> % Ss 2 Stephen D. Krasner 1 systems of tune: structural realist approaches, which posit an internat ionally symmetrical, power-maximizing states acting in an anarchic env ronment. But they maintain that under certhin restrictive conditions in- volving the failure of individual action to secure Pareto-optimal outcomes. international regimes may have a significant| impact even in an anarchic ‘world. This orientation is most explicitly elaborated in the essays of Arthur Stein, Robert Keohane, und Robert Jervis; it dlno informs the analyses pre sented by Jctn Ruggie, Charles Lipson, and Benjamin Cohen. ‘The first section of this introduction develops definitions of regime and 1e change. The following section investigates various approaches to the ship between regimes, and belavior awl outcomes. The third section examines five basic causal fictors—egoistic kelf-interest. political power, diffuse norms and principles, usige and customn, and knowledge—that have been used to explain the development of regimes. Defining regimes and regime change Regimes can he defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, ules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converte in " given aren of International relations. Principles are heliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude, Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proserip- tions for action, Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice. | ‘his usage is consistent with other recent formulations. Keohane a Nye, for instance. define regimes as “sets of governing arrangements” th inchide “networks of rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behavior and control its effects.""! Haas argues that a regime encompasses a mutually coherent set of procedures, rules. and norms.” Hedley Bull. using a some- ‘what different terminology. refers to the importance of rules und institutions nMernationzal society where rules refer to “general imper which require or authorize prescribed classes of persons or groups to behave prescribed ways." Institutions for Bull help to secure adherence 10 rules by. formulating, commuicating, administering, enforcing, interpreting. legitimating, and adapting them. Regimes must be understood as something more than temporary ar- rangements that change with every shift in power or interests. Keohane notes that a basic analyiic distinction must be made between regimes and ‘her 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. Power and durniependonce (Boson Lit 197, p a thm Technolapcal Sel Refince for Latin Americ the OAS Contribution seaman Oganicaan M4 44 Nuts (HD). S88 Meey But, The Anarchival Soviets: A Sindy of Onder in Wes tun Universi Press, 1977-984 hm Structural causes and vegibie consequences agreements. Agreements fe ad fae often “one-shot” at puspove of regimes is to fgiitate agreements. Siniiry, Jervis the concept of regimes “jmplies not only norms an expectations that facilitate cooperation, but fh form of coopération that is more than ‘the fol: lowing of short-run self-interest“? For instance, he contends thatthe re Strains that have appfied jn Korea and other limited wars show! not be Considered a regime, These ced purely on short-tern calculations of interest. A changed. behavior changed! Waltz’ conception of the balance of power svhich states are driven hy © hv commitment 10 rales that e8 tion especially not destrayfng an essential actor), ‘milly. regime-gowgmned behavior must not he based soley stations of ifterest. Since regimes encompass prineples ant iy fanetion thats being maximized must embody some sr fof general obligation. One uch principle. reciprocity. is emphasized in Jer pwocity they’ will i tha ater actors will Ciprocate inthe Future, eveh if they are not under a5 se, This formula Al Higseh's b tnutual exchange nnd 10 thislextent often much more than that! Over Imesumed hy its permanenge 0 be tment of time, though. the exchange anced. tis the infusion of behavior i puishes regime-governed apivity in th Conventional activity. euided exclusively by ‘A fundanent nust be made between principles snd moss con the one hand. and-ruled and procedures on the other. Principles ant fnorms provide the basie defining characteristics of # regime. ‘There may be fnuny rules jes thal ave consistent with the fame principles and norms| Changes in cules and decision-making proce ied ta principles nl moras ac Fronts nt that there tes beet i eaning the 1970 nce-af-payments adjustment, fit net heiefil on hath sites. At any nv very unlikely to be recite inciples snd norn system from me row calculations of interes hres are changes within regione. pa tmaltered. Far insta, Bepjamin Coh substantia increase meant a change in the ules governing bal + Robert Jersic'scomtibution this wane p17 “Renmeti Walt, Theses of Inermeriomal edie tReating, Nass Ais ese ton Pots (New ik ily 198. 978) Morton Kap, Systm an Pre 12 Rapa, Fouls Pv Ieratsial Thou ies Yorke Vice Tes Teal sch He Sova Foto ts Cans Haat University Pass 1940 po4 Stephen D. Krasner it does not mean that there has been a fundamental change in the regime. The basic norm of the regime remains the same: aceéss to balance-of-payments financing should be controlled, and conditioned gn the bel ig countries. John Ruggie argues tha in general the changes in economic regimes that took place in the 1970s wefe norm-governed changes. ‘They did not alter the basic principles and norn}s of the embedded liberal regime that has been in place since the 1940s, Changes in principles und norms are changes of the rexime itself. When norms and principles are abandoned, there is either a change toa new regime or a disappearance of regimes from a given issue-area. For instance, Ruggi contends that the distinction between orthodox und embedded liberalism in- volves differences over norms and principles. Orthodox liberalism endorses increwsing the scope of the market, Embedded liberalism prescribes state don (0 contnin domesti¢ social and economic lislocations generated by kets. Orthodox and embedded liberalism define different regimes. The change from orthodox liberal principles and norris before World War IL to iples and norms after World War Il was. in Ruggie's terms, a" ry” change. Fundamental political arguments are more concerned with norms and principles than with rules and procedures. Changes in the fatter may be in- {erpreted In diferent ways. For (of international trade. in the Articles of Agreement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provide for special and differential treatment for Tess developed countries (LDCs). All indus s have instituted cherafized systems of preferences for LDCs, Such rules vi we of the basic norms of the liberal postwar order. the most-favored: of all parties. However. the industrialized nations tions in the rules as temporary departures neces: cumstances of poorer areas. At American insistence the concept of gradua tion was formally introduced into the GATT Articles after the Tokyo Round. Graduation holds that as countries become more developed they will accept rules consistent with liberal principles. Hence, Northern representatives Hs treatment of developing ies as a change within the regime. Speakers for the Third World, on the other hand, have argued that the ‘basic norms oF th ‘order should be redistribut equity, not nondisci ncy. They see the changes fas changes of the regime because they identify these changes with busic changes in principle. There is a fundamental difference between viewing cchanges.in rules as indications of ef im the regime and viewing these changes as indications uf change between regimes. The difference hinges ‘on assessinents of whether principles and norms have changed a assessments are never easy because they cannot be based on objective he- havioral observations. "We know deviations from regimes.” Ruggie avers, “aol simply by acts that are undertaken, bul by the intentionality and ac- Structural causes and regime fonsequences ceptability attributed to those acts in th to distingish thin or between mnges levision-making procedures uf u regime become less caherent, ari increasingly inconsfstent with principle ld by somet etrorists, nnd the failure to prpvide alequ indications that the classic regijne protect However. the furtive nature of hese activi norms are not being dircftly halle American diplomats by groupd sanctione: basic challenge to the re he context of subjective the weakening of a regime from s. norms. rules, and ‘al tales, at pro ‘treatment for weakened, invip the liberal regime thing else. The use of diplomatic the assassination of diplomats hy uate local police protection are all ig foreign envoys has weakened. ities indicates that basic principles n contrast, the seizure oF od by the Tranian government is 3 me itself. Iran violated principles and norms. not just rules and,procedures." | In sum, ‘change within a regime involves alterations of rules and decision-making procedures, byt not of no re of are gime involves alteration of noris and principles ie of 9 roping involves incoherence among the components of the regime or inconsistency between the regime and related, behavior. sesses, 10 pe a ing variables. stunding b rently, power and interests) and putcomes analyze regimes thus assumed the folk Figure 1, \ BASIC CAUSAL VARIABLES Regimes da no rie of thi in themselves. Once in pace the They are not merely epiphe oh Roe’ comin tis + Ira evr ony be tte revaling, Furopean derived regi. 5 ied. ternational gamut AS is editor pos This projeet began with Id be © lables (most promi: nd behavior. ‘The first attempt to ng set of causal relationships (see RELATED BEHAVIOR p> REGIMES $=» nn ourcomes Figure 1 oa tations ta aie the toa Thess Re6 i Stephen D. Krasner “The independent impact of regimes is a cehtral analytic issue. The sec- ‘ond causal arrow implies that regimes do mattdr. However, there is no gen- eral agreement on this point, and three basid orientations can be guished. The conventional steuctural views the|regime concept as useless. if fot misleading. Modified structural suggests that regimes may matter, bu tinly tne fly restective comditions. Ant ( imore pervasive, as Inherent attributes of any ebmples, persistent putter human behavior. in this volume Susan Strange represents {he first orientation. She has rave reservations about the value of the notion of regimes. Strange argues that the concept is pernicious because it obfuseates and obscures the inter- and power relationships that are the proximate. not just the ultimate, -cauise of behavior in the international system.|“*All those international ar- Tangements dignified by the label regime are only oo easily upset when either the balance of bargaining power or the perception of national interest (or both together) change among those states, who negotiate them.'"* Re- times, Ir hey can be sk trave bite or no impact, They are merely epiphenomenal. he underlying causal schematic is one that sees direct connection between changes in basic dausal factors (whether eco- ‘nomic oF political) and changes in behavior and outcomes. Regimes are ex- cluded completely. or their impact on outcomes and related behavior is re- farded as t Strange’s position is consistent with prevailing intellectual orientations for analyzing social phenomena. These structural orientations conceptualize a world of rational self-seeking actors. The actors may be individuals. or firms, or groups, or classes. or states. They funétion in a system or environ- iment that is defined by their own interests, power, and interaction. These Orientations are resistant to the eontention that principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures have 1 significant impact on outcomes and be: havior. ' ‘Nowhere is this more evident than in the image of the market, the reigning analytic conceptualization for economics, the most successful ofthe social sciences, A market is characterized by inipersonality between buyers and sellers, specialization in buying and selling. and exchange based upon prices set in erms of a common medium of exchange." Max Weber states that in the maiket “social actions are not determined by orientation to any sort of norm which is held to be valid, nor do they rest on custom, but entirely on the fact that the corresponding type of social action isin the halure of the ease best alapted to the normal inlerests ofthe actors as they themselves are aware of them." ‘The market is a world of atomized. self- seeking egoistic individuals. * Susan Strange’ contsbation to this volume, p. 245. ‘Cyr Belshow, Tredinal Exchange und Madera Markets (Englewood Cis, NJ Prentice-Hall, 1965, wp 89. Mn Weber mma id Sondete Berkeley. University of Clan Press 197), 30. Seructurul causes and regint consequences The market is powerful metaphor for many arguments inthe liter of political science, not relutions, ‘The recent work of Kenneth Waltz exemplifies this orientation. For Wallz. the defining charac leristie of the international system is that iis component parts (states) are Functionally et i a ¢ environment. International ssysteins ate di nitions of vetative apa ities i own sell interest, Ata ini mn presers num, drive for universat domination.” The) are constrained only by their interaction with ‘other states in the system, Behavior is, therefore, « funtion of the distribt tion of power among hu the position of exch particular state. Wh power distributions change. behavior will also change. Regimes. for Waltz can only be one small step removed from the underlying power capabilities that sustain them.! The second orientation tq regimes, modified structural, is most clearly Feflected in the essays of Kephane and Stein, Both of these authors start from a conventional struct realist perspective, 1 workl af sove g to muximize their interest and power. Keohane posits th ternational system regimes derive fom voluntary ngreen ally equal actors. Steip states that the “conceptusliz gimes developed here is rooted in the classic characterization af interna: nal politics as relations betyeen sovereign entities dedicated (o their own self preservation, ult le to depend only on themselves, pared to resort to force." Ina world of sovereiga st nate state behavi \desired outcomes Such coordination is attractive under sever K have a comes could not be of self-interest. The prisoners’ sic gam ple, Stein also argues that regis jonomous effect an out comes when purely autonomous behavior could lead to disastrous results fi both parties. The game of chicken is the game-theoretic analog, Haas hers in this volume suggest that regimes may have significant impact in highly complex world in intl hoe, indivi calculations of interest regimes is to coon: particular issue-arens."* circumstances. Stein and ay Pareto-optimal could not possibly provide the hecessary level of coordination, If, as many hhave argued, there is a general inovement toward a world of complex inter 1 Walt, henry of Pernationd Relivo BUR Ii espctlly chapter and 6. This conventional sectors view fr the sai ch ‘sits aalog in Marat aay to sae ha foc excl o tehigyaad” "Roler (, Keohane’ anu Arthur A Steins contributions otis vok= Vinod K. Agewrvaleriphasizes thi pot. See hie "Hanging Regime Change inthe Textl-Apparel Sstem, 1990-1979," PLD de Wah chap.