Você está na página 1de 26

African Military Slaves in the Medieval Middle East: The Cases of Iraq (869-955) and Egypt (868-1171) Author(s):

Jere L. Bacharach Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Nov., 1981), pp. 471-495 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/162910 . Accessed: 08/08/2013 10:28
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Journal of Middle East Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 67.115.155.19 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:28:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Int. J. Middle East Stud. 13 (198I), 471-495 Printed in the United States of America

Jere L. Bacharach AFRICAN MILITARY SLAVES IN THE MEDIEVAL MIDDLE EAST: THE CASES OF IRAQ (869-955) AND
EGYPT (868-1 171)

INTRODUCTION

Islamic military slavery has been the subject of a number of studies in recent years. The central theme of these scholarly works has been the dominant role played by Turks, imported as slaves and trained as cavalry, for whom the term "Mamluk" is used to denote both racial background and occupation. A second aspect, which has not been as systematically studied, is that most Muslim armies were composed of cavalry and infantry units organized into units based on racial identities.2 The theory was that their racial affinities were the cohesive element within a unit; that the natural rivalries between these groups would bring strength to a ruler's position as they tried to outdo one another on the field of battle; and that these racial jealousies would create a balance which would prevent any one military/racial group from dominating the government. Another major theme, most clearly articulated by Professors David Ayalon and Bernard Lewis,3 is the generally held view of racial and military superiority of Mamluks. In contrast, Africans, including African military slaves who served as infantry troops,4 were held in low esteem. The military occupations of peoples from these two vast, non-Islamic geographic areas - Central Asia and Africa - reflected and reinforced the racial differences: Cavalry was superior to infantry; Turk was superior to African. The competition and conflicts between Mamluk and African troops within Islamic society are revealed in a number of incidents recorded by medieval Arab chroniclers. Professor Lewis, in his stimulating study, Race and Color in Islam,5 gives a number of examples of this racial warfare in medieval Iraq and Egypt in which Africans are always the victim and the loser. One may ask, however, whether "racial" attitudes are the only, or the best, explanation for internecine warfare between Turks and blacks. Although Professor Lewis does not explicitly create a paradigm whereby race is the sole or critical factor which determined the fate of the African military slaves, the section on military slaves does leave that impression. In addition the section stresses the "loyalty" of African military slaves to their political masters while other troops, notably Turks, appear to lack that sense of loyalty. In this study I argue that race and color were not the dominant factors in either of these struggles, and that racial tension did not cause the ultimate
? Cambridge University Press 198I 0020-7438/81/040471-25 $02.50

This content downloaded from 67.115.155.19 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:28:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

472

Jere L. Bacharach

disappearance of African military slaves in medieval Iraq and Egypt. Because I will be focusing attention on alternate, more specific local causes including geographical factors, it will be necessary to treat each incident separately. Out of these particular cases, given in chronological order first for Iraq and then for Egypt, I draw the following conclusions. First, the earliest appearance of African military slaves is difficult to determine. Second, it was a military need that led to the use of African troops as infantrymen. Third, as was true with most other bodies of troops who were identified as coming from a single racial stock or geographic area, these slaves were grouped together by that racial or geographic label. Fourth, when Africans served as cavalry in addition to their normal occupation as infantry, the clashes between Mamluks and Africans were more intense than the Mamluk cavalry/ African infantry rivalries. Fifth, when African military slaves deserted, they did so as one segment of a larger force composed of a number of racially separate cavalry and infantry units, or as individuals and small groups which joined units of African infantrymen on the victorious side. Sixth, when the possibility of desertion diminished, the intensity of the fighting increased. Seventh, the ultimate disappearance of infantrymen, and African military slaves in particular, was a direct result of a fundamental shift in the organization of medieval Muslim armies.
IRAQ

Our knowledge of the early history of African military troops has been enhanced by the work of Professor Daniel Pipes. In a short article he gathered all the references he could find to their use by Muslims before circa 210/825. He concluded his study by stating that "the use of Africans in the Abbasid armies shows a distinct decrease after 210/825. In large part this can be attributed to the Abbasids' loss of control over the areas which produced African soldiers. The Aghlabids in Tunisia in particular have opportunities to intercept the passage of Africans to the east; indeed, they did make major use of Africans in their armies."6 Professor Pipes does not make clear in his stimulating works why the Arab leaders turned to African military slaves for their military needs.7 I would argue that the critical factor was a change in the organization of Muslim armies after they had left the Arabian Peninsula. Specifically, I refer to a shift from an all cavalry army to one composed of cavalry and infantry units. This is a model that had been used by Byzantine and Sassasian forces before and during the Arab conquests. In addition, these troops were usually grouped by linguistic, geographic, or racial category. Under Muslim rule the creation of a cavalry core of Turkish military slaves as cavalry, the Mamluks, is the most noted and important change in the composition of Muslim armies; but a similar, apparently unrecorded, parallel development must have taken place in creating an infantry. Among the peoples available to Muslim rulers from lands bordering on the Dar al-Islam (The Abode of Islam) were sub-Saharan Africans. Since Turks were considered excellent cavalrymen even from pre-Islamic times, Africans were

This content downloaded from 67.115.155.19 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:28:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

African Military Slaves in the Medieval Middle East

473

the logical choice for infantry. The absence of a strong tradition of horsemanship among Africans would have strengthened the stereotyping of Africans for the role of infantrymen. Finally, Arabs and Berbers were already used as cavalry within the Islamic world. The last part of Professor Pipes's statement points up another critical factor: the role of geography in determining which troops would be used by certain dynasties. While Mamluks may be desired by all Muslim dynasties, the further a military slave was from his original homeland, the more expensive it was to import him. There was also the possibility that political powers in territories between the source of these military slaves and the potential buyer would (and could) prevent the movement of large numbers of Mamluks through their land. In the case of African military slaves under the early Abbasids, Professor Pipes argues that the Aghlabid geographic location played a critical role in preventing the movement of African military slaves to the heart of the Abbasid Empire in central Iraq. In part, I agree with Dr. Pipes, but another factor must be noted. The Arab chroniclers rarely treated the activities of African military slaves as germane to the major, contemporary power struggles they were recording. It was not unusual to find references to African slaves in Iraq without any warning of when and how they got there or what happened to them after the specific event was recorded; for example, a revolt of African Zanj slaves in Basra in 76/695 or the appearance of 4,000 Zanj military slaves in Mosul in I33/75I. Therefore, the silence in the Arabic chronicles on the numbers and activities of African military slaves in Iraq from 210/825 to the Zanj rebellion (255/869-271/883) may reflect their absence or, more likely, their relative unimportance in the eyes of the chroniclers. For the purposes of this study, the details of the Zanj revolt that have been studied by Popovic8 need not be examined. The example illustrates the use of African military slaves in Iraq, the pattern of desertions and the absence of a systematic anti-African policy on the part of the Abbasid caliphs. When the revolt began, the bulk of the Zanj troops were African slaves who had had no military training nor had they been manumitted. By a process unrecorded in the sources, the Zanj army began to jell into a fairly effective military force. In addition to the African infantry units, some Arab Bedouins joined them as a cavalry. During the first years of the revolt, some African infantrymen who served the Abbasids deserted and fought for the Zanj.9 This action was not typical of most African troops who served the Abbasids, nor is there any evidence that the Abbasids feared a massive desertion by their African infantry. There are references in the Arab chronicles to African military slaves continuing to serve in the Abbasid military, presumably as infantry, during the period of the Zanj rebellion.10 But the pattern of desertion, Zanj infantry to Abbasid African infantry, illustrates the fifth point made in the introduction. More critical for the Abbasid caliphs than the potential desertions by Africans was the fact that the Abbasid army was not able to direct all its resources to crushing the Zanj because of military threats from other parts of the empire. Eventually one of the most serious was that posed by Ahmad b. Tulufnin Egypt.

This content downloaded from 67.115.155.19 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:28:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

474

Jere L. Bacharach

He had entered the Egyptian capital, Fustat, in 243/868, and had become involved in a series of political struggles culminating in his consolidation of power as governor. His army eventually came to include Turks, Faraghanians, Berbers, Africans, and Rumi (a term defined below). A similar composition of forces was found with the troops of an important Tulunid general in Syria, Lu'lu'." In 268/881, Lu'lu' changed sides and joined the Abbasid army. It appears that all his forces, including the African ones, came to serve the Abbasid cause. The desertion of Lu'lu' and his troops to the government at Samarra illustrates the interrelation of developments in Iraq and Syria. The arrival of Lu'lu's troops made a significant difference in the quantity and quality of the forces that the Abbasids could send against the Zanj. The Zanj revolt lasted another two years, but when the Abbasid government took the offensive, it actively encouraged Zanj troops to desert their leader and to join African contingents in the Abbasid army.'2 The action of Lu'lu' and the pattern of individual desertions during the Zanj rebellion illustrate alternatives whereby troops could switch sides. In the first case a commander, Lu'lu', brought his whole army with him and the only difference was that he - and by extension his African military slaves - had a new nominal overlord. In the second case Zanj troops joined Africans in the Abbasid army; that is, they changed sides according to occupational and ethnic/ racial categories. In neither case did racial attitudes prevent the Abbasids from using African military slaves in their armies. The Abbasid armies were composed of numerous racial groups which were stereotyped by occupation: Africans were perceived as and employed as infantry, thus creating a circular relationship where race and occupation reinforced each other. If the Arab chroniclers are silent on the fate of African military slaves from the end of the Zanj rebellion in 270/883 until 318/930, it is perhaps owing to three factors. First, African military slaves, deemed unimportant, were not directly involved in the power struggles consuming the Baghdad court.'3 Second, the number of African military slaves reaching Iraq must have suffered a significant decline. Because of the Zanj rebellion, there may have been a reluctance to import large numbers of East Africans. More critical was that Ahmad b. Tulun and his successors controlled Egypt and Syria, a major trade route to the African sources. It is unlikely that the Tulunids would have permitted the export of large numbers of African military slaves to Iraq where, in turn, they could have been used against the Tulunids. Finally, the role of infantrymen in the Abbasid army was being filled by another people, the Dailimi, Persian speakers from northern Iran who were geographically closer to Baghdad and along more secure trade routes. The following incident which took place in 3 8/930 proves that some African troops continued to serve the central Abbasid government in Iraq as infantry in addition to the Dailimi. It has been used by other scholars as an example of the terrible fate that befell African military slaves at the hands of non-African, primarily Mamluk, troops. According to Professor Lewis, the Africans . .. were attacked and massacred by the white cavalry, with the help of other troops

This content downloaded from 67.115.155.19 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:28:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

African Military Slaves in the Medieval Middle East

475

and of the populace, and their quarters burnt."'4 A close examination of the Arabic sources reveals a more intricate story and casts doubt on a racial interpretation. In Muharram 3i8/February 930 Mu'nis, a powerful military commander, temporarily deposed the Abbasid caliph al-Muqtadir (295-320/908-932), until the Masaffiyya, a palace infantry unit of mixed racial composition, restored him.'5 According to the chronicler Miskawayh, the Masaffiyya were aggressive in their demands, mutinous and insubordinate.'6 The cavalry, the Hujariyya, supported by Muhammad b. Yaqut, head of the Baghdad shurta (police), also demanded more money. Al-Muqtadir deflected the Hujariyya-shurta alliance by claiming that the Masaffiyya had seized all his money. This led to fighting between the Masaffiyya and the Hujariyya-shurta force, which the latter won, forcing the remnants of the Masaffiyya to flee to Wasit, south of Baghdad. In the chaos the African troops, who were present in the city, also demanded a pay raise, but the victorious troops then turned to fight them. Before serious hostilities occurred, however, the Abbasid wazir accepted the Africans' call for a truce. In return for this, the African forces accepted the old pay scale. Quiet prevailed for six months, until Jumada II 318/July 930. In that month the cavalry rebelled, again for more money; again the African infantry demanded the same. Muhammad b. Yaqut stalled the Africans and renewed his alliance with the cavalry. These combined forces attacked the African quarters. This time the Africans' former ally, the wazir, was out of office and there was no truce. The cavalry-shurta alliance destroyed the homes of the Africans and killed many of them. The survivors fled to Wasit where they joined the Masaffiyya in open rebellion against the central government. Mu'nis, the chief Abbasid military commander, who was now aiding Caliph alMuqtadir, led a powerful military force of his own to Wasit at the end of Rajab 318/August 930 and defeated the combined Masaffiyya-African force. According to the chronicles, Mu'nis slew most of the rebellious troops, except for some Africans who asked him for protection. He dispersed them to various regions. 7 In the introduction I argued that whereas color prejudices existed, they were not the only or even the best explanation for understanding the fate of African military slaves. The preceding example illustrates the key role of old-fashioned, politico/military power struggles for determining the fortunes of the Africans. The major political alliances that were operative at the time were, on one side, African-Masaffiyya and a particular Abbasid wazir and, on the other, Caliph al-Muqtadir, the head of the Baghdad shurta, his forces, and the Hujariyya cavalry, with Mu'nis switching sides at various times. It was not predetermined that the Africanside would lose. One additional piece of evidence suggests that the 318/930 attack on the Africans was not motivated by racial prejudice. In 324/936 Muhammad b. Yaqut, the former head of the shurta who had led the charge against the Africans in Baghdad, was killed.'8 A major factor leading to his death was his failure to defeat the army of a new military force in Iraq, the Buyids. The Buyid army was composed of Dailimi infantry and Turkish cavalry (Mamluks), while

This content downloaded from 67.115.155.19 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:28:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

476

Jere L. Bacharach

Muhammad b. Yaqut's main force was a contingent of 3,000 African infantrymen! It is true that African troops were rarely used in Iraq after the third/ninth century, but political and economic rather than social factors can explain this. By the third/ninth century African military slaves imported into Iraq had to pass through Egypt, which was in the hands of Turkish governors, such as the Tulunids and Ikhshidids, whose policies I analyze below, and whose loyalty to the central authority was always in doubt. Prior to the Buyid control of Baghdad in 334/944, references to Africans disappear totally from the sources about Iraq, with one exception. In Dhu-Hijja 329/September 94I Ibn Ra'iq, an important military leader, returned to power in Baghdad after having fled the city in 327/929. During the interim he had established himself in Syria, fought al-Ikhshid, the governor of Egypt, and eventually arranged a peace with him.19 As part of Ibn Ra'iq's army, which retook Baghdad, there was a contingent of African infantrymen. Once in the Abbasid capital, Ibn Ra'iq ordered these Africans to attack a force of 400 Dailimi associated with a former military leader. The African military slaves killed all but one of the Dailimi. Eight months later Ibn Ra'iq was assassinated; the fate of his African troops went unrecorded. As in the preceding examples where Arab chroniclers did not deem it important to record the fate of surviving but defeated African military slaves, the subsequent activities of Ibn Ra'iq's victorious troops were passed over in silence. One obvious conclusion is that chroniclers considered African forces unimportant, a view that is reinforced by the absence of the name of any of their leaders. With the preceding example, African military slaves disappear from the recorded history of medieval Iraq. As stated in the introduction, these troops suddenly appear as a military force with no indication of when, how, or in what numbers they arrived. Although the data are very limited, African military slaves were probably most numerous in Iraq in the latter half of the third/ninth century, but they rarely played a major role in the power struggles involving the Abbasid court and the various military leaders. When they disappeared from the chronicles and, it can be assumed, from Iraq, anti-African prejudices do not appear to be the critical factor. Whatever racial attitudes of the local Buyid commanders, Mamluk cavalry and Dailimi infantry, other considerations were more important. First, Dailimi as infantrymen were closer to Baghdad, cheaper, and available in greater numbers. Second, the Dailimi may have feared the creation of competing infantry units of Africans which could have been used against them. And third, rival dynasties - Ikhshidids and then Fatimids - controlled Egypt and southern Syria, and they could have hampered the overland movement of large numbers of Africans to Iraq. Again, the Iraqi Muslim armies were still composed of cavalry and infantry units, but now they were primarily Mamluks and Dailimi. None of the foregoing examples denies that medieval Muslim society perceived Turk as better than African, or that cavalry was considered superior to infantry. What these examples illustrate is the general thesis that the fate of the African military troops had less to do with racial attitudes than with specific,

This content downloaded from 67.115.155.19 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:28:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

African Military Slaves in the Medieval Middle East

477

local, political, and economic factors. A secondary theme has been that troops who deserted to another side could continue to serve in the new army as long as their military services were needed. This possibility was significantly increased when the side they joined included forces of a similar race, but this was not a necessary condition. African military slaves disappeared from Iraq by the second half of the fourth/ tenth century; the Dailimi suffered a similar fate a century later. In the latter case the key factor was not race; the new Saljuq armies were almost exclusively cavalry and Dailimi infantrymen had no role. This thesis, the last point in the introduction, is developed after the history of the use of African military slaves in Egypt is traced. The first significant appearance of African infantry in the Nile Valley, in the post-Muslim conquest era, dates to the reign of Ahmad b. Tuilin (254-270/868-884).
EGYPT: TULUNIDS AND IKHSHIDIDS

Neither in Professor Pipes's study nor in the dissertation of Dr. Michael Dunn on pre-Tulunid Egypt are there references to African military slaves in pre-254/868 Egypt.20 If there were some African military slave troops in Abbasid Egypt, they did not play a pivotal role in the ensuing political struggles and their activities were not recorded by the Arab chroniclers. A second possible reason for their absence in any significant numbers is that the central government in Baghdad wished to prevent the growth of regional powers and therefore limited the size of armies employed by local governors. Ahmad b. Tulin broke the pattern and created the first semi-independent Muslim dynasty in Egypt. With his rule, African military slaves are noted by the chroniclers.21 They were brought in to meet specific military needs. Ahmad b. Tuilin had entered the Egyptian capital Fustat in 254/868 and had become involved in a series of political struggles, culminating in his consolidation of power as governor. One major problem he initially faced was that the finances were controlled by other officials. This was done to limit his ability to acquire funds to buy a large personal army and thus make himself virtually independent of the Abbasid government in Samarra. However, events in Palestine in 256/870 aided him. He was given money by the Abbasids to raise an army to put down a rebellious governor in Palestine. Before Ahmad b. Tulun reached Palestine with his new army, the governor of Damascus had crushed the rebellion, but "for the first time Egypt possessed a large military force independent of the caliphate."22 The troops which Ahmad b. Tulun initially purchased were from the "Sudan"23 and Rum. The Africans were used as infantrymen; their importation could not be hampered by rival leaders in Iraq. The term "Rum" can mean "Byzantine territories" or "from Byzantine sources" and therefore Rumi troops could have been Greeks, Slavs, or other light-skinned peoples. They served as cavalry. As stated, the armies of Ahmad b. Tuilin came to include Turks, Faraghanians, and Berbers as well as Africans and Rfmi.24 Because most Central Asiatic military slaves had to be imported across lands controlled

This content downloaded from 67.115.155.19 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:28:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

478

Jere L. Bacharach

by the Abbasid government in Samarra, it must have been more difficult to acquire them than Rumi. Cost would have been another factor which should have limited the number of Turkish military slaves,25 although their reputation as fighters might have offset the problems of distance and cost. Ahmad b. Tulun's concern for his army went beyond merely acquiring larger numbers of troops. He wanted them properly quartered. As early as Sha'ban 256/July 870 he ordered the clearing of an area north of Fustat, which had been used for Jewish and Christian cemeteries, in order to build a palace, parade area, mosque, and quarters for his troops. This area was called al-Qata'i' and there were specific areas for Africans as well as Rmi troops.26 Numbers are almost impossible to find in medieval sources, and then they must be used with great caution. Dr. Yaacov Lev has done the most systematic collecting of data for the Tulunids.27 He found the following accounts: Ahmad b. Tiluin had an initial force of I2,000 Africans, which was then increased by 24,000 Mamluks and 7,000 mawali. Another version states Ahmad b. Tulun began with Persian troops and mawall to which Africans were added. The total number was 24,000 Turkish cavalry, 40,000 Africans, and 7,000 free mercenaries. Another version puts the number of Africans at 45,000. The Arabic chronicles do not indicate if these numbers included the troops under his lieutenants in Syria, such as Lu'lu'. The conclusion which can be drawn from the career of Ahmad b. Tulun, as it relates to the history of African military slaves, is that he imported large numbers and built separate quarters for them. His policy of creating a military force identified by function and race paralleled earlier Islamic practices. By the year 270/884 the Zanj rebellion had ended and Khumarawayh (270-282/884-896) succeeded his father in Egypt. African military slaves served Abbasid and Tulunid rulers, but were especially conspicuous in Egypt. According to one report, when Khumarawayh rode in a procession, he was followed by I,ooo African guards "wearing black cloaks and black turbans, so that a watcher could fancy them to be a black sea spreading over the face of the earth, because of the blackness of their color and of their garments. With the glitter of their shields, of the chasing on their swords, and of the helmets under their turbans, they made a really splendid sight."28 The splendor could not hide a basic lack of leadership ability on the part of Khumirawayh and his successors. By 29I/904 the Abbasids had raised a large army under one Muhammad b. Sulayman in order, once more, to bring Egypt under their direct control. As Muhammad b. Sulayman began to retake Syrian cities in the name of the Abbasid caliph, fighting erupted among the various factions of the Tulunid army, culminating in 292/905 in the murder of the head of the dynasty. His successor, Shayban (292/905), was not recognized by all the Tulunid troops and when Muhammad b. Sulayman entered al-Qata'i' on 30 Safar 292/10 January 905, most of the Tulunid cavalry had already switched sides, leaving the Africans isolated. After defeating the remaining Tulunid forces, the Abbasid commander destroyed all of al-Qata'i', including the Africans' quarters, except for the mosque.

This content downloaded from 67.115.155.19 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:28:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

African Military Slaves in the Medieval Middle East

479

According to one account, Muhammad b. Sulayman massacred the Africans.29 This incident is said to demonstrate both the great loyalty to their masters of Africans and the anti-African attitudes of other military forces.30 Light-skinned cavalry, Rfmi or Turk, had a role in the army of Muhammad b. Sulayman, and desertion was a relatively easy matter of joining Abbasid units of similar occupational/racial characteristics. African infantrymen did not have this opportunity. The sense of the ferocity of Muhammad b. Sulayman's attack against the Africans cannot be attributed to an unproven, fanatical, racial attitude on the part of the Abbasid commander. I would assume that the intensity of African resistance to the conquering army was the most critical factor. But why should Africans be more loyal to a Sunni Turkish dynasty (Tulunids) than to a Sunni Arab dynasty (Abbasids)? There is no racial or religious reason, but there is an economic one; that is, African military slaves had no effective role in the new army. An Abbasid victory meant the end of their employment and politico/military power, as limited as it was. However, there is another historical tradition about the fall of the Tulunids: the pattern of desertion. According to the variant account, Muhammad b. Sulayman returned to Baghdad, once again the Abbasid capital, with a number of prisoners including Africans.31 If valid, this report implies that not all Africans were massacred and that they could be used in some capacity in Iraq. While it is dangerous to argue from silence, it is probable that these captured African military slaves served Iraqi commanders as infantrymen, as African troops were still being used in 318/930 in Baghdad. It is even possible that both traditions are valid: some Africans were massacred and others marched to Iraq. Between the end of the Tulunid dynasty and the establishment of the Ikhshidid dynasty in 323/935, there are no references to African military slaves in Egypt. The silence of the Arabic sources may, as in the case of Iraq, reflect their actual absence from Egypt, or their relative unimportance in terms of recorded military and political events, or the biases of the Arabic chroniclers who deemed them of a secondary interest. With the Ikhshidids (323-358/ 935-969) there is only a slight improvement in the value of the Arabic sources for the history of African military slaves. This is surprising because every medieval and modern account refers to the career of Kaffr (d. 356/968), the African eunuch who ruled Egypt and southern Syria after the death of his master and founder of the dynasty, Muhammad b. Tughj al-Ikhshid (323-334/ 935-946).32 While it has been assumed that al-Ikhshid and Kafuirrecruited large numbers of African troops,33 the data are limited. Almost every reference to the military forces refers either to an army (jund, 'askar, or jaysh) or to the Ikhshidiyya and Kaffiriyya, the nisba forms of the names of the rulers.34 None of these terms identify the regional or ethnic/racial origins of the troops. After al-Ikhshid occupied Egypt in 323/935, he seized control of the local finances. As his goal was to make himself and his family semi-independent of the control of the central government in Baghdad, he needed a military force loyal to himself. In light of contemporary attitudes, his army had to be composed of cavalry and infantry units, usually divided along racial lines. As a Turk

This content downloaded from 67.115.155.19 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:28:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

480

Jere L. Bacharach

himself, Muhammad b. Tughj would have sought Turkish military slaves to form the core of his cavalry. But the Abbasids continued to control the trade routes from Central Asia to Egypt, as they had during the Tulunid era, and thus had the ability to restrict the number of Turkish military slaves imported into Egypt. Also, the distances involved and the reputed military skills of Turks would have combined to drive their price up. The Ikhshidid governors had to purchase Rimi when Turks were not available. For infantry, Africans represented the closest, safest, and presumably cheapest source of manpower; the alternative, the Dailimi, were as difficult of access as the Turks. The data to document the foregoing hypothesis are again lacking. The reference to Ibn Ra'iq using African military slaves in Baghdad after he had signed a peace treaty with al-Ikhshid has already been mentioned. A second reference to African troops is found in a list of al-Ikhshid's estate which included 3,000 Rufmi, Africans, and Muwalladun (probably non-Arabs, possibly of Turkish or Rumi descent, who had become Arabicized).35 This total appears very low when compared to the reported size of Ahmad b. Tulun's army or when the number of al-Ikhshid's military campaigns is considered.36 For the period when Kaiffr ruled and the descendants of al-Ikhshid reigned, there is one reference that describes the composition of the Ikhshidid army: 1,070 Turks, 2,000 Rumi, and 4,000 Africans and Muwalladun.37 This shows that Turkish military slaves were imported, which was then the goal of Muslim rulers. The size of the force (7,070) is reasonable and might be closer to the actual number than the figures for the Tulunids or the hundreds of thousands given below for Fatimid armies. In 358/969 Ikhshidid Egypt faced a number of severe problems: an internal economic crisis, a lack of leadership, attacks from Palestine by the Qarmatians and from the West by the Fatimids. The last was decisive. But what happened to the African military slaves? I don't know. The sources only refer to the troops as Ikhshidiyya and Kafiriyya. Some of these troops deserted to the Qarmatians.38 Another group resisted the Fatimids, were defeated, but were used by the Fatimids with great reluctance in their campaigns in Syria, such as in 372/982 when the Fatimid army consisted of Turks, Persians, Dailimis, and former Ikhshidid troops.39 Neither the Arabic sources nor the careful study of Dr. Lev enable us to determine if these forces who served the Fatimids were African military slaves or even infantry. The generalizations about desertion patterns cannot be tested in this example.
FATIMIDS TO AL-MUSTANSIR

The sources are meager for studying the history of African military slaves in pre-Fatimid Egypt; it is hard to do more than determine the existence of African troops. While it has been assumed that the African military slaves held limited power in relation to other military groups, this position could not be adequately documented. Although generalizations about ethnic/racial tensions as part of Islamic society have been put forward and documented by other scholars, evidence directly related to conflicts between Africans and other

This content downloaded from 67.115.155.19 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:28:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

African Military Slaves in the Medieval Middle East

48I

militaryunits for Egypt before 358/969has been very limited. With the coming to power in Egypt of the Fatimids,the role and power of the Africansexpanded and the chroniclers devoted proportionallymore space to them, permittinga greater documentationof their history. The Fatimid era can be divided into three periods for the purposes of this study. The first era, which covers the years from the Fatimid occupation of by the appearanceof African militaryslave units and their growingrole in the political arena, especially under al-Hakim. The second period (427-487/
1035-1095)

Egypt in 358/969 to 427/1035, the beginning of al-Mustansir's reign, was marked coincides with the reign of al-Mustansir. African troops, including

cavalry, reachedthe apogee of theirpower. Duringhis reignthe most intensive


Mamluk-African struggles took place. The last period (487-564/1095-1169)

found African militaryslaves involved in the politico/militarystrugglesof the Fatimid court and their eventual demise as a fighting unit at the hands of Saladin. In 297/909 the Fatimid caliphate was established in North Africa with the Kutama Berbers as its militarybase. These Sevener Shi'ite caliphs saw their mission as a universal one and, in particular,as the destructionof the Sunni Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad. This meant raisinga large army and, in order to conquer IkhshididEgypt, it had to be a mobile, cavalry force. To the core of KutamaBerbersthey addedother Berberunits, Arabbedouins, and military slaves. These last, whose background and militaryrole paralleledthe Turkishthe slaves of Abbasids,were called Faranji(Europeanorigin), speakingmilitary or All the North African troops were known as alRumi. Saqlabi,40Siqilli, in contrast to the Turks, Dailimi, and Eastern MediMaghariba(Westerners) terraneanArab bedouins, who were to join the Fatimidarmies later and who were called al-Mashariqa (Easterners).
In 358/969 the Fatimid caliph, al-Mu'izz (341-365/953-975), sent his general

Jawharto conquerEgypt. Afterdefeatingthe Ikhshidids,Jawharbeganbuilding a new administrativecapital in Egypt, al-Qahira, just north of Fustat, a royal to b. Ahmad Tilun's surroundedby quartersfor (similar al-Qata'i') complex troops. These included the Kutama Quarter,the Barqa Quarter(al-Mu'izz's troops from Barqa, Tunisia), the Rim Quarter(Rumiand other Western cavalry), and, from the reignof the Fatimidcaliph, al-'Aziz (365-386/975-996),the Dailimi Quarter.4'The Africans had no quarternamed after them, although many of them came to live in one section of the city.42 Because they were held in such high esteem, Turkishtroops were added to the Fatimidarmy, but there were problemsin acquiringthem.43 The land route from Central Asia crossed Abbasid lands and the Baghdadcaliphs and their Dailimi-Buyid militarymasterswouldhave triedto limitthe numberof Mamluks reaching Cairo. Therefore, the Fatimids used Rumi as well as Mamluks. A parallelproblemexisted for the Fatimidsin acquiringDailimias infantrymen.44 The obvious, most accessible, and cheapest replacementfor Dailimi as foot soldiers were African militaryslaves. Which Fatimid caliph first used African military slaves is not clear. The Ikhshidiyyaand Kafiriyya who served al-Mu'izzand al-'Aziz could have been

This content downloaded from 67.115.155.19 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:28:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

482

Jere L. Bacharach

African infantrymen, but clear references to Africans do not appear until after their reigns. The only appropriate reference for this first period of Fatimid rule comes from a list of the estate of the great Fatimid wazir, Ibn Killis (d. 380/ 99o). It is claimed he owned 4,000 military troops including Africans.45 During the reign of the next Fatimid caliph, al-Hakim (386-4II/996-102I), the role of African military slaves increased to the point that the caliph relied upon them as his major support. A number of references relate their participation in military campaigns and as a tool for al-Hakim to enforce his domestic policies.46 The most famous event involving African troops took place at the end of 410 (or early 41 I/March, 1020) when the Cairo populace finally reacted to al-Hakim's policies.47 They began rioting. The conflict continued for three days and, it is stated, one-third of Misr had been burnt and about one-half of it plundered.48 Women were raped and kidnapped. The African troops are described as the main perpetrators of the atrocities and the agents of al-Hakim.49 In one source al-Hakim is said to have watched the burning and looting, wondering aloud: "Who ordered these Africans to do this?"50 By the fourth day the non-African troops felt pity for the populace, possibly feared the ever increasing power of the Africans, and joined the clamor for al-Hakim to call off his African troops. The caliph did so and he rode between the Africans and his other troops, denouncing the former for committing crimes without his knowledge or permission. But, as noted in one of the chronicles,51 this same caliph had been supplying the Africans with weapons and urging them on in secret. If some Africans were killed before al-Hakim brought the pillage to an end, the numbers were not great.52 The incident marked a fundamental shift in the relative power of African troops. This increase in the Africans' role as an instrument of the caliphate affected the attitudes of other military units toward Africans. The role of the Dailimi was always limited by problems of recruitment. Berbers and Arabs both lost their relative military power as cavalry, although both could be disruptive. The Turks (which included the Rumi) served as the main Fatimid cavalry force, just as the Africans were the primary infantry force. Thus, a situation of the Turk vs. African emerged under the Fatimids parallel to the Turk vs. Dailimi under the Buyids. During the reign of al-Zahir (4I 1-427/1021-1035), Africans continued to play a significant military role.53 They fought in Upper Egypt against a Bedouin confederation and, in a scene reminiscent of 4II/I020, they plundered the warehouses at the port, seizing wheat and barley as well as looting and burning private homes.54 These African troops only came under control with the threat of force and the reward of additional pay. But the real struggle for power took place during the reign of al-Zahir's son, al-Mustansir (427-487/1035-1095).
AL-MUSTANSIR

African military troops were a major political and military force for over half of al-Mustansir's reign. Their prominence was a direct result of the support

This content downloaded from 67.115.155.19 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:28:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

African Military Slaves in the Medieval Middle East

483

and patronage of al-Mustansir's mother, an African. The Fatimid caliph, alZahir, had acquired the mother of the future caliph from a Jewish merchant and banker, Abu Sa'd Ibrahim b. Sahl al-Tustari.55She had been his concubine. Thus, Abu Sa'd and his brother acquired very close ties with the court and became the agents for al-Mustansir's mother. When al-Zahir died, al-Mustansir was only seven, and the Fatimid government was run by al-Zahir's last wazir, al-Jarjara'i (d. 436/1045). His wazirate, which lasted until his death in Ramadan 436/April 1045, was marked by an era of relative internal stability, although Egypt suffered one of its recurrent famines due to a low Nile. Behind the scenes the dowager attempted to build up her own power base by having large numbers of African troops bought. She also appointed Abu Sa'd to a high office (ca. 428/1036), although the exact nature of the position cannot be determined from the sources.56 The competing centers of political power - one around the wazir and the other around the dowager's entourage - came into direct conflict during the wazirage of al-Falahi (d. 439/1047). He, like Abfi Sa'd, had been born a Jew, but he converted to Islam before becoming wazir. In an attempt to build his own power base and to counterbalance the power of the Africans, al-Falahi bought more Turks. This approach was to no avail and he found himself wazir in name only, with all the decisions being made by al-Mustansir's mother and Abu Sa'd. In 439/1047 the wazir, al-Falahi, was able to incite a group of Turks to kill Abu Sa'd. The dowager sought revenge and had al-Falahi removed from office and eventually killed. In this first round between Turk and African during the reign of al-Mustansir, each one of their representatives - al-Falahi and Abu Sa'd, respectively - had been slain but a direct military clash between the two forces had not yet occurred. According to the Arab chronicles,57 al-Mustansir's mother used succeeding wazirs to carry out her policy of improving the numbers and position of the African troops. During this period (roughly 442-450/1050-1058), the Persian Shi'ite missionary and poet, Nasir-i Khusrau, visited Egypt and observed the results of the dowager's policies in a military parade.58 One group was called Kitamis;these came from Qayrawanin the service of al-Mu'izz li-Din Allah. They are said to number 20,000 horsemen. Another group was called Batilis, said to be men from North Africa who came to Egypt before the arrivalof alMu'izz. They are said to number15,000 horsemen.Anothergroupwas called Masmfdis; they were Africansfrom the land of the Masmidis and are said to number20,000 men. Anothergroup was called the Easterners,consistingof Turksand Persians. They were so-called because they were not of Arab origin. Though most of them were born in Egypt, their name derives from their origin.They are said to numberI0,000 powerfully built men. Another group was called the "slaves by purchase" ('Abid al-shird). They were slaves boughtfor money and are said to number30,000 men. Anothergroup was called Bedouins. They were from the Hijaz and were all armedwith spears. They are said to number50,000 horsemen.Anothergroupwere called Ustads. These were servants (eunuchs?),blackand white, boughtfor service. They numbered30,000horsemen. Anothergroupwas called "palace men" (Sardyi).They were foot soldierscomingfrom all countries. They had their own separate commanderwho looked after them. Each

This content downloaded from 67.115.155.19 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:28:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

484

Jere L. Bacharach

race foughtwith the weaponsof theirown country;they numberedI0,000 men. Another group was called Zanj. They all fought with the saber and are said to number30,000 men.
Irrespective of the impossibility of an army that large - 215,000 men - the

breakdown of troops by race illustrates the major role Africans had come to play. First, 30,000 infantrymen, called Zanj by Nasir-i Khusrau are listed. More startling was the appearance for the first time of large numbers of African cavalry, including 20,000 Masmudis, some of the Ustads,59 and possibly the "slaves by purchase."60 On the other hand, the relatively few Turks reflected the financial and geographical problems of importing large numbers of them. Based on these figures of over 50,000 Africans, the Turks had reason to worry. In fact, the military threat was even more serious than the numbers implied because, for the first time since early Abbasid times, one ethnic/racial group formed both infantry and cavalry units. In addition, the nature of stereotyping in the Islamic world, where all "peoples" of one geographical area were lumped together created a common identity between these cavalry and infantry units which, because of military roles, were normally rivals. The now inevitable clash between African and Turk came about, but not through al-Mustansir's mother's machinations. In Jumada I 454/July 1062, a group of Africans killed a drunken Turk who had drawn his sword on them.6' This incident was the spark that touched off a civil war between the Mamluks and Africans. The intensity of the resulting battles illustrates the fourth point made in the introduction: the impact of the creation of an African cavalry on the level of fighting. The Turks, now numbering 6,000 and knowing they were outnumbered, established an alliance with the Berber and Arab cavalries. The reliability of these two groups was questionable as they had to be bribed into joining. More significant was the Turks' decision to recognize a Turk named Nasir al-Dawlah, a descendant of the Hamdanid dynasty, as their leader.62 Ruthless and interested only in aggrandizing his own power and wealth, Nasir al-Dawlah was an outstanding military leader. The Africans were informed of the Turkish plans by a wazir who had aided the dowager earlier.63 They gathered their 50,000 cavalry and infantry troops near their quarters. Sometime in late 454 or early 455/1062-1063, a battle took place at Qum Rish. The Turks were initially defeated but, while retreating, set up an ambush. The Africans, breaking rank, rushed after the Turks, got caught in the ambush, and panicked. The Turks and their supporters then turned on the Africans and slew, according to the sources, 40,000, with the remaining Africans fleeing to Upper Egypt. In Rabi' I 456/April 1063 it is recorded that Nasir al-Dawlah killed another I,000 African infantrymen.64 The problem of numbers aside, it is apparent that the Africans had suffered a severe loss. Turkish tactics and leadership were critical factors in their success. They were militarily superior to the African forces, whose leaders are not even identified in the chronicles. I believe the Mamluk military superiority and their prejudices against Africans were not the primary motives behind the

This content downloaded from 67.115.155.19 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:28:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

African Military Slaves in the Medieval Middle East

485

battles. An African victory in the power struggle meant the elimination of the Turkish military role, as the sub-Saharan troops were serving at that moment both as cavalry and infantry. The Turks were fighting for their military, political, and economic life and the intensity of the warfare reflected it. The victory of Nasir al-Dawlah did not end the role of African military troops. The dowager continued to send them financial and military aid. Thus, they were able to regroup in Upper Egypt and, by 459/1067, a force of 15,000 African infantrymen and cavalry gathered at Giza across the Nile from Cairo. Once more the Turks went to al-Mustansir to complain about the activities of his mother. This time she had some of her African servants attack the Turks visiting the palace. Those that survived fled and were joined on the outskirts of Cairo by Nasir al-Dawlah and the remaining Turkish forces. Nasir al-Dawlah vowed to break the Africans' power or be killed. He crossed to Giza and for three days engaged in battle until he was victorious. The surviving Africans fled once more to Upper Egypt while Nasir al-Dawlah turned his attention to the African troops in Cairo, which he killed. The only significant African military force in the Delta, at Alexandria, surrendered after a siege of the city. It appears that they only had to accept Nasir al-Dawlah's appointment as governor of Alexandria.65 Nasir al-Dawlah continued to expand his personal power at the expense of everyone else. The Africans who had fled to Upper Egypt after the defeat of 459/1067 disrupted Nasir al-Dawlah's plans. They cut the Nile trade route and seized the local revenues. In Ramadan 460/August o168 a Turkish commander led a new force to Upper Egypt to deal with the African troops. Once more the Turks were initially defeated and were forced to flee to Cairo. As in the past, they went to al-Mustansir, blaming him for aiding the Africans. This time they again regrouped under Nasir al-Dawlah's leadership, engaged the Africans in Upper Egypt, and put them to rout.66 For all intents and purposes, this civil war ended the power of the Africans during the reign of al-Mustansir. Nasir al-Dawlah became the most powerful figure in all the Fatimid lands, even to the point of excluding many of the Turks from a share in the spoils. In 465/1073 a group of Turks reacted by slaying him. As for Caliph al-Mustansir, his position was still very precarious and he called for external aid, his Armenian governor in Acre, Badr al-Jamali. The Armenian general reached Egypt in 466/ 1074 and set about taking over the country. In 469/1076 he led an expedition to Upper Egypt, ending what little local power the remaining Africans and local Arab bedouins had maintained. For the African military troops the first half of al-Mustansir's reign represented the zenith of their power. For the first and only time they had been represented in both cavalry and infantry. Their "blackness" had given them a common identity as opposed to Turk, Berber, and Arab. The warfare had been "racial" in that it was primarily African vs. Turk, but these ethnic designations are also labels to describe two military groups involved in a deadly struggle for power. The Africans' weakness and eventual loss were due to their lack of an outstanding leader and the covert nature of support from al-Mustansir's mother. The fact that the African forces included cavalry intensified

This content downloaded from 67.115.155.19 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:28:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

486

Jere L. Bacharach

the warfare. The possibility of desertion for either African cavalry or infantry did not exist and this condition increased the level of warfare.

BADR AL-JAMALI

TO SALADIN

(SALAH AL-DIN)

Egypt under Badr al-Jamali (466-487/1073-1094) and his son al-Afdal (487-515/I092-I 12I) experienced a period of relative tranquillity. But, as in the case of their predecessors, these Armenian wazirs needed an army and, as was the tradition, it was composed of both infantry and cavalry organized along racial lines. The most important change was the use of large numbers of Armenians for infantrymen.67 Badr al-Jamali did not reject the use of African military slaves who came to serve in his army.68The major force created during this Armenian era was called the Juyushiyyah after Badr al-Jamali Amir alJuyfish. A number of sources indicate that this military unit was composed of Africans.69 Another military group which was created during this period was the Rayhaniyyah.70 One source implies that the Rayhaniyyah were African.71 In fact, the exact racial composition and size of the Juyushiyyah and Rayhaniyyah cannot be established. Most of the events between the murder of al-Afdal in 515/I 168 and Saladin's clash with African military slaves in 564/1168 need not concern us. The story is a depressing one of power struggles among various wazirs with their supporting forces, while very young Fatimid princes were placed on the throne as caliphs. What is of interest is that African military slaves were involved on both winning and losing sides. References also exist to the growing role of Armenians, such as the creation in 526/II31 of an Armenian force, the Yanisiyya, by the Armenian wazir Yanis,72 who was then poisoned by order
of Caliph al-Hafiz (524-544/I 130-1149).

In 528/1134 two of the sons of al-Hafiz, Haydara and Hasan, became involved in a major power struggle. Hasan won and in the process used Juyushiyyah against the Rayhaniyyah. Large numbers on both sides were killed. According to the historian, al-Dawadari, the African slaves were victorious.73 In the meantime, Bahram, an Armenian general, entered Cairo with a force of 20,000 infantry and cavalrymen, primarily Armenian. He succeeded in controlling the Africans, restoring order, and having himself named wazir.74 The most unusual aspect of this entire affair was that Bahram was a Christian!75 By 531/1137 the fear that Bahram and his Armenian supporters were going to force Muslims to convert led to a successful revolt by Ridwan who, ironically, was not Shi'ite but Sunni. Bahram fled Cairo to Qus and Aswan where he was defeated by a force of African military slaves. Unlike most of the later Fatimid wazirs, he died a natural death.76 The wazirate of Ridwan ended with his removal from office in 533/I 139 and his flight from Egypt. In 542/1146, however, he returned to Cairo with a large military force, but Caliph al-Hafiz was able to make an alliance with the head of the African troops and in the ensuing battle Ridwan was slain and his head sent to the caliph as a sign of victory.77

This content downloaded from 67.115.155.19 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:28:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

African Military Slaves in the Medieval Middle East

487

Tales of coups and blood continued, with numerous wazirs and even caliphs being murdered. This bloody military and political history of the Fatimid government from al-Afdal to Saladin illustrates again the necessity of studying each incident in relative isolation. There is no real sense of development or change during these years in the role of African military slaves. Africans continued to be used as infantry by caliphs and wazirs. Evidence that these African troops had a special sense of loyalty to the Fatimid dynasty, particular caliphs, or even individual wazirs is lacking. They fought on different sides at different times; they appeared to be interested in improving if not preserving their position in Fatimid society. Thus, whatever social views were held by the various combatants, they do not appear to be the only or even the most important factor for explaining the fate of the African military slaves. By the time Saladin became wazir, the Africans, who may have numbered 50,000, served as the primary infantry force for the Fatimid caliphate.78 They were aided in their role by Armenians who also served as infantrymen. With a few exceptions, some of which are noted above, the Arab chronicles are even more silent on the history and fate of Armenian troops than they are for African military slaves. Even M. Canard's study of Armenians under the Fatimids has very little on their military role in this period.79 While no systematic study of "racial" attitudes toward Armenians in medieval Islamic society exists, it is safe to say that Armenians as fighters were considered inferior to Turks and, as infantrymen, were deemed less valuable than cavalry. I have not been able to determine if they were considered superior to Africans as a military force. After Muhammad, the Muslim figure who has been the subject of the most studies is Saladin (ruler of Egypt 564-589/I I69-I I93).8? A critical turning point in his career was his consolidation of power in Egypt, after becoming wazir in 546/1169, as head of the cavalry forces sent by Nfir al-Din of Mosul and replacing his recently deceased uncle. The crisis began when Mu'tamin al-Khilafa - a eunuch who governed the Fatimid palace - sent a secret message to the Crusaders calling on them to coordinate an attack on Saladin and his forces so that the Kurdish Sunni leader and his troops would be eliminated. In a tale repeated in a number of chronicles, the messenger dressed in rags (but wearing new slippers) was caught by a Turk who was suspicious of the contrasting costume. Inside the slippers was found the message calling for Christian aid against the Sunni wazir. When Mu'tamin al-Khilafa learned that Saladin had intercepted his message, he became very cautious in his movements, never leaving the palace. After a while Mu'tamin relaxed his guard. Near the end of Dhu-l-Qa'da 564/ August II69 Saladin struck and had him killed. The events known as "the battle of the blacks" or "the battle of the slaves" have been recorded by a number of sources. The account of Ibn al-Athir is as follows: Then the Africans [al-Sudan]who were in Misr became furious on account of the killingof Mu'taminal-Khilafa,theirprotector,because he had been close to them. They mobilizedand gathereduntil their numbersincreasedto over 50,000. They intendedto

This content downloaded from 67.115.155.19 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:28:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

488

Jere L. Bacharach

battle Saladin's [Salahiyyah]army. He also gathered an army and they fought one anotherbetween the two palaces. Many were killed on both sides. Saladinsent troopsto the Africans'lodgingsknownas al-Mansura [nearBab Zuwaila] and set fire to their possessions, [killing]childrenand women. When the news reached the Africans[in the city], they fled. Saladinattackedthem with swords and closed their escape routes. After many of them had been killed, the Africansasked for peace. They were given a positive answer and many of them left Misr for Giza. Shamsal-DinTuranShah, Saladin'soldest brother,crossed over to Giza with a group of [Saladin's]army and cut the Africansto pieces. There remainedamong them only a few fugitives.8' This incident was an extremely serious blow to the position of African military slaves, but it did not mark their final act in medieval Egyptian military history. Four years later (568/ 173), in a story reminiscent of the events after the clash between Nasir al-Dawlah and the Africans in Cairo in 455/I062, Africans who had fled to Upper Egypt joined a general revolt to remove Saladin and the Ayyubid family and restore the Fatimid dynasty, which had ended in 567/ I71. This time Saladin sent another brother (al-'Adil) against the Africans and other troops. The Ayyubid forces were victorious.82 Modern scholars stress different aspects of the battles between Saladin and the Africans. For Professor Ehrenkreutz, who gives the most detailed account of the encounter, the event illustrates the excessive methods that Saladin was willing to use to consolidate his hold over Egypt.83 Professor Lewis stresses the racial nature of the conflict, but in the following context: "Although the conflict was not primarily racial, it acquired a racial aspect, which is reflected in some of the verses composed in honor of Saladin's victory."84 A third approach - and the one I have used in this study - is to study the event in terms of military history. In this case another element must be added to the story. The Armenian troops aided the Africans in their resistance to Saladin's forces and they were also wiped out.85 By the end of the fighting in 546/1169, the Fatimid infantry had been destroyed, their possessions seized, and their lands confiscated. There is no religious or racial reason why Africans and Armenians should have been more loyal to Fatimids than Arabs, Berbers, Dailimi, Turks, or any other group. But there was a military reason. The army that Saladin brought to Egypt was composed only of cavalry. He was to continue this anti-infantry outlook during his entire career and, in his classical study of Saladin's armies, Professor H. A. R. Gibb never refers to a permanent, salaried infantry force.86 In fact, a standing, salaried infantry would return to Egypt only with the Ottomans in 923/1517.87

This new trend in terms of the composition of Islamic armies did not begin with Saladin. The idea probably originated with the Saljuqs, whose initial forces were composed of nomadic Turkomen supplemented by Turkish military slaves. The Zangids of Mosul, a Saljuq successor state, continued this tradition, which was then carried to Egypt by Saladin. For the African infantrymen the appointment of Saladin, a Kurd and Sunni, to the wazirate was not just another government change. There had been Fa-

This content downloaded from 67.115.155.19 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:28:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

African Military Slaves in the Medieval Middle East

489

timid Shi'ite, Twelver Shi'ite, Sunni, and even Christian wazirs before Saladin. Saladin, however, represented a totally new philosophy in terms of the use of military forces. Africans and, by extension, Armenians, faced a bleak future. Even if the Fatimid caliphate was retained by Saladin, which was doubtful, their military role would come to an end. The ferocity of the African attack on Saladin's troops was a result of the Africans' concern for survival. Unlike earlier periods when desertions to join opposing forces could take place across occupational and racial lines, the Africans had no opportunity to switch sides. The general prejudice against Africans (and Armenians) serving as cavalry only increased their isolation from the new military order. When the military engagement took place, the Africans were fighting for their lives and their livelihood. Only a Fatimid caliphate, whose wazirs supported the concept of a mixed military force, offered them a future role in Egyptian society. With the demise of that model for a military organization, the history of African military slaves in Egypt in the medieval period came to an end.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

The history of the use of African military slaves is not only a chronicle of race prejudice, although such prejudice undoubtedly figured in many of the events and, no doubt, affected the attitudes of Arab chroniclers recording these events. The more significant context is Muslim military history itself. The first Muslim armies were ethnically/racially homogeneous and were composed primarily of Arab cavalry. By the time of the Umayyads, if not under the Rashidun, non-Arab forces were regularly serving Muslim rulers and these troops were often grouped according to ethnic/racial lines. At the same time another military change was happening: infantry troops were becoming part of the regular military establishment. By the Abbasid era the Muslim military reflected an organizational pattern more familiar to the pre-Islamic Fertile Crescent than to the Arabia of Muhammad. Arabs now governed former Byzantine and Sassanian lands and used many of their earlier forms of administration. In addition, there were not enough Arabs to control all the lands effectively. The most important Muslim innovation at this time was the creation of units of imported military slaves as the primary military force, the most famous being Turkish cavalry.88 These young men came from beyond the Islamic frontiers and added new peoples to an empire which was already multiracial/ethnic. Unfortunately, the Arab chronicles do not permit the establishing of a clear date when African military slaves were first used. The interaction of numerous peoples with the Arabs led, naturally, to another development. There emerged in Muslim society a series of stereotypes vis-avis non-Arabs. The emergence of "we/they" categories brought, as always, a sense of the superiority in the people who established the definitions.89 Within the Eastern Mediterranean world, and by the third/ninth century, these stereotypical attitudes were reinforced by employment patterns. In both the preIslamic Arabian world and the Byzantine Empire, cavalry was considered su-

This content downloaded from 67.115.155.19 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:28:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

490

Jere L. Bacharach

perior to infantry, and the belief grew that the best cavalry was composed of Turkish military slaves. In fact, this became a circular relationship: Turkish military slaves were the best cavalry and the best cavalry were Turkish military slaves. Africans were considered inferior to Turks; they were also stereotyped as infantry, which was inferior to cavalry. Therefore, African military slaves by color and occupation were considered of less importance than Turks. In summary, African military slaves entered the Islamic world because a real need existed. They were to serve as infantry. Paralleling the experience of other ethnic groups and reflecting the widely held view of the superiority of grouping forces by racial origin, Africans were kept together as one people, as were Arabs, Armenians, Berbers, and Turks. One factor complicating the study of these general attitudes is how the Arabic historical sources reflect and reinforce them. The chronicles are full of detailed accounts of Turkish military slaves, but rarely mention African military slaves. The attitudes of particular chroniclers toward Africans can be examined, in fact, by the degree to which they report anti-African material, for example, alMutanabbl's poetry critical of Kafir,90 the poetry composed in honor of Saladin's destruction of the African troops, or cannibalism involving Africans. On the other hand, the absence in any source of the name of a particular African military leader, other than individual eunuchs, does reflect the low status the African infantry held in the society, as well as the lack of interest on the part of chroniclers. Granted the reality of such data, assuming the existence of color prejudice does not necessarily mean that prejudice was the primary factor in explaining what happened to particular African military units. Throughout this essay I have argued the necessity of knowing the secifics of politico/military alliances and the composition of the opposing armies. Such knowledge leads, for example, to a generalization on the pattern of desertion which took two forms. In one pattern, all the troops loyal to a particular commander changed sides and came to fight for a new paymaster. But in the second form, the occupational and racial patterns of the opposing forces were critical. Arab cavalry serving Byzantine forces at Yarmuk, or Turkish cavalry under Romanus Diogenes at Manzikert, could join Muslim armies and continue serving as cavalry alongside troops of a similar ethnic/racial background. The case of the Zanj/Abbasid African infantry switching sides provides another clear example. On the other hand, if the opportunity to serve on the side of the potentially victorious force did not exist then, I have argued, resistance to these troops increased. There are no ethnic, racial, religious, or geographical reasons why African troops should be more loyal to particular rulers than Turks, Dailimi, or Armenians. And, when given the opportunity, as in the late Fatimid period, the African military forces were as unreliable as any other group. Only when the possibility of alternative employment did not exist were the Africans "loyal" to the end. Finally, whatever the economic, political, or even linguistic impact of the Saljuq invasions, they did involve a fundamental change in the makeup of

This content downloaded from 67.115.155.19 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:28:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

African Military Slaves in the Medieval Middle East

491

Muslim armies. The post-Saljuq armies were composed of free cavalry and Turkish military slaves. Infantry were used for limited purposes, such as siege warfare, and did not constitute an essential (and thus regularly salaried) component of the new military. The Saljuq model was carried westward. The post1055 armies of Baghdad lacked Dailimites; the post-I I68 armies of Cairo lacked Africans. The Fertile Crescent and Egypt had come under the control of military leaders with a concept of military organization very different from the earlier forms. The history of African military slaves in medieval Iraq and Egypt is not one of constant change. A particular idea of how armies should be organized came to be accepted by Muslim rulers. Cavalry and infantry were needed and, in the belief that they were more loyal, troops of a non-Islamic slave origin tended to be used. Africans served almost exclusively as infantrymen. Their actual power was limited, although this varied in particular cases. They continued their role as infantry until a new cavalry-based concept of military organization was imposed on Egypt and the Fertile Crescent. There is an architectural development which may be related to this change in military organization. By the time of the Umayyads the center of political power in Egypt and the Fertile Crescent was located in urban centers in a series of buildings I would call the "mosque/palace/barracks" complex.91 Whether one investigates the urban history of Damascus or Aleppo, Fustat or al-Qata'i', Baghdad or Samarra, and many other cities, the governmental center is found to have been on a physical level with the rest of the city. In each case there was a mosque/palace/barracks combination where the governor (or caliph) and his troops, both infantry and cavalry, were housed. As mentioned earlier, troops were housed according to geographical or ethnic/racial categories. There may have been a wall between this complex and the city population, but it does not appear to have been critical. The existence of a citadel was also not essential because it did not serve as the center of governmental power; at the most, it was a place of retreat or refuge. If the mosque/palace/barracks complex within and on a level with a city characterized the pre-Saljuq urban history of the Fertile Crescent, then the use (and often building) of the citadel was critical for the later period. The citadel was not just another locale in which a mosque/palace/barracks was found; it was physically distinct from the rest of the city. The citadel dominated its environment, as did the man on horseback. The number of troops which had to be housed was also much smaller than in earlier periods. This also permitted the use of the citadel as the locale for the government and the military. Thus, the end of the use of African military slaves was more than the demise of a particular body of foreign military slaves. It represented the end of the early Islamic concepts of how the military was organized and where political power was to be physically located.
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

This content downloaded from 67.115.155.19 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:28:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

492
NOTES

Jere L. Bacharach

Author's note: The research for this study was partly funded by grants from the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Fulbright-Hays Faculty Research Abroad Program and I am most grateful for their support. I wish to thank my colleagues in the University of Washington's History Research Group and Professors Caroline Bynum and Judah Bierman for their constructive comments. 'The many excellent works of David Ayalon reflect this approach. A number of his articles can be found reprinted in D. Ayalon, The Mamluk Military Society (London, I980), and his "Preliminary Remarks on the Mamluk Military Institution in Islam," in War, Technology and Society in the Middle East, V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp, eds. (London, 1975), pp. 44-58. 2C. E. Bosworth, "Recruitment, Muster, and Review in Medieval Islamic Armies," in War, Technology and Society, pp. 159-177, is a very fine introduction. A detailed study of the Abbasid army can be found in Jacob Lassner, The Shaping of'Abbasid Rule (Princeton, 1980), pp. I16-136. Patricia Crone, in Slaves on Horses: The Evolution of the Islamic Policy (Cambridge, 1980), does not deal with the question of the origins and development of Muslim armies in terms of the role and use of infantry. Daniel Pipes, Slave Soldiers and Islam: The Genesis of a Military System (New Haven, I98I), was not available when this study was submitted. 3David Ayalon, "On the Eunuchs in Islam," in Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, I (1979), as well as a number of his earlier works; Bernard Lewis, Race and Color in Islam (New 109-122, York, 1970). One recent survey which includes references to the secondary literature is William McKee Evans, "From the Land of Canaan to the Lord of Guinea: The Strange Odyssey of the Sons of Ham," American Historical Review, 85 (1980), 15-43. The new journal Slavery and Abolition, I (I980), contains a major bibliographical survey in its first issue. 4Although over three centuries are covered, only this one aspect of the African experience in the Islamic world is analyzed. Not investigated in the following pages, for example, are the exact sub-Saharan origins of these troops which cannot be determined from the Arabic sources. Since the origins, development, and characteristics of prejudices associated with Africans in the Near Eastern Islamic lands have been detailed by other scholars, including the work by Professor Lewis, this study presupposes that by the third century A.H./ninth century A.D. there existed prejudices and stereotypes, in which the African was seen as relatively inferior to the non-African. Finally, the careers of individual Africans, some of whom became very powerful leaders, are related to the degree that their actions affected the fate of the military units composed of Africans. 5Lewis, pp. 69-74. 6Daniel Pipes, "African Troops in Early Islamic Armies," The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 13 (1980), 94. 7Ibid.; Pipes, Slave Soldiers and Islam, pp. I59-I94. 8Alexandre Popovic, La Revolte des esclaves en Iraq au II siecle, IXe siecle (Paris, I976). 9Ibid., p. 251; T. Noldeke, Sketches from Eastern History (London and Edinburgh, 1892), p. 153; John Wansbrough, "Africa and the Arab Geographers" in Language and History in Africa, D. Dalby, ed. (New York, 1970), p. 91. '?al-Tabari, Kitdb akhbar al-rus,ul wa-al-muluk, M. J. de Goeje et al., eds. (Leiden, 1901), III, 1864, 1903, I905, 1920, 1977, 2020, 2047, 2056, 2080, 209I and 2096. "Ibid., III, 2036-2038. '2In Ramadan, 276/April, 88I, the number of Zanj requesting safe conduct reached 5,000 (Noldeke, p. I61, Wansbrough, p. 99). '3The most thorough study of the power struggle is David Waines, "Caliph and Amir: A Study in the Social and Economic Background of Medieval Political Power," Ph.D. diss., McGill University, 1974. Some of his arguments are included in his "The Pre-Buyid Amirate: Two Views from the Past," International Journal of Middle East Studies, 8 (I977), 339-348. '4Lewis, p. 70. '5"There were first of all a group of former slaves of varying origins, white such as Daylamis and Berbers, or black such as Nubians and former Zandj prisoners taken by al-Muwaffaq during the preceding reign, who were employed to form a line of troops (masaff) in the reception rooms and who were probably the origins of the corps of the Masafiyya mentioned below. There were

This content downloaded from 67.115.155.19 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:28:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

African Military Slaves in the Medieval Middle East

493

also others brought especially by al-Mu'tadid to be on duty in the "halls" (hujar) of the Palace, from which they took their name (al-Hujariyya), and placed under the cammand of eunuchs called II 80). ustadhs" (D. Sourdel, "Ghulam," E.I.2, II, '6Miskawaih, Kitab tajarid al-umam wa-ta'dqib al-himan, H. F. Amedroz and D. S. Margoliouth, eds. and trans. (London, I920-I921), IV, 227. '7Ibid., IV, 228; 'Arib b. Sa'id al-Qurtubi, Silat tarlkh al-Tabari, M. J. de Goeje, ed. (Leiden 1897), p. 50; al-Hamadani, Takmila tdrikh al-Tabari, A. J. Kana'an, ed. (Beirut, I961), p. 63. '8Miskawaih, IV, 380; al-Hamadani, p. 95. '9Jere L. Bacharach, "The Career of Muhammad Ibn Tughj al-Ikhshid: A Tenth-Century Governor of Egypt," Speculum, 50 (1975), 599-600. 20Michael C. Dunn, "The Struggle of 'Abbfsid Egypt," Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, I975. "The standard works in Western languages are Z. M. Hassan, Les Tulunides (Paris, 1933); Oleg Grabar, The Coinage of the Tulunids (New York, 1957); and various articles in the Encyclopaedia of Islam. 22A. M. Hassan, "Tfilunids," E.I.2, I, 278: al-Yaqubi, Tarlkh (Leiden, I883), II, 505-506; Ibn al-Daya, Sira Ahmad b. Tuilun(Berlin, 1894), p. I I. 23The term "Sudan" has been translated in the most general sense of African. (Y. F. Hannan, The Arabs and the Sudan [Edinburgh, I967]; al-Maqrizi, al-Mawd'iz wa-al-i'tibdr bi dhikr al-khitdt wa-al-dthir [Khitat] [Cairo, n.d.; repr. of Bulaq, 1853], II, 315; al-Balawi, Sira Ahmad b. Tuilun [Damascus, 1358/I939], p. 51). 24al-Tabari, III, 2080; al-Maqrizi, Khitat, II, 315. 25AChristian chronicle relates that Ibn Tulun squeezed the Coptic Church in order to raise funds to buy troops (Sawiris b. al-Muqaffa', History of the Patriarchs of the Egyptian Church, Yassa 'Abd al-Masih, 0. E. N. Burmester, and A. S. Atiya, eds. and trans. [Cairo: Society of Coptic actions Archaeology, 1943], II, ii; Eng., p. 104). For a more favorable view of Ahmad b. Tfiuluin's see A. S. Atiya, "Kibt", E.I.2, V., 94. 26al-Maqrizi, Khitat, II, 315; Ibn Taghri Birdi, al-Nujum al-zdhira fi muluk Misr wa-al-Qdhira, III, I5. 27Dr. Yaacov Lev, "Fatimid Policy towards Damascus (358/968-386/996): Military Political and Social Aspects" (MS), p. 8. Also see al-Qalqashandi, Subh al-a'shd (Ciaro, 1914), III, 471; and Ibn lyas, Kitdb tadrkhMisr (Bulaq, 131I/1893), I, 37. 28Ibn Taghri Birdi, III, 59; al-Maqrizi, II, 318; Lewis, p. 70. 291bnTaghri Birdi, III, 137-138. 30Lewis, p. 70. 3'Ibn Sa'id, Kitdb al-mughrib fihuld al-Maghrib, K. L. Tallquist, ed. (Helsingfors-Leiden, I899), p. 7; Ibn al-'Adim, Zubdat al-halab min tdrikh Halab, S. Dalan, ed. (Damascus, 1951), I, 92; Ibn Taghri Birdi, III, 135. 32A. S. Ehrenkreutz, "Kafur," E.I. 2, III, 418, and Charles Issawi, "al-Mutanabbi in Egypt (957-962)," in Medieval and Middle Eastern Studies in Honor of Aziz Suryal Atiya, Sami Hanna, ed. (Leiden, 1972), pp. 236-239. 33Hassan, Arabs and the Sudan, pp. 45, 57; Gernot Rotter, "Die Stellung des Negers in der islamisch-arabischen Gesellschaft bis zum XVI Jahrhundert," Ph.D. Diss., Bonn, I967, p. 65; alQalqashandi, III, 467. 34An example of the type of data available was documented in Thierry Bianquis, "La prise du pouvoir par les fatimides en Egypte (357-363/968-974)," Annales Islamologiques, II (1972); 49-108, and Yaacov Lev, "Fatimid Conquest," pp. 6-12, especially p. I I. 35Ibn Sa'id, p. 44; Lev, p. 8. 36An account of his campaigns can be found in Bacharach, pp. 599-609. 37al-Nuwayri, Nihayat al-'Arab; MS Dfr al Kutub Misriyya, Ma'arif 'ammah No. 549, XXVI, I9. 3'Bianquis, p. 72; idem, "Les derniers gouverneurs ikhchidides de Damas," Bulletin d'etudes orientales, 23 (1970), I83; Lev, p. I . 39Ibid. 40The most thorough study is Ayalon, Eunuchs, pp. 67-124. Only the first part of his study has

This content downloaded from 67.115.155.19 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:28:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

494

Jere L. Bacharach

been published. 4'Ibn Taghri Birdi, IV, 42-49; Ibn al-Dawadari, Kanz al-durar wa jdmi' al-ghurar (Cairo, 196I), VI, 141. 42Rotter, pp. 65ff. 43Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamilfi tarkh (Beirut, 1965-67), VIII, 656-661; Ibn Kathir, al-Biddya wa alnihdya (Cairo, 1348 A.H.), XI, 380; one of many discussions on the qualities of the Turks can be found in Bosworth, "Recruitment," p. 64, and Ayalon, "Preliminary Remarks," p. 56. 44Lev, p. 13. 45Ibnal-Dawadari, VI, 226. 46al-Maqrizi, Itti'dz al-hunafd' bi-akhbdr al-a'inima al-Fdtimiyyin al-khulafd' (Cairo, I971), II, 12; Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhayl tdr[kh Dimaskh (Beirut, 1908), pp. 48-49; Ibn Iyas, I, 53. al-muluk wa 47al-Maqrizi, Itt'dz, II, I Io; Ibn Kathir, XII, 9; Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam fi tdr&kh al-umam (Hyderabad, 1938), VIII, 299-300. 48Ibn al-Athir, IX, 315, is an excellent example of one account. 49Ibn Taghri Birdi, IV, i8i. 50Ibn Kathir, XII, 9. 5Ibid. 52The incident is used in this case as an example where racial elements, if the central issue, should have led to a serious problem for African troops but did not. It is not only necessary to show that racial attitudes were critical when Africans were attacked but also to explain why they were not critical at other times. 53al-Maqrizi, Itti'dz, II, 137, and 169-170. 54Ibid., pp. I69-170. 55Professor Lewis included the following story from the ninth/fifteenth century historian Ibn Tagri Birdi for the year 428/1036. "The Blacks used to wait in the alleys, catch women with hooks, strip off their flesh, and eat them. One day a woman passed through the Street of the Lamps in Old Cairo. She was fat and the Blacks caught her with hooks and cut a piece off her behind. Then, they sat down to eat and forgot about her. She went out of the house and called for help, and the chief of police came and raided the house. He brought out thousands of bodies, and killed the Blacks" (Ibn Taghri Birdi, V, 17, and Lewis, p. 7I). The story illustrates two areas of research that must still be systematically investigated. First, is there a significant correlation between antiBlack stories and a particular school of historians; specifically, do ninth/fifteenth century historians include more anti-Black material than existing earlier sources? Second, was cannibalism a widespread phenomenon? The following examples are presented to illustrate the problem. In 439/1047 word reached Cairo from Mosul that due to the plague people were eating corpses (Ibn Taghri Birdi, V, 43); even more gruesome tales are related for Egypt and the impact of the 462/1069 famine. "There appeared a man who killed his children and wife and buried their heads and extremities and sold their flesh. Then he was killed and his flesh was eaten" (Ibn Kathir, al-Biddya, XV, 99). There are variations on these tales and others in Ibn Kathir, XV, 99; al-Dawadari, VI, 37I; Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, VIII, 257-258; al-'Ayni, 'Iqd al-jumdn fi tdrnkhal-zamdn, MS Dar al-Kutub Misriyya, TairikhNo. 1084, XIX, 527-529. 56A number of sources touch on his career but the best study is Walter J. Fischel, Jews in the Economic and Political Life of Medieval Islam (New York, 1969; repr. of New York, 1937 ed.), pp. 68-89. 57Cited by Fischel, pp. 79-80. 5SBernardLewis translation in Islam from the Prophet Muhammad to the Capture of Constantinople (New York, 1974), I, 217. See also Nasir-i Khosrau, Sefer Nameh: Relation du voyages de Nasiri Khosrau, Charles Schefer, ed. and trans. (Amsterdam, 1970; repr. of Paris, I88I ed.), p. I38. 59Another example of a racially mixed military unit was the Masaffiya. See above pp. 475-476. 6?In other cases the terms 'abid and 'AbTdal-shurd have referred to African infantrymen. Here the term probably refers to cavalry. 61al-Maqrizi, Itti'dz, II, 265-267, has a long account of the civil war. 62A long notice on Nasir al-Dawlah is in Ibn al-Athir, X, 80-87.

This content downloaded from 67.115.155.19 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:28:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

African Military Slaves in the Medieval Middle East

495

63The caliph's mother relied on the support of the wazir 'Abd Allah b. Muhammad al-Babli. Another wazir, Muhammad b. Ja'far b. al-Husayn al-Maghrabi, tried to mediate between the Africans and the Turks. For a more critical view see Hasan, The Arabs and the Sudan, p. 48. 64al-'Ayni, XV, 204-205; Ibn al-Athir, X, 80-87. 65al-Maqrizi, Itti'dz, II, 273-274; Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, Mirdt al-Zamdn, XII, 98a. 66al-Maqrizi, Itti'dz, II, 275-278; al-'Ayni, XV, 243-244; Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, XII, I376. 67Muhammad Hamdi al-Manawi, al-Wizdra wa al-wuzara' fi al-'asr al-Fdtimiyyin (Cairo, n.d.), pp. I77-178; M. Canard, "Notes sur les Armeniens en Egypte a l'epoque fatimide," Annales de l'Institut d'Etudes Orintales, 13 (1955), 144. 68al-Maqrizi, Khitat, II, 3; B. J. Beshir. "Fatimid Military Organization," Der Islam, 55, (1978), 40. 69al-Manawi, p. I89. 7?al-Maqrizi, Itti'dz, III, I49. 7'Usamah ibn Munqidh, Kitdb al-I'tibar, Philip K. Hitti, trans. (Princeton, 193I), p. 30. 72al-Qalqashandi, III, 482, 502; al-Manawi, p. 178; G. M. Wickens, "al-Hafiz," E.I. 2, III, 54. 73al-Dawadari, VI, 514-515. 74According to al-Dawadari he killed many of them (VI, 515). 7Sal-Maqrizi, Itti'dz, III, I55; Ibn Muyassar, Akhbdr Misr (Cairo, I919), pp. 79 ff. 76Ibn al-Athir, X, 48; Ibn Muyassar, p. 86. 77Ibn al-Athir, X, 49; Ibn Muyassar, p. 88. 78Ibn Wasil, Mufarrij al-kurub, Gamal al-Din al-Shayyal, ed. (Cairo, I953), I, I74. 79Canard, pp. I43-I57. 8?Andrew S. Enrenkreutz, Saladin (Albany, N.Y., I972), pp. 4-9 and 263-273. More recent biographies have not added significantly to our knowledge of Saladin with the exception of R. Stephen Humphrey's chapter in From Saladin to the Mongols (Albany, N.Y., 1977), pp. I5-39. 8'Ibn al-Athir, XI, 345-347. 82Numerous chronicles include these events: Ibn Kathir, XII, 287-288; Ibn Wasil, II, I6-I7; Ibn al-Athir, XI, 414; Ibn Khallikan, Wafaydt al-A'ydn, I, 286. Among others, there is also a secondary account in Hasan, The Arabs, p. 98. 83Ehrenkreutz, pp. 76-79. 84Lewis, p. 72. 85Ehrenkreutz, pp. 78-79. 86Sir Hamilton A. R. Gibb, "The Armies of Saladin," in Studies on the Civilization of Islam, Stanford J. Shaw and William Polk, eds. (Boston, I963), pp. 74-88 (reprinted from Cahiers d'Histoire Egyptienne, ser. 3, fasc. 4 [Cairo, I95I], 304-320). 87The temporary use of African military slaves by the Mamluk sultan Muhammad b. Qayitbay (901-903/1496-1498) only confirms the prejudice held against infantry as well as the stereotyping of Africans for this role (David Ayalon, Firearms and Gunpowder in Mamluk Egypt [London, I956], pp. 67-71). 88David Ayalon, "Aspects of the Mamluk Phenomenon," Der Islam, 53 (I976), 196-225, for a more detailed discussion of some of these issues. 89A different view on the impact of these developments is found in I. K. Sundiata, "Beyond Race and Color in Islam," The Journal of Ethnic Studies VI, no. I (Spring, 1978), 1-24. Y9WhileIbn Khallikan included both the pro- and anti-Kafir poetry composed by al-Mutanabbi in his biography of Kafir, Ibn Taghri Birdi included only the negative verses. See nn 31 and 32; see also Ibn Khallikan (Beirut, 1968), IV, Ioo, and Ibn Khallikan's Biographical Dictionary, Baron MacGuckin de Slane, trans. (Paris and London, I843-I871), II, 525. 9'Oleg Grabar, "The Architecture of Power: Palaces: Citadels and Fortifications," Architecture of the Islamic World, George Michell, ed. (London, I978), pp. 48-79, esp. p. 54.

This content downloaded from 67.115.155.19 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:28:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Você também pode gostar