ON VAGUENESS, SoRITES, AND PUTNAM’S “INTUITIONISTIC STRATEGY” The challenges which sorites like (1) A fellow with no hairs is bald (2) Ifa fellow with n hairs is bald, then a fellow with n + 1 hairs is bald (3) Thus, a fellow with any number of hairs is bald, present hardly require introduction. Neither is it necessary to elaborate at length upon the range of puzzles—Parfit’s Persons, Theseus’ Ship, and Chisholm’s Paradox—which turn upon Sorites-style inferences. Suffice it to say that sorites complicate the day in a number of diverse metaphysi- cal endeavors, This fact makes sorites worthy of study in their own right, with the hope of hitting upon a general strategy applicable in each context in which sorites arise. In pursuit of this goal, of course, the first step is to diagnose the source of the problem: what general feature of sorites is responsible for their paradoxical flavor? In his careful studies of the subject, Crispin Wright suggests a plausible candidate: sorites paradoxes, he urges, stem from the vagueness of the predicates (e.g., ‘bald’) appearing in the de ductions.! Our discussion accepts Wright’s diagnosis as apt and surveys £ straightforward treatment of vague predicates which promises to dispel their sorites-susceptibility. Specifically, we will first recount a consitiera- tion—what Wright dubs the “No Sharp Boundaries” paradox—which militates in favor of a link between sorites and vagueness. This done, we then introduce Hilary Putnam’s observation which, he suggests, remedies vague predicates’ sorites-vulnerability: if we only admit intuitionistic inferencé-rules in our logical treatment of vague predicates, then vague predicates'no longer give rise to sorites-style paradoxes (1983, 311-14), “On Vagueness, Sorites, and Putnam's “Intuitionistic Strategy” by Timothy Chambers, The Monist, vol. 81, no. 2, pp. 343-348. Copyright © 1998, THE MONIST, La Salle, Hlinois 61301.344 TIMOTHY CHAMBERS Such a simple remedy has struck many commentators as (00 good to be true*—a suspicion this essay aims to substantiate, Further, we suggest that the failure of Putnam's simple remedy can, itself, be shown by a quite simple consideration, Why link the sorites paradox with vagueness? Wright's explanation proceeds as follows. Consider the following trio of claims, each of which carry intuitive weight. First, the sorites invite the folllowing first-order regimentation (compare (1)-(3) above) (1*) BO). 2") (a) (Bt) > Bn + 1). 3*) Thus, (n) B(n). Second, we accept classical first-order logic in detiving logical conse- quences of (1*) through (3*). Finally, an immediate consequence of classi fying a predicate as vague is to deny that it has sharp boundaries; in the example at hand, we say that there is no number, k, such that a fellow with hairs is bald, yet a fellow with k + 1 hairs is not. Hereafter, we refer to these principles as the Regimentation, Classical, and Tolerance Con- straints, respectively. What we will see, presently, is that we must surrender at least one these intuitive constraints—for the trio is all we need to invite paradox, Suppose we have a sorites-series of fellows—a first with no hairs, the second with a single hair, and so forth. Then the Classical Constraint underwrites a dichotomy: either (x) (B(x) > B(x + 1)) or Gx) (B(x) & “B(x + 1)) is true of the series. Yet we can’t embrace the former disjunct; for it ensnares us in the sorites paradox, by the Regimentation Constraint (compare expression (2*)). So we must opt for the latter disjunct. Yet this tack, too, is unsatisfactory, as accepting the latter disjunct contradicts the Tolerance Constraint. So, on pain of taking vague predicates as semanti- cally incoherent, we must reject one of our constraints, Putnam suggests that we reject the Classical Constraint, Because observe that our proceeding from rejecting our initial dichotomy’s former disjunct to affirming the latter one presupposes the classical inference rules, [>(n) Fn / (Sn) Fn] and (7(p > q) / (p & q)]. On the other hand, the intuitionistic first-order calculus sanctions neither of these rules. Hence Putnam's suggestion: “treat vague predicates . . . as predicates which are not decidable are treated in Intuitionistic logic” 983,31.ON VAGUENESS 345 Does this alluringly simple move dispel vague predicates’ sorites- susceptibility? In a pair of subsequent exchanges, Putnam has defended his suggestion against the charge that sorites-style paradoxes—now un- derwritten by intuitionistic inferences alone—spring up anew.* Read and Wright, for instance, argue that if we read Putnam's sug- gestion as committing us to the negated existential, (4) 7G@x) (Bx & AB(x + 1), then, from (4), we can intuitionistically infer (x)(B(x) > 77B(x + 1)). But this yields, in tur, that iterated contraposition allows us to infer, for any even k, that: (x)(—#B(x) > +2 B(x + 1))—where “—#” denotes negations, With this principle established, a contradiction is rapidly in the offing. Because on one hand, B(0) and repeated application of the principle give (5) 10.000 B(5,000). Yet if we plausibly suppose that a fellow with five thousand hairs is not bald, then -B(5,000); thus, by repeated applications of double-negation addition rule, we get (6) 7(799°8 B(5,000)). Yet (6) contradicts (5); “So the paradox,” Read and Wright conclude, “is with us yet” (1985, 57). f Putnam's rejoinder to this criticism is straightforward. He points out that by no means should his suggestion to be read as including a commit- ment to claim (4): “accepting the negation of [(x) (B(x) > B(x + f))], which we must do, I think, while not inferring [(Ax)(B(x) & B(x + 1)], is not the same as denying [(@x)(B(x) & “B(x + 1)]. In my proposal, [it] is not denied” (1985, 203). Instead, Putnam concludes that & ‘What the Read-Wright argument does show, in fact, is that I should deny [Gx)B() & >B(x + 1)] denial—that is, I should accept the double negation. of (Gx)tB(x) & 4B(x + 1)]. This is in keeping with a suggestion I did make, that one can use the double negation of a vague sentence to express one’s attitude to it (1985, 203, emphasis his).