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Prolif Stuff Copy

Prolif Stuff Copy

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Published by: malkr on Oct 20, 2009
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04/25/2013

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Prolif causes pre-emptive strikes by weaker states

Beckman 2k [Peter, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, et al, The Nuclear Predicament:
Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century, 3rd edition, p. 6]cn

There are, of course, other reasons to be concerned. If nuclear proliferation continues, there are some potential nuclear
states that may not be politically strong and stable enough to ensure control of the weapons and
control of the decision to use them. If neighboring, hostile
, perhaps politically unstable states, such as India
and Pakistan
, have them, the temptation to strike against traditional rivals may be too hard to resist. When
the weak fear the strong, the weaker party often does what it can to maintain its security. Pakistan has
fought three wars with its
larger and more powerful neighbor, India. If it feels threatened, it might be
tempted in the future to act preemptively. Many fear that states that are radical at home
, say a Libya, will
recklessly use their nuclear weapons in pursuit of revolutionary ends
abroad. In some of the new nuclear states,
civil control of the military may be weak. Nuclear weapons may fall into the hands of military officers

more inclined to use them.

Despite uncertainty, military leaders will plan and seriously consider preemptive strikes

Fetter 96 [Steve, associate professor in the School of Public Affairs at the University of
Maryland, "Nuclear Deterrence and the 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis," International Security, v21
nl, Summer, p. 179 ]cn

Although no prudent leader should have confidence in the ability of preemptive or counterforce strikes to limit
damage to an "acceptable" level, that does not mean that such attacks will not be planned and seriously
considered
during a crisis. The fact that U.S. and Soviet planners could not have confidence in the ability of counterforce
strikes to limit damage did not prevent military officials from planning counterforce attacks. As late as 1961, the U.S.
military believed that massive preemptive strikes "should permit the United States to prevail in the event of a general nuclear war," even though they
believed that "some portion of the Soviet long-range nuclear force would strike the United States." Some military leaders went so far as to
recommend a preemptive attack
, despite the fact that the Soviet Union's nuclear capabilities at the time far exceeded those of India or
Pakistan today. Without reliable information on the nuclear doctrines of proliferators, it would be unwise to
assume that military officials in these countries will not also plan such attacks and recommend their
implementation during a crisis
.

Arizona Debate Institute 2009

21

Frappier/Russell/Stables Lab

Prolif Core

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