Drilon v.

Lim
Facts:
The City Government of Manila passed Ordinance No. 7794 entitled the Manila Reve
nue Code. In consonance with section 187 of the Local Government Code, private
petitioners challenged the validity of the said ordinance before the Office of t
he Secretary of Justice which in turn resolved it in their favor. Thereafter, th
e City of Manila filed before the Manila Trial Court a petition for certiorari.
The trial court revoked the secretary's resolution and sustained the ordinance.
Also, it held that Section 187 of the LG Code unconstitutional as it vesture in
the Secretary of Justice the power of control over local governments in violatio
n of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether the setting aside of the city ordinance by the Secretary of Justice is a
n exercise of power of control over LGU.
Held:
No. Power or control includes laying down the rules in the doing of an act. If t
hey are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done
by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. While power of supe
rvision merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not l
ay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. I
f the rules are not followed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to
conform to the prescribed rules. Under Section 187 of LGC it authorizes the Secr
etary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ord
inance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. Secre
tary Drilon set aside the ordinance on two grounds: inclusion therein of certain
ultra vires provisions; and, non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in it
s enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonablene
ss, of the tax measure. There is no showing that he substitute his own judgment
for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. He only sees
to it that the rules are followed, which in the case at bar was not. Therefore,
it resulted to the setting aside of the ordinance. In conclusion, the court upho
ld the constitutionality of Section 187 of LGC and that the Secretary is exercis
ing only the power of supervision as mandated by law.