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Literature Review Prudential regulation often imposes regulatory capital requirements in order to create the necessary cushion to protect

banks against unexpected losses and ultimately failure (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994; Goodhart et al., 2003; Pennacchi, 2005; Goodhart, 2008; amongst others). One of the principles in the design of capital requirements is to make them risk sensitive, obliging banks to put aside more capital when they enter into more risky positions. Therefore the efficiency of regulatory capital requirements is intrinsically linked to their capacity to make low capital buffers banks rebuilt their buffers by simultaneously raising capital and lowering risk. However, capital requirements may not contribute to reduce banks risk-taking behavior and can even create perverse effects on bank safety (Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Kim and Santomero, 1988; Clare, 1995; Blum, 1999). Ediz et al. (1998), Aggarwal and Jacques (1998, 2001), Rime (2001) and Van Roy (2008) found that banks reacted to the regulatory pressure by adjusting their capital ratios primarily through capital rather than through risk.

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