1

The Art of Navigating the North Atlantic Ocean: Columbus in the Search of Cipango

Renato Pereira Brandão∗

Revision and translation of “O Engano de Colombo na Procura do Oriente”. In A cruz

de Cristo na Terra de Santa Cruz: A geopolítica dos descobrimentos e o domínio
estratégico do Atlântico Sul. PhD thesis in Social History, Federal Fluminense
University, Rio de Janeiro State, Brazil.

The version of the discoveries of the Americas which is the most accepted and
widespread, even in academic circles, purposes that it was a natural development from the
knowledge gained by Portugal and Spain from the practice of sailing in the Atlantic
between the 14th and 15th centuries. Drawing on the nautical expertise gained by the
discoveries of islands and exploration of Africa’s Western coast, Spanish and Portuguese
sailors searched for a way round the Turkish blockade on the trade with the West after the
fall of Constantinople, in 1943. Therefore, their aim was not to discover the ‘New World’
but to arrive at the Eastern Ports where they could resume direct trade. Moreover whilst
the Portuguese aim was to arrive at the Indies by navigating straight to the East, the
Genovese Mariner Christopher Columbus’s conviction that the Earth was sphere shaped
led him to suggest to the Spanish Monarchy a route that would go in the opposite direction
to the one envisaged by the Portuguese, which meant, reaching the East by sailing towards
the west. By reaching the Americas yet believing that he had arrived in the East, Columbus
ended up revealing the existence of a New World. Soon after, the Portuguese Pedro Álvares
Cabral discovered Brazil, by following the route indicated by Vasco da Gama, the
discoverer of a new route to the Indies. Henceforth the doors to the Americas and the
Eastern Ports became open to the Portuguese and Spanish Crowns.
However, this version is built on a gross historical error. This refers to the claim
that the Turks had created a blockade on the trade routes with the West. In truth, the fall
of Constantinople had little effect on the trade with the East. As it not only also relied on
the Syrian Ports, which were supplied by the Persian Gulf’s route, but more importantly by
the port of Alexandria in Egypt. As it had become by the 16th century the most important
port for the East-West trade market. Moreover, by receiving a constant flux of goods
derived from the Indian Ocean and Red Sea’s route, Alexandria welcomed mainly the fleet

∗
Titular Professor of Modern History of the International Relations Course. Estácio de Sá University,
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
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of the Venetian merchants. As after defeating Genoa in the battle of Chioggia in 1380, the
Venetians had gained the monopoly on the trade with the East.
Furthermore in principle, it would not would have been economically viable to
establish a route in the Atlantic, being that in a Western direction, such as the one adopted
by Columbus, or the East, as the one adopted by the Portuguese, in direct competition to
the route dominated by the Venetians. As the distance to be travelled in those routes are no
less than ten times longer than the Mediterranean route.
For this venture to be economically viable, it would have been necessary to develop
large vessels, which would compensate for the increase in the distance by the sheer size of
the volume that could be transported. On the other hand, a vessel which is capable to
transport at least ten times more in weight than the Venetian vessels, would have to have
been so heavy, that it would need to be propelled not only by the wind but also, far more
importantly by the sea currents.
In view of these adversities, in the 15th century, the Portuguese maritime trade in
the African Coast had been limited up to the Guinean Golf. From there onwards, this
coast is swept by the current of Benguele which, by flowing in a south to north direction, it
impeded the access of the Portuguese ships to the South African coast. The utilization of
caravels came to allow the Portuguese to exploit the African Coast to the south of the
Guinean Gulf. However the excellent navigability of this type of vessel had as a
counterweight the limited cargo capability, which resulted in it being unsuitable for the
supply of Western markets of eastern goods.
Therefore, due to these apparent impossible obstacles, the nations that were part of
the trading market in the Mediterranean, including the kingdom of Aragon, believed that
the Portuguese Maritime expansion would have been limited to the implementation of
trading posts in the African western coast, and not as a direct competitor in the trade of
eastern goods.
When Columbus made his proposition to the monarchs of Castile and Aragon, he
did not mention any intention of obtaining goods and spices from the East, but of gold
and precious stones, in which case, if the enterprise were to succeed, would have made the
voyages profitable, irrelevant of the small volume that could be carried by the relatively
small and low costly vessels requested. O’Gorman expresses bellow the version that is
most widely accepted by historians.

The thesis is as follows: When Columbus arrived on the 12th October , 1492 in a
small island that he believed to belong to an archipelago adjacent to Japan, he had
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in fact discovered America. [...] There is no need to worry about documental

citations here, as nobody could argue with what had happened: when Columbus
sighted land, in the night between the 11th and 12th of October, 1492, he was certain
of having arrived in Asia (1992:25, 104)

In the same way, Mollat (1990:57-58) refers to the thesis above as a historical fact.
Moreover, he believes that everything could have been made simpler for the discovery of
the Americas if Columbus would not have had been blinded by the search of the island of
Cipango (Japan), for the land of Cathay (China) and of the city of Quinsay (Hangcheu) and
of Zayton (Sinkiang) during his first journey. Resulting in Columbus believing to have
found Japan in the island called Cibao by the native Indians and identified Cathay with
Cuba.
However, already during the 16th century suspicious were raised on the veracity of
Columbus claims that he had mistakenly believed to have reached the Far-East, which
resulted in him being relegated to near complete historical obscurity soon after his death.
(Wilford, 1992:1) In the beginning of the last century, the thesis which supported that
Columbus had indeed made a ‘mistake’ was again questioned by the American historian
Henry Vignaud, after demonstrating that the correspondences and maps attributed to
Toscanelli, found in the Colombina Library were in fact apocryphal and fraudulent (Dias,
1921: LXIX). Vignaud’s theory was in turn marginalized, mainly after the publication, in
1942, of the work Christopher Colombus, Mariner, written by Samuel Eliot Morison, an
American admiral. In this book he revives the version that considers Columbus' ‘discovery’
to be a complete misunderstanding, as Columbus was supposed to have wrongly believed
to have had arrived in Japan. (Morison, 1994:108-111). From then on the thesis of the
‘misunderstanding’ became accepted as the official one, on the discovery of the Americas.
The historical fragility of this thesis is so evident, that is difficult to accept its
enduring popularity, especially as the commemorations of the fifth centennial of the
discovery of the Americas came to pass, without it being re-evaluated. Therefore to begin
with, we must first consider the uncertainties surrounding Columbus' own origins. The
version that portrays Columbus as a mere waver’s son from Genoa, has been duly
accepted, not for there are any documents to prove it, but because it is considered to be the
least "imaginative” of the versions concerning Columbus origins (Heers, 1992:16).
In the same way that the primary sources concerning the voyage of discovery are
extremely scarce. Only a single document is recognised as coming from Columbus himself.
Presently found in the Archivo Nacional de Espanha, in Simanca, this document is a letter
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written to the Spanish monarchs, where he presents his journal in an abbreviated form
(Mollat, 1990:58-9).
The whereabouts of that which would be the most important documental source,
Columbus’ navigational journal, is unknown. The version which is known today is an
abbreviation made by Frei Bartolomeu de Las Casas, who would have had access to one of
the copies from the original. However, it is impossible to know how true to the originals
the Franciscan friar was in his abbreviation. Fernando Columbus, Christopher’s legitimate
son, is also believed to have had a copy of the journal, which was partly published in his
book Historie della vita e dei fatti dell’ammiranglio Don Cristoforo Colombo. Considered to be the
main historical source for the Columbus’ story, however the creditability of the documental
sources cited above are currently being questioned (Caracci, 1992:38-41)

The central question which ends the thesis of the Western discoveries is how to
explain the navigational error which resulted in Columbus mistaken the island of
Guanahani, current Watlings, in the Bahamas, with the archipelagos of Japan. For Mollat
(1990:58) this mistake was due to the errors committed by Columbus in determining the
latitudes, as he was not used to making these calculations under the tropical sky. However,
the island of Guanahani is situated above the Tropic of Cancer, which means, out of the
tropical zone, therefore, not at any moment, did Columbus in his journey from the Canary
Islands to the Guanahani sailed under tropical Skies

Moreover, it was not any errors committed in determining the latitude which made
Columbus mistake the Americas for Japan. The greatest difficulty in sailing during the time
of the discoveries was not how to determine the latitude, but how to determine the
longitude, which could only be made by estimates, therefore with little precision.
Therefore it would be an understandable mistake if were not for the dimensions of the
error committed. If we take the Canary Islands as a point of reference for the start of the
voyage, we have the following relationship:

Approximated longitude of the Canaries - 20º W

Approximated longitude of the Island of San Salvador - 75º W
Average Longitude of Japan - 140º E
Distance in degrees of longitude to be travelled from the Canaries to Japan
if taken the route to the West - (180-20) + (180-140) = 160 + 40 = 200 º.
Distance in degrees of longitude travelled from the Canaries to San Salvador - 55º
to the West.

Hence, Columbus had travelled a little over a 1/4 of the distance which separates the
Canaries from Japan when, in encountering an island, decided that he had reached his
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destination. Even if taken in consideration the small amount of precision in the calculus of
longitude by estimation, the sheer severity of this mistake is absolutely inadmissible, even
for most inexperienced, or incompetent of navigators.
There are numerous attempts to justify such error. For Morrison (1994:34), it was
in Marco Polo’s Description of The World, also known as Book of Wonders, that Columbus, in
search of the treasures described to be found in Cipango, found the information and
calculus which misled him into having this distorted notion of the distance between Spain
and Japan. However, the reading of Marco Polo’s book does not offer the possibility to
infer any sort of calculus for oceanic navigation, as it is, also, extremely succinct the
description of the Island of Cipango, as it did not even belong to the Kingdom of Kublai
Khan, for whom Marco Polo was employed (Polo,1985:188.).
Morison (ibid.) further considers that Columbus “Came to the conclusion that the world
was 25% smaller [sic] than Eratosthenes had estimated and 10% more reduced than what was taught by
Ptolemy”. However, if taken in consideration that Eratosthenes arrived at a value which is
quite close to the one which is currently accepted as expressing the Earth’s diameter, this
inaccuracy is not enough to justify such a huge mistake, as Columbus would have to have
had reduced the Earth’s dimensions to 25%, or at ¼ of the real one, and not by 25%.
Therefore, Chaunu (1972:109-110) presents, without any sort of documental information
whatsoever, a complex association of errors from the mistaken readings made by a number
of geographers, which would have resulted in Columbus extending the dimension of the
combined Europe-Asia to 225º, projected over the smallest dimension of the Earth ever
conceived.
Moreover, it needs to be taken in consideration the fact that Columbus, had as a
brother Bartholomew, who was an established cartographer in Portugal and to whom
Columbus had consulted a number of times, and certainly had known all the most
important maps made up until then. As the admiral Gago Coutinho (1945:12) notes “even
the maps at that time– such as de Martellus – placed China’s coast, distanced from Europe by the West to
be more than double of the distance travelled by Columbus.” Therefore, by having a well know
cartographer as a brother, it is categorically impossible for Columbus to have committed
such a huge mistake. At the same time, as the distance which refers to the degree of
latitude had already been calculated to a close proximity, the thesis that forwards Columbus
to have made a mistake places itself in contradiction towards his own belief that the Earth
is sphere shaped, as, in this case the distance which refers to the degree of the average
latitude is equivalent to the Longitude in the Equator. Therefore, only if considering the
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Earth to be cylinder shaped, it would have been possible for Columbus to have confused
the Americas for China.
If we take Columbus as presented to us, a dreamer caught in a delirium, driven by huge
errors in calculations, it is then highly surprising that Columbus demonstrated to be
extremely assured of his own navigational skills in order to reach the Americas, even
though he “believed” to have reached the far side of Asia.
In reference to the oceanic navigation in the Atlantic during the 15th century, we should
be aware that, at that time the calculation for the compensation of the Magnetic
Declination was not yet known, or in other words, the difference between the True North
Pole and the Magnetic North Pole, which varies according to the time and place, as the
Magnetic Pole shifts with the Earth’s plates. Therefore, the compass was of great
usefulness for journeys which did not sail too far away from the coastal references, from
which the much needed corrections in directions were made. Hence because of these
limits, at the time of Columbus’ departure, the archipelagos of Azores was the maximum
limit in the Atlantic reached by the Portuguese mariners. It is believed that the island of
Santa Maria was discovered in 1427 by Gonçalo Velho, under orders from Dom Henrique.
Therefore, being this island at (Lat. + 36° 55’ 25’’; Long. 25° 01’40’’ W) distanced by
around 16° of longitude from Lisbon (+ 38° 42’ 18’’; Long. 09° 08’ 18’’ W), which
approximately twice the distance in longitude of the island of Madeira (Funchal Lat. + 32°
28’ 04’’; Long. 16° 53’ 53’’ W), the control of the route from Portugal to the Azores is
regarded as one of the great nautical enterprises sponsored by Dom Henrique, due to the
difficulties in sailing that far away from the coast. However, this navigational route was
made possible due to the fact that, the island of Santa Maria is positioned practically in the
same latitude of the Cape of Sao Vicente (+ Lat. 37° 01’ 16’’; Long. 08° 38’ 15’’ W), an
important point of reference for sailing along the whole of the Iberian peninsula.
Therefore, having as a reference the latitude obtained from the position of the sun, with an
astrolabe or a cross-staff, the most skilled Portuguese mariners could reach the said
archipelagos, however not without fear, for being forced to sail so deep into the Atlantic
Ocean.
Moreover in reference to Columbus, it is usually said that during the voyage of discovery
the only obstacle presented for him to overcome was the fear and anxiety of his crew.
Apart from that, the voyage went on quite smoothly, and did not present, any major
complication as far as the actual sailing was concerned. ( Heers, 1992:174)
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The voyage begun with a stop at the Canary Islands, where the way to, did not
present any difficulty for the pilots who followed in the fleet. Columbus then ordered a
modification in the equipment of the only caravel, the Niña, changing its sails from lateen
into a caravel (Colombo, 1991: 36) which, as shown above, did generate more speed in
favourable winds, but on the other hand, made the sailing more difficult in adverse winds.
After leaving the Canaries, Columbus went in a westerly direction, going deep into a region
which was not yet known in the Atlantic. Sailing between the parallels 25º and 28º N
propelled by the North Equatorial Current and by the north-eastern trade winds,
Columbus was then able to arrive at the Americas (Colombo,1991:119-133). In this
manner, he sailed in a latitude similar to the one travelled by the Portuguese to reach the
Azores. However, whilst the masterful Portuguese mariners travelled at the most, around
16° of longitude without coastal reference, Columbus, along the way, travelled 55° of
longitude until he reached San Salvador, meaning, more than three times over the
maximum sailed by the experienced Portuguese mariners. Therefore it could be said that,
the fear and apprehension felt by the crew in setting sail, was not due to their ignorance or
belief in sea monsters, but noting that, by being propelled to the west by favourable
constant winds and currents, they were distancing themselves from the continent to such
an extent that would make impossible for them to return, specially because they could not
even count on a single vessel equipped with the lateen sail. For Morison (1993:69)., the
success of Columbus in this crossing was due to the fact that “his good fortune caused that the
wind carried speedily, without any hindrance, the fleet to the Americas.” Therefore, having the whole
of the Atlantic in front of him, Columbus amazing luck, resulted in him utilizing exactly the
only route possible to safely surpass the 55° of longitude which divides the Canaries to the
Bahamas.
However, if the voyage to the Americas was a staggering strike of “good fortune”,
it does not even come close in comparison to the voyage of return. As for that, Columbus
could not simply revert to applying the same navigation of height, due to the fact that, the
currents and winds would have been flowing in the opposite direction. Setting off from San
Domingo (Lat. + 18° 27’ 53’’; Long. 69° 52’ 59’’ W), amazingly, Columbus sailed in a
northern direction, until the approximated height of the 40º parallel. From then on, he
started another navigation of height, taking the direction to the east, propelled by the Gulf
Stream and south-westerly winds. In this way, he arrived at the island of Santa Maria, in the
Azores, with the approximated latitude of 37° (Mollat, 1990:114).
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Therefore, the 55° of longitude which separates San Domingo from the Azores
were cleared, by applying, not just one navigation of height. Hence, Columbus had to first
travel to the parallel that refers to the Azores, as only from there onwards, he was able to
start the navigation of height, maintaining the same latitude. The arrival of Columbus to
the Azores from the Americas is implicated in the fact that he had reached the archipelagos
through a completely new sea route, as up until then all the accumulated nautical
knowledge referred to the route coming from Europe. Nevertheless, Morison goes on to
make the startling claim that this feat was only possible because “Columbus had as much luck
in his return as he had in his journey to”. (Ibidem: 136).
However, in the diary attributed to Columbus, he states that the “navigation was done
extremely correctly and he had oriented himself very well (...) Moreover, he was sure to be in the region of the
Azores.” He goes to say that he pretended to be disorientated in order to confuse the pilots
and thus remain the only one able to master the route to the Indies. (Columbus, 1991:133).
Therefore, there could be no doubts that Columbus intentionally arrived at the Azores, and
not by sheer luck, as Morison claims. If this was the case, he would have been as
disorientated as the pilots that accompanied him, as Morison himself observes: “There were
those who judged it to be already Castella, others that it was the mountain range of Sintra, near Lisbon yet
others believed it to be Madeira. Only Columbus affirmed it to be an island in the Azores, and as ever,
correctly so.” (Ibidem: 142).
As Chaunu observes, the routes and stopovers made by Columbus were exactly
those which were later consolidated by the armada and the New Spanish fleet, for being the
only safe sailing route between the Iberian Peninsula and Central America.

In the technical conditions of this first blind, transoceanic voyage, it was impossible
to arrive in the Americas, coming from the Iberian Peninsula, without stopping at the
Canaries. Columbus also stopped there in the four voyages he made, as did every
other discoverer after him. The archipelagos of the Canaries are there, in the route of
the New World. (...) But this role of port of call – is lucky and unlucky at the same
time - due to the flow of the wind and of the sea currents, it can only be use during
the voyage to. (...) Is for this reason that the base of the Canaries, in the traffic with
the Americas, cannot be disassociated with the Azores (...). In the return route, the
use of Azores as a port of call is necessary for a number of reasons. On the way back,
the voyage takes longer than on the way to, due to the tempestuous zone that needs
to be crossed, which is much more difficult than on the way to. The position of the
Azores is, in this aspect, superior to that of the Canaries (...) many ships, in a
desperate effort, were able to reach the Azores, before sinking, in order to save men
and treasures. Even a higher number of ships, were only able to continue on their
voyage after undergoing extensive repairs in the archipelagos. (...) Moreover, the
Azores are essential for many other reasons, as during the 16th and 17th century
oceanic navigation had to be performed almost blindly. Without a single calculation
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of longitude, and a very mediocre calculation done at sea for the latitude. The way
back is even harder to trail than the way to; it is therefore important, in the first place,
to multiply the points of reference. (1980:50,61-2)

Moreover, even if we go against nautical logic by considering valid the thesis of the
mistake, and consequently believing that Columbus had in fact arrived at the Americas by a
huge strike of luck in his insane obsession to get to Japan, this same rationale cannot be
extended to the question of how he arrived at the Azores. To find a continent, which
extended before Columbus, sailing in the same latitude of the last notable point of
reference, is very different to purposely reach the Azores, a small archipelago lost in the
vastness of the ocean.
Chaunu (1980:63) also observes that all the oceanic routes that originated in either
Portugal or Spain carved out a triangle consisting of the Azores to the north, the Canaries
to the south and a fragment of the Iberian coast which goes from Lisbon to Cádiz to the
east. “It is the bottleneck; everything passes through there, everything enters through it”. Therefore, even
though he had the whole of the Atlantic laying before him, Columbus still managed to sail
correctly through the very narrow bottleneck, not only on the way to the Americas but also
on the way back.
Thus, we can safely affirm that it was categorically impossible for Columbus to
have intentionally arrived at the Azores without having the full knowledge of the necessary
routes to be followed. The manner that Columbus behaved in the command of this
transoceanic crossing demonstrates that he had precise knowledge not only of the direction
and the latitude of the routes to be followed, but also of the differences in longitude.
Without this knowledge it would be simply impossible to know the time that would have
taken to undertake the crossing of the Canaries-Americas and then back via Azores.
Consequently, there would also be no way of knowing the amount of provisions to be
carried specially water during the crossing, which would inevitable result in a tragic end to
this voyage of discovery.
Even if we contradict all the evidence expounded above, by stating that Columbus
was indeed an irresponsible and maverick mariner, the same certainly cannot be said about
the other officers under his command. If he managed to con the sailors, by registering in
his log-book a shorter distance than the one travelled, he certainly did not manage to pull
this trick on Martín Alonso Pinzón, a far more experienced mariner than Columbus, who
accompanied him in the commando of the Pinta. In the return voyage, when he left
Columbus’ company in the date of 22 of November, Pinzón was trying to precede
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Columbus’ return to Spain, most certainly in order to claim the authorship of the discovery
for himself. Moreover, as he did not know of the necessity of initially sailing to the north,
and only then, when propelled by the Gulf Stream, take to the east, he found himself in the
embarrassing situation of being forced to rejoin Columbus’ company in order to return to
Europe (Morison, 1994: 131-2) If the experienced navigator Martin Pinzón accepted to
take part in the expedition under the Columbus’ command, certainly it was not because he
believed in some visionary’s luck who, in truly suicidal fashion, was about to throw himself
into the yet unknown ends of the Atlantic ocean, in his drive to find the wonders described
Marco Polo based in the most delirious possible association of nautical and cartographical
errors.
By utilising the quantitative method, Chaunu (1980:306-7) demonstrates that the
biggest obstacle to be surmounted by the Spanish fleet in the crossing with the Americas
was in the voyage of return. While there was almost no losses suffered in the passage
Canaries-Antilles, there were a number of vessels that sunk along the route to the Azores.
Therefore, the most that the “mistaken” Columbus could have had accomplished, sailing
under the luckiest of all the lucky stars in the sky, was to have arrived in the Americas.
However, he would never be able to return safely to Spain.
Certainly, it would not have been enough for Columbus to be in possession of only
one map where this route in the Atlantic was represented. A single map would only be of
use if Columbus was able to do the necessary calculations for pinpointing the vessel,
together with the compensation of the magnetic declination, and than trace the route to be
taken. Moreover, Morison observes, rightly, that Columbus in the whole length the
journey only made three astronomic observations for the calculus of the latitude, which he
got it wrong every time. Therefore, Columbus’ journey would only have been possible if
he possessed an extremely detailed nautical chart where it was specified the routes to be
followed and the estimated time of each route, according to the travelled speed. This
nautical chart, in turn, would be based in what is known as the cartographical polygon, with
the apex in Cape of San Vicente, in the Canaries, in San Domingo and in the Azores. The
geographical coordinates of this polygon would permit the elaboration of a safe route to be
sailed in such a vast area of the ocean. It is evident that this is consequence of a long
process, which included numerous exploratory voyages, with a heavy toll not only financial,
but also of lives lost by some of Columbus’ predecessors in order to make this voyage
possible.
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Pérez (1992:32-5) observes that the fact that Columbus broke the news of his
“discovery” to king of Portugal John II even before the monarchs of Spain instantly raised
suspicion in the court of Aragon. This suspicion becomes even more significant once we
consider the fact that, due to the information given by Columbus to D. João II, even before
communicating the “discovery” to the monarchs of Spain, the king of Portugal was able to
claim as belonging to his own crown the lands reached by Columbus. This just claim is based
in the terms of the treaty agreed between the two Iberian crowns in the Portuguese town of
Alcáçovar in 1478, where the Portuguese crown agreed to forsake the possession of all the
islands in the archipelago of the Canaries, in exchange for exclusive rights to any new found
land to the south of this archipelago (1). Due to the sheer importance of the Canaries, for
sailing in the Atlantic, the delegation negotiating for the Spanish crown, were certainly
extremely satisfied with what seemed to be a diplomatic coup, and did not notice that the
terms of the treaty did not restrict the rights to the discoveries which concerned solely the
African continent. Therefore, as the Earth is round and as the lands Discovered by
Columbus were at latitudes in the northern hemisphere inferior to the ones in the Canaries,
D. João II’s claim to the new found lands were indeed validated by the terms agreed in the
Treaty of Alcáçovar.
Moreover, in order for D. João II to be able apply this stratagem, it would have
been necessary for Columbus to have informed him not only of the existence of the
discovered islands but also of their respective latitudes, as, only in this way the king of
Portugal could substantiate his claim, as he did, due to the fact that those islands are situated
to the south of the Canaries. As the claim from the King of Portugal took place almost as
soon as Columbus had returned, we are therefore, faced with only two possibilities. Either
Columbus had informed the king of Portugal not only of his “discovery” but also of the
islands’ latitudes, or the King of Portugal had known of their latitudes all along. Therefore,
as the extreme south of the island of Tenerife and the Cape Canaveral, in Florida, are in the
latitude of + 28°, Portugal’s possessions, by extending over the continent, would have had
incorporated the great American empires of the; Aztecs, Mayans and Incas; leaving to Spain
the North-American regions where there were no accumulative cultures nor treasures and
material wealth.
However, soon after Columbus departure in his voyage of discovery, there was a
twist that would cause a serious blow to Portugal’s geopolitical strategy. The untimely
death of the pope Innocent VIII was to cause a crisis in the ensuing battle for the
nomination for the pontiff’s successor, which became increasingly bitter and entrenched
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between the cardinals Caraffa and Juliano Della Rovere, resulting in the election of the
opportunistic and lewd Valencia born Aragonite cardinal, Rodrigo Borgia.
Even though his nomination was to face severe opposition not only from within
the Vatican but also from Charles VIII, King of France, Rodrigo Borgia, father, of amongst
others, Cesar e Lucrecia Borgia, managed, with the backing of Ferdinand of Aragon, to
take his place on the papal throne on the 11th of August 1492 as Alexander VI.
After being informed by D. João II that the Columbus “discovery” would suit
primarily Portugal’s interest, Ferdinand of Aragon managed to change the course of events
due to his influence over the new pope. Alexander VI promulgated then a new bull in the
3rd of May 1493, denominated Inter Coetera, where he concedes to the Catholic Monarchy
the control and ecclesiastical patronage over all the lands to be discovered from the Azores and
Cabo Verde a hundred leagues from the West and from noon.
In the king of Portugal’s refusal to accept this bull, an extremely unusual behaviour
for a catholic king, which normally would have resulted in his excommunication, the
representatives of the kings of Castile and of Portugal met in the city of Tordesilhas in
1494, with the aim of reaching an agreement. By arguing of the need to preserve the
control over the oceanic space necessary in order for its vessels to return from the Guinean
Gulf, in the African coast, the representatives from Portugal proposed that the dividing line
to be dislocated to the West, going from a hundred to 370 leagues from Cabo Verde. As
for the Spanish representatives this advance would only take place over the sea, probably
incorporating a small island lost in the vastness of the ocean, the proposal forwarded by the
king of Portugal was accepted, resulting in the signing of the treaty of Tordesilhas in the 7th
of July 1494.
In the law suit ensued by the Spanish Crown against Columbus’ heir over the sole
rights in the capitulations of Santa Fé (In Cortesão, 1947:660-5), the witnesses Alonso Gallego
and Fernando Valiente claimed that the company in charge of the discovery of the West
Indies was in reality a joint venture between Columbus and Martin Alonso Pinzón, who had
received the information on the existence and localisation of the islands to be discovered
through Pero Vázques de la Frontera. Who in turn, is identified as an experienced mariner,
and was known to have taken part in at least one of the Portuguese expedition that took
place under orders from the Portuguese Infante D. Henry (In Pregunta Del cuestionario de
1535. Cortesão, idem: 765-6). Even if openly manipulated by the Spanish Crown, this law
suit reveals that, soon after Columbus “discovery”, it was already known in the Spanish
court of the impossibility of him going through with this venture without the full knowledge
 13

of the sea routes to and from the Americas, and that the necessary information had, in all
probably been trafficked from Portugal.

MAPS

First voyage of Colombus. In Morison (opus cit)

Ocean Currents.
 14

Bibliographics References

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CARACCI, Ilaria Luzzana

Colombo: metas e projectos. Oceanos: Portugal e o Mar. Lisboa, Comissão Nacional para as
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CHAUNU, Pierre.
La expasión europea (siglos XIII al XV). Nueva Clio 26. Barcelona, Ed. Labor, 1972
___________________
A Sevilha e a América nos séculos XVI e XVII. São Paulo, Difel, 1980.

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HEERS, Jacques.
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_______________
A Europa e o mar. Lisboa, Presença, 1995.

MORISON, Samuel Eliot

Cristóvão Colombo, Almirante do Mar-Oceano. Lisboa, Editorial Notícias, 1994.
 15

PERES, Damião
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Descobrindo Colombo. Diálogo. Rio de Janeiro, vol. 25 n. 3, pp. 6-9, 1992.