was affirmed in toto. 2 Hence, the instant petition. In his three-page petition, petitioner raises as errors allegedly committed by the ECC, the following: A. That respondent Commission have acted with grave abuse of discretion when it declared that petitioners ailment, DIAGNOSED as 'Rheumatoid Arthritis is not an occupational disease; B. Likewise, respondent Commission has acted with grave abuse of discretion when it declared that petitioner miserably failed to offer proofs substantial enough to show that such disease arose or has aggravated in the course of his employment due to working conditions; C. Finally, respondent Commission has acted in excess of its jurisdiction in denying altogether petitioner's compensation benefits. and contends that the decision of the GSIS, thru its Employees' Compensation Department, and that of the ECC are "not in accord with the applicable decisions of this Tribunal and in violative to (violation of) the spirit of Social Legislations which are designed for the benefit of retiring employees of the government." 3 The petition is without merit.

G.R. No. L-46443 June 28, 1988 NONATO ROSALES, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM and The DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. PADILLA, J.: Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission, dated 17 April 1977, affirming in toto the ruling of the Employees' Compensation 116

Petitioner filed his claim under PD No. 626 which took effect on 1 January 1975. Under said law, for an illness to be compensable, it must be done definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same was increased by working conditions. 4 The ECC denied the claim of petitioner for compensation on the ground that the ailment, Rheumatoid Arthritis, was not an occupational disease, and that, as required by law, petitioner failed to show proof that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by his working conditions. We quote from the assailed decision: Perusal of the evidence on record in the instant claim will disclose the miserable failure of the appellant to discharge the burden required of him by the new law on

employees' compensation. Much as we may postulate the Identity of liberality, we cannot go so far as to cast favorable reflection on what is otherwise a claim clearly lacking of support in evidence, which is mandatory requisite under PD No. 626, as amended, for finding the ailment in question as an occupational disease, or that, its contraction was the result of the appellants' working conditions, it follows then that the appealed decision is in accordance with the law and cannot be disturbed. 5 In denying, petitioner's claim, the ECC properly applied PD No. 626. In workmen's compensation cases, the governing law is determined by the date on which the claimant contracted his illness. 6 Thus, where an ailment supervened before the new Labor Code took effect, the governing law is the old Workmen's Compensation Act. On the other hand, were an ailment occured after 1 January 1975, the new law on Employees' Compensation applies. 7 Applying the foregoing rules to the present case, we find nothing in the allegations as to when petitioner contracted the disease. For failure to do so, and having filed his claim under PD No. 626, the presumption is that he contracted the disease after the effectivity of PD No. 626 on 1 January 1975. The ECC, therefore, in rendering the assailed decision and resolution, denying petitioner's claim, could not be faulted in applying the governing law, which is PD No. 626. Moreover, the doctrine enunciated by this Court in Caparas vs. WCC, et al., 8 cited by petitioner in his motion for reconsideration of the ruling of the Employees' Compensation Department of the GSIS, is not applicable in the present case. In that case, the Court granted compensation, on the basis of the old Workmen's Compensation Act, it appearing that claimant contracted the disease prior to the effectivity of PD No. 626. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. With costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

Petitioner Napoleon O. Carin was a Special Counsel in the Fiscal's office of Cebu City. Sometime in October 1975, he felt a severe pain in his left leg while getting the expedientes of cases scheduled for trial on that day. Petitioners illness was subsequently diagnosed as ostemoyelitis. As recommended by his physician, petitioner underwent surgery at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. He was confined therein from 1 to 5 December 1975. On 12 May 1976, petitioner filed a claim for income benefits for his disability under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, with the Government Service Insurance System. His claim was denied by the System on the ground that the cause of his disability was neither an occupational disease nor caused by hs employment and that the risk of contracting the same was not increased by his working conditions. Reconsideration of the claim's denial was likewise denied. Petitioner appealed to the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission which, on 15 June 1977, issued the assailed decision. Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that his illness, chronic ostemoyelitis, although not an occupational disease as enumerated in Presidential Decree No. 626, is nonetheless compensable, anchored on the theoretical concept of "increased risk" as defined under Rule III, Section (b) of the implementing rules of Presidential Decree No. 626. According to petitioner, he had presented sufficient evidence to show that his sickness arose out of, and was caused by his employment and that the risk of contracting the same was increased by his working conditions. The evidence consisted of a report on his sickness, ostemoyelitis, which he submitted on 12 May 1976 to the GSIS, together with the attending physician's report showing that he was working at the time of the illness and the affidavit of Assistant City Fiscal Felix Barral attesting to the fact that he (petitioner) suffered the attack or pain in his left leg at the City Fiscal's office of Cebu City while taking the expedientes for the day's scheduled trial. We sustain the finding of the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission that petitioner failed to submit substantial evidence to prove that his illness was caused by his employment or that the risk of contracting it was increased by his working conditions. 1 Under the new law on employees' compensation, or Presidential Decree No. 626, in case the sickness or illness is not an occupational disease, as in the present case, to be compensable, proof must be adduced that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. 2

G.R. No. L-46556 May 28, 1988 NAPOLEON O. CARIN, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,respondents. Napoleon O. Carin for petitioner. The Chief Legal Officer (ECC) and The Government Corporate Counsel for respondents. PADILLA, J.: Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission, dated 15 June 1977, affirming the decision of the Government Service Insurance System which denied petitioner's claim for compensation. 117 The evidence presented by petitioner does not, in any way, show a reasonable connection between his ailment and the nature of his employment nor a direct causal relation between his employment and the illness he suffered. Although the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in compensation claims, 3 still, petitioner failed to show with substantial evidence that his illness was reasonably work-connected, to be entitled to compensation. 4 Further, petitioner's contention that the rule of compensability under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, is a revival of the old law on workmen's compensation or Act 3428, particularly Section 44 thereof, which recognized the presumption of compensability, is not meritorious. The principle of presumption of compensability no longer obtains under the new law on Employees' Compensation.5

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission, under review, is AFFIRMED. With costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-65680 May 11, 1989 JOSE B. SARMIENTO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (National Power Corporation), respondents. Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioner. The Solicitor General and The Government Corporate Counsel for respondents. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition for review of the decision rendered by the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 2134 on August 25, 1983 which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) denying the petitioner's claim for death benefits as surviving spouse of the late Flordeliza Sarmiento. The findings of the respondent Commission are as follows:

G.R. No. L-47414 May 23, 1988 ELIODORO T. ISCALA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Department of Education & Culture, Bureau of Public Schools), GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SERVICE SYSTEM, and the EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents. Victorio L. Rodriguez for petitioner. The Solicitor General for respondents. SARMIENTO, J.: A Motion for Partial Reconsideration of our decision promulgated on December 11, 1987, was filed by the respondent Government Service Insurance System; by way of comment, the correspondent Republic of the Philippines (Department of Education, Culture and Sports) categorically interposed no objection to the motion. We find the foregoing motion to be grounded on the doctrine that when GSIS is made to pay for compensation benefits under the old Workmen's Compensation Act, it has a right of reimbursement from the employer, which doctrine was laid down by this Court in Corales vs. Employees' Compensation Commission (No. L-44063, March 15,1982,112 SCRA 501) and reiterated in a number of subsequent cases including the very recent case of Reyes vs. ECC (No. L-43828, March 19, 1988). WHEREFORE, it is hereby resolved to GRANT the Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Accordingly, our decision in this case is MODIFIED in that payment of compensation by the GSIS to the petitioner shall be without prejudice to its right of reimbursement from the Department of Education, Culture & Sports, the employer of the deceased Nena S. Iscala. As modified, the decision will, therefore, read as follows, the modification being in bold: xxx xxx xxx WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission dated October 12, 1977 denying petitioner's claim for compensation for the death of Nena Iscala is hereby SET ASIDE and the GSIS is hereby ordered to AWARD to the petitioner such compensation as provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act without prejudice to its right of reimbursement from the DECS. NO COSTS. xxx xxx xxx SO ORDERED.

The record shows that the late Flordeliza Sarmiento was employed by the National Power Corporation in Quezon City as accounting clerk in May 1974. At the time of her death on August 12, 1981 she was manager of the budget division. History of the deceased's illness showed that symptoms manifested as early as April 1980 as a small wound over the external auditory canal and mass over the martoid region. Biopsy of the mass revealed cancer known as "differentiated squamous cell carcinoma." The employee sought treatment in various hospitals, namely, Veterans Memorial Hospital, United Doctors Medical Hospital and Makati Medical Center. In March 1981, a soft tissue mass emerged on her left upper cheek as a result of which her lips became deformed and she was unable to close her left eye. She continued treatment and her last treatment at the Capitol Medical Center on July 12, 1 981 was due to her difficulty of swallowing food and her general debility. On August 12, 1981, she succumbed to cardiorespiratory arrest due to parotid carcinoma. She was 40 years old. Believing that the deceased's fatal illness having been contracted by her during employment was service-connected, appellant herein filed a claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. On September 9, 1982, the GSIS, through its Medical Services Center, denied the claim. It was pointed out that parotid carcinoma is "Malignant tumor of the parotid gland (salivary gland)" and that its development was not caused by employment and employment conditions. Dissatisfied with the respondent System's decision of denial, claimant wrote a letter dated October 8, 1982 to the GSIS requesting that the records of the claim be elevated to the Employees' Compensation Commission for review pursuant to the law and the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation. (At pp. 17-18, Rollo) On August 25, 1983, the respondent Commission affirmed the GSIS' decision. It found that the deceased's death causation by parotid carcinoma is not compensable because she did not contract 118

nor suffer from the same by reason of her work but by reason of embryonic rests and epithelial growth. It may be noted that the petitioner was earlier paid GSIS benefits in the amount of P142,285.03 but the claim for employee's compensation was disallowed. Hence, the instant petition. The petitioner, while principally stressing the compensability of the deceased's ailment, attacks the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, the law on employees' compensation which superseded the Labor Code and the of the Workmen's Compensation Act. He alleges that provisions the said law infringes upon the guarantees of promotion of social justice, substantive due process, and equal protection of laws, and also permits unjust discrimination and amounts to class legislation in its enforcement. He prays for the application of the Old Workmen's Compensation Act which provided for a presumption of compensability whenever an ailment supervened during the course of the employment. We dismiss the petition. We cannot give serious consideration to the petitioner's attach against the constitutionality of the new law on employee's compensation. It must be noted that the petitioner filed his claim under the provisions of this same law. It was only when his claim was rejected that he now questions the constitutionality of this law on appeal by certiorari. The Court has recognized the validity of the present law and has granted and rejected claims according to its provisions. We find in it no infringement of the worker's constitutional rights. It is now settled jurisprudence (see Sulit v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483; Armena v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851; Erese v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 138 SCRA 192; De Jesus v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92) that the new law discarded the concepts of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" to restore what the law believes is a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employees' rights to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability. In the case of De Jesus v. Employees' Compensation, (supra), this Court explained the new scheme of employees' compensation as follows: The new law establishes a state insurance fired built up by the contributions of employers based on the saries of their employees. The injured worker does not have to litigate his right to compensation. No employer opposes his claim. There is no notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a claim with a new neutral Employees' Compensation Commission which then determines on the basis of the employee's supporting papers and medical evidence whether or not compensation may be paid. The payment of benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration is low. The amount of death benefits has also been doubled. On the other hand, the employer's duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to the scheme. It does not look for insurance companies to meet sudden demands for compensation payments or set up its own funds to meet 119

these contingencies. It does not have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims. The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's compensation. The Commission administers and settles claims from a find under its exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the compensation process and it has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. The open ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits. Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on presumption of compensability and controversion cease to have importance. The lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which called for equalization through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now absent. (At pp. 99-100) The petitioner's challenge is really against the desirability of the new law. These is no serious attempt to assail it on constitutional grounds. The wisdom of the present scheme of workmen's compensation is a matter that should be addressed to the President and Congress, not to this Court. Whether or not the former workmen's compensation program with its presumptions, controversions, adversarial procedures, and levels of payment is preferable to the present scheme must be decided by the political departments. The present law was enacted in the belief that it better complies with the mandate on social justice and is more advantageous to the greater number of working men and women. Until Congress and the President decide to improve or amend the law, our duty is to apply it. Under the present law, a compensable illness means any illness accepted as an occupational disease and listed by the Employees' Compensation Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions (Bonifacio v. Government Service Insurance System, 146 SCRA 276). Applying the law to the present case, parotid carcinoma or cancer of the salivary glands is not an occupational disease considering the deceased's employment as accounting clerk and later as manager of the budget division. The petitioner must, therefore, prove that his wife's ailment was caused by her employment or that her working conditions increased the risk of her contracting the fatal illness. The petitioner alleges that as budget manager, the deceased visited regional and field operations and was, naturally, exposed to the elements. According to the petitioner, the deceased's field trips necessitated her to take frequent plane travels which caused deafening and numb sensations in her ears. This, he says, caused her "differentiated carcinoma" which, according to the certificate of Dr. Ariston Bautista, "apparently started on external auditory canal." We find these allegations as mere conjectures. As with other kinds of cancer, the cause and nature of parotid carcinoma is still not known. A medical authority, however, declares that: SALIVARY GLANDS

Painless swelling of the parotid glands is often noted in hepatic cirrhosis in sarcoidis, in mumps, following abdominal surgery, or associated with neoplasm or infections. The common factors may be dehydration and inattention to oral hygiene. The latter promotes the growth of large numbers of bacteria which, in the absence of sufficient salivary flow, ascend from the mouth into the duct of a gland. Another cause of a painful salivary gland is sialolithiasis (salivary duct stone). The submandibular glands are most commonly affected. Pain and swelling associated with eating are characteristic. Saliva promotes retention of artificial dentures because of its mucin content. Thus, conditions characterized by diminished saliva flow often adversely affect the ease with which dentures may be worn. Calcium phosphate stone tend to form because of a high pH and viscosity of the submandibular gland saliva which has a high mucin content. Stones are removed by manipulation or excision. Autoimmune sialosis is the MikulicsSjogren Syndrome, a unilateral or bilateral enlargement of the parotid and/or submandibular gland, and often the lacrimal glands. Occasionally painful, it is associated with xerostomia (dry mouth) due to impaired saliva formation that is most common in older women. Beriow et al., The Merek Manuel, 14th Edition, pp. 2095-2096). Another author states the following regarding squamous cell carcinoma:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decisions of the Government Service Insurance System and the Employees' Compensation Commission denying the claim are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-46684 April 27, 1988 ROSALINA G. NAVALTA, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, BUREAU OF CUSTOMS and EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System and denied the claim for income benefits filed by Rosalina Navalta, widow of the late Alberto Navalta. The facts as found by the respondent Commission are as follows:

Moreover, when the salivary gland is almost totally destroyed and replaced by epidermoid cancer it may be difficult or even impossible to ascribe the origin of the growth to salivary gland tissue. Indeed many squamous cell carcinomas, especially of the parotid, may be metastatic lesions that develop in lymph nodes included within the parotid. And it is important to stress that the juxtaparotid and intraparotid lymph nodes are not merely accumulations of lymphoid tissue but nodes with efferent and afferent lymphatics. Squamous cell carcinomas of the major salivary glands are generally fixed to the skin and the underlying tissues and, in the case of the parotid, are often the cause of facial palsy. Epidermoid cancers grow swiftly and the clinical course is usually rapid. A few tumours, however, have been present for as long as two years before the patient seeks advice. Some patients remain alive and asymptomatic after radical surgery, but ordinarily the lesions are highly malignant, infiltrating locally and metastasizing to the regional nodes Distant metastasis is seldom a prominent clinical feature. In the case of the submandibular gland the tumor may simulate osteomyelitis of the mandible or an abscess in the gland itself, and if such lesions are incised a chronic sinus is liable to persist until radical treatment is undertaken. (Evans and Cruickshank, Epithelial Tumours of the Salivary Glands, Vol. 1, p. 254) Given the preceding medical evaluations, we affirm the findings of the public respondents which found no proof that the deceased's working conditions have indeed caused or increased the risk of her contracting her illness.

Before his death on September 8, 1976, Alberto Navalta was employed as Port Administration Checker in the Office of the Special Commissioner on Port Administration, Bureau of Customs. It appears that his actual duties consisted of controlling receipts, storing and distributing supplies and equipment; conducting periodic inventory supplies, materials and equipment; disposing obsolete and unserviceable properties; and doing related work. Sometime in August, 1976, while deceased was assigned at warehouse 12 to assist in the inventory of properties of the defunct CAS per Office Order NO. 15-76, he suddenly complained of extreme abdominal pain, for which reason, he was confined at the Philippine General Hospital for nineteen (19) days. He died in the hospital on September 8, 1976 due to Cancer of the Pancreas. Deceased's widow filed a claim for income benefits with the Government Service Insurance System. On the basis of a finding that deceased's fatal ailment, Cancer of the Pancreas, is not an occupational disease, the System denied compensation to the claimant. ... (p. 18, Rollo) After the respondent Commission affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System, the petitioner went to this Court on petition for review. The petitioner alleges that the deceased as a member of the customs inventory team and later as port administration checker was exposed to various cargoes stored inside warehouses, which included carbons, ink, concentrated toners and chemicals such as alphanaphtylamine, betanaphtylamine, or bensidrine auramine or magenta in their raw forms. The petitioner argues that since the deceased's cancer has spread to the gallbladder, it may be concluded that papilloma of the bladder, which is listed in the employee's compensation law as an occupational disease, was one of the causes of his death.

120

The petitioner's views have no merit. Since the deceased's ailment is not an occupational disease listed by the Employees' Compensation Commission, it became incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that the employee's working conditions increased the risk of his contracting the fatal illness (Bonifacio v. Government Service Insurance System, 146 SCRA 276). This task was not satisfactorily discharged by the petitioner. As a general rule, cancer is a disease of still unknown origin which strikes people in all walks of life, employed or unemployed (Milano v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 52). Unless it be shown that a particular form of cancer is caused by specific working conditions or environment, we cannot conclude that it was the employment which increased the risk of contracting the disease. The nature of cancer of the pancreas is discussed by a medical authority as follows: Cancer of the Pancreas Gen. Considerations. Carcinoma of the pancreas is now the 4th commonest cancer causing death in the US; only cancer of the lung, colon and breast occur more frequently... The disease is more common in males than females (1.5:1), and the peak incidence is between the ages 60 to 70. Although the etiologic factors in most cases are not known, incidence of carcinoma of the pancreas is 2.0 to 2.5 times greater in smokers than in non-smokers, and about 2 times greater in patients with diabetes mellitus. Patients with calcific pancreatitis also have an increased incidence of pancreatic carcinoma. Some reports have suggested an association between heavy coffee intake and increased risk of pancreatic cancer, but whether a true causal relationship exists is uncertain. The tumors are usually adenocarcinomas arising from ductal epithelium. The head of the pancreas is involved in about 65%, the body and tail in 30 percent, and the tail alone is 5%. At the time of diagnosis the tumor is confined to the pancreas in only 15% of patients; 25% demonstrate local invasion or regional lymph node spread, and the remaining 60% exhibit distinct metastases. (Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, 10th Ed., p. 1845) These medical findings support the evaluation of the Government Service Insurance System that "(P)ancreatic carcinoma is a malignant new growth of the said organ, characterized by loss of weight, pain and yellowish discoloration of the skin. It affects predominantly patients over forty-five (45) years of age. Predisposing factors are age, sex, genetic influence and presence of diabetes mellitus. Diabetic patients are believed to have increased susceptibility to the disease. (p. 19, Rollo) We do not find merit in the petitioner's contention that Mr. Navalta's cancer was caused by his exposure to certain chemicals. As the respondent Commission opined "exposure to the (above named) chemicals is the risk involved in the contracting of cancer of the epithelial lining of the bladder." (p. 19, Rollo) The petitioner's contention that cancer of the bladder was also one of the causes of her husband's death was correctly denied due to the fact that the employee's bladder was affected as a result of metastatic spread only. The real and direct cause of his death remains cancer of the pancreas. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The decisions of the Government Service Insurance System and the Employees' Compensation Commission are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. 121

G.R. No. L-45484 April 8, 1988 ZOSIMO CAPACIO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (Bureau of Public Schools) respondent. GANCAYCO, J.: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission (WCC) denying the claim of petitioner Zosimo Capacio for compensation benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act against respondent Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of Public Schools. The petitioner was an elementary grade public school teacher assigned in Barrio Matambong, Palapag, Northern Samar. He started working as a substitute teacher and progressed to that of a regular teacher. His service covered a span of 33 years. Finding himself suffering from peptic ulcer, hypertension and schistosomiasis he retired from the government, service on August 13, 1974 at the age of 60 years. Immediately upon retirement he was called to the Workmen's Compensation Commission Regional Office in Samar for medical check-up by the office physicians. These ailments complained of started from March 19, 1973 and continuously bothered the petitioner up to August 13, 1974, his last day of work. After this medical examination on the petitioner, and after the lapse of almost a month he was treated up to September 15, 1974. A further examination was conducted on August 13, 1974, when an EKG test was taken. He stopped teaching after August 13, 1974. Another EKG examination of petitioner was made on July 22, 1975. He sought workmen's compensation after this disabling sickness. The claim of the petitioner was initially heard by the hearing officer, Romeo M. Resuello of Regional Office No. 9, Department of Labor, Tacloban City, Leyte. After the hearing, petitioner was awarded the amount of P5,693.57 as sickness compensation and reimbursement of medical and hospital expenses on November 24, 1975. The award statesIt appearing upon perusal of the records, that claimant Zosimo C. Capacio contracted illness (Peptic ulcer, hypertension and schistosomiasis on March 19,1973, which either supervened in the course of his employment as a public school teacher (with an average weekly wage of P90.53) of the respondent, or was aggravated by or the result of the nature of such employment, and it appearing further that the respondent failed to controvert the claimant's right to compensation within 14 days from the date of disability or within 10 days from knowledge thereof, pursuant to Section 45 of the Act, as amended, resulting as it did, in the loss of its non-jurisdictional defense and ultimate admission of the compensability or work connection of claimant's illness, an outright award of compensation in favor of the claimant is, under the circumstance, in order. 1 The dispositive portion of this award states: Award, therefore, is hereby entered in favor of the claimant of the aforementioned compensation benefits, and the respondent is directed to pay the following:

1. To the claimant, thru this Office, the sum of FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED NINETY-THREE PESOS and FIFTY-SEVEN centavos (P5,693.57) as compensation and reimbursement for medical and hospital expenses; 2. To this Office, the amount of FIFTY SEVEN PESOS (P57.00) as fee, pursuant to Sec. 55 of the Act. A motion for reconsideration of this Award was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General. The Workmen's Compensation Commission, upon review, reversed the aforesaid award. The Workmen's Compensation Commission took exception to the findings of the Regional Labor Office and reached a contrary opinion. In its Decision, the Commission said: Gleaned from the record of this case, claimant had alleged to have been sick of the aforementioned illness sometime on March 19, 1973 and stopped working on August 13, 1974. This was also the exact date when he retired, It is sad to note however, that nowhere in the records could We find any documentary evidence which would substantiate claimant's allegations. While it is true that Dr. Ramon Rabino was once his attending physician, the first and last treatment was conducted only on September 15, 1974, which was one month after the employer-employee relationship had ceased to exist. True, that there is attached to the record on EKG results, likewise, the same should not be given any evidentiary value, it appearing that it was conducted only last July 22, 1975, Of course, there is a showing that claimant was on leave from July 22 to August 13, 1974, there is no showing that it was on account of the; illness subject of this claim. his Commission believes that the aforementioned leave of absence was merely preparatory to his retirement, which eventually took effect on August 13, 1974. This Commission is further convinced that claimant retired not as a result of any disabling illness, but rather with the sole aim and purpose of enjoying the benefits afforded him by the Retirement Law after rendering 33 years of service with the government and reaching the age of 60. 2 We reverse. The records of the case reveal that the petitioner suffered from peptic ulcer, hypertension and schistosomiasis Feeling that he could not withstand the rigors and continuous strain of his teaching job with his assignment in a remote barrio which entailed the stamina of walking for one and one-half hours, he retired on his 60th birthday. All along he could have served the whole length of a normal civil service tenure of work with the retirement age of 65. He served a continuous 33 years. His daily hike from the town proper passing through rivers, creeks, streams and rough roads, trails and woodland affected his health. The streams in that region were infested with parasitic worms known as schistosoma haematobium. Indeed, this physical strain took a toll upon his health. It does not take a stretch of the imagination to conclude that this strain had its consequence and adversely affected his health. There is on record the fact that after retirement, he immediately filed his claim for sickness compensation with the Department of Labor Regional Office No. 9, Workmen's Compensation Unit in Tacloban City. He submitted himself to medical examination by the physician of the Workmen's Compensation Unit. After this examination, the medical officer studied his case and then ordered that the petitioner be hospitalized in Tacloban City. These facts show that the illness of the petitioner occurred during the course of his employment. 122

The petitioner took the Commission to task for not taking into consideration the mandatory provision of Section 45, Act No. 3428, as amended, wherein the employer (in this case the Bureau of Public Schools) is given up to 14 days from disability, or 10 days after it had knowledge of the alleged illness, to controvert the right of the claimant; otherwise, by operation of law, the employer waives or renounces the right to dispute its liability for said compensation. This provision has been consistently applied by this Court when a condition of this nature confronts Us. In Manila Railroad Co. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission and Crispin Pineda, 3 We ruled: "The company's failure to controvert the claim on time amounts to a renunciation of the right to dispute compensability." Again, in Dinaro vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 4 We set aside the Commission's dismissal of the claim made by a clerical aide in the District Engineer's Office in Marawi City who contracted pulmonary tuberculosis and rheumatism in the course of his employment. This Court held: The Commission inexplicably failed to apply the express mandate of Section 45 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and issue outright an award, since a failure to controvert is a renunciation of the right, to challenge the claim and a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defenses and there is nothing that the employer can legally prove in relation thereto. Regarding the point of presumption of compensability, We had occasion to rule as follows: Once the illness supervened in the course of employment, rebuttable presumption arises that such illness arose out of or was at least aggravated by such employment and the burden to overthrow such presumption shifts to the employer ... 5 Lately, in Buyco vs. Secretary of Labor 6 We ruled that the presumption of compensability shifts the burden of proof on the employer to show the contrary. Where the illness supervened during the time of employment, there was rebuttable presumption that the illness arose out of or at least was aggravated by the employment. 7 Thus, the government's stand that failure to file an employer's report did not divest the Workmen's Compensation Commission of its power to review the Decision of the Regional Office and seek reconsideration is plainly without merit. We held before that: ... Failure to seasonably controvert the compensation claim renders the claim beyond challenge and a waiver of the employer's right to do so. 8 ... Main consideration for compensability of illness is that the essential hypertension of the deceased was constracted during and by reason of her employment. 9 We also stated that an: Employer has the burden to establish the contrary to the presumtion of compensability of illness by substantial evidence. 10

Another point raised by the respondent Commission in its Decision reversing the award is that the petitioner submitted to medical treatment after the employer-employee relationship had ceased. This implies that petitioner's illness was not work connected as he got sick after his retirement; that the documents submitted proved the existence of petitioner's illness after he retired from his employment, not before. We disagree. First, there is no proof that the respondent was able to overcome the presumption under Section 44 of Act No. 3428 that the illness or injury either arose out of, or was at least aggravated by his employment. With this legal presumption, the burden of proof shifts to the employer and not the employee. Second, the petitioner's ailment occurred while he was an employee a teacher working under the hazardous conditions of that far-flung town. There is a showing that his illness was caused or was aggravated by his teaching duties. He got his schistosomiasis from his daily hike to his place of work, the barrio school. As regards a teacher's ailment, We had occasion to say that: Presumption of compensability is rendered conclusive by reason of employee's employment as barrio school teacher and working conditions which increased the risk of contracting her illness and failure of employer to rebut presumption. 11 We likewise made the following observations: Reasonable work connection, not direct causal relation between the disease and employment is the only requirement to establish compensability, 12 and actual proof of causation is not necessary to justify compensability. 13 In one of Our latest rulings on employment compensation of teachers, We opined: The teachers shall be protected against the consequences of employment injury in accordance with existing laws. The effects of the physical and nervous strain in the teacher's health shall be recognized as compensable occupational diseases in accordance with existing laws. 14 Accordingly, the Decision of the respondent Commission dated March 9, 1976 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered reinstating the original award made by the Hearing Officer of November 24,1975. No costs. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-42087 April 8, 1988 URSULA VDA. DE CLEMENTE, FOR HERSELF AND FOR HER CHILDREN NAMELY: MARITA, EDNA, AMELIA, ROBERTO, ANTONIO AND REYNALDO, ALL SURNAMED CLEMENTE, petitioners, vs. THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND RATTAN ART AND DECORATIONS INC., respondents. PADILLA, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari, treated by the Court as a special civil action., 1 of the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission 2 reversing the decision of the Acting Referee which granted death compensation benefits to the claimants. 3 The antecedents of the case are as follows: The deceased Ricardo Clemente was employed as a machine set-up man by respondent Rattan Art & Decorations, Inc., assigned to the Preparation Section, working six (6) days a week from 6: A.M. to 11:00 A.M. and from 12:00 noon to 3:00 P.M., earning a daily wage of P10.30. On 21 February 1974, at about 1:40 A.M., Ricardo Clemente, while asleep, died of acute cardiorespiratory failure, with manifest pulmonary infarct, cardiac dilatation and marked visceral congestion. 4 He was at the time of death forty-nine (49) years old. The deceased was survived by his widow, Ursula vda. de Clemente and six (6) minor children, who filed on 17 March 1975 a claim for death compensation benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, on account of the death of said deceased. In a decision, 5 dated 10 September 1975, the Acting Referee of the Workmen's Compensation Commission rendered a decision in favor of the claimants. The dispositive part of the decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondent Rattan Art and Decorations, Inc., to pay through this office and in lump sum: 1. Claimants the death compensation in the sum of SIX THOUSAND PESOS ( P6,000.00 ) plus the burial expenses in the sum of TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P200.00 ) PESOS, through Ursula Clemente, the legitimate mother of the above-named children; 2. Their counsel, Abraham M. Perez, the sum of P300.00; and 3. This Office the sum of SIXTY ONE ( P61.00 ) PESOS as fees pursuant to Section 55 of the Act, as amended.' On 22 September 1975, private respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision of the Acting Referee but the same was denied in an order dated 23 October 1975. 6 Pursuant to Section 49 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the motion for reconsideration and the records of the case were referred to the Commission for review. The decision of the acting referee was reversed, the 123

Commission upholding the allegations of the private respondent that the cause of death of the deceased is what is commonly known as "bangungot," that it is non-compensable, and that the claimants failed to establish the fundamental preliminary link to connect the death of the deceased to his work, thereby justifying a denial of the claim of herein petitioners, 7 hence, this petition. Petitioners claim that the work of the deceased was not only strenuous but debilitating and weakening on the constitution of the deceased, so much so that in the years 1973-1974, he was always complaining of dizziness, severe cough, chest and back pains, over-fatigue and was later found to be suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis (PTB) and heart failure. 8 However, no proof was submitted by petitioners to substantiate their allegations as to the ailments of the decedent prior to his death. 9 It is further contended by petitioners that it is for convenience, rather than for accuracy, that some medical practitioners call or brand the causes of death similar to that of the deceased in this case as "bangungot" but the fact is, that no inference was ever made in the "post mortem certificate of death" that the late Ricardo Clemente died of "bangungot." 10 The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the cause of the death of the deceased had a causal relation to the nature of his work while in private respondent's employ. To be entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the illness which resulted in the death of the employee must be directly caused by his employment or either aggravated by, or the result of the nature of his employment. 11 In the interpretation of this rule, the Court has adopted a liberal stand to give effect to the compassionate spirit of the law as a social legislation, and has ruled that what the law merely requires is a reasonable work connection and not a direct causal relation of the illness or ailment to the job or working conditions present in the course of the performance of one's duties. 12 The degree of proof required to establish work-connection between the disabling ailment and the working conditions is merely substantial evidence, or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 13 In testing the evidence on the relation between the injury or disease and the employment, probability and not certainty is the touchstone. 14 Moreover, when illness supervenes during employment, there is a disputable presumption that the claim is compensable. The claimant is relieved of the duty to show causation as it is then legally presumed that the illness arose out of the employment. 15 The law presumes, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that the claim for death or disability benefits is compensable. The burden to disconnect, by substantial evidence, the injury or sickness from the nature of the employment is laid at the employer's door. So rigid is this rule that, even where the cause of the employee's death is unknown, the right to compensation subsists. The reason for this is, that the Workmen's Compensation Act is a social legislation. It is designed to give relief to the working man. To give effect to this purpose, the Act must be liberally construed in favor of the worker. 16 The exact medical cause of the illness of an employee is not significant for, granted for the sake of argument that the evidence of the claimant is insufficient to establish a causal link between the nature of his employment and his ailment under the provisions of Section 44 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, still, it is to be presumed that the illness which supervened at the time of his employment, either arose out of or was at least aggravated by, such employment. 17 This presumption, rebuttable at its inception, becomes conclusive upon the failure of the respondent employer to overcome the same. 18 In the instant case, the deceased was found to have died of acute cardiorespiratory failure during his sleep, commonly known as 'heart failure" and not of what respondent claims as "bangungot." While it 124

is true that the claimants failed to prove the causal link between the cause of the death of the deceased to the nature of his work, yet, the Court cannot discount the probability that his work, as a set-up man, caused or aggravated his illness that led to his death. Considering the nature of the job of the decedent, it may be fairly concluded that the strenuous physical activity required in the performance of his duties caused a heavy strain on his heart, which ultimately resulted in death. It is claimed by petitioners that the deceased was also suffering from PTB, and medical science has already established that any chronic lung disease, such as tuberculosis, may lead to a pulmonary heart disease. 19 The allegation of respondents that the medical records of the deceased, prior to his death, reveal that he was in good health 20 and the fact that the death of the decedent occurred at a time when he was already off from work is not material; the main consideration for granting death compensation to petitioners is the fact that the illness which resulted in the death of the deceased supervened in the course of his employment. The contention that the deceased had no history of cardiac ailment strengthens the presumption that his fatal heart attack, during the period of his employment, was work-connected or aggravated thereby and therefore compensable. 21 Respondents' claim that the cause of the decedent's death is 'bangungot," is without legal or medical basis, for it is apparent from the "Post Mortem Certificate of Death" that the deceased died of heart failure. The real cause of "bangungot" has remained a mystery up to the present, and no medical explanation has so far been established to unravel this phenomenon. There are several theories submitted in an attempt to explain the reason or cause for the death of reported victims of 'bangungot;' however, the exact cause of death is still unknown. However, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the deceased indeed died due to 'bangungot," still in Mercado, Jr. v. ECC 22 it was held that where the causes of an ailment are unknown and undetermined even by medical science, the requirement of proof of causal link between the ailment and the working conditions should be liberalized. The Court said: ... The point is that it is grossly inequitable to require as a condition for an award of compensation that the claimant demonstrate that his ailment the cause or origin of which is unknown to and undetermined even by medical science was, in fact caused or the risk of contracting the same enhanced by his working conditions. Plainly, the condition would be an impossible one, specially considering that said claimant is most probably not even conversant with the intricacies of medical science and the claimant invariably bereft of the material resources to employ medical experts to demonstrate the connection between the cause and the disease. Considering the liberal character of employment compensation schemes, the impossible condition should be deemed as not having been intended and/or imposed. Verily, by permitting compensation notwithstanding the absence of any showing of causal link between the ailment whose Causes are unknown and the working conditions which may be the probable origins of said ailment, We merely accede to the dictates of the social justice provisions of the Constitution. Where the causes are known, determined or determinable, the claimant must prove reasonable work- connection in order to receive compensation otherwise, the parity or balance between the competing interests of employer and employee with respect to Workmen's Compensation is destroyed. (Sulit v. ECC, L-48602 [June 30, 1980]). Where, however, the causes of an ailment are unknown to and/or undetermined even by medical science, the requirement of proof of any causal link between the ailment and the working conditions should be liberalized so that those who have less in life will have more in law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission, dated 27 November 1975, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and, in lieu thereof, a new one is entered AFFIRMING the decision of the Acting Referee, dated 10 September 1975. No costs. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.

1. To pay to the claimant, thru this Unit, the sum of FOUR THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTY-THREE AND FORTY-FIVE CENTAVOS (P 4,963.45) representing disability benefits computed as follows: Claimant's disability began on January 30,1970 and up to October 15, 1975, date of decision, is 2,183 days or 296 6/7 weeks equals P4,963.45. (Section 14) 2. To pay to the claimant, thru this Unit, a weekly compensation of Pl6.72 beginning October 16, 1975 and weekly thereafter until his illness is declared arrested by competent authority but in no case shall the total benefits exceed P6,000.00 including the first lump sum; (Section 14) 3. To pay Mr. Feliciano Reyes, 339 Elizondo St., Quiapo, Manila, the sum of TWO HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT PESOS AND TWENTY CENTAVOS (P248.20) as attorney's fee under Section 55 of the Act, as amended. Respondent is further ordered to pay to this Unit, the sum of P 50.00 by way of decision fee pursuant to Section 55 of the Act, as amended. SO ORDERED. Private respondents appealed said decision to the Workmen's Compensation Commission. On 30 December 1975, the Commission reversed the decision of the hearing officer, thus absolving private respondents from any liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act; hence, this petition for review on certiorari. 6 The main issue presented for resolution in this case is whether or not the Workmen's Compensation Commission erred in reversing the decision of the hearing officer holding private respondents liable to petitioner. Before resolving the main issue in this appeal, we will resolve the incidental issue of the timeliness of the filing of this petition. Private respondents allege that this petition was filed out of time. In turn, petitioner claims that he received a copy of the WCC decision, dated 30 December 1975, only on 4 March 1977, after he went to the Department of Labor office in San Pablo City to verify the status of his claim. Under the rules of the Workmen's Compensation Commission, the decision of a Commissioner or referee is appealable to the Commission en bancwithin ten (10) days from receipt of the decision; however, an appeal from the decision of the Commission en banc, through a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court may be taken within fifteen (15) days from receipt or notice of the Commission's decision. 7 The petitioner, in the case at bar, filed with this Court on 14 March 1977 his first motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari. The petition itself was filed on 13 April 1977, or within the extended period granted by the Court. It is further alleged by private respondents that copy of the WCC decision was served upon petitioner's representative, Mr. Feliciano Reyes, 8 on 18 February 1976, as evidenced by a copy of the notice of the decision.9 Upon careful examination of said notice of decision addressed to both petitioner's representative and to private respondents' counsel, we note that there is only one initial of the recipient thereof, and this appears at the bottom part of said notice together with the date and time of receipt, but it does not state as to whether it was received on behalf of petitioner's representative or for private respondents' counsel. Neither does the certification issued by the 125

G.R. No. L-45785 March 21, 1988 EDUARDO LAGINLIN, petitioner, vs. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and CANLUBANG SUGAR ESTATE, C.J. YULO and SONS,respondents. PADILLA, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the now defunct Workmen's Compensation Commission absolving private respondents Canlubang Sugar Estate and C.J. Yulo and Sons from any liability to the petitioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Petitioner Eduardo Laginlin started his employment with the private respondents as a field worker on 12 December 1955, with specific duties to plant sugarcane and weed the sugarcane plantation owned by respondents, working seven (7) days a week from Monday to Sunday, with a salary of P4.60 a day. In 1967, and while working for the private respondents, petitioner started to suffer an illness which, according to the diagnosis of private respondents' physician, Dr. Bunye, was pulmonary tuberculosis. Petitioner was treated as an outpatient and was given free medicine by private respondents while he continued to perform his work. Despite said treatment, petitioner's health failed to improve, and as a consequence, Dr. Bunye recommended his retirement and, on that basis, he was retired effective 30 January 1970, receiving a disability retirement benefit from the private respondents in the amount of P1,800.00. 2 On 15 February 1975, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act for the ailment which he contracted as a result of his employment, docketed as R05-W.C. Case No. C-2772. 3 To facilitate the disposition of all unresolved cases pending before the Workmen's Compensation Unit of San Pablo City, the parties were required to submit their affidavit and counter affidavit to sustain their respective stands. Private respondents failed to seasonably controvert the claim of petitioner by not submitting their counter affidavit; thus, the case was deemed submitted for resolution on the merits. 4 On 15 October 1975, a decision 5 was rendered by the hearing officer in favor of petitioner. The dispositive part of the decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the claimant and against the respondent, the latter is directed as follows:

Workmen's Compensation Unit of San Pablo City that the case was terminated and considered closed as of 21 December 1976, 10 prove that copy of the 30 December 1975 decision of the Commission had been served upon the petitioner or his representative. Another piece of evidence presented by private respondents to prove their claim that the decision of the Commission has already become final and unappealable is a xerox copy of the registry return receipt addressed to petitioner's representative which is not, however, numbered or postmarked at all by the post office. 11 But assuming that this petition for certiorari was filed out of time, a few days of delay in filing the petition should not deprive herein petitioner of his right to appeal, based on a mere technicality and where the decision appealed from is blatantly erroneous in denying the petitioner his right to disability compensation under the law. Dismissal of appeals based on purely technical grounds should be frowned upon. A hearing, on the merits, ofbona fide appeals should be encouraged. Rules of procedure are intended to promote not to defeat substantial justice; therefore, they should be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. 12 In Serrano vs. Court of Appeals,13 it was held that: And even assuming that a petition for review is filed a few days late, where strong considerations of substantial justice are manifest in the petition, this Court may relax the stringent application of technical rules in the exercise of our equity jurisdiction. In addition to the basic merits of the main case, such a petition usually embodies justifying circumstances which warrant our heeding the petitioner's cry for justice, inspire of the earlier negligence of counsel. Furthermore, the objective of the Workmen's Compensation Act is to secure workmen and their dependents from becoming objects of charity, by providing for a reasonable compensation for such accidental calamities as are incidental to their employment. 14 As a social legislation, its provisions should be interpreted liberally to give effect to its purpose and the Rules of Court are merely suppletory in the application of such Act. Coming now to the merits of the case, it is evident that the Workmen's Compensation Commission committed a grave error in absolving private respondents from liability. Ample jurisprudence has now been established that, where the illness or disease was contracted by the employee in the course of his employment, said employee is entitled to disability compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Compensability is presumed where illness supervened during employment and, with the presumption of compensability of illness, the burden of proof is shifted to the employer and the employee is relieved of the duty to show causation. 15 An x-ray examination is not even essential to prove the claim of the petitioner for disability compensation due to illness which he contracted while under the employ of private respondents. In fact, it was private respondents' company physician who examined the petitioner and, finding him to be suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis, made a recommendation for petitioner's retirement before he reaches the retirable age under the law. In view of the approval by private respondents of the petitioner's early retirement, the fact of his disability was placed beyond question or doubt. 16 Furthermore, the disease of tuberculosis is an occupational disease or work-connected in such occupations, as that of a teacher, laborer, driver, land inspector and other similar occupations; hence compensable. 17 As held in Aribon v. WCC, (139 SCRA 492):

In this case, however, it is patent from the records that the diagnosis of the petitioner's illness was clinically obvious. The petitioner had undergone examination by three doctors who uniformly attested to the fact of his ailment was peptic ulcer. The petitioner was initially treated by the respondent company's Canlubang Hospital and no less than its own company doctor diagnosed his ailment as peptic ulcer and recommended him for retirement. There was no need, therefore, for the petitioner to produce any G.I. Series. Since the case of Vallo v. Workmen's Compensation Commission (73 SCRA 623 [1976]) this Court has categorically ruled in unbroken line of cases, the most recent of which isDonato Jereza v. Workmen's Compensation Commission (G.R. No. L- 42916, August 7, 1985) that a medical report of an attending physician may be received as evidence and used as proof of the fact in dispute and that an x-ray or some other laboratory report may sometimes be dispensed with. Moreover, private respondents during the initial stage of the case before the hearing officer of the Commission, failed to controvert or refute the claim of petitioner, as a result of which, the presumption of compensability became conclusive, and the claimant was no longer required to substantiate his claim for compensation. 18 The holding of the Commission to the effect that it finds no valid reason to sustain the grant of disability benefit to petitioner because the report of Dr. Eusebio Panganiban, the attending physician with a finding that the petitioner is suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis far advanced, appears to be tampered and that no other evidence was presented, is not sufficient to overthrow the presumption of compensability. As held by this Court, the evidence necessary to destroy the legal presumption of compensability must do more than create a doubt. It should be such as a reasonable mind must accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 19 The early retirement of an employee due to work-related ailment proves that indeed the employee was disabled totally to further perform his assigned task, and to deny permanent total disability benefits when he was forced to retire would subvert the very essence and purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act to implement the social justice provision of the Constitution. 20 Where an employee was forced to retire at an early age due to his illness, and illness persisted even after retirement, resulting in his present unemployment, such condition amounts to total disability which should entitle him to the maximum benefits allowed by law. 21 The fact that petitioner received a retirement benefit from his employer does not bar him from being entitled to a disability compensation benefit under the Workmen's Compensation Act, having in mind that the purpose of the disability benefit is separate and distinct from the retirement benefit given to an employee upon reaching the age of retirement. The disability benefit under the Act is to compensate the worker for his actual loss, for his disablement to earn wages in the same kind of work which he is engaged in, or work of similar nature. On the other hand, the retirement benefit is intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his life, lessening the burden of worrying for his financial support and as a form of reward for his loyalty and service to the employer. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission, dated 30 December 1975, is REVERSED and a new one is hereby entered AFFIRMING the decision of the hearing officer of the Workmen's Compensation Unit of San Pablo City, dated 15 October 1975, This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.

126

G.R. No. L-48594 March 16, 1988 GENEROSO ALANO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent. GUTTIERREZ, JR., J.:

and is "ategorical in that the injury must have been sustained at work while at the workplace, or elsewhere while executing an order from the employer." (Rollo, p. 44) The Government Service Insurance System which received a copy of the Court's resolution requiring the parties to submit their memoranda, however manifests that it does not appear to be a party to the case because it had not been impleaded as a party thereto. We rule in favor of the petitioner.

The only issue in this case is whether or not the injury sustained by the deceased Dedicacion de Vera resulting in her death is compensable under the law as an employment accident. The facts as found by the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission are as follows: Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee during her lifetime, worked as principal of Salinap Community School in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Her tour of duty was from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A.M., while she was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to the school, she was bumped and run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted in her instantaneous death. She is survived by her four sons and a daughter. On June 27, 1977, Generoso C. Alano, brother of the deceased, filed the instant claim for in come benefit with the GSIS for and in behalf of the decedent's children. The claim was, however, denied on the same date on the ground that the "injury upon which compensation is being claimed is not an employment accident satisfying all the conditions prescribed by law." On July 19, 1977 appellant requested for a reconsideration of the system's decision, but the same was denied and the records of the case were elevated to this Commission for review. (Rollo, p. 12) The respondent Commission affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System. It stated that Section I (a), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation specifically provides that: "For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all the following conditions (1) The employee must have sustained the injury during his working hours; (2) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; and (3) The employee must have been performing his official functions." (Rollo, p. 13) According to the respondent Commission, the deceased's accident did not meet any of the aforementioned conditions. First, the accident occured at about 7:00 a.m. or thirty minutes before the deceased's working hours. Second, it happened not at her workplace but at the plaza where she usually waits for a ride to her work. Third, she was not then performing her official functions as school principal nor was she on a special errand for the school. The case, therefore, was dismissed. The petitioner then went to this Court on petition for review on certiorari. He alleges that the deceased's accident has "arisen out of or in the course of her employment." The respondent Commission reiterates its views and contends that the present provision of law on employment injury is different from that provided in the old Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428) 127

This case does not come to us with a novel issue. In the earlier case of Vda. de Torbela v. Employees' Compensation Commission (96 SCRA 260,263,264) which has a similar factual background, this Court held: It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he was on his way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran Negros Occidental where the school of which he was the principal was located and that at the time of the accident he had in his possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his residence on the eve of his death. The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is going to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment. In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school principal's being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there. As to the Government Service Insurance System's manifestation, we hold that it is not fatal to this case that it was not impleaded as a party respondent. As early as the case of La O v. Employees' Compensation Commission, (97 SCRA 782) up to Cabanero v. Employees' Compensation Commission (111 SCRA 413) and recently, Clemente v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No. L-47521, August 31,1987), this Court has ruled that the Government Service Insurance System is a proper party in employees' compensation cases as the ultimate implementing agency of the Employees' Compensation Commission. We held in the aforecited cases that "the law and the rules refer to the said System in all aspects of employee compensation including enforcement of decisions (Article 182 of Implementing Rules)." WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and the Government Service Insurance System is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) as death benefit and the sum of One Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P1,200.00) as attorney's fees. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 73867 February 29, 1988 TELEFAST COMMUNICATIONS/PHILIPPINE WIRELESS, INC., petitioner, vs. IGNACIO CASTRO, SR., SOFIA C. CROUCH, IGNACIO CASTRO JR., AURORA CASTRO, SALVADOR CASTRO, MARIO CASTRO, CONRADO CASTRO, ESMERALDA C. FLORO, AGERICO CASTRO, ROLANDO CASTRO, VIRGILIO CASTRO AND GLORIA CASTRO, and HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,respondents. PADILLA, J.: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Intermediate Appellate Court, dated 11 February 1986, in AC-G.R. No. CV-70245, entitled "Ignacio Castro, Sr., et al., PlaintiffsAppellees, versus Telefast Communication/Philippine Wireless, Inc., Defendant-Appellant." The facts of the case are as follows: On 2 November 1956, Consolacion Bravo-Castro wife of plaintiff Ignacio Castro, Sr. and mother of the other plaintiffs, passed away in Lingayen, Pangasinan. On the same day, her daughter Sofia C. Crouch, who was then vacationing in the Philippines, addressed a telegram to plaintiff Ignacio Castro, Sr. at 685 Wanda, Scottsburg, Indiana, U.S.A., 47170 announcing Consolacion's death. The telegram was accepted by the defendant in its Dagupan office, for transmission, after payment of the required fees or charges. The telegram never reached its addressee. Consolacion was interred with only her daughter Sofia in attendance. Neither the husband nor any of the other children of the deceased, then all residing in the United States, returned for the burial. When Sofia returned to the United States, she discovered that the wire she had caused the defendant to send, had not been received. She and the other plaintiffs thereupon brought action for damages arising from defendant's breach of contract. The case was filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan and docketed therein as Civil Case No. 15356. The only defense of the defendant was that it was unable to transmit the telegram because of "technical and atmospheric factors beyond its control." 1 No evidence appears on record that defendant ever made any attempt to advise the plaintiff Sofia C. Crouch as to why it could not transmit the telegram. The Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, after trial, ordered the defendant (now petitioner) to pay the plaintiffs (now private respondents) damages, as follows, with interest at 6% per annum: 1. Sofia C. Crouch, P31.92 and P16,000.00 as compensatory damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages. 2. Ignacio Castro Sr., P20,000.00 as moral damages. 3. Ignacio Castro Jr., P20,000.00 as moral damages. 4. Aurora Castro, P10,000.00 moral damages.

5. Salvador Castro, P10,000.00 moral damages. 6. Mario Castro, P10,000.00 moral damages. 7. Conrado Castro, P10,000 moral damages. 8. Esmeralda C. Floro, P20,000.00 moral damages. 9. Agerico Castro, P10,000.00 moral damages. 10. Rolando Castro, P10,000.00 moral damages. 11. Virgilio Castro, P10,000.00 moral damages. 12. Gloria Castro, P10,000.00 moral damages. Defendant is also ordered to pay P5,000.00 attorney's fees, exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000.00 to each of the plaintiffs and costs. 2 On appeal by petitioner, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision but eliminated the award of P16,000.00 as compensatory damages to Sofia C. Crouch and the award of P1,000.00 to each of the private respondents as exemplary damages. The award of P20,000.00 as moral damages to each of Sofia C. Crouch, Ignacio Castro, Jr. and Esmeralda C. Floro was also reduced to P120,000. 00 for each. 3 Petitioner appeals from the judgment of the appellate court, contending that the award of moral damages should be eliminated as defendant's negligent act was not motivated by "fraud, malice or recklessness." In other words, under petitioner's theory, it can only be held liable for P 31.92, the fee or charges paid by Sofia C. Crouch for the telegram that was never sent to the addressee thereof. Petitioner's contention is without merit. Art. 1170 of the Civil Code provides that "those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages." Art. 2176 also provides that "whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done." In the case at bar, petitioner and private respondent Sofia C. Crouch entered into a contract whereby, for a fee, petitioner undertook to send said private respondent's message overseas by telegram. This, petitioner did not do, despite performance by said private respondent of her obligation by paying the required charges. Petitioner was therefore guilty of contravening its obligation to said private respondent and is thus liable for damages.

128

This liability is not limited to actual or quantified damages. To sustain petitioner's contrary position in this regard would result in an inequitous situation where petitioner will only be held liable for the actual cost of a telegram fixed thirty (30) years ago. We find Art. 2217 of the Civil Code applicable to the case at bar. It states: "Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate results of the defendant's wrongful act or omission." (Emphasis supplied). Here, petitioner's act or omission, which amounted to gross negligence, was precisely the cause of the suffering private respondents had to undergo. As the appellate court properly observed: [Who] can seriously dispute the shock, the mental anguish and the sorrow that the overseas children must have suffered upon learning of the death of their mother after she had already been interred, without being given the opportunity to even make a choice on whether they wanted to pay her their last respects? There is no doubt that these emotional sufferings were proximately caused by appellant's omission and substantive law provides for the justification for the award of moral damages. 4 We also sustain the trial court's award of P16,000.00 as compensatory damages to Sofia C. Crouch representing the expenses she incurred when she came to the Philippines from the United States to testify before the trial court. Had petitioner not been remiss in performing its obligation, there would have been no need for this suit or for Mrs. Crouch's testimony. The award of exemplary damages by the trial court is likewise justified and, therefore, sustained in the amount of P1,000.00 for each of the private respondents, as a warning to all telegram companies to observe due diligence in transmitting the messages of their customers. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision appealed from is modified so that petitioner is held liable to private respondents in the following amounts: (1) P10,000.00 as moral damages, to each of private respondents; (2) P1,000.00 as exemplary damages, to each of private respondents; (3) P16,000.00 as compensatory damages, to private respondent Sofia C. Crouch; (4) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees; and (5) Costs of suit. SO ORDERED. 129

G.R. No. L-65216 December 1, 1987 FLERIDA OVENSON, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,respondents. PARAS, J.: This is a Petition to Review the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 2009 dated August 30, 1983, affirming the decision of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), to wit: Flerida Ovenson, appellant herein, elevated her case to this Commission for review of the decision of the respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) denying her claim for benefits under PD 626, as amended, for the death of her husband due to adenocarcinoma of the rectum. Records show that the late Serafin Ovenson started working in 1955 as laborer in the Central Bank of the Philippines and later on rose to various posts until he was appointed senior trade analyst. His duties include: assisting the supervising trade examiner in reviewing the verification, examination and evaluation work made by a group of trade analysts on reports of foreign sales, export declarations/permits and mark-up computation reports of embroidery exporters; preparing reports and memoranda on findings relative to pricing, payment terms and other conditions of sale which do not conform to export regulations; preparing periodic accomplishment reports and other duties that may be assigned to him by his superior from time to time. On March 29, 1981, Ovenson was confined at the Delos Santos General Hospital due to on-and-off LBM which started about one-and-a-half months before. This symptom was later accompanied by rise of temperature in the afternoon, Dr. Violeta Roda, diagnosed his condition as "septicemia ,adenocarcinoma rectum and hypothyroidism." The patient was sent home on May 4, 1981 after undergoing proctoscopy and chemotherapy. Two days later, on May 6, he succcumed to adenocarcinoma of the rectum at the age of 49 years. The claim for death benefits filed by the widow under PD 626, as amended, was denied by the respondent System based on its medical evaluation that the fatal ailment, a malignant new growth of the rectum which commences in the mucous membrane and gradually invades the deeper structure is attributed to genetic influence. Appellant requested reconsideration of respondent's adverse ruling. However, her request was also turned down by respondent reiterating its previous stand that the ailment which resulted in the decedent's death is not in the lease causally related to his duties and conditions of work. Hence, this appeal. We have carefully reviewed the records and we believe that respondent System did not err in disallowing the instant claim. From our study of the etiology of the

ailment in question, we failed to find any basis for attributing the same to the deceased's employment. According to medical authorities, adenocarcinoma of the rectum and lower sigmoid comprises approximately 7% of all malignant tumors of the body. Men are affected more commonly than women in the ratio of 3:2. While no age is exempt, the most common decade for the occurrence of this form of cancer is 50-60, although many cases have been reported under the age of 30 years. Though the true etiology of cancer is as yet unknown, certain lesions may be considered pre-malignant in the rectum. This is particularly true with multiple or single polyps. Malignant lesions of the rectum are spread by direct extension, and venous and lymphatic channels. Reference: Textbook of Surgery, 3rd edition, edited by Moseley, 1959. It is evident from the foregoing medical definition that cancer of the rectum could not be caused by decedent's employment factors. We have taken into consideration the decedent's duties as senior trade analyst at the Central Bank but we could not come up with any possible link between his work and his employment (sic). Even the decedent's working environment would not to our mind contribute in any manner to the contraction of his ailment. As regards the deceased's other ailments of "septicemia and hyperthyroidism the contraction of which being not traceable to decedent's employment are not compensable under the law. In view of the foregoing, we have no recourse but to affirm respondent's decision denying the instant claim. FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from, should be as it is hereby, AFFIRMED and the instant case dismissed. SO ORDERED. Manila, Philippines. The sole issue postulated on appeal is whether or not cancer of the rectum was contracted by Serafin Ovenson by reason of his employment. Petitioner contends that the decision of the ECC overlooked the nature and conditions of employment of her late husband Serafin Ovenson. To convince Us that the illness causing the death of her husband was work- related, petitioner argues that cancer diseases may be caused by chemical, physical and parasitic carcinogens present in a man's environment. That her late husband was exposed to all these is confirmed by an examination of his employment records, petitioner alleging that during the early days of her husband's employment at the Central Bank, he worked as laborer and janitor. Petitioner claims that in those capacities, her late husband was exposed to different 130

chemicals in his painting jobs and in cleaning comfort rooms of the building with acids and disinfectants, not to mention possible parasitic infestation because of insanitary working environment. This exposure to health hazards was compounded by physical and mental stress in employment, the same stress which some scientists believe may have a much larger role in helping cancer cells to grow and that according to some experts, stress such as tension and agitation weaken the body's protective immune systems which hold some potential cancers in check (Times Journal, April 1, 1982)." 1 Claimant's contentions are palpably meritorious. Under the law 2 a "compensable sickness" means (1) any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the ECC, or 2) any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. A cursory reading of the law shows that cancer of the rectum is not listed by the ECC as one of the compensable diseases. The next question therefore is whether the working conditions of claimant's deceased husband predisposed him to contract cancer of the rectum. The record reveals that the husband of the claimant contracted the fatal disease only in 1981 or after 16 years from the time he started to work as laborer in 1955. Respondent GSIS, relying on its medical evaluation, found that the fatal illness of the deceased is attributed to genetic influence. Respondent ECC ruled that although the true cause of cancer is yet unknown, certain lesions may be considered pre-malignant in the rectum and may be aggravated during the course of employment if there is sufficient proof presented by the claimant. But as ruled by Us, this duty to prove exists only when the cause of the disease is known. In a case like the present one, even medical experts have not determined its cause, and therefore the duty to prove does not exist for it is absurd for the law to require an impossibility. Thus in the case of Mercado, Jr. v. Employees Compensation Commission, 139 SCRA 270 citing Cristobal v. ECC, 103 SCRA 329. We ruled as follows: While the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation espoused under the Workmen's Compensation Act may have abandoned under the New Labor Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is significant that the liberality of the law in general still subsists. ... As agents charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by both 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more liberal attitude in deciding claims for compensability especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection, 103 SCRA 329, 336). ... Where however, the causes of an ailment are unknown to and or undetermined even by medical science, the requirement of proof of any casual link between the ailment and the working conditions should be liberalized so that those who have less in fife will have more in law ... . ... The point is that it is grossly inequitable to require as a condition for an award of compensation that the claimant demonstrate that his ailment the cause or origin of which is unknown to and undetermined even by medical science was, in fact caused or the risk of contracting the same enhanced by his working conditions. Plainly, the condition would be an impossible one, specially considering that said claimant is most probably not even conversant with the intricacies of medical science and the claimant invariably bereft of the material resources to employ medical experts to demonstrate the connection between the

cause and the disease. Considering the liberal character of employment compensation schemes, the impossible condition should be deemed as not having been intended and/or imposed. (139 SCRA, pp. 275-276). ... As an employee, he had contributed to the funds of respondent for 34 years until his forced retirement. In turn respondent should comply with its duty to give him the fullest protection, relief and compensation benefits as guaranteed by law." (Ibid, p. 277). In the more recent case of Flaviano Nemaria, 3 Petitioner versus Employees' Compensation Commission and Government Service Insurance System (Ministry of Education and Culture), Respondents, promulgated October 28, 1987 and following the rule We enunciated in the Mercado case, We stated: Thus the requirement that the disease was caused or aggravated by the employment or work applies only to an illness where the cause can be determined or proved. Where cause is unknown or cannot be ascertained, no duty to prove the link exists. For certainly, the law cannot demand an impossibility. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Employees Compensation Commission is SET ASIDE and another is rendered ordering the respondents to pay the herein petitioner the fun amount of compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626 as amended. SO ORDERED.

conducted at the St. Paul's Hospital in Tacloban City revealed a diagnosis of adnocarcinoma of the ileocaecal junction (a certain portion of the small intestine). She underwent "exploratory laparotomy with resection of ileocaecal junction" but her ailment continued to recur. She filed a claim for disability benefits under PD 626, as amended, with respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). The claim was, however, denied by the GSIS on the ground that her ailment is not an occupational disease considering her particular employment as telegraph operator. Not satisfied, she sent a letter to the Chairman of respondent Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) Minister Blas F. Ople, requesting for a review of her case. She averred that her cancer should be considered by the system as work-connected since she acquired the same during her sixteen (16) years of employment. On Nov. 22, 1980, Leticia Mora died. Her appeal to the ECC which was prosecuted by her husband after her death, was denied, the ECC ruling that the illness which caused Leticia Mora's death is not workconnected. Hence, this petition which We find to be meritorious. The law applicable to the case at bar is the New Labor Code, PD 442, as amended, which covers injury, sickness, disability or death occurring on or after January 1, 1975. The new law on employee's compensation makes compensable disability or death arising from an ailment under any of the following grounds namely: (a) when the illness is definitely accepted as an occupational disease by the Employees' Compensation Commission, or (b) when said illness is caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the work conditions. Thus, the New Labor Code particularly Art. 167 (1) as amended by PD 1368, defining compensable illness, provides: (1) "Sickness" means any illness definitely accepted as occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is empowered to determine and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment. (As amended by Sec. 1, PD 1368). Implementing the foregoing provision, the Employees' Compensation Commission promulgated its amended Rules, Section 1 (b), Rule III , of which provides: Sec. 1 (b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under "ANNEX "A" of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied, otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. The cause of the decedent's death, is not listed in said Annex "A" as occupational disease. To be compensable thereby the law requires that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the employment of the deceased. But this requisite proof can be given only if the cause of the disease cancer can itself be known. However, despite scientific advances on the matter, even professional experts have not as yet determine its cause. All that they can say regarding the ailment of the deceased is the following: Adenocarcinoma ileocaecal junction is malignancy affecting a certain portion of the small intestines. 131

G.R. No. L-62157 December 1, 1987 EULALIO MORA JR., in representation of his deceased wife, LETICIA ADOR MORA petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and the GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Bureau of Telecommunication), respondents. PARAS, J.: This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside and annul the decision dated July 29, 1982 of respondent Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 1524, which affirmed the decision of respondent Government Service Insurance System, denying petitioner's claim for compensation benefits under the New Labor Code, for disability and subsequent death of Leticia Mora. The undisputed factual background is as follows: The late Leticia Mora was from 1963 until December 25, 1979 a telegraph operator of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Tacloban City. During the course of her employment, and more particularly in January 1978, she complained of frequent epigastric pain radiating to the periumbilical region. Biopsy

Carcinoma of the small intestine occurs more frequently in the male sex with the highest incidence in the fourth, fifth and sixth decades. Histologically, these carcinomas are classified into four types: adenocarcinoma medullary, scirrhous and colloid. The clinical manifestations are variable and depend upon the location, size and character of the tumor and the degree of malignancy. They are predominantly those of intestinal obstruction. A history of abdominal distress and pain is frequent. When the tumor becomes sufficiently large, a movable, palpable mass may be present." (Cecil and Loeb A Textbook of Medicine, 10th ed., p. 854). (Cited in Comment of respondent ECC, p. 34). As stated in Our decisions in Mercado, Jr. v. Employees Compensation Commission, 139 SC0RA 270 citingCristobal v. ECC, 103 SCRA 329, and Flaviano Nemaria v. Employees' Compensation Commission and Government Service Insurance System (Ministry of Education and Culture promulgated on October 28, 1987, the necessity of proof is present only when the cause of the disease is known. If not known, there is no duty to present proof, for the law does not demand an impossibility. Thus, in the Mercado, Jr. v. Employees Compensation Commission case, We held: While the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation espoused under the Workmen's Compensation Act may have abandoned under the New Labor Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is significant that the liberality of the law in general still subsists. ... As agents charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by both 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more liberal attitude in deciding claims for compensability especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection, 103 SCRA 329, 336). ... Where however, the causes of an ailment are unknown to and or undetermined even by medical science, the requirement of proof of any casual link between the ailment and the working conditions should be liberalized so that those who have less in life will have more in law ... . ... The point is that it is grossly inequitable to require as a condition for an award of compensation that the claimant demonstrate that his ailment-the cause or origin of which is unknown to and undetermined even by medical science-was, in fact caused or the risk of contracting the same enhanced by his working conditions. Plainly, the condition would be an impossible one, specially considering that said claimant is most probably not even conversant with the intricacies of medical science and the claimant invariably bereft of the material resources to employ medical experts to demonstrate the connection between the cause and the disease. Considering the liberal character of employment compensation schemes, the impossible condition should be deemed as not having been intended and/or imposed. (139 SCRA, pp. 275- 276). ... As an employee, he had contributed to the funds of respondent for 34 years until his forced retirement. In turn respondent should comply with its duty to give him the fullest protection, relief and compensation benefits as guaranteed by law." (Ibid., pp. 277). 132

In the more recent case of Flaviano Nemaria v. Employees' Compensation Commission and Government Service Insurance System (Ministry of Education and Culture), (supra) we stated that: Thus the requirement that the disease was caused or aggravated by the employment or work applies only to an illness where the cause can be determined or proved. Where cause is unknown or cannot be ascertained, no duty to prove the link exists. For certainly, the law cannot demand an impossibility. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Employees Compensation Commission is SET ASIDE and another is rendered ordering the respondents to pay the herein petitioner the full amount of compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626 as amended. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-57889 October 28, 1987 FLAVIANO NEMARIA, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Ministry of Education and Culture), respondents. PARAS, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 1398 affirming the decision of respondent government Service Insurance System, denying petitioner's claim for compensation benefits. Petitioner Rosario Nemaria was appointed classroom teacher in November, 1948. She was first assigned in the poblacion of Badian, Cebu. Later she was transferred to the municipality of Ronda, Cebu. From September 8-25 1978, Rosario Nemaria was confined at the Southern Islands' Hospital, Cebu City, for on and off severe abdominal pains, anorexia, weight loss and jaundice, indicative of cancer of the liver, duodenal ulcer and cancer of the breast. These ailments did not respond to medications and she died on October 16, 1978. She was at the time of her death 58 years of age (Rollo, p. 31). The service record of the decedent shows that she rendered government service for about thirty years (Rollo, p. 4). Alleging that the cause of his wife's death was due to her employment as a classroom teacher, herein petitioner filed with the respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), a claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626 as amended. Subsequently, the GSIS through its medical evaluation and underwriting denied the claim. Upon receipt of the order of denial, petitioner appealed his case to the now respondent Employees Compensation Commission for review.

On August 13, 1980, respondent Employees Compensation Commission affirmed the decision of respondent GSIS denying the petitioner's claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626 as amended, the dispositive portion of which reads: For all the foregoing, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed and the instant case dismissed. SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 31) In a letter-appeal dated October 13, 1980 the petitioner expressed his desire to appeal his case to the Supreme Court, but he could not come to Manila nor could he hire a lawyer because he was very poor (Rollo, p. 1). In the resolution of November 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court referred petitioner's case to the Citizens Legal Assistance Office, Ministry of Justice, for possible legal assistance (Rollo, p. 12). Hence, this petition. Upon manifestation of counsel for petitioner, the latter was allowed to litigate as pauper in the resolution of August 26, 1981 (Rollo, p. 5). In the resolution of September 21, 1981, this Court without giving due course to the petition required the respondents to comment thereon (Rollo, p. 52). In compliance therewith, respondent Government Service Insurance System filed its comment on November 19, 1981 (Rollo, pp. 65-77), and respondent Employees Compensation Commission on February 2, 1982 (Rollo, pp, 84-91). Acting upon the petition for review on certiorari as well as all subsequent, pleadings filed, the Court resolved in the resolution dated August 30, 1982 to give due course to the petition (Rollo, p. 97). Petitioner's brief was filed on January 20, 1983 (Rollo, pp. 105-108) while the Solicitor General's brief as counsel for respondent Employees Compensation Commission was filed on April 8, 1983 (Rollo p. 110). Finally, petitioner filed his reply-brief on June 1, 1983 (Rollo, pp. 120-126). The sole issue in the instant case is whether or not petitioner's wife's death is compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626. The petition is impressed with merit. A careful review of the records shows that the question must be answered in the affirmative. It is not disputed that the ailments of the deceased were not listed/enumerated under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation with respect to public school teachers but petitioner anchors his claim under the theory of "increased risk," that is, when said illness is caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions (Brief for Petitioner, pp. 3-4). Respondents, however, insist that the causes of the decedent's death, which are cancer of the liver, duodenal ulcer and cancer of the breast, had nothing to do with her work as a teacher and, therefore, do not fall within the compensable coverage of the law. They pointed out in particular that hepatoma is not an occupational disease in the decedent's particular employment (Rollo, p. 87). They further claim that the predisposing factors deemed largely responsible for the development of the decedent's ailments which resulted in her death were not inherent in or peculiar to her employment as a 133

classroom teacher. Cancer of the liver has something to do with liver cirrhosis while predisposition to duodenal ulcer is traceable to one afflicted with cancer of the liver (Rollo, p. 89). To establish compensability of the claim under the theory of increased risk under Section 1 (b) Rule 111 of P.D. 626, the claim must show proof of reasonable work connection and not necessarily a direct casual relation. Impliedly, the degree of proof required is merely substantial, which means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (Cristobal v. Employees Compensation Commission, 103 SCRA 330 (1981)). Strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation. There are no stringent criteria to follow. The degree of proof required under P.D. 626 is merely substantial evidence (Sarmiento v. E.C.C. et al., G.R. No. 68648, Sept. 24, 1986). Thus, it has been ruled that a reasonable work-connection is all that is required or that there was a showing that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions (San Valentin v. E.C.C., 118 SCRA 160 [1982]). The Court ruled further, that the uncertainty as to whether or not the disease was caused or the risk of contracting the same was increased by the decedent's working conditions cannot eliminate the probability that the ailment was work-connected (Cristobal v. E.C.C., supra), Both petitioner and respondents are in accord that although the cause of liver cancer is not known, still it has been found to be mostly associated with liver cirrhosis which in turn is caused by alcoholic ingestion plus impaired nutrition; that a high percentage of hepatoma has been discovered also in Asia and Africa which was found to be due to certain hepatic carcinogens digested in food stuffs (Brief of Petitioner, p. 3). The decedent, a public school teacher assigned in a municipality several kilometers away from the provincial capital, rendered her services for more or less twenty-nine (29) years. She started in November 1948 as classroom teacher assigned in the poblacion of Badian, Cebu and from thence she was assigned to the Municipality of Ronda, Cebu, which is a blighted area, where she continued to discharge her duties as classroom teacher (Rollo, p. 68). Under those circumstances, the possibility would not be remote, that she suffered impaired nutrition and while working in a farflung rural area where foodstuffs are not closely examined before being eaten, it is not too far-fetched to consider that she was exposed to hepatic carcinogens which reportedly were ingested therein (ibid). Corollary thereto, it is undisputed that the deceased was in good health when she entered the government service, otherwise, she would not have been accepted for insurance purposes by the Government Service Insurance System. The conclusion is therefore inevitable, that the decedent's ailments developed during her employment while working under conditions which predisposed her thereto. It is enough that hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable. Medical opinion to the contrary may be disregarded especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection. Probability not certainty is the touchstone (Sarmiento v. E.C.C., et al., supra). Respondent Employees Compensation Commission in its decision based its conclusion merely on the findings of the Medical Evaluation and Underwriting Group and the medical opinion on references in medical etiology (Rollo, p, 38), concluding that no direct cause factors triggered the contraction of her ailments resulting in death (Rollo, p. 42). What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation (Sagliba v. E.C.C., 128 SCRA 723; Guevara v. E.C.C., 146 SCRA 6472).

In the case of Marte v. E.C.C., 96 SCRA 884, the Court ruled: "... . The findings, however, of the doctors and the Chief Medical Officer of the GSIS and ECC respectively are not binding on this Court as they are not considered experts. Opinion of the Medical Rating Officer who did not physically examine the claimant cannot be relied upon" (Nuguid v. WCC, 93 SCRA 374). The Labor Code is clear that it does not only confine compensable diseases to those enumerated therein as occupational. It also contemplates illness caused by employment where the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions thereof (2nd paragraph, Art. 208, P.D. 626). The Court has ruled that cancer of the liver though not an occupational disease, may be deemed work-connected (Abadiano v. GSIS, 111 SCRA 509, Jan. 30, 1982). Moreover, in the case of Abana v. Quisumbing, 22 SCRA 1279, the Court held that under the law, it is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth development or acceleration of claimant's illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for. It is enough that his employment had contributed even in a small degree. The Supreme Court applied a liberal interpretation in the case of Mercado, Jr. v. Employees Compensation Commission, 139 SCRA 270 citing Cristobal v. ECC, 103 SCRA 329, as follows: While the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation espoused under the Workmen's Compensation Act may have abandoned under the New Labor Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is significant that the liberality of the law in general still subsists. ... As agents charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by both 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more liberal attitude in deciding claims for compensability especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection (103 SCRA 329, 336). ... Where however, the causes of an ailment are unknown to and or undetermined even by medical science, the requirement of proof of any casual link between the ailment and the working conditions should be liberalized so that those who have less in life will have more in law ... . ... The point is that it is grossly inequitable to require as a condition for an award of compensation that the claimant demonstrate that his ailment the cause or origin of which is unknown to and undetermined even by medical science was, in fact caused or the risk of contracting the same enhanced by his working conditions. Plainly, the condition would be an impossible one, specially considering that said claimant is most probably not even conversant with the intricacies of medical science and the claimant invariably bereft of the material resources to employ medical experts to demonstrate the connection between the cause and the disease. Considering the liberal character of employment compensation schemes, the impossible condition should be deemed as not having been intended and/or imposed. (139 SCRA, pp. 275-276). ... As an employee, he had contributed to the funds of respondent for 34 years until his forced retirement. In turn respondent should comply with its duty to give him the fullest protection, relief and compensation benefits as guaranteed by law. (Ibid, p. 277).

Thus the measurement that the disease was caused or aggravated by the employment or work applies only to an illness where the cause can be determined or proved. Where cause is unknown or cannot be ascertained, no duty to prove the link exists. For certainly, the law cannot demand an impossibility. Moreover, cancer being a disease which is often discovered when it is too late, the possibility that its onset was even before the effectivity of the New Labor Code cannot be discounted. As a consequence the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot be totally disregarded. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission is SET ASIDE and another is rendered ordering the respondents to pay the herein petitioner the full amount of compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626 as amended. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-29670 October 9, 1987 CENTRAL AZUCARERA DON PEDRO, petitioner, vs. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and NEMESIO TANIO, respondents. NARVASA, J.: Nemesio Tanio started working at the Central Azucarera Don Pedro (hereafter simply referred to as the CENTRAL) as a laborer, picking up strewn cane, during the 1946-1947 milling season. Starting with the 1954-1955 milling season, he was assigned as operator of an electrically operated caneunloading machine. 1 Tanio stopped working on February 9, 1960, allegedly because he began to spit blood at this time. An x-ray examination conducted by the CENTRAL's physician revealed that Tanio was suffering from minimal pulmonary tuberculosis (PTB) in the right lung. He was consequently confined at the CENTRAL's hospital, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement then in force, but after three (3) days, he refused further treatment and at his request was discharged. Tanio then opted to retire, and the CENTRAL paid him P400.00 as gratuity. On March 30, 1960, he executed an affidavit affirming his volunteer refusal to be treated at the CENTRAL's hospital. 2 Three years later, or more precisely on October 8, 1963, Tanio filed a complaint against the CENTRAL with Regional Office No. 4 of the Department of Labor at Manila, seeking disability compensation and reimbursement of medical expenses. The CENTRAL moved to dismiss, alleging that Tanio was statutorily barred from presenting and prosecuting his claim. 3 The Hearing Officer to whom the case was assigned rendered a decision on August 15, 1965 dismissing the case for lack of merit. The decision pointed out that Tanio's averment of having spat blood was corroborated by neither an eyewitness nor medical proof; there was no showing of any resulting disability for labor; and proof of illness alone does not entitle an employee to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 4 134

On appeal taken by Tanio, the Workmen's Compensation Commission reversed the judgment of the Hearing Officer. It declared that since Tanio was healthy when first admitted for employment by the CENTRAL and he was afterwards found to be suffering from minimal PTB, the presumption was that his illness had been caused or aggravated by his employment, a presumption that had not been overthrown by the evidence on record. It accordingly ordered the CENTRAL to pay Tanio P4,000.00 as disability compensation; P1,300.00 as reimbursement for medical expenses; P400.00 as attorney's fees, and P41.00 as costs. It also commanded the CENTRAL to provide medical services to Tanio until his illness was cured. 5 Subsequently, in a Resolution dated September 27, 1968, the Commission denied the CENTRAL's motion for reconsideration. 6 However, the Medical Member of the Commission dissented. According to her, Tanio's PTB was minimal, was not in an aggravated stage at all but was in fact just being, hence, there could be no causal relation between Tanio's illness and his employment. 7 The CENTRAL has filed a petition with us for the review of the Commission's judgment in accordance with Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeking to persuade us that the latter has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by us or decided it in a way not in accord with law or our applicable decisions. Said petitioner submits the following particular issues: (1) whether or not the Regional Office No. 4, stationed in Manila, had jurisdiction over Tanio's claim; (2) the proper interpretation of Sections 24 and 45 (paragraph 2) of Act 3428, otherwise known as the Workmen's Compensation Act; (3) whether or not Tanio was entitled to reimbursement of medical expenses notwithstanding his voluntary waiver of proferred medical treatment; and (5) whether or not attorney's fees were correctly awarded despite the absence of any prayer therefor in Tanio's complaint. The CENTRAL maintains that Regional Office No. 4 stationed at Manila is, under the law, without authority to entertain the claim and that Tanio having admitted he is a resident of Bo. Talon, San Luis, Batangas, only Regional Office No. 5 could validly assume jurisdiction over the claim. Under Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of the Workmen's Compensation Commission, a claim for compensation may be filed and heard in the regional office of any of the following places: where the accident occurred; where the claimant, or any of the claimants resides; or where the respondent or any of the respondents, resides, at the option of the claimant. The choice of any of these venues is solely the claimant's. Tanio having opted to file his claim for compensation at the Regional Office No. 4, stationed at Manila, and it having been established that Tanio was residing at Sta. Cruz, Manila, at the time of such filing, Regional Office No. 4 validly assumed jurisdiction over the same. The purpose of the rule is to foster the convenience of the claimant considering that he is the aggrieved party. 8 The CENTRAL contends that in order to maintain an action under the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, it was necessary for Tanio to file with said employer notice of his illness and claim for compensation within two months after learning of such illness, as prescribed by Section 24 of the Act; and that, not having done this, his cause of action, if any, had already prescribed when he filed the compensation claim herein with the Department of Labor, Regional Office No. 4, on October 8, 1963, three years and some seven months after he first learned that he had tuberculosis and chose to retire. That contention is without merit, there being no dispute that as soon as he exhibited the first symptoms of his ailment, which the CENTRAL's physician diagnosed as minimal PTB, Tanio was confined and treated at the CENTRAL's expense at the latter's hospital for at least three days. The employer's act of extending and paying for medical assistance suffices for and obviates the necessity of giving him the notice required by law. Just as we have consistently ruled that compensation claims accruing under the Workmen's Compensation Act and prior to the effectivity of the Labor Code of 135

1974 prescribe in ten years, 9 so we have also held that delay or failure to give the employer notice of compensable illness or injury within the prescribed period does not bar a claim for compensation if it is shown that the latter, his agent or representative in fact knew of such injury or illness or that he suffered no damage by reason of such delay or lack of notice. 10 Whether, considering the nature of the private respondent's employment, minimal PTB is a compensable illness in his case, is also a settled question. As we held in Villones vs. Employees' Compensation Commission: 11 Moreover, this Court, in consistently holding that the disease of tuberculosis is an occupational disease or work-connected in such occupations as that of a teacher, laborer, driver, land inspector and such other occupations, hence compensable, aptly stated and WE quote: "Medical science has it that tuberculosis as an ailment is latent in man regardless of his age, sex and occupation. When given favorable conditions this disease becomes active and prominent. Some of these favorable conditions are: too much physical exertion without the corresponding rest; exposure to excessive heat and cold; lack of good food as to weaken the body constituents and contact with people suffering from tuberculosis ..." (Corales vs. ECC, supra). Moreover, the CENTRAL having failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of Section 45 of the Workmen's Compensation Act to controvert Tanio's claim within the limiting periods established in said section, 12 it is deemed to have waived by operation of law its right to controvert said respondent's claim on non-jurisdictional grounds. 13 Likewise, we find the CENTRAL's allegation that the Commission erred in awarding attorney's fees without a prayer for such fees and evidence to justify an award thereof, devoid of merit. The case of Central Azucarera Don Pedro v. Agno 14 cited by the CENTRAL, is no longer applicable. The insertion of the phrase "which shall be chargeable against the employer" in Section 31 of the Workmen's Compensation Law by Rep. Act 4119, which was approved June 30, 1964 clearly indicates the intention of the law to make attorney's fees an integral part of the compensation or benefits due the employee or his dependents under the Act. As said Section 31 fixes the amount of the attorney's fees that may be recovered, prayer for such relief and proof thereof are no longer necessary. 15 We, however, find that the Commission incurred in legal error in awarding reimbursement for medical expenses and ordering that Tanio be given medical services until his illness is cured. As already observed, after three days of confinement following discovery of his illness, Tanio had refused further treatment and was discharged from petitioner's hospital at his own request, a fact he later confirmed in a sworn statement. The right of a disabled employee to medical attendance under Section 13 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, can be impugned or abated if he unreasonably refuses to accept the medical services proferred by the employer, or if he shall voluntarily impede or obstruct such services. 16 WHEREFORE, modified only by striking therefrom the award of P1,300.00 to reimburse medical expenses incurred by Tanio as well as the order that he be extended medical services until he is cured of his illness, the decision under review is affirmed in all other respects, with costs against Central Azucarera Don Pedro. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-62300 September 25, 1987 ANGELITA TAEDO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Ministry of Agrarian Reform), respondents. NARVASA, J.: Subject of the instant petition is the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) dated September 11, 1980 which affirmed the denial by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) of petitioner's claim for benefits arising from the death of her husband, Francisco Tanedo, under P.D. No. 626, as amended. Francisco Tanedo was a Janitor-Laborer in the District Office of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform at Tarlac, Tarlac. His duties included the cleaning of the comfort rooms of the office and the watering of plants. Prior thereto, he worked as laborer in the former Bureau of Public Highways commencing in February, 1955, then as "Capataz Timekeeper," and "Construction Capataz" before transferring to the Agrarian Reforms Ministry on June 29, 1972. In December, 1976 he was found to be suffering from "puffiness of face, pedal edema and progressive abdominal enlargement." He was accordingly confined at the Central Luzon Doctors Hospital where his ailment was diagnosed as "renal insufficiency secondary to chronic renal disease." An apparent recurrence of his illness caused his hospitalization again, in January, 1978, this time at the Tarlac Provincial Hospital. He however failed to respond to the administered treatment; his condition gradually retrogressed. In September, 1978 he sought and obtained admission at the Tarlac Provincial Hospital where, twenty days later, he finally died. His widow, petitioner herein, filed a claim for death benefits with respondent GSIS. The latter denied her claim on the ground that the disease which caused her husband's death, "chronic glomerulonephritis," was not one of the compensable illnesses under the law; this, on the basis of the report (findings and recommendations) of its Medical Director dated May 7, 1979. 1 It overuled her claim that the final diagnosis and effective cause of death was "glomerulonephritis; renal hypertension and Koch's pulmonary." 2 Her motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner elevated the matter to the ECC which, as aforestated, affirmed the decision of the GSIS. She is now before us, praying for reversal of those decisions of the GSIS and the ECC and the award to her of the death benefits she has applied for. A compensable sickness according to the law, is "any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the game is increased by working conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is empowered to determine and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered compensable based on the peculiar hazards of employment." That list referred to, of illnesses definitely accepted as occupational diseases, is set out in Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. 4 It is clear that in order that "sickness and the resulting disability or death .. be compensable," the claimant must show either:
3

1) that it is "the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of .. (the ECC) Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied;" or 2) if not so listed, that "the risk of contracting the disease is increase by the working conditions.
5

It being at once apparent that "chronic glomerulonephritis" is not among the listed compensable illnesses in Annex "A" of the Amended Rules, it behooved the petitioner to adduce persuasive proof that her decease husband's death was caused not only by said disease but also and additionally by renal hypertension and that Identified by her as "Koch's pulmonary," as was the theory upon which she had founded her application for death benefits, and that, additionally, "the risk of contracting" those diseases was "increased by the working conditions" attendant upon her husband's duties as janitor-laborer. Regrettably, even under the less stringent evidentiary norm of substantial evidence obtaining in employees 'compensation proceedings, 6 petitioner has failed to adduce such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion that she has urged the GSIS and the ECC to make. 7 What the evidence does establish, as the ECC observes, is that the disease and its complications from which petitioner's husband died bore no causal relation to the nature of his employment. His hypertension was only a manifestation of his chronic glomerulonephritis, was in other words "simply a complication," and was "not brought about by employment factors." 8 We perceive nothing in the record to warrant reversal of these findings. Neither may an award in petitioner's favor be justified upon any presumption that illness causing death or disability arose out of the employment or was at least aggravated by such employment. That presumption was laid down by the old statute. 9 It is however now a thing of the past, abolished on effectivity of the new law on January 1, 1975.10 Awards of compensation benefits for death or disability can now no longer be made to rest on presumption, but on a showing that the causative disease is among those listed by the ECC, or on substantial evidence that the risk of contracting said disease is increase by the employee's working conditions. 11 WHEREFORE, the petition is dismiss, without pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 70660 September 24, 1987 EULALIO GALANIDA, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,respondents. GUTIERREZ, JR., J: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Employees' Compensation Commission's (ECC) decision affirming the denial by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) of the petitioner's claim for disability compensation under P.D. 626. Petitioner Eulalio Galanida started working for the government on November 8, 1948 as a messenger/janitor at the Bureau of Agricultural Extension Office in Tagbilaran City. Subsequently, he 136

was promoted to Clerk and, finally, to Administrative Officer II of the Ministry of Agriculture until he retired on December 10, 1983. Galanida's medical records reveal that sometime in 1955, he complained of facial distortion and numbness accompanied by the blurring of vision and headache. According to the petitioner, he suffered irregular sleep and heart palpitation, as well as pain in both extremities for several years. From May 15 to 29, 1972, he was confined at the Bohol Provincial Hospital for hemorrhoidectomy which was performed by Dr. Miguel C. Froilan. On January 18, 1983, the petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626 with the GSIS. On March 9, 1983, the GSIS disapproved the claim on the ground that the claimant's ailments are not occupational diseases and there was no showing that his work had increased the risk of contracting the same. The petitioner elevated his case to the ECC and on November 27, 1984, the ECC affirmed the decision of the GSIS. After a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, we find no justifiable reason to reverse the decision of the ECC. The petitioner's ailments were diagnosed to be the following: xxx xxx xxx (1) Bells Palsy is an acute lower Motor Neuron Palsy of the facial nerve, characterized by pain, weakness or paralysis of the affected side of the face (2) Anxiety Neurosis is a progressive disintegration of personal instability arising in the course of the intercurrent illness. (3) Peripheral Neuritis is a syndrome of sensory motor, reflect and basomotor reflex symptoms produced by lesion of nerve root on peripheral nerves. (p. 27, Rollo) The above-mentioned diseases are not among those listed as occupational diseases under Annex "A" of P.D. 626 nor has the petitioner shown proofs that the risk of ' contracting the diseases was increased by his employment's working conditions as Administrative Officer II of the Ministry of Agriculture in Manila as provided by Section l(b), Rule III, Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation. As we have repeatedly held, the doctrines of aggravation and presumption of compensability under the former Workmen's Compensation Act are no longer provided by law under the present social insurance scheme (Erese v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 138 SCRA 192). Considering that the illnesses are not occupational diseases, it was, therefore, necessary for the petitioner to present proof that he contracted them in the course of his employment at the Ministry of Agriculture. Unfortunately, he failed in this regard. In his petition for review submitted to the Employees' Compensation Commission dated May 16, 1983, the petitioner alleges that the "cleaning of rooms as janitor and subsequently the amount of paperwork thereby forcing him to render overtime, increased the risk of contracting said ailments." This is a mere allegation which needs to be proved. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence. (People vs. Lumayok, 139 SCRA 1) Despite the request made by the respondent (letter dated July 9, 1983, rollo, p. 39) the petitioner failed to submit evidence or proofs such as a certification signed by the employer as to inclusive dates of leave of absences or sick leaves, medical certificates, hospital records and/or clinical records of confinement/consultation so as to substantiate his claim for compensation under P. D. 626. There is absolutely no showing how the work of a janitor increase the risk of contracting the petitioner's ailments. Moreover, the petitioner's attending physician, Dr. Segundo Racho categorically stated that the petitioner's ailments are not work-connected. Hence, the petitioner's claim for disability compensation under P.D. 626 has no factual basis. 137

Even if we applied the ruling in Corales vs. Employees' Compensation Commission (88 SCRA 547), as contended by the petitioner, his claim for compensation wig still not prosper. The records show that the symptoms of the petitioner's ailments upon which he could base his claim for compensation under the Corales doctrine became manifest in 1955. His right to claim for compensation, therefore, accrued as early as that date. Hence, the law to be applied under his contention would be the Workmen's Compensation Act following the principle that in workmen's compensation commission cases, the governing law is to be determined by the date on which the claimant contracted his illness. (Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation of the Philippines v. Dela Rosa, 146 SCRA 222). The right founded on statute prescribes in ten (10) years which are counted from the date of disability (Leonardo v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 88 SCRA 58). In the instant case, the petitioner alleged that in the years 1954-1955, he was treated by several doctors and confined twice in the hospital for the ailments earlier mentioned. He, therefore, had until 1964-1965 within which to file his claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act. And even if we counted the ten-year period from the date of his hospitalization for hemorrhoidectomy on May 15 to 29, 1972, the claim filed only in January 18, 1983 is obviously beyond the prescriptive period. Moreover, hemorrhoidectomy has never been mentioned as the basis of his claim. The petitioner, therefore, failed to seasonably raise his claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, assuming its applicability. Furthermore, the fact that the petitioner continued working until he compulsorily retired on December 10, 1983 militates against his right to disability compensation. In the case of Corales v. Employees Compensation Commission (supra), we held: It must be noted that We disallowed petitioner's claim for disability compensation because of the undisputed fact that petitioner, despite his disabling illness of PTB medically speaking was able to physically pursue his line of work the very day he reached the compulsory age of retirement 65; and therefore cannot be awarded disability benefits under Section 14 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, which observes the wage loss factor as basis of the granting of disability benefits for it commands that " ... No compensation shall be allowed for the first three calendar days of incapacity resulting from an injury except the benefits provided for in the preceding section; but if the incapacity extends beyond that period, compensation shall be allowed from the first day of such incapacity. ... ." (Section 14, Act 3428, as amended). Consequently, We ruled that, despite OUR finding that petitioner's illness and disability was workconnected, he is not entitled to disability benefits because his illness and/or medical disability did not result in any wage loss or diminution of earnings as it is undisputed from the records that he not only continued to receive the same rate of salary (P3223.58 per annum) he was receiving in 1965 when he was initially found afflicted with PTB but also thereafter enjoyed increases of salaries and at the time of his compulsory retirement in 1975, his rate was P5095.20 per annum; although he did not receive any promotion in rank or position. from 1965 to the year of his retirement. ... (at p. 555). WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-47521

July 31, 1987

On October 26, 1977, respondent ECC affirmed the GSIS' action of denial and rendered its own decision dismissing petitioner's claim (ECC Case No. 0509). Respondent ECC's decision was anchored upon the findings that the ailments are not listed as occupational diseases; that there was no substantial evidence of causal connection; and that, in fact, the evidence was that the deceased had already contracted the Hansen's disease before his employment. In the exact words of the ECC: In the case at bar, since the deceased's ailments are not listed as occupational diseases, appellant herein must prove that such ailments were caused by deceased's employment and that the risk of contracting the same was increased by his working conditions in order to be compensable. A mere cursory reading of the evidences on record, however, will disclose that appellant failed to submit the required proof of causation. There is no substantial proof in the record from which we could draw the conclusion that indeed the nature of deceased's employment as Janitor of Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic could be traced as the direct cause of his ailment. Hence, in the absence of such evidence, we are not disposed to disturb on appeal the findings of the respondent System. On the contrary, we find the records that the deceased, prior to his employment in this office, was already suffering from his ailment of Hansen's disease. This proves that his working conditions did not increase the risk of his contracting the same. If at all, his employment merely aggravated his ailments. Unfortunately, however, aggravation of a preexisting illness, a rule under the old law, is not anymore a ground for compensation under the new law. Thus, the cases cited by the appellant cannot be raised as authorities to support her claim. Petitioner now seeks a review of the ECC decision. (pp. 76-78, Rollo) There is no question that the claim falls under the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended. Under Article 167(L) of the Labor Code and Section 1 (b) Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, for the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules with the conditions therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions (De Jesus v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92, 96). As the illnesses of the deceased are admittedly, not listed under Annex "A" of the Rules as occupational diseases, the petitioner bases her claim under the theory of increased risk. She alleges that the deceased, as janitor of the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic, was exposed to patients suffering from various kinds of skin diseases, including Hansen's disease or leprosy. She avers that for ten years, the deceased had to clean the clinic and its surroundings and to freely mix with its patients. She claims that it was during this time that he was attacked by other dreadful diseases such as uremia, cancer of the liver, and nephritis. On the other hand, the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission contends that the petitioner failed to prove by substantial evidence that the deceased's ailments were indeed caused by his employment. It maintains that the deceased merely had a recurrence of a pre-existing illness aggravated possibly by the nature of his employment and that there is no evidence on record showing that the nature of the deceased's employment was the direct cause of any of his illnesses. 138

CAROLINA CLEMENTE, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM Department of Health (Dagupan City) and EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 0509 which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and denied the claim for death benefits filed by Carolina Clemente, widow of the late Pedro Clemente, The undisputed facts of the case are summarized in the memorandum for the respondent Government Service Insurance System, as follows: Petitioner's husband, the late Pedro Clemente, was for ten (10) years a janitor in the Department of Health (Dagupan City), assigned at the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic, Laoag City. He was hospitalized from November 3 to 14, 1976 at the Central Luzon Sanitarium, Tala Sanitarium, Tala, Caloocan City, due to his ailment of "nephritis," as per medical certification of his attending physician, Dr. Winifredo Samson. He was also found to be suffering from such ailments as portal cirrhosis and leprosy, otherwise known as Hansen's Disease. On November 14, 1976, Pedro Clemente died of uremia due to nephritis. Thereafter, petitioner filed with the GSIS a claim for employees' compensation under the Labor Code, as amended. On February 4, 1977, the GSIS denied the claim of the petitioner because the ailments of her husband are not occupational diseases taking into consideration the nature of his work and/or (sic) or were not in the least causally related to his duties and conditions of work. On March 9, 1977, petitioner requested for reconsideration of the GSIS' denial of her claim, stating that the ailments of her husband were contracted in the course of employment and were aggravated by the nature of his work. Petitioner alleged that her husband, as janitor of the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic (Laoag City), worked in direct contact with persons suffering from different skin diseases and was exposed to obnoxious dusts and other dirt which contributed to his ailment of Hansen's disease. Citing further the cases of Seven-Up Bottling Co., of the Phil. v. Rimerata, L-24349, December 24, 1968 and Avana v. Quisumbing, L-23489, March 27, 1968. Petitioner stated that her husband's ailment recurred in the course of employment presumably due to his direct contact with persons suffering from this ailment. Acting upon petitioner's request for reconsideration, the GSIS, on April 11, 1977, reiterated its previous denial of her claim. On April 14, 1977, treating the request for reconsideration as an appeal, the GSIS forwarded the records of the petitioner' claim for review by the ECC.

The respondent Government Service Insurance System concurs with the views of the respondent Commission. It, however, argues that it should be dropped as a party respondent in this case. It claims that the petitioner has no cause of action against it, the subject of judicial review being the adverse decision of the respondent Commission. We rule for the petitioner. In Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission (144 SCRA 421, 46) we held that: Strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation (San Valentin v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 118 SCRA 160; Better Building, Inc., v. Puncan, 135 SCRA 62). There are no stringent criteria to follow. The degree of proof required under P.D. 626; is merely substantial evidence, which means, "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion" (Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, supra, citing Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union, Inc., 69 Phil. 635; and Acosta v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 109 SCRA 209). The claimant must show, at least, by substantial evidence that the development of the disease is brought largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job. What the law requires is a reasonable workconnection and not a direct causal relation (Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, supra; Sagliba v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 128 SCRA 723; Neri v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 127 SCRA 672; Juala v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 128 SCRA 462; and De Vera v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 133 SCRA 685). It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable. Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection (Delegente v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 118 SCRA 67; and Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, supra). Probability not certainty is the touchstone (San Valentin v. Employees' Compensation Commission, supra). In this case, we find sufficient evidence on record to sustain the petitioner's view. The records disclose that in resisting the petitioner's claim, the respondent Commission cited the following medical authorities: Uremia refers to the toxic clinical condition associated with renal insufficiency and retention in the blood of nitrogenous urinary waste products (azotemia). Renal insufficiency may be due to (1) nephritis, bilateral pyelonephritis, polycystic kidney disease, uretral or bladder obstruction, SLE, polyarteritis, amyloid disease, or bilateral cortical necrosis; (2) acute tubular necrosis resulting from transfusion reaction, shock, burns, crushing injuries, or poisons; (3) sulfonamides precipitated in the kidneys or ureters; (4) nephrocalcinosis resulting from extreme alkalosis, diabetic acidosis, dehydration, or congestive heart failure may result in azotemia, or may predipitate (sic) severe uremia in the presence of already damages kidneys. Reference: Lyght, Charles E.: The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy; M.S. & D. Research Lab.; 11th Edition, 1966, pp. 257-258. Portal Cirrhosis: A chronic disease characterized by incresed connective tissue that spreads from the portal spaces, distorting liver architecture and impairing liver functions. Etiology, Incidence and pathology: Portal cirrhosis occurs chiefly in males in late middle life. Malnutrition is believed to be a predisposing if not a primary etiology factor. The role of 139

alcohol is not clearly established. Alcohol probably exerts a direct toxic effect on the liver, and also increases malnutrition by providing calories without essential nutrients. Cirrhosis has been produced in animals by diets low in protein and specifically low in choline. The addition of choline to these diets prevents cirrhosis. Chronic poisoning with carbon tetrachloride or phosphorus produces changes similar to those from portal cirrhosis. The liver is diffusely nodular, scarred and dense. Microscopic section shows parenchymal degeneration cellular infiltration, proliferation or scar tissue and areas of regeneration. Fatty changes are present in the early states. Reference: Lyght, C.E.: The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy: M.S. & D. N.J. 11th Edition, 1966, p. 928. Hepatoma (Liver cancer) refers to malignant primary tumor of the liver destroying the parenchyma arise (sic) from both liver cell and bile duct elements. It develops most frequently in the previous cirrhosis liver. A higher fraction of patients with post necrotic cirrhosis develop hepatoma than those with portal alcoholic cirrhosis. This may reflect the more active necrotic and regenerative processes in the post necrotic cirrhosis liver. Most large series indicate that 60% or more of hepatomas develop in a previously cirrhotic liver. The cirrhosis of hemochromatosis seems particularly liable to hepatomas as high a fraction as 20% of patients with hemochromatosis die from this cause. Reference: Harrison, T.R.: Principles of Internal Medicine; McGraw Hill; N.Y., 5th Ed.; 1966, p. 1072. Leprosy is a chronic, mildly contagious, infectious disease characterized by both cutaneous and constitutional symptoms and the production of various deformities and mutilations. The causative organism is an acid fast rod. Mycobacterium leprae, first described by Hansen in 1874. The mode of transmission is obscure, although infection by direct contact appears likely. The disease is found predominantly in tropical and sub-tropical Asia, Africa, and South America. It is endemic in the Gulf States of the USA, Hawaii, the Philippines and Puerto Rico. Reference: Lyght, C.E.: The Merk Manuel of Diagnosis and Therapy; " M.S. & D.; 11th Ed.; 1966, p. 847. The nature of nephritis, however, was discussed by Mr. Daniel Mijares, GSIS Manager, Employees' Compensation Department, in his letter dated February 4, 1977, denying petitioner's claim, as follows: Nephritis is an acute, diffuse inflammation of the glomeruli or kidneys. It usually follows previous streptoccocal infection mostly in the upper respiratory tract. Because of this, it is always thought that nephritis is the result of an auto-immune or allergic reaction to infection, usually streptococcal. (Rollo, p. 20) The foregoing discussions support rather than negate the theory of increased risk. We note that the major ailments of the deceased, i.e. nephritis, leprosy, etc., could be traced from bacterial and viral infections. In the case of leprosy, it is known that the source of infection is the discharge from lesions of persons with active cases. It is believed that the bacillus enters the body through the skin or through the mucous membrane of the nose and throat (Miller and Keane, Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Medicine and Nursing, (1972), p. 530).

On the other hand, infectious diseases which give rise to nephritis are believed to be as follows: Table 294-1 Causes of acute glomerulonephritis Infectious diseases A. Post streptococcal glumerulonephritis

The petitioner's arguments of recurrence of an already cured disease or the contracting of the disease due to increased risks become more plausible. When there are two or more possible explanations regarding an issue of compensability that which favors the claimant must be chosen.1avvphi1 We also do not find merit in the respondent GSIS' contention that it should be dropped as a party in this case. This Court has passed upon this issue on several occasions. Thus, in the case of Cabanero v. Employees' Compensation Commission (111 SCRA 413, 419), this Court citing Lao v. Employees' Compensation Commission (97 SCRA 782), held: xxx xxx xxx

B. Non-Post streptococcal glumerulonephritis 1. Bacterial: Infective endocarditis, "Shunt nephritis," sepsis, pneumococcal pneumonia, typhoid fever, secondary syphilis, meningococcemia 2. Viral: Hepatitis B, infectious menoneucleosis, mumps, measles, varicella, vaccinia, echovirus, and coxsackievirus 3. Parasitic: Malaria, taxoplasmosis 1) The sum of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00) as death benefits; and (Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, 10th edition, p. 1633) 2) The sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00) as attorney's fees. The husband of the petitioner worked in a skin clinic. As janitor of the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic, Mr. Clemente was exposed to different carriers of viral and bacterial diseases. He had to clean the clinic itself where patients with different illnesses come and go. He had to put in order the hospital equipments that had been used. He had to dispose of garbage and wastes that accumulated in the course of each working day. He was the employee most exposed to the dangerous concentration of infected materials, and not being a medical practitioner, least likely to know how to avoid infection. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to conclude that Mr. Clemente's working conditions definitely increased the risk of his contracting the aforementioned ailments. This Court has held in appropriate cases that the conservative posture of the respondents is not consistent with the liberal interpretation of the Labor Code and the social justice guarantee embodied in the Constitution in favor of the workers (Cabanes v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al., L-50255, January 30, 1982; and Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al., supra). It clashes with the injunction in the Labor Code (Article 4, New Labor Code) that, as a rule, doubts should be resolved in favor of the claimant-employee (Mercado, Jr., v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 139 SCRA 270, 277). The respondents admit there may have been aggravation of an existing ailment but point out that aggravating is no longer a ground for compensation under the present law. They contend that the compensable factor of increased risks of contracting the disease is not present in this case. The fallacy in this theory lies in the failure to explain how a sick person was able to enter the government service more than ten years before he became too ill to work and at a time when aggravation of a disease was compensable. There is no evidence to show that Mr. Clemente was hired inspite of having an existing disease liable to become worse. SO ORDERED. ... This Court is of the opinion that respondent System, as the ultimate implementing agency of the ECC's decision, is a proper party in this case. The fact that this Court chose to require respondent GSIS to comment is an indication that it is a necessary party. It must be noted that the law and the rules refer to the said System in all aspects of employee compensation (including enforcement of decisions (Article 182 of Implementing Rules.) (at p. 793). WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and the respondent Government Service Insurance System is hereby ordered to pay the petitioner:

G.R. No. L-35800

July 23, 1987

ROSALINDA PA-AC, for herself and in behalf of the minors, MARCELO, JR., GENOVEVA, DOMINADOR, BONIFACIO and ROSALINDA, all surnamed PA-AC, petitioners, vs. ITOGON-SUYOC MINES, INC., and WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition to review the decision of the defunct Workmen's Compensation Commission in WCU Case No. ROI-388 entitled "Rosalinda Pa-ac v. Itogon Suyoc Mines, Inc." which reversed the decision of Mr. Erudito E. Luna, Workmen's Compensation Section Chief of the Baguio City Sub-Regional Office, and denied the claim for death benefits filed by petitioner Rosalinda Pa-ac. The factual findings of the Workmen's Compensation Commission are as follows: The record shows that the deceased, Marcelo Pa-ac worked for the respondent company from 1951 to 1968 or a period of 17 years. He started as a laborer, shovelling sand and 140

gravel in connection with the construction work of the respondent. After two years, Pa-ac was Promoted as a shifter in the mill department as a precipitation man. His primary duty as such was to conduct precipitation color test-The process which lasted for about 15 minutes at a time was repeated every hour, and involved the mixing of chemical solutions. On January 1, 1960, Pa-ac was assigned as sand fin operator and charged with the duty of maintaining the specific gravity of the fed while he makes a record of the readings. He also saw to it that the pump was functioning smoothly. On January 1, 1961, the deceased was assigned as ball mill operator whose duty it was to regulate the ball mill fed by opening and controlling a 48-square inch (8" x 6") fed gate by pushing the fed lips. It was also his work to charge the steel balls by means of an electric machine which starts by pressing a button and to see to it that the machine was running smoothly while he balanced the fed. Three years thereafter, or on June 17, 1964, Pa-ac was reassigned to the precipitation section. On September 1, 1967, he was promoted as mill general capataz whose duty it was to supervise the men working in the mill. As such, he worked seven days a week and received a daily wage of P8.15. He worked in shifts rotated every 15 days. The morning shift was from 7:00 o'clock a.m. to 3:00 o'clock p. m. the afternoon shift was from 3:00 o'clock p. m. to 11:00 o'clock p.m., and the night shift was from 11:00 o'clock p.m. to 7:00 o'clock a.m. On June 14, 1968, Pa-ac was a guest in a wedding party. Before luncheon consisting of fatty foods was served, Pa-ac joined the other male guests in drinking San Miguel gin and Tanduay rhum. It seems that he had one drink too many because he became talkative and when it was time to leave, he could not walk straight. He had to be supported by Mr. Alexander Olivar, the respondent's safety engineer, to the service pick-up which brought them to the bus terminal. Sensing that Pa-ac was in no condition to work, Olivar advised Pa-ac who was supposed to report for work with the afternoon shift, not to report for duty anymore. From the bus terminal, where the two parted ways, Pa-ac headed home on foot to the Mountaineers's Store, some 500 meters away. At quarter past 2:00 o'clock p.m., that day, two laborers, Basilio Sabado, a crane helper and Camilo Valloyas, a hoistman while on their way to work, came upon Pa-ac sitting alone by the roadside. He was in a state of dizziness and his hands were shaking. Summoning the service pick-up, the two laborers rushed Pa-ac to the respondent's hospital in Sangilo. When admitted in the hospital, Pa-ac was weak and semi conscious. He was immediately attended to by Dr. Carmen Chunuan. All efforts of the doctor notwithstanding which included medication, stimulant injection, oxygen and cardiac massage, Pa-ac died within two hours from admission. Safety Engineer Olivar volunteered a mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, but this, too, did not help. The cause of death was attributed to myocardial infarction. The record also shows that the deceased was twice married. On September 23, 1945, he married Natividad Saloy according to the rites of the Roman Catholic Church. In July, 1960, after living together as husband and wife for 15 years, Pa-ac and Natividad were. divorced according to the tribal customs of the Mountain Province, In September of the same year, Pa-ac married Rosalinda Palki following the customs of their tribe. Whereas, Pa-ac had no issue with Natividad after years of married life, his second marriage proved fruitful for Rosalinda bore him five children, namely, Marcelo, Jr., Genoveva, Dominador Bonifacio and Rosalinda, all surnamed Pa-ac Rosalinda Palki instituted the instant claim for herself and for her five children. The claim was filed by Rosalinda with the knowledge and tacit consent of Natividad who had chosen to nurse her frustration and disappointment in her hometown of Bauko, Mountain Province." (pp. 33-35, Original Record).

On February 2, 1970, the Chief of the Workmen's Compensation Section, Baguio City Sub-Regional Office, decided in favor of the petitioner. He found the claim to be within the purview of Section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act. No. 3428), as amended, which states that: Grounds for compensation. When an employee suffers personal injury from any accident arising out of and in the course of his employment or contracts tuberculosis or other illness directly caused by such employment, or either aggravated by or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the person hereinafter specified. The right to compensation as provided in this Act shall not be defeated or impaired on the ground that the death, injury or disease was due to the negligence of a fellow servant or employee, without prejudice to the right of the employer to proceed against the negligent party. Relying on the pronouncement of this Court in the case of Magalona v. Workmen's Compensation Commission and National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (21 SCRA 1199), he held: "Considering that the work of the deceased involved strain and exposure to the inclemencies of the weather, even when he worked as a capataz the conclusion is inevitable that his employment contributed to the acceleration of his illness. In any event, since the seriousness of his illness occurred while going to work, there is a rebuttable presumption that the same arose out of, or was at least aggravated by his employment. Hence, the claimant is relieved from the burden of proving causation. The burden to overthrow the presumption is laid by the statute on the employee." (Rollo, p. 15). On these bases, he ordered the respondent to pay the petitioner and her children the sums of P6,000.00 as compensation benefits, P200.00 as burial expenses, P300.00 as attorney's fees, and to the Workmen's Compensation Sub-Regional Office, the sum of P61.00 as administrative costs. (p. 17, Rollo). On appeal by the respondent to the Workmen's Compensation Commission, the aforementioned decision was reversed. The Commission found that the petitioner failed to establish a preliminary link between the illness and the employment of the deceased. Moreover, it found that "the rebuttable presumption which the Workmen's Compensation Unit Chief invoked in favor of the claimant has been successfully overthrown by the respondent by substantial evidence." (p. 22, Rollo) Hence, this petition. The petitioner assails the Commission's decision on the grounds that it is contrary to law and existing jurisprudence and that its conclusions are not supported by the evidence on record. We sustain the Commission's decision. In the case of Vda. de Cardiente v. Workmen's Compensation Commission (134 SCRA 66, 70), this Court, in construing Section 2 of Act 3428, held that: "... compensable illnesses or diseases are those which are. (1) directly caused by such employment; or (2) either aggravated by the employment, or (3) the result of the nature of such employment." The records disclose that the deceased died of myocardial infarction. Medical authorities reveal the nature of such illness as follows: myocardial infact. A region of dead or dying tissue in the muscle of the heart which is the result of an obstruction to the blood circulation, usually by a clot. Schmidt Attorney's Dictionary of Medicine and Word Finder, [19651, p. 531) 141

Myocardial (mi'o-kar-de-al) pertaining to muscular tissue of the heart. m. infarction. formation of an infarct in the heart muscle, due to interruption of the blood supply to the area (see also CORONARY OCCLUSION). (Miller and Keane, Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Medicine and Nursing, [1972], p. 618) Cross-referring to CORONARY OCCLUSION, the same shows: CORONARY (kor'o-na-'re) encircling in the manner of a crown, a term applied to vessels, ligaments, etc. xxx xxx xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

... It was not the intention of the legislature to make the employer an insurer against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment, but only for such injuries arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar to the nature of the work in the scope of the workman's employment or incidental to such employment, and accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to some risk or hazard to which the employee is exposed in a special degree by reason of such employment. Risks to which all persons similarly situated are equally exposed and not traceable in some special degree to the particular employment are excluded. WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED, and the present petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Occlusion, the occlusion, or closing off, of a coronary artery. It may occur when the artery is suddenly plugged by a blood clot developing within the vessel (coronary thrombosis), or it may result when mounting fatty deposits in the wall of the vessel finally clog the artery. Coronary occlusion and coronary thrombosis are commonly referred to as a "heart attack" because the situation is usually acute with severe symptoms resulting from damage to the heart muscle (myocardial infarction and subsequent heart failure. (Ibid., p. 231.) In supporting her claim, the petitioner alleged that the strain involved in the deceased's work caused him to suffer the abovementioned ailment. Reviewing the records of the case, however, we find that no causal relation between the illness and the employment of the deceased has been established. The duties of the deceased as stated in his job description are light and do not involve strenuous physical exertion. As capataz he merely acted as overseer of the mill. It is not' unreasonable, therefore, to conclude that such duties could not have directly caused the deceased's ailment. The records also belie the theory of aggravation. They show that the illness was not pre-existing. Prior to his death, the deceased never complained of any symptoms of the disease. He was never admitted and treated in the hospital for the said ailment. The attack was the first time he suffered the ailment and that one time proved fatal. The petitioner emphasizes the presumption of compensability provided by the law in these cases.1avvphi1 We note, however, that this presumption is rebuttable. The presumption stands unless the employer clearly establishes that the death or ailment was not caused or aggravated by such employment or work. In this case, there is substantial evidence which shows that the deceased's ailment was not traceable to his employment. The respondent presented medical authority and opinions which state that myocardial infarction occurs without relation to ef forts or other discernible clinical event. (Records, p. 123). It also showed that the deceased, prior to his death, had been drinking and eating fatty food. We agree with the ruling of the Commission that while the Workmen's Compensation Act is a social legislation designed to give relief to the workman who has been the victim of workconnected accident and should be liberally construed in favor of the workman, it cannot be reconstructed to fit particular cases ... ." In Afable v. Singer Sewing Machine Co. (58 Phil. 39, 42), this Court held: 142

G.R. No. L-43674 June 30, 1987

YSMAEL MARITIME CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. CELSO AVELINO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch XIII, Court of First Instance of Cebu and SPOUSES FELIX C. LIM and CONSTANCIA GEVEIA respondents. FERNAN, J.: This special civil action for certiorari raises the question of whether the compensation remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act [WCA], and now under the Labor Code, for work-connected death or injuries sustained by an employee, is exclusive of the other remedies available under the Civil Code. It appears that on December 22, 1971. Rolando G. Lim, single, a licensed second mate, was on board the vessel M/S Rajah, owned by petitioner Ysmael Maritime Corporation, when the same ran ground and sank near Sabtan Island, Batanes. Rolando perished as a result of that incident. Claiming that Rolando's untimely death at the age of twenty- five was due to the negligence of petitioner, his parents, respondents Felix Lim and Consorcia Geveia, sued petitioner in the Court of First Instance on January 28, 1972 for damages [Civil Case No. R-12861]. In its answer, petitioner-defendant alleged by way of affirmative defenses [1] that the complaint stated no cause of action; [2] that respondent-plaintiffs had received P4,160 from petitioner and had signed release papers discharging petitioner from any liability arising from the death of their son, and [3] that most significantly, the respondents had already been compensated by the Workmen's Compensation Commission [NCC] for the same incident, for which reason they are now precluded from seeking other remedies against the same employer under the Civil Code.

A protracted legal battle over procedural points ensued. Finally, on July 30, 1975, the case was set for pre-trial. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. In his order of December 29, 1975, respondent Judge Avelino upheld respondents' vigorous opposition and denied petitioner's motion to dismiss for being unmeritorious. Its motion for reconsideration having met the same fate on February 3, 1976, petitioner filed the instant special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction, contending that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he refused to dismiss the complaint for damages on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. This Court subsequently granted a temporary restraining order prohibiting the trial court from proceeding with the hearing of the case. At issue is the exclusory provision of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act reiterated in Article 173 of the Labor Code 7 Sec. 5 Exclusive right to compensation. The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury, Art. 173 Exclusive of liability. Unless other wise provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title shall bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, Republic Act No. 610, as amended, Republic Act No. 4864, as amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered by the System, during the period of such payment for the same disability or death, and conversely. In the recent case of Floresca vs. Philex Mining Company, L-30642, April 30, 1985, 136 SCRA 141, involving a complaint for damages for the death of five miners in a cave in on June 28, 1967, this Court was confronted with three divergent opinions on the exclusivity rule as presented by several amici curiae One view is that the injured employee or his heirs, in case of death, may initiate an action to recover damages [not compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act) with the regular courts on the basis of negligence of the employer pursuant to the Civil Code. Another view, as enunciated in the Robles case, is that the remedy of an employee for work connected injury or accident is exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of the WCA. A third view is that the action is selective and the employee or his heirs have a choice of availing themselves of the benefits under the WCA or of suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages from the employer by reason of his negligence. But once the election has been exercised, the employee or his heirs are no longer free to opt for the other remedy. In other words, the employee cannot pursue both actions simultaneously. This latter view was adopted by the majority, in the Floresca case, reiterating as main authority its earlier decision in Pacaa vs. Cebu Autobus Company, L-25382, April 30, 1982, 32 SCRA 442. In so doing, the Court rejected the doctrine of exclusivity of the rights and remedies granted by the WCA as laid down in the Robles case. 'Three justices dissented. It is readily apparent from the succession of cases dealing with the matter at issue * that this Court has vacillated from one school of thought to the other. Even now, the concepts pertaining thereto 143

have remained fluid. But unless and until the Floresca ruling is modified or superseded, and We are not so inclined, it is deemed to be the controlling jurisprudence vice the Robles case. As thus applied to the case at bar, respondent Lim spouses cannot be allowed to maintain their present action to recover additional damages against petitioner under the Civil Code. In open court, respondent Consorcia Geveia admitted that they had previously filed a claim for death benefits with the WCC and had received the compensation payable to them under the WCA [Rollo, pp. 22-23, 2930]. It is therefore clear that respondents had not only opted to recover under the Act but they had also been duly paid. At the very least, a sense of fair play would demand that if a person entitled to a choice of remedies made a first election and accepted the benefits thereof, he should no longer be allowed to exercise the second option. "Having staked his fortunes on a particular remedy, [he] is precluded from pursuing the alternate course, at least until the prior claim is rejected by the Compensation Commission." [See Separate Opinion by Justice Teehankee in Robles vs. Yap Wing, supra on pp. 281-282]. In the light of this Court's recent pronouncement in the Floresca case, respondent Judge Avelino's denial order of petitioner's motion to dismiss is adjudged to be improper. WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Avelino's orders dated December 29, 1975 and February 3, 1976 are reversed and set aside, Civil Case No. 12861, entitled "The Spouses Felix C. Lim, and Consorcia Geveia vs. Ysmael Maritime Corp." is hereby ordered dismissed. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on May 5, 1978 enjoining respondent Judge Avelino from conducting further proceedings in said case is made permanent. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 48664 May 20, 1987 GLICERIA C. CASUMPANG, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM AND BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondents. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 0713 entitled "Gliceria C. Casumpang v. Government Service Insurance System (Bureau of Prisons)"which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System and denied the claim for death benefits of Gliceria C. Casumpang, widow of the late Jose Casumpang. The assailed decision of the Employees Compensation Commission is as follows: The questioned decision denied the claim for compensation originally filed by the deceased employee. Jose Casumpang, then working as Prison Guard of the Bureau of Prisons with assignment at the San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm, Zamboanga City. Upon its conversion to a claim for income benefits for death following the demise of said Jose Casumpang due to Cancer of the Stomach, the

claim is now being prosecuted (sic) on appeal to this Commission by the herein appellant-widow, Gliceria Casumpang. The System's denial of the appellant's claim was predicated on the ground that the cause of death is not an occupational disease nor the result of the deceased's nature of occupation as Prison Guard, This is the gist of the System's letter-denial dated August 5, 1976, reiterated in its resolutions dated October 4, 1976 and August 18. 1977, respectively, therein further denying the requests for reconsideration of the appellant. The preponderance of mandatory legal postulate requiring proof of causation once an ailment upon which a claim is based is not considered an occupational disease as defined and understood under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, would subserve the respondent System's findings that the above-titled claim is not compensable. The conclusion of the respondent System cannot be faulted. From even the cursory reading of the record, the evidences (sic) submitted by the appellant in support of her claim would fail to indicate that the cause of death is in occupational disease, noting further thereon that the work of the deceased did not involve handling of wood products such as those of wood workers, loggers, carpenters and employees of plywood, pulp and paper mills. Neither did these evidences (sic) measure up to the substantial and positive evidence requirement for a determination of compensability, since there is no showing that the risk of contracting gastric carcinoma was increased by the deceased's working conditions. The contention of the appellant that compensability is presumed once the ailment is shown to have supervened in the course of employment cannot be accorded merit. The doctrine of presumptive compensability which was then expressly provided under the old Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428) is not recognized under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, the present law on employees' compensation. In the latter law, proof of causation by the claimant is imperative, such burden being incompatible with the presumption of compensability. FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby AFFIRMED, and the instant claim dismissed. (Original Records, Decision of ECC). The main issue in the case at bar is whether or not cancer of the stomach is an occupational disease and hence, compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. This case falls under the New Labor Code, which fact is admitted by the petitioner herself (Casumpang's Petition for Certiorari, p. 3). After a close perusal of the records of the case, nowhere does it appear that Jose Casumpang contracted his disease or ailments before January 1, 1975. There are no medical findings. reports, affidavits or any indication that he was suffering from any pain or discomfort prior to the effectivity of the Labor Code which by liberal interpretation may have worked in his favor. There is no dispute that prior to his demise Jose Casumpang had ruptured duodenal ulcer with generalized peritonitis. 'This condition according to medical findings on record, worsened into cancer 144

of the stomach which disease finally caused his death. The former ailment was officially diagnosed in June 28, 1976. In his medical history, this was traced to hematemesis and melena which began in November 1975. In other words, all of his ailments were after January 1, 1975. It is Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, therefore, which is applicable in this case and not the Workmen's Compensation Act. It is important to determine which law is applicable. Under the former Workmen's Compensation Act or Act No. 3428 as amended. the claimant was relieved of the duty to prove causation as it was then legally presumed that the illness arose out of the employment'. under the presumption of compensability (Tortal v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 124 SCRA 211). However, under the new law, the principles of aggravation and presumption of compensability have been stricken off by the lawmaker as grounds for compensation (Milano v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 52). Under Article 167 (b) of the New Labor Code and Section I (b), Rule Ill of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, for the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions (De Jesus v. Employees Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92). Under the Labor Code, cancer of the stomach is not an occupational disease considering the decedent's employment as prison guard. We agree with the Solicitor General that: ... In ECC Resolution No. 247-A dated April 13, 1977, cancer of the stomach and other lymphatic and blood forming, vessels was considered occupational only among woodworkers; wood products industry carpenters, loggers and employees in pulp and paper mills and plywood mills. The complained illness is therefore not compensable under the first group provided in the Labor Code. Under the second ground for compensability, it should be shown that an illness is caused by employment and that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. In her letter dated December 6, 1977 to respondent ECC (Annex B), petitioner claims that her deceased husband escorted inmates to work in the hinterlands of San Ramon; that at times he was overtaken by rain; that he had to work at night in case of prison escapes, and that he missed his meals owing to the nature of his duties. It should be noted however, that said conditions do not bring about cancer of the stomach. On the ailment of Jose Casumpang, the GSIS found that the evidence (you have) submitted are not sufficient for us to establish that his ailment is the direct result of your occupation or employment as Prison Guard in the Bureau of Prisons, Zamboanga City (GSIS letter dated August 5, 1976, supra.) This was reiterated by the GSIS in its letter dated October 4, 1976 denying a request for reconsideration. Thus: 'On the basis, (however), of the papers and evidence on record which you have

submitted, it appears that you have not established that your employment had any causal relationship with the contraction of the ailment.' Petitioner did not demonstrate that the adverse conditions mentioned above had direct causal connection with his job which would develop into cancer of the stomach. (Rollo, pp. 125-126). The case of Aninias v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, (83 SCRA 806) cited by the petitioner is not applicable to the cast at bar as the former case applied the Workmen's Compensation Act. The petitioner's arguments more properly apply claims falling under the old law. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED., The decision of the Government Service Insurance System and the Employees' Compensation Commission denying the claim are AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

de Oro City. As Garbage Truck Driver, he was assigned mostly in the night shift. In fact, at the time of his death, his time of duty started from 10:00 o'clock at night to 6:00 o'clock in the morning the next day. It was gathered from the evidence on record that the deceased was a heavy coffee drinker which was his way of warding off sleepiness. Prior to his death, he was observed by his co-employees to have been getting paler and weaker while at work until the time he collapsed and became unconscious while on his tour duty and was brought to his residence by his companions. Despite hospitalization, he died two weeks later on July 3, 1976. A claim for income benefits under the Employee's Compensation Program was filed by the widow, the herein appellant. The Government Service Insurance System decided against the compensability of the claim on the ground that decedent's ailment, Peptic Ulcer, is not definitely accepted as an occupational disease, as listed under the present law on compensation. Neither was there a showing that the same was directly caused by his employment and that the risk of contracting the same was increased by the working conditions attendant to the deceased's employment. 1 The case was then elevated to the ECC which ruled that: ... Peptic ulcer, the deceased's main ailment, is a sharp circumscribed loss of tissue resulting from the digestive action of acid gastric juice. Aggravating factors are ingestion of alcohol, coffee, tea and cola drinks. Cigarette smoking has also been documented to be a definite cause of delayed healing of peptic ulcer. Some drugs also contribute to its occurrence. Another factor in the production of peptic ulcer is the hereditary predisposition which seems to play a major role in the occurrence of peptic ulcer. Intractable bleeding is a complication of peptic ulcer. Death will ensue due to irreversible shock as a result of a bleeding peptic ulcer. (Principles of Internal Medicine by Harrison). Upon evaluation based on generally accepted medical authorities, the deceased's ailment was found not to be in the least causally related to his duties and conditions of work. His ailment was principally traceable to factors which were definitely not work-connected, specifically, his inherent predisposition to drinking coffee heavily which could have aggravated his contraction of the disease resulting to his death. However, aggravation of an illness is not a ground for compensation under the present compensation law. 2 On these considerations, the ECC found no sufficient basis to reverse the ruling of the GSIS denying petitioner's claim. Hence, this petitioner certiorari. The sole issue which the Court must determine is whether or not under the premises the death of Sigfredo A. Dabatian is compensable. The petition obviously addresses itself to the presumption of compensability and the principle of aggravation which were sufficient grounds for entitlement under the Workmen's Compensation Act. In fact, all the cases cited by the petitioner were decided under the old compensation law.

G.R. No. L-47294 April 8, 1987 HILARIA DABATIAN, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (General Services Department, Cagayan de Oro City),respondent. Mando Z. Tagarda and Longino G. Tagarda for petitioner. Nicasio S. Palaganas and Jose G. de Vera for respondent ECC. GANCAYCO, J.: A petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission dated June 27, 1977 in ECC Case No. 0217 which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) denying the claim for death benefits of Hilaria Dabatian, widow of the late Sigfredo A. Dabatian, was filed on September 26, 1977. However, for failure to file the necessary docket fees, this Court denied the petition in a Resolution dated September 30, 1977. A Motion for Reconsideration together with a motion to litigate as pauper was filed by the petitioner and this Court, in a Resolution dated November 11, 1977, gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file simultaneous memoranda, The Employees' Compensation Commission, which was not formally impleaded as respondent in the petition, filed its memorandum and so did respondent GSIS. Petitioner failed to file her memorandum. The case was submitted for decision on August 30, 1978. The undisputed factual background as found by the ECC which should have been made the proper respondent in this case, is as follows: At the time of his death Sigfredo A. Dabatian was employed as Garbage Truck Driver in the General Services Department of the City Government of Cagayan 145

The records show that petitioner died on July 3, 1976 when the old compensation law had already been abrogated. No competent evidence whatsoever was submitted to prove that Dabatian's ailment was contracted prior to January 1, 1975 in order to bring it under the protective mantle of the old compensation law. 3 There are no medical findings, affidavits, reports or any other evidence that deceased suffered from pain or any discomfort prior to the effectivity of the New Labor Code. No allegation was even made to this effect. True it is, that strict rules on evidence do not apply in cases such as this and that all doubts should be resolved in favor of labor. However, We cannot over-extend the limits of such rules. Justice and fair play dictate otherwise. The new law on compensation should be applied to this case. The present Labor Code, P.D. 442 as amended, abolished the presumption of compensability and the rule on aggravation of illness caused by the nature of employment, the reason being "to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's right to receive reparation for work- connected death or disability ... " 4 It was found, and rightly so, that the old law, the Workmen's Compensation Act, destroyed the parity or balance between the competing interests of employer and employee with respect to workmen's compensation. The balance was tilted unduly in favor of the workmen since it was possible to stretch the workrelated nature of an ailment beyond seemingly rational its. 5 Thus, under the present law, 6 in order for the employee to be entitled to sickness or death benefits, the sickness or death resulting therefrom must be, or must have resulted from either a) any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission or b) any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. Since peptic ulcer is not included in the list of occupational diseases as drawn up by the Commission, then petitioner has the burden of proving that the nature of her husband's work increased the risk of contracting the disease. Aside from the undisputed fact that the deceased is a heavy coffee drinker, which was his way of warding off sleepiness, no evidence was ever adduced by petitioner to bolster the theory that her husband's work increased the risk of contracting the ailment. Being a heavy coffee drinker may have aggravated his peptic ulcer, but, aggravation of an illness is no longer a ground for compensation under the present law. This Court takes notice of the fact that the conditions in this case are not peculiar to the work mentioned herein. Many, if not most, employees are equally exposed to similar conditions but have not been victims of peptic ulcer. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is denied for lack of merit. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-61931 March 3, 1987 JESUS CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. THE EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (BUREAU OF POSTS), respondents. Reynaldo L. Libanan for petitioner. PARAS, J.: This is a Petition to Review by certiorari the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission affirming the findings of the Government Service Insurance System that petitioner's ailments are not work-connected and hence not compensable as required by law. The undisputed facts of the case are briefly summarized by respondent Government Service Insurance System in its Comment as follows: Petitioner was born on February 22, 1920 in Baleno, Masbate. Effective January 1, 1981, after 24,36347 years of creditable government service and at the age of 60 years, 10 months and 8 days, he retired as Postmaster 1, Bureau of Posts, Region V, with station at Baleno, Masbate. His service in the government, which started on July 5, 1949 as a public school teacher and later on as a municipal councilor, was interrupted twice as reflected in his service record, first from July 1,1952 up to December 31, 1955 and second, from June 16,1956 up to January 31, 1960. On December 4, 1980, petitioner Chavez applied for retirement benefits under the provisions of PD No. 1146. He has already received a gross 5-year lump sum annuity of P24,598.80 and will receive a monthly pension of P409.98 starting in 1986. Petitioner Chavez alleges that he first complained of frequent urination and irregular bowel movement sometime in October 1972. In 1974, he underwent surgery for removal of renal stones. In 1976, he experienced hypochondriac pains because of kidney stones. And, in July 1982, or one year and a half (1 1/2) after his retirement, he submitted himself to surgery for removal of a right urethral stone. Thereafter, on January 4, 1982, he filed the present claim. On February 10, 1982, the GSIS denied it on the ground that petitioner's ailments are not workconnected, as required by law. The GSIS also evaluated petitioner's claim under the provisions of PD No. 1146 for Possible non-work connectedbenefits, particularly the sickness income benefit, but the same could not be granted because he was enjoying sick leave with pay at the time (Sec. 20, P.D. No. 1146). The GSIS reiterated its decision on May 3, 1982. Later, on September 2, 1982, respondent ECC affirmed the action by the GSIS (ECC Case No. 1985). (pp. 74-75, Rollo)

146

Hence, this Petition for Review, claimant assigning several errors which can be narrowed down into the determinative issue of whether petitioner's compensation claim for ailments contracted by him prior to the effectivity of the New Labor Code on November 1, 1974 but filed after said date should be adjudicated under the old Workmen's Compensation Law (Act No. 3428 as amended) or under the New Labor Code. We rule that the Labor Code as amended applies, for what is important is when compensation is sought. Petitioner's assignments of errors are listed down as follows: I THE RESPONDENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE AILMENTS OF PETITIONER ARE NOT OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES AS CONTEMPLATED BY LAW II THE RESPONDENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE AILMENTS OF THE PETITIONER ARE NOT WORK-CONNECTED ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE THE PETITIONER'S CLAIM OF STRENUOUS WORKING CONDITIONS AND EXPOSURE To INCLEMENT WEATHER IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT COULD NOT HAVE LED TO THE CONTRACTION OF HIS AILMENTS III THE RESPONDENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT HOLDING AND FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER'S RISK OF CONTRACTING HIS AILMENTS HAD BEEN INCREASED BY HIS WORK OR BY HIS WORKING CONDITIONS TO WHICH HE HAD BEEN SO CONSTANTLY EXPOSED AS SUCH POSTMASTER OF THE BALENO POST OFFICE IN MASBATE

Chronic pyelonephritis is a slowly progressive infection of a renal pelvis and prenchyma, frequently bilateral. Factors such as stones, structures and tumors cause obstruction to the flow of urine andpredispose to infection. Ureterolithiasis is the presence of stone in the ureter. This stone originates from the kidney and are carried down to the ureter by urine flow. Ascariasis is infestation with ascaris lumbricoides. Its vehicles for transmission are the fecally contaminated food and drinks. Portal of entry is through the oral route., (Letter-denial-decision, dated February 10, 1982, paragraphs 3, 4, 5, italics supplied for emphasis, p. 33, Rollo) It is petitioner's contention that his ailments are compensable under the provisions of the New Labor Code. Under Art. 1167 paragraph 1 of P.D. 626 as amended a compensable sickness is defined as (1) any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission or (2) any illness caused by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions. Since Petitioner's ailments are not listed as occupational diseases, petitioner must perforce present proofs and evidence that these ailments were work-related and that the risk of contracting the same was aggravated by the working conditions of his employment as postmaster and/or male carrier. There is no question that petitioner was presumably in good health when he started working as postmaster. To substantiate his claim, herein petitioner recalls the stress and rigors he allegedly encountered as a mail carrier wherein he had to walk the whole day to deliver all kinds of mail matters under inclement weather or intense heat; that in order to carry out said duties effectively, he had to sail on an open motor boat which passes through shallow coastal barrios and ed rivers or rivulets and then had to walk to several adjacent inland barrios which resulted often in his acquiring bodily ailments. In September of 1961, upon his assignment as a postmaster in Baleno, Masbate, he had to perform the additional task of cleaning the said post office, because that was a one man post office. So for some nineteen (19) years, he held the unenviable job of a postmaster, letter-carrier and janitor all at the same time. He had to negotiate a distance of 40 miles while sailing on an open boat, which fact often hampered relief of his personal necessities. Petitioner further narrates the following facts: 14. Thus, in 1972, while petitioner was already undergoing treatment for a kidney ailment, diagnosed medically as 'pyelonephritis and Uretorolithiasis' he was unmindful of the ill ,effects of his work to his ailment, such that he went on performing the very same functions he had done for the last twelve (12) or so years then, with the same zeal and enthusiasm. He was in fact, admitted at the UST Hospital in October 1972 on complaint of frequent urination and irregular bowel movement. (Decision of respondent ECC, on page 1, paragraph 2, Annex "C" hereof) Despite that however, upon his discharge from the UST HospitaL he continued on with his usual duties, sailing on in an open motor boat and walking great distances thus encountering the very same elements of nature. He had remitted postal funds during his tenure of office as he did in the years 1973 and 1974 and until 1980. As a matter of fact, in 1974, he underwent surgery for the removal of renal stones at the Masbate Provincial Hospital. Thus, during his confinement and recuperation, he was unable to perform his duties. But immediately after his discharge from the said hospital he resumed performing his regular duties un- til in 1976 he developed intermittent right hypochondriac pain and during the ensuing examination at the Nicanor Reyes Memorial Hospital the presence of stones in his right kidney was discovered. (Pls. see Decision, supra on page 1) But, he went on with his regular duties and in order not to prejudice 147

IV THE RESPONDENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT APPLYING THE LAW LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF COMPENSABILITY ESPECIALLY WHEN THE RIGORS AND STRESSES OF PETITIONER'S EMPLOYMENT HAVE CONTRIBUTED HEAVILY IF NOT FURTHER INCREASED THE RISK OF CONTRACTING THE AFORESAID AILMENTS V THE RESPONDENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING COMPENSABILITY TO THE PETITIONER DESPITE THE CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE INTENT AND POLICY OF THE LAW TO AFFORD PROTECTION TO LAW The petition is patently meritorious and must be granted. Petitioner is found to have chronic pyelonephritis, ureterolithiasis and ascariasis, which were defined by respondents as follows:

his duties and responsibilities he merely took "Uretricin O-P" and other drugs which temporarily relieved him of pains enabling him to go on with his work, 15. Because of his said ailments, herein petitioner frequently went on leave of absence to be able to submit himself to medicacion. In one of his several visits to the UST Hospital, his attending physician had advise him to retire from his employment for the reason that his health would no longer warrant a prolonged performance of the said work. He, therefore, wishing to stay alive a little more eventually was forced to retire effective January 1, 1981 at the early age of only 61 years after having rendered a continuous and dedicated public service for twenty (20) years. 16. But,evenafterhisforcedretirementinJanuaryl981,he submitted himself for sustained treatment of the aforesaid ailments which he had contracted in the course of his employment as such postmaster with varied duties. He finally was operated on for the removal of a right uretheral stone by cystoscopy and was discharged therefrom last July 7, 1982. 17. Retired due to a disabling disease and knowing that his ailments had been due to his employment he contracted during his tenure with the Bureau of Posts as such postmaster at Baleno, Masbate, he filed the instant complaint for disability compensation benefits under Presidential Decree 626, as amended, which had been rejected by the respondent System and which decision had been affirmed by the respondent Commission. 18. Thus, the present petition, to reiterate, for review on certiorari, of the said adverse decisions of the respondents including his claim for reimbursement of medical expenses in the amount of Pl1,850.80 duly supported by official receipts OR Nos. 38382, 39815 and 50091, herein marked and attached as Annex "D " and also made part hereof. 19. Petitioner was attended by Dr. Pasion last June 24, 1981 and by Dr. Lantin on June 27, 1981 of the St. Luke's Hospital and copy of the examination-results is hereto marked and attached asAnnexes 'E" and "F", respectively and likewise further made integral part hereof. (pp. 15-17, Rollo) This Court takes judicial notice of the strenuous nature of the work of a letter-carrier. We cannot disregard the fact that petitioner's employment brought him to places not common to the ordinary public nor to a clerical employee in an air-conditioned office. Petitioner in the execution of his duties had to go to far-flung barrios braving or indifferent to all kinds of weather. He had to walk or cross flooded places, and in the course of his travel he had to partake of food bought or taken from unsanitary places where he found himself situated, be it in the barrio, the town or the market sites. His nature of work made him thirsty most of the time forcing him or leaving him no choice except to drink water from sources unknown and uncertain as to its cleanliness. In remote barrios and villages, the common source of potable water would be the ordinary artesian well or if there is none, from the rivers and places which city folks and employees would not even dare to consider. In such a situation, it would not be difficult to conclude that petitioner contracted his ailments more particularly ascariasis since this disease is transmitted from contaminated food and/or water. Petitioner also invites Our attention to the fact that his ailments could also be due to slowly progressing infections which take time to attack the human body. It is undisputed that petitioner in the 148

course of his employment had constant exposure to the elements such as the heat of the sun, sudden rain, wind, floods, and similar conditions. The discomfort attendant to the inconvenient relief of personal necessities, the long hours of travel on land and sea-all these contributed to his ailments, resulting in his incapacity to continue working. Undoubtedly, therefore petitioner's ailments are workconnected, work-aggravated and hence compensable. Respondents argue that petitioner's action has already prescribed as it was filed beyond the 3-year prescriptive period provided for under Art. 292 of the New Labor Code. A penisal of the record shows that petitioner filed this case on January 4, 1982 for disability benefits. Petitioner was afflicted with the disease in 1972 or 1974, yet he continued to go on with his regular work as postmaster. In 1976, when he was operated on for removal of kidney stones, he was just on sick leave with pay. Immediately after his discharge from the hospital, he continued to work as postmaster. He was thus not disabled yet to discharge his work. His incapacity to work began when his doctors advised him to quit working to be able to live longer, and this was in January 1981 when he filed his forced retirement papers at the age of 61 years. The determining point of the accrual of the cause of action is the time the complainant-employee becomes disabled or incapacitated to do his regular work because that is the time when the benevolent mantle of the Law commences to cover and protect him. Thus when petitioner filed his complaint on January 4, 1982, the 3-year prescriptive period had not yet lapsed. However, We find merit in respondent GSIS' contention that under the "exclusivity of benefit" doctrine provided for under the provisions of P.D. 626 as amended by P.D. 1641 (New Labor Code) and CA 186 as amended by P.D. 1146 (GSIS Act), petitioner, since he already availed himself of his sick leave with ay benefits and retirement benefits, is entitled only to benefits, the formula for the computation of which shall be that provided for under CA 186 (as amended by P.D. 1146) plus 20% thereof. The record shows that petitioner has already received his gross 5-year lump sum annuity retirement of P 24,598.80 and a monthly pension of P 409.98 starting 1986. He is therefore entitled only to 20% of P 24,598.80 as disability benefits. Petitioner is likewise entitled to the reimbursement of his medical and hospital expenses duly supported by proper receipts, it appearing that his operation in 1982, one year after his retirement, was for the removal of a right urethral stone. Noteworthy at this juncture is the contention of respondent GSIS that if petitioner is found to be entitled to benefits, the employer Bureau of Posts of petitioner should ultimately pay, not the State Insurance Fund which is administered by the GSIS. The State Insurance Fund is composed of funds coming from employers' contributions under the New Labor Code which took effect on November 1, 1974. Petitioner retired in January 1981. After payment by the GSIS, it can seek reimbursement from the Bureau of Posts which shall be heard thereon pursuant to the requirement of due process. Additionally, it appearing that herein petitioner had availed himself of the services of a lawyer, petitioner is entitled to recover attorney's fees. WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of respondent Employees' Compensation Conunission is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one is hereby rendered, ordering the Government Service Insurance System (1) to pay petitioner's disability benefits, (2) to refund his medical and hospital expenses duly supported by proper receipts, (3) to pay attorney's fees, and (4) to pay administrative costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-68648 September 24, 1986 MARTINIANO SARMIENTO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,respondents. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is an appeal by certiorari, seeking the review of the July 20, 1984 decision of the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 2279, affirming the decision of respondent Government Service Insurance System which denied the claim of petitioner Martiniano Sarmiento for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. The claim was denied on the ground that Sarmiento's ailments-acute follicular pharyngitis with hypertrophic rhinitis-are not occupational nor work-connected in his position as casual laborer with the Bureau of Agricultural Extension from January 5, 1976 to his retirement on June 30, 1980. Martiniano Sarmiento was a casual laborer of the Bureau of Agricultural Extension requiring him to deal with different kinds of plants which have to be sprayed with insecticides and pesticides. On February, 1983, as per medical records, petitioner's illness started as a fever accompanied by chest pain, cough, and watery nasal discharge. On March 14, 1983, he filed his claim for disability compensation with the respondent Government Service Insurance system under P. D. 626, as amended. His illness was diagnosed as acute follicular pharyngitis with hypertrophic rhinitis. He was treated for these ailments at the Provincial Hospital of Bohol by Dr. Segundo T. Rocha, a private physician. The history of petitioner's illness was recorded by Dr. Rocha as follows: Present condition started three (3) days prior to consultation as sudden onset of cough accompanied by chest pain and feverish sensation. Cough hard in character and more in early evening and morning. He has been with nasal stuffiness for almost 15 years as on and off nasal stuffiness associated with frontal headache. On April 6, 1983, the Manager, Disability Benefits Department of GSIS, Mr. Oscar B. Marcelino denied the petitioner's claim stating that the petitioner's ailments are not occupational. From this decision, a petition for review was filed by petitioner before the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC). On March 18, 1984, the respondent ECC through its medical officer, Dr. Francisco A. Estacio found that there is no proof to establish the compensability of the disease in relation to the claimant's occupation. Neither was there an increased risk arising from the working conditions, He recommended affirmance of the GSIS decision denying the claim. On July 20, 1984, the respondent ECC rendered its questioned decision in ECC Case No. 2279. The dispositive portion of the decision is quoted as follows: 149 while

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed and this instant case is dismissed. Hence, this petition. The compensability of petitioner's ailments, as in most workmen's compensation cases today, is the sole issue raised in the case at bar. Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, under which the petitioner seeks compensation benefits defines compensable sickness as "any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions" (Section 1, P.D. 626, amending Article 165 of the Labor Code of the Philippines). Neither follicular pharyngitis nor chronic hypertrophic rhinitis have been listed by the ECC as occupational diseases, that is, caused by or especially incident to a particular employment, or occupation. Describing the petitioner's illness, the GSIS Medical Services Center report states that: Pharyngitis is inflammation of the pharynx most frequently viral in origin, but which may be due to streptococci, pneumococci or c. diptheria. It often arises by extension of infection from tonsils, adenoids, nose or sinuses or during the course of measles, streptococcinosis, diptheria or common cold.

Hypertrophic rhinitis is a chronic inflammatory process marked by the thickening of the nasal mucosa and submucosa, causing enlargement of the turbinates. The report found no apparent connection whatsoever between the two illnesses and petitioner's employment as laborer in the Bureau of Agricultural Extension, leading the System (that is, the GSIS) to deny compensation benefits. Petitioner posits his claim under the theory of "increased risk", that is, a disease is deemed compensable when the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions to which a laborer or employee is exposed to. However, to establish compensability of the claim under the said theory, the claimant must show proof of work- connection (Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 103 SCRA 329; Acosta v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 109 SCRA 209). Strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation (San Valentin v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 118 SCRA 160; Better Building, Inc. v. Pucan, 135 SCRA 62). There are no stringent criteria to follow. The degree of proof required under P.D. 626, is merely substantial evidence, which means, "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion" (Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, supra, citing Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union, Inc., 69 Phil. 635; and Acosta v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 109 SCRA 209). The claimant must show, at least, by substantial evidence that the development of the disease is brought largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job. What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation (Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, supra; Sagliba v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 128 SCRA 723; Neri v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 127 SCRA 672; Juala v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 128 SCRA 462; and De Vera v.

Employees' Compensation Commission, 133 SCRA 685). It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable. Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection (Delegente v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 118 SCRA 67; and Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, supra). Probability not certainty is the touchstone (San Valentin v. Employees' Compensation Commission, supra). This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, supra). The policy is to extend the applicability of the decree. to a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor (Acosta v. Employees' Compensation Commission. 109 SCRA 209). An extensive analysis of the petitioner's ailments and the circumstances under which they were suffered provides us with the reasonable proof of work-connection, if not a direct causal relation between his employment and said illnesses. The very nature of petitioner's ailments as respiratory diseases vis-a-vis his occupation with the Bureau of Agricultural Extension where, as laborer, he was constantly exposed to plant dusts, and chemicals such as pesticides and fertilizers, clearly respiratory irritants, substantiates petitioner's claim of work-connection and increased risk. This is not the case of an employee subjected to general pollution suffered in common with workers and non- workers alike. Mr. Sarmiento worked directly and regularly with pesticides and toxic materials as part of his employment. A closer study of the petitioner's ailments firmly establishes the work-connected nature of his ailments. Simple chronic rhinitis is a serious or catarrhal inflammation of the nasal mucosa membrane, attributable to prolonged irritation from chronic nasal obstruction, sinus disease and recurrent exacerbations of acute rhinitis. It is characterized by a permanent increase of the connective tissue elements, which produces nasal obstruction and increased secretion (Hollander, Abraham R, Office Practice of Otolaryngology, F.A. Davis Co., Philadelphia, 1965). On the other hand, chronic hypertrophic rhinitis results from repeated acute nasal infections from recurrent attacks of suppurative sinusitis, which produces a chronic state, and from vasomotor states independent of local disease (Boies, Hilger and Priest, Fundamental Otolaryngology, A Textbook of Ear, Nose and Throat Diseases, W. B. Saunders Co., Philadelphia, 4th Ed., 1964). Independent from disease or infection, chronic rhinitis is a reaction of the turbinate mucous membrane to irritants whether tobacco, excessive use of vasoconstrictor drops or atmospheric irritants, by enlarging, limiting the airway, resulting in nasal obstruction, either intermittent or persistent, with a post-nasal discharge of mucous (Bull, T.R., Color Atlas of Ear, Nose and Throat Diagnosis, Yearbook, Medical Publishers, Inc., 1974, pp. 115- 116). Inhalants like insect sprays, paints, varnishes, oils, perfumes, occupational dusts and odors, fumes and smokes will increase the severity or provoke episodes of rhinitis (Hollander, Office Practice of Otolaryngology, supra, 1965, p. 387). Too, a combination of long-standing allergic rhinitis and low-grade inflammation may produce the permanent enlargement of the turbinates, particularly the inferior turbinates, as is the case with petitioner in the case at bar. When this occurs, the turbinate loses most of its normal ability to expand and to shrink. The result is continuous nasal obstruction (David D. de Weese and William H. Saunders, Textbook of Otolaryngology, F.A. Davis Co., Philadelphia, 1965, p. 387).

The use of the term "Chronic", meaning long-term or long-standing to characterize petitioner's hypertrophic rhinitis further confirms work-connection. The same implies a long and gradual development of the ailment. It is a clear indication that it was not the single bout with infection which associated the same with follicular pharyngitis, that could have produced the hypertrophy or "permanent enlargement or thickening" of petitioner's nasal mucous membranes. Not only is there reasonable work-connection shown but direct causal relation of petitioner's employment and illness of hypertrophic rhinitis, for which compensation must be given. A general weakening of a person's constitution and body resistance is, likewise, a necessary consequence of petitioner's working conditions. Coupled with chronic hypertrophic rhinitis, the petitioner's susceptibility to infection was increased causing him to further contract follicular pharyngitis. There is a close and logical link between follicular pharyngitis and petitioner's working conditions as the main predisposing factor to respiratory ailments. Thus the compensability cannot be denied. WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission is SET ASIDE and another one entered ordering the respondents to pay disability benefits as abovestated. The respondents are ordered to compute the full extent of the petitioner's disability and on that basis immediately pay him the benefits due. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-69572 July 28, 1986 JOSEFINA MILLORA, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM [MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS], respondents. FERNAN, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision rendered by the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 2380, entitled, "Josefina Millora, Appellant, vs. Government Service Insurance System [Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports], Respondents," dismissing the claim of petitioner for death benefits. Petitioner Josefina Millora is the widow of Prisco Millora, who had been a classroom teacher at the Division of Public Schools in Pangasinan since 1963 until his death at age 40 on February 1, 1982. Having been a diabetic during the last eleven [11] years of his life, Prisco Millora had, on several occasions, been admitted to and confined at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital for treatment of diabetes mellitus and diabetic ulcers, On September 8, 1981, he was again admitted to the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, where he underwent surgical operation for "cataract, mature [diabetic] right". Upon his discharge from said hospital, he forthwith filed with respondent System a claim for benefits under P.D. 626, as amended, for diabetes mellitus and its complications, cataract and ulcer of the extremeties. Said claim was, however, denied. On January 20, 1982, Prisco Millora was examined at the same hospital and was found to be suffering from infection of the eye which had been operated on. On February 1, 1982, he died. 150

According to the death certificate issued by the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, the cause of death was cataract extraction [infection] of the right eye." 1 Subsequently, petitioner requested the respondent System to reconsider its denial of the deceased's claim. When respondent System denied the claim anew in a letter dated September 21, 1982, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that deceased's fatal ailments were brought about by the nature of his work. In other words, the deceased allegedly contracted ulcer of the extremeties because of his active involvement in various developmental projects, and developed cataract through the long night hours spent on preparing lesson plans and visual aid materials, and through exposure to the glare of the sun while engaged in the school's outdoor projects, Despite such arguments, respondent System stood pat on its decision, compelling petitioner to elevate the case to the Employees Compensation Commission for review. On December 6, 1984, the aforesaid Commission affirmed the decision of respondent System and dismissed the case. Hence, this petition. The denial of petitioner's claim for death benefits by respondent System on the ground that the cause of the deceased's ailments was not work-connected, was based on the evaluation made by the GSIS Medical Services Center of the deceased's main ailment, to wit: Diabetes mellitus is a hereditary or developmental disorder of carbohydrate metabolism due to an absolute or relative insufficiency of insulin appearing at any age or hyperglycemia, [sic] glycoccus, polyuric [sic], polydipsia, polynegia, praritis[sic], weakness and weight loss. Inadequate production of insulin by the beta cells of the islets of Langerhans [sic] due to causes still unknown, is responsible for most cases of diabetes mellitus. In addition there may be an increased requirement for insulin due to numerous physiologic and pathologic mechanisms. Heredity is [sic] important factor since there is a familial history of diabetes in as many as 50 percent of cases. 2 In sustaining the System's conclusion that the etiology of the main ailment of the deceased negates compensability, respondent Commission further observed: Diabetes Mellitus is a disease of worldwide distribution consisting of a metabolic and vascular component. The following have predisposition for the disease: 1. relative of known diabetics 2. obese persons 3. persons in the older age group 4. mothers from whom large babies are born since the birth of a large infant may be an indication of maternal pre-diabetes. It is well-established that it is inherited although the mode of inheritance is still under discussion. As to types, the following etiological classification may be applied: 151

1. genetic 2. pancreatic 3. endocrine 4. introgenic-precipitated by administration of certain drugs, [Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine by Wintrobe, et. al., 7th ed., p. 8501 The foregoing discussion clearly shows that diabetes mellitus could not have been caused by employment conditions. Even its complications in the case at bar [ulcer and cataract] could not have been work-connected. .. 3 Petitioner, however, argues that while diabetes may be hereditary, the work of a patient suffering from a predisposition to the disease can aggravate the same and hasten the patient's death; and that, at any rate, actual proof of causation is not necessary to justify compensability. These arguments of petitioner actually refer to the principles of aggravation and presumption of compensability, These principles, available under the Workmen's Compensation Act, were abolished by the New Labor Code [P.D. No. 626, as amended]. As explained by this Court in Sulit v. ECC, 98 SCRA 483: Those radical innovations, the presumption of compensability and the rule on aggravation of illness, which favor the employee, paved the way for the latitudinarian or expansive application of the Workmen's Compensation Law in favor of the employee or worker. It now appears that after the government had experimented for more than twenty years with such employee-oriented application of the law, the lawmaker found the result to be unsatisfactory because it destroyed the parity or balance between the competing interests of employer and employee with respect to workmen's compensation. The balance was tilted unduly in favor of the workmen. Hence, to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's right to receive reparation for workconnected death or disability, the old law was jettisoned and in its place we have the employees' compensation and state insurance fund in the Labor Code, as amended. As correctly observed ... the Labor Code abolished the presumption of compensability and the rule on aggravation of illness caused by the nature of the employment. This Court is powerless to apply those rules under the Labor Code [Resolution of March 8, 1978 in L-47008, Ibanez v. Workmen's Compensation Commission]. Under the Labor Code, as amended, the law applicable to the case at bar, in order for the employee to be entitled to sickness or death benefits, the sickness or death resulting therefrom must be or must have resulted from either [a] any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the

Commission, or [b] any illness caused by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. The respondent Commission has been empowered under Section 1, P.D. 1386 to determine and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment. The list drawn up by the respondent Commission pursuant to ECC Resolution No. 247-A [April 13, 1977], No. 432 [July 20, 1977] and No. 1676 [January 29, 1981] does not include diabetes mellitus as an occupational disease. This being the case, petitioner is charged with the burden of proving that the nature of her late husband's work increased the risk of contracting the said ailment. Petitioner attempted to do this by quoting from the medical opinion of Dr. Augusto Litonjua, president of the Philippine Diabetic Association, published in the November 1, 1985 issue of Bulletin Today. Dr. Augusto Litonjua, president of the Philippine Diabetic Association, also said that other causes of diabetes are overweight, accidents, operations, pregnancy and certain drugs. Speaking before the weekly 'Agham Ugnayan', Litonjua said diseases caused either by a virus or bacteria were found to have damaged the pancreas and caused diabetes in persons 'with a pre-disposition.' Litonjua explained that a person under stressful physical or emotional situations secrete hormones that are 'contra- insulin' or hormones which outweigh the effects of insulin. Insulin, a hormone that is produced by the pancreas lowered blood sugar. He noted that there are more diabetes cases in urban than in a rural setting. This discrepancy is believed to be attributed to the more 'Westernized' environment in urban areas which have more problem is and tensions and are flooded with products with high fat content.4 Observing that the medical opinion abovequoted was published in a non-medical periodical, the Court verified the accuracy of said report with Dr. Augusto Litonjua himself. He described paragraph 3 of the cited opinion as "essentially accurate though a bit unclear." He said that the proper phraseology should be as follows: ..a person under physical or emotional stressful situations produces hormones which are 'contra-insulin' in their effects, i.e., increase the blood sugar to outweigh the blood sugar lowering effects of insulin." 5 Petitioner asserts that since, according to the medical evaluation of respondent System, the cause of diabetes mellitus is unknown, and considering that her late husband could not have inherited the disease as his parents were not diabetic, nor was the deceased otherwise predisposed to said ailment by reason of obesity or old age, it would be more fair to conclude that his contracting diabetes mellitus was increased by the nature of his work. We find merit in this contention. Prisco Millora began work as a public school teacher when he was twenty-one [21] years old. Although not predisposed to diabetes mellitus by reason of old age, obesity or heredity, he became diabetic after eight [8] years in said employment. As a classroom teacher, his 152

work was not confined to the regular eight-to-five schedule, but stretched into the long hours of the night preparing lesson plans and instructional materials. Aside from this, he was actively involved in the school's developmental projects. To our mind, such work situation could reasonably be described as physically and emotionally stressful, a situation cited by Dr. Litonjua as producing hormones which are 'contra-insulin' in their effects and which satisfies the evaluation made by respondent Commission of the endocrinal etiology of diabetes mellitus. We may even go further and state that the abovecited work activities likewise increased the deceased's risk of contracting the fatal complications, ulcer of the extremeties and cataract. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission is hereby set aside and the Government Service Insurance System is hereby ordered to pay petitioner the sums of Twelve Thousand Pesos [12,000.00] as death benefits. One thousand Pesos [1,000.00] as funeral expenses and One Thousand and Two Hundred Pesos [1,200.00] as attorney's fees. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-56191 May 27, 1986 JESUS DE JESUS, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Philippine National Railways), respondents. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System denying the claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, of petitioner Jesus de Jesus, surviving spouse of the late Ester P. de Jesus. On April 13, 1945, Ester P. de Jesus was employed by the Philippine National Railways (PNR) as a telephone operator assigned at its San Fernando, Pampanga railway station. She was transferred in 1964 to the switchboard 'of the PNR Hospital at Caloocan City. De Jesus worked every other day during the night shift, for continuous periods of 16 hours starting from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. of the following day. From November 10, 1978 to April 5, 1979, she was hospitalized four times at the PNR hospital. Her attending physician, Dr. Juan Pineda, Chief of Clinics, PNR hospital, diagnozed her ailments as chronic pyelonephritis, diabetes mellitus, anemia and modular pulmonary metastases which is also known as lung cancer. According to Dr. Pineda, the ailments of Mrs. de Jesus started sometime in August, 1978 when she experienced progressive loss of weight and sudden loss of appetite accompanied by body weakness and easy fatigability with no other accompanying signs and symptoms except frequent urination. Despite medications, no improvement was noted and she soon complained of non-productive cough and mild lumbar pains. On December 8, 1978, after more than 33 years of service and at the age of 55 years she applied for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Republic Act 1616 and Republic Act 4968 which was approved effective March 1, 1979. Retirement benefits were thereafter given under Retirement Gratuity No. 65520. Ester P. de Jesus died of her ailments on June 20, 1979. Petitioner Jesus de Jesus, the deceased's husband, filed a claim for death benefits under

P.D. 626, as amended, on August 17, 1979. The claim was denied by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) on the ground that the deceased's ailments were not occupational diseases under the Labor Code. According to the GSIS Diabetes mellitus is a hereditary disorder of carbohydrate metabolism due to inadequate production of insulin by the pancreas. Contributing factors for its occurrence are obesity, excessive consumption of sugar and fat disorders of endocrine glands and most important, hereditary. Symptoms include excessive thirst and urination, itching, hunger, weakness and loss of weight. Anemia is a condition in which the normal amount of red blood cans is reduced. This may be a complication of the above diseases. Chronic pyelonephritis is a slowly progressive infection in the renal pelvis and parenchyma frequently bilateral. It is associated with some obstructive lesions such as kidney stones and structural abnormalities in the renal tract. Moreover, there is also no showing that your position as telephone operator in the Philippine National Railways, Manila, had increased the risks of contracting said ailments. This decision was affirmed on review by the Employees' Compensation Commission on January 15, 1981. Hence, the instant petition. Since the ailments of the deceased, as found by her attending physician, manifested themselves in 1978 or beyond January 1, 1975, the law governing the petitioner's claim is the New Labor Code (Art. 208, P.D. 442, as amended). Under Article 167 (L) of the New Labor Code and Section I (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, for the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. In this case, it is the petitioner's contention that the condition of the deceased's work increased the risk of her contracting the diseases which caused her death. After a careful examination of the case, we find the petitioner's claim without merit. The petitioner has failed to prove by competent evidence that the risk of contracting said diseases was indeed increased by the working conditions concomitant with the deceased's employment. In affirming the GSIS' decision, the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission cited the following medical discussions to negate causal relation of the deceased's work to her ailments. Nodular pulmonary metastases' is a phenomenon which results from infection with tumor emboli carried by the peripheral veins. Sarcomas, hypernephromas, melanomas and tumors of the breast, thyroid, and pancreas seem to find the 153

lung an especially favorable site for the growth of metastases. On x-ray, nodular pulmonary metastases may appear as a solitary 'cannonball' nodule, multiple nodules, or military dissemination known as lymphangitis carcinomatosis. Dyspnea and pleuritic pain are the cardinal symptoms of lung metastases. (Reference: Harrison, T.R. Principles of Internal Medicine, McGraw Hill N.Y.: 5th Edition, 1966, pp. 945-946). On the other hand, 'anemia' is a condition in which the amount of blood in the body is decrease From a practical standpoint, the term means a reduction in the number of and the amount of hemoglobin per unit of blood. The Medical Division of this Commission discusses the etiologic classification of - as follows: '(1) loss of blood, (2) deficiency of factors in is; (3) excessive construction of red corpuscles; (a) Congenital -or hereditary, (b) Acquired; (1) infection (2) chronic diseases; (3) plumbism following irradiation, drug sensitivity; (4) endocrine deficiencies; (5) myelophthisic anemia; (6) hypersplenism (7) Idiopathic bone marrow failure; (c) miscellaneous hypersideremic anemias. Reference: Harrison, T.R.: Principles of Internal Medicine; McGraw Hill N.Y. 5th edition, 1966, p. 153.' The decedent's other aliments, namely: diabetes mellitus and chronic pyelonephritis are likewise not traceable to her employment and employment conditions. 'Diabetes mellitus', according to medical science is: A hereditary or developmental disorder of carbohydrate metabolism due to an absolute or relative insufficiency of the action of insulin appearing at any age as hyperglycemia, glycosuria, polyuria, polydipsia, polyphagia, pruritus weakness and weight loss. Etiology and incidence: Insufficient insulin action from causes still unknown is responsible for most cases of diabetes mellitus. Decreased effectiveness of insulin, which may or may not be associated with the presence of antagonist to insulin, is probably of greater etiologic importance than is an inadequate production of insulin by the B-cells of the islets of Langerhans. Although the exact cause of diabetes has not been found, some contributory factors are recognized. Hereditary is important, since there is a familiar history of diabetes in as many as 50% of cases. Obesity has been indicted. Disorders of endocrine glands other than the pancreas may be associated with the development of diabetes mellitus. Infection is a common precursor to the appearance or exacerbation of the disease, probably making a latent diabetes manifest. Pancreatitis, pancreatic tumors and hemochromatosis are responsible for occasional cases of diabetes. In certain persons who may be more susceptible to the eventual development of diabetes (e.g. strong positive family history) the use of certain drugs may be associated with the appearance of overt diseases. Such drugs include adrenocortical steroids and thiazide diuretics. Reference: Lyght, C.E.: The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy, M.S.D.; N.J. llth ed., 1966,. pp- 325-326. Chronic pyelonephritis refers to a slowly progressing infection in the renal pelvis and parenchyma frequently bilateral The condition may have its origin in an acute pyelonephritis in childhood, especially in females, or during pregnancy. In males, it is usually associated with some obstructive lesion, such as renal calculi or prostatic hypertrophy. The common etiologic agent is the colon bacillus, P. vulgaris, or a related organism. Less frequently, one of the gram-positive cocci

may be responsible. Reference: C.E. Lyght: The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy, M.S., N.J. 1lth ed., p. 255. On the other hand, the petitioner alleges that the deceased's continuous night shift duties coupled with the offensive odor of some medicine and dirty linens that were dumped regularly near her office, afflicted her weakening lungs and induced the development of lung cancer and anemia. To bolster his claim, he submits a clinical history of the deceased and a letter certification both prepared by Dr. Juan Pineda, who was the attending physician of the deceased, We regret to note, however, that the allegations have not been substantiated by the petitioner. While this court has always maintained that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation (Neri v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 127 SCRA 672), the basic rule that a mere allegation is not evidence (Topweld Manufacturing, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 44944, August 9, 1985; Lagasca v. de Vera, 79 Phil. 376) should not be disregarded. As to the medical view of Dr. Pineda, his endorsement that the deceased's working condition "contributed immeasurably to the insidious development of her lung lesion" and that her 11 unusual and prolonged working hours finally sapped her strength leading to physical exhaustion" which, together with diabetes and anemia, provided a "groundwork for pulmonary metastases" (Rollo, p. 16), implies aggravation of the disease rather than its direct causation. We are, therefore, powerless under the law to reject the respondents' view that the diseases which the deceased suffered are not caused by employment. As the medical authorities reveal, those ailments are common to all mankind whether employed or unemployed, and if employed, irregardless of the nature of the employment. Under the old Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, which provided for the concepts of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" it was possible to stretch the work related nature of an ailment beyond seemingly rational limits. In this case, however, there is no dispute that the governing law is the New Labor Code, which according to settled jurisprudence (Sulit v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483; Armena v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851; Felipe U. Erese v. Employees' Compensation Commission, GSIS, Metro Manila, G.R. No. L45662, August 20, 1985), discarded the aforesaid concepts to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's rights to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability. The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of employers based on the salaries of their employees. The injured worker does not have to litigate his right to compensation. No employer opposes his claim. There is no notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a claim with a new neutral Employees' Compensation Commission which then determines on the basis of the employee's supporting papers and medical evidence whether or not compensation may be paid. The payment of benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration is low. The amount of death benefits has also been doubled. On the other hand, the employer's duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to the scheme. It does not look for insurance companies to meet sudden demands for compensation payments or set 154

up its own funds to meet these contingencies. It does not have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims. The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's compensation. The Commission administers and settles claims from a fund under its exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the compensation process and it has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. The open ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits. Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on presumption of compensability and controversion cease to have importance. The lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which called for equalization through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now absent. The Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund was established after actuarial studies and on the basis of the provisions of the new law. I commiserate with the claimant but compassion should be for all beneficiaries and not specific claimants. If we endanger the stability and liquidity of the Fund through orders compelling payment of benefits where the law never intended such benefits to be paid, we are not compassionate. We endanger the scheme. WHEREFORE, we hold that the decision appealed from should be, as it is, hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-50545 May 23, 1986 LYDIA D. MILANO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Katipunan National Agricultural School, Katipunan Zamboanga del Norte), respondents. Roldan B. Dalman for petitioner. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) denying the claim for death benefits of Lydia D. Milano, widow of the late Samuel Milano. The late Samuel Milano started working for the government in 1955 as a FACOMA bookkeeper. On October 1, 1958, he transferred to the Katipunan National Agricultural School at Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte. After about seventeen (17) years working as a bookkeeper, he became an administrative assistant in the same institution on April 10, 1975. In the early part of 1975, Milano started to feel vague signs of "epigastric pain" which were later diagnosed by Dr. Camilo Tomboc of the Perpetual Succor Hospital at Cebu City as "penetrating

Duodenal Ulcer On". February 6, 1977, he was admitted at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital for "ascitis, marked weight loss, and epigastric discomfort". Dr. Gerardo Ypil of the hospital diagnosed his ailment as "cancer of the pancreas with metastases". On March 15, 1977, he was discharged from the hospital. On the same day, he died of cardiorespiratory arrest due to cancer of the pancreas. On May 30, 1977, petitioner Lydia D. Milano filed with the GSIS a claim for death benefits. The claim was denied on the ground that the "decedent's illness could not be considered an occupational disease". A request for reconsideration was likewise denied. Consequently, the claimant appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission. The respondent commission affirmed the GSIS decision and dismissed the appeal. Hence, this petition for review. The petitioner filed her claim under Article 167, Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code, as amended, on the ground that the illness which resulted in the death of the employee was caused by his employment. This provision requires the claimant to prove that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by working conditions. As will be explained later, the petitioner failed to present any evidence to meet this requirement. Since the petitioner's arguments are based on the presumption of compensability and the principle of aggravation which are both major grounds for entitlement under the former Workmen's Compensation Act, we have ascertained whether or not the claim may fall under the provisions of the old law. The petitioner argues that the proximate cause of her husband's death was his duodenal ulcers which were first felt in the early part of 1975. She alleges that the process of acquiring ulcers "takes months or years" until eventually the ulcer has eaten its way right through the wall of the stomach or duodenum thereby "causing agonizing pains of a severe peritonitis" (Petitioner's Memorandum, rollop. 132) Hence, according to the petitioner, her husband's ulcers which resulted in the latter's death may be traced to the period before the New Labor Code took effect on January 1, 1975. The above argument is a mere conjecture not borne by the evidence on record (see Armea vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851). As held in the case of Erese vs. Employees' Compensation Commission (G.R. No. L-45662, August 20, 1985): (N)owhere does it appear that Erese contracted his diseases or ailments before January 1, 1975. There are no medical findings, reports, affidavits, evidence, or any indication that he was suffering from any pain or discomfort prior to the effectivity of the Labor Code ... . In the case of Labenia vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, (G.R. No. L42889, December 27, 1985) this Court held that: ... for the presumption to arise, the illness must have supervened during the employment. There must be competent evidence to show when the illness was contracted. The records disclose that Milano's earliest period of treatment was dated November 17, 1976 to November 29, 1976 (Annex "F", Petition for Review, Rollo, p. 27). Under "History of present illness", in the attending physician's certification submitted by the claimant, Milano was stated as suffering from "epigastric pain for 6 months durationrelieved by milk and food intake."

Clearly therefore, Milano's ailments occurred after January 1, 1975 and are covered by the new law (Corales vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, 88 SCRA 547). Rule III, Section 1 (b) of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation elucidates on Asrticle 165 of the Labor Code. It states: Section 1. Grounds xxx xxx xxx (b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. Applying the law to the present case, cancer of the pancreas is not an occupational disease considering the decedent's employment as bookkeeper and eventually as administrative assistant. To be entitled, the petitioner must, therefore, prove that her husband's ailments were caused by his employment. More specifically, she must submit proof that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the employee's working conditions. As a general rule, cancer is a disease of still unknown origin which strikes people in all walks of life, employed or unemployed. There are certain predisposing factors such as working with chemicals, being exposed to radiation, handling asbestos fibers, etc. The claimant has failed to show and we are not aware of any medical literature to the effect that his work as a bookkeeper or clerk would increase the risk of contracting cancer of the pancreas. The petitioner alleges that her husband had to take meals at odd hours or sometimes even completely forget about eating due to pressure of work. She states that because of this, her husband felt vague epigastric discomfort that eventually developed into penetrating duodenal ulcer and cancer of the pancreas. The above allegation cannot serve as the basis for a finding that there was an efficient and competent producing cause for Samuel Milano's death. We agree with the Government Service Insurance System when it stated that: ... Even on the assumption that it is true, we respectfully submit that the conditions, pictured by petitioner, would apply also to other occupations. To be sure, the conditions are not peculiar to the occupation of a bookkeeper or administrative assistant. Many employees are exposed to such adverse conditions but have not contracted cancer of the pancreas. What is important is that the above conditions are not causative factors of cancer of the pancreas. In several cases, this Court has held that the principles of aggravation and presumption of compensability are no longer grounds for compensation under the new law. (Zozobrado vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 65856, January 17, 1986; Dela Rea vs. ECC, G.R. No. 66129, January 17, 1986, Vda. de Silencio vs. ECC, 131 SCRA 128, Erese vs. ECC, supra, Armena vs. ECC, 122 SCRA 851). The petitioner's arguments more properly apply to claims falling under the old law. 155

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Government Service Insurance System and the Employees' Compensation Commission denying the claim are affirmed. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Prior to the aforesaid report of the (LOD) Board, or on August 5, 1982, herein petitioner filed a claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626 with the Government Service Insurance System (p. 12, ECC rec). This claim was denied on November 29, 1982 by means of a letter signed by Juanito A. Santamaria, Social Security Services of the GSIS. Said letter-denial is quoted hereunder:. This has reference to your claim for death benefits under PD #626, as amended, due the late Mauricio A. de la Rea, a former serviceman in the Philippine Navy who died on May 29, 1982.

G.R. No. L-66129 January 17, 1986 CARMELITA DE LA REA, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,respondents. Carmelita dela Rea for and in her own behalf. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated September 15, 1983 of respondent Employees' Compensation Commission which affirmed the decision of respondent Government Service Insurance System denying the claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, filed by herein petitioner, on account of the death of her husband Mauricio de la Rea. The following facts are not disputed: The late Mauricio de la Rea enlisted in the Philippine Navy on October 3, 1972 and re-enlisted every three years thereafter. He held various ranks, the last one being CD2 (E-5) which rank he held up to the time of his death on May 29, 1982 (p. 17, ECC rec.). immediately before his death, he was assigned in the Philippine Navy's Assault Craft Squadron, National Defense Forces in Sangley Point, Cavite City. On May 15, 1982, he was granted his rest and recreation order, or what is commonly known as vacation leave, for fifteen (15) days, from May 15, to May 30, 1982, for the purpose of undergoing physical examination relative to his re-enlistment in the Philippine Navy. While enjoying his rest and recreation privileges at his hometown in Halang, Amadeo, Cavite, he was shot to death for unknown motive by a certain Pepito Montoya who is also a resident of the same place. Mauricio de la Rea died instantly from gunshot wounds he sustained. On July 19, 1982, the Philippine Navy created a Line on Duty (LOD) Board to investigate the death of Mauricio de la Rea and to determine whether he died in line of duty. On August 26, 1982, the (LOD) Board submitted its report to the Commander, Naval Defense Forces (CNDF) of the Philippine Navy concluding that the death of the deceased was not due to his misconduct, neither was he AWOL (absent without official leave) at the time of the incident, and recommending that Mauricio de la Rea, who died in line of duty be entitled to all the benefits due and to become due him as prescribed by laws and regulations (pp. 19-20, ECC rec.). On September 12, 1982, the investigation report was approved by the (CNDF) (p. 24, ECC rec.).

After a careful study an appraisal of the records submitted, your claim cannot be considered favorably on the ground that the sickness/injury that caused his/her death is not due to circumstances of his/her employment, nor incurred in the performance of the duties and responsibilities of his/her position. As legally evaluated, it shows that Subject EP was shot to death on May 29, 1982 while he was on authorized Rest and Recreation and, therefore, he was not performing his official functions, nor injured in the place where his work requires him to be, and neither was he executing an order for his employer which are the conditions necessary in order that the death of an employee win be considered work- connected. For failure to satisfy the above-stated conditions, disapproval of the claim is hereby recommended. DISAPPROVED. In view of the foregoing, it is deeply regretted that your claim cannot be given due course by this Office. (p. 16, ECC rec.) On January 3, 1983, petitioner sought a reconsideration of the above letter denial (p. 38, ECC rec.) which was likewise denied by the respondent GSIS. On Appeal to respondent ECC, as indicated earlier, the latter rendered the questioned decision dated September 15, 1983 sustaining the denial of petitioner's claim for compensation benefits primarily because the death of Mauricio de la Rea emanated from factors which are not work-connected. Pertinent portions of respondent ECC's decision state the following: Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1 (a) of Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employee's Compensation, for an injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all the following conditions, namely: (1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; (2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and (3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer. We have meticulously scrutinized the records and the evidence submitted and we believe no cogent reason exists to reverse the respondent System's findings 156

that the deceased's contingency does not fall within the compensable provision of the law. When an employee sustains an injury at a time when he is not in the performance of his official functions, he is not entitled to compensation benefits. The records show that Mauricio de la Rea at the time of his death was on vacation leave. Needless to state, he was not in the performance of his official functions as a navy serviceman. Neither was he at his workplace. Indeed, the decease's death on the fateful day of May 29, 1982 had no bearing on his employment as a navy serviceman as he was in his hometown in Cavite. Moreover, his assailant as borne by the records was no other than his neighbor in the barrio. Clearly, de la Rea's death emanated from factors which are not work connected. Inasmuch as his death does not satisfy even one of the indispensable requisites imposed by the Employees' Compensation Law for compensability of an injury, appellant's prayer for reversal of her claim based on her husband's death cannot be sustained for lack of legal basis. (pp. 16-17, rec.) Hence, this petition for review, petitioner submitting that respondent ECC erred in not considering compensable under the law the death resulting from a work-related injury of Mauricio de la Rea. " We find the petition devoid of merit. For the death to be compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626, Section 1 (a), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation is in point: Section 1. Grounds (a) for the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following conditions: (1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; (2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and (3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer. In the case before us, the required conditions are wanting. There is also no submission that the above rules are unconstitutional or invalid. Mauricio de la Rea was not at the time and place where his work required him to be; neither was he performing official functions nor was he executing an order for his employer at the time he was slain. In other words, his death is not work-related. Mauricio de la Rea was undisputedly on vacation leave in his hometown in Halang, Amadeo, Cavite when after alighting from a jeepney, he was shot twice by a certain Pepito Montoya with a .45 caliber pistol. The motive behind the killing was unknown, The records do not even show, much less was evidence presented that the death which befell the petitioner's husband arose as an incident to the performance of his duties in the Philippine Navy or that the same arose from the perils of his work. (Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 26 SCRA 102) In the absence of such causal-connection, especially under the present law on employees' compensation, the claim can not be granted. 157

As held in the case of Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, (27 SCRA 1132:) ... (J)urisprudence is to the effect that injuries sustained by an employee while in the course of his employment, as the result of an assault upon his person by another employee, or by a third person, no question of the injured employee's own culpability being involved, is compensable where, from the evidence presented, a rational mind is able to trace the injury to a cause set in motion by the nature of the employment, or some condition obligation or incident therein; and not by some other agency. (Morgan v. Hoage 63 App. DC 355, 72 F. [2d] 727.) [Emphasis supplied] We are cognizant of the fact that the days when an employee is on vacation are considered part of the period of his employment. The rationale behind the grant of vacation leave to an employee is to enable the employee to have some rest and to reinvigorate himself so that he would be more efficient and productive in his work (Vda. de Ucang v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 77 SCRA 69). However, not everything which transpires during a vacation may be attributed or related to the employment. It does not follow that every death or disease while on vacation is work- connected. The petitioner cites the cases of Aranzanso v. Sagnit (71 SCRA 608) and Vda, de Ucang v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, supra to support her claim The aforecited cases can not be precedents for the case now before us. As stated by the Solicitor-General in his memorandum which we quote: The cases cited by petitioner (Aranzo v. Sagnit, 71 SCRA 611; Vda. de Ucang v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 77 SCRA 69) are not relevant in the case at bar considering that the main issue raised therein was whether or not the employer-employee relationship existed during the time an employee was on vacation leave. Besides, the bases of the claims for compensation in the aforecited cases were illness of the employees (heart attack which occurred while they were on vacation leave. Further, in both cases, this Honorable Court found that the illness was contracted or aggravated by reason of employment. (pp. 50-5 1, Respondent's Memorandum). It should be noted that these cited cases were covered by the defunct Workmen's Compensation Act where there was a presumption of compensability not re-enacted in the new law. The present Employees Compensation Law has studiedly different provisions and envisions a system different from that under the former law. We reiterate the ruling in the case of Armea v. Employees' Compensation Commission (122 SCRA 851) where it was clearly explained that in order: xxx xxx xxx ... to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's right to receive reparation for workconnected death or disability the old law was jettisoned and in its place we have the employees' compensation and state insurance fund in the Labor Code, as amended. xxx xxx xxx

To rule that, for purposes of employees compensation, a person on vacation leave is still working would be stretching the law too far. Following the same arguments, a person struck by lightning while fast asleep in his bed at night would be considered as having been merely resting so he could better perform his work the following morning. Under this kind of reasoning, there would be no deaths which would not be compensable. The law might as well be amended to make the fact of death with no qualifications or requirements whatsoever compensable. Furthermore, the mere fact that the employee-employer relationship continues during an intermission from work is not controlling on the question of whether or not an injury incurred during such time is compensable. (Mack v. Reo Motors, Inc., 76 N.W. 2d 35) What is essential is the causal connection between the resulting death or disability and the employee's work (Manigbas v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 128 SCRA 411). As Justice Munoz Palma stressed in the case of Belarmino v. Workmen's Compensation Commission (82 SCRA 261): xxx xxx xxx

1. (a) Roque Zozobrado, petitioner herein, begin working for the then Bureau of Public Highways at Cebu City on October 20, 1958 as civil engineer aide. (b) On April 16, 1959, he was transferred to the then Bureau of Public Works at Marawi City. At this post, petitioner was promoted to Associate Civil Engineer in 1961, Senior Civil Engineer in 1966, Supervising Civil Engineer in 1968, and District Engineer on March 23, 1971 until he retired on September 1, 1979 from the Ministry of Public Works at age 63 due to glaucoma and cataract. He "was paid under PB 13822 in the amount of P33,365.40. 1 2. Petitioner also filed a claim for total and permanent disability with the GSIS based on the following clinical history: (a) In December, 1967 he had a glaucoma operation (OS) of the left eye. (b) In August, 1970 he had a glaucoma operation (OD) of the right eye.

... but more controlling is the principle laid down in Luzon Stevedoring that where the cause of assault is work-connected, the death of an employee is compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act. (emphasis supplied) Unfortunately, the petitioner failed to establish such a causal connection. No allegations were made as to the reason why her husband was killed. Investigators who inquired into the circumstances surrounding the death were not able to identify or determine the motive for the killing. The suddenness of the attack on Mauricio de la Rea and the absence of motive for such an act clearly belie petitioner's claim for compensation. We are, therefore, constrained to deny petitioner's claim for death benefits on the ground that the death is not work connected. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

(c) In May, 1978 he had an operation for "cataract, mature (OS) and submitted himself for lens extraction at the Perpetual Succor Hospital in Cebu City. 3. (a) On February 2, 1981, the GSIS, through its Disability Benefits Department, denied the claim on the ground that under Presidential Decree. No. 626 (as amended) glaucoma and cataract are not occupational diseases. (b) On July 20, l981, petitioner moved for reconsideration. He averred that his eye ailment can be considered to have emanated from his employment because his work entailed constant use of his vision in the process of reviewing "plans, specifications, bill of materials, cost estimates of projects, act on letters, decide office problems, settle dispute of sites for projects in the fields, prepare guidelines for Project Engineers and all other similar duties". 2 (c) On September 23, 1981, the GSIS reiterated its previous denial. It emphasized that on the basis of the evidence presented by petitioner there is no showing that the ailment contracted directly arose or resulted from the nature of his employment. (d) On appeal to the ECC, the latter affirmed the Decision of the GSIS and dismissed petitioner's claim for compensation. The ECC explained: A meticulous review of the records and the evidence submitted convince us of the wisdom of the respondent System in denying the instant claim. Cataract is an opacification of the lens or its capsule. In this sense, almost any adult has cataract. They are not considered of serious clinical significance unless they interfere with vision. Cataracts re-develop through the alteration of the physical and chemical states of the lens proteins. Denaturation of protein and the inhibition of water may each play a role. It is known that in cataractous lens, sodium and calcium contents are lower than normal. An etiological classification of cataracts is as follows: (1) Congenital most common cause is heredity: (2) Senile-due to morphologic and metabolic changes undergone by the aging lens; (3) Secondary or after- cataract may occur after some forms of cataract extraction; (4) Complicated caused by disease of the uveal tract, pigmentary retinal detachment and old injuries; (5) Traumatic caused by blunt injuries or 158

G.R. No. L-65856 January 17, 1986 ROQUE V. ZOZOBRADO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Ministry of Public Works), respondents. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: This is a Petition for Review on certiorari to set aside the Decision of respondent Employees' Compensation Commission, dated July 21, 1983, in ECC Case No. 1992, affirming the Decision of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) denying petitioner's claim for disability benefits. The factual background follows:

penetrating injuries to the eye, intraocular foreign bodies, radiation and high voltage electricity; (6) Toxic Cataract certain drugs such as ergot dinitrophenol naphthalene, phenothiazines and tiparanol may produce cataracts. (H. Schie and Albert, Adler's Textbook of Ophthalmology, 8th ed., pp. 281-282). Appellant's cataract being the senile type has to do with morphologic and metabolic changes undergone by the aging lens. Medical authorities further disclose that glaucoma is a disease characterized by increased intraocular tension which can cause impairment of vision ranging from slight abnormalities to absolute blindness. It may either be primary or secondary. Among the predisposing factors of primary glaucoma are vasomotor and emotional instability, hyperopia and heredity. Secondary glaucoma results from pre-existing ocular disease, usually uveitis and intraocular tumor. Prolonged corticosteroid therapy especially with topical opthalmic preparations can produce an increased pressure, particularly in patients with pre-disposition. (The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy, 13th edition, p. 1977). We took into consideration appellant's averment that his work entailed reviewing plans, specifications, bin of materials, and cost estimates of projects; that he likewise resolved office problems, settled disputes on sites for projects and prepared guidelines for project engineers. These, however, are not sufficient bases to establish proof that appellant's risk of developing cataract was increased by his working conditions. Senile cataract is an ailment to which all persons are exposed regardless of whether they are employed or not, its etiology being attributed to degenerative changes or aging. While it may be argued that 'cataract' is listed by the Commission as an occupational disease, appellant's case cannot fall under this classification since his occupation did not subject him to frequent and continued exposure to the glare or rays from molten glass or redhot metal which is the criterion for compensability of cataract. The findings of the Medical Division of this Commission also failed to indicate a causal link between appellant's duties and his contracted ailments. 3 Dissatisfied, petitioner filed this Petition for Review. In petitioner's letter, dated July 20, 1981, addressed to the GSIS, seeking reconsideration of the denial of his claim, he states that his disability was due to cataract in 1978, since his glaucoma in 1967 and 1970 had been operated on successfully. 4 The applicable law at the time petitioner contracted the cataract in 1978 is the Labor Code. 5 Section 1 (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation embodied therein explicitly provides: SECTION 1. xxx xxx xxx

(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex 'A' of these rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. The doctrine of "presumptive compensability in the old Workmen's Compensation Law that when an illness supervenes during the course of employment it is deemed to have either arisen out of or been aggravated by petitioner's employment has been abandoned. 6 Under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, the present law on compensation, the listed occupational diseases are compensable when the conditions contained therein are met, and certain diseases are allowed to be compensable whenever the claimant can prove that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the conditions of the employment of the deceased. As to the degree of proof required, the claimant must show at least by substantial evidence that the development of the disease is 'brought largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job. 7 Petitioner's eye ailment is "cataract, senile (OS) of the left eye. 8 A cataract is any opacity in the crystalline lens. Senile cataract is by far the most common type, usually associated with factors related to aging. 9 "Senile cataract as defined, is the most common form of cataract occurring after the age of fifty (50) due to aging or degenerative changes (Adler's Text Book of Ophthalmology by Schele and Albert, 8th Edition, 1968, pp. 281-282). It is a risk or hazard to which an persons are exposed regardless of whether they are employed or not, the same (Senile Cataract) being attributed to degenerative changes or to aging process. 10 Senile cataract is not a listed occupational disease. 11 Neither does it have any causal connection with his work as District Engineer in Marawi City. It is due to degenerative changes accompanying the aging process. It is not generated by strain on the eyes, as petitioner claims. Nor was the risk of contracting it aggravated by the nature of his duties or his working conditions. It is a physiologic process occurring after the fourth decade of life and to which everyone is exposed whether employed or not. The claim for disability benefits, therefore, was correctly denied by public respondents. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission, dated July 21,1983, is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

159

G.R. No. L-46187 January 16, 1986 VIRGINIA VDA. DE TUMOLVA, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Mun. Gov't., Tumauini, Isabela), respondents. Benedicto L. Nanca for petitioner. Nicasio S. Palaganas and Jose G. de Vera for respondent ECC. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 0231 entitled "Virginia Vda. de Tumolva v. Government Service Insurance System (Municipal Government, Tumauini, Isabela)" which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System and denied the claim for death benefits of Virginia Tumolva, widow of the late Ildefonso Tumolva. The assailed decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission is as follows: On the sole question of whether or not the deceased's ailments of Obstructive Jaundice Secondary to Cancer, Head-Body of Pancreas and Pulmonary Tuberculosis, Moderately Advanced, could have emanated from the nature of his employment as a Municipal Secretary, as well as the working conditions attendant thereto, appellant herein seeks a review of the decision of the respondent Government Service Insurance System denying her claim for income benefits for death due to the foregoing ailments under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. The controlling facts as appearing from the record are as follows: The late Ildefonso A. Tumolva, husband of appellant herein, was in life a Municipal Secretary of Tumauini, Isabela. On February 6, 1975, on complaints of general body weakness with vague abdominal discomfort and slight yellowish discoloration of the sclerae associated with gradual loss of appetite, he was brought to the Tumauini Emergency Hospital. Noting no improvement in his prognosis, he was transferred to the Mary Johnston Hospital where his ailments were clinically diagnosed to be 'Obstructive Jaundice Secondary to CA, HeadBody of Pancreas and PTB, Moderately Advanced.' He subsequently died on June 19, 1975 due to the foregoing ailments. The claim for income benefits for death filed by the deceased's widow, appellant herein, was denied by the respondent System on June 21, 1976 on the ground that the causes of death are not occupational diseases and the nature of the deceased's duties as Municipal Secretary as well as the working conditions obtaining in his employment could not have directly caused his ailment which led to his subsequent death. From this denial, appellant elevated her claim to this Commission for review, 160

After a careful examination of the facts of this claim, we do not see any reason why the respondent System's decision, finding the present claim to be not compensable, should be reversed. In this particular case, the illness that actually hastened the life of the deceased was Obstructive Jaundice Secondary to CA, Head-Body of the Pancreas. As time and again stressed by this Commission, when an ailment upon which a claim for compensation is barangay is not classified as an occupation disease under Annex "A" of the Rules on Employee's Compensation, such as in the instant claim, it is incumbent upon the claimant to establish by substantial proof that the risk of contracting the ailment is increased by the employee's working conditions. In the case at hand, there is nothing at all in the record that could substantiate the allegation of the appellant that such employment conditions to which deceased had been exposed had increased the risk of contracting his malignant ailment of Cancer of the Pancreas. Pulmonary Tuberculosis, while it may have served to complicate the main ailment of the deceased, does not fall under the purview of 'Occupational disease' as defined and understood under the decree, unless the claimant could show that the employee's occupation involved close and frequent contact with a source or sources of tuberculosis infection by reason of employment: (a) in the medical treatment or nursing of a person or persons suffering from tuberculosis, (b) as a laboratory worker, pathologist or postmortem worker where occupation involves working with material which is a source of tuberculosis infection The deceased's occupation as a Municipal Secretary does not involve any of these risks. Accordingly, since the foregoing ailments that eventuated in the death of the deceased had not been due to the deceased's employment, the ensuing death, therefore, is hereby, as the respondent did, held not compensable. FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby AFFIRMED, and the instant claim dismissed. (Original Records, Decision of ECC). Upon receipt of the copy of the above decision on May 6, 1977, Virginia Tumolva immediately filed a notice of appeal and elevated her case to this Court by way of certiorari on June 9, 1977. Although her claim is based on Presidential Decree No. 626, the petitioner raises the following issues which seem to invoke provisions of the old Workmen's Compensation Act: 1. whether or not the defense of non-compensability is waived by failure of employer to controvert claim. 2. whether or not Pulmonary Tuberculosis is an 'occupational disease' to be service connected, and hence, compensable. " (Petition, Rollo, p. 8) Considering that the severe illnesses which contributively precipitated the death of petitioner's husband occurred immediately after the effectivity of the New Labor Code on January 1, 1975, we find a close scrutiny of the nature of these ailments necessary for a just adjudication of this case. Medical authors on the said diseases reveal the following findings:

Jaundice a morbid condition characterized by yellowness of the eyes, skin and urine, constipation and loss of appetite ... (Maloy, Medical Dictionary for Lawyers, 2nd Ed., p. 334). ... it is usually first noticeable in the eyes, although it may Come on so gradually that it is not immediately noticed by those in daily contact with the jaundiced person. Jaundice is not a disease. It is a symptom of one of a number of different diseases and disorders of the liver, gallbladder and blood. ... Jaundice may also be a symptom of infectious (viral) hepatitis." (Miller, Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Medicine and Nursing, p. 505). CHOLESTASIS A clinical and biochemical syndrome which results when bile flow is impaired at any point from the liver cell canaliculus to the ampulla of Vater. The term 'cholestasis' is preferred to 'obstructive jaundice' because a mechanical obstruction is not always present. Etiology. For clinical purposes a distinction between intra and extrahepatic causes is crucial The commonest intrahepatic causes are viral or other hepatitis, drugs, and alcoholic liver disease. Some less common etiologies are primary biliary cirhosis cholestasis of pregnancy, metastatic carcinoma, pericholangitis secondary to ulcerative colitis, and numerous rare disorders. Extrahepatic cholestasis is most often due to a common duct stone or pancreatic carcinoma. Less frequently, benign stricture of the common duct (usually related to previous surgery), ductal carcinoma, pancreatitis or pancreatic pseudocyst, and sclerosing cholangitis are causative." ... Berkow editor. The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy, 13th ed., p. 852). In this case, Obstructive Jaundice, which is one of the immediate causes of the decease's death, coexisted with Cancer of the Head-Body of the Pancreas which in turn has the following characteristics: G. Adenocarcinoma of Pancreas. Cancer of the pancreas is increasing in frequency. It usually develops between age 40 and 60. The disease is rarely curable because it has extended or metastasized by the time it is detected. 1. Diagnosisa. Symptoms and signs. Pain in the epigastrium and back is deep-seated, dull and often is exacerbated by recumbency. Anorexia and weight loss are 161

characteristics. Obstructive jaundice is caused by cancer arising in the head of the gland, ... (Schrock, Handbook of Surgery, 7th ed., p. 332.) Pancreas. Malignant tumors arise from the products and acinar cells as adenocarcinoma. Adenocarcinoma in the head of the pancreas usually causes painless jaundice, anorexia, nausea and weight loss. A tumor in the body of the pancreas causes gnawing pain which radiates to the back and is worse after the patient eats and when he lies down; weight loss and anorexia are late consequences. Tumors in the tail of the pancreas are often silent until they spread locally, especially to the spleen. Prognosis is very poor since pancreatic advanced when detected. Metastases to the stomach, tumors are liver and lung are common. Berkow supra, p. 830). Severity of Problem Fifty percent of those with pancreatic cancer die in less than three months from the time of diagnosis. Two percent or less survive for three years. Usually the cancer is so well advanced when detected that little can be done to fight it. (Pescar, Medical Reference Library: Symptoms and Illness, p. 76). The foregoing medical conclusions attest to the fact that obstructive jaundice is caused by and can be directly traceable from cancer of the pancreas. At the very least, said illness may be considered as an aggravation of the original sickness of cancer of the pancreas. More important to the issues presented by the petitioner, there is a unanimous finding that cancer of the pancreas is one of those rare diseases which are already at their advanced stages when detected such that the chances for their effective cure become nil. There are no findings that this illness does not progress gradually. The facts of this case appear to be consistent with the aforecited medical findings because from the time the deceased complained of abnormal body functions on February 6, 1975, a rapid deterioration of his physical condition ensued which led to his death on June 19, 1975 or barely four months after his first medical check-up on record at the Tumauini Emergency Hospital. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to conclude that the deceased's sickness had pre-existed and dated back to a much earlier time before he obviously felt the severity of his ailment or before 1975. Even assuming, however, that this inference is strictly speaking, based on other inferences which are difficult to verify, we note that the deceased's death was also caused by Moderately Advanced Pulmonary Tuberculosis. In the case of Leonardo V. Workmen's Compensation Commission (88 SCRA 58), we attributed to pulmonary tuberculosis the following nature: ... tuberculosis is not an instantaneous disease. It is an imperceptible disease that is breathed in and feeds on the lungs and taken with food; its presence in the body cannot easily be discerned; its incipient stage may not be readily discovered. It is medically accepted that exposure to dust and dirt is a predisposing cause of tuberculosis and tends to produce fibrosis of the lungs which weakens the resistance to any latent tuberculosis infection and reactivates that infection

Thus, we cannot avoid the conclusion that the ailments which led to the deceased's death imperceptively supervened at the time when the New Labor Code was not yet in force and effect. In this case, we only need to reiterate this Court's rule that where the ailment was contracted before January 1, 1975, although the death occurred and the subsequent claim was filed after the effectivity of the New Labor Code in 1975, the claim should still be decided under the Workmen's Compensation Act. (See De Castro, Jr. vs. Republic, 75 SCRA 372; Cuenza v. Employee's Compensation Commission 104 SCRA 198). It is a settled rule that the governing law in the prosecution of a cause of action which has accrued prior to the effectivity of new law shall be the law enforced at the time of the accrual of said cause of action (Balatero v. Employee's Compensation Commission, 95 SCRA 608). Applying now the provisions of the old Workmen's Compensation Act, we rule that when there is a showing that the ailment was contracted in the course of his employment, there is a disputable presumption that the claim is compensable and the burden of proof is shifted to the employer to prove by substantial evidence that the illness did not arise from such employment or was at least aggravated by it. (Cuenza vs. Employee's Compensation Commission, supra). The deceased's employer, the municipal government of Tumauini Isabela, did not controvert the petitioner's claim. The Government Service Insurance System which is the party respondent in this case did not rebut the petitioner's allegations that the deceased, as municipal secretary and alter ego of the mayor, was exposed to potential sources of tuberculosis infection. The petitioner alleged that her husband, aside from doing office work also frequented the barrios, usually passing along dusty road, entertained and helped people from all walks of life and stayed up late in the evening during cases of emergency. Due to respondent's failure to overthrow by substantial evidence the presumption of compensability in this case, we are constrained to rule in favor of the petitioner. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent Government Service Insurance System is ordered to pay: 1. SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) for death benefits to the petitioner; 2. TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P200.00) burial expenses to the petitioner; 3. SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P600.00) attorney's fees to petitioner's counsel; and 4. SIXTY ONE PESOS (P61.00) administrative fees to the Ministry of Labor and Employment.

G.R. No. L-64802 September 23, 1985 VENUSTO PANOTES, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Ministry of Education and Culture), respondents. RESOLUTION MAKASIAR, C.J.: On March 29, 1984, WE rendered a decision in this case granting compensation benefits (pursuant to P.D. 626, as amended) to petitioner Venusto Panotes for the death of his wife, Agustina Garfin Panotes. The fatal disease, colonic malignancy or cancer of the colon, was considered by this Court as having been contracted due to or at least the risk of contracting the same had been increased by the working conditions to which the deceased had been subjected as a public school teacher, and accordingly, ordered respondent Government Service Insurance System: 1) to pay petitioner the sum of P12,000.00 as death benefits; 2) to reimburse the petitioner's medical and hospital expenses, duly supported by proper receipts; 3) to pay the petitioner the sum of P1,200.00 as funeral expenses; and 4) to pay the petitioner the sum of P1,200.00 as attorney's fees. On May 2, 1984, respondent GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration based on the following grounds: 1) reasonable work-connection is required by the law for an employees'compensation claims, the alleged fact of impossibility of proof notwithstanding; 2) the legal requirement of work-connection should prevail upon the general liberality of the law; 3) award of attorney's fees is not within the contemplation of the law and which this Court had previously reduced to 5% (p. 82, rec.). WE find the motion of respondent GSIS devoid of merit.

SO ORDERED. In this motion before US, respondent GSIS brings up the issue of the relation between the standard of reasonable work connection established by this Court in compensation cases and the Court's statement in the case at bar that the cause of the fatal disease is unknown (Emphasis supplied). Respondent's theory that, by granting petitioner's claim, the standard of reasonable work-connection for compensation cases was rendered meaningless because this Court's findings in the present case that the cause of the fatal disease cancer of the colon is still unknown, belies the finding that said fatal disease was caused by the nature of the work and/or the risk of contracting the same was increased by the working conditions of the deceased. Respondent further submits the proposition that "if the cause of the ailment is unknown, then it cannot also be said that the ailment is work-connected under the increased risk doctrine" (p. 73, rec., italics supplied). "To declare as compensable all ailments 162

whose causes are unknown would be to place the claimants with such types of ailments in a far better or superior position than those whose causes are known but cannot be proved as work-connected", respondent adds (p. 71, rec.). WE ruled in the case of Cristobal vs. Employees' Compensation Commission (L-49280, Feb. 26, 1981, 103 SCRA 329, 335336), thus: The deceased died of rectal cancer on May 27, 1977. Concededly the exact cause or etiology of this disease is still unknown. Even respondent ECC's own medical officer, Dr. Mercia C. Abrenica, certified that the cause of rectal carcinoma as of any other malignancies is still unknown' (p. 9, ECC rec.). Its cause and development are insidious, imperceptible to the naked eye, and defies expert analysis. Therefore, whether or not the disease rectal cancer was caused or the risk of contracting the same was increased by the decedent's working conditions remains uncertain This uncertainty, of course, cannot eliminate the probability that the ailment was work- connected as it had been established that the deceased was exposed to unhygienic working conditions, various chemicals and intense heat which are generally considered as predisposing factors of cancer. At this point, there is need to reiterate that when the deceased started working in 1964, he was free from any kind of disease. In ruling on this claim, this Court also applied the theory of increased risk under Section 1 (b) Rule III of PD 626 which states that: For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex 'A' of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions (Emphasis supplied). aside from the possibility that the disease might have been contracted prior to the effectivity of the new Labor Code. To establish compensability of the claim under the said theory, the claimant must show proof of work-connection. Impliedly, the degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence, which means 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion' (Ang Tibay vs. The Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union, Inc., 69 Phil. 635) or clear and convincing evidence. In this connection, it must be pointed out that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation. ... (Emphasis supplied). Under the employees' compensation law, there are two categories of occupational illness or disease deemed compensation; a) those listed as occupational disease by the Commission, and b) any illness caused by the employment, subject to a showing by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions (Jarillo vs. ECC, L52058, February 25, 1982). In defining the increased risk doctrine, Larson states: "the distinctiveness of the employment risk can be contributed by the increased quantity of a risk that is qualitatively not peculiar to the employment" (Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. I, S 6.30, pp. 3- 4 [1978]). An occupational disease is thus discussed further as follows: 163

An occupational disease generally providing compensation therefor, is a disease which is caused by, or especially incident to, or the natural consequence of, the particular employment in which the workman is engaged, which results from exposure therein to hazards greater or different than those involved in ordinary living, which generally develops gradually over a considerable period of time in the employment, and which industry has not learned to fend against or eliminate. xxx xxx xxx In determining the cause of disability, and whether the cause was an occupational disease within the provisions of the statute, all factors must be taken into consideration; and whether a disease is compensable must be determined on the basis of the particular facts involved in each case and the peculiar characteristics of each employment. Thus, while an occupational disease is generally one which from common experience is recognized to be necessarily incidental to the usual and ordinary course of the employment it has also been held that if the disease is one that results from employment it is an occupational disease, even though the risk of disease was not generally known. Accordingly, the disease need not be a natural and common result rather than an unexpected one. While there is some authority to the effect that ordinary diseases of life are not compensable unless they follow as an incident of an occupational disease, a disease, to be compensable as occupational, is generally not required to be an extraordinary disease, and one to which the general public is not exposed, and it is not essential that the disabling occupational disease should arise solely out of the occupation in which the employee is engaged, in order to make it compensable. Moreover, the fact that an employee's disease may be of a class or nature which members of the general public may acquire under ordinary and usual conditions and circumstances will not exclude it from the benefits of the act if the disease was in fact occasioned as a result of being subjected to the risks afforded by the unusual conditions of work in his employment (99 CJS Workmen's Compensation, S 169, pp. 566-569 [1958], (Emphasis supplied). Respondent GSIS further alleges that the evidences presented tended to prove a mere case of aggravation and not reasonable work-connection, thus, the following allegations: In the case at bar, this Honorable Court went on to describe in detail the physical, mental and emotional pressures undergone by the deceased public school teacher who entered the service in perfect health was not confined in the classroom but engaged in other school activities, was exposed to the elements, missed her meals because of workloads, etc.all of which factors weakened her body resistance and made her susceptible to diseases. These conditions are invariably present in different types of employment. In fact, even among teachers, these conditions are unavoidably present but there has been no showing that many teachers have succumbed to cancer of the colon. Thus, we humbly ask for clarification as to whether aggravating conditions unconnected to the ailment contracted, are enough to establish reasonable work connection, though the doctrine of aggravation, as stated by this Honorable Court, has already been removed under the present law (Ibaez vs. ECC, L47008, March 8, 1978) [p. 73, rec.].

Assuming arguendo that the evidences cited in the case at bar were mere aggravating conditions, this Court, in the case of Acosta vs. ECC (109 SCRA 210) had occasion to discuss the matter as follows: The GSIS itself was inclined to believe that the ailment of the deceased was aggravated by the nature of her work when it stated in the comment that it has no relation at all to the work of the deceased as a public school teacher except by way of aggravation.' if this is so, there would be no consistency in respondent denying the claim for compensation on the ground that the risk of contracting the disease was not increased by her working conditions. It is more in keeping with reason to hold that once a situation of aggravation arises, there exists a causal relation between her work and her ailment which caused her death, as shown respondent GSIS has conceded the possibility of aggravation being present. (Emphasis supplied). It is apparent from respondent's arguments that what it seeks is a direct, actual proof of the causal connection between the fatal disease and the working conditions of the deceased. WE, however, rule in this case as WE did in the other cases that actual proof of causation is not necessary to justify compensability. The degree of proof required to establish proof of work-connection between ailment and the deceased's employment is only substantial evidence or reasonable work connection (Cristobal vs. ECC, L-49280, February 26, 1981, 103 SCRA 329; Neri vs. ECC 127, SCRA 672). Where cause of the employee's death is unknown, the right to compensation subsists (Najera vs. ECC, 122 SCRA 697). Proof of causal connection between claimant's disease of tumor and his employment as a condition of compensability, the causes of which disease cannot be explained, would render nugatory the constitutional principles of social justice and protection to labor (Poral vs. ECC, 131 SCRA 602; Mercado Jr. vs. ECC 127 SCRA 664). In the case of Cristobal vs. ECC (Ibid.) cited earlier, this Court ruled: xxx xxx xxx ... As the agents charged by the law to implement the social justice guarantee secured by both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more liberal attitude in deciding claims for compensation especially when there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work- connection. This should not be confused with the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. While these doctrines may have been abandoned under the new Labor Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is significant that the liberality of the law, in general, still subsists. All these factual and legal grounds were considered in relation to each other constituting substantial evidence clearly convincing US to resolve that rectal cancer is compensable. Let it be pointed out too that the deceased's ailment was one of those falling under the borderline cases and in connection therewith, this Court has ruled in the case of Sepulveda vs. ECC (84 SCRA 771) as cited in the case of San Valentin vs. ECC (118 SCRA 160), that: ... (T)he respondent Commission under Resolution No. 223, dated March 16, 1977, adopted, as a policy, the institution of a more compassionate interpretation of the restrictive provisions of P.D. 626, as amended, by its administering 164

agencies, the SSS and the GSIS, with respect to, among others, Myocardial Infarction and other borderline cases. ... (Emphasis supplied). Thus, the following diseases were deemed compensable: rheumatic heart disease (Panangui vs. ECC 121 SCRA 65), lung cancer (Dator vs. ECC, G.R. No. 57416, January 30, 1982), senile cataract (Jarillo vs. ECC, L-52058, February 25, 1982), liver cancer (Abadiano vs. GSIS, L-52254, January 30, 1982), pancreatitis (Villavert vs. ECC 110 SCRA 274), rectal cancer (Cristobal vs. ECC, L-49280, February 26, 1981, 103 SCRA 29). The very fact that the cause of a disease is unknown, creates the probability that the working conditions could have increased the risk of contracting the disease, if not caused by it, thus, the increased risk doctrine was applied in the present case. The situation obtaining in the case at bar generates doubts, which by principle and in keeping with the law, should be resolved in favor of labor. To warrant the arguments of respondent would render futile the provision of Article 4 of the New Labor Code, expressly providing that: All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor (Emphasis supplied). The preceding law is a direct implementation of the constitutional mandate on social justice and protection to labor as embodied in Article II, Sections 6 and 9, herein quoted as follows: Sec. 6. The State shall promote social justice to ensure ... the dignity, welfare, and security of all the people ... . Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration (Emphasis supplied). Social justice in workmen's compensation cases is not equality but protection of the laborer as against the employer (De los Santos vs. WCC 120 SCRA 730). Respondent GSIS refuses to appreciate the evidence substantiating the claim of petitioner. It cited the evidences in the decision which allegedly are, at most, aggravating conditions only. Respondent, however, failed to take these evidences in the light of other equally compelling factors. The deceased worked as an elementary school teacher from 1949 until she contracted the fatal disease in 1979. She was in perfect health when she entered the government service. She was not only teaching and confined within the protection of the classroom, but she was saddled as well with other outdoor activities. This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that public school teachers are made to take up the burden of attending to various activities, both for the school and the community, aside from and in addition to their duties as a teacher. This is a fact obvious and known to everyone familiar with our public school system and yet, ironically, we close our eyes to it. Finally, with respect to the award of attorney's fees, respondent argues that the award is not proper or should have been reduced to only 5% of the compensation claim. The argument is devoid of merit.

There is no prohibition against imposing attorney's fees on the employer, for the benefit of the counsel for the claimant (Marte vs. ECC, L-46362, January 30,1982). In Cristobal vs. ECC (supra), this Court has ruled that: xxx xxx xxx A close examination of the aforequoted provision reveals that the intent of the law is to free the award from any liability or charge so that the claimant may enjoy and use it to the fullest. It is the claimant who is exempt from liability for attorney's fees. The defaulting employer or government agency remains liable for attorney's fees; because it compelled the claimant to employ the services of counsel by unjustly refusing to recognize the validity of the claim of petitioner. This actually is the rationale behind the prohibition. Nothing is wrong with the court's award of attorney's fees which is separate and distinct from the other benefits awarded. Besides, in the instant case, the participation of petitioner's counsel was not limited to the preparation or filing of the claim but in appealing petitioner's case before this Court necessitating submission of pleadings to establish his cause of action and to rebut or refute the arguments of herein respondents. Fairness dictates that the counsel should receive compensation for his services, otherwise, it would be entirely difficult for claimants, majority of whom are not teamed in the intricacies of the law, to get good legal service. To deny counsel compensation for his professional services, would amount to deprivation of property without due process of law ( Emphasis supplied). There is a clear difference, from the standpoint of legal policy, between attorney's fees to be paid by the laborer and fees awarded by the court to be paid by the employer. The plain intent of the statute is that the compensation to be received by the injured workman should not be reduced by more than 10% on account of lawyer's fees. This purpose is attained where the fees are to be paid by the employer, since the compensation receivable by the workman is then in no way diminished. In the latter eventuality, all that the law requires is that the counsel's fees should be reasonable (NDC vs. WCC, L-19863, April 29, 1964, 10 SCRA 696). Thus, the award of 10% attorney's fees is proper. There is no prohibition in the law as to such an award nor as to the proper amount that should be awarded. The amount is actually discretionary upon the Court so long as it passes the test of reasonableness. WHEREFORE, THE DECISION DATED MARCH 29, 1984 IS HEREBY AFFIRMED. THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS HEREBY DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT, AND THIS DENIAL IS FINAL AND EXCUTORY LET ENTRY OF JUDGMENT BE MADE. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-63535 May 27, 1985 PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND BRIGIDO SAMSON, represented by wife, NORMA S. SAMSON, respondents. Gamaliel G. Bongco for petitioner. Doroteo A. Dadal for private respondent. ALAMPAY, J.: The case at bar stems from a claim for disability compensation benefits and hospitalization expenses under employment contract, filed by private respondent herein, Brigido Samson, against the petitioner before the National Seaman's Board (NSB). On April 2, 1981, a decision was rendered on by the Executive Director of the NSB, ordering petitioner herein to: 1. Pay complainant the sum of US $3,800.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency as disability compensation benefits; and 2. Pay complainant's counsel Atty. Doroteo A. Dudal, the sum of US $380.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency as attorney's fees. Payment of these amounts should be coursed thru the National Seamen Board. Not satisfied with the foregoing judgment, petitioner appealed to the NLRC. During the pendency of said appeal, petitioner offered P18,000.00 to private respondent. On May 7, 1981, private respondent received said amount and executed a "Release" document stating therein the following: RELEASE I, BRIGIDO SAMSON, do hereby certify to the following facts and circumstances: 1) That I had been employed by the PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CORPORATION (PISC) as 2nd Engineer on its vessel the M/V "ASEAN KNOWLEDGE" from May 31, 1980 to February 12, 1981. 2) That my last day of service on board was on February 12, 1981. 3) That for a just, legal and valid cause, I had been repatriated due to illness after arrival in Manila onFebruary 12, 1981. 4) That I received all salaries, wages and other compensation due me during the period of my incapacity. 165

5) That I assumed responsibility of paying the services of the Lawyer who represents my case with the NSB against PISC in claiming for my compensation benefits which amounted to P18,000.00. 6) That I hereby declare and affirm that I accept the validity and legality of my separation and express my desire and intention to release the Philippine International Shipping Corporation (PISC) for any claim that may accrue to my favor whether contractual, equitable or legal in character in the course of my employment with said company and whatever right I have against the same in consequence of the termination of my employment. SIGNED THIS 7th DAY OF May, 1981 in Quezon City WITNESS:

Pursuant to the said Order, an amended Writ of Execution was forthwith issued. Petitioner herein however, filed a motion to quash the amended writ of execution. In a Resolution dated July 26, 1982, the Board denied the said motion. Petitioner appealed the denial of its motion to herein respondent NLRC. On December 20, 1982, the NLRC rendered a resolution dismissing petitioner's appeal. Hence, this instant petition for certiorari, with petitioner attributing to the NLRC the commission of the following alleged errors, namely. 1. The respondent NLRC erred in not quashing the amended writ of execution despite the release already executed by private respondent. 2. The respondent NLRC erred in recognizing a clearly illegal decision, because said decision orders payment in the dollar standard in violation of law. We find no merit whatsoever in the petition.

______________ (SGD.) (Annex B, Petition, Rollo 15). When private respondent executed the aforestated Release document, he was then undergoing Medical treatment for the injury he sustained while on board petitioner's vessel M/V Asean Knowledge as a Second Engineer therein. On December 17, 1981, the appealed decision was affirmed by the NLRC. After the said decision reached finality, the corresponding writ of execution was issued and served on petitioner. On April 28, 1982, the Sheriff who served the writ submitted a report to the Board, stating that petitioner had paid P18,000.00 to private respondent herein which the latter accepted and evidenced by a voucher and a "Release" document dated May 7, 1981; and that because of said payment, the Sheriff had in the meantime refrained from collecting the balance of the award until the Board shall have passed upon this matter. On May 19, 1982, the Board issued an Order calling the parties to a hearing, During the scheduled hearing on June 7, 1982, private respondent maintained that the P18,000.00 was accepted by him only as partial payment of the award since he badly needed the money for his on-going medical treatment. Petitioner herein, however, insisted that said amount constituted full payment of the award. On June 17, 1982, an Order was issued by the Board: Considering all the foregoing, the Board is of the opinion and so hold that the amount paid and the circumstances surrounding the payment of P18,000.00 to complainant do not appear to be full compliance of the decision award rendered by this Board in its decision dated April 2, 1981, as affirmed on appeal by the NLRC in its decision promulgated December 17, 1981. At most, the sum of P18,000.00 paid to complainant would constitute only as partial compliance with the said decision but not a waiver of the balance including the attorney's fees. WHEREFORE, let an amended writ of execution issue as to the balance of the unpaid decision award and as to the attorney's fees. 166 The only issue in this case that may be said to approximate and raise a question of law is the submission of petitioner that the directive in the decision, affirmed by the NLRC, ordering payment of the award using the dollar standard is in violation of law. We find however this petition taken by petitioner to be untenable. While it is true that Republic Act No. 529 makes it unlawful to require payment of domestic obligations in foreign currency, this particular statute is not applicable to the case at bar. A careful reading of the decision rendered by the Executive Director of the NSB dated April 2, 1981 and which led to the Writ of Execution protested to by petitioner, will readily disclose that the award to the private respondent does not compel payment in dollar currency but in fact expressly allows payment of "its equivalent in Philippine currency." (Rollo, p. 14) Moreover, as pointed out by public respondent, without any subsequent controversion interposed by petitioner, the fixing of the award in dollars was based on the parties employment contract, stipulating wages and benefits in dollars since private respondent was engaged in an overseas seaman on board petitioner's foreign vessel. (Comment of respondent NLRC to the Petition, pg. 10, Rollo, 49) Accordingly, we fail to see any violation of R.A. No. 529. As to petitioner's principal contention that its payment of P18,000.00 under the document of release executed by private respondent constitutes full satisfaction of the award, We uphold the ruling of the public respondent NLRC on this matter and find no error, much less grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent NLRC in rejecting such assertion. In the case of MRR Yard Crew Union versus Philippine National Railways, 72 SCRA 88 (1976), this Court held that the fact that the employee "has signed a satisfaction receipt does not result in waiver; the law does not consider as valid any agreement to receive less compensation than that the worker is entitled to recover." Moreover, from the records it appears that there was a hearing on National Seamen Board precisely to consider and resolve whether admittedly made by petitioner was in full or partial satisfaction compensation benefits due to the private respondent. The said June 7, 1982 called by the the payment of P18,000.00 of the award for disability Board gave credit to the

manifestations of private respondent that the latter was constrained to accept the payment of P18,000.00 and execute the release of document as at that time he was still undergoing on-going medical treatment for which apparently he needed funds for his expenses. (Order of June 17, 1982 of the National Seamen Board; Annex C of Petition, Rollo, pp. 16-17). A decision on a question of fact by an administrative body is entitled to respect. Courts, as a rule, refuse to interfere with proceedings undertaken by administrative bodies or officials in the exercise of administrative functions, absent any showing that such decision was rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition or mistake. (Nera vs. Titong, Jr., 56 SCRA 40, 44, citing Manuel vs. Villena, 37 SCRA 745; Venancio Lim, Sr., vs. Secretary of Agriculture, 34 SCRA 751). It was also stated in Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Camara Shoes vs. Camara Shoes, 112 SCRA 689, that findings of fact of National Labor Relations Commission are generally entitled to respect except when there is grave abuse of discretion, a circumstance which however we do not find attendant in the case at bar. Aside from the reasons above-stated, we also note that the release document was executed by private respondent on May 7, 1981 during the pendency of the appeal made to the NLRC by petitioner Philippine International Shipping Corporation from the decision of the National Seamen Board, dated April 2, 1981. Despite the execution of said release document, the petitioner herein did not file any motion to dismiss its appeal or to have said appealed case declared terminated due to the alleged satisfaction of the judgment. This omission negates an inference that the parties had actually agreed that the payment of the P18,000.00 would be equivalent to a full satisfaction of the award and/or a waiver of the balance on the award. It is also worth noting that the questioned decision of the NLRC dated December 17, 1981, affirming the decision of the National Seamen Board, does not appear to have been the subject of any challenge or appeal whatsoever. It was only after the National Seamen Board had issued its order of June 17, 1982 directing petitioner to pay the balance still remaining on its previous decision award and directing the issuance of an amended writ of execution that petitioner took exception to the decision of the NLRC which had long become final by alleging that the decision of the National Seamen Board which the NLRC had affirmed, is in violation of law. Petitioner may not now evade the effects of a final NLRC decision by assailing the writ of execution issued pursuant thereto. WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-62354 May 9, 1985 ROSALINDA GODIZANO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Philippine Navy), respondents. Alfred L. Juntilla for petitioner. RESOLUTION MAKASIAR, J.: On March 22, 1984, WE rendered a decision in this case, the dispositive portion of which is as follows: WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY REVERSED AND THE RESPONDENT GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM IS HEREBY ORDERED 1. TO PAY HEREIN PETITIONER AND HER TWO CHILDREN THE SUM OF SIXTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY PESOS AND NINETY-FIVE CENTAVOS (P16,680.95) FOR DEATH BENEFITS FROM AUGUST 19, 1978 TO MARCH 19, 1984; AND THEREAFTER A MONTHLY PENSION OF P224.82 FOR THE PETITIONER AND FOR EACH OF THE TWO DEPENDENTS, A MONTHLY PENSION OF TWENTY-TWO PESOS AND FORTY-EIGHT CENTAVOS (P22.48) UNTIL EACH REACHES THE AGE OF 21 YEARS; 2. TO PAY ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) FOR FUNERAL EXPENSES; 3. TO REFUND PETITIONER'S MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER RECEIPTS; AND 4. TO PAY ONE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P1,600.00) FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES. SO ORDERED. (pp. 10 and 11, rec.) On April 26, 1984, respondent GSIS filed a motion for partial reconsideration, which motion grants the petitioner bigger benefits under the present law in the amount of P27,525.90 death benefits and P428.96 as monthly income benefits. The GSIS further requests however, for reconsideration and/or modification of the P1,600.00 attorney's fees "in the light of Article 203 of the labor Code, or in the alternative, in the light of the previous holding by this Honorable Court of awarding 5% merely of the principal sum as and for attorney's fees" (p. 85, rec.) citing Calvero v. ECC & GSIS, G.R. No. 52059, September 30, 1982 (p. 86, rec.). 167

It is most gratifying that the GSIS increased the claim for death benefits and monthly income benefits against it. WE applaud and encourage such fidelity to the law shown in the case at bar by the GSIS for the claimant's benefit. However, WE cannot give assent to the prayer of the GSIS to reduce the attorney's fees. The reason behind the grant of attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the death benefits notwithstanding the prohibition in Article 203 of the Labor Code was already explained and made clear by US in the 1981 case ofCristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission (L-49280, February 26, 1981; 103 SCRA 339), to wit: A close examination of the aforequoted provision reveals that the intent of the law is to free the award from any liability or charge so that the claimant may enjoy and use it to the fullest. It is the claimant who is exempt from liability for attorney's fees. The defaulting employer or government agency remains liable for attorney's fees; because it compelled the claimant to employ the services of counsel by unjustly refusing to recognize the validity of the claim of petitioner. This actually is the rationale behind the prohibition. Nothing is wrong with the court's award of attorney's fees which is separate and distinct from the other benefits awarded. Besides, in the instant case, the participation of petitioner's counsel was not limited to the preparation or filing of the claim but in appealing petitioner's case before this Court necessitating submission of pleadings to establish his cause of action and to rebut or refute the arguments of herein respondents. Fairness dictates that the counsel should receive compensation for his services; otherwise, it would be entirely difficult for claimants, majority of whom are not teamed in the intricacies of the law, to get good legal service. To deny counsel compensation for his professional services, would amount to deprivation of property without due process of law. While WE granted at first a mere 5% as attorney's fees in the case of Calvero; said amount was increased to 10% in a later resolution in the consolidated cases of Corales, Villones, Caneja, Barga, Duran, Calvero, Delegente, Cenita v. ECC and GSIS (November 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 136). The dispositive portion referring to the case of Calvero reads as follows: WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE IS HEREBY ORDERED 1. TO PAY PETITIONER THE SUM OF SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00) PESOS AS DISABILITY COMPENSATION BENEFITS; 2. TO REIMBURSE PETITIONER HER MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER RECEIPTS; 3. TO PAY PETITIONER THE SUM OF SIX HUNDRED (P600.00) PESOS AS ATTORNEY'S FEES; AND 4. TO PAY ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS. SO ORDERED. 168

Issues already resolved by US in very similar cases as the case herein should not be repeatedly raised. Time is most essential for the claimants and their counsel. The currency has repeatedly suffered depreciation and may depreciate again as time passes. Its purchasing power has tremendously diminished. WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY AMENDED AND THE RESPONDENT GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM IS HEREBY ORDERED 1. TO PAY HEREIN PETITIONER AND HER TWO CHILDREN THE SUM OF TWENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE PESOS AND NINETY CENTAVOS (P27,525.90) FROM AUGUST 19, 1978 TO MARCH 1984 FOR DEATH BENEFITS; AND THEREAFTER A MONTHLY INCOME BENEFIT OF P 357.46 FOR THE PETITIONER, AND FOR EACH OF THE TWO DEPENDENTS, A MONTHLY INCOME BENEFIT OF THIRTY-FIVE PESOS AND SEVENTY-FIVE CENTAVOS (P35.75) UNTIL EACH REACHES THE AGE OF 21 YEARS; 2. TO PAY ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS FOR FUNERAL EXPENSES; 3. TO REFUND PETITIONER'S MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER RECEIPTS; AND 4. TO PAY TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY- TWO PESOS AND 59/100 (P2,75259) FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985 PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, in his own behalf and on behalf of the minors ROMULO and NESTOR S. FLORESCA; and ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO, PEDRO S. FLORESCA, JR., CELSO S. FLORESCA, MELBA S. FLORESCA, JUDITH S. FLORESCA and CARMEN S. FLORESCA; LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children LINDA, ROMEO, ANTONIO JEAN and ELY, all surnamed Martinez; and DANIEL MARTINEZ and TOMAS MARTINEZ; SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. DE OBRA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children JOSE, ESTELA, JULITA SALUD and DANILO, all surnamed OBRA; LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. DE VILLAR, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children EDNA, GEORGE and LARRY III, all surnamed VILLAR; DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA. DE LANUZA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children EDITHA, ELIZABETH, DIVINA, RAYMUNDO, NESTOR and AURELIO, JR. all surnamed LANUZA; EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. DE ISLA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children JOSE, LORENZO, JR., MARIA, VENUS and FELIX, all surnamed ISLA, petitioners, vs. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. JESUS P. MORFE, Presiding Judge of Branch XIII, Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents. Rodolfo C. Pacampara for petitioners. Tito M. Villaluna for respondents. MAKASIAR, J.: This is a petition to review the order of the former Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII, dated December 16, 1968 dismissing petitioners' complaint for damages on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working underground. Portion of the complaint reads: xxx xxx xxx 9. That for sometime prior and up to June 28,1967, the defendant PHILEX, with gross and reckless negligence and imprudence and deliberate failure to take the 169

required precautions for the due protection of the lives of its men working underground at the time, and in utter violation of the laws and the rules and regulations duly promulgated by the Government pursuant thereto, allowed great amount of water and mud to accumulate in an open pit area at the mine above Block 43-S-1 which seeped through and saturated the 600 ft. column of broken ore and rock below it, thereby exerting tremendous pressure on the working spaces at its 4300 level, with the result that, on the said date, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, with the collapse of all underground supports due to such enormous pressure, approximately 500,000 cubic feet of broken ores rocks, mud and water, accompanied by surface boulders, blasted through the tunnels and flowed out and filled in, in a matter of approximately five (5) minutes, the underground workings, ripped timber supports and carried off materials, machines and equipment which blocked all avenues of exit, thereby trapping within its tunnels of all its men above referred to, including those named in the next preceding paragraph, represented by the plaintiffs herein; 10. That out of the 48 mine workers who were then working at defendant PHILEX's mine on the said date, five (5) were able to escape from the terrifying holocaust; 22 were rescued within the next 7 days; and the rest, 21 in number, including those referred to in paragraph 7 hereinabove, were left mercilessly to their fate, notwithstanding the fact that up to then, a great many of them were still alive, entombed in the tunnels of the mine, but were not rescued due to defendant PHILEX's decision to abandon rescue operations, in utter disregard of its bounden legal and moral duties in the premises; xxx xxx xxx 13. That defendant PHILEX not only violated the law and the rules and regulations duly promulgated by the duly constituted authorities as set out by the Special Committee above referred to, in their Report of investigation, pages 7-13, Annex 'B' hereof, but also failed completely to provide its men working underground the necessary security for the protection of their lives notwithstanding the fact that it had vast financial resources, it having made, during the year 1966 alone, a total operating income of P 38,220,254.00, or net earnings, after taxes of P19,117,394.00, as per its llth Annual Report for the year ended December 31, 1966, and with aggregate assets totalling P 45,794,103.00 as of December 31, 1966; xxx xxx xxx (pp. 42-44, rec.) A motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 was filed by Philex alleging that the causes of action of petitioners based on an industrial accident are covered by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428, as amended by RA 772) and that the former Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners filed an opposition dated May 27, 1968 to the said motion to dismiss claiming that the causes of action are not based on the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act but on the provisions of the Civil Code allowing the award of actual, moral and exemplary damages, particularly:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre- existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasidelict. (b) Art. 1173The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply. Art. 2201. x x x x x x x x x In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the nonperformance of the obligation. Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. After a reply and a rejoinder thereto were filed, respondent Judge issued an order dated June 27, 1968 dismissing the case on the ground that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. On petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said order, respondent Judge, on September 23, 1968, reconsidered and set aside his order of June 27, 1968 and allowed Philex to file an answer to the complaint. Philex moved to reconsider the aforesaid order which was opposed by petitioners. On December 16, 1968, respondent Judge dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and ruled that in accordance with the established jurisprudence, the Workmen's Compensation Commission has exclusive original jurisdiction over damage or compensation claims for work-connected deaths or injuries of workmen or employees, irrespective of whether or not the employer was negligent, adding that if the employer's negligence results in work-connected deaths or injuries, the employer shall, pursuant to Section 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Act, pay additional compensation equal to 50% of the compensation fixed in the Act. Petitioners thus filed the present petition. In their brief, petitioners raised the following assignment of errors: I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS' COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. II 170 PLAINTIFFSA

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE AND CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.

In the first assignment of error, petitioners argue that the lower court has jurisdiction over the cause of action since the complaint is based on the provisions of the Civil Code on damages, particularly Articles 2176, 2178, 1173, 2201 and 2231, and not on the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. They point out that the complaint alleges gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take the necessary security for the protection of the lives of its employees working underground. They also assert that since Philex opted to file a motion to dismiss in the court a quo, the allegations in their complaint including those contained in the annexes are deemed admitted. In the second assignment of error, petitioners asseverate that respondent Judge failed to see the distinction between the claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the claims for damages based on gross negligence of Philex under the Civil Code. They point out that workmen's compensation refers to liability for compensation for loss resulting from injury, disability or death of the working man through industrial accident or disease, without regard to the fault or negligence of the employer, while the claim for damages under the Civil Code which petitioners pursued in the regular court, refers to the employer's liability for reckless and wanton negligence resulting in the death of the employees and for which the regular court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the same. On the other hand, Philex asserts that work-connected injuries are compensable exclusively under the provisions of Sections 5 and 46 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which read: SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury ... SEC. 46. Jurisdiction. The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court, ... Philex cites the case of Manalo vs. Foster Wheeler (98 Phil. 855 [1956]) where it was held that "all claims of workmen against their employer for damages due to accident suffered in the course of employment shall be investigated and adjudicated by the Workmen's Compensation Commission," subject to appeal to the Supreme Court. Philex maintains that the fact that an employer was negligent, does not remove the case from the exclusive character of recoveries under the Workmen's Compensation Act; because Section 4-A of the Act provides an additional compensation in case the employer fails to comply with the requirements of safety as imposed by law to prevent accidents. In fact, it points out that Philex voluntarily paid the compensation due the petitioners and all the payments have been accepted in behalf of the deceased miners, except the heirs of Nazarito Floresca who insisted that they are entitled to a greater amount of damages under the Civil Code.

In the hearing of this case, then Undersecretary of Labor Israel Bocobo, then Atty. Edgardo Angara, now President of the University of the Philippines, Justice Manuel Lazaro, as corporate counsel and Assistant General Manager of the GSIS Legal Affairs Department, and Commissioner on Elections, formerly UP Law Center Director Froilan Bacungan, appeared as amici curiae and thereafter, submitted their respective memoranda. The issue to be resolved as WE stated in the resolution of November 26, 1976, is: Whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case of his death under the Workmen's Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or cumulative, that is to say, whether his or his heirs' action is exclusively restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act or whether they have a right of selection or choice of action between availing of the worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and/or exemplary) from the employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of the employer or of his other employees or whether they may avail cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts. There are divergent opinions in this case. Justice Lazaro is of the opinion that an injured employee or worker, or the heirs in case of his death, may initiate a complaint to recover damages (not compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act) with the regular court on the basis of negligence of an employer pursuant to the Civil Code provisions. Atty. Angara believes otherwise. He submits that the remedy of an injured employee for work-connected injury or accident is exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, while Atty. Bacungan's position is that the action is selective. He opines that the heirs of the employee in case of his death have a right of choice to avail themselves of the benefits provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act or to sue in the regular court under the Civil Code for higher damages from the employer by virtue of negligence of the latter. Atty. Bocobo's stand is the same as that of Atty. Bacungan and adds that once the heirs elect the remedy provided for under the Act, they are no longer entitled to avail themselves of the remedy provided for under the Civil Code by filing an action for higher damages in the regular court, and vice versa. On August 3, 1978, petitioners-heirs of deceased employee Nazarito Floresca filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that they have amicably settled their claim with respondent Philex. In the resolution of September 7, 1978, WE dismissed the petition only insofar as the aforesaid petitioners are connected, it appearing that there are other petitioners in this case. WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try the case, It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based on the Workmen's Compensation Act but a complaint for damages (actual, exemplary and moral) in the total amount of eight hundred twenty-five thousand (P825,000.00) pesos. Petitioners did not invoke the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act to entitle them to compensation thereunder. In fact, no allegation appeared in the complaint that the employees died from accident arising out of and in the course of their employments. The complaint instead alleges gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure on the part of Philex to protect the lives of its workers as a consequence of which a cave-in occurred resulting in the death of the employees working underground. Settled is the rule that in ascertaining whether or not the cause of action is in the nature of workmen's compensation claim or a claim for damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, the test is the averments or allegations in the complaint (Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar Mill, Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 100). 171

In the present case, there exists between Philex and the deceased employees a contractual relationship. The alleged gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure that amount to bad faith on the part of Philex, constitute a breach of contract for which it may be held liable for damages. The provisions of the Civil Code on cases of breach of contract when there is fraud or bad faith, read: Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is able shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. In cases of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the nonperformance of the obligation. Furthermore, Articles 2216 et seq., Civil Code, allow the payment of all kinds of damages, as assessed by the court. The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act differs from that in giving damages under the Civil Code. The compensation acts are based on a theory of compensation distinct from the existing theories of damages, payments under the acts being made as compensation and not as damages (99 C.J.S. 53). Compensation is given to mitigate the harshness and insecurity of industrial life for the workman and his family. Hence, an employer is liable whether negligence exists or not since liability is created by law. Recovery under the Act is not based on any theory of actionable wrong on the part of the employer (99 C.J.S. 36). In other words, under the compensation acts, the employer is liable to pay compensation benefits for loss of income, as long as the death, sickness or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated, even if the death or injury is not due to the fault of the employer (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the other hand, damages are awarded to one as a vindication of the wrongful invasion of his rights. It is the indemnity recoverable by a person who has sustained injury either in his person, property or relative rights, through the act or default of another (25 C.J.S. 452). The claimant for damages under the Civil Code has the burden of proving the causal relation between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury as well as the damages suffered. While under the Workmen's Compensation Act, there is a presumption in favor of the deceased or injured employee that the death or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated; and the employer has the burden to prove otherwise (De los Angeles vs. GSIS, 94 SCRA 308; Carino vs. WCC, 93 SCRA 551; Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp. vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 228). The claim of petitioners that the case is not cognizable by the Workmen's Compensation Commission then, now Employees Compensation Commission, is strengthened by the fact that unlike in the Civil Code, the Workmen's Compensation Act did not contain any provision for an award of actual, moral and exemplary damages. What the Act provided was merely the right of the heirs to claim limited compensation for the death in the amount of six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos plus burial expenses of two hundred (P200.00) pesos, and medical expenses when incurred (Sections 8, 12 and 13, Workmen's Compensation Act), and an additional compensation of only 50% if the complaint alleges

failure on the part of the employer to "install and maintain safety appliances or to take other precautions for the prevention of accident or occupational disease" (Section 4-A, Ibid.). In the case at bar, the amount sought to be recovered is over and above that which was provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act and which cannot be granted by the Commission. Moreover, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, compensation benefits should be paid to an employee who suffered an accident not due to the facilities or lack of facilities in the industry of his employer but caused by factors outside the industrial plant of his employer. Under the Civil Code, the liability of the employer, depends on breach of contract or tort. The Workmen's Compensation Act was specifically enacted to afford protection to the employees or workmen. It is a social legislation designed to give relief to the workman who has been the victim of an accident causing his death or ailment or injury in the pursuit of his employment (Abong vs. WCC, 54 SCRA 379). WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts. In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. In Pacaa WE said: In the analogous case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma, involving the application of Section 6 of the Workmen's Compensation Act on the injured workers' right to sue third- party tortfeasors in the regular courts, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, again speaking for the Court, pointed out that the injured worker has the choice of remedies but cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously and thus balanced the relative advantage of recourse under the Workmen's Compensation Act as against an ordinary action. As applied to this case, petitioner Esguerra cannot maintain his action for damages against the respondents (defendants below), because he has elected to seek compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law, and his claim (case No. 44549 of the Compensation Commission) was being processed at the time he filed this action in the Court of First Instance. It is argued for petitioner that as the damages recoverable under the Civil Code are much more extensive than the amounts that may be awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act, they should not be deemed incompatible. As already indicated, the injured laborer was initially free to choose either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Compensation Law or else, to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages. While perhaps not as profitable, the smaller indemnity obtainable by the first course is balanced by the claimant's being relieved of the burden of proving the causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury, and of having to establish the extent of the damage suffered; issues that are apt to be troublesome to establish satisfactorily. Having staked his fortunes on a particular remedy, petitioner is 172

precluded from pursuing the alternate course, at least until the prior claim is rejected by the Compensation Commission. Anyway, under the proviso of Section 6 aforequoted, if the employer Franklin Baker Company recovers, by derivative action against the alleged tortfeasors, a sum greater than the compensation he may have paid the herein petitioner, the excess accrues to the latter. Although the doctrine in the case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), applies to third-party tortfeasor, said rule should likewise apply to the employer-tortfeasor. Insofar as the heirs of Nazarito Floresca are concerned, as already stated, the petition has been dismissed in the resolution of September 7, 1978 in view of the amicable settlement reached by Philex and the said heirs. With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino Martinez submitted notices and claims for compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that they be paid in installments (pp. 106-107, rec.). Such allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to dismiss dated May 27, 1968 (pp. 121-122, rec.) in the lower court, but they set up the defense that the claims were filed under the Workmen's Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of the committee created to investigate the accident which established the criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex, and which report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to the then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only (p. 76, rec.). WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmen's Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen's Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor. B Contrary to the perception of the dissenting opinion, the Court does not legislate in the instant case. The Court merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice then secured by Section 5 of Article 11 and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and now by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article 11 of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, and as implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950. To emphasize, the 1935 Constitution declares that:

Sec. 5. The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the State (Art. II). Sec. 6. The State shall afford protection to labor, especially to working women, and minors, and shall regulate the relations between landowner and tenant, and between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration (Art. XIV). The 1973 Constitution likewise commands the State to "promote social justice to insure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the people "... regulate the use ... and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits "establish, maintain and ensure adequate social services in, the field of education, health, housing, employment, welfare and social security to guarantee the enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of living" (Sections 6 and 7, Art. II, 1973 Constitution); "... afford protection to labor, ... and regulate the relations between workers and employers ..., and assure the rights of workers to ... just and humane conditions of work" (Sec. 9, Art. II, 1973 Constitution, emphasis supplied). The foregoing constitutional guarantees in favor of labor institutionalized in Section 9 of Article 11 of the 1973 Constitution and re-stated as a declaration of basic policy in Article 3 of the New Labor Code, thus: Art. 3. Declaration of basic policy.The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. (emphasis supplied). The aforestated constitutional principles as implemented by the aforementioned articles of the New Civil Code cannot be impliedly repealed by the restrictive provisions of Article 173 of the New Labor Code. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (before it was amended by R.A. No. 772 on June 20, 1952), predecessor of Article 173 of the New Labor Code, has been superseded by the aforestated provisions of the New Civil Code, a subsequent law, which took effect on August 30, 1950, which obey the constitutional mandates of social justice enhancing as they do the rights of the workers as against their employers. Article 173 of the New Labor Code seems to diminish the rights of the workers and therefore collides with the social justice guarantee of the Constitution and the liberal provisions of the New Civil Code. The guarantees of social justice embodied in Sections 6, 7 and 9 of Article II of the 1973 Constitution are statements of legal principles to be applied and enforced by the courts. Mr. Justice Robert Jackson in the case of West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette, with characteristic eloquence, enunciated: The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections (319 U.S. 625, 638, 87 L.ed. 1638, emphasis supplied).

In case of any doubt which may be engendered by Article 173 of the New Labor Code, both the New Labor Code and the Civil Code direct that the doubts should be resolved in favor of the workers and employees. Thus, Article 4 of the New Labor Code, otherwise known as Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, promulgated on May 1, 1974, but which took effect six months thereafter, provides that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Art. 2, Labor Code). Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail. " More specifically, Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise directs that. "In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the laborer." Before it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act provided: Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury (emphasis supplied). Employers contracting laborecsrs in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same may stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment; and all service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section shall be presumed to include such agreement. Only the second paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act No. 3428, was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, thus: Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury. Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply to injuries received outside the Island through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment. Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs, should such law be more favorable to them (As amended by section 5 of Republic Act No. 772).

173

Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not repeal expressly nor impliedly the applicable provisions of the New Civil Code, because said Article 173 provides: Art. 173. Exclusiveness of liability.- Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title shall bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred eighty- six, as amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred Sixtyfour, as amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered by the System during the period of such payment for the same disability or death, and conversely (emphasis supplied). As above-quoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code expressly repealed only Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, R.A. No. 1161, as amended, C.A. No. 186, as amended, R.A. No. 610, as amended, R.A. No. 4864, as amended, and all other laws whose benefits are administered by the System (referring to the GSIS or SSS). Unlike Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as aforequoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not even remotely, much less expressly, repeal the New Civil Code provisions heretofore quoted. It is patent, therefore, that recovery under the New Civil Code for damages arising from negligence, is not barred by Article 173 of the New Labor Code. And the damages recoverable under the New Civil Code are not administered by the System provided for by the New Labor Code, which defines the "System" as referring to the Government Service Insurance System or the Social Security System (Art. 167 [c], [d] and [e] of the New Labor Code). Furthermore, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, decisions of the Supreme Court form part of the law of the land. Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides: Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. The Court, through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in People vs. Licera ruled: Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect" (65 SCRA 270, 272-273 [1975]). 174

WE ruled that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself (Caltex vs. Palomer, 18 SCRA 247; 124 Phil. 763). The aforequoted provisions of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, before and after it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, limited the right of recovery in favor of the deceased, ailing or injured employee to the compensation provided for therein. Said Section 5 was not accorded controlling application by the Supreme Court in the 1970 case of Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company (32 SCRA 442) when WE ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amount set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for greater damages; but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. Said Pacana case penned by Mr. Justice Teehankee, applied Article 1711 of the Civil Code as against the Workmen's Compensation Act, reiterating the 1969 ruling in the case of Valencia vs. Manila Yacht Club (28 SCRA 724, June 30,1969) and the 1958 case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), both penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes. Said Pacana case was concurred in by Justices J.B.L. Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Villamor. Since the first sentence of Article 173 of the New Labor Code is merely a re-statement of the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, and does not even refer, neither expressly nor impliedly, to the Civil Code as Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act did, with greater reason said Article 173 must be subject to the same interpretation adopted in the cases of Pacana, Valencia and Esguerra aforementioned as the doctrine in the aforesaid three (3) cases is faithful to and advances the social justice guarantees enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. It should be stressed likewise that there is no similar provision on social justice in the American Federal Constitution, nor in the various state constitutions of the American Union. Consequently, the restrictive nature of the American decisions on the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot limit the range and compass of OUR interpretation of our own laws, especially Article 1711 of the New Civil Code, vis-a-vis Article 173 of the New Labor Code, in relation to Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution then, and now Sections 6, 7 and 9 of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of Article II of the 1973 Constitution. The dissent seems to subordinate the life of the laborer to the property rights of the employer. The right to life is guaranteed specifically by the due process clause of the Constitution. To relieve the employer from liability for the death of his workers arising from his gross or wanton fault or failure to provide safety devices for the protection of his employees or workers against the dangers which are inherent in underground mining, is to deprive the deceased worker and his heirs of the right to recover indemnity for the loss of the life of the worker and the consequent loss to his family without due process of law. The dissent in effect condones and therefore encourages such gross or wanton neglect on the part of the employer to comply with his legal obligation to provide safety measures for the protection of the life, limb and health of his worker. Even from the moral viewpoint alone, such attitude is un-Christian. It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation aforementioned. The Court, to repeat, is not legislating in the instant case. It is axiomatic that no ordinary statute can override a constitutional provision.

The words of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and of Article 173 of the New Labor Code subvert the rights of the petitioners as surviving heirs of the deceased mining employees. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and Article 173 of the New Labor Code are retrogressive; because they are a throwback to the obsolete laissez-faire doctrine of Adam Smith enunciated in 1776 in his treatise Wealth of Nations (Collier's Encyclopedia, Vol. 21, p. 93, 1964), which has been discarded soon after the close of the 18th century due to the Industrial Revolution that generated the machines and other mechanical devices (beginning with Eli Whitney's cotton gin of 1793 and Robert Fulton's steamboat of 1807) for production and transportation which are dangerous to life, limb and health. The old socio-political-economic philosophy of live-and-let-live is now superdesed by the benign Christian shibboleth of live-and-help others to live. Those who profess to be Christians should not adhere to Cain's selfish affirmation that he is not his brother's keeper. In this our civilization, each one of us is our brother's keeper. No man is an island. To assert otherwise is to be as atavistic and ante-deluvian as the 1837 case of Prisley vs. Fowler (3 MN 1,150 reprint 1030) invoked by the dissent, The Prisley case was decided in 1837 during the era of economic royalists and robber barons of America. Only ruthless, unfeeling capitalistics and egoistic reactionaries continue to pay obeisance to such un-Christian doctrine. The Prisley rule humiliates man and debases him; because the decision derisively refers to the lowly worker as "servant" and utilizes with aristocratic arrogance "master" for "employer." It robs man of his inherent dignity and dehumanizes him. To stress this affront to human dignity, WE only have to restate the quotation from Prisley, thus: "The mere relation of the master and the servant never can imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do himself." This is the very selfish doctrine that provoked the American Civil War which generated so much hatred and drew so much precious blood on American plains and valleys from 1861 to 1864. "Idolatrous reverence" for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures man's survival and ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life." C It is curious that the dissenting opinion clings to the myth that the courts cannot legislate. That myth had been exploded by Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that "No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. " Hence, even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the New Civil Code, recognizes that in certain instances, the court, in the language of Justice Holmes, "do and must legislate" to fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply Nor has the human mind the infinite capacity to anticipate all situations. But about two centuries before Article 9 of the New Civil Code, the founding fathers of the American Constitution foresaw and recognized the eventuality that the courts may have to legislate to supply the omissions or to clarify the ambiguities in the American Constitution and the statutes. 'Thus, Alexander Hamilton pragmatically admits that judicial legislation may be justified but denies that the power of the Judiciary to nullify statutes may give rise to Judicial tyranny (The Federalist, Modern Library, pp. 503-511, 1937 ed.). Thomas Jefferson went farther to concede that the court is even independent of the Nation itself (A.F.L. vs. American Sash Company, 1949 335 US 538).

Many of the great expounders of the American Constitution likewise share the same view. Chief Justice Marshall pronounced: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial department to say what the law is (Marbury vs. Madison I Cranch 127 1803), which was re-stated by Chief Justice Hughes when he said that "the Constitution is what the judge says it is (Address on May 3, 1907, quoted by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on March 9, 1937). This was reiterated by Justice Cardozo who pronounced that "No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower. He legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law. " (The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 113). In the language of Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone, "The only limit to the judicial legislation is the restraint of the judge" (U.S. vs. Butler 297 U.S. 1 Dissenting Opinion, p. 79), which view is also entertained by Justice Frankfurter and Justice Robert Jackson. In the rhetoric of Justice Frankfurter, "the courts breathe life, feeble or strong, into the inert pages of the Constitution and all statute books." It should be stressed that the liability of the employer under Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act or Article 173 of the New Labor Code is limited to death, ailment or injury caused by the nature of the work, without any fault on the part of the employers. It is correctly termed no fault liability. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, or Article 173 of the New Labor Code, does not cover the tortious liability of the employer occasioned by his fault or culpable negligence in failing to provide the safety devices required by the law for the protection of the life, limb and health of the workers. Under either Section 5 or Article 173, the employer remains liable to pay compensation benefits to the employee whose death, ailment or injury is work-connected, even if the employer has faithfully and diligently furnished all the safety measures and contrivances decreed by the law to protect the employee. The written word is no longer the "sovereign talisman." In the epigrammatic language of Mr. Justice Cardozo, "the law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal" (Wood vs. Duff Gordon 222 NW 88; Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 100). Justice Cardozo warned that: "Sometimes the conservatism of judges has threatened for an interval to rob the legislation of its efficacy. ... Precedents established in those items exert an unhappy influence even now" (citing Pound, Common Law and Legislation 21 Harvard Law Review 383, 387). Finally, Justice Holmes delivered the coup de grace when he pragmatically admitted, although with a cautionary undertone: "that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially they are confined from molar to molecular motions" (Southern Pacific Company vs. Jensen, 244 US 204 1917). And in the subsequent case of Springer vs. Government (277 US 188, 210-212, 72 L.ed. 845, 852- 853), Justice Holmes pronounced: The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. x x x. When we come to the fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that they must be received with a certain latitude or our government could not go on. To make a rule of conduct applicable to an individual who but for such action would be free from it is to legislate yet it is what the judges do whenever they determine which of two competing principles of policy shall prevail. xxx xxx xxx It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative 175

and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the branches into waterlight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires. True, there are jurists and legal writers who affirm that judges should not legislate, but grudgingly concede that in certain cases judges do legislate. They criticize the assumption by the courts of such law-making power as dangerous for it may degenerate into Judicial tyranny. They include Blackstone, Jeremy Bentham, Justice Black, Justice Harlan, Justice Roberts, Justice David Brewer, Ronald Dworkin, Rolf Sartorious, Macklin Fleming and Beryl Harold Levy. But said Justices, jurists or legal commentators, who either deny the power of the courts to legislate in-between gaps of the law, or decry the exercise of such power, have not pointed to examples of the exercise by the courts of such law-making authority in the interpretation and application of the laws in specific cases that gave rise to judicial tyranny or oppression or that such judicial legislation has not protected public interest or individual welfare, particularly the lowly workers or the underprivileged. On the other hand, there are numerous decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights and statutory enactments expanding the scope of such provisions to protect human rights. Foremost among them is the doctrine in the cases of Miranda vs. Arizona (384 US 436 1964), Gideon vs. Wainright (372 US 335), Escubedo vs. Illinois (378 US 478), which guaranteed the accused under custodial investigation his rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights as even as it protects him against the use of force or intimidation to extort confession from him. These rights are not found in the American Bill of Rights. These rights are now institutionalized in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Only the peace-and-order adherents were critical of the activism of the American Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Earl Warren. Even the definition of Identical offenses for purposes of the double jeopardy provision was developed by American judicial decisions, not by amendment to the Bill of Rights on double jeopardy (see Justice Laurel in People vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260, 261-268). And these judicial decisions have been restated in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as well as in Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. In both provisions, the second offense is the same as the first offense if the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or frustration thereof or necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first offense. The requisites of double jeopardy are not spelled out in the Bill of Rights. They were also developed by judicial decisions in the United States and in the Philippines even before people vs. Ylagan (58 Phil. 851-853). Again, the equal protection clause was interpreted in the case of Plessy vs. Ferguson (163 US 537) as securing to the Negroes equal but separate facilities, which doctrine was revoked in the case of Brown vs. Maryland Board of Education (349 US 294), holding that the equal protection clause means that the Negroes are entitled to attend the same schools attended by the whites-equal facilities in the same school-which was extended to public parks and public buses. De-segregation, not segregation, is now the governing principle. Among other examples, the due process clause was interpreted in the case of People vs. Pomar (46 Phil. 440) by a conservative, capitalistic court to invalidate a law granting maternity leave to working women-according primacy to property rights over human rights. The case of People vs. Pomar is no longer the rule.

As early as 1904, in the case of Lochner vs. New York (198 US 45, 76, 49 L. ed. 937, 949), Justice Holmes had been railing against the conservatism of Judges perverting the guarantee of due process to protect property rights as against human rights or social justice for the working man. The law fixing maximum hours of labor was invalidated. Justice Holmes was vindicated finally in 1936 in the case of West Coast Hotel vs. Parish (300 US 377-79; 81 L. ed. 703) where the American Supreme Court upheld the rights of workers to social justice in the form of guaranteed minimum wage for women and minors, working hours not exceeding eight (8) daily, and maternity leave for women employees. The power of judicial review and the principle of separation of powers as well as the rule on political questions have been evolved and grafted into the American Constitution by judicial decisions (Marbury vs. Madison, supra Coleman vs. Miller, 307 US 433, 83 L. ed. 1385; Springer vs. Government, 277 US 210-212, 72 L. ed. 852, 853). It is noteworthy that Justice Black, who seems to be against judicial legislation, penned a separate concurring opinion in the case of Coleman vs. Miller, supra, affirming the doctrine of political question as beyond the ambit of judicial review. There is nothing in both the American and Philippine Constitutions expressly providing that the power of the courts is limited by the principle of separation of powers and the doctrine on political questions. There are numerous cases in Philippine jurisprudence applying the doctrines of separation of powers and political questions and invoking American precedents. Unlike the American Constitution, both the 1935 and 1973 Philippine Constitutions expressly vest in the Supreme Court the power to review the validity or constitutionality of any legislative enactment or executive act. WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND THE CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. SHOULD A GREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BE DECREED IN FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONERS, THE PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO THEM PURSUANT TO THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED. NO COSTS. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-46046 April 5, 1985 EMELITA ENAO, petitioner, vs. THE EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent. Vivencio M. Carpio, Jr. for petitioner. Jose G. De Vera for respondent ECC. ALAMPAY, J.: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission (E.C.C.), dated October 26, 1976, affirming the decision of the Government Service Insurance System, denying petitioner's claim for Compensation of income benefits due to the injuries sustained by her when on August 1, 1975, while on her way to Dipolog City for the purpose of purchasing supplies and 176

other training and school aids for her office, she, together with others, were ambushed by unidentified men believed to be communist insurgents. The antecedent facts of this case are not disputed and are well stated in the appealed decision rendered by the Employees' Compensation Commission, subject of the petition in this case. ... On August 1, 1975, appellant (Emelita Enao), a Public School Teacher, together with others, was on her way from her official station at Sergio Osmena, Sr., Zamboanga del Norte to Dipolog City. According to the Acting Administrative Officer of her employer, 'Having held classes on July 26, in lieu of August 1, 1975, as per District Memorandum hereto attached, Miss Enao was on her way home from station when their group was ambushed and fired upon by armed men hitting her on her forearm and abdomen necessitating operation' (Part II, Income Benefits Claim for Payment), and according to appellant's witnesses, who were members of the ambushed party, she was on her way to Dipolog City for the purpose of 'securing supplies and other training and school aids necessary for furthering (our) services as a school teacher' (Affidavits of Francisco L. Podol and Juanita Adanza, respectively). When the appellant and her group were at barrio de Venta Perla, Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte, they were fired upon by a band of armed men believed to be communist insurgents. As a result of the ambush, the appellant sustained gunshot wounds on her left forearm and abdomen which compelled her confinement at the Zamboanga del Norte Provincial Hospital from August 1 to 6, 1975, for surgical removal of foreign bodies (shrapnel) from her left arm and later at the Dipolog Medical Center from September 10 to 12, 1975 for definitive treatment. She also developed interstitial pneumonia as a result. (Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission, Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 8-9). On August 5, 1975, petitioner sent a notice of claim of injury to the Secretary of Education and Culture, through the Division Superintendent of Schools, Zamboanga City. It is said that this claim was not controverted. On the same date, a claim for income benefits for disability was filed by the herein petitioner with the Government Service Insurance System but this claim was denied by the System in its letter-decision, dated February 27, 1976, on its reasoning that: It appears that on your way to Dipolog City for the purpose of purchasing your needs, you were ambushed by unidentified men believed to be NPAS. Though this happened on August 1, 1975, a regular working day, this was considered your off day, having held classes in its stead on July 26, 1975, a Saturday, per District Memorandum No. 1, s. 1975, dated June 2, 1975. Under such situation, for purposes of the Employees' Compensation, said accident happened outside your time and place of work, not to mention the fact that you were not in the performance of your official functions when it happened. In view of the foregoing, your claim is hereby denied. (Annex "A", Rollo, p. 7) Not satisfied with the above ruling of the GSIS and upon denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof, the latter appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission. On October 26, 1976, the ECC affirmed the decision of the GSIS appealed from and dismissed the Petitioner's claim, on the grounds that: 177

... First. the day when the accident occurred, more particularly August 1, 1975, was an off-day. Perusal of the District Memorandum No. 1, series of 1975 and dated June 2, 1975, win show that August 1, 1975, is not just an isolated off-day, but one of those dates fixed and set in lieu of Saturday. Hence, the injury was incurred not during office hours. Second, appellant incurred injury while en route to Dipolog City; more aptly put, while outside t-he school premises where she normally discharges her official functions. The sworn statement of the Acting Administrative Officer and the appellant's witness all point to the same circumstance. Third, while appellant's witnesses testified in an affidavit that appellant left her official station for Dipolog City on the day in question for the purpose of procurring school supplies and training aids to enhance her teaching efficiency, we find the version of the Acting Administrative Officer more crediblethat is, the appellant was on her way home from station-for there is nothing which indicates that it is false, misleading or fabricated. On the other hand, the preponderance of legal opinion holds that affidavits, as those of appellant's witnesses, are only prima facie evidence of weak probative force and are in themselves self-serving declarations where the same have been made in anticipation of a future litigation. It has been said that 'perhaps the most subtle and prolific of au the fallacies of testimony arises out of unconscious partisanship.' In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the companions of the appellant perhaps still sympathetic to her for what befall her, and testifying in an affidavit, are apt to side with her. (Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 9-10) In the petition for review presented to this Court, Petitioner contends that the Respondent ECC has decided the claim in a way not in accordance with law and applicable decision of the Supreme Court. At the time of the incident in question, the pertinent and governing provisions of law are to be found in Section 1, Rule 11, of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, which provides: SECTION 1. Grounds.(a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following conditions: (1) The employee must have sustained the injury during his working hours; (2) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; and (3) The employee must have been performing his official function. The Petitioner, in proceeding to Dipolog City on August 1, 1975, which is a Friday, from her station at the Municipality of Sergio Osmena, Sr., Zamboanga del Norte, intended to procure supplies and other training aids which are needed facilities in connection with her services as a school teacher at the Wilbon Primary School, cannot be at all disputed. The companions of the Petitioner at the time of the ambush and who appear to be co-teachers of the Petitioner, namely: Francisco L. Podol and Juanita Adanza, have attested in their respective affidavits that they and the Petitioner were at that time on their way to Dipolog City "for the purpose of securing supplies and other training and school aids necessary for the furtherance of their services as school teachers." There is no mention at an in the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission that this particular assertion has been at all contradicted or controverted by any evidence whatsoever submitted to the Commission by the GSIS.

We find no basis at an for the findings made by the Employees' Compensation Commission in its decision that the statements of Petitioner and her witnesses are merely self-serving declarations because We can discern no circumstance that would indicate or support such a conclusion. As a matter of fact, the decision appealed from accepts the fact that the statements given by PetitionerAppellant's witnesses constitute prima facie evidence of the matter sought to be established. Uncontroverted and unrefuted by any evidence, then such statements of appellant's witnesses would suffice to establish that the multiple gunshot wounds and injuries sustained by appellant and which caused her confinement at the Zamboanga del Norte Provincial Hospital from August 1 to 6, 1975 for removal of shrapnels from her left arm and later at the Dipolog Medical Center from September 1 to 12, 1975, are definitely work-connected. The conjecture expressed in the decision of the ECC that appellant obtained the referred self-serving declaration of her witnesses "in anticipation of a future litigation" is unfair and untenable. Petitioner could not have even expected that respondent GSIS would resist her claim. Notice of the same claim for the injuries she sustained is said to have been presented to the Secretary of Education and Culture, through the Division Superintendent of Schools, Division of Zamboanga del Norte at Dipolog City, promptly on August 5, 1975, or four (4) days after the ambush incident and such claim was not controverted by said public school officials. These submissions of Petitioner-Appellant have not at all been contradicted by Respondent. No cause has, therefore, been shown why petitioner would have been to obtain false affidavits from her co-teachers whose sense and probity and righteousness must be presumed until otherwise disproved. Furthermore, the fact that Dipolog City is also the residence of the Petitioner does not at all, by this singular circumstance, render untrue or false the clear evidence submitted in this case that Petitioner and her co-teachers were proceeding to Dipolog City at the time to purchase needed supplies and other training and school aids. That Dipolog City happened to be also the Petitioner's place of residence, in this instance, becomes simply incidental and/or purely coincidental. As it can be rightfully ruled that the Claimant-Petitioner was actually then performing her official functions, it hardly matters then whether such task which Petitioner was then engaged in or discharging, happened outside the regular working hours and not in the Petitioner's place of work. It is rather obvious that in proceeding to purchase school materials in Dipolog City, Petitioner would necessarily have to leave the school premises and her travel need not be during her usual working hours. What is significant and controlling is that the injuries she sustained are work-connected, which the Court finds to be so. The environmental facts in this case are even more compelling than the earlier case of Vda. de Torbela vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, L-42627, February 21, 1980, 96 SCRA 260, where, by a significant majority vote of this Court, it was held that a claim arising from a vehicular accident sustained by a school principal on his way from Bacolod City where he lived to his school at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental where he was the school principal of, is compensable. It was therein ruled that "where an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place of work, while she is going to and from her work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of her employment. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE, and the Government Service Insurance System is hereby ordered to grant the Petitioner's claim for loss of income benefits and to process and ascertain the total amount due herein Petitioner and thereafter to pay the same. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-46775 January 17, 1985 SILVERIO PARAGES petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (CEBU CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT), respondents. Davide, Fernandez, Montecilla, Abella & Sitoy Law Office for petitioner. Teofilo Hebron and Teresita C. Marbibi for respondents. MAKASIAR, J.: This is a petition to review the decision of respondent Employees' Compensation Commission dated June 8, 1977, affirming the decision of respondent Government Service Insurance System which denied petitioner's claim for disability benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. Petitioner herein, Silverio Parages, is a retired detective of the Cebu City Police Department. Although the records are completely bereft of any data indicating his length of service in the government, they show that he had served in several units of the police department, such as the Missing Persons Squad, Foot Patrol, and the subpoena and Warrant Section (p. 26, ECC rec.). According to the certification issued by the chief of police of Cebu City, his last assignment was with the Warrant and subpoena Section in the year 1971 up to the time of his retirement from the government service on July 1, 1975 at the age of 63, two years short of the compulsory retirement age of 65. His primary duty in the said section was to serve subpoenas and other court processes within the city of Cebu (p. 30, E CC rec.). Petitioner's medical record shows that in 1967 and 1969, he was examined by doctors of the City Health Department, Cebu City, and found to be suffering from rheumatoid arthritis on both knees (p. 28, ECC rec.). On August 5, 1972, he was confined at the Cebu Community Hospital for episodes of severe, persistent dizziness usually appearing when he strains, associated with continuous frontal headache and nausea and vomiting. Final diagnosis showed that he is suffering from several ailments, namely: "Essential hypertension, diabetes mellitus (mild), and obesity, and osteoarthritis" (p. 33, ECC rec.). On December 4, 1975, petitioner filed his claim for employee's compensation benefits with the respondent GSIS on the ground that his ailments (essential hypertension, diabetes mellitus, and osteoarthritis) are work-connected and were aggravated by the nature of the duties he performed (p. 31, rec.). On December 17, 1975, respondent GSIS, in a letter-decision, denied petitioner's claim on the ground that his ailments are not occupational diseases. Pertinent portions of the said letter-decision read: xxx xxx xxx An occupational disease is one which usually and directly results from the occupation or profession of the worker.

178

Essential hypertension is a disorder in which there is abnormal resistance to the flow of blood. It is usually dependent on some external factors such as: individual's predisposition, age, diet, presence of kidney disease and heredity. The latter by far is the most important predisposing factor. Diabetes mellitus is a chronic disorder of carbohydrate metabolism characterized by deficiency of insulin. The three important causative factors are heredity, obesity and possibly hormonal disturbances. It is now well established that the diabetic trait is inherited. In this connection, it is worthy to mention here, that you have been diagnosed also by your attending physician to be having obesity. Osteoarthritis or senescent arthritis is a chronic disorder which may appear as early as the second decade of life and increases in frequency and severity with advancing age. This results from ordinary 'wear and tear', i.e., from cumulative trauma of everyday life. Furthermore, the presence of diabetes is a contributory factor to the occurrence of arthritis. The nature of your duties as a Detective as wen as the working conditions of your employment could not have directly caused your ailments. ... (P. 27, ECC rec.). Petitioner made several requests for reconsideration, but they were an denied by the respondent GSIS. On November 16, 1976, pursuant to Section 5 of Rule XVII of the Rules and Regulations implementing PD 626, the records of the claim were sent to the respondent ECC for review (p. 17, ECC rec.). On June 8, 1977, respondent ECC rendered its decision affirming the denial of petitioner's claim on the grounds that petitioner's ailments are not occupational diseases as defined and understood under PD 626, and that petitioner was not able to show by substantial evidence that the risk of contracting such diseases was increased by his working conditions (p. 12, rec.). On July 9, 1977, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was likewise denied by the respondent ECC on the ground that the Commission cannot act on his motion for reconsideration since under Section 1, Rule XVII of the implementing rules of PD 626, as amended, no motion for reconsideration of the decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall be entertained (p. 4, rec.). Hence, this petition. WE find for the petitioner. It is not disputed that herein petitioner, Silverio Parages was of sound health when he entered the government service, and that his ailments supervened only in the course of his employment. Petitioner's medical record shows that as early as 1967 he was found to be suffering from rheumatoid arthritis on both knees, and it was in 1972 when he was also found to be suffering from his present ailments, to wit: essential hypertension diabetes mellitus, and osteoarthritis. Consequently, petitioner's cause of action accrued at least in 1967, long before the Labor Code was amended by PD 626. Hence, in view of the doctrine laid down in Corales vs. ECC (88 SCRA 547 179

[19791) and reiterated in numerous cases, the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, will apply in the instant case, not PD 626, as amended. Thus, in Corales vs. ECC (Ibid, pp. 554-555), this Court ruled that: Petitioner's claim having accrued prior to the New Labor Code, the presumption of compensability, the principle of aggravation, the award of attorney's fees and the payment of administrative fees must be observed and applied. And the Employees Compensation Commission as the successor of the defunct Workmen's Compensation Commission is duty bound to observe and apply the foregoing principles in passing upon workmen's compensation. Moreover, as an agency of the State, the Employees Compensation Commission, like the defunct Court of Industrial Relations and the Workmen's Compensation Commission, is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to the constitutional guarantees in favor of the workingmen, more specially the social justice guarantee; for otherwise, these guarantees would be merely a lot of meaningless patter (Santos vs. WCC, 75 SCRA 371 [1977]). The legal presumption of compensability established under the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and the employee is relieved of the burden to show the causal relationship of his illness and the nature or conditions of his employment. In the case at bar, the presumption of compensability becomes conclusive since petitioner's employer (Cebu City Police Department) did not adduce any evidence to refute his claim for compensation. Furthermore, the opinion of the ECC Medical Officer (p. 16, ECC rec.) that there was no causal relationship between the petitioner's ailments and the nature and/or conditions of his employment cannot by itself overcome the presumption of compensability established by law (Calvero vs. ECC, et al., 117 SCRA 461 [1982]). It must be pointed out, however, that WE find petitioner's ailments compensable not only on the basis of the legal presumption of compensability, but also substantial evidence that his ailments were caused and aggravated by the nature and/or conditions of his employment. The findings of medical authorities on the petitioner's ailments are as follows: 1. Essential hypertension. ... The term essential hypertension has been employed to indicate those cases of hypertension for which a specific endocrine or renal basis cannot be found, and in which the neural element may be only a mediator of other in influences. Since even this latter relationship is not entirely clear, it is more properly fisted for the moment in the category of unknown etiology. The term essential hypertension defines simply by failing to define; hence it is of limited use except as an expression of our inability to understand adequately the forces at work. ... Many factors in the hypertensive syndrome have now been delineated. It may be permissible to attempt to integrate them in a theoretic case of human 'essential' hypertension in a fashion which lays much stress on the primary role of nervous vasoconstrictor influences. In this Idealized view an individual by reason of inherited traits, including race and sex, may be particularly susceptible to vasomotor reactions resulting from a stressful environment. ...

2. Osteoarthritis or degenerative joint disease. ETIOLOGY. Many anatomic studies, including the excellent one of Bennett, Waine, and Bauer in which knee joints from persons one month to ninety years of age were examined, reveal that alterations in the particular cartilage characteristic of DJD begin to appear in the second decade and increase in frequency and severity with age. It is commonly held that these changes result from "wear and tear" i.e., from cumulative trauma . Although diseased cartilage has a reduced concentration of chondroitin sulfate, it has been shown that this is not because of inability of cartilage cells to synthesize this mucopolysaccharide ... 3. Diabetes Mellitus. Non-hereditary (secondary) diabetes. Secondary diabetes may arise from any one of several causes for which a definite etiology for carbohydrate intolerance can be established. It may follow surgical removal of the pancreas, destruction of the pancreas by carcinoma severe pancreatitis, or damage of the islets by iron deposits in hemochromatosis. "Recently, the diabetogenic action of certain diuretics of the benzothiadiazine type has been noted. There is some evidence that these drugs mediate such mechanism by inhibiting pancreatic insulin release. This effect is reversible, contrary to the damage produced by the administration of alloxan. In addition, overacvity of the pituitary (acromegaly) adrenals (pheochromocytoma, Cushing's disease), or thyroid gland (Graves' disease) may result in diabetes, usually reversible once the primary disease is corrected. Growth hormone mediates its diabetogenic action by decreasing peripheral glucose utilization; excess epinephrine causes increased hepatic glycogenolysis the steroids act by increasing hepatic gluconeogenesis and thyroxin increases hunger and food intake and generally heightens the level of metabolic activity. Liver disease is often associated with mud diabetes, though severe liver disease may lead to hypoglycemia. Infection of any sort will impair glucose tolerance and may unmask the tendency to diabetes. The diabetogenic mechanism of infection is probably nonspecific and consists of elevated levels of corticosteroids, fever that increases the general metabolic load, and possibly acidosis, which decreases the effectiveness of circulating insulin. In rare instances inflammation of the pancreatic islets takes place. Regardless of what precipitates secondary diabetes, the common denominator in all these factors is hyperglycemia, with resulting stimulation of insulin secretion. This serves to put a constant strain on the beta cells, with eventual exhaustion of the insulin reserve. ... (Principles of Internal Medicine, Harrison, 5 ed., pp. 490, 1358, 706, Emphasis supplied). It is indubitable that petitioner's ailment were directly caused and aggravated by the nature and conditions of his employment. Petitioner's medical record shows that as early as 1967 he was already suffering from rheumatoid arthritis on both knees. As a police detective, petitioner had to expose himself to the natural elements, the hectic and strenuous everyday grind of police work. The records show that he had served in the Missing Persons Squad, Foot Patrol, Warrant and subpoena Section, and other units of the Cebu City Police Department. His physical condition continued to deteriorate that by 1972, he was found to be suffering not only from arthritis, but also from essential hypertension and diabetes mellitus. 180

In spite of these ailments, petitioner went on working for three more years until he could no longer endure the rigors of police work. His ailments forced him to retire at the age of 63, two years short of the compulsory retirement age of 65. Hence, the question as to his disability is foreclosed with the approval of his optional retirement. Memorandum Circular No. 133 issued by the Office of the President, dated October 19, 1967, provides that optional retirement may ay be snowed before reaching the compulsory age of retirement only upon proof that the employee is already physically incapacitated to render sound and efficient service (Meez vs. ECC, et al., 97 SCRA 87, 97 [1980]; Delos Angeles vs. ECC, et al.. 94 SCRA 308, 312 [1979]; Faicol vs. WCC, et al., 93 SCRA 811, 818 [1979]; Caonero vs. WCC, 81 SCRA 712, 720 [1978]; Romero vs. WCC, 77 SCRA 482, 490 [1977]) [Calvero vs. ECC, et al., 88 SCRA 555, 459, 460]. WE cannot deny the fact that the members of the police force are rendering a valuable service to the community preserving peace and order risking their lives in the process, aggravated by fears and worries that all the more weaken their undernourished bodies which their starvation wages could hardly furnish them and their families adequate food. The government must afford them the relief decreed by the law when they are incapacitated by illness caused or aggravated by the rigors and hazards of their duties. WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE CEBU CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1. TO PAY PETITIONER THE SUM OF SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00) PESOS AS DISABILITY COMPENSATION BENEFITS; 2. TO REIMBURSE PETITIONER HIS MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER RECEIPTS; 3. TO FURNISH PETITIONER REHABILITATION SERVICES INCLUDING MEDICAL, SURGICAL OR HOSPITAL TREATMENT; 4. TO PAY PETITIONER ATTORNEY'S FEES EQUIVALENT TO 10% OF THE AMOUNT OF THE WARD; AND 5. TO PAY ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-50029 November 16, 1984 MALAYSIAN INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CORPORATION and BOTELHO MARITIME AGENCIES, INC.,petitioners, vs. MARCOS LARIZA, NATIONAL SEAMEN's BOARD and HON. BLAS F. OPLE, respondents. Narciso Parayno, Jr. for respondent Marcos Laniza.

5. Loss of one lim 50% 6. Permanent Total and loss of one limb 100% loss of sight of one eye

7. Permanent Total disablement (other loss of sight of one or both eyes or loss of limb) 100% 8. Temporary Total disablement Not covered

than

Raul M. Gonzales for private respondent. 9. Temporary Partial disablement Not covered MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.; Herein assailed on certiorari is the Decision of respondent National Seamen's Board (NSB), affirming the Labor Arbiter's award of US$ 24,000.00 to private respondent Marcos LARIZA for "permanent total disability" to Ms left knee. On April 26, 1976, LARIZA entered into a contract of employment with petitioner Malaysian International Shipping Corporation, represented in the Philippines by its co- petitioner Botelho Maritime Agencies, Inc. (jointly referred to as PETITIONERS), whereby he was hired as Chief Engineer aboard the vessel M/V "Bungi Seripagi" for a period of one year, with a monthly salary of US$2,360.00, plus US$15.00 monthly uniform allowance. The contract of employment provided, among others, for illness and injury compensation benefits, thus: xxx xxx xxx Chief Engineer 24,000.00 When the employee sustains any injury, he shall be accorded full wages, sustenance and medical expenses until he rejoins a vessel or is repatriated to his country of origin. xxx xxx xxx each In the event of illness or injury, wages, maintenance and medical expense shall be borne by the owners in accordance with Malaysian Act or Ordinance. Attached to the employment contract was a "Scale of Compensation" providing for the following compensation benefits: 1. Death 100% 2. Permanent Total loss of sight of both eyes 100% 3. Permanent Total loss of sight of one eye 50% 4. Loss of two limbs 100% 181 (Emphasis supplied) PETITIONERS deny, however, that the foregoing Scale was part of its employment contract with LARIZA. On December 27, 1976, while the vessel was anchored at Port Gdynia, Poland, LARIZA, while in the performance of his duties, fractured his left knee necessitating removal of the left patella. LARIZA was confined and operated on in an hospital in Poland and was subsequently repatriated. Sometime in January, 1977, he was subjected to another operation at the Makati Medical Center after which he underwent physical therapy up to September, 1977. 2nd Engineer 20,000.00 R/O Electrician/3rd Engineer 12,000.00 Medical Expenses: Medical expenses will, in addition, be paid by the Underwriters up to but not exceeding 15 percent of the total amount of any claim admitted under Item 8 or 9. Master US $ 28,000.00 Chief Officer 20,000.00 2nd Officer 12,000.00 3rd Officer 9,000.00

LARIZA was paid his wages, originally only up to January, 1977, but upon his complaint, PETITIONERS paid him up to May, 1977. Dissatisfied, LARIZA filed a Complaint before respondent National Seamen's Board for recovery of unpaid wages up to September, 1977, and disability compensation benefits for the injury which, he alleged, rendered him incapable permanently for work. The Hearing Officer dismissed the claim for unpaid wages since LARIZA had been paid his three months' wages after repatriation, but ordered PETITIONERS to pay him compensation benefits of US$ 24,000.00 for "permanent total disablement" under Item No. 7 of the "Scale of Compensation." On appeal, the NSB affirmed the Labor Arbiter's ruling that the "Scale of Compensation" was applicable since it formed part of the contract of employment. In a subsequent Order, respondent Minister of Labor ordered the Sheriff to proceed with the execution of the Decision. 1 Hence, this Petition. We resolved to give due course. Previous to that, we issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction restraining respondents from enforcing the order of garnishment issued by the NSB in the sum of P161,700.00 and from turning over the said amount to LARIZA. Upon LARIZA's manifestation, however, that he had already received and spent the amount, we ordered LARIZA to return the same considering that PETITIONERS had filed a bond in the sum of P192,202.00 to answer for the questioned award. Still LARIZA failed to comply and we issued an Order of arrest. However, upon manifestation by PETITIONERS, we required LARIZA, instead, to include in his Memorandum a detailed accounting of how he had disposed of the amount in so short a time. That Memorandum has not been submitted and records show that another Resolution of this Court dated September 30, 1981, could no lower be served on LARIZA, the return from the postal office reading "removed." What is the nature of LARIZA's injury and to what extent are petitioners liable? These are the issued to be resolved. The Report (Exhibit "C") prepared by the orthopedic and physical therapeutic surgeon, Dr. Tyrone Reyes, dated September 30, 1977, after LARIZA had undergone rehabilitation treatment states: l. He still lacks about 20 of full flexion in the left knee and therefore he is not able to squat squarely. 2. He is able to kneel for short period of time is able to negotiate stairs, although some difficulty because of complainant of pain in the left knee. Activity tolerance and endurance is fair. From the rehabilitation standpoint, I feel that we have achieved the highest attainable progress through conservated means. The patient has plateaued in his progress in physical therapy in the last two weeks and no further improvements therefor could be reasonably expected. We have thus recommended the termination of his rehabilitation program with us last September 29, 1977. 2 A subsequent Medical Report dated December 15, 1977 of Dr. Cesar P. Unas (Exhibit " E ") reads:

Medical Report Re: Ch. Engr. MARCOS LARIZA Engr. Lariza, 49 years old, chief Engineer by profession, consulted today for preemployment medical examination. He had history of left knee injury sustained December 1976. Fractured patella (lower half) was removed and later underwent physiotherapy. Pertinent Physical findings: Patient limbs on walking, left knee swollen compared to the normal right knee. Flexion of the left knee is limited with pain on weight bearing, left side. Recommendation : Due to the nature of his work on board the ship not to mentioned rough weather, he needs to go up and down narrow and inclined stairs. He is incapable to perform normal sea duty. REMARKS: UNFIT to work as Chief Engr. on board the vessel. (SGD) CESAR P. UNAS, MD. 3 On the basis of the foregoing and the testimony of LARIZA himself, the NSB concluded that the injury suffered by LARIZA was permanent total disability. It should be noted, however, that in the Medical Summary (Exhibit "D") prepared by Dr. Tyrone Reyes he also stated that as far as LARIZA's "left knee disability is concerned from medical standpoint, it may be classified as PERMANENT/PARTIAL". As LARIZA himself had declared in his Affidavit (Exhibit "D"), at the same time that he was arguing for "Permanent Total Disablement": xxx xxx xxx 5. That in accordance with the report of Dr.Tyrone M.Reyes who attended to me in the Philippines, from the medical standpoint my disability may be classified as PERMANENT/PARTIAL. Permanent in the sense that in my profession as Chief Engineer I may be considered as permanently disabled because I cannot go up and down to the engine room, I cannot withstand cold weather and cannot perform my usual duties as Chief Engineer, and Partial in the sense that I can still use my left leg for walking. Dr. Reyes, after LARIZA's physical therapeutic treatment, further summarized: The strength of the muscle of the left-lower extremity is much improved, especially that of the left quadricups. Functionally, Mr. Lariza is able to perform the following tasks: (a) Ambulate independently without the use of any assistive device; 182

(b) Independent in the different activities of daily living; (c) Transfer independently from bed to chair to standing and the like; and (d) His activity tolerance and endurance is fair. 4 It would appear, therefore, that LARIZA's left knee injury had not rendered him totally and permanently disabled. The left knee was only partially injured. The use of the left leg was neither physically nor functionally lost. It is significant, too, that the Report of Dr. Unas (Exhibit "E") mentions that LARIZA had consulted for "pre-employmentmedical examination", which can only mean that he was still not disabled from seeking further employment. And although LARIZA may no longer be able to discharge the duties of his former position as Chief Engineer, it does not necessarily follow that his disability should be considered as permanent and total. Permanent and total disability means any impairment of mind or body rendering it impossible for the insured to follow continuously a substantially gainful occupation, without seriously impairing his health, the disability being permanent when of such nature as to render it reasonably certain to continue through the lifetime of the insured. 5 Incapacity or disability cannot be found to be total where it appears that the claimant's earning power is not wholly destroyed and that he is still capable of performing remunerative employment. 6 Thus, evidence that a truck driver after injury to his left arm could drive a truck, load and unload merchandise but that it took him longer to do the work than it did before he was injured, sustained a finding that the employee suffered a "partial permanent disability" 7 Since LARIZA's disability must be held to be permanent and partial, he is entitled to compensation under Item 5 of the Scale of Compensation, or US$12,000.00 (50% of $24,000.00) computed at the exchange rate at the time the Labor Arbitraters rendered judgment on March 20, 1978. PETITIONERS' argument that the Scale of Compensation is not applicable is unacceptable considering the NSB finding of fact that "such scale was attached to the employment contract and therefore a part of such contract." 8 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered modifying the judgment appealed from in that petitioners shall pay private respondent, Marcos Lariza, 50% of US$ 24,000.00, or US$12,000.00, computed at the rate of exchange of the dollar to the peso on March 20, 1978. Any amount in excess of what respondent Marcos Lariza has already received shall be refunded to petitioners. Conversely, any amount still owing shall be paid by petitioners to private respondent. No costs: SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-63860 April 24, 1984 NEMIA SAGLIBA, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Bureau of Agricultural Economics), respondents. Eugenio C. Alaba for petitioner. The Solicitor General for respondents. MAKASIAR, This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 1958, dated March 17, 1983, affirming the decision of the Government Service Insurance System denying the claim for compensation benefits under P.D. 626, as amended, filed by petitioner Nemia Sagliba for the death of her husband, Diosdado Sagliba, on the ground that the fatal ailment, hepatoma, is not work-connected (ECC Comment, p. 89, rec.). The decease Diosdado Sagliba, started working with the government on July 17, 1969 as statistician at the Bureau of Agricultural Economics in Tacloban City. On July 1, 1973, he became a senior statistician and was holding the same position at the time of his death in 1981 (p. 108, rec.). Sometime in the early part of 1981, Diosdado Sagliba complained of general weakness, anorexia and easy fatigability. Once, he experienced melena for which he was given " Irgamet 200 mg. tab." for 7 days by his physician. He was also treated for hematemesis at the Bethany Hospital as an outpatient. It was then here where his bleeding peptic ulcer was detected. When his condition continued to deteriorate, Diosdado Sagliba was brought to the Capitol Medical Center in Quezon City on April 27, 1981. A few minutes prior to his admission, he vomitted fresh and clotted blood several times and complained of dizziness and slight abdominal pain. His attending physician, Dr. Agapito Tuazon, Jr. subjected him to exploratory laparotomy and liver biopsy. The diagnosis was carcinoma, liver; bleeding varices; malnutrition; sepsis; hepatic coma." On May 7, 1981, 11 days after his confinement, Diosdado Sagliba died at the age of 37 years. The cause of death is hepatic failure due to sepsis and hepatoma (p. 109, rec.). Sometime thereafter, the widow and herein petitioner, Nemia Sagliba, filed a claim for death compensation benefits under P.D. 626, as amended, with respondent GSIS. The System denied the claim on the ground that the cause of death is not work-connected. Petitioner then wrote a letterappeal to the Office of the President which referred the same to respondent Employees' Compensation Commission. The Commision rendered a decision affirming that of the respondent GSIS and dismissed the claim (pp.109-110 rec.). Hence, this petition. The only issue is whether or not hepatoma is work-connected and therefore compensable under P.D. 626, as amended.

183

Petitioner contends that the ailment of the deceased was directly caused and/or aggravated by the nature of his employment as senior statistician of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, hence, compensable. (p. 110, rec.). Respondents, however, contend that the principle of aggravation and the presumption of compensability are no longer applicable to compensation cases under the New Labor Code. They submit further that neither was there proof that the risk of contracting the illness was increased by the working conditions; therefore, the fatal ailment does not fall within the compensable coverage of the law (pp. 111, 115, rec.). WE find for the petitioner. The basis for respondent System's denial of petitioner's claim for death benefits under the New Labor Code is the following evaluation of the disease: t.hqw Liver carcinoma a malignant tumor which may either be primary or secondary in nature. In this case it is primary. The chief predisposing factors are irritation of the liver cells. Contributing factors are parasitic manifestation dietary deficiency, chemical irritants and chronic alcoholism. Bleeding varices, malnutrition, sepsis and hepatic coma are complications of hepatic insufficiency. Hematemesis from ruptured esophageal varices occurs in 25% of the case. It is a grave prognostic sign, since about 60% of these patients succumb within a year of the first episode. Sepsis account for about 25% of the fatalities. Hepatic coma is the terminal event of hepatic insufficiency (pp. 39-40, ECC rec.; Emphasis supplied). The findings of the Medical Division of the respondent Commission are as follows: t.hqw Hepatoma is a form of primary malignancy of the liver which is of liver cell origin. In most series, hepatoma accounts for 80 to 90% of liver cell carcinomas. Liver cell carcinoma is two to four times more frequent in men than women. The cause is unknown but medical authorities have observed that most cases are associated with liver cell cirrhosis, a form of liver pathology the basic lesion of which is diffuse liver cell death and the major cause of which is chronic alcohol ingestion plus impaired nutrition. Also in some parts of the world as Asia and Africa, where a very high incidence of hepatomas have been found, certain known hepatic carcinogens, such as afflatoxins are ingested in foodstuffs. The course of the disease is usually rapid. Most patients die within six months from gastrointestinal hemorrhage, progressive cachexia or hepatic failure (Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, Wintrobe et al., 7th ed., 1977; Empahsis supplied), In the recent case of Neri vs. ECC (No. 60642, Feb. 20, 1984), We quote this Court, thus: t.hqw The decision of the Employees' Compensation Commision shows that hepatoma is a primary tumor of the liver. WE have ruled in the case of Dator vs. Employees' Compensation Commission (111 SCRA 634, L-57416, January 30, 1982) that 184

'until now, the cause of cancer is not known. Indeed, the respondent has provided an opening through which petitioner can pursue and did pursue the possibility that the deceased's ailments could hate been caused by the working conditions while employed with the DBP. ... It is indubitable that the causes of the illnesses of the deceased, specifically, hepatoma and postnecrotic cirrhosis, are still unknown and may embrace such diverse origins which even the medical sciences cannot tell with reasonable certainty. Scientists attending the World Genetic Congress in New Delhi India, have warned that about 25,000 chemicals used around the world could potentially cause cancer, Lawrence Fishbein of the US National Center for Toxicological Research pointed out that humans were daily exposed to literally hundreds of chemical agents via air, food, medication, both in their industrial home and environments (Evening Post, December 16, 1983, p. 3, Cols 2-3). ... The sweeping statement of the Employees' Compensation Commission to the effect that the 'pre-disposing factors for the development of the deceases ailments are manifestly not inherent or peculiar to his employment or employment conditions as cashier in the DBP Ozamis Branch (p. 16, rec.) is untenable and not in accordance with the facts on record. From a position of uncertainty, one cannot draw a conclusion of certainty (Emphasis supplied). The foregoing belies the conclusion of respondents that the ailment which caused the death of Diosdado Sagliba is not work-connected. The medical findings of respondents' medical officers admit the fact that as in all cancer cases, the etiology of hepatoma or liver cancer is still unknown. There was neither any finding that the deceased was an alcoholic. This is important because excessive amount of ethanol in alcoholic drinks is one of the causes of liver cancer (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 9th ed., 1980, p. 1473). The deceased's medical records reveal that he used to drink liquor occasionally. However, medical experts submit that the quantity and duration of drinking necessary to cause cirrhosis are unknown but average social usage is not sufficient to cause permanent liver damage. The typical alcoholic with cirrhosis has consumed a pint or more of whiskey, several quarts of wine, or an equivalent amount of beeper day for at least 10 years. The amount of ethanol rather than the type of alcoholic beverage, is the determinant factor (Harrizon's Principle of Internal Medicine, 9th ed., 1980, p. 1473). The deceased, as senior statistician, was assigned to Region 8 as Regional Coordinator of SamarLeyte and the Biliran sub-province. He performed the following duties and responsibilities: t.hqw 1. Assisted in the administration, supervision, coordination of agricultural statistical activities on the national level; 2. Partly responsible for the planning and preparation for data collection through provability or subjective surveys, periodic forecasting of crop production and hectarage; 3. Responsible for the study and examination and analysis of secondary data when and where available examination and evaluation of production stocks and consumption requirements, data in relation to supply situation of the staple foods,

4. Submitted work programs and fiscal plans for the activities of the Statistics Division represented the Chief of the Division on the technical committee working groups of conference and seminars; and 5. Performed other technical jobs that were assigned from time to time" (p. 32, ECC rec.; Emphasis supplied), As substantiated by the records of the case, the deceased had to travel to remote places and had to drive the government vehicle himself. Allegedly, he had to wake up early and work till late at night when coordinating meetings and other activities, meeting with different people or gathering data in different places. Undoutedly, these varied functions and activities subjected him to excessive fatigue constantly. His day to day travels exposed him to the harsh elements of nature and to unhygienic conditions where he could have contracted parasites which might have caused the fatal disease. It must be added too that the medical records also reveal that the deceased often missed his meals and was malnourished when he entered the hospital in 1981. When the deceased entered the government service in 1969, he was in perfect health. However, through the years of his employment and the nature of his job, the constant pressures to which he had been subjected because of it, he contracted several diseases, among others, peptic ulcer, hematemesis, and the fatal ailment, liver cancer. In resolving issues in compensation cases under the Employees' Compensation Act, the liberal construction of the law is still the determining factor. It has been consistently held by this Court that in compensation cases the strict rules of evidence are not applicable. Proof of actual causes of ailment is not necessary (Panotes vs. ECC, No. 64802, [March 29, 1984]; Mercado vs. ECC, No. 60346 [Feb. 20, 1984]; San Valentin vs. ECC, 118 SCRA 160). Quoting from the case of Cristobal vs. ECC (103 SCRA 329, 335), this Court stated the following. t.hqw The deceased died of rectal cancer on May 27, 1977. Concededly, the exact cause or etiology of this disease is still unknown. Even respondent's own medical officer. Dr. Mercia C. Abrenica, certified that the case of rectal carcinoma as of any other malignancies is still unknown (p. 9, ECC rec.). Its cause and development are insidious, imperceptible to the naked eye, and defies expert analysis. Therefore, whether or not the disease rectal cancer was caused or the risk of contracting the same was increased by the decedent's working conditions remains uncertain This uncertainty, of course, cannot eliminate the probability that the ailment was work-connected as it had been established that the deceased was exposed to unhygienic conditions, various chemicals and intense heat which are generally considered as predisposing factors of cancer. At this point, there is need to reiterate that when the decease started working in 1964, he was free from any kind of disease (Emphasis supplied). Under the law, it is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of claimant's illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for. It is enough that his employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease (Abadiano vs. ECC, 111 SCRA 509, quoting from Abana vs. Quisumbing, 1968). The theory of increased risk is applicable in the case at bar, which, under Section 1 (b), Rule Ill of P.D. 626, as amended, states the following:t.hqw 185

For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex 'A' of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. The degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence, which means "such relevant evidence to support a decision" (Ang Tibay vs. CIR and National Labor Union, Inc., 69 PhiL 635) or clear and convincing evidence. As above-stated, it must be stressed that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation. What the law merely requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation. This interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Panotes vs. ECC, supra; Godizano vs. ECC, No. 62354 [March 22, 19841; Neri vs. ECC, et al., supra Najera era vs. ECC, 122 SCRA 697; Delegente vs. ECC, 118 SCRA 67; San Valentin vs. ECC, supra Calvero vs. ECC, 117 SCRA 452; Abadiano vs. ECC, supraDator vs. ECC, supra; Cristobal vs. ECC, supra). WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM IS HEREBY ORDERED 1. TO PAY THE PETITIONER THE SUM OF TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS AS DEATH BENEFITS; 2. TO REIMBURSE THE PETITIONER'S MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER RECEIPTS; 3. TO PAY THE PETITIONER THE SUM OF ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED (P1,200.00) PESOS FOR FUNERAL EXPENSES; AND 4. TO PAY THE PETITIONER THE SUM OF ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED (P1,200.00) PESOS AS ATTORNEY'S FEES. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 64802. March 29, 1984.] VENUSTO PANOTES, Petitioner, v. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Ministry of Education and Culture), Respondents. Roger Panoles for Petitioner. Solicitor General for Respondents.

DECISION

MAKASIAR, J.: This is an appeal by certiorari, seeking the review of the decision of respondent Employees Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 1963, dated June 16, 1983, affirming the decision of respondent Government Service Insurance System denying the claim of petitioner Venusto Panotes for compensation benefits under P.D. 626, as amended, for the death of his wife, Agustina Garfin Panotes, on the ground that the cause of death, colonic malignancy or cancer of the colon, is not compensable. The GSIS, however, paid the petitioner gratuity benefits under C.A. No. 186, as amended, in the amount of P28,405.22, in lieu of compensation benefits. The GSIS, also, will refund to the petitioner the total retirement premiums paid by his deceased wife (with interest) and the corresponding government share (without interest) [Comment, p. 20, rec.]. For more than 30 years, from 1949 to 1980, the deceased worked as an elementary school teacher of the Ministry of Education and Culture, her last assignment being with the Francisco Balagtas Elementary School in Sta. Cruz, Manila (p. 6, rec.). On October 25, 1979, she was admitted in the UST Hospital, complaining of vomiting and severe abdominal pains. The attending physician, Dr. Rafael Ferrer, diagnosed her ailment as colonic malignancy or cancer of the colon. She underwent two operations. On May 23, 1980, she died of the same ailment at the age of fifty. Upon her death, the petitioner filed with respondent GSIS a claim for compensation benefits under P.D. 626, as amended. The System denied his claim on the ground that colonic malignancy was not work-connected. Petitioner asked for reconsideration but the same was denied, with respondent GSIS reiterating that "there is no proof that the deceaseds ailment was the direct result of the nature of employment" (p. 6, rec.). On February 12, 1982, petitioner then wrote to President Marcos, which letter was considered as an appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission. The respondent ECC affirmed the GSIS denial of the claim, on the basis, to wit: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Carcinoma of the colon, medical experts say, is one of the most common types of cancer. The disease is slightly more common in females than in males. It is particularly common in colon involved by multiple polyposis or by ulcerative colitis. If cancer is encountered before the fourth decade, it usually is associated with one of these diseases. Symptoms are quite variable, depending upon the primary location of the tumor. In the right colon, the symptoms consist of flatulence distention to cramp-like pains, secondary anemia and change in bowel habit. In the left colon the symptoms are constipation and bleeding with bowel movement is common (Christophers Textbook of Surgery, Davis, 7th edition, pp. 708-709). "From the foregoing medical discussion, it is evident that carcinoma of the colon is traceable to factors which are not attributable to employment but rather to multiple polyposis or ulcerative colitis. It is likewise shown that gastric influence is an important predisposing factor. Therefore, we cannot give weight to appellants arguments that his wifes irregular meals in the course of her employment gave rise to her ailment. This supposition lacks medical basis. "Moreover, we note that the deceased in her entire career as a teacher was never exposed to toxic chemicals and radioactive substances, exposure to which has been found by cancer experts to be contributory factors in the development of cancer. "Much as we desire to help herein appellant, we cannot do so because the facts and the evidence on 186

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION; COMPENSABILITY OF AILMENTS; CANCER OF THE COLON, ORIGIN STILL UNKNOWN. It is evident that the cause of colonic malignancy is still unknown. Predisposing factors which may cause the fatal disease have been mentioned but all these have been qualified as probabilities. As in other cancer diseases, medical experts are still in the process of finding out the exact nature of the disease, what causes it and what may cure it. In its decision, however, respondent ECC was definite in its conclusion that the fatal disease is traceable to factors which are not attributable to employment but rather to multiple polyposis or ulcerative colitis. This indeed, is a sweeping conclusion which is devoid of any merit. Respondent cannot state definite conclusions from an unknown or uncertain premise. It must be pointed out that medical authorities have always qualified their discussion of the subject with a statement that "the cause of the disease (cancer of the colon) is still unknown."cralaw virtua1aw library 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THEORY OF INCREASED RISK, APPLICATION JUSTIFIED IN CASE AT BAR. In the case of Acosta v. ECC (109 SCRA 210), this Court recognized such fact and commented: ". . . it is generally accepted that the exact origin of practically all types of cancer is not yet determined. Scientists and medical experts are still in the process of discovering the most effective cure for that malady. With this backdrop, one should not expect ordinary persons like petitioner to prove the real cause of the ailment of the deceased when the experts themselves are still in the dark." This pronouncement by the high court indeed justifies petitioners allegation that the nature and the working conditions of his wifes employment increased the risk of contracting the fatal disease. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHERE CAUSE OF DEATH IS UNKNOWN, RIGHT TO COMPENSATION SUBSISTS; STRICT RULES OF EVIDENCE NOT APPLICABLE; CASE AT BAR. Thus, where the cause of employees death is unknown, the right to compensation subsists, the reason being that the Workmens Compensation Act is a social legislation, designed to give relief to the workingman, and therefore, to effectuate its purposes, it must be liberally construed (Najera v. ECC, 122 SCRA 697). In compensation cases, strict rules of evidence are not applicable. Proof of actual cause of the ailment is not necessary. The test of evidence or the relation of the disease with the employment is probability and not certainty (San Valentin v. ECC, 118 SCRA 160). To be compensable, it is enough that the hypothesis on which workmens claim is based is probable. Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded (Delegente v. ECC, 118 SCRA 67).

record

negate

compensability

under

P.D.

626"

(pp.

21-22,

rec.)

The only issue is whether or not colonic malignancy or cancer of the colon is compensable under P.D. No. 626, as amended. Petitioner contends that the ailment which took the life of his wife is not an occupational disease, nevertheless, he asserts that the risk of contracting the same was increased by the nature and the working conditions of his wifes employment. He further contends that the deceased was in perfect health when she started teaching in 1949. Because of the meetings and other school activities, she missed her meals occasionally which weakened her and made her susceptible to diseases. He also contends that by the nature of her job and precisely because of her employment her disease worsened resulting in her early demise.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red Respondent ECC, on the other hand, contends that cancer of the colon is not listed as an occupational disease and no proof was shown that the risk of contracting the same was increased by the working conditions. Furthermore, ECC contends that the doctrine of compensability and the principle of aggravation have been abandoned under the New Labor Code. Respondent Commission also submits that "the New Labor Code is an entirely new social insurance scheme, vastly different in philosophy and approach from the old law where the employer shoulders by himself alone, the responsibility of paying liability compensation. It was and still is envisioned to compensate only purely work-connected sickness, disability or death, to restore a sensible quilibrium between the employe rs obligation to pay workmens compensation and the employees right to receive reparation for work connected disability or death" (p. 40, rec.). WE find for the petitioner.

increased likelihood of developing a completely independent second tumor . . . It is now appreciated that carcinoma of the colon pre-exist for a considerable time before it produces clinical symptoms. It begins in all probability as an `in situ lesion and then later becomes a sm all mucosal area of asymptomatic cancerous transformation. In all likelihood it requires years to become an overt tumor. . . ." (pp. 881-183, Pathology by Robins, 3rd edition; Emphasis supplied). "Carcinoma of the colon, medical experts say, is one of the most common types of cancer. The disease is slightly more common in females than in males. It is particularly common in colon involved by multiple polyposis or by ulcerative colitis. If cancer is encountered before the fourth decade, it usually is associated with one of these diseases. Symptoms consist of flatulence distention to cramplike pains, secondary anemia and change in bowel habit. In the left colon the symptoms are constipation and bleeding with bowel movement is common" (Christophers Textbook o f Surgery, Davis, 7th edition, pp. 708-709, as cited by respondent in its decision, p. 13, rec.; Emphasis supplied). Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the cause of colonic malignancy is still unknown. Predisposing factors which may cause the fatal disease have been mentioned but all these have been qualified as probabilities. As in other cancer diseases, medical experts are still in the process of finding out the exact nature of the disease, what causes it and what may cure it. In its decision, however, respondent ECC was definite in its conclusion that the fatal disease is traceable to factors which are not attributable to employment but rather to multiple polyposis or ulcerative colitis. This indeed, is a sweeping conclusion which is devoid of any merit. Respondent cannot state definite conclusions from an unknown or uncertain premise. It must be pointed out that medical authorities have always qualified their discussion of the subject with a statement that "the cause of the disease (cancer of the colon) is still unknown."cralaw virtua1aw library Cancer is still an unanswered question in medical science. Its nature and cause are vague even to the most respected experts in the medical field and its characteristic fatality and uncertainty are unfortunately the only feature which are certain and definite. Thus, in the case of Acosta v. ECC (109 SCRA 210), this Court recognized such fact and commented: ". . . it is generally accepted that the exact origin of practically all types of cancer is not yet determined. Scientists and medical experts are still in the process of discovering the most effective cure for that malady. With this backdrop, one should not expect ordinary persons like petitioner to prove the real cause of the ailment of the deceased when the experts themselves are still in the dark." This pronouncement by the high court indeed justifies petitioners allegation that the nature and the working conditions of his wifes employment increased the risk of contracting the fatal disease. The deceased worked as an elementary school teacher from 1949 until she contracted the fatal disease in 1979. She entered the service in perfect health. As a teacher, she was not simply confined to the four corners of her classroom but instead was made to attend meetings and other school activities. She must have been assigned in other places in the course of her service, a natural occurrence in the life of an elementary public school teacher. This exposed her to far and dirty places where she could have contracted viruses and parasites. Her constant exposure to chalk and dust, to the vagaries of nature when attending school activities, would naturally take its toll on her health. She was constantly under physical, mental and emotional pressure. She does not only teach children but had to take care of them too, thus, entailing a very big responsibility on her shoulders. She must stay in the classroom throughout the class hours and must wait until recess time or until the class is over before she could relieve herself whenever the need for it arises, which was of course very detrimental to the health, adding to the sad fact that most comfort rooms in public schools are quite unhygienic. She had loads of work to do which surely made her miss her meals, as alleged. The tension and the pressure which every teacher must go through in order to finish the papers and the grades of at least 187

The disease cancer of the colon, has been described as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "A malignant new growth of the colon. This type of cancer is made up of cells which tend to infiltrate the surrounding tissues and give rise to metastasis. It usually grows to a large size and produces constipation and ulceration with bleeding. This type of cancer is believed to have a close relationship between lesions of the large intestines such as polyps chronic inflammatory disease of the colon as seen in ulcerative colitis. Familial tendency of the diseases is also well documented" (p. 21, rec.) "Cancer of the Colon. Etiology. The cause of colon cancer is unknown. The greater incidence in Western Society suggests that dietary factors may be involved . . . As mentioned above, while there is a possibility that adenomatous polyps may become malignant, villous adenomas are definitely associated with cancer. It appears that a colon bearing a polyp may develop a cancer elsewhere. Congenital multiple polyposis of the colon has an astonishingly high malignant potential; ulcerative colitis also seems to potentiate or stimulate the development of carcinoma in the diseased bowel. Other lesions of the large intestine seem to bear no causal relations to cancer (pp. 1563-1564, Harrison, Principles of Internal Medicine, 8th Edition; Emphasis supplied). "Carcinoma of the large bowel is fairly common at any age, but 75% of the cases are discovered in the sixth, seventh and eighth decades of life. Males and females are affected about equally. All colonic cancers tend to be more aggressive in younger patients, resulting in a sharp reduction in the five year survival rate. The question of a familial tendency with respect to these lesions has long been a controversial issue. While a few reports have cited a higher attack rate in blood relatives of a proband, other reports have disagreed. In any event, if any familial tendency exists, it is indeed equivocal. "It is well to remember that certain conditions predispose to the development of carcinoma of the colon. These include chronic ulcerative colitis, multiple familial polyposis, villous adenomas and previous colonic carcinoma. In about 4% of the cases two carcinomas occur either concomitantly or successively. Stated in another way, the patient with a primary colonic carcinoma has a severalfold

forty pupils on time, aside from the fact that they have to attend to other school activities, cannot be discounted. These factors would likely weaken her bodily condition and make her susceptible to diseases.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph In the case of Abandiano v. GSIS (111 SCRA 509) citing the case of Meez v. ECC (97 SCRA 87), this Court expressed concern for public school teachers, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "x x x

deceased should be considered as compensable" (Dator v. ECC, 111 SCRA 632; Cristobal v. ECC, 103 SCRA 329). Finally, it must be reiterated that the deceased died of a disease (colonic malignancy) the etiology or cause of which is still unknown. Taking this fact into consideration, this Court has enunciated the following ruling in the case of Dator v. ECC, Et. Al. (111 SCRA supra) as cited in the case of De Leon v. ECC (118 SCRA 544):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "We have ruled that until now the cause of cancer is still unknown. Despite this fact, however, the ECC has listed some kinds of cancer as compensable. There is no reason why cancer of the lungs should not be considered as a compensable disease" ( Emphasis supplied). Thus, where the cause of employees death is unknown, the right to compensation subsists, the reason being that the Workmens Compensation Act is a social legislation, designed to give relief to the workingman, and therefore, to effectuate its purposes, it must be liberally construed (Najera v. ECC, 122 SCRA 697). In compensation cases, strict rules of evidence are not applicable. Proof of actual cause of the ailment is not necessary. The test of evidence or the relation of the disease with the employment is probability and not certainty (San Valentin v. ECC, 118 SCRA 160). To be compensable, it is enough that the hypothesis on which workmens claim is based is probable. Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded (Delegente v. ECC, 118 SCRA 67). In the case of Cristobal v. ECC (103 SCRA 329), as cited in the case of Abadiano v. GSIS (111 SCRA 509), this Court had the occasion to qualify the compensability of borderline cases in the New Labor Code and the social justice guarantee under this new set-up, thus:chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad "x x x

"Finally, Republic Act 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Charta for Public School Teachers, recognized the enervating effects of these factors (duties and activities of a school teacher certainly involve physical, mental and emotional stresses) on the health of school teachers when it directed in one of its provisions that `Teachers shall be protected against the consequences of employment injury in accordance with existing laws. The effects of physical and nervous strain on the teachers health shall be recognized as compensable occupational diseases in accordance with laws" (Pantoja v. Republic, Et Al., L-43317, December 29, 1978). As correctly alleged by petitioner, the theory of increased risk is applicable in this case. Section 1 (b), Rule III of P.D. 626, as amended, states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex `A of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions."cralaw virtua1aw library Construing the above provision in the case of Cristobal v. ECC (103 SCRA 329), this Court stated the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "To establish compensability under the said theory, the claimant must show proof of work-connection. Impliedly, the degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence, which means `such relevant evidence to support a decision (Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union, Inc., 69 Phil. 656) or clear and convincing evidence. In this connection, it must be pointed out that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation. Respondents however insist on evidence which would establish direct causal relation between the disease rectal cancer and the employment of the deceased. Such a strict requirement which even medical experts cannot support considering the uncertainty of the nature of the disease would negate the principle of the liberality in the matter of evidence. Apparently, what the law merely requires is a reasonable workconnection and not a direct causal relation. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that `all doubts in the implementation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor. ". . . As the agents charged by the law to implement the social justice guarantee secured by both 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more liberal attitude in deciding claims for compensation especially when there is some basis in the facts inferring a work-connection. This should not be confused with the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation under the Workmens Compensation Act. While these doctrines may have been abandoned under the new Labor Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is significant that the liberality of the law, in general, still subsists . . ." (Emphasis supplied). Considering the uncertainty that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary of the cause of cancer diseases, the Court has ruled

"In the instant case, it is evident that rectal cancer is one of those borderline cases. Like, it is clear that the purpose of the resolution is to extend the applicability of the provisions of P.D. 626, thereby affording a greater number of employees the opportunity to avail of the benefits under the law. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State, as mandated by the Constitution and embodied in the New Labor Code, to give maximum aid and protection to labor. The Employees Compensation Commission, like the defunct Court of Industrial Relations and the Workmens Compensation Commission, is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to the constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man, more specially, the social justice guarantee; for otherwise, these guarantees would be merely `a lot of meaningless patter (Santos v. WCC, 75 SCRA 371, 1977). "As pointed out by no less than the respondent ECC itself in its Comment dated January 5, 1978 It may not be amiss to mention that the ECC has time and again expanded the list of occupational diseases. This comes about after continuing studies made by the ECC. Indeed, cancer has already been included as a qualified occupational disease in certain cases . . . "Worth noting is the fact that the above types of cancer have no known etiology. Yet they are regarded as occupational. The clear implication is that the law merely requires a reasonable work connection (pp. 59-60, rec.) "From the foregoing statements, it is palpable that the respondent ECC recognizes, as it is duty bound to, the policy of the State to afford maximum aid and protection to labor. Therefore, to require the petitioner to show the actual causes or factors which led to the decedents rectal malignancy would not be consistent with this liberal interpretation. It is of universal acceptance that practically all kinds of cancer belong to the class of clinical diseases whose exact etiology, cause or origin, is unknown. . . . (Id., pp. 479-480)" [Emphasis supplied]. 188

". . . (I)t is possible that the disease must have supervened before the Amended Labor Code took effect. Even if the illness occurred after the Amended Labor Code had taken effect, the illness of the

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM IS HEREBY ORDERED. 1. TO PAY THE PETITIONER THE SUM OF TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS AS DEATH BENEFITS; 2. TO REIMBURSE THE PETITIONERS MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER RECEIPTS; 3. TO PAY THE PETITIONER THE SUM OF ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED (P1,200.00) PESOS FOR FUNERAL EXPENSES; AND 4. TO PAY THE PETITIONER THE SUM OF ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED (P1,200.00) PESOS AS ATTORNEYS FEES. SO ORDERED.

applicable. a reasonable work-connection is all that is required that there was a showing that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions."cralaw virtua1aw library 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POSSIBILITY THAT DECEASED DEVELOPED HEPATOMA AND POSTNECROTIC CIRRHOSIS DUE TO HIS EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS GIVEN CREDENCE IN CASE AT BAR. The sweeping statement of the Employees Compensation Commission to the effect that the "predisposing factors for the development of the deceaseds ailments are manifestly not inherent or peculiar to his employment or employment conditions as cashier in the DBP Ozamiz Branch (p. 16, rec.) is untenable and not in accordance with the facts on record. From a position of uncertainty, one cannot draw a conclusion of certainty. We are dealing with possibilities and medical authorities have given credence to the possibility that the deceased developed hepatoma and postnecrotic cirrhosis while working as cashier in the DBP branch in Ozamiz City. The records show that the deceased was found to be physically and mentally healthy when he entered the bank as emergency clerk-typist in 1959. WE cannot discount the fact that in his position, physical contact with various chemicals in the form of carbon paper, erasing fluids and other materials is inevitable. When the deceased was promoted to the position of bank cashier, he was often assigned to follow up accounts and solicit deposits. This fact was even admitted by respondent Employees Compensation Commission. Such assignments invariably involved irregular working hours and exposure to different working conditions, body fatigue, not to mention psychological stress and other similar factors which influenced the evolution of his ailments. We add to this the possibility that the deceased could have contracted his illnesses from contact with germs while counting paper money bills. 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OBLIGATION OF THE EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION TO ADOPT A LIBERAL ATTITUDE IN DECIDING COMPENSATION CASES; CASE AT BAR. We do not see any reason to depart from the ruling of this Court in the case of Abadiano v. Government Service Insurance System and Employees Compensation Commission (111 SCRA 509, L-62254, January 30, 1982) citing Cristobal v. Employees Compensation Commission (97 SCRA 473) that: ". . . It is palpable that the respondent ECC recognizes, as it is duty bound to, the policy of the State to afford maximum aid and protection to labor. Therefore, to require the petitioner to show the actual causes or factors which led to the decedents rectal malignancy would not be consistent with this liberal interpretation." We have repeatedly held that respondent Commission should remain vigilant as to its obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to the constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man (Cristobal v. Employees Compensation Commission, 97 SCRA 473, citing Santos v. WCC, 75 SCRA 371). DECISION

[G.R. No. L-60642. February 20, 1984.] FLORA C. NERI, Petitioner, v. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Respondents. Donatilo C. Macamay for Petitioner. The Solicitor General for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; COMPENSABILITY OF ILLNESS; DEATH RESULTING FROM HEPATOMA AND POSTNECROTIC CIRRHOSIS COMPENSABLE ALTHOUGH CAUSES ARE STILL UNKNOWN; CASE AT BAR. The decision of the Employees Compensation Commission shows that hepatoma is a primary tumor of the liver. WE have ruled in the case of Dator v. Employees Compensation Commission (111 SCRA 634) that" [U]ntil now, the cause of cancer is not known." Indeed, the respondent has provided an opening through which petitioner can pursue and did pursue the possibility that the deceaseds ailments could have been caused by the working conditions while employed with the DBP. It is indubitable that the causes of the illnesses of the deceased, specifically, hepatoma and postnecrotic cirrhosis, are still unknown and may embrace such diverse origins which even the medical sciences cannot tell with reasonable certainty. Under the theory of increased risk, the deceaseds illnesses are compensable. 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; THEORY OF INCREASED RISK; LAW MERELY REQUIRES A REASONABLE WORK-CONNECTION AND NOT A DIRECT CAUSAL RELATION; CASE AT BAR. This Court applies the theory of increased risk under Section 1(b) Rule III of P.D. 626. In Cristobal v. ECC (103 SCRA 336-337, L-49280, Feb. 26, 1981), this Court this Court had the occasion to interpret the said theory and applying the same in the case of San Valentin v. Employees Compensation Commission (118 SCRA 160), this Court held that "In compensation cases, strict rules of evidence are not 189

MAKASIAR, J.: This is a petition to review the decision of respondent Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) dated March 4, 1982 (Annex "A", Decision, pp. 13-17, rec.) in ECC Case No. 1517, which affirmed the decision of respondent Government Service Insuranc e System (GSIS), denying petitioners claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library The undisputed facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Petitioner is the widow of the late Blasito P. Neri, who joined the government service on August 6, 1948 as clerk-messenger in the Office of the City Assessor of Ozamiz City. On September 1, 1959, the deceased was transferred to the Ozamiz Branch of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) as emergency clerk-typist.

The deceased rose from the ranks and on April 18, 1974, he was appointed cashier of the bank, the position he held at the time of his death on October 19, 1979. Sometime in 1977, the first symptoms of his ailments were manifested in the form of off-and-on epigastric pains. The pain was at the time relieved by food intake and antacids or antispasmodic tablets. He used to consult the DBP retainer physician, Dr. Adolfo S. Murallon, who advised him to submit to a G.I. Series (Comment of respondent, pp. 37-46, ECC rec.). By 1979, Neris condition had already worsened, the epigastric pains became frequent and were accompanied by nausea and vomiting. He became jaundiced and exhibited occasional high fever. Likewise, he had severe melena and developed ascites (Annex "A", Decision, pp. 13-17, rec.). On September 6, 1979, the deceased submitted himself to a G.I. Series conducted by one Dr. Alejo A. Tiu, a radiologist at the Cebu Doctors Hospital. The results of the examination was negative, thereby ruling out the diagnosis of peptic ulcer and leaving the diagnosis of the ailments for hepatoma and liver cirrhosis (Annex "A", Decision, pp. 13-17, rec.). When he started to bleed, he was brought to the Misamis Community Hospital on October 3, 1979 and was transferred after six days to the Cebu Doctors Hospital. Blasito P. Neri thereafter died on October 18, 1979. On account of his death, the surviving spouse, herein petitioner, filed a claim for death benefits under P.D. 626, as amended. The respondent System denied the claim on the basis of its medical findings negating any causal relationship between the subject diseases and the deceaseds employment. The said decision was affirmed by respondent Employees Compensation Commission in its decision dated March 4, 1982, stating among others:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library x x x

drugs. Postnecrotic cirrhosis should be suspected in non-alcoholic patients with evidence of chronic liver diseases. (Harrison, Principles of Internal Medicine, 7th edition, p. 1543). "It is evident from the aforequoted medical report that the predisposing factors for the development of the deceaseds ailments are manifestly not inherent or peculiar to his employment o r employment conditions as cashier in the DBP Ozamiz branch. Medical experts enumerate alcoholism, malnutrition, exposure to chemicals, drug poisoning and heredity as possible causes of liver cirrhosis. x x x

(Decision,

pp.

13-17,

rec., Emphasis

supplied).

On June 4, 1982, Petitioner, assisted by counsel, filed the instant petition, the only pertinent issue being whether or not her husbands death from hepatoma and postnecrotic cirrhosis is compensable under the law. The petitioner contends that her husbands death is compensable and that respondent Commission erred in not taking into consideration the uncontroverted fact that when the deceased entered into the DBP in 1959, he was found to be physically and mentally healthy, She further contends that when her husband was holding the position of "cashier" at the DBP from April 18, 1974 until he died, he had been counting money paper bills which undeniably contained germs of various kinds that caused his illness which eventually led to his death (Petition, pp. 2-9, rec.). Moreover, petitioner submits that the deceased has always been sent to different places during his employment with the DBP to effect collection and campaign for depositors and it was during the course of his travels that he must have contracted the illnesses which caused his death. The respondent Commission, on the other hand, maintains that no reasonable finding nor logical conclusion may be drawn from the fact that the deceased employees provincial trips directly resulted in his illnesses or that the risk of contracting them was likewise increased. It also maintained that medical findings of the ECC do not substantiate the fact that exposure to germs while handling paper money bills caused the illness of the deceased. Thirdly, it is argued that such medical findings strengthen the stand of respondent Commission on the non-compensability of the instant claim, as cancer of the liver is compensable only among vinyl chloride and plastic workers (Memorandum, pp. 63-63, rec.). WE find the petitioners claim meritorious.

"After a careful review of the records of the case, we affirm respondents decision disallowing the instant claim. . . . "Hepatoma, according to medical authorities, is a primary tumor of the liver destroying the parenchyma arising from both liver cell and bile duct elements. It develops most frequently in the previous cirrhotic liver. A higher fraction of patients with postnecrotic cirrhosis develop hepatoma than that with postal alcoholic cirrhosis. This may reflect the more active necrotic and regenerative processes in the post necrotic cirrhosis liver. Most large series indicate that 60% or more of hepatomas develop in a previously cirrhotic liver. The cirrhosis of hemochromatosis seems particularly liable to hepatomas; as high as 20% of patients with hemochromatosis die from this cause. (Harrison Principles of Internal Medicine, 5th edition, p. 1072). "On the other hand, cirrhosis is a term often used loosely by physicians to mean any form of chronic liver disease with scarring. To qualify as cirrhosis to the pathologist, a condition must involve extensive destruction of the liver with diffuse fibrosis and regeneration that destroys the normal lobular architecture. Etiology of liver cirrhosis are: (a) alcoholic or portal (b) post-necrotic (c) biliary (d) congestive (e) inherited. Bleeding from ruptured esophageal varices occur as complication. (The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy; 11th ed.; p. 929). Postnecrotic cirrhosis this form of chronic liver disease is the most common type of cirrhosis on a worldwide basis. The cause of postnecrotic cirrhosis is still unknown, but epidemiological and serological evidence suggest that viral hepatitis is an antecedent factor in many instances. A small percentage of cases stems from documented intoxications with industrial chemicals, poisons or 190

In the case of Laron v. Workmens Compensation Commission (73 SCRA 90), WE held, citing Schmidts Attorneys Dictionary of Medicine, 165 Sup. 143; Beerman v. Public Service Coordinated Transport, 191 A 297, 299; Words and Phrases, 6 Permanent Edition 61, "The English word cancer, is derived from the Latin word cancer which means crab, in the medical sense, it refers to a malignant, usually fatal, tumor or growth (Emphasis supplied). The decision of the Employees Compensation Commission shows that hepatoma is a primary tumor of the liver. WE have ruled in the case of Dator v. Employees Compensation Commission (111 SCRA 634 L-57416, January 30, 1982) that" [U]ntil now, the cause of cancer is not known." Indeed, the respondent has provided an opening through which petitioner can pursue and did pursue the possibility that the deceaseds ailments could have been caused by the working conditions while employed with the DBP.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph Medical authorities support the above decision that the etiology or cause of cancer and postnecrotic cirrhosis is still unknown as provided for in the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "The cause of postnecrotic cirrhosis is still unknown, but epidemiologic and serologic evidence suggests that viral hepatitis is an antecedent factor in many instances. . .

"Some patients have bouts of upper abdominal pain, the sudden onset of unexplained ascites, episodes of hepatic encephalopathy, or massive variceal hemorrhage as the major or initial clinical feature. The signs and symptoms of postnecrotic cirrhosis resemble those of alcoholic cirrhosis and reflect the loss of liver cell reserve, advancing portal hypertension, and disorders of salt and water metabolism" (Harrison, Principles of Internal Medicine, 9th Edition, 1980 p. 1476; Emphasis supplied). "Although the etiology of cancer in humans cannot yet be explained at the molecular level, it is clear that genetic composition of the host is important in cancer induction. Related immunologic factors may predispose the host to a putative carcinogen. There is some evidence that viruses may play a role in the neoplastic process. In addition, both environmental and therapeutic agents have been identified as carcinogens" (Harrison, Principles of Internal Medicine, 9th Edition, 1980, p. 1584). "Cancer may be associated with, or lead to, an altered host immune response; however, the causeand-effect relationship remains to be determined" (Harrison, Principles of Internal Medicine, 10th Edition, 1983, p. 755). "What emerges from such concepts is the belief that cancers in man do not appear suddenly out of the blue. They represent the unhappy endpoint of a long, dynamic process of evolution having its origin years or even decades before the first clinical evidence of the neoplasm appears. Moreover, there need not be a single etiology or pathogenesis. Many influences may be at work during the evolution of the lesion and many pathways may be involved. Indeed, the term cancer may embrace a multiplicity of diseases of diverse origins" (Robbins, Pathologic Basis of Disease, 2nd Edition, 1979, p. 185, Emphasis supplied). It is indubitable that the causes of the illnesses of the deceased, specifically, hepatoma and postnecrotic cirrhosis, are still unknown and may embrace such diverse origins which even the medical sciences cannot tell with reasonable certainty, Scientists attending the World Genetic Congress in New Delhi, India, have warned that about 25,000 chemicals used around the world could potentially cause cancer, and Lawrence Fishbein of the US National Center for Toxilogical Research pointed out that humans were daily exposed to literally hundreds of chemical agents via air, food, medication, both in their industrial home and environments (Evening Post, December 16, 1983, p. 3, cols. 2-3).chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad This Court applies the theory of increased risk under Section 1(b) Rule III of P.D. 626, which states that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions."cralaw virtua1aw library This Court had the occasion to interpret the theory of increased risk under the above-mentioned law in the case of Cristobal v. Employees Compensation Commission (103 SCRA, 336-337, L-49280, February 26, 1981):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "To establish compensability under the said theory, the claimant must show proof of work-connection. Impliedly, the degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence, which means such rel evant evidence to support a decision (Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union, Inc., 69 Phil. 635) or clear and convincing evidence. In this connection, it must be pointed out that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation. Respondents however insist on evidence which would establish direct causal relation between the disease rectal cancer and the employment of the deceased. Such a strict requirement which even medical experts cannot support considering the uncertainty of the nature of the disease would negate the principle of the liberality in the matter of evidence. Apparently, what the law merely requires is a reasonable work191

connection and not a direct causal relation. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the new Labor Code which states that all doubts in the implementation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor. ". . . As the agents charged by the law to implement the social justice guarantee secured by both 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more liberal attitude in deciding claims for compensation especially when there is some basis in the facts inferring a work-connection. This should not be confused with the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmens Compensation Act. While these doctrines may have been aband oned under the new Labor Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is significant that the liberality of the law, in general, still subsists. . . . (Emphasis supplied). The sweeping statement of the Employees Compensation Commission to the effect that the "predisposing factors for the development of the deceaseds ailments are manifestly not inherent or peculiar to his employment or employment conditions as cashier in the DBP Ozamiz Branch (p. 16, rec.) is untenable and not in accordance with the facts on record. From a position of uncertainty, one cannot draw a conclusion of certainty.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library WE are dealing with possibilities and medical authorities have given credence to the possibility that the deceased developed hepatoma and postnecrotic cirrhosis while working as cashier in the DBP branch in Ozamiz City. The records show that the deceased was found to be physically and mentally healthy when he entered the bank as emergency clerk-typist in 1959. WE cannot discount the fact that in his position, physical contact with various chemicals in the form of carbon paper, erasing fluids and other materials is inevitable. When the deceased was promoted to the position of bank cashier, he was often assigned to follow up accounts and solicit deposits. This fact was even admitted by respondent Employees Compensation Commission. Such assignments invariably involved irregular working hours and exposure to different working conditions, body fatigue, not to mention psychological stress and other similar factors which influenced the evolution of his ailments. WE add to this the possibility that the deceased could have contracted his illnesses from contact with germs while counting paper money bills.cralawnad In the case of San Valentin v. Employees Compensation Commission (118 SCRA 160, L-56909, November 2, 1982), this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice de Castro, held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library x x x

"In compensation cases, strict rules of evidence are not applicable. A reasonable work connection is all that is required or that there was a showing that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions."cralaw virtua1aw library Moreover, WE do not see any reason to depart from the ruling of this Court in the case of Abadiano v. Government Service Insurance System and Employees Compensation Commission (111 SCRA 509, L-62254, January 30, 1982) citing Cristobal v. Employees Compensation Commission (97 SCRA 473) that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "x x x.

". . . It is palpable that the respondent ECC recognizes, as it is duty bound to, the policy of the State to afford maximum aid and protection to labor. Therefore, to require the petitioner to show the actual causes or factors which led to the decedents rectal malignancy would not be consistent with this

liberal

interpretation."cralaw

virtua1aw

library

No reasonable work-connection exists in petitioner's case (pp. 155 & 158, rec.) Respondent contends ... that to declare as compensable all ailments whose causes are unknown, would be to place the claimants with such types of ailments in a far better position than those whose causes are known but cannot be connected to the employment. ... that the standard of reasonable work-connection established by this Honorable Court becomes meaningless if ailments with unknown causes be made compensable; for, in such cases, all ailments will and should logically become compensable-an interpretation which is not yet contemplated by law. ... that under the facts presented ... there is absolutely no reasonable workconnection between his ailment and his employment (pp. 154-155, rec.). Significantly, the motion cites three resolutions of the First Division which apparently run counter to the decision now under review. The three resolutionsTimbang vs. ECC (G.R. No. 59676, February 15, 1984); Planas vs. ECC (G.R. No. 65020, February 20, 1985); and Ceballo vs. ECC (G.R. No. 63816, February 29, 1984)-denied employee compensation claims there being no proof that the ailments in question were work-connected, i.e., either the ailments were contracted as a result of the employment or the risk of contracting the same was increased by the working conditions. Planas-promulgated on exactly the same day the decision under review was promulgate-implied agreed with therein respondents proposition that: ... The fact that the cause of the ailment is unknown, cannot relieve a claimant of the burden of proof; otherwise, we arrive at the illogical or absurd result that claimants with ailments whose causes are unknow, are better off than those whose causes are known and cannot be connected to the employment. The petition itself recognizes that there should at least be a reasonable workconnection between the ailment and the employment. That standard becomes meaningless if ailments with unknown causes are complensable. For, in such a case, all ailments will and should become compensable. We respectfully submit that at this time, such an intepretation is not yet contemplated by the law (pp. 4-5, Comment in G.R. No. 65020). WE cannot reverse. It is not disputed that the etiology of intracranial new growth or brain tumor is as obscure as that of neoplasm elsewhere in the body; that (brain) tumor is a disease of such nature that the developments of medical science up to now cannot fully explain its causes and the factors that may aggravate or alleviate its causes and progress. Neither is it disputed that the petitioner, who had served the government for 34 years prior to his forced retirement, entered the government service and, for the most part, stayed therein, free from any kind of disease. 192

This is in line with the avowed policy of the State as mandated by the Constitution (Article II, Section 9) and embodied in the new Labor Code (Article 4), to give maximum aid and protection to labor. WE have repeatedly held that respondent Commission should remain vigilant as to its obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to the constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man (Cristobal v. Employees Compensation Commission, 97 SCRA 473, citing Santos v. WCC, 75 SCRA 371). WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM IS ORDERED. 1. TO PAY THE PETITIONER THE SUM OF TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS AS DEATH BENEFITS; 2. TO REIMBURSE THE PETITIONERS MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER RECEIPTS; 3. TO PAY THE PETITIONER THE SUM OF ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED (P1,200.00) PESOS FOR BURIAL EXPENSES; AND 4. TO PAY THE PETITIONER THE SUM OF ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED (P1,200.00) PESOS AS ATTORNEYS FEES. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-60346 October 11, 1985 JOSE P. MERCADO JR., petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Refuse & Environmental Sanitation Center, City of Manila), respondents. RESOLUTION MAKASIAR, C.J.: Before Us is a motion for reconsideration filed on March 22, 1984 by the respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) on the following arguments: Reasonable work-connection is required by the law for all employees' compensation claims, the alleged fact of impossibility of proof notwithstanding. xxx xxx xxx

Finally, it is also not disputed that petitioner was exposed to unhygienic working conditions during his tenure in government, and specially at least during his early employment as laborer, special laborer and watchman with the Department of Health of Manila in 1945 when Manila was still in ruins, dusty, unsanitary, with destroyed water system and without any system of garbage collection. The present case is similar to Cristobal vs. ECC (L-49280, Feb. 26, 1981, 103 SCRA 329). There, We granted compensation consonant with the following observations: The deceased died of rectal cancer on May 27, 1977. Concededly, the exact cause or etiology of this disease is- still unknown. ... Its cause and development are insidious, imperceptible to the naked eye, and defies expert analysis. Therefore, whether or not the disease rectal cancer was caused or the risk of contracting the same was increased by the decedent's working conditions remains uncertain. This uncertainty, of course, cannot eliminate the probability that the ailment was work-connected as it had been established that the deceased was exposed to unhygienic working conditions, various chemicals and intense beat which are generally considered as predisposing factors of cancer. At this point, there is need to reiterate that when the deceased started working in 1964, he was free from any kind of disease. Concededly, in the case at bar, petitioner failed to provide direct proof that his brain tumor was workconnected. This failure however was simply due to the undisputed fact that the causes of intracranial new growth is not known even to medical science. Nonetheless, the probability that petitioner's brain tumor was work-connected is bolstered by the facts that the petitioner had been working with the government for 34 years before he was forced by his ailment to retire from employment, that he joined the government service in good health, and that he was undoubtedly exposed to unhygienic working conditions (generally considered as a predisposing factor of cancer) during his tenure with the government. This probability coupled with the constitutional guarantees of social justice and protection to labor lead Us to no other conclusion but to grant petitioner's compensation claims. Again, in Cristobal We said: In urging that the disease rectal cancer is not compensable since its nature or cause is unknown and petitioner was not able to show proof of direct causal relation, respondents would instruct us to ignore the (above) provision of law and the policy of the State of giving maximum aid and protection to labor (as We have stated earlier in the main decision). As the agents charged by the law to implement the social justice guarantee secured by both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more liberal attitude in deciding claims for compensation especially when there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection (103 SCRA 329, 336; italic supplied). While the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation espoused under the Workmen's Compensation Act "may have been abandoned under the new Labor Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is significant that the liberality of the law, in general still subsists. All these factual and legal grounds were considered in relation to each other constituting substantial evidence clearly convincing Us to resolve that rectal cancer is compensable" (Cristobal vs. ECC, supra). 193

It is non sequitur to state, as respondent avers, "that to declare as compensable all ailments whose causes are unknown, would be to place the claimants with such types of ailments in a far better position than those whose causes are known but cannot be connected to the employment." The point is that it is grossly inequitable to require as a condition for an award of compensation that the claimant demonstrate that his ailment-the cause or origin of which is unknown to and undetermined even by medical science was, in fact caused or the risk of contracting the same enhanced by his working conditions. Plainly, the condition would be an impossible one, specially considering that said claimant is most probably not even conversant with the intricacies of medical science and the claimant invariably bereft of the material resources to employ medical experts to demonstrate the connection between the cause and the disease. Considering the liberal character of employment compensation schemes, the impossible condition should be deemed as not having been intended and/or imposed. Verily, by permitting compensation notwithstanding the absence of any showing of causal link between the ailmentwhose causes are unknown and the working conditions which may be the probable origins of said ailment, We merely accede to the dictates of the social justice provision of the Constitution. Where the causes are known determined or determinable, the claimant must prove reasonable work-connection in order to receivecompensation otherwise, the parity or balance between the competing interests of employer and employee with respect to workmen's compensation is destroyed (Sulit vs. ECC, L-48602 [June 30, 1980]). Where however the causes of an ailment are unknown to and/or undetermined even by medical science, the requirement of proof of any causal link between the ailment and the working conditions should be liberalized so that those who have less in life will have more in law. Henceforth, the standard of reasonable work-connection established by this Court is hereinabove read in its proper perspective. And the same is not rendered meaningless by the grant of compensation in the present case. Considering that the causes and/or origin of intracranial new growth is unknown and undetermined, it is easy to see that respondent's contention that "... there is absolutely no reasonable work-connection between his ailment and his employment" is without basis. Because the causes and/or origin of the ailment are unknown and undetermined, then it cannot categorically be stated that there is absolutely no reasonable work-connection between petitioner's ailment and his working conditions. The probability that petitioner's ailment is work-connected cannot be completely and totally disregarded. Even the Employees' Compensation Commission recognizes this probability. While it is a universally accepted fact that the exact etiology of cancer, of which intra-cranial new growth or brain tumor is a specie is still unknown, We take judicial notice of the fact that even the ECC has expanded its list of occupational diseases to include certain types of cancer. The proggressive stance of ECC persuades Us to be more liberal in allowing compensation in the case at bar. The conservative posture of respondent GSIS is not consistent with the liberal interpretation of the Labor Code and the social justice guarantee embodied in the Constitution in favor of the workers (Cabanero vs. ECC, et al., L-50255 [January 30, 1982]; Cristobal vs. ECC, et al., supra). It clashes with the injunction in the Labor Code (Article 4, New Labor Code) and the Civil Code (Article 1702, New Civil Code) that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the claimant-employee. The degree of proof required to establish work-connection between the disabling ailment and the working conditions is merely substantial evidence, or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion" (Cristobal vs. ECC, supra; Ang Tibay vs. The Court of Industrial Relations, et al., 69 Phil. 635). Probability not certainty is the touchstone in testing evidence of work-connection (Laron vs. WCC, 73 SCRA 84).

And as We have earlier discussed, the probability that the petitioner's brain tumor is work-connected is supported by the facts of the case, Basic rules of equity and fair play behoove Us to grant petitioner's claim. Petitioner, by law and by virtue of his employment with the City of Manila, had been a member of the System since 1945 (Section 4, Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended). As such, he had contributed (by compulsion of law Sec. 5, Commonwealth Act No. 186) to the funds of respondent for 34 years until his forced retirement. In turn the respondent should comply with its duty to give him the fullest protection, relief and compensation benefits as guaranteed by law. Under the Employees' Compensation Act (Article 168) and its predecessor, the Workmen's Compensation Act (Section 3), petitioner, by virtue of his membership in the respondent System, is entitled to the benefits he now claims under the Employees' Compensation Act. The claimant is not asking for a dole-out, nor for charity; he is simply demanding for what is his by law. Finally, respondent urges Us to reduce the award of attorney's fees to five percent (5%). WE are not persuaded. There is no prohibition against imposing attorney's fees on the employer for the benefit of claimant's counsel (Marte vs. ECC, L-46362 [January 30, 1982]). In Cristobal, supra, We ruled: A close examination of the aforequoted provision (Art. 203, Labor Code) reveals that the intent of the law is to free the award from any liability or charge so that the claimant may enjoy it to the fullest. It is the claimant who is exempt from liability for attorney's fees. The defaulting employer or government agency remains liable for attorney's fees because it compelled the claimant to employ the services of counsel by unjustly refusing to recognize the validity of the claim of petitioner. This actually is the rationale behind the prohibition. Nothing is wrong with the Court's award of attorney's fees which is separate and distinct from the other benefits awarded. Besides, in the instant case, the participation of petitioner's counsel was not limited to the preparation or filing of the claim but in appealing petitioner's case before this Court necessitating submission of pleadings to establish his cause of action and to rebut or refute the arguments of herein respondents. Fairness dictates that the counsel should receive compensation for his services; otherwise, it would be entirely difficult for claimants, majority of whom are not learned in the intricacies of the law, to get good legal service. To deny counsel compensation for his professional services would amount to deprivation of property without due process of law. Respondent's reliance on the case Duran vs. ECC (L-52363, 113 SCRA 389 [March 30, 1982]) is misplaced. The award of five percent attorney's fees in said case was subsequently increased to ten percent (10%) in a later resolution in the consolidated cases of Corales, Villones, Caneja, Barga ,(Duran), Calvero, Delegente, Cenita vs. ECC and GSIS (126 SCRA 136 [Nov. 29,1983]). WE find it apropos to reiterate Our instructions in Godizano vs. ECC (No. 62354, May 9,1985): Issues already resolved by Us in very similar cases as the case herein should not be repeatedly raised. Time is most essential for the claimants and their counsel. The currency has repeatedly suffered depreciation and may depreciate again as time passes. Its purchasing power has tremendously diminished.

WHEREFORE, FOR LACK OF MERIT, THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS HEREBY DENIED WITH FINALITY. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-46894 June 24, 1983 TERESA M. ARMEA petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Municipal Treasurer's Office, Daraga, Albay), respondents. Calleja & Armea Law Office for petitioner. Chief Legal Officer for respondents. VASQUEZ, J.: This is a petition for review by certiorari of the decision of Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 0367 affirming the decision of the Government Service Insurance System which denied the claim for death benefits filed by petitioner Teresa M. Armea. Patricio D. Armea, husband of the herein petitioner was employed by the government on February 21, 1942, and held the positions of clerk, public school teacher, budget examiner and lastly as municipal treasurer of Daraga, Albay, which position he occupied since July 1, 1975 until his death on June 1, 1976. The cause of his death was certified to be " acute monolytic leukemia." On September 30, 1976, petitioner filed a claim for employee's compensation with the respondent GSIS which denied the said claim on the ground that Patricio D. Armea's ailment was not in the least causally related to his duties and conditions of work, and that there was no showing that said ailment directly resulted from his occupation or employment as municipal treasurer of Daraga, Albay. (Annex "A", Petition) A motion for reconsideration of the denial of the claim filed by petitioner was also denied by respondent GSIS on the ground that: In the case of your husband, it will be noted that the ailment which resulted to his death on June 1, 1976 was Acute Monolytic Leukemia. This is not being listed as an occupational disease, therefore, requires such degree of proof as mentioned above. On the basis, however, of the papers and evidence on record which you have submitted it appears that you have not established that the decease's employment as Municipal Treasurer of Daraga, Albay, there has not been any showing that the same directly arose them from or resulted from the nature thereof. (Annex "B", Petition) Petitioner appealed the decision of the respondent GSIS to the respondent Employee's Compensation Commission on the principal contention that the respondent GSIS committed error in 194

denying her claim inasmuch as the death of her husband should be presumed compensable under P.D. 626, as amended, as it was so presumed under Section 44 of Act 3428 the old Workmens Compensation Law inasmuch as the illness that resulted in his death supervened in the course of his employment. This contention was brushed aside by the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission reasoning out as follows: The dictum enumerated under Act 3428 that an illness is presumed compensable once it is shown that it supervened in the course of employment cannot now be relied upon to support a claim for compensation under P.D. 626, as amended. For under P.D. 626, the sickness, to be compensable, must be an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or if it is not so, then it must be caused by employment and the employee must prove that the risk of contracting it is increased by working conditions. Nowhere in the law can we find a provision from which we can draw the presumption that once the illness developed during employment, it is compensable. In fact, since by explicit mandate (Section 1[e], Rule III, Book VII of the implementing rules of the Labor Code Act 3428, or the Workmen s Compensation Act, the law under which the dictum evolved, has been then it follows as a logical consequence, that the principle of presumptive compensability should have no application to cases cognizable under P. D. 626, as amended In claims grounded on non-occupational disease such as the case at hand, the claimant is called upon by law to prove that his sickness is caused by his employment and the risk of contracting it is increased by his working conditions (Section l[b], Rule III on Employees' Compensation He is obligated by law to do specific act to entitle him to compensation and, that is, to prove, by substantial evidence, the direct causation between the illness which caused the death and the nature of his employment On the other hand, the dictum of presumptive compensability precisely exempts one who claims compensation benefits from doing such a specific act, Thus, it would be discordant for the appellant herein to say that he is relieved from coming forward with proof of work-connection between her husband's employment and his fatal disease, as the two requirements are unmistakably incompatible with each other, especially so because the express repeal of Act 3428, as amended, under which the dictum evolved, by P. D. 442, as amended (Labor Code of the Philippines and the implementing rules (Sec. l[e], Rule IV, Book VII, increased our skepticism about its applicability to cases falling under the decree. Moreover, the etiology of "Monolytic Leukemia" from which appellants husband died shows no causal relation with his work. Leukemia is a generalized proliferative neoplastic disorder of the blood forming tissues, usually involving the leukecytic series. ETIOLOGY: Some forms of Leukemia in chicken mice and rats are due to viruses: thus far, there is no proof of a similar etiology in man. Pending further investigation leukemia may be regarded as a cancer of the blood forming organs. Genetic factors are not conspicuous in the occurrence of leukemia in man but in some cases exposure to environmental factors, such as X-ray, radioactive materials and certain chemicals (especially benzone) may be associated with the disease. While leukemia is not difficult to diagnose in most instances, certain preleukemia states and poorly defined leukemia variants may be difficult to classify. Occasionally, a leukemia reaction (blood picture resembling leukemia) may appear with certain infections (e.g., whooping cough infections mononuclosis tuberculosis and also in noaneoplastic blood dyserasis and advanced cancer. (Monolytic Leukemia is a disease, usually with a fairly 195

rapid course marked by excessive proliferation of the monolytic elements of the bone marrow, river and spleen. The monocytes probably are produced in the reticuloondothehal system While circulating monocytes normally constitute about 4 to 10% of the leucocytes monolytic leukemia they are infiltration of lymphnnodes, spleen and bone marrow and appear in the peripheral blood. (Lygh C.E.: The Merk Man of Diagnosis and Therapy. M.S. & D: N.J.: 11th edition: 1966; pp. 90-91.) The records do not show proof that the death is related to his employment as municipal treasurer nor was there an increased risk in the working conditions; hence, this case is not compensable. (Annex "C", pp. 16-19, Rollo.) The above-quoted ruling is the one brought to Us on appeal by certiorari in the instant proceeding, In her present petition, the petitioner reiterates her reliance on what she terms " the long established legal and concrete doctrine of our Honorable Supreme Court on presumptive compensability" which she claims to be applicable likewise to claims for compensation under P.D. 626, as amended. There is no dispute that the petitioner' s claim for death benefits is governed by the provisions of the New Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. 442, as amended inasmuch as the death of the petitioner' s husband occurred on June 1, 1976 or after January 1, 1975. (Art. 208, P.D. 442, as amended.) In Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation issued by the Employees' Compensation Commission to implement Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code, " leukemia" is considered as an occupational disease if the nature of the employment involved "exposure to X-rays, ionizing particle of radium or other radioactive substance or other forms of radiant energy." As was correctly observed by the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission no evidence on record shows that the petitioner's husband in his job as municipal treasurer, or in the other government positions held by him, was exposed to X-rays ionizing particle of radium or other radioactive substance in connection with his duties. The submittal by the petitioner that she could still rely on the doctrine of "presumptive compensability" whereby, when an illness supervened during the course of employment there is a presumption that the same arose out of or at least was aggravated in the course of employment (Santos vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission), had already been resolved in "Sulit vs. Employees' Compensation Commission" 98 SCRA 483 wherein, through Justice Aquino, this Court expected the abandonment of the doctrine of presumptive compensability as follows: Those radical innovations (referring to R.A. No. 772, Act No. 812, amending Section 2 of Act No. 3428), the presumption of compensability and the rule on aggravation of illness, which favor the employee, paved the way for the latitudinarian or expansive application of the Workmen's Compensation Law in favor of the employee or worker. It now appears that after the government had experimented for more than twenty years with such employee-oriented application of the law, the lawmaker found the result to be unsatisfactory because it destroyed the parity or balance between the competing interests of employer and employee with respect to Workmen's compensation The balance was titled unduly in favor of the workmen. Hence, to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employees obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's right to receive reparation for workconnected death or disability, the old law was jettisoned and in its place we have

the employees' compensation and state insurance fund in the Labor Code, as amended. As correctly observed by the teamed Government Corporate Counsel Manuel M. Lazaro, the Labor Code abolished the presumption of compensability and the rule on aggravation of illness caused by the nature of the employment, This Court is powerless to apply those rules under the Labor Code. (Resolution of March 8, 1978 in L-47008, Ibaez vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission). In sustaining the decision appealed from We have not overlooked the ruling laid down in " Duran vs. Employees' Compensation Commission " 113 SCRA 389, March 30, 1982, wherein this Court ordered the payment of death benefits to the surviving wife of a municipal judge who died likewise of acute monolytic leukemia on April 28. 1977. Said case does not contravene our previous rulings on the abandonment of the doctrine of presumptive compensability and may even be said to be a recognition thereof. The grant of compensation in Duran was premised on a showing by the therein petitioner that although monolytic leukemia is not an occupational diseases, the said ailment resulted from a complication or after. effects of prolonged treatment of diseases which were attributed to the nature and conditions of his work. In Duran the following findings had been made: Petitioner has sufficiently established and respondent Commission has in fact admitted that as justice of the peace and judge, deceased served in three municipalities which did not have adequate transportation facilities. Sta. Rita alone where Judge Duran spent his last 13 years as municipal judge has 31 barrios. Obviously, land transportation was not then developed nor easily available since Judge Duran travelled mostly by foot or banca. It has also been shown and admitted that aside from his regular duties of conducting hearings and making ocular inspections, he went beyond his courtroom to settle disputes between parties by amicable settlement or mediation and to speak at conferences and seminars. And in the performance of such duties, it was normal to see him wade through streams or ride in bancas. It requires simple imagination to picture the experience that the deceased judge had gone through just so he could dispense justice even if it meant giving more of himself than what was normally expected of him He walked along distances and forged streams under variable weather conditions. He was literally exposed to the elements the sun, rain, weather and rough roads. He worked as if he were a fieldman he was a roving judge, The tenious work coupled with unhealthy exposure bore down on him after 20 years. He must have been a strong, healthy person when he first joined the Judiciary because it took all of 20 years before he suffered from angina pectoris, gouty arthrities, coronary insufficiency and monolytic leukemia. Needless to say, the human body can only take so much physical and mental pressures. xxx xxx xxx VASQUEZ, J.: It must be borne in mind that from March 1972 to April 28, 1977, decedent was treated and hospitalized for angina pectoris, coronary insufficiency, gouty arthrities and finally, acute monolytic leukemia. As part of his treatment he was continuously given analgesics and antibiotics As shown by the aforequoted medical findings, chloramphenicol is the technical name for antibiotics and phenybultazone for anti- rheumatic drugs. It has also been found that such medicines when taken consistently for a long period of time, can be 196

leukemogenic or can cause monolytic leukemia as a complication. There is an element of certainty in aforesaid findings; of medical authorities will not attest the same. We have carefully examined the record of the instant case in an effort to find some credible and adequate basis to show that the acute monolytic leukemia that resulted in the death of the petitioner's husband could have been caused by or traceable to conditions under which he Performed his duties as municipal treasurer. Sadly enough our efforts proved in vain. No circumstance similar to those involved in Duran had been shown or is existent in the records to justify a similar disposition of the case at bar. We are equally unsuccessful in finding factual basis to apply in favor of the petitioner the ruling in Corales vs. Employees' Compensation Commission (84 SCRA 762; 88 SCRA 547) to the effect that if the illness of the deceased accrued before January 1, 1975, the presumption of compensability must still be observed There is no showing of any illness suffered by the petitioner's husband prior to January 1, 1975. The records reveal that the deceased was hospitalized for the first time on March 13, 1976 for allergy and influenza. His subsequent hospitalization on March 21, 1976 was for urinary tract infection and on March 24, 1976 for acute monolytic leukemia. It would be delving in the realm of pure conjecture to rule that the last mentioned disease accrued, or was aggravated by ailments that supervened prior to January 1, 1975. WHEREFORE, We are constrained to hold that the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby, AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-61628 December 29, 1982 BA FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. GREGORIO G. PINEDA, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH XXII, AND ANTONIO SY, respondents. Valera, Urmeneta and Associates for petitioner. Eulogio P. Flores for respondents.

Private respondent Antonio Sy was adjudged liable in favor of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7379 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija for damages resulting from a vehicular accident involving a cargo truck supposedly owned by him. Claiming that the adverse decision in said case was due to the mishandling of the same by the counsel who represented him therein, he filed on December 1, 1981 Civil Case No. 43869 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which was assigned to the sala presided over by the respondent Judge. Named as defendants in said Civil Case No. 43869 are

herein petitioner BA Finance Corporation whom private respondent claims to be the real owner of the cargo truck involved in the accident; the Metro-Taisho Insurance Corporation, which issued the insurance policy covering the same; Atty. Ireneo Calderon, the counsel who represented him in the case filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija; and Robert Chua, the driver of the other vehicle that figured in the accident. Petitioner BA Finance Corporation was served summons on December 18, 1981. Eleven days later, or on December 29, 1981 petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion for extension of time to file answer and/or motion to dismiss. In an order dated January 4, 1982, served on petitioner's counsel on January 12, 1982, the respondent Judge gave the petitioner a period of 15 days, counted from January 2, 1982 and to expire on January 18, 1982 (sic), within which to file its answer or motion to dismiss the complaint, On January 13, 1982, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action. In his order dated March 1, 1982, a copy of which was served on the petitioner on March 8, 1982, the respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss, for being "devoid of merit." On March 17, 1982, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated March 1, 1982. On March 24, 1982, petitioner received a copy of private respondent's motion to strike out the petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the alleged ground that the motion for reconsideration was filed out of time. It was argued by counsel for the private respondent that when the petitioner filed its motion to dismiss on January 13, 1982, it had already used 11 days out of the 15 days' extension granted to it by the Court in the order of January 4, 1982; that having received the order denying its motion to dismiss on March 8, 1982, the petitioner had only the remainder of 4 days or up to March 12, 1982 within which to file its answer to the complaint; consequently, the filing of the motion for reconsideration on March 17, 1982 was already beyond the reglementary period for filing the answer. In the order of the respondent Judge dated April 5, 1982, the motion to strike out was granted, and the petitioner was declared in default for having failed to answer the complaint within the reglementary period, and private respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex-parte. On April 19, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion to lift order of default. The order of the respondent Judge dated May 4, 1982, served on the petitioner on May 18, 1982, denied the petitioner's motion to lift order of default and directed the issuance of a pre-trial order for the other defendants who were not declared in default. On May 28, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated May 4, 1982. On June 16, 1982, petitioner received a copy of an order dated June 10, 1982 setting aside the declaration of default of the herein petitioner and ordering it to file its answer to the complaint within 15 days from notice thereof. The petitioner had by then, or on May 11, 1982, already filed its answer. The proceedings taken subsequent thereto are not clear from the record. According to the petitioner, on August 12, 1982, it received an order dated July 14, 1982, which reads as follows: ORDER

Anent plaintiff's Motion to Remove From the Records Answer of Defendant BA Finance Corporation, the record shows on March 1, 1982 this Court issued an order denying defendant BA Finance Corporation's Motion to Dismiss. On March 17, 1982 counsel for BA Finance received the order denying the motion to dismiss. Under the new Rules, if the motion to dismiss is denied or if determination thereof, is deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the reglementary period under Rule 11, computed from the time he received notice of the denial or deferment, unless commences to run all over again from the time the defendant receives notice of the denial of his motion to dismiss. In the case at bar, since defendant received notice of the denial of its motion to dismiss on May 17, 1982, it had fifteen (15) days from March 17, 1982 or up to April 1, 1982 to file its answer. But on March 17, 1982 defendant filed its Motion for Reconsideration of the order denying the motion to dismiss. The motion for reconsideration is without proof of service; the registry receipt attached to the motion is not the proof of service required by the Rules. Without proof of service, a motion is nothing but a scrap of paper. It did not merit the attention of the court; it was stricken out of the record. Defendant allowed the reglementary 15-day period to answer to elapse without filing its answer. It failed to file its answer on or before April 1, 1982. Since this fact had supervened, this Court, when it issued the order dated April 6, 1982, properly declared defendant BA Finance Corporation in default. On April 19, 1982, said defendant filed its Motion to Lift Order of Default which on May 4, 1982 was denied. On May 28, 1982, said defendant filed its Motion for Reconsideration which on June 10, 1982 was granted and the order of April 5, 1982 was lifted. On June 11, 1982, said defendant filed its answer. Hence, plaintiff's Motion To Remove From the Records the Answer of Defendant BA Finance Corporation. Plaintiff observes BA Finance Corporation's Motion for Reconsideration filed May 28, 1982 is Identical with that of its Opposition (To Plaintiff's Motion to Declare Defendant BA Finance Corporation in Default and Motion to Strike Out Motion for Reconsideration of BA Finance) filed on March 29, 1982, and thus concludes that the former (Motion for Reconsideration) is a pro-forma motion resorted to solely to gain time and delay proceedings whereby in this case said defendant was able to file its answer on June 11, 1982. lt is a settled rule that pro-forma motion for reconsideration is disallowed and is not worth the attention of the court for it is mere scrap of paper. And the order of the Court based on such motion pro-forma is null and void. In view of the foregoing, the order of this Court dated June 10, 1982 is hereby set aside and declared null and void. And the answer filed on June 11, 1982 is hereby stricken out of the record. Let the pre-trial be set anew on August 6, 1982, at 2.00 P.M. SO ORDERED. Pasig, Metro Manila, July 14, 1982.

For failure to file answer within the reglementary period despite due summons, as prayed for by plaintiff, defendant Roberto Chua is hereby declared in default and plaintiff is allowed to present evidence ex-parte against said defendant. 197

[s] Gregorio G. Pineda

[t] GREGORIO G. PINEDA J u d g e (Rollo, pp. 77-78.) Petitioner further alleged that on August 31, 1982, it received a copy of the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 43869 dated August 17, 1982 which orders the defendants therein, including herein petitioner, but excluding Atty. Ireneo Calderon, to pay unto the private respondent the total sum of P 228,255.64 as moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. In their "Opposition" to the petition which they intended as their Comment thereon, the respondents claimed that after private respondent Antonio Sy filed an opposition to the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the petitioner succeeded by false representations in securing the order lifting the order of default and allowing it to file an answer to the complaint; that upon discovering such irregularity, private respondent filed a "Motion to Remove From the Records Answer of Defendant BA Finance Corporation"; and that it was on the basis of said motion that the respondent Court issued its order of July 14, 1982 which declared its previous order of June 10, 1982 as null and void and ordered the answer to be stricken out from the record. After the respondents have filed their comment to the petition, We issued a temporary restraining order in the Resolution of October 11, 1982 enjoining the respondent Judge from further acting on Civil Case No. 43869 until further orders from this Court. It is distressing to note that a provision of the Revised Rules of Court which had been in force since January 1, 1964, or for the last 19 years, on a subject as significant or as commonplace as the period to file an answer to the complaint could be misapplied and misconstrued by a court of first instance in a major metropolitan area. It can only be hoped that a similar unfamiliarity with the Rules is not true with other courts in more remote areas of the country. The provision in question, Section 4 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, cannot be any clearer: SEC. 4. Time to plead. If the motion to dismiss is denied or if determination thereof is deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the time he received notice of the denial or deferment, unless the court provides a different period. Admittedly, the above provision is a departure from the doctrine previously upheld as to the period when to file an answer in case a motion to dismiss the complaint is denied. While the above- quoted provision is new, there being no similar provision in the Rules of Court of 1940, the language thereof is clear and leaves no doubt as to the intendment thereof. It has received a categorical interpretation from the Supreme Court since January 31, 1969 inMatute vs. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 768, wherein this pronouncement was made: Rule 11, section I of the Revised Rules of Court gives the defendant a period of fifteen (15) days after service of summons within which is file his answer and serve a copy thereof upon the plaintiff, unless a different period is fixed by the court. However, within the period of time for pleading, the defendant is entitled to move for dismissal of the action on any of the ground enumerated in Rule 16. If the motion to dismiss is denied or if determination thereof is deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the time he receives notice of the denial or deferment, unless the court provides a different period (Rule 16, section 4). In other words the period for filing a responsive pleading commences to run e all over to again from the time the defendant receives notice of the denial of his motion to dismiss . (See also, Acosta-Ofalia v. Sundiam 85 SCRA 412.) 198

Had the respondent Court, exhibited a modicum of awareness of the law and jurisprudence directly applicable to the question presented for its determination, this proceeding would not have been filed at all. It is undisputed that the petitioner was given an extension of time within which to file its answer which was to expire on January 18, 1982. On January 13, 1982, it filed a motion to dismiss which was denied, and notice of which was served on the petitioner on March 8, 1982. When the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on March 17, 1982, it was well within the 15-day period within which to file the answer counted from the date it received notice of the denial of its motion to dismiss which was on March 8, 1982. Yet, on the erroneous belief that the petitioner had only to its credit the balance of the period to answer that it did not consume by the time it filed its motion to dismiss, the respondent Judge ruled that the filing of the motion for reconsideration on March 17, 1982 was already beyond the reglementary period and forthwith declared tile defendant in default. We could have stopped further discussion of the instant petition at this point. However, We cannot allow to pass unnoticed the subsequent developments in the case which had been characterized not only by obscurity, but also by actuations which are less than commendable. After declaring the petitioner in default in the order of April 5, 1982 and after denying the motion to lift order of default in the order of May 4, 1982, the respondent Judge made a complete turnabout in his order of June 10, 1982 by setting aside the default declaration of the petitioner, giving no reason therefor except the catch phrase "in the interest of justice." Then, another change of mind on the part of the respondent Judge was manifested in his order of July 14, 1982 which reiterated the order of April 5, 1982 declaring the petitioner in default. This time, the respondent Judge woke up to his mistake and ruled that the petitioner had 15 days from the date it received notice of tile denial of its motion to dismiss on March 11, 1982 within which to file its answer. Nonetheless, respondent Judge stubbornly persisted in maintaining his view that the answer of the respondent to the complaint was filed out of time by alleging two new grounds, namely: (1) the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner against the denial of its motion to dismiss is a mere scrap of paper for lack of proof of service; and (2) the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner against the order of May 4, 1982 which denied the petitioner's motion to lift order of default is pro-forma for being Identical to petitioner's opposition to the plaintiff's motion to declare the petitioner in default. The lack of palpable merit of said grounds leads to a natural impression that the respondent Judge was determined to prevent the petitioner from being given a chance to defend itself in the case filed against it by the private respondent, contrary to repeated exhortations and pronouncements from the Supreme Court frowning upon judgments by default on purely technical grounds. The new arguments resorted to by the respondent Judge were not even mentioned in the motion of the private respondent to strike out the answer, nor were they mentioned by the respondent Judge in his first order declaring the petitioner in default. The motion to strike out filed by the private respondent and the order of respondent Judge dated April 5, 1982 declaring the petitioner in default made reference only to the alleged fact that the motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to dismiss was filed beyond the reglementary period. Such ground, as aforementioned, had been acknowledged by the respondent Judge himself in his order of July 14, 1982 to be erroneous. The allegation that the motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioner lacks the requisite notice of hearing and proof of service is a factual distortion. On page 4 of said motion for reconsideration which has been attached as Annex "F" of the petition (Rollo, pp. 5154), it clearly appears that the petitioner's counsel set the said motion for hearing on April 16, 1982 and that a copy of the same was sent by registered mail to the counsel for the private respondent on March 17, 1982. The private respondent filed a motion to strike out the said motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 55-58 dated March 24, 1982), thereby showing that private A. respondent had notice of the motion for reconsideration long before the scheduled hearing thereof on April 16, 1982.

The imputation that the motion to reconsider the order of May 4, 1982 which denied the petitioner's motion to lift order of default is pro-forma reveals a misconception of the concept of proforma motions for reconsideration. It is not every motion for reconsideration that reiterates grounds or arguments aired in a previous motion that may be declared pro-forma. It will be noted that the motion for reconsideration herein involved is of an interlocutory order, and not of a final judgment or final order. There should be a distinction in determining whether a motion for reconsideration may be declared pro-forma depending on whether it is directed against a final judgment or order, or only against an interlocutory order. In the case of the former, a repetition of arguments or grounds already sufficiently discussed in prior incidents may properly be categorized as being merely for purposes of delay. In the case of interlocutory orders, a reiteration of the ground or argument previously advanced is not necessarily indicative that the movant filed the motion merely for gaining delay. It must be remembered that, normally, when an interlocutory order is sought to be reviewed or annulled by means of any of the extra legal remedies of prohibition or certiorari, it is required that a motion for reconsideration of the question order must first be filed, such being considered a speedy and adequate remedy at law which must first be resorted to as a condition precedent for filing of any of such proceedings (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 65, Rules of Court). There is no similar requirement in taking an appeal from a final judgment or order should the questioned interlocutory order be subject to attack only on one ground, as in the case of the default declaration herein involved, a motion for reconsideration against the order complained of would necessarily and inevitably contain a repetition of the ground previously alleged. In so doing, the movant is praying the court to give his motion a second look, in the hope that the court would realize its supposed error, correct the same, and thereby preclude the necessity of seeking relief in a higher tribunal. In the case presently considered, the reiteration of the argument that the respondent Judge committed error in his computation of the period to file an answer after a motion to dismiss shall have been denied becomes a necessity in view of the fact that, although the first motion for reconsideration of the order of default was granted, the respondent Judge subsequently revoked his favorable action thereon. The motion to reconsider the order of revocation must necessarily invoke the same ground showing why the ground upon which the default order is based is erroneous. That said argument is no Idle reiteration of the reason previously alleged, or that the motion for reconsideration was not filed for purposes of delay is indubitably shown by the fact that the respondent Judge sustained the same and corrected his error with respect to the period of time within which to file an answer on the basis thereof. By and large, it adequately appears that the questioned actuations of the respondent Judge in this case have been characterized not only by palpable error but also by grave abuse of discretion which should be corrected and warned against. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. All the proceedings conducted by the respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 43869, including the judgment rendered therein dated August 17, 1982, insofar as the herein petitioner is concerned, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The answer with counterclaim filed by the petitioner dated June 10, 1982 shall be deemed ADMITTED. Costs against private respondent. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-56909 November 2, 1982 FLORENCIA B. SAN VALENTIN, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICEINSURANCE SYSTEM,respondents. Isidro G. Pasana for petitioner. The Solicitor General for respondents. DE CASTRO, J.: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission. The late Delfin San Valentin, husband of petitioner entered the government service in 1951 as a laborer in the Bureau of Plant Industry's Economic Garden in Los Banos, Laguna. After twenty years, he was promoted to the post of nursery farm aide. The deceased was assigned in the Plant Propagation Project where he was tasked with cultivation, propagation and caring of varieties of plants in the Bureau. Sometime in 1979, the deceased noticed some symptoms of iii-health, such as discharging urine deep yellow in color, yellowing of skin progressive abdominal enlargement as well as feeling of fullness. He was confined at the Philippine General Hospital where he was diagnosed to be suffering from hepatic encephalopathy obstruction jaundice due to tuberculosis of the liver, pancreatic carcinoma and hepatoma. On July 28, 1979, he succumbed to said ailments. Petitioner filed her claim with the GSIS for death benefits under PD No. 626 as amended. The claim was denied by the System on January 25, 1980 on the ground that the fatal ailments are not occupational diseases. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on February 25, 1980. The case was elevated to the Employees' Compensation Commission for review. The Commission, in affirming the System's denial of the claim on February 19, 1981 adopted the recommendation 1 of its Medical Division which states, thus: The instance (sic) case is bereft of proofs that would show causal relationship between the disease, hepatic encephalopathy secondary to cirrhosis, and the former employment and employment conditions of the deceased as nursery farm aide at the Bureau of Plant Industry; neither are there indications that the risk of contracting same disease had been increased by his former working conditions. Corollary thereto, the Employees' Compensation Commission even cited the book "Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine" by Wintrobe, et al., in discussing cirrhosis and hepatic encephalopathy viz: Cirrhosis is a generic term that includes all forms of chronic diffuse river disease. The basic causative element of this complex lesion is diffuse river cell death. Post necrotic cirrhosis is the most common type of cirrhosis on a world-wide basis. The cause is still unknown; but viral hepatitis is an antecedent factor in 199

many instances. A small percentage of cases stem from documented intoxications with industrial chemicals (phosphorus) poisons or drugs (chloroform, iproniazid). Finally, certain infections (brucellosis), parasitic infestations (chionorchiasis), metabolic disorders (hepatolenticular degeneration) and advanced alcoholic liver disease may result in postnecrotic cirrhosis. xxx xxx xxx

required to prove the actual causes of the ailment of the deceased would be to go against the liberal interpretation of the labor law in favor of the workingmen, as is the rule when construing doubtful provisions of the labor law. WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 19, 1981 of the Employees Compensation Commission is hereby set aside and the GSIS is hereby directed: 1. To pay petitioner the sum of P12,000.00 as death benefits;

Petitioner now contends that as indicated in the book, the cause of cirrhosis is still unknown; that certain infections (brucellosis), parasitic infestations, and metabolic disorders could also lend to the causation of the disease; that based on the above discussion, cirrhosis can be caused by intoxications or exposure to chemicals, poison and the like, and therefore, decedent's cirrhosis falls within the compensable purview of the law, considering that as nursery farm aide, he was frequently exposed to plant chemicals, insecticides and the like. We find merit in the petition. In compensation cases, strict rules of evidence are not applicable. A reasonable work-connection is all that is required or that there was a showing that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. Following the theory of increased risk, petitioner was able to present convincing proof that would entitle her to the relief prayed for. The frequent exposure of the deceased to plant chemicals and insecticides affected his health. The exposure resulted to the lowering of his body resistance, for it is undisputed that the deceased was in good health when he entered the government service; for, otherwise, he would not have been accepted for insurance purposes by the Government Service Insurance System. It is not too farfetched that the ailment of the deceased developed due to the chemicals used in the nursery farm where he was assigned, for it cannot be denied that the nature of his work required him to deal with different kinds of plants which have to be sprayed with insecticides and the like. We have held that the test of evidence in compensation cases or the relation of the disease with the employment is probability and not certainty. 2 In the case of Sepulveda vs. Employees Compensation Commission, 3 this Court stated that ... the respondent Commission, under Resolution No. 223 dated March 16, 1977, adopted, as a policy, the institution of a more compassionate interpretation of the restrictive provisions of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, by its administering agencies, the Social Security System and the Government Service Insurance System, with respect to, among others, Myocardial Infarction and other borderline cases. ... It is evident that cirrhosis is one of those borderline cases. The manifest purpose of the above quoted resolution is to extend the applicability of the decree to a greater number of employees in consonance with the avowed policy of the State, as mandated by the Constitution, to give maximum aid and protection to labor. From the foregoing, We conclude that the ailment of petitioner's husband is compensable by the nature of his work as nursery farm aide. As earlier indicated, petitioner substantially complied with the condition as to the degree of proof required under the theory of increases risk. For the petitioner to be 200

2. To reimburse petitioner medical and hospital expenses duly supported by proper receipts; and 3. To pay the petitioner attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10 %) percent of the death benefits. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-54204 September 30, 1982 NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. (PTE) and PACIFIC SEAMEN SERVICES, INC., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD, HON. CRESCENCIO M. SIDDAYAO, OSCAR M. TORRES, REBENE C. CARRERA and RESTITUTA C. ABORDO, respondents. Bito, Misa & Lozada Law Offices for petitioners. The Solicitor General and Jose A. Rico for respondents. RELOVA, J.: In this petition for certiorari, petitioners pray that the order dated June 20, 1979 of the National Seamen Board, and the decision dated December 11, 1979 of the Ministry of Labor be nullified and set aside, and that "if petitioners are found liable to private respondent, such a liability be reduced to P30,000.00 only, in accordance with respondent NSB's Standard Format of a Service Agreement." Napoleon B. Abordo, the deceased husband of private respondent Restituta C. Abordo, was the Second Engineer of M.T. "Cherry Earl" when he died from an apoplectic stroke in the course of his employment with petitioner NORSE MANAGEMENT COMPANY (PTE). The M.T. "Cherry Earl" is a vessel of Singaporean Registry. The late Napoleon B. Abordo at the time of his death was receiving a monthly salary of US$850.00 (Petition, page 5). In her complaint for "death compensation benefits, accrued leave pay and time-off allowances, funeral expenses, attorney's fees and other benefits and reliefs available in connection with the death of Napoleon B. Abordo," filed before the National Seamen Board, Restituta C. Abordo alleged that the amount of compensation due her from petitioners Norse Management Co. (PTE) and Pacific Seamen Services, Inc., principal and agent, respectively, should be based on the law where the vessel is

registered. On the other hand, petitioners contend that the law of Singapore should not be applied in this case because the National Seamen Board cannot take judicial notice of the Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore. As an alternative, they offered to pay private respondent Restituta C. Abordo the sum of P30,000.00 as death benefits based on the Board's Memorandum Circular No. 25 which they claim should apply in this case. The Hearing Officer III, Rebene C. Carrera of the Ministry of Labor and Employment, after hearing the case, rendered judgment on June 20, 1979, ordering herein petitioners "to pay jointly and severally the following: I. US$30,600 (the 36-month salary of the decreased)) or its equivalent in Philippine currency as death compensation benefits; II. US$500.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency as funeral expenses; III. US$3,110 or 10% of the total amount recovered as attorney's fees. It is also ordered that payment must be made thru the National Seamen Board within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision. Petitioners appealed to the Ministry of Labor. On December 11, 1979, the Ministry rendered its decision in this case as follows: Motion for reconsideration filed by respondents from the Order of this Board dated 20 June 1979 requiring them to pay complainant, jointly and severally, the amount of Thirty-four thousand and two hundred ten dollars ($34,210.00) representing death benefits, funeral expenses and attorney's fees. The facts in the main are not disputed. The deceased, husband of complainant herein, was employed as a Second Engineer by respondents and served as such in the vessel "M.T. Cherry Earl" until that fatal day in May 1978 when, while at sea, he suffered an apoplectic stroke and died four days later or on 29 May 1978. In her complaint filed before this Board, Abordo argued that the amount of compensation due her should be based on the law where the vessel is registered, which is Singapore law. Agreeing with said argument, this Board issued the questioned Order. Hence this Motion for Reconsideration. In their motion for reconsideration, respondents strongly argue that the law of Singapore should not be applied in the case considering that their responsibility was not alleged in the complaint that no proof of the existence of the Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore was ever presented and that the Board cannot take judicial notice of the Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore. As an alternative, they offered to pay complainant the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as death benefits based on this Board's Memorandum Circular No. 25 which, they maintained, should apply in this case. The only issue we are called upon to rule is whether or not the law of Singapore ought to be applied in this case.

After an exhaustive study of jurisprudence on the matter. we rule in the affirmative. Respondents came out with a well-prepared motion which, to our mind, is more appropriate and perhaps acceptable in the regular court of justice. Nothing is raised in their motion but question of evidence. But evidence is usually a matter of procedure of which this Board, being merely a quasi-judicial body, is not strict about. It is true that the law of Singapore was not alleged and proved in the course of the hearing. And following Supreme Court decisions in a long line of cases that a foreign law, being a matter of evidence, must be alleged and proved, the law of Singapore ought not to be recognized in this case. But it is our considered opinion that the jurisprudence on this matter was never meant to apply to cases before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies such as the National Seamen Board. For well-settled also is the rule that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies are not bound strictly by technical rules. It has always been the policy of this Board, as enunciated in a long line of cases, that in cases of valid claims for benefits on account of injury or death while in the course of employment, the law of the country in which the vessel is registered shall be considered. We see no reason to deviate from this well-considered policy. Certainly not on technical grounds as movants herein would like us to. WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied and the Order of tills Board dated 20 June 1979 affirmed. Let execution issue immediately. In Section 5(B) of the "Employment Agreement" between Norse Management Co. (PTE) and the late Napoleon B. Abordo, which is Annex "C" of the Supplemental Complaint, it was stipulated that: In the event of illness or injury to Employee arising out of and in the course of his employment and not due to his own willful misconduct and occurring whilst on board any vessel to which he may be assigned, but not any other time, the EMPLOYER win provide employee with free medical attention, including hospital treatment, also essential medical treatment in the course of repatriation and until EMPLOYEE's arrival at his point of origin. If such illness or injury incapacitates the EMPLOYEE to the extent the EMPLOYEE's services must be terminated as determined by a qualified physician designated by the EMPLOYER and provided such illness or injury was not due in part or whole to his willful act, neglect or misconduct compensation shall be paid to employee in accordance with and subject to the limitations of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the Republic of the Philippines or the Workmen's Insurance Law of registry of the vessel whichever is greater. (Emphasis supplied) In the aforementioned "Employment Agreement" between petitioners and the late Napoleon B. Abordo, it is clear that compensation shall be paid under Philippine Law or the law of registry of petitioners' vessel, whichever is greater. Since private respondent Restituta C. Abordo was offered P30,000.00 only by the petitioners, Singapore law was properly applied in this case. The "Employment Agreement" is attached to the Supplemental Complaint of Restituta C. Abordo and, therefore, it forms part thereof. As it is familiar with Singapore Law, the National Seamen Board is justified in taking judicial notice of and in applying that law. In the case of VirJen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. vs. National Seamen Board, et al (L41297), the respondent Board promulgated a decision, as follows: 201

The facts established and/or admitted by the parties are the following: that the late Remigio Roldan was hired by the respondent as Ordinary Seamen on board the M/V "Singapura Pertama," a vessel of Singapore Registry; that on September 27, 1973, the deceased Remigio Roldan met an accident resulting in his death while on board the said M/V "Singapura Pertama" during the performance of his duties; that on December 3, 1973, the respondent Virjen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. paid the complainant Natividad Roldan the amount of P6,000.00 representing Workmen's Compensation benefits and donations of the company; that the amount of P4,870 was spent by the respondent company as burial expenses of the deceased Remegio Roldan. The only issue therefore remaining to be resolved by the Board in connection with the particular case, is whether or not under the existing laws (Philippine and foreign), the complainant Natividad Roldan is entitled to additional benefits other than those mentioned earlier. The Board takes judicial notice, (as a matter of fact, the respondent having admitted in its memorandum) of the fact that "Singapura Pertama" is a foreign vessel of Singapore Registry and it is the policy of this Board that in case of award of benefits to seamen who were either injured in the performance of its duties or who died while in the course of employment is to consider the benefits allowed by the country where the vessel is registered. Likewise, the Board takes notice that Singapore maritime laws relating to workmen's compensation benefits are similar to that of the Hongkong maritime laws which provides that in case of death, the heirs of the deceased seaman should receive the equivalent of 36 months wages of the deceased seaman; in other words, 36 months multiplied by the basic monthly wages. In the employment contract submitted with this Board, the terms of which have never been at issue, is shown that the monthly salary of the deceased Remigio Roldan at the time of his death was US$80.00; such that, 36 months multiplied by $80 would come up to US$2,880 and at the rate of P7.00 to $1.00, the benefits due the claimant would be P20,160. However, since there was voluntary payment made in the amount of P6,000 and funeral expenses which under the Workmen's Compensation Law had a maximum of P200.00, the amount of P6,200.00 should be deducted from P20,160 and the difference would be P13,960.00. WHEREFORE, the Board orders the respondent Virjen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. to pay the complainant Natividad Roldan the amount of P13,960.00 within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision. The Board also orders the respondent that payment should be made through the National Seamen Board. The foregoing decision was assailed as null and void for allegedly having been rendered without jurisdiction and for awarding compensation benefits beyond the maximum allowable and on the ground of res judicata. This Court in its resolution dated October 27, 1975 and December 12, 1975, respectively dismissed for lack of merit the petition as well as the motion for reconsideration in said G.R. No. L- 41297. Furthermore, Article 20, Labor Code of the Philippines, provides that the National Seamen Board has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or cases including money claims, involving employer-employee relations, arising out of or by virtue of any law or contracts involving Filipino seamen for overseas employment. Thus, it is safe to assume that the Board is familiar with pertinent Singapore maritime laws relative to workmen's compensation. Moreover, the Board may apply the rule on judicial notice and, "in administrative proceedings, the technical rules of procedure 202

particularly of evidence applied in judicial trials, do not strictly apply." (Oromeca Lumber Co. Inc. vs. Social Security Commission, 4 SCRA 1188). Finally, Article IV of the Labor Code provides that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this code, including its implementing rules and resolved in favor of labor. For lack of merit, this petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-52058 February 25, 1982 PERFECTO JARILLO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Department of Engineering, Quezon City), respondents. MAKASIAR, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated September 27, 1979 of respondent Employees' Compensation Commission, which affirmed the decision of respondent Government Service Insurance System denying the claim of herein petitioner for disability benefits on the ground that his ailment-senile cataract-is not an occupational disease taking into consideration the nature of his particular work (p. 25, rec.). The following facts are not disputed: Petitioner Perfecto Jarilloborn on February 27, 1916entered government service on January 1, 1955 as a temporary laborer in the Department of Engineering, Quezon City. On July 1, he was designated as construction worker in the same office, and it was the same position held until his retirement on August 31, 1977 (pp. 61-62, rec.). He received pension benefits under Republic Act No. 660 in the total sum of P5,229.97 (p. 3, NLRC rec.). On January 24, 1975, he was admitted to the UST Hospital under the care of Dr. Jose L. Duran, who performed a cataract operation on his right eye on January 30, 1979 (p. 23, rec.). On September 13 to 28, 1977, petitioner was again hospitalized at the Jose R. Reyes Memorial Hospital where he was operated on for lens extraction, intracapsular with peripheral iridectomy, this time on his left eye (p. 24, rec.). Prior to this second operation or on April 15, 1977 (p. 9, ECC rec.), petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under P.D. No. 626. This claim was denied on April 18,1977 by means of a letter signed by Daniel N. Mijares Manager of the Employees' Compensation Department of respondent GSIS. Said letter-denial is quoted hereunder:

xxx xxx xxx Please be advised that the same cannot be given due course on the ground that your ailment, Senile Cataract, is not an occupational disease taking into consideration the nature of your particular work. An occupational disease is one which is characteristic of or peculiar to a particular grade, occupation, process or employment and to exclude all diseases of life to which the general public is exposed. Senile Cataract is opacity of the leds resulting from degenerative changes, an aging process. Under the aforesaid decree, only the following types are considered occupational: (a) Cataract produced by frequent exposure to the glare of, or rays from molten glass or red hot metal (b) Cataract due to ionizing radiations, and (c) Cataract due to trauma. Upon evaluation based on generally accepted medical authorities, your ailment is found not to be in the least causally related to your duties and conditions of work. We believe that your ailment is principally traceable to factors which are definitely not work-connected. Moreover, the evidences you have submitted are not sufficient for us to establish that this ailment is the direct result of your occupation or employment as a Construction Helper in the Department of Engineering, Diliman, Quezon City ... (p. 25, rec.). Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the above letter-denial on November 14,1978, which was likewise denied by the respondent GSIS on December 14,1978 (p. 12, ECC rec.). On appeal to respondent ECC, the latter rendered a decision dated September 27, 1979, affirming the opinion of Manager Mijares, pertinent portions of which read as follows: Senile cataract does not fall under the list of occupational diseases. Only the following types of cataract are considered occupational: (1) cataract produced by frequent exposure to the glare of, or rays from molten glass or red hot metal (2) cataract due to ionizing radiation and (3) cataract due to trauma. There is no proof presented by claimant to show that a direct causal relationship exists between the above disease and the employee's occupation as Construction helper in the Department of Engineering, Diliman, Quezon City. This case is not compensable and it is therefore recommended that the decision of the GSIS denying the claim be affirmed. Environmental facts of the case considered, we find no cogent reason to disturb the conclusion arrived at by the respondent System that appellant's senile cataract, although it supervened in the course of his employment, developed independently from his employment and therefore the disability arising from the same falls outside the scope of the compensatory purview of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended (pp. 31-32, rec.). Hence, this petition for review. 203

Petitioner argues that the possible cause of his illness is the condition of the place of his work and the construction material he is exposed to while working as a construction worker, such as the hot asphalt and the heat of the sun.He also claims that the blurring of his vision started when, on one occasion in January 1975-while he was lifting a bag of cement-the bag gave way and particles of cement lodged in his two eyes; that after such incident, his right eye was operated on for acute glaucoma or cataract; and that since then, he felt that his left eye had a gradual blurring of vision which became severe prior to his confinement and operation in September 1977 (pp. 15-16, rec.). On the other hand, respondent insists that petitioner's plaintiff is not compensable because it is neither an occupational disease listed by the commission nor work-connected. "Under the Labor Code, cataract to be compensable must result from frequent and prolonged exposure to the glare of, or rays from molten glass or red hot metal (Please see p. 3 of respondent's quoting paragraph 3 of the listing of Occupational Disease, p. 63, rec.). Respondent further argues: Senile cataract ,which petitioner's ailment is not a listed occupational disease pursuant to Annex A' of the Rules on Employees' Compensation. Senile cataract, as defined, is the most common form of cataract occurring after the age of fifty (50) due to aging or degenerative changes [Adlers Textbook of Ophthalmology by Schele and Albert 8th Edition, 1968, pp. 281-282]. It is a risk or hazard to which all persons are exposed regardless of whether they are employed or not, the same (Senile Cataract) being attributed to degenerative changes or to aging process. Petitioner makes an attempt to show that his illness is 'Traumatic Cataract' and, therefore, compensable by claiming that on one occasion, a bag of cement broke and his face and eyes were covered with cement that the cement-that got into his eyes was the cause of his cataract. Petitioner's posture, however, is belied by the finding of his physician that petitioner's cataract ailment is "senile and mature" which by its terms, implies that the same is due to degenerative process (p. 64, rec.). The only issue presented for resolution is whether or not petitioner's illness cataract is compensable under the provisions of P.D. No. 626, as amended. The Rules on Employees' Compensation, Annex A Listing of Occupational Diseases mentions only one kind of cataract as compensable, i.e., cataract produced by exposure to the glare of, or rays from molten or red hot metal (par. 3, Occupational Diseases, Annex "A" to Rules on Employees) Compensation which took effect on January 1, 1975). The said list is, however, not exclusive, as borne by the provisions of 167(l) of I.D. No. 442, as amended by P.D. 626 [amendment as of August 31, 1977, the date of disability retirement of petitioner], which reads: "Sickness means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or my illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions."

The administrative officer of the Department of Engineering of Quezon City, Mr. Paterno S. Lopez, has issued a certification (p. 13,ECC rec.) to the effect that petitioner's actual duties as construction helper are as follows: (a) asphalting of roads 40%; (b) spot patching of roads 30%; (c) cutting grass 15%; (d) cleaning of clogged canals 10%; (e) other duties 57%; As found by respondent Commission, petitioner's medical records reveal that his ailment of mature senile cataract, bilateral, started as bluring of vision of both eyes. This blurring of vision subsequently became progressive accompanied by occasional lacrimination, and on June 30, 1975, petitioner underwent "cataract operation O.D. at the UST Hospital under the professional care of Dr. Jose L. Duran. After about two years, on September 13, 1977, petitioner's left eye also underwent cataract operation medically known as "lens extraction intracapsular with peripheral iridectomy, O.S." at the Jose R. Reyes Memorial Hospital under the able hands of Dr. Herbert Barrios (p. 27, rec.). From the nature of petitioner's duties, there is no doubt that the risk of contracting cataract was increased by his working conditions. His duties as construction worker keeps him on the road seventy percent (70%) of his working time, and ninety-five percent (95%) outdoors. This must have exposed him to the sun's glare and heat, as well as to excessive dirt and dust. The appealed decision of respondent Commission presents an etiological classification of cataract, as follows: ... (1) Congenital cataract the most common cause of which is heredity (2) Secondary or after cataract [one which occurs after certain forms of cataract extractions]; (3) complicated cataract one caused by disease of the uveal tract, pigmentery retinal degeneration, absolute glaucoma. retinal detachment and old injuries; (4) traumatic cataract - caused by blunt or penetrating injuries to the eye, introcular foreign bodies, radiation and high voltage electricity ; (5) toxic cataractbrought about by certain drugs such as ergot, dinetrophenol, naphalene, phenothriazines, and triparanol; (6) senile cataract- the most common form of cataract occuring after the age of fifty due to aging or degenerative changes (p.5 of Decision citing Adlers's Textbook of Opthalmology by H. Shele and Albert, 8th edition,1968,pp. 281-282; emphasis supplied [p.30,rec.]. Lighting electric and heat ray cataracts are explained in a medivcal manual, as follows: Lighting, electric and heat ray cataracts-Persons struck by lighting or shocked by a high voltage electric current may develop bilateral lens opacities beginning in the posterior and anterior cortex of the lens. These opacities become visible more rapidly than those of radiation cataract. Operation is indicated by linear extraction in young individuals and combined extraction in persons over thirty-five years of age. Long continued exposure to high temperatures in the glass-blowing and iron-puddling industries may give rise to slow progressing posterior cortical lens opacities which require the same treatment (Charles A. Perrera, Diseases of the Eye, 1953, p. 272). Petitioner's cataract could also be traumatic cataract caused by cement that entered his eyes when a bag of cement broke. Cement is so caustic that it can easily irritate the skin and even destroy rubber or leather. 204

In the case of Cerezo vs. ECC, et al. (93 SCRA 680, 684 [1979]), this Court through Mr. Justice Vicente Abad Santos upheld the claim of Alberto Cerezo whose illness osteoarthritiswas likewise not listed as an occupational disease in Annex "A" [of the Rules on Employees' Compensation, as ammended, under theory of increased risk. Petitioners work experience as narrated above justifies the same conclusion which was reached in ECC Case No. 0571 (Fortunata Cadangog vs. GSIS, decided on May 10, 1978). In making this conclusion, We have kept in mind that the social and humane character of the law leans towards compassion and compensability. Advancing age, as in this case, may have caused or contributed to the development of the ailment but it is not a drawback for what is material and decisive is that the employment contributed even in a small degree in aggravating the ailment (see Natividad vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, No. L-42340, August 31, 1978, 85 SCRA 115). In the light of the foregoing, petitioner is entitled to income benefits for disability pursuant to Section 192 of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. Since he as not represented by a private counsel, no award for attorney's fees is made herein. WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY REVERSED AND THE RESPONDENT GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM IS HEREBY ORDERED. 1. TO PAY HEREIN PETITIONER THE SUM OF TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS AS INCOME BENEFITS; AND 2. TO REFUND PETITIONER'S MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER RECEIPTS. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-57416 January 30, 1982 BAYANI DATOR, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,respondents. FERNANDEZ, J.: This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 1458, entitled "Bayani Dator, Appellant, versus Government Service Insurance System, (Municipal Government of Lopez, Quezon), Respondent", affirming the denial by the Government Service Insurance System of the claim for benefits under PD No. 626, as amended, for the death of Wenifreda Dator. 1 The petitioner, Bayani Dator, is the surviving spouse of the late Wenifreda Dator who was a municipal librarian of the Municipality of Lopez, Quezon when she died of Bronchogenic Carcinoma with Pleural Effusion on December 2, 1972. The facts, as found by the Employees' Compensation Commission, are: The deceased was a municipal librarian of Lopez, Quezon from 1963 up to November 11, 1978 when she was forced to seek disability retirement due to her ailment. She sought treatment from the Magsaysay Memorial Hospital in Lopez, Quezon and the Quezon Institute in Quezon City but her condition did not improve. Subsequently, she was admitted at the Philippine General Hospital where she finally succumbed to her illness of February 2, 1979. Blaming the decedent's employment as librarian for her death, the appellant herein filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626, as amended, with the respondent System. Respondent, however, denied appellant's claim on the ground that the decedent's illness is not an occupational disease considering her particular work.2 The Employees' Compensation Commission denied the claim because: Bronchogenic carcinoma is the most common form of malignancy in males, reaching a peak between the fifth and seventh decades and accounting for 1 in 4 male cancer deaths. The sex incidence is at least 5 to 1, male to female. Extensive statistical analysis by medical authorities has confirmed the relationship between lung cancer and heavy cigarette smoking. It has been demonstrated that the more cigarettes a person smokes, the greater is his risk of developing lung cancer. Other factors that may have potential roles are air pollution, exposure to ionizing radiation, exposure to chromates, metallic iron and iron oxides, arsenic, nickel, berylluim and asbestos. There is no conclusive evidence, however, that community air pollution is a causal factor. On the other hand, pleural effusion is the presence of fluid in the pleural cavity and when present in a patient with a lung cancer is an indication that, the pleural is already affected. (Ref.: Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine by Wintrobe et al, 7th ed., pp. 1323-1324) 3 205

Until now the cause of cancer is not known. Despite this fact, however, the Employees' Compensation Commission has listed some kinds of cancer as compensable. There is no reason why cancer of the lungs should not be considered as a compensable disease. The deceased worked as a librarian for about 15 years. During all that period she was exposed to dusty books and other deleterious substances in the library under unsanitary conditions. In Cristobal vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, 4 this Court said: The deceased died of rectal cancer on May 27, 1977. Concededly, the exact cause or etiology of this disease is still unknown. Even respondent ECC's own medical officer, Dr. Mercia C. Abrenica, certified that the cause of rectal carcinoma as of any other malignancies is still unknown (p. 9, ECC rec.). Its cause and development are insidious, imperceptible to the naked eye, and defies expert analysis. Therefore, whether or not the disease rectal cancer was caused or the risk of contracting the same was increased by the decedent's working conditions remians uncertain. This uncertainty, of course, cannot eliminate the probability that the ailment was work-connected as it had been established that the deceased was exposed to unhygienic working conditions, various chemicals and intense heat which are generally considered as predisposing factors of cancer. At this point, there is need to reiterate that when the deceased started working in 1964, he was free from any kind of disease. Although, Wenifreda Dator died only on December 2, 1979, it is possible that the disease must have supervened before the Amended Labor Code took effect. Even if the illness occurred after the Amended Labor Code had taken effect, the illness of the deceased should be considered compensable. In the same case of Cristobal vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, supra, this Court said: To establish compensability of the claim under the said theory, the claimant must show proof of work-connection. Impliedly, the degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence, which means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion" (Ang Tibay vs. The Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union, Inc., 69 Phil. 635) or clear and convincing evidence. In this connection, it must be pointed out that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation. Respondents however insist on evidence which would establish direct causal relation between the disease rectal cancer and the employment of the deceased. Such a strict requirement which even medical experts in the field cannot support considering the uncertainty of the nature of the disease would negate the principle of liberality in the matter of evidence. Apparently, what the law merely requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the new Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor." In urging that the disease rectal cancer is not compensable since its nature or cause is unknown and petitioner was not able to show proof of direct causal relation, respondents would instruct us to ignore the above provision of law and the policy of the State of giving maximum aid and protection to labor as We have

stated earlier in the main decision. As the agents charged by the law to implement the social justice guarantee secured by both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more liberal attitude in deciding claims for compensation especially when there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection. This should not be confused with the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. While these doctrines may have been abandoned under the new Labor Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is significant that the liberality of the law, in general still subsists. All these factual and legal relation to each other constituting substantial evidence clearly convincing Us to resolve that rectal cancer is compensable. 5 Under the established facts of the case, the death of Wenifreda Dator caused by bronchogenic carcinoma with pleural effusion is compensable. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the Government Service Insurance System is ordered: (1) To pay the petitioner the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00) as death benefits. (2) To reimburse the petitioner medical and hospital expenses duly supported by proper receipts; and (3) To pay petitioner the sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00) as funeral expenses. SO ORDERED.

The petitioner, Mercedes Abadiano, is the judicial guardian of the minor legitimate children of the deceased Catalina B. Buenvenida, namely, Josephine, Rodolfo, Jose, Honorio and Catalino, all surnamed Buenvenida. On account of the death of Catalina B. Buenvenida, the petitioner filed a claim for compensation benefits under P.D. 626, as amended, with the Government Service Insurance System which denied the claim on the ground that the ailment that caused the death of Catalina B. Buenvenida is neither an occupational disease nor work-related. From the adverse decision of the Government Service Insurance System, the petitioner appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission which also denied the claim for death benefits and affirmed the ruling of the Government Service Insurance System in a decision rendered dated December 6, 1979. The facts, as found by the Employees' Compensation Commission, are: The record shows that for about twenty four (24) years, the late Catalina Buenvenida was employed at the Department of Education (now Ministry of Education and Culture) as elementary grades teacher. Her last assignment as such teacher when her above-named ailment supervened was in Catbalogan III Elementary School in Catbalogan, Samar. Per certification of the deceased's attending physician Dr. Damaso J. Salinas Jr., of the Samar Provincial Hospital in Catbalogan, Saniar, the deceased's liver cancer started in September of 1978 as gradual weight loss, nausea and vomiting. These symptoms were later on accompanied by emaciation and gradual enlargement of the upper abdomen. The decedent was confined at the abovesaid hospital starting December 5, 1978, but apparently the deceased's ailment at that time could have already reached its terminal stage for on December 13, 1978, the decedent died. She was then 51 years of age and her death was attributed to her affliction of cancer of the liver. 2 The Employees' Compensation Commission denied the claim on the following ground: Carcinoma of the liver or liver cancer is definitely not accepted as an occupational disease in decedent's employment. The cause of cancer of the liver is not known, but medical authorities have observed that most cases are associated with However cirrhosis a form of liver pathology the basic lesion of which is diffuse liver cell death and the major cause of which is chronic alcohol ingestion plus impaired nutrition. 3 The petitioner contends that the claim is compensable because: In implementing the aforesaid definition, the Rule implementing PD 626, as amended provides that"'For the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions" (Rule III, Section 1 [b]). Clearly, from the above Rule, where the ailment is not an occupational disease, it could still be considered a compensable ailment if it could be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by working conditions. Consequently, decedent ailment comes within the compensable coverage of the law for the simple reason that the risk of contracting decedent's fatal ailment, Cancer of the Liver, is increased by the working conditions. Admittedly, a teacher's work is very demanding, not only was decent subjected to the rigors of physical and mental stress and strain but also exposed to the vagaries of nature, She was overworked and underpaid and because of this she was unusually undernourished the latter being accepted by 206

G.R. No. L-52254 January 30, 1982 MERCEDES ABADIANO, for and in behalf of the minors, Josephine, Rodolfo, Jose, Honorio, & Catalino, all surnamed Buenvenida, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM & EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION,respondents. FERNANDEZ, J.: This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC-Case No. 1334 entitled "Mercedes Abadiano etc., Appellant, vs. Government Service Insurance System, Respondent," dated December 6, 1979 which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System denying the claim for income benefits for the death of Catalina B. Buenvenida resulting from cancer of the liver contracted by the decease during her employment. 1

the Commission as one of the contributing factor in the irritation of the liver cell and eventually the development of cancer of the liver (p. 3, Decision). The fact that Cancer of the Liver is caused by some other etiological factors is of no moment in the face of what this Honorable Court stressing in the oft-quoted case of Abana vs. Quisumbing, 1968, which we quote: While there is that possibility that factors other than the employment of the claimant may also have contributed to the aggravation of his illness, this is not a drawback to its compensability. For, under the law, it is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of claimant's illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for. It is enough that Ms employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease. 4 The duties of the public school teacher are not confined to the classroonm During the 24 years that Catalina B. Buenvenida worked as a teacher, she must have been exposed to the elements while attending to the outdoor projects which were part of the curriculum and extra curricular activities connected with her school work. The deceased, Cataline B. Buenvenida, was exposed to the elements, like inclement weather, heavy rains, typhoon as well as dust. These natural elements and unwholesome conditions are occupational hazards of a public school teacher. During the 24 years that the deceased served as public school teacher she must have gone hungry many times resulting in the weakened condition of her body. In Cristobal vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, 5 this Court declared rectal cancer as compensable for the following reasons: In the instant case, it is evident that rectal cancer is one of those borderline cases. Like, it is clear that the purpose of the resolution is to extend the applicability of the provisions of P.D. 626, thereby affording a greater number of employees the opportunity to avail of the benefits under the law. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State, as mandated by the Constitution and embodied in the New Labor Code, to give maximum aid and protection to labor. The Employees' Compensation Commission, like the defunct Court of Industrial Relations and the Workmen's Compensation Commission, is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to the constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man, more specially, the social justice guarantee; for otherwise, these guarantees would be merely 'a lot of meaningless patter. (Santos vs. WCC, 75 SCRA 371 [1977]) As pointed out by no less than the respondent ECC itself in its Comment dated January 5, 1978 It may not be amiss to mention that the ECC has time and again expanded the list of occupational diseases. This comes about after continuing studies made by the ECC. In deed, cancer has already been included as a qualified occupational disease in certain cases 207

Occupational Diseases l. Cancer of the pitelial lining of the bladder (Papilloma of the bladder) 2. Cancer epithellomatoma or ulceration of the skin of the corneal surface of the eye due to tar, pitch, bitumem, mineral oil or paraffinor any compound product or residue of any of these substances xxx

Nature of Employment Work involving exposure to alphanaphtylamine betanapthy lamine or. benzidine or any part of the salts; and auramine magenta. The use or handling of, exposure to tar, pitch, bitumen mineral oil (include paraffin) soot or any compound product or residue of any of these substances xxx

16. Cancer of the stomach and other lymphatic and blood forming vessels; nasal cavity and sinuses 17. Cancer of the lungs, liver and brain

Vinyl chloride plastic workers Vinyl chloride plastic workers

workers,

workers,

Worth noting is the fact that the above types of cancer have no known etiology Yet, they are regarded as occupational. The clear implication is that the law merely requires a reasonable work connection (pp. 59-60, rec., emphasis supplied). From the foregoing statements, it is palpable that the respondent ECC recognizes, as it is duty bound to, the policy of the State to afford maximum aid and protection to labor. Therefore, to require the petitioner to show the actual causes or factors which led to the decedent's rectal malignancy would not be consistent with this liberal interpretation. It is of universal acceptance that practically all kinds of cancer belong to the class of clinical diseases whose exact etiology cause or origin, is unknown. It is in this regard that the evidence submitted by the petitioner deserves serious consideration. 6 And in Meez vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, 7 this Court expressed concern for public school teachers, thus: Finally, Republic Act 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Charta for Public School Teachers, recognized the enervating effects of these factors (duties and activities of a school teacher certainly involve physical mental and emotional stresses) on the health of school teachers when it directed in one of its provisions that' Teachers shall be protected against the consequences of employment injury in accordance with existing laws. The effects of the physical and nervous strain on the teacher's health shall be recognized as compensable occupational

diseases in accordance with laws '(Pantoja vs. Republic, et al. L-43317, December 29, 1978). 8 In view of the foregoing and of the established facts of record, the death of Catalina B. Buenvenida caused by cancer of the liver is compensable, said illness having been caused or aggravated by her duties as public school teacher for 24 years. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission appealed from is set aside and the Government Service Insurance System is hereby directed: (1) To pay the petitioner the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) as death benefits; and (2) To reimburse the petitioner of medical and hospital expenses duly supported by proper receipts. SO ORDERED.

Sometime in 1975, the subject decedent was subjected to radioactive iodine treatment at the Philippine General Hospital to arrest a follicular carcinoma of his thyroid gland. Subsequently, he sought admission at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center due to easy fatigability, shortness of breath and on and off high grade fever. His ailment was confirmed to be apapillo follicular ca of the thyroid gland, pulmonary and neck metastasis He died on June 23, 1978. Following his death, a claim for death benefit was filed by his widow, appellant herein, Louella G. Jimenez. Said claim was denied by the respondent Government Service Insurance System based on its finding that the cause of death is not an occupational disease and no evidence could show that the decedent's risk of contraction of the ailment was increased by the nature of his employment. 2 The Employees' Compensation Commission denied the claim because: The cause of death is carcinoma of the thyroid gland. Although the etiology of subject disease is unknown, it is generally accepted that it may develop in patients with toxic goiter who are under prolonged thiouracil therapy and from intake of antithyroid drugs in large doses. (Textbook of Surgery, 3rd Edition, Mosely, p. 398). In the instant case, there is no indication that the late Leonardo Jimenez was predisposed to carcinogenic elements in his employment at the Philippine National Railways. In most cases, one is predisposed to the disease by frequent exposure to drugs, which does not apply to this case as can be gleaned from the records. P.D. 626, as amended, dictates that the ailment must be an occupational disease listed in Annex "A" of the implementing rules and regulations; otherwise there must be proof that the employee's risk of contracting the disease was increased by his working condition. 3 According to the respondent, Government Service Insurance System, the background facts are: Petitioner's husband, the late Leonardo J. Jimenez, was employed by the Philippine National Railways, first as a temporary policeman in 1961, then as security guard in 1962, and finally as researcher-analyst on December 31, 1975. Relative to his last position his duties included documentation, investigative and surveillance work and attendance at court hearings from time to time. On January 7, 1975, he was admitted at the Philippine General Hospital where he received radioactive iodine treatment to arrest a follicular carcinoma of his thyroid gland. Later, he sought admission at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center on complaint of easy fatigability, shortness of breath, and on-and-off highgrade fever. His ailment was confirmed to be apapillo follicular Ca of the thyroid gland, pulmonary and neck metastasis On June 23, 1978, he died on account of his ailment. 4

G.R. No. L-57341 January 18, 1982 LOUELLA G. JIMENEZ, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS), respondents. FERNANDEZ, J.: This is a petition to review the decision 1 of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 1450 entitled "Louella G. Jimenez, Appellant, versus Government Service Insurance System (Philippine National Railways), Respondent", affirming the denial by the Government Service Insurance System of the claim for income benefits for death of Leonardo G. Jimenez, aformer employee of the Philippine National Railways. The petitioner, "Louella G. Jimenez, is the widow of the deceased, Leonardo J. Jimenez. The facts, as found by the Employees' Compensation Commission, are: The late Leonardo J. Jimenez, whose death is the subject matter of this claim, was formerly employed by the Philippine National Railways. His stint thereat consisted of a temporary appointment as a police in 1961, assigned as a security guard in 1962, and promoted to the post of researcher-analyst on December 31, 1975. Among his duties as embodied in his application for income benefits were as follows: 'acts as personnel/document and physical security that are assigned for investigation, conducts surveillance that may be assigned by the chief cso/pcs; and attends to hearing in court from time to time.' 208

It is clear from the undisputed facts that the disease of the deceased, Leonardo J. Jimenez, supervened prior to January 1, 1975 when the Workmen's Compensation Act was still the law governing claims for compensation. Indeed the Government Corporate Counsel, in his Comment for the Goverment Service Insurance System, said: It is undisputed that petitioner's husband was admitted at the Philippine General Hospital on January 7, 1975 where he was subjected to radioactive iodine treatment to arrest his follicular carcinoma of the thyroid gland. Undoubtedly, the diagnosis of the ailment of petitioner's husband as carcinoma was made prior to undergoing the treatment on January 7, 1975 and the symptoms thereof could only have developed or appeared even earlier. Thus, the onset of the ailment of the deceased occurred prior to January 1, 1975 when the new employees' compensation scheme under the State Insurance Fund became effective, hence, prior to the repeal of the old Workmen's Compensation law. Thus, the case accrued under the Workmen's Compensation Law. What should then apply in the case at bar are the provisions of the old Workmen's Compensation Act, and assuming the compensability of the claim under said law, the liability should be imposed upon the employer of the deceased, the Philippine National Railways, and not upon the State I Fund. The body or agency which assumed the functions of the defunct Workmen's Compensation Commission is, therefore, the proper forum to entertain the instant claim The claim should have been filed with the Workmen's Appeal and Review Staff of the Ministry of Labor. 5 Under the Workmen's Compensation Act there is a disputable presumption that the death of Leonardo J. Jimenez is compensable because his illness occurred during his employment with the Philippine National Railways. In G. B. Francisco, Inc. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission 6 this Court held: The Workmen's Compensation Act which governs the present situation expressly provides in its Section 44 that in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary it is presumed that a claim comes within the provisions of this Act. Time and again this Court stated that under this declaration of a benign and sound public politic, an employee is freed from the burden of proving that his or injury was caused or aggravated by the nature of his work. In fact, the cause of the ailment is immaterial; what is important is that it occurred or was aggravated in the course of employment and disabled the workman from pursuing his ordinary occupation. It does not appear that the employer, Philippine National Railways, adduced any evidence to rebut the presumption that the death of the deceased employee was compensable. The contention of the Government Corporate Counsel that the compensation should be paid by the employer, Philippine National Railways, and not by the State Insurance Fund has no merit. The State Insurance Fund and the funds of government employers are both government funds and it would not matter where the payment of employees' compensation case would come from. In fact in Corales vs. Employees' Compensation 7 this Court ordered the Government Service Insurance System to pay the case which accrued under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Whether or not the Government Service Insurance System is entitled to reimbursement from the employer, Philippine National 209

Railways, is a matter to be threshed out between the employer and the System. It cannot affect the payment of the claim to the petitioner. The petitioner is entitled to reimbursement of medical and funeral expenses and attorney's fees. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the Government Service Insurance System is ordered: a. To pay the petitioner the amount of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) as death benefits; b. To reimburse the petitioner medical and funeral expenses supported by proper receipts; c. To pay the petitioner the amount of SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P600.00) as attorney's fees; and d. To pay the Ministry of Labor the amount of P61.00 as administrative costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-37896 July 22, 1981 LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and LEONARDA VDA. DE HAYSON respondents. GUERRERO, J.: Petition for review of the decision dated July 16, 1973 of the Workmen's Compensation Commission en banc in WCU Case No. ROXII-602-70 affirming the WCC Referee's award of compensation benefits in favor of the widow and children of the late Pantaleon Hayson, an employee of petitioner corporation. The facts as found by WCC Referee Conchita Martinez of Regional Office No. XII, Department (now Ministry) of Labor, Davao City, after the case was heard on the merits, are: That the deceased (Pantaleon Hayson) was employed by the respondent Luzon Stevedoring Corporation as a Gang Boss or capataz with a daily wage of P 9.00. That the nature of the business of the

respondent is stevedoring and lightering. On February 16, 1970 at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, he was on duty as such capataz on board the M/V President Aguinaldo. While the deceased and his co- workers, Segundo "Nonoy" Catalan. Felimon Caparas, Francisco Toralba and another laborer were waiting for the cargoes and telling stories to pass the time, the 3rd Officer of the M/V President Aguinaldo approached them. Since there was a party on board the boat at that time and since it was a cold night, the deceased asked for something to drink from the 3rd Officer. So, the 3rd Officer left them for a while and when he returned the latter gave them a half-filled bottle of pocket-size Tanduay Rhum. The group then took turns in drinking from the said bottle with the deceased taking the first drink. After his co- workers drank from the supposed bottle of Tanduay Rhum they found out that the contents of the said bottle was rot liquor but oil of winter green, About an hour after that the late Pantaleon Hayson complained of stomach pain and he was immediately brought to the San Pedro Hospital where he died on February 17, 1970 at around 4:40 A.M. due to poisoning according to the findings of the attending physician, Dr. Alex Panuncialman and which was confirmed by the autopsy performed by Dr. Juan M. Abear, Jr., Medico Legal Officer, City of Health Office, Davao City (Exhibit "E"). It was also established that the deceased was not a heavy drinker as testified to by Segundo Catalan also an employee of the respondent and who was present at the incident because he was on duty together with the deceased. He was presented as witness for the respondent. ... It was further established that claimant Leonarda Vda. de Hayson was legally married to the deceased (Exhibit "B"), and that out of their union they begot two children, namely: Epifania Hayson and Norma Hayson 1 (Exhibits "C" and "D"). From the facts as established, the Referee ruled that the death of Pantaleon Hayson arose out of and in the course of his employment as capataz, and ordered Luzon Stevedoring Corporation to pay: 1. To claimant Leonarda Vda. de Hayson and to minors, Epifania and Norma, both surnamed Hayson, thru this Office, the sum of FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P5,200.00), as compensation, plus the further sum of TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P200.00), as burial expenses or the total of FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (P5,400.00); 2. To Atty. Jose B. Guyo, Jr., thru this Office, the sum of TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY PESOS (P270.00), as attorney's fees, pursuant to section 31 of the Act; and

3. To this Office, the sum of FIFTY-FIVE PESOS (P55.00), as fee pursuant to Section 55 of the Act. Respondent (now herein petitioner) filed on March 9, 1971 a motion for reconsideration of the Referee's decision raising as sole ground the allegation that Pantaleon Hayson was notoriously negligent, hence, his death is not compensable under Section 4 of Act 3428, as amended. Referee Martinez, in a resolution dated March 26, 1971, denied the motion for reconsideration. The entire record of the case was thus elevated to the Workmen's Compensation Commission for review. In the decision dated July 16, 1973, the Workmen's Compensation Commission affirmed 2 the decision appealed from. Resolving the sole issue raised by respondent Luzon Stevedoring Corporation that the deceased was notoriously negligent for which reason his death falls outside the compensatory coverage of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the WCC defined the concept and degrees of negligence, thus: In the case of Soriano v. Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation, WCC Case No. 84, this Commission had the occasion to construe notorious negligence as something more than a simple or contributory negligence. "By notorious negligence is meant such entire want of care as to raise a presumption that a person at fault is conscious of the probable consequences of his carelessness and is indifferent to the danger of injury to himself and other persons. The negligence necessary to exempt an employer must amount to reckless disregard of the safety of persons and property. Notorious negligence is practically equivalent to the doing of an intentional wrong. Accordingly, the WCC held that the deceased could not have been notoriously negligent because he was unaware of the probable consequences of his act. Nowhere was there an iota of proof evidencing his intent to put an end to his life. If at all, his attitude constituted simple which thus brings this claim within the compensatory coverage of the beneficient provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended. Hence, the WCC's stamp of affirmance on the award made by Referee Martinez in favor of Pantaleon Hayson's widow and children. Not satisfied with the WCC decision, Luzon Stevedoring Corporation on September 8, 1973 sought reconsideration thereof 'out the WCC, failing to find sufficient justification to warrant reversal or modification of its decision, denied on October 11, 1973 the motion for reconsideration. Hence, the instant recourse to Us on a petition for review on certiorari. The sole issue now before Us for resolution is whether this claim for compensation benefit on account of Pantaleon Hayson's demise due to accidental poisoning when he mistook oil of wintergreen for Tanduay Rhum falls within the coverage of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended.
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Petitioner insists that the deceased was notoriously negligent because he drank from the bottle containing oil of wintergreen not only once but continued to do so despite the unanimous opinion of his companions. We agree, however, with the ruling of the WCC which is fully justified and supported by clear, competent, and substantial evidence, to wit: Quoting from the testimony of the companions of the deceased, respondent pointed out that the deceased drank the contents of the bottle of Tanduay Rhum, knowing well that it contained oil of wintergreen, hence his attitude constituted notorious negligence that brought out his death from the coverage of the Act. This pretense of respondent is far from being tenable. In the case at bar, it was established that the deceased was not a heavy drinker and at the time they asked something to drink from the 3rd Officer of the boat, the deceased or his companions were not shown to have drunk any liquor or anything that could have affected the mental state of the deceased at the time he asked a drink from the said Officer. Nor was it shown that previous to the incident, the deceased was so despondent that there was an intention on his part to end his life. All that they did in asking for a drink from the Officer is what ordinary persons would do under the circumstances. It was a cold night on board the boat and they were waiting for work, then, it was but natural that they want to do something to alleviate the cold. In the nature of their job, occasional drinking is quite ordinary and does not in any way violate standard rules and regulations, unless of course the same is done to the extent of causing drunkenness. Being not a drinker as he was, the deceased could not be expected to know the different tastes of wines. That what he drank contained oil of wintergreen made no difference to him because as stated, he was not a drinker and could not have distinguished the taste of the kind of wine, so much so, that when his companions tasted the wine later, and told him that it contained oil of wintergreen, he even bragged that it was stateside, an act which projected his innocence. And even if he drank after he was told that the bottle contained oil of wintergreen, still the same could not constitute notorious negligence on his part, because there was no showing that he admitted knowledge that the contents of the bottle was oil of wintergreen, nor was there a warning made by his companions that drinking the same could be fatal to him. To constitute notorious negligence, it must be shown that the act of the deceased entirely wants in care as to raise a presumption that he was conscious of the probable consequences of his carelessness and indifferent to the danger of injury to himself and other persons. It must be equivalent to the doing of an intentional wrong. Certainly, this Commission cannot consider the attitude of the deceased in the case at bar to constitute notorious negligence, because he was not aware of the probable consequences of his act, nor was it shown that there was an intent on his part to end his life. If at all, his attitude simply constitutes simple negligence, which is well within the compensatory coverage of 3 the Act.

On the matter of notorious negligence, this Court in the case of Paez v. WCC, et al, L-1 8438, March 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 588, 594, said: It is finally contended that the respondent WCC erred in not finding that the accident was caused through the notorious negligence of the deceased (Sec. 4 of Act No. 3428) ...That defense should be proven by the party invoking it. Notorious negligence is something more than mere or simple negligence, or contributory negligence; it signifies a deliberate act of the employee to disregard his own personal safety. In the case at bar, there is no showing at all that deceased Barawid had deliberately disregarded his safety; no intention was attributed to him to end his life or that he wantonly courted death. The deceased wanted to return home as it was getting late, and even helped in the loading and unloading of the palay to the banca and truck, to finish the work that day. It is claimed that the deceased wanted to return home, because he was to drive the new truck of his brother-in-law, and he was in such a hurry that he unheeded the suggestion of his companion not to embark anymore, as it was dark and the banca was fully loaded. Conceding this to be true, for the purpose of argument, (Barawid can no longer contradict it, his lips having been sealed by death), still the disregard of the warning cannot be considered as notorious negligence. Disobedience to rules, orders and/or prohibition does not in itself constitute notorious negligence, if no intention can be attributed to the injured to end his life. And if in the case at bar, there was any negligence at all, the case cannot be considered notorious or evidence. The deceased did not act with the full knowledge of the existence of a danger that ordinary prudence would counsel him to avoid such a case ... The above doctrine is clearly applicable to the instant case. In A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc. v. WCC, et al, No. L-20219, September 28, 1964, 12 SCRA 27, 30, the Supreme Court set down the conditions for compensability of death claims, as follows: Considering the philosophy behind the requirement that to be compensable the death must occur while the worker is performing some work in the course of his employment, the authorities are to the effect that to come within the purview of such requirement, three things must concur: the injury must be received during the period covered by the employment; the worker must be shown to have been injured at the time and place where the performance of his work requires him to be; and the worker must have been doing something in pursuance of his work. In the instant case, We hold and rule that the above conditions have been established and met.
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Indeed, acts reasonably necessary to health and comfort of an employee while at work, such as satisfaction of his thirst, hunger, or other physical demands. or protecting himself from excessive cold, are incidental to the employment and injuries sustained in the performance of such acts are compensable as arising out of and in the course of the employment (58 Am. Jur., sec. 236, p. 742, citing numerous cases). And further reviewing the decision appealed from in the light of the rule emphasized in Cuyno, Jr. vs. WCC, et al.,No. L-44271, September 22, 1977, 79 SCRA 100, 106, declaring that when an employee dies in line of duty, or when actually at work as in this case, his death is presumed to be serviceconnected and is compensable and that when doubts on the cause and/or aggravating factors of illness of the claimant arise, they must be resolved in favor of the claimant and his heirs, the affirmance of the respondent Commission's judgment is clearly inevitable and justifiable. The law presumes that a claim is compensable, absent substantial evidence to the contrary. So this Court has consistently and resolutely adhered to the doctrine that even where the cause of death is unknown, the right to compensation subsists, the underlying philosophy being that the Workmen's Compensation Act is a social loesiation formulated in obeisance to the social justice guarantee of the Constitution, its raison d'etre being to alleviate and ameliorate the plight of the workingman, and thus uplift the quality of life of the laboring class. And so, it has been reiterated in a long chain of workmen's compensation cases elevated to and resolved by this Court that the Workmen's Compensation Law should be construed fairly, reasonably and liberally in favor of and for the benefit of employees and their dependents and an doubts as to the right of compensation as well as all presumptions resolved in their favor. WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision under review is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

1) to pay the petitioner the sum of P12,000.00 as death benefits; 2) to reimburse petitioner medical, surginal and hospital expenses duly supported by proper receipts; 3) to pay petitioner the sum of P700.00 as funeral expenses; and 4) to pay the petitioner attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the death benefits. On June 5, 1980, respondent GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration based on the following grounds: I As the ailment of the deceased is not a listed occupational disease, proof should have been shown that the cause of the ailment was the working conditions. This Honorable Court only found a case of aggravation which is different from proof of increased risk of contracting the ailment. II. Assuming that the ailment is compensable under the new law, the benefits awarded to petitioner are not in accordance with said law. III. The grant of attorney's fees in the sum equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the death benefits is not proper. On June 14, 1980, respondent ECC likewise filed a motion for reconsideration based essentially on the same grounds, to wit: I. The illness of rectal malignancy which caused the death of Fortunato S. Cristobal is not compensable under the theory of increased risk as provided in PD 626, as amended. II. The amounts awarded as death benefits, funeral expenses and attorney's fees are not in accordance with law. III. The cause of death not being a compensable illness, the order for reimbursement of medical, surgical and hospital expenses has no basis. WE cannot sustain respondents' views. The main issue raised by respondents as to whether or not the illness of the deceased, rectal cancer, is compensable, actually boils down to the question of sufficiency of evidence. Respondents took note of the following evidence submitted by petitioner: a) The affidavit of Angel Peres, a co-employee to the deceased, to this effect I know personally Fortunato Cristobal because he was my Supervisor in the Bureau of Printing:

G.R. No. L-49280 February 26, 1981 LUZ G. CRISTOBAL, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (National Science Development Board), respondents. MAKASIAR, J.: On April 30, 1980, We rendered a decision in this case finding that petitioner Luz G. Cristobal, widow of the deceased Fortunato Cristobal, has shown by clear and convincing evidence that her husband contracted rectal cancer or at least the risk of contracting the same had been increased by the conditions under which he was working and accordingly ordered respondent G SI S: 212

During the employment to Fortunato Cristobal at the Bureau of Printing; he contracted sickness which was later diagnosed as anorectal cancer which caused his death; Fortunato Cristobal continued working at the aforementioned Bureau of Printing even when he was already suffering from a rectal illness and he had been complaining to me that said illness became more painful whenever he performs his job in the Bureau; I also noticed that he oftentimes eat food in the Bureau without washing his hands; The place where Fortunato Cristobal was assigned in the Bureau of Printing is very hygienic and polluted with chemicals and he oftentimes complain to me that the odor of the chemicals make him feel dizzy always. Fortunato Cristobal always handled chemicals in the Bureau of Printing while in the performance of his duties ( Annex C, Petition). b) The medical certificate issued by Dr. Rufo A. Guzman stating that "the illness may be aggravated by the unhygienic conditions in the Bureau of Printing where he works. handling of chemicals for printing. eating without proper washing of hands, tension due to the pressure of work, plus neglected personal necessity which may be attributed to the inadequate facilities in the Bureau of Printing [Annex D, Petition]. As correctly observed by the respondents herein, these evidence were considered in the light of the foregoing facts: 1. The deceased entered the government service in 1964 free from any kind of disease; 2. He was assigned to the printing department of the NSDB as supervising information officer where he was exposed to various chemicals and intense heat. 3. The deceased's ailment supervened in the course of his employment with said agency. Respondents however refuse to appreciate these facts in relation to other equally compelling considerations. The deceased died of rectal cancer on May 27, 1977. Concededly, the exact cause or etiology of this disease is still unknown. Even respondent ECC's own medical officer, Dr. Mercia C. Abrenica, certified that "the cause of rectal carzinoma as of any other malignancies is still unknown" (p. 9, ECC rec.). Its cause and development are insidious, imperceptible to the naked eye, and defies expert analysis. Therefore, whether or not the disease rectal cancer was caused or the risk of contracting the same was increased by the decedent's working conditions remains uncertain. This uncertainty, of course, cannot eliminate the probability that the ailment was work connected as it had been established that the deceased was exposed to unhygienic "Forking conditions, various chemicals and 213

intense heat which are generally considered as predisposing factors of cancer. At this point, there is need to reiterate that when the deceased started working in 1964, he was free from any kind of disease. In ruling on the claim, this Court also applied the theory of increased risk under Section 1(b) Rule Ill of PD 626 which states that: For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex 'A' of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions (emphasis supplied), aside from the possibility that the disease might have been contracted even prior to the effectivity of the new Labor Code. To establish compensability of the claim under the said theory, the claimant must show proof of work-connection. Impliedly, the degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence, which means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion" (Ang Tibay vs. The Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union, Inc., 69 Phil. 635) or clear and convincing evidence. In this connection, it must be pointed out that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation. Respondents however insist on evidence which would establish direct causal relation between the disease rectal cancer and the employment of the deceased. Such a strict requirement which even medical experts in the field cannot support considering the uncertainty of the nature of the disease would negate the principle of liberality in the matter of evidence. Apparently, what the law merely requires is a reasonable workconnection and not a direct causal relation. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the new Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor. " In urging that the disease rectal cancer is not compensable since its nature or cause is unknown and petitioner was not able to show proof of direct causal relation, respondents would instruct us to ignore the above provision of law and the policy of the State of giving maximum aid and protection to labor as We have stated earlier in the main decision. As the agents charged by the law to implement the social justice guarantee secured by both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more liberal attitude in deciding claims for compensation especially when there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection. This should not be confused with the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. While these doctrines may have been abandoned under the new Labor Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is significant that the liberality of the law, in general, still subsists. All these factual and legal grounds' were considered in relation to each other constituting substantial evidence clearly convincing Us to resolve that rectal cancer is compensable. With respect to the award of death benefits in the amount of P12,000.00, respondents argue that the same is not in consonance with Articles 193 (a) and 191(a) of the Labor Code, as amended by PD 891, which provide as follows: Art. 193. Death (a) Under such regulations as the Com mission may approve the System shall pay to the primary beneficiaries upon the death of the covered employee under this Title a monthly income benefit equivalent to the monthly income for permanent total disability plus ten percent of the basic benefit for each dependent child but not exceeding five, beginning with the youngest and without substitution: Provided, That the monthly income benefit shall not be paid for more

than five years, but the portion corresponding to the monthly income benefit for permanent total disability shall be guaranteed for five years: Provided, however, That total payments shag in no case exceed twelve thousand pesos; Provided, further, that if he has no primary beneficiary, the System shall pay to his secondary beneficiaries a lump sum benefit equivalent to the lesser or thirty-five times the monthly income benefit for permanent total disability and six thousand pesos. Art. 191 (a) Under such regulations as the Commission may approve, any employee under this Title who contracts sickness or sustains an injury resulting in permanent total disability shall, for each month until his death but not exceeding five years, be paid by the System during such disability an income benefit equivalent to one hundred fifteen percent of the basic benefit which shall be computed as follows: Forty-five percent of the first three hundred pesos of average monthly salary credit or fraction thereof, plus Twenty-five percent of the next three hundred pesos of average, monthly salary credit for each month or fraction thereof; plus Nine percent of each succeeding one hundred pesos of average monthly salary credit or fraction thereof; plus One-tenth of one percent of the average monthly salary credit for each month of paid coverage in the System in excess of one hundred twenty months of paid coverage prior to the semester of disability: Provided, That the monthly income benefit shall not less than forty-five pesos. This argument is untenable A computation of the death benefits in accordance with the underlined procedure would disclose that the amount, awarded by this Court is well within the limitations provided therein. To illustrate: The husband of petitioner received an annual salary of P11,904.00. His average monthly salary, therefore, is P992.00. The monthly income benefit is 115% of the basic benefit which is computed as follows: 45%, of the first P300 of the P992..................................................... P125.00 25% of the next P300.................................................. 75.00 9% of each succeeding P100....................... 9.00 9% of P100..................................................... 9.00 9% of Pl00....................................................... 9.00 9% of P 92 (refraction of P100)................... 8.28 Basic Benefit.................................................................. P235.28 214

Consequently, the monthly income benefit (115 % of P235.28) would amount to P270.57. In addition, the law grants an additional 10%, of the basic benefit (P235.28) for each dependent child not exceeding 5. The deceased left, at the time of his death, 7 dependent children. Petitioner would therefore be entitled to an additional grant of P23.53 (rounded) for each child or a total of P117.65 for 5 dependent children, observing the limitation. ln summation, petitioner should be receiving a monthly income benefit of P270.57 plus P117.65 or a total of P388.22. In a year's time, this would amount to P4,658.64 and in 5 years time, the total would be P23,293.20. This Court in compliance with the proviso set forth in Article 193 (a) " that total payment shall in no case excedd twelve thousand pesos [P12,000.000]" limited its award to P12,000.00. Respondent likwise question the award of attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the death benefits. Its objection is based primarily on article 203 of the Code which provides that : No agent , attorney or other person pursuing or in charge of the preparation or filing of any claim for benefit under this title shall demand or charge for his service any fee, and any stipulation to the contrary shall be null and void. the retention or deduction of any amount from any benefit gramated under this title for the payment of fees of such services is prohibited. Violation of any provisions of this Article shall be punished by a fine of not less than five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), or imprisonment for not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year, or both, at the descretion of the court. A close examination of the aforequoted provision reveals that the intent of the law is to free the awrad from any liability or charge so that the claimaint who is exempt from liabitity for attorney's fees. The defaulting employer or governement agency remains libale for attorney's fees; because it compelled the claimant to employ the services of counsel by unjustly refusing to recognize the validity of the claim of peitioner. This actually is the rationale behind the prohibition. Nothing is wrong with the court's award of attorney's fees which is separate and distinct from the other benefits awarded. Besides, in the instant case, the participation of petitioner's counsel was not limited to the preparation or filling of the claim but in appealling petitioner's case before this Court necessitating submission of pleadings to establish his cause of action and to rebut or refute the arguments of herein respondents. Fairness dictates that the counsel should receive compensation for his services; otherwise, it would be entirely difficult for claimants, majority of whom are notlearned in the intrecacies of the law, to get good legal service. To deny counsel compensation for his professional services, would amount to deprivation of property without due process of law. Petitioner appealed to this Court in forma pauperis. Respondents are of the mistaken belief that such manner of appeal is incompatible with the award of attorney's fees. It must be pointed out that Section 22, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court merely exempts a pauper litigant from the payment of legal fees and from the filing of appeal bond, printed record and printed brief, but does not exempt him from the payment of attorney's fees. Therefore, the award of attorney's fees in the instant case is proper. With respect to the award of medical benefits, suffice it to say that Article 166 of the Labor Code provides that: Policy The State shall promote and develop a tax-exempt employees' compensation program whereby employees and their dependents in the event of work-connected disability or death may promptly secure adequate income benefit and medical or related benefits.

In line with this provision, this Court ordered the reimbursement of medical, surgical and hospital expenses duly supported by proper receipts. On the award of funeral benefits in the amount of P700.00, We find that the same should be increased to Pl,000.00 pursuant to PD 1146, Section 19 in relation to Section 45, and PD 1641, Section 6(d), which took effect on May 31, 1977. This is also consistent with this Court's award in the cases of Mitra vs. Employees' Compensation Commission (96 SCRA 284 119801); Vda. de Torbela vs. ECC (96 SCRA 260 119801); and Tuquero vs. ECC (96 SCRA 291 [19801). WHEREFORE, THE DECISION DATED APRIL 30, 1980 IS HEREBY MODIFIED TO READ AS FOLLOWS: SO ORDERED. 1) TO PAY THE PETITIONER THE SUM OF Pl2,000.00 AS DEATH BENEFITS; 2) TO REIMBURSE PETITIONER MEDICAL SURGICAL AND HOSPITAL EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER RECEIPTS; 3) TO PAY PETITIONER THE SUM OF ONE THOUSAND (Pl,000.00) PESOS AS FUNERAL EXPENSES; AND 4) TO PAY PETITIONER ATTORNEY'S FEES EQUIVALENT TO 10% OF THE DEATH BENEFITS. THUS MODIFIED, THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS AFFIRMED IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS. THE MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION ARE HEREBY DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT; AND THIS DENIAL IS FINAL AND EXECUTORY. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-48488 October 27, 1980 GLORIA D. MENEZ, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION & CULTURE), respondents. MAKASIAR, J.: In a motion dated May 27, 1980 and filed on May 28, 1980, respondent Employees' Compensation Commission thru the Solicitor General, prays that the dispositive portion of the decision be amended to direct respondent Government Service Insurance System thru its State Insurance Fund to pay directly to petitioner the disability benefits. In its comment of July 11, 1980 and filed on July 14, 1980, respondent GSIS offers no objection to the aforesaid motion of respondent Commission and prays that said comment be considered in relation to the said motion for modification. There is no need now to pass upon the other points raised by respondent GSIS as they are not present nor relevant in the case at bar. The said motion being meritorious, the dispositive portion of the decision dated April 25, 1980 is hereby accordingly amended to read as follows: WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION IS HEREBY SET ASIDE.AND THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE 215

INSURANCE SYSTEM THROUGH ITS STATE INSURANCE FUND IS HEREBY ORDERED 1) TO PAY PETITIONER THE SUM TWELVE THOUSAND [P12,000.00] PESOS AS DISABILITY INCOME BENEFITS; AND 2) TO REIMBURSE PETITIONER'S MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY RECEIPTS.

[G.R. No. L-48602. June 30, 1980.] FE N. SULIT, Petitioner, v. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Cavite Naval Shipyard Naval Shore Establishment), Respondents.

DECISION

AQUINO, J.: This is a claim for employees compensation. Gregorio S. Sulit was employed as a mechanic in the Cavite Naval Shipyard, Naval Shore Establishment, Cavite Naval Base of the Philippine Navy from May 26, 1966 up to his death on December 17, 1975 at the age of fifty three years. His duties were as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Under general supervision, inspect, repair, and overhaul gas and diesel propulsion engine, auxiliary engine, dock machineries and other mechanical equipment such as compressors, pumps, reduction gear, windlass, transmission, steering control mechanism and other allied machineries; disassemble and reassemble engine and other mechanical equipment in accordance with instruction manual. "Take data of engine parts in order to determine further serviceability and submit report to leadingman for checking; assemble and install parts repaired and adjust to conform with their prescribed clearances; assemble, reinstall and align prime mover, compressor, motor, generator and repair and service other mechanical accessories on board PN vessels and may perform other duties as directed."cralaw virtua1aw library Due to persistent backaches and bilateral lumbar pains, accompanied by fever and chills, he was confined in the Philippine General Hospital from December 11, 1975 up to his death six days later. He died of acute pyelonephritis and bronchopneumonia. Pyelonephritis is an acute pyogenic infection of the kidney. Strictures, calculi. tumors or prostatic hypertrophy cause obstruction to the flow of urine and may predispose a person to contract such a disease. It is caused by pus-producing bacteria (like the colon bacilli) which may originate from infected tonsils, carious teeth or other foci of infection in the body and which reach the kidney by way

of the bloodstream or lymphatics. (The Merck Manual, 8th ed., p. 563.) On the other hand, bronchopneumonia is an infection of the bronchi and lung tissue and is usually a complication of a debilitating disease. (See Annex A.) Fe N. Sulit, the widow of the deceased mechanic, filed a claim for employees compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626. She contended that her husbands work was postural in nature and time consuming and that his repairing of a motor vehicle while in a prone position under it for long perspiring hours daily in the span of his working career produced a kinking of his ureters, thereby causing a constant and progressive stagnancy of urine flow which led to infection in the urinary tract and stone formation therein. The Government Service Insurance System and the Employees Compensation Commission rejected the claim because pyelonephritis and bronchopneumonia are not occupational diseases since they do not usually and directly result from the occupation or profession of the worker. Furthermore, the risks of contracting such diseases were not increased by the working conditions concomitant with the decedents employment. The Commission pointed out that aggravation of the disease due to the work of the employee is no longer a legal basis for granting compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626, (See Annexes A, B and D.) Mrs. Sulit appealed to this Court. She contends that she was denied due process because she was not accorded an opportunity to be heard. That gripe is baseless. The filing with the GSIS of a claim for income benefits is in its inception not an adversary proceeding. The claim is filed on a prescribed form. The claimant may present with the claim supporting papers or proof that the disability or death was work-connected or that the risk of contracting the disease involved in the claim was increased by the working conditions. The claim is processed by the GSIS. No formal hearing is required in the processing of the claim. If after processing, the GSIS finds, as in this case, that on its face the claim has no basis, then it is rejected outright. The claim becomes controversial when the claimant appeals to the Employees Compensation Commission, or when an aggrieved party appeals from the Commission to this Court (Arts. 180 and 181, Labor Code; Secs. 3 to 5, Rule XVII and sec. 1, Rule XVIII, Amended Rules on Employees Compensation). Mrs. Sulit was given all the opportunity in the GSIS and in the Commission to prove that her husbands death was work-connected. She was not able to do so. We hold that the GSIS and the Commission did not err in denying her claim. Pyelonephritis was not caused by her husbands work as a mechanic. The contracting of such a disease was not increased by the working conditions of his job. Hence, that disease is not compensable in this case. The same observations apply to bronchopneumonia. Claimants other contention that the decisions of the GSIS and the Commission are not in conformity with the law and established jurisprudence is palpably unmeritorious. Mrs. Sulit has in mind the rulings under the old law, Act No. 3428. She has overlooked that her claim is being decided under the Labor Code, the employees compensation provisions of which are different from those of the old law. Article 166 of the Labor Code provides that "the State shall promote and develop a tax-exempt employees compensation program whereby em ployees and their dependents, in the event of work216

connected disability or death, may promptly secure adequate income benefit, and medical or related benefits."cralaw virtua1aw library A compensable sickness "means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Employees Compensation Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is empowered to determine and approve occupational diseases and workrelated illnesses that may be considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment." (Art. 167[1], as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1368, effective May 1, 1978.) Originally, Act No. 3428 restricted compensation to an injury sustained by the employee in the course of his employment or to an illness caused by his employment or resulting from the nature thereof, as shown in the following provisions:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "SEC. 2. Grounds for compensation. When any employee receives a personal injury from any accident due to and in the pursuance of the employment, or contracts any illness directly caused by such employment or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified."cralaw virtua1aw library The original law did not contain any presumption of compensability. Act No. 3812 amended section 2 by substituting the phrase "arising out of and in the course" for the phrase "due to and in the pursuance of." Section 2 was clarified by the New Civil Code in the following provisions. "ART. 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation for the death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employees, even though the event may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the death or personal injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The employer is also liable for compensation if the employee contracts any illness or disease caused by such employment or as the result of the nature of employment. If the mishap was due to the employees own notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not be liable for compensation. When the employees lack of due care contributed to his death or injury, the compensation shall be equitably reduced."cralaw virtua1aw library Republic Act No. 772, which took effect on June 20, 1952, amended section 2 of Act No. 3812, by (1) specifying tuberculosis as a compensable disease, (2) adopting the rule that aggravation of the disease by the nature of the employment is compensable and (3) abolishing the fellow-servant rule which was already abrogated by article 1712 of the Civil Code. As thus, amended section 2 reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "SEC. 2. Grounds for compensation. When an employee suffers personal injury from any accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, or contracts tuberculosis or other illness directly caused by such employment, or either aggravated by or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified. The right to compensation as provided in this Act shall not be defeated or impaired on the ground that the death, injury or disease was due to the negligence of a fellow servant or employee, without prejudice to the right of the employer to proceed against the negligent party."cralaw virtua1aw library Furthermore, Republic Act No. 772 introduced the presumption of compensability by providing in section 43 that "in any proceeding for the enforcement of the claim for compensation under this Act, it shall be presumed in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary 1. that the claim comes within the provisions of this Act; 2. that sufficient notice thereof was given; 3. that the injury was not occasioned by the willful intention of the injured employee to bring about the injury or death of himself or of another; 4. that the injury did not result solely from the intoxication of the injured employee while

on duty; and 5. that the contents of verified medical and surgical reports introduced in evidence by claimants for compensation are correct."cralaw virtua1aw library Those radical innovations, the presumption of compensability and the rule on aggravation of illness, which favor the employee, paved the way for the latitudinarian or expansive application of the Workmens Compensation Law in favor of the em ployee or worker. It now appears that after the government had experimented for more than twenty years with such employee-oriented application of the law, the lawmaker found the result to be unsatisfactory because it destroyed the parity or balance between the competing interests of employer and employee with respect to workmens compensation. The balance was tilted unduly in favor of the workmen. Hence, to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employers obligation to pay workmens compensation and the employees right to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability, the old law was jettisoned and in its place we have the employees compensation and state insurance fund in the Labor Code, as amended. As correctly observed by the learned Government Corporate Counsel, Manuel M. Lazaro, the Labor Code abolished the presumption of compensability and the rule on aggravation of illness caused by the nature of the employment. This Court is powerless to apply those rules under the Labor Code (Resolution of March 8, 1978 in L-47008, Ibaez v. Workmens Compensation Commission). WHEREFORE, the appeal is dismissed and the decisions of the GSIS and the Employees Compensation Commission, denying the claim, are affirmed. No costs. SO ORDERED

G.R. No. L-49280 April 30, 1980 LUZ G. CRISTOBAL, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (National Science Development Board); respondents. Luz G. Cristobal in her own behalf. Manuel M. Lazaro for respondent GSIS. Office of the Solicitor General for respondent ECC.

MAKASIAR, J.: Petition for review on certiorari of the June 21, 1978 decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission filed by petitioner in forma pauperis. The deceased, Fortunato S. Cristobal was employed as Supervising Information Officer 11 of the National Science Development Board (NSDB for short) based in Bicutan, Taguig, Rizal. His original appointment was dated February 26, 1964 (p. 16, ECC rec.). On April 8, 1976, he developed loose bowel movement which later worsened and his excrement was marked with fresh blood. Selfadministered medications were made but symptoms persisted until April 22, 1976 when he was brought to the Hospital of Infant Jesus and was there treated by Dr. Willie Lagdameo, who diagnosed his illness as rectal malignancy. On May 28, 1976, he was discharged with improved conditions but just one year thereafter, he was again confined at the UST Hospital for the same ailment. A second operation became necessary because of the recurrence of malignancy in the pelvis. Despite earnest medical efforts, he succumbed to his illness on May 27, 1977 (p. 6, rec.). The petitioner herein, as the decedent's widow and beneficiary, filed with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS for short), a claim for income (death) benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. The said claim was denied by the GSIS and in a subsequent request for reconsideration, the System reiterated its decision stating that Under the present law on compensation, the listed occupational diseases are compensable when the conditions set therein are satisfied. It also allows certain diseases to be compensable whenever the claimant is able to prove that the risks of contracting such diseases were increased by the working conditions attendant to the deceased's employment. This is provided under Sec. l (b) Rule III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 626 which took effect on January 1, 1975. As far as the degree of proof is concerned, the claimant must be able to show at least by substantial evidence that the development of the ailment was brought largely by the working conditions present in the nature of employment. In the case of your husband, it will be noted that the ailment which resulted in his death on May 27, 1977 was Rectal Malignancy. This ailment, not being fisted as an occupational disease, therefore, required such degree of proof as mentioned above. On the basis, however, of the papers and evidence on record which you have submitted, it appears that you 217

have not established that the deceased's employment has any direct causal relationship with the contraction of the ailment. While it is admitted that the aforementioned ailment supervened in the course of the deceased's employment as Supervising Information Officer II in the National Science Development Board, Bicutan, Taguig, Rizal, there has not been any showing that the same directly arose therefrom or resulted from the nature thereof (GSIS letter dated February 20, 1978 denying the request of petitioner for reconsideration). The petitioner appealed to the ECC, which affirmed the decision of the GSIS.

petitioner to substantiate her claim. In denying the claim, it merely relied on the fact that the certification issued by the physician of the deceased failed to indicate the actual causes or factors which led to the decedent's rectal malignancy. This Court, however, is of the opinion that the affidavit of Angel Peres substantiated by the medical certificate issued by Dr. Rufo A. Guzman (in relation to the medical findings of Dr. Willie Lagdameo of the Hospital of Infant Jesus [p. 17, ECC rec.] and Dr. Mercia C. Abrenica, its own medical officer [p. 9, ECC rec.]) sufficiently establish proof that the risk of contracting the disease is increased, if not caused, by the working conditions prevailing in the respondent's (NSDB) premises. In the case of Eliseo vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission (84 SCRA 188), this Court held:

Hence, this petition. In resolving the issue of compensability, the respondents herein failed to consider these outstanding facts patent from the records. The deceased, as Supervising Officer II of the NSDB, was actually assigned to the Printing Department of the said agency where he was exposed to various chemicals and intense heat. This fact was corroborated by the affidavit of one Angel Peres, a co-employee of the deceased, to the effect that I know personally Fortunato Cristobal because he was my Supervisor in the Bureau of Printing; During the employment of Fortunato Cristobal at the Bureau of Printing, he contracted sickness which was later diagnosed as anorectal cancer which caused his death; Fortunato Cristobal continued working at the aforementioned Bureau of Printing even when he was already suffering from a rectal illness and he had been complaining to me that said illness became more painful whenever he performs his job in the Bureau; I also noticed that he oftentimes eat food in the Bureau without washing his hands; The place where Fortunato Cristobal was assigned in the Bureau of Printing is very unhygienic and polluted with chemicals and he oftentimes complain to me that the odor of the chemicals make him feel dizzy always; Fortunato Cristobal always handle chemicals in the Bureau of Printing while in the performance of his duties (Annex C, Petition). These statements find relevance in the medical certificate issued by Dr. Rufo A. Guzman stating that "the illness may be aggravated by the unhygienic conditions in the Bureau of Printing where he works. Handling of chemicals for printing, eating without proper washing of hands, tension due to the pressure of work, plus neglected personal necessity which may be attributed to the inadequate facilities in the Bureau of Printing" (Annex D, Petition). Undisputed is the fact that the deceased entered the government free from any kind of disease. Likewise, it is admitted that the deceased husband's ailment supervened in the course of his employment with the NSDB. The ECC, however, failed to appreciate the evidence submitted by the 218 We cannot agree with the private respondent that the claim of the petitioner is without any factual or legal basis nor with the respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission that there is no evidence substantial enough to show that this leukemia which caused the death of Isabel Eliseo has a causal relation to the nature of her work with the respondent G & S Manufacturing Corp. It may be true that the job of a reviser or quality controller, which was the work of claimant Isabel Eliseo, does not entail physical exertion. It may also be true that all that is required is alertness of the eye to see and detect any defect or flaw in a garment being and to point out those defects for correction or repair before a garment can pass for distribution and use. However, it must be admitted that the nature of the work of the claimant required her to deal with textiles or fabrics which involved chemicals of various kinds and composition and this exposure of the deceased to these chemicals in private respondent's establishment probably led to the development of the disease of leukemia or at least aggravated the illness of the claimant from which she died as a result. In Laron vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al., 73 SCRA 84, We held that in testing the evidence or the relation between the injury or disease and the employment, probability and not certainty, is the touchstone, reiterated inNational Housing Corp. vs. WCC, 79 SCRA 281. Section l(b), Rule III of the Implementing Rules and regulations of P.D. 626 provides For sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease fisted under Annex 'A' of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied- otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. This Court is convinced that the petitioner, by clear and convincing evidence, has adequately satisfied the second part of the aforequoted provision, following the theory of increased risk as laid down in the case of Amparo vs. GSIS, ECC Case No. 0046 (August 18, 1976) and reiterated in Corales vs. ECC, 84 SCRA 762 (August 25,1978). Furthermore, in the case of Sepulveda vs. Employees'Compensation Commission (84 SCRA 771 [August 25, 1978]), this Court stated that ... the respondent Commission, under Resolution No. 223 dated March 16, 1977, adopted, as a policy, the institution of a more compassionate interpretation of the restrictive provisions of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, by its administering agencies, the Social Security System and the Government Service

Insurance System, with respect to, among others, Myocardial Infarction and other borderline cases. ... In the instant case, it is evident that rectal cancer is one of those borderline cases. Like, it is clear that the purpose of the resolution is to extend the applicability of the provisions of P.D. 626, thereby affording a greater number of employees the opportunity to avail of the benefits under the law. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State, as mandated by the Constitution and embodied in the New Labor Code, to give maximum aid and protection to labor. The Employees' Compensation Commission, like the defunct Court of Industrial Relations and the Workmen's Compensation Commission, is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to the constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man, more specially, the social justice guarantee; for otherwise, these guarantees would be merely "a lot of meaningless patter." (Santos vs. WCC, 75 SCRA 371 [1977]).] As pointed out by no less than the respondent ECC itself in its Comment dated January 5, 1978 It may not be amiss to mention that the ECC has time and again expanded the list of occupational diseases. This comes about after continuing studies made by the ECC. Indeed, cancer has already been included as a qualified occupational disease in certain cases

ming vessels; nasal cavity and sinuses 16. Cancer of the lungs, liver and brain

employees in pulp and paper mills and plywood mills Vinyl chloride workers, plastic workers

Worth noting is the fact that the above types of cancer have no known etiology. Yet, they are regarded as occupational. The clear implication is that the law merely requires a reasonable work connection (pp. 59-60, rec., Empahasis supplied). From the foregoing statements, it is palpable that the respondent ECC recognizes, as it is duty bound to, the policy of the State to afford maximum aid and protection to labor. Therefore, to require the petitioner to show the actual causes or factors which led to the decendent's rectal malignancy would not be consistent with this liberal interpretation. It is of universal acceptance that practically all kinds of cancer belong to the class of clinical diseases whose exact etiology, cause or origin, is unknown. It is in this regard that the evidence submitted by the petitioner deserves serious consideration. As persuasively pointed out by the petitioner in her memorandum addressed to this Court dated April 6, 1979 xxx xxx xxx

Occupational Disease 1. Cancer of the epithelial lining of the bladder (Papilloma of the bladder)

Nature of Employment Work involving exposure to alphnaphtylamine, betanapthylamine or benzidine or any part of the salts; and auramine or magenta

The respondent GSIS said, 'It is unfortunate that despite the relatively fast pace in the march of progress, science to this day has not given us the cause of cancer' (p. 11, GSIS Comment). Hence medical scientists are still venturing into the unknown, so to speak. ... xxx xxx xxx Evidently, GSIS has trodden the grounds on an unsure foot. It would seem to insinuate that petitioner must blame science for having not yet discovered the actual cause of her husband's fatal illness. Why is it then that petitioner must be required to prove causation-that her husband's cancer was caused by his employment - if science itself is ignorant of the cause of cancer?... WE give due consideration to the respondent's application of P.D. 626 in ruling on the claim since petitioner's husband died on May 27, 1977, after the effectivity of the provisions of the New Labor Code on Employees' Compensation. Moreover, medical records did not disclose the date when the deceased employee actually contracted the disease, rectal malignancy having been discovered only on April 22, 1976 when the deceased sought hospital confinement. From the above discussion, it is undeniable that the petitioner is entitled to her claim.

2. Cancer epithellomatoma or ulceration of the skin of the corneal surface of the eye due to tar, pitch, bitumen, mineral oil or paraffin or any compound product or residue of any of these substances xxx 7. Cancer of the stomach and other lymphatic and blood for-

The use or handling of, ex posure to tar, pitch, bitumen, mineral oil (include paraffin) soot or any compound product or residue of any of these substances

xxx Woodworkers; wood products industry carpenters, loggers and 219

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF RESPONDENT EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE RESPONDENT GSIS IS HEREBY DIRECTED 1. TO PAY THE PETITIONER THE SUM OF TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS AS DEATH BENEFITS; 2. TO REIMBURSE PETITIONER MEDICAL, SURGICAL AND HOSPITAL EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER RECEIPTS; 3. TO PAY PETITIONER THE SUM OF SEVEN HUNDRED (P700.00) PESOS AS FUNERAL EXPENSES; AND 4. TO PAY THE PETITIONER ATTORNEY'S FEES EQUIVALENT TO TEN (10%) PERCENT OF THE DEATH BENEFITS SO ORDERED.

one (31) years, more or less. His retirement was brought about by ailments diagnosed as high blood pressure and rheumatoid arthritis, both knees. 2 The petitioner applied for compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626 to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in 1976. In a letter dated March 8, 1976, the Senior Assistant General Manager, Domingo N. Garcia, of the GSIS denied the claim on the ground that the ailments of hypertension and rheumatic infection, both knees, are not occupational diseases and that the working conditions of the petitioner's employment could not have directly caused such ailments. 3 The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner was denied by the Senior Assistant General Manager of the Government Service Insurance System in a letter dated May 17, 1976. 4 The petitioner appealed to the Employee's Compensation Commission which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System denying the claim. It is a fact that part of the duties of the petitioner was to make monthly visits to various schools which are not accessible by road. To reach these mountainous schools, the petitioner had to hike through muddy ricefields and climb slippery mountains during sunny and rainy days. During these monthly visits, the petitioner fell down many times because of the slippery paths in the ricefields and trails in the mountains. The ailments of hypertension and rheumatoid arthritis, both knees, must have been caused by the exposure to the elements of the petitioner and his falling down many times while hiking in muddy ricefields and on slippery mountain trails under all kinds of weather conditions on his way to the barrio schools not accessible by road. There is sufficient substantial evidence of record to show that the ailments of the petitioner were caused by the duties of his employment and that the risk of contracting said ailments was increased by the working conditions. He is entitled to permanent total disability compensation. The record also discloses that the petitioner received medical treatment. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employee's Compensation Commission sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside and the Government Service Insurance System is ordered: 1) To pay the petitioner the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) as disability benefit; 2) To reimburse the petitioner the medical expenses he incurred, supported by proper receipts; and 3) To pay the petitioner the amount of Six Hundred Pesos (P600.00) as attorney's fees. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-45910 April 28, 1980 ELIGIO P. MIRASOL, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEE'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Department of Education and Culture), respondents. FERNANDEZ, J.: This is a petition to review the decision of the Employee's Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 0134 entitled "Eligio Mirasol, Claimant, versus, Government Service Insurance System (Department of Education and Culture), Respondent" affirming the decision of the Government Service Insurance System denying the claim for compensation of Eligio P. Mirasol on the ground that the claimant's ailments, hypertension and rheumatic infection in both knees, are not occupational diseases arising from his employment. 1 The petitioner, Eligio P. Mirasol, while in good health, was appointed as classroom teacher on August 1, 1945 in the public school in Libmanan, Camarines Sur. In 1960, he was appointed as District Food Production Coordinator and Attendant Teacher in the same school. He became a District Revolution Coordinator and Attendant Teacher in 1972. In 1974, the petition was given additional assignment as District Vocational Coordinator. The district was composed of forty eight (48) central barrio schools, eighteen (18) of which were in the mountains which could be reached only on foot. Eight (8) schools were 30 kilometers and the nearest was 10 kilometers from the petitioner's headquarters in the town proper of Libmanan, Camarines Sur. It was the petitioner's duty to visit monthly all the district schools. On August 25, 1973, he experienced for the first time symptoms of malignant hypertension and rheumatoid arthritis. The ailments of the petitioner persisted. He was under continuous medical treatment until he retired on February 28, 1976 after having been in the government service for thirty 220

G.R. No. L-42627 February 21, 1980 EXALTACION VDA. DE TORBELA, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Bureau of Public Schools), respondents. Exaltacion Vda. de Torbela in her own behalf. Romulo P. Untalan for respondents. FERNANDEZ, J.: This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 0009 (Jose P. Torbela, Deceased) entitled "Exaltacion Vda. de Torbela, Appellant, versus, Government Service Insurance System" affirming the decision of the Government Service Insurance System which denied the claim of Exaltacion Vda. de Torbela on the ground that the death of her husband, Jose P. Torbela, Sr., is not compensable." 1 The petitioner, Exaltacion Vda. de Torbela, filed a claim for compensation dated March 20,1975 with Regional Office VII, Workmen's Compensation Unit, Iloilo City, for the death of her husband, Jose P. Torbela, Sr., who was a secondary school principal of the Bureau of Public Schools in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental when he died in a vehicular accident on March 3, 1975. The petitioner also filed an application for compensation dated April 4, 1975 with the Government Service Insurance System. The claim was denied by the Government Service Insurance System on the ground that the death of Jose P. Torbela, Sr. was not the result of an employment accident. The claimant, petitioner herein, appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System . The facts, as found by the Employees' Compensation Commission, are: Jose P. Torbela, Sr. in his lifetime, was employed as a Secondary School Principal of the Bureau of Public Schools. He died on March 3. 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock a.m. due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he was on his way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran, Negros Occidental where the school of which he was the principal is located. In his possession at the time of the accident were official papers he allegedly worked on in his residence on the eve of his death. 2 The Employees' Compensation Commission affirmed the decision denying the claim because: The appealed decision denying the instant claim for compensation is hereby affirms Under Presidential Decree No. 626 and its implementing rules, for the injury and the resulting death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following conditions: (1) the employee must have sustained the injury during his working hours; (2) the employee must have been injured at the place where his work required him to be; and (3) the employee must have been performing his official functions. The 221

evidence on record unerringly points to the fact that not even one of these conditions, which must all concur, has been satisfied. On the contrary, the evidence shows that the deceased was merely engaged in ordinary travel from home to work, during which time he was not even doing something related or incidental to his duties as secondary School Principal; that the accident occurred at a time not incompassed by his official working hours; and that the place of the accident is not where his work required him to be or so proximate thereto as to be deemed a part of his workplace, he being not on special errand for his employer at the time he met his death, his possession of official papers notwithstanding. Thus, we find that there is sufficient factual and legal bases for the GSIS conclusion at the death in question is not the result of an injury from an employment accident and, therefore, such findings should not be disturbed. 3 It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he was on his way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran. Negros Occidental where the school of which he was the principal was and that at the time of the accident he had in his possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his residence on the eve of his death. The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place of work, while he is going to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment. 4 WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission appealed from is hereby set aside and the Government Service Insurance System is ordered to pay the petitioner the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) as death benefit, the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) as funeral expenses pursuant to Section 19, P.D. No. 1146, and the sum of One Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P1,200.00) as attorney's fees. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-46200 July 30, 1979 FELIXBERTO VILLONES, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE), respondents. Alan A. Leynes for petitioner. Nicasio & Palaganas for respondent ECC. Manuel Lazaro for respondent GSIS. MAKASIAR, J.:1wph1.t This is a petition for review of the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission affirming the decision of the GSIS Medicare-Employees' Compensation, which denied the claim of herein petitioner for income benefits in connection with the death of his son, the late Rolando M. Villones. The records show that the late Rolando M. Villones was employed as a secondary school teacher in the Department of Education and Culture assigned at Dayhagan Barrio High School in Bongabon, Oriental Mindoro, from July 3,1972 up to the time of his death on September 2, 1975 with a basic salary of P347.60 per month, plus P50.00 monthly allowance. He died of pulmonary tuberculosis. On December 23, 1975, the deceased's father and herein petitioner, filed with the Government Service Insurance System, in the prescribed form, a claim for income benefits for the death of his son under the provision of Presidential Decree No. 626, attaching thereto a xerox copy of the decedent's death certificate (see pages 1 & 4 of ECC Case No. 0137). On February 4, 1976, additional documents were submitted to the GSIS consisting of: (a) a medical certificate showing that deceased Rolando M. Villones was on sick leave of absence from December 4 to 20, 1972 due to influenza; (b) a medical certificate issued by Dr. Fernando B. Viloria, Municipal Health Officer of Bongabon, Oriental Mindoro certifying that he examined Rolando M. Villones on July 19, 1972 and found him to be physically and mentally fit for employment; and (c) a certification from the principal of Bongabon (South District), Oriental Mindoro to the effect that the actual duties of the deceased as secondary school teacher "were teaching secondary school subjects specifically the following: chemistry, science, history, and English. He also led students in some curricular work like green revolution projects, youth civic programs, and the like. Aside from these, he also did community work like helping in the organization of puroks and barangay youth clubs" (pp. 5, 6 and 8, ECC rec.). On March 9, 1976, the GSIS Medicare-Employees' Compensation denied the claim on the ground that "the cause of your son's death, Pulmonary Tuberculosis, although listed as an occupational disease, has failed to satisfy other conditions in order to be compensable," stating further that: t.hqw For Tuberculosis and its resulting disability or death to be compensable, the employee manifesting this disease should have an occupation involving close and frequent contact with a source or sources of tuberculosis infection by reason of employment: (a) In the medical treatment or nursing of a person or persons suffering from tuberculosis, (b) As a laboratory worker, pathologist or postmortem worker, where occupation involves working with material which is a source of tuberculous infection. The nature of your son's duties as a Teacher as 222

well as the working conditions of his employment did not expose him to the source or sources of tuberculous infection aforementioned (p. 7, ECC rec.). After petitioner's request for reconsideration of the denial of his claim was denied on June 10, 1976 by the GSIS Medicare Employees' Compensation, the entire record of the case was elevated on September 2, 1976 to the Employees' Compensation Commission for review in accordance with the law and rules (pp. 12-15, ECC rec.). On February 17, 1977, the Employees' Compensation Commission (En Banc) rendered its decision affirming the earlier denial made by the GSIS Medicare-Employees' Compensation of herein petitioner's claim for income benefits, pertinent portions thereof read as follows: t.hqw Pulmonary Tuberculosis having been ruled out as an occupational disease in the occupation in which the deceased was engaged in, appellant is repudiating pulmonary tuberculosis as the cause of death. Appellant insisted that the Municipal Health Officer might have erred in indicating in the Death Certificate that his son died of Pulmonary Tuberculosis, there being no autopsy conducted. In other words, appellant would like to make it appear that hemoptysis which was the only visible sign immediately before the teacher's death, could have been due to other illness traceable to employment and not necessarily as a result of Pulmonary Tuberculosis. Be this as it may, a research has been made on the possible causes of hemoptysis. Medical studies show that blood-streaked sputum or gross bleeding coming from the respiratory tract may be caused by: (1) inflammable inflammatory causes are hose of tuberculosis, extending in severity from the smallest amount to death from rapid exsanguination. Other common causes, mild or profuse, are bronchiectasis bronchitis, lung abscess or pneumonia; (2) Neoplastic-bronchogenic carcinoma or bronchial adenoma; (3) Vascular-mitral stenosis and pulmonary infarct, are the most frequent conditions associated with pulmonary hemorrhage. Other causes are left ventricular failure arteriovenous mal-formations, etc.; (4) Traumatic such as foreign body or lung contusion; and (5) Hemorrhagic Hemorrhagic diathesis or anti-coagulant therapy. (Principles of Internal Medicines by Harrison). All of the above causes of hemoptysis are neither related in any way to the nature of the duties of the deceased as a teacher, nor to his working conditions. As correctly ruled by the GSIS, the nature and conditions of the deceased's employment could have just aggravated his physical condition. Aggravation of a pre-existing illness is, however, no longer compensable under the present Employees' Compensation Program. (pp. 17-19, ECC rec. in ECC Case No. 0137). WE find the petition meritorious. In the case before US, it is undisputed that petitioner's son, the late Rolando M. Villones, who was employed on July 3, 1972 as a secondary public school teacher in Dayhagan Barrio High School in Bongabon, Oriental Mindoro, died on September 2, 1975, which was a working day. The cause of his death, according to the municipal health officer of Bongabon, Dr. Fernando B. Viloria, was PTB, hemoptysis (p. 2, ECC rec.).

The records reveal that the deceased, prior to his employment as a teacher, was physically and mentally fit to perform his duties (p. 5, ECC rec.). While employed as such teacher, he went on sick leave from December 4 to 20, 1972 (16 days). Dr. Fernando B. Viloria, who was his attending physician, diagnosed his sickness as "influenza" (p. 6, ECC rec.). Considering, however, the limited medical facilities in municipal health centers, it is possible that what was diagnosed as influenza was actually pulmonary tuberculosis in its incipient stage, which may not be easily detected by physical examination but by extensive x-ray. In the case of Batangas Transportation Co. vs. Perez and WCC (11 SCRA 793 [19641) WE stated that: "... Tuberculosis is not an instantaneous disease, it is an imperceptible germ disease that feeds on the lungs whose presence in the body cannot be easily discerned and its incipient stage may not be readily discovered" (see also Bautista vs. WCC, L43027, January 31, 1979; Lorenzo vs. WCC, 85 SCRA 440, 441 [1978], emphasis supplied). By the very nature of tuberculosis, the deceased could not have instantly acquired such illness on September 2, 1975 and died as a result of that on the same day. And the observation of petitioner's counsel that "pulmonary tuberculosis does not belong to that category of sickness which is instantaneously fatal to its victim upon contracting thereof, but takes months, if not years, before the person afflicted dies" is realistic as it is confirmed by several compensation cases that reached this Court (p. 5, Petition for Review, p. 11, rec.). Thus, in the case of Manila Railroad Company vs. Ferrer & WCC (109 Phil. 716 [1960]). the employee was found to be afflicted with moderately advance PTB on November 19, 1953 but he was able continue working until a few months before he died of said illness on January 27, 1958, or a period of more than four (4)years from the time he contracted the disease. In Vda. de Calado vs. WCC (38 SCRA 567 [1971]), the employee was diagnosed to be suffering from advanced PTB on December 18, 1959 and died two and a half (2 1/2) years later on June 4, 1962. In Lambino vs. Del Rosario (6 SCRA 1017 [1962]), the employee was found to be afflicted with a far advanced PTB in April, 1952 but he was able to work briefly up to the time of his death, by reason of said illness, on May 7, 1953, or afterthirteen (13) months. In another case, the employee was treated for pulmonary tuberculosis from December, 1952 until he died of said illness on January 23, 1954 or thirteen (13) months later (National Development Company vs. WCC, 19 SCRA 861 [1967]). And in Manila Railroad Company vs. Vda. de Chavez (12 SCRA 142 [1964]), the employee was confined in the hospital from November 22 to December 2, 1956 for PTB, after which he was able to work briefly only to be confined again, and he died of the aforesaid illness on August 10, 1957 or nine (9) monthslater. Considering, therefore, the undisputed nature of the deceased's employment as certified by the principal of Bongabon (South District); and in addition, the fact that he had plenty of homework to do after his regular working hours such as preparing the lesson plans for the next day's classes, correcting test papers and making various school reports and in doing all these, he would usually stay up-late at night; that with a meager monthly pay of P397.60, with his parents, a sister, and two (2) brothers depending on him for support, he could barely afford to buy and eat good food; and that as such teacher, it becomes inevitable for him to be in constant contact with students and other types of people who may be afflicted with PTB, which is a highly communicable disease, it is not surprising that he should contract tuberculosis, so that from December 4 to 20, 1972, only five (5) months after he was employed as a teacher, he was forced to go on sick leave by reason of the aforestated illness. When he was able to resume work, he was again exposed to same working conditions thus aggravating his illness until he suddenly died on September 2, 1975 of sever hemoptysis due to PTB as certified by Dr. Fernando B. Viloria. It has been clearly shown that the deceased did not only engage in teaching such academic subjects as chemistry, science, history and English but he was also assigned to such co-curricular courses like green revolution projects, youth civic action programs (YCAP), and in such other community works as helping organize purok and barangayyouth clubs.

And as noted in the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission, one of the causes of hemoptysis a condition which includes both blood-streaked sputum or gross bleeding coming from the respiratory tract is tuberculosis, extending in severity from the smallest amount to death from rapid exsanguination (pp. 17-19, ECC rec.). Likewise, in her findings submitted to the Employees' Compensation Commission, Dr. Mercia C. Abrenica, a medical officer of the Employees' Compensation Commission, stated that of the inflammatory causes of hemoptysis, tuberculosis is still the major cause, and that while PTB is the most probable diagnosis in the instant case, it can be considered occupational only when the occupation involves exposure to source or sources of tuberculosis infection (p. 10, ECC rec.). Consequently, in the instant case, the cause of action accrued as early as December 4, 1972 when the late Rolando Villones contracted his illness and continued to run until September 2, 1975 when he died by reason thereof; hence, the cause of action accrued before the effectivity of the New Labor Code. And WE ruled in Corales vs. ECC, et al. (L-44063, February 27, 1979) that the governing law in the prosecution of the cause of action which accrued prior to the effectivity of a new law on the same subject matter, shall be the law in force at the time of the accrual of said cause of action. Since the Workmen's Compensation Act was then in full force and effect, then it should govern in the case at bar. It is based on the principle that t.hqw Rights accrued and vested while a statute was in force ordinarily survive its repeal. The repeal of a statute does not operate to impair or otherwise affect rights which have been vested or accrued while the statute was in force. This rule is applicable alike to rights acquired under contracts and to rights of action to recover damages for torts. Where a new statute continues in force provisions of an old statute, although in form it repeals then at the moment of its passage, a right of action created by the old statute is not thereby destroyed ... (82 CJS 1010). It must be pointed out that as early as December 4 to 20, 1972, the deceased Villones was already entitled to disability benefits under Section 14 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, because his illness prevented him from reporting to his work for more than three (3) days; and under such a situation, his employer (Department of Education and Culture) was obligated under Section 37 of the same Act to file a notice of illness with the Workmen's Compensation Commission and to manifest its intention of whether or not to controvert his right to compensation. There is no showing that respondent employer has complied with its duty under Sections 37 and 45 of the Workmen, s Compensation Act, as amended, of filing with the Workmen's Compensation Commission a notice of the initial illness of its employee, Rolando Villones, as well as his subsequent death on September 2, 1975, and of controverting the right to compensation within the prescribed period of fourteen (14) days from the occurrence of the disability or death, or within ten (10) days from knowledge thereof. It cannot be denied that respondent employer had knowledge of the illness of the deceased Villones because he applied for sick leave from December 4 to 20, 1972 which presumably was acted upon by his principal and/or supervisor, they being his immediate superiors (Gallemit vs. Republic, 75 SCRA 382, 383, 385, 386 [1977]). Likewise, respondent employer had knowledge of the subsequent death of Rolando Villones on September 2, 1975 because he died on a regular working day; hence, the fact of death could not have escaped the notice or knowledge of the principal and/or supervisor. Such knowledge of the illness and death of Rolando Villones by the principal and/or supervisor, being agents of the respondent employer, is deemed in law as knowledge of the respondent employer, which is sufficient to charge it with its duty under Sections 37 and 45 of the Workmen's Compensation 223

Act, as amended (Gallemit vs. Republic, supra; MRR vs. WCC, 10 SCRA 665 [1961]). WE have repeatedly ruled that failure to comply with said sections constitutes a renunciation of the employer's right to controvert the claim, resulting in the waiver of all its non-jurisdictional defenses, such as the non-compensability of the claim (Paraiso vs. Castelo-Sotto, 85 SCRA 419 [1978]; Republic vs. WCC, 85 SCRA 107 [1978]; Lamco vs. WCC, 84 SCRA 401 [1978]; and Canonero vs. WCC, 81 SCRA 712 [1978]). Moreover, this Court, in consistently holding that the disease of tuberculosis is an occupational disease or work connected in such occupations as that of a teacher, laborer, driver, land inspector and such other occupations, hence compensable, aptly stated and WE quote: "Medical science has it that tuberculosis as an ailment is latent in man regardless of his age, sex and occupation. When given favorable conditions, this disease becomes active and prominent. Some of these favorable conditions are: too much physical exertion without the corresponding rest; exposure to excessive heat and cold; lack of good food as to weaken the body constituents and contact with people suffering from tuberculosis ..." (Corales vs. ECC, supra). It is heartening to note that the ECC, in its Resolutions Nos. 233 and 432, respectively dated March 16, 1977 and July 20, 1977, adopted a more compassionate construction of the otherwise restrictive provisions of the new Labor Code (PD No. 442, as amended by PD Nos. 570-A, 626, 643, 823, 849, 850, 865-A, 891, 928, 1389) by including in the list of compensable ailments and diseases, cardiovascular disease which comprehends myocardial infarction, pneumonia and bronchial asthma (Sepulveda vs. ECC, et al., L-46290, Aug. 25, 1978). Finally, the grant of compensation benefits to herein petitioner will not be impaired even if he (petitioner himself entertains doubts as to the real cause of the death of his son when he stated that no autopsy was made nor was there anybody who actually examined the deceased prior to or after his death. At any rate, as aforestate, pulmonary tuberculosis is concededly one of the causes of hemoptysis. Even unexplained deaths, the occasion and circumstances of which are unknown or undertermined, are usually deemed compensable, as long as there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection, a casual relation between the death and the employment (Mulingtapang vs. WCC, 80 SCRA 610 [1977]; Castro vs. WCC, 75 SCRA 179 [1977]; ITEMCOP vs. Florzo, 16 SCRA 2104 [1966]). And, in case of doubt in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, the same shall be resolved in favor of the laborer (Art. 4, PD No. 442, as amended; Art. 1702, New Civil Code). WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF RESPONDENT EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM IS HEREBY ORDERED 1. TO DAY HEREIN PETITIONER THE SUM OF SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00) PESOS AS DEATH BENEFITS; 2. TO REFUND PETITIONER's MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER 3. TO PAY PETITIONER BURIAL EXPENSES IN THE AMOUNT OF TWO HUNDRED (P200.00) PESOS; 4. TO PAY SIX HUNDRED (P600.00) PESOS AS ATTORNEY' FEES; AND

5. TO PAY ADMINISTRATIVE COST. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-44063 February 27, 1979 VICTORIANO F. CORALES, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,respondents. RESOLUTION MAKASIAR, J.: On August 25, 1978, We rendered a decision in this case finding that petitioner has shown by clear and convincing evidence that he contracted tuberculosis or at least the risk of contracting said disease had been increased by the conditions under which he was then working (p. 5, decision) and accordingly ordered respondent Government Service Insurance System 1. TO REIMBURSE PETITIONER HIS EXPENSES FOR MEDICAL SERVICES DULY SUPPORTED' BY PROPER RECEIPTS; 2. TO FURNISH HIM SUCH MEDICAL SERVICES AND APPLIANCES AS THE NATURE OF HIS RECOVERY MAY REQUIRE AS WELL AS REHABILITATION SERVICES TO HELP HIM BECOME PHYSICALLY INDEPENDENT AND TO DEVELOP HIS MENTAL, VOCATIONAL AND SOCIAL POTENTIAL; 3. TO PAY THE PETITIONER ATTORNEY'S FEES EQUIVALENT TO TEN PERCENT (10%) OF HIS MEDICAL EXPENSES; AND 4. TO PAY THE ADMINISTRATION COSTS. WE did not award petitioner disability petition because despite the fact that he was medically pronounced to be totally and permanently disabled, such disability did not result in wage-loss as he was able to continue working until he reached the compulsory retirement age of 65, thus: The degree of disability as certified to by Dr. Bravo, a government physician, and which is not disputed by the parties, is "Total and permanent" (Annex "A", p. 8, rollo). But the fact that petitioner-claimant was never absent from work nor went on leave of absence for at least four days and instead continued to report for work until his compulsory retirement at the age of 65, militates against his right to 224

disability compensation (Sec. 14, Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended); because the very term implies that the compensation must be for loss or diminution of salary by reason of illness incurred or aggravated due to his employment (p. 5, orig. rec.). WE sympathize with the predicament of petitionerclaimant especially because in his affidavit dated July 19, 1975, he stated that "His financial hardship prevented me (him) from hospitalization, so that I (he) hired the services of Dr. Ricardo Almario since September 1965 to date. But OUR symphaties with his sad plight will not justify a different conclusion as the same would be in effect amending the law, which WE cannot legally do. (pp. 6-7, Decision). On September 15, 1978, the Solicitor General filed for respondent Employees Compensation Commission a motion for reconsideration on the following grounds: I. TUBERCULOSIS IS NOT AN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE WITH RESPECT TO AN EMPLOYEE PERFORMING THE WORK OF A LAND INVESTIGATOR. TO PETITIONER'S EMPLOYMENT II. PETITIONER HAS NOT SHOWN BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE RISK OF CONTRACTING TUBERCULOSIS IS INCREASED BY THE WORKING CONDITIONS OF HIS EMPLOYMENT: III. THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION OF COMPENSABILITY IN FAVOR OF CLAIMANT FOR WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS UNDER THE NEW LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES: IV. PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF MEDICAL EXPENSES INCURRED FOR THE TREATMENT OF A NON-COMPENSABLE ILLNESS. Respondent Government Service Insurance System likewise filed on October 5, 1978 a motion for reconsideration upon the following grounds: I. PETITIONER'S AILMENT OF TUBERCULOSIS IS NOT COMPENSABLE UNDER THE PREVAILING LABOR CODE BECAUSE: A. TUBERCULOSIS IS NOT AN OCCUPATIONAL REFERENCE TO PETITIONERS EMPLOYMENT; DISEASE WITH

II. AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IS PROHIBITED UNDER THE PRESENT LAW. III. THE PAYMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS IS NOT PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE PRESENT LAW, WHICH OPERATES UNDER A SCHEME DIFFERENT FROM THE OLD WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW. IV. RESPONDENT GSIS IS NOT A PROPER PARTY RESPONDENT IN THESE PROCEEDINGS. Petitioner filed his reply and comment. 1. It must be impressed upon the movants that what this Court applied in this Court applied in this claim are the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended. The decision sought to be reconsidered readily shows this fact. The facts of the case call for the application of the aforesaid provisions as it is undisputed that the illness of petitioner was contracted by him as early as September, 1965 and remained uncured at the time of his retirement from the Government at the age of 65 on March 27, 1975. His March 17, 1975 chest x-ray petition disclosed broad linear densities in the right upper lung fields and ill-defined densities in the root of the lung field which are indicative of the fact that he is still suffering from PTB moderately advanced. Consequently, petitioners cause of action existed as early as September, 1965; hence, clearly before the effectivity of the New Labor Code, although it can be advanced that his cause of action transcended the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, because his illness continued even after the New Labor Code was already effective and operative. Article 294, Title III (Transitory and Final provisions) of the New Labor Code provides that all actions and claims accruing priorto the effectivity of this Code shall be determined in accordance with the laws in force at the time of their accrual and under the third Paragraph of Article 292, Title II (Prescription of Offenses and Claims), workmen's compensation claims accruing prior to the effectivity of this Code and during the period from November 1, 1974 up to December 31, 1974 shall be processed and adjudicated in accordance with the laws and rules at the time their causes of action accrued. Hence, this Court applied the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, on passing upon petitioner's claim. Furthermore, the provisions of the New Labor Code on Employees Compensation Book IV, Title II apply only to injury, sickness, disability or death accruing on or after January 1, 1975 (Art. 208). More precise is Section 1 (c) of Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, which declares that only injury or sickness that accrued on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting disability or death shall be compensable under the Rule.There is therefore no doubt that what governs petitioner's claim is the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended. In De Castro, Jr. versus Republic, etc., WE held that the fact that the teacher-claimant died during the effectivity of the New labor Code did not divest the Workmen's Compensation Commission of its jurisdiction over the claim for compensation as the death was a direct result of an illness which supervened at the time the Workmen's Compensation Act was in full force and effect (75 SCRA, pp. 373-381, L-43289, Feb. 28, 1977). Article 292 of the New Labor Code, which requires that workmen's compensation claimant accruing prior to the New Labor Code shall be filed with the appropriate regional offices of the Department of Labor not later than March 31, 1975, otherwise, they shall forever be barred, does not apply to petitioner, who filed his claim on August 4, 1975 with the GSIS; because We have repeatedly held that the prescriptive period for claims which accrued under the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, is ten (10) years, it being a right founded on statute. Petitioner's right accrued as early as September 1965 and hence is a vested right. 225

B. PETITIONER DID NOT SUCCESSFULLY DISCHARGE THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE. COMPENSABILITY OF HIS AILMENT, AS REQUIRED BY LAW; C. PRESUMPTIONS OF COMPENSABILITY NO LONGER EXIST UNDER THE PRESENT LAW; D. AGGRAVATION OF THE DISEASE BY THE EMPLOYMENT IS NO LONGER SUFFICIENT FOR COMPENSABILITY.

Rights accrued and vested while a statute was in force ordinarily survive its repeal. The repeal of a statute does not operate to impair or otherwise affect rights which have been vested or accrued while the statute was in force. This rule is applicable alike to rights acquired under contracts and to rights of action to recover damages for torts. Where a new statute continues in force provisions of an old statute, although in form it repeals them at the moment of its passage, a right of action created by the old statute is not thereby destroyed ... (82 CJS 1010). The fact that the claim was filed with the GSIS instead of with the appropriate regional office of the Department of Labor, does not militate against the claim. For the filing of a claim in an office that has no authority to act on it can be treated as having been filed with the appropriate agency as long as it is filed within the period allowed by law (Pobre vs. WCC, 77 SCRA 315-320, May 31, 1977). Section 3 of Rule I (Venue of Actions), of Book VII (Prescription petitions, Transitory and Final Provisions) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code, provides: Sec. 3. Workmen's compensation claims (a) Claims for workmen's compensation accruing prior to January 1, 1975 shall be filed with the appropriate regional offices of the Department of labor in accordance with the rules of the Workman's Compensation Commission. (b) Claims for workmen's compensation arising on or after January 1, 1975 shall be filed with the Social Security System for employees of the private sector or with the GSIS for employees of the government, as the case may be, in accordance with such rules and regulations as may be laid down by the Employees Compensation Commission. 2. Under the premeses aforestated, the first three (3) grounds of the Solicitor General and all the grounds of respondent GSIS, being based on the provisions of the New Labor Code on Employees Compensation, are without merit. Petitioner's claim having accrued Prior to the New Labor Code, the presumption of compensability, the principle of aggravation, the award of attorney's fees and the payment of administrative fees must be observed and applied. And the Employees Compensation Commission as the successor of the defunct Workmen's Compensation Commission is duty bound to observe and apply the foregoing principles in passing upon workmen's compensation. Moreover, as an agency of the State, the Employees Compensation Commission, like the defunct Court of Industrial Relations and the Workmens Compensation Commission, is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to the constitutional guarantees in favor of the workingmen, more specially the social justice guarantee; for otherwise, these guarantees would be merely a lot of meaningless patter (Santos vs. WCC, 75 SCRA 371 [1977]). It must be emphasized however, that the finding in the main decision of the connection or between petitioner's illness and the nature of his employment was based not only on the presumption of compensability but also on the evidence presented by him which WE found substantial and sufficient for the purpose. 226

3. The Solicitor General contends that petitioner is not entitled to reimbursement of medical expenses incurred for the treatment of a non-compensable illness. It must be noted that we disallowed petitioner's claim for disability compensation because of the undisputed fact that petitioner, despite his disabling illness of PTB medically was able to physically pursue his line of work the very day he reached the compulsory age of retirement 65; and therefore cannot be award disability benefits under Section 14 of the Workmen's Compensation Act , as amended, which observes the wage-loss factor as basis of the granting of disability benefits for it commands that ... No compensation shall be allowed for the first three calendar days of incapacity resulting from an injury except the benefits provided for in the preceding section; but if the incapacity extends beyond that period, compensation shall be allowed from the first day of such incapacity ... (Section 14, Act 3428, as amended). consequently, We ruled that, despite OUR finding that petitioner's illness and disability was work-connected, he is not entitled to disability benefits because his illness and/or medical disability did not result in any wage-loss or diminution of as it is undisputed from the records that he not only continued to receive the same rate of salary (P3223.58 per annum) he was receiving in 1965 when he was initially found afflicted with PTB but also thereafter enjoyed increases of salaries and at the time of his compulsory retirement in 1975, his rate was 5095.20 per annum although he did not receive any promotion in rank or position, from 1965 to the year of his retirement. We have recognized the fact that an employee medically pronounced disabled for work can, despite thereof, pursue his work by sheer determination and ingenuity. In the subsequent cases of Romero vs. WCC, et al. (77 SCRA, 480, June 30, 1977) and Gonzales vs. WCC, et al. (81 SCRA, 709-710), WE enunciated that: Disability, as a basis for compensation, is the combination of partial or total physical incapacity and of inability to work or inability to work with the same ease and competency as before the injury, or the loss, total or partial of earning power from the injury (Corpus Juris, Section 535, p. 813). Disability is used either in the medical or physical as evidenced by obvious loss of members or by medical testimony that the claimant simply cannot make the necessary movements and exertions; it is used to mean de facto inability to earn wages, as evidenced by proof that claimant has not in fact earned anything. This medical and wage-loss of disability may be more clearly illustrated as follows: At claimant may be, in a medical and wage-loss utterly shattered and ruined, but may by sheer determination and ingenuity contrive to make a living for himself; conversely, a claimant may be able to work, in both his and doctor's opinion but awareness of his injury may lead employers to refuse him employment. The problem of the administrators of the Act is the proper balancing of these and medical and wage-loss factors. An absolute insistence on medical disability in the abstract would produce a denial of compensation in the latter case, although the wage-loss is a real and as directly traceable to the injury as in any other instance. At the other extreme, an insistence on the wage-loss as the best would deprive the claimant in the former illustration of an award, thus not only penalizing his

laudable efforts to make the best of his misfortune but also fostering the absurdity of pronouncing a man non-disabled in spite of the unanimous contrary evidence of experts and of common observation (Larson, Vol. II, p. 3). (Emphasis supplied). In the Romero and Gonzales cases, therein claimants persisted working although intermittently they went on sick leaves despite their confirmed medical disability, but, unlike claimant Corales who survived working despite disability up to his compulsory age retirement they were forced to retire before the compulsory age of retirement: in the case of Romero, at the age of 52, and Gonzales, at the age of 64. In both cases, We awarded claimants not only disability compensation benefits but also reimbursements of medical expenses incurred even before they were effectively and physically disabled and thereafter. To limit the award of reimbursement of medical expenses to claimants who stopped working after being medically pronounced is to the laudable efforts of a medically disabled to make the beet of his misfortune by continuing in his work. Both need medicines to cure their illnesses. To rule otherwise is to uphold unfair petition as well as inequitos principle and inflict gross injustice on one, like herein petitioner, who, despite his predicament, went on working, instead of immediately availing and enjoying the compensation benefits under the law in order that his illness may be timely arrested. A look at Section 13 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, reveals that it does not require that illness or disability should result in wage-lose to entitle one to an award of medical or benefits. That section clearly states that "immediately after an employee has suffered an injury or contracted sickness and during the subsequent period of disability, the employer or insurance carrier shall provide the employee with such services, appliances and supplies as the nature of his disability and the process of his recovery may require; and that which will promote his early restoration to the maximum level of his physical capacity ... Section 13 was further emphasized in Section 23, which reads thus: SEC 23. Medical and Rehabilitative examination. After an injury or contracting sickness and during the period of his disability and rehabilitation, the laborer shall at reasonable times and places submit to examination by a duly qualified physician or surgeon and rehabilitation technician designated and paid by the employer or insurance carrier ... As WE stated in Cebu Portland vs. WCC, et al.: It may be observed that the law, in imposing on the employer the obligation to providemedical attendance to an injured or sick employee, unlike those provisions relating to compensation for disability (Sections 14, 16, 17 and 18 of Act No. 3428, as amended) does not provide maximum either in the amount to be paid or the time period within which such right may be availed of by the employee. On the contrary, the law imposes on the employer the obligation to "Provide the employee with such medical, surgical, and hospital services and supplies as the nature of the injury or sickness may require." The implication is that, such medical expenses as may be necessary until the work-connected injury or sickness ceases, may be charged against the employer. In the United States, from where our labor compensation law is derived, the two kinds of benefits for physical injury or sickness are, like in our law, treated 227

differently. The wage-loss payments based on the concept of disability are invariably limited in both amount and duration, while payments of medical benefits, that is, hospital and medical expenses occasioned by any work-connected injury, regardless of wage-loss or disability, vary in the different states of the Union (10 SCRA, L-19164, 420, 423-424, Feb. 29, 1964). A fair interpretation of these provisions allows payment and/or reimbursement of medical expenses to one ho suffered work-connected illness or injury or disability, regardless of whether it results to wageloss or not. For said section commands the employer or the insurance carrier to provide the employee with services, appliances and supplies immediately after he has suffered an injury or contracted sickness, and during the subsequent period of disability, even if he continues to report to work until he reaches the compulsory age of retirement. In the case of Mondejar vs. WCC, et al., WE granted the claimant a water meter reader of the NWSA for 26 years since 1948, both disability compensation and medical services, including reimbursement for such expenses therefor, as well as attorney's fees, in spite of the fact that he continued to work until he voluntarily retired at age 60 because of the economic demands of his family as he was the only breadwinner in the family, although "he made leaves with the office and went home to Maasin, Iloilo, where he consulted Dr. Numeriano Jalbuena and was found to be suffering from the same sickness and on August 12, 1974, he finally retired from the service. (77 SCRA 301-304, L-43154, May 31, 1977). In Evangelista vs. WCC, et al., the teacher-claimant, who continued working notwithstanding her ailment, until her voluntary retirement at age 61, was granted disability compensation, medical services, including reimbursement of expenses therefor, attorney's fees and administrative costs (77 SCRA, 497-600, L-43572, June 30, 1977). In Ibaez vs. WCC, et al., teacher-claimant, despite her ailment, continued to work until her voluntary retirement at age 64. She was also granted the same benefits, including attorney's fees and administrative costs (77 SCRA 501-508, L-44123, June 30, 1977). In Ilingan vs. WCC, et al., the claimant-employee of the Philippine National Railways was likewise granted benefits although he continued and never stopped working until his voluntary retirement at age 63; because he "May not wait for his body to waste away or his condition to worsen by applying for retirement at the age of 65, when he is entitled under the law to an earlier retirement (79 SCRA 345-347, L-40174, Oct. 11, 1977; see also Dimaano vs. WCC, et al., L-453553, Aug. 31, 1977,78 SCRA, 507-511). WE need not rely on the cases abovecited; because here in the Supreme Court, all Associate Justices and employees are enjoying the medical facilities in the clinic and the services of its doctors whenever they are afflicted with a disease or ailment, which does not disabled them from performing their official functions. The claimant in the case at bar sacrificed and endured his pain and suffering by reporting to work because he needed his salary for the support of himself and his family, and in the process saved the government money which would have been granted him as disability compensation if he went on sick or vacation leave with or without pay. It is rather disheartening to observe that the officials and agencies designated by the law to implement the social justice guarantee in the Constitution and the social legislation in favor of the working man lack the heart and the compassion to accord a liberal

interpretation of the Workmen's Compensation Law and to resolve all doubts in favor of the employee as mandated by both the New Labor Code, the New Civil Code, and the relevant jurisprudence. It must also be noted that disability compensation benefits and medical benefits are covered by separate sections. Section 13 for medical benefits and Section 14 for disability compensation benefits. And while Section 14 adheres to the wage-loss factor as the basis of award for disability compensation benefits, implicit from its requirement that no compensation shall be allowed for the first three calendar days of incapacity resulting from an injury except the benefits provided in the preceding section, Section 13 does not. It is not therefore difficult to conclude that wage-lose is not necessary for the award of medical benefits. Jurisprudence in the United States shows that "workmen's compensation benefits fall initially into two categories. benefits to the workman for physical injury, and benefits to dependents in case of death. Benefits for physical injury, in turn, are of two kinds: wage-loss payments based on the concept of disability and payment of hospital and expenses occasioned by any work-connected injury regardless of wage-loss or disability. Wolf v. City of Altamonte Spring, 148 So. 2nd 13 (Fla. 1962); Shepherd v. Gas Serv. Co., 186 Kan. 699, 352 P.2d 48 (1960);Howerton v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 191 Kan. 449, 381 P.2d 365 (1963)." [Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. II, 10-1, 10-21]. In the abovecited case of Shepherd, respondent contended that since the trial court found that the claimant suffered no disability, and inasmuch as he remained in respondent's employment at the same work and wage as before the injury he is not entitled to compensation. The Supreme Court of ruled as follows: [4] We will start with the petition that the workman's compensation act is founded broadly upon considerations of public policy. Its purpose is to provide protection to workmen within the limits established by the act. To this end this court is committed in many decisions unnecessary to review, to a liberal interpretation of the act in favor of the employee ... While the trial court found that claimant suffered no temporary total or permanent partial disability since he did not miss any work, the court did not suffer a temporary partial with personal injury by accident and ordered that respondent furnish medical and hospital treatment in the sum for medical care and hospital treatment in the sum specified for medical care necessary as a result of claimants accidental injury to his back. Inherent in the trial court's finding is a finding that the claimant did suffer a temporary partial liability by reason of accidental injury and the same could be corrected by medical and hospital attention. It allowed compensation by way of medical treatment but inasmuch as claimant was working at the same wage made no allowance for compensation in weekly payments ... (pp. 50-51). Continuing, the Court said. Respondent seems to contend that since the record imposes that after being injured claimant continued in the same job and performed the same duties of his employment at the wage, he had no disability and no valid claim for compensation ... [5] It is a well-established rule in this state that an employee partially incapacitated by an injury from performing his labor does not lose his right to 228

compensation under the workmen's compensation act by in the employment of his employer at his former wage ... WHEREFORE, THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ARE HEREBY DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT. THIS DENIAL IS FINAL AND EXECUTORY.

[G.R. No. L-43641. August 26, 1977.] ENCARNACION VDA. DE YOHANON, Petitioner, v. JOSE BALENA and WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION, Respondents. Celestino B. Sabate for Petitioner. Conrado O. Lupos for respondent Jose Balea.

DECISION

MAKASIAR, J.: This is a petition for review of the decision dated February 23, 1976 of the now defunct Workmens Compensation Commission (hereinafter referred to as WCC) in RO9-WC Case No. 14180, which affirmed the decision of WCC Regional Office No. 8 (Tacloban City) dismissing the claim of herein petitioner for failure "to substantially prove that her husbands death arose out of his employment."cralaw virtua1aw library Petitioner Encarnacion Vda. de Yohanon is the surviving spouse of the deceased Mayorico Yohanon who, during his lifetime, was employed as conductor in Bus No. 7 of the Pioneer Bus Lines operated by private respondent Jose Balea. The deceased was paid a monthly salary of P150.00 plus P3.00 daily meal allowance. On March 21, 1974 at about 8:00 oclock in the evening, said deceased fell from atop Bus No. 7 referred to above and landed on the cemented pavement resulting in his death. Subsequently, on October 31, 1974, the widow of the deceased, petitioner herein, filed a death compensation claim alleging, in the main, that the deceased, while arranging the cargoes on top of the passenger bus as its conductor, fell to the cemented pavement, suffered a fractured skull, and as a consequence, died on March 22, 1974.chanrobles law library : red A decision dated December 10, 1975 (pp. 5-9, rec.) was rendered by Labor Attorney and Hearing Officer Bienvenido C. Elorcha, dismissing the case since the claimant-widow failed "to substantially prove that her husbands death arose out of his employment." Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration (pp. 10-11, rec.) of the said decision on January 15, 1976, praying, inter alia, that in the event of denial of the motion, the records of the case be elevated to the Workmens Compensation Commission for review (pp. 10-11 rec.). In an order dated January 26, 1976 (p. 12, rec.), the Hearing Officer denied the aforementioned motion and, as prayed for by the movant (petitioner herein), elevated the entire records of the case to the respondent Commission. Acting on the appeal interposed by the petitioner, the Workmens Compensation Commission, sitting en banc, in a decision dated February 23, 1976 (pp. 13-15, rec.), affirmed the decision appealed from, absolving the respondent from any liability to the claimant under the Workmens Compensation Act

concluding "that the deceased died not in line of duty nor was he doing something incidental to his employment but due to an accident which was attended by exculpating circumstances of notorious negligence and drunkenness on his part" (p. 14, rec.). In her petition for review, the petitioner raised three issues which she reiterated in her memorandum (pp. 47-5, rec.), namely:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library 1. That the decision (pp. 5-9, rec.) affirmed by respondent Workmens Compensation Commission (pp. 13-15, rec.) has not appreciated nor considered the significance or import of petitioners evidence; 2. That private respondents failure to controvert the claim within the reglementary period provided for under the Workmens Compensation Act and the rules and regulations militates against defense of drunkenness; and 3. That payment made by private respondent to petitioner in the total amount of P1,013.00 is an admission of the compensability of the petitioners claim. The points raised by the petitioner herein are indeed well-taken and are discussed hereinbelow ad seriatim. The admission of private respondents witnesses that there were already passengers in the bus and cargoes loaded on the top of the bus (p. 3, rec.), gave credence to petitioners content ion that the deceased was on top of the bus receiving, loading, and arranging the cargoes when he fell from the bus to the concrete pavement. As one of the bus conductors duties, as it was in the case of the deceased, Mayorico Yohanon, was to be present, available and ready to serve these passengers and load their cargoes, so it was at 8:00 oclock that night of March 21, 1974 that Yohanon was on top of the bus receiving, loading and arranging the cargoes when he fell to the concrete pavement. The deceased was therefore in the actual performance of his duty as a bus conductor when he suffered from a fractured skull resulting in his death.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary Moreover, apart from the testimony of one Pedro Jundarino that he and the deceased had a drinking spree and that they both proceeded to the bug drunk, no other evidence was adduced by private respondent to show that the deceased was extremely or very drunk at the time of the incident, and that being drunk, was then absolutely incapable of maintaining his balance and equanimity so that he was exposed to the danger of falling from atop the bus. The records clearly show that when the deceased fell to the cemented pavement, he was immediately taken to the Samar Provincial Hospital. Strangely, the private respondent did not present in evidence the hospital bulletin or record of the deceased. Neither was an autopsy, if any, performed upon the deceased, submitted to show whether the deceased smelt of liquor or his blood had alcohol content. Even if it could be shown that a person drank intoxicating liquor, still it is incumbent upon the person invoking drunkenness as a defense to show that the said person was extremely drunk. This is so because a person may take as much as several bottles of beer or several glasses of hard liquor and still remain sober and unaffected by the alcoholic drink. "Thus, intoxication which does not incapacitate the employee from following his occupation is not sufficient to defeat the recovery of compensation, although the intoxication may be a contributory cause of his injury. It must be shown that the intoxication was the proximate cause of the death or injury and the burden of proof lies on him who raises drunkenness as a defense" (Compania Maritima v. Cabagnot, L-10675, April 29, 1960; Balbiga v. Time Taxicab Co., CA-GR 12219-R, Oct. 20, 1955). On the whole, therefore, the evidence of private respondent disclaiming liability is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of compensability of the death of Mayorico Yohanon. Again, assuming arguendo that the deceased was drunk at the time when he fell from atop the bus, herein private respondent cannot avail of the defense of drunkenness by reason of his failure to 229

controvert petitioners claim for compensation within fourteen (14) days following the date of the disability, if known to the employer, or within ten (10) days after he has knowledge of the alleged accident (Sec. 45, Act No. 3428, as amended). Private respondent herein had knowledge of the accident immediately after it occurred; because he testified that his checker, Fortunato Yulas, informed him of the accident the following day, March 22, 1974. Private respondents notice of controversion was filed only after the claim had been filed and received by the WCC Regional Office on October 31, 1974 more than seven (7) months after the death of the employee on March 22, 1974. In the stipulation of facts between the parties herein, petitioner admitted having received the total amount of P1,013.00 from respondent (p. 6, rec.). Petitioner contended, and rightly so, that said amount of P1,013.00 is an advance payment, and constitutes an admission of the compensability of the death of Mayorico Yohanon. Private respondent is presumed to know the law and his liability to his employees under the Workmens Compensation Act, and accordingly made an advance settlement of his liability thereunder. It cannot, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be considered an act of charity, as adverted to by private respondent in his memorandum (p. 44, rec.). WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY REVERSED, AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT JOSE BALEA IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO PAY.chanrobles.com : virtual law library 1. PETITIONER ENCARNACION VDA. DE YOHANON THE SUM OF SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00) PESOS AS DEATH COMPENSATION BENEFITS, LESS THE AMOUNT OF ONE THOUSAND THIRTEEN (P1,013.00) PESOS ADVANCED TO THE PETITIONER BY RESPONDENT HEREIN; 2. ATTY. CELESTINO B. SABATE OF BORONGAN, EASTERN SAMAR, THE SUM EQUIVALENT TO TEN PERCENT (10%) OF THE AMOUNT RECOVERABLE, AS ATTORNEYS FEES; 3. THE WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION THE AMOUNT OF SIXTY-ONE (P61.00) PESOS AS ADMINISTRATIVE FEE; AND 4. THE COSTS. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. Nos. L-29938-39. March 31, 1971.] SAMAR MINING CO., INC., Petitioner, v. WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION, EMETERIA VDA. DE MENDOZA and TRINIDAD VDA. DE MENDOZA, Respondents. Benedicto G. Arcinas & Benjamin C. Gascon for Petitioner. Eustaquio C. Cabides for respondent Emeteria Vda. de Mendoza. Feliciano Reyes for respondent Trinidad Vda. de Mendoza.

Act. 4. ID.; ID.; WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE LEGAL DEPENDENTS. The Commissions determination as to who of the two claimants is the legal wife of the decedent and as such a dependent entitled under Section 9 of the Act to the compensation is a legal question that is subject to appeal in a proper case to this Court for final determination. The hearing referee is therefore enjoined to receive all evidence from the complainants as to their respective claimed status as dependent wife of the decedent, and to resolve the issue, subject to the commissions decision on review, conformably to the provisions of substantive and adjective law. In Republic v. Workmen s Compensation Commission (13 SCRA 272 [1965]) the Court overruled the commissions award of compensation to two alleged illegitimate children of the deceased (accepting that to the widow, which was not disputed by the employer) on the ground that their filiation, on which was based the commissions award to them as dependent children, had not been established in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and that the baptismal certificates presented by the claimants did not satisfy the Codes requirement of a record of birth or authentic writing for purposes of meeting its provisions on voluntary recognition of the claimed filiation. 5. ID.; ID.; ROLE IN CASE OF TWO CLAIMANTS. It should be noted, that the commission may, in accordance with Section 8 of the Act, act as referee and arbitrator between the two claimants and help them reach a mutually acceptable compromise settlement of allotting the compensation among themselves and their dependent children, if any, in order to avoid unnecessary expense, delay and litigation between them. It should be borne in mind that in cases where the second wife had in good faith contracted marriage with the decedent notwithstanding the subsistence of his marriage with the first wife, the Court has generally sought and applied a just and equitable solution and division of the decedents estate among the two innocent surviving parties. FERNANDO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library 1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION; POWER; TO PASS UPON AND DECIDE QUESTIONS ORDINARILY FALLING WITHIN THE COMPETENCE OF AND COGNIZABLE BY THE JUDICIARY. Implicit in the ably written opinion of Justice Teehankee, which I join, is the recognition of the power of the Workmens Compensation Commission an administrative tribunal, to pass upon and decide questions ordinarily falling within the competence of and cognizable by the judiciary, namely "as to who of the claimants is the legal wife of the decedent and as such a dependent entitled under Section 9 of the act to the compensation . . . ." Thus once again is made evident a sympathetic response to the question of the permissible scope of the authority that may be lawfully entrusted to administrative agencies. That is as it should be. No bar should be interposed to the conferment of the needed authority to the governmental agency which can best discharge the function entrusted to it, even at the risk of defying the canons a rigid, formalistic approach to the postulate of separation of powers would impose. It does not admit of doubt that if the determination as to who is the widow of the deceased according to law in case conflicting claims are raised cannot be passed upon by the Commission but must be left to the courts in a separate action, then the result would be further delay and frustration of an objective of a legislation which in accordance with the social justice principle and protection to labor provisions of the Constitution require speedy implementation. This latest manifestation of according wide discretion to administrative tribunals marks to my mind the attainment of further progress in the effort of government through such instrumentalities to cope with the increased responsibilities thrust on it if social and economic rights, or liberty in an affirmative sense, would be vitalized. 2. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES; WHENEVER POWER IS GRANTED, IT IS TO BE ASSUMED THAT THE MEANS NECESSARY SO THAT ITS EXERCISE WOULD BE RENDERED EFFECTIVE IS TO BE DEEMED INCLUDED. There is moreover the equally applicable doctrine of statutory construction that whenever power is granted, it is to be assumed that the means necessary so that its exercise would be rendered effective is to be deemed included. Clearly if it were not so, the result might be to reduce the statute to a barren form of words. The effect would be nullification 230

SYLLABUS 1. LABOR LAWS; WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION; CLAIMS; VENUE; UNIT WHERE CLAIM FIRST FILED SHALL ASSUME EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION THEREOF. The commissions Rules, particularly, Rule 6, Section provide for the proper venue of claims and adequately cover the case at bar. As restated by the Court in Philippine Cotton Development Corp. v. Workmens Compensation Commission, 2 SCRA 16 May 19, 1961); italics furnished, "a claim for compensation may be filed and heard in the regional office of any of the following places: where the accident occurs; where the claimant, or any of them, if more, resides, or where the respondent or any of them, if more resides, at the option of the claimant." The Commissions rules c ontemplated that as in the case at bar, there may be more than one claimant for the same compensable death against the same employer and granted the choice of venue to the claimants as a whole, but expressly provide that where there is a conflict as to choice of venue among the claimants, the unit where the claim is first filed shall assume exclusive jurisdiction over the case. This is but in accord with the analogous rule on venue for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." The principal question of compensability of the death of the deceased should therefore be heard and resolved in the first case filed in Manila, pursuant to Rule 6, Section 2 of the commissions Rules, with the claimant-widow in Zamboanga City, Emeteria, considered an intervenor therein, with a claim adverse to that of the first claimant, Trinidad. 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE REQUIRED. What is simply at issue is stated in the employers controversion "that the deceased succumbed to a non-industrial illness" and the attendance at the hearings of Emeteria is not necessary for the resolution of this medical question. Whoever of the claimants is finally upheld has in her favor the law s presumption of compensability of the death as well as the general rule of the commission governing proceedings therein that" (T)he hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy in workmens compensation cases shall be without regard to technicalities, legal forms and technical rules on evidence. Substantial evidence shall be sufficient to support a decision, order or award."cralaw virtua1aw library 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSOLIDATION AND JOINT HEARING THEREOF; APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. The procedure is in consonance with the commissions own Rule 11, Section 9 for consolidation and joint hearing of claims, as well as with Rule 31, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, applicable in a suppletory character, which provides that the court ordering consolidation of actions or joint hearing thereof "may make such orders concerning proceedings, therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay." The two cases shall therefore be consolidated with the case filed in Manila, RW-WC Case No. 7052, prevailing, subject only to the right reserved to Emeteria to submit in Zamboanga City, upon due notice to the other parties, to the referee in the Zamboanga City case her documentary evidence and testimonial evidence upon deposition by written interrogatories, as well as any interrogatories she may wish to have propounded to Trinidad, which shall be forwarded to the Manila case to form part of the record thereof. Only one decision shall be rendered in the said Manila case, resolving the compensability of the death of the deceased Fernando Mendoza as well as the question of who among the two claimants is the legal wife and dependent of the decedent entitled to receive any compensation payable under the Workmens Compensation Act, for the purposes of the

instead of implementation. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, whenever there is a transfer of competence from one agency to another, what could be lawfully performed by the former is not beyond the authority conferred on the latter. There is to be no fragmentation If It were otherwise, there is the risk of failing to achieve that which is desired. 3. POLITICAL LAW; SEPARATION OF POWERS; PRINCIPLE THEREOF NOT TO BE ENFORCED WITH PEDANTIC RIGOR. In terms of the fundamental principle of separation of powers, this decision is a further recognition of the traditional flexibility associated with such a concept. It is not to be enforced with pedantic rigor. The demands of practical statesmanship preclude a doctrinaire application. The decisive question should be whether there is a need for an administrative tribunal being created and if so what powers must be entrusted to it to assure that the legislative objective is attained. The fact that under a tripartite system of government such agencies fall within the executive branch should not be a bar to the conferment of such authority, even if essentially judicial in character, as long as it is incidental to the discharge of the task of its implementation. Any other view would be self-defeating. There is to be then no hesitancy in according the seal of approval to an assumption of wider competence by administrative tribunals. It is of course preferable that there be express statutory language to that effect. Lacking such explicitness, an enactment is to be so construed. That would conduce to their further efficiency. It would be a further recognition of what is now undeniable, that such agencies are, along with courts, and perhaps to a greater degree, necessary instruments in the fulfillment of the welfare function incumbent on government. BARREDO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library 1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION; VENUE AND JURISDICTION; WHERE SEPARATE CLAIMS ARE FILED IN MORE THAN ONE OF THE VENUES FIXED THEREIN, "THE UNIT WHERE THE CLAIM IS FIRST FILED SHALL ASSUME EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE." Coming now to the two issues submitted for Our resolution, those of venue and jurisdiction, I concur, as I have already indicated, in the holding that pursuant to Sec. 2 of Rule 6 of the Commission. quoted in the main opinion, the two claims herein involved should be heard and decided by the referee in the Manila regional office where the first claim was filed, to the exclusion of the Zamboanga City regional office. It is clear to me that the contingency of two women filing in distinct places separate claims in which the allege adversely to one another each to be the legal widow of the same worker is within the contemplation of the provision in the cited section of the rules to the effect that where separate claims are filed in more than one of the venues fixed therein, "the unit where the claim is first filed shall assume exclusive jurisdiction over the case." It is a necessary consequence of this provision that any hardship to any of the parties occasioned by their separate claims and their respective initial venues is pallet of the very nature of the reasons for which such separate claims are filed and, naturally, it is not imposing any uncalled for burden upon them that they should be prepared to undergo said hardships. I submit that, after all, the law need not assume that workers would enter into extra-legal relationships. Besides, the resolution of the Commission upholding the propriety of the separate venues of the two claims in question is obviously impractical, since it overlooks the fact that of necessity only one common decision can be rendered in regard to the two claims and the Commission does not suggest how this can be done under the procedure it has sanctioned. Precisely, it is one of the purposes of the rule fixing a common venue to enable the Commission to render such a single decision. 2. ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION; "EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION" VESTED BY REPUBLIC ACT 772 UPON THE WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION TO HEAR AND DECIDE CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION IS INTENDED TO WITHDRAW OR TAKE AWAY THAT JURISDICTION FROM THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COURTS AND COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE. Blue Bar Coconut Company v. Boo, 95 Phil. 867, made it clear that the "exclusive jurisdiction vested by Republic Act 772 upon the Workmens Compensation Commission to hear and decide claims for compensation under the Act is intended to withdraw or take away that jurisdiction from the justice of the Peace Courts and Courts of First Instance that therefore heard and decided workmens claims for compensation within their respective jurisdiction. . . . The Congress has the power and authority to 231

vest in the Workmens Compensation Commission the jurisdiction to hear and decide c laims under the Workmens Compensation Act to the exclusion of the Courts that therefore had exercised such jurisdiction" (p. 870). Having in view the intent of the Act to simplify and expedite the settlement of claims contemplated in it, it stands to reason that this transfer of jurisdiction must be construed to be plenary and complete. DECISION

TEEHANKEE, J.: Appeal from an order of the Workmens Compensation Commission and its resolution en banc denying the petition of herein petitioner, for the consolidation of two cases filed in two different regional offices for compensation for the death of one and the same person. As a consequence of the death on April 5, 1967 of Fernando Mendoza, an employee of petitioner at its mining operations in Buug, Zamboanga del Sur, two separate claims for death compensation were filed against petitioner in two different regional offices of respondent Commission. The records, upon examination, show that one was first filed on May 4, 1967 with Regional Office No. IV, Manila, by Trinidad Vda. de Mendoza; 1 and the second was filed afterwards on July 31, 1967 with Regional Office No. IX, Zamboanga City by Emeteria Vda. de Mendoza. 2 Each claimant claims to be the legal wife and surviving spouse of the deceased and entitled to the compensation payable for his death. As both claimants insisted on their separate claims being heard and tried by the respective regional offices where they were filed, and the regional office referees were disposed to proceed separately, notwithstanding their being aware of the pendency of the two cases, petitioner filed with respondent commission its petition for consolidation of the two cases. It alleged that since the cases involved a common question of law and fact concerning the death of the decedent, consolidation of the cases would avoid confusion and best serve the interests of all parties concerned and therefore prayed for the consolidation and joint hearing by one referee either in Manila or Zamboanga City of the two cases. Respondent commission, through its chairman, issued its order dated October 7, 1968, holding that consolidation would serve the best interests of petitioner alone in that: "such a concession in its behalf would prejudice one or the other of the two claimants. If the cases were to be consolidated and heard in Zamboanga City, the claimant who resided in Manila would have to go all the way to Zamboanga City with all her witnesses for every hearing conducted therein until such time as the cases can be terminated. On the other hand, if the cases were to be heard in Manila, the same inconvenience would result to the claimant who resided within the jurisdiction of the Zamboanga City regional office. In other words, while one or the other of the claimants would be prejudiced in either case, the petitioner would be spared from a similar inconvenience, and in fact, its best interest alone would be served. Such situation was never contemplated in the pertinent Rules of the Workmens Compensation Commission governing venue."cralaw virtua1aw library It therefore denied consolidation ruling that" (U)nder Sec. 2, Rule 6 of the Rules of the Commission, the claim shall be filed with the Workmens Compensation Unit of the Regional Office where the injury or illness was received or contracted or where the claimant or any of the claimants reside or where the respondent or any of the respondents reside or has his place of business, at the option of the claimant (Emphasis supplied). Implicit in this provision is that the claimant, or claimants where there are several of them, are given the right to select such venue of action as are legally provided for their benefit."cralaw virtua1aw library Reconsideration of the denial order having been denied by the resolution of November 22, 1968 of

the The

commission petition

en has

banc, merit

petitioner and

filed should

this be

appeal. granted.

hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy in workmens compensati on cases shall be without regard to technicalities, legal forms and technical rules on evidence. Substantial evidence shall be sufficient to support a decision, order or award." 6 What is really essential for Emeteria is to establish her claimed personal status as the legal wife and dependent spouse of the deceased entitled to payment of the compensation, in the same manner as it is equally essential for the first claimant in Manila, Trinidad, to establish her claimed personal status as such as against Emeteria. Again, here it would be principally a matter of documentation and Emeteria may submit the documents in proof of her marriage to the referee in the Zamboanga City case, who would forward the same to the case in Manila to be considered with the documents submitted by Trinidad. Any supplemental testimonial evidence that Emeteria might wish to submit could likewise be taken by the referee in the Zamboanga City case by deposition upon written interrogaries * under Rule 24, sections 25 to 27 with due notice to Trinidad, who may submit crossinterrogatories. By analogy to the same Rule, Emeteria may further submit written interrogatories questioning Trinidads claimed status to the referee in Manila, who may propound them to Trinidad at the hearings here, and take all such evidence under consideration in resolving the conflict between the two claimants. The procedure above suggested is in consonance with the commissions own Rule 11, section 9 for consolidation and joint hearing of claims, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Sec. 9. Joint Hearing of Claim. The referee to whom cases or claims involving a common question of law or fact arising from the same occurrence or accident against a common employer, are assigned for hearing and decision may order a joint hearing on said cases and render only one decision thereon when he believes that justice can best be served there by."cralaw virtua1aw library as well as with Rule 31, section 1 of the Rules of Court, applicable in a suppletory character, 7 which provides that the court ordering consolidation of actions or joint hearing thereof "may make such orders concerning proceedings, therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay."cralaw virtua1aw library The two cases shall therefore be consolidated with the case filed in Manila, RO4-WC Case No. 7052, prevailing, subject only to the right reserved to Emeteria to submit in Zamboanga City, upon due notice to the other parties, the referee in the Zamboanga City case her documentary evidence and testimonial evidence upon deposition by written interrogatories, as well as any interrogatories she may wish to have propounded to Trinidad, which shall be forwarded to the Manila case to form part of the record thereof. Only one decision shall be rendered in the said Manila case, resolving the compensability of the death of the deceased Fernando Mendoza as well as the question of who among the two claimants is the legal wife and dependent of the decedent entitled to receive any compensation payable under the Workmens Com pensation Act, for the purposes of the Act. The Commissions determination as to who of the two claimants is the legal wife of the decedent and as such a dependent entitled under section 9 of the Act to the compensation 8 is a legal question that is subject to appeal in a proper case to this Court for final determination. The hearing referee is therefore enjoined to receive all evidence from the complainants as to their respective claimed status as dependent wife of the decedent, and to resolve the issue, subject to the commissions decision on review, conformably to the provisions of substantive and adjective law. In Republic v. Workmens Compensation Commission, 9 the Court overruled the commissions award of compensation to two alleged Illegitimate children of the deceased (excepting that to the widow, which was not disputed by the employer) on the ground that their filiation, on which was based the commissions award to them as dependent children, had not been established in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and that the baptismal certificates presented by the claimants did not satisfy the Codes requirement of a record of birth or authentic writing for purposes of meeting its provisions on voluntary recognition of the claimed filiation. 232

The commissions Rules, particularly, Rule 6, section 2, provide for the proper venue of claims and adequately cover the case at bar. Said Rule provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Sec. 2. Where Filed. The claim shall be filed in triplicate, with the Workmens Compensation Unit of the Regional Office where the injury or illness was received or contracted or where the claimant or any of the claimants reside or where the respondent or any of the respondents reside or has his place of business, at the option of the claimant. The unit where the claim is first filed shall assume exclusive jurisdiction over the case . . ." (Emphasis ours) Thus, as restated by the Court in Philippine Cotton Development Corp. v. Workmens Compensation Commission, 3 "a claim for compensation may be filed and heard in the regional office of any of the following places: where the accident occurs; where the claimant, or any of them, if more, resides, or where the respondent or any of them, if more resides, at the option of the claimant." The Commissions rules contemplated that as in the case at bar, there may be more than one claimant for the same compensable death against the same employer and granted the choice of venue to the claimants as a whole, but expressly provide that where there is a conflict as to choice of venue among the claimants, the unit where the claim is first filed shall assume exclusive jurisdiction over the case. This is but in accord with the analogous rule on venue for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." 4 To construe the rule, as respondent commission did, as allowing several conflicting claimants to select as many venues of action as are legally provided for the same compensable claim and against the same employer, would not be conducive to the orderly administration of justice. There is only one subject matter and one cause of action against petitioner-employer involved in the case at bar, arising from the death of the decedent, even though there are two claimants claiming the right to receive the same death compensation, each claiming to be the legal widow and dependent. They cannot each claim the right to pursue their respective claims in, separate and independent proceedings, with unnecessary duplication of hearings and reception of evidence on the common and identical question of compensability of the claim to the detriment of the public interest and of the parties themselves, when they are in effect alternative claimants and the validity of their conflicting claims to the same death compensation must be determined and resolved in one proceeding. The possibility of confusion that would result should the two referees arrive at conflicting decisions on the merits of the identical question of fact and of law presented with the compensability of the death being upheld in one case and the claim for compensation being dismissed in the other case, should be avoided. The principal question of compensability of the death of the deceased should therefore be heard and resolved in the first case filed in Manila, pursuant to Rule 6, section 2 of the commissions Rules, with the claimant-widow in Zamboanga City, Emeteria, considered an intervenor therein, with a claim adverse to that of the first claimant, Trinidad. With reference to the commendable concern of the commission for Emeteria, the claimant in Zamboanga City, who would in such case, according to the commission, have to come all the way to Manila with all her witnesses for the hearings, it might be stated that Emeterias attendance at the Manila hearings may well be dispensed with. The fact of death on April 5, 1967, of the decedent "when seized by sudden hemiphlegia" while in the employ of petitioner is after all not disputed and is of record per the employers reports to the commission. What is simply at issue is stated in the employers controversion "that the deceased succumbed to a non -industrial illness" and the attendance at the hearings of Emeteria is not necessary for the resolution of this medical question. Whoever of the claimants is finally upheld has in her favor the laws presumption of compensability of the death 5 as well as the general rule of the commission governing proceedings therein that" (T)he

It should be noted, however, that the commission may, in accordance with section 8 of the Act, 10 act as referee and arbitrator between the two claimants and help them reach a mutually acceptable compromise settlement of alloting the compensation among themselves and their dependent children, if any, in order to avoid unnecessary expense, delay and litigation between them. It should be borne in mind that in cases where the second wife had in good faith contracted marriage with the decedent notwithstanding the subsistence of his marriage with the first wife, the Court has generally sought and applied a just and equitable solution and division of the decedents estate among the two innocent surviving parties. 11 ACCORDINGLY, the order and resolution en banc appealed from are hereby reversed, and the two cases are ordered consolidated, heard and decided by only the referee in Manila in R04-WC Case No. 7052 (Manila), who shall proceed in accordance with the procedure stated in the three preceding paragraph. Without costs.

conforms to the language of the statute and its purpose should prevail and that no construction is to be adopted that would "tend to defeat the purpose and object of the legislator."cralaw virtua1aw library 5. ID.; ID.; WHERE POLICY OF LAW IS CLEAR; DUTY COURT TO GIVE EFFECT. Once the policy of purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by the judiciary. Even if honest doubts could be entertained, therefor, as to the meaning of the statutory provisions, still respect for such a basic doctrine calls for a rejection of the plea of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company. 6. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; WORKMENS COMPENSATION ACT; INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION, TO BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE. "To state the constructions sought to be fastened on the clear and explicit language of the statute is to reject it. It comes into collision with the constitutional command pursuant to the social justice principle that the government extend protection to labor." How could such an intent then be imputed to the legislative body. No such suspicious ought to be entertained that it was contemplated by our lawmakers that any provision of the Workmens Compensation Act could be so worded as to deny protection to the laboring elements and their dependents and thus frustrate the constitutional objective of social justice. 7. ID.; ID.; WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION; FINDINGS OF FACT IT BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, NOT DISTURBED ON APPEAL; INSTANT CASE. The alleged error that the accident resulting in the death of Condrado Macabenta could not be considered as having arisen out of and in the course of employment is not to be taken too seriously. The facts as set forth in the decision, which must be accepted by us in view of their being based on substantial evidence argue against the condensation of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company. 8. ID.; ID.; APPEAL FROM DECISION OF THE WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION TO SUPREME COURT ASCERTAINTMENT OF CREDIBILITY AND WEIGHT OF CONFLICTING EVIDENCE, BEYOND AUTHORITY IN APPEALS BY CERTIORARI. The task of ascertaining the credibility and weight of conflicting evidence is, however, beyond the province of our authority in appeals by certiorari. Even if the possibility that the Commissions conclusions were erroneous could not be ruled out, still, to borrow the language of justice Dizon in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Workmens Compensation Commission, such errors would constitute mere errors of judgment but do not involve any grave abuse of discretion on its part. DECISION

[G.R. No. L-27489. April 30, 1970.] LEONORA TANTOY VDA. DE MACABENTA, for herself and in behalf of her minor child, RAQUEL MACABENTA, claimants-appellees, v. DAVAO STEVEDORE TERMINAL COMPANY, Respondent-Appellant. Peregrino M. Andres for Claimants-Appellees. H. A. Cabarroguis & Associates for Respondent-Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; WORKMENS COMPENSATION ACT; DEPENDENTS OF INJURED EMPLOYER. From the express language of the Workmens Compensation Act, a widow living with the deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting him or herself, and unmarried, whether or not actually dependent upon the deceased, are considered dependents. 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANT CASE. Claimant here is clearly the widow of the deceased Conrado Macabenta. It is true that the marriage took place after the fatal accident but there was no question that at the time of his death she was marked to him. 3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; WHERE LAW IS CLEAR; DUTY OF COURT TO APPLY THE LAW TO FACTS AS FOUND. Where the law is clear, our duty is equally plain. We must apply it to the facts as found. What is more, we have taken pains to defeat any evasion of its literal language by rejecting an interpretation, even if not totally devoid of plausibility, but likely to attach to it a significance different from that intended by the lawmakers. A paraphrases of an aphorism from Holmes is not inappropriate. there can always occur to intelligence hostile to a piece of legislation a misinterpretation that may, without due reflection, be considered not too far-fetched. 4. ID.; ID.; SETTLED RULE. The Court has constantly held from the early cases of Ty Sue v. Hord, 12 Phil. 485, a 1909 decision, in United States v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 and again in Riera v. Palmori, 40 Phil. 105 (1919) that , assuming a choice is necessary between conflicting theories, that which best 233

FERNANDO, J.:

The success of the employer Davao Stevedore Terminal Company in imparting plausibility to the novel question raised as to whether or not the widow of a deceased employee whose marriage occurred after the accident as well as the posthumous child could be considered dependents within the meaning of the Workmens Compensation Act may be gauged by the fact that we gave due course to the petition for the review of a decision of the Workmens Compensation Commission answering the question in the affirmative and sustaining the right to compensation of the claimant Leonora Tantoy Vda. de Macabenta for herself and in behalf of her minor child, Raquel Macabenta. After hearing the parties and in the right of the language of the law, its manifest purpose, and the constitutional provisions on social justice and protection to labor, we answer the question similarly. We affirm the appealed decision of the Workmens Compensation Commission. In the decision rendered by the then Chairman of the Commission, Nieves Baens del Rosario, dated

September 27, 1966, it is stated that there is no dispute "that at the time that the decedent met the vehicular accident on September 13, 1961 which led to his death on September 29, 1961, the claimant-widow was not yet married to the decedent although they had already been living together as husband and wife for the past three months. However. on the day following the accident, they were lawfully wedded in a marriage ceremony solemnized at San Pedro Hospital in Davao City where the deceased was hospitalized up to his death. It is noteworthy that the marriage was facilitated through the intercession of the general manager of the respondent company." 1 The decision likewise noted that the claimant widow gave birth on April 8, 1962 to the posthumous daughter of the deceased who was given the name Raquel Tantoy Macabenta. As to how the deceased Conrado Macabenta met his accident, the decision, after stating that the deceased was a laborer in the sawmill of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company at Manay, Panabo, Davao, about 48 kilometers from his residence in Davao City, went on as follows: "Although some sort of quarters were provided by the respondent to its employees at the sawmill, many of them apparently preferred to commute, and the deceased in particular went home about three times a week. While the respondent, through its lone witness and at the same time production manager, Sergio Dalisay, disclaimed the claimants declarations that the company provided a service pickup to transport its employees to and from work, the synthesis of the very same testimonial evidence does not support this denial, but on the contrary tends to bring out the fact that the respondent did furnish transportation." 2 As a result, it reversed the finding of the then acting referee of its regional office in Davao City and awarded to the claimant widow for herself and in behalf of her minor child the amount of P2,708.00 as compensation and the sum of P270.80 as attorneys fees. Hence, this petition for review, which, as noted, was given due course primarily due to the question raised being one of first impression. As announced at the opening of this opinion, we uphold the Workmens Compensation Commission. 1. From the express language of the Workmens Compensation Act, a widow living with the deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting him or herself, and unmarried, whether or not actually dependent upon the deceased are considered dependents. 3 Claimant here is clearly the widow of the deceased Conrado Macabenta. It is true that the marriage took place after the fatal accident but there was no question that at the time of his death she was married to him. She, therefore, comes entirely within the letter of the law. Nor can there be any doubt that the child, Raquel Macabenta, also falls within the words the Act employs. As set forth in the decision, while the marriage took place on Sept. 14, 1961, the widow and the deceased had already been living together as husband and wife the preceding three months. The child born of such relationship, later legalized, is, as made clear in the decision, the posthumous daughter of the deceased. What the employer Davao Stevedore Terminal Company seems bent in ignoring is that our Civil Code, in no uncertain terms, considers a conceived child born for all purposes that are favorable to her provided the birth is attended with the conditions specified, namely, that she is alive at the time she is completely delivered from the mothers womb. 4 Here, fortunately, the child has survived the ordeal of the loss of the one called upon to support her, her father, who, unfortunately however, met his death before her birth. Time and time again, we have stressed that where the law is clear, our duty is equally plain. We must apply it to the facts as found. 5 What is more, we have taken pains to defeat any evasion of its literal language by rejecting an interpretation, even if not totally devoid of plausibility, but likely to attach to it a significance different from that intended by the lawmakers. A paraphrase of an aphorism from Holmes is not inappropriate. There can always occur to an intelligence hostile to a piece of legislation a misinterpretation that may, without due reflection, be considered not too far-fetched. The employer in this case, without impugning its motives, must have succumbed to such a temptation, quite understandable but certainly far from justifiable. It is quite obvious then why we find its stand devoid of merit. 2. Our conclusion likewise finds support in the fundamental principle that once the policy or purpose 234

of the law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by the judiciary. 6 Even if honest doubts could be entertained, therefore, as to the meaning of the statutory provisions, still respect for such a basic doctrine calls for a rejection of the plea of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company. We have never deviated from our constant holding from Ty Sue v. Hord, 7 a 1909 decision, that, assuming a choice is necessary between conflicting theories, that which best conforms to the language of the statute and its purpose should prevail. Again, as far back as United States v. Toribio, 8 decided the next year, we made unmistakable our view that no construction is to be adopted that would bend "to defeat the purpose and object of the legislator." We made use of an expression almost identical in Riera v. Palmaroli 9 with our warning against so narrowly interpreting a statute "as to defeat the manifest purpose of the legislator." The employer in this case should have been well advised to take into consideration the teachings of the above cases before it sought to press upon us the desirability of imparting to the applicable statutory language a meaning that would render fruitless the purpose so clearly evident on the face of the Workmens Compensation Act. 3. There is still another avenue of approach that similarly calls for the affirmance of the decision of the Workmens Compensation Commission now on appeal. This is apparent from an excerpt from a recent case of Automotive Parts & Equipment Company, Incorporated v. Lingad: 10 "To state the construction sought to be fastened on the clear and explicit language of the statute is to reject it. It comes into collision with the constitutional command pursuant to the social justice principle that the government extend protection to labor." How could such an intent then be imputed to the legislative body. No such suspicion ought to be entertained that it was contemplated by our lawmakers that any provision of the Workmens Compensation Act could be so worded as to deny protection to the laboring elements and their dependents and thus frustrate the constitutional objective of social justice. To quote from the Lingad case anew: "For it is undeniable that every statute, much more so one arising from a legislative implementation of a constitutional mandate, must be so construed that no question as to its conformity with what the fundamental law requires need arise. 4. The basic question in this petition for review thus disposed of, there is nothing to stand in the way of the affirmance of the decision now on appeal. The alleged error that the accident resulting in the death of Conrado Macabenta could not be considered as having arisen out of and in the course of employment is not to be taken too seriously. The facts as set forth in the decision, which must be accepted by us in view of their being based on substantial evidence argue against the contention of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company. As we had occasion to state only last month in B. F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc. v. Acebedo: 11 "Nor can the conclusion reached by respondent Commission be repudiated unless on a clear showing of failure to consider the evidence on record or failure to consider fundamental and patent logical relationships in the evidence, amounting to a clear travesty of justice or grave abuse of discretion. What was said by us in Basaysay v. Workmens Compensation Commission, through the present Chief Justice, bears repeating: The task of ascertaining the credibility and weight of conflicting evidence, is, however, beyond the province of our authority in appeals by certiorari. Even if the possibility that the Commissions conclusions were erroneous could not be ruled out, still, to borrow the language of Justice Dizon in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Workmens Compensation Commission.such errors would constitute mere errors of judgment but do not involve any grave abuse of discretion on its part." WHEREFORE, the decision of the Workmens Compensation Commission of September 27, 1966 is affirmed. With costs against respondent Davao Stevedore Terminal Company.

G.R. No. L-27588

April 28, 1969

LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and ROSARIO VDA. DE ROSANO respondents. H. San Luis and L. V. Simbulan for petitioner. Juan B. Moreno for respondent Rosario Vda. de Rosano. Villavieja, Villanueva and Ocampo for respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission. REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.: Petition filed by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation for review of the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner (in R04 WC Case No. 3941), ordering it to pay claimants Rosario Vda. de Rosano, minors Rebecca, Edgardo and Baltazar, all surnamed Rosano death compensation benefits, burial expenses and attorney's fees for the death of Pastor Rosano; as well as of the resolution of the Workmen's Compensation Commission en banc denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision. As found by the Acting Referee of the Department of Labor, supported by the evidence on record, the facts of the case are as follows: At about 6 o'clock in the morning of 30 November 1964, stevedore Pastor Rosano went to Pier 9, Manila, to await the arrival of a barge of herein petitioner corporation, scheduled to dock at 9 o'clock in the morning. While thus waiting for the vessel Rosano had a heated verbal argument with one Benjamin Valdez, another stevedore engaged by petitioner corporation, over the possession of a platform used in the loading and unloading of cargoes taken into or out of the watercraft. Rosano was able to get it. As the barge did not arrive as scheduled, Rosano went home for lunch. When he returned at about 1 o'clock in the afternoon, he found the platform again in the possession of Valdez. Rosano's demand for delivery to him of said platform precipitated another argument which almost ended in fist fight. Valdez finally gave up the platform, but not before he had uttered threats against the life of Rosano. Later, informed that the barge they were waiting for definitely was not arriving, Rosano, with two companions, boarded a passenger jeep bound for Tondo. When he got off from the jeep near his house, he was met by Valdez, who whipped out a knife and stabbed him. Rosano fell to the ground. He was immediately brought to the hospital where he expired at 2:30 in the afternoon of that same day, 30 November 1964 (Exhibit C). On 1 March 1965, the widow, Rosario Vda. de Rosano, for herself and on behalf of her 3 minor children filed with the Department of Labor a formal claim for death compensation benefits against petitioner Luzon Stevedoring Corporation for the death of her husband, Pastor Rosano. The company answered, denying the allegations of the complaint and raising the defense of prescription, in that the claim was filed beyond the 3-month period from the death of Rosano, as provided in the Workmen's Compensation law. On 15 September 1965, after due hearing, the Acting Referee rendered judgment, ordering the company to pay to the claimants death compensation benefits in the sum of P6,000.00; P200.00 as reimbursement for burial expenses; P200.00, as attorney's fees; and P61.00 as fees payable to the office. The award was based on the finding that Rosano was an employee of the company and that death arose out of his said employment. The defense of prescription was rejected, it appearing that the company had failed to controvert the claimants' right to compensation within the period prescribed in Section 45 of Act 3428. The company appealed to the Workmen's Compensation Commission, 235

which affirmed the decision of the Referee. And when its motion for reconsideration of said decision was denied by the Commission en banc, the company filed the present petition for review, assigning as all errors committed by the Commission its finding on the existence of employee-employer relationship between the petitioner and the deceased and the ruling that the right to demand compensation benefits has not prescribed. The contention that there existed no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and the late Pastor Rosano is premised on the allegation that the latter was a "gang boss" working with the petitioner on an "on and off" basis; that Rosano worked for petitioner when so assigned by the union, of which he was a member, that, if at all, the employer-employee relationship existed only whenever the deceased rendered actual service for the petitioner. Since on 30 November 1964 Rosano was not able to work (because the barge did not arrive), then, according to petitioner, he was not an employee when he (Rosano) met his death. There is no merit to this contention. In the first place, while petitioner company failed to submit any evidence that the work rendered by the deceased was purely casual, 1 it has been established that prior to the stabbing incident the deceased, with other stevedores, was in the pier prepared to do hauling jobs for the petitioner's business. And there is unrebutted testimony that the deceased had been doing stevedoring work for said petitioner for 15 years. 2 Secondly, even assuming petitioner's allegations to be true, that the deceased was a union member, and that it was the union that furnished laborers and stevedors when required by petitioner company, presumably with the latter delivering the stevedoring charges directly to the union for distribution to the individual laborers, these facts did not make the union an independent contractor whose intervention relieved the said company of liability for the death of a laborer specially where no contractor's bond was required for the union's performance of its undertaking. 3 The union here was no more than an agent of the company and whose fiction is merely to save the latter from the necessity of dealing with individual laborers. And in this kind of indirect employment, it has been repeatedly held, the employer is not relieved of liability under the Workmen's Compensation law. 4 It is next claimed for the petitioner that even if he were an employee, Rosano's death is not compensable because it came when he was outside of the company premises and not at work. We do not agree with the appellant. From the proved sequence of events that took place on 30 November 1964 involving the deceased Pastor Rosano, it is evident that the cause of his fatal stabbing by Benjamin Valdez (who was thereafter accused and convicted) can be traced to their disagreement over the possession of a platform that was to be used in their work for petitioner that although the altercation started in the morning the same was resumed when they returned in the afternoon and carried on when Valdez left, lay in wait near Rosario's house, and there met and stabbed the latter when he alighted from the jeep. Neither can it be said that the employer is exempt from liability under the Workmen's Compensation law because the cause of death arose outside of the company premises, 5 whereas the quarrel happened at the waterfront at Pier 9. For an injury to be compensable, it is not necessary that the cause therefor shall take place within the place of employment. If a workman is acting within the scope of his employment, his protection "in the course of" the employment usually continues, regard of the place of injury. 6 Thus, in one case, 7 an employee went to the House of the employer across the warehouse where he worked to get a drink of water, that there, while trying to drive away a puppy that he saw eating fish in the employer's kitchen, he was bitten in the hand, as a result of which he later died of hydrophobia. The death of the employee was held compensable, on the ground that his trip to the kitchen was occasioned by the employer's fault in not providing adequate drinking water at the warehouse. In the present case, it cannot be disputed that it is inherent in the stevedoring work for the petitioner that the laborers, like the deceased, stay in the pier and wait for the docking of petitioner's vessels.

Furthermore, jurisprudence is to the effect that injuries sustained by an employee while in the course of his employment, as the result of an assault upon his person by another employee, or by a third person, no question of the injured employee's own culpability being involved, is compensable where, from the evidence presented, a rational mind is able to trace the injury to a cause set in motion by the nature of the employment, or some condition, obligation or incident therein, and not by some other agency.8 The rule as stated by the Connecticut Supreme Court is that ... when the employee is assaulted while he is defending his employer, or his employer's interests, or when the assault was incidental to some duty of his employment, the injuries he suffers in consequence of the assault will, as a rule, arise out of the employment. He will then be serving his employer's ends and not of his own. (Jacquemin vs. Turner and Sermour Manufacturing Co., Conn., 103 A. 115; Goldshirch vs. American Character Doll Co., 135 Misc. 817, 238 N. Y. 519.) Similarly, in Appleford vs. Kimmel, 296 NW, 861, it appeared that a theater employee's job required him to handle disturbances in the theater; that several patrons were ordered by him to leave the theater because of disturbances they were causing; and that after the theater closed the employee started for home and was subjected to injurious assault by those he had previously ordered to leave; the court held that the evidence sustained the finding that the employee's injury arose out of, and in the course of, the employment. In the leading case of Field vs. Charmette Knitted Fabric Co., 245 N.Y. 138, where a superintendent was injured on the sidewalk by workmen with whom he had quarreled in the mill, the late Justice Cardozo (then of the New York Supreme Court) declared the injury compensable, reasoning that the quarrel outside of the mill was merely a continuation or extension of the quarrel begun within; that continuity of the case had been so combined with continuity in time and space "that the quarrel from origin to ending must be taken to be one". The rationale applies to the case at bar, where the facts, shown by the evidence found by the referee and affirmed by the Commission, are that Rosano had been assaulted by the man with whom he had quarreled barely a half hour after leaving the place of work where the quarrel occurred, in connection with the possession of the platform to be used in unloading cargo, without any independent agency or cause for the assault being shown. As pointed out by Larson (Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. I, section 29.21) since the ultimate test applied by Judge Cardozo was whether "the quarrel from origin to ending must be taken to be one" it should make no difference how widely separated the assault was from the employment in time and space if it remained an inherent part of an employment incident. Other cases applying the same principle are collated in Schneider, "Workmen's Compensation", Perm. Ed., Vol. 6, page 131, et seq. As regards the defense of prescription raised by petitioner, it is true that the formal demand for compensation for the death of Pastor Rosano on 30 November 1964 was made by the dependent widow and minor children only on 1 March 1965, or beyond the 3-month period provided for 'in section 24 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. But we are not impressed by petitioner's disclaimer that it had no knowledge of the stabbing incident prior to its notification by the Regional Office of the filing of the claim. It may be pointed out that the law does not speak of "formal notice" by the employer of the accident; it specifies only "knowledge of the accident". For petitioner to say that it had 236

no actual knowledge of the stabbing incident on 30 November 1964 would run counter to the ordinary course of human behavior. An employer could scarcely have been spared the news of the killing of one of its laborers by another laborer, especially where the cause therefor started in the place where the laborers gather and work. When the widow went to the company premises to demand compensation for the death of her husband a week after his burial, she was able to talk to an unknown employee inside the compound, who told her that she could not get anything because the death of her husband did not occur in the company premises. Far from showing lack of knowledge by the employer, this fact constitutes sufficient indication that the death of Rosano was already a matter of common knowledge in petitioner's office that even an allegedly unidentified employee could advance the exact defense that the employer later set up in the case. lawphi1.nt The fact remains that the petitioner failed to controvert in due time the right of the claimants to compensation, as required by section 45 of Act 3428. And the rule is now well-settled that the requirements (for claimants) of giving of notice of injury and filing of claim within the prescribed period is non-jurisdictional and does not constitute a bar to compensation proceedings if the employer, who had knowledge of the accident, failed to controvert the claimant's right to compensation pursuant to section 45 of the law. 9 For such failure of the employer to controvert the claimant's constitutes a waiver (or a forfeiture by law) of its right to question the validity and reasonableness of the claim and precludes the setting up of all non-jurisdictional defenses, such as non-compensability of injuries, prescription, and the like. 10 WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission and its resolution en banc, the petition for review is hereby dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.

G.R. No. L-26341

November 27, 1968

ILOILO DOCK & ENGINEERING CO., petitioner, vs. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and IRENEA M. PABLO, for herself and in behalf of her minor children EDWIN, EDGAR and EDNA, all surnamed PABLO, respondents. Luisito C. Hofilena for petitioner. Villavieja and Villanueva for respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission. Gualberto C. Opong for respondent Irenea M. Pablo and her minor children. CASTRO, J.: This is an appeal by the Iloilo Dock and Engineering Company (hereinafter referred to as the IDECO) from the decision dated February 28, 1966 of the Workmen's Compensation Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) affirming the decision of the Regional Office VII in Iloilo City, and ordering the IDECO to pay to the widow and children of Teodoro G. Pablo (Irenea M. Pablo and the minors Edwin, Edgar and Edna, all surnamed Pablo) the sum of P4,000, to pay to the widow P89 as reimbursement for burial expenses and P300 as attorney's fees, and to pay to the Commission the amount of P46 as fees pursuant to section 55 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended.

At about 5:02 o'clock in the afternoon of January 29, 1960, Pablo, who was employed as a mechanic of the IDECO, while walking on his way home, was shot to death in front of, and about 20 meters away from, the main IDECO gate, on a private road commonly called the IDECO road. The slayer, Martin Cordero, was not heard to say anything before or after the killing. The motive for the crime was and still is unknown as Cordero was himself killed before he could be tried for Pablo's death. At the time of the killing, Pablo's companion was Rodolfo Galopez, another employee, who, like Pablo, had finished overtime work at 5:00 p.m. and was going home. From the main IDECO gate to the spot where Pablo was killed, there were four "carinderias" on the left side of the road and two "carinderias" and a residential house on the right side. The entire length of the road is nowhere stated in the record. According to the IDECO, the Commission erred (1) in holding that Pablo's death occurred in the course of employment and in presuming that it arose out of the employment; (2) in applying the "proximity rule;" and (3) in holding that Pablo's death was an accident within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The principal issue is whether Pablo's death comes within the meaning and intendment of that "deceptively simple and litigiously prolific",1 phrase The two components of the coverage formula "arising out of" and "in the course of employment." 2 The two components of the coverage formula "arising out of" and "in the course of employment" are said to be separate tests which must be independently satisfied;3 however, it should not be forgotten that the basic concept of compensation coverage is unitary, not dual, and is best expressed in the word, "work-connection," because an uncompromising insistence on an independent application of each of the two portions of the test can, in certain cases, exclude clearly work-connected injuries.4 The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident takes place.5 As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise "in the course of employment" when it takes place within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto. 6 The general rule in workmen's compensation law known as the "going & coming rule," simply stated, is that "in the absence of special circumstances, an employee injured in, going to, or coming from his place of work is excluded from the benefits of workmen's compensation acts." 7 This rule, however, admits of four well-recognized exceptions, to wit: (1) where the employee is proceeding to or from his work on the premises of his employer; (2) where the employee is about to enter or about to leave the premises of his employer by way of the exclusive or customary means of ingress and egress; (3) where the employee is charged, while on his way to or from his place of employment or at his home, or during his employment, with some duty or special errand connected with his employment; and (4) where the employer, as an incident of the employment, provides the means of transportation to and from the place of employment.8 We address ourselves particularly to an examination and consideration of the second exception, i.e., injuries sustained off the premises of the employer, but while using a customary means of ingress and egress. This exception, known as the "proximity rule," was applied in Philippine Fiber Processing Co., Inc. vs. Ampil.9There, the employee, at about 5:15 a.m., while proceeding to his place of work and running to avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a ditch fronting the main gate of the employer's factory, as a result of which he died the next day. The sole question was whether or not the accident which caused the employee's death arose out of and in the course of his employment. This Court ruled in favor of the claimant thus: 237

The very case of Afable vs. Singer Sewing Machine Co. invoked by the petitioner intimated that "we do not of course mean to imply that an employee can never recover for injuries suffered while on his way to or from work. That depends on the nature of his employment." Considering the facts found by the Commission, namely, that the deceased Angel Ariar was not under any shift routine; that his assignment covered the entire working hours of the factory; that the first working hour starts at 6:00 o'clock in the morning; that it takes at least thirty minutes before the machine operates at full speed or load; that the spot where he fell (ditch fronting petitioner's factory or sidewalk of its premises), is immediately proximate to his place of work, the accident in question must be deemed to have occurred within the zone of his employment and therefore arose out of and in the course thereof. In Salilig vs. Insular Lumber Co., G.R. No. 28951, September 10, 1928, referred to in the Comments on the Workmen's Compensation Commission Act by Morabe and Inton, 1955 edition, compensation was allowed for injury received by a laborer from an accident in going to his place of work, along a path or way owned by his employer and commonly used by the latter's laborers. In contrast is Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. vs. Quiroz,10 which concerned injuries sustained by a centrifugal operator. He had reported for work at 9:30 p.m. (March 7, 1958) and was dismissed at 5:30 the following morning. Soon "after he stepped out of the company gate, and while standing about 2- meters from it between the shoulder of the highway and a railroad that came from inside the compound and intersected the highway, waiting for a ride home, he was bumped by a jeepney, as a result of which he sustained" injuries. In holding that these injuries were "not produced by an accident "arising out of and in the course of employment," " this Court reasoned thus: The compensability of an injury suffered by an employee proceeding to or coming from his work depends upon whether or not it is "work-connected." As Chief Justice Kenison of New Hampshire has put it, "the fact that the employee is travelling to or from work on a public highway does not necessarily exclude coverage (Brousseau vs. Blackstone Mills, 130 A 2d 543, 545). Conversely, it is not enough to say that the employee would not have been on the public highway had it not been for his job, since the same can usually be said of the general public (Payne & Dolan vs. Industrial Commission, 46 NE 2d 925). The law, in effect, insures the employee against losses arising from the perils of his work. In other words, the Workmen's Compensation Act covers occupational injuries, which, as such, must have a causative connection with something, not merely in common with the public, but peculiar to the employment. In order to warrant recovery for off-the-premises injuries, it must be shown that there has been a very special danger, some particular risk which the employer could have caused or allowed to exist. Hence, It is significant that practically all successful off-the-premises cases have involved normal route of access to the plant, or an icy sidewalk adjacent to the premises and therefore identified with the premises in the sense that the employer should have removed the ice. (Emphasis ours.) It is true that in Philippine Fiber Processing Co. v. Ampil, G.R. No. L-8130 (June 30, 1956), we held the employer liable for an injury sustained by an employee who, as he was running to his place of work to avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a ditch in front of the factory's main gate and near the same. The ditch was, however, in itself an obvious hazard which, owing to its proximity to the gate, the employer should have taken measures to remove. Thus, thru his inaction, he had contributed, in a special way, to the occurrence of the accident.

In the case at bar, no such special circumstance appears to exist. There is no particular causative connection between the injury sustained by the employee and either his work or his employer. Although, as stated in the decision appealed from, the record does not show that the company "had taken measures to make the waiting place safe for the employees," neither does the record show either that the accident occurred at the usual waiting place of the employees, or that said place was particularly unsafe. Our Workmen's Compensation Act being essentially American in origin and text, it is not amiss to pay deference to pertinent American jurisprudence. In the precise area of law here involved, we can draw guidance from an affluence of Federal and State precedents. From Samuel B. Horovitz' Injury and Death under Workmen's Compensation Laws (1944), pp. 159 to 165, we glean the following observations: Suppose, however, that the injury occurs on the way to work or on the way home from work. Injuries going to or from work have caused many judicial upheavals. The question here is limited to whether the injuries are "in the course of" and not "out of" the employment. How the injury occurred is not in point. Street risks, whether the employee was walking or driving, and all other similar questions deal with the risk of injury or "out of" the employment. "In the course of" deals mainly with the element of time and space, or "time, place and circumstances." Thus, if the injury occurred fifteen minutes before working hours and within one hundred feet of the employer's premises, on sidewalks or public roads, the question of "in the course of" the employment is flatly raised. Some of our states refuse to extend this definition of "in the course of" to include these injuries. Most of the states will protect the employee from the moment his foot or person reaches the employer's premises, whether he arrives early or late. These states find something sacred about the employment premises and define "premises" very broadly, not only to include premises owned by the employer, but also premises leased, hired, supplied or used by him, even private alleyways merely used by the employer. Adjacent private premises are protected by many states, and a few protect the employee even on adjacent public sidewalks and streets. Where a city or any employer owns or controls an island, all its streets are protected premises. There is no reason in principle why states should not protect employees for a reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the employer's premises. The Supreme Court of the United States has declared that it will not overturn any state decision that so enlarges the scope of its act. Hence, a deaf worker, trespassing on railroad tracks adjacent to his employer's brickmaking premises (but shown by his superintendent the specific short crossing over the track), and killed by a train, was held to be in the course of his employment when hit by an oncoming train fifteen minutes before his day would have begun. So long as causal relation to the employment is discernible, no federal question arises. The narrow rule that a worker is not in the course of his employment until he crosses the employment threshold is itself subject to many exceptions. Off-premises injuries to or from work, in both liberal and narrow states, are compensable (1) if the employee is on the way to or from work in a vehicle owned or supplied by the employer, whether in a public (e.g., 238

the employer's street car) or private conveyance; (2) if the employee is subject to call at all hours or at the moment of injury; (3) if the employee is travelling for the employer, i.e., travelling workers; (4) if the employer pays for the employee's time from the moment he leaves his home to his return home; (5) if the employee is on his way to do further work at home, even though on a fixed salary; (6) where the employee is required to bring his automobile to his place of business for use there. Other exceptions undoubtedly are equally justified, dependent on their own peculiar circumstances. Schneider (supra, at p. 117) makes this significant statement: The proximity rule exception to the general going and coming rule is that an employee is generally considered to be in the course of his employment while coming to or going from his work, when, though off the actual premises of his employer, he is still in close proximity thereto, is proceeding diligently at an appropriate time, by reasonable means, over the natural, practical, customary, convenient and recognized way of ingress, or egress either on land under the control of the employer, or on adjacent property with the express or implied consent of the employer. On pp. 98 to 99 of 85 ALR, we find the following disquisition: The compensation acts have been very generally held not to authorize an award in case of an injury or death from a peril which is common to all mankind, or to which the public at large is exposed. 28 R.C. L. 804. And they do not as a general rule cover injuries received while going to or from work on public streets, where the employee has not reached, or has left the employer's premises. The question whether an injury arises out of and in the course of the employment, however, is one dependent upon the facts of each case, and in some cases, where an injury occured while the employee was going to or from work, but was in the street in front of the employer's premises, it has been held compensable. Thus, in the reported case (Barnett v. Brtiling Cafeteria Co., ante, 85) the injury was held to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment, where the employee slipped on ice on the sidewalk immediately in front of the employer's place of business, while on her way to report for duty, and just before entering by the only entrance to her place of employment. The court here recognized the general rule that, if an employee is injured while going to or from his work to his house, or to or from some point not visited for the discharge of a duty arising out of the employment, or while in the use of a public highway, he does not come within the protection of the Workmen's Compensation Act, but stated that there is an exception to this rule and that the employment is not limited by the actual time when the workman reaches the scene of his labor and begins it, or when he ceases, but includes a reasonable time and opportunity before and after, while he is at or near his place of employment. The court reasoned that in the case at bar, although the employee had not entered the employer's place of business, and the sidewalk was a public highway so much therefore as was in front of the employer's place of business was a necessary adjunct, used in connection with the business, and that the sidewalk was to a limited degree and purpose a part of the employer's premises. In Industrial Commission v. Barber (1927) 117 Ohio St 373, 159 NE 363, the injury was held to have arisen in the course of the employment where an employee, about five minutes before the hour when he was to go on duty, was struck by an automobile owned and driven by another employee, within a short distance from the employer's plant, which was located at the dead end of a street maintained by the employer from its plant to the intersection with another street, and, although the street was a public one, it led nowhere

except to the employer's plant, and all of its employees were obliged to use it in going to and from their work. The court stated that where the conditions under the control of an industrial plant are such that the employee has no option but to pursue a given course with reference to such conditions and environments, the pursuance of such course is an implied obligation of the employer in his contract with such employee, and that when he, for the purpose of entering his employment, has entered into the sphere or zone controlled by his employer and is pursuing a course with reference to which he has no option, he is then not only within the conditions and environments of the plant of his employer, but is then in the course of his employment; and that, when he receives an injury attributable to such conditions and environments, there is a direct causal connection between his employment and his injury, and the injury falls within the class of industrial injuries for which compensation has been provided by the Workmen's Compensation Law. 99 C.J.S., at pp. 807-814, has this to say: It is laid down as a general rule, known as the "going and coming" rule, that, in the absence of special circumstances, and except in certain unusual circumstances, and where nothing else appears, harm or injury sustained by an employee while going to or from his work is not compensable. Such injury, or accident, is regarded by the weight of authority of many courts as not arising out of his employment, and as not being, or not occurring, in the course thereof. However, this rule is not inflexible, is not of inevitable application, and is subject to qualifications, and to exceptions which depend on the nature, circumstances, and conditions of the particular employment, the circumstances of the particular case, and the cause of the injury. Jaynes vs. Potlach Forests11 expresses with enlightening clarity the rationale for extending the scope of "course of employment" to certain "off-premises" injuries: We are urged here to again recognize and apply the distinction between off-premises injuries which occur on private property and those which occur on public streets and highways. The extension of the course of employment to off-premises injuries is not based upon the principle which would justify a distinction upon the narrow ground of private and public property; it is not sound to say that while an employee is on public highway he is always there as a member of the public and in nowise in the exercise of any right conferred by his contract to employment; nor is it a complete answer to say that while he is on his employer's premises his presence there is by contract right, otherwise he would be a trespasser. The question of whether or not one is a covered employee should not be resolved by the application of the law relating to rights to enter upon lands, or by law of trespass, licensee, invitee or otherwise. A substantial and fair ground to justify the extension of the course of employment beyond the premises of the employer is to extend its scope to the necessary risks and hazards associated with the employment. These risks may or may not be on the premises of the employer and for this reason there is no justification to distinguish between extended risks on public highways and private pathways. In fact it is at most a distinction without a difference. Under the better reasoned cases the technical status as public or private is obviously of no moment or in any event in and of itself is not conclusive. Likewise enlightening is the following explanation of the premises rule exceptions: 239

We have, then a workable explanation of the exception to the premises rule: it is not nearness, or reasonable distance, or even the identifying or surrounding areas with the premises; it is simply that, when a court has satisfied itself that there is a distinct "arising out of" or causal connection between the conditions under which claimant must approach and leave the premises and the occurrence of the injury, it may hold that the course of employment extends as far as those conditions extend. (Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, 1965 ed., vol. 1, pp. 210-211) We now direct our attention to the cause of the employee's death: assault. An "assault," although resulting from a deliberate act of the slayer, is considered an "accident" within the meaning of sec. 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, since the word "accident" is intended to indicate that "the act causing the injury shall be casual or unforeseen, an act for which the injured party is not legally responsible."12 In the cases where the assault was proven to have been work-connected, compensation was awarded. In Nava, supra, the helmsman of a boat was engaged in hauling the ship's cable and in coiling the cable partly occupied by a folding bed of one of the passengers. This passenger, upon being asked, declared his ownership of the bed. Nava expressed his intention of pushing it out of the way and proceeded to do so. Angered by this, the passenger exchanged hot words with Nava, and then, with a piece of wood, jabbed Nava at the pit of the stomach. At this point, the passenger's brother ran up to Nava and stabbed him to death. The death was adjudged compensable. In Bohol Land Transportation Co. vs. Vda. de Mandaguit,13 the truck which Mandaguit was driving collided with a cyclist going in the opposite direction. The latter turned around and immediately pursued the bus. He overtook it a few minutes later when it stopped to take on passengers. The driver then disembarked from the bus to wash his hands at a drugstore nearby. The cyclist followed him there and knifed him to death. We affirmed the grant of compensation upon the finding that the death arose out of and in the course of employment. In Galicia vs. Dy Pac,14 the employee, Pablo Carla, was asked to work in lieu of another employee who had been suspended from work upon request of his labor union; while Carla was working, the suspended employee asked him to intercede for him, but Carla refused; an altercation resulted; shortly thereafter the suspended employee stabbed Carla to death. The death was held compensable because "the injury sustained by the deceased was caused by an accident arising out of his employment since the evidence is clear that the fight which resulted in the killing of the deceased had its origin or cause in the fact that he was placed in the job previously occupied by the assailant." In the three cases above-cited, there was evidence as to the motive of the assailant. In A. P. Santos, Inc. vs. Dabacol,15 the death of an employee-driver who, while driving a cab, was killed by an unidentified passenger, was held compensable by the Commission. However, the question of whether the assault arose out of the employment, was not raised on appeal to this Court. In Batangas Transportation Company vs. Vda. de Rivera,16 that question was raised. While the employee-driver was driving a bus, a passenger boarded it and sat directly behind the driver. After about thirty minutes, during which the passenger and the driver never so much as exchanged a word, the passenger shot the driver to death and then fled. There was no competent proof as to the cause of the assault, although there were intimations that the incident arose from a personal grudge. The majority decision17 ruled the death compensable. The bases: (1) Once it is proved that the employee died in the course of the employment, the legal presumption, in the absence of substantial evidence

to the contrary, is that the claim "comes within the provisions of the compensation law" (sec. 43), in other words, that the incident arose out of the workman's employment. (2) Doubts as to rights to compensation are resolved in favor of the employee and his dependents. (3) The Commissioner's declaration on the work-connection might be binding on the Court. (4) There are employments which increase the risk of assault on the person of the employee and it is in that sense that an injury or harm sustained by the assaulted worker arises out of the employment, because the increased risk to assault supplies the link or connection between the injury and the employment. Among the jobs enumerated as increasing the risk of assault are (a) jobs having to do with keeping the peace or guarding property; (b) jobs having to do with keeping or carrying of money which subject to the employee to the risk of assault because of the increased temptation to robbery; (c) jobs which expose the employee to direct contact with lawless and irresponsible members of the community, like that of a bartender; and (d) work as bus driver, taxi driver or street car conductor. It has been said that an employment may either increase risk of assault because of its nature or be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault. The first kind of employment, the so-called "increased risk" jobs comprehend (1) jobs involving dangerous duties, such as that of guarding the employer's property, that of carrying or keeping money, that where the employee is exposed to lawless or irresponsible members of the public, or that which subjects him to increased or indiscriminate contact with the public, such as the job of a street car conductor or taxi-driver;18 (2) jobs where the employee is placed in a dangerous environment; 19 and (3) jobs of employees whose work takes them on the highway. On the other hand, the employment itself may be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault as where a supervisor is assaulted by workmen he has fired, or where the argument was over the performance of work or possession of tools or the like, or where the violence was due to labor disputes.20 In Rivera, supra, the unexplained assault on the employee was considered to have arisen out of the employment because it occurred in the course of employment. This Court relied on the presumption of law that in any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the claim is presumed to come within the provisions of the Act.21According to this Court, "this statutory presumption was copied from New York." Concerning the corresponding New York provision of law, Larson has this to say: In a few jurisdictions, notably New York and Massachusetts, a statutory presumption in favor of coverage has figured in unexplained-accident cases. The Massachusetts statute provides: In any claim for compensation, where the employee has been killed, or is physically or mentally unable to testify, it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter, that sufficient notice of the injury has been given, and that the injury or death was not occasioned by the wilful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or another. This provision was largely copied from the New York section on presumptions, except that the New York act creates the presumption in all cases, not merely those involving an employee's death or inability to testify. The sweeping inclusiveness of this language might seem at first glance to mean that the mere making of a claim is also the making of a prima facie case, as long as death or injury is shown to have occurred. The New York and Massachusetts courts have not so interpreted these statutes, however. It seems to be necessary to establish some kind of preliminary link with the employment before the presumption can attach. Otherwise, the claimant widow would have merely to say, "My husband, who was one of your employee, 240

has died, and I therefore claim death benefits," whereupon the affirmative burden would devolve upon the employer to prove that there was no connection between the death and the environment. It is not yet entirely clear what initial demonstration of employment-connection will give the presumption a foothold. Apparently, the idea is to rule out cases in which claimant can show neither that the injury occurred in the course of employment nor that it arose out of it, as where he contracted a disease but has no evidence to show where he got it. If there is evidence that the injury occurred in the course of employment, the presumption will usually supply the "arising-out-of-employment" factor." Larson's Workmen Compensation Law (1965) vol. 1, pp. 123-124. We also quote from the decision of the Court of Appeals of New York in Daus vs. Gunderman & Sons:22 The statute is not intended to relieve completely an employee from the burden of showing that accidental injuries suffered by him actually were sustained in the course of his employment. "It is not the law that mere proof of an accident, without other evidence, creates the presumption under section 21 of the Workmen's Compensation Law (Consol. Law, c. 67) that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment. On the contrary, it has been frequently held, directly and indirectly, that there must be some evidence from which the conclusion can be drawn that the injuries did arise out of and in the course of the employment." Proof of the accident will give rise to the statutory presumption only where some connection appears between the accident and the employment. Likewise of relevance is the following treatise: The discussion of the coverage formula, "arising out of and in the course of employment," was opened with the suggestion that, while "course" and "arising" were put under separate headings for convenience, some interplay between the two factors should be observed in the various categories discussed. A few examples may now be reviewed to show that the two tests, in practice, have not been kept in air-tight compartments, but have to some extent merged into a single concept of work-connection. One is almost tempted to formulate a sort of quantum theory of workconnection: that a certain minimum quantum of work-connection must be shown, and if the "course" quantity is very small, but the "arising" quantity is large, the quantum will add up to the necessary minimum, as it will also when the "arising" quantity is very small but the "course" quantity is relatively large. But if both the "course" and "arising" quantities are small, the minimum quantum will not be met. As an example of the first, a strong "arising" factor but weak "course" factor, one may cite the cases in which recoveries have been allowed off the employment premises, outside business hours, when an employee going to or coming from work is injured by a hazard distinctly traceable to the employment, such as a traffic jam overflowing from the employment premises, or a rock flying through the air from a blast on the premises. Here, by normal course of employment standards, there would be no award, since the employee was not on the premises while coming or going. Yet the unmistakable character of the

causal relation of the injury to the employment has been sufficient to make up for the weakness of the "course" factor. Another example of the same kind of balancing-out is seen in the line of cases dealing with injury to travelling men or loggers while sleeping in hotels or bunkhouses. It was shown in the analysis of these cases that, although the "course" factor is on the borderline when the employee is sound asleep at the time of injury, a strong causal relation of the injury to the conditions of employment as where a fellowlogger runs amok, or a straw falls into the bunkhouse-inmate's throat from the mattress above, or the employee is trapped in a burning hotel will boost the case over the line to success; while a weak causal connection, as where the salesman merely slips in a hotel bath, coupled with a weak "course" factor due to the absence of any direct service performed for the employer at the time, will under present decisions add up to a quantum of work-connection too small to support an award. It was also shown that when the "course" element is strengthened by the fact that the employee is at all times on call, the range of compensable sources of injury is broader than when the employee, although living on the premises is not on call. A somewhat similar balancing-out process is seen in the holding that a borderline courseof-employment activity like seeking personal comfort or going to and from work falls short of compensability if the method adopted is unusual, unreasonable and dangerous, while no such restriction applies to the direct performance of the work. As an example of the reverse situation, a strong "course" element and a weak "arising" element; one may recall the "positional" cases discussed in section 10, as well as the unexplained-fall and other "neutral-cause" cases. Here the course of employment test is satisfied beyond the slightest doubt: the employee is in the midst of performing the active duties of his job. But the causal connection is very weak, since the source of the injury whether a stray bullet, a wandering lunatic, and unexplained fall or death, or a mistaken assault by a stranger is not distinctly associated with employment conditions as such, and is tied to the employment only by the argument that the injury would not have occurred to this employee but for the obligation of the employment which placed him in the position to be hurt. Yet, since the "course" element is so strong, awards are becoming increasingly common on these facts. Incidentally, it may be observed that this "quantum" idea forms a useful yardstick for measuring just how generous a court has become in expanding compensation coverage; for if a court makes an award when a case, by the above standards, is weak both on course of employment and on causal connection, one can conclude that the court is capable of giving the act a broad construction. Thus, an award was made in Puffin v. General Electric, where the course element was weak (rest period) and the causal element was weak (setting fire to own sweater while smoking). Both factors were likewise very weak in O'Leary v. Brown Pacific-Maxon Inc., where the course of employment consisted of a recreation period interrupted by a rescue of a stranger, and the arising factor consisted of drowning in a channel where decedent was prohibited from going. And, in Martin v. Plaut, the course of employment factor was weak (a cook dressing in the morning) and the causal factor was also weak (an unexplained fall); yet an award was made in New York. But another New York case shows that the simultaneous weakness of course and arising factors may reach the point where the requisite quantum is not found. In Shultz v. Nation Associates, compensation was denied to an employee who while combing her hair preparatory to going to lunch negligently struck her eye with the comb. Here we see thinness on all fronts: as to course of employment time factor, we have a lunch period; as to the course of employment activity factor, we have care of personal appearance; and as to the causal factor, we have negligence of the employee. Each weakness standing alone 241

lunch period, care of appearance, negligence would not be fatal; there are many awards in which one or another of these is present. But when all are present, while an award is not impossible and could be defended on a point by point basis, it cannot be relied upon in most jurisdictions by the prudent lawyer. Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law 1965 ed. Vol. 1, pp. 452.97 to 452.100. In resume: 1. Workmen's compensation is granted if the injuries result from an accident which arise out of and in the course of employment. 2. Both the "arising" factor and the "course" factor must be present. If one factor is weak and the other is strong, the injury is compensable, but not where both factors are weak. Ultimately, the question is whether the accident is work-connected. 3. In a proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the same is presumed to come within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. But a preliminary link must first be shown to exist between the injury and the employment. Thus if the injury occurred in the course of employment, it is presumed to have arisen out of the employment. 4. The "course" factor applies to time, place and circumstances. This factor is present if the injury takes place within the period of employment, at a place where the employee may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto. 5. The rule is that an injury sustained while the employee goes to or comes from his place of work, is not of the employment. 6. The exception to the rule is an injury sustained off the employee's premises, but while in close proximity thereto and while using a customary means of ingress and egress. The reason for extending the scope of "course of employment" to off-premises injuries is that there is a causal connection between the work and the hazard. 7. An "assault" may be considered an "accident" within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The employment may either increase risk of assault because of its nature or be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault. From the milestones, we now proceed to take our bearings in the case at bar, having in mind always that no cover-all formula can be spelled out with specificity, that the particular facts and circumstances of each case must be inquired into, and that in any perceptive inquiry, the question as to where the line should be drawn beyond which the liability of the employer cannot continue has been held to be usually one of fact. We shall first dwell on the question of ownership of the private road where Pablo was killed. In granting compensation, the Commission said that "the road where the deceased was shot was of private ownership, was called the IDECO road, and led straight to the main IDECO gate, thus raising the reasonable assumption that it belonged" to the IDECO. The Commission reasoned out that "even if the ownership of the road were open to question, there was no doubt that its private character was obviously exploited by the respondent for the purpose of its own business to such an extent as to make it to all intents and purposes an extension of its premises," so that the "shooting of the deceased may be considered to have taken place on the premises, and therefore within the

employment;" and that "while respondent allowed its name to be used in connection with the private road for the ingress and egress of the employees it did not apparently take the necessary precaution to make it safe for its employees by employing security guards." But the IDECO denies ownership of the road. In its memorandum filed with the Regional Office, IDECO averred that Pablo's death did not originate from his work as to time, place and circumstances. This, in effect, is a denial of ownership of the road. The decision of the Regional Office does not state that the road belongs to the IDECO. All that it says is that Pablo was shot "barely two minutes after he was dismissed from work and while walking along the IDECO road about twenty (20) meters from the gate." In its "motion for reconsideration and/or review," the IDECO emphasized that "the place where the incident happened was a public road, not less than twenty (20) meters away from the main gate of the compound, and therefore not proximate to or in the immediate vicinity of the place of work." Again, the ownership of the road was implicitly denied. And in its "motion for reconsideration and/or appeal to the Commission en banc," the IDECO alleged outright that the "road where the incident took place, although of private ownership, does not belong to IDECO. There is absolutely no evidence on record that shows IDECO owns the road." If the road were owned by the IDECO, there would have been no question that the assault arose "in the course of employment."23 But if it did indeed own the road, then the IDECO would have fenced it, and place its main gate at the other end of the road where it meets the public highway. But while the IDECO does not own the private road, it cannot be denied that it was using the same as the principal means of ingress and egress. The private road leads directly to its main gate. 24 Its right to use the road must then perforce proceed from either an easement of right of way or a lease. Its right, therefore, is either a legal one or a contractual one. In either case the IDECO should logically and properly be charged with security control of the road. The IDECO owed its employees a safe passage to its premises. In compliance with such duty, the IDECO should have seen to it not only that road was properly paved and did not have holes or ditches, but should also have instituted measures for the proper policing of the immediate area. The point where Pablo was shot was barely twenty meters away from the main IDECO gate, certainly nearer than a stone's throw therefrom. The spot is immediately proximate to the IDECO's premises. Considering this fact, and the further facts that Pablo had just finished overtime work at the time, and was killed barely two minutes after dismissal from work, the Ampil case is squarely applicable here. We may say, as we did in Ampil, that the place where the employee was injured being "immediately proximate to his place of work, the accident in question must be deemed to have occurred within the zone of his employment and therefore arose out of and in the course thereof." Our principal question is whether the injury was sustained in the course of employment. We find that it was, and so conclude that the assault arose out of the employment, even though the said assault is unexplained. American jurisprudence supports this view. In Bountiful Brick Company vs. Giles,25 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled: Employment includes both only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee to be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. In other words, the employment may begin in point of time before the work is entered upon and in point of space before the place where the work is to be done is reached. Probably, as a general rule, employment may be said to begin when the 242

employee reaches the entrance to the employer's premises where the work is to be done; but it is clear that in some cases the rule extends to include adjacent premises used by the employee as a means of ingress and egress with the express or implied consent of the employer. The above ruling is on all fours with our facts. Two minutes from dismissal and twenty meters from the main IDECO gate are "a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from" the IDECO's premises. The IDECO employees used the private road with its consent, express or implied. Twenty meters on that road from the main gate is in close proximity to the IDECO's premises. It follows that Pablo's death was in the course of employment. In Carter vs. Lanzetta,26 it was held that "such statutes envision extension of coverage to employees from the time they reach the employer's premises until they depart therefrom and that hours of service include a period when this might be accomplished within a reasonable interval;" and that "under exceptional circumstances, a continuance of the course of employment may be extended by allowing the employee a reasonable time not only to enter or leave the premises but also to surmount certain hazards adjacent thereto." The private road led directly to the main IDECO gate. From this description, it would appear that the road is a dead-end street. In Singer vs. Rich Marine Sales,27 it was held that, where the employee, while returning to work at the end of the lunch period, fell at the curb of the sidewalk immediately adjacent to the employer's premises and one other located thereon, and the general public used the street only in connection with those premises, and the employer actually stored boats on the sidewalk, the sidewalk was within the precincts of employment. In that case there were even two business establishments on the dead-end street. Here, it is exclusively the IDECO premises which appear to be at the end of the private road. We find in Jean vs. Chrysler Corporation28 a meaningful statement of the obligation of the employer to its employees: "That the employer owes, so to speak, a duty of 'safe passage' to an employee to the point where he can reach the proper arrival or departure from his work seems without question." We next quote extensively from Kelty vs. Travellers Insurance Company:29 The rule has been repeatedly announced in Texas that an injury received by an employee while using the public streets and highways in going to or returning from the place of employment is not compensable, the rationale of the rule being that in most instances such an injury is suffered as a consequence of risk and hazards to which all members of the travelling public are subject rather than risk and hazards having to do with and originating in the work or business of the employer.... Another exception, however, which is applicable is found in the so-called "access" cases. In these cases a workman who has been injured at a plane intended by the employer for use as a means of ingress or egress to and from the actual place of the employee's work has been held to be in the course of his employment. The courts have said that these access areas are so closely related to the employer's premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the employer's premises. We shall discuss the principal authorities dealing with this exception to the general rule. The leading cases in Texas dealing with the "access" exception, and one which we think is controlling of this appeal, is Lumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72, 28 A.L.R. 1402. In that case the employee was employed by Hartburg Lumber

Company, which company operated and owned a sawmill in Hartburg, Texas, which was a lumber town, consisting solely of the employer's facilities. A railroad track ran through the town and a part of the lumber company's facilities was situated on either side of the right-ofway. A public road ran parallel to the railroad tracks which led to the various buildings on the property of the lumber company. This crossing was used by any member of the public desiring to go to any part of the lumber company facilities. On the day in question the decedent quit work at noon, went home for lunch and while returning to the lumber company plant for the purpose of resuming his employment, was struck and killed by a train at the crossing in question. The insurance company contended (as it does here) that the decedent's death did not originate in the work or business of his employer and that at the time of his fatal injuries he was not in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer. The Supreme Court, in an extensive opinion, reviewed the authorities from other states and especially Latter's Case 238 Mass. 326, 130 N. E. 637, 638, and arrived at the conclusion that the injury and death under such circumstances were compensable under the Texas Act. The court held that the railroad crossing bore so intimate a relation to the lumber company's premises that it could hardly be treated otherwise than as a part of the premises. The Court pointed out that the lumber company had rights in and to the crossing which was used in connection with the lumber company's business, whether by employees or by members of the public. In announcing the "access" doctrine Justice Greenwood said: Was Behnken engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer when he received the injury causing his death? He was upon the crossing provided as the means of access to his work solely because he was an employee. He encountered the dangers incident to use of the crossing in order that he might perform the duties imposed by his contract of service. Without subjecting himself to such dangers he could not do what was required of him in the conduct of the lumber company's business. He had reached a place provided and used only as an adjunct to that business, and was injured from a risk created by the conditions under which the business was carried on. To hold that he was not acting in furtherance of the affairs or business of the lumber company would be to give a strict interpretation to this remedial statute, which should be liberally construed with a view to accomplish its purpose and to promote justice. xxx xxx xxx

quoted from the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Bountiful Brisk Company, et al. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 48 S. Ct. 221, 72 L. Ed. 507, 66 A. L. R. 1402, as follows: An employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. In other words, the employment may begin in point of time before the work is entered upon and in point of space before the place where the work is to be done is reached. The ruling enunciated above is applicable in the case at bar. That part of the road where Pablo was killed is in very close proximity to the employer's premises. It is an "access area" "so clearly related to the employer's premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the employer's premises." That portion of the road bears "so intimate a relation" to the company's premises. It is the chief means of entering the IDECO premises, either for the public or for its employees. The IDECO uses it extensively in pursuit of its business. It has rights of passage over the road, either legal, if by virtue of easement, or contractual, if by reason of lease. Pablo was using the road as a means of access to his work solely because he was an employee. For this reason, the IDECO was under obligation to keep the place safe for its employees. Safe, that is, against dangers that the employees might encounter therein, one of these dangers being assault by third persons. Having failed to take the proper security measures over the said area which it controls, the IDECO is liable for the injuries suffered by Pablo resulting in his death. As therefore stated, the assault on Pablo is unexplained. The murderer was himself killed before he could be brought to trial. It is true there is authority for the statement that before the "proximity" rule may be applied it must first be shown that there is a causal connection between the employment and the hazard which resulted in the injury.30 The following more modern view was expressed in Lewis Wood Preserving Company vs. Jones:31 While some earlier cases seem to indicate that the causative danger must be peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood for the injuries to arise out of and in the course of the employment (see Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peek, 36 Ga. App. 557 [137 S.E. 121]; Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Cox, 61 Ga. App. 420, 6 S.E. 2d 189), later cases have been somewhat more liberal, saying that, "to be compensable, injuries do not have to arise from something peculiar to the employment." Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Bardon, 79 Ga. App. 260, 262, 54 S.E. 2d 443, 444. "Where the duties of an employee entail his presence (at a place and a time) the claim for an injury there occurring is not to be barred because it results from a risk common to all others ... unless it is also common to the general public without regard to such conditions, and independently of place, employment, or pursuit." New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 682, 118 S.E. 786, cited in Globe Indemnity Co. v. MacKendree, 39 Ga. App. 58, 146 S.E. 46, 47; McKiney v. Reynolds & Manley Lumber Co., 79 Ga. App. 826, 829, 54 S.E. 2d 471, 473. But even without the foregoing pronouncement, the employer should still be held liable in view of our conclusion that that portion of the road where Pablo was killed, because of its proximity, should be considered part of the IDECO's premises. Hence, the injury was in the course of employment, and 243

In Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Anderson, Tex. Civ. App., 125 S. W. 2d 674, wr. ref., this court followed the rule announced in Behnken, supra. In that case the employee was killed while crossing the railroad track near his place of employment. In discussing the question of the situs of the injury Justice Looney said: Its use as a means of ingress to and exit from his place of work not only conduced his safety and convenience, but contributed to the promptness and efficiency with which he was enabled to discharge the duties owing his employer; hence the reason and necessity for his presence upon the railroad track (that portion of the pathway leading over the railroad right of way) when injured, in our opinion, had to do with, originated in and grew out of the work of the employer; and that, the injury received at the time, place and under the circumstances, necessarily was in furtherance of the affairs or business of the employer. Again, in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Boecker, Tex. Civ. App. 53 S. W. 2d 327, err. ref., this court had occasion to follow the "access" doctrine. In that case Chief Justice Jones

there automatically arises the presumption invoked in Rivera that the injury by assault arose out of the employment, i. e., there is a causal relation between the assault and the employment. We do say here that the circumstances of time, two minutes after dismissal from overtime work, and space, twenty meters from the employer's main gate, bring Pablo's death within the scope of the course factor. But it may logically be asked: Suppose it were three minutes after and thirty meters from, or five minutes after and fifty meters from, would the "proximity" rule still apply? In answer, we need but quote that portion of the decision in Jean vs. Chrysler Corporation, supra, which answered a question arising from an ingenious hypothetical question put forth by the defendant therein: We could, of course, say "this is not the case before us" and utilize the old saw, "that which is not before us we do not decide." Instead, we prefer to utilize the considerably older law: "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof" (Matthew 1:34), appending, however, this admonition: no statute is static; it must remain constantly viable to meet new challenges placed to it. Recovery in a proper case should not be suppressed because of a conjectural posture which may never arise and which if it does, will be decided in the light of then existing law. Since the Workmen's Compensation Act is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to workmen, it must be liberally construed to attain the purpose for which it was enacted. 32 Liberally construed, sec. 2 of the Act comprehends Pablo's death. The Commission did not err in granting compensation. ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is affirmed, at petitioner's cost.

G.R. No. L-22096

September 29, 1967

TALISAY-SILAY MILLING CO., INC., petitioner, vs. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and ILDEFONSO ALVAREZ, respondents. Guanzon, Sison and Associates for petitioner. P. C. Villavieja and P. E. Villanueva for respondents. CASTRO, J.: This is an appeal by certiorari by the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. from the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission rendered on August 16, 1963 in case R07-46801 1 and affirmed by the Commissionen banc on October 8, 1963, ordering the company 1. To pay the claimant, through this Office, in lump sum the amount of ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED NINETY FIVE AND 69/100 (P1,395.69) as compensation; 2. To pay the claimant the amount of SIX HUNDRED TWENTY-ONE and 85/100 (P621.85) as reimbursement of medical expenses; and 3. To pay to the Workmen's Compensation Fund the amount of FOURTEEN PESOS (P14.00) as fees, pursuant to Section 55 of the Act. On November 23, 1953 the claimant Ildefonso Alvarez, a paymaster of the petitioner, after he had paid the wages of some of the laborers of the petitioner, was ordered by the latter to cease work and go home because of an approaching typhoon. A passenger bus brought him to Bacolod City, where he boarded a pick-up truck of the petitioner which proceeded to Bago, Negros Occidental, his hometown. At Kilometer 17 in barrio Calumangan, the vehicle met with an accident, resulting in death to three of its passengers and physical injuries to four others, among them the respondent. The latter was confine at the Negros Occidental Provincial Hospital for twenty-one days. After his discharge from the hospital, his injuries took three more months to heal. He was thereafter never re-employed. The issues tendered for resolution are (1) whether the WCC erred in holding that the respondent's injuries arose "out of and in the course of employment", 2 within the meaning and intendment of section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, and (2) whether the petitioner failed to controvert the claim for compensation.1awphl.nt It is undisputed that the petitioner furnished its employees free transportation from its central to Bacolod City and from Bacolod City to the central, and that the pick-up truck that figured in the accident was assigned for such purpose. The petitioner contends, however, that the injuries sustained by the respondent are not compensable as they did not arise out of and in the course of employment, because the trip to Bago was made without the "knowledge and consent" of its resident manager, Mariano Castaeda, or his duly authorized representative, Roque Torres, chief of security guards and superintendent of transportation; and that, therefore, the respondent took the ride at his own risk, and, like a "hitch-hiker", should suffer the consequences of the travel. This contention is untenable. Castaeda's testimony that the respondent did not ask him permission to use the vehicle for the trip to Bago does not belie the respondent's claim that he " asked 244

permission from Mr. Torres . . . for the use of the pick-up truck from the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., to the municipality of Bago, Negros Occidental, which request was granted him by Mr. Torres". 3 True it is that Torres declared that "there was nopass" or written permission given for that trip, but this witness never denied categorically that the respondent orally asked his permission for the use of the vehicle for the trip, or that he orally "granted" the request. Absent such categorical denial, the reasonable inference can be made that such request was indeed made and that he, as superintendent of the petitioner's transportation department, granted it orally. This Court has in the past refused to reverse or modify the findings of fact of the WCC on the ground, here relied upon, that there was testimonial evidence on record contrary to the findings of the 4 WCC. And there is at all no showing that the findings of the WCC, more particularly the finding that the trip was with the petitioner's "knowledge and consent", find "absolutely no support in the evidence on record", or are "unsupported by substantial evidence". 5 Upon the contrary, findings of the WCC are based not merely upon the respondent's oral testimony, but also upon "factors and circumstances brought out during the hearing of the case". Thus, the WCC correctly observed that Aside from the claimant who lived in Bago, three other passengers of said truck, who were also employees of respondent company, resided in said municipality. From this and from the fact that the respondent declared an emergency because of the coming storm and had to send its employees home, the most logical conclusion that can be drawn is that said trip to Bago was with the knowledge and consent of the respondent [petitioner herein], as had been previously done during an emergency or when employees rendered overtime work. It is of no moment that the trip to Bago, Negros Occidental, was beyond the customary perimeter of travel, for the extended trip was made with the acquiescence of no less than the petitioner's superintendent of transportation. Injuries sustained by a workman when he is provided with transportation while going to or coming from his work have been considered as arising out of and in the course of his employment, when such transportation is the result of an "express agreement" between the employer and his workman, or when it has ripened into a "custom" to the extent and it is "incidental to," and "part of", the "contract of employment," or when it is with the "knowledge and acquiescence of the employer," or when it is the result of a "continued practice" in the "course of the employer's business" and which practice is "beneficial to both employer and employee."6 The petitioner further contends that the WCC, erred in holding that it failed to make a timely controversion of the respondent's claim for compensation. The petitioner admittedly failed to file on time its Controverting Claim for Compensation (Form No. 6, exh. 1) and its Employer's Supplementary Report of Accident or Sickness (Form No. 5, exh. 2). It nonetheless argues that the time requirement of the law regarding the filing of the controversion is not "strictly mandatory", considering that the rules of the WCC should be "liberally construed in order to promote and attain their object to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their case",7 that the fact that the hearing officer allowed the petitioner to adduce evidence resisting the respondent's claim shows that such claim was "never treated as an uncontroverted or uncontested case"; and that the respondent's failure to have the petitioner declared in default and to object to the presentation if its evidence "had the legal consequence of reinstating to the petitioner its right to controvert".

This contention is without merit. Having failed to file its controversion on time, the petitioner thereby waived or renounced "by operation of law" its right to question the validity or reasonableness of the respondent's claim for compensation.8 And this "statutory renunciation" was not voided by the fact that the hearing officer never treated the case as uncontroverted or uncontested. Nor was the case ipso facto re-instated because of the respondent's failure to have the petitioner declared in default or to object to the presentation of its evidence. For to effect a reinstatement of its right to controvert, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to submit reasonable grounds on the basis of which his right to controvert might be reinstated. The petitioner's honest assumption that controversion was superfluous and unnecessary as "the respondent's claim for compensation was filed out of time", is not one of the "reasonable grounds" contemplated by the applicable provisions of law. We have repeatedly held that the requirement prescribed in section 24 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, may be dispensed with, where as in this case, the record indubitably shows that the petitioner had knowledge of the accident that resulted in physical injuries to the respondent and that no prejudice was caused to the employer by the delay in the filing of the claim for compensation. 9 ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is affirmed in toto, at petitioner's cost.

G.R. No. L-22117

April 29, 1966

PAMPANGA SUGAR DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., petitioner, vs. DONATO QUIROZ, respondent. Gil R. Carlos and Associates, for petitioner Dioscoro G. Pineda, for respondent. CONCEPCION, J.: Although entitled "Petition for Certiorari" and the prayer thereof suggests that it is an original action for certiorari, this proceeding is, in effect, an appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission sentencing herein petitioner, Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc., hereinafter referred to as the Company, to pay P1,899.24 to Donato Quiroz, plus P142.44 to his counsel and P24.00 to the Workmen's Compensation Fund. The facts are set forth in said decision, from which we quote: There is practically no controversy as to the circumstances surrounding the accident that befell the claimant. The caimnant,1 who was employed as centrifugal operator by the respondent2 reported for work on March 7, 1958 at around 9:30 p.m. and was dismissed at around 5:30 a.m. the following day. Soon after he stepped out of the company gate, and while standing about 2 1/2 meters from it between the shoulder of the highway and a railroad that came from inside the compound and intersected the highway, waiting for a ride 245

home, he was bumped by a jeepney as a result of which he sustained various wounds on his body as well as a complete fracture of his left clavicle. According to the records of the case, the injured was with other employees of the same company waiting for transportation. There is nothing in the records which shows that respondent had taken measures to make the waiting place safe for the employees. The main issue for determination in this case is whether the injuries sustained by claimant Quiroz, under the circumstances indicated, were produced by an accident "arising out of and in the course of employment", as this clause is used in Section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. As stated in In re McNicol (102 NE [1913] 697): . . . It is sufficient to say that an injury is received "in the course of" employment when it comes while the workman is doing the duty which he is employed to perform. It arises "out of" the employment when there is apparent in the rational mind ... causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury .... But it excludes an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to which the workman would have been equally exposed apart from the employment. The causative danger must be peculiar to the work, and not common to the neighborhood. It must be incidental to the character of the business, and not independent of the relation of master and servant. It need not have been foreseen or expected, but after the event, it must appear to have had its origin on a risk connected with the employment , to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence. An injury or accident "befalls a man in thec ourse of" his employment, if it occurs while he is doing what a man may reasonably do within a time during which he is employed, and at a place where he may reasonably be during that time. 13 NACCA LAW JOURNAL 28-29. And it "arises out of" the work of the employer, when it results from a risk or hazard which is necessarily or ordinarily or reasonably inherent in our incident to the conduct of such work or business. (Emphasis ours.) As a consequence, the general rule, subject to exceptions, is that injuries sustained by an employee, outside the premises of the employer, while going to or returning from work, are not compensable. Referring to the exceptions, Larson has this to say: . . . recoveries have been allowed off the employment premises, outside business hours, when an employee going to or coming from work is injured by a hazard distinctly traceable to the employment, such as a traffic jam overflowing from the employment premises, or a rock flying through the air from a blast on the premises. Here, by normal course of employment standards, there would be no award, since the employee was not on the premises while coming or going. Yet the unmistakable character of the causal relation of the injury to the employment has been sufficient to make up for the weakness of the "course" factor. Another example of the same kind of balancing-out is seen in the line of cases dealing with injury to travelling men or loggers while sleeping in hotels or bunkhouses. It was shown in the analysis of these cases that, although the "course" factor is on the borderline when the employee is sound asleep at the time of injury, a strong causal relationof the injury to the conditions of employment as where a fellow-logger runs amok, or a straw falls into a bunkhouse-inmate's throat from the mattress above, or the employee is trapped in a burning hotel will boost the case over the line to success; while a weak causal relation, as where the salesman merely slips in the hotel bath, coupled with the work "course" factor due to the absence of any direct service performed for the 246

employer at the time, will under present decisions add up to quantum of workconnection too small to support an award.3 (Emphasis ours.) Thus, the compensability of an injury suffered by an employee proceeding to or coming from his work depends upon whether or not it is "work connected". As Chief Justice Kenison of New Hampshire has put it, "the fact that the employee is travelling to or from work on a pubIic highway does not necessarily excluded coverage (Brousseau vs. Blackstone Hills, 130 A 2d 543, 545). Conversely, it is not enough to say that the employee would not have been on the public highway had it not been for his job, since the same can usually be said of the general public (Payne & Dolan vs. Industrial Commission, 46 NE 2d 925). The law, in effect, insures the employee against losses arisingfrom the perils of his work. In other words, the Workmen's Compensation Act covers occupational injuries, which, as such, must have a causative connection with something, not merely in common with the public, but peculiar to the employment. In order to warrant recovery for off-the-premises injuries, it must be shown that there has been a very special danger, some particular risk which the employer could have caused or allowed to exist.4 Hence, It is significant that practically all successful off-the-premises cases have involved either a dangerous railroad crossing lying in the normal route of access to the plant, or an icy sidewalk adjacent to the premises and therefore identified with the premises in the sense that the employer should have removed the ice. In other words, there has always been a very special danger.5 (Emphasis ours.) It is true that in Philippine Fiber Processing Co. vs. Ampil, G.R. No. L-7130 (June 30, 1956), we held the employer liable for an injury sustained by an employee who, as he was running to his place of work to avoid the rain, slippedand fell into a ditch in front of the factory's main gate and near the same. The ditch was, however, in itself an obvious hazard which, owing to its proximity to the the gate, the employer should have taken measures to remove. Thus, thru his inaction, he had contributed, in a special way, to the occurrence of the accident. In the case at bar, no such special circumstances appears to exist. There is no particular causative connection between the injury sustained by the employee and either his work or his employer. Although, as stated in the decision appealed from, the record does not show that the company "had taken measures to make the waiting place safe for the employees", neither does the record show either that the accident occurred at the usual waiting place of the employees, or that said place was particularly unsafe. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and petitioner herein absolved from the claim of Donato Quiroz, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered. 1wph1.t

G.R. No. L-20202

May 31, 1965

CIRIACO HERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, respondents. Felix Law Office for petitioner. Villavieja and Martinez for respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission. Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for respondent Manila Electric Company. BENGZON, J.P., J.:

WHEREFORE the Manila Electric Company is hereby adjudged to pay Mr. Ciriaco Hernandez, through this Office, the sum of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) as temporary total disability compensation pursuant to the instant claim. Respondent is further ordered to pay to this Office the sum of FORTY ONE PESOS (P41.00) as fees pursuant to Sec. 55 of Act No. 3428, as amended. Counsel for claimant may not charge the latter, attorney's fees in excess of the limit provided for under Section 6, Rule 26 of the Rules of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. SO ORDERED.

Petition for review of a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. Petitioner Ciriaco Hernandez was employed by respondent Manila Electric Company, hereafter called MERALCO, on May 15, 1930, as automotive mechanic. The work entailed, among other things, the dismantling, repair and installation of transmissions, differentials and steering wheels of trucks. Admittedly, he was then in good health. On January 15, 1953, after 23 years continuous service Hernandez was found to be suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis. From 1953 to 1959, his x-ray examinations indicated presence of "minimal, fibrotic infiltration of both apices." During said period he received treatment for said disease from MERALCO's physician at its clinic. Aside from pulmonary tuberculosis, Hernandez contracted inguinal hernia, and underwent operation therefor, in 1954. Still later, on September 18, 1959, he had carcinoma of the prostate, and was likewise operated on for it. Pursuant to its general circular on "Leaves and Retirement" providing: When an employee shall have (a) Completed 30 years of continuous, faithful and satisfactory service to the Company, or (b) Reached his 60th birthday, said employee shall be retired from the service and be paid the full amount credited to his "Retirement Account", MERALCO advised Hernandez on May 8, 1959 that he will be retired on December 31, 1959 and be paid his "Retirement Account". At his own request, however, Hernandez was retired on November 25, 1959 and was paid his retirement benefits. He was then 69 years old. On March 10, 1960, Hernandez filed with the Department of Labor a Notice of Sickness and Claim for Compensation. Subsequently, this was superseded by an Amended Claim filed on March 7, 1961. The claimant alleged, in brief, that due to illness suffered in the course of his employment he was forced to retire due to disability to work but respondent MERALCO did not pay him compensation as provided by law. After MERALCO filed its answer controverting the claim, the Department of Labor, Regional Office No. 4, heard the case. On February 1, 1962, the hearing officer decided that claimant was entitled to disability compensation, thus: 247 The reason given by the Workmen's Compensation Commission in rejecting compensation for petitioner's tuberculosis was that since it took 23 years for the disease to manifest itself the same could not have been due to petitioner's working conditions. Such a view runs counter to our ruling in Agustin vs. WCC, L-19957, September 29, 1964, that once the disease has been shown to have arisen in the course of the employment, it is presumed by law , in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that it arose out of it. Petitioner's tuberculosis admittedly arose in the course of his employment. The fact alone that 23 years had elapsed before the disease appeared is not substantial evidence that it did not arise out of the employment: The Commission does not refer to any evidence showing that the disease of the claimant could not have been due to the conditions in which he had been working for so many years. It merely speculates that it could not have so originated, because after 23 years the tuberculosis was found to be minimal. We find this speculation insufficient to rebut the statutory presumption, since it does not exclude the probability that the condition of work reduced the resistance of the laborer's body to the point that he was unable to withstand the infection. Also, the Commission's reasoning is faulty, in that the number of years that elapsed before the disease became manifest merely tends to prove that the deterioration caused by working conditions was slow, but not that the working conditions did not cause such deterioration in the health of the laborer. (Agustin vs. WCC, supra.) A petition for review of the hearing officer's decision was filed by MERALCO before the Workmen's Compensation Commission. On June 25, 1962, the Associate Commissioner designated thereon rendered a decision reversing that of the hearing officer. On a motion for reconsideration by the claimant, the Workmen's Compensation Commission, en banc, affirmed the Associate Commissioner's decision, per its resolution of August 22, 1962. Accordingly, the claimant has appealed. The record shows that petitioner was forced to ask for retirement ahead of schedule not because of his old age, but principally because of his weakened bodily condition due to his illness. At the time of his actual retirement, on November 25, 1959, petitioner was still being treated for his pulmonary tuberculosis which was definitely pronounced arrested only on April 6, 1961. As the hearing officer found, and MERALCO does not dispute it, the Employer's Report of Sickness in fact stated that Hernandez retired due to "minimal PTB, bilateral, fibroid." There is, therefore, no denying the fact that petitioner's aforesaid sickness contracted in the course of his employment, and not merely his age, was responsible for his untimely retirement 36 days ahead of schedule from the service of MERALCO.

Since petitioner is entitled to compensation payments due to his pulmonary tuberculosis, we find it unnecessary and academic to resolve whether his inguinal hernia and carcinoma of the prostate likewise entitled him to the same. Petitioner's compensation, however, should be for his inability to work during the remaining 36 days before his scheduled compulsory retirement. Since he was retirable on December 31, 1959 and has in fact received from MERALCO his retirement benefits, it cannot be said that subsequent to said date his inability to work was due to his sickness. There is no evidentiary basis to support an award for compensation payment even after December 31, 1959. From the record it could only be concluded that petitioner's earning capacity, independent of his sickness ended on December 31, 1959, so that compensation payments, which are premised on loss or impairment of earning capacity due to illness or injury, cannot extend beyond that date. In this regard compensation differs from medical and hospital services and supplies. An employer's obligation to provide the latter subsists until the illness is cured or arrested, pursuant to Section 13 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as long as the illness was contracted during the employer's employment (Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. vs. Dulay, L-18974, September 30, 1963). The present case involves only compensation payments since MERALCO had voluntarily provided Hernandez with medical and hospital services and supplies. As to the alleged prescription, suffice it to say that by voluntarily furnishing medical service and supplies MERALCO dispensed with the need for petitioner to file his Notice of Sickness within the time limit therefor (Section 24, Workmen's Compensation Act). With regard to the two-month period for the filing of a claim for compensation, the same should be counted from the date when the disease or illness becomes compensable, that is, from the date the employee becomes physically disabled to work (Peter Paul Philippines Corporation vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L19612, July 30, 1964). Petitioner herein was thus disabled only on November 25, 1959. While his formal claim was filed on March 10, 1960, or beyond the two-month period, his request for retirement on November 25, 1959 predicated on sickness causing his disability from working until his scheduled retirement on December 31, 1959, substantially fulfills the requirement of a claim, for then the company cannot plead surprise in the preparation of its defense, which is the only reason for requiring an early filing of the claim on the part of the employee (Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. WCC, L-19742, January 31, 1964). Petitioner's applicable average weekly wage has been shown to be P69.60 (P11.60 x 6 days). Sixty per cent thereof is P41.76, so he is entitled to the maximum of P35.00 weekly compensation for the period from November 25, 1959 to December 31, 1959, exclusive of the first three days pursuant to Section 14 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.1wph1.t WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed and respondent Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is hereby ordered to pay petitioner the compensation payment of P35.00 per week for the period from November 25, 1959 to December 31, 1959, exclusive of the first three days. Respondent is further ordered to pay to the Workmen's Compensation Commission the expenses provided for in Sec. 55 of Act No. 3428. No costs in this instance. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-18246

October 30, 1964

PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and ESTRELLA ALBA TITONG, respondents. Office of the Government Corporate Counsel Simeon M. Gopengco and Assistant Corporate Counsel V. Constantine, Jr. for petitioner. Paulino Manongdo for respondent. DIZON, J.: Petition filed by the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation for the review of the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission in R03-WC Case No. 242 ordering it to pay Estrella Alba Titong the sum of P2,287.84 as compensation for the death of her husband Cesar Titong, plus P200.00 as burial expenses. It is not denied that Titong was employed as checker by petitioner at a weekly salary of P35.50. In the afternoon of July 10, 1956, while checking the cement that was being loaded on a truck, Titong and one Federico Magalang, also an employee cf petitioner, engaged in a heated argument which developed into a fistfight between them. In the course thereof, Titong was hit on the eye and fell to the ground on his back, his head hitting a hollow block. After receiving emergency treatment at a hospital, he reported for duty the following day and worked continuously until July 17, 1956 when he complained of severe pains in the head. He was brought to and confined at the Quirino Labor Hospital, but as his condition worsened, he was transferred to the San Lazaro Hospital where he laid unconscious until his death on August 25 of the same year A post mortem examination made by the National Bureau of Investigation revealed that death was due to "toxemia 11 to abscess of the brain and bed sore." The amount of P211 was spent for his burial. On January 6, 1958 Titong's widow, herein respondent Estrella Alba Titong, filed with the Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor, a claim for compensation under Act 3428 against petitioner. Within the reglementary period, the latter filed an answer denying the material averments of the claim and alleged, by way of affirmative defenses, that (1) the claim for compensation had already prescribed for failure of the deceased to inform petitioner of the injury within 2 months after it had been sustained, and for failure of his dependents to file a claim against it within 3 months after his death, as provided in Sec. 24 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and (2) that the accident resulting in the death of Titong did not arise out of and in the course of his employment with petitioner because the deceased suffered injury through his own notorious negligence. After due hearing, the chief hearing officer found respondent's claim compensable under Act 3428 and made the corresponding award of compensation. Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Workmen's Compensation Commission, alleging that the hearing officer erred in not finding (1) that the deceased provoked and started the fist fight which subsequently resulted in his death and that, therefore, his death was due to his own notorious negligence and (2) that the claim had prescribed. On January 31, 1961 the Commission rendered the Appealed decision affirming that of the hearing officer and, as said Commission denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration filed subsequently, the latter took the present appeal and insists that, as the injuries sustained by the deceased Titong resulting in his death were due to his having played a practical joke on his co-worker, Federico Magalang, which joke was not connected at all with the performance of his duty, such injuries and resulting death may not be regarded as having arisen out of, and in the course of, his employment; 248

and that claimant's cause of action had prescribed because of her failure to comply with the provisions of Section 24 of Act No. 3428, as amended. We find petitioner's first contention to be without merit. The case before Us is similar in many respects to that of La Mallorca Taxi vs. Guanlao, et al., G.R. No. L-8613, January 30, 1957, where, according to the facts, Guanlac was shot to death by a coemployee who had deeply resented the former's hiding the soup belonging to the latter. In deciding the case We said that, while Guanlao, with his joke, offended and led his co-worker to assault him, said circumstance was not sufficient to charge him with such gross negligence as to make his death not compensable. Upon the other hand, an injury is said to arise in the course of employment when it takes place within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto (page 193, Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, 1953) (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). As in this case it is not denied that Titong suffered the injury resulting in his death within the premises of his employer and while he was fulfilling his duties as checker, the conclusion is inescapable that such injury arose in the course of his employment. In Batangas Transportation, etc. vs. Josefina Vda. de Javier, G.R. No. L-7658, promulgated on May 8, 1956, We said that once it is proven that the employee died in the course of his employment, the legal presumption, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, is that the claim for compensation comes within the provisions of the Compensation Law. In the present case, no sufficient evidence appears in the record to take the claim under consideration beyond the purview of the Compensation Law, either because the injury that resulted in the death of Titong did not arise in the course of his employment or that it was due to his own gross or notorious negligence. Petitioner's claim that it did not have knowledge of the injury until more than one year after Titong's death is without merit. The Employer's Report of Accident duly accomplished and submitted by petitioner's Chairman and General Manager, Vicente Orosa, shows conclusively that the plant superintendent, Dr. Floresta, came to know of said accident or injury on July 10, 1956, the very date when it occurred. Upon the second issue, namely, whether or not the claim for compensation had already prescribed when it was filed, pursuant to Sec. 25 of Act 3428 We have already ruled in Martha Lumber Mill, Inc. versus Lagradante, et al., G.R. No. L-7599, June 27, 1956, that the failure of the petitioner to submit the required employer's report of accident or sickness within the time prescribed in said act constituted a waiver of the defense that the claim for compensation was not filed within the statutory period. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs.

G.R. No. L-19304

August 31, 1964

RED LINE TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., and MANUEL LEGASPI ABRAZADO, petitioners, vs. TERESA BARRIZO, respondent. Vicente Ampil for petitioners. Ricardo Mag. Bernaldo for respondent. CONCEPCION, J.: Herein petitioners, Red Line Transportation Co., Inc., and Manuel Legaspi Abrazado, are public utility operators, hereafter referred to as oppositors. They seek the review of a decision of the Public Service Commission, authorizing herein respondent Teresa Barrizo hereinafter referred to as applicant an authorized TPU Auto-truck service operator on the line Tuguegarao-San Jose via Baggao (Cagayan), to increase her equipment by the addition of six (6) auto-trucks instead of the eight (8) applied by her for the transportation of passengers and freight in said line, pursuant to the time scheduled set forth in said decision. Said application had, likewise, been opposed by the Bachrach Transportation Co., Inc., owner and operator of the Rural Transit, and one Petronila Callueng, but these two (2) oppositors have not appealed from the aforementioned decision. Pursuant thereto: It appears from the evidence submitted by the applicant that at present there are only two Transportation Companies aside herself, who are operating on the line applied for with the use of only one unit each; that while there are other Transportation Companies leaving Tuguegarao, buses of said companies proceed to Aparri; that the road to San Jose branches off to Baybayog; that from Baybayog to San Jose one has to pass the Municipality of Baggao and that Baybayog to Baggao is twelve kilometers and Baggao to San Jose is eighteen kilometers; that the trucks of the Red Line and the Cal Transit, owned and operated by Petronila Callueng, the only two Transportation Companies operating on the said line, aside the trucks of the herein applicant, are always full and there are passengers who could not be accomodated due to the fact that said buses are full; that the present application for increase of units is motivated because of the present predicament as attested to by the request of so many people living in the different places of the line applied for and by Resolution No. 7 passed by the Municipal Council of Iguig, Cagayan to the effect that because of the enormous increase in number of the travelling public due largely to the steady progress in trade and commerce in the municipalities traversed by this route, hence, the present transportation facilities plying on said line have become inadequate to cope with the situation (Exh. I) ; that applicant is financially capable to operate and maintain the service applied for due to the fact that applicant who is authorized to operate three buses for regular use and one for reserve on the said line, has already invested P20,000.00 in said business and that from the operation of her present service she derives an income of P500.00 to P600.00 a month from each truck; that she had a 15hectare agricultural land in Iguig, Cagayan, valued at P120,000.00 and with an annual harvest of from 600 to 700 cavanes of palay at P10.00 to P11.00 per cavan; a 24-hectare agricultural land planted to corn situated at Iguig, Cagayan, valued at P5,000.00 with an annual harvest of 350 cavanes of corn at P14.00 per cavan; a poultry farm with an investment of around P1,000.00, a house and lot in Iguig, Cagayan, worth P40,000.00 and a cash on hand in the amount of P25,000.00.

249

On the other hand, oppositor Red Line Transportation Co., Inc., presented evidence with the testimony of its secretary, that the Red Line has eight (8) round trips from Tuguegarao to Aparri; that on the Line Tuguegarao-Aparri, the road branches off at Baybayog which is thirty-five kilometers, from Tuguegarao in going to San Jose. The oppositor Rural Transit submitted evidence showing that said oppositor has a line from Tuguegarao to Aparri via San Vicente and Baybayog although it has no direct line to San Jose; that there are other operators from Tuguegarao to Baggao; that aside from their Santiago-Aparri Line, they have also the Ilagan-Aparri and Manila-Aparri lines all of which pass Baybayog; and that their buses are not even half full when said buses pass or stop at Baybayog. From the foregoing evidence the Public Service Commission concluded: From the mass of evidence, we find the following facts established; that there are passengers commuting daily on this line: that the one bus of the Red Line, another one bus of the Cal Transit, and the three buses of the applicant plying on this line are not sufficient to cope with the present passenger traffic on the line; and that applicant is financially capable to maintain and operate the service which is the subject of the instant application. Petitioners assail the accuracy of this conclusion upon the ground that it is not borne out by the record, but an examination thereof shows that there is substantial evidence in support of the aforementioned finding. Indeed, it has been established by applicant's testimony that, when the truck of the Red Line Transportation Co., Inc., which leaves Tuguegarao between 10 and 11 a.m., reaches the road from the municipality of Iguig to that of Baggao, it already has standing passengers; that this fact was verified by an agent of the Public Service Commission, Fernando A. Lazo, who had been detailed to check the volume of the traffic in the aforementioned line, and confirmed by the testimony of Jovencio A. Reyes, Isidro A. Cepada and Vicente Trinidad; and that, accordingly, the municipal councils of Tuguegarao, Iguig, Amulong and Baggao had passed resolutions, and the people of the first three (3) municipalities had written to said Commission, urging that applicant's request be granted. In fact, Inspector Lazo asserted that 95% of all public utility auto-buses passing thru this checkpoint had always four (4) to five (5) paying passengers standing and that five (5) to seven (7) passengers were not accommodated in each one of said vehicles. Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against said oppositors and petitioners herein. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-19742

January 31, 1964

LUZON STEVEDORING CO., INC., petitioner, vs. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL., respondents. C. R. Tiongson, B. L. Rillo and L. V. Simbulan for petitioner. Villavieja and De Leon for respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission. Bonifacio V. Tupaz for respondents Antonio Cordero, et al. BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: Antonio Cordero was employed as a sailor on a barge of the Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. receiving a wage of verify P28.00 a week. His duty was to look after the safety of the barge and its cargo especially in the absence of the patron. On September 11, 1956, Cordero, having been requested by the patron to take over, was left alone in charge of the barge. Two days later his lifeless body was found floating in the Pasig river by Det. Labao of the Manila Police Department. A postmortem examination revealed that he died of asphyxia as a result of submersion in water. After the incident, Ramon Relente president of the union to which the deceased belonged, reported the matter to the officer in charge of the marine department of the company and asked for financial aid to the family of the deceased, and this request having been denied, he made arrangement for a loan of P250.00 from the company. The company filed a report with the Workmen's Compensation Commission manifesting its desire to controvert the claim if one is filed later. On March 5, 1957, the deceased's widow filed a formal claim for compensation which was referred to a hearing officer who, after hearing, rendered decision ordering the company to pay to claimant death benefits in the amount of P2,912.00, to reimburse the claimant the amount of P200.00 as burial expenses, to pay attorney's fees in the amount of P218.40, and the sum of P35.00 as fees of the Workmen's Compensation Commission Office. The company filed a petition for reconsideration based on three grounds: (a) there was no causal connection between Cordero's death and his employment as a sailor; (b) Cordero's death was due to his own negligence; and (c) claimant's right, if will, is already barred by Section 24 of Act 3428, as amended.1wph1.t The Workmen's Compensation Commission, on March 12, 1962, affirmed the decision in toto; hence the present petition for review. It is contended that the claim filed by the deceased's widow is already barred by law because it was filed beyond the 3-month period within which the law requires that it be filed from the death of the deceased. Thus, Antonio Cordero died on September 11, 1956, and under the law the heirs of the deceased had until December 11 of the same year within which to file the claim for death benefits, but the widow filed her claim only on January 31, 1958, which is after a period of more than three months. But Workmen's Compensation Commission did not consider this objection material it appearing that the president of the union to which the deceased belonged had taken immediate steps to inform the management of the incident while he asked that financial aid be extended to the bereaved family even to the extent of making arrangement for loan to cover the burial and other expenses of the family. 250

Under the facts of this case, we are inclined to agree to this finding of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. Yes, under Section 24 of Act 3428, in order the a claim for compensation may prosper it is necessary that it be made not later than three months after the death of the deceased and that if that is not done the claim may considered of no legal effects, 1 but in this case the facts are such that this requirement may deemed to have been complied with considering that the company cannot claim ignorance of what has actually happened. Thus, it pears that when Antonio Cordero died notice of his death was given by Ramon Relente two or three days thereof to the officer in charge of the marine department of the company. Relente likewise asked the company to extend certain financial aid to the family of the victim and when this was denied he made representations that some loan extended to it to cover the expenses it may have to face as a result of Cordero's death . But all this was denied on the technical ground that the deceased died not in the course of employment or that he is guilty of notorious negligence. We believe that such request for financial aid can be considered as advance filing of claim in contemplation of law for then the company cannot plead surprise the preparation of its defense, this being the only tenable reason for requiring an early filing of the claim on the part of the employee or heirs of the deceased. This is especially so taking into account that under Section 44 of the same Act it is presumed that "the claim comes within the provision of the Act and that sufficient notice thereof was given." This provision should be liberally construed. The second point raised by petitioner is that Cordero died not in the course of employment, or that his death did not arise out of it, because at the time of his death he was swimming with some companions in the Pasig river and as a consequence he was drowned and his lifeless body was found floating on the surface of the river. Hence, petitioner claims, his heirs are not entitled to the compensation prescribed by law. As to the nature of the employment of Cordero, the Workmen's Compensation Commission made the following finding: The nature of the employment of the deceased was like that of the barge of which he was in charge moored at the Pasig river and tied to the seawall. His duty required him to be nailed to his post 24 hours of a day followed by other days. But he was a moving human being and not like a machinery which can be kept sleeping in a little corner of the barge, during the long and monotonous hours of the days and nights of his employment. He had to move and perform the ordinary, functions of a human being like for example, answering the calls of nature, bathing, eating and sleeping. When he took a bath in the water, he performed a daily routine needed by the human body, incidental to, and habitual and usual in the life of a sailor, and any accident occurring to him and due to ordinary and necessary incidents of his employment is well within the sphere of such unusual employment and the employer is liable to pay compensation to the family. While in the strict sense death caught up with Cordero when he was not in the barge where he is supposed to be for 24 hours watching and taking care of it but swimming with some companions somewhere in the Pasig river near where the barge was moored, it may be said that he died in line of duty for he was then undertaking something that is necessary to his personal need and comfort since the taking of bath is not only habitual in a sailor but necessary to the human body. He went swimming not for pleasure, not for fun, but in answer to the daily need nature, in the same manner as a human being needs to answer other calls, such as eating, sleeping and the like. When these needs are satisfied in the course of employment and something takes place that may cause injury, harm or death to the employee or laborer, it is fair and logical that the happening be considered as one occurring in the course of employment for under the circumstances it cannot be undertaken in any other way. The situation would be different if the mishap occurs in a manner that it may clearly show that the laborer has acted beyond his duty or course of employment. Not so in this case.

Neither can it be contended that in going out with some companions to swim the deceased is guilty of notorious negligence for the reason that if his purpose was to take a bath he could have done it with the aid of a water tank on board the barge. If the deceased were one who does not know how to swim or is not a sailor accustomed to the perils of the water, the argument may have some value but not so in the case of the deceased who undisputable was a swimmer. He must have preferred to take a bath while swimming than by pouring water over his body on board the barge because of his awareness that he was swimmer and for him to swim in a river was merely routine. And if he died in the course thereof it must be due to an event that he has not foreseen. At any rate there is no clear evidence that his death was due to his notorious negligence and not to a cause which he could not have reasonably avoided. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

G.R. No. L-19377

January 30, 1964

MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, petitioner, vs. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL., respondents. Government Corporate Counsel S. M. Gopengco and Trial Attorney V. Constantino, Jr. for petitioner. Gualberto Cruz for respondents. BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: Mariano Canalda was employed as trackman in the Manila Railroad Company on March 16, 1946. His daily work consisted in cutting grasses and weeds covering the railroad tracks, changing railroad ties, raising the rails, and shovelling stones and gravel under the rail ties to prevent them from sagging. He has never been absent from his work except for one month when he was operated on for appendicitis. In the physical examination made on him on August 19, 1949, he was found to be free from any illness, while his lungs were clear of any tubercular infection. His healthy condition remained the same until his medical examination on August 16, 1958. On April 23, 1959, while performing his usual work, Canalda was overtaken by the rain and as a result he was not able to report for work. On April 28, 1959, he was brought to the Camarines Sur Provincial Hospital at Naga City where he was treated by Dr. Jose V. Arenas, but the treatment failed and six days thereafter he died of lobar pneumonia.1wph1.t On February 4, 1960, the heirs of the deceased filed complaint for compensation pursuant to law, but the claim was denied by the hearing officer on the ground that the death of Mariano Canalda was not compensable. On appeal taken by the claimants, Commissioner N. Baens Del Rosario reversed the decision and awarded to the claimants the amount of P3,744.00 as death benefits and P200.00 as burial expenses. She further ordered the company to pay the Commission the amount of P38.00 as Commission fees. This decision having been affirmed by the Commission en banc, the company interposed the present petition for review. The issues posed by the company are: (1) whether the death of Canalda arose in the course of his employment and, therefore, compensable and (2) whether the claim can be taken cognizance of by 251

the Workmen's Compensation Commission it appearing that the same was not filed within the 3month period required by Section 24 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, is amended. The first issue raised should be answered in the affirmative. While it is true that lobar pneumonia is directly caused by the virus known as pneumococcus, and as such is not an occupational disease, it cannot however be denied that the sickness which brought the decease to his grave was contracted in the Course of his employment as shown by the fact that while working and perspiring under the heat of the sun on April 23, 1959, he was suddenly overtaken by a heavy downpour as a consequence of which he fell sick of pneumonia and died several days thereafter. The circumstance that he had been doing the same work and exposed to the same inconvenience for thirteen years and has not been afflicted with such sickness during that time, is of no moment for it is possible that his physical resistance then was strong and court repel the onslaught of the sickness, but that on the occasion in question the rain caught up with him when his resistance was low and contracted the sickness that resulted in his death. The stubborn fact, however, is that when he contracted the sickness he was well in the course of his employment as he was doing then his usual daily chore and so it is but fair that he be compensated as required by law. We fully agree with the following comment of commissioner Del Rosario: We believe, there can be no more positive and convincing proof of the fact that the deceased's death in this case was work connected than the very finding that on April 23, 1959, the deceased was overtaken by a heavy downpour while performing his work as trackman. Indeed, one need not possess a proficient knowledge of medicine to arrive at the conclusion that any person working under the heat of the sun and perspiring, if suddenly overtaken by a heavy downpour, is likely to catch cold which may eventually develop into pneumonia. And the ensuing illness or death, is certainly one arising out of and in the courts of his employment. This, we gathered from the records, was precisely what happened to the deceased Canalda. Consequently, we find ourselves without any alternative but to reverse the decision under consideration. As regards the second issue, the record shows that when Mariano Canalda failed to report for work, his foreman was notified of his sickness and of his treatment at the Provincial Hospital of Camarines Sur, the medical clinic where the company usually sends it's employees and laborers. Such information is a sufficient notice for the company to submit to the Commission the report that the law requires regarding the sickness or death of an employee or laborer. In spite of this notice, however, the company remained silent and failed to give to the Commission the report required by Section 37 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Because of such failure, the company is deemed to have waived its defense that the claim is not compensable because of the claimant's failure to file it within the statutory period. ... Moreover, it appears the petitioner did not submit the required employer's report of accident or sickness which would have served as petitioners answer in the compensation proceedings; and such failure may be deemed as a waiver of the defense that the claim for compensation was not filed within the statutory period. (Martha Lumber Mill, Inc. Romana V. Lagradante, et al., G.R. No. L-7599, June 27, 1956) WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-22135

December 27, 1963

VISAYAN STEVEDORE-TRANSPORTATION CO., petitioner, vs. THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND EXALTACION BARRION, for herself and in behalf of her minor children ELVIRA, ERLINDA and SHIRLEY, all surnamed GUTANA, respondents. Luisito C. Hofilena for petitioner. RESOLUTION DIZON, J.: Appeal by certiorari from a resolution of the Workmen's Compensation Commission in the case of Exaltacion Barrion, et al. vs. Visayan Stevedore-Transportation Company (WCC Case No. R07-757). It appears that Graciano Gutana was a laborer of petitioner in its stevedoring business at the Pulupandan wharf in Occidental Negros, at a daily salary of P4.60. Sometime in May 1958, petitioner undertook the loading of sugar on the Japanese ship "Hiyeharu Maru" then anchored about two miles from the coast of Pulupandan, and Gutana was one of the more than seventy of its laborers assigned to do the loading. In the afternoon of May 19, 1958, after having rendered the usual eight hours of work, the laborers were given time off to take their evening meal before working over time, as it was the purpose of the employer to finish the loading of the sugar as soon as possible. After taking their meal on board the ship, Gutana and some of the laborers had to answer the call of nature by the left side of a barge tied along the right side of the Japanese ship, in view of the insufficiency of the sanitary facilities board. After relieving himself, and as he was standing and buttoning up his pants, the raft "Narwhal" came along the right side of the barge and bumped it, causing it to hit the right side of the Japanese vessel. As a result, Gutana was pinned by the end of the hatch cover of the barge against the side of the vessel, thereby suffering physical injuries which resulted in his death. Petitioner's foreman at the premises immediately notified the latter of the fatal incident, and petitioner shouldered all the funeral expenses. A claim for compensation for the death of Gutana was filed by the widow of the deceased and their children on September 1, 1958, and petitioner controverted it in its answer filed on the 29th of the same month. After hearing, the Regional Office of the Department of Labor, Bacolod City, rendered a decision awarding death compensation to the claimants in the total amount of P4,000.00, plus attorneys' fees and costs. Petitioner appealed to the Workmen's Compensation Commission which, in turn, affirmed the decision just mentioned in its resolution of October 15, 1963, the latter being now the subject of appeal. The first question raised by petitioner is that the claim for compensation had prescribed having been filed more than three months after Gutana's death. We find petitioner's contention to be without merit. The case is covered by the provisions of Section 24, Workmen's Compensation Act No. 3428, as 252

amended, which dispenses with the requirement of filing a claim for compensation if the employer had voluntarily made compensation payments. Under Section 8 of the same act, burial expenses are considered as part of the death benefits due to the heirs of a deceased laborer. It appears in this case that petitioner had voluntarily paid the burial expenses in connection with the burial of Gutana. Consequently, the late filing of the claim for compensation is not fatal. lawphil.net Petitioner likewise contends that the death of Gutana was due to his notorious negligence. On this matter, we are of the opinion, as was the Workmen's Compensation Commission, that the facts established by the evidence do not support petitioner's contention. Due to the number of laborers engaged in the loading work, the sanitary facilities on board the "Hiyeharu Maru" were rendered inadequate, thus compelling some of the laborers to answer the call of nature by going down a barge tied along the right side of the ship. The deceased Gutana was among those who was forced, to resort to this uncomfortable way of relieving himself. Moreover, in the circumstances of this case, it is but logical to consider the barge as an extension of the premises where the laborers were working. As already stated, they took their evening meal on board the ship and were supposed to resume their work (overtime work) a reasonable time thereafter. As, because of this, they were not free to leave the vessel, the accident must be deemed to be one arising out of, or in the course of employment. PREMISES CONSIDERED, we find the petition under consideration to be without merit, and the same is hereby dismissed.

On March 10, 1958, Hearing Officer Juan M. Gerardo, issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which states Without prejudice to the right of the claimant to file suit against the respondent under Employer's Liability Act (Act No. 1874) before the Courts as directed by sec. 42, of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the instant claim is hereby declared DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction of the Regional Office to take cognizance of the same. Complainant Isabela Japones, presented a Petition for Review of the above Order. Associate Commissioner Jose Sanchez, on January 9, 1959, remanded the case for such action as is consistent with the Order, making the following observations ... The Hearing Officer is correct in his finding that the respondent regularly used a truck owned by him in his business of buying palay. But this is precisely the reason for the logical conclusion that, although the business of buying palay is not in the enumeration contained in Section 42 of the Act, which is not exclusive, said business should nevertheless be considered "hazardous or deleterious" as this phrase is meant to be understood in the Act.. Moreover, the Hearing Officer found that the respondent used his truck for transporting not only the palay he purchased but also that of other persons engaged in the same or similar business as his; and that in all these instances he charged freight for such transportation. Respondent must therefore, be deemed engaged in the business of transporting goods which causes him to fall under sub-paragraph 1, of Section 42 of the Act.. In view of the foregoing, we hold that the respondent comes within the coverage of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, either in his business of buying palay, or in his enterprise of transporting goods; hence, the Regional Office No. 3, Manila, has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim for compensation filed against him by the claimant. and remanding the case for further investigation and/or hearing on the merits. The Hearing Officer received evidence, and rendered the same decision, dismissing the case, which was again reversed by the Associate Commissioner who ordered Paez 1. To pay the claimants, thru this Commission, the sum of THREE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE and 71/100 (P3,455.71) PESOS as Death benefits; 2. To reimburse the claimant, thru this Commission, the sum of P150.00 for burial expenses; 3. To pay the amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY-NINE and 18/100 (P259.18) PESOS as attorney's fees pursuant to Section 6, Rule 26, of the Rules of the Workmen's Compensation Commission and Article 2208 (8) of the new Civil Code; and 4. To pay the Commission the sum of P35.00 as fees pursuant to Section 35 of the Act. After the denial of a motion for reconsideration, the case was brought to this court, for review.

G.R. No. L-18438

March 30, 1963

CONRADO PAEZ, petitioner, vs. THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and ISABELA JAPONES, in behalf of her minor children RODOLFO, ROLANDO and JAIME, all surnamed BARAWID, respondents. Bienvenido P. Faustino for petitioner. The Legal Counsel, Department of Labor for respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission. Lea T. Castillo for Isabela Japones and her minor children. PAREDES, J.: On October 30, 1957, the heirs of Marciano Barawid, presented with the Department of Labor, Regional Office No. 3, a complaint for compensation. A Motion to Dismiss the complaint was presented on January 28, 1958, on three grounds, to wit 1. The allegations do not constitute a cause of action; 2. Lack of jurisdiction; it appearing that the capital of Paez is very much less than P10,000.00 and that his business of buying and selling palay is not hazardous nor deleterious to employees; and 3. The claim is barred by the statute of limitations.

Paez and his wife were on and sometime before 1953, engaged in the business of buying palay for the King Tong Seng Ricemill of Victoria, Tarlac, with the latter supplying the capital of P1,000.00 to 253

P2,000.00. In August, 1953, Paez had been buying palay in Isabela. For such purpose, he employed agents, two truck drivers and two truck helpers, all of whom were paid on commission basis. In bringing the palay purchased by his agents to Nueva Ecija or Tarlac, the same had to be ferried in bancas across the Magat River in Aurora, Isabela, towards the other bank, which is Cabatuan; from Cabatuan side to Guimba, the palay were hauled by truck which was regularly driven by Valentin Lagman. Respondent's truck driver on the Aurora side was Primitivo Apolonio, who also collected all the palay on said side hauled them to the river bank (Aurora side), where he engaged boatmen to ferry the palay to the Cabatuan side and where Lagman would take them and bring them to Guimba or Victoria, as the case may be. On August 1, 1953, because his child became seriously ill, Lagman engaged the services of Marciano Barawid to substitute him in undertaking the trip to Isabela, with the understanding that he (Barawid), was to receive his (Lagman's) pay during the latter's absence. On August 2, 1953, Barawid drove respondent's truck up to the Cabatuan side of the Magat River to await for the palay that were to be ferried from the Aurora side. On the same date, instead of awaiting the palay on the Cabatuan side, Barawid crossed the Magat River and joined Apolonio on the Aurora side in hauling the palay. After having collected all the palay on the Aurora side, Apolonio and Barawid reached the river's bank at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, and both helped in loading three (3) bancas. Apolonio advised Barawid not to ride the third banca because same was already fully loaded, but to take another to Guimba, as he had to drive a new truck of his brother-in-law. While in the midst of the Magat River, the banca capsized and sunk, and Barawid was drowned. The petitioner submits the following issues for determination, to wit a) the jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Commission over the case; b) whether the death arose out of and in the course of employment; c) prescription of action; and d) whether the deceased was guilty of notorious negligence. The Workmen's Compensation Act No. 3428. as amended provides SEC. 42. Law applicable to small industries. All claims for compensation by reason of an accident in an enterprise, industry, or business carried on or in a trade, occupation or profession exercised by an employer for the purpose of gain, whose capital amounts to less than ten thousand pesos and is not hazardous or deleterious to employees, shall be governed by the provisions of Act Numbered Eighteen hundred and seventy-four and its amendments: Provided, however, That the following enterprises or establishments shall be among those considered hazardous or deleterious to employees : (1) Any business for the transportation of persons or goods, or both; .... The regular use of motor vehicles, was indispensable and essential in carrying on petitioner's business, and necessarily placed his business under the category of hazardous enterprises. Without the use of motor vehicles, it would be extremely difficult for petitioner to conduct such business. The provision of law above cited is not exclusive, for it clearly provides that the enterprises or establishments enumerated therein are among those that are considered hazardous or deleterious to the employees. True it is, that the mere act of buying and selling palay is in itself not hazardous, but when the one engaged in the business used motor vehicles to transport the goods, especially when, as in the instant case, the place of purchase was very far from the place of sale (Isabela to Tarlac), 254

that business became inherently hazardous and dangerous. To a driver, like the deceased Barawid, risk on the road was great, resulting from hold-ups and outlaws, falling into ravines, vehicular accidents of all sorts, collisions, tire blowouts, etc. There seem to be no serious discussion that the regular use of motor vehicles by the claimant's own employees makes the business hazardous (Haddad v. Commercial Motor Truck Co., 146 La. 897, 84 So. 197, [1920]). The respondent Court found that petitioner was in a sense engaged in the transportation of goods (palay), by charging freight from other persons who loaded their palay in his trucks, thereby definitely classifying the business of the petitioner as hazardous. It was shown that for buying palay for the ricemill, the petitioner was paid a commission of P.20 for every cavan of palay purchased, aside from the freight he charged for transporting palay from Isabela to Nueva Ecija or Tarlac at P1.50 per cavan. This being the case, We need not stretch our imagination far, to visualize that petitioner was engaged more in the transportation of palay than the buy-and-sell thereof. The trial court was, therefore, correct in assuming jurisdiction of the case. Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t Petitioner contends that the respondent WCC erred in finding that the death of Barawid arose out of and in the course of employment. In justifying its findings in this respect, respondent court said ... And so, each case must be analyzed and decided according to its own peculiar facts and careful consideration given to the nature and incidents entailed by the employment.. Here, as elsewhere stated, the deceased Marciano Barawid left the International truck assigned to him and went to the other side of the Magat River (Aurora side) for the purpose of advising the other truck driver, Primitivo Apolonio, to have all the palay bought by the respondent's agent loaded early because he was in a hurry to go back to Guimba. In fact, Barawid joined Apolonio in the work of loading and unloading the palay at the bank of the river to be ferried towards the Cabatuan side where the International truck was parked. The activities performed by Barawid, we believe, were incidental to his duties not only as driver but as purchaser of the respondent who was engaged in the business of buying and selling palay. It is reasonable to expect an employee, as in the case of Barawid to help a coemployee in the performance of his duties. And even granting, only for the sake of argument, that the acts performed by the deceased were not strictly within the bounds of his duties, still he was, in the fullest sense of the term, in the course of the employment. For the performance of those acts helping the other employee of the respondent load and unload palay would inure to the benefit of the respondent in the pursuit of his business. As Arthur Larsen, an eminent authority on the subject of Workmen's Compensation Laws, has put it: An act outside an employee's regular duties which is undertaken in good faith to advance the employer's interests, whether or not the employee's own assigned work is hereby furthered, is within the course of employment.(Larsen's Workmen's Compensation Text, Vol. 7, p. P338) "Simply stated, 'if the act is one for the benefit of the employer or for the mutual benefit of both, an injury arising out of it will usually be compensable."'(Schneider's Workmen's Compensation Text, Vol. 7, p. 338.) There is little to be added to the above observations, except to state that they are based upon the evidence and law on the subject.

The third proposition dwells on the non-dismissal of the claim for having been filed out of time. The record shows that the petitioner had knowledge of the death of Barawid, and he himself made immediate arrangements for the removal of the body from the place of the accident (Cabatuan) to his home town, Guimba; and that the petitioner also gave respondent Isabela Japones, the amount of P150.00 for burial and other expenses and another P150.00 for family subsistence. Knowledge of the accident by the employer, his agent or representative, is sufficient notice (section 27, of Act. No. 3428, as amended); so that, even if the notice of injury was filed beyond the 3 months period fixed by law, the proceeding is still valid. The fact that the petitioner also made voluntary compensation payments to the widow, rendered it no longer necessary to file the claim for compensation within the time prescribed by law, as provided for in section 24 of the same Act. The present action is not, therefore, barred by the statute of limitations. It is finally contended that the respondent WCC erred in not finding that the accident was caused through the notorious negligence of the deceased (Sec. 4, of Act No. 3428). Petitioner's answer to the complaint for compensation, does not allege notorious negligence in his defense. That defense should be proven by the party invoking it. Notorious negligence is something more than mere or simple negligence, or contributory negligence; it signifies a deliberate act of the employee to disregard his own personal safety. In the case at bar, there is no showing at all that deceased Barawid had deliberately disregarded his safety; no intention was attributed to him to end his life or that he wantonly courted death. The deceased wanted to return home as it was getting late, and even helped in the loading and unloading of the palay to the banca and truck, to finish the work that day. It is claimed that the deceased wanted to return home, because he was to drive the new truck of his brother-in-law, and he was in such a hurry that he unheeded the suggestion of his companion not to embark any more, as it was dark and the banca was fully loaded. Conceding this to be true, for the purpose of argument, (Barawid can no longer contradict it, his lips having been sealed by death), still the disregard of the warning, can not be considered as a notorious negligence. Disobedience to rules, orders and/or prohibition, does not in itself constitute notorious negligence, if no intention can be attributed to the injured to end his life. And if in the case at bar, there was any negligence at all, the same can not be considered notorious or evident. The deceased did not act with the full knowledge of the existence of a danger that ordinary prudence would counsel him to avoid such a case. That a banca loaded with palay and 3 persons, at night time, would sink if one person more was added to its weight, constituted merely a miscalculation on the part of such person, if he thought it would be safe for him to embark, the alleged overloading notwithstanding Barawid's promptness in accomplishing his duties, to enable him to attend his personal interest thereafter, cannot be a valid reason to deny him the right to be compensated. IN VIEW HEREOF, the petition is dismissed, and the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.

G.R. Nos. L-17362 and L-17367-69

February 28, 1963

MADRIGAL SHIPPING CO., petitioner, vs. MONICA MELAD, FRANCISCA SICCUAN, JUANA SICCUAN, BARBARA TULIAO, PLACIDA DE LA CRUZ, APARRI PILOTS' ASSOCIATION AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents. Concepcion A. Salud for petitioner. Villanueva & Villavieja for respondents. REGALA, J.: The S.S. "Cetus" was owned and operated by petitioner Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. On November 25, 1955, it left the port of Aparri for Manila. However, after sailing five miles, the officers of the ship decided to return to the port of Aparri for repair of its rudder. For this purpose, the captain sent Jua Siong Kong Ho, Inc., the ship's agent in Aparri, a telegram with instruction to "PLEASE ADVISE PILOT WILL ENTER AGAIN FOR RUDDER REPAIR." Accordingly, the agent informed the Aparri Pilots' Association of the contents of the telegram and, forthwith, Primitivo Siccuan, chief pilot, and Francisco Ricerra, district pilot, of the pilots' association, made arrangements with Filoteo Siccuan and Domingo Batta to take them by boat to the ship in distress. The party reached the ship about past 12 midnight of November 25. Primitivo Siccuan, Francisco Ricerra and Filoteo Siccuan boarded the ship while Domingo Batta remained on the boat. At about 2:30 a.m., November 26, the ship sank on account of heavy waves. The boat was also lost. Among those who perished in the tragedy were Primitivo Siccuan, Francisco Ricerra, Filoteo Siccuan and Domingo Batta. In due time, four claims were filed in the Workmen's Compensation Commission against petitioner. Upon the creation by Reorganization Plan 20-A of Regional Offices in the Department of Labor, these cases were transferred to Regional Office No. 2, which, after hearing, made an award ordering petitioner to pay the claimants the following: 1. To the heirs and dependents of decedent FRANCISCO RICERRA, the sum of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00), the maximum amount allowed by law, which should be divided among them; 2. To the heirs and dependents of decedent FILOTEO SICCUAN, the sum of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00), the maximum amount allowed by law, which should be divided among them; 3. To the heirs and dependents of decedent PRIMITIVO SICCUAN, the sum of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00), the maximum amount allowed by law, which should be divided among them;

255

4. To the widow and dependent of decedent DOMINGO BATTA, the sum of ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE PESOS AND TWELVE CENTAVOS (P1,725.12), which includes burial expenses; 5. To this office, the sum of ONE HUNDRED FORTY-ONE PESOS ONLY (P141.00), pursuant to Section 55 of said Act. This award was affirmed by Associate Commissioner Jose Sanchez and later by the Workmen's Compensation Commission sitting en banc. Hence, this petition for review, petitioner contending in its assignment of errors: 1. That the hearing officer of Regional Office No. 2 had no jurisdiction to decide these cases; 2. That there was no employer-employee relationship between it (petitioner) and the persons for whose death these claims were filed; and 3. That some of the respondents were not the dependents of Primitivo Siccuan and Domingo Batta, as the term dependents is used in the law. With regard to the first point, petitioner argues that Reorganization Plan 20-A, which confers jurisdiction to hear workmen's compensation claims on Regional Offices of the Department of Labor, is unconstitutional. The contention is without merit. As this Court held in San Miguel Brewery, Inc. v. Sobremesana, et al., G.R. No. L-18730, September 16, 1961, Petitioner argues incorrectly that our previous rulings (Corominas v. Labor Standards Commission, G.R. No. L-14837, and related cases decided June 20, 1961) held null and void Reorganization Plan 20-A in so far as it vests the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor with original and exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide labor claims, including workmen's compensation claims. This Court never ruled that the Regional Offices have no authority to pass upon workmen's compensation claims under Plan 20-A; on the contrary, in our decisions in the case of Miller v. Mardo, G.R. No. L-15138, and related cases, promulgated on July 31, 1961, we said: On the basis of the foregoing considerations, we hold and declare that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, insofar as it confers judicial power to the Regional Offices over cases other than those falling under the Workmen's Compensation Law, is invalid and of no effect. (Emphasis supplied) The reason for the ruling is that, as pointed out in the same cases, the consideration and adjudication of claims under the Workmen's Compensation Law was already being exercised by the Department of Labor's Compensation Commission even prior to its reorganization under Plan 20-A. In conferring initial power to hear and decide such claims upon the hearing officers of the Department's Regional Offices, section 25 of Plan 20-A was merely reallocating powers already possessed by the Department, and was in conformity with the authority granted by section 6 of Republic Act 997 as amended by Republic Act No. 1241. There was in the particular case no assumption of powers not 256

previously vested in the Department, and, therefore, no transgression of the reorganizational authority and purposes of the enabling laws. This ruling was reiterated in later cases.1 Anent the second point, Section 26 of the Workmen's Compensation Law (Act No. 3428, as amended) provides: When an employee suffers personal injury from accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, or contracts tuberculosis or other illness directly caused by such employment, or either aggravated by or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified .... As may be noted from the above-quoted provision, the existence of employer-employee relationship is the jurisdictional foundation for recovery under the law. (Asia Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al. G.R. No. L-7638, June 27, 1955). Hence, the question is: Was there such a relationship between petitioner, on the one hand, and Primitivo Siccuan, Francisco Ricerra, Filoteo Siccuan and Domingo Batta, on the other? Petitioner contends that there was none for the following reasons: 1. Because its pilotage contract was with the Aparri Pilots' Association and not with the members thereof; 2. Because the salaries of the pilots were paid not by petitioner but by the association; 3. Because petitioner had no control over the action of the Chief pilot and district pilot; and 4. Because the service of Filoteo Siccuan and Domingo Batta were contracted by the pilots' association and not by the petitioner. Petitioner's claim lacks merit. As pointed out by the Workmen's Compensation Commission, Primitivo Siccuan and Francisco Ricerra were members of the Aparri Pilots' Association, not its employees. While it is true that their salaries were paid by the association, yet it is equally true that the same were taken out of the pilotage fees paid by vessels. The pilots' association cannot be considered an independent contractor so as to free the petitioner from the liability of an employer because it appears to have neither capital nor money to pay its employees nor does it appear to have filed a bond. (Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al., G.R. No. L-17395, June 29, 1962; Caro v. Rilloraza, et al., G.R. No. L-9569, Sept. 30, 1957) The claim that petitioner had no right of control over the work of the pilots is based on Customs Administrative Order No. 26 (Nov. 28, 1946) which provides as follows: Par. XLIII. A pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes control thereof until he leaves it anchored free shoal; Provided, That his responsibility shall cease at the moment the master neglects or refuses to carry out his instruction. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner misreads the provision in question, for while it says that a pilot is responsible for the direction of the vessel from the moment he assumes control of the same, the provision nevertheless makes the conduct of the pilot subject to approval by the master of the vessel. That is why it relieves the pilot of responsibility if his action is disapproved by the master of the vessel. Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t Besides, as the Commission held, Customs Administrative Order No. 69 (Oct. 1, 1948), likewise invoked by petitioner, shows that coast pilots are employed by the vessels needing their services. Thus, it provides: Any vessel employing a coast pilot between pilotage districts shall pay the prescribed compulsory or optional pilotage, fee to the pilots' association within whose jurisdictional waters any part of said service may be rendered and any vessel employing a district pilot from one pilotage district to another in addition to the payment provided for in paragraph II, shall pay to the association in the district or in which such vessel is piloted, the compulsory pilotage fee provided for said district. In some respects, this case is similar to the case of Martha Lumber Mill, Inc. v. Lagradante, et al., 52 O.G. No. 9, 4230. In the latter case, the deceased was appointed by the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to the following provisions of Forestry Administrative Order No. 11 (Sept. 11, 1934): 34(s) Within thirty (30) days from the date of the issuance of a license, and after the terms and conditions of said license had been duly accepted in their entirety by the licensee concerned, at least one concession guard, if so required in the license, shall be employed by said licensee. The name and address of the concession guard so employed shall be reported to the local forest office under whose jurisdiction the license area falls. The concession guard, whose salary will be paid him directly by the licensee, shall from time to time, report to the herein mentioned forest officer for instruction regarding his duties and obligationsto patrol and cooperate with the government in the protection of the area of the licensee employing him. His appointment by the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and his being under the supervision and control of that department notwithstanding, this Court held the concession guard to be an employee of licensee. Petitioner also argues that, even assuming that Primitivo Siccuan and Francisco Ricerra were its employees within the purview of the law, yet the same cannot be said of Filoteo Siccuan and Domingo Batta, sounder and oarsman, respectively, because these two were employed not by petitioner but by the pilots' association. But it is a fact that the services of the two were needed so that the pilots could be taken to the S.S. "Cetus." It is well settled that a person who is asked for help in an emergency which threatens the employer's interests becomes an employee under an implied contract of hire. (I Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, sec. 47-42(c) 699; 1 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation Text, sec. 234, 627) Here, as stated in the beginning, the S.S. "Cetus" had to return to port for a needed repair of its rudder. Losing no time, the pilots engaged the services of Filoteo Siccuan and Domingo Batta to take them to the ship in trouble. It is under these circumstances that We hold the sounder and the oarsman to be employees of the petitioner. 257

Viewing from another point the relationship of the petitioner with the victims, We hold that even granting that the Aparri Pilots' Association was an independent contractor and that the deceased were its employees, still the result would be the same. Section 39 of the Workmen's Compensation Act provides in part: In this Act, unless the context indicates otherwise, the definition of various words used therein shall be as follows: (a) "Employer" includes every person or association of persons, incorporated or not, public or private, and the legal representative of the deceased employer. It includes the owner or lessee of a factory or establishment or place of work or any other person who is virtually the owner or manager of the business carried on in the establishment or place of work but who, for the reason that there is an independent contractor in the same, or for any other reason, is not the direct employer of laborers employed there. (b) "Laborer" is used as a synonym of "Employee" and means every person who has entered the employment of, or works under a service or apprenticeship contract for an employer. It does not include a person whose employment is purely casual and is not for the purposes of the occupation or business of the employer. Any reference to a laborer injured shall, in case he dies, include a reference to the person dependent on him, as defined in this Act, if the context so requires, or, if the employee is a minor or incapacitated, to his guardian or nearest of kin.... Construing this provision, We held in De los Santos v. Javier, 58 Phil. 82 that although the owner of the factory is not the direct employer of the laborers employed therein because there is an independent contractor in the factory, the owner of the factory is nevertheless to be considered for the purposes of the law as the employer of the laborers working under the independent contractor, as long as the work is for the purposes of the business of the owner. 2 Certainly, the pilotage of the ship so that it could enter port for necessary repair was in the usual course of the business of the petitioner in the same way that the repair of the window railing of a building intended for rent (Caro v. Rilloraza, et al., G.R. No. L-9569, Sept. 30, 1957) and the construction of a mezzanine floor of a hotel (Shellborne Hotel v. De Leon, G.R. No. L-9149, May 31, 1957) have been held for the purpose of the owner's business. Our conclusion upon this point is in accord with the doctrine that the Workmen's Compensation Law should be construed fairly, reasonably, or liberally in favor of and for the benefit of employees and their dependents and all doubt as to right of compensation resolved in their favor and all presumptions indulged in their favor. (Caro v. Rilloraza, et al., G.R. No. L-9569, Sept. 30, 1957; Francisco v. Consing, 63 Phil. 354). And now We come to the last point. It is contended that the claimants of Primitivo Siccuan, who are his children, have all reached the age of 18 and therefore cannot be considered dependents under Section 9. But We find that the Commission modified the decision of the hearing officer and instead gave the award to Primitivo Siccuan's grandchildren to whom the Commission directed the amount of P4,000.00, to be divided equally. The Commission's finding that the grandchildren were dependent on Primitivo Siccuan is one of fact which We will not review unless shown to be without support in evidence.

Petitioner does not explain in what way proof of respondent Placida de la Cruz' marriage to Domingo Batta is not satisfactory. The same goes with respect to the claim that there is no evidence as to the amount of wages of the deceased. Hence, We shall not pass upon these points. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission is affirmed, with costs against petitioner.

considering the strenuous work he performed, his employment as janitor aggravated his pre-existing illness; that although here is a discrepancy between the cause of death "beriberi adult," as appearing in the death Certificate and the testimony of Dr. Villareal, the latter deserves more credence, because the information (cause of death) was given by the sanitary inspector who did not, in any way, examine the deceased before or after his death. The Commission, therefore, ordered the respondent Chinese Commercial School, Inc., in said case 1. To pay to the claimant, for and in behalf of her minor children by the deceased, namely, Carlito, Gloria, Rosita and Ernesto, all surnamed Fabrigar, the amount of TWO THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED NINETY SIX and 00/00 Pesos (P2,496.00) as Death benefits; and

G.R. No. L-16600

December 27, 1961 2. To pay to the Commission the amount of P25.00 as fees pursuant to Section 55 of Act 3428, as amended. The above decision is now before Us for Review on a Writ of Certiorari, after the motion for reconsideration had been denied, petitioner alleging that the Commission erred: 1. In disregarding completely the evidentiary value of the death certificate of the attending physician which was presented as evidence by both claimants and respondent (Exhibits C & 4) to prove the cause of death; 2. In finding that the cause of death of said Santiago Fabrigar was tuberculosis and was contracted during and as a result of the nature of his employment; 3. In holding that the herein petitioner was the employer of the deceased Santiago Fabrigar; and 4. In not holding that the herein petitioner is exempt from the scope of the Workmen's Compensation Law.lawphil.net Petitioner contends that the preponderance of evidence on the matters involved in this case, militates in its favor. Considering the doctrine that the Commission, like the Court of Industrial Relations, is bound not by the rule of preponderance of evidence as in ordinary civil cases, but by the rule of substantial evidence (Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil. 635; Phil. Newspaper Guild vs. Evening News, 47 Off. Gaz. No. 12, p. 6188; Secs. 43 & 46 Rep. Act No. 772, W.C. Act), petitioner's pretension is without merit. Substantial evidence supports the decision of the Commission. While seemingly there exists an inconsistency in the cause of death, as appearing in the death certificate by Dr. Labitoria and in Dr. Villareal's diagnosis, it is a fact found by the Commission, that the Sanitary Inspector did not examine the deceased before and after his death. "Undoubtedly," says the Commission, "the information that he died of beriberi adult, as appearing in the death certificate was given because it appears that the deceased had also edema of the extremities (swollen legs)." The evidence of record sustains the following findings of the Commission, is Fabrigar's cause of death to wit The short period of time intervening between his last day of work (March 13, 1956) when he spat blood and his death June 28, 1956 due to pulmonary tuberculosis indicates that he had been suffering from the disease even during the time that he was employed by the respondent. Considering the strenuous work that he performed while in the service of the respondents and the unusually long hours of work he rendered (6:00 p.m. to 1:30 p.m. and from 2:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. or 7:00 p.m.) beyond the normal and legal working hours, we 258

ILOILO CHINESE COMMERCIAL SCHOOL, petitioner, vs. LEONORA FABRIGAR and THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents. Luis G. Hofilea for petitioner. J. T. de Leon for respondents. PAREDES, J.: As a result of the death of Santiago Fabrigar, on June 28, 1956, his heirs in the person of Leonora Fabrigar (common-law wife) and their children, filed a claim for compensation with the Workmen's Compensation Commission, Case No. 1085, W.C.C., entitled "Leonora Fabrigar, et al., Claimants, vs. Iloilo Chinese Commercial School, Respondent." In this claim, it was alleged that the cause of death was " pulmonary tuberculosis contractedduring and as a result of his employment as janitor." The Hearing Officer of the WCC denied the claim and dismissed the case, finding that the claimant failed to prove the casual effect of employment and death; nothing was shown that the disease was contracted in line of duty; that whatever evidence claimant presented about the cause of death was only a mere suggestion that progressively developed from tuberculosis with heart trouble to a sudden fatal turn, ending up for the cause of "beriberi adult" at the time of death, as per certification of Sanitary Inspector Dr. P. E. Labitoria, of Dao, Capiz (Exhibits C & 4). The heirs of Santiago Fabrigar appealed the decision with the Workmen's Compensation Commission which, on November 12, 1959, rendered judgment reversing the decision of its Hearing Officer, making the following findings of facts: That Santiago Fabrigar had been employed from 1947 to March 12, 1956, as a janitor-messenger of the respondent Iloilo Chinese Commercial School, his work consisting of sweeping and scrubbing the floors, cleaning the classrooms and the school premises, and other janitorial chores; on March 11, 1956, preparatory to graduation day, he carried desks and chairs from the classrooms to the auditorium, set the curtains and worked harder and faster than usual; that although he felt shortness of breath and did not feel very well that day, he continued working at the request of the overseer of respondent, that on the following day he reported for work, but on March 13, he spat blood and stopped working; that from April 29, 1956 to May 15, 1956, he was under treatment by Dr. Quirico Villareal "for far advanced pulmonary tuberculosis and for heart disease"; and that previous to said treatment, he was attended by Dr. Jaranilla for pulmonary tuberculosis. The Commission concluded that the short period of intervention between his last day of work (March 13, 1956) when he spat blood and his death on June 28, 1956, due to pulmonary tuberculosis, indicated that he had been suffering from such disease even during the time he was employed by the respondent and

find that his employment aggravated his pre-existing illness and brought about his death. Moreover, our conclusion finds support in the fact that immediately preceding his last day of work with the respondent, he had an unusually hard day lifting desks and other furnitures and assisting in the preparations for the graduation exercises of the school. Considering also his complaints during that day (March 11), among which was "shortness of breath", we may also say that his work affected an already existing heart ailment. We find no plausible reason for altering or disturbing the above factual findings of the Commission, in the present appeal by certiorari. It is claimed that actually the deceased was not an employee of the petitioner, but by the Iloilo Chinese Chamber of Commerce which was the one that furnished the janitor service in the premises of its buildings, including the part thereof occupied by the petitioner; that the Chamber of Commerce paid the salaries of janitors, including the deceased; that the petitioner could not afford to pay rentals of its premises and janitor due to limited finances depended largely on funds raised among its Board of Directors, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Chinese nationals who helped the school. In other words, it is pretended that the deceased was not an employee of the school but of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce which should be the one responsible for the compensation of the deceased. On one hand, according to the Commission, there is substantial proof to the effect that Fabrigar was employed by and rendered service for the petitioner and was an employee within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Law. On the other hand, the most important test of employer-employee relation is the power to control the employee's conduct. The records disclose that the person in charge (encargado) of the respondent school supervised the deceased in his work and had control over the manner he performed the same. It is finally contended that petitioner is an institution devoted solely for learning and is not an industry within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Law. Consequently, it is argued, it is exempt from the scope of the same law. Considering that this factual question has not been properly put in issue before the Commission, it may not now be entertained in this appeal for the first time (Atlantic Gulf, etc. vs. CIR, et al., L-16992, Dec. 23, 1961, citing International Oil Factory Union v. Hon. Martinez, et al., L-15560, Dec. 31, 1960). The decision of the Commission does not show that the matter was taken up. We are at a loss to state whether the issue was raised in the motion for reconsideration filed with the Commission, because the said motion is not found in the record before us. And the resolution to the motion for reconsideration does not touch this question. IN VIEW HEREOF, the appeal interposed by the petitioner is dismissed, and the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the herein petitioner.

G.R. No. L-14204

June 30, 1961

MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, petitioner, vs. ROSALINDA DE LA PEA VDA. DE OLIVEROS, TUAZON, HIZON & OCAMPO CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, and WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents. The Government Corporate Counsel for petitioner. Pablo L. Madamba for respondents. PADILLA, J.: This is an appeal by certiorari under the provisions of sections 46 and 49, Act No. 4328, as amended by Act No. 3812, Commonwealth Act No. 210 and Republic Acts Nos. 772 and 889, in connection with Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, to review a decision of the Workmen's Compensation tion Commission dated 9 December 1957 ordering the petitioner to pay to the respondent Rosalinda de la Pea Vda. de Oliveros the sum of P4,000 as compensation for the death of her husband Napoleon Oliveros and to the Commission the sum of P46 as fees (Annex H) and the resolution of the Commission in banc dated 28 July 1958 denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration (W.C.C. case No. 35306, Annex J). On or about 20 January 1955 the respondent Rosalina Vda. de Oliveros filed a claim for compensation for the death of her husband Napoleon Oliveros in the Workmen's Compensation Commission against Tuazon, Hizon and Ocampo Construction Company. On or about 20 September 1956 the respondent widow filed an amended claim to include the petitioner Manila Railroad Company (Annex A). On 30 October 1956 the acting chief referee of the respondent Commission ordered the petitioner to answer the amended claim within 15 days from receipt of notice (Annex B). On 7 December 1956 the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the amended claim on the ground that "There is no employer-employee relationship between the deceased and the respondent (petitioner) MRR;" and that "the claim is barred by sec. 24" (Annex D). The respondent widow filed an answer to the motion to dismiss on the merits. On 5 January 1957 the acting chief referee denied the motion to dismiss and set the case for hearing on 11 January 1957 at 8:00 o'clock a.m. (Annex E). At the hearing, the petitioner and the respondent widow appeared by counsel but the respondent contractor did not. On 12 January 1957 the acting chief referee rendered a decision holding that the petitioner is the statutory employer of the deceased engineer; that section 24 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended providing among others that in case of death, notice of claim for compensation must be given by the person claiming such benefit to the employerwithin a period of not later than three months after death of the employee, is not a prescriptive period; and that although such notice had been given after that period, the fact that the petitioner had knowledge of the death of the employee, such notice is no longer necessary, and ordering the petitioner and the respondent contractor, jointly and severally, to pay to the respondent widow the sum of P4,000 as compensation for the death of her husband and to the commission the sum of P41 as fees (Annex F). On 14 February 1957 the petitioner filed with the respondent Commission a petition for review of the decision of the acting chief referee. In support of its petition, it claimed that "the deceased employee was not a laborer within the meaning of section 39(b) of Act No. 3428, as amended;" that "the employment of the deceased is purely casual and is not for the purpose of occupation or business of the respondent MRR Co. (petitioner);" and that "the claim is barred by section 24." (Annex G). On 9 December 1957 the chairman of the respondent Commission rendered a decision affirming that of the acting chief referee (Annex H). On 21 July 1957 the petitioner filed a "motion for recon-sideration of the decision dated December 9, 1957." (Annex I). On 28 July 1958 the Commission in banc denied the motion for reconsideration (Annex J) Hence, this appeal interposed by the petitioner. 259

The petitioner has raised the following questions for resolution of this Court: 1. Whether the deceased was an employee of petitioner MRR or of respondent Tuazon. Hizon and Ocampo Construction. 2. Whether or not the deceased was a laborer within the meaning of Section 39(b) of Act 3428 as amended. 3. Whether the employment of the deceased is purely casual and not for the purpose of the occupation or business of MRR Co. 4. Whether or not the claim is barred by Section 24 of Act 3428, as amended.. 5. Whether or not Section 24 is a Statute of Limitation. 6. Whether or not Section 27 of the Act could be applied in the instant case to justify the claimant's delay in filing her claim when said Section has express reference to notice of injury and not claim for compensation. which may be reduced to a single issue, to wit: whether or not the petitioner is liable to the respondent widow for compensation for the death of her husband while employed by the respondent contractor who undertook to build a bridge for the petitioner. The evidence, as summarized by the respondent Commission, are: The records show that on January 9, 1955, while the late Napoleon Oliveros, a civil engineer employed by respondent Tuazon, Hizon & Ocampo Construction Co., was directing the construction of a bridge, a project of the' MRR Company at Bacnotan, La Union, he was killed by one of the laborers. The construction of said bridge was in accordance with the contract entered into by and between the respondents under which the MRR Company would furnish the materials while the contractor, labor. The records also disclose that the MRR Co. exercised close supervision over the construction of the project in order to assure compliance by the contractor with the specifications provided in the contract. . . . The very project engineer of the company supervising the construction of the bridge knew of the accident which resulted the death of the workman. He made inquiry and notified the Chief Train Dispatcher of the tragedy, but notwithstanding this fact, the company did not submit its employer's report as required by Section 37 of the Act. . . . . The recent cases of Shellborne Hotel vs. De Leon, G.R. No. L-9149, 31 May 1957, and Caro vs. Rilloraba, G.R. No. L-9569, 30 September 1957, offer a solution to the question in the case at bar. In Shellborne Hotel vs. De Leon, the facts are: Shellborne Hotel is engaged in the Hostelry business which consists in the entertainment of guests by offering them food and accommodations. It engaged the services of Crispin Sigua, a contractor, to construct its mezzanine floor, the hotel furnishing the necessary materials. The contractor in turn engaged the services of one Romulo, a laborer, to work on the job with a daily wage of P5.50. The hotel supervised the construction and saw to it that the work was done in accordancewith the plan. The contractor did not file any bond for the faithful 260

performance or execution of the work and had to get money by "vales" from the hotel to pay his laborer every Saturday. While working in the construction, the said laborer met with an accident injuring his right hand and disabling him from work for more than two months. The question that arose was whether or not the hotel was liable to the injured laborer for compensation under the workmen's Compensation Act. This Court held that under the facts of the case, Sigua was not an independent contractor and that the hotel was liable to the injured laborer for compensation. Said this Court: The contention that the construction of the mezzanine floor is far removed from the business of hostelry is erroneous. Said business consists in the entertainment of guests offering food and providing accommodations. The accommodations include comfortable and luxurious living quarters extended to guests. The construction of the mezzanine floor was for the purpose of giving comfort and luxury to petitioner's guests, more spacious and attractive rooms to satisfy its customers, thus ultimately keeping their patronage and that of others who would know of such inviting conditions. The construction can be said to be for the promotion of, and to have a direct bearing on petitioner's hostelry business. The facts in Caro vs. Rilloraza are: Carmen Prieto de Caro is the owner of a building "intended or used for rental (business) purposes," managed by her husband Ramon Caro, as administrator of their conjugal partnership and president and general manager of Ramcar, Inc. The administrator engaged the services of Daniel de la Cruz, a job contractor, to change the joists and repair other parts of building, under the direction and control of the former or his representative and in the manner or by the method designated by either. The contractor, in turn, engaged the services of Lucas Rilloraza, a carpenter to work on the job. While working on the window railing of the building, the wooden platform on which Rilloraza and another carpenter were working collapsed and Rilloraza fell to the ground and broke his leg. The injury resulted in his temporary total disability for a period of six months and permanent partial disability of 5% of the broken leg. The question raised was whether or not the owner of the building was liable to the injured carpenter for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. After reviewing the cases of Santos vs. Havier 58 Phil. 82; Andoyo vs. Manila Railroad Co., G.R. No. 34722, 28 March 1932; Philippine Manufacturing Company vs. De Geronimo, G.R. No. L-6868, 29 November 1954, and Mansal vs. P. P. Gocheco Lumber Company, G.R. No. I,8017, 30 April 1955, this Court held that . . . the repair of said building is part of the usual business of the administration of the aforesaid properties, so that the same may be suitable for the gainful purpose above referred to. Consequently, even if Rilloraza, who did the repair work thereof, were a casual laborer, engaged directly by De la Cruz, acting as an independent contractor, which he is not, the former would still be an employee of petitioner herein, within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and, hence, would be entitled to demand compensation from him. From the foregoing cases, the following rule on the liability of an owner of an industrial or business establishment, ordering the performance or execution of a particular work or job by another, for injury or death of an employee or laborer of the contractor, arising out of or in the course of employment, may be drawn: Where the owner of an industrial or business establishment lets another do a certain piece of work or execute a particular job directly or necessarily connected with the conduct or pursuit of its usual or habitual business, and the owner of the said establishment has direct supervision and control of the employees or workers of the person executing the job or work, the owner of the establishment ordering the execution of the job or work becomes the statutory employer of the employees of the said contractor. Tested by the foregoing standard, the petitioner cannot escape liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act to the respondent widow for the death of her husband. The petitioner is engaged

in the transportation business. Its purposes are stated in Executive Order No. 399, 5 January 1951, 47 Off. Gaz. 7, prescribing a uniform charter for all government owned or controlled corporations, as follows: (a) To own or operate railroads, tramways, and other kinds of land transportation, vessels and pipe lines, for the purpose of transporting for consideration, passengers, mail and property between any points in the Philippines; and . (b) As an auxiliary to its main purpose, to own and/or operate powerhouse, hotels, restaurants, terminals, warehouses, timber concessions, coal mines, iron mines and other mineral properties and to manufacture rolling stock, equipment, tools and other appliances; to construct and operate in connection with its railroad lines toll viaducts; toll bridges and toll tunnels. To carry out the purposes above-mentioned, it shall have the special power to acquire by condemnation proceedings rights of way, real property or interest or easements therein as it may require for its purposes. (Emphasis supplied.) The construction of the bridge, therefore, was directly or necessarily connected with the conduct or pursuit of its usual or habitual business. Furthermore, the petitioner furnished the contractor all the necessary materials for the construction of the bridge and "exercised close supervision over the construction of the project in order to assure compliance by the contractor with the specifications provided in the contract." The petitioner tries to exploit to its advantage the fact that while the accident happened on 9 January 1955, yet the amended claim against it for compensation dated 20 September 1956, was filed by the respondent widow in the Workmen's Compensation Commission on 29 September 1956 and served upon the petitioner on 2 October 1956. It contends that, pursuant to the provisions of section 24 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, the claimant should have given it notice of claim not later than three months after the death of her husband; that the respondent widow's claim having been filed beyond the period provided for by law, it became incumbent upon her to prove that the petitioner "did not suffer by said delay in giving notice inasmuch as petitioner has not waived the defense provided by See. 24 aforecited;" and that the respondent widow failed to prove such fact. The petitioner, on the other hand, tried to prove "that if suffered from claimant's (the respondent widow) delay in giving the required notice for said claim is now too old to be successfully investigated and defended . . .;"that it "could no longer obtain witnesses regarding the accident and since this action was brought against it after it had already paid the Contractor Martin V. Tuason, it could no longer deduct from the proceeds of the contract whatever compensation may be due the claimant . . .;" and that "by reason of the termination of the contract and the consequent release of the surety," it could no longer recover from the bond filed by respondent contractor for whatever damage or compensation it might be ordered to pay the respondent widow. The petitioner's contention cannot be sustained. The respondent Commission found that the petitioner "exercised close supervision over the construction of the project in order to assure compliance by the contractor with the specifications provided in the contract;" and that . . . The very project engineer of the company supervising the construction of the bridge knew of the accident which resulted in the death of the workman. He made inquiry and notified the Chief Train Dispatcher of the tragedy, but notwithstanding this fact, the company did not submit its employer's report as required by Section 37 of the Act. 261

Section 27 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, provides that "failure to or delay in giving notice shall not be a bar to the proceeding herein provided for, if it is shown that the employer, his agent or representative had knowledge of the accident . . . ." The decision under review is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.

G.R. No. L-17015

April 29, 1961

GEORGE H. EVANS, ETC., petitioner, vs. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and NATALIA ARGUELLES VDA. DE NAVAL, respondents. J. A. Wolfson for petitioner. E. R. Trillo for respondents. BARRERA, J.: This is an appeal by certiorari to review the decision of the respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission dated February 4, 1960, as well as its resolution in banc of April 12, 1960. From the records, it appears that on December 2, 1952, a claim for death benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428, as amended) was filed by respondent Natalia Arguelles Vda. de Naval (for herself as widow of the deceased Fabian Naval, and for and in behalf of her 2 minor children with said deceased, namely, Elmer and Evelyn Naval) against the Dahican Lumber Company. When the claim was transmitted to the company, it elicited an answer to the effect that it (company) was denying liability for the death of Fabian Naval, on the ground that he (Naval) was laid off from the service on July 31, 1952, and, since he died on August 10, 1952, his "death occurred when there was no longer any employer-employee relation between him and the company."1 On November 5, 1953, Dahican Lumber Company informed respondent Commission that it was under receivership, and pointed to herein petitioner George H. Evans as the receiver duly appointed by the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 20987. Thereafter (or on April 22, May 5, and August 5, 1955), respondent Commission, acting through Referee Patricio Dionisio, advised petitioner to take cognizance of the claim for compensation filed against the company by respondent Vda. de Naval. On August 24, 1955, petitioner's counsel replied to the referee in a letter of this tenor: 1. Your letter of 5 August 1955 was referred to us by Mr. George H. Evans (herein petitioner), receiver of Dahican Lumber Company. 2. It is respectfully suggested that hearing of this claim be had by your Office to determine the merit or lack of merit of this claim. If, after said hearing your Office finds this claim meritorious, and an award is decreed, such award will then be submitted to the Court for

consideration with a view to it being consolidated with the claims of other persons and entities against the Dahican Lumber Company in the receivership proceedings. 3. Please let us know of such action as you may decide to take in the premises. Acting upon this suggestion, the referee set the case for hearing on September 21, 1955, notice thereof having been sent to respondent Vda. de Naval and to petitioner's counsel. The scheduled hearing was, however, postponed, first to September 26, 1955, and then to October 7, 1955. On November 4, 1955, the referee issued an order (copy of which was received by petitioner on November 16, 1955) stating: ORDER The parties in this case are hereby ordered to appear before the Public Defender at Daet, Camarines Norte when summoned by said official, to submit their respective evidence. Notify (1) Mrs. Natalia Arguelles Vda. de Naval, c/o Joaquin Gosilater Daet, Camarines Norte; (2) The Receiver Mr. George Evans [herein petitioner], 233 David St., Manila; and (3) Baradi and Gallardo Law Office; 804-806 Wilson Bldg., Manila. SO ORDERED. Without notifying petitioner to appear before him, the Public Defender at Daet, on January 28 and 30, 1956, conducted a hearing of the case, pursuant to the abovequoted order of the referee. On April 25, 1956, the referee rendered a decision against Dahican Lumber Company, in favor of respondent Vda. de Naval, the dispositive part of which reads: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS and considering further the fact that the allegations of the claimant widow (herein respondent Vda. de Naval) were corroborated by the foreman of the deceased and by a log-contractor of the Company (Dahican Lumber Company), there is no other alternative but to consider this compensation case as compensable. It is hereby ordered, therefore, that the Company should be held responsible to the claimant widow and her children, by paying them the amount of 50 per centum of the deceased's regular weekly wages. Computing it for the whole period of 208 weeks, as provided by law, the dependents are entitled to P2,184.00, as compensation payable in lump sum, less the 8 per centumprovided by Section 22 of Act 3428, as amended, or P2,209.28. The Company is also ordered to pay to the widow the amount of P200-00, as burial expenses and to pay to this Commission the amount of P21.00, as provided by Section 55 of the Compensation Law, as amended. Let the parties concerned be served with a copy of this Decision for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.

communication from respondent Commission regarding the case. It was only on said date (June 12, 1959), that petitioner received the following letter dated June 4, 1959, from respondent Commission: Our records do not reveal that the decision dated April 26, 1956 of the defunct Workmen's Compensation Commission in the above-entitled case requiring you to pay the claimant the amount of P2,209.28 has ever been complied with. In this connection, it is requested that said amount together with the sum of P21.00 fee as required by Section 55 of the Workmen's Compensation Commission as amended, be remitted to this Office within ten (10) days from your receipt hereof, otherwise we shall, much to our regret, issue a writ of execution to enforce the aforesaid decision. However, if direct payments have been made to the claimant, kindly submit to this Commission within the above-mentioned period corresponding proof thereof together with said fee. Upon receipt of said letter, petitioner's counsel, on June 13, 1959, wrote to respondent Commission the following letter: 1. The Receiver, George H. Evans (herein petitioner), has referred to us your letter of 4 June 1959, wherein you referred to ". . . the decision dated April 26, 1956, of the defunct Workmen's Compensation Commission in the above-entitled case requiring you to pay the claimant the amount of P2,209.28 has ever been complied with." and this is to advise (that) we never received any notice of said alleged decision. 2. The last notice we received in this case was dated 4 November 1955 and read as follows: ORDER "The parties in this case are hereby ordered to appear before the Public Defender at Daet, Camarines Norte when summoned by said official, to submit their respective evidence. "Notify (1) Mrs. Natalia Arguelles Vda. de Naval, Joaquin Gosilater Daet, Camarines Norte; (2) The receiver Mr. George Evans, 233 David St., Manila; and Baradi and Gallardo Law Office, 804-806 Wilson Bldg. Manila. "SO ORDERED. "MANILA, November 4, 1955.

From November 16, 1955, the date when petitioner received a copy of the aforequoted order (dated November 4, 1955) of the referee requiring the parties "to appear before the Public Defender at Daet, Camarines Norte, when summoned by said official, to submit their respective evidence", until June 12, 1959 (a period of 3 years, 6 months, and 28 days,), petitioner received no notice, order, or other 262

"PATRICIO Trial Referee."

DIONISIO

3. No notice of trial or hearing was ever received and repeat, no notice of the decision was ever served. 4. Please review the record and furnish us proof (a) notice of trial or hearing was duly served and (b) no of decision of 26 April 1956 was duly served. Without s proof, any trial or hearing and any decision, is null and void. (Emphasis supplied.) On October 27, 1959,-respondent Commission sent to petitioner's counsel, a letter of this tenor: In connection with your letter, informing us of the that you have not received a copy of the Decision dated A 25, 1956, rendered by the defunct Workmen's Compensation Commission on the above-entitled case, we are furnishing herewith a true copy of the same. On November 4, 1959, petitioner filed with respond Commission a petition for review of said decision of the referee (dated April 26, 1956), on the ground that it "is null and void and, therefore, contrary to law." On February 4, 1960, respondent Commission affirmed said decision of the referee, in a decision which in part reads: In this case, we find that the employer has failed to establish his right to controvert the claim within the period required by law. It has also failed to answer any defenses which could be lawfully considered in his favor to defeat the claim .The mere allegation that at the time of death of the employee, he was no longer under its employ is totally inadequate. proven fact is that the worker's illness was contracted in course of his employment and by reason of his work long be the severance of the employer-employee relationship due to circumstances not imputable to the fault of the employee. And, since the cause of action accrued at the time when the employer-employee relationship was still subsisting, the claim must, a should, prosper. In this case, the facts show direct casual petitions between the worker's illness and his employment, and referee's decision is supported by both the evidence and applicable law. WHEREFORE, the decision under review should be, as it is hereby, affirmed and the respondent ordered to pay, in addition to what has been adjudged against it by the referee, the sum of P5.00 for this review. SO ORDERED. On March 8, 1960, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision, on the grounds that (1) it is contrary to law; (2) Dahican Lumber Company is in receivership proceedings, and cannot be reached by the Workmen's Compensation Commission except through the court having jurisdiction over said receivership; and "all proceedings to date have been without due and proper notice to the court having jurisdiction and, therefore, are null and void." Said motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent Commission in its resolution in banc of April 12, 1960. Hence, this appeal. The appeal is meritorious. As already stated, since November 16, 1955, when petitioner received from the referee of respondent Commission, notice of order directing him "to appear before the Public Defender at Daet, Camarines Norte, when summoned by said official", to submit evidence in connection with respondent Vda. de Naval's claim for compensation against Dahican Lumber Company, of which he (petitioner) is the receiver, no notice or communication whatsoever has been received from the Public Defender at Daet or the referee of the Commission regarding the hearing of 263

the case on January 28, and 30, 1956 and the rendering of a decision thereon on April 26, 1956, awarding the sum of P2,209.28 as compensation to respondent Vda. de Naval. Neither copy nor notice of said decision of the referee was ever served on petitioner or his counsel. It was only on June 12, 1959 when petitioner received respondent Commission's letter dated June 4, 1959, requiring him to comply with the aforesaid decision of the referee on April 26, 1956, that petitioner learned for the first time that the claim has been heard and decided. In the circumstances, petitioner was clearly deprived of his day in court. Consequently, all proceedings had by respondent Commission in connection with the case, are null and void and without any legal effect. As to respondent Commission's claim that petitioner's failure to establish his right to controvert the claim within the period required under Section 45 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, namely, to submit a report of Naval's death within 14 days from date thereof, or within 10 days after acquiring knowledge of the same, resulted in the admission of liability for said claim, we note that Naval was laid off from the service of Dahican Lumber Company on July 31, 1952. He died on August 110, 1952. Hence, the company was not in a position to know of the death of Naval. Besides, it occured 10 days after the employer-employee relationship between him and the company had seen severed. In the circumstances, Dahican Lumber Company was not in law bound to submit the required report of Naval's death within the aforesaid period. On the other hand, the records show that when respondent Vda. de Naval's claim for compensation was transmitted to the company, the latter seasonably answered that it was not liable for the death of Fabian Naval, for the reason that he (Naval) was laid off from the service of the company on July 31, 1952 and, since he died on August 10, 1952, said death occured when "there was no longer any employer-employee relationship" between him and the company. This to our mind, constituted sufficient controversion of the claim in question by the company. Petitioner was thereafter, accordingly, entitled to be duly notified of all proceedings taken in connection with said claim. Petitioner's claim that he could not be sued before the Workmen's Compensation Commission as receiver of Dahican Lumber Company, without first obtaining permission from the court (Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 2,0967) having jurisdiction of the receivership proceedings is without merit since it was petitioner himself who, through his counsel, suggested in his letter of August 24, 1955 (quoted earlier in this opinion) that the claim be heard by the Commission for determination of its merits. Furthermore, under Section 7, Rule 61 of the Rules of Court, "subject to the control of the court in which the action is pending, a receiver shall have the power to bring, and defend, as such, actions in his own name."(See Cahilo v. De Guzman, et al., G.R. No. L-13431, prom. November 24, 1959; Somes v. Government of P.I., 62 Phil. 432.) WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission appealed from are hereby set aside, and the case is remanded to respondent Commission for further proceedings after due notice to the parties. No costs. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-15045

January 20, 1961

IN RE: PETITION FOR EXEMPTION FROM COVERAGE BY THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, petitioner-appellant, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee. Feria, Manglapus and Associates for petitioner-appellant. Legal Staff, Social Security System and Solicitor General for respondent-appellee. GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.: On September 1, 1958, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, thru counsel, filed with the Social Security Commission a request that "Catholic Charities, and all religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations, which are directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila," be exempted from compulsory coverage of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, otherwise known as the Social Security Law of 1954. The request was based on the claim that the said Act is a labor law and does not cover religious and charitable institutions but is limited to businesses and activities organized for profit. Acting upon the recommendation of its Legal Staff, the Social Security Commission in its Resolution No. 572, series of 1958, denied the request. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, reiterating its arguments and raising constitutional objections, requested for reconsideration of the resolution. The request, however, was denied by the Commission in its Resolution No. 767, series of 1958; hence, this appeal taken in pursuance of section 5(c) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended. Section 9 of the Social Security Law, as amended, provides that coverage "in the System shall be compulsory upon all members between the age of sixteen and sixty rears inclusive, if they have been for at least six months a the service of an employer who is a member of the System, Provided, that the Commission may not compel any employer to become member of the System unless he shall have been in operation for at least two years and has at the time of admission, if admitted for membership during the first year of the System's operation at least fifty employees, and if admitted for membership the following year of operation and thereafter, at least six employees x x x." The term employer" as used in the law is defined as any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries in the Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses the services of another person who is under his orders as regards the employment, except the Government and any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including corporations owned or controlled by the Government" (par. [c], see. 8), while an "employee" refers to "any person who performs services for an 'employer' in which either or both mental and physical efforts are used and who receives compensation for such services" (par. [d], see. 8). "Employment", according to paragraph [i] of said section 8, covers any service performed by an employer except those expressly enumerated thereunder, like employment under the Government, or any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities including corporations owned and controlled by the Government, domestic service in a private home, employment purely casual, etc. From the above legal provisions, it is apparent that the coverage of the Social Security Law is predicated on the existence of an employer-employee relationship of more or less permanent nature and extends to employment of all kinds except those expressly excluded. Appellant contends that the term "employer" as defined in the law should following the principle of ejusdem generis be limited to those who carry on "undertakings or activities which have the element of profit or gain, or which are pursued for profit or gain," because the phrase ,activity of any 264

kind" in the definition is preceded by the words "any trade, business, industry, undertaking." The contention cannot be sustained. The rule ejusdem generisapplies only where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated. (Grosjean vs. American Paints Works [La], 160 So. 449). In the case at bar, the definition of the term "employer" is, we think, sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit, like herein appellant, within its meaning. This is made more evident by the fact that it contains an exception in which said institutions or entities are not included. And, certainly, had the Legislature really intended to limit the operation of the law to entities organized for profit or gain, it would not have defined an "employer" in such a way as to include the Government and yet make an express exception of it. It is significant to note that when Republic Act No. 1161 was enacted, services performed in the employ of institutions organized for religious or charitable purposes were by express provisions of said Act excluded from coverage thereof (sec. 8, par. [j] subpars. 7 and 8). That portion of the law, however, has been deleted by express provision of Republic Act No. 1792, which took effect in 1957. This is clear indication that the Legislature intended to include charitable and religious institutions within the scope of the law. In support of its contention that the Social Security Law was intended to cover only employment for profit or gain, appellant also cites the discussions of the Senate, portions of which were quoted in its brief. There is, however, nothing whatsoever in those discussions touching upon the question of whether the law should be limited to organizations for profit or gain. Of course, the said discussions dwelt at length upon the need of a law to meet the problems of industrializing society and upon the plight of an employer who fails to make a profit. But this is readily explained by the fact that the majority of those to be affected by the operation of the law are corporations and industries which are established primarily for profit or gain. Appellant further argues that the Social Security Law is a labor law and, consequently, following the rule laid down in the case of Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. Araos (G.R. No. L-10091, January 29, 1958) and other cases1, applies only to industry and occupation for purposes of profit and gain. The cases cited, however, are not in point, for the reason that the law therein involved expressly limits its application either to commercial, industrial, or agricultural establishments, or enterprises. . Upon the other hand, the Social Security Law was enacted pursuant to the "policy of the Republic of the Philippines to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines and shall provide protection to employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death." (See. 2, Republic Act No. 1161, as amended.) Such enactment is a legitimate exercise of the police power. It affords protection to labor, especially to working women and minors, and is in full accord with the constitutional provisions on the "promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people." Being in fact a social legislation, compatible with the policy of the Church to ameliorate living conditions of the working class, appellant cannot arbitrarily delimit the extent of its provisions to relations between capital and labor in industry and agriculture. There is no merit in the claim that the inclusion of religious organizations under the coverage of the Social Security Law violates the constitutional prohibition against the application of public funds for the use, benefit or support of any priest who might be employed by appellant. The funds contributed to the System created by the law are not public funds, but funds belonging to the members which are merely held in trust by the Government. At any rate, assuming that said funds are impressed with the character of public funds, their payment as retirement death or disability benefits would not constitute a violation of the cited provisions of the Constitution, since such payment shall be made to the priest not because he is a priest but because he is an employee.

Neither may it be validly argued that the enforcement of the Social Security Law impairs appellant's right to disseminate religious information. All that is required of appellant is to make monthly contributions to the System for covered employees in its employ. These contributions, contrary to appellant's contention, are not in the nature of taxes on employment." Together with the contributions imposed upon the employees and the Government, they are intended for the protection of said employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death in line with the constitutional mandate to promote social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Resolutions Nos. 572 kind 767, series of 1958, of the Social Security Commission are hereby affirmed. So ordered with costs against appellant.

Now, this petition for mandamus seeks to compel the Commission to decide its motion on the merits, petitioner contending that its motion to reconsider had been filed on time, because the law allows "fifteen days" for appeal, under sec. 50, Republic Act No. 772. The rule is void, asserts herein petitioner, because it shortens the period specified by law. We think it clear, however, that the section cited by petitioner refers to appeals from Workmen's Commission to this Court. Maybe the Commission rule holds that when no appeal to it from the decision of one Commissioner is made in ten days' the latter's opinion becomes the decision of the Commission. From which an appeal may be taken to this Court within fifteen days from notice, as by statute provided. Nevertheless, without ruling on this matter, we have chosen to act in accordance with the second alternative of the petition before us; to regard it as a petition for review of the compensatory award. According to the decision, the facts were these:

G.R. No. L-15978

December 29, 1960

DAVAO GULF LUMBER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. N. BAENS DEL ROSARIO, ET AL., respondents. Primitivo A. Diaz for petitioner. N. S. Nata and R. Occea for respondents. BENGZON, J.: Review of a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. On September 29, 1967, the truck of Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation carrying some lumber from its sawmill to Davao City, accidentally overturned on the road. Vicente Soriano, its driver, was killed instantly together with his son, Vicente Soriano Jr. His widow, Flavia A. Soriano, claimed compensation on November 11, before the Regional Office No. 8, at Davao, of the Department of Labor. Having found thedriver guilty of notorious negligence, the hearing officer denied compensation. On appeal, the Chairman of the Workmen's Compensation saw differently. He found no such negligence, and awarded compensation. Fifteen days after receiving copy of such award, the Davao Gulf moved for reconsideration by the Commission as a whole. It happened, however, that there was a rule of the Commission which provided: Sec. 3. Disposition of Appeal. The Commissioner to whom an appealed case is assigned by the Chairman shall decide the same on its merit. Either appellee or appellant, or both, may seek the reconsideration of the decision of a Commissioner by the Commission en banc within 10 days from receipt of said decision. So, pursuant to such rule, the Commission denied the motion for being out of time.

Vicente Soriano since 1947 until his death on September 29, 1957, was employed as a driver of the respondent corporation, earning P5.00 a day or P30.00 a week. In the early morning of the last mentioned date, said Vicente Soriano together with his assistant Mariano Bariquit, and one Rodolfo Mapa,another employee of the respondent corporation, loaded his truck with lumber from the sawmill to be brought to the company yard in Davao City. Then Vicente Soriano brought the truck to the gasoline station owned and operated by the respondent within its sawmill compound, and filled the truck with gasoline(60 liters). A delivery receipt for the lumber was issued by the dispatcherand the truck was allowed to proceed to Davao City. On the way, the truck did have passengers Vicente Soriano's wife and 3 minor children, his assistant, Mario Bariquit and 6 laborers who hitched a ride in the truck. Sitting beside Vicente Soriano was Vicente Soriano, Jr., then Mario Bariquit, Conchita, a daughter of Soriano, and Mrs. Flavia Aliwasag de Soriano. The truck was loaded with about one hundred (100) pieces of rough lumber. Sittingon the load of rough lumber were the aforementioned laborers of the Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation. At about 10:30 a.m., same date, when they were near the house of Ex-Sgt. Oxales, PC, at Nalagos, Davao City, driver Vicente Soriano stopped the truck because they heard an unusual sound from under the rear portion thereof. Soriano, together with Mario Bariquit, descended from the truck and decided to investigate. They then dismantled the rear axle of the vehicle and seeing no defect therein, they returned the parts to their respective places and then proceeded with their trip. At about 11 o'clock that same morning, after having passed Nalagos crossing, policeman F. Macias of Davao City, signalled the truck to stop because he wanted to ride, but seeing no place to sit in the truck, he gave up the idea and told the truck driver to proceed. After the truck had run about a period of 20 minutes along the descending road, at Km. 30, Nalagos, Davao City, the gear of the truck went out of order rendering the gear shift useless. The truck was rapidly gaining speed and Vicente Soriano finding that the brakes would not function ordered the persons riding atop the load of lumber to jump off the vehicle. At this instance Mario Bariquit pulled the hand brake so as to stop the truck but it did not function. Vicente Soriano stepped on the clutch pedal and manipulated the transmission in order to switch to low gear but to no avail. Vicente Soriano was able to guide the truck from Km. 30 to Km. 29 at Nalagos, Davao City. But Vicente Soriano, Jr. became scared and 265

jumped into the arms of his father who lost control of the vehicle, which then bumped Km. Post #29 and a pile of big stones about one (1)) meter in diameter by the right side of the road causing the truck to somersault. As a result of the impact, the new cable about one half inch in diameter with which the load of lumber was tied was cut and the pieces of lumber were strewn on the road. Vicente Soriano, Sr. and his son, Vicente Soriano, Jr. were killed instantly. On the basis of the above, the Commissioner ordered the Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation to pay. The latter insists the accident was due to the deceased's reckless negligence, and points out to the findings of the hearing officer. The latter, it must be stated, imputed notorious negligence to the driver because: 1. Preceding the accident the truck was running 40 to 50 kilometers per hour; 2. That the road was dangerous forming a steep slope and the curve of the road was very near the accident;lawphil.net 3. That the machine of the truck was very defective as the truck that met the accident has no more brakes at the time it was going down at a distance of 5 kms; 4. That the trip in question was personal to meet the relative of the wife of the deceased and the loading of the lumber on that day SUNDAY was never authorized by the respondent nor any of its representatives. (Pp. 3-2 s.t.n.) (P. 8 s.t.n.) 5. That the trip was made solely at the instance of the deceased; 6. That the dump truck that met the accident was not registered in the Motor Vehicle Office as the same must be utilized only in carrying slabs inside the sawmill compound; so that its brakes are not in good condition and unworthy to be taken to the public highway; 7. That despite the defective condition of the truck the deceased (Vicente Soriano Sr.) still drove the truck until he met the accident; 8. That the members of his family were all seated in the front seat and immediately preceding the accident his Jr. jump into his arms as a consequence of which he lost control of the steering wheel thus hitting a kilometer post. (Affidavit of Mario Bariquit). (Exh. 7-B) In our opinion, the truck was running fast just before overturning because it was then on a slope, and (as declared by the Commission) the "gear of the truck went out of order rendering the gear shift useless," and that the brake "would not function." As to the fourth and fifth circumstances, the Commissioner's decision says the Companyconsented to or authorized the trip. Concerning the non-registration of the truck in Motor Vehicle Office, and its defective condition there is no finding that the driver knew this at the time of driving. Registration of the vehicle was not his concern. As to the presence of members of his family in the vehicle, supposing it was in violation of company regulations, it is not certain that it caused the accident. 1Indeed, as his wife and children were present, this driver must have been extremely careful not reckless. What happened must have been 266

unforeseen, it may only be blamed upon the worn-out condition of the motor transport or to "accident," for which the employer is responsible, it having arisen out of and in the course of the deceased's regular duties as driver. (Sec. 2, Act No. 3428 as amended by Republic Act 772.) The death was, consequently, compensable. The Commission and this Court find no notorious negligence.

Judgment affirmed, with costs

G.R. No. L-14827

October 31, 1960

CHUA YENG, petitioner, vs. MICHAELA ROMA, and her minor children GUADALUPE, PILAR, ROSARIO, CORNELIO and GERARDO,respondents. Pedro B. Uy Calderon and A. Marigomen for petitioner. D. V. Nacua and J. D. Palma for respondents. REYES, J.B.L., J.: Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission, dated September 17, 1958, and its resolution en banc, dated December 4, 1958, awarding compensation for the death of Santos Romeo. The appeal raises issues facts and of law, but since findings of the fact by the Workmen's Compensation Commission are final, if supported by substantial evidence mission are final, if supported by substantial evidence, (Batangas Transportation Co., vs. Galicano Rivera, et al., supra., p. 175; Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., vs. Consuto, et al., 108 Phil., 62, and since the record shows that such evidence is not wanting, the Court will consider the case on the facts as found by the commission. Santos Romeo was, on May 16, 1956, working for petitioner as cargador in loading and unloading copra at the former's warehouse at C. Padilla Street, Cebu City. In the morning of that day, after asking permission from his employer, Santos Romeo went to petitioner's house just across the street from the warehouse to get a drink of water, the water pump in the warehouse being out of order and no supply being available. Reaching the kitchen of said house and while he was drinking, he saw a puppy eating some fried fish inside an open cabinet. He tried to drive away the puppy by saying " tse", but as the puppy still continue to eat the fish, Santos made a motion with hand to drive it away, in the course of which his right hand was bitten by said puppy. On June 26, 1958, Santos Romeo died of hydrophobia from the dog bite. It appears that the puppy was not owned by petitioner. Appellant contends that, under the circumstances narrated, the death of the laborer can not be considered to arise "out of and in course" of his employment.

We find no merit in this contention. The rule is well established that Such acts as are reasonably necessary to the health and comfort of an employee while at work, such as satisfaction of his thirst, hunger, or other physical demands, or protecting himself from excessive cold, are nevertheless incidental to the employment, and injuries sustained in the performance of such act are generally held to be compensable as arising out of and in the course of the employment. (58 Am. Jur., sec. 236,p . 742, citing numerous cases.) That Santos Romeo was in the kitchen of appellant's house and not at his usual place of work does not bring the case out of the operation of the rule previously quoted, for the reason that the laborer was practically driven to that place through the appellant's fault in not providing an adequate supply of drinking water at the warehouse. Appellant urges that the dog bite was provoked by Santos' trying to take the fish away from the puppy and hence, while he was engaged in an independent activity. We do not regard such act as voluntary deviation from his duties, considering that the act of the deceased was practically an instinctive one, that would naturally be expected from any person in his position. Moreover, it was motivated by a sense of loyalty to his employer, a desire to protect the latter's property, that can not be deemed wholly foreign to the duties of the laborer as such (71 C.J. 675). In fact, it has been held that the act of saving the employee's own property from an apparent danger, is compensable (in re Brightman, 107 N.E. 527, cited in 71 C. J. 670). There, is was said: the standard to be applied is not that which now, in the light of all that has happened, is seen to have been directly within the line of labor helpful to the master, but that which the ordinary man required to act in such an emergency might do while actuated with a purpose to do his duty. Compensation has been granted, even if the injury occurred while the order was not performing acts strictly within the scope of his duties, but engaged in an activity either related or incidental to his duties, or doing an act in the interest of his employer. Thus, injury to an employee of a bus firm, occurring outside of assigned territory, in undertaking to retrieve personal belongings of a passenger, was compensable (Vergoza vs. Arnaz Vda. de Cruz, L-7305, December 15, 1953); so was that of a laborer who, trying to alight from a truck to pick up a sack which had fallen, belonging to his employer, was caught between the wheels (Ramos vs. Poblete, 40 Off. Gaz., 3474); likewise, the death of a worker who tried to recover a price of board which had fallen into a molasses tank, and died from the deal fumes therein (Estandarte vs. Phil. Motor Alcohol Corp., G. R. No. 39733, Nov. 1, 1933). In the foregoing, an impelling factor considered by the court was the fact that the employee was acting in the interest of the employer. To the argument that the employee sustained the injury not from drinking water but from driving away the puppy, suffice it to say that under the circumstances that impelled him to act without opportunity for deliberate reflection, we are not prepared to say that his act was unreasonable or negligent. Driving away a puppy is not so fraught with potent danger as to deter every man possessed of reasonable disposition. As has been said . . . he was doing a thing which a man while working may reasonably do a workman of his sort may reasonably smoke, he may reasonably drop his pipe, and he may reasonably pick it up again. (Ramos vs.Poblete, supra., citing M'Lauchan vs. Anderson, S.C. 529.)

By analogy, the deceased in this case may reasonably get a drink of water to satisfy his thirst; while drinking, he may reasonably see a puppy eating some fried fish belonging to his employer; and he may reasonably be expected to make a motion with his hand to drive said puppy away. At any rate, the resulting injury is not without causation in the conditions under which deceased was required to perform his work. It appears that there were no adequate and sanitary means of water supply in the place of work; that petitioner's workers used, for drinking purposes, water from a well at the back of the warehouse; that this well was out or order at the time of the incident, so that the deceased had to cross a wide public street to petitioner's house just to get a drink, thereby exposing himself to hazards which may well have been avoided if there were drinking facilities at, or more proximate to, the place of work. Finally, the Workmen's Compensation Act being a social legislation, and in line with the intent of the law to effect social justice, the provisions thereof should be liberally construed in favor of the workingman (Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc., vs. Dayao, et al., 106 Phil., 525; Madrigal Shipping Co. vs. Baens del Rosario, et al., L-13130, October 31, 1959). Wherefore, the decision and the resolution appealed from are hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. L-15454

September 30, 1960

MANILA RAILDROAD COMPANY, petitioner, vs. EMILIANA FERRER and WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents. Gov't. Corp. counsel S.M. Gopengco and Atty. Luis T. Mojica for petitioner. Gualberto Cruz for respondents. BARRERA, J.: This is petition to review on certiorari the decision dated February 20, 1959 of the Workmen's Compensation Commission as well as its resolution en banc of March 13, 1959. On January 10, 1958, Isidro Mamaril filed with Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor, a complaint alleging, inter alia, that he was employed by petitioner Manila Railroad Company as Trackman from February 1, 1946 up to April 15, 1957, when he was separated from the service due to physical disability; that his said disability was due to his having contracted pulmonary tuberculosis, as per the letter dated January 4, 1957 of petitioner's principal physician; that as per letter dated March 28, 1957 of said principal physician to petitioner's chief engineer, he was found to be suffering from "P.T.B. far advanced, right lung, and minimal, left lung," and that said physician recommended his retirement from the service due to physical disability; and that the sickness contracted by him (tuberculosis) "was contracted and caused by his employment" with petitioner and "aggravated by the nature of his employment" as trackman. He prayed that judgment be rendered in his favor, ordering petitioner to pay him from P4,000.00 to P5,000.00 as compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 1 267

On January 27, 1958, or 17 days after the filing of said complaint, Mamaril died. On January 30, 1958, respondent Emilia Ferrer, surviving spouse of Mamaril, filed with said Regional Office a petition for substitution of party claimants. On February 4, 1958, she filed an amended complaint. On January 29, 1958, petitioner filed his answer alleging, by way of affirmative defense, that Mamaril's illness "was neither caused nor aggravated by the nature of his work, as (its) trackman," and that the nature of his work or employment" with it. Issues having been joined, the case was heard and, after hearing, Hearing Officer Paulino S. Perez of the Regional Office, rendered a decision holding that "the deceased Isidro Mamaril contracted P.T.B. out of, and in the course of his employment as trackman, and that his ailment was aggravated by the nature of his work; hence, the herein claimants (respondent Ferrer and children) are entitled to death benefits under Act 3428, as amended." Petitioner was ordered to pay respondent the sum of P3,598.40 as compensation, and any amount which she may have spent for the treatment of the deceased. On August 13, 1958, petitioner filed a petition for review of said decision. On February 20, 1959, the Workmen's Compensation Commission 2 affirmed said decision of the Hearing Officer, thus: DECISION This is a review of the decision of the Hearing Officer of Regional Office No. III declaring claimant entitled to compensation.1awphl.nt The only issue to be resolved in this case is the casual connection of the pulmonary tuberculosis of Isidro Mamaril, with his employment as trackman of respondent Manila Railroad Company for over 11 years from February 1, 1946 to April 15, 1957, inclusive. He died of said sickness on January 27, 1958. A persual of the records disclosed that the deceased as trackman was working outdoors on railroad tracks of respondent (herein petitioner). His work consisted mainly of the inspection of the tracks within his area of employment. He pulled out overgrowing grass on the railroad tracks and fixed the rails and ties whenever he found them out of order. At time, particularly after a storm and heavy rains, he performed strenuous work in the repairs of railroad tracks. While working, he was exposed to the heat of the sun and sometimes overtaken by rain. The first time Isidro Mamaril was found sick of tuberculosis was on November 19, 1953 when he was examined by the company physician. This examinations made on June 5, 1954, and on April 18, 1956 practically gave the same results. However, on December 3, 1956, the same company doctor found the deceased suffering from far advanced pulmonary tuberculosis in the left lung and moderately advanced in the right lung. In the examination made on March 27, 1957 when the deceased stopped working in the company his tuberculosis in the left lung was still in the far advanced stage. In view of the evidence adduced that he performed strenuous work especially after the storm and heavy rains, there is a strong indication that the worsening condition of his disease was brought about by the nature of his employment . The deceased must have been sick of tuberculosis long before November 19, 1957, during which period his tuberculosis progress to far advanced stage. 268

WHEREFORE, the decision under review should be, as it is hereby affirmed and respondent ordered to pay an additional fee of P5.00 for this review pursuant to Section 55 of the Act. SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.) On March 3, 1959, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging, inter alia, that Mamaril's disease was not aggravated by the nature of his work with petitioner; that the Hearing Officer committed a jurisdictional error by giving due course to Mamaril's claim, although it was filed beyond the 2-month statutory period for filing the same, that he, likewise, committed a jurisdictional error by giving due course to the claim, despite its motion for dismissal of the case, on the ground that respondent Ferrer was not Mamaril's wife; and that Mamaril's living condition caused and possibly aggravated his illness. On March 13, 1958, said motion was denied by the Commission, in its resolution en banc3 stating: Respondent seeks the reversal of the decision of the Chairman of the Commission which affirmed that of the Hearing Officer declaring claimants entitled to compensation. After a careful review of the records of the case, we find as a fact that Isidro Mamaril's employment as trackman of respondent was causally related to the progress of his pulmonary tuberculosis which subsequently resulted in his death. We cannot agree with the allegation for respondent that the Hearing Officer committed a "jurisdictional error, tantamount to an abuse of discretion" when he gave due course to the claim allegedly filed beyond the 2-month period prescribed by the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended. The case involves a death claim so that the reckoning of the period in filing it should start from the death of worker. Inasmuch as Isidro Mamaril died on January 27, 1958, the filing of the "Petition for Substitution of Party Claimants" and the "Petition to Admit Amended Complaint" on January 31 and February 13, 1958, respectively, is within the 3-month prescribed period. As regards the allegation of respondent that it was jurisdictional error on the part of the Hearing Officer to have given due course claimant widow was not legally married to the deceased worker, the records disclose that there is evidence to establish such marriage. Besides, respondent did not adduce any evidence to the contrary. as a matter of fact, in its petition for review, it staged that it was "laboring under the belief that Ferrer was Mamaril's legal wife, respondent (herein petitioner) did not of respondent to make timely objection to the evidence prevented proving marriage of Emilia Ferrer to Isidro Manila and adduce proofs in support of its allegation should not be blamed on the Hearing Officer. IN VIEW OF ALL FOREGOING, the decision under review should be, as it is hereby, affirmed. SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.) On June 12, 1959, petitioner filed with us this present petition for review merely reiterating4 the grounds relied upon in its motion for reconsideration and disposed of in the resolution just quoted.

We find no merit in the petition. The evidence on record shows that when the deceased Isidro Mamaril entered petitioner's employment, as trackman, on February 1, 1946, he was healthy and physically sound. As petitioner's trackman, he was assigned outdoors on petitioner's railroad tracks. His work consisted mainly in inspecting said tracks within the area assigned to him. He pulled out or cut overgrown grasses which he found on said tracks, and fixed the rails and ties therein, whenever he found them out of order. At times, especially when said tracks were damaged or washed out due to storms or heavy rains, he performed strenuous work in order to repair them. While performing his daily work, he was usually exposed to the elements. He worked day and night, as the exigencies of the service required it. So strenuous, indeed, was the nature of his work that when examined physically by petitioner's physician on November 19, 1953, he was found to be suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis on the left lung, which is in an active and moderately advanced stage. Subsequent examinations by the same physician on June 5, 1954 and April 18, 1956, discloses the same condition. However, on December 3, 1956, he was found to be suffering from far advanced pulmonary tuberculosis on the left lung, and moderately advanced on the right. In spite of the seriousness of his illness, petitioner allowed the deceased to continue working as trackman up to March 27, 1957. On this date, he was examined and found to be far advanced in tuberculosis of his left lung. And finally on April 15, 1957, he was separated from the service due to physical disability. We agree with respondent Commission that the strenuous work performed by the deceased worsened the condition of his disease. The fact that he was found to be suffering from lack of nourishment, upon examination by petitioner's physician on June 5, 1954, and that he was living in a small and crowded room, are not in themselves conclusive as causing the aggravation of his illness. If at all, they are merely contributory (not primary) factors, and could not counteract the established fact that the nature of his employment as petitioner's trackman, required him to perform strenuous work day and night, as the exigencies of the required the same, exposing himself to the elements thereby aggravating his illness which he, undoubtedly contracted in the course of his employment by petitioner. Neither would the fact that when examined by petitioner's physician after 3 months of continuous work, the sick condition of his left lung remained stationary while some slight improvement of his condition, defeat his right to compensation. For the fact remains that when he was examined on March 27, 1957, his left lung was found to be so far advanced in tuberculosis that he was recommended for retirement on the following day (March 28) due to physical disability and was actually separated on April 15, 1957, and died 9 months thereafter, on January 27, 1958. Petitioner likewise, contend that respondent Commission erred in not holding that claimant Isidro Mamaril's claim is barred having been filed beyond the 2-month statutory period for filing the same. The contention can not be sustained. In the first place, the records disclose that the employer knew all the time the condition of the health of the employee. Secondly, although Mamaril's claim (complaint) was filed only on January 10, 1958, or almost 9 months after he was separated from the service by petitioner, the same converted into a death claim, when on January 30, 1958, i. e., 3 days after his death (on January 27) his widow, respondent Emilia Ferrer filed a petition for substitution as party claimants and an amended complaint of February 4, 1958. Being a death claim, it can made by any person entitled to the compensation within 3 months after death, regardless of whether or not compensation was claimed by the employee himself. (Sec. 24, Act No. 3423, as amended.) Clearly, the present claim was filed well-within the period prescribed by law. As to the right of respondent Emiliana (Emilia) Ferrer and her children to the death benefits there is the express finding of the workmen's Compensation Commission that her marriage to the deceased has been duly proven.

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision and resolution appealed from, the same are hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered

G.R. No. L-11504

May 23, 1958

ELISEO SAULOG, petitioner-appellant, vs. N. BAENS DEL ROSARIO, Acting Commissioner of the Workmen's Compensation Commission and SERGIO MONTOYA, respondents-appellees. Ricardo Rosal for petitioner. Toribio T. Bella for respondent Sergio Montoya. BENGZON, J.: Appeal from award of the Workmen's Compensation Commission dated October 4, 1956, requiring Eliseo Saulog to furnish Sergio Montoya with medical, and hospital, services, to pay him a total of P5,200.00 and to pay regular official fees. In 1949 and 1950, Montoya worked as conductor of the Saulog Transit, a common carrier engaged in land transportation by buses, owned and operated by Eliseo Saulog. About the end of February 1950, he began spitting blood and having chest pains which resulted in his hospitalization about April up to November of the same year. Due to physical inability he resigned from Saulog Transit in May 1950. And on September 12, 1952, he filed with the Commission the corresponding Notice of Injury or Sickness and Claim for Compensation. Over Saulog's opposition, he obtained favorable action. The contentions of the appellant may be summarized as follows: ( a) the notice of injury and claim for compensation were not presented in due time; (b) the factual findings of the Commissioner disregarded those of the referee; (c) the award of compensation was excessive; and (d) the employer's liability, if any, should be enforced against Saulog Transit Co. Concerning the last contention it appears that on October 24, 1951, Eliseo Saulog sold his entire transportation business to Saulog Transit Co. a corporation; so that when Montoya filed his claim on September 12, 1952, the business already belonged to Saulog Transit Co. Consequently, argues appellant, the latter is the responsible entity. In the absence of proof that the sale included this particular liability, there is no legal ground to make this corporation pay. Apart from the question whether such transfer of liability, even if agreed upon between Eliseo Saulog and the purchaser, could legally affect the rights of Sergio Montoya, who had not consented to the transfer. But the principal issue tendered before the Commission and reiterated here, refers to the claimant's failure to give notice of his injury or sickness and failure to claim for compensation within the twomonth period provided in section 24 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. On this point, the Commissioner found that in the end of January 1950, while Montoya stood on his bus punching 269

passenger tickets, he was suddenly thrown down when the driver abruptly applied the brakes to avoid hitting another conveyance; that Montoya accidentally bumped his chest against one of the seats; that apparently the accident had no consequences because Montoya continued working for three weeks; but afterwards he felt breast and back pains and began spitting blood which resulted in his, confinement in a hospital from April 1, 1950 up to November of the same year. The Commissioner also found that one day, prior to April 1950, claimant Montoya met Anadres Medina, assistant manager of the Saulog Transit, and informed the latter about his illness; and that when Montoya was first brought to the hospital, Montoya's mother and brother went to the office of the Saulog Transit to ask for medical and hospitalization expenses, but Mercedes Saulog, (wife of the petitioner) who was treasurer of the organization, refused to extend any help alleging that his illness had not been contracted in line of service. In the circumstances we think it improper to count the two-month period from the day claimant bumped his chest, because at that time he experienced no untoward consequences, so much so that he continued working for three weeks. The period should begin to run when he realized or felt that he was sick that was about the end of February. And from that time to the end of March (prior to April 1, 1950 or on that date) when Medina and Mrs. Saulog were notified, not more than two months had elapsed. If necessary, it may be held that this claim rested on the disease 1 which manifested itself only in the last week of February 1950 not on the accidental bumping in the previous month. In fact, we have heretofore held that "when an injury is apparently unimportant and does not at first warrant the filing of a claim for compensation, a laborer may submit such claim to the employer within two months after he learned that the injury resulted to be serious, and said claim is a substantial compliance with law," (Francisco, Labors Laws p. 940 citing Libron vs. Binalbagan, G.R. No. 41175, July 27, 1934.) See also Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs. Nabor, 40 Off. Gaz., 9th Supplement p. 164. The petitioner disputes the findings of the Commission on the dates of the verbal notices; but we do not feel justified to interfere on such factual question. This, notwithstanding the assertion that the referee's findings had been overruled. Again, petitioner insists that there was no written notice, in violation of section 25 of the Act which provides that "the notice and claim shall be in writing," and shall contain the name and address. etc. etc. However, section 27 of the Act provides as follows: SEC. 27. Sufficient notice.Any notice given in accordance with the provisions of section 25 of this Act shall not be considered as invalid or insufficient by reason of any incorrectness in the statement of time, place, nature or cause of the injury or of anything else, unless it be shown that the employer has been actually misinformed respecting the injury. Failure to or delay in giving notice shall not, be a bar to the proceeding herein provided for, if it is shown that the employer, his agent or representative had knowledge of the accident or that the employer did not suffer by such delay or failure. Under the above provisions, a verbal notice or a belated notice might be good if the employer does not show he has been actually misinformed respecting the injury. The section may be construed to mean that the notice shall not be considered invalid by reason . . . "of anything else," (which would include verbal notice) "unless the employer be misinformed. "Furthermore, even if the verbal notice to Medina and to Mrs. Saulog be regarded as no notice for the purposes of section 25, this claimant may still recover pursuant to the last part of the above section 27, because the employer or his agent 270

had knowledge2 of the injury on sickness.3 And also because according to the Commissioner, the employer did not suffer by such failure or delay.4 If petitioner should argue that above section 27 applies only to "notice" and not to "claim," the answer is that since according to section 25 of the Act as amended notice may include claim," any provisions concerning the form of "notice" should normally be deemed applicable to "claim." Disregarding the tardiness in the presentation of a written notice and claim, the Commissioner declared that Eliseo Saulog suffered no loss from such delay. Appellant disputes this declaration, insisting that had he been duly notified he could have included this claim among the "liens and encumbrances" transferred to the purchaser Saulog Transit Incorporated. Granting the possibility of such inclusion, we still think it does not necessarily imply any damage to herein appellant, because the purchase price would have been correspondingly reduced at the same time. Anyway, as it is not denied that the corporation is merely the "alter ego" of herein petitioner, who practically owns it 5 the point thus raised becomes purely academic. If all the above issues are decided against petitioner-appellant, one issue on the matter of compensation must be decided in his favor: it was error for the to require him to furnish Montoya with medical and hospital services and supplies until his illness declared arrested or cured. We hold it was error, because Montoya had resigned from the Saulog's services before starting these proceedings. But as regards the amounts already expended for claimant's medical treatment and hospitalization, we see no reason to interfere. There was evidence that such expenses amounted to P2,500.00. Evidently, the Commission deemed such expenditure to exceed "the amount ordinarily paid in the community for such treatment of an injured person of the same standard of living" and in the exercise of discretion reduced it to P2,200.00. (Sec. 13 of the Act.) Neither do we find fault with the estimate of claimant's total disability compensation: Claimant is entitled to 60% of his average weekly wages for the period he is incapacitated for labor but not exceeding 208 weeks and exclusive of the first 7 days. In this case, he has been disabled since April 1, 1950 to the present. Sixty per centum of his average weekly wage which was P35.00 equals P16.20 and for 208 weeks (same had already elapsed), he should receive the total compensation of P3,369.60 or P3,000.00 (maximum prior to R. A. No. 772). This computation accorded with sec. 14 of the Act, and there is no dispute as to Montoya's weekly wages. For all the foregoing reasons, the award of the respondent Commissioner is hereby affirmed, except the part hereinabove found to be erroneous. Costs against petitioner-appellant.

G.R. Nos. L-10308 and L-10385-8

April 30, 1957

MARIA PAZ S. ALBA, ETC., ET AL., petitioners, vs. RACIO BULAONG, ET AL., ETC., respondents. Abad Santos and Pablo for petitioners. Antonio C. Masaquel and Adaucto P. Ocampo for respondents. BENGZON, J.: This is a petition to reverse the decision of the Commissioner of the Workmen's Compensation Commission in five cases denying the claims for compensation, against Dr. Horacio Bulaong, of herein petitioners, who were his employees and dependents of his employees. On March 12, 1955, petitioners Gregorio de la Cruz, Pedro C. Bulaong and Pacifico Bulaong were employees of Dr. Horacio Bulaong in his business of threshing palay. Other employees were Engracio Alba (husband of petitioner Maria Paz S. Alba) and Vicente A. Sebastian (husband of petitioner Elisea S. Sebastian). Early in the morning of that day said five employees were, upon specific orders of Dr. Bulaong, on their way to Barrio Baringan, Malolos, Bulacan, to thresh palay, riding on a tractor which was pulling a threshing machine. Suddenly a speeding bus of the Victory Liner Inc. collided with the thresher which in turn hit the tractor, and as a result those on board were violently thrown out. Engracio Alba and Vicente Sebastian died; Gregorio de la Cruz, Pedro C. Bulaong and Pacifica Bulaong sustained physical injuries. WHEREFORE, five separate claims were filed before the Workmen's Compensation Commission against the employer Dr. Bulaong. Three defenses were set up by him: ( a) claimants were not his employees, but industrial partners, (b) the injuries were not sustained in the course of employment and (c) the claims, if any, had been extinguished by virtue of the monetary settlements which petitioners had concluded with the Victory Liner Inc. The referee overruled the defenses, having found the five men to be employees who had died or were injured in the course of employment. Consequently he required the employer to make compensation in the amounts specified in his award. However on appeal, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner absolved Dr. Bulaong from all liability, because he found that the claimants had received, after the mishap, various amounts of money from the owner of the colliding bus, the Victory Liner Inc., each of them having executed a written release or waiver in favor of said Liner, the pertinent part of which reads as follows: And I likewise freely and completely cede and transfer into said Company (Victory Liner Inc.) any right given to me by law against any person or company that should be liable for the said accident except my right to claim against Dr. Horacio Bulaong in accordance with and under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Rep. Act 772). Claimants, the Commissioner declared, had elected to hold the Liner responsible for the accident, and could not thereafter turn around to recover their employer. He cited section 6 of the Workmen's Compensation Law, which for convenience is quoted: SEC. 6. Liability of third parties. In case an employee suffers an injury for which compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides his employer, it shall be 271

optional with such injured employee either to claim compensation from his employer, under this Act, or sue such other person for damages in accordance with law; and in case compensation is claimed and allowed in accordance with this Act, the employer who paid such compensation or was found liable to pay the same, shall succeed the injured employee to the right of recovering from such person what he paid: Provided, That in case the employer recovers from such third person damages in excess of those paid or allowed under this Act, such excess shall be delivered to the injured employee or any other person entitled thereto, after deduction of at the expenses of the employer and the costs of the proceedings .The sum paid by the employer for compensation to which the employee or his dependents are entitled of this Act, shall not be admissible as evidence in any damage suit or action. (As amended.) Naturally the argument before this Court dwelt mostly on the interpretation of the above section and its application to the circumstances of record. There was no election, petitioners contend, to recover from the Linerto the exclusion of Dr. Bulaong, because the document itself signed by petitioners reserved their right to claim against Dr. Horacio Bulaong under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Such reservation, counter the respondents, besides being void and against the law, cannot bind Dr. Bulaong who was not a party to the instrument. There is no question that the Liner was a "third party" within the meaning of section 6. There is also no question that petitioner have not sued the Liner for damages. Wherefore they are not deemed to have made the election specified in section 6. However, the plain intent of the law is that they shall not receive payment twice for the same injuries (from the third party and from the employer). Hence if without suing they receive full damages from the third party, they should be deemed to have practically made the election under the law, and should be prevented from thereafter suing the employer. Full damages means, of course what they would have demanded in a suit against the third party or what they would receive in a compensation as complete settlement. Needless to say, where the injured employee is offered, by the third party, compensation which he deems insufficient, he may reject it and thereafter litigate with such third party. Or choose instead to complain against his employer. Nevertheless there is nothing in the law to prevent him from accepting such insufficient compensation butexpressly reserving at the same time his right to recover additional damages from his employer. If the third party agrees to the reservation, such partial payment may legally be made and accepted. We say "if", because the reservation necessarily entails some disadvantage to the third party, inasmuch as pursuant to legal principles when the employer subsequently pays, he may in turn recover from the third party (See sec. 6). The employer can not validly object to such reservation by the employee, because in effect the settlement helps to reduce the amount he will afterwards have to disgorge. As we see it, the five employees' acceptance of the Victory Liner's offer of compensation, under the circumstances disclosed by this record, especially the written acknowledgments, showed they were not content with the amount received they did not consider it sufficient so they reserved their right to require additional compensation from their employer. Hence their action against Dr. Bulaong is not barred by section 6. He may in turn demand reimbursement from Victory Liner Inc. The implied reservation of Dr. Bulaong's right against Victory Liner Inc. is not unprecedented in the roam of jurisprudence. When a promissory note is dishonored for non-payment, the holder may recover its value either from the maker or from the indorser. If he sues the indorser and recovers, the latter may in turn recoup from the maker. The statute expressly permits him to renounce his right against the maker and reserve his right to recover from the indorser (Sec. 120 (e) Negotiable

Instruments Law). When that happens, the courts say the indorser's right to recover from the maker is also reserved. (Bootman's Sav. vs. Johnson, 24 Mo. App. 317; Tolentino Commercial Laws Vol. I (7th Ed.)p. 361.1) In the situation resulting after the collision, we could regard the five employees, the Victory Liner and Dr. Bulaong in the same juridical position, respectively, of holder, maker and indorser. The release with express reservation produced the implied reservation already stated. What then, it may be asked, was the advantage accruing to the Liner from the settlement it had worked to accomplish? For one thing its driver would not be prosecuted by petitioners; besides earning such driver's gratitude, the Liner thereby avoided losses in time and services. For another, even if it be liable to the employer for whatever the latter might have to satisfy, the Liner could expect the settlement between employer and employees to be reasonable considering their relationship, more reasonable perhaps than a settlement between itself and the injured employees. It is therefore our view that the moneys received from Victory Liner Inc. did not necessarily have the effect of releasing Dr. Bulaong. Inasmuch as the five men were his employees, and they were injured by reason of and in the course of their employment, he must pay compensation to be fixed in accordance with law. Bearing in mind, however, the law's intention not to give double compensation, the amounts they have received from the Victory Liner shall be deducted from the sums so determined. In this connection we notice that the referee who has investigated the matter has made some calculations of monetary award. However they were not passed upon by the Commissioner. Wherefore, for the purpose of ascertaining and awarding such compensation to petitioners, the record will be remanded to the Workmen's Compensation Commission for further action in accordance with this opinion. No costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-9807

April 17, 1957

PAN PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and LEONORA FRIAS, respondents. Claro M. Recto for petitioner. Cesareo Perez and Anacleto Ea for respondents. CONCEPCION, J.: This is an appeal, taken by the Pan Philippines Corporation, from a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission ordering said appellant to pay to Leonora Frias, as the widow of Pascual Castillo, the sum of P983.84, by way of compensation for the latter's death, and the costs of the proceedings. Pascual Castillo, was a carpenter of the Pan Philippines Corporation. On December 25, 1945, he, together with Victor Lozado and Daniel Buenafrancisca, who were, also, employees of the corporation, died by drowning, as a boat thereof capsized off the coast of the Caramoan Peninsula, while sailing from Sabang, San Jose, Camarines Sur, with a cargo of UNRRA goods for the mining concession of said appellant in the Island of Lahuy, Municipality of Caramoan, Camarines Sur. This occurrence was reported to the Workmen's Compensation Division of the Bureau of Labor, on or about August 6, 1947, when Jovita Sacil filed her claim for compensation as widow of the aforementioned Daniel Buenafrancisca. In the course of the proceedings relative to this claim of Jovita Sacil, said office learned about the death of among others, Pascual Castillo, in view of which, on September 25, 1947, appellant was required to submit the data pertinent thereto. Subsequently, or on February 11, 1949, Leonora Frias filed with office her claim for compensation as widow of Pascual Castillo acting thereon, as referee pursuant to Section 31 Act No. 3428, as amended by Act No. 3812 on September 9, 1950, the Bureau of Labor found that appellant should pay Leonora Frias, as widow of the deceased Pascual Castillo, the sum of P983.84 by way of compensation of his death. Thereafter, on June 20, 1952, the Workmen's Compensation Commission was created by Republic Act No. 772. In the exercise of its authority under this Commission took cognizance of the claim of Leonora Frias, and on February 3, 1955, a referee thereof rendered the decision above mentioned, which, upon appellant's petition for review, was affirmed by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner. Hence, this by said corporation. Appellant maintains that, pursuant to Section 43 paragraph (2), of Act 190, the claim of Leonora Frias prescribed after six years (6) from the accrual of her cause of action on December 25, 1946 and is barred, therefore, by the statute of limitations, the Workmen's Compensation Commission having assumed jurisdiction over this case more than six years (6) after said date or on June 20, 1952. This pretense was rejected in the decision appealed from, upon the ground that said period of prescription was extended by Article 1144 (2) of the Civil Code to ten (10) years from the accrual of the cause of action, and that said period did not expire, in the case at bar, until December 25, 1955, or after the Commission had taken cognizance of this case, and rendered decision. Appellants assails this conclusion upon the ground that, pursuant to Article 2252 of the Civil Code: "Changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by this Code which may prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation have no retroactive effect." and that the application of said Article 1144 to the claim of Leonora Frias would impair vested rights of said appellant. The latter had, however, no such vested right when the Civil Code of the Philippines 272

became effective in 1950, inasmuch as the period of six (6) years provided in Act No. 190 did not expire until December 25, 1951. Accordingly, the defense of prescription of action is untenable. It is next urged, that the Workmen's compensation Commission had no jurisdiction to entertain this case, for Section 42 of Act 3428 (as amended by Act 3812) provides: Law applicable to small industries. All claims for accidents occurring in a trade, occupation or profession exercised by an employer for the purpose of gain, the gross income of which during the year next preceding the one in which the accident occurred was less than twenty thousand pesos, shall be governed by the provisions of Act Numbered Eighteen hundred and seventy-four and its amendment. Appellant claims to be in the nature of a small industry, as contemplated in this provision, for it did not do any business during the occupation, and, consequently, it had no income whatsoever in 1944, the year preceding the death of Pascual Castillo. In this connection, the decision appealed from has the following to say: . . . The testimony of the respondent, thru its representative Mr. Nicasio Martin, discloses that the respondent company is a Philippine, Mining Corporation; that it had a capital stock before the war of more than 1/2 million pesos; that its mining properties are mainly located in the Bicol region; that the operation of their mining activities was closed during the war; that after liberation, it received more than 1/2 million pesos as payment for war damages. The exemption of liability to pay compensation as sought by the representation of the respondent based or, the provisions of section 42 of the Compensation Act is not justified because this provision of law refers to small industries, and as the law so recites, it only refers to a trade or occupation or profession exercised by an employer for the purpose of gain. It does not refer to large or big industries such as mining and similar large enterprises wherein big capital investment is needed to make the enterprise productive. Organized mining enterprises are not small industries. It is also our view that the phrase "during the year preceding the one in which accident was occurred was less than P20,000" in Section 42 of the Act, should be interpreted as "during the business, year preceding etc." which in this case is the year 1941, the last year of business activity of the respondent corporation before its closure due to war. He could there have been a gross income of less than P20,000 if there was no business transacted the preceding year due to enclosure of the plant? When the law speaks of gross income, it presupposes business activity. We are fully in agreement with this view, not only for the reasons therein set forth, but also, because, otherwise, allemployers, no matter how big their capital and income may be, would be exempt, during their first year of operation, from any and all liability under the Workmen's Compensation Law. Neither its spirit, nor its language, justifies, however the belief that such could possibly have been intent of the farmers of said legislation. Appellants insists that the death of Pascual Castillo did not arise out of and in the course of his employment, for it took place while he was transporting UNRRA goods, which is foreign to his employment as appellant's carpenter. These pretense was correctly found untenable in the decision appealed from. As stated therein, . . . It was testified by the representative of the respondent that the mining company had recalled its pre-war employees to do rehabilitation work in their plant, and it is undeniable that part of the rehabilitation work of the respondent was to rehabilitate its employees by 273

providing them with clothing due to loss of destruction of their personal belongings during the war. The fact that the workers or employees of the respondent in 1945 were assigned to do jobs other than actual mining work did not mean that no employer-employee relation existed between the laborers and the respondent corporation, and if during their work a laborer is injured, the respondent must pay compensation under the Act. It is lastly argued that the alleged marriage of Leonora Frias to Pascual Castillo has not been duly established, the proof thereon being purely hearsay. The evidence on record consists of: 1. An affidavit of Alejandro Frias and Ana Plopinio (Exhibit A-4), stating that they were witnesses to the wedding of Pascual Castillo and Leonora Frias on June 25, 1941, in the Parochial Church of the barrio of San Miguel, Municipality of Caramoan, Camarines Sur, where said affiants reside; 2. An affidavit of Pedro Frias (Exhibit A-5), another resident of the same barrio, to the effect that he knew personally said spouses; that they were married in the place and on the date above stated; that, thereafter, they lived as husband and wife, in the Island of Lahuy, Caramoan, Camarines Sur; and that they had a baby boy, born on March 10, 1943, who died ten (10)days later, without the benefit of baptism; 3. The verified claim of Leonora Frias (Exhibit A), stating, among other things, that she is the wife of Pascual Castillo; and 4. The statement, Exhibit A-3, of the parish priest of San Miguel, Caramoan, Camarines Sur, certifying that the marriage certificate of Pascual Castillo and Leonora Frias cannot be found among the records of his parish owing to the partial destruction of said records during the Japanese occupation. These documents were part of the report of the investigator appointed by the Commission and were properly considered in evidence, pursuant to Section 49 of Act 3428, as amended by Republic Act No. 772. The only qualification imposed therein is that "any party in interest shall have an opportunity to examine and rebut" said evidence "by further evidence", which opportunity appellant has had. There is, accordingly, no merit in its aforesaid pretense. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-8114

May 25, 1955

warehouse buildings. Post No. 2 embraces the main gate, the school building and its premises. At about 5:00 P. M., January 29, 1952, Duazo arrived at Post No. 1. He went direct to timekeeper Panfilo Artagame and asked for a scratch of paper which the latter gave him. Then with the permission granted by Suataron who was standing by the door, he (Duazo) entered the police office. He sat on a chair by the table of the police clerk and read the new issue (Jan. 29/52) of the "The Manila Chronicle". After a while he stood at the door of the police office holding a shotgun and told Suataron saying, "Pare (meaning brother spiritually) you stand." When Suataron saw him, he stood up from the chair on which he was sitting and said "Pare, do not joke with that gun." He stood for a while and observed the movement of Duazo. After an elapse of a few minutes when he saw nothing unusual in Duazo's action, he sat again on the chair which was placed outside of the door of the police office. Within a few minutes after Suataron sat on the chair the shotgun exploded in his face. He was hit straight to the left eye. All the buck shots in the shell passed thru his head and went out at the back of the right ear. The fatal wound caused his instantaneous death. As the immediate superior of Romeo Suataron and Benigno Duazo, I know both men in regards to their behavior, conduct and character. I also know besides the information of the people around and their fellow policemen, that they were good friends. During the time that they were under me as policemen of the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, I have never known that their close friendship was marred by minor differences or misunderstanding which would lead to their fatal tragedy. In view of the above, I can conclude that Duazo shot Suataron accidentally and when he saw his friend dead, he committed suicide by placing the muzzle of the shotgun under his chin near his throat and pressed the trigger. (Annex 1, Record, pp. 33-34). (Emphasis supplied.) The Chief of Police of Silay, Negros Occidental, within whose jurisdiction the incident took place, made a similar investigation and reached the same conclusion. In fact, the award of the referee and the petition filed by the company with this Court quote with approval the narration of facts made in said reports. Under the foregoing circumstances, are the widow and children of the deceased, Romeo Suataron, entitled to the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Act? Sections 2 and 4 of Act No. 3428, as amended by Republic Act No. 772, provide: Sec. 2. Grounds for compensation. When an employee suffers personal injury from any accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, of contracts tuberculosis or other illness directly cause by such employment, or either aggravated by or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the person hereinafter specified. The right to compensation as provided in this Act shall not be defeated or impaired on the ground that the death, injury of disease was due to the negligence of a fellow servant or employee, without prejudice to the right of the employer to proceed against the negligent party. Sec. 4. Injuries not covered. Compensation shall not be allowed for injuries caused: (1) by the voluntary intent of the employee to inflict such injury upon himself or another person; (2) by drunkenness on the part of the laborer who had the accident; and (3) by notorious negligence of the same. 274

HAWAIIAN-PHILIPPINE COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSIONER and PACITA S. VDA. DE SUATARON, respondents. Hilado and Hilado for petitioner. Cesareo de Leon in his own behalf as respondent Compensation Commissioner. CONCEPCION, J.: This is an appeal taken by the Hawaiian-Philippine Co., from a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, affirming the award of a referee of the Workmen's Compensation Commission ordering said appellant. 1. To pay Pacita Salabaria Vda. de Suataron, Maria Eva Suataron and Romeo Suataron, Jr., through this Commission, the sum of TWO THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE AND 52/100 PESOS (P2,171,52), with interest thereon at the legal rate from January 29, 1952 until fully paid, less whatever amount of compensation which was already paid. 2. To pay the claimants, through this Commission, the sum of ONE HUNDRED PESOS (P100) as burial expenses. 3. To pay direct to this Commission the sum of TWENTY-TWO PESOS (P22.00) as cost per Sec. 55 of Act No. 3428, as amended, and requiring said company to pay the additional sum of Five Pesos (P5.00) as fee, pursuant to section 55 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (No. 3428, as amended). This proceeding was commenced by a claim for Compensation filed by the respondent Pacita S. Vda. de Suataron, in her behalf, as widow of Romeo Suataron, deceased, and on behalf of their minor children, Eva and Romeo, Jr., both surnamed Suataron. Romeo Suataron was killed by Benigno Duazo on January 29, 1952, while both under the employment of the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, as security guards or special policemen thereof. The circumstances surrounding the tragic event are set forth in the report of the Chief of Police of the company, who repaired to the scene of the occurrence and investigated the same, soon after it took place. The pertinent parts of said report read as follows: At about 5:30 P. M., January 29, 1952, Romeo Suataron, a policeman of the HawaiianPhilippine Company, was shot by Benigno Duazo, also a policeman of this Company, and as a result he died instantaneously. After shooting Suataron, Duazo shot himself too by placing the muzzle of the shotgun under his chin, near his throat and pressed the trigger. The case was investigated and my investigation revealed that Romeo Suataron was on duty in Post No. 1 from 4:00 P. M. to 12:00 P. M., while Benigno Duazo was on duty in Post No. 2 from 12:00 P. M. to 8:00 A. M. Post No. 1 embraces the police office, the timekeeper's Office, main office building, the nearby staff houses, the laboratory and all

It is not denied that the death of Romeo Suataron occurred in the course of his employment. Hence, the issue narrows down to whether or not it (1) arose out of his employment, and (2) was caused by his notorious negligence, as contended by petitioner herein. With reference to the first question, petitioner maintains that the injury sustained by Romeo Suataron did not "grow out of the risks peculiar to the nature of" his work or incidental" to his employment, and is not traceable to some risk or hazard to which he was "exposed in a special degree by reason of such employment, "but was due to a risk "to which all persons similarly situated are equally exposed," in the language quoted by this Court in the case ofAfable vs. Singer Sewing Machine Co. (58 Phil., 39, 42). We do not agree with this pretense. To begin with, admittedly, the killer acted without criminal intent, and the death of Suataron was purely accidental. Indeed, when security guard Duazo held the gun of Suataron and bade him to stand up, Suataron remarked: "Pare, do not joke with that gun?" Moreover, as stated in the aforementioned award of the referee: If the death of the deceased was the result of horse play of larking among employees the courts have also declared the same as a compensable accident. Thus, in the case of Leonbruno V. Champlain Silk Milles, 229 N.Y. 470 (1920), claimant hit in eye by apple thrown by one boy at another, Cardozo, J. said that the innocent victim was injured, not merely while he was in a factory, but because he was . . . in touch with associations and conditions inseparable from factory life. The risk of such associations and conditions were risks of the employment. (Ibid., p. 111 Emphasis supplied.) In the words of the decision appealed from: There can be no question that horseplay or larking is unfortunately too common in factory life. That employees are placed in such an environment where it is a natural tendency for normal people to indulge in occasional foolery cannot be denied. In the case of Leonbruno V. Chaplain Silk Mills, 229 N. Y. 470, N. E. 711, 13 A. L. R. 522 (1920), cited by the referee in his decision under review, wherein an apple thrown by one co-employee hit claimant in the eye, the court held: "Whatever men and boys will do, when gathered together in such surroundings, at all events if it is something reasonably to be expected was one of the perils of his service. . . .." Considering, therefore, that risks of associations and conditions inseparable from factory life are risks of the employment, the death of Romeo Suataron through a joke played on him which proved fatal should be considered as having arisen out of and in the course of his employment. The deceased did not participate in the horseplay as can be gleaned from his statement to his co-employee not to joke with the gun when he saw it being pointed at him. "It is now established by the great majority of decisions that the non-participating victim of horseplay may recover compensation." (Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. 1, p. 343). In the case at bar, both Duazo and Suataron were security guards or special policemen of petitioner herein. As such, they were provided with firearm, which are meant to be carried around by them while on duty, as Suataron was at the time of the fatal incident. The peculiar nature of their work, accordingly, exposed them, in a special degree, to the risks incidental to the handling of said firearms, including the accidents which may occur while engaged in horseplay with each other. Indeed, 275

Suataron was at the door of the office of the security guards, where he was posted by reason of his duties. Being himself another security guard, Duazo was free to enter, and did enter, said office. For the same reason it was not particularly unusual for him to approach Suataron and hold his gun, even if only out of curiosity. Had Duazo been a stranger, or, at least, not a security guard, Suataron would not have allowed him, in all probability, to take possession of the gun, much less to aim it at him. At least, Suataron would have immediately retrieved the firearm from Duazo, and the accident would have been averted thereby. The risk in question resulted, therefore, from "association and conditions" arising out of the nature of their employment. Hence, the injury sustained in consequence thereof is compensable, unless, as contended by petitioner, there was notorious negligence on the part of Suataron. In this connection, the decision appealed from has the following to say: We believe that the deceased, Romeo Suataron, was not guilty of notorious negligence simply because a co-employee was able to take hold of and play with his gun. If at all, he was merely guilty of simple negligence as he was supposed to keep the gun in his possession at all times whenever he was on duty. But this should not in any way deprive him of his compensation under the law. It should be stated in this connection that the deceased and the assailant were both policemen of the respondent company though the latter at the time of the accident was off duty. We are fully in agreement with this view. Besides, Suataron was entitled to assume that Duazo knew now to handle the gun, and would take special care to avoid any accident, not only because both were security guards and were familiar, therefore, with the corresponding risks, but, also, because they were very good friends. In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with cost against petitioner, Hawaiian-Philippine Company. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-7318

April 20, 1955

HELEN GENIO DE CHAVEZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellants, vs. A.L. AMMEN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents-appellees. Ojeda and Vilgera for appellants. Manuel O. Chan for appellees. MONTEMAYOR, J.: This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur in a case involving the application of the Workmen's Compensation Act. We allowed the appeal, involving as it does, a fundamental question of law as regards the responsibility of an employer for an act committed by its agent supposedly in violation of rules and regulations promulgated and enforced by the employer, which act to the agent resulted in the death of another agent of laborer whose heirs now claim compensation against the employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

Under the law, in appeals from decisions of the Court of Appeals, we may not review the evidence but must accept the findings of fact of said court. We are therefore, reproducing the pertinent portions of the decision appealed from which contain the facts and set forth the issue involved. This is a case of claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, with Helen Genio de Chavez and Vida Chavez, as plaintiffs, and A.L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc., as defendant. Helen Genio de Chavez is the widow of Felipe Chavez and Vida Chavez a child born from their wedlock. After hearing the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur rendered decision, the dispositive part of which is as follows: Wherefore, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff a weekly compensation of P12.25 for a period of 208 weeks, to pay attorney's fees in the sum of P300, and the costs of the suit. A.L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc., now comes on appeal assigning the following error: 'The trial court in holding that the accident which resulted in the death of Felipe Chavez "arises out of and in the course of the employment of the defendant."' Appellant is a company engaged in land transportation, operating buses therefor. It had a subsidiary station in the municipality of Tigaon, Albay, provided with a shop for the repair of the company's buses. Felipe Chavez, by occupation a mechanic, was employed as such in this subsidiary station, which was under management of Emilio Esperida. At between half past five and six o'clock on the afternoon of September 10, 1951, mechanic Chavez was examining an automobile placed in the grease-rack of the shop when its spring broke loose, the pieces scattering, some of which hit Chavez. Shortly thereafter, the car fell off the grease-rack and caught Chavez under it Later, he was removed dead from underneath. The contention of the appellant is that it had express ban to repair in the shop any machine not belonging to the company. And conformably thereto, it is further contended, Esperida, who was in the shop when the car was brought, had it removed therefrom. But, despite his express prohibition, Chavez brought the car again to the shop, placed it in the grease rack and started repairing it until it fell off and caught him under it. In rebuttal Helen Genio Vda. de Chavez stated that her husband was already at home from his duty that afternoon when Esperida came to fetch him, telling him that there was something to do in the shop. Thus, Chavez rode in the car in which Esperida came, and the two left, seemingly, for the station. The issue, therefore, is whether Chavez died in line of duty. On this point, the trial Judge remarked: It is contended, however, that the accident which resulted in the death of Felipe Chavez did not arise out of and in the course of the employment of Felipe Chavez as required by section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation law. The court has already come to the conclusion that the accident which resulted in the death of Felipe Chavez took place while he was repairing the car of now Governor Trivio at the orders of defendant's managing agent, Emilio Esperida. It is, however, contended that even if this be true, still it did not arise out of and in the course of the employment of Felipe Chavez because the repair was not in the furtherance of the business of the defendant. The Court cannot accept this theory. While, according to the testimony of Emilio Esperida defendant's shop in Tigaon 276

does not accept outside jobs, this is immaterial in-so-far as Felipe Chavez was concerned. Felipe Chavez was an auto mechanic and was under the immediate control and supervision and orders of defendant's managing agent Emilio Esperida. As such auto mechanic he had no choice but to obey the orders of its managing agent. Any work performed by Felipe Chavez in pursuance to the orders of defendant's managing agent, necessarily arise out of and in the course of the employment of the defendant. Felipe Chavez had no discretion to choose the work which he must perform for the company. His duty was to perform such work as was required of him by defendant's managing agent. To refuse the order of the managing agent may result in the loss of his employment. If defendant's managing agent had violated any company rule prohibiting the performance of outside jobs, then he alone must be held responsible to the company. But certainly the defendant company relieve itself of its obligation under the Workmen's Compensation Act on the theory that its agent had violated the company regulation. Defendant, as a corporation, necessarily must rely on its agents, and it is from these agents that the employees receive their orders. To accept defendant's theory would enable it to evade its responsibility in many cases under the Workmen's Compensation Law on the ground that its agents had exceeded, or acted beyond their authority. Such certainly could not have been the intention of the law. (Pp. 18-19, appellant brief) Granting that Chavez tried to repair Governor Trivio car upon order of Esperida, the latter cannot bind his principal by such act, for it was clearly outside the scope of his employment. There was express prohibition to repair motor cars not belonging to the company in the shop. Such prohibition must have been known to all employees working in the shop, specially the mechanics. Taking this into consideration, the most liberal interpretation of the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot justify a conclusion that Chavez died in line of duty. xxx xxx xxx

We are, therefore, of the opinion that appellant are not entitled to compensation and the judgment appealed from is, consequently, reversed, without costs. It will be noticed from the decision of the Court of Appeals above reproduced that it makes no definite findings as to whose instance the car of Governor Trivio was received in the shop of the defendant company for purposes of repair, although it says that assuming or granting that the deceased Chavez tried to repair the Governor's car upon the orders of Esperida, the latter could not bind its principal for such act for it was clearly outside the scope of Chavez's employment because of the express prohibition against repairing motor cars not belonging to the company. For this reason, in this decision we must assume as a fact that Esperida as manager of the subsidiary station in Tigaon ordered the repair. Not only this, but considering the circumstances surrounding the case, it was most unlikely that Chavez without the knowledge and consent of Esperida, his immediate superior, much less against his express order, would admit Governor Trivio's car in the shop, place it on the grease after it had previously been ordered taken down therefrom by Esperida and proceed to repair the car on his own account. We believe that it is more probable that because of the prominence and high social position and political standing of Governor Trivio, Esperida, believing that he was furthering the interests of his company, the defendant, accepted the car and ordered Chavez to repair it. It is not unusual for land transportation companies maintaining big repair shops with adequate facilities to go out of their way and make repairs on cars of prominent citizens and high officials of the Government, especially in places where private repair facilities are not adequate or available, this, to gain and maintain the good will and obtain the help and cooperation of such prominent citizens and high officials, all for the interests of the company itself.

The authorities cited in the decision of the Court of Appeals and by counsel for the company are to the effect that under the Workmen's Compensation Act, where injury is sustained by an employee while performing work outside the scope of his employment and in willful violation of the law, or rules and regulations promulgated by his employer, or where the work being performed was not in furtherance of the interests of his employer but solely of his own, said employee or his heirs may not recover compensation. We have no quarrel with said authorities. They might be applicable in this case if the repair were being done by manager Esperida himself and he were the one who suffered the injury; but such authorities have no application in the case of Chavez. It was not he (Chavez) who accepted the repair job, in violation of the company's regulations. It was Esperida, his superior. Chavez merely obeyed orders. From the standpoint of Chavez, the order of Esperida was the order of the Company, which he was bound to obey unless clearly unlawful and outside the scope of his employment. As far as Chavez was concerned, the Company that promulgated the rules banning the repair of private cars may break them or make exception through its agents and high officials like Esperida. The rule confining repairs to motor vehicles of the company involves a matter of policy, to be enforced, suspended or relaxed by the Company through its official or managers like Esperida. Chavez a mere mechanic was not concerned with the enforcement or suspension of such policy. In the present case, the repair work given to Chavez by Esperida was strictly within the scope of his employment as a mechanic. That was the work for which he was being paid. Could he, a mere mechanic, question the propriety of Esperida's action in accepting Governor Trivio car, and tell his manager that it was in open violation of the company's rule and that, consequently, he (Chavez) refused to make the repairs? If Chavez did that, how long could he have kept his job? If the repair work attempted by Chavez had been done in a manner contrary to the regular procedure followed in similar cases, that is to say, more dangerous to the mechanic, or where said work had been done outside the premises and facilities of the employer and under circumstances involving more risk to the mechanic, or where the repair work had been done at this instance and on his own account and for his sole exclusive profit, all this, in violation of the rules of the company, if may yet be said that the injury did not occur in line of duty and did not arise out or in the course of this employment. But in the present case, the violation of the company's rule that only motor vehicles of the company may be repaired in the shop, was by Manager Esperida and perhaps in furtherance of the interests of the company whom he represented. The repair job was being done within the premises of the company and with its own facilities. In doing the repair job such as putting the car on the grease rack, Chavez was presumably following the usual and standard procedure. There is no showing that by making the repair job on the car, Chavez was going to receive additional compensation, except perhaps extra pay for overtime work which he was ordinarily entitled to under the law. It was surely not Chavez's concern whether the rules and regulations of the company in this matter for one reason or another, are relaxed and not strictly enforced. Let us taken an example. Supposing that one of the buses or trucks of the defendant company through the negligence of its chauffeur collides with a private car and causes damage. The car owner is willing to waive compensation if the damage to the engine of his car was repaired by the company or at the company's expense. Could not the company well have the repairs made by its mechanic and in its shop where all the facilities are available, and could Chavez in that case refuse to make the repairs just because the car did not belong to his company? The answer is obvious. If he did refuse, he might be accused of insubordination and lack of cooperation and may have to look for work elsewhere. In conclusion, we hold that although the repair attempted to be made on the Governor's car was in technical violation of the rules of Company, such violation was committed not by Chavez but by Esperida himself, who from the standpoint of Chavez acted for the company in ordering the repair, which order Chavez could not well ignore. We, therefore, agree with the trial court and hold that the 277

heirs of Chavez may recover under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Whether the company may recover the amount to be paid by it from Esperida, we do not now attempt to determine. The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed, and the decision of the lower court is affirmed, with costs.

[G.R. No. L-8110. June 30, 1956.] MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS, INC., Petitioner, vs. THE WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION, THE HEIRS OF PEDRO MAMADOR and GERONIMO MA. COLL, Respondents.

DECISION BENGZON, J.: The Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc. questions by certiorari the order of the Workmens Compensation Commissioner confirming the referees award of compensation to the heirs of Pedro Mamador for his accidental death. Only the right to compensation is disputed; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarynot the amount. It appears, says the award, that on August 23, 1951, at 6:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary00 a.m. in Bo. Sumangga, Mogpog, Marinduque, the deceased Mamador together with other laborers of theRespondent-corporation, (Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc.) boarded a truck belonging to the latter, which was then driven by one Procopio Macunat, also employed by the corporation, and on its way to their place of work at the mine camp at Talantunan, while trying to overtake another truck on the company road, it turned over and hit a coconut tree, resulting in the death of said Mamador and injury to the others. Procopio Macunat was prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. (Criminal Case No. 1491). He has paid nothing however, to the latter. In his first proposition Petitioner challenges the validity of the proceedings before the Commission, asserting it had not been given the opportunity to cross-examine the opposing witnesses. According to Respondents. The records show that pursuant to a request made by this Commission on March 28, 1953 to investigate the above-entitled case, the Public Defender of Boac, Marinduque, notifiedRespondent Geronimo Ma. Coll and the general manager of the Respondent company, Mr. Eric Lenze, to appear before him in an investigation, first on May 12, 1953, when neither of them appeared, and the second on May 29, 1953, when only Mr. Geronimo Ma. Coll. appeared. The sworn testimony of Mr. Ma. Coll was then taken down in a question and answer method. On August 18, 1953, thru Referee Ramon Villaflor, this Commission wrote the Respondentcompany to comment on the enclosed copy of the sworn declaration of Ma. Coll. The Respondent company, thru its Vice President, denied its liability under the Workmens Compensation Act, as amended. In an investigation conducted on February 8, 1954 by the undersigned referee, the Respondent company thru Mr. Lenze who was assisted by counsel, was allowed to examine the records of the case including the sworn declaration of Ma. Coll and was given all the opportunity to rebut the same by additional evidence. In our opinion, Petitioners grievance does not rest on any sound basis, because it was given notice, and therefore had the chance, to examine (and cross-examine) the witnesses against it. The statute

even permits the Commissioner (or his referee) to take testimony without notice (section 48 Act 3428 as amended) provided of course such ex parte evidence is reduced to writing, and the adverse party is afforded opportunity to examine and rebut the same which was done in this instance. Anyway we are not shown how its failure to cross-examine the witnesses prejudiced thePetitioners position. In its second proposition, Petitioner maintains that this claim is barred by section 6 of the Workmens Compensation Law, because (a) Macunat was prosecuted and required to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and (b) an amicable settlement was concluded between said heirs and Macunat. Section 6 provides as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Sec. 6. Liability of third parties. In case an employee suffers an injury for which compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides his employer, it shall be optional with such injured employee either to claim compensation from his employer, under this Act, or sue such other person for damages, in accordance with law; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand in case compensation is claimed and allowed in accordance with this Act, the employer who paid such compensation or was found liable to pay the same, shall succeed the injured employee to the right of recovering from such person what he paid:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Provided, That in case the employer recovers from such third person damages in excess of those paid or allowed under this Act, such excess shall be delivered to the injured employee or any other person entitled thereto, after deduction of the expenses of the employer and the costs of the proceedings. The sum paid by the employer for compensation or the amount of compensation to which the employee or his dependents are entitled, shall not be admissible as evidence in any damage suit or action. It is the Petitioners contention that Criminal Case No. 1491 and its outcome constituted an election by the employee (or his heirs) to sue the third person, such election having the effect of releasing the employer. However, Criminal Case No. 1491 was not a suit for damages against the third person, it being alleged, without contradiction that the heirs did not intervene therein and have not so far received the indemnity ordered by the court. At any rate, we have already decided in Nava vs. Inchausti Co. 1 that the indemnity granted the heirs in a criminal prosecution of the other person does not affect the liability of the employer to pay compensation. 2 As to the alleged amicable settlement, it consists of an affidavit wherein, for the sum of 150 pesos, Mamadors widow promised to forgive Macunat for the wrong committed and not to bring him before the authorities for prosecution. Upon making such promise Petitionerargues she elected one of the remedies, (against the third person) and is barred from the other remedy (against the employer). The contention may not be sustained, inasmuch as all the widow promised was to forego the offenders criminal prosecution. Note further that a question may be raised whether she could bind the other heirs of the deceased. The most important aspect of this appeal, is the effect of the deceaseds having violated the employers prohibition against laborers riding the haulage trucks. Petitioner claims such violation was the laborers notorious negligence which, under the law, precludes recovery. The Commission has not declared that the prohibition was known to Mamador. Yet the employer does not point out in the record evidence to that effect. Supposing Mamador knew the prohibition, said the referee, can we truthfully say that he boarded the fatal truck with full apprehension of the existence of the danger, if any at all, that an ordinary prudent man would try to avoid? I do not believe so, and even in the presence of doubt, the same must be resolved in his favor. Unless of course, we can attribute to him a desire to end his life. Nowhere in the records of this case can we find the slightest insinuation of that desire. There is no doubt that mere riding on haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not negligence, ordinarily. It couldnt be, because transportation by truck is not dangerous per se. It is argued that there was notorious negligence in this particular instance because there was the employers prohibition. Does violation of this order constitute negligence? Many courts hold that violation of a statute or ordinance constitutes negligence per se. Others consider the circumstances. 278

However there is practical unanimity in the proposition that violation of a rule promulgated by a Commission or board is not negligence per se; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut it may be evidence of negligence. (C.J.S., Vol. 65, p. 427.) This order of the employer (prohibition rather) couldnt be of a greater obligation than the rule of a Commission or board. And the referee correctly considered this violation as possible evidence of negligence; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut it declared that under the circumstance, the laborer could not be declared to have acted with negligence. Correctly, it is believed, since the prohibition had nothing to do with personal safety of the riders. Such finding is virtually a finding of fact which we may not overrule in this certiorari proceeding. Nevertheless, even granting there was negligence, it surely was not notorious negligence, which we have interpreted to mean the same thing as gross negligence 3 implying conscious indifference to consequences pursuing a course of conduct which would naturally and probably result in injury utter disregard of consequences. (38 Am. Jur., 691) Getting or accepting a free ride on the companys haulage truck couldnt be gross negligence, because as the referee found, no danger or risk was apparent. There being no other material point raised in the petition for review, the award of compensation is hereby affirmed, with costs against Petitioner.

G.R. No. L-47360

November 28, 1940

BOHOL LAND TRANSPORTATION CO., recurrente y apelante, vs. FERMINA VIUDA DE MADANGUIT Y OTROS, recurridos y apelados. Sres. Alvear y Agrava en representacion de la recurrente. D. Antonio Logarta y D. Cecilio I. Lim en representacion de los recurridos. HORRILLENO, J.: Este es un recurso de certiorari promotivao por la Bohol Land Transportaion Co. contra Fermina Viuda de Mandaguit, la recurrida, en el que pide se revoque la decision del Tribunal de Apelaciones, promulgada el 28 de febrero de 1940, la cual, copiada literalmente, dice asi:. Driving the passenger truck No. 77 of the defendant transportation company, Ramon Madanguit left Tagbilaran, Bohol, on his regular trip to barrio Catigbian of another municipality in the afternoon of May 17, 1937. On the road he overtook and passed another truck of the defendant, and in doing so he fell but collided with Ciriaco Dalmao (then riding a bicycle in the opposite direction),practically ditching him. Dalmao immediately turned around and pursued Madanguit's truck, which a few minutes later had to park in front of the house of Attorney Celestino Gallares, because some pedestrian signaled to get aboard. Taking advantage of the stop, Madanguit went to the Lourdes Drug Store across the street to wash his hands which had become dirty when he cleaned the truck. In the meantime, Ciriaco Dalmao arrived, went into the drug store, and, without much ado, knifed Madanguit to death. Dalmao was prosecuted and having pleaded guilty was sentenced accordingly.

Subsequently, the heirs of Madanguit filed this action for compensation under Act No. 3428, as amended, in the Court of First Instance of Bohol, and obtained judgment for the total sum of P1,507.58, to be paid in the manner directed. The defendant appealed, questioning not the amount of compensation nor the manner of payment thereof, but the right of the plaintiff to be compensated, and submitting the proposition: First, that the death did not arise out of Madanguit's employment and in the course thereof; and, second that compensation is not due because the death occurred on the account of Madanguit's notorious negligence, or intention to inflict injury upon Dalmao. We are of the opinion that under the facts stated at the beginning of this decision, the death of Madanguit arose out, and in the course of his employment. It appears that because while driving the defendant's truck he offended Dalmao, the latter stabbed and killed him. But the defendant maintains that there is no competent proof regarding Dalmao's motive, maintaining that the declaration in open court of the widow of Madanguit, who merely repeated Dalmao's testimony in the criminal case against him for murder is hearsay and incompetent evidence. But hearsay evidence regarding the motive or intention of a person is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule. (See Wigmore on Evidence, par. 1729, et seq.: and also notes to its Supplement.) And view of the fact that the declarations of Dalmao were made under the sanction of an oath, and the defendant itself presented Exhibit 9 (testimony of some witness in the criminal case against Dalmao), which corroborates the widow's testimony, we cannot say that there is not enough evidence about the motive impelling Dalmao's murderous hand. At any rate, the declaration of the widow at pages 22 to 25 of the transcript of the stenographic notes were not objected to as hearsay, and for all purposes are in the record entitled to some value. (Diaz vs. U.S., 223 U.S. 442.). Nevertheless, let us suppose, that proof of Dalmao's resentment is insufficient. Then Madanguit's injury does not appear to have arisen out of his employment; yet it being undeniable that he was killed 'in the course of his employment' (see Jackson vs. Dairyman's Creamery, 162 S.E., 359; Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co. vs. Sartonio, 12 Pac. [2nd] 221, his family is entitled to compensation under the decision of the Supreme Court in Pollisco vs. Basilan Lumber Co., G.R. 39721, Oct 23, 1993 (Philippine Cases on Workmen's Compensation by Butalid, p.7) Referring to the second point, the accident did not arise out of his employment, which was that of operating the machine and fixing it when it was out of commission, inasmuch as said accident did not occur while he was engaged in said work and as a consequence thereof. "But that the accident occurred in the course of his employment there can be no doubt, for the reason that, being an employee of the firm and while riding in the wagon furnished by the company to bring then home within the concession after their work, plaintiff was within the radius of action and under the control of the defendant company." (Pollisco vs. Basilan Lumber Co., supra ). In Bellosillo vs. City of Manila (G.R. No. 34522, November 9, 1931, Butalid, supra, p. 16), a workman employed on a public street temporarily left his work and crossed the street, he was run over by an automobile and killed. The Supreme Court gave him compensation under Act 3428, holding that the injury was caused by an accident due to, and in pursuance of, his employment. 279

It should be noted in this connection that in constructing this specific provision of the Workmen's compensation law, the tendency is towards liberality in favor whenever an employee suffers injury in the course of his employment, a reasonable factual presumption, is that the hurt arose out of the employment. The defendant attempted to establish the fact that Madanguit owed Dalmao about P3.50; that on May 17, just a few minutes before the killing, Dalmao stopped Madanguit and asked for payment, that Madanguit paid no attention to Dalmao, whereupon the latter became enraged, followed Madanguit and killed him. The theory is not plausible for it is unlikely that for a small indebtedness Dalmao should take away the life of an individual. it is also incredible that he should stop a truck to demand payment. But this alleged debt of Madanguit lends color to the plaintiff's version, because his rudeness in crowding Dalmao out of the street was resented by the latter, who, as a creditor of Madanguit, evidently expected better treatment. The other defense that the killing was caused by Madanguit's intention to inflict injuries upon Dalmao, or to his notorious negligence, is concededly premised on the assumption that the decision in criminal case No. 4180, Exhibit E, is admissible (appellant's brief, p.34). As we agree with the defendant that said Exhibit, for the purpose of showing the facts recited therein, is not admissible, we do not have to go into this defense, specially because we are not convinced there was notorious negligence or wilfull misconduct on the part of Madanguit. The net result is that plaintiff are entitled to compensation. And as the defendant has assigned no error as to the rate or amount of the award, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, with costs against the appellant. La recurrente, como fundamento de su recurso, alega:. 1. The Second Division of said Court of Appeals completely disregarded the fact that the death of Ramon O. Madanguit was not an accident at all and erroneously held that, because Ramon O. Madanguit was murdered by Ciriaco Dalmao in the Lourdes Drug Store, the said death arose in the coarse of his employment or as a result of said employment it been found by said Second Division of Court of Appeals that the death of the deceased arose from the following facts: . . . "On the road he overtook and passed another truck of the defendant, and in doing so he fell but collided Ciriaco Dalmao (then riding a bicycle in the opposite direction), practically ditching him, Dalmao immediately turned around and pursued Madanguit's truck which a few minutes after had to park in front of the house of Attorney Celestino Gallares, because some pedestrian signaled to get aboard. Taking advantage of the stop. Madanguit went to the Lourdes Drug Store across the street to wash his hands which had become dirty when he cleaned the truck. In the meantime, Ciriaco Dalmao arrived, went into the drug store and without much ado, knifed Madanguit to death. Dalmao was prosecuted, and having pleaded guilty, was sentence accordingly." 2. The Second Division of the Court of Appeals committed an error in holding the deceased was not notoriously negligent when,

(a) The deceased violated and disregarded the rules and regulations of petitioner by starting late from; petitioner's garage which fact accounted for deceased going to the Lourdes Drug Store to wash his hands and comb his hair; and (b) The deceased disregarded the right of Ciriaco Dalmao, his assailant, by almost colliding with, and there was not enough space for his truck to go through without causing injury or damage to the travelling public. 3. The Second Division of the Court of Appeals also committed an error of law in implied holding that petitioner is an insurer against all accidental injuries which might happened to its employees while in the course of their employment and holding that, because the deceased was murdered on account of his carelessness and derelictions of duty, the said deceased Ramon O. Madanguit died in the course of his employment. ( See par. 2, p.2, decision, Appendix A.) 4. The Second Division of the Court of Appeals again committed an error of law by concluding that petitioner is answerable for the death of decease when it itself finds that "It appears that because while driving the defendant's truck he (the deceased) offended Dalmao, the latter stabbed and killed him" and . . . 5. Finally, the decision of the Second Division of Court of Appeals is against the applicable decision of this Honorable Court in that it applied without exception and limitation, the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law in holding that 'the tendency is towards liberality in favor of the employee. And perhaps it is not error to say that whenever an employee suffers injuries in the course of his employment, a reasonable factual presumption is that the hurt arose out of the employment' when according to the case Vergara vs. Pampanga Bus Co., G.R. No. 44149, January 9, 1936; Vol. V, lawyers' Journal, p. 372, this Honorable Court says: "We have heretofore given repeated evidence of our desire to see a spirit of liberality characterize the construction of the Workmen's Compensation Act. We have endeavored to interpret the Act to promote its purpose. We have even gone so far as to interpret it fairly in favor of the employee. But we cannot construct the Act to fit particular cases, and in this particular case neither the facts nor the law are demonstrative of a meritorious claim on the part of the employee coming within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act." No se discuten por la recurrente, ni puede discurtilos en esta instancia, los hechos declarados probados por el Tribunal de Apelacion en su decision objeto del presente recurso, a sabeer: Driving the passenger truck No. 77 of the defendant transportation company, Ramon Madanguit left Tagbilaran, Bohol, on his regular trip to barrio Catigbian of another municipality in the afternoon of May 17, 1938. On the road he overtook and passed another truck of the defendant and in doing so he fell but collided with Ciriaco Dalmao (the riding a bicycle in the opposite direction), practically ditching him. Dalmao immediately turned around and pursued Madanguit's truck, which few minutes later had to work in front of the house of Attorney Celestino Gallares, because some pedestrian signaled to get aboard. Taking advantage of the stop, Madanguit went to the Lourdes Drug Store across the street to wash his hands which had become dirty when he cleaned the truck. in the meantime , Ciriaco Dalmao arrived, went into the drug store, and without much ado, knifed Madanguit to death. Dalmao was prosecuted, and having pleaded guilty, was sentence accordingly. 280

Subsequently, the heirs of Madanguit filed this action for compensation under Act 3428, as amended, in the Court of First Instance of Bohol, and obtained judgment for the total sum of P1,507,58, to be paid in the manner directed. The defendant appealed, questioning not the amount of compensation nor the manner of payment thereof, but the right of the plaintiff to be compensated, and submitting the proposition: First, that the death did not arise out of Madanguit's employment and in the course thereof; and, occurred on account of Madanguit's notorious negligence, or intention to inflict upon Dalmao. La unica cuestion, por consiguiente, que se plantea ante Nos es la de si, en vista de tales hechos, procede o no otorgar a la recurrida los beneficios de la Ley de Compensacion de Obreros No. 3428, segun ha sido enmendada por la Ley No. 3812. Dicha ley, tal como ha sido enmendada, dispone en su articulo 2, lo siguiente: ART. 2. Motivos para una compensacion. Cuando un empleado sufre una lesion personal por accidente proveniente de, y en el curso de su empleo, o contrajere una enfermedad causada directamente por el empleo o como resultado de la naturaleza de dicho empleo, su patrono le pagara una compensacion en las cantidades y a las personas que se especifican mas adelante. En Pollisco vs. Basilan Lumber Co., R.G. No. 39721, este Tribunal, entre otras cosas, declaro que Pollisco tenia derecho a la compensacion no obstante haber ocurrido el accidente despues de su trabajo y mientras volvia ya a su casa. El caso de autos es, a nuestro juicio, mas fuerte y meritorio todavia que el citado de Pollisco. Como se desprende de los hechos probados segun el Tribunal de Apelacion, Madanguit, el difunto, era el chofer de uno de los buses de la recurrente, Bohol Land Transportation Co., y mientras guiaba el coche, este choco contra la bicicleta que montaba Ciriaco Dalmao; que momentos despues, casi inmediatamente, Madanguit paro su coche frente a la casa del abogado Celestino Gallares, por haber recibido seas de algunos peatones que querian coger el camion y, aprovechando esta oportunidad, bajo de el y se dirigio al Lourdes Drug Store con el objeto de lavarse las manos que se habian ensuciado al limpiar su coche. Entretanto, Ciriaco Dalmao llego y entro en la botica y, sin mas ni mas, apualo a Madanguit que murio en el acto. En otro asunto, Bellosillo vs. City of Manila, R.G. No. 34522, decidido por este Tribunal, se declaro que un obrero de la Ciudad de Manila, que trabajaba en las calles publicas, tenia derecho a la compensacion bajo la ley, a pesar de haber dejado temporalmente su trabajo y cruzado la calle, momento en que fue atropellado por un automovil que le dejo muerto en el acto. En Corpus Juris, pag. 673, tomo 71, hallamos lo siguente: . . . where the employee is injured while seeking toilet facilities or going to ro from a toilet, the injury arises out of the employment and in the course of it . . . El Tribunal de Apelacines, por tanto, no incurrio en error alguno al decidir este asunto, confirmando en todas sus partes el fallo del tribunal a quo a favor de Fermina Vda. de Madanguit, la recurrida. En su consecuencia, procede, y asi lo declaramos, confirmar en todas sus partes la decision objeto del recurso, con las costas en ambar instancias a cargo de la recurrente. Asi se ordena.

G.R. No. L-47565

November 25, 1940

THE PHILIPPINE MANUFACTURING COMPANY, petitioner, vs. JESUS NABOR, respondent. Ross, Lawrence, Selph & Carrascoso, and Federico Agrava for petitioner. Cecilio I. Lim (public defender) for respondent. LAUREL, J.: This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Court of First Instance of manila, by virtue of which the petitioner herein is ordered to pay the respondent Jesus Nabor, the sum of P513.17 with interest at the legal rate from the date of the filling of the complaint, as compensation due the latter under sections 14 and 17 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428, as amended), plus cost. The court below found that for some time before July 2, 1938, the respondent had been one of the pressmen of the petitioner, and on that date was on the night shift of the petitioner's oil mill working from 11 at night until 7 in the morning; that a short while before closing time, as he was planning a copra cake, a particle got into his right eye, and he asked his fellow-worker, Juan Villareal, to try and take it out; that the latter was not able to see it although the eye was red, and as the respondent went on complaining of pain in that eye, he told him to take a rest; that the respondent did so and washed his eyes under the tap, but as the pain persisted he sat down until his shift ended; that he then reported it to his foreman, Federico Sudio in compliance with the regulations of the petitioner; that the respondent did not return to the mill until the afternoon of July 5th, to take up his wages, because there was no work for anyone during the week following July 2d, as had previously been announced; that on August 29, 1938, less than ten months later, he went back to the mill to consult the company physician about the injury to his eye; that it appears that the respondent intended to apply for reinstatement, and wanted to know how if the injury to his eye would be counted against him; that the company physician. Dr. De Dios, found an ulcer in the cornea of his right eye, and treated him for a number of days; that unable to improve the condition, Dr. De Dios sent him to Dr. Alcantara, a specialist, who confirmed the diagnosis, and told the respondent that his right eye would be permanently useless: that upon receipt of this information, the respondent field a notice of injury and a claim for compensation with the Bureau of Labor on September 18, 1938; that the latter's medical inspector Dr. Santillan, also confirmed the diagnosis and declared that the vision of the right eye would be limited to the perception of light; that on September 29, 1938, the Bureau formally noticed the petitioner of the notice and claim for compensation, and upon the latter's disclaimer of liability institute the action which gave rise to the present appeal. But two question need be considered for the final determination of this case in this instance: (1) Did not verbal report made by the respondent of his accident to the foreman, Federico Sudio, dispense with the necessity of a written notice of the injury as required by section 24 of the Workmen's compensation Act; (2) Should the two-month period prescribe by the same section of the same act with in which the claim for compensation should be made, be counted from July 2, 1938, the date of the respondent's accident, or from August 29, 1938, the date when he learned for the first time that the injury resulted to be serious? Section 27 of the Workmen's Compensation Act provides, among other things, that failure to or delay in giving notice shall not be a bar to the proceeding herein provided for, if it is shown that the employer, his agent or representative had knowledge of the accident." It is insisted by the petitioner 281

that Federico Sudio is not agent or representative within the meaning of this section, and that even if he were, he did not acquire knowledge of the accident in view of his testimony to the effect that he did not hear was attending to his work. This contention was dispose of by the Court of Appeals i its resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, in the following language: In the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendant appellant, it is insisted 'that although the accident to the appellee of July 2d, 1938, was reported to the foreman, Federico Sudio, the latter did not thereupon acquire knowledge of such accident.' We cannot accept this conclusion although it was so testified by said foreman; because assuming that he was sincere (and we do not think so ) the fact that he took no pains to find out what it was the plaintiff had told him, shows obvious negligence, for a foreman is appointed over his men not only to serve as a means of communication between them and the company, and even to look after their welfare in representation of the company. This being so, the foreman's negligence can certainly not held out against the plaintiff or serve as a ground for denying him recovery. The petitioner places great reliance on the Walkden's case 237 mass., 115, 129 N.E., 396, in which it was held that the second hand or boss foreman was not an agent of the employer and his knowledge of the accident did not relieve the claimant of the statutory requirement for written notice. The decision in the case cited is no authority upon which to rest the decision in the present case for the reason that the factual basis is not similar. Here, it is admitted that Federico Sudio is a section foreman who has charge of the press section, and their is evidence to show that the report was made to him in compliance with the regulation of the petitioner. We are therefore, satisfied that Federico Sudio, as section foreman, exercises direct and immediate supervision over the press-men, one of whom was the respondent herein, and numerous case have held that a "foreman" or "boss" in charge of a crew or gang of men is an agent or representative of the employer whose knowledge of the injury is sufficient under the statute. (Fell's Case, 226 mass. 380, 115 N.E. 430; In re Simmons, 117 Me. 175, 103 Atl. 68; Hornbrook Price Co. v. Stewart [Ind. App.] 118 N.E. 315; Joilet Motor Co. v. Industrial Board, 280 Ill. 148, 117 N.E. 423; R.F. Conway & Co. v. Industrial Board 282 Ill. 313, 118 N.E. 705; State ex rel. v. Pennington County , 132 Minn. 251, 156 N.W. 278; In re Bloom, 222 Mass. 434,111, N.E. 45; Parker Washington Co. v. Industrial Board, 274 Ill. 489, 113 N.E. 976; In re Murphy, 226 Mass, 115 N. E. 40; Bates & Rogers Const. Co. v. Allen, 183 Ky. 815, 210 S.W. 467.) The second question raised by the petitioner is not of first impression in this court and has already been laid at rest in the case of Libron vs. Binalbagan Estate, G.R. No. 41475, promulgate July 27, 1934, wherein the following doctrine was enunciated: The fact that the law requires that a notice of the injury shall be presented within a reasonable time and that the claim for compensation shall be presented within two months after the date of the injury, indicates that the injury must be such a nature as to entitle the injured person to compensation. Since the injury to the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was apparently unimportant and, therefore, did not warrant the filing of a claim for compensation until it became evident that the plaintiff was in imminent danger of losing the sight of the injured eye, he could not exercise his right to claim compensation within two months from the date of the accident. This right accrued and became available when he finally learned that he had lost the sight of one of his eyes. The Workmen's Compensation Act Should be interpreted so as to accomplish, not defeat, the purpose for which it was enacted by the legislature. In this case a seemingly unimportant accident occurred which later resulted to be so serious as to cause the loss of an eye. It would have been absurd for the plaintiff to have field a claim for compensation

based upon the sole fact that a particle of coal had entered his eye. Experience teaches that such an accident ordinarily does not result seriously. The respondent's claim for compensation having been filed with the petitioner on September 29, 1938, exactly one month from August 29, 1938, the date when, upon undergoing Dr. De Dios' examination he learned for the first time that his right eye was diseased, we hold that the claim was seasonably made in accordance with Section 24 of the Workmen's compensation Act. Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same must be, as it is hereby affirmed, with cost against the petitioner. So ordered.

4. That the plaintiffs are totally dependent upon the deceased Octavio Madrid, and in accordance with the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, they are entitled to the maximum compensation of P3,000, if the accident is compensable. 5. That notice of injury and claim for compensation was filed on time by the plaintiffs despite which said defendant refused and still refuses to pay the compensation due. 6. That they are nineteen (19) other cases (Cases Nos. 50632-50636; 50638-50640; 50710, 50746, 50973, 51004, 51016, 51187, 51189, and 51191-51194, of identical nature now pending in this court, all of which were brought against the same defendant by the dependents of the other officers and members of the crew who died in the sinking of the S.S. "Marie". 7. That the defendant accepts all the facts alleged in the complaints filed in the other nineteen (19) cases, and specially those relating to questions of the occurence of the accident, dependency, wages, and the amounts of compensation claimed in each and every case. 8. That the parties plaintiffs and defendant agree that whatever decision is rendered by the court in the present case shall apply o the other nineteen (19) cases. 9. That the parties also agree to submit this case on the above stipulation of facts without any hearing, and to this end, the respective counsel pray that they be given ten (10) days from this date to present a memorandum. Upon the foregoing stipulation of facts the court rendered judgment on November 16, 1937, ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P3,000 with legal interest thereon from November 23, 1936, and the costs. The court, believing that the stipulation likewise submitted for decision the other 19 cases mentioned therein, also ordered the defendant. in the decision rendered by it in this case, to pay to the other plaintiffs the sums of money claimed as compensation in the other complaints filed by them. The defendant appealed from the decision so rendered, but in this appeal and in the decision rendered by its court, only the appeal taken in this case G. R. No. 46020 will be considered and decided. The reason is because in this appeal the plaintiffs in the other cases have neither appeared nor been heard. According to the stipulation of facts, it is admitted that on July 8, 1936, Octavio Madrid was employed by the defendant as first officer of the S. S. "Marie", with a salary of P110 a month; that on said date, while the vessel in question was plying off Palanan Point, Province of Isabela, and while Octavio Madrid was performing his duties as first officer, it was caught in a severe storm, as a result of which it sank with all the officers and members of the crew, including Octavio Madrid, perishing in the disaster. 1. It is admitted that the defendant was the owner and operator of the S. S. Marie and that he was doing business under the name of "Manila steamship Navigation Company"; but the plaintiffs did not prove that the gross income of his business during the year next preceding the one in which the accident occured amounted to P20,000 or more. In the first assignment of error, it is contended that the court should have dismissed the action for failure to prove such fact, inasmuch as the Workmen's Compensation Act requires that the gross income of the employer during the year next preceding the one in which the accident occured should have amounted to P20,000 or more, because otherwise the claim should be presented in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 1874. In the case ofRolan vs. Perez (34 Off. Gaz., 1593), this court held that under the law, as amended, the fact that the gross 282

G.R. No. L-46020 December 8, 1938 CONCEPCION MURILLO, in her own behalf and as guardian ad litem of Antonio, Carmen, Flavio and Jose Luis, surnamed Madrid, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. ALFREDO MENDOZA, doing business under the name and style of "MANILA STEAMSHIP NAVIGATION",defendant-appellant. Cardenas & Casal for appellant. Arturo Zialcita for appellees. De Witt, Perkins & Ponce Enrile as amici curiae. IMPERIAL, J.: As widow and children of the deceased Octavio Madrid, the former being the guardian ad litem of her minor children Antonio, Carmen, Flavio and Jose Luis, surnamed Madrid, the herein plaintiffs brought this action to recover from the defendant the compensation allegedly granted them by the Workmen's Compensation Act by reason of the death of said deceased. The parties submitted the case upon the following stipulation of facts: 1. That the plaintiffs are the dependents of Octavio Madrid, now deceased, and the defendant is the owner and operator of the S. S. "Marie", the said defendant conducting his business under the name and style of "Manila Steamship Navigation Company." 2. That on or about July 8, 1936, the said Octavio Madrid was employ by the defendant as first officer of the S. S. "Marie", with a salary of P110 a month plus board during the last 12 weeks immediately preceding his death or an average weekly wage of P28.29. 3. That on or about the date mentioned in the preceding paragraph, while the said vessel was plying off the coast of the Province of Isabela, at Palanan Point, and while Octavio Madrid was performing his duties as first officer, the vessel was struck by a heavy typhoon, as a result of which it sank with all the officers and members of the crew perishing in the disaster.

income of the employer during the year next preceding the one in which the accident occured was P20,000 or more, as required by law, need not be alleged or proven by the plaintiff, but that, it being a defense of the defendant, the burden is on the latter to allege and establish it. In the above-cited case, it was said: . . . The court dismissed the complaint, in addition to the above ground, because in its opinion the plaintiff had failed to establish that the gross income of the diary farms in 1933 was not less than P20,000. We hold that this was error. The law, as it now stands, does not require the plaintiff to allege and prove this fact. It is a defense favorable to the defendant and the burden is on him to establish it. Subsection (d) of section 39 of Act No. 3428 originally read: SEC. 39 . . . (d) "Industrial employment" in case of private employer includes all employment or work at a trade, occupation or profession exercised by an employer for the purpose of gain, the gross income of which in the year immediately preceding the one during which the accident occured was not less than forty thousand pesos, except agriculture, charitable institutions, and domestic service. As amended by section 13 of Act No. 3812, said subsection (d) is couched in this wise: (d) "Industrial employment" in case of private employer includes all employment or work at a trade, occupation or profession exercised by an employer for the purpose of gain, except agriculture, charitable, institutions, and domestic service, but as to agriculture, employees for the operation of mechanical implements shall be entitled to the benefits of this Act. It will be noted that when the said subsection was amended, the legislature omitted the phrase "the gross income of which in the year immediately preceding the one during which the accident occured was not less than forty thousand pesos." This omission simply means that from the taking effect of the amendment, December 8, 1930, the necessity to allege and prove the amount of the gross income ceased. It is true that section 42, as amended by section 14 of Act No. 3812, provides that when the gross income of any trade of occupation exercised by the employer during the year next preceding the one in which the accident occured, is less than P20,000, the claim for compensation shall be governed by the provisions of Act No. 1874; but the only purpose of this provision is to introduce a defense in favor of the employer so that, in the event his gross income does not reach said amount, he may invoke his right to be sued under the provisions of Act No. 1874; and being a defense favorable to the defendant, upon him, and not upon the plaintiff, rests the burden of alleging and proving it. The doctrine laid down in said case directly disposes of the first assignment of error which should be overruled for being unfounded. 2. In second assignment of error it is contended that the accident is not compensable under Act No. 3428, as amended, on the ground that the immediate cause thereof was a force majeure or a fortuitous event for which nobody should be responsible.

The first point raised by the assignment of error is whether or not the Workmen's Compensation Act covers maritime accidents occuring in the Philippine waters. Unlike legislations existing in the United States of America wherein, aside from the workmen's compensation laws and the Lomgshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act are in force, our Legislature has deemed it advisable to include in the Workmen's Compensation Act all accidents that may occur to workmen or employees in factories, shops and other industrial and agricultural workplaces as well as in the interisland seas of the archipelago. In this wise, section 38 of Act No. 3428, as amended by section 12 of Act No. 3812, provides: SEC. 38. Iterisland trade. This Act shall cover the liability of the employers towards employees engaged in the coastwise and interisland trade, and also in the foreign trade when such is permissible under the laws of the United States and the Philippines Islands. The applicability of the Workmen's Compensation Act to accidents occuring in the Philippine seas has been discussed for the first time in the case of Enciso vs. Dy-Liacco (57 Phil., 446 et seq.), where the question was decided affirmatively. In said case it was stated: The next point the appellant takes up is whether Act No. 3428 applies to the accident we are considering, and he contends that the provisions of this law do not cover the present case. It would be enough, to refute this contention, to cite section 38 of the Act in question, which reads as follows: SEC. 38. Interisland trade. This Act shall cover the liability of the employers towards employees engaged in the interisland trade, and also in the foreign trade when such is permissible under the laws of the United States and the Philippine Islands. A casual reading of section will show that the sea accident in which Dimamay died comes under it, since the Aloneros was then engaged in the interisland trade. The next question raised is whether or not Octavio Madrid's death is compensable under the law, it appearing that it was caused by the typhoon which is a force majeure or fortuitous event, being an act of God unforeseen and imputable to nobody. Stated in other words, the question submitted, which this court is called upon to decide, is whether or not Act No. 3428, as amended by Act No. 3812, includes responsibilities for damages arising from unforeseen acts wherein no fault or negligence not punishable by law has intervened (articles 1105, 1902, 1903, 1905, 1906, 1907, 1908, 1909 and 1910 of the Civil Code). In the case of Enciso vs. Dy-Liacco, supra, this court stated that the consensus of opinion and of the decisions of the courts of various States of the Union is that workmen's compensation acts have been enacted to abrogate the common law and the Civil Code relative to obligations arising from nonpunishable fault or negligence. To that effect it was said: It is also argued that the accident was due to force majeure and therefore the appellant cannot be made responsible for it according to law. It has been repeatedly stated that Workmen's Compensation Law was enacted to abrogate the common law and our Civil Code upon culpable acts and omissions, and that the employer need not be guilty of neglect or fault, in order that responsibility may attach to him. Bearing in mind this purpose, the appellant's contention is evidently untenable.

283

The compensation acts, especially the pioneer enactments differ considerably, one from another, in many essential aspects. While the purpose sought to be accomplished is the same, the legislatures of the various states chose diverse means for its attachment. One thing is characteristic of all of the acts; the common law doctrines of negligence are abrogated, and in place of the common law procedure is substituted a scheme for achieving cheap, speedy justice. (28 R. C. L., p. 714.) . . . Admitting, however, that the compensation acts do create liability without fault, the courts have uniformly held this to be no objection to their validity. It is pointed out that our jurisprudence affords numerous examples of liability without fault and the deprivation of property without fault being attributable to its owner. Statutes making railroad corporations absolutely liable, without regard to negligence, for injuries to property cause by fire escaping from their locomotive engines, are clearly statutes creating liability without fault, yet these statutes have been upheld by all the courts of the states in which they have been enacted, as well as by the Supreme Court of the United States. As a matter of fact, the workmen's compensation act does exactly the same thing as the safety appliance acts; it imposes new duties of care on the employer the difference being that in one case the duty is announced in definite terms, whereas in the other it rests in implication. As expressed by the United States Supreme Court, "the common law bases the employer's liability for injuries to the employee upon the ground of the negligence; but negligence is merely the disregard of some duty may be modified by legislation, with corresponding change in the test of negligence. . . ." (28 R. C. L., pp. 752, 753.) The workmen's compensation acts are based on a new theory of compensation distinct from the theories of damages, payments under the acts being made as compensation, not as indemnity (71 C.J., 232; Mobile & O. R. Co. vs. Industrial Commission of Illinois, 28 F. [2d] 228; Martin vs. Kennecott Copper Corporation, 252 F., 207; Devine's Case, 129 N. E., 414; Duart vs. Simmons, 121 N. E., 10; 251 U. S., 547; Kenney vs. Boston, 111 N. E., 47; Erie R. Co. vs. Linnekogel, 248 F., 389; De Biasi vs. Nomandy Water Co., 228 F., 234; Schlickenmayer vs. City of Highland Park, 235 N. W., 156; Amndrejwski vs. Wolverine Coal Co., 148 N. W., 684; Flanigan vs. Hines, 193 P., 1077). The intention of the Legislature in enacting the Workmen's Compensation Act was to secure workmen and their dependents against becoming objects of charity, by making a reasonable compensation for such accidental calamities as are incidental to the employment. Under such Act injuries to workmen and employees are to be considered no longer as results of fault o negligence, but as the products of the industry in which the employee is concerned. Compensation for such injuries is, under the theory of such statute, like any other item in the cost of production or transportation, and ultimately charged to the consumer. The law substitutes for liability for negligence an entirely new conception; that is, that if the injury arises out of and in the course of the employment, under the doctrine of man's humanity to man, the cost of compensation must be one of the elements to be liquidated and balanced in the course of consumption. In other words, the theory of the law is that, if the industry produces an injury, the cost of that injury shall be included in the cost of the product of the industry. Hence the provision that the injury must arise out of and in the course of the employment (Mobile & O. R. Co. vs. Industrial commission of Illinois, 28 F. [2d], 228, 229). Under Act No. 3428, as amended by Act No. 3812, accidents are compensated independently of whether or not the employer has incurred fault or negligence, and the only exceptions thereto are the accidents arising from the voluntary act of the injured person, those resulting from the drunkenness of the employee who had the accident, and those caused by the notorious negligence thereof (section 4, Act No. 3428). 284

Lastly, it is contended by the appellant and by the attorneys for the Philippine Shipowners' Association, Inc., who have appeared as amici curiae, that the accident is not compensable under the law because it did not arise out of the employment of the deceased. Section 2 of Act No. 3428, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 3812, provides that in order that an accident may be compensated, it is necessary that it has arisen out of and in the course of the employment. A definition of the phrase arising out of the employment that has received wide favor is the one stating that this element required by law exists when there is apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of all of the circumstances, a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury (71 C.J., 648; Michigan Transit Corporation vs. Brown, 56 F. [2d], 200, 202; In re Employers' Liability Assur. Corporation, 102 N. E., 697; Industrial Commission of Colorado vs. Enyeart, 256 P., 314, 315; Mann vs. Glastunbury Knitting Co., 96 A., 368; 90 Conn., 116; Vincennes Bridge Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 184 N.E., 603, 605; Triangle Auto Painting & Trimming Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 178 N.E., 886, 889; Landon vs. Industrial Commission, 173 N.E., 49, 50; Franklin Coal & Coke Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 152 N. E., 498, 500; Edelweiss Gardens vs. Industrial Commission, 125 N. E., 260; Texas Indemnity Ins. Co. vs.Mclaury, 54 S. W. [2d], 862, 863). It is said that an accident has arisen in the course of the employment when it has occurred within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably be and while he is reasonably fulfilling the duties of his employment (71 C. J., 659; Stakonis vs. United Advertising Co., 148 A., 334; Taylor vs. St. Paul's Universalist Church, 145 A., 887; Flanagan vs. Webster & Webster, 142 A., 201; Larke vs.John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co., 97 A., 320). The defendant and the amici curiae admit that the deceased met his death in the course of his employment and while he was fulfilling his duties as first officer, but they emphatically deny that his death has arisen out of his employment. We can neither adhere to nor uphold this theory on the ground that it is contrary to the liberal interpretation of the law and to the spirit underlying the same. In investigating whether or not the death of said official arose out of his employment, all of the circumstances present in the case should be taken into consideration in order to be able to determine whether or not a causal connection exists between his said death and the conditions under which the necessarily had to fulfill his duties. The deceased was contracted and employed to direct and render services in the vessel. When he accepted the employment, he knew that he was in duty bound to render services in good whether as well as when the vessel encountered a storm or typhoon, as it so happened, and it may be stated that he must have been aware that in case of a typhoon his services had to be rendered in a higher degree, because in such event it was part of his duties to save the vessel. Taking into consideration all of these circumstances, it is clear that his death is compensable under the law on the ground that a causal relation existed between such death and the conditions under which he had to perform his employment. It is obvious that the typhoon was the immediate cause of sinking of the vessel and that there existed no causal relation between it and the employment of the deceased. It is evident, however, that between the conditions and circumstances under which the deceased discharged his employment and his death, there existed the causal connection which makes the accident compensable.lawphil.net The doctrine is generally accepted that the employer is not responsible for accidents arising from force majeure or an act of good, as it is usually called, when the employee has not been exposed to a greater danger than usual. However, in the case of the deceased and in that of a sailor, it cannot be denied that upon contracting their services to navigate in the waters of the archipelago, having to render extraordinary services in cases of typhoon, they are exposed to greater risk than usual, in comparison with other employees working on land. Injuries resulting from exposure to the elements are generally classed as risks to which the general public is exposed. As shown by the earlier annotations, however, the rule is generally recognized that if an employee, by reason of his duties, is exposed to a special or peculiar danger from the elements, that is, one greater than that to which other persons in the community are exposed, and an unexpected injury is sustained by reason of the elements, the injury constitutes an accident arising out of and in the course of the

employment within the meaning of the workmen's compensation acts. And this rule has been recognized and applied in later cases. (83 A. L. R. Annotation, page, 234). An assistant engineer on a dredge was drown while attempting to save the dredge from destruction during a storm. The trial court found that the sinking of the dredge was due to the violence of the storm, and that the death of the engineer was due to an accident arising out of the employment. In affirming the decision, the court said: "The nature of the employment, the conditions under which it was to be and was pursued, the exposure to probable injury from reasonably to be expected storms of similar character were all matters incident to such a risk as was here underwritten, and therefore an injury maturing such a risk, we think, could well be said to have been incidental to and to have arisen out of that employment." (Workmen's Compensation Law, Schneider, vol. I, pp. 1076, 1077.) The court, in granting the compensation to the plaintiffs, based its opinion mostly on the doctrine laid down by this court in the case of Enciso vs. Dy-Liacco, supra. The attorney for the defendant and the amici curiae insist that there is no parity between the facts of the above-cited case and those of the case under consideration. In said case the motor boat "Aloneros" sank on its way to a river to seek shelter, because a hurricane was raging. Upon reaching the sea, the anchor stuck to a rock and the launch could not get out of the place. The big waves therein dashed against the launch until it was filed with water, and a little later it sank with the master. It is contended that there is no similarity in the facts because the sinking of the launch "Aloneros" was due to the waves. This court sees no substantial difference between the facts of one and those of the other case. In the Enciso case the immediate cause of the master's death was the sinking of the launch, but there is no doubt that said accident was due to the typhoon then raging. In both cases the mediate cause of death was the typhoon. There is similarity between an accident caused by lightning and one caused by a typhoon because both are fortuitous events and of the so-called acts of Gods. By reason of such similarity some cases decided by the courts in connection with accidents caused by lightning may be cited to better illustrate the doctrine laid down by this court. In the case of Aetna Life Ins. Co. vs. Industrial Commission of Colorado (254 P., 995), the Supreme Court of said State held that the death of a farm hand, who was struck by lightning while driving a team of horses across a hill near a wire fence, was compensable as an accident which arose out of his employment. In the case of Moody vs. Tillman (163 S. E., 521), the Supreme Court of Georgia held that burns received by a workman employed to sound a turpentine still, where burns resulted from the still's catching fire by lightning, had arisen out of the employment and were compensable. In the case of Mathis vs. Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co. (272 P., 183), the Supreme court of Kansas held that the death of the employee of some quarries, by lightning, while he was walking along the railroad track on his way from one quarry to another, was compensable and that such death arose out of the employment. In the cases of Lebourgeois vs. Lyon Lumber Co. (6 La. App., 216); Fontenot vs. Lyon Lumber Co. (6 La. App., 162), and Gasca vs. Texas Pipe Line Co. (2 La. App., 483), the supreme Court of Louisiana held that an employee killed by lightning while eating his launch near a tree at the noon hour, was killed by an accident arising out of his employment and was compensable.

The attorneys who appeared as amici curiae call this court's attention to articles 643 and 837 of the Code of Commerce and contend that it was not the intention of the legislature to repeal the abovecited articles with the enactment of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The pertinent parts of said articles read as follows: ART. 643. If the vessel and her freight should be totally lost, by reason of capture or wreck, all rights of the crew to demand any wages whatsoever shall be extinguished, as well as that of the agent for the recovery of the advances made. ART. 837. The civil liability contracted by the shipowners in the cases prescribed in this section, shall be understood as limited to the value of the vessel with all 'her appurtenances and all the freight earned during the voyage. This court is of the opinion that the Legislatue, in enacting the Workmen's Compensation Act and the amendments thereto, intended to create a new source of compensation in favor of workmen and employees, by granting them the right to the compensation, in the cases provided therein, independently of the fault or negligence incurred by the employers. The rights and responsibilities defined in said Act must be governed by its own peculiar provisions in complete disregard of other similar provisions of the civil as well as the mercantile law. If an accident is compensable under the orkmen's Compensation Act, it must be compensated even when the workman's right is not recognized by or is in conflict with other provisions of the Civil Code or of the Code of Commerce. The reason behind this principle is that the Workmen's Compensation Act was enacted by the Legislature in abrogation of the other existing laws. Workmen's compensation acts follow the natural and logical evolution of society and the theory upon which they are based is that each time an employee is killed or injured, there is an economic loss which must be made up or compensated in some way. The border of this economic loss should be borne by the industry rather than by society as a whole. A fund should be provided by the industry from which a fixed sum should be set apart as every accident occurs to compensate the person injured, or his dependents, for his or their loss (State vs.Industrial Commission, 111 N.E., 299; L.R.A 1916D, 944). This court is aware of the fact that the practical application of the doctrine laid down herein will perhaps occasion great losses to the shipowners doing business in this country, but humanity and civilization demand protection for the workman in every line of labor, and to fulfill this social objective and at the same time a void ruin, employers and shipowners should employ means to insure the stability of their business. 3. In his last assignment of error the defendant contends that the court erred in ordering him to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P3,000, with legal interest thereon from November 23, 1936, and the costs. Such contention is without merit. It has been stipulated that in case the plaintiffs are entitled to the compensation sought by them, such compensation would consist in the amount of money in question. On the other hand, it having been decided that the death of Octavio Madrid is compensable under the law, the court did not commit the error so assigned. For all the foregoing reasons, the decision rendered by the lower court in this case, which is the only one appealed from, is affirmed, with the costs of this instance to the defendant-appellant. So ordered.

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G.R. No. L-45699

February 24, 1938

SILVESTRA CUEVO, petitioner, vs. FAUSTO BARREDO, respondent. Arturo Zialciata for petitioner. Antonio Barredo y Padags for respondent. VILLA-REAL, J.: This case is before this Court by virtue of a petition for certiorari filed by the plaintiff Silvestra Cuevo for the reversal by this court of the judgment rendered by the second division of the Court of Appeals, whereby it affirmed of the Court of First Instance of Manila absolving the defendant Fausto Barredo from the complaint filed by said plaintiff against him and dismissing said complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs. The jurisdiction of this court in this case being merely to review the conclusions of law inferred by the Court of Appeals from those of fact established in its judgment in questioned, we can take into consideration only the following conclusions of fact which are briefly as follows: On August 3, 1935, a strong wind was blowing in the City of Manila. A typhoon signal was raised. The current of the Pasig River was swift and strong. On that date Anastacio Lozano was working as carpenter for the defendant on the job of cementing and setting up a concrete pier in the middle of the Pasig River, adjoining the "Convalescencia Island", and two abutments on the banks, upon which a bridge annexed to the Ayala bridge was to be constructed. While Anastacio Lozano was thus working, a wavelet, produced by a launch that had just passed by, reached the heap of unfastened logs which were to be used as piles, causing one of said logs to be carried by the current. Yoshio Tagashira, the foreman of the defendant, upon seing that said log was being carried away by the current, cried out, saying that the log should be recovered otherwise they would have to pay for its value. Thereupon, Anastacio Lozano, who knew how to swim and could swim across the Pasig River, leaped into the water, swam and attempted to recover the log, but unfortunately was drowned. Said second division of the Court of Appeals, is affirming the absolutory judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, held that the defendant, as contractor of the work, is not bound, under section 1, clause 1, of Act No. 1874, to pay indemnity for damages for the death of Anastacio Lozano, inasmuch as said death was accidental and was not due to a defect in the condition of the ways, works or machinery connected with or used in the business of the defendants, which arose from, or had not been discovered or remedied in consequence of, the negligence of the defendant or a person in his service who had been intrusted by him with the duty of seeing that the ways, works or machinery were in proper condition; nor under clause 2 of the same section of said Act, because said death was due to the negligence of the defendant or of a person in his service who was entrusted with and was exercising superintendence, and if so, the deceased employee failed to exercise due care. There is no doubt that under section 1, clause 1, of Act No. 1874, the defendant is under no obligation to pay indemnity for damages for the death of Anastacio Lozano on the ground that said log was not a way, work, or machinery used by the defendant in carrying out the construction of the bridge annex, but a mere material that was to be employed in said work, and it was not the one that directly or indirectly caused Lozano's death.

As to the question whether or not Anastacio Lozano's death took place as a consequence of the negligence of a person in the defendant's service, who was intrusted with and was exercising superintendence, Yoshio Tagashira was the defendant's foreman charged with the vigilance and care of the workmen and materials for the construction of the bridge annex. While he was thus performing his duties as such foreman or superintendent, he heard the shout of one of the laborers under him, who were heaping the logs to used as piles, that an unfastened log was being carried away by the current. Naturally, when said foreman saw what he had just been informed of there flash in his mind the thought of recovering the log in question in order not to incur responsibility, and he issued the aforesaid threatening order. Said order which, coming from a superior and containing a threat had the nature of a command was obeyed by Anastacio Lozano who, at that time was engaged in piling up logs. When Anastacio leaped into the water at that pressing moment, he was undoubtedly prompted by his confidence in his ability as a swimmer, the fear of having to pay for the loss of the log if it was not recovered, that of disobeying a superior's order and the impending loss of said log. Under the second clause of section 1 of Act No. 1874, the negligence of the employer or of his superintendent makes the former civilly liable for any personal injury caused to an employee, or for his death as a consequence thereof. In order to exempt himself from this responsibility, it was necessary for the employer or his superintendent to take care so that no employee of theirs might suffer personal injury or die as a result of their negligence. Therefore, the foreman was, on that occasion, faced with alternative of having to avoid injury to the employee, who might obey his order, and of saving the log. He knew, or at least, he should know from ordinary experience, that anybody who leaped into the water under said circumstances would run the risk of drowning. He likewise knew that a man's life in worth very much more than a log. Notwithstanding these considerations, said foreman, without taking the necessary precautions tending to protect the life of his employee, who might obey his order, issued the threatening order which prompted Anastacio Lozano to leap into the water to recover the log then being carried away by the current, thereby acting with serious negligence. The effects of such negligence rebound to the defendants as an employer, because the custody and conservation of the materials to be used in the work formed part of the general power of superintendence received by superintendent as such from his employer (art. 1712, Civil Code). In ordering recovery of the log carried away by the current, the foreman acted within the scope of said power, and the defendant, as principal, is responsible for the acts of his agents (art. 1727, Civil Code). However, in order to hold the employer responsible for the death of an employee, it is not sufficient that such death was due to the negligence of a superintendent of his but it is necessary that the deceased employee had on part exercise due care in order to avoid the accident. As already stated, Anastacio Lozano was a good swimmer and could swim across the Pasig River. Upon hearing the threatening order of the foreman and seeing that the current was carrying the log away, he leaped into the water. Offhand, he undoubtedly thought that, notwithstanding the swiftness of the current of the river, he could recover the log in question, confident in his ability as a good swimmer and in that his foreman, a more experienced and intelligent man than he, would not give said order if he were not sure that the compliance therewith did not involve any risk. Furthermore, the thought of losing the log, the threat of having the value thereof and the fear of being dismissed if he did not obey the order must have greatly oppressed the mind of the unfortunate workman and impelled him to leap into the water, without giving his time to consider the situation and exercise his free will. If due care and prudence are the result of a calm reflection, having been placed by the foreman in such a situation that he had no time to make use of his reflective faculties, he can not be blamed for acting as he did, in obeying the threatening order under the psychological impulse of the moment. Inasmuch as it was the foreman who, by his negligence, caused Anastacio to act in said manner, the former can not allege in his defense that the latter failed to exercise due care. Neither can the employer invoke said defense because the effect of the negligence of his foreman, while acting within the scope of his authority, extend to him.

286

Now arises the question of procedure whether or not the defendant may be held responsible under the second clause of section 1 of Act No. 1874, as amended by Act No. 2473, by virtue of the complaint filed by Silvestra Cuevo in the Court of First Instance of Manila. In paragraph III of the complaint in question, it is alleged that on August 3, 1935, at about 8 a.m., and while Anastacio was performing with due care his usual work as carpenter in the defendant's construction work of the Ayala Bridge annex, a log of the defendant's property, located near said Anastacio Lozano, was carried away by the strong current and, trying to save it, he was, along with the log, carried by the current and was drowned. While it is true that an allegation to the effect that the death of said workman arose from the negligence of a foreman of the defendant, who was intrusted with and was exercising superintendence of the workmen, is lacking, in order to make the alleged facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, in accordance with the above-stated section 1, clause 2, of Act No. 1874, section 1 of Act No. 2473, amending Act No. 1874, provides that "in all litigations instituted by a laborer or by his heirs and successors under the provisions of Act Numbered Eighteen hundred and seventy-four of the Philippine Legislature, entitled 'An Act to extend and regulate the responsibility of employers for personal injuries and deaths suffered by their employees while at work, neglect on the part of the employer shall constitute a presumption of law." The negligence of the employer being presumed by law, it is unnecessary to allege such requisite in a complaint filed by a laborer or by his heirs and successors. Therefore, as the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action under said section 1, clause 2, of Act No. 1874, and as the existence of the alleged facts have been proven by a preponderance of evidence, it is unnecessary to order the amendment of the complaint in question in order to make such allegations agree with the facts found, there being no variance between them (sec. 109, Act No. 190). Although the theory maintained by the plaintiff in the Court of First Instance was different from that maintained by her in the Court of Appeals, inasmuch as evidence in support of both theories had been adduced in the court of origin, without any objection, and as the plaintiff had prayed in her complaint that she be granted such other remedy as the court may deem just and equitable under the premises, this court is authorized under the procedural law to decide the case in accordance with the allegations with the complaint constituting a cause of action and supported by the evidence. Therefore, as the complaint contains allegations sufficient to constitute a cause of action under section 1, clause 2, of Act No. 1874, in connection with Act No. 2473, and such allegations having been proven, judgment should be rendered in accordance with such allegations and the evidence.1vvphl.nt The only question now left for this court to consider is whether or not the plaintiff-appellant is entitled to the indemnity claimed by her. Section 2 of Act No. 1874 requires that at the time of the death of the employee, as the result of the negligence of a person for whose acts the employer is liable, the heir claimant was dependent upon the wages of the deceased employee for support. In the appealed judgment of the Court of Appeals, no data is available on this point. However, it appears from that of the Court of First Instance, which was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, that the plaintiff was married in second wedlock to one Tomas Diaz, who had no permanent employment and did not earn enough for her and her children's support, and that her deceased son used to give her all his earnings. The law does not require the legitimate heir of the employee, who died as a result of the negligence of a person for whose acts the employer is liable, to depend absolutely for his or his children's support upon the salary of the deceased, it being sufficient that they somehow and to a certain extent depend upon said salary for support. In view of the foregoing considerations, this court is of the opinion and so holds: (1) That where it is alleged in a complaint, seeking indemnity for the damages caused by the death of an employee as a consequence of the negligence of a foreman, that the deceased employee in question acted with due 287

care, failure to allege the negligence of said foreman is not a defect making the allegation insufficient to constitute a cause of action under section 1, clause 2, of the Act No. 8174, inasmuch as Act No. 2473 establishes the legal presumption of the existence of neglect on the part of the employer; (2) that where a complaint is based upon two causes of action, for both of which evidence has been presented without objection, any of said causes of action may be maintained on appeal, and the theory is not altered thereby; (3) that a foreman, who, in the performance of his duties as such, sees a log belonging to his employer being carried by a strong current, and warns the laborer under his superintendent that said log must be recovered, otherwise they would be made to pay for the value thereof, which threatening order is obeyed by one of the laborers who, knowing how to swim, leaps into the water to recover said log and drowns, commits negligence for not having taken the necessary precautions to avoid the fatal result; (4) that an employee, who, being a good swimmer, sees that one of the logs he is piling up is being carried away by the strong current, hears the order of his foreman that said log must be recovered otherwise they would be made to pay for the value thereof, and leaps into the water for the purpose of recovering it, is not guilty of negligence on the ground that he had no time for reflection; (5) that the foreman, whose threatening order, issued within the scope of his authority under circumstances which give no time for reflection, is taken as a command and obeyed, causing the drowning of the person obeying it, cannot invoke in his defense the drowned employee's alleged failure to exercise due care; (6) that neither can the employer of said foreman invoked said defense inasmuch as the employer liable for the foreman's acts committed within the scope of his authority; and (7) that section 2 of Act No. 1874 does not require that the legitimate heir's dependence upon the salary of the deceased employee be total, it being sufficient that such dependence be partial. Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed, and the respondent is ordered to pay, as indemnity for damages, the sum of P1,000, with legal interest thereon from the date of filing of the complaint, until fully paid, with costs to said respondent. So ordered.

G.R. No. 44352

March 28, 1936

MOISES ROLAN, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ANTONIO PEREZ (alias ABOODY PEREZ), defendant-appellee. Bernabe Butalid for appellant. Jose Galan Blanco and Jose P. de la Cruz for appellee. IMPERIAL, J.: The plaintiff brought this action to recover from the defendant the sum P155.57 as compensation for a permanent partial injury suffered by him as a result of an accident. He appealed from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing his complaint, without costs. From November, 1933, the plaintiff was a laborer of the defendant, with a daily wage of P1, in the latter's La Loma Dairy Farm in the barrio of La Loma, municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal. He was employed directly by the defendant, and his work consisted in fixing the barbed wire fence around the land, occupied by the dairy farm, weeding the land, and cutting the tall branches of the

trees, mostly acacia trees, found therein. He also did any other work given to him by the defendant, for which reason he sometimes served as carpenter and tinman, but always within the dairy farm. The branches of the trees were chopped to give way to shorter ones affording more shade to the cows which were being taken care of in the corral. One afternoon in April, 1934, at three o'clock, while the plaintiff was cutting the branch of an acacia tree growing on the border of the dairy farm, and as there was a strong wind and a heavy downpour, the branch gave way and fell on the electric wire found on that side of the road. The impact produced electric sparks and cut the wire and brought it down on the barbed wire fence which was there supported by the trunk of the acacia tree with metal nails or hooks. The contact of the wire fence, thus charged with electricity, with the tree trunk transmitted the electric current to the branches where the plaintiff was. The electric shocks which he received thereby caused him to fall on the wire fence, from a height of about six meters, receiving injuries on different parts of his body, principally in his right leg, dislocating his spinal column and eventually losing his consciousness. He was taken to the Chinese General Hospital and later to the St. Luke's Hospital, but notwithstanding the medical treatment to which he was submitted, he remained sick for several weeks. He was still sick when he appeared at the trial, and he had been unable to work from the time of the accident. According to Dr. Santillan, one of his attending physicians, the plaintiff lost 25 per cent of the use of his right leg and foot. All the hospital and medical expenses were defrayed by the defendant. The appealed decision rules that, under the facts, the plaintiff was not legally a laborer, but a servant, and consequently he cannot avail himself of the provisions of Act No. 3428, as amended by Act No. 3812. The plaintiff assigns this ruling as the first error in the decision. We are of the opinion that the error assigned is real. It is said that the plaintiff was not a laborer because his work had nothing to do with the milch cows and that he was not engaged in milking them. According to subsection ( b) of section 39 of Act No. 3428, as amended by section 13 of Act No. 3812, "laborer" is the synonym of "employee" and means every person who has entered the employment of, or works under a service or apprenticeship contract for an employer. Undoubtedly the plaintiff falls under this definition because he worked under a contract, although verbal, had with the defendant. According to the evidence, the latter was the one who employed him directly. What section 2 of the same law provides is, that the accident suffered by the laborer be in the course of his employment or arose therefrom. This connection between the accident and the employment or work has likewise been present in this case because for its existence it was not necessary that the plaintiff should directly attend to the milch cows or should milk them, proof of which was apparently required by the court. It is evident that the plaintiff cut the weeds, fixed the barbed wire fence, and chopped the branches the trees for the benefit and care of the cows in order that the latter may produce more milk and yield greater profits to their owner, the herein defendant. In the light of these facts, it cannot be denied that the plaintiff was a laborer of the dairy farm and that the accident which he suffered arose out of the nature of his work or employment and occurred in the course thereof. It is not important that, aside from his work, the plaintiff occasionally did carpentry and tin work which, if it had been specified, would probably have shown that it was all necessary for the maintenance of the dairy farm and its accessories or utensils. We conclude, therefore, that the first assigned error is well founded. To establish that the defendant had obtained a gross income of not less than P20,000 from his business in 1933, plaintiff's attorney offered Exhibit E as a part of his evidence. This was a letter addressed by the Deputy Collector of Internal Revenue to the Director of the Bureau of Labor, stating that the gross income of the San Miguel Dairy Farm and the La Loma Dairy Farm for the year 1933, immediately prior to that when the accident occurred, had been included in the income tax return filed by the defendant and which exceeded P20,000. Defendant's attorney objected to the admission of the document on the ground that it was incompetent, and the court sustained the objection and rejected the exhibit. The plaintiff assigns this ruling as the second error committed by the court. We agree with the court that the evidence was incompetent and that it was properly rejected. But we dissent from its ruling dismissing plaintiff's action in the absence of such evidence. The court dismissed the 288

complaint, in addition to the above ground, because in its opinion the plaintiff had failed to establish that the gross income of the dairy farm in 1933 was not less than P20,000. We hold that this was error. The law, as it now stands, does not require the plaintiff to allege and prove this fact. It is a defense favorable to the defendant and the burden is on him to establish it. Subsection ( d) of section 39 of Act No. 3428 originally read: Sec. 39. * * * * * * * (d) "Industrial employment" in case of private employers includes all employment or work at a trade, occupation or profession exercised by an employer for the purpose of gain, the gross income of which in the year immediately preceding the one during which the accident occurred was not less than forty thousand pesos, except agriculture, charitable institutions, and domestic service. As amended by section 13 of Act No. 3812, said subsection (d) is couched in this wise: (d) "Industrial employment" in case of private employers includes all employment or work at a trade, occupation or profession exercised by an employer for the purpose of gain, except agriculture, charitable institutions, and domestic service, but as to agriculture, employees for the operation of mechanical implements shall be entitled to the benefits of this Act. It will be noted that when the said subsection was amended, the Legislature omitted the phrase "the gross income of which in the year immediately preceding the one during which the accident occurred was not less than forty thousand pesos." This omission simply means that from the taking effect of the amendment, December 8, 1930, the necessity to allege and prove the amount of the gross income ceased. It is true that section 42, as amended by section 14 of Act No. 3812, provides that when the gross income of any trade or occupation exercised by the employer during the year next preceding the one in which the accident occurred, is less than P20,000, the claim for compensation shall be governed by the provisions of Act No. 1874; but the only purpose of this provision is to introduce a defense in favor of the employer so that, in the event his gross income does not reach said amount, he may invoke his right to be sued under the provisions of Act No. 1874; and being a defense favorable to the defendant, upon him, and not upon the plaintiff, rests the burden of alleging and proving it. Consequently plaintiff's action was not prejudiced by the rejection of Exhibit E, wherefore, the court erred in dismissing the complaint due to plaintiff's failure to establish that the gross income of defendant's business for the year 1933 was not less than P20,000. We repeat that it was incumbent upon the defendant to prove that his gross income for said year was less than P20,000, had he taken the position that the plaintiff's claim should have been decided under the provision of Act No. 1874, but as the defendant elected not to present any evidence, plaintiff's action lies. Plaintiff's last two assigned errors are equally well founded. Having made out his case, plaintiff was entitled to a judgment for the amount claimed, and an erroneous judgment having been entered, he was also entitled to have it corrected by the presentation of his motion for a new trial. The amount of the compensation claimed by the plaintiff is not disputed.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed, and the defendant Antonio Perez ( alias Aboody Perez) is ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of P155.57, with legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint and the costs of both instances. So ordered.

that inasmuch as the direct and immediate cause of the accident was Moralda's own notorious negligence in driving the truck in the manner above stated, the plaintiff is not entitled to claim any compensation from the defendant in conformity with section 4 of Act No. 3428. Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, without costs. So Ordered.

G.R. No. L-44112

December 21, 1935 G.R. No. L-36858 March 6, 1933

ELISA DE LA CRUZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. HIJOS DE I. DE LA RAMA & CO., defendant-appellee. Bernabe Butalid for appellant. Hervas and Concepcion for appellee. IMPERIAL, J.: The plaintiff, widow of Crecenciano Moralda, brought this action against the defendant to obtain compensation for the death of her husband, under Act. No 3428, as amended by Act No. 3812. She appealed from the decision of the court dismissing her action, without costs. Crecenciano Moralda was a chauffeur of the defendant earning approximately P40 a month, at the rate of P0.25 for every trip made by him with the truck he was driving, loaded with sugar. He was married to the plaintiff with whom he had two children. All of them depended on Moralda's salary. In the afternoon of January 21, 1933, Moralda, as usual, drove the Chevrolet truck which the defendant had just bought from the Pacific Commercial Company. The truck was loaded with sugar bound for Pulupandan from the Lumagob Sugar Central which belonged to the defendant. Upon crossing a bridge near the intersection of the Pulupandan and Maao roads and while the truck was travelling at the rate of from 40 to 50 kilometers an hour, Moralda unexpectedly met a car coming in the opposite direction from Pulupandan. To avoid the imminent collision he made a false maneuver and the truck fell into a ditch, turned turtle, and the engine caught fire. As a result of the accident Moralda's clothes and those of the child with him caught fire, and both suffered serious burns on their bodies. Moralda died a few days later as a result of the accident, notwithstanding the assistance rendered him. The foregoing proven facts are not disputed by the parties and the only question at issue is whether or not there was notorious negligence on the part of Moralda, preventing the plaintiff from obtaining the compensation claimed by her, as provided by section 4 of Act No. 3428.1awphil.net The road on which the truck was traveling at the time of the accident formed a sufficiently steep slope and not only did Moralda drive the truck at the said speed but he also drove on the right side of the road without sounding his horn. We agree with the court that Moralda acted with notorious negligence in driving the truck at that speed under such circumstances, because any chauffeur employing ordinary diligence and care would not have driven the truck at more than 20 kilometers an hour in order to forestall any unexpected accident. If Moralda had maintained the truck he was driving at a reasonable speed, taking into consideration the fact that he was descending a slope that there was a curve in the road, that the front view was as fully loaded with sugar, he would have been able to control it when he unexpectedly met the car, thereby preventing the truck from falling into a ditch and the engine from catching fire, which caused his burns and resulted in his death. We hold, therefore, 289

JUSTA AFABLE and the minors POTENCIANO MADLANGBAYAN and ROSA MADLANGBAYAN, by JUSTA AFABLE, as guardian ad litem, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANY, defendant-appellee. Bernabe Butalid and Teofilo Mendoza for appellants. William F. Mueller for appellee. VICKERS, J.: This is an appeal by the plaintiffs from a decision of Judge Pedro Concepcion of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing the complaint, without a special finding as to costs. The appellants make the following assignments of error: I. El Juzgado a quo incurrio en error al considerar que los hechos probados por los demandantes caen fuera de las disposiciones del articulo 2 de dicha Ley No. 3428 tal como ha sido enmendada por la Ley No. 3812 de la Legislatura Filipina; II. Erro tambien al sobreseer de una manera definitiva la demandada; III. Incurrio finalmente en error al no conceder la compensacion reclamada en la demanda a que tienen derecho los demandantes, segun las disposiciones de dicha Ley. It appears from the evidence that Leopoldo Madlangbayan was a collector for the Singer Sewing Machine Company in the district of San Francisco del Monte, outside of the limits of the City of Manila, and he was supposed to be residing in his district according to the records of the company. His compensation was a commission of eight per cent of all collections made by him. On the afternoon of Sunday, November 16, 1930, Leopoldo Madlangbayan while riding a bicycle was run over and fatally injured at the corner of O'Donnel and Zurbaran streets in the City of Manila by a truck driven by Vitaliano Sumoay. It appears that Madlangbayan had moved to Teodora Alonso Street in Manila without notifying the company, and that at the time of his death he was returning home after making some collections in San Francisco del Monte. According to the practice of the company, if collectors made collections on Sunday they were required to deliver the amount collected to the company the next morning.

On November 21, 1930, Vitaliano Sumoay, the driver of the truck within caused the death of Leopoldo Madlangbayan, was convicted for the crime of homicide through reckless negligence, and was sentenced to imprisonment for one year and one day, and to indemnify the heirs of Leopoldo Madlangbayan in the sum of P1,000. On February 19, 1931, the widow and children of Leopoldo Madlangbayan brought the present action to recover from the defendant corporation under Act No. 3428, as amended by Act. No. 3812, P100 for burial expenses and P1,745.12 for compensation. Plaintiffs' complaint was subsequently amended, and they sought to recover under sections 8 and 10 of Act No. 3428 fifty per cent of P16.78 for 208 weeks of P1,745.12 plus P100 for burial expenses. In its answer to the plaintiffs' last amended complaint, the defendant denied all the allegations thereof, and as special defenses alleged that prior to the filing of this complaint the plaintiffs had obtained a judgment against Vitaliano Sumoay for the damages caused by him; that Leopoldo Madlangbayan at the time that he sustained the injuries resulting in his death was violating an ordinance of the City of Manila which prohibits work on Sunday; and that Act No. 3428, as amended, is unconstitutional and void because it denies the defendant the equal protection of the law, and impairs the obligation of the contract between the defendant and Leopoldo Madlangbayan, and deprives the Courts of First Instance of their probate jurisdiction over the estate of deceased persons and nullifies Chapters XXIX, XXX, XXXI, XXXII, XXXIII, and XXXIV of the Civil Code Procedure and related articles of the Civil Code. As the deceased Leopoldo Madlangbayan was killed on November 16, 1930 and Act No. 3812 was not approved until December 8, 1930, it is apparent that the law which is applicable is Act No. 3428, section 23 of which reads as follows: When any employee receives a personal injury from any accident due to in the pursuance of the employment, or contracts any illness directly caused by such employment or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified. The accident which caused the death of the employee was not due to and in pursuance of his employment. At the time that he was over by the truck Leopoldo Madlangbayan was not in the pursuance of his employment with the defendant corporation, but was on his way home after he had finished his work for the day and had left the territory where he was authorized to take collections for the defendant. The employer is not an insurer "against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment", and as a general rule an employee is not entitled to recover from personal injuries resulting from an accident that befalls him while going to or returning from his place of employment, because such an accident does no arise out of and in the course of his employment. The phrase "due to and in the pursuance of" used in section 2 of Act No. 3428 was changed in Act No. 3812 to "arising out of and in the course of". Discussing this phrase, the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of Mueller Construction Co. vs. Industrial Board (283 III., 148; 118 N.E., 1028; 1 W.C.L., 943), said: The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place. (Fitzgerald vs. Clarke & Sons, 1 B.W.C.C., 197; Dietzen Co. vs. Industrial Board, 279 Ill., 11; 116 N.E., 684.) By the use of these words it was not the intention of the legislature to make the employer an insurer against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment, but only for such injuries arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar to the nature of the work in the scope of the workman's employment of incidental to such 290

employment, and accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to some risk or hazard to which the employee is exposed in a special degree by reason of such employment. Risks to which all persons similarly situated are equally exposed and not traceable in some special degree to the particular employment are excluded. Although some courts have held otherwise, we think the better rule is as we have stated it. We do not of course mean to imply that an employee can never recover for injuries suffered while of his way to or from work. That depends on the nature of his employment. In the case at bar, if the deceased had been killed while going from house to house in San Francisco del Monte in the pursuance of his employment, the plaintiffs would undoubtedly have the right, prima facie, to recover. The appellants cite the syllabus in Stacy's case (225 Mass., 174), in support of their contention, but an examination of that case shows that it differs materially from the case at the bar. Stacy was drowned by reason of breaking through the ice of Colburn's Pond while of his way home from work. Up to the time of his death he had been employed in the ice-house, in the work of storing ice which was cut from the pond. The ice-house was situated at the southerly end of the pond and the deceased lived directly north from the ice-house, across the pond. He followed the reasonable and customary way of leaving his employer's premises. The path around the pond was not used in winter. He was on his employer's premises when he met his death and was leaving those premises by a reasonable way. There was no other convenient way of going home. The pond was the premises of his employer, under his employer's control. It was as a result of the working operations of his employer that he met his death. The court said. "The finding that the pond was in the control of the employer and that crossing over it upon the ice was the "reasonable and customary way" for the deceased to reach his home, and that he and other employees who lived in the same direction "crossed by this way regularly", warranted the further finding that the injury occurred in the course of the employment." The court added: "It also could have been found that the death of the employee was due to his employment as a contributing proximate cause, incidental to the nature of the work in which he was engaged. There was evidence from which the board could have found that Stacy's death occurred by reason of the special hazard incident to the work which it was his duty to perform ." The court said that Stacy's case was clearly distinguishable from Fumiciello's case (219 Mass., 488): Fumiciello was employed by Lathrop & Shea, who were doing some contract work for the Boston & Albany Railroad Company near Middlefield. He lived about one mile west where he was employed, and it was necessary for him to pass over the tracks of the Boston & Albany Railroad Company to go from his work to his home. While returning home at the close of the day's work, Fumiciello entered upon the railroad track where he was struck by a train and killed. The question for decision was whether the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. The court said: "It is plain that if, as the record states, it was necessary for him to pass over the railroad location, it formed no part of the employers' plant; nor was it in any way connected therewith or in their control as was the common stairway used by employees in Sundine's Case, 218 Mass., 1. The contract of employment did not provide for transportation or that the employee should be paid for the time taken in going and returning to his place of employment, and when the day's work had ended the employee was free to do as he pleased. If he had chosen to use the public ways and had been injured by a defect or passing vehicle the administrator could not recover against the employer because there would be no causal connection between the conditions of employment and the injuries suffered." This subject is considered at length in Workmen's Compensation Law by Schneider, Second Edition, pp. 745 et seq. In the case at bar the deceased was going from work in his own conveyance.

An employee quit work, mounted his motorcycle and started for home. When riding down the street he collided with an automobile driven by another employee. He sustained injuries which resulted in his death. In holding that the accident did not arise out of in the course of the employment, the court said: "To come within the term "injury received in the course of employment " it must be shown that the injury originated in the work, and, further, that it was received the employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs of the employer. If it be conceded that the injury originated in the work, it would still be necessary, in our opinion, to show that the employee was engaged in the furtherance of his employer's business." (Indemnity Co. vs. Dinkins [Tex. Civ. App.], 211 S.W., 949 [1919]; 18 N.C.C.A., 1034; 4 W.C.L.J., 294; In rePeter S. Winchester, 2nd A.R.U.S.C. C., 262; In re Julius Rosenberg, 2nd A.R.U.S.C.C., 263; Kirby Lumber Co. vs. Scurlock, Tex. Civ. App.- [1921], 229 S.W., 975.) An employee who was paid by the hour was furnished a bicycle for his work, and while riding home one evening on the main road he was run into and killed by a motor lorry. It was held that, since it was no part of his duty to ride home on the bicycle the accident did not arise in the course of his employment. (Edwards vs. Wingham Agriculture & Imp. Co. [1913], W.C. & Ins. Rep., 642; 109 L.T. Rep. 50; 82 L.J.K.B., 998; 6 B.W.C.C., 511; 4 N.C.C.A., 115; Cook vs. Owners of "Montreal," 108 L.T. Rep., 164; 29 T. L. Rep. 233; 6 B. B.C.C., 220 [1913], 4 N. C.C.A., 115.) An employee had quit work and left the promises. He was sitting in his buggy waiting for his son, when the horse took fright and ran away. It was held that the injury sustained in the runaway did not arise out of or in the course of the employment. ( In re McCall, Ohio I. C. No. 121401, Nov. 4, 1915; Hilding vs. Dept. of Labor & Ind.[Wash.], 298 Pac., 321 [1931].) Furthermore, it appears that the deceased had never notified the defendant corporation of his removal from San Francisco del Monte of Manila, and that the company did not know that he was living in Manila on the day of the accident; that the defendant company did not require its employees to work on Sunday, or furnish or require its agents to use bicycles. These are additional reasons for holding that the accident was not due to and pursuance of the employment of the deceased. If the deceased saw fit to change his residence from San Francisco del Monte to Manila and to make use a bicycle in going back and forth, he did so at his own risk, as the defendant company did not furnish him a bicycle or require him to use one; and if he made collections on Sunday, he did not do so in pursuance of his employment, and his employer is not liable for any injury sustained by him. For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellants

G.R. No. L-37074

February 25, 1933

EUSEBIA FLORES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. LA COMPAIA MARITIMA, defendant-appellee. Provincial Fiscal Consing for appellants. Rodriguez & Zacarias and Quirino del Mar for appellee. IMPERIAL, J.: Eusebia Flores, in her own capacity and as guardian ad litem of her four minor children, instituted this action in the Court of First Instance of Cebu to recover from the defendant corporation, Compaia Maritima, compensation for the death of her husband, Graciano Paninsoro, in accordance with Act No. 3428. This is an appeal taken by her from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Cebu, dismissing the complaint, with costs. About the last week of the month of October, 1929, the defendant's boat, Albay, dropped anchor in the port of Cebu where the captain thereof, through a contractor or agent, recruited laborers who were to board the ship for the purpose of unloading her cargo upon arrival at the next port of call, Davao, and loading cargo for the various ports of call on her return trip. Among those laborers was the appellant Eusebia Flores' husband, Graciano Paninsoro, who was earning a daily wage of P1.50 including subsistence. On the 25th of the same month, while the boat was at anchor in the port of Davao unloading her rice cargo, Paninsoro received a severe blow on the head from a bundle of sacks of rice which were being hauled from the hold by means of the ship's crane, with the result that he fell into the hold fracturing his skull and receiving injuries on different parts of his body. He was brought to the Davao Provincial Hospital where he died on October 27, 1929, after receiving the proper medical treatment. The captain, as well as the ship's officers, were aware of the accident, but neither the former nor the appellee ratified the Bureau of Labor of the accident until November 24, 1930, when they sent the written notice, Exhibit C. The appellant reported her husband's accident to the Bureau of Labor, and on November 22, 1929, she sent a written notice prepared in accordance with the official form of said bureau, Exhibit B. This document was received by the Bureau of Labor on November 26, 1929, and the director thereof, acting as arbitrator in conformity with the law, proceeded to make the necessary investigation. The appellant, or rather the provincial fiscal of Cebu who represents her, assigns in his typewritten brief the following alleged errors: I. That the lower court erred in sustaining objections of appellee's attorneys to questions propounded by appellants tending to prove that a notice of injury or sickness and claim for compensation was sent to the appellee. II. That the lower court erred in rejecting Exhibits B, C and D as evidence of the appellants.

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III. That the lower court erred in not holding that the appellants have complied with the provisions of section 24 of Act No. 3428. IV. That the lower court erred in not declaring that the appellants should have been exempted from filing a notice of injury or sickness by virtue of section 27 of Act No. 3428. V. That the lower court erred in admitting the defense of the appellee for supposed failure on the part of the appellants to comply with section 24 of Act No. 3428, without this matter being specially pleaded in the answer. VI. That the lower court erred in not holding that Graciano Paninsoro was an employee of the defendant-appellee under the Workmen's Compensation Act. VII. That the lower court erred in not awarding compensation due from the defendantappellee to the appellants as heirs of the deceased, Graciano Paninsoro. VIII. That the lower court erred in overruling the motion for a new trial. We shall begin by saying that the appeal is well founded and should prosper. Without endeavoring to discuss separately the eight errors assigned, we are of the opinion that the trial court should have admitted Exhibits B, C and D which prove that the Director of the Bureau of Labor intervened as investigator in the accident and that the defendant-appellee, through its representative the captain of the steamship Albay, had knowledge thereof and that, for this reason, the appellant, together with her four children, were relieved of the duty to serve a written notice as required by section 24 of Act No. 3428. The trial court, in denying the admission of such documents and in not permitting the attorney for the appellant to ask questions tending to prove service of notice required by law, based its resolution on the alleged lack of allegation of such an important fact in the complaint. We admit that really there is no allegation that the appellant notified the appellee of the accident and presented her claim within three months immediately following the accident, but, it having been alleged in the complaint that the Bureau of Labor investigated the case and that the director thereof acted as arbitrator, evidence offered to that effect should have been admitted inasmuch as the defect of ambiguity of the complaint was not raised or submitted to the court by demurrer. However, even disregarding the purely technical basis on which the judgment appealed from is based, we hold that, according to the facts, the appellant was relieved of the obligation to serve written notice of the accident in view of the fact that the captain of the steamship Albay was immediately informed thereof. This knowledge constitutes one of the exceptions mentioned in section 27 of Act No. 3428. With respect to the claim for compensation, we take for granted that it was presented on time inasmuch as the documentary evidence which was not admitted proves that the Bureau of Labor investigated the accident, and the law requires that the claim for compensation should be included in these proceedings. Furthermore, Exhibit B proves to be the same claim prepared in accordance with the form of said office. There is not the least shadow of a doubt that the deceased was a laborer in the legal sense. He had been recruited by order of the captain of the ship and he was engaged in the task of unloading the ship's cargo at the time of the accident. There can be no dispute that this kind of work is included in 292

the business in which the appellee is engaged. That the deceased had been recruited or engaged by a contractor is of no moment because the latter, for purposes of the law, was an agent or representative of the ship's captain who, in turn, represented the appellee. The deceased Paninsoro was earning a daily wage of P1.50 and, according to sections 8 and 10 of the aforementioned Act, his wife and four children who were entirely dependent upon his work, are entitled to compensation equivalent to 60 per cent of his weekly wages for a period of not more than 208 weeks, or until the death of the beneficiaries thereof, or until the widow contracts another marriage, or until his children arrive at the age of 18 years, and to the sum of P100 for funeral expenses. Such compensation, excluding the sum of P100, amounts to P1,310.40 which the appellee may pay in a lump sum to the appellant if it so prefers, provided the discount on the same shall not exceed 20 per cent. The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and it is ordered that the appellee pay the appellant and her four children the sum of P6.30 a week from November 1, 1929, for 208 consecutive weeks, the aliquot part corresponding to the widow to be paid her until her death or until she contracts another marriage, and that corresponding to her four children, until their death or until they arrive at the age of 18 years, and the sum of P100 for funeral expenses, with costs of both instances.

G.R. No. L-36830

February 16, 1933

JAHARA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. THE MINDANAO LUMBER COMPANY, defendant-appellee. Provincial Fiscal Evangelista and Deputy Fiscal Escalona for appellants. Pablo Lorenzo, Delfin Joven, and Barrera & Reyes for appellee. IMPERIAL, J.: This is an action commenced in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga by the plaintiffs for the recovery of compensation from the defendant company for the death of the workman, Moro Sapturani, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3482, otherwise as the "Workmen's Compensation Act." The above-mentioned plaintiffs appealed from the judgment rendered by the trial court absolving the defendant from the complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs. Prior to the date of the accident, the late Moro Kingan was engaged in the business of cutting timber within the defendant's concession, employing laborers for that purpose, among them Sapturani. Kingan paid his cutter's wages and delivered the timber and firewood to the defendant company which paid him the corresponding value thereof. On the morning of February 12, 1930, between 6 and 6.30 o'clock, Sapturani, who was about to go to the place where he was engaged in cutting timber, by means of the defendant's train operating in the place, was run over by the last car of the train as it was moving backwards, and died almost instantly as a result of injuries received on different parts of his body.

Mora Jahara, the divorced wife of the deceased, his daughters, Albaya and Mandasiang, and their respective husbands, Ladaya and Bachaja, are the plaintiffs and appellants in this case. Such are the undisputed facts of record. We shall discuss later how the accident occurred. The appellants assign the following alleged errors in the trial court's decision. I. The trial court erred in not granting the plaintiffs the period of three days prayed for, within which to file and introduce as evidence a document showing the gross annual income for the year 1929 of the defendant corporation, of over P40,000. II. The court a quo erred in holding that the accident causing the death of Moro Sapturani was due to his negligence in trying to embark on the rear platform of the train of the defendant corporation at the Chinkang Sawmill, Naga-Naga, which was moving backwards at the time of the accident, and not holding that Moro Sapturani was overrun and killed by the train of the defendant corporation thru the negligence and carelessness of the employees of the latter. III. The trial court erred in holding that the preponderance of the weight of evidence is in favor of the defendant and against that of the plaintiffs. IV. The trial court erred in holding that in view of the negligence of Moro Sapturani, the defendant can not be made liable for the payment of compensation to the plaintiffs under the Worksmen's Compensation Act No. 3428 as amended by Act No. 3812, and in not holding that even admitting the facts stated in the decision, the paupers- appellants are still entitled to their claim under the law. V. The trial court erred in denying plaintiffs' motion for new trial. We shall refrain from considering all of the errors assigned by the appellants, limiting ourselves to the discussion and solution of the questions relating to the manner in which the accident, happened and whether the accident or Sapturani's death was the result of his own notorious negligence. Proceeding thus, we shall decide the appeal on its merits. The trial court declared that the deceased was notoriously negligent in connection with the accident, because the evidence shows that he tried to board the rear platform of the car as it was moving backwards; that he succeeded in getting a foothold but failing to obtain a hold of the car, he fell to the ground and was run over by the train. We have reviewed all the evidence presented and find that the conclusions reached by the trial court are supported by a preponderance thereof. We note that the plaintiffs' witnesses named Bachaja and Mandasiang gave a different version of the accident stating that the deceased, who was between the rails at that time, was knocked down and run over by the train as it was moving backwards, without the engineer noticing him, but we agree with the trial court that this story is improbable and inaccurate. As stated by the trial court, it was difficult for the accident to happen in this manner because, even without the warning of the whistles, Sapturani should have been aware of the proximity of the train and could easily have avoided it by only getting off the rails.

Turning to the legal aspect of the case, we likewise agree with the lower court that Sapturani acted with notorious negligence in attempting to board the train in the manner in which he did and, consequently, the action cannot be maintained in accordance with subdivision 3 of section 4 of Act No. 3428 which provides that no action for the recovery of compensation shall prosper when the accident upon which it is based is due to the notorious negligence of the workman. The judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, affirmed without costs, inasmuch as the appellants are paupers. So ordered

G.R. No. L-35741

December 20, 1932

VICTORIA TALLER VIUDA DE NAVA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. YNCHAUSTI STEAMSHIP CO., defendant-appellee. Acting Provincial Fiscal Debuque for appellant. A. de Aboitiz Pinaga for appellee. De Witt, Perkins & Brady as amicus curiae. STREET, J.: This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo by Victoria Taller Vda. de Nava, for the purpose of recovering the sum of P1,00.92 from the Ynchausti Steamship Co., it being alleged that said amount is due to the plaintiff under the Workmen's Compensation Act, No. 3428 of the Philippine Legislature, by reason of the death of her husband in the course of his duty, while serving as helmsman (timonel) on the interisland steamer Vizcaya, under the circumstances stated in the complaint. Upon hearing the cause the trial court absolved the defendant from the complaint, and the plaintiff appealed. The case was submitted upon an agreed statement of facts from which it appears that the Ynchausti Steamship Co. is engaged in the business of operating vessels in the coastwise and interisland trade, and on April 2, 1930, the steamer Vizcaya, one of its vessels, was being maneuvered in the mouth of the Iloilo River, at Iloilo. At this time Valentin Nava held the position of helmsman ( timonel) on said boat, receiving a monthly compensation of P35. In connection with moving the boat Nava, in charge of other members of the crew, was engaged in hauling in the ship's cable and in coiling the cable on the deck of the boat preparatory to passing it down a hatchway and bestowing it in its proper place in the vessel. While thus engaged Nava found the space which they required for coiling the cable partly occupied by a folding bed belonging to one of the third-class passengers. Nava asked whose bed it was, and Dalmacio Villanueva, one of the passengers, answered that he was the owner of the bed. Thereupon Nava said that he (Nava) would push it to another place because it interfered with the work. Suiting the action to the word, he pushed the bed with his foot towards the other side of the ship. This act aroused the anger of the owner of the bed, and hot words were exchanged, in the course of which Villanueva, using one of the wooden bars of the bed, gave Nava a jab in the pit of the stomach. Under the impact of this blow Nava leaned back, and at this moment Vicente Villanueva, a brother of Dalmacio Villanueva, ran up to Nava and stabbed him with a fan knife just above the left nipple. The blade penetrated Nava's heart and he died almost instantly. For the crime of homicide 293

thus committed Vicente Villanueva was later sentenced to imprisonment for fourteen years, eight months and one day, reclusion temporal, with accessories, and was required to indemnify the family of the deceased in the amount of P1,000, with costs. The deceased left a wife and seven children, and this action for compensation was instituted by the widow, under Act No. 3428 of the Philippine Legislature, as amended. The answer of the defendant raises several questions all of which were decided in favor of the plaintiff by the trial court with the exception of the most vital one which will chiefly engage our attention in the course of this opinion. But as the defendant relies in its brief upon the various points decided against it in the appealed decision, it is advisable to notice these points as preliminary to the discussion of what we consider to be the main question. Among other things, it is insisted that the death of Valentin Nava was not an accident within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, No. 3428. Under section 2 of Act No. 3428, as it stood when this incident occurred, compensation is demandable for "a personal injury from any accident due to and in the pursuance of the employment". By the word "accident" as here used it is intended to indicate that the act causing the injury shall be casual, in the sense of being unforeseen, and one for which the injured party is not legally responsible. Now, in the case before us, the death of Valentin Nava, was not, at least as regards the perpetrator of the deed, any accident whatever. The death was caused by the criminal and intentional act of Vicente Villanueva. But an act may be an accident as regards one person or from one point of view and not an accident as regards another person and from another point of view. This homicide was not attributable to the act of deceased himself and was not capable of being foreseen as a likely consequence of the discharge of his duties. The trial court therefore correctly held that the death of Nava was due an accident within the meaning of section 2 of Act No. 3428. Again, it is insisted that Nava was not an "industrial employee", within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, inasmuch as he was employed as a helmsman (timonel) and his duties were not of an industrial nature. This contention takes too narrow a view of the meaning of the phrase "industrial employee" as used in the Act cited. As helmsman on the boat Nava was charged with the performance of duties connected with piloting of the boat and controlling its movements when in motion. Duties of this character are clearly of an industrial nature, since they are concerned with effecting the ends and purposes of industry. The definition of "industrial employment", as given in subsection (d) of section 39, Act No. 3428, covers all employment or work at a trade, occupation or profession exercised by an employer for the purpose of gain, subject only to the limitation of yearly gross income. Nava was therefore an industrial employee and entitled to compensation under the Act, provided the other circumstances attendant upon the accident which caused his death were of such nature as to bring him within the purview of the Act. It is further insisted that Act No. 3428, as amended, does not cover the case of an employee upon a coastwise vessel. In this connection attention is directed to the fact that, under section 38, Act No. 3428 extends to the cases of "employees engaged in the interisland trade"; and it was only by Act No. 3812 (section 12) that the provision was amended so as to include employees engaged in the "coastwise and interisland trade". From this it is supposed that the case in question does not fall under section 38 of Act No. 3428. The question is in our opinion without merit. In the first place, the word "interisland", as originally used in section 38, was apparently used in a broad sense, to include all shipping in and among the islands, in vessels of Philippine registration, and it is not limited to shipping from a port of one island to a port of another island. The expression "the coastwise and" was therefore of clarifying a possible ambiguity and to bring the phraseology of the Act more into harmony with the technical terms commonly used in the Customs laws and regulations. Even supposing, therefore, that the Vizcayawas only engaged in the carrying of trade between different ports of the same island a fact which does not appear the "accident" with which we are here concerned 294

should be considered within the purview of the law. It is not apparent that the meaning of the law was changed in any essential feature by this amendment. Still, again, it is insisted that the case does not come under Act No. 3428 for the reason that it does not appear that the defendant had a gross income during the year immediately preceding the one during which the accident occurred of not less than P40,000. But we note that in the agreed statement of facts it is stated that during the last twelve months anterior to the month of April of 1930, the defendant had a gross income of more than P40,000 as a result of its business. This was evidently intended to cover the requirement expressed in subsection (d) of section 39 of Act No. 3428, and although the stipulation does not technically cover the gross earning for the full calendar year anterior to the calendar year in which the accident occurred, we are of the opinion that the trial judge committed no error in interpreting the stipulation in that sense. Finally, it is supposed that the circumstance that the criminal court imposed the civil obligation on Vicente Villanueva to indemnify the family of the deceased in the amount of one thousand pesos makes it improper to allow additional compensation in this case. As the trial court properly held, the suggestion is without merit. In the first place, it does not appear that the criminal indemnity has been paid and, in the second place, that obligation is wholly distinct from the obligation imposed by the Workmen's Compensation Act and the latter is in no sense subsidiary to the former.lawphil.net This brings us to consider the most important question in the case, namely, whether the death of Valentin Nava occurred in the course of his employment, or was the result of the nature of such employment. In this connection we quote section 2 of Act No. 3428, which runs as follows: SEC. 2. Grounds for compensation. When any employee receives a personal injury from any accident due to and in the pursuance of the employment, or contracts any illness directly caused by such employment or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified. This provision was amended by section 1 of Act No. 3812 so as to read as follows: SEC. 2. Grounds for compensation. When any employee receives a personal injury from any accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, or contracts any illness directly caused by such employment, or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified. This last provision, having been enacted since the death of Valentin Nava, is not directly applicable to the case before us, but it may properly be quoted for purposes of comparison and interpretation. Fixing our attention then more particularly upon section 2 of Act No. 3428, it is quite clear that the death of Valentin Nava was not due to any illness directly caused by his employment or the result of the nature of such employment. We are of the opinion, however, that it occurred in the course of his employment and "in pursuance of the employment", as this expression is used in the provision cited. The attorneys for the appellee presents a narrow view of Nava's employment and insists that, inasmuch as he was employed as helmsman, he was acting within the scope of his duties only when his hand was on the helm of the vessel and he was engaged in actually guiding its motions. We are of the opinion that his duties should be considered as having greater latitude. It is true that the term indicative of his employment was that of helmsman, but we think that his duties should be considered as comprehending acts done by him in helping to guide the ship. In maneuvering a vessel, in entering and leaving ports, it is necessary for the ship's officers in charge of the motions of the vessel to avail themselves of cables; and the taking in of a cable and the coiling of it upon the deck are acts properly incident to controlling the motion of the vessel. It results that, when Nava found that one of the third-

class passengers had placed his bed on the deck in a position where it was in his way, he acted within the scope of his duty when he pushed the bed back; and when the fatal assault was made upon him because of that act, it must be considered that his death resulted from an act done in the line of his duty. At this juncture it may be well to give a few words of explanation concerning the verbiage of section 2 of Act No. 3428 and of the amendment effected in this section by Act No. 3812, and particularly in the substitution, in the latter Act, of the expression "arising out of and in the course of the employment" for the expression "due and to in the pursuance of the employment" used in Act No. 3428. Upon this point we note that Act No. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine Legislature in Spanish, and the original of the section is taken from the statutes of the Territory of Hawaii (section 3604, Chapter 209 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii, 1925). Our English version here is the official translation into English of the Spanish version as adopted by the Philippine Legislature. In the Hawaiian law the expression used in the part of the statute here under consideration is "arising out of and in the course of such employment". These words, after passing through the Spanish version, and upon being turned back into English, appeared as "due to and in the pursuance of the employment". It follows that the expression found in the amendatory provision (section 1 of Act No. 3812) is merely a reversion to the English wording of the Hawaiian statute, which corresponds, we may add, to the wording commonly used in the American statutes. It is clear therefore that the amendment introduced by the last named Act was merely intended to bring the English version of our statute into verbal conformity with the Hawaiian and other American laws. No change whatever in the meaning of the provision was intended to be effected by said amendment. The attorneys for the appellee have called our attention to some American decisions, which, it is insisted, support the conclusion of the trial court that the homicide which resulted in the death of Valentin Nava was not an accident due to and in the pursuance of his employment, as this expression runs in section 2 of Act No. 3428. The cases most emphatically urged upon us in this connection by the appellee are State of Minnesota ex rel. School Dist. No. 1, in Itasca County vs. District Court (140 Minn., 470; 15 A. L. R., 579), and Schmoll vs. Weisbrod & Hess Brewing Co. (89 N. J. L., 150; 97 Atl., 732). In the first of these cases the facts were as follows: The school district employed a young woman to teach in the Round Lake school, some 35 miles from Deer River in Itasca County and 25 miles from Black Duck in Beltrami County, these two places being the nearest railway points. The country was densely wooded and sparsely settled. The school was a one-room school and fifteen pupils attended. The nearest house was a half mile away, and the boarding house was a mile or a mile and a quarter. On the morning of September 20, 1916, an unknown man asked for food at the boarding place of the teacher. On the evening of that day, when her work at the school was finished, she started for her boarding house, taking a short cut through the woods. She had some papers which she intended to correct at home in the evening, and a book to study. As she was on her way, and when just off the school grounds, she was criminally assaulted by this for the gratification of his passions, and as part of the transaction he shot her, destroying the sight of her left eye. She filed a claim for compensation against the school district, under the Compensation Act, which required an employer to pay compensation "in every case of personal injury or death of his employee, caused by accident, arising out of and in the course of the employment". The District Court for Itasca County awarded the compensation prayed for, and the School District brought an action for certiorari in the Supreme Court of Minnesota, claiming that the injury suffered by the employee did not arise out of and in the course of the employment. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court, and held that the injury for which compensation had been awarded by the district court did not arise out of the employment. In the second case it appeared that the deceased was a route foreman in the employ of the respondent. His duties were to look after the various beer delivery routes and see that they were properly conducted, and on Saturdays he had a beer delivery where he delivered beer and collected 295

the moneys therefor. On the 19th day of December, 1914, on a Saturday night, at about 8 o'clock, the deceased made a delivery of beer at some dwelling house in Atlantic City leaving his wagon in the street, a little distance away, and while returning to his wagon he was assaulted and shot by some person unknown. The deceased mounted his wagon and returned to brewery and accounted to his employer for the moneys intrusted to and collected by him and then went to a hospital where he, ten days later, died from the effects of the gunshot wound. In the first of these cases it is quite evident that there was no causal relation between the service which the plaintiff as a teacher, had rendered and the assault which was committed upon her. In the second case the motive of the assault was evidently robbery, and there was no direct connection between the work done by the victim of the robbery and the assault. If it had appeared, in the first case, that the teacher had been attacked while in the act of properly disciplining one of her pupils, and because of that fact, it would, we think, have been held that the injury had been incurred in the course of her employment. The second case brings us perhaps into more debatable ground, but the casual relation between the performance of duty and the assault was not as manifest as in the case now before us. The following decisions, gleaned from American jurisprudence, shed further light upon the situation before us: In In re Wooley vs. Minneapolis Equipment Co. and Globe Indemnity Co. (157 Minn., 428; 196 N. W. 477), where a salesman was shot and killed in a street brawl brought on by himself and for his own purposes, even though he was engaged in his employee's business just before the fracas, and intended to resume it afterwards, the court held that the injury did not arise out of the employment. In Scholtzhauer vs. C. & L. Lunch Co. (233 N. Y., 12; 134 N. E., 701), it was held that the injury did not arise out of the employment, where a waitress in a restaurant was shot by a negro dish-washer because she had declined an invitation to out with him and had stated that she would not go out with a negro. In the case now in hand it seems clear to us that the plaintiff is entitled to the compensation demanded and no question has been made as to the amount thereof. The judgment appealed from will therefore be reversed, and the plaintiff will recover of the defendant the sum of P1,000.92, with interest from the date of the filing of the complaint and with costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-20950 December 20, 1923 AMADO WENCESLAO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. FAUSTINO CALIMON, defendant-appellant.

We find in the proceeding no sufficient ground for altering the judgment appealed from; wherefore the same is hereby affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.

G.R. No. 10765 December 22, 1916 Tiburcio Ind. Villacorte for appellant. J. Fernando Rodrigo for appellees. PACIENTE TAMAYO, father of the minor, Brualio Tamayo, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CARLOS GSELL, defendant-appellant. William A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan for appellant. Modesto Joaquin for appellee. TRENT, J.: This is an action for damages against the defendant Gsell for personal injuries suffered by Braulio Tamayo, minor son of the plaintiff. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in his capacity as guardian ad litem of Braulio Tamayo for the sum of P400, without costs, except P25 fees for the attorney of the Bureau of Labor, the defendant appealed and now urges that the trial court erred: 1. In permitting the attorney of the Bureau of Labor to conduct the case and awarding him P25 fees. 2. In finding that Garlos Gsell is the owner of the factory wherein Braulio was injured. 3. In finding that the accident occurred because Braulio Tamayo was assigned to work to which he was not accustomed and did not understand, without any previous warning as to the dangers thereof or instructions as to the manner of doing the work, in order to avoid being injured. 4. In finding that the negligence of the defendant or the persons for whom he is responsible was the cause of the accident. 5. In declining to sustain the defendant's defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risks. 6. In awarding damages against the defendant in the absence of a showing that the injuries in any way diminished Braulio Tamayo' earning capacity. Act No. 1868, approved June 18, 1908, creating the Bureau of Labor, provides in section 2 that the purpose of the Bureau shall be to see to the proper enforcement of all existing laws and those which shall be enacted hereafter with reference to labor and capital in the Philippine Islands and to promote the enactment of all other legislation which shall tend to establish the material, social, intellectual, and moral improvement of workers; to acquire, collect, compile, systematize, and submit from time to time reports to the Secretary of Commerce and Police, statistical data relating to the hours and wages of labor, the number of workers in each trade or occupation, etc., and to inspect all shops, factories, industrial and commercial establishments and "to take the proper legal steps to prevent the exposure of the health or lives of laborers and to aid and assist by all proper legal means laborers and workers in securing just compensation for their labor, and the indemnity prescribed by law for injuries resulting from accidents when engaged in the performance of their duties." Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1868 296

ROMUALDEZ, J.: This is a case of a legal redemption sanctioned by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, to the effect that the defendant should resell to the plaintiffs a four-fifth part of a parcel of land situated in the barrio of Baluarte, municipality of Bulacan, described in the complaint. Three principal questions are raised by the appellant in his brief, the first relating to the period of nine days for the redemption the second to the price of the repurchase, and the third to the capacity of the redeemers. As to the first point, even supposing the nine days fixed by article 1524 of the Civil Code to have expired, which is not the case, the provision applicable here is that contained in article 1067, as the matter concerns heirs and an inheritance not yet distributed, according to the stipulation of facts. But even considering article 1524 to be applicable, the fact is that the plaintiffs are minors and have no legal guardian. The period fixed in said article could not have run against them. Contra non valentem agere non currit prscriptio. This principle is recognized in our substantive law and is expressly enshrined by sections 42 and 45 of our Code of Civil Procedure. itc@a1f With regard to the price, the evidence and circumstances of the case sufficiently show that the defendant did not pay but P7,700 and a note for P5,000, the effectiveness of which depends upon the said defendant's taking possession of the land. The evidence does not establish that this action was brought on behalf of Anselmo Hilario. The admission of the affidavit Exhibit A does not constitute any error. Those who have signed it have testified in court against what they had stated in said document (section 343, Code of Civil Procedure). It is not obstacle to the upholding of the right of redemption that the redeemers have no money to make the redemption. The lack of finds may render such a right inefficacious, but does not affect its existence. The plaintiffs cannot exercise such right unless they reimburse the purchaser with the purchase price paid by him (article 1067, Civil Code). As to the offer to redeem made by Urbano Wenceslao on behalf of his children the herein plaintiffs, we think it is valid. He is the natural guardian of his children whom he represented in court and out of court. Such an offer was not an act of administration of property but of representation of his children in their rights.

were amended by Act No. 2258, but such amendments do not affect the issues involved in the instant case. Act No. 2385 amends subsection (d) of section 2 and section 3 of Act No. 1868 and adds several paragraphs to the end of section 4 of that Act and repeals Act No. 2258. Subsection ( d) of section 2, as thus amended, reads: To secure the settlement of difference between employer and laborer and between master and servant and to avert strikes and lockouts, acting as arbitrator between the parties interested, summoning them to appear before it, and advising and bringing about, after hearing their respective allegations and evidence, such arrangement as these may, in his judgment, show to be just and fair. The pertinent provision added to section 4 and provide that the Bureau of Labor shall also have an attorney who shall be paid a fixed salary per annum. Said attorney shall assist the Director or Assistant Director of Labor in all legal questions by them submitted to him, and shall bring suit gratuitously, in the proper courts, for laborers or servants when he shall deem this proper after the failure of the endeavors to bring about a friendly settlement made by the Director or Assistant Director of Labor in the performance of the duties imposed had the exercise of the powers conferred upon them by subsection (d). . . . Provided, however, That the attorney of the Bureau of Labor shall not bring suit under this Act unless the plaintiff shall have previously secured a certificate of indigency from the proper court. The sentences of the courts trying cases under this Act shall provide, in case of judgment in favor of the plaintiff, for the payment by the defendant of the sum of twenty-five pesos as costs of the attorney of the Bureau of Labor, which sum shall be collected in the same manner as other costs and turned into the Insular Treasury and credited to the general funds. It is argued that in conferring the power and duty upon the Director of the Bureau of Labor "to secure the settlement of difference between employer and laborer and between master and servant and to avert strikes and lockouts" the legislature never intended to bring negligence cases resulting in personal injuries under the jurisdiction of the Director. If the attorney of the Bureau of Labor is authorized to represent the plaintiff in actions such as the one under consideration he could, it is said, appear on behalf of a laborer charged by his employer with larceny of materials or on behalf of an employee under prosecution for assaulting his master. We think this result does not necessarily follow. The Director is given the power and it is made his duty to aid and assist by all legal means laborers and workers in securing the indemnity prescribed by law for injuries resulting from accidents. If this cannot be done by "a friendly settlement," then the attorney "shall bring suit gratuitously" for the employee if such employee is too por to employ private counsel. No additional right of action is given laborers and workers by this legislation. It was only the intention of the Legislature, as expressed in the acts, to provide the services of an attorney for pauper employees in certain cased and to tax a portion of the costs of such services against the defendant if the suit be successful. This, it is true, is advanced legislation when compared with similar Acts in the United States. In Missouri the Bureau of Labor is in most cases chiefly an instrument for gathering statistics. The arbitration of disputes between employers and employees is given to a board distinct form the Bureau of Labor (Ann. Sta., 1906). Minnesota (Statutes of 1894) provides for a Bureau of Labor to gather statistics and inspect factories, with the power to enforce the laws pertaining to the welfare of the workingmen, but gives it no power to prosecute civil actions for individuals. In Nebraska the Bureau of Labor is a statistic gatherer, a factory inspector, and protector of the laborer to the extent that the commissioner may file a complaint for a violation of the Act creating the Bureau and defining its powers, which the county attorney must prosecute. (Statutes of 297

Nebraska, 1911.) Other States have similar statues. Some State provide for public defenders in criminal cases. In this jurisdiction provisions are made for the defense of pauper criminals and section 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the Supreme Court and the Courts of First Instance to assign any lawyer to render professional aid to a p[arty in any pending action, free of charge, if such court, upon full investigation, shall find that the party is destitute and unable to employ a lawyer. The statute under consideration requires a certificate of indigency from the court before an attorney of the Bureau of Labor can institute the action. The only essential difference between the two systems is a small amount for the services of the attorney of the Bureau of Labor, which is taxed against defendants when the plaintiffs are successful, but it cannot be done except in cases where "a friendly settlement" has failed. Considering the scope and purposes of the Acts, in connection with the fact that the plaintiffs are paupers, we see no reason for holding that the provisions attacked are in violation of public policy or transcends the power of the Legislature. Therefore, the first assignment of error is without merit. The second assignment of error has no merit. The plaintiff testified positively that the defendant is the owner of the factory and when another witness was asked who the owner was, counsel for the defendant stated," We do not dispute the ownership." No other testimony was offered on this point and all proceeded thereafter upon the theory that there was no question about the fact that the defendant is the owner of the match factory, yet counsel, in their printed brief, say that "there is not one syllable of evidence in the testimony or anywhere else in the record as to the ownership of this factory." The other assignments of error raise both questions of fact and law. The trial court's findings of fact are these: The facts proven in the case are as follows: 1. That the boy Braulio Tamayo, whose age neither he nor his father, Paciente Tamayo, knows, nor does it appear of record, but which, in the opinion of the court, is about eleven or twelve years, was one of the workmen employed in the match factory, situated in Santa Ana, Manila, and owned by the defendant, Carlos Gsell. On the 13th of March, 1914, the boy met with an accident which consisted of an injury caused by the knife of one of the machines of the factory which cut the little ring fingers on the right hand, the latter of which was severed. 2. That the accident arose by reason of his being assigned by Eugenio Murcia, one of the foremen employed in the factory, to perform work to which he was not accustomed. He was put at the machine of Arcadio Reyes only the day of the accident, in spite of his persistent and manifest opposition to assist the machinist; his work was to recover strips, used in the manufacture of match boxes, from the machine, Exhibit 1, which were extracted from the said machine from the wood placed therein. At the same time he had to clean out the pieces of wood form said strips, which stuck in the machine and obstructed its proper working. Prior to the date in question the only work entrusted to the boy, Braulio Tamayo, was to pick over the piles of wood from which the strips used in the manufacture of match boxes were made and select the best pieces for the purpose. 3. Due to his inexperience in the work to which, for the first item and without any preparation or instruction, he had been assigned in essaying to clean that part of the machine where the pieces of wood from the strips were stuck, he was caught by the knife of the machine and the right finger of his right hand was served. He was thereupon taken to the General Hospital, where he received medical treatment until he was released.

4. The plaintiff complied with the provision contained in section 4 of Act No. 1874, advising the employer, who is the defendant herein, of the accident which had occurred to his son. In view of the facts as they were shown in the record, in spite of the conflicting testimony of the witnesses of both sides, the court is obliged to give credit to the testimony of the witnesses for the plaintiff, and since it was not contradicted by Eugenio Murcia, to whom is attributed the determination to assign Braulio Tamayo, on the date and hour in question, to another machine and to give him, inspite of his tender years, work of a class to which he was not accustomed, the responsibility contracted by the employer to indemnify the injured workman, represented by his father, for the damage and injury which he has suffered, according to the Act cited, is very clear. Eugenio Murcia was one of the foremen employed in the factory; he knew the kind of work which was assigned to each of the employees in relation to their respective ages and he must have known that it is not the same thing to select wood lying on the ground, work in which Braulio Tamayo had been employed ever since he entered the employ of the factory, as to receive the strips delivered from the machine, Exhibit 1, and to clean the said machine, even while it was running, of those parts of the strips which might interfere with its working, and he should not have suddenly ordered Braulio Tamayo, taking into account his youth, to temporarily take the place of a workman who ordinarily performed the work we have spoken of on Arcadio Reyes' machine, especially without first preparing him and giving him the necessary instruction in order to avoid an accident such as that which occurred and one to which a boy of the age of Braulio Tamayo would be exposed. After a careful examination of the record we are convinced that the foregoing findings of fact are supported by a fair preponderance of the evidence. This being true and the findings being the result found by the trial court from conflicting testimony, we certainly are not justified in reversing the judgment upon this branch of the case. In United States vs. Benitez and Lipia (18 Phil. Rep., 513, 517), Justice Moreland, speaking for the court said: In a conflict of testimony such as is presented in this case, this court must reopened to a considerable extent upon the discernment of the judge who sits at the trial. A careful and discriminating trial judge has unequaled advantages in determining the relative credibility of opposing witnesses. If he exercises his facilities with shrewdness and sagacity, he performs a most valuable work for the appellate court. We have considered this case in a very painstaking manner. We have searched the record for any evidence indicating that the learned trial court was mistaken in his judgment as to the relative credibility of the witnesses or that he had overlooked some fact or circumstances of weight or influence in passing upon the evidence, or that he had misinterpreted the significance of the facts as proved. We have been unable to find from the record that the learned trial court has fallen into such error; and, in accordance with the rule which we have so often laid down, namely, that this court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing upon the relative credibility of opposing witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or its significance misinterpreted by him, we decline to interfere with the judgment of the trial court upon the facts in this case. The foregoing well considered rule is perfectly applicable to the case under consideration.lawphi1.net Dr. Vasquez of the General Hospital, who attended Braulio Tamayo at the time he was injured, testified in reference to the nature and character of the injuries as follows: 298

Q. Do you know in what condition the child's finger was? A. The finger was mashed. Q. Are you sure that it was mashed? A. Mashed and severed. During the trial of the case counsel for the defendant made this statement: I wish to appear of record that the right hand of the child shows that the severed finger was cut at the first joint. It also bears a diagonal scar inside (interior?) and near the tip of the next finger, the little finger. With reference to whether there was a dimunition in the earning capacity of Braulio Tamayo due to the injuries received and as to the payment of expenses and salary while he was being treated for the injuries, Geiser, superintendent of the defendant's factory, testified that the defendant paid the hospital bill and Braulio's regular salary of fifty cents a day during the time he was absent; that after Braulio left the hospital he (the witness) tried to get him to return to work at the same salary, but he refused to do so; and that Braulio could occupy any place in the factory which his age would permit, as his hand had been cured. While this witness did not definitely state that Braulio's injuries did not diminish his earning capacity for the work he was doing in the factory, yet it may be inferred, and we so decide, that the boy can perform his former works in the factory just as well as now as he could before the accident, or in other words, the injuries caused no dimunition of his ability to perform such work. As to the character of the injuries, we have the finding of the trial court to the effect that the little and ring fingers on the right hand were cut, the latter of which was severed, and the statement of counsel that the ring finger was cut off at the first joint and the little finger showed a diagonal scar on the inside of the end. The result is that we have a case where a foreman of a match factory, owned and operated by the defendant, put a young ignorant employee to work at dangerous machinery without any previous preparation or instruction. The boy was only 11 or 12 years old and so ignorant that he did not know before the accident, which resulted in the severing of his ring finger on his right hand at the first joint, doing only the very simplest work, in the performance of which he had nothing to do with the machinery. He was ordered against his persistent and manifest opposition to assist in cleaning out the pieces of wood "which stuck in the machinery and obstructed its proper working," without any previous warning of the dangers incident to such work or previous instruction as to how he should do the work in order to avoid accidents. He was entirely unfamiliar with that kind of work, which required at least some knowledge of the working of the machine. The machine was not defective and the danger resulting from putting one's finger under the knife was obvious. To this extent the established facts are against the contentions of the defendant. The questions of law require an investigation touching the scope and purposes of Act No. 1874, known as the Employer's Liability Act. We will first inquire into the origin and history of this Act. By a joint resolution of the two Houses, dated February 1, 1908, there were appointed on April 30, 1908, a committee of twenty-one for the purpose of "preparing and submitting to the president of the Commission and the Speaker of the Assembly its recommendations on the Labor Accident Bill presented by the Representative for the Second District of Manila, Honorable Fernando Ma. Guerrero, and to study, prepare, and submit also any other recommendations deemed pertinent in the premises." (Vol. 2, p. 289 of the Commission Journal of 1908.) Before this committee met for the purpose, as indicated two other bills were drafted, one by another member of the Assembly and the other by the Secretary of Commerce and Police, who was then a member of the Legislature. During the sessions of the committee the three bills were discussed and

by a majority vote a fourth bill was prepared and its passage recommended. The Assembly then passed a bill substantially the same as that recommended by the committee. The committee of the Commission, to whom the Assembly bill was referred, recommended in its report of June 13, 1908, various amendments. These amendments were adopted by the Commission and the bill, as thus amended, was passed by that body. The bill in its amended form was returned to the Assembly and passed by it, and became law (Act No. 1874) on June 19, 1908. The chairman of the joint committee, in his report to the President of the Commission and the speaker of the Assembly, in referring to the bill prepared by the Secretary of Commerce and Police, said: One of these (bills) was prepared in the Department of Commerce and Police for submission to the committee, which was drawn substantially along the lines which have prevailed in the State of Massachusetts some years and upon which interpretations have been made by the Masachusetts courts defining the exact meaning of the provisions of the law. (Vol. 2, p. 298, Commission Journal of 1908.) A comparison of Act No. 1874 with that of the State of Massachusetts of 1902 shows that the former is essentially a copy of the latter. The first section of each is exactly the same and, in so far as the question under consideration are concerned, there are no differences in the other sections of the two acts. It appears from the official proceedings of the joint committee that the Guerrero bill, which was rejected by the committee and the Legislature, was based on the Spanish law. This is shown from the following extract from these proceedings: The clause contained in the Guerrero bill was based on a similar clause found in the Spanish law, which was put in the same order to make provision for the damage and detriment caused by work in the mercury mines, and as the Guerrero bill was based on the Spanish law this clause was put in. . . . For this reason I move that the amendment proposed by Mr. Javier be rejected but the section as it is drawn up be adopted. Act No. 1874 does not attempt to define generally the rights of master and servants, and is not a codification of the law. Reference must be made to some other law to define who are masters, who are servants, what is the scope of the employment, and whether the injury was the approximate result of the negligence; and negligence itself must be determined by that other law and not by the Act. The Act does not impose any obligation on the master to employ competent servants nor to instruct or warn his servants about their work or the dangers of it. These obligations, if they exist, must be found elsewhere. Neither does the Act define the word "damages" by setting forth the element thereof, nor does it fix any general rules for determining the measure of damages in personal injury case brought under it. It does provide, however, that in those case where damages are awarded for the death of an employee the same shall be assessed with reference to the degree of culpability of the employer or of the person for whose negligence the employer is liable. The Act also fixes the minimum and maximum amounts which may be awarded if deaths results from the injuries, and the maximum amount of damages for personal injuries not resulting in the death of the employee. In determining the important question here involved for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the Legislature, must we look to the Civil Code and the decision of this court in construing its provisions for our guidance or was the statute adopted with the construction given to it by the court in the country from which it was copied? The Massachusetts statute was "copied verbatim, with some variations of detail, from the English statute (43 and 44 Vict. ch. 42). Therefore, it is proper, if not necessary, to begin by considering how the English act had been constructed before our statute was enacted." (Ryalls vs. Mechanics' Mills, 150 Mass., 190; 5 L. R. A., 667.) 299

The Employers' Liability Act of Alabama, first enacted in 1855 (Civil Code 1907, Ch. 80, sec. 3910), is a substantial, if not an exact copy, of the English Act of 1880. This court is not finally concluded by the decision of any other State court or the British court, in their construction of a similar statute, but the opinion of learned courts upon similar questions are entitled to great weight, and this is specially true when the statute, from which ours was copied had been construed prior to its enactment by our legislature. (Brimingham Ry & Electric Co. vs. Allen, 99 Ala., 359, 371; 20 L. R. A., 457.) The Employers' Liability Act of Colorado (Laws 1893, chap. 77; Mill's Annotated Statutes, Supp. 1891-1896, sec. 1511a) was copied from the Massachusetts Act of 1887 and the Colorado Legislature "presumably adopted the Act with the construction that had been given it by the courts of that state." (Colorado Milling & Elevator Co. vs.Mitchell [1899], 26 Colo., 284.) Generally speaking, when a statute has been adopted from another State or country and such statute has previously been construed by the courts of such State or country, the statute is deemed to have been adopted with the construction so given it. (Cerezo vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., 33 Phil. Rep., 425, citing 2 Lewis Sutherland on Stat. Const., sec. 783.) The law being so clearly traced to its source and the intention of the Legislature being so apparent, it is necessary to ascertain and be guided by the decisions of the courts in the United States construing essentially the same law. Further reference will be made to the same question in considering the sixth assignment of error. Dresser on Employers' Liability (vol. 1, sec. 2), says: It is apparent that the act has not attempted to define generally the rights and duties of master and servants, and is not a codification of the law. . . . Constant reference must be made to the common law to define who are master and who servants, what is the scope of the employment, and whether the injury was the proximate result of the negligence; and negligence itself is determined by the common law, and not by the act. The act, moreover, is silent concerning certain terms of the contract of service. It does not impose any obligations on the master to employ competent servants, nor to instruct or warn his servants about their work or the dangers of it. These obligations were too well settled and important to be taken away by implication merely, and the courts have held that the act was remedial, and a concurrent, instead of an exclusive remedy. (Citing cases from Massachusetts, Alabama, Colorado, and England.) The courts in the United States, in order to ascertain what changes have been made by the Employers' Liability Acts in the "fellow servant rule," held that at common law the master impliedly agreed to provide competent workmen, and in so doing he was bound to exercise that measure of care which reasonably prudent men do so under similar circumstances, that the master is not an insurer, and that it was only necessary that the danger in the work be not enhanced through his fault. The servant on his part, by entering the employment, was held to impliedly agree to take upon himself the perils arising from the carelessness and recklessness of those were in the same employment, without regard to their grade, rank or authority in the service, provided that the act causing the injury was not in the performance of any personal duty of the master intrusted to the negligent servant. The whole doctrine in brief was a denial as to the employee of the principle of respondent superior. Under the latter, a stranger invited upon the master's premises could recover for the injuries received through the negligence of the employees. It was this right which was denied to the employees. The

effect of section 1 of the Employers' Liability Act, the same courts held, is to exempt from the class of fellow servants, the result of whose negligence the servant was held to have assumed, such persons as are intrusted by the master with duties of superintendence while in the exercise of them. The persons must be superintendents within the meaning of the Act and the negligent acts must have been done in the exercise of the controlling functions of superintendent. Applying these principles to the instant case, there can be no doubt that Eugenio Murcia, one of the foremen employed in the defendant's factory, was exercising the controlling functions of superintendent when he ordered Braulio Tamayo to assist in keeping the machine clean. Consequently, if such act constitutes negligence, the defendant is liable in damages for the injures caused thereby, if it were, under the circumstances, the duty of the defendant or the foreman to warn Braulio Tamayo as to the dangers incident to such work and instruct him how the work should be done in order to avoid accidents. As to whether it was the duty of the defendant or the superintendent to thus warn and instruct Braulio Tamayo, it is urged that no such duty was imposed on either of them because, as the danger of putting one's fingers under the knife was obvious, Braulio assumed all the risks of the work which he was ordered to do. It is further urged that the defendant is not liable because Braulio Tamayo was not in the exercise of due care at the time he received the injuries. In other words, the defendant here interposes the common law defense of assumption of risks and contributory negligence. Some confusion has arisen with reference to these two defenses. The Supreme Court of the United States explained the distinction between the two in the following language in the recent case of Seaboard Air Line Railway vs. Horton (233 U. S., 492, 503): The distinction, although simple, is sometimes overlooked. Contributory negligence involves the notion of some fault or breach of duty on the part of the employees, and since it is ordinarily his duty to take some precaution for his own safety when engaged in a hazardous occupation, contributory negligence is sometimes defined as a failure to use such care for his safety as ordinarily prudent employees in similar circumstances would use. On the other hand, the assumption of risk, even though the risk be obvious, may be free from any suggestion of fault or negligence on the part of the employees. The risks may be present, notwithstanding the exercise of all reasonable care on is part. Some employments danger that must be and is confronted in the line of his duty. such danger as are normally and necessarily incident to the occupation are presumably taken into account in fixing the rate of wages. And a workman of mature years is taken to assume risks of this sort, whether he is actually aware of them or not. But risks of another sort, not naturally incident to the occupation, may arise put of the failure to providing a safe place of work and a suitable and safe appliances for the work. These the employee is not treated as assuming until he becomes aware of the defect and risk alike are so obvious that an ordinarily prudent person under the circumstance would have observed and appreciated them. These distinctions have been recognized and applied in numerous decisions of this court. (Choctaw, Oklahoma & Gulf R. Co. vs. McDade, 191 U. S., 64, 68; Schlemmer vs. Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburg Ry. Co., 220 U. S., 590, 596; Tex & Pac. Ry. Co. vs. Harvey, 228 U. S., 319, 321; Gila Valley Ry. Co. vs. Hall, 232 U. S., 94, 102, and cases cited.) In Southern Ry. Co. vs. Crockett (234 U. S., 725), the Supreme Court of the United States, in passing upon the question as to what effect the Federal Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908, has had upon the common law defense of assumption of risks, said: Upon the merits we of course sustain the contention that by the employers' Liability Act the defense of assumption of risk remains as at common law, saving in the cases mentioned in section 4, that is to say: "Any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee." 300

In England it was said in the case of Thomas vs. Quartermaine (18 Q. B. D., 685) that the act had not variated the effect of the maxim volenti non fit injuria, so far as it involves the ordinary risks inherent in the particular employment. To the same effect is O'Malley vs. South Boston Gas Light Co. (158 Mass., 135); Birmingham Ry. & Electric Co. vs. Allen (99 Ala., 359); Whitcomb vs. Standard Oil Co. (153 Ins., 513.) There has been, however, a noticeable difference in the application of the doctrine in favor of the workman since the enactment of the Employers' Liability Act, but this change does not affect the issues involved in the instant case. So it is quite clear that the Legislature in enacting Act No. 1874 intended to establish in this jurisdiction, if it did not already exist, the defense of assumption of risks; that is, the servant assumes such dangers as are normally and necessarily incident to the occupation. At common law the defense of contributory negligence is always available in actions for compensation for negligence and if proved, defeats the action. The Act has not deprived the employer of this defense. (Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 20, p. 138.) In Massachusetts it was said that assuming the negligence of the superintendent, the servant could not recover if he were guilty of contributory negligence. (Regan vs. Lombard, 192 Mass., 319.) This doctrine, however, has been more recently partially abrogated by statutes. Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat. 65; U. S. Comp. Stat., Supp., 1911, p. 1322), the defense of contributory negligence "is abrogated in all instances where the employer's violation of a statute enacted for the safety of his employees contributes to the injury." And in several states the doctrine of comparative negligence, as to some industries, has been established by statute. (Cerezo vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., supra, and cases cited.) But such is not the case in this jurisdiction in so far as the application of Act No. 1874 is concerned. That the defense of contributory negligence, as it is understood in the United States, is recognized in the Act (Act No. 1874) with all its force and effect, is clear because the first section requires as an essential requisite that the employee be "in the exercise of due care" at the time of the injury in order to hold the employer liable for damages. (Cerezo vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., supra.) The Civil Code does not recognized such a complete defense. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359, 366; Eades vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., 19 Phil. Rep., 561.) While the defenses of assumption of risks and contributory negligence are available to masters in actions for personal injuries brought under Act No. 1874, these defenses have their limitations when interposed in actions for personal injuries of minor or infant employees. These limitations rest upon the well-established principle that it is the duty of masters or their superintendents to warn such employees as to the dangers of the work and instruct them as to the manner of doing the work in order to avoid accidents. The master is bound to warn and instruct his servant as to all dangers which he knows, or in the exercise of reasonable care ought to know, and which he has reason to believe the servant does not know and would not by the exercise of reasonable care discover. The duty continues during the employment, and cannot be delegated by the master. (Dresser on Employers' Liability, sec. 99.) In cases where the servant assumes the risks, there is no duty on the part of the master to warn or instruct him in regard to the work. The obligation of warning "is imposed mainly for the sake of the young who have not the experience or power to look out for themselves, which are to be expected in

adults, o, in the case of adults, where there are concealed defects." (Robinska vs. Lyman Mills, 174 Mass., 432, 433; O'Neal vs. Chicago & I. C. Ry. Co., 132 Ind., 110.) And "it is clear that, in respect to all matters wherein a young and inexperienced employee is competent to understand and avoid the dangers, such employee stands upon the same footing with an experienced adult." (Levey vs. Bigelow, 6 Ind. App., 677.) The distinction between the adult and the child becomes important when it is necessary to presume knowledge from the character of the danger, and determine whether it was obvious to a person of the plaintiff's apparent capacity. (Dresser on Employers' Liability, sec. 99.) The dangers of a particular position or mode of doing work are often apparent to a person of capacity of knowledge of the subject, while other, from youth, inexperience, or want of capacity, may fail to appreciates them; and a servant, even with his own consent, is not to be exposed to such dangers, unless with instructions and cautions sufficient to enable him to comprehend them and to do his work safely, with proper care on his part. This is particularly so when the master employs for a hazardous work, a child, young person, or other person without experience, and of immature judgment. In such a case, the master is bound to point out the dangers of which he has, or ought to have, knowledge, and give to the employee such instructions as will enable him to avoid injury by the exercise of reasonable care, unless both the danger and the means of avoiding it are apparent, and within the comprehension of the servant. But a master is not culpable simply because he hires a minor servant for the performance of dangerous duties. Shearman and Redfield on Negligence (vol. 1, sec. 218) state the rule as follows: Where a servant is set at dangerous work, the mere fact of his minority does not render the master liable for the risk, if the servant has sufficient capacity to take care of himself, and knows and can properly appreciate the risk. The following statement of the law relating to the employment of young children occurs in 4 Thompson on Negligence, sec. 3826, and is quoted with approval in Fitzgerald vs. Furniture Co. (131 N. C. 636): The law, says Thompson on Neg., 978 "puts upon a master, when he takes an infant into his service, the duty of explaining to him fully the hazards and dangers connected with the business, and of instructing him how to avoid them. Nor is this all; the master will not have discharged his duty in the regard unless the instructions and precautions given are so graduated to the youth, ignorance and inexperience of the servant as to make him fully aware of the danger to him, and to place him, with reference to it, in substantially the same state as if he were an adult." In Taylor vs. Wootan (50 Am. St. Rep., 200) it was held that: It is an actionable wrong for a person to place or employ a child of such immature judgment as to be unable to comprehend the danger to work with or about a machine of a dangerous character likely to produce injury, . . . With reference to the nature and character of the risks assumed by infant employees, the court, in Saller vs.Friedman Brothers Shoe Co. (130 Mo. App., 712) said: 301

Generally, an employee assumes such risks as are open and obvious or which he would have observed he had used ordinary caution; but children are not expected to observe closely the construction of machines at which they are put to work or to appreciate the ordinary risks incident to their operation, and for this reason are not held to assume the ordinary risks of their operation, or such risks as they do not perceive and apprehend, and of which they are not informed and warned against. (Vansler vs. Boc Co., 108 Mo. App., l. c. 628-9, 84 S. W., 201, and cases cited.) The law with reference to contributory negligence on the part of infant employees is fairly well settled in the United States. In Wynne vs. Conklin (86 Ga., 40) the court held that whether the plaintiff [a boy of 13 years of age] knew of the hazard or peril; whether he was of sufficient age and capacity to appreciate the same and to provide against danger, are questions of fact which ". . . must be left to the consideration of a jury." In Bare vs. Crane Creek Coal Co. (61 W. Va., 28) the court said: It is actionable negligence for an employer to engage and place at a dangerous employment a minor who, although instructed, lacks sufficient age and capacity to comprehend and avoid the dangers of the employment if the employer has, or should have, notice of the minor's age and lack of capacity. (Thomp. on Neg. sec. 4689; 20 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, supra; Golf vs. Norfolk & W. R. Co. supra; 1 Shear. & Redf. Neg., supra.) In Saller vs. Friedman Brothers Shoe Co., supra, the court said: Plaintiff, on cross-examination, testified he knew if his fingers were caught between the upper and lower halves of the molder when they came together, they would be crushed. Of course he knew this; the simplest child would know as much if it observed the operation of the machine, but it might not, and probably would not make the observation. Plaintiff's evidence tends to prove that though he knew his fingers would be mashed if caught between the two halves of the molder when they came together, yet he swore he never thought of getting hurt. His evidence shows that the idea that he might be hurt never entered his mind until he was hurt; while his evidence shows he knew he might be hurt in the manner he was hurt, yet he never thought of or appreciated the danger of getting hurt in that manner. It is because of this very thoughtlessness and on account of the inexperience of minors that the law does not hold them to the exercise of the same degree of care as it requires of adults. In the Brand Case (64 Fla., 184) cited in the recent case of Coons vs. Pritchard (L. R. A., 1915 F, 558) the court held: As a matter of fact an employees who is an inexperienced youth may not be free from fault when he is injured, yet in law his youth and inexperience may excuse his fault, and when the employer has placed him at work the dangers and risks of which the youth does not appreciate, and the youth is injured because of the dangers of the work, the employer is liable. The court in Coons vs. Prichard, supra, lays down this rule:

In employing a minor, the duty devolves upon the employer to fully instruct such employee, and in such cases the master is bound to consider the age, mentality, and lack of capacity and experience of his infant employee, and make such instructions so full and explicit as to bring the dangers incident to the employment to the complete comprehension of the minor. The theory seems to be that a minor presumably ignorant of the use of machinery or dangers incident to his occupation, or to risks incident to the use of defective machinery, would, without such instructions, be exposed to those dangers which he could have avoided had his master fully discharged this duty. The infant employee's capacity is the criterion of his responsibility. As he grows older, he becomes more and more amenable to the rules of law in respect to assumption of risk and contributory negligence applicable to adults, and whether such infant employee has assumed the risks or been negligent are questions to be answered by the jury in the United States and by the courts in this jurisdiction. There is another point ion the case at bar which should be taken into consideration and which bears upon the defendant's defenses of assumption of risks and contributory negligence, and that is, the injuries did not occur while Braulio Tamayo was engaged in the particular work and class of work for which he was employed. On the contrary, he was at the time engaged in a work outside the ordinary contract of employment and wholly disconnected with it. "To pick from piles of wood from which the strips used in the manufacture of match boxes were made and select the best pieces" is a very different thing from assisting in keeping the machine clean in order that it would not be obstructed in its proper working. While the record is silent as to who made the contract of employment, yet, taking into consideration the age of the boy and the interest which the father was taking in his welfare, we may at least presume that the father consented to the boy's entering the factory and doing the ordinary work which he had been engaged in before he was ordered to work at the machine, and the father, in so doing, had the right to presume that neither the defendant nor those who represented him would expose his son to such perils. If the order had been given to a person of mature years, who was not engaged to do such work, although enjoined to obey the directions of the foremen, it might, with some possibility, be argued that he should have disobeyed it, as he must have known that its execution was attendant with danger, or, if he chose to obey that order, he took upon himself the risks incident to such work. Bur Braulio Tamayo occupied a very different position. He was a mere child without, as we have said, any experience in that kind of work, and not familiar with the machinery. In Union Pacific Railroad Co. vs. Fort (84 U. S., 553), Fort brought suit to recover damages for injury to his son, age 16 years, resulting in the loss of an arm while in the employment of the railroad company. The boy was employed in the machine shop as a workman or a helper under the superintendence and control of one Collett and had been chiefly engaged in receiving and putting away mouldings as they came from a molding machine. After the service had been continued for a few months, the boy, by order of Collett, ascended a ladder, resting on a shaft, for the purpose of adjusting a belt by which a portion of the machinery was propelled and which had gotten out of place. While engaged in an endeavor to execute the order, his arm was caught in the rapidly revolving machinery and torn from his body. The injury found that he had been engaged to serve under Collett as a workman or helper and was required to obey his orders; that the order by Collett to the boy (in carrying out which he lost his arm) was not within the scope of his duty and employment, but was within that of Collett's; that the order was not a reasonable one; that its execution was attended with hazard to life and limb; and that a prudent man would not have ordered the boy to execute it. A verdict and judgement in favor of Fort was sustained. Applying the foregoing principles, which are founded upon reason and justice, to the case under consideration, we conclude that the trial court did not err in rejecting the defenses of assumption of risks and contributory negligence interpose by the defendant. 302

We now come to the consideration of damages. As above stated, the record fails to disclose to what extent, if any, the earning capacity of Braulio Tamayo has been diminished by reason of the injuries. He could not, therefore, recover any amount if this action had been brought under the Civil Code, as the services for medical attendance and salary during the confinement have been paid by the defendant. (Marcelo vs. Velasco, 11 Phil. Rep., 287; Algarra vs. Sandejas, 27 Phil. Rep., 284). But this court has never held that slight lameness or permanent injuries and pain and suffering are not elements of damages, but simply that damages cannot be allowed for the former, unless the extent of the diminution of the earning power or capacity is how, and that the Civil Code does not include damages for the latter. The English rule as to the measure of damages which may be awarded for personal injuries is stated in Halsbury's Laws of England (vol. 10, p. 323), as follows: In actions for personal injuries, whether such actions are founded on breach of contract to carry safely, or upon negligence, the jury are to award damages not only for the actual pecuniary loss occasioned by the injury, but also for the pain and suffering of the plaintiff and the diminution of his capacity for the enjoyment of life, as well as in respect of the probable inability of the plaintiff to earn an income equal to that which he has earned in the past; and the probability that but for the injury the plaintiff might have earned an increasing income is to be taken into account. Shearman and Redfield on the Law of Negligence (vol. 3, p. 1994 [6th ed.]) in discussing the measure of damages for personal injuries, say: In an action for negligent injury to the person of the plaintiff, he may recover the expense of his cure, the value of the time lost by him during his disabilities, and a fair compensation for the bodily and mental suffering caused by the injury, as well as for any permanent reduction of his power to earn money, provided, of course, that such damage is a proximate result of the injury. As already stated, allowance should be made for all such damages, future as well as past, if reasonably certain to occur. (Citing numerous authorities, including various decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.) As these rules, if not exclusively, upon the Anglo-American common law, it becomes necessary to inquire just what changes, if any, have been brought about by the enactment of the Employers' Liability Acts. Dresser on Employers' Liability, section 18, says: Subject to the limitation upon the amount, damages are to be measured in accordance with the common-law rules. Reno's Employers' Liability Acts (2nd ed.), section 186, says: The Massachusetts statute limits the amount of damages recoverable by an employee when his injury does not result in death to a sum not exceeding four thousand dollars. It does not prescribe any criterion for estimating the amount, but leaves the question to be settled upon general principles of law. And further on (sec. 198) the same author states:

In Alabama it has been decided, in an action under its Employers' Liability Act, that such (Exemplary or punitive) damages are not receivable where the injury results in death. The statute does not limit the amount of damages recoverable, and the measure of damages is determined upon common-law principles. Labatt's Master and Servant ([2d ed.], vol. 5, sec. 1730) lays down this rule: The provisions specifying the amount recoverable by an injured servant do not give a measure of damages, but merely fix a limit beyond which the jury cannot award compensation. Within that limit the measure of damages is left to be determined upon the ordinary principles which regulate the assessment of the indemnity in actions for personal injuries. Section 1 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act (Act of Congress of April 22, 1908) provides "That every common carrier by railroad, while engaging in commerce between any of the several States or Territories, . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, . . . ." The Supreme Court of the United States in Michigan Central R. R. Co. vs. Vreeland (227 U. S., 59, 65), in referring to the measure of damages recoverable under the Act, said: It (the Act) plainly declares the liability of the carrier to its injured servant. If he had survived he might have recovered such damages as would have compensated him for his expense, loss of time, suffering, and diminished earning power. And in St. Louis & Irom Mtn. Ry. vs. Craft (237 U. S., 648) the Supreme Court of the United States sustained a judgment, in an action brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, of the State court in favor of the father of the deceased employee for $6,000, being $1,000 for the pecuniary loss to the father and $5,000 for the pain and suffering of the deceased. What is the scope of the word damages as used in Act No. 1874? Did the Legislature intend that the measure of damages should be the same as that in the United States, from the country the Act was copied, or did it intend that the recovery should be limited to those elements of damages provide for by the Civil Code in personal injury cases? In determining these questions it must be borne in mind that the intent of the Legislature is the law; that the legislative meaning is to be extracted from the statute as a whole. Its clauses are not to be segregated, but every part of a statute is to be construed with reference to every other part and every word and phrase in connection with its context, and that construction sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute its every word; that the history of the statute from the time it was introduced until it was finally passed may afford aid to its construction; that where one legislature adopts, without change of phraseology, or with only a merely immaterial change a legislative act of another jurisdiction, if antecedent to its adoption, the statute has received a settled construction in the jurisdiction from which adopted, the Legislature is presumed to have adopted the construction along with the statute; and that a remedial statute is to be liberally construed to accomplish the purpose of its enactment. (Vol. 11, Encyclopedia of United States Supreme Court Reports under "Construction," and cases cited.) In Cerezo vs. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co. (supra), the court said:

We do not doubt that it was, prior to the passage of Act No. 1874 and still is, the duty of the employer in this jurisdiction to perform those duties, in reference to providing reasonably safe places, and safe and suitable ways, works, and machinery, etc., in and about which his employees are required to work, which, under the common law of England and America, are termed personal duties, and which in the United States are held to be such that the employer cannot delegate his responsibility and liability to his subordinates. (Rakes vs.Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359.) The employer or master also impliedly agrees to furnish competent workmen (article 1903 of the Civil Code; Chaves and Garcia vs. Manila Electric R. R. & Light Co., 31 Phil. Rep., 47). Therefore, the master, under the Civil Code, can defend against an action by his servant by proving his own freedom from negligence; that the negligence of the servant was the immediate cause of the injury or that the accident happened through one of the ordinary risks of employment. On the other hand the servant can recover a portion of the damages resulting from the injuries, although he may be guilty of contributory negligence. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pac. Co., supra.) And the Civil Code does not fit the maximum amount of the recovery. Act No. 1874 should be liberally construed in favor of employees. The main purpose of the Act, as its title indicates, was to extend the liability of employers and to render them liable in damages for certain classes of personal injuries for which they are not liable under the Civil Code. And one of these classes of cases is that where injuries are cause to employees through the negligence of the master's "superintendent," although the master may have used due care in the selection of his superintendent. To this extent the master's liability or responsibility has, in fact, been extended. But the defense of contributory negligence, as it is understood in the United States, is recognized in the Act with all its force and effect, as the first section requires as an essential requisite to recovery that the employee be "in the exercise of due care" at the time of the injury. The Act does not recognize the rule of comparative negligence. It fixes the maximum amount which the injured servant may recover. As to these matters, the Act restricts the master's liability. And if the measure of damages is limited to conform with the Civil Code, the master's liability would be further restricted. If reference must be made to the Anglo-American common law to define the rights and duties of master and servants, as above indicated, what reasons exist for saying that the Legislature intended that the courts must look to the Civil code for the meaning and scope of the word "damages," a word, according to the origin and history of the Act, of purely English origin, different in its scope from the Spanish word "dao"? It is said that the Act is an Employers' Liability Act and not a law of damages. This contention is without foundation in law because "to extend and regulate the responsibility of employers' means to enlarge their pecuniary liability, otherwise the phrase would be meaningless. One's responsibility is his liability or obligation. The Act is remedial. By remedial is not meant that it pertains to a remedy in the sense of procedure such as the character and form of the action, the admissibility of evidence, etc. The Act defines certain rights which it will aid, and specifies the way in which it will aid them. So far as it defines, thereby creating, it is "substantive law." So far as it provides a method of aiding and protecting, it is "adjective law," or procedure. The right to damages is the essence of the cause of action. It is a substantive right granted by the Act. Take this away and the injured employee has nothing of value left. No one in this country has a vested interest in any rule of the Civil Code and the great office of the Act is to remedy defects in the Civil Code rules as they are developed. The Congress of the United States, in conferring upon the personal representative of a deceased person, whose death was the result of a wrongful act, neglect or fault of any person or corporation in the District of Columbia, a right of action for damages, provided "that in no case shall the recovery under this Act, exceed the sum of $10,000." (31 Stat. at Large, 1394, chap. 854.) The Federal Employers' liability Act, referred to above, does not limit the amount of damages which may be recovered in actions brought thereunder. In Hyde vs. Southern Railway Co. (31 App. D. C., 466) the 303

court held that the recovery under the last named Act was not limited to $10,000 as provided in the former Act. To the same effect is the case of Devine vs. C. R. I. & R. R. Co. (266 Ill., 248). The inevitable conclusion is, therefore, that the Legislature intended that the measure of damages in personal injury cases brought under Act No. 1874 shall be the same as that in the country from which the Act was taken. The result is that Braulio Tamayo is entitled to recover, through his guardian ad litem, damages for pain and suffering and permanent injury, such damages being as they are the approximate result of the injuries. Bodily disfigurement is included in his permanent injury. It needs no proof to show that the severing of the ring finger at the first joint caused pain and suffering and a permanent injury and bodily disfigurement, although slight. The fact that damages for such injuries cannot be ascertained with mathematical exactness does not and should not defeat recovery for a reasonable amount. In Gagnon vs. Klauder-Weldon Dyeing Mach. Co. (174 Fed. Rep., 477), the plaintiff was awarded $4,000. This was reduced to $3,000, the court saying: As to the damages, there was no evidence that Gagnon has received less wages since his injury than he did before. He was out nothing. His wages were continued while laid up, and then he was given employment by defendant and later by others at no less wages than he had been receiving. But he suffered pain and permanent disfigurement of one hand. He lost two fingers and that part of the hand immediately below or behind them. His power to lift and handle things is interfered with and lessened. In some stations or businesses his earning power or ability to perform his duties would not be interfered with at all; in others it would be materially. What his future will demand of him cannot be foretold. As a mechanical blacksmith his ability to do work, handle things, is impaired. I do not think the jury was affected by passion or prejudice against corporations. They were carefully cautioned against this. While damages in such cases are largely discretionary with a jury, still that discretion is always within the control of the court. The pain and suffering in this case was not of long continuance, the disfigurement is confined to the one hand, the arm is not injured, the plaintiff can pick up and handle articles and handle all ordinary tools. I am of the opinion that the damages were excessive, all things considered, and that they should be reduced to $3,000. In "City of Panama" vs. Phelps (101 U. S., 453) the court said: Damages, in such a case, must depend very much upon the facts and circumstances proved at the trial. When the suit is brought by the party for personal injuries, there cannot be any fixed measure of compensation for the pain and anguish of body and mind, nor for the permanent injury to health and constitution, but the result must be left to turn mainly upon the good sense and deliberate judgment of the tribunal assigned by law to ascertain what is a just compensation for the injuries inflicted. In Gahagan vs. Aeromotor Co. (67 Minn., 252) the plaintiff was awarded $1,800. this was reduced to $1,200, the court saying: The only remaining question is whether the damages awarded are excessive. The boy, one of eight children, was between 8 and 9 years of age. Aside from doing such chores about the house as he was bidden by his parents, the only work he had ever engaged in was selling newspapers on the village streets. His father was a buthcer, whose occupation was to peddle through the country the flesh of animals which he bought and slaughtered. The injury to the boy consisted of the mangling of the ends of the ring and middle fingers of the 304

left hand so as to require their amputation, the one at the first joint, and the other just below the first joint. This was successfully done at one operation, and the fingers healed satisfactorily. Of course, this was necessarily accompanied by considerable pain; and there is some evidence to the effect that the ends of the finger may always be somewhat more sensitive to heat and cold than if not amputated. There was, also, the opinion of a physician that the muscles supplying those fingers will not develop as fully as they would if the whole fingers were there. It is also true that the amputation of the ends of these fingers constitutes something of a disfigurement of the person. We have no desire to belittle the right which every one, even in the humblest walks of life, has to the possession of all his faculties, both mental and physical, unimpaired. but we are compelled to the conclusion that, in any view of the case, the damages awarded to the boy are excessive. There are certain profession, such as that of instrumental music, where the loss of the ends of two fingers, even on the left hand, would be quite serious; but it is self-evident, without the aid of evidence, that in all the ordinary occupations of life the injury to the boy will be almost inappreciable. We have often had occasion to say that the question is not for what sum of money will compensate for it as far as money can compensate at all; and, where a person asks for pecuniary compensation, he cannot complain if the loss is estimated on a strictly pecuniary basis. In Rittel vs. Souther Iron Co. (127 Mo. App., 463) in reducing the award from $4,500 to $3,000 and in disposing of the contention of the appellant that there was no evidence that the plaintiff's earning capacity had been diminished by reason of the injuries, the court said: Plaintiff, as stated, was a young man twenty-one years old at that time of the accident, and as far as appears he made his living by work similar to that he was doing when hurt; he was not a mechanic, but a common laborer. He testified that he had done no work from the date of the injury to the time of the trial; that prior to said time he had been earning nine dollars a week, and in his opinion he was unable to do the same kind of work he had been doing theretofore. We think it is a matter of general knowledge that a laboring man who has the thumb and forefinger of his right hand mashed has suffered a diminution of earning power. Similar holdings appear in Olsen vs. Tacoma Smelting Co. (50 Wash., 128); Rommen vs. Empire Furniture Mfg. Co. ([1911] 118 Pac., 924); Duskey vs. Green Lake Shingle Co. (51 Wash., 145); Barclay vs. Puget Sound Lumber Co. (48 Wash., 241); Adams vs. Peterman Mfg. Co. (47 Wash., 484); Ball vs. Peterman Mfg. Co. (47 Wash., 653); Johnson vs. City of Bay City (164 Mich., 251). This opinion is quite long, necessarily made so by the importance of the questions raised. The judgment being strictly in accordance with law and the merits of the case, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.