A STUDY INTO THE SIZE OF THE WORLD’S INTELLIGENCE

INDUSTRY

CHRISTIAN HIPPNER

A Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty of Mercyhurst College

In Partial Fulfillment of the of the Requirements for

The Degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
APPLIED INTELLIGENCE

DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STUDIES

MERCYHURST COLLEGE
ERIE, PENNSYLVANIA
OCTOBER 2009
 DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STUDIES
MERCYHURST COLLEGE
ERIE, PENNSYLVANIA

A STUDY INTO THE SIZE OF THE WORLD’S INTELLIGENCE INDUSTRY

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Mercyhurst College
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
The Degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
APPLIED INTELLIGENCE

Submitted By

Christian Hippner

Certificate of Approval:

___________________________
Kristan J. Wheaton
Associate Professor
Department of Intelligence Studies

___________________________
James G. Breckenridge
Chair/Assistant Professor
Department of Intelligence Studies

___________________________
Phillip J. Belfiore
Vice President
Office of Academic Affairs

October 2009
Copyright © 2009 by Christian Hippner
All rights reserved.

iii
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my primary reader, Kristan Wheaton, for his creativity, found

throughout this product. I would also like to thank Carl Hippner for his assistance in

interpretation. Finally, I would like to acknowledge Cole Davis for his technical

assistance and motivation, despite having a two o’clock meeting.

iv
 ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

A Study into the Size of the World’s Intelligence Industry

By

Christian Hippner

Master of Science in Applied Intelligence

Mercyhurst College, 2009

Professor Kristan J. Wheaton, Chair

[This thesis determines the approximate size of the world’s intelligence industry in

quantitative terms. It reviews existing literature which describes, in qualitative terms,

various themes found about intelligence agencies around the world. The thesis provides a

quantitative method to estimate unknown intelligence spending and personnel. The study

concludes that the world’s intelligence industry spends approximately 106 billion United

States Dollars, and employs about one million people. Furthermore, the hypothesized

direct correlation between Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and intelligence spending may

exist, but the research does not strongly support the assertion. It is apparent that GDP is a

factor when it comes to intelligence spending, but it does not seem to be the primary

component.]

v
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

COPYRIGHT PAGE ........................................................................................................ iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................. iv

ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................v

TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................. vi

LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................... viii

LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... ix

CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 1

2 LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................. 4

Information Gap ........................................................................................ 4

Comparative Studies in Intelligence ......................................................... 7
Self-Reporting Countries ......................................................................... 14
Systematic Studies of Intelligence .......................................................... 16

3 METHODOLOGY ......................................................................................... 21

Data Collection ........................................................................................ 22

Collection from Internet Sources ................................................. 23
Collection from Other Sources ................................................... 27
Other Relevant Information Collection ...................................... 28
Establishing Webpage Credibility .......................................................... 28
Process for Estimating Unknown Spending ........................................... 29
Process for Estimating Unknown Personnel ........................................... 30
Standardizing Spending Units ................................................................. 31
Standardizing Personnel Definitions ....................................................... 32

4 RESULTS ........................................................................................................ 33

The Totals: Spending ............................................................................... 33

The Totals: Personnel ............................................................................. 40
Other Extracted Results .......................................................................... 46
Summary of Results ................................................................................ 50

5 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 53

vi
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 63

APPENDICES ................................................................................................................ 75

Appendix A: Websites You Can Trust ............................................................... 76

Appendix B: Intelligence Spending Sorted Highest to Lowest ........................... 77
Appendix C: Data for Individual Countries......................................................... 80

vii
 LIST OF TABLES

Page

Table 4.1 Affect of US on Estimating 39

Table 5.1 List of Journals, Newsletters, and Other 56

Relevant Database Productions

Table 5.2 Outcome of Assuming Intelligence Spending 59

and GDP is Linear or Exponential

viii
 LIST OF FIGURES

Page

Figure 4.1 Total World Intelligence Spending 33

Figure 4.2 Top Ten Percent Intelligence Spending 34

Figure 4.3 Intelligence Spending Sorted Largest to Smallest 37

Figure 4.4 Total Intelligence Employment 40

Figure 4.5 Geographic Position of Top Intelligence Employers 42

Figure 4.6 Top 21 Intelligence Employers 42

Figure 4.7 Comparing Intelligence Spending Per Person 43

Figure 4.8 Bottom 90 Percent Employment vs. 44

Top Ten Percent Employment

Figure 4.9 Countries with Top Spending and Employment 45

Figure 4.10 Histogram of Intelligence Employment 45

Figure 4.11 Histogram of Source Credibility 50

Figure 5.1 Affect of a Linear Relationship Assumption on 61

Intelligence Spending (US Not Included)

Figure 5.2 Countries with Known Intelligence Spending with 62

Trend Lines (US Not Included)

ix
 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is about intelligence in national security. Since the Treaty of

Westphalia every nation-state has had concerns about its national security, however

defined. The role of intelligence is one that supports policymakers, military

commanders, and nation as a whole. Describing the actual process of intelligence is the

subject of many books, reports, and theoreticians. Although the traditional view of

intelligence encapsulates its activities as a cylindrical process, new conceptual models

tend to structure it around a collaborative targeted process. Regardless of how one wants

views what is intelligence, this thesis is about those engaged in it as a whole.

Intelligence as field of employment dates back to biblical days, when Moses sent

12 men to the land of Canaan in order to,

See what the land is like: whether the people who dell in it are strong or
weak, few or many; whether the land they dwell in is good or bad;
whether the cities they inhabit are like camps or strongholds; whether the
land is rich or poor; and whether there are forests there or not.1

Moses is a decision maker who wants to know everything that may be relevant, as his

tasking implies. He asks for reports on the economic, military, and social situation of

Canaan. While this passage is infamous in some intelligence communities, Sun-Tzu’s

writings may resonate in others. With the relatively few exceptions, the subject of how to

finance the collection of intelligence is generally missing. Collection systems, or in

Moses’ case human operators, require adequate funding to be successful. It is

1
Numbers 13:18-20 (New King James Version).
 2

unimaginable that Moses sent 12 men “who were heads of the children of Israel” without

food or other provisions.2 Yet discussion regarding this subject is absent.

If intelligence requires funding, like the rest of the national security

establishment, then every nation must allocate a budget. Various studies aiming to

estimate national defense spending already exist. Some countries issue so-called white

papers, while research institutions, such as the Stockholm International Peace Research

Institute (SIPRI) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), have

elaborate methodologies to determine the spending of countries that do not self-report.

While each entity has a particular estimate regarding the world’s spending on defense,

none have ventured into a more nuanced subset of national security – intelligence.

This thesis is a study to determine the approximate size of the world’s national

intelligence industry. It uses two separate indicators to determine size. The first

indicator is intelligence spending by individual nations. The second indicator of size is

intelligence personnel under employment by individual nations. For the purposes of this

study, the components of the intelligence industry are, broadly speaking, services or

agencies that are direct divisions of a recognized government.

Understanding the size of the world's intelligence industry is significant for three

reasons. First, there is no existing study with the purpose of discovering the approximate

size of the global intelligence industry. Second, understanding its size can be useful for

allocating resources by US intelligence agencies. Third, knowing the size of the world's

intelligence industry would be helpful to educational institutions for their own planning.

As the intelligence studies field grows, knowing the relative level of demand for

professionals in this market will likely support these institutions in recruiting practices.
2
Numbers 13:3 (New King James Version).
 3

To that end, a comprehensive and quantitative study is necessary. Although there are

numerous smaller studies that focus on certain regions or nations, they all fit into the

realm of qualitative discussions. While they add to the body of literature for this field,

they fall short of exploring the “human resources” aspect. The study could also assist in

training institutions’ recruitment by indicating the job market that exists for intelligence

professionals.

Determining the size of the world’s intelligence industry is also relevant for

practitioners. A study of this nature would give a national intelligence community

another method to benchmark their performance, as well as assist in future planning.

Knowing the relative size of other nations’ capabilities can result in more efficient

resource allocation or support new hiring practices.

There are certain limitations to this study. First, it does not intend to study the

organizational structure of an intelligence community of a given country. It simply wants

to determine an amount spent by that community. Second, governments are not always

willing to publish such data and if they do, it may be intentionally inaccurate. This study

can and will make the most accurate and conservative estimates as possible. A person

can delve deep into government publications and other primary data for years in an

attempt to determine a single precise answer. This is unnecessary due to the scale of the

study – the individual numbers are more likely in the hundreds of millions of dollars,

meaning that the impact of relatively few dollars is negligible. Third, for many countries

there is no existing information at all. This study estimates these figures using a process

described in Chapter 3, and then presents its findings in Chapter 4.

 4

LITERATURE REVIEW

There are a limited number of comprehensive studies into the world’s different

intelligence systems and agencies. Most studies on the topic of national intelligence

communities are qualitative in nature. They explore a variety of intelligence related

topics, such as structure and oversight, but few actually engage in describing their subject

in quantitative terms. The following literature review has four sections. The first section

briefly discusses why there are few systematic studies describing intelligence in

quantitative terms. The second section discusses the different comparative studies of

intelligence systems. The third section examines countries with self-reported data, their

relevance, and their drawbacks. The fourth and final section looks at the existing

attempts to systematically document different intelligence communities.

Information Gap

There are no comprehensive studies analyzing the total spending of the world’s

different intelligence organizations, or are there studies indicating their accumulated size.

One argument against the systematic study of intelligence is that the systems in different

countries are not comparable. In the words of author Michael Warner, “both inside and

outside scholars have sought to compare and contrast intelligence disciplines and

organizations across multiple national experiences and time periods. Unfortunately, this

is not yet possible to do in a systematic manner”.3 This mindset is perhaps the primary

reason for the lack of research into these matters. However, arguing that a transnational

quantitative comparison is not possible hinges on faulty assumptions.

3
Michael Warner, “Sources and Methods for the Study of Intelligence,” in Handbook of Intelligence
Studies, ed. Lock K. Johnson (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 25.
 5

The argument assumes that the functions, roles, and missions of intelligence

organizations are inconsistent in international situations and cannot be categorized.

Notable intelligence scholar Loch K. Johnson argues against this point, saying that there

are basic common features found in all national intelligence apparatuses. According to

Johnson, there are three basic activities of these governmental entities – collection and

analysis, covert action, and counterintelligence.4 He argues that these three activities are

universally found in all national intelligence systems, regardless of the security

environment surrounding the country. This point seems to echo in the writings of Marina

Caprini, a theoretician on security-sector reform, who says that “within government,

intelligence has come to be thought of as comprising four main activities: collection,

analysis and estimates, counterintelligence and covert action”.5 At the heart of the three

activities, Johnson argues, is national wealth – Gross Domestic Product (GDP).6 Johnson

would likely argue that the security situation around a nation impacts intelligence

spending less than its national wealth. Of wealthy nations, he says,

Because of the breadth of their concerns, not even expenditures in the

range of $35 billion a year (the widely reported figure for U.S. intelligence
in 2002-2003) can offer transparency for the entire globe – especially
when adversaries choose to conceal their schemes and weapons systems in
deep underground caverns, with camouflage, or by other methods of
stealth to avoid the prying lens of satellite cameras orbiting above them.
In contrast, the intelligence objectives of smaller nations are much more
limited, say, to a single region or even a solitary enemy. Some may view
this paradox as self-evident, but comparisons of the intelligence systems
of different countries are often made without taking into account the
differences in their funding abilities and targeting needs.7

4
Loch Johnson, “Bricks and Mortar for a Theory of Intelligence,” Comparative Strategy. 22, no. 1 (2003):
1.
5
Marina Caparini, “Controlling and Overseeing Intelligence Services in Democratic States,” in Democratic
Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephant, ed. Hans Born and Marina Caparini
(England: Ashgate, 2007), 5.
6
Loch Johnson, “Bricks and mortar for a Theory of Intelligence,” Comparative Strategy 22, no. 1 (2003):
22-23.
7
Ibid, 3.
 6

Outside of national wealth, Johnson argues that other attributes are necessary for

successfully implementing these activities, such as focused targeting, all-source

synergism, and strong communication.8 These activities are important, but they are a

result of three basic features, collection and analysis, covert action, and

counterintelligence.

The ultimate goal of these activities is to reduce the level uncertainty for the

decision-maker. The end goal for national intelligence agencies is also inherently

different from other governmental entities with similar features. For instance, law

enforcement bodies often engage in Johnson’s three basic actives. They collect and

analyze crime statistics in order to identify problems and determine the best preventative

measures.9 They engage in undercover operations, as well as establish security measures

to prevent the dissemination of sensitive information. In short, many law enforcement

agencies engage in intelligence. However, the purpose of having a law enforcement

agency is to enforce laws, while its end goal is to facilitate crime and problem

reduction.10

Nevertheless, the primary attribute for the successful implementation of Johnson’s

activities is national wealth, suggesting that only wealthy nations have large, integrated,

intelligence systems. Yet Johnson is quick to admit that there are some exceptions to his

8
Ibid.
9
Veronica Coleman and others, "Using Knowledge and Teamwork to Reduce Crime," National Institute of
Justice Journal 241, (1999): 18-20, http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/jr000241d.pdf.
10
Jerry H. Ratcliffe, "Intelligence-led policing: Anticipating Risk and Influencing Action," in press 2009,
3, http://jratcliffe.net/papers/Ratcliffe%20(draft)%20ILP-
Anticipating%20risk%20and%20influencing%20action.pdf.
 7

theory.11 He points to Russia as an example, saying while it may maintain a large

intelligence service, it is not an affluent nation.12

Johnson’s conceptual framework seems to suggest an observable correlation

exists between a nation’s wealth and the size of its intelligence community. If this is true,

further research is necessary to test Johnson’s assertion that national wealth, GDP,

determines the limits of intelligence activity. While most authors tend to focus

intelligence issues such as oversight, democratic control, and the significance of 9/11,

Johnson’s assertion is measurable in quantitative terms. His assertion is not only

quantitative but free from cultural biases. The next section reviews existing comparative

studies of intelligence, which are predominately qualitative in nature.

Comparative Studies in Intelligence

There are several ways existing comparative studies describe different

intelligence systems. The first section here describes intelligence in the context of the

Cold War, the second section describes intelligence through the lens of the Civil-Military

Relations (CMR) model, and the third section describes intelligence from the non-

western perspective. Common themes exist throughout all three sections, for instance, all

of the authors use a case-study format to compare intelligence systems. Each case-study

uses narratives and qualitative information to describe intelligence communities – another

theme in all three sections – and also tend to focus on research at the national level.

There are several reasons to conduct comparative studies of intelligence communities.

According to Peter Gill, conducting comparative studies allows one to “find out about

11
Loch Johnson, “Bricks and mortar for a Theory of Intelligence,” Comparative Strategy 22, no. 1 (2003):
15.
12
Ibid.
 8

one’s own country through the study of others”.13 He adds that comparative studies also

allow for the generalized classification of data.14 Beginning to classify data is the

intuitive starting point towards quantification. While comparative studies of intelligence

are steadily increasing, they are not a new phenomenon.

One example, written 1985, is Walter Laqueur’s A World of Secrets: The Uses

and Limits of Intelligence. Laqueur compares the intelligence systems in “open

societies” and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.15 He compares these entities in

order to identify differences between the western world and Soviet bloc. Laqueur’s

writings on open societies tend focus on the relationship between intelligence producers

and consumers in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Israel.16 He

arranges each chapter consistently, initially providing a brief overview of the national

intelligence community, and then he gives examples of their interactions with civilian

authorities. He also compares the performance of the intelligence communities by

addressing issues such as the inefficient bureaucracies within some large agencies, and

analyzing the public’s perception of the intelligence community’s activities.17 Well-

written, well-thought out, Laqueur gives a critical analysis of intelligence in open

societies, but his method of comparative studies does not venture beyond qualitative

research.

Laqueur approaches Soviet intelligence from a slightly different angle. He looks

at Soviet intelligence from a historical perspective, first describing its revolutionary roots,

13
Peter Gill, “Knowing the Self, Knowing the Other: The Comparative Analysis of Security Intelligence,”
in Handbook of Intelligence Studies, ed. Lock K. Johnson (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 83.
14
Ibid.
15
Walter Laqueur, A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence (New York: Basic Books,
1985), 201-251.
16
Ibid, 201.
17
Ibid, 228, 231.
 9

then moving to its most recent structure.18 He describes the relationship between the

Soviet Union and the other communist nations as unequal, where the smaller nations tend

to aid the Soviets.19 Laqueur’s historical approach is different than his methods used to

compare the various open societies. The dichotomy in approaches makes it difficult to

have a transnational comparison. One example is his description of the Soviet Union’s

intelligence structure – he focuses more on the weaknesses in their operations, rather than

comparing different agencies to one another.20 While he explains in some length about

the relationship between intelligence producers and consumers in open societies, he

glazes over the subject when writing about the Soviet system. Instead, his focus remains

more on its historical development and current defects.21

Other comparative studies use the Civil-Military Relations (CMR) model to

compare intelligence communities. Scholar Robert Jervis says the role of intelligence is

the “missing dimension” in international relations and advocates using the CMR model.22

There are some interesting parallels between CMR studies and other studies analyzing

relations between civilian authorities and intelligence services. According to Jervis, the

general view of intelligence services and militaries is that they “should be strong,

efficient, and professionalized, but on the other hand they should not set their own goals

and they must respond to civilian authority…We want the military and intelligence to be
18
Ibid, 233-248.
19
Ibid, 249-250.
20
Ibid, 248-252.
21
There are a number of writings on the defects of the Soviet intelligence apparatus and Laqueur’s
discussion is not entirely out of context. A more recent writing on this subject comes from Michael
Herman in Intelligence Services in the Information Age. Herman discusses the role of the intelligence
services in under Stalin and how their assessments were intentionally subjective. This continued after
Stalin and exemplifies one difference between western intelligence and non-western intelligence. See
Michael Herman, Intelligence Services in the Information Age (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers,
2001), 16-19.
22
Robert Jervis, “Intelligence, Civil-Intelligence Relations, and Democracy,” in Reforming Intelligence:
Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, ed. Thomas Bruneau and Steven Boraz (Austin, Texas:
University of Texas Press, 2007), xix.
 10

under civilian control but also to resist illegitimate orders”.23 Studies using the CMR

analogy generally fall into two broad categories, intelligence in modern democracies and

intelligence in emerging democracies. The overall focus in each category is how to

increase democratic civilian control over the intelligence organization of a given

country.24

Democratic civilian control is possible by giving legal oversight authority to the

executive, legislative, or judicial branches of government. According to authors Steven

Boraz and Thomas Bruneau, a favorite oversight mechanisms used by governmental

bodies is budgetary review.25 They argue that in modern democracies, executive bodies

exercise budgetary control through advisory departments, such as the Office of

Management and Budget (OMB).26 However, they are clear that budgetary review is not

the only oversight tool at the disposal of the executive bodies. Boraz and Bruneau both

agree that legislative bodies are able to control intelligence activities through budgetary

control and fund allocation.27 Legislative bodies accomplish budgetary oversight by

establishing oversight and appropriations committees.28 The CMR model analyzes

intelligence spending as a way to keep these organizations under the control of elected

officials, and ultimately to learn about the effective practices of well-performing nations.

However, these comparative case studies tend to introduce a certain level of

Western-bias into their methods. This creates two problems. The first is whether or not a

nation is measurably democratic. For countries conceptualized as undemocratic, the

23
Ibid, xiii.
24
Steven Boraz and Thomas Bruneau, “Best Practices: Balancing Democracy and Effectiveness,” in
Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, ed. Thomas Bruneau and
Steven Boraz (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 2007), 331.
25
Ibid, 14.
26
Ibid, 30
27
Ibid, 15.
28
Ibid, 45.
 11

national intelligence system is automatically exempt from study. If the goal is to observe

how various democratic nations maintain or create civilian control over their intelligence

services, countries such as China or Burma, which are generally seen as undemocratic,

cannot be studied for comparison. The likely underpinning argument for this point-of-

view is that civilian control is desirable.

The second problem addresses the subjectivity of what is desirable. Civilian

control is desirable for whom? Iran has a standardized election process, yet would the

West prefer to deal with the Supreme Council or the former Shah? If the ultimate

purpose of using the CMR model to study national intelligence systems is to learn how to

increase civilian control, then it is preferable to study Iran under the Supreme Council.

Using CMR as model creates the assumption that more civilian control is a good thing

(the researcher is inclined to agree). However, the Western bias that enters into these

studies results in inappropriate comparisons. These comparisons may include budgetary

reviews to satisfy the old adage “follow the money” but not to study transnational

spending patterns.

A third body of comparative literature might counter cultural bias, as it attempts

to gather knowledge about non-western intelligence systems. This literature comes from

native contributors and it provides descriptions of the strategic intelligence environment

of a non-Western country.29 According to one author, the primary purpose for this

accumulated research is to,

Provide some counterweight to the liberal democratic domination of the

literature, especially Anglo-American. Specifically…it is important to
describe and analyze a wider range and variety of national intelligence
systems in order to counter any simplistic assumptions that Anglo-

29
Peter Gill, introduction to the PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches,
vol. 1, ed. Stuart Farson et al (London and Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008), 1.
 12

American models provide a reliable guide to present or, necessarily, future

arrangements elsewhere.30

As the quote suggests, studying other intelligence systems can allow for greater self-

inspection, may result in empirical material suitable for comparison, and can counter the

biases built into the CMR model.31 However, these studies are generally inconsistent in

the intelligence attributes they analyze. Some of these studies describe the internal

structure of an intelligence system, while others discuss issues relating to civilian

oversight. In short, Laqueur’s problems manifest themselves once again, only now it is

in a multi-polar world.

Some of these studies are subsections of defense sector reviews – likely a result of

their publishing venues. For instance, Anthony Cordesman and Khalid Al-Rodhan write

about the military forces of nation-states in the Persian Gulf.32 Their study reviews nine

countries, each of which includes a section titled “Paramilitary, Security, Police, and

Intelligence Forces”.33 These sections include a brief biographical background along

with limited quantitative data. Yet, many of these defense sector reviews tend to

emphasize the military aspect over the intelligence component. An example of a robust

defense review is The Middle East Military Balance: 2000-2001, edited by Shai Feldman

and Yiftah Shapir. The review gives a weapons inventory for twenty-one Middle East

countries.34 The authors provide general information about individual economic and

30
Ibid.
31
This point is articulated by Peter Gill, although he does indicate what “material” can produce empirical
data. See Peter Gill, “Knowing the Self, Knowing the Other: The Comparative Analysis of Security
Intelligence,” in Handbook of Intelligence Studies, ed. Lock K. Johnson (London and New York:
Routledge, 2007), 83.
32
See Anthony Cordesman and Khalid Al-Rodhan, Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars
(Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2007).
33
Ibid.
34
Shai Feldman and Yiftah Shapir, eds., The Middle East Military Balance: 2000-2001 (Massachusetts:
MIT Press, 2001).
 13

arms procurement programs for each country – only after which do they give an order-of-

battle for each military branch. Exploring countries in such a comprehensive manner

allows the authors to create international benchmarks and compare levels of military

prowess. Studies this detailed are not present in the current body of comparative studies

of intelligence.

Another example of a defense sector review with a subsection on intelligence is

Jane’s Information Group. Its Sentinel Country Risk Assessment Library attempts to

provide a comprehensive list of entities related to every nation’s security apparatus. It is

a very valuable resource for those looking to obtain quick and general information about

the security situation in a country. For many nations, the library is also successful in

identifying their various intelligence agencies. While the information most pertinent to

this study comes from Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment Library, the majority of

the company’s intelligence related information is in Jane’s Intelligence Review and

Intelligence Weekly – albeit in qualitative form.

While some comparative studies discuss the interaction within the described

national intelligence system, others provide a detailed account of the weapon systems in

possession of each country. Each provides a response in a narrative format. As with all

comparative studies, there is a certain measure of variance between each observed

country. According to Peter Gill, the variance in national approaches reflects the

conditions of the individual nation itself.35 In western democracies, writers tend to

describe intelligence as something in need of reform, whereas in non-western nations,

35
Peter Gill, introduction to the PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches,
vol. 1, ed. Stuart Farson et al. (London and Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008), 15.
 14

they are entities to support the ruling party.36 Nevertheless, these contributors add to the

comparative body of intelligence studies, although, they are a reflection of the qualitative

approach.

Self-Reporting Countries

One body of literature relative to this thesis consists of countries opting to publish

information about their individual intelligence organizations and programs. Although

uncommon in most of the world, self-reporting can provide a wealth of information.

Self-reporting countries can provide unique views of those within the intelligence

establishment, as well as insight on the organization’s operations or how they interact

with top decision-makers. It gives other qualitative information about their internal

arrangements, decision-making process, and other data that is also useful for comparative

research.

Specifically, self-reporting countries are important to this thesis because they

contain budgetary and workforce data. Quantitative data is necessary to create a

benchmark and begin creating estimates in any study with unknowns. Thus, this

quantitative data allows the study to estimate unknown intelligence spending and

personnel – the explanation of this process is in Chapter 3.

There are various reasons why a country would publish its intelligence

community’s budgetary and personnel data. Some countries report their intelligence

budgets because of their own rules and regulations, generally in an attempt to provide

oversight. The US is an example of a country which requires its intelligence community

to regularly report its budget. Yet there are some drawbacks to how it reports. For
36
Ibid.
 15

instance, reporting the intelligence budget does not occur on an annual or semi-annual

basis, only periodically with no set schedule. Infrequent and irregular reporting is a

problem for researchers attempting to create a trend analysis for a case study.

Fortunately, this study is not trying to analyze spending at the individual country level,

and therefore the most recent published data ought to suffice.

The US also demonstrates another problem with self-reported budgetary data. In

previous reported amounts, the US exempted the budget for the Military Intelligence

Program (MIP). Created in 2005, the MIP represents all intelligence spending under the

Department of Defense.37 Similar defense programs – such as the Tactical Intelligence

and Related Activities (TIARA) – formerly encompassed the department’s spending, and

were not disclosed.38 Excluding part of the total intelligence budget is a common

problem. When nations do report their intelligence spending, it tends to only represent

certain programs or agencies. Nevertheless, the solution to this problem usually requires

more research.

The obvious problem with reporting individual programs – or agencies – is that it

becomes a bit more complex in counting, or more specifically, ensuring that none are

absent from the total. Canada is one example. Although it is not legally required, each

agency includes a budget within its own annual report. These reports usually discuss

operations, ability to meet customer demands, and budgetary data. While much of the

qualitative information here assists this thesis by ensuring the agency meets Johnson’s

conceptual framework, it does not identify other agencies or programs. To be sure that

37
Congressional Research Service, “Intelligence Issues for Congress," US Library of Congress, Order
Code IB10012, May 9, 2006, 6, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/66506.pdf.
38
Ibid.
 16

one identified the correct number of intelligence entities, secondary sources must be

consulted.

These problems are not unique to financial matters. Indeed, similar problems

exist with sources that report on personnel. One example is Japan, which publishes a lot

of information on their intelligence establishment. However, the Land of the Rising Sun

has five distinct intelligence agencies – which apparently do not report to a single

oversight entity. The end result is that, while information exists about the employment

practices of the Japanese intelligence agencies, it becomes somewhat difficult to correctly

identify each one and find its total personnel.

Nevertheless, the nations that do self-report intelligence data are valuable to this

study. While the reports are sometimes dense and qualitative, the quantitative data –

budgets and personnel figure – are like golden nuggets of information. In many cases,

reporting these figures is a matter of legality, while others report simply due to agency

practice. This body of literature, nations which opt to publish quantitative data, is far

from being universal – most are generally considered part of Western society.

Regardless, the geographical spread of self-reporting nations is worldwide.

Systematic Studies of Intelligence

Despite the lack of comprehensive quantitative research, there are two prominent

studies attempting to catalog the world’s intelligence agencies. Each study has

substantial benefits and provides a solid starting point for quantitative research.

However, each study approaches cataloging their information by using different methods.

Uniformity between these studies is certainly lacking. Before discussing them further, it
 17

is important to briefly review the suitability of using a comparative case study design for

large-scale projects.

According to Michael Collier, Director of Research at Florida International

University’s Latin American and Caribbean Center, the purpose for conducting

comparative studies is to identify variance among the measured attributes.39 Measuring

variance allows the observer to identify diversity and determine how different attributes

may result in the same outcome. He says,

Often qualitative and quantitative analysis tools are used incorrectly in

comparative studies…the goal or strategy of comparative research is to
discover diversity among cases. Quantitative methods assume that all
causal factors (independent variables) work the same against the outcome
factor (dependent variable) being explained. In comparative analysis, it is
assumed that there is more than one causal path to the same outcome.40

Collier points out that comparative research identifies diversity and only can apply to a

moderate number of case studies, say 50 or so.41 For studies with more than 50 cases, the

researcher must move away from the comparative case study format and use statistical

methods.42

One project that uses the comparative case study design to systematically catalog

national intelligence communities is Brassey’s International Intelligence Yearbook by

Robert Henderson. Henderson attempts to create a comprehensive list of intelligence

agencies in 50 countries.43 Brassey’s Yearbook “is intended to provide such a

background reference guide”.44 For the purposes of comparison, this “reference guide”

39
Michael Collier, “A Pragmatic Approach to Developing Intelligence Analysts,” Defense Intelligence
Journal, 14, no. 2 (2005), 22.
40
Ibid, 26.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
43
Robert Henderson, Brassey’s International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington DC:
Brassey’s Inc, 2003).
44
Ibid, x
 18

structures its information into two broad categories, country briefings and countries

studies. For each country Henderson compares the following attributes:45

 System of Government
 National Intelligence Community
 National Security Legislation
 Intelligence Oversight
 International Intelligence Relationships
 Recent activities

Both categories, country studies and country briefings, contain a section of each listed

attribute. However, each country lacks completeness and uniformity in its data. For

example, Henderson’s Costa Rican country study says of intelligence oversight,

“Reportedly, there is a Legislative Assembly Committee with responsibility for

legislative review of the security and police forces”.46 This brief description includes

only the name of the legislative body and their technical area of oversight. Henderson

does not explain the historical context of the country’s intelligence oversight, officials

charged with overseeing intelligence agencies, or the source for this information. This is

a marked difference from the next country study, Estonia. For intelligence oversight,

Henderson includes the name of the oversight authorities, the historical run-up to the

current system, notable oversight figures, and the source of the information.47

While Henderson lacks uniformity in completeness of each predetermined

attribute, he effectively creates a reference guide for future studies. His goal is not to

create a methodologically correct book of case studies. Henderson wants to provide

future researchers with a starting point. As a result, many of his country studies contain

relevant information pertinent to this thesis.

45
Ibid, xi
46
Robert Henderson, Brassey’s International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington DC:
Brassey’s Inc, 2003), 248.
47
Ibid, 258-259.
 19

Another study attempting to catalog the world’s intelligence agencies is a subset

of the Intelligence Resource Program (IRP), an ongoing project by the Federation of

American Scientists (FAS). This section of the IRP is dedicated toward finding and

classifying any available information on any intelligence agency.48 Each country has

information discussing their national intelligence agencies. The individual listings

generally have two sections. The first section contains documents specifically about the

intelligence agencies. For example, the IRP lists India’s three different ministries with

intelligence agencies.49 The second section contains information about sources and

background areas for future research. Looking again at the entry for India, the sourcing

section has two entries; the first is a study by Ronald Kostoff of the US Department of

the Navy, which reviews Indian defense research literature.50 The second source links to

Bharat-Rakshak, a news-like consortium with different Indian military websites

available.51 Each source provides a valuable starting place for future research.

The IRP’s website on the world’s different intelligence agencies is a repository of

information with limited analysis. It is best called a research library, not a study. Barring

countries with well-known intelligence agencies, each country entry links to either a

document on FAS’s website or to another external source. Like Henderson, the FAS’s

IRP provides resources, much like a specialized library or database.

These sources amount to correlated data and not congregate findings or

assessments. Previous qualitative methods used to describe the world’s intelligence

48
To see the IRP’s list of countries with complied information on their intelligence agencies, see John Pike,
World Intelligence and Security Agencies, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/index.html.
49
John Pike, India Intelligence and Security Agencies, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/india/index.html.
50
Ibid. To read Kostoff’s study, see Ronald N. Kostoff, et al., Assessment of India's Research Literature,
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/india/research.pdf.
51
Ibid. To view Bharat-Rakshak, see Bharat-Rakshak, http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/.
 20

systems are relevant when looking at individual countries, and understanding other

methods to achieve civilian control over intelligence services is important. However, the

lack of quantitative studies describing intelligence communities provides an excellent

opportunity for advancement, particularly in testing Loch Johnson’s correlation between

intelligence activity and national wealth. This study’s specific goal is to quantitatively

determine the approximate size of the world’s intelligence industry, although it expects to

identify Lock’s relationship. To that end, the researcher expects the aggregated amount

spent on intelligence to near 100 billion United States Dollars (USD), and the total

number of people working within the worldwide community to be about 500,000.

 21

METHODOLOGY

This study uses a quantitative descriptive research design because it allows for the

classification of a sample population’s characteristics in a systematic way.52 For each

country, the study measures the following interval data – intelligence spending,

personnel, and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This study uses the definition of GDP

given by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The researcher collected intelligence

spending and personnel information on individual countries using open sources, primarily

from the internet. The data also comes from traditional academic sources, such as books,

journals, and conference papers. However, not all budgetary and personnel information

is readily available for every country. The study does estimate some of the intelligence

spending and personnel data. The following chapter explains the process used to identify

and estimate the different spending and personnel numbers of the world’s intelligence

industry.

This chapter also explains how the researcher collated the intelligence spending of

individual nations into standardized units, such as dollars valued at a certain year.

Quantifying the set of data allowed for cross-country comparisons. However, problems

arose when unifying the datasets and this affected the standardizing process. The last

section describes the methods used to resolve these classification problems, specifically

52
This concept and other methodological approaches are discussed in Ronald Hunter and Mark Dantzker,
Research Methods for Criminology and Criminal Justice: A Primer, 2nd ed. (Boston: Jones & Bartlett,
2005), 98-100,
http://books.google.com/books?id=Z0sDhvGkomgC&pg=PA98&lpg=PA98&dq=descriptive+historical+de
sign&source=bl&ots=CSla94hG0K&sig=-
8ayiRuBBsQ7dp0OICv7dMOGjD8&hl=en&ei=M0whSsrLG4aHtgeK_7jCBg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct
=result&resnum=2#PPP1,M1.
 22

how this study dealt with the definitional inconsistencies of different personnel types,

such as full-time, part-time, and contacted employees.

Data Collection

According to the Congressional Research Service, open source information comes

from newspapers, journals, radio, television, and the internet.53 Collecting information

on intelligence spending and employment came primarily from sources on the internet.

The data also came from other sources, such as scholarly journals, trade publications, and

congressional research documents.

This thesis limits the scope of collection to the 195 sovereign nation-states

recognized by the United States State Department – with the exception of the Holy See

(Vatican City). These states form the basis of the data. The Vatican is not included

because there are no GDP estimates to indicate its national wealth. Attempting to

measure this indicator would likely present a problem, as most of the Vatican’s income

comes from outside its territorial boundaries. The Vatican’s external assets and

economic activity cannot be included in a GDP estimate under the BEA’s definition of

GDP, which it says is “the value of final goods and services produced in [a country] in a

given period of time”.54 With the exception of minor goods, such as tourist mementos

and museum fees, the primary sources of income for Vatican City come from external

sources. Therefore, its GDP estimate is tricky at best to determine.

53
Congressional Research Service, “Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): Issues for Congress,” US Library
of Congress, Order Code RL34270, December 5, 2007, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34270.pdf.
54
Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Measuring the Economy: A Primer on GDP and the National Income
and Product Accounts,” US Department of Commerce, September 2007, 2,
http://www.bea.gov/national/pdf/nipa_primer.pdf.
 23

The list of 195 countries does not include dependencies or other areas that are not

independent nations. Excluding these areas is consistent with the US State Department’s

definitions.55 The United Nations also does not consider these territories as independent

nations, and they are not recognized as Member States.56

The agencies listed within each country are intelligence agencies. To the best of

his ability, the researcher excluded government agencies with characteristics unique to

law enforcement. In some cases, the distinction between intelligence and law

enforcement is blurred. One example is the treatment of financial intelligence units (FIU)

as members of an intelligence community. While some FIUs act as members of a

nation’s intelligence community, others do not. The researcher addressed this issue by

generally excluding agencies with mandates requiring them to enforce financial

regulations, compliance matters, and tax evasion – when it relates to money laundering.

In other cases, there is no distinction between intelligence and law enforcement

agencies. The researcher used the best available information to establish if such an

agency was consistent with the conceptual framework as explained in Chapter 2.

Collection from Internet Sources

The researcher used three different methods to collect relevant information from

the internet. The first method consisted of keyword and phrase searches using terms

most likely to generate results of an individual country’s intelligence spending and

personnel. Some keywords and phrases resulted in the desired information, but not all.

55
See United States State Department, Independent States in the World,
http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm#note4.
56
To see the list of Member-States of the United Nations, see United Nations, Member States of the United
Nations, http://www.un.org/en/members/ [accessed June 1, 2009].
 24

Most of the search results gave supplementary information, such as oversight committees

or annual reports about the intelligence community of a country. The most useful results

were noted for future use.

After using this initial search criterion, the researcher adjusted the terms to

specify the intelligence agencies. Adjusting the search criterion increased the precision

of the results. The process of searching initial keywords and phrases, then refining, is a

matter of trial and error. After finding the relevant information, the researcher recorded

the relevant data and year of publication. This method was applied to every country.

In the second search method, the researcher utilized online journals and websites

with dedicated sections on intelligence. Journals like the International Journal of

Intelligence and Counterintelligence, the Defense Intelligence Journal, and the

Intelligence and National Security Journal, provided some keywords and phrases for

future use. While some of the journals are available print, many more are available on

the internet. Additionally, their online versions tended to be more suitable, as they are

easier to conduct keyword searches.

The researcher searched these journals in a very systematic manner, where the

most recent editions’ articles were examined for relevant information. The only articles

searched had descriptions about intelligence agencies or communities – however, the

journal article titles provided most of the information necessary to determine if they

contained any relevant information. After recording the relevant data and citation from

the journal publication, the researcher continued on to the previous journal edition,

searching through it for relevant information. Each scholarly journal received this

process.
 25

Other online publishers that consistently report, or have dedicated sections, on

intelligence agencies received the same systematic search approach. Some of these

organizations include the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Jane's Sentinel

Country Risk Assessments Library, the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of

Armed Forces (DCAF), and GlobalSecurity.org. The researcher also applied the

systematic search approach to these sources, although the process slightly differed. From

a researcher’s standpoint, the primary difference between these sources and scholarly

journals is how they categorize their information. The scholarly journals generally

organize their content around date, whereas these online publishers organize their content

around national lines. This required a slight change in systematically searching for data.

Instead of searching these online sources based on publication date, the researcher

searched for data along national lines, systematically going through each publisher’s list

of countries, one at a time.

Government websites proved to be another useful source for information. As

previously discussed, some countries’ intelligence agencies publish a regular report of

spending, while in other countries the governments require the agencies to publish

general budgetary reports every so often. An example of a country that requires annual

reporting is New Zealand. Section 34 and 70I of the 1989 New Zealand Public Finance

Act requires the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service to undergo an annual audit by

the internal Auditor-General.57 Comparatively, the United States Constitution requires “a

regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditure of all public Money shall

57
New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, “Financial Reporting,” House of Representatives, Home >
Annual Reports > 2006 > Financial Reporting, http://www.nzsis.govt.nz/reports/ar06/financial.aspx.
 26

be published from time to time”.58 In practice however, the publication of this

information does not occur on a set schedule, but rather infrequently.59 Nevertheless,

when self-reporting does exist it is generally attainable through government websites.

The researcher used a systematic search approach similar to the method used for online

publishers, in order to gather this information.

In the third method, the researcher used “Google Alerts,” a free “push” service

from Google.com. The researcher created a generic Boolean search criterion and set it at

the comprehensive collection level. This setting covers news, blogs, and videos.

However, using Google Alerts requires the user to first identify terms likely to produce

results. The researcher first identified the names of a particular country’s intelligence

agencies, generally both in English and the native language. After identifying these

agencies, the researcher entered their various names into the Google Alert search field

using Boolean format. The reporting of these results generally occurred on a daily basis.

In order to assist the translating of non-English results found by these three search

methods, the researcher used the website FreeTranslation.com. The owner of this

website is a service company that provides language translation software to global

corporations.60 FreeTranslation.com has two useful features: first, it has a single word

translator. The user inputs the text from the original language and selects the language of

the translation. Second, it has an entire webpage translator, where, the user inputs the

Uniform Resource Locator (URL) and then FreeTranslation.com coverts it from the

originating language to the desired language.

58
“The Constitution of the United States,” Article I, Section 9, Clause 7.
59
Congressional Research Service, “Intelligence Spending: Public Disclosure Issues,” US Library of
Congress, Order Code 94-261, Updated February 15, 2007, 2, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/94-261.pdf.
60
SLD, Company Profile, http://www.sdl.com/en/company/company/.
 27

Despite the benefits provided from using FreeTranslation.com, the website does

not have a comprehensive list of languages. The text translator can only translate into

English from the following languages: Spanish, French, German, Italian, Dutch,

Portuguese, Russian, and Japanese. A similar restriction applies to their webpage

translator. The webpage translator can only translate to English: Spanish, French,

German, Italian, Dutch, and Portuguese. FreeTranslation.com also does not translate

Portable Document Format (PDFs) – a rather large drawback. Despite these limitations,

the service did assist in researching general information about foreign intelligence

agencies.

Collection from Other Sources

Data collected also came from other sources not previously mentioned. These

sources include journals not online, trade publications, and congressional documents.

The most common way in which the researcher identified these resources was cited

footnotes in other sources. Throughout the data collection process, the researcher

continually checked the sourcing of relevant data, which not only provided more

resources, but also allowed the researcher to better gauge the information’s reliability and

credibility. For example, one document from the Congressional Research Service

document gave Spain’s intelligence spending for 2006.61 The report’s authors cite

discussions with Spanish officials as the source of this information. Checking the

sourcing also led the researcher to further research that sometimes yielded more relevant

61
Congressional Research Service, "European Approaches to Homeland Security and Counterterrorism,"
US Library of Congress, Order Code RL33573, July 24, 2006, 34,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33573.pdf.
 28

data. A footnote may contain a book, report, or other primary source publications, which

can led to other relevant studies.

Other Relevant Information Collection

In addition to collecting information on intelligence spending and personnel, the

researcher also identified the corresponding year of the published data, and GDPs of the

individual countries. The purpose of citing the year of publication and the GDPs of

individual countries is to assist in comparing and estimating unknown datasets. The GDP

figures come from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which was chosen for its

consistent reporting periods. Also included are the names of the national intelligence

agencies, indicated intelligence community, or intelligence spending program. The

names of the intelligence agencies are not necessarily relevant to this study, but they are

available for reference purposes only. The researcher used Microsoft Excel to collate this

information in one single spreadsheet. Under each country listing is the name of an

intelligence agency and its corresponding budgetary and personnel data. However, if the

only information found represented the national intelligence community or spending

program, then it is indicated, and not necessarily each agency.

Establishing Webpage Credibility

This thesis uses Dax Norman’s Trust Evaluation Worksheet to estimate the

credibility of online sources. This Worksheet comes from Norman’s study, How to

Identify Credible Sources on the Web, in which he seeks to determine a “valid criteria for
 29

evaluating the credibility of open source Web sites”.62 It is the first quantitative study

which aims to create a methodologically sound criterion for establishing a website’s

credibility, while targeting its use for open-source analysts. Previous studies either

addressed the issue as tangent to a larger study or were methodologically flawed.

According to Norman, there are several factors to consider when determining the

credibility of a website; corroboration is the most influential criterion.63 The worksheet

applies only to websites and not to online editions of journals or other primarily

hardcover sources. Each online source has a credibility rating recorded with its citation.

The purpose of tracking credibility is incidental to this study – it merely provides a

critique to non-peer reviewed sources.

Process for Estimating Unknown Spending

This thesis uses a three step process for estimating the unknown intelligence

spending of an individual country. In short, the researcher created a ratio using the

known intelligence spending and GDP from countries with the available information.

Once identifying each individual ratio for countries with known intelligence spending,

the researcher created an average of all the ratios. By using this averaged ratio, the study

identified the unknown intelligence spending for the remaining countries. GDP acts as

the independent variable, while intelligence spending represents the dependent variable.

GDP is independent because it represents national wealth – the variable that influences

the country’s intelligence spending. The following three steps explain how the study

62
Dax Norman, "How to Identify Credible Sources on The Web,," (Master's Thesis, Joint Military
Intelligence College, December 2001), viii, http://daxrnorman.googlepages.com/5-CompleteThesis-
May08.pdf.
63
Dax Norman, “Websites You Can Trust,” American Libraries 37, no. 7 (2006), 36,
http://daxrnorman.googlepages.com/WebSitesYouCanTrust-Oct08.pdf.
 30

created the averaged ratio and how it was used to identify the intelligence spending for

countries without this information. The steps are:

Step 1: Average the known intelligence spending of an individual country against its

GDP. Record this ratio of known intelligence spending and GDP for future use. Each

country with reported intelligence spending receives a ratio based on their reported

information. Each country’s ratio reflects its intelligence spending compared to its GDP.

Step 2: Create an average from all of the ratios in order determine a single general ratio

for intelligence spending. Although statistical outliers generally diminish the overall

accuracy of a distribution curve, they are included in this ratio. This is because it allows

the ratio more flexibility when estimating the spending.

Step 3: Apply this single averaged ratio to each country with unknown intelligence

spending. The estimation of a nation’s unknown intelligence spending was identified

through cross-multiplication, using the GDP of the country and the averaged ratio.

Process for Estimating Unknown Personnel

For countries with reported intelligence spending but not personnel, the researcher

used a four step process. This process treats intelligence spending as an independent

variable in order to estimate a country’s intelligence personnel. To estimate the number

of intelligence professionals in countries with unknown personnel, the researcher

identified two countries with similar levels of intelligence spending and with reported

employees. The researcher then took the average of these two countries’ employees and

applied it to the country with unknown personnel. The depended variable here is
 31

unknown personnel, as the estimated figure relies on intelligence spending. The

individual steps in the process are:

Step 1: Identify the two most similar countries on the basis of reported intelligence

spending. These two countries must have both reported spending and personnel. One

country must have a lower level of reported intelligence spending than the country with

unknown personnel. The other country must have higher reported intelligence spending

than the country with unknown personnel.

Step 2: The country with the lower reported intelligence spending and personnel is set as

the low range, while the other country with reported intelligence spending and personnel

is set as the high range. The country with unreported personnel must fall somewhere in

between the high and low ranges.

Step 3: Average the personnel for both the high and low ranges. This results in a ratio of

the two ranges.

Step 4: Apply this ratio to the country with unknown personnel.

There are also countries with neither reported intelligence spending nor personnel.

For these countries, the researcher used the previously described process to estimate

intelligence spending. This included each of the three steps, where estimates use a

general ratio based on GDP. After estimating the country’s intelligence spending, finding

its personnel is a matter of following the pre-described four step process.

Standardizing Spending Units

The information for each country’s intelligence spending often came from

different periods in time and in different currencies. In order to standardize the monetary
 32

units, the researcher converted the amounts from the originating currency to US Dollars

(USD). After converting the units, the amount still remained in the reported year. In

order to unify the estimated amounts into a single year, the study uses 2008 used as a

baseline year. To convert the original currency to USD, the researcher used the website

Oanda.com. This website provides free “Internet-based forex trading and currency

information services”.64 The advantage of using Oanda.com is that it allows the user to

convert currencies using previous rates. The user can determine the desired amount

currency to convert, set the rate used, and then pick the expressed currency.65

Standardizing Personnel Definitions

While the currency data may differ, personnel information suffers from

conflicting definitions. Some sources include only full-time employees, while others

include contract-based personnel. For example, the Canadian Security Intelligence

Service reports its total as the number of full-time equivalent employees.66 However, the

US includes approximately 56,000 contractors with its total intelligence personnel.67 In

order to come to terms with the differences in classification, the researcher only included

full-time equivalent employees directly employed by the government agency. In most

situations, the reported figure did not further divide personnel into separate categories.

The researcher accepted these figures as full-time equivalents.

64
OANDA, About OANDA, http://www.oanda.com/site/oanda/com_index.shtml.
65
OANDA, “FXConverter - Currency Converter for 164 Currencies,”
http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic.
66
Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “Public Report 2006-2007,” Canadian Security Intelligence
Service (Gatineau: Public Works and Government Services, 2007), 15, http://www.csis-
scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/nnlrprt/2006/rprt2006-eng.pdf.
67
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2009 National Intelligence Strategy, September 15, 2009,
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2009/09/dni091509-m.pdf.
 33

RESULTS

Research into the approximate size of the world’s intelligence industry produced a

number of interesting results. This chapter will give the overall findings produced by the

methods described in Chapter 3. This chapter’s first section will discuss the patterns of

intelligence spending, while the second section will describe the workforce of the

intelligence industry. The third section will give a brief narrative description of the

identified intelligence agencies. The fourth and final section will provide a summary of

the results.

The Totals: Spending

Using the described methods, this study identifies that the world’s intelligence

industry spends an estimated

Figure 4.1: Total World Intelligence
$106,961,604,308.01 United States Spending
World
Intelligence
Dollars (USD) on an annual basis. The Spending:
$31.96
Billion
relationship between intelligence 35%
US
spending and Gross Domestic Product Intelligence
Spending:
$75 Billion
(GDP) is positive, where for every 947 65%

units of GDP there are two units of

Total Spending: $106,961,604,308.01
intelligence spending. The United States

spends the most on intelligence. As shown in Figure 4.1, the US spends about $75 billion

dollars, approximately 65 percent of the total amount. According to statistics from the

International Monetary Fund (IMF), the US’s GDP represents only 23.5 percent of the
 34

world’s entire GDP.68 When comparing the US’s portion of intelligence spending to its

proportion of the world’s GDP, is it clear that the US spends far more proportionally on

intelligence than the rest of the world. Its share of the intelligence pie is roughly double

that of its share of GDP.

Including the US, 20 nations represent the top ten percent of intelligence spenders

- those that spend $263,307,103.72

Figure 4.2: Top Ten Percent
Intelligence Spending or more. Their accumulated
Remaining
World
Spending: Top Ten
spending – indicated in Figure 4.2
$7.6 Percent
Billion Spending: – accounts for about 93 percent of
7% $99.5
Billion the total amount, or
93%
$99,507,696,851.13. Compare this

to the same countries’ accumulated

GDP, about $42,127,856,999,999,

or 69.42 percent of the world’s total 2008 GDP.69 However, not all of these 20 countries

top the list of nations with the largest GDP.70 The average point-to-point variation in

intelligence spending among the top ten percent of spenders is $3,933,496,948.26.

68
This figure uses the International Monetary Fund’s world GDP estimate to derive the number 23.5
percent. The amount is $60,689,812,000,000. See International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook
Database, Report for Selected Country Groups and Subjects,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2008&ey=2008&scsm=1&ssd
=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=001%2C998&s=NGDPD&grp=1&a=1&pr.x=27&pr.y=8.
69
This figure uses the IMF’s GDP estimate for the years of the intelligence spending - the years which the
study identified intelligence spending. See International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook
Database, April 2009: Nominal GDP list of countries Data for the year 2008,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/index.aspx.
70
For the complete list of GDP estimate for 2008, see International Monetary Fund, World Economic
Outlook Database, April 2009: Nominal GDP list of countries Data for the year 2008,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/index.aspx. Or, to view a quick total, see “List
of countries by GDP (nominal),” Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)#cite_note-0 [accessed June 2, 2009].
 35

However, excluding the US when measuring variation produces an average of

$248,494,801.33.

The other 175 nations, or the bottom 90 percent, spend the remaining seven

percent of the total intelligence figure, or $7,453,907,456.88. These countries have a

total GDP of $12,819,519,999,996, comprising about 31.12 percent of the world’s 2008

GDP.71 When comparing this population’s proportion of intelligence spending to its

proportion of GDP, it again demonstrates unevenness. The bottom 90 percent of

intelligence spenders is similar to the bottom 90 percent of countries with the lowest

GDP. The average intelligence spending for these countries is $42,593,756.90.

A bar graph is perhaps the best method for displaying the spread of intelligence

spending by each country. The graph in Figure 4.3 shows countries sorted by intelligence

spending. The countries most close to the y-axis have the highest intelligence spending,

while the countries farthest away, along the x-axis, have the lowest intelligence spending.

For the purpose of increasing clarity, numbers are in place of country names. Appendix

B: Intelligence Spending Sorted Highest to Lowest has a list of each number’s

corresponding country, along with their individual intelligence spending. Additionally,

the y-axis in Figure 4.3 is set as logarithmic – its scale increasing by the power 10 – in

order to improve the visual display of the data.

There are two trend lines that seem to be the best fit for the data, power and

exponential. The first line is solid black and represents the exponential trend line. The

second line is a dotted black, representing the power trend line. The solid black trend line

71
See International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, World Economic Outlook
Database, April 2009,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2008&ey=2008&scsm=1&ssd
=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=001%2C998&s=NGDPD&grp=1&a=1&pr.x=27&pr.y=8.
 36

increases steadily upward from right to left. Given the logarithmic scaling, this

movement is consistent with what one expects from data which is exponential. The

dotted black trend line increases right to left in a similar way, however, there is a steady

curve that eventually hooks sharply upwards as it nears the y-axis. The researcher

computed the R-Squared (R2) values – which measures how well a trend line will match

with the data – in order to assist in analyzing the trend lines. The R2 value for the

exponential trend line is 0.940 and the R2 value for the power trend line is 0.835. It is

likely that the dataset, the individual intelligence spending, follows slightly more of an

exponential curve rather than a curve that obeys a power law. Nevertheless, the

proximity of the two R2 values to one another is notable, as it indicates that the dataset

may still follow a power law. Further research into identifying the minimum x (Xmin) and

the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) is necessary. This step is necessary to

determine the approximated scaling exponent of the curve, if indeed it does follow a

power law curve. After finding the scaling exponent, it ought to be relatively simple to

accurately say this data does or does not follow a power law curve.

One interesting finding of this study is the difference the US has on deriving

statistical information from the data. For instance, including the US in estimating the

mean amount spent on intelligence results in an average of $548,521,047.73. However,

without the US the average drops dramatically, to $164,750,537.67. The standard

deviation with the US is $5,389,872,754.45, without the US it is $576,959,565.88. The

differences in the two means and standard deviations are noteworthy. On one hand, this

information suggests that the US is an outlier and it should not be included when

calculating this statistical information. On the other hand, the US appears to play a very
37
 38

minor role in shaping the ratio used to estimate unknown intelligence spending. The

overall difference in the amount estimated – when using the measuring ratio that includes

the US, verses using the ratio that excludes the US – is about five percent.

When including the US, the average ratio of intelligence spending to GDP is

2/947, also expressed as 0.000961961. To determine this ratio, the researcher limited the

dataset to countries with known intelligence spending and GDP. The ratio here found a

total of $19,279,129,862.15 in estimated spending. The standard deviation of the ratio

group – the sample used to estimate – is 1/798, or 0.001368871. When excluding the US

from calculating the average of these ratios, the result is 1/442, or 0.0008665 – only

slightly different from the original 2/947. Using 1/442 to find unknown intelligence

spending results in a total of $17,365,946,777.38 in estimated spending. The difference

between using the ratio 2/947 and 1/442 is $1,378,694,524.39, an overall difference of

5.22 percent.

The US clearly spends far more on intelligence than any other nation, from any

standpoint. However, when looking at its ratio of intelligence spending to GDP, the US

does not necessarily spend in disproportionate amount. Its affect on the total spending

figure is notable, but its affect on the estimating process is not. Table 4.1 reflects this

information by showing the US’s slight affect on the estimating ratio.

 39

Table 4.1: Affect of US on Estimating

Population Population
(US Included) (US Excluded)
Average Spending $548,521,047.73 $164,750,537.67

Standard Deviation $5,389,872,754.45 $576,959,565.88

Ratios for Estimating 2/947 1/442

Percent Difference of Estimates 5.22%

As for the countries that comprise the top ten percent of intelligence spenders,

obvious nations – such as the US, UK, and Russia – are on the list. However, it is

surprising to see the nations not on the top ten percent list. If GDP is the primary

indicator of intelligence spending, then Spain would most certainly make the list with its

1.2 trillion dollar economy.72 Yet sources indicate that it spends about $200,000,000, an

amount far lower than Venezuela, which is part of the top ten percent. A direct

correlation between GDP and intelligence spending may exist, but it is not strongly

indicated here. It is apparent that GDP is a factor when it comes to intelligence spending

but it does not seem to be the primary factor. Further research is necessary to quantify

GDP’s affect on intelligence spending.

72
See Spain’s 2005 GDP at International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, World
Economic Outlook Database, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/index.aspx.
 40

The Totals: Personnel

This study identifies the total number of people working in the intelligence

industry as 1,130,104 persons. The two largest employers are the US and Russia who, as

shown in Figure 4.4, jointly employ approximately 28 percent of the total. All other

things being equal, it is logical to assume that because the US spends the most on

intelligence, that it should also employ the most people. However, it employs about

28,000 less than Russia. The US does

Figure 4.4: Total Intelligence Employment
employ approximately 56,000

intelligence contractors, however.73

US
144,000
Including them into the calculations 13%

would increase the US’s share, but the Russia

172,000
15%
definitions given previously in this
World
study prohibit non-government workers 814,104
72%
from being counted. Regardless, the

US employs about 144,000 people,

resulting in roughly $520,833 in Total Employment: 1,130,104

intelligence spending per person. Its GDP per person is about $99,059,722.

For Russia, its total number of workers is about 172,000, making it the world’s

largest employer of intelligence professionals.74 Although Russia may employ the most

people, it does not come nearly as close as spending the most money. Russia has about

73
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2009 National Intelligence Strategy, September 15, 2009,
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2009/09/dni091509-m.pdf. Although the total number given by the ODNI is
200,000, previous interviews indicate that in 2008 the US's intelligence community employed 28 percent of
its workforce as contractors. After removing contractors, 56,000, the remaining number of employees is
about 144,000. See Joseph Fitsanakis, "US Spy Services Hiding True Employee Numbers Says Senate
Panel," IntelNews.org, July 27, 2009, http://intelligencenews.wordpress.com/2009/07/27/01-195/.
74
Ivan Safranchuk, “Funding for the Russian Secret Services," Agentura.ru,
http://www.agentura.ru/english/experts/safranchuk/.
 41

$18,902.70 in intelligence spending per person – a figure substantially lower than its

American counterpart. This difference is also present when using GDP to calculate a per

person figure, which is $5,752,488. Obviously there are other factors working into the

equation. Given the small scope of this study, the finding here is that there are some

differences in employment practices.

Using the best information available, this thesis finds 21 countries that employ

10,000 or more people. They employ about 61 percent of the world’s total intelligence

workforce, or 689,428 people. As shown in Figure 4.5, the 21 countries come from

various regions around the world – however, some countries listed, such as Camroon and

Algeria, have estimated personnel. The researcher based these estimates on the best

available information and the methods outlined in Chapter 3. The total intelligence

employment of these countries varies, as seen in Figure 4.6. While the US has the

highest intelligence spending per person, $520,833.33, the United Kingdom has the

highest GDP per person, at $229,787,213.11. Panama has the lowest intelligence

spending per person, $1,465.79, and Syria has the lowest GDP per person, $1,567,200.

One interesting country on the list of top intelligence employers is China. China

is third largest intelligence employer in the world with an estimated workforce of 88,050

people, a figure representing about 7.79 percent of the world’s total intelligence industry.

Yet China’s intelligence spending per person is $46,755.19 – 40.42 percent higher than

Russia. Figure 4.7 compares the amounts spent per person by China, Russia, and the

world’s average. Taken at face value, China’s spending per employee is clearly more

consistent with the world average when compared with Russia. China employs less

people but spends more per person than its Russian counterpart.
 42

Figure 4.5: Geographic Position of Top Intelligence Employers

= Top Intelligence Employers

Source: Trevor Coultart, World Geography Ignorance,

http://trevorcoultart.wordpress.com/2008/05/26/world-geography-ignorance/. The grey shading and
color alterations are the work of this researcher.

Figure 4.6: Top 21 Intelligence Employers

200,000
180,000
160,000
140,000
120,000
100,000
People

80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
0
Singapore

Portugal
Egypt

Cuba

India

Syria
Romania
Iraq
Pakistan

Iran

United States
United Kingdom
Luxembourg
Panama

Slovenia

China

Russia
Bangladesh
Cameroon

Switzerland
Algeria

Country
 43

Figure 4.7 also says something about Russia. One of three scenarios is likely:

Russia’s identified intelligence spending is grossly inaccurate, the country values

intelligence less than the rest of the world, or the country has drastically different hiring

practices than its peers.

Figure 4.7: Comparing Intelligence Spending Per Person

$60,000.00

$50,000.00
Intelligence Spending Per Person

$40,000.00

$30,000.00

$20,000.00

$10,000.00

$0.00
Average
Russia

World
China

The remaining 90 percent of employers comprise 174 countries, representing 39

percent of the world’s total intelligence workforce, or 440,676 people – shown in Figure

4.8. The average number of persons employed by any given country is 2,533, with a

standard deviation of 2,709. Australia spends the most on its intelligence professionals,

about $1,273,174.83 per person. However, this figure may result from problems with

collection. The country with the second highest intelligence spending per person is

Japan, which spends approximately $1,123,208.36 per employee. Japan’s spending per

person estimate is likely more accurate due to the completeness in data collected on its

workforce. In arguing the correctness of its estimate, this thesis is also arguing that Japan
 44

has the highest intelligence spending per person in the world. Information on Japan’s

total comes from the Ministry of Defense’s Nationall Institute for Defense Studies, but its

spending is an estimate.

One interesting finding is the diversity

ty in intelligence spending per person. While

approximately 60 percent of the world’s intelligence workforce is in countries that

employ 10,000 or more persons, these nations are not necessarily the same as the top

intelligence spenders.
ers. Only six countri
countries
es with the highest intelligence spending are also

on the list of top intelligence employers – as shown in Figure 4.9.. The data should reflect

the assumption that a relationship exists between intelligence spending and employment,

yet it does not. Most countries

ountries employ between 0 and 2,000 persons in their intelligence

system, as shown in Figure 4.10.. There are also notable decreases in the number of

countries that employ more than 6,000 persons and then again at 14,000. Countries seem

to cluster around employment le

levels between 0-6,000, and then 8,000-14,000.
14,000.

Figure 4.8: Bottom 90 Percent

Employment vs. Top Ten Percent
Employment
1,200,000
1,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000
0
Total Employment
Top Ten Percent
689,428
Employment
Bottom 90
Percent 440,676
Employment
 45

Figure 4.9: Countries with Top Spending and Employment

= Top Intelligence Spender and

Employer

Source: Trevor Coultart, World Geography Ignorance,

http://trevorcoultart.wordpress.com/2008/05/26/world-geography-ignorance/. The grey shading and
color alterations are the work of this researcher.

Figure 4.10: Histogram of Intelligence Employment

110
100 96
90
80
Number of Countries

70
60
50
40 36
30 24 # of Countries
20 13
10 5 5 6 4
1 2 1 1 1 1
0

Employs Between
 46

Other Extracted Results

Research of the 195 sovereign nations identified 246 different national

intelligence agencies.75 Based on the best available information, this list does not include

agencies involved in law enforcement. The average number of intelligence agencies per

country is 1.28. Most of these agencies seem to focus on military or political-strategic

target sets rather than operating and maintaining technological systems. The average

credibility rating for internet sources is 38.56, or somewhere between the medium and

high ranges of Dax Norman’s Trust Evaluation Worksheet. Before elaborating further on

credibility, the following paragraphs will discuss the exclusion of certain financial

“intelligence agencies”.

The 246 different agencies identified by this study generally do not include ones

that specialize in, what they list as, “financial intelligence”. The by and large exclusion

of these agencies is due to inconsistent descriptions of their duties, as briefly discussed in

the methodology. For instance, the Canadian Financial Transaction and Reports Analysis

Centre (FINTRAC) says a primary function is to counter terrorist financing,76 while its

mandate requires the agency to “provide law enforcement financial intelligence that

would be relevant to the investigation or prosecution of money laundering offences and

terrorist activity financing offences as well as to provide CSIS [the Canadian Security

75
The figure does not include intelligence agencies of the United States. This is because the intelligence
spending of the US is expressed in its budgetary account form, that is, the National Intelligence Program
(NIP) or the Military Intelligence Program. The same is true for the United Kingdom which expresses its
intelligence spending via the Single Intelligence Account (SIA). There is some question as whether or not
the Defense Intelligence Staff includes its budget within the SIA – the figure within this study appears to
include it. For referencing on the SIA, see Intelligence and Security Committee, "Annual Report 2007-
2008," Parliament of the United Kingdom, ISC 2008/09/064, 8, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/uk/isc2007-
08.pdf.
76
To view a FINTRAC’s 2008 Annual Report on its duties, functions, and activities, see Financial
Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, FINTRAC Annual Report 2008 (Ottawa: 2008), 22,
http://www.fintrac-canafe.gc.ca/publications/ar/2008/ar-eng.pdf.
 47

and Intelligence Service is the country’s foreign intelligence agency] with financial

intelligence that would be relevant threats to the security of Canada”.77 FINTRAC is an

intelligence agency that participates in collection and analysis, and interacts with the

Canadian intelligence system. Another example is the Saudi Arabian Financial

Investigation Unit, whose first priority is to “handle suspicious financial transactions,

analyze them and prepare reports thereon to submit them to the competent

authorities…and exchanges information with the relevant agencies in Saudi Arabia and

abroad”.78 Despite using the term “investigation” in its title, the entity is Saudi Arabia’s

official financial intelligence unit.79 These agencies differ from that of the Bahamas’

Financial Intelligence Unit, which says it is “The Bahamas’ regulator for anti-money

laundering and prevention of the financing of terrorism”.80 While the unit’s realm of

specialty includes preventing terrorism financing, the definition given here, along with

the Financial Intelligence Unit Act of 2000, clearly describes itself as a regulatory entity

and not an intelligence agency.81 The Bahamas’ description of its Financial Intelligence

77
Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, Who We Are, http://www.fintrac-
canafe.gc.ca/fintrac-canafe/1-eng.asp [accessed May 30, 2009].
78
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Financial Investigation Unit, Background,
http://www.moi.gov.sa/wps/portal/safiu/!ut/p/c1/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3hT5wBnTwtfY0
N3ZxNnA08TwzCDYGdTY6MAE6B8JJK8gamTs4FRmJ-
zaVBIgIGboykB3cGpefrhIDtxq7I0RpPHYgdI3gAHcDTQ9_PIz03VL8iNqPDMMlEEACELTPE!/dl2/d1/
L0lDU0lKSWdra0EhIS9JTlJBQUlpQ2dBek15cUEhL1lCSkoxTkExTkk1MC13ISEvN181Q1BDSThNMz
E4NkU0MEk0NUpNNktFMkMyMQ!!/?WCM_PORTLET=PC_7_5CPCI8M3186E40I45JM6KE2C21_W
CM&WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/wps/wcm/connect/main/Financial+Investigation/Main/Background/
[accessed November 17, 2009]
79
The Egmont Group, List of Members, http://www.egmontgroup.org/about/list-of-members/by-region/asia
[accessed November 17, 2009].
80
Commonwealth of The Bahamas, Welcome to FIU Bahamas,
http://www.bahamas.gov.bs/bahamasweb2/home.nsf/vContentW/A4AE9BF530DECF23852572C600580B
D7.
81
See An Act to Provide for the Establishment of a Body to be Known As the Financial Intelligence Unit,
the Functions and Powers of That Body, and for Connected Purposes, No. 29 of 2000, Parliament of The
Bahamas, December 29, 2000, http://www.bahamas.gov.bs/bahamasweb2/home.nsf/vContentW/CC--
Other--Compliance+Commission+PDFS/$file/FinIntellUnitAct2000(ConsolidatedVersion).pdf.
 48

Unit is consistent with members of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF).

CFATF is,

An organisation of thirty states of the Caribbean Basin, which have agreed to

implement common countermeasures to address the problem of criminal money
laundering...In Aruba representatives of Western Hemisphere countries, in
particular from the Caribbean and from Central America , convened to develop a
common approach to the phenomenon of the laundering of the proceeds of
crime...The main objective of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force is to
achieve effective implementation of and compliance with its recommendations to
prevent and control money laundering and to combat the financing of terrorism.
The Secretariat has been established as a mechanism to monitor and encourage
progress to ensure full implementation of the Kingston Ministerial Declaration.82

CFATF’s mandate does not extend to sharing such financial information with intelligence

agencies either within participating countries, or abroad. Simply put, these financial

intelligence units are generally not part of a national intelligence system.83

The 246 intelligence agencies do not generally include intelligence oversight

entities or coordinating agencies. The descriptions given by many these organizations are

not systematically consistent with the definitions of this study, indicating that a

correlation between them and what entities were counted is not possible. However, the

study uses the best possible information available to establish if these oversight entities

were comparable. Examples of these types of organizations are the Argentinean

Secretariat of National Intelligence and the Brazilian Consulting Council of the

Intelligence System. These two entities exemplify oversight and coordinating bodies and

are not comparable to agencies that participate in the coordination and analysis of

information, such as the US’s Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). In
82
Caribbean Financial Action Task Force [CFATF], CFATF OVERVIEW, http://www.cfatf.org/.
83
For more information regarding financial Units, The Egmont Group provides a comprehensive starting
point. The Egmont Group states in its purpose statement that it is an organization created with the intent to
combat money laundering, regardless of the money’s end use. It is an organization that provides a
mechanism for sharing financial information related to money laundering. See Egmont Group, Statement
of Purpose of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, June 23, 2004,
http://www.egmontgroup.org/files/library_egmont_docs/statement_of_purpose.pdf.
 49

short, the purposes and functions of the Secretariat of National Intelligence and the

Consulting Council are not comparable or similar to the ODNI.84 Including these types

of entities creates difficulties in maintaining a consistent conceptual model. Therefore,

the list of 246 different intelligence agencies does not include them.

The study finds its internet-based sources as having an averaged medium to high

rating of credibility. Based on Dax Norman’s Trust Evaluation Worksheet (shown in

Appendix A), the average of all internet sources used is 38.55, or medium to high

credibility. This rating is applicable for about 36 percent of the sources used. Norman’s

Trust Evaluation Worksheet does not apply to the remaining sources. Figure 4.11 is a

histogram displaying the different credibility ranges and the frequency of their

occurrences. The chart indicates that the sources follow a bimodal distribution, with

most falling into either the low or high ranges. The distribution of the data supports the

overall credibility of the internet sources, as, this study would not otherwise have a

quantitative tool to measure them. Furthermore, Norman’s study finds that intelligence

analysts generally require a source to be 75 percent credible to use in an intelligence

product.85 According to Norman’s findings, a 75 percent rating is 35.06 on his Trust

Evaluation Worksheet.86 Therefore, the researcher believes the credibility of this study’s

internet-based sources to be sufficient.

84
For a discussion into the particular differences between organizations which coordinate and oversee
verses organizations which primarily coordinate information, see Lucia Dammert, ed., Report of the
Security Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean (Santiago, Chile: Facultad Latinoamericana de
Ciencias Sociales, 2007), 99-121; available at http://issuu.com/flacso.chile/docs/ssr_lac.
85
Dax Norman, “How to Identify Credible Sources on the Web,” (Master’s Thesis, Joint Military College,
December 2001), 63,
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&ct=res&cd=3&ved=0CBAQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2F
daxrnorman.googlepages.com%2F5-CompleteThesis-
May08.pdf&ei=_xwDS56YF9OUnQftxt14&usg=AFQjCNFNfRehUePDuWuIgUUiq0xvcqcDnA.
86
Ibid.
 50

Figure: 4.11: Histogram of Source Credibility

40
36
35

30

25
Frequency

20
16
15

10
5
5
1 0
0

Summary of Results

The data collected using the methods described in Chapter 3 indicates that the

world’s intelligence industry spends $106,961,604,308.01, employs 1,130,104 persons,

and has at least 246 agencies. Specific country information is in Appendix C: Data for

Individuals Countries. There appears to be an identifiable correlation between GDP and

intelligence spending, albeit not direct, while the personnel estimates seem to have some

interesting per person patterns.

One problem regarding the results is whether or not using GDP can create viable

estimates of intelligence spending. Author Loch Johnson argues that national wealth is

connected to intelligence spending. This study is indirectly exploring his assertion.

Although the correlation is not likely linear, the results presented here show that a
 51

connection does exist. However, the correlation predicates on the assumption that the

dataset with identified known spending is self-reported in an objective and accurate

manner. In short, the total spending assumes that deception does not play a role. This

may distort the identified correlation between GDP and intelligence spending. The

correlation also assumes that the set of individual country data is complete. There are

two problems with this assumption; first, the datasets are not complete, and second, ever

knowing if they are complete poses a difficult challenge – one will likely never know.

In addition, the total workforce findings hold similar problems. To estimate

personnel, this study uses intelligence spending as the sole metric to define similarity

among countries, thus creating the assumption that a linear correlation exists between the

two. Countries were rank-ordered on the basis of intelligence spending, whether

estimated or not. Yet some countries with similar levels of intelligence spending did not

have similar levels of employment. An example is Romania and South Africa. For both

countries, the researcher identified the total intelligence spending of the two countries –

the difference in spending is about $27,370,657.72, or 6.10 percent. Both Romania and

South Africa have known employment levels, Romania has about 41,800 workers and

South Africa has 3,500 – a difference of 38,300 persons or 84.54 percent! How can two

countries with similar levels of intelligence spending have such drastically different

levels of employment? Obviously other factors are at play. It may be a reflection of

cultural traditions, the use of expensive technology, or due to inaccurate reported data. It

may also indicate that the study’s assumption about the linear relationship between

intelligence spending and personnel is incorrect. The reasons for the discrepancies are
 52

plentiful, however, it can be said that this estimating process is acceptable, as it follows a

structured methodology.
 53

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis was to identify the approximate size of the world’s

intelligence industry. The primary indicator to measure its size was intelligence

spending, while the second indicator was the number of people working in such

activities. Using the collection and estimation methods outlined in Chapter 3, this thesis

found a total of $106 billion United States Dollars (USD) in intelligence spending and

identified about one million people working in the field. In all likelihood, these numbers

are probably a low estimate due to two factors: first, the methodology assumed a linear

correlation between intelligence spending and Gross Domestic Product (GDP), not

exponential. Based on the identified information, the estimating process used the ratio

2/947 to find unknown intelligence spending. Second, the list with the total number of

intelligence agencies is probably not wholly comprehensive and complete. It is difficult

to say with virtual certitude that this thesis “got them all,” because of the nature of these

agencies and the conservative criteria used. Despite these two factors, this thesis makes

the best approximation possible with the given information. It used two methods to

identify the quantitative metrics and it is important to note what worked, and what did not

work.

The first method is direct observation of the national intelligence services, using

the three methods explained in Chapter 3. Regarding the methods, the automate push-

source search method provided little valuable information. Although Google-Alerts do

give a reasonable starting point for further research, creating them initially requires some

reasonable knowledge of the target country. Therefore, the results of each alert tended to
 54

err on the unhelpful or useless side. They do provide an excellent way to collect

information on a specific topic over time, allowing one to study its trends. Unfortunately

this study did not have much use for one specific topic as it changes over time. It

required the answer to many similar questions and nothing much more.

Using keywords and phrase searches to identify the necessary information

provided helpful information. Much of the intelligence spending and personnel data

came from this method. One benefit of using this search method over automated push-

sources is its adaptability. A researcher has the ability to quickly alter the search terms in

order to increase the likelihood of identifying the necessary information. Having the

ability to search by keywords and phrases allowed the researcher to quickly cover various

online sources – books, scholarly works, and other forms of documents on the internet.

Unfortunately, the primary drawback is that the process consumes a lot of time. This

method requires a researcher to objectively understand that the amount of time spent

looking for one country’s metrics is increasingly outweighing the benefits provided by

the answers. The solution is to maintain objectivity and understand that time can

outweigh an answer.

Perhaps the most beneficial method employed came from systematic searching

journals and websites with dedicated sections on intelligence. This process is very

effective, although it is also very time consuming. The process is likely the most

effective for obvious reasons – they are the industry’s trade journals, associations, and

forums of discussion. Perhaps the most up-to-date and commonly used source is Jane’s

Sentinel Country Risk Assessment Library, although corroborating the information and

identifying primary sources tended to be difficult. Nevertheless Jane’s library of country

 55

studies provides valuable information on the defense and intelligence field. Although

there are a few websites and online databases with sections dedicated to intelligence,

none came close to matching Jane’s level of organization and extensive collection. The

complete listing of journals and other scholarly sources searched for this thesis are on

Table 5.1. Table 5.1 has two columns; the first indicates sources completely searched.

The second column contains sources and publications not completely searched, due to

their lack of availability or other restrictions.

In addition to systematically searching through these various publications, the

search method extended to the websites of governmental intelligence oversight

committees and ministries. As many of these countries require their intelligence systems

to publish reports on an annual or frequent basis, these websites were helpful. Although

the practice of publishing annual reports is more common in Western nations, they are

increasingly becoming common in Eastern European countries – these reports are not

consistently published elsewhere, however.

The second method used to identify the quantitative metrics was estimating

unknown intelligence spending and employment. Determining the approximate total for

each category required the researcher to proceed according to the methods presented in

Chapter 3. It required using an averaged ratio, generated by countries with known

intelligence spending and GDP. As mentioned, this study assumes that intelligence

spending has a linear correlation with GDP. However, the results in Chapter 4 indicate

that the relationship is most likely exponential, or even power-law, in nature. The study

estimated unknown intelligence personnel using a slightly different approach. It

established the likeness of countries on the basis of intelligence spending. After which, it
 56

estimated countries with unknown intelligence personnel by using known the workforces

of similar nations.

Table 5.1: List of Journals, Newsletters, and Other Relevant Database Productions

Completely Searched Partially Searched

African Security Review Arab-reform.net

American Intelligence Armed Forces Journal
Comparative Strategy Journal International
Cryptologia Athena Intelligence Special
Cryptome Report
Defense Intelligence Journal Brown Journal of World Affairs
Europe-Asia studies Institutions and Organizations
Eye Spy Magazine Intelligence Heritage Centre
Federation of American Scientists Intelligence Resource Journal
Program International Defense Review
Foreign Affairs Joint Forces Quarterly
Intelligence Online Nativ – Israeli
Intelligence and National Security RFE/RL Newsline
International Affairs Terrorism Monitor
International Journal of Intelligence & CounterIntelligence The Spooks Newsletter
International Journal of Middle East Studies World Intelligence Review
International Security
International Studies Review
Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library
Jane’s Intelligence Review
Jane’s Intelligence Weekly
Journal of Democracy
Middle East
Middle East Intelligence Bulletin
Middle East journal
Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal
National Security Archive: George Washington University
Orbis (Philadelphia)
RUSI Journal
Strategic Analysis
Strategic Forecasting
Strategic Forum
Strategic Studies Quarterly
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism
Studies in Intelligence
 57

Another approach might use a ratio composed of known intelligence spending and

known personnel, to estimate unknown personnel. Using this average is slightly akin to

comparing countries on the basis of intelligence spending, as the underlying assumption

is that a relationship exists between spending and employment. In terms of being a more

accurate, further research is necessary to determine if this is a better approach. In terms

of increasing confidence, using an intelligence spending per person average to estimate

unknown employment would likely increase the overall confidence level. One can

statistically check the validity of a per person average, whereas the method used in this

study lacks that ability. The standard deviation and variance of the known spending per

person dataset is observable. The result, that is, the statistical information, would likely

more clearly explain the relationship between intelligence spending and personnel.

Both methods, the one used in this thesis and the hypothesized per person method,

contain the assumption that a linear correlation exists between spending and employment.

In retrospect, this assumption is built into the methodology, as explained in Chapter 3,

and is present when estimating intelligence spending. The method used to approximate

individual spending does not address this assumption. It was applied consistently when

estimating spending and its affect is seen in Figure 5.1. The figure is a scatter-plot chart

of the intelligence spending of individual countries. GDP is set as the X-axis and

intelligence spending is set as the Y-axis. The trending line, in black, follows neatly

along the line of data points, in blue. Although it is difficult to display, most countries lie

just above the trending line until they reach approximately $40 billion in GDP.
 58

The linear trend line in Figure 5.1 appears rather strong and initially seems to fit

the data quite well. However the data points represent both known intelligence spending

and estimated spending. Therefore, the data points should be consistent with the trending

line, as some are estimated under the assumption that a linear relationship exists. The fit

of the trending line is not so clear when looking at the same scatter-plot chart without the

estimated data. In Figure 5.2, the blue data points represent the countries with identified

intelligence spending. As with Figure 5.1, the GDP is set as the X-axis and intelligence

spending is set as the Y-axis. There are two trend lines on Figure 5.2, the solid black line

is the linear trend line, and the black dotted line is the exponential trend line. They are

both included for purposes of comparison and to determine which has the best fit. It is

difficult to determine which trend line most accurately describes the data, and it is likely

that any future answer will be subjective. The R-Squared (R2) value of the linear trend

line is 0.349, while the exponential R2 value is 0.401. Both numbers are similar in how

they describe the fitness of the data. Therefore, using a methodology that assumes a

linear relationship exists may not be correct, but it would not be anymore incorrect than

using a methodology which assumes the relationship is exponential.

The researcher would say that if the relationship is assumed to be exponential,

then the intelligence spending total would likely be higher. However, this assumption

would likely have little effect on estimating personnel, as there are few countries that fall

beyond what appears to be key points – nations with GDPs over $1.8 trillion and $2.1

trillion. For a comparison of different outcomes, see Table 5.2.

Nevertheless this study meets its stated purpose, that is, to identify the

approximate size of the world’s intelligence industry. It identified both the primary and
 59

secondary metrics – total intelligence spending and personnel. It also gave an

approximate number of externally-focused intelligence agencies and systems. In this

regard, the study appears to have met its stated purpose.

Table 5.2: Outcome of Assuming Intelligence Spending and GDP is Linear or Exponential
Assuming the Relationship is Assuming the Relationship is
Linear Exponential

Estimating Intelligence Same results; this study Total intelligence spending

Spending Outcome assumes that the relationship is estimate would likely be
linear. higher. This would be
especially true for countries
with GDP’s over
approximately $1.8 trillion and
then again at $2.1 trillion.
Estimating Intelligence Same results; this study Total intelligence personnel
Personnel Outcome assumes that the relationship is estimate would likely be
linear. slightly higher. There are
relatively few countries
beyond the two relative points
that would be affected.

However there are many more topics for further research. As discussed, the

methodology assumes a linear relationship exists between spending and employment.

More research is necessary to explore this topic. Understanding this relationship will

ultimately allow future studies to determine whether or not demand for intelligence

professionals is growing. As intelligence studies programs increase in number and

function, it is beneficial to correctly gauge the industry’s demand. Hopefully this study

plays a part in identifying that demand. In addition, now that a benchmark exists,

national intelligence communities are able to quantitatively compare their performance

against the industry average.

 60

However, the breadth of this study is like an inverse function of its depth, that is,

it does not delve deeply into both spending and personnel. Future studies may look at

how these agencies spend their budgets, whether on personnel, technology, or on

bureaucratic redundancies. Another topic is how they utilize their workforces, for

instance, what percentage are analysts, linguists, or support staff? These questions seem

to be the next step in the field’s quantitative research.

61
62
 63

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[accessed June 1, 2009].

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping. La gouvernance.

http://www.bi.undp.org/fr/service_renseigne.htm.

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April 16, 2009].

United States Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. European

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United States Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Open Source

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United States Department of Commerce. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Measuring the

Economy: A Primer on GDP and the National Income and Product Accounts.
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United States State Department. Independent States in the World.

http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm#note4.

Ünlü, Hazırlayan Ferhat. "MİT'te iç çekişme entrikaya yol açtı." Sabah, July 19, 2007.
http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2007/07/19/haber,4D36E8C34C434B5880E8E8BE1D3F
F328.html [accessed April 27, 2009].
 74

Warner, Michael. “Sources and methods for the Study of Intelligence.” in Handbook of
Intelligence Studies, ed. Johnson, Lock. London and New York: Routledge, 2007.

Wikipedia. “List of countries by GDP (nominal),” Wikimedia Foundation,

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Williams, Kieran and Denis Deletant. Security Intelligence Services in new

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Houndmills, 2001.
 75

APPENDICES
 76

Appendix A: Websites You Can Trust

46.75 = Very High Credibility, 40.00 = High Credibility, 35.06 = Medium Credibility, 21.00 =
Low Credibility, 7.46 = Not Credible
Criteria Tips Value Y/N
1. Content can be Check some of site’s Facts. 5.17
corroborated?
2. Recommended by subject Doctor, Biologist 4.94
matter expert?
3. Author is reputable? Google for opinions, ask 4.64
others.
4. You perceive site as Check with other sources. 4.56
accurate?
5. Information was reviewed Science journals, 4.52
by an editor or peers newspapers.
6. Author is associated with a Google for opinions, ask 4.02
reputable org? others.

7. Publisher is reputable? Google for opinions, ask 3.78

others.

8. Authors and Trustworthy 3.78

sources want
to be known.

9. You perceive site as Last update? 3.78

current?
10. Several other Web sites Sites only link to other site 3.68
link to this one? they trust
11. Recommended by a Librarian, Researcher 3.65
generalist?
12. Recommended by an A travel journal may 3.56
independent subject-guide? suggest sites
13. Domain includes a Trademark owners protect 3.45
trademark name? their marks.
14. Site’s bias in clear? Bias is ok if not hidden 3.06
15. Site has professional look? It should look like someone 2.86
cares.
TOTAL
Source: Norman, Dax. “Websites You Can Trust.” American Libraries 37, no. 7 (2006),
36, http://daxrnorman.googlepages.com/WebSitesYouCanTrust-Oct08.pdf.
 77

Appendix B: Intelligence Spending Sorted Highest to Lowest

Number Countries Total Expenditures Number Countries Total Expenditures

1 United States $75,000,000,000 36 Egypt $155,995,389.31
2 Japan $4,736,464,406.93 37 Algeria $153,595,297.45
3 China $4,234,179,531.47 38 Kuwait $152,075,399.60
4 Russia $3,251,264,510.00 39 Hungary $150,339,060.60
United 40 Kazakhstan $127,199,096.80
5 $2,854,668,400.00
Kingdom
41 Peru $122,744,256.96
6 Italy $2,225,874,049.52
42 Argentina $114,126,558.00
7 Mexico $1,046,736,334.72
43 Norway $108,957,708.00
8 South Korea $1,000,000,000.00
44 Qatar $98,410,499.97
9 France $636,492,097.00
45 Denmark $98,022,410.00
10 Germany $515,661,895.00
46 Libya $96,264,365.73
11 Saudi Arabia $500,000,000.00
47 Ukraine $90,380,219.00
12 Indonesia $492,297,799.83
48 Iraq $87,448,958.19
13 Switzerland $473,857,013.88
49 Vietnam $86,411,964.60
14 Canada $469,481,900.00
50 Morocco $83,107,629.71
15 Iran $400,000,000.00
51 Angola $80,212,128.11
16 Turkey $378,301,672.00
52 Bangladesh $78,821,132.99
17 Taiwan $377,619,583.05
53 Croatia $66,694,656.84
18 Greece $343,948,073.89
54 Brazil $63,600,000.00
19 Venezuela $307,291,600.78
55 Belarus $57,994,684.58
20 Finland $263,557,983.06
56 Sudan $55,708,104.08
21 Ireland $262,930,784.70
57 Luxembourg $52,881,863.65
22 Thailand $262,853,827.85
58 Syria $52,718,330.34
23 Sweden $252,755,397.00
59 Slovenia $52,560,568.79
United Arab
24 $250,245,409.41 60 Belgium $51,860,690.13
Emirates
25 Nigeria $249,191,821.00 61 Oman $50,583,739.62
26 South Africa $237,920,657.72 62 Ecuador $50,572,196.09
27 Portugal $235,191,686.96 63 Cuba $50,308,618.87
28 Malaysia $213,765,937.06 64 Bulgaria $50,011,373.02
29 Romania $210,550,000.00 Czech
65 $49,584,953.00
Republic
30 Netherlands $200,271,805.00
66 Serbia $48,156,712.86
31 Spain $200,000,000.00
67 Lithuania $45,504,587.31
32 Israel $194,086,145.77
68 Azerbaijan $44,613,811.73
33 Australia $184,610,349.79
69 Philippines $44,200,000.00
34 India $178,120,639.00
Dominican
35 Singapore $175,018,161.47 70 $43,862,520.45
Republic
 78

Number Countries Total Expenditures Number Countries Total Expenditures

71 Austria $42,403,426.00 110 Albania $12,470,858.06
72 Pakistan $41,600,000.00 111 Georgia $12,380,433.76
73 New Zealand $40,057,767.00 112 Nepal $12,214,976.53
74 Slovakia $39,370,697.13 113 Afghanistan $11,602,207.58
75 Tunisia $38,813,188.92 114 Armenia $11,474,266.81
76 Zambia $38,508,618.00 115 Colombia $11,428,800.00
77 Sri Lanka $38,097,490.19 D.R. Congo
116 $11,148,162.15
78 Guatemala $37,474,139.67 (Kinshasa)
79 Poland $36,900,000.00 117 Estonia $10,867,484.00

80 Latvia $32,758,608.49 118 Cambodia $10,756,644.16

Republic of
81 Uruguay $31,034,774.98 119 Congo $10,364,164.21
82 Lebanon $27,838,179.69 (Brazzaville)
83 Uzbekistan $26,856,017.85 120 Mozambique $9,286,768.26
84 Burma $26,148,014.80 121 Macedonia $9,205,001.61
85 Yemen $26,118,194.02 122 Madagascar $8,901,984.00
86 Botswana $25,677,600.00 123 Mali $8,448,900.52
87 Ethiopia $24,681,986.75 124 Mauritius $8,405,612.29
88 Cyprus $23,994,184.87 125 Chad $8,070,849.98
Trinidad and 126 Malta $8,020,828.03
89 $23,862,396.26
Tobago 127 Burkina Faso $7,794,767.27
90 Côte d'Ivoire $22,613,771.32 Papua New
128 $7,784,185.70
91 Cameroon $22,358,851.74 Guinea
92 Panama $22,209,747.84 129 Bahamas $7,179,112.44
93 El Salvador $21,273,760.11 130 Turkmenistan $6,977,100.70
94 Kenya $21,229,784.00 131 Namibia $6,906,166.00
95 Bahrain $20,428,196.69 132 Burundi $6,900,000.00
96 Tanzania $19,932,786.94 133 Haiti $6,687,550.54
97 Jordan $19,268,072.12 134 Benin $6,676,007.02
Equatorial 135 Nicaragua $6,108,450.22
98 $17,820,321.32
Guinea 136 Moldova $5,891,047.11
Bosnia and
99 $17,766,451.53 137 Rwanda $5,758,689.00
Herzegovina
Palestinian
100 Iceland $16,881,447.71 138 $5,250,381.31
Authority
101 Bolivia $16,750,621.06 139 Niger $5,174,386.42
102 Ghana $15,510,653.77 140 Laos $5,059,913.10
103 Paraguay $15,397,142.41 141 Mongolia $5,057,989.18
104 North Korea $14,191,805.69 142 Tajikistan $4,939,668.02
105 Brunei $13,999,413.56 143 Montenegro $4,638,574.33
106 Gabon $13,966,706.90 144 Guinea $4,369,225.34
107 Jamaica $13,849,347.70 145 Liechtenstein $4,001,756.37
108 Honduras $13,588,656.36 146 Chile $4,000,000.00
109 Senegal $12,842,174.88
 79

Number Countries Total Expenditures Number Countries Total Expenditures

147 Kosovo $3,659,298.37 Solomon
184 $455,007.39
Islands
148 Barbados $3,541,939.17
Guinea-
149 Fiji $3,453,438.79 185 $443,463.87
Bissau
150 Kyrgyzstan $3,432,795.00 186 Dominica $350,153.68
151 Andorra $3,121,562.36 187 Sierra Leone $317,745.00
152 Mauritania $3,040,757.66 188 Tonga $248,185.85
153 Zimbabwe $2,996,216.00 189 Micronesia, $243,376.05
154 Suriname $2,870,490.63 Sao Tome
190 $169,305.08
155 Togo $2,780,066.32 and Principe
156 Swaziland $2,734,854.17 191 Palau $163,533.31
Marshall
157 Somalia $2,436,646.36 192 $143,332.14
Islands
158 Costa Rica $2,164,904.00 193 Kiribati $131,788.61
Central
194 Tuvalu $28,858.82
159 African $1,921,035.45
Republic 195 Nauru $22,125.10
160 Cape Verde $1,657,458.23
161 San Marino $1,638,219.01
162 Lesotho $1,558,376.28
163 Eritrea $1,419,853.94
164 Belize $1,328,467.68
165 Malawi $1,323,120.00
166 Bhutan $1,315,962.19
167 Monaco $1,261,130.43
168 Maldives $1,211,108.48
Antigua and
169 $1,208,222.60
Barbuda
170 Guyana $1,087,015.55
171 Saint Lucia $986,009.68
172 Djibouti $944,645.37
173 Liberia $804,199.12
174 Seychelles $802,275.19
175 Gambia $777,264.22
176 Grenada $614,692.87
177 Uganda $606,953.15
Saint Vincent
178 and the $578,138.36
Grenadines
179 Vanuatu $551,203.46
Saint Kitts
180 $533,888.17
and Nevis
181 Samoa $516,572.88
182 Comoros $511,763.07
183 Timor-Leste $480,018.37
 80

Appendix C: Data for Individual Countries

This appendix cites its information using the Chicago Style Manual, with one

minor exception. Indicated before each cited source are the credibility results from Dax

Norman’s Trust Evaluation Worksheet. The results include both a verbal assessment,

anywhere from “Not Credible” to “Very High Credibility,” and also the quantitative

finding. A record of the researcher’s scoring is available for each individual source but

will only be provided by request. The researcher used a general score for information

from Jane’s Information Group, which is “High Credibility, 44.3.” Government websites

and uploaded documents were not scored.

There are four columns of information in this appendix: first, the name of the

country, second, the name of the identified intelligence agencies, third, intelligence

spending, and fourth, intelligence personnel. There are essentially two rows of

information, the first row has a country’s name, total spending, and total personnel (this

row is in faded grey). An Italicized number indicates that the total was estimated using

the methodology outlined in Chapter 3. Under each country, a second row contains an

individual intelligence agency, with its identified spending and personnel. The

information in this row has citations according to the location of the source. If the

information was not identified then the cell is left empty. If a country has more than one

intelligence agency, or program, it is likewise listed under the country’s name.

 81

Country Agency Spending Personnel

1 Afghanistan $11,602,207.58 550

National Directorate of
Security (NDS)

2 Albania $12,470,858.06 5,000

State Intelligence Service

5,00087
(ShISh)

Military Intelligence
Agency

3 Algeria $153,595,297.45 12,000

Department of Information
and Security (DRS)

4 Andorra $3,121,562.36 195

5 Angola $80,212,128.11 7,000

Directorate of Intelligence
and Security

6 Antigua and Barbuda $1,208,222.60 1,650

7 Argentina $114,126,558.00 5,500

87
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Library > The Balkans > Albania > Security
and Foreign Forces, “Total Strength 5,000 (estimated)” [accessed September 21, 2008].
 82

State Intelligence Office

$81,518,97088 2,50089
(SIDE)

National Military Strategic

$32,607,58890 3,00091
Intelligence (DNIEM)

8 Armenia $11,474,266.81 550

National Security Ministry

(NSM)

Intelligence Department
(MI)

9 Australia $184,610,349.79 145

Australian Secret
$104,003,429.7992
Intelligence Service (ASIS)

Defence Signals Directorate

(DSD)

Office of National
$21,000,00093 14594
Assessments (ONA)

Defence Intelligence
Organisation (DIO)

88
Low Credibility, 26.85, Natasha Niebieskikwiat, "El Gobierno pasa a controlar las tareas de inteligencia
militar," Clarin, April 23, 2006, http://www.clarin.com/diario/2006/04/23/elpais/p-00315.htm [accessed
April 30, 2009].
89
Ibid.
90
Ibid.
91
Ibid.
92
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Secret Intelligence: Portfolio Budget
Statements 2007-2008 (Canberra: Australian Government, 2008), 198,
http://www.dfat.gov.au/dept/budget/2007_2008_pbs/2007-2008_FA+T_PBS_06_ASIS.pdf.
93
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Oceania > Australia >
Security and Foreign Forces, "The ONA budget for 2005-06 was USD21 million (AUD28 million),
representing a 290 per cent increase over four years from the 2001-02 level."
94
Office of National Assessments, About Us, http://www.ona.gov.au/aboutus.htm [accessed April 24,
2009].
 83

Defence Imagery &

Geospatial Organisation $59,606,92095
(DIGO)

10 Austria $42,403,426.00 55096

Army Intelligence Service

$42,403,42697
(HNA)

Abwehramt (AbwA)

11 Azerbaijan $44,613,811.73 5,000

Ministry for National

5,00098
Security (MNS)

12 Bahamas $7,179,112.44 97

Drug Enforcement Unit

9799
(DEU)

13 Bahrain $20,428,196.69 2,000

Bahrain National Security

2,000100
Agency (BNSA)

95
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Oceania > Australia >
Security and Foreign Forces, "DIGO has grown rapidly over the last few years, witnessing an increase in its
staff numbers by over one third and a near tripling of its budget since inception to AUD90.5 million”
[accessed November 11, 2008].
96
Siegfried Beer, "Bound" to Cooperate: Austria’s Little-known Intelligence Community Since 1945,"
Journal of Intelligence History 4, no. 1 (2003),
http://www.acipss.org/intelligence/beitraege/bound_to_cooperate/current_organizations.htm.
97
Ibid.
98
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Russia and the CIS >
Azerbaijan > Security and Foreign Forces, “Total Strength 5,000 (estimated).”
99
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Central America & the
Caribbean > Bahamas > Security and Foreign Forces , "There is a 97-strong Drug Enforcement Unit
(DEU), with a 19-member strike force that participates in OPBAT missions; a 10-member marine unit
which crews and services three fast interceptor boats; a 22-member general investigation unit; drug canine
units; and a 14-member technical and surveillance unit with a nine-member unit in Freeport and three
commanders” [November 12, 2008].
 84

Anti-Money Laundering
and Terrorist Financing
Unit (AMLTFU)

14 Bangladesh $78,821,132.99 10,000

Directorate-General of
National Security
Intelligence (NSI)

Directorate General of
10,000101
Forces Intelligence (DGFI)

15 Barbados $3,541,939.17 90

Regional Security System

90102
Liaison Unit

16 Belarus $57,994,684.58 1,600

State Security Committee

(KGB)

Main Intelligence
Directorate - MI (GRU)

17 Belgium $51,860,690.13 1,600103

100
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Gulf States > Bahrain
> Security and Foreign Forces, "In 1998, Bahrain set up a new force, the National Guard (NG), to help
protect the country from external military threats and also threats to internal security. It was proposed that
the NG would be an elite, lightly armed force. It is organised on the basis of three battalions and has an
estimated strength of about 2,000” [accessed November 13, 2008].
101
Low Credibility, 24.52, Maloy Krishna Dhar, "The Fulcrum of Eastern Evil: DGFI Directs Terrorism
and Jihad Against India," Frontier India Strategic and Defence, November 1, 2008,
http://frontierindia.net/the-fulcrum-of-eastern-evil-dgfi-directs-terrorism-and-jihad-against-india.
102
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Central America &
the Caribbean > Barbados > Security and Foreign Forces, "There is also a special Financial Investigations
Unit, which targets money laundering, financial fraud, and similar offences. There is a 90-strong task force
for special operations, which is trained by and liaises directly with the Regional Security System” [accessed
October 4, 2008].
103
Herman Matthijs, "Intelligence Services in Belgium", Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 4
(2008): 552-576.
 85

Veiligheid Van de Staat

$51,860,690.13104
(VS)

Algemene Inlichtingen- en
Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD)

18 Belize $1,328,467.68 1,650

19 Benin $6,676,007.02 2,700

20 Bhutan $1,315,962.19 1,650

21 Bolivia $16,750,621.06 477

Bosnia and
22 $17,766,451.53 703
Herzegovina

Intelligence and Security

703105
Agency (OSA)

23 Botswana $25,677,600.00 9,800

Directorate of Intelligence
$25,677,600.00106
and Security (DIS)

24 Brazil $63,600,000.00107 1,600108

104
Ibid.
105
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > The Balkans >
Bosnia-Herzegovina > Security and Foreign Forces, "A total of 200 agents of the former Intelligence and
Security Service of Republika Srpska, which employs some 400 people, and 307 members of the former
Federation Security and Intelligence Agency, were sacked on 31 December 2004. In line with the new
systematisation, the new OSA will employ 703 people” [accessed September 29, 2008].
106
Low Credibility, 24.01, Isaiah Morewagae, “Botswana: Police Chief Unaware of DIS Torture Report,"
AllAfrica Global Media, February 9, 2009, http://allafrica.com/stories/200902080020.html.
107
Marco Cepik, "Democratic Control of Intelligence in Brazil,” in Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to
Democratic Control and Effectiveness, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 2007), 165,
http://books.google.com/books?id=zvGTOjWOID4C&pg=PA149&dq=%E2%80%98%E2%80%98Structu
 86

Brazilian Intelligence
$36,000,000109
Agency (ABIN)

Ministry of Defense

25 Brunei $13,999,413.56 250

Department of Security and

250110
Intelligence

Directorate of Intelligence
(MI)

26 Bulgaria $50,011,373.02 2,050

National Intelligence
Service (NIS)

Military Information
Service (MIS)

27 Burkina Faso $7,794,767.27 469

28 Burma $26,148,014.80 9,800

Office of the Chief of

Military Affairs Security
(OCMAS)

29 Burundi $6,900,000.00 2,549

ral+Change+and+Democratic+Control+of+Intelligence+in+Brazil%22&ei=R6qySc_sEpGOMsennPkL&cl
ient=firefox-a#PPA169,M1.
108
Ibid, 169.
109
Marco Cepik and Antunes, Priscila, "Brazil's New Intelligence System: An Institutional
Assessment," International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 16, no. 3 (2003): 370.
110
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Southeast Asia >
Brunei > Security and Foreign Forces. , “Department of Security and Intelligence – 250” [accessed
December 12, 2008].
 87

National Intelligence
$6,900,000111
Service (SNR)

30 Cambodia $10,756,644.16 300

Cambodian Intelligence and

Research Department (MI)

31 Cameroon $22,358,851.74 10,000

National Security Service

(Sureté Nationale)

32 Canada $469,481,900.00 4,128

Canadian Security
$303,081,900112 2449113
Intelligence Service (CSIS)

Communications Security
$127,000,000114 1350115
Establishment (CSE)

Transaction and Reports

Analysis Centre of Canada $39,400,000116 329117
(FINTRAC)

33 Cape Verde $1,657,458.23 195

Central African
34 $1,921,035.45 195
Republic

111
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, La gouvernance,
http://www.bi.undp.org/fr/service_renseigne.htm.
112
Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Public Report 2006-2007 (Gatineau: Public Works and
Government Services, 2007), 18, http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/nnlrprt/2006/rprt2006-eng.pdf.
113
Ibid, 15.
114
Roy Rempel, "Canada's Parliamentary Oversight of Security and Intelligence," International Journal of
Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 17, no. 4 (2004): 639.
115
Communications Security Establishment Canada, CSEC: An Overview, http://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/home-
accueil/about-apropos/overview-survol-eng.html [accessed November 29, 2008].
116
Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, FINTRAC Annual Report 2008 (Ottawa:
2008), 22, http://www.fintrac-canafe.gc.ca/publications/ar/2008/ar-eng.pdf.
117
Ibid, 21.
 88

35 Chad $8,070,849.98 469

National Intelligence and

Security Service (NISS)

36 Chile $4,000,000.00 2,000

National Intelligence
$4,000,000118 2,000119
Agency (ANI)

Directorate of National
Defense Intelligence
(DIDN)

37 China $4,234,179,531.47 88,050

Ministry of State Security

(MSS)

General Staff Department -

Second Division (Second
Division)
General Political
Department - Liaison
Department (Liaison
Department)
United Front Works
Department

$11,428,800.00
38 Colombia 800

Administrative Department
$11,428,800120 800121
of Security (DAS)

118
High Credibility, 44.3, José Higuera, "Chile set to create a National Intelligence Agency," Jane's
Defense Weekly, March 19, 2003, www.janes.com [accessed March 15, 2009].
119
Medium Credibility, 36.88, "Chile," Federation of American Scientists,
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/chile/dina.htm [accessed January 3, 2009].
120
The original figure, $100 million, represents the total annual budget for DAS, which provides "strategic
intelligence and counterintelligence; investigates crimes that threaten state security such as terrorism,
kidnapping, and drug and human trafficking; and all issues concerning immigration." It has a total of 7,000
employees, with 800 working specifically on intelligence. DAS spends approximately $14,286 per
employee (Using $100 million as the total budget and 7,000 as total employees). However, the source also
indicates that only 800 work specifically on intelligence. If DAS spent the same per employee ($14,286),
 89

Military Intelligence
(DIPOL)

39 Comoros $511,763.07 250

Republic of Congo
40 $10,364,164.21 300
(Brazzaville)

D.R. Congo
41 $11,148,162.15 300
(Kinshasa)

National Intelligence
Agency (ANR)

Military Directorate on
Anti-state Activities
(DMIAP)

42 Costa Rica $2,164,904.00 195

Security Intelligence
$2,164,904122
Directorate (DIS)

43 Côte d'Ivoire $22,613,771.32 2,050

National Security Council

44 Croatia $66,694,656.84 2,500123

the total spent for intelligence would be $11428800. See Steven Boraz, "Colombia," in PSI Handbook of
Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches, vol. 1, ed. Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, Mark
Phythian, and Shlomo Shpiro (London and Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008), 137.
121
Steven Boraz, "Colombia," in PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches,
vol. 1, ed. Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, Mark Phythian, and Shlomo Shpiro (London and Connecticut: Praeger
Security International, 2008), 137. Also see Steven Boraz, “Establishing Democratic Control of
Intelligence in Colombia," International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 19, no. 1 (2005):
90.
122
Paul Chaves, "Los Espías no Bastan: Definiendo las Politicas Públicas en Materia de Servicios de
Inteligenciaen Costa Rica," in Research and Education in Defense and Security Studies (Washington DC:
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, 2001), http://www.fas.org/irp/world/costa_rica/chaves.html.
123
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Library > The Balkans > Croatia > Security
and Foreign Forces [accessed October 13, 2008].
 90

Security and Intelligence

Agency (SOA)

Military Security and

Intelligence Agency
(VSOA)

Croatian Intelligence
Service (HIS)

45 Cuba $50,308,618.87 15,000

Directorate General of
15,000124
Intelligence (DGI)

America Department (DA)

46 Cyprus $23,994,184.87 9,800

47 Czech Republic $49,584,953.00 1,600125

Office for Foreign Relations

$49,584,953126 500127
and Information (ÚZSI/BIS)

Military Intelligence (VZ) 800128

124
Edward González and Kevin McCarthy, “Cuba After Castro: Legacies, Challenges, and Impediments,”
RAND (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004), 44,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2005/RAND_TR131.pdf.
125
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Library > Central Europe and the Baltic
States > Czech Republic > Security and Foreign Forces, "The UZSI is the smallest of the four Czech
intelligence services numbering approximately 500 personnel” [accessed October 18, 2008].
126
Security Information Service [BIS], Annual Report of the Security Information Service (BIS) for 2005,
http://www.bis.cz/_english/vz2005/vz2005-9.html [accessed May 5, 2009].
127
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Library > Central Europe and the Baltic
States > Czech Republic > Security and Foreign Forces, "The UZSI is the smallest of the four Czech
intelligence services numbering approximately 500 personnel” [accessed October 18, 2008].
128
Kieran Williams and Denis Deletant, Security Intelligence Services in new Democracies: the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, and Romania (New York: Houndmills, 2001), 94.
 91

48 Denmark $98,022,410.00 700

Defence Intelligence
$98,022,410129
Service (FE)

Danish Security Intelligence

700130
Service (PET)

49 Djibouti $944,645.37 3,000

Service de la
Documentation et de la 3000131
Sécurité (SDS)

50 Dominica $350,153.68 250

51 Dominican Republic $43,862,520.45 2,775

52 Ecuador $50,572,196.09 2,050

53 Egypt $155,995,389.31 12,000

Egyptian General
Intelligence Service (EGIS)

Military Intelligence (MI)

54 El Salvador $21,273,760.11 3,500

129
Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste [ Danish Defence Intelligence Service], FE's Budget, http://fe-
ddis.dk/Om%20FE/Budget/Pages/default.aspx [accessed April 30, 2009].
130
Danish Security and Intelligence Service, Organisation and Personnel,
http://www.pet.dk/English/Organisation.aspx [accessed April 30, 2009].
131
Autor Localizado, Africa South of the Sahara 2003, 32nd ed. (Routledge, 2002), 348,
http://books.google.com/books?id=1KBP7QbalX0C&pg=PP1&dq=Africa+South+of+the+Sahara+2003&c
lient=firefox-a.
 92

National Directorate of
Intelligence (DNI)

Ministry of Defense and

Public Security (MI)

55 Equatorial Guinea $17,820,321.32 1,352

56 Eritrea $1,419,853.94 1,650

National Security Office

(NSO)

57 Estonia $10,867,484.00 300

Estonian Intelligence
$10,867,484132 300133
Bureau (EIB)

58 Ethiopia $24,681,986.75 9,800

National Intelligence and

Security Service (NISS)

59 Fiji $3,453,438.79 195

Fiji Intelligence Service

(FIS)

60 Finland $263,557,983.06 2,415

General Staff Intelligence

Division

132
This comes from the Estonian Ministry of Defence Budget for 2007 where it is listed under "Information
Board". See: Estonian Ministry of Defence, "Estonian Ministry of Defence Budget 2007," Ministry of
Defence, http://www.mod.gov.ee/?op=body&id=439 [accessed March 2, 2009].
133
Robert Henderson, Brassey's International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington DC:
Brassey's Inc, 2007), 257.
 93

61 France $636,492,097.00 9,166

General Division of
$538,915,500134 4,406135
External Security (DGSE)

Directorate of Military
$12,192,036136 1,700137
Intelligence (DRM)

Directorate of Territorial
$73,000,000138 1,500139
Surveillance (DST)

Direction de la Protection et
de la Securite de la Defense $12,384,561140 1,560141
(DPSD)

62 Gabon $13,966,706.90 2,625

63 Gambia $777,264.22 250

134
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Library > Western Europe > France >
Security and Foreign Forces, "As of 2007, the DGSE employed 4,406 personnel, of which two-thirds were
civilian and a third military. Military personnel are predominantly attached to the 44th Infantry Regiment.
The DGSE has a budget of EUR445 million (excluding the wages of military personnel), translating to 0.9
per cent of the Ministry of Defence's budget. The DGSE operates out of two primary stations, Mortier and
Tourelles, located in Paris. Although attached to the Ministry of Defence, the DGSE is highly dependent on
the prime minister's office at Matignon” [accessed December 19, 2008].
135
Ibid.
136
European Parliament, Report on the Existence of a Global System for the Interception of Private and
Commercial Communications, Report A5-0264/2001PAR1, July 11, 2001, 173,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A5-2001-
0264+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN [accessed April 30, 2009].
137
Ibid.
138
Hans Born and Marina Caparini, ed., Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue
Elephants (Ashgate Publishing, 2007), 131,
http://books.google.com/books?id=FUtNtTJVe6EC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Democratic+Control+of+Int
elligence+Services:+Containing+Rogue&ei=NmgJSszUHaG2zQTqzeiQDw&client=firefox-a#PPA131,M1
[accessed May 5, 2009].
139
European Parliament, Report on the Existence of a Global System for the Interception of Private and
Commercial Communications, Report A5-0264/2001PAR1, July 11, 2001, 173,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A5-2001-
0264+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN [accessed April 30, 2009].
140
Low Credibility, 32.25, "Exclusive: How DPSD Operates," Intelligence Newsletter, July 12, 2000,
www.nexis.com.
141
Ibid.
 94

National Intelligence
Agency (NIA)

64 Georgia $12,380,433.76 200

Foreign Intelligence and

200142
Security Service (FISS)

65 Germany $515,661,895.00 7,250

Federal Intelligence Service

$515,661,895143 6,000144
(BND)

Military Security Service

1,250145
(MAD)

Intelligence Service (G-2)

66 Ghana $15,510,653.77 477

Defence Intelligence
Agency

67 Greece $343,948,073.89 2,929

National Intelligence
2,929146
Service (EYP)

142
"Gela Bezuashvili; Tblissi," Intelligence Online, February 14, 2008, www.nexis.com.
143
Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, The 2006 Budget: Chancellor and Federal
Chancellery, http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_6562/Content/EN/Artikel/2006/03/2006-03-29-the-2006-
budget-chancellor-and-federal-chancellery.html.
144
Bundesnachrichtendienst, Herzlich Willkommen beim Arbeitgeber,
http://www.bnd.de/cln_090/nn_1365968/DE/JobsUndKarriere/JobsUndKarriere__node.html?__nnn=true
[accessed May 2,2009].
145
Robert Henderson, Brassey's International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington, DC:
Brassey's Inc, 2003), 71.
146
John M. Nomikos, "Greek Intelligence Service (NIS-EYP): Past, Present and Future," National Security
and the Future 9, no. 1-2 (2008): 84, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/greece/nomikos2.pdf.
 95

Independent Intelligence
Branch (MI)

68 Grenada $614,692.87 250

Grenada Drug Information

Network

69 Guatemala $37,474,139.67 5,500

Military Intelligence
Directorate (MI)

Secretariat of Strategic
Analysis (SAE)

70 Guinea $4,369,225.34 5,500

71 Guinea-Bissau $443,463.87 250

72 Guyana $1,087,015.55 1,650

73 Haiti $6,687,550.54 2,700

74 Honduras $13,588,656.36 2,625

75 Hungary $150,339,060.60 5,750

Military Intelligence
Service (KFH)

Military Counter-
Intelligence Service (KBH)
 96

Foreign Intelligence Service

(IH)

76 Iceland $16,881,447.71 477

77 India $178,120,639.00 18,000

Research and Analysis

$31,000,000147 8,000148
Wing (RAW)

Intelligence Bureau (IB) 10,000149

National Technical
Facilities Organisation $147,120,639150
(NTFO)

Defence Intelligence
Agency (DIA)

78 Indonesia $492,297,799.83 5,689

National Intelligence
Agency (BIN)

Strategic Intelligence
Agency (BAIS)

79 Iran $400,000,000 17,000

Ministry of Intelligence and

$400,000,000151 15,000152
Security (MOIS)

147
Robert Henderson, Brassey's International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington DC:
Brassey's Inc., 2003), 78.
148
Ibid.
149
Low Credibility, 30.9, Maloy Krishna Dhar, interview by Susheela Menon, "Keep Up the Pressure, Says
Former IB operator," India Together, January 12, 2009, http://www.indiatogether.org/2009/jan/ivw-
dhar.htm [accessed March 25, 2009].
150
Low Credibility, 33.37, Sanjay Singh, "New Intelligence Agency Set Up," The Pioneer (New Delhi),
April 7, 2003, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/india/ntfo.html.
 97

Intelligence Directorate
2,000153
(MI)

80 Iraq $87,448,958.19 10,000

General Security
4,000154
Directorate

Military Intelligence
6,000155
Service

81 Ireland 2,415
$262,930,784.70

Military Intelligence (G-2)

82 Israel $194,086,145.77 8,200

Institute for Espionage and

1,200156
Special Tasks (Mossad)

151
Estate of Yael Botvin et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, Civil Action No.: 05-220 (RMU), January 28, 2005, 8,
http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/Botvin_v_Iran_Complaint.pdf.
152
Anthony Cordesman and Khalid Al-Rodhan, Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars
(Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies), 404,
http://books.google.com/books?id=QaosFaOqzrEC&pg=PA235&lpg=PA235&dq=General+Intelligence+P
residency+(GIP)&source=bl&ots=7mcs-
ArTL0&sig=1hZp3Ol0xjxqnqTwQDd_RwxPfYU&hl=en&ei=NvXsScyAKp7Itge-
uojOBQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=10#PPA233,M1 [accessed April 20, 2009]. Also see
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Gulf States > Iran >
Security and Foreign Forces, “The agency is believed to have approximately 15,000 officers and support
staff. MOIS differs from SAVAK in that its personnel are all civilians” [accessed April 20, 2009].
153
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Gulf States > Iran >
Security and Foreign Forces, The Intelligence Directorate of the IRGC is relatively small, boasting no more
than 2,000 officers. Its officers are heavily vetted for ideological conformity, and unlike the VEVAK, their
loyalty to the Islamic regime is beyond doubt." [accessed November 15, 1008]. See also Mahan Abedin,
"The Iranian Intelligence Services and the War On Terror," Terrorism Monitor 2, no. 10 (2005),
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=393&tx_ttnews[backPid]=179&no_ca
che=1 [accessed on April 10, 2009].
154
Ibrahim Al-Marashi, "Iraq's Security and Intelligence Network: A Guide and Analysis," Middle East
Review of International Affairs 6, no. 3 (2002), http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2002/issue3/jv6n3a1.html.
155
Anthony H. Cordesman and Arleigh A. Burke, "Iraqi Intelligence and Security Forces and Capabilities
for Popular Warfare," Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 16, 2003, 7,
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/iraqi_popwarfare%5B1%5D.pdf.
 98

Military Intelligence Branch

7,000157
(Aman)

Research and Political

Planning Center

83 Italy $2,225,874,049.52 3,500

Intelligence and Democratic

1,500158
Security Service (SISDE)

Service for Information and

Military Security (SISDE)

Security and Intelligence

2,000159
Division (RIS)

84 Jamaica $13,849,347.70 2,625

Defence Force Intelligence

Unit (HQ JDF Int Unit)

85 Japan $4,736,464,406.93 4,100160

Cabinet Intelligence and

170161
Research Office (CIRO)

Cabinet Satellite
300162
Intelligence Center (CSICE)

156
Paul Todd and Jonathan Bloch, Global Intelligence: The World's Secret Services Today (London: Zed
Books, 2003), 152-153.
157
Ibid.
158
Robert Henderson, Brassey's International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington DC:
Brassey's Inc, 2003), 103.
159
Ibid, 103-104.
160
Ken Kotani, "Current State of Intelligence and Intelligence Issues in Japan," The National Institute for
Defense Studies News 100 (2006): 2,
http://www.nids.go.jp/english/dissemination/briefing/2006/pdf/100.pdf.
161
Hajime Kitaoka, "Japan," in PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches,
vol. 1, ed. Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, Mark Phythian, and Shlomo Shpiro (London and Connecticut: Praeger
Security International, 2008), 266.
 99

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Intelligence and Analysis 80163
Service (IAS)

Defense Intelligence
2,300164
Headquarters

Public Security Intelligence

1,500165
Agency (PSIA)

86 Jordan $19,268,072.12 1,352

General Intelligence
Department (GID)

87 Kazakhstan $127,199,096.80 5,750

National Security
Committee - Syrbar (KNB)

Defence Intelligence of the

Ministry of Defence (GRU)

88 Kenya $21,229,784.00 5,000

National Security
$21,229,784166 5,000167
Intelligence Service (NSIS)

Military Intelligence (MI)

162
Ken Kotani, "Current State of Intelligence and Intelligence Issues in Japan," The National Institute for
Defense Studies News, no. 100 (2006), 2,
http://www.nids.go.jp/english/dissemination/briefing/2006/pdf/100.pdf.
163
Ibid, 271.
164
Ibid, 268.
165
Ibid, 270.
166
Low Credibility, 24.11, Fred Mukinda, "Battle Lines Drawn Over Election Violence Report," Daily
Nation, October 22, 2008, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/483076/-/view/printVersion/-/thp3kkz/-
/index.html.
167
Ibid.
 100

89 Kiribati $131,788.61 250

477
90 North Korea $14,191,805.69

State Security Department,

Communications
Interception Bureau

Reconnaissance Bureau
(MPAF)

91 South Korea $1,000,000,000.00 9,000

National Intelligence
$1,000,000,000168 9,000169
Service (NIS)

Defense Intelligence
Command (DIC)

92 Kosovo $3,659,298.37 1,045

93 Kuwait $152,075,399.60 6,000

Kuwait State Security

6,000170
(KSS)

94 Kyrgyzstan $3,432,795.00 195

168
Jon Moran, "South Korea," in PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches
vol. 1, ed. Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, Mark Phythian, and Shlomo Shpiro (London and Connecticut: Praeger
Security International, 2008), 287.
169
Ibid.
170
The Kuwait State Security is also referenced by other sources as the National Guard. The source here
describes the duties of the guard as, “providing assistance to the military and security forces, in addition to
the execution of any assignment entrusted to it by the Higher Defense Council, such as safeguarding
establishments and utilities of a sensitive nature and importance.” This description indicates, at the
qualitative level, to the researcher that it is an intelligence agency. See Anthony Cordesman and Khalid al-
Rodhan, Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars, vol. 1 (Washington DC: Center for Strategic
and International Studies, 2007), 103.
 101

Kyrgyz National Security

$3,432,795171
Service (SNB)

95 Laos $5,059,913.10 5,500

Ministry of National
Defence

96 Latvia $32,758,608.49 1,750

Military Intelligence's
Security Service (J-2)

97 Lebanon $27,838,179.69 9,800

State Security Organisation

(SSO)

General Security
Directorate (MI)

98 Lesotho $1,558,376.28 300

National Security Service

300172
(NSS)

99 Liberia $804,199.12 1,750

171
Stéphane Lefebvre and Roger McDermott, "Russia and the Intelligence Services of Central Asia,"
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 21, no. 2 (2008): 272.
172
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Southern Africa >
Lesotho > Security and Foreign Forces, "TOTAL STRENGTH 300...It is responsible directly to the prime
minister, in his capacity as minister of defence. Its role is set out in the National Security Service Act of
1998, and includes to: protect the state against threats of espionage, terrorism or sabotage which may
infringe on national security; protect the state from activities of agents of foreign powers and from actions
of persons intended to overthrow or undermine democracy by political, industrial or violent means; protect
the economic well-being of the state against threats posed by the actions or intentions of persons inside or
outside Lesotho; and protect the state against any activity that may tend to operate to undermine national
security” [accessed December 27, 2008].
 102

National Security Agency

(NSA)

Minister of National
Security (MNS)

National Security Council

(NSC)

100 Libya $96,264,365.73 200

Jamahiriya Security
200173
Organisation

101 Liechtenstein $4,001,756.37 1,045

102 Lithuania $45,504,587.31 3,750

State Security Department

(VSD)

103 Luxembourg $52,881,863.65 13,300

Second Bureau of the Army

- Deuxième Bureau de
l'Armée (MI)

104 Macedonia $9,205,001.61 300

Intelligence Agency (AR

173
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > North Africa > Libya
> Security and Foreign Forces, "Hayat Ann al Jamahiriya is Libya's intelligence/security service. It is
divided into two main wings, one dealing with domestic security (al-Amn al-Dakhili) and the other with
foreign intelligence gathering and operations (al-Amn al-Khariji). The latter is run by Musa Kusa and is
sometimes known as the Secretariat of External Security (SES) and has been involved in operations outside
the country aimed at liquidating opponents of the regime. Approximately 200 agents are thought to be
active” [accessed November 20, 2008].
 103

Security and Counter-

intelligence Directorate
(UBK)

105 Madagascar $8,901,984.00 300

General Directorate of
Information and 300174
Documentation (DGID)

106 Malawi $1,323,120.00 1,650

National Intelligence
1,323,120175
Bureau

107 Malaysia $213,765,937.06 2,000

Military Intelligence 2000176

108 Maldives $1,211,108.48 1,650

109 Mali $8,448,900.52 840

Unités Méharistes 840177

174
High Credibility, 44.3 Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Southern Africa >
Madagascar > Security and Foreign Forces, "300 - DGID…The General Directorate of Information and
Documentation (Direction Générale de l'Information et de la Documentation: DGID)...was tasked as the
main Madagascan internal and external intelligence agency with a heavy political bias towards the then
ruling party” [accessed December 27, 2008].
175
Malawi Economic Justice Network, "Comments on the proposed Malawi Budget 2001-2002: Report for
Members of Parliament," Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 10,
http://www.sarpn.org.za/CountryPovertyPapers/Malawi/ProposedBudget/MalawiBudget2001.pdf.
176
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Southeast Asia >
Malaysia > Security and Foreign Forces, "Other intelligence units are Malaysia's external intelligence
organisation, controlled by the Department of the Prime Minister, and the Ministry of Defence's joint-
service 2,000-strong Military Intelligence” [accessed January 3, 2009].
177
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > West Africa > Mali >
Security and Foreign Forces, "Since 1996, specialist camel patrol units have been used within the National
Guard to re-extend state control into the desert regions. Functions include border patrol, rural policing and
dispute resolution, as well as countertrafficking and the gathering of intelligence on Saharan insurgent
organisations...Known as Unités Méharistes, they have been funded and equipped by France on the model
 104

110 Malta $8,020,828.03 469

250
111 Marshall Islands $143,332.14

112 Mauritania $3,040,757.66 195

Direction Générale de la
Securité Extérieure et de la
Documentation (DGSED)

113 Mauritius $8,405,612.29 469

114 Mexico $1,046,736,334.72 6,250

Center for Intelligence and

National Security (CISEN)

115 Micronesia $243,376.05 250

116 Moldova $5,891,047.11 400

Information and Security

400178
Service (SIS)

117 Monaco $1,261,130.43 1,650

118 Mongolia $5,057,989.18 5,500

of colonial forces...Each 'brigade' is composed of 100 to 140 armed men...They are based in the following
locations: Abeibara (Adrar des Iforhas mountains; Algerian border), Gossi (Burkina Faso border), Inabog
(near Tessalit; Algerian border), Inakounder (near Araouane; northern desert), Léré (Mauritanian border),
Ménaka (Niger border)” [accessed December 27, 2008].
178
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Russia and the CIS >
Moldova > Security and Foreign Forces, "Estimated Strength: 400+ The SIS was created in 2000 on the
basis of the National Security Ministry. The agency's operations are governed by the Law on the SIS. The
SIS director is appointed by the parliament and has a ministerial status, reporting to the prime minister. The
current SIS director is Artur Resetnicov, a former legal advisor to President Vladimir Voronin” November
13, 2008].
 105

General Intelligence
Agency (GIA)

Information Research
Agency (IRA)

119 Montenegro $4,638,574.33 5,500

120 Morocco $83,107,629.71 4,000

General Directorate of
Studies and Documentation 4,000179
(DGED)

121 Mozambique $9,286,768.26 300

State Security and

Intelligence Service (SISE)

122 Namibia $6,906,166.00 2,549

Namibia Central
$6,906,166180
Intelligence Service (NCIS)

123 Nauru $22,125.10

250

124 Nepal $12,214,976.53 500

National Investigation
Department (Guptachar
Bibhag/NID)

179
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > North Africa >
Morocco > Security and Foreign Forces, "The DGED is a counter-intelligence service, set up after an
attempted coup against King Hassan II in 1972...It has been reported that the DGED has a strength of about
4,000” [accessed November 20, 2008].
180
Institute for Public Policy Research, "National Budget 2008/09: Great Dollops of Jam," IPPR Briefing
Paper No. 42, March 2008, 5,
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/cpsi/unpan031201.pdf [accessed January 4, 2009].
 106

Military Intelligence
Directorate (RNA)

125 Netherlands $200,271,805.00 1,764

Defence Intelligence and

$50,928,905181 764182
Security Service (MIVD)

General Intelligence and

$149,342,900183 1000184
Security Service (AIVD)

126 New Zealand $40,057,767.00 570

New Zealand Security

Intelligence Service $15,881,767185 200186
(NZSIS)
Government
Communications Security $23,176,000187 340188
Bureau (GCSB)

External Assessment
$1,000,000189 30190
Bureau (EAB)

181
Defence Intelligence and Security Service, Annual Report of the Defence Intelligence and Security
Service of the Netherlands (The Hague: 2002), 29, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/netherlands/mivd2002.doc.
182
Ibid, 28.
183
Beatrice de Graaf, "The Netherlands," in PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National
Approaches vol. 2, ed. Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, Mark Phythian, and Shlomo Shpiro (London and
Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008), 352.
184
According to Janes, the AIVD had 750 personnel in 2002. However, according to annual report, the
service added 250 employees in 2004 and 2005. See High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country
Risk Library > Western Europe > Netherlands > Security and Foreign Forces > "In 2001 the Netherlands
National Communications Security Agency (NBV) was also incorporated into the service to increase its
range and quality of information sources. The AIVD is undergoing an expansion in personnel. In 2002, it
had 750 operatives with a target of recruiting an additional 150 each year until the AIVD reaches its desired
strength in 2008. " and Beatrice de Graaf, "The Netherlands," in Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, mark Phythian,
and Shlomo Shpiro, PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches Volume 2
(London and Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008), p. 352.
185
New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, “Annual Report 2006,” House of Representatives,
http://www.nzsis.govt.nz/reports/ar06/review.aspx.
186
New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, Overview, http://www.nzsis.govt.nz/about/ [accessed March
20, 2009].
187
Government Communications Security Bureau, Organisation, http://www.gcsb.govt.nz/about-
us/organisation.html [accessed March 20, 2009].
188
Ibid.
189
Robert Henderson, Brassey's International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington, DC:
Brassey's Inc, 2003), 138.
190
Ibid.
 107

Directorate of Defence
Intelligence and Security
(DDIS)

127 Nicaragua $6,108,450.22 2,700

Directorate of Intelligence
Affairs (DAI)

128 Niger $5,174,386.42 5,500

129 Nigeria $249,191,821.00191 1,700

Directorate of Military
Intelligence (DMI)

National Intelligence
Agency (NIA)

130 Norway $108,957,708.00 3,100

Norwegian Intelligence
$108,957,708192
Service (NIS)

131 Oman $50,583,739.62 2,050

Internal Security Service

(ISS)

132 Pakistan $41,600,000.00193 10,000

Inter-Services Intelligence
10,000194
(ISI)

191
Budget Office, "2009 Budget: Intelligence Community," Ministry of Finance,
http://www.budgetoffice.gov.ng/2009_budget/2009BudgetICom.pdf [accessed April 1, 2009].
192
Not Credible, 7.46, Norwegian Intelligence Service, http://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/enwiki/4133162
[accessed March 1, 2009].
193
Robert Henderson, Brassey's International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington DC:
Brassey's Inc, 2003), 143-144.
 108

133 Palau $163,533.31 250

9,000
134 Palestinian Authority $5,250,381.31

General Intelligence Service 8,400195

Military Intelligence 600196

135 Panama $22,209,747.84 10,000

National Service of
Intelligence and Security

136 Papua New Guinea $7,784,185.70 469

137 Paraguay $15,397,142.41 477

138 Peru $122,744,256.96 5,750

National Intelligence Centre

(CNI)

Army Intelligence Service

(SIE)

139 Philippines $44,200,000.00197 3,750

194
Sean Winchell, "Pakistan's ISI: The Invisible Government," International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence 16, no. 3 (2003): 384.
195
Roland Friedrich and Mohammed Najib, "Palestine," in PSI Handbook of Global Security and
Intelligence: National Approaches, vol. 2, ed. Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, Mark Phythian, and Shlomo Shpiro
(London and Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008), 604.
196
Ibid, 606.
197
High Credibility, 44.3, "Philippines Intelligence Budget," Jane's Defense Weekly, December 22, 1999,
www.janes.com.
 109

National Security Council

$946,636198
(NSC)

National Intelligence
Coordinating Agency $4,528,445
(NICA)

140 Poland $36,900,000.00199 4,600

The Intelligence Agency

2,000200
(AW)

Military Intelligence
1,300201
Service (SWW)

Military Counterintelligence
1,300202
Service (SKW)

141 Portugal $235,191,686.96 22,650

Department of Defense
Strategic Information
Service (SIED)

142 Qatar $98,410,499.97 800

Qatari State Security (QSS)

198
House of Representatives, "Intel Agencies Invoke Broader National Security Concerns to Justify
Budget," Congress of the Philippines 13, no. 81 (2005),
http://www.congress.gov.ph/committees/commnews/commnews_det.php?newsid=478 [accessed April 29,
2009].
199
Robert Henderson, Brassey's International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington DC:
Brassey's Inc, 2003), 151-155.
200
Ibid.
201
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Central Europe and
the Baltic States > Poland > Security and Foreign Forces, “The WSI was disbanded on 30 September 2006.
Minister of Defence, Radek Sikorski, has been engaged with releasing WSI personnel trained under the
former Soviet regime from duty. He has also discussed the resignation of WSI leadership. The WSI will be
replaced by a new military intelligence (SWW) and counter-intelligence (SKW) service…According to
Wassermann both the SWW and SKW would require between 1,200 and 1,300 personnel to be effective
including civilian personnel” [accessed October 18, 2008]
202
Ibid.
 110

National Security Shield

800203
(NSS)

Intelligence Centre Against

Drug Trafficking

143 Romania $210,550,000.00204 41,800205

Foreign Intelligence Service

(SIE)

Defense General Directorate

for Intelligence (DGIA)

Special Telecommunication
Service (STS)

144 Russia $3,251,264,510206 172,000207

Federal Security Service

(FSB)

Foreign Intelligence Service

6,000208
(SVR)

203
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Gulf States > Qatar >
Security and Foreign Forces > "Qatar launched a major security project, National Security Shield (NSS), in
July 2007. The NSS, which is expected to deploy more than 800 personnel when fully operational, has the
task of operating a network of electronic surveillance stations on Qatar's land and sea borders, and also of
covering the emirate's airspace. The mission of the NSS is to supply security information to all official
agencies in Qatar, including the armed forces and the Ministry of the Interior” [accessed November 13,
2008].
204
Valentin Filip, "The Intelligence Phenomenon in a New Democratic Milieu: Romania - A Case Study"
(Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2006), 44,
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/romania/filip.pdf.
205
The source used here indicates a total of 46,800 individuals work in the "Security and Intelligence
Service," however, this figure also includes the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI). The SRI is the
internal intelligence agency and the same source indicates that it has approximately 5,000 employees. This
number was subtracted from the total to reach 41,800. This number includes the DGIA, SIE, and STS.
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > The Balkans > Romania
> Security and Foreign Forces [accessed October 14, 2008].
206
Low Credibility, 23.27, Ivan Safranchuk, “Funding for the Russian Secret Services," Agentura.ru,
http://www.agentura.ru/english/experts/safranchuk/.
207
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Russia and the CIS >
Russia Federation > Security and Foreign Forces > Security and Foreign Forces [accessed November 13,
2008].
 111

Federal Agency of
Government Information
120,000209
and Communication
(FAPSI)

Main Intelligence
Directorate (GRU)

145 Rwanda $5,758,689.00 2,700

Directorate of Military
Intelligence (DMI)

National Security Service

$5,758,689210
(NSS)

146 Saint Kitts and Nevis $533,888.17 250

147 Saint Lucia $986,009.68 1,650

Saint Vincent and the

148 $578,138.36 250
Grenadines

149 Samoa $516,572.88 250

Transnational Crime Unit

(TCU)

150 San Marino $1,638,219.01 195

208
Paul Todd, Jonathan Bloch, Global Intelligence: The World's Secret Services Today (London: Zed
Books, 2003), 143.
209
Ibid, 146.
210
Ministry of Finance and Planning, "Annex II-3: State expenditure by Budget Agency – 2008-2010,"
Government of Rwanda, 1, http://www.minecofin.gov.rw/en/inno-download_file.php?fileId=100.
 112

Sao Tome and 250

151 $169,305.08
Principe

152 Saudi Arabia $500,000,000.00 5,689

General Intelligence
$500,000,000211
Presidency (GIP)

Military Intelligence (MI)

Financial Investigation Unit

(SA-FIU)

153 Senegal $12,842,174.88 2,625

Senegalese Intelligence
Agency

154 Serbia $48,156,712.86 2,500

Security-Intelligence
2,500212
Agency (BIA)

Military-Security Agency
(VBA)

155 Seychelles $802,275.19 500

211
Anthony Cordesman and Khalid Al-Rodhan, Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars
(Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies), 233-234,
http://books.google.com/books?id=QaosFaOqzrEC&pg=PA235&lpg=PA235&dq=General+Intelligence+P
residency+(GIP)&source=bl&ots=7mcs-
ArTL0&sig=1hZp3Ol0xjxqnqTwQDd_RwxPfYU&hl=en&ei=NvXsScyAKp7Itge-
uojOBQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=10#PPA233,M1 [accessed April 20, 2009]. ;
Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, "The Saudi Security Apparatus: Military and Security Services -
Challenges and Developments," Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 42,
http://www.dcaf.ch/news/past_2004/ev_geneva_04071113_Cordesman.pdf.
212
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Library > The Balkans > Serbia > Security
and Foreign Forces [October 25, 2008].
 113

Special Branch 500213

156 Sierra Leone $317,745214 250

Central Intelligence and

Security Unit (CISU)

JIC Joint Assessment Team

(JAT)

Office of National Security

(ONS)

157 Singapore $175,018,161.47 12,000

Security and Intelligence

Division (SID)

158 Slovakia $39,370,697.13 2,585

Slovenska informacni
$39,370,697.13215
sluzba (SIS)

213
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Library > Central Africa > Seychelles >
Security and Foreign Forces, "TOTAL STRENGTH = 500 (estimated)...The National Guard is the main
internal security force, but there is also the small Police Special Support Unit, which is armed for riot
control and response. Police Special Branch is the main organ for non-criminal intelligence gathering and
analysis” [accessed October 19, 2008].
214
It should be noted that this figure does not include two important spending figures. First, it does not
include funds from international aid programs, which are generally one time allotments for specific
projects. For instance, the ONS received grant money from the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund. The
ONS received USD $1.5 million to start construction on a new facility. This money is not included in the
total number given in the Ministry of Finance's budgetary statement. For more information on this specific
project, see United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Fund Project Summary,
http://www.unpbf.org/sierraleone/sierraleone-projects.shtml [accessed April 16, 2009]. The second
spending figure excluded from the total figure given is salaried employees. See Ministry of Finance,
Government Budget and Statement of Economic and Financial Policies for the Financial Year 2007
(Freetown: Bank of Sierra Leone, 2006), 6, http://bankofsierraleone-centralbank.net/pdf/Gov_Budget.pdf
[accessed April 16, 2009].
215
The amount cited was for 1998 and was 944,912,000 SKK, however, no rates were available for
conversion to 1998 USD. The researcher used the 2008 exchange rate, 48.22 SKK per 1 USD) Kieran
Williams and Denis Deletant, Security Intelligence Services in new Democracies: the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, and Romania (New York: Houndmills, 2001), 141.
 114

Military Intelligence
Service (VSS)

159 Slovenia $52,560,568.79 13,300

Intelligence and Security

Agency (SOVA)

Intelligence and Security

Service (OVS)

160 Solomon Islands $455,007.39 250

161 Somalia $2,436,646.36 195

Somali National Security

Agency

162 South Africa $237,920,657.72 3,500

South African Secret

$220,502,680.70216 1,500217
Service (SASS)

Intelligence Division
$17,417,977.02218 2,000219
(SANDF-ID)

163 Spain $200,000,000 4,982

216
High Credibility, 35.31, Steve Swart, MP, "Intelligence Budget Vote," African Christian Democratic
Party, http://acdp.intoweb.co.za/index.php?page=speeches167.
217
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Southern Africa >
South Africa > Security and Foreign Forces, “At provincial level, Provincial Intelligence Co-coordinating
Committees (PICOC) were subsequently created. Information on personnel strengths is confidential, but a
report published at the end of 1999 indicated that NIA employed some 2,500 agents and the Secret Service
1,500 agents. Control mechanisms such as a mechanism for parliamentary oversight; an independent
inspector-general; and an absence of law enforcement powers are also provided for."
218
Source cites The Library of Congress Country Studies; CIA World Fact book,
http://www.photius.com/countries/south_africa/national_security/
south_africa_national_security_defense_budget.html.
219
Kevin A. O'Brien, "South Africa's Evolving Intelligence and Security Structures," International Journal
of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 9, no. 2 (1996): 197.
 115

National Intelligence Center

$200,000,000220
(CNI)

Armed Forces Intelligence

Center (CIFAS)

164 Sri Lanka $38,097,490.19 2,585

National Intelligence
Bureau (SIS)

Military Intelligence Corps

(MIC)

165 Sudan $55,708,104.08 1,600

al-Amn al-Khariji

Military Intelligence Branch

(MI)

166 Suriname $2,870,490.63 195

167 Swaziland $2,734,854.17 195

168 Sweden $252,755,397.00 1,900

Security Service (SS) $115,000,000221 900222

220
Congressional Research Service, "European Approaches to Homeland Security and Counterterrorism,"
Federation of American Scientists, 34, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33573.pdf.
221
Dennis Töllborg, "Sweden," in PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches
vol. 2, ed. Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, Mark Phythian, and Shlomo Shpiro (London and Connecticut: Praeger
Security International, 2008), 379.
222
Ibid. See also, Swedish Security Service, Swedish Security Service 2006: Annual Report (Växjö:
Davidsons Tryckeri AB, 2007), 10,
http://www.securityservice.se/download/18.79f4d0a71125247256d800035/swedishsecurityservice2006.pdf
.
 116

Military Intelligence and

Security Directorate
(MUST)

Independent Special Unit

(FRA)

Swedish Defence Research

$137,755,397223 1,000224
Agency (FOI)

169 Switzerland $473,857,013.88 21,128

170 Syria $52,718,330.34 25,000

General Intelligence
25,000225
Directorate (GID)

Political Security
Directorate (PSD)

Syrian Military Intelligence

(SMI)

Air Force Intelligence (AFI)

171 Taiwan $377,619,583.05 1,500

National Security Bureau

1,500226
(NSB)

Military Intelligence Bureau

(MIB)

223
Swedish Defence Research Agency, What is FOI?,
http://www.foi.se/FOI/templates/Page____6630.aspx [accessed March 25, 2009].
224
Ibid.
225
Robert Henderson, Brassey's International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington, DC:
Brassey's Inc, 2003), 317.
226
Steven Phillips, "Taiwan's Intelligence Reform in an Age of Democratization," in Reforming
Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, ed. Thomas Bruneau and Steven Boraz
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 177.
 117

172 Tajikistan $4,939,668.02 5,500

Ministry of Security (MoS)

173 Tanzania $19,932,786.94 1,352

Tanzania Intelligence and

Security Service (TISS)

174 Thailand $262,853,827.85 2,415

National Intelligence
Agency (NIA)

175 Timor-Leste $480,018.37 250

195
176 Togo $2,780,066.32

National Intelligence
Agency

177 Tonga $248,185.85 250

178 Trinidad and Tobago $23,862,396.26 9,800

Special Intelligence Agency

(SIA)

179 Tunisia $38,813,188.92 2,585

Tunisian Intelligence
Agency
 118

180 Turkey $378,301,672.00 5,000

National Intelligence
$378,301,672227 5,000228
Organisation (MIT)

Special Warfare Unit

(SWU)

181 Turkmenistan $6,977,100.70 5,000

National Security
4,000229
Committee (KNB)

Aliens' Registration Service

1,000230
(GSRIG)

182 Tuvalu $28,858.82 250

183 Uganda $606,953.15 250

External Security
$4,229.15231
Organisation (ESO)

227
The translation from Turkish to English was provided by Babylon.com, Low Credibility, 28.47,
"MİT'İN 2009 BÜTÇESİ NE?" Cafe Siyaset, November 4, 2008,
http://www.cafesiyaset.com/haber/20081104/MITin-2009-butcesi-ne.php [accessed April 28, 2009]. The
figure indicated here represents the allocated amount in the 2009 budget in 2008 USD. However, using the
2009 USD conversion rate, the amount would be USD $273,475,903, quite a difference!
228
The translation from Turkish to English was provided by Babylon.com, Low Credibility, 32.25,
Hazırlayan Ferhat Ünlü, "MİT'te iç çekişme entrikaya yol açtı," Sabah, July 19, 2007,
http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2007/07/19/haber,4D36E8C34C434B5880E8E8BE1D3FF328.html [accessed
April 27, 2009].
229
Stéphane Lefebvre and Roger McDermott, "Russia and the Intelligence Services of Central Asia,"
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 21, no. 2 (2008): 280.
230
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Russia and the CIS >
Turkmenistan > Security and Foreign Forces, "The GSRIG, a spin-off from the NKB...Its de-facto core
responsibility is counter-espionage and total control over the expatriate community. The agency employs
over 1,000 intelligence officers..."
231
Joseph Enyimu, A Review of the Uganda Police Force Budget and its Effect on Crime Management, ed.
G.P. Joshi, Michelle Kagari & Sophy Thomas, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (London:
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2006), 24,
http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/police/uganda_report.pdf.
 119

Chieftaincy of Military
Intelligence (CMI)

Joint Anti-Terrorism Task

$602,724232
Force (JATT)

184 Ukraine $90,380,219.00 4,350

Foreign Intelligence Service

$49,153,882233 4,350234
of Ukraine (FISU)

Main Directorate for

$41,226,337235
Intelligence (MDI)

185 United Arab Emirates $250,245,409.41 1,700

UAE Intelligence

186 United Kingdom $2,854,668,400.00236 12,200

Single Intelligence Account

(SIA)

Defence Intelligence Staff

4,500237
(DIS)

Security Service 3,200238

232
Low Credibility, 30.75, Human Rights Watch, "Open Secret: Illegal Detention and Torture by the Joint
Anti-terrorism Task Force in Uganda," Human Rights Watch, April 8, 2009,
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/82072/section/8.
233
Oleksii Petrov, "Political and Budgetary Oversight of the Ukraine Intelligence Community: Processes,
Problems, and Prospects for Reform," (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate College, September 2007), 71,
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/ukraine/petrov.pdf.
234
Ibid.
235
Ibid, 74.
236
Intelligence and Security Committee, "Annual Report 2007-2008," Federation of American Scientists, 8,
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/uk/isc2007-08.pdf.
237
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Western Europe >
United Kingdom > Security and Foreign Forces, "Defence Intelligence Staff Total Strength 4,500 (est)."
 120

Secret Intelligence Services

Government
Communications $1,212,878,238239 4,500240
Headquarters

187 United States $75,000,000,000.00241 144,000242

National Intelligence
Program (NIP)

Military Intelligence
Program (MIP)

188 Uruguay $31,034,774.98 9,800

189 Uzbekistan $26,856,017.85 9,800

National Security Service

(SNB)

Defence Intelligence
Service (GRU)

190 Vanuatu $551,203.46 250

238
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Western Europe >
United Kingdom > Security and Foreign Forces > "The number of staff is around 2,200 in total after a
recruitment drive during 2004, and there are plans to increase staff numbers to around 3,200 by 2008…”
[accessed December 12, 2008].
239
Medium Credibility, 36.03, “GCHQ Moves Into Limelight," Intelligence Newsletter, December 7, 2000,
www.nexis.com.
240
Ibid.
241
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2009 National Intelligence Strategy, September 15,
2009, http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2009/09/dni091509-m.pdf.
242
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2009 National Intelligence Strategy, September 15,
2009, http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2009/09/dni091509-m.pdf. Although the total number given by the
ODNI is 200,000, previous interviews indicate that in 2008 the US's intelligence community employed 28
percent of its workforce as contractors. After removing contractors, 56,000, the remaining number of
employees is about 144,000. See High Credibility 43.28, Joseph Fitsanakis, "US Spy Services Hiding True
Employee Numbers Says Senate Panel," IntelNews.org, July 27, 2009,
http://intelligencenews.wordpress.com/2009/07/27/01-195/.
 121

191 Venezuela $307,291,600.78 2,415

Directorate of Security and

Police Intelligence (DISIP)

192 Vietnam $86,411,964.60 7,000

General Department II (GD

II, Tong Cuc 2)

193 Yemen $26,118,194.02 9,800

194 Zambia $38,508,618.00

Zambia Security
$38,508,618243 2,585
Intelligence Service

195
195 Zimbabwe $2,996,216.00

Central Intelligence
$2,996,216244
Organisation (CIO)

243
Low Credibility, 31.39, Charles Musonda, "State, Mines Act to Save Jobs," Zambia Daily Mail, March
26, 2009, http://www.daily-mail.co.zm/media/news/viewnews.cgi?category=9&id=1238053304.
244
Medium Credibility, 36.03, Tendai Biti, "Zimbabwe's 2008 Budget: Economic Fiction," Association of
Zimbabwe Journalists in the UK, November 30, 2007,
http://www.zimbabwejournalists.com/story.php?art_id=3245&cat=4.