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WESTERN MINDANAO STATE UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB-III B
BATCH 2013-2014
SUCCESSION
CASE DIGESTS
Based on the book of Jurado,
Tolentino and Balane


SUBMITTED TO:
ATTY. JIHAN EL R. EDDING
NOVEMBER 2013



[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS] LLB III-B, BATCH 2013-2014

[1]

LIMJUCO VS.ESTATE OF PEDRO FRAGANTE
G.R. No. L-770
April 27, 1948

FACTS:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public convenience
to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is financially capable of
maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public
convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or
Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate
the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a contravention
of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the estate of Fragante may extended an artificial judicial personality.
HELD:
The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because under the Civil Code,
estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person for the purpose of settlement
and distribution of his properties. It should be noted that the exercise of juridical administration
includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death. One of
those surviving rights involved the pending application for public convenience before the Public Service
Commission..
Supreme Court if of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the
Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O.
Fragante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as
amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.

ABDURAJAK,PSAMIERA A.
LLB III-B





[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS] LLB III-B, BATCH 2013-2014

[2]

CENTENERA VS. SOTTO
G.R. No. L-49065
April 30, 1947

FACTS:
On June 20, 1940, Mariano Garchitorena file a motion praying that subdivision plan Psu-66063-Amd., marked
as Annex E, be approved and that it be decreed that certificates of title be issued in his name on lots 2,3, and
4 of the original plan Psu-66063 and upon lots 1,5,6,7, and 8 of the subdivision plan Psu-66063-Amd. The
movant alleged that on May 14, 1931, a decision was rendered by the lower court granting Rita Garchitorena
as heiress of her father Andres, title over four lots, the same described in her original application, subject to
lien in favor of Mariano Garchitorena and other creditors, with the exclusion of about 500 hectares belonging
to Ramon and Jose Alvarez, about 300 hectares of land of the public domain, a portion of 18 hectares
belonging to Hermogenes P. Obias and another portion of 24 hectares of land of the public domain, with the
exception of 4 hectares belonging to Januario Alvarez, all said portions being included in lot number 1. It is
also alleged that after said judgment was modified by the Supreme Court and some steps have been taken as
a result of said modification, lots 1,2,3 and 4 of land Psu-66063 were adjudicated to Mariano Garchitorena in
consideration of the amount of P28,745.93 a deed of sale having been executed to said effect on September
8, 1935, which was approved by the lower court on April 26, 1940, and that Mariano Garchitorena bought the
500 hectares of Ramon and Jose Alvarez on April 27, 1939. Several persons appeared to oppose the motion,
but only three of them came to appeal against the lower courts order dated June 28, 1941, decreeing the
issuance of certificate of titles in favor of Mariano Garchitorena on lots 2,3, and 4 of the original plan Psu
66063-Amd., and on lots, 1,6,and 7 of the same subdivision plan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Land Court has jurisdiction over the issuance of the certificate of title of the said lots.
HELD:
The jurisdiction of the Land Court extends no further than the inscription of the land described in its final
decree and the enforcement of that decree, and that, even though the land described in the petition be
found by the court, as between the petitioner and the oppositor, to be the property of the opponent, such
land can not be inscribed in his name, the Land Court having , as we have said , no jurisdiction or power to do
so. It naturally and necessarily follows that the opponent, if he desires the land of which he claims ownership
to be registered in accordance with law, must begin a new proceeding in the Land Court for that purpose.

ABDURAJAK,PSAMIERA A.
LLB III-B






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[3]

BARRIOS VS DOLOR
G.R. No. 559
March 14, 1903

FACTS:
The plaintiff has brought an action for the recovery from the defendants, heirs of the late Don Ciriaco
Demonteverde, of one-half of a sugar estate and the stock thereon, which he claims to have purchased
from the said Don Ciriaco Demonteverde. In support of his contention as to the law of the case he
attached to the complaint a public instrument which appears to have been executed by himself and
Demonteverde, February 3, 1883, in which, according to the plaintiff, a stipulation is made for a contract
of partnership for the operation of the said estate, and, furthermore, a community, of ownership is
established with respect to the estate in favor of the two parties to this instrument. It does not appear
that this instrument has been recorded in the registry of property. Service of the complaint having been
had on the defendants, Dona Maria Pascuala Dolor raised an incidental issue as previous question,
praying that the instrument referred to be ruled out of evidence on the ground that it had not been
recorded in the registry of property, and that it be returned to the plaintiff without leaving in the record
any transcript or copy thereof of extract therefrom, resting this contention upon rticle 389 of the
Mortgage Law. This motion was granted by the judge by order of the 24
th
of March, 1898, against which
the plaintiff appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether the defendants, as heirs of Don Ciriaco Demonteverde, can and should be regarded as third
persons for the purposes of the Mortgage Law.
HELD:
The defendants are not third persons with respect to the contract entered into by their decedent, Don
Ciriaco Demonteverde, in the instrument of February 3, 1883, and they therefore cannot avail
themselves of the prohibition contained in article 389 of the Mortgage Law for the purpose of opposing
the admission of this instrument as evidence in the case, because not recorded in the registry of
property. This prohibition was established solely and exclusively in favor of those who, within the
meaning of that law, are third persons. Were it otherwise, the position of the defendants would be
superior to that of the person whom they derived their rights, because he, not being a third person,
could not set up such an exception. This would certainly be most illogical from a legal point of view, in
view of the fact that the heir is, above stated, a mere continuation of the civil personality of his
decedent.

ABDURAJAK,PSAMIERA A.
LLB III-B

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS] LLB III-B, BATCH 2013-2014

[4]

SUILIONG & CO. VS. CHIO-TAYSAN
G.R. No. L-4777
November 11, 1908

FACTS:
Avelina Caballero, deceased, owned during her lifetime a certain tract of land, which was was
inscribed in her name in the land registry of the city of Manila. On March 27, 1903, she
borrowed from Francisca Jose, the intervener and appellant in this action, 1,000 pesos, Mexican
currency, and turned over her title deeds to this tract of land to the lender as security for the
loan, but no entry touching the transaction was noted in the land registry. Avelina Caballero
died on the 5
th
day of June, 1903, and thereafter Silvina Chio-Taysn, the defendant in this
action, instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action, known, under the system of
civil procedure in existence prior to the adoption of the present code, as an action for the
declaration of heirship and on the 5
th
day of August 1903, following order declaring her to be
the only and exclusive heir of Avelina Caballero, deceased.On March 9, 1904, the registrar of
deeds of the city of Manila by virtue of order entered the inscriptions in the land registry
whereby the said Silvina Chio-Taysan is made to appear as the owner of the land in question.
On the 26
th
day of May 1904, the said Silvina Chio-Taysan borrowed the sum of P2,500 from the
Fire and Marine Insurance and Loan Co.,of which the plaintiff is the lawfully appointed
liquidator, and mortgaged the land in question as security for the payment of loan. Therefter
the husband of Silvina Chio-Taysan instituted special proceedings under the provisions of the
present Code of Civil Procedure, for the administration of the estate of Avelina Caballero,
deceased. On the 16
th
day of October 1905, he was appointed administrator. On the 10
th
day of
October, 1906, the plaintiff in this action filed its complaint against the defendant , Silvin Chio-
Taysan, praying for judgment for the amount loaned her as above set out, and the foreclosure
of its mortgage upon the land. The trial court enteree judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
against both the defendant and the intervener in conformity with the prayer of the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether one or more heirs could be entitled to be recognized as the owner or owners of the
property of the deceased in an action for declaration of heirship.
HELD:
A judgment in an action for the declaration of heirship in favor of one or more heirs could not
entitle such persons to be recognized as the owner or owners of the property of the deceased
on the same terms as such property was held by the deceased, for it passes to the heir, under
the new civil code, burdened with all the debts of the deceased, his death having created a lien
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[5]

thereon for the benefit of the creditor; and indeed an examination of the proceedings
prescribed in the new code of Civil Procedure for the administration and distribution of the
estates of deceased persons leaves no room for doubt that those proceedings are exclusive of
all other judicial proceedings looking to that end, and supersede the judicial proceeding for the
declaration of heirship, as recognized in the old procedure, atleast so far as the proceedings
served as a remedy whereby the right of specific persons to succeed to the rights and
obligations of the deceased as his heirs might be judicially determined and enforced.
ABDURAJAK,PSAMIERA A.
LLB III-B



















[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS] LLB III-B, BATCH 2013-2014

[6]


Pavia vs. De la Rosa
8 Phil. 70
March 18, 1907


FACTS:

The plaintiffs prayed that a judgment be rendered in their favor and against the defendants for
the sum of 15,000 pesos, Philippine Currency, as damages, together with costs of action,
alleging in effect that by reason of the death of the testator, Pablo Linart e Iturralde, Francisco
Granda e Iturralde was appointed executor under the will of the said deceased, in which will
the minor Carmen Linart y Pavia was made the only universal heir, and that owing to the death
of the executor Francisco Granda toward the end of December, 1893, there was substituted as
executor Jose de la Rosa, who took possession of the personal property of the state, amounting
to 10,673 pesos, Mexican Currency, as well as the property situated at No. 27 Calle Solana,
Walled City, likewise the property of the testator; that during the month of April, 1904, the
plaintiff, Rafaela Pavia, in her own behalf, and as guardian of Carmen Linart y Pavia, executed a
power of attorney in behalf of the aforesaid Jose de la Rosa with the powers therein expressed,
and the attorney having accepted such power proceeded to administer the aforesaid estate in a
careless manner until the 20th of August, 1903, neglecting the interests of the plaintiffs and
wasting the capital, and causing damages amounting to over 15,000 pesos, Philippine currency,
owing to the fact of having retired or disposed of without any necessity the sum of 7,207 pesos
Mexican currency, together with interest thereon amounting to 360.25 pesos, which amounts
would have produced 12,321.90 pesos, Mexican currency, for the plaintiffs; that the executor
and attorney De la Rosa neglected to appraise, count, and divide the estate of Linart, deceased,
notwithstanding it was his duty to do so, and leased the aforesaid house No. 27 Calle Solana to
his relatives from December, 1893, to August, 1903, at a much lower rental than could have
been obtained, thereby causing the plaintiffs losses amounting to 6,570 pesos, Mexican
Currency; that the aforesaid Jose de la Rosa died on the 14th of September, 1903, leaving the
defendants Bibiana and Salud de la Rosa as his only heirs and representatives, Eusebio Canals
being the husband of the said Bibiana.

ISSUE

WON the defendant Bibiana and Salud de laRosa are responsible for the personal acts of
Josedela Rosa.

HELD:

No. It has not been shown that the estate or the intestate succession of the deceased, Jose de
la Rosa, was ever opened or that an inventory has ever been presented in evidence,
notwithstanding that at the time of the death of De la Rosa, the Code of Civil Procedure (Act
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[7]

No.190) was already in force, and that in accordance with its provisions the estate of the
deceased should have been administered and liquidated.- In accordance with the provisions of
the Act No.190 it is understood that estate or intestate succession of a deceased person is
always accepted and received with benefit of inventory, and his heirs, even after having taken
possession of the estate of the deceased, do not make themselves responsible for the debts of
said deceased with their own property, but solely with that property coming from the estate or
intestate succession of said deceased.- The Code of Civil Procedure now in force makes
necessary the opening of a testate or intestate succession immediately after the death of the
person whose estate is to be administered, the appointment of an executor or administrator,
the taking of an inventory of the estate of the deceased, and the appointment of two or more
commissioners for the purpose of appraising the property of the estate and deciding as to the
claims against said estate

ALAWI II, MUHAIDIR U.
LLB III-B





























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[8]

Montelibano vs. Cruz,
35 Off. Gaz. 1083
April 30, 1964


FACTS:

Spouses Alejandro Montelibano and his wife Gliceria, who died, respectively, on August 14,
1927 and September 19, 1914, were survived by the children, Jose M. Alfredo M. Concepcion
and Alejandro all surnamed Montelibano. On September 6, 1927, Jose M. Montelibano applied
in Civil Case No. 4281 of the aforementioned court for letters of Administration of his deceased
father Alejandro Montelibano. A similar petition was filed on November 12, 1927, with the
same court and docketed therein as Case No. 4428, as regards the estate of Gliceria M.
Montelibano. In due course, the inventories of the properties constituting the estates of the
aforementioned deceased spouses was submitted on October 2, 1930. Subsequently, or on
June 11, 1931, the corresponding petition for declaration of heirs of said spouses and project of
partition of their respective estates was file. Said petition and project of partition were
approved the court on July 21, 1931. Nothing appears to have be done in said cases until
September 11, 1940, when the attention of the court was called to the payment of the
corresponding inheritance taxes, whereupon both cases we declared closed on September 14,
1940.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petition for declaration of heirs is valid.

HELD:

Petitioners assail the accuracy or validity of these grounds, but a review of the record does not
show that they have succeeded in their endeavor. What is more, during the period intervening
from the issuance of the order of October 22, 1958, to that of April 11, 1962, petitioners had
begun to introduce their evidence. Apparently, the nature thereof was not such as to impart to
respondent judge the impression that petitioners' cause of action was sufficiently, meritorious
to warrant a reconsideration of the first order. At any rate, the issue hinges on whether or not
the other properties of respondent herein which are subject to the notice of lis pendens suffice
to protect petitioners' alleged rights, should the same be eventually upheld judicially. Upon the
records before us, we are not prepared to conclude that respondent Judge had abused his
discretion, much less gravely, in resolving this question, in the affirmative.


ALAWI II, MUHAIDIR U.
LLB III-B


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[9]


LEDESMA vs. MCLACHLIN
66 PHIL 547
November 23, 1938


FACTS:

Lorenzo Mclachlin is indebted to 3rd person. But Lorenzo before he was able to pay the debt,
he died. But when he died, he had no property. Theoretically, there should have been
succession between Lorenzo and Anna. So Anna should have inherited from Lorenzo. But
because Lorenzo had no properties, Anna did not inherit anything from Lorenzo.

ISSUE:

Can the 3rd person claim from Anna?

HELD:

No. He cannot because Lorenzo did not transmit anything to Anna and the inheritance is only to
the extent of the value. So, for example, Lorenzo had debts. The value of the inheritance should
only be to the value of the debts. But there was no property left.So the value of the inheritance
is zero. The debts cannot beenforced against Anna because Anna inherited nothing. ARTICLE
777. The rights to the succession aretransmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent.



ALAWI II, MUHAIDIR U.
LLB III-B










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[10]

Uson vs. Del Rosari
G.R. No. L-4963
January 29, 1953

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Recovery of the ownership and possession

FACTS:

Five (5) parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan, filed by
Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four children named Concepcion, Conrado,
Dominador, and Faustino, surnamed Nebreda, who are all of minor age, before the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan.

Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands
involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson.
However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria
del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and
enjoyment.

Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson
and her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document whereby they agreed
to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was
given a parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any
other property that may be left by her husband upon his death.

ISSUE:

WON Maria Urson has the right to inherit any other property that may be left by her husband
upon his death.

HELD:

There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda,
former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is likewise no
dispute that Maria del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was merely a common-law
wife of the late Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate children, her now co-
defendants. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity
of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in
1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death
to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code).As this Court aptly said, "The
property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if
the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death"
(Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of
inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested.
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[11]


The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in
question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may
acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into on February
21, 1931, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the
subject of a contract nor can it be renounced (1 Manresa, 123, sixth edition; Tolentino on Civil
Code, p. 12; Osorio vs. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531).
But defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate
children of the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any
successional rights, however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950,
they are given the status and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional
rights which the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and
because these successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be
given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred
under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).

There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which
are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave
rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new
rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article
provides that "if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at
once, even though the act or event which gives rise thereto may have been done or may have
occurred under the prior legislation, provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any
vested or acquired right, of the same origin." As already stated in the early part of this decision,
the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon
the death of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law
which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death
(Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the
illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the
vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.

As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in state, in a
gesture of pity or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in question to the minor children for
the reason that they were acquired while the deceased was living with their mother and Maria
Uson wanted to assuage somewhat the wrong she has done to them, this much can be said;
apart from the fact that this claim is disputed, we are of the opinion that said assignment, if
any, partakes of the nature of a donation of real property, inasmuch as it involves no material
consideration, and in order that it may be valid it shall be made in a public document and must
be accepted either in the same document or in a separate one (Article 633, old Civil Code).
Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been followed, it results that the alleged
assignment or donation has no valid effect.

AMIILBAHAR, NURULAIN K.
LLB III-B
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[12]


Baun vs. Heirs of Baun
G.R. No. L-30750
October 24, 1929



FACTS:

On May 31, 1928, the administrator of the estate filed a motion, requesting authority to sell
personal and real properties of the estate, in order to pay its debts. The motion alleged (a) that
the estate was indebted to the Asociacion Cooperativa del Credito Rural de Tarlac in the sum of
P1,000, with interest at 10 per cent from February 11, 1925; (b) that it was also indebted to
Manuel Urquico in the sum of P7,412.22, with interest at 12 per cent from November 1, 1927;
and (c) that the estate was without sufficient funds to meet said obligations.

On June 1, 1928, the heirs of the estate, with the exception of Damiana Manankil, widow of
the deceased, filed their written conformity to the proposed sale of the only real property of
the estate described in the inventory, consisting of a parcel of land and the machinery and
building thereon. They also stated that Genara Pineda offered P20,000 of said property and
that they considered said offer as most advantegeous and beneficial to their interest. Said
written conformity was assign by Alejandro Calma in his own behalf and as guardian of the
minors Guillermo and Simeona Calma, and by Celedonia Baun, with the consent of her husband
Lorenzo Mallari.

On June 15, 1928, the court appointed Jose Fausto, an attorney at law, as guardian ad litem of
the minors Guillermo and Simeona Calma, heirs of Jacinto Baun, with special reference to the
proposed sale of the real property of the estate.

Some time thereafter said guardian ad litem filed his report, recommending favorably the
proposed sale of the land and the machinery and building thereon to Genara Pineda at the
price offered by her.

On June 29, 1928, the court authorized the administrator of the estate to sell the property of
the deceased in the form and manner most advantageous to the estate. The pertinent part of
the order of the court said:" Por la presente queda autorizado el referido administrador para
vender los vienes del aludido finado en la forma que crea procedente y ventajosa para los fines
arriba indicados."

On July 6, 1928, Simplicio Baun, the administrator of the estate, filed a petition requesting
approval by the court of the sale of said real property to Pedro Santos for the sum of P22,000.
The administrator sold the property to said vendee, who gave a better price than that offered
by Genara Pineda, which was for P20,000 only, as above stated.

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[13]

On July 7, 1928, the court approved said sale, and on July 10, 1928, ordered the vendee Pedro
Santos to immediately deliver to the administrator of the estate the price of the property
amounting to P22,000.
ISSUE:

WON That the administrator sold the real property of the estate without having first sold the
personal property;

WON that Damiana Manankil, the widow of the deceased, who was also an heir of the estate,
did not give her conformity or consent to said sale;

WON that no notice of the hearing of the application for authority to sell the property of the
estate was served upon the heirs, either personal or by publication, as required by section 722,
paragraph 3, of the Code of Civil Procedure; and (d) that no hearing was held on said
application of the administrator.

HELD:

(1) that said real property was sold because the personal property of the deceased was
insufficient to meet the obligation of the estate; (2) that the real property of the estate was
sold upon the initiative and with the written consent of the heirs and consequently they are
now estopped from attacking the validity of said sale; (3) that notice of the hearing of the
application for authority to sell the property of the estate was not necessary inasmuch as the
requirements of the law had been virtually satisfied by the written consent of the heirs to the
sale; and (4) that the written consent of all of the heirs was not necessary because the law does
not specifically require the consent in writing all of the heirs.

That the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, regulating the sale of the estate of the
deceased and prescribing certain formalities, were not complied with in the sale of the real
property in question, and consequently the sale is null and void.

In this jurisdiction, by virtue of the provisions of articles 657 and 661 of the Civil Code, the heirs
succeeded to all the rights and obligations of the decedent "by the mere fact of his death." The
rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death." In
other words, the heirs succeed immediately to all the rights and obligations of the ancestor by
the merefact of the death of the ancestor. From the death of the ancestor the heirs are the
absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the ancestor, and they
cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by the law.

The only law providing for the sale of the property which formerly belonged to the deceased
and prescribing the formalities antecedent to said sale, is found in sections 714 and 722 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.

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[14]

in view of what precedes, the order appealed from is hereby reversed, the sale is hereby
declared null and void; and the record is hereby remanded to the lower court with the direction
that, after the citations of all the heirs including Catalina Tejeiro and all of the other creditors
and Pedro Santos, and after giving them an opportunity to be heard, it issue such orders in
harmony with this decision as will, in equity and justice, protect the interest of all parties
concerned, to the end that the estate of Jacinto Baun may be finally settled and terminated.
The appellants are also hereby ordered to deposit with the lower court such additional amount
as may be found necessary to pay in full all the indebtedness and obligations of the estate,
including the interest thereof; or, otherwise, the court shall proceed to sell the property of the
estate for the purpose of paying said indebtedness. And without any finding as to costs, it is so
ordered.

AMIILBAHAR, NURULAIN K.
LLB III-B






























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[15]


Cuison vs. Villanueva
90 Phil. 850;



FACTS:On February 14, 1939, Manuel Cuison filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental a petition for the probate of a document marked exhibit "A", said to be the last will
and testament of Leodegaria Villanueva who died on December 14, 1938. The heirs instituted in
said will were Reynaldo Cuison, a nephew of the testatrix and six minor children Maria
Dolores, Hernando, Leonardo, Angel, Maria Jimena and Telma, all surnamed Macasa, said to be
grandnephews and nieces. Petitioner Manuel Cuison was appointed administrator and he
qualified as such.

On January 29, 1941, the lower court, presided over by Judge Sotero Rodas, dismissed the
petition "por falta de gestion de solicitante." Upon motion of the petitioner the order of
dismissal was reconsidered, the case reinstated and later, by order of November 28, 1941, the
lower court denied the probate of the will and declared that the deceased Leodegaria
Villanueva died intestate. Upon another motion for reconsideration filed by Manuel Cuison the
order of denial of probate was reconsidered and Manuel Cuison was ordered to secure a
transcript of the stenographic notes taken during the hearing of probate held on March 15,
1941. This order of reconsideration was dated December 6, 1941. One or two days later the
Pacific war broke out.

On December 16, 1948, the oppositor Nicolas Villanueva, et al., move for the definite dismissal
of the petition for probate. By order of January 10, 1949, Judge Jose Teodoro, then presiding
over the trial court, definitely denied the petition for probate. On January 22, 1949, petitioner
Manuel Cuison moved for the reconsideration of the order of denial of the petition for probate.

On August 16, 1949, Elisa, Ricardo, Josefina, Luis, Hermenigilda, all surnamed Cuison, for the
first time, entered this case, claiming to be legitimate brothers and sisters of Reynaldo Cuison
the nephew of the testatrix Leodegaria Villanueva instituted as one of the heirs in the will,
exhibit "A". Further claiming that said Reynaldo Cuison died intestate on February 12, 1939,
about two months after the death of the testatrix, they filed a petition for relief under Sections
2 and 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, from the order January 10, 1949 definitely denying
probate of the will. The petitioners Elisa Cuison, et al., further claimed that Reynaldo Cuison,
their brother, upon his death, left neither legitimate nor natural acknowledged children,
consequently, his only heirs are the said petitioners and their brother Manuel Cuison. The
petition for relief was based on the allegation that they had no actual knowledge of the order
of January 10, 1949, denying the probate of the will, until the month of July, 1949; that up to
the filing of the petition for relief, petitioners had never been direct or actual parties to the
probate proceedings but they were constructive parties, since the proceedings were in rem and
the order of the denial of probate would affect them as heirs of the legatee Reynaldo Cuison;
that there non-appearance or participation in the probate proceedings may be regarded as
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[16]

excusable negligence; and that if they were given a chance, they would prove the validity and
the due execution of the will in question and would present the instrumental witnesses. The
trial court presided over by Judge Eduardo D. Enriquez, acting upon the petition, denied the
same by order of February 18, 1950. However, instead of considering the merits of the petition
for relief, Judge Enriquez based his order of denial on the ground that, pursuant to the
provisions of Article 925 of the Civil Code, present petitioner have no right to represent their
deceased brother, Reynaldo Cuison, in the inheritance of the testatrix Leodegaria Villanueva,
consequently they have no interest in the will or the property involved and so have no
personality to intervene in these proceedings by filing the petition for relief.

ISSUE:

The petition for probate was opposed by Nicolas Villanueva and others who claim to be
relatives of the testatrix.

HELD:

The proceedings for the probate of a will, he should show an interest in said will or the property
affected thereby (Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil, 244). The lower court was equally right in holding
that under Art. 925, paragraph 2, of the old Civil Code, the right of representation shall take
place only infavor of children of brothers and sisters, which petitioners Elisa Cuison et al., are
not. But said trial court erred in holding and assuming that petitioners Elisa Cuison et al., were
invoking the right to represent their brother Reynaldo Cuison, for they were not. They seek to
inherit the legacy of their brother provided for in the will for their own right and not in
representation of their deceased brother. The law is clear that there is representation only
when relatives of a deceased person try to succeed him in his rights which he would have had
still living. In the present case, however, said deceased had already succeeded his aunt, the
testatrix herein, and had acquired the right to the legacy given by her to him, upon for death,
for the reason that under Arts. 657 and 65l of the Civil Code the rights to the succession of a
person transmitted from the moment of his death and an heir succeeds to all rights and
obligations of the decedent by the mere fact of the latter's death. It is a fact that the time of the
death of the testatrix, Reynaldo Cuison was still alive. He died two months after her (testatrix's)
death. And upon his death, he transmitted to his heirs, the petitioners herein Elisa Cuison et al.,
the legacy or the right to succeed to the legacy, which he received by virtue of the will. In other
words, the herein petitioners-appellants are not trying to succeed to the right to the property
of the testatrix, but rather to the right of the legatee Reynaldo Cuison in said property.

AMIILBAHAR, NURULAIN K.
LLB III-B





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[17]

Enriquez vs. Abadia
G.R. No. L-7188
August 9, 1954

Topic/Doctrine: Will and Testament

FACTS:

In September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed document purporting to
be his Last Will and Testament. Resident of the City of Cebu, he died onJanuary 14, 1943, in the municipality
of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October
2, 1946, Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees filed a petition for the probate of the will in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will,
filedopposition.

During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without contradiction
that in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wroteout in longhand the will
in Spanish which the testator spoke and understood; that he signed on The left hand margin of the front page
of each of the three folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and numbered the same with
Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his writing at the last page, all this, in the presence
of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his last will and that the said three witnesses signed
their names on the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each other.
The oppositors did not submit any evidence.
The trial court found and declared the will to be a holographic will; that it was in the hand writing of the
testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic
wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided
the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under
a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to the trial court is
the controlling factor and may override any defect in form,said trial court admitted to probate the Last Will
and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors appealed from that decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the holographic will should be allowed despite the fact that when it was executed the civil
code proscribes the execution of such wills.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that despite the effectivity of the new Civil Code allowing the executionof
holographic wills, the contested holographic will still cannot be allowed and admitted to probate. This is
because under Art. 795 of the Civil Code, the extrinsic validity of a will should be judged not by the law
existing at the time of the testators death nor the law at the time of its probate, but by the law existing
at the time of the execution of the instrument. For the verysimple reason that although the will becomes
operative only after the testators death, still hiswishes are given expression at the time of execution.

AMIILBAHAR, NURULAIN K.
LLB III-B


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[18]

IBARLE v. PO
GR No.L-5064
February 27, 1953


Topics/Doctrine: The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment
of his death.

FACTS:

Leonardo Winstanley died leaving a parcel of land to his surviving spouse Catalina Navarro and
some minor children. Catalina sold the entire parcel of land to Maria Canoy who later sold the
same land to the plaintiff Bienvenido Ibarle. After some time, after her appointment as guardian
of her minor children, Catalina again sold 1/2 of the land in question, which portion now
belonged to the children as heirs, to herein defendant Esperanza Po.

ISSUE:

Which sale was valid, and who has the rightful claim to the property?

HELD:

The sale to defendant is valid. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides: "The rights to the
succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death."
The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda. de
Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the
seller's children. No formal or judicial declaration being needed to confirm the children's title, it
follows that the first sale was null and void in so far as it included the children's share.

On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of the competent
court was undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of no
consequence. If registration were necessary, still the non-registration would not avail the
plaintiff because it was due to no other cause than his own opposition.


AMING, RHASDY P.
LLB-III B







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[19]

JAKOSALEM VS RAFOLS
G.R. No. L-48372
July 24, 1924

Topic/Doctrine: The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of
his death." The estate of the decedent would then be held in co-ownership by the heir/s.

FACTS:

The land in question described in the appealed in the decision originally belonged to Juan Melgar. When
he died judicial administration of his estate was commenced. During the pendency of the said
administration, that is, on July 5, 1917, Susana Melgar, daughter of the deceased Juan Melgar, sold the
land with the right of repurchase to Pedro Cui, subject to the stipulation that during the period for the
repurchase she would continue in possession of the land as lessee of the purchaser. On December 12,
1920, the partition of the estate left by the deceased Juan Melgar was made, and the land in question
was adjudicated to Susana Melgar. In 1921, she conveyed, in payment of professional fees, one-half of
the land in favor of the defendant-appellee Nicolasa Rafols, who, entered upon the portion thus
conveyed and has been in possession thereof up to the present. On July 23, 1921, Pedro Cui brought an
action to recover said half of the land from Nicolas Rafols and the other half from the other defendants,
and while that case was pending, or about August 4, 1925, Pedro Cui donated the whole land in
question to Generosa Teves, the herein plaintiff-appellant.

HELD:

Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides: "The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted
from the moment of his death." The estate of the decedent would then be held in co-ownership by the
heir/s. The co-heir or co-owner may validly dispose of his share or interest in the property subject to the
condition that the portion disposed of is eventually allotted to him in the division upon termination of
the co-owership.
It results therefore that the sale made by Susana Melgar in favor of Pedro Cui was valid, but it would be
effective only as to the portion to be adjudicated to the vendor upon the partition of the property left by
her deceased father Juan Melgar. And as on December 12, 1920, upon the partition of said property, the
land in question was adjudicated to Susana Melgar, the sale of the whole land which the latter made in
favor of Pedro Cui was entirely confirmed.

Upon the confirmation of the sale of December 12, 1920 in favor of Pedro Cui, the conveyance by
Susana Melgar in favor of Nicolasa Rafols in 1921 could no longer be done. And even in the case of a
double sale, where neither of the purchasers has registered the sale, the first in possession namely,
Pedro Cui, should be referred. When the sale made in the latter's favor was confirmed on December 12,
1920, Susana Melgar was in possession of the land as lessee, and this possession should be considered
as that of Pedro Cui. The possession of Nicolas Rafols commenced in 1921 only, wherefore, it is
subsequent to that of Pedro Cui.

AMING, RHASDY P.
LLB-III B
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[20]

LORENZO VS POSADAS
G.R. No. L-43082
June 18, 1937

Topic/Doctrine: The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of
his death.

FACTS:
Thomas Hanley died on May 27, 1922, leaving a will and considerable amount of real and personal
properties. The will which was duly admitted to probate, provides among other things, that all
properties of the testator shall pass to his nephew, Matthew Hanley. However, it also provides that all
real estate shall be placed un-der the management of the executors for a period of ten years,after the
expiration of which the properties shall be given to the said Matthew Hanley. Plaintiff Lorenzo was
appointed as trustee. During plaintiffs incumbency astrustee, the defendant Collector of Internal
Revenue, alleging that the estate left by the deceased at the time of his death consisted of realty and
personalty, assessed against the estate an inheritance tax. The defendant prayed that the trustee be
ordered to pay the Government the inheritance tax together with the penalties for delinquency in
paying such tax. The trustee paid under protest and however, he demanded that he be refunded for the
amount paid. The plaintiff contends that the inheritance tax should be based upon the value of the
estate at the expiration of the period of ten years after which according to thetestators will, the
property could be and was to be delivered tothe instituted heir, and not upon the value thereof at the
timeof the death of the testator. The defendant overruled plaintiffs protest and refused to refund the
amount.

ISSUES:
1. When does the inheritance accrue?
2. Should the inheritance be computed on the basis of the value of the estate at the time of
thetestators death or on its value 10 years later?

HELD:
1. Invoking the provision of Art. 657 (now Art. 777) of the Civil Code, the Supreme Court, speaking
through Justice Laurel, held: Whatever may be the time when actual transmission of the inheritance
takes place, succession takes place in any event at the moment of the decedents death. Thomas Hanley
having died on May 27, 1922, the inheritance tax accrued as of that date. The tax is upon transmission
or the transfer or devolution of property of a decedent, made effective by his death. It is in reality an
excise or privilege tax imposed on the right to succeed ,to receive, or take property by or under a will or
the intestacy law, or deed, grant, or gift to become operative at or after death. Thomas Hanley having
died on May 27, 1922, the inheritance tax accrued as of the date.
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[21]

2. Based of the value of the estate at the time of the testators death - If death is the generatingsource
from which the power of the estate to impose inheritance taxes takes its being and if,upon the death of
the decedent, succession takes place and the right of the estate to tax vests instantly, the tax should be
measured by the value of the estate as it stood at the time of thedecedent's death, regardless of any
subsequent contingency value of any subsequent increaseor decrease in value.A transmission by
inheritance is taxable at the time of the predecessor's death, notwithstandingthe postponement of the
actual possession or enjoyment of the estate by the beneficiary, andthe tax measured by the value of
the property transmitted at that time regardless of itsappreciation or depreciation.

AMING, RHASDY P.
LLB-III B


















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[22]

Osorio vs. Osorio
GR No.L- 16544
March 30, 1921

Topic/Doctrine: THE DONATION CANNOT INCLUDE FUTURE PROPERTY


FACTS:

The plaintiff seeks to recover 610 shares of stock of "Ynchausti Steamship Co." and the
dividends corresponding to them, which were included in the inventory of the properties of the
deceased Da. Maria Petrona Reyes, whose estate is administered by the defendant. The facts
was D. Antonio Osorio had formed with Ynchausti & Co., a joint account association for the
exploitation of the shipping business, he being the owner of one-third of the company's capital.
This capital amounted to P500,000, of which P166,666.66, that is, one-third belonged to D.
Antonio Osorio. Upon his death, his heirs agreed to authorize the defendant Da. Tomasa
Osorio, then administratrix of the estate of the deceased, to present a project of partition, and
said administratrix inserted in the project with the consent of all the heirs, among the
properties which belonged to the widow Da. Petrona Reyes, the sum of P94,000 as her part in
the "share of the estate in the shipping business of Ynchausti & Co.," that is, a little over
P166,666.66, which was the share in said business of the deceased Osorio during his lifetime.
The project of partition was approved on May 10, 1915, with the consent of the heirs, by the
Court of First Instance of Cavite, which had cognizance of the testamentary and administration
proceedings of the estate of the deceased Osorio.

On February 28, 1914, the widow of D. Antonio Osorio, Da. Petrona Reyes, now also deceased,
executed before the notary D. Florencio Gonzales Diez a document of gift in favor of her son D.
Leonardo Osorio, the plaintiff, giving to him one-half of her share in the one-third part which
belonged to her husband in the shipping business of Ynchausti & Co., a donation which was
duly accepted by the donee D. Leonardo Osorio, who signed said document with the plaintiff.
On that date, February 28, 1914, the estate of D. Antonio Osorio was not yet distributed among
his heirs, and the donor Da. Petrona Reyes in order to correct the error in said document,
wherein it was stated that said half was adjudicated to her as part of her conjugal property,
when the partition was yet being effected, executed another document dated July 3, 1915,
maintaining said donation in effect in the sense that she ceded and donated to her son D.
Leonardo Osorio, for the same reasons stated in the document of February 28, 1914, all interest
or participation in said shipping business of Ynchausti & Co., which was adjudicated to her in
the division of the estate of D. Antonio Osorio, which division was approved by the Court of
First Instance of Cavite on May 10, 1915.

After the death of D. Antonio Osorio and before the distribution of the estate, Ynchausti & Co.
purchased the steamer Governor Forbes and recognized the heirs of D. Antonio Osorio as
having an interest to the extent of one-third in the ownership and business of said steamer. It
was agreed upon by all the interested parties that the share of Da. Petrona Reyes, widow of
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[23]

Osorio, in the vessel Governor Forbes, at the time of the incorporation of "The Ynchausti
Steamship Co." was P61,000, equivalent to 610 shares of stock of said corporation. Said sum
was deposited with the Steamship Co. until the final settlement of the question that had arisen
between the heirs of Da. Petrona Reyes as to the ownership thereof for, while the plaintiff
alleges that, by virtue of the donation made in his favor by Da. Petrona Reyes, he is the owner
of said shares and of their value which is P61,000; the defendant on the other hand contends
that said shares are not included in the donation in question and belong to the heirs of Da.
Petrona Reyes.

ISSUE:

Whether the donation made by Da. Petrona Reyes in favor of the plaintiff was valid under the
law on succession particularly the future inheritance/property.

HELD:

It is alleged that the donation made by Da. Petrona Reyes is void because she donated on
February 28, 1914, a future property, such as the share in the business of the deceased Osorio,
which was adjudicated to her on May 10, 1915, and because in 1914 she did not have the right
to all or part of the share which her deceased husband had in the shipping business of
Ynchausti & Co.

According to article 635 of the Civil Code, the donation cannot include future property. By
future property is meant that of which the donor cannot dispose at the time of the donation.
This court believe the concurring opinion of Manresa that the future properties, the donation of
which is prohibited by said article, are those belonging to others, which, as such, cannot be the
object of disposal by the donor; but the properties of an existing inheritance, as those of the
case at bar, cannot be considered as another's property with relation to the heirs who through
a fiction of law continue the personality of the owner.


AROLA, ALNASHRIP AKMADUL
LLB III-B











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[24]

Tinsay vs. Yusay
GR No.L- 23126
March 17, 1925

Topic/Doctrine: PARTITION OF FUTURE INHERITANCE; ESTOPPEL


FACTS:

Juan Yusay died leaving a widow, Juana Servando. After his death his descendants made a
partition by a private instrument of certain lands, community property of his marriage to Juana
Servando. Though she took no part in the partition her interest in the land was nevertheless
distributed among the descendants. On the strength of the partition the descendants, among
them the appellants, went into possession of the respective portions allotted to them in said
partition. Some years later the portions of the appellants were registered in their names in a
cadastral proceeding. Upon the subsequent death of the widow, the appellants as heirs of the
widow claimed a share of her interest in the land. Held: (a) That, B not being a party to the
partition agreement, the agreement standing alone was ineffective as to her interest in the
property partitioned; (b) that the partition of her interest among her heirs before her death
constituted a partition of a future inheritance and was therefore invalid under the second
paragraph of article 1271 of the Civil Code; (c) that, nevertheless, if the appellants have
accepted the benefit of the partition agreement to the prejudice of the other heirs and refuse
to make restitution of the property received by them by virtue of said agreement, they are
estopped from repudiating the agreement and from claiming an interest in the property
allotted to the other heirs.

HELD:

Held: (a) That, Juana Servando not being a party to the partition agreement, the agreement
standing alone was ineffective as to her interest in the property partitioned; (b) that the
partition of her interest among her heirs before her death constituted a partition of a future
inheritance and was therefore invalid under the second paragraph of article 1271 of the Civil
Code; (c) that, nevertheless, if the appellants have accepted the benefit of the partition
agreement to the prejudice of the other heirs and refuse to make restitution of the property
received by them by virtue of said agreement, they are estopped from repudiating the
agreement and from claiming an interest in the property allotted to the other heirs.


AROLA, ALNASHRIP AKMADUL
LLB III-B




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[25]

Arroyo vs. Gerona
GR No.L- 36059
Date: March 31, 1933

Topic/Doctrine: EXPECTANT HEIRS AND PERSONS IN CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONS; FRAUDULENT
CONCEALMENT

FACTS:

The appellant, a paternal uncle of a demented girl, qualified as her guardian and, being at the
same time executor of the will of his own deceased mother (grandmother of the demented
girl), submitted an inventory in the testacy of his mother, including therein as property of the
latter the real estate which his ward had inherited from her own parents. The result of this trick
of passing his ward's property through the estate of her grandmother was to make it appear
that the greater part of such property had passed to the 'appellant under the will of the
grandmother.

HELD:

That this device, coupled with the failure of the appellant to reveal to the other heirs of his
ward the true state and value of the property pertaining to the latter, was a fraudulent
contrivance sufficient to relieve such heirs from an agreement made by them with the
appellant, subsequent to the death of the ward, with respect to the disposition of the property
pertaining to her.


AROLA, ALNASHRIP AKMADUL
LLB III-B
















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[26]

Tordilla vs. Tordilla
G.R No. 39547
May 3, 1934

Topic/Doctrine: A certain value is stated in a deed of donation, that the value is different than
its actual value at the time of donation.

FACTS:

Francisco Tordilla died intestate, leaving his wife, a legitimate son and Moises Tordilla a natural
child and an appellant in the case at bar. One of the contentions of the appellant that where a
certain value is in a deed of donation. The value cannot be questioned when properties are
brought into collation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contention of the appellant is correct?

HELD:

This is incorrect, as Article 1045 of the Civil Code provides for the assessment of the property at
its actual valuation at the time of donation. The recital in the deed cannot therefore be
controlling.

BADEO, MICHAEL J.
LLB III-B


















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[27]

Allison Gibbs vs. Government of the Philippines
and Register of Deeds of Manila
G. R. No. L-35694
December 23, 1933

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Principle of Lexreisitae

FACTS:

Allison Gibbs is a citizen of California and domiciled therein, that he and Eva Gibbs where
married at Ohio, USA. She acquired 3 parcels of land in the city of Manila, she died survived by
her husband Allison leaving him the properties in Manila. Allison contend that the law of
California should determine then extent of the title, if any. While the oppositor and respondent
relies on Article XI Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which imposes tax inheritance.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the national law of California shall apply to Allison?

HELD:

In accordance with the rule that real property is subject to Lexreisitae, the respective rights of
husband and wife in such property, in the absence of ante nuptial contract, are determined by
the law of the place where the property is situated, irrespective of the domicile of the parties or
to the place where the marriage was celebrated. Under this broad principle, the nature and
extent of the title which vested Mrs. Gibbs at the time of the acquisition of the community
lands herein questioned must be determined in accordance with Lexreisitae.


BADEO, MICHAEL J.
LLB III-B













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[28]

Bacayo vs. Borromeo
G.R. No. L- 19382
August 31, 1965

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Laws of Succession, a decedents uncle and aunts may not succeed
abintastado so long as the nephews and nieces of the decedent survived, willing and qualified
to succeed.

FACTS:

Melodia Ferraris died without a surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse but survived
by her aunt Filomena, nephews and nieces who were children of Melodias only brother who
predeceased the decedent. These two classes of heirs sought to participate in the estate of
Melodia. The trial court ruled that the nephews and nieces shall succeed by right of
representation and excluded Filomena.

ISSUE:

Who should inherit the estate of the decedent?

HELD:

Our laws of succession, a decedents uncles and aunts may not succeed abintastado so long as
the nephews and nieces are willing and qualified to succeed.


BADEO, MICHAEL J.
LLB III-B
















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[29]

Michael C. Guy vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 163707
September 15, 2006

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Parents or Guardian may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only
by judicial authorization.

FACTS:

Sima Wei died intestate and left 10 million pesos consists of real and personal properties. He
was survived by his wife Shirley and five children. They prayed before the court to appoint the
petitioner a special administrator of the estate. Michael contend that respondents had been
paid, waived, abandoned or extinguished by reason that when Remedios, the mother of the
natural child of Sima Wei, received a financial support for education as a condition the natural
children shall repudiate their rights to the estate of Sima Wei. As a result, the estate of Sima
Wei is free from any liabilities.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the parents or guardian of a minor can repudiate the inheritance of their ward?

HELD:

Under Article 1044 of the Civil Code second paragraph provides that parents or guardian s may
repudiate the inheritance of their ward only by judicial authorization. In the case at bar, such
requisite is absent therefore, there was no repudiation transpired and the natural children are
entitled to their legitime.

BADEO, MICHAEL J.
LLB III-B














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[30]

Quison vs. Salud
12 Phil. 109
November 21, 1908

Topic/Doctrine: General Provisions

FACTS:

Upon the merits of this case the only question is one of fact, namely, is the boundary line
between the land formerly owned by Fidel Salud, the father of the defendant, and land owned
by Claro Quison, father and uncle of the plaintiffs, the estero or River Nagsaulay, or is it, as
found by the court below, a straight line of mango and bamboo trees to the south of the above-
mentioned estero? The land in controversy is situated between this line of trees and the estero.
That Claro Quison owned land to the north of the estero, is undisputed, but the
defendant claims that he [Quison] never owned any land south of the estero. A large amount of
evidence, principally parol, was introduced upon this question, and after an examination
thereof, we are satisfied that it clearly preponderates in favor of the decision of the court
below, and that it was proven at the trial that the land in question belongs to the heirs of
Quison. Claro Quison died in 1902.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the rights of succession were transmitted to the heirs after the decedents
death, according to Article 777 of the Civil Code

HELD:

Yes. It was proven at the trial that the present plaintiffs are the next of kin and heirs, but it is
said by the appellant that they are not entitled to maintain this action because there is no
evidence that any proceedings have been taken in court for the settlement of the estate of
Claro Quison, and that, without such settlement, the heirs cannot maintain this action. There is
nothing in this point. As well by the Civil Code as by the Code of Procedure, the title to property
owned by a person who dies intestate passes at once to his heirs. Such transmission is, under
the present law, subject to the claims of the administration and the property may be taken
from the claims of the purpose of paying debts and expenses, but this does not prevent the
immediate passage of the title, upon the death of the intestate, from himself to his heirs.
Without some showing that a judicial administrator had been appointed in proceedings to
settle the estate of Claro Quison, the right of the plaintiffs to maintain this action is established.



BUNDA, JILL CARMEN D.
LLB-III B

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[31]

ILUSTRE vs. FRONDOSA
G.R. No. L-6077
November 16, 1910

Topic/Doctrine: General Provisions

FACTS:

Francisco Calzado died on the 9th or 10th of December, 1903 and appears from the record that
at the time of his death he was the owner of certain property. The plaintiff alleges, and the fact
is not denied, that he was appointed as administrator of the estate of the said Francisco
Calzado. The record fails to show when he was appointed.

On the 31st of July, 1909, nearly six years after the death of the said Calzado, the plaintiff, as
administrator, commenced the present action to recover the property and alleged that: that at
the time of the death of Francisco Calzado he was the owner of the property described in the
complaint; that at the time of the death of Francisco Calzado he had no relatives, descendants
or ascendants, but nephews, who being of lawful age divided among themselves the property
in question and sold to the defendant the said property; that at the time of the division of the
estate among the heirs of the deceased and at the time the lands were sold, there were no
debts against the estate of the said Francisco Calzado; that the plaintiff is not a creditor of the
estate of the said deceased.

During the trial of the cause the defendant showed by oral and documentary proof that he was
in possession of the land in question; that he had purchased the same from some of the
nephews and heirs of the deceased Francisco Calzado; that he had purchased the interest of all
the heirs except perhaps three. There was no proof adduced during the trial of the cause to
show that any of the heirs of the deceased were minors or that there were any debts existing
against the said estate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs succeed immediately to all the property of the deceased

HELD:

Yes. Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657 to 661), the rights to the succession of a
person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs succeeded
immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs
at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and
delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing against
the estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property immediately. If
they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among
themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege.
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The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for
partition in case they cannot mutually agree in the division. When there are no debts existing
against the estate, there is certainly no occasion for the intervention of an administrator in the
settlement and partition of the estate among the heirs. When the heirs are all of lawful age and
there are no debts, there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the costs and
expenses of an administrator. The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of
existing debts against the estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in any way
whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs. They are co-owners of an undivided
estate and the law offers them a remedy for the division of the same among themselves. There
is nothing in the present case to show that the heirs requested the appointment of the
administrator, or that they intervened in any way whatever in the present action. If there are
any heirs of the estate who have not received their participation, they have their remedy by
petition for partition of the said estate.


BUNDA, JILL CARMEN D.
LLB-III B
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[33]

BAUTISTA vs. Justices of the Special First Division of the Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 79958
October 28, 1988

Topic/Doctrine: General Provisions

FACTS:

The parties submitted an Agreed Stipulation of Facts dated December 15, 1975: that both
parties admit that the land in question was registered in the name of petitioner Manuel
Bautista, and the latter inherited this land from his father, Mariano Bautista; both petitioners
and private respondents admit that on Dec. 22, 1966, a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition was
executed-- private respondents were signatories to the deed, and the signature of petitioner
Manuel Bautista was supposed to appear in that document, although petitioner Manuel
Bautista denied having signed that Extrajudicial Partition; that the parties admit that the private
respondents, with the exception of Manolito Bautista, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of Manolito Bautista of that property and upon registration, certificates were issued to his
name thereof; that Manolito Bautista executed a Deed of Sale in favor of the other private
respondents and upon registration of said Deed of Sale, certificates were issued to private
respondents; that the parties admit that Manuel Bautista and his second wife, Emiliana
Tamayo, had only a child, Evangeline Bautista; that the property in question was the subject
matter of extrajudicial partition of property among the heirs of the late Juliana Nojadera, the
first wife of Manuel Bautista; that all the parties agreed to submit to the NBI the questioned
signature of Manuel Bautista; and that the NBI concluded that the questioned document was
authentic.

The findings of facts of both the trial court and the respondent Appellate Court that the
signature of Manuel Bautista in the questioned Deed of Extrajudicial Partition is authentic, as
examined by the NBI, can no longer be questioned in this proceeding. Nevertheless, even
granting that the signature of Manuel Bautista in the questioned Extrajudicial Deed of Partition
is genuine, an examination of the document based on admitted and proven facts renders the
document fatally defective. The extrajudicial partition was supposed to be a partition without
court intervention of the estate of the late Juliana Nojadera, first wife of Manuel Bautista,
constituting the subject property. In the same document Manuel Bautista appears to have
waived his right or share in the property in favor of private respondents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property of the surviving husband can be the subject of an extrajudicial
partition of the estate of the deceased wife; whether or not there was preterition




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HELD:

Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court an extrajudicial settlement of the Estate applies
only to the estate left by the decedent who died without a will, and with no creditors, and the
heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives. If the
property does not belong to the estate of the decedent certainly it cannot be the subject
matter of an extrajudicial partition.

As the subject property does not belong to the estate of Juliana Nojadera, the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition, is void ab initio being contrary to law. To include in an extrajudicial
partition property which does not pertain to the estate of the deceased would be to deprive
the lawful owner thereof of his property without due process of law. Only property of the
estate of the decedent which is transmitted by succession can be the lawful subject matter of
an extrajudicial partition. In this case, the said partition obviously prejudices the right of
Manuel Bautista as exclusive owner of the property.

The said partition also effectively resulted in the preterition of the right of Evangeline Bautista
as a compulsory heir of Manuel Bautista, daughter of the latter by his second marriage. It is
difficult to believe that Manuel Bautista would wittingly overlook and ignore the right of her
daughter Evangeline to share in the said property. It is not surprising that he denied signing the
said document. Moreover, private respondents knew Evangeline Bautista who is their half-
sister to be a compulsory heir. The court finds that her preterition was attended with bad faith
hence the said partition must be rescinded.


BUNDA, JILL CARMEN D.
LLB-III B

















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MALAHACAN vs. IGNACIO
G.R. No. L-6207
August 4, 1911

DOCTRINE: The fact that the hereditary estate is placed under administration will not affect the
application of the rule stated in Art. 777 to the effect that the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.
FACTS:
The action is brought by Simon Malahacan as administrator of the goods, chattels, and credits
of Guillerma Martinez, deceased, against the defendants, the only heirs at law of the said
deceased, to recover possession of the real estate of which the said Guillerma Martinez died
seized, which said real estate the defendants had been occupying for some years before the
commencement of this action. Under the provisions of the Civil Code the ownership of real
estate passes to the heirs of the owner instantly in his death. Guillerma Martinez, having died
seized of the lands involved in this suit, leaving the defendants as her only heirs at law, it
follows that said heirs instantly became the owners and were entitled to the immediate
possession thereof. It is not alleged in the complaint nor does it appear from the record or the
evidence in this case that there were debts outstanding against Guillerma Martinez at the time
of her death. The only ground upon which an administrator can demand of the heirs at law
possession of the real estate of which his intestate died seized is that such land will be required
to be sold to pay the debts of the deceased.
ISSUE:

Whether or not that the said heirs instantly became the owners and were entitled to the
immediate possession thereof.

HELD:

YES. Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657-661), the rights to the succession of a
person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs succeed
immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs
at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and
delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing against
the estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property immediately. If
they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among
themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege. The Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for partition in
case they can not mutually agree in the division. When there are no debts existing against the
estate, there is certainly no occasion for the intervention of an administrator in the settlement
and partition of the estate among the heirs. When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are
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no debts, there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the costs and expenses of
an administrator. The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing
debts against the estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in any way whatever in the
division of the estate among the heirs. They are coowners of an undivided estate and the law
offers them a remedy for the division of the same among themselves. There is nothing in the
present case to show that the heirs requested the appointment of the administrator, or that
they intervened in any way whatever in the present action. If there are any heirs of the estate
who have not received their participation, they have their remedy by petition for partition of
the said estate.


DE LA CRUZ, FATIMA NICA Q.
LLB-III B































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[37]

BELTRAN vs.DORIANO
G.R. No. L-9969
October 26, 1915

DOCTRINE: By the mere fact of the death of the husband, his children and heirs, together with
their mother, by operation, of law succeeded him in the dominion, property and possession of
the land and its improvements, for, from the moment Doroteo Guintu died, though survived by
his widow, the rights to the succession of their deceased father were thereby transmitted to his
children, since the latter, as his forced heirs, succeeded him in all his rights and obligations.

FACTS:

Modesta Beltran filed a complaint in which they allege that they were the owners in fee simple
of a parcel of mangrove swamp land; that the defendants unlawfully took possession of and
continue to occupy the said land of the plaintiff. It appears Feliciana Doriano, the widow of the
late Francisco de la Rosa have declared that the said deceased, Francisco de la Rosa, husband
and father of the deponents, left at his death property consisting mostly of mangrove swamp
land which has not yet been judicially petitioned; but in the proceedings for the settlement of
his estate, there was presented a proposed partition which had not yet been approved, and
which set forth that there had been awarded to Maria de la Rosa, as her share of the estate, the
mangrove swamp land situated, as specifically described in the deed of sale executed by her on
the same date in behalf of Modesta Beltran and ratified before the notary Esteban Victorio. In
the same proposed partition there was adjudicated to Feliciano de la Rosa, likewise as a part of
his share in the estate, another parcel of mangrove swamp land, the description of which is
given in the deed of sale executed in turn by him in behalf of the spouses Doroteo Guintu and
Modesta Beltran. The heirs of the deceased De la Rosa agreed to recognize these sales as valid
and effective as though the hereditary property had been judicially partitioned and the said
lands legally adjudicated to the vendors who alienated them and they furthermore waived all
the rights they might have therein. By virtue of the acquisition by the spouses Guintu and
Beltran of the land, they entered into the possession of the property and took steps to improve
it and increase the number of plants in order to secure the greatest benefit therefrom.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a co-heir is prohibited from selling his share.

HELD:

NO. There is no provisions of law whatever which prohibits a co-heir from selling his share of
the estate, or legal portion, to a stranger, before the partition of the hereditary property is
approved by the court, for article 1067 of the Civil Code prescribes: "If any of the heirs should
sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the division, all or any of the co-heirs may
subrogate themselves in the place of the purchaser, reimbursing him for the value of the
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[38]

purchase, provided they do so within the period of a month, to be counted from the time they
were informed thereof." .
Still more: section 762 of the Code of Civil Procedure contains among others the following
provisions: "Such partition may be made although some of the original heirs or devisees have
conveyed their shares to other persons; and such shares shall be set to the persons holding the
same as they would have been to the heirs or devisees."

In law, the rule governing property held by various co-owners in common is analogous to that
which obtains where the estate of a deceased person is held pro indiviso by several co-
participants, for, pursuant to article 450 of the Civil Code, "each one of the participants in a
thing possessed in common is considered as having exclusively possessed the part which may
be alloted to him on the distribution for the entire period during which there is no division." .

The provisions of this article appear to be confirmed by that contained in article 1068 of the
Civil Code. Feliciano de la Rosa could, therefore, lawfully sell the said land in question as a part
of his share of the estate, even before the approval of the proposed partition of the property,
which his father, Francisco de la Rosa, left at his death and besides, apart from this, the sale
made by him appears to have been expressly recognized by himself and his co-heirs as well as
by his mother, Feliciana Doriano, in Exhibit B.

As the defendants legally alienated the land by absolute sale to the plaintiffs and received the
price thereof, they can never justify the seizure, made with manifest bad faith, of the products
of the said land which no longer belongs to them.


DE LA CRUZ, FATIMA NICA Q.
LLB-III B

















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[39]

BONDAD vs. BONDAD
G.R. No. L-8092
March 14, 1916

DOCTRINE: The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely
as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the
absence of debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said
property immediately.

FACTS:

Rufina Bondad had two brothers and two sisters, respectively named Venancio, Placido, Maria, and
Paula. The last named died leaving four children: Eleno, Estanislao, Raymundo, and Pedro, all surnamed
Emlano. Rufina Bondad brought suit against her said brothers sisters, and nephews to secure the
partition of the property left to these defendants by their father or grandfather, respectively, Crisanto
Bondad upon his death. She designates the lands to be divided. Documentary and parol evidence was
introduced, and the Court of First Instance of Laguna decided the case by dismissing the complaint and
absolving defendants therefrom, with the costs against the plaintiff.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a need for the intervention of an administrator in the absence of any
outstanding debts.

HELD:

NO. It has been repeatedly shown in the record that there are no debts outstanding against either
succession, and the complaint itself so states. Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657 to 661),
the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words,
the heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. If they desire to
administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among themselves and can do this by
mutual agreement, they also have that privilege. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an
estate may be divided by a petition for partition in case they cannot mutually agree in the division.
Where there are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no occasion for the intervention
of an administrator. The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts
against the estate, the administrator has no right whatever to intervene in any way in the division of the
estate among the heirs.

If, at the present time or in the future, some creditor should come forward with a claim, or if debts of
either or both of the two intestate estates should appear, prescription after two years could not be set
up against such creditors or against such debts, because the date from which the beginning of the two
years should be counted, could not be determined. This is the risk that is incurred in a partition of these
intestate estates and hence the need of making the partition in writing, that is, so that it would not
prejudice any third person; but among themselves the heirs must abide by the terms upon which they
have agreed.

DE LA CRUZ, FATIMA NICA Q.
LLB-III B
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LEGASTO vs. VERZOSA
G.R. No. L-32344
March 31, 1930

DOCTRINE: No contracts may be entered into with respect to future inheritances except those
the object of which is to make a division inter vivos of the estate in accordance with article
1056.Considering that the language of article 1056 cannot be interpreted to mean that a person
may, by acts inter vivos, partition his property referred to in the section wherein said article is
found, without the authority of a testament containing an expression of his last will, or the
authority of law, for, otherwise, a partition thus made would be tantamount to making a will in
a manner not provided for, authorized, nor included in the chapter referring to testaments, and
especially, to the forms thereof, which is entirely different from the legal consequences of a
free disposition made by parents during their lifetime, whereby they give to their children the
whole or a part of their property.


FACTS:

Sabina Almadin executed a will devising certain parcels of land belonging to her, to her four
nieces and daughters of her sister Catalina Almadin, designating the parcels to be given to
each.Sabina Almadin partitioned her property among her aforesaid sister and nieces, executing
a deed to her niece, Maria Verzosa, assigning and making over to her three parcels of her land
therein described. On the same day, Sabina Almadin executed a deed in favor of her niece Oliva
Verzosa, assigning to her two parcels of land described in said instrument. Sabina Almadin
executed a deedin favor of her niece Toribia Verzosa, assigning to her the four parcels of land
therein described. Again on the said day, August 8, 1925, Sabina Almadin executed a deed to
her niece Ruperta Palma assigning to her three parcels of land described therein. The assignees,
Maria Verzosa, Toribia Verzosa, Oliva Verzosa, and Ruperta Palma, took possession of their
respective parcels thus ceded by Sabina Almadin, and have to this day been cultivating them as
exclusive owners thereof. Sabina Almadin passed away and her sister, Catalina Almadin,
presented by Attorney Federico Marino, propounded her will, mentioned above, for probate.
The said will was not admitted to probate.
1
Vivencio Legasto, then, the special administrator
appointed by said Court of First Instance of Laguna to take charge of Sabina Almadin's estate,
filed the complaint which originated this case, claiming the delivery of the parcels of land.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the partition made by Sabina Almadin of her property among her nieces, the
defendants and appellants herein, was valid enforceable.





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HELD:

NO. Article 1056 of the Civil Code Provides:ART. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of
his property by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.

Considering that, inasmuch as the second paragraph of article 1271 makes reference to the
aforesaid article, in providing that no contracts may be entered into with respect to future
inheritances except those the object of which is to make a division inter vivos of the estate in
accordance with article 1056, it is evident that said difference likewise leads to the conclusion
that a partition thus made should be on the basis of a testemantary or legal succession and
should be made a conformity with the fundamental rules thereof and the order of the heirs
entitled to the estate, because neither of the two provisions could be given a wider meaning or
scope than that they simply provide for the division of the estate during the lifetime of the
owner, which, otherwise, would have to be done upon the death of the testator in order to
carry into effect the partition of the estate among the persons interested.

It is thus seen that both the Spanish Supreme Court and the learned and authoritative
commentator, Manresa, are of opinion that a testator may, by an act inter vivos, partition his
property, but he must first make a will with all the formalities provided for by law. And it could
not be otherwise, for without a will there can be no testator; when the law, therefore, speaks
of the partition inter vivos made by a testator of his property, it necessarily refers to that
property which he has devised to his heirs. A person who disposes of his property gratis inter
vivos in not called a testator, but a donor. In employing the word "testator," the law evidently
desired to distinguish between the one who freely donates his property in life and one who
disposes of it by will to take effect his death.

Sabina Almadin must have been aware of the necessity of a prior will, since before making the
partition of her property among her nieces, the defendants herein, she executed a will giving to
each of them the same parcels of land which she later transferred to them gratuitously.

And since Sabina Almadin's will is null and void for lack of the legal requisites, consequently, the
partition which she made of her estate among her nieces the defendants-appellants herein,
during her lifetime is likewise null and void.


DE LA CRUZ, FATIMA NICA Q.
LLB-III B






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BALDEMOR vs. MALANGYAON
G.R. No. L-8806
March 24, 1916

Topic: Effect of Judicial Settlement

FACTS:

To the petition the defendants duly answered, denying generally and specifically the facts
stated in the complaint, and alleging: That they were the legitimate descendants of the said
Benedicto Bonot, that they were all of lawful age, that they had, prior to the commencement of
the present action, mutually made a division among themselves of the property in question,
that there are no debts existing against the estate of the said Benedicto Bonot, and that the
plaintiff is without authority to maintain said action in support of the allegation that the
defendants had mutually divided the estate of their parent.
After hearing the respective parties, the Honorable Percy M. Moir, judge, reached the
conclusion that the plaintiff was without right to maintain the action in question and dismissed
the complaint, absolving the defendants from any liability under the same, without costs,
reserving to the defendant, Clara Falcon, the right to maintain an action against her co-heirs
form any fraud which they may have committed against her interest. From that judgment the
plaintiff appealed to this court. There was no proof adduced during the trial of the cause, the
case having been submitted to the lower court upon the pleadings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the special administrator may maintain an action for the purpose of taking
possession of said property, thereby depriving the heirs of possession of the same.

HELD:

Section 596 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions as amended by section 1 of Act No. 2331
provides that: Whenever all the heirs of a person who died intestate are of lawful age and legal
capacity, and there are no debts due from the estate, or all the debts have been paid the heirs
may, be agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, and not otherwise, apportion and
divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without proceedings in court. Said
section clearly gives the heirs the right to mutually partition their estate.

DELATADO, VANESSA JOY, R.
LLB III-B





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VELAZCO vs. VIZMANOS
G.R. No. L-21244
February 7, 1924

Topic: Effect of Judicial Settlement

FACTS:

Encarnacion Saenz de Vizmanos died intestate on November 16, 1921, leaving no heirs by force
of law ( herederos forzosos). The appellee was appointed the administrator of the estate of the
deceased and, in the administration proceedings, the Court of First Instance issued an order of
distribution in which certain collateral relatives of the deceased in the fourth degree were
declared heirs. The appellants herein are relatives in the sixth degree and claim participation in
the inheritance, but were excluded there from in the order of the distribution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellants contention of claiming participation in the heritance is valid as
they are in the sixth degree?

HELD:

There is no dispute as to the fact that the persons declared heirs are nearer to the deceased in
relationship than are the appellants, but counsel for the latter argues strenuously that the
former were not properly represented in the administration proceedings and that, therefore,
the court had no jurisdiction over them and could not properly declare them heirs.

There is of course, no merit whatever in this contention. Under articles 657, 658, and 661 of
the Civil Code, the title to the inheritance is transmitted to the heirs immediately upon the
death of the predecessor and, upon sufficient proof that certain persons are the heirs of the
deceased, it becomes the duty of the court to order the distribution of the estate to them in the
due course of the administration proceedings no matter whether such persons have formally
appeared in the proceedings or not.
The order of distribution appealed from is in conformity with article 921 of the Civil Code and is
hereby affirmed, with the costs against the appellants.


DELATADO, VANESSA JOY, R.
LLB III-B





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FULE vs. FULE
G.R. No. 21859
September 30, 1924

Topic: Effect of Judicial Settlement

FACTS:

Saturnino Fule died intestate. Ciriaco Fule, one of the heirs, presented a petition in the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Laguna for the appointment of an administrator of the estate
of Saturnino Fule, deceased, and prayed specially for the appointment of Cornelio Alcantara as
such administrator. The petitioner further prayed that during the pendency of the petition for
the appointment of an administrator, the said Cornelio Alcantara be then and there appointed
as special administrator for said estate. The petitioner alleged that at the time of the death of
Saturnino Fule, he was the owner of real and personal property located in the municipality of
San Pablo, Province of Laguna, of the value of P50,000 with a rental value of about P8,000 and
that, in addition to said real and personal property, he also left about P30,000 in cash. The
lower court on the day of the presentation of the petition appointed Cornelio Alcantara as
special administrator and required him to give a bond of P8,000. The special administrator
presented in court an inventory of the alleged property of the deceased.

The petitioner answered the motion of the oppositors and opposed their petition for the
revocation of the appointment of a special administrator. He alleged that the oppositors had
been requested to make a partition of the property of the deceased; that no partition of the
property of the deceased had been made during the lifetime of the deceased; that the property
described in Exhibit A attached to the motion of the oppositors was the exclusive and absolute
property of the petitioner, who had for more than forty years been in the quiet, public, and
exclusive possession of the same, as owner; and prayed that the motion of the oppositors is
denied.

ISSUE:

1. Was the appeal from the decision of the lower court perfected within the time required by
law?

2. Did the court a quo commit an error in refusing to appoint and administrator for the estate
of Saturnino Fule, deceased?


HELD:

Upon the issue thus presented, the Honorable judge, revoked the appointment of the special
administrator and ordered him to render an account. On the same day, the Honorable Judge
denied the appointment of an administrator, and suggested to the petitioner that within thirty
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[45]

days from that date he should amend his petition and present an ordinary action for the
partition of the property of the estate of the deceased, and in case he should fail to do so it
would be understood that the petition for the appointment of an administrator is denied.
Upon the second question, it may be said (a) that it is admitted by all of the parties to the
present action, that at the time of his death no debts existed against his estate and (b) that all
of the heirs of Saturnino Fule were of age.
In this jurisdiction and by virtue of the provisions of articles 657, 659 and 661 of the Civil Code,
all of the property, real and personal, of a deceased person who dies intestate, is transmitted
immediately to his heirs. When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts there is no
reason why the estate should be burdened with the cost and expenses of an administrator. The
administrator has no right to intervene in any way whatsoever in the division of the estate
among the heirs when they are adults and when there are no debts against the estate. When
there are no debts and the heirs are all adults, their relation to the property left by their
ancestor is the same as that of any other co-owners in common, and they may recover their
individual rights, the same as any other co-owners of undivided property. And even when there
are debts against the estate, the heirs, all being of age, may pay the debts and divide the
property among themselves according to their respective rights, as heirs or as legatees in case
of a will, without probating the same, and the effect of such division is to invest each party with
a complete equitable title to their particular share of the estate. The right of the heirs in cases
like the one we are discussing, also exists in the division of personal as well as the real property.
If they cannot agree as to the division, then a suit for partition of such personal property among
the heirs of the deceased owner is maintainable where the estate is not in debt, the heirs are all
of age, and there is no administration upon the estate and no necessity thereof. It is difficult to
conceive of any one class or item of property susceptible of being held in common which may
not be divided by the co-owners. It may be of personal property as well as of real estate; of
several parcels as well as of a single parcel, and of non-contiguous as well as of adjacent tracts;
or of part only of the lands of the co-owners as well as of the whole.


DELATADO, VANESSA JOY, R.
LLB III-B













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[46]

REYES vs. BARRETTO-DATU
G.R. No. L-17818
January 25, 1967

Topic: Effect of Inclusion of Intruder in Partition

FACTS:

Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime they acquired a vast
estate, consisting of real properties in Manila, Pampanga, and Bulacan. When Bibiano died, he
left his share of these properties in a will to Salud Barretto, mother of plaintiff's wards, and
Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa and Felisa and his
nephews and nieces. Usufruct was reserved for his widow. The widow then prepared a project
of partition which she signed in her own behalf, and as guardian of the minor Milagros. This was
approved by CFI Manila. As a consequence, Salud Barretto took immediate possession of her
share and secured the cancellation of the originals and the issuance of new titles in her own
name.

Upon the widows death, it was discovered that she had executed two wills, in the first of
which, she instituted Salud and Milagros as her heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the same
and left all her properties in favor of Milagros alone. Thus, the later will was allowed and the
first rejected. Plaintiff then filed an action for the recovery of one-half portion of properties left
for them under Bibianos will. This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her
right of ownership, not only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all theother properties
willed and delivered to Salud, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the
estate of Bibiano, thereby directly attacking thevalidity, not only of the project of partition, but
of the decision of the court based thereon. The defendant contends that the Project of Partition
from which Saludacquired the fishpond in question is void ab initio. This was based on Article
1081 of the Civil Code of 1889: A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir,without
being so, has been included, shall be null and void. CFI rejected plaintiffs contention that since
Bibiano was free to dispose of one-third (1/3) of his estate under the old Civil Code, his will was
valid in favor of Salud to the extent, at least, of such free part. And it concluded that, as
defendant Milagros was the only true heir of Bibiano Barretto, she was entitled to recover from
Salud, and from the latter's children and successors, all the Properties received by her from
Bibiano's estate, in view of the provisions of Art 1456 of the new Civil Code establishing that
property acquired by fraud or mistake is held by its acquirerin implied trust for the real owner.


ISSUE:

1. WON the partition between Salud and Milagros in the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of Bibiano is void.


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[47]

2. WON there was preterition?

HELD:

1. NO
The agreement of partition was not only ratified by the court's decree of distribution, but
actually consummated, so much so that the titles inthe name of the deceased were cancelled,
and new certificates issued in favor of theheirs, long before the decree was attacked. The only
instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a
final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or
through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to
secure relief isreopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary period,
insteadof an independent action the effect of which, if successful, would be, for another
courtor judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and
reshuffleproperties long ago distributed and disposed of. Art. 1081 has been misapplied. Salud
admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano Barretto's last will and testament
together with defendant Milagros; hence,the partition had between them could not be one
such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not null
and void under said article.

2. NO.
The fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share smaller than her legitime does
not invalidate the institution of Salud as heir. There was no preterition, or total ommission of a
forced heir.



DELATADO, VANESSA JOY, R.
LLB III-B









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[48]

Dais vs CFI of Capiz
51 Phil 396

Topic: Effect of Judicial Settlement

FACTS:

Serapion Dais died intestate. The court appointed a judicial administrator to do the transactions
on the inheritance according to the orders of the court especially on the liquidation and
partition processes. The Dais Heirs filed for a complaint to dismiss the appointment of an
administrator for the estate of the decedent. The Dais heirs wanted that their respective
portions be delivered to them immediately because they contested that the they already
acquired ownership from the moment the decedent died.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs after accepting inheritance can demand delivery of respective
portions even there is an appointed administrator.

HELD:

No. Although the heirs acquired ownership over the inheritance from the moment of death of
the decedent, they cannot compel the administrator to deliver to them their respective
portions to which they are entitled. The judicial administrator, by virtue of his appointment,
acquires the right to the possession of the estate subject to the orders of the court.


DONDOYANO, CINDY MAE F.
LLB III-B














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[49]

ARSENIO DE VERA for himself and as guardian ad litem of the minors
ARTURO, TEOGINISA, DEOGRACIAS, SIMEON, GUILLERMO and VICTORIA surnamed DE VERA,
vs.
CLEOTILDE GALAURAN
67 Phil 273
April 10, 1939

Topic/Doctrine: Article 777, Effect of Judicial Settlement

FACTS:

Isabel Domingo Is survived by Arsenio de Vera and six minor heirs. During the lifetime of
deceased wife and herein petitioner, they mortgaged their property to secured a loan from
respondent CleotildeGaularan. According to petitioner, respondent illegally made them to sign
a deed which made them believed to be of mortgage and which later turnedout to be a sale.
Petitioner instituted an action against respondent before CFI of Rizal for the annulment of the
sale. Respondent interposed a demurrer alleging that plaintiffs has no cause of action for they
have not been declared legal heirs in a special proceeding. Lower court sustained demurrer and
the action was dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not plaintiffs may commence an action for the recovery of property without the
necessity of a previous and separate judicial declaration of their status.

HELD:

Yes they may commence an ordinary action arising out of a right belonging to the ancestor. If
the deceased turned out to have debts, the creditors or the heirs themselves may initiate a
special proceeding. The lower court should have granted this petition instead of sustaining the
demurrer and dismissing the action.


FALCATAN, GARY
LLB III-B









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[50]

Maria Lao vs. Dee Tim
90 Phil. 868
Date:

Topic/Doctrine: Article 777, Effect of Judicial Settlement

FACTS:

Yap Siong died leaving a considerable amount of property to be distributed among his heirs. An
administrator was appointed to administer his estate. During the course of the administration and
distribution of the estate there appeared the petitioners and the respondents, each claiming to be
the legitimate heirs of Yap Siong and entitled to his estate. The petitioner Maria Lao claims to be
the legitimate widow of Yap Siong, having been legally joined to him in holy wedlock in the
Philippine and that Jose Lao is a legitimate child born of that marriage, and that they are therefore
entitled, as heirs, to the estate of Yap Siong, deceased.

Respondent Dee Tim on the other hand claims to be the legitimate widow of Yap Siong; that she
and Yap Siong were joined in holy wedlock in accordance with the laws of China and that the said
Yap Kim Ting, Yap Kim Seng, and Yap Hu Cho were her legitimate children born of that wedlock.

Petitioners presented a great deal of proof and a number of documents to support their contention.
Yap Siong admitted in a public document that Mari Lao was his wife. The respondent Dee Tim
presented a great deal of proof also to show that she was the legitimate wife of Yap Siong, to
support that contention she presented what she contended was a certificate of marriage, it was
positive proof of her marriage and that it complied with the custom and practice in China with
reference to marriage ceremonies. To support her contention she presented a number of witnesses

ISSUE:

Whether or not the estate of Yap Siong be divided equally between petitioners and respondents.

HELD:

When two women innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same
man, they and their children, born of said wedlock, will be regarded as legitimate children, and each
family will be entitled to one-half of the estate of the husband upon distribution of his estate. That
provision of the Leyes de Partidas is a very humane and wise law. It justly protects those who
innocently have entered into the solemn relation of marriage and their descendants. The good faith
of all parties will be presumed until the contrary is positively proved. A woman who is deceived by a
man, who represents himself as a single man, and who marries him, she and her children are
entitled to all the rights of legitimate wife and children.


FALCATAN, GARY
LLB III-B

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[51]

FORTUNATA VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ, BENJAMIN RODRIGUEZ, MERCEDES RODRIGUEZ DE HALLARE, LUZ
RODRIGUEZ DE CARLOS AND ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ
vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO A. TAN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and ABELARDO RODRIGUEZ
92 Phil. 273
Date: November 24, 1952

Topic/Doctrine: Article 777, Effect of Judicial Settlement

FACTS:

Flaviano Rodriguez died leaving an estate with a value of P10,000; that the surviving heirs are the widow,
Fortunata Vda. de Rodriguez, and six children who are the petitioners and respondent Abelardo Rodriguez all
the heirs, who were then already of age, entered into a verbal agreement whereby they agreed not to make
a liquidation of the estate but to place it under the administration of the widow with the understanding that
each of the six children would be entitled to receive a portion of the income in equal shares from year to year
for the needs of their families provided that they do not exceed the participation to which they are entitled.
Eight years after the death of decedent ,respondent filed a petition for administration and the petitioners
objected.

Respondents admitted the existence of a verbal agreement entered into between the heirs, wherein they
agreed not to liquidate the estate and to place it under the administration of the widow in view of the
unsettled conditions then prevailing at the time, but they contend that while that was the understanding the
same was not carried out because in reality it was Benjamin Rodriguez, one of the petitioners herein, who
took over the administration of the estate and in the discharge of his duties he failed and refused to give to
respondent Abelardo Rodriguez his share in the income which he badly needed for the support of his family,
for which reason he started the intestate proceedings which gave rise to the present petition for certiorari.
Lower court after overruling appointed Abelardo Rodriguez as Administrator.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an administrator in an estate with no debts and all the heirs entitled to the share are all of
age can validly be appointed by the court.

HELD:

Yes, It appears that both parties submitted the names of the persons they wanted to be appointed as
administrator and the court made its choice only after weighing the fitness and qualifications of the persons
recommended. The petitioner in this case appears to be qualified to act as administrator of the estate of the
deceased Flaviano Rodriguez and does not possess any of the disqualifications.


FALCATAN, GARY
LLB III-B





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[52]

MORALES vs. YAEZ
G.R. No.L-9315.
March 24, 1956

Topic/Doctrine: The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death
of the decedent

FACTS:

There is no question that said lands belonged to Eugeniano Saarenas who died intestate in
1937, leaving no ascendants nor descendants; that as his surviving nephews (by a
sister)Defendant Proceso Yaez (and his sisters) took possession of said lots; and
that Plaintiffsare illegitimate (adulterous) children of Eugeniano, born between 1910 and 1927.
Plaintiffs action is founded on arts. 287 and 988 of the New Civil Code, giving illegitimate
children the right to succeed, where decedent leaves no ascendants nor descendants.
Defendant Yaez (and his sisters) claim the right to inherit under the Civil Code articles 946,
947, and 948 the law in force at the time of Eugenianos death. Applying the Civil Code, the
trial judge absolved the Defendant. He refused to apply the New Civil Code that grants for the
first time successional rights to illegitimate children, in accordance with this Courts decision in
Uson vs. Del Rosario, (92 Phil., 530) promulgated January 29, 1953, the pertinent portions of
which are: But Defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor Defendants are
illegitimate children of the late Faustino Nebrada and under the old Civil Code are not entitled
to any successional rights, however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in June
1950, they are given the status and rights which the law accords to the latter (Article 2264 and
Article 278, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared for the first
time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave
rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Art. 2253, new Civil Code).

HELD:

ART. 2263. Rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with or without a will, before the
effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and
by the Rules of Court. The inheritance of those who, with or without a will, die after the
beginning of the effectivity of this Code, shall be adjudicated and distributed in accordance with
this new body of laws and by the Rules of Court; but the testamentary provisions shall be
carried out insofar as they may be permitted by this Code. Therefore, legitimes, betterments,
legacies and bequests shall be respected; , their amount shall be reduced if in no other manner
can every compulsory heir be given his full share according to this Code.


FERNANDEZ, ELAINE JOY A
LLB III-B


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[53]

MARABILLES vs. QUITO
G.R. No.L-10408.
October 18, 1956

Topic/Doctrine: The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death
of the decedent

FACTS:

Defendants, instead of answering the complaint, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds (1)
that Plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue, (2) that the complaint states no cause of action,
and (3) that the action had prescribed. Defendants attached to their motion as Annex A
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1065 issued in the name of one Guadalupe Saralde on March
31, 1941 and Original Certificate of Title No. 1018 as Annex B issued in the name of Patricio
Marabiles on February 19, 1954. This is a homestead patent granted under Act No. 2874.
Plaintiffs filed a written opposition to the motion, to which Defendants replied, and thereafter
the court issued on November 8, 1954 an order sustaining the motion. Accordingly, it dismissed
the complaint with costs against the Plaintiffs. When Plaintiffs appealed from this order to the
Court of Appeals, the case was certified to us on the ground that the questions raised are
purely of law. One of the grounds on which the lower court dismissed the complaint is
that Plaintiffs do not have legal capacity to sue because it appears that the title of the land was
issued in the name of Patricio Marabiles who already died and the complaint does not allege
that Severina Marabiles and her child who now appears as Plaintiffs had been duly declared as
his heirs to entitle them to bring the action. The court is of the impression that judicial
declaration of heirship is necessary in order that an heir may have legal capacity to bring the
action to recover a property belonging to the deceased.

ISSUE:

Whether or not judicial declaration of heirship is necessary to assert the right of heirs to the
property.

HELD:

The right to assert a cause of action as an heir, although he has not been judicially declared to
be so, if duly proven, is well settled in this jurisdiction. This is upon the theory that the property
of a deceased person, both real and personal, becomes the property of the heir by the mere
fact of death of his predecessor in interest, and as such he can deal with it in precisely the same
way in which the deceased could have dealt, subject only to the limitations which by law or by
contract may be imposed upon the deceased himself.


FERNANDEZ, ELAINE JOY A
LLB III-B
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[54]

ADRIANO vs. OBLEADA
G.R. No. L-39938
August 12, 1933

Topic/Doctrine: The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent

FACTS:

The petitioner, Carmen Adriano, is the deceased Mariano Lopez's surviving mother whom, under his
will, he has instituted his heiress entitled to receive two thirds of his estate. After the deceased Mariano
Lopez's will had been admitted to probate and the corresponding committee on claims and appraisal
appointed, the herein respondents, Alfredo Obleada and Teodorica Mariano, presented before said
committee their claim consisting in a credit amounting to P4,750 alleged to be the unpaid balance of a
promissory note for P5,000 signed by the deceased Mariano Lopez and his wife, Natalia Arevalo Vda. de
Lopez, the herein respondent. Inasmuch as their claim was disallowed by the aforementioned
committee on claims and appraisal, the creditor-claimants, Alfredo Obleada and Teodorica Mariano,
appealed from the committee's advance resolution and filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila the
corresponding action against Natalia Arevalo Vda. de Lopez, as administratrix of the estate of the
deceased, Mariano Lopez, for the recovery of the said sum of P4,750 representing the unpaid balance of
the promissory note for P5,000, signed by the deceased Mariano Lopez and his wife Natalia Arevalo Vda.
de Lopez, one of the herein respondents. The promissory note in question was reproduced by the
creditor-claimants in their complaint which was registered as civil case No. 44327. The defendant,
Natalia Arevalo Vda.de Lopez, as administratrix of the estate of the deceased, Mariano Lopez, filed an
answer denying generally and specifically the acts alleged in the complaint. The petitioner, Carmen
Adriano, as heiress, instituted by the deceased Mariano Lopez under his will, filed a motion in the court
praying that she be permitted to intervene in the aforementioned civil case No. 44327, alleging that she
had a legal interest in the case; that promissory note upon which the alleged creditor-claimants, Alfredo
Obleada and Teodorica Mariano, base their claim is fictitious; that the said promissory note is without
consideration, and that it was obtained through fraud, in connivance with the defendant, Natalia
Arevalo Vda. de Lopez.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner herein, being a heiress instituted by the deceased, Mariano Lopez, can
intervene in the case, there being in fact a judicial administratrix to present the testamentary estate.

HELD:

Heirs; right to intervene in an action involving inheritance. The heirs have the right to intervene in an
action involving some of the property of the haereditas jacens of a decedent when they believe that the
acts of the judicial administrator are prejudicial to their interest.

FERNANDEZ, ELAINE JOY A
LLB III-B


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[55]

CUEVAS vs ABESAMIS
G.R. No. L-47431
December 19, 1940

Topic/Doctrine:

Effect of Judicial Settlement- Hence, even before there has been a judicial declaration of
heirship, it is well established that an heir has a right to assert a cause of action as an heir,
although he has not been judicially declared to be so. This is logical because of the principle that
the property of a deceased person, both real and personal, becomes the property of his heir by
the mere fact of death of his predecessor in interest.

FACTS:

Crescenciano Cuevas submitted for probate the last will and testament of her deceased natural
father, Crescenciano Abesamis, which bequeathed three parcels of land, one share of stock in
the "Gallera de Pearanda" of a par value of P100, and two carabaos worth P100 to Concordia
Cuevas (alias Concordia Abesamis), Francisco Abesamis, Perpetua Abesamis, Isaias Abesamis
and Pedro Abesamis in the manner and under the conditions stated therein. However, Pedro
Abesamis and twenty-five others entered their opposition to the distribution of the properties
described in the will and had commenced an action for the partition of said properties. The will
was admitted to probate and Concordia Cuevas was appointed executrix with a bond of P1,000.
Pedro Abesamis and the other oppositors did institute civil case No. 4816 against the estate of
Crescenciano Abesamis, Concordia Nuevas, Francisco Abesamis and Isaias Abesamis for the
partition, alleging that said properties belonged, in the first instance, to Anacleto Mercado, their
common causante, who entrusted them to Crescenciano Abesamis with the understanding that
they were not to be subdivided as long as the minor children of her other deceased son,
Teodorico Abesamis, were living with the Crescenciano. A judgment was rendered adjudicating
seven-eights (7/8) of the properties in favor of the plaintiffs and the other one-eight (1/8) for
the defendants. The court ordered the commissioners of partition to declare as sole heiress
Concordia Cuevas to the exclusion of Francisco and Isaias Abesamis.lawphil.net Concordia
Cuevas presented to the probate court a partition plan adjudicating the three lots and the two
carabaos in favor of the legatees mentioned in the will. This was rejected by the court for the
reason that it was not in conformity with the inventory of the estate and the decision in civil
case No. 4816. The executrix submitted an amended inventory and later another project of
partition distributing the properties of the estate in accordance with the terms of the will,
which were objected by the defendants, because these included their legitimate shares under
the decision in civil case No. 4816. The opposition was upheld by the court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court erred in not holding that the decision in civil case No. 4816 of the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, declaring that the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis is
entitled only to one-eight (1/8) of the property described in the will, is a nullity and can not bind
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[56]

the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis.

HELD: Yes.The herein executrix-appellant was pronounced by the sole heiress of the deceased.
As said defendants were declared in default and are, to be sure, bound by the decision in that
case, we are of the opinion that the appellant cannot now be permitted to assail its virtuality
not to regard it as totally ineffectual against the testate estate. In the absence of a special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate, there is no necessity of a previous declaration of
status and the heir or heirs can sue and be sued in that capacity.


FLORENDO, KATHERINE GAY V.
LLB-IIIB
































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[57]

ARAYATA vs JOYA
G.R. No. L-28067
March 10, 1928

Topic/Doctrine: Effect of Judicial Settlement- While it is very true that they acquire ownership therof
from the moment of the death of their predecessor, yet upon the appointment of a judicial
administrator, the latter, by virtue of his appointment, acquires a right to the possession of the estate,
subject to the orders of the court, unless he consents to the heirs continuing in possession therof.

FACTS:

Cecilio Joya, during his lifetime, inherited from his deceased parents the right of lease to six lots of the
friar lands. Cecilio Joya married the herein plaintiff, Basilia Arayata. When the Insular Government
acquired the said land, Cecilio Joya continued his lease. While married to the herein plaintiff-appellant,
Cecilio Joya purchase the lots he had been leasing, on installments, from the Government, under said
Act No. 1120. As the number of lots which a purchaser could acquire under the law was limited, lots Nos.
1153 and 2352 were excluded and put up for sale. In order not to lose them, Cecilio Joya had Pedro
Tiongco buy them, supplying him with the necessary funds. Subsequently, Pedro Tiongco transferred his
right to said lots to Cecilio Joya by donation. At the time of his death, Cecilio Joya had not yet completed
the payment of the price of the lots mentioned above to the Insular Government. All the lots in question
except lot No. 547, are in the possession of the defendants, who enjoy their products. On May 10, 1920
lots Nos. 2352, 1086, 1153 and 1031, were transferred to Florentino Joya as administrator of the estate
of the deceased Cecilio Joya. On May 26, 1919, Cecilio Joya died, and on June 9, 1919, his executor, the
herein defendant Florentino Joya, presented said will for probate to the Court of First Instance of Cavite,
which was probated after the proper proceedings. In March, 1920, in the course of the testamentary
proceedings, the executor Florentino Joya presented an alleged agreement of partition by the legatees,
which agreement was disapproved by the court in view of the herein plaintiff's opposition, who alleged
that her signature had been obtained by fraud.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the herein plaintiff-appellant is entitled to the possession and the products of the friar
lands acquired by the Insular Government

HELD:

Yes. We have seen that the legacies given by Cecilio Joya to the defendants were void. If the lands, which
are the subject matter of said legacies and which are in the possession of the defendants, still belong to
Cecilio Joya's estate, because no judicial partition has as yet been made of the property he left, which is
subject, together with its fruits, to the payment of his debts, said defendants cannot invoke the
provisions of the Civil Code with respect to possession in good faith insofar as the fruits are concerned;
because even when the legacies are valid they acquired only when the latter judicially assigned to them
in the final partition, and because, while said lands are under administration, the administrator is obliged
to render an account of his management of the same and the products thereof.


FLORENDO, KATHERINE GAY V.
LLB-III B
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[58]

MACROHON vs SAAVEDRA
G.R. No. L-27531
December 24, 1927

Topic/Doctrine: Kinds of Succession - There are three ways in which succession may be effected:
by the will of man, by the law, or by both at the same time. In the first case the succession is
called testamentary, because it is based on the last will and testament, which is the orderly
manifestation of the testator's will; in the second, it is called legal, because it takes effect by
operation of the law; and the third is called mixed, because it partakes of the character of both
testamentary and legal succession.

FACTS:

Victoriana Saavedra died without descendants or ascendants, being at that time married to
Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, both of them having executed a joint will, which joint will has
been duly admitted to probate in this court. The only near relations of the said Victoriana
Saavedra, with the right to inherit her estate are her brothers Juan and Segundo Saavedra; her
nephews and nieces, Teofilo Saavedra, Manuel Saavedra, Victoriana Saavedra, Mariano
Saavedra, Froilan Saavedra, Josefa Saavedra, Encarnacion Carpio and Macra Carpio, in case that
the said Victoriana Saavedra died intestate, or did not dispose of her property in said will. It was
stated in the will that in case of the death of Macario Macrohon Ong Ham before Victoriana
Saavedra, the properties be given to Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian jointly, and should either of
the two die before Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, all the said properties be given to the survivor.
In case that Victoriana Saavedra should survive Macario Macrohon Ong Ham,Lot No. 838, Lot
No. 817 and Lot No. 768 shall belong exclusively to Victoriana Saavedra. Should Victoriana
Saavedra die before Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, Lot No. 817 be adjudicated to Segunda
Saavedra, widow, sister of Victoriana Saavedra, free of all liens and encumbrances. Lot No. 768
be adjudicated to Segunda Saavedra and her heirs, on condition that she devote the products of
the same to having masses said for the repose of the soul of Victoriana Saavedra. In case of the
death of either of the two, the surviving spouse be appointed executor of this our last will and
testament.This executor submitted a scheme of partition and distribution of the property in
accordance with the terms of the joint will, to which Juan Saavedra and others filed an
opposition. The executor rejoined insisting upon the approval of the scheme and asking that the
opposition of Juan Saavedra and others be overruled.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the brother, sister, nephews, and nieces of the testatrix, were entitled to receive
her share in the said sixteen parcels of land, given to the legatees, Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka
Jian, under the terms of the said joint will.

HELD:

Yes. As we have said, the acquisition of right by the alleged legatees depends on the occurrence
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of the event constituting the condition, that is, the death of Macario Macrohon Ong Ham prior
to that of his wife; and this condition not having been complied with, the said Ong Ka Chiew and
Ong Ka Jian have not acquired any right, and therefore the testatrix's estate is to be divided
among her heirs in accordance with the law.


FLORENDO, KATHERINE GAY V.
LLB-IIIB




































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LITONJUA v. MONTILLA
GR No.L-4170,
January 31, 1952


Topic/Doctrine: It is the estate left by the decedent, instead of his heirs directly, that
becomes vested and charged with his obligations which survived after his death.


FACTS:

Pedro Litonjua obtained a judgment against Claudio Montilla for the payment of a sum of
P4,039. Failing to find or identify a property of Claudio to be levied, petitioner then proceeded
to file a claim in the intestate proceeding of the estate of Agustin Montilla Sr, father of the
deceased. The estate has not yet been properly probated.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioner could succeed in collecting the debt as against the estate of the debtor's
deceased parent?

HELD:

No. In the case of Ortiga Brothers and Co. vs. Enage and Yap Tico, 18 Phil. 345, it was held that
the creditor of the heirs of a deceased person is entitled to collect his claim out of the property
which pertains by inheritance to said heirs, only after the debts of the testate or intestate have
been paid and when the net assets that are divisible among the heirs are known, because the
debts of the deceased must first be paid before his heirs can inherit. It was therein also held
that a person who is not a creditor of a deceased, testate or intestate, has no right to intervene
either in the proceedings brought in connection with the estate or in the settlement of the
succession. The foregoing pronouncements are perfectly applicable to the case at bar, because
the appellant is not a creditor of the deceased Agustin Montilla, Sr. and he seeks to collect his
claim out of the inheritance of Claudio Montilla, an heir, before the net assets of the intestate
estate have been determined.



IJIN, MOHAMMAD IJIN E.
LLB III-B





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LEDESMA v. MCLACHLIN
GR No.L-44837
November 23, 1938

Topic/Doctrine: It is the estate left by the decedent, instead of his heirs directly, that becomes vested
and charged with his obligations which survived after his death.


FACTS:

Lorenzo Quitco, died in 1930, leaving defendant Mclachlin and her children as heirs. Plaintiff Ana
Ledesma, spurious/illegitimate child of Lorenzo Quitco, and her mother, sued to declare her as
compulsory heir which the court however denied. Two years later, Lorenzo's father Eusebio died, and
because he left some personal and real properties without a will, an intestate proceeding was instituted
and a court order declaring his compulsory heirs did not of course include Ana as one. Following such
court action, the plaintiff proceeded to collect the sum payable on a promissory note then issued in
favor of her by Lorenzo by filing a claim in the intestate proceedings of Eusebio's Estate claiming that the
sum be paid out of the properties inherited by the defendants represents that of the successional rights
of Lorenzo as a compulsory heir of his father Eusebio.


ISSUE:

WON the plaintiff has the right to collect the sum promised by her father from her grandfather's estate?


HELD:

No. The properties inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by representation are
not subject to the payment of debts and obligations of their deceased father, who died without leaving
any property. While it is true that under the provisions of Articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a child
presents his father or mother who died before him in the properties of his grandfather or grandmother,
this right of representation does not make the said child answerable for the obligations contracted by
his deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is received with the benefit of
inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the properties received from their predecessor. The
herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are
not bound to pay the indebtedness of their father from whom they did not inherit anything.



IJIN, MOHAMMAD IJIN E.
LLB III-B




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GUINTO VS. MEDINA
50 Off. Gaz. 199
(CA)

Topic/Doctrine: It is the estate left by the decedent, instead of his heirs directly, that becomes
vested and charged with his obligations which survived after his death.


FACTS:

Leon Guinto filed an action for forcible entry against Santiago Medina. The trial court ruled in
favor of Guinto.However, Guinto still appealed because the trial court dismissed his claim for
damages. While the case was onappeal, Medina died. Medina was substituted by his heirs.

ISSUE:

WON the heirs of Medina are liable for damages to Guinto in excess of the inheritance they
received?

HELD:

No.The heirs of Medina, having been merely substituted in his place at the time of his death,
their liability for damages is only to the extent of the value of the property they might have
received, if any, from him.



IJIN, MOHAMMAD IJIN E.
LLB III-B















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BONA vs. BRIONES
G.R. No. L-10806
July 6, 1918

Topic/Doctrine: Forms of Wills

FACTS:

Counsel for Monica Bona, the widow by the second marriage of the deceased Francisco Briones
who died on August 14, 1913, applied for the probate of the will which the said deceased
husband on September 16, 1911. The petition was granted on January 20, 1915.

The counsel of the legitimate children by the first marriage of the testator, opposed the
probate of the will alleging that the said will was executed before two witnesses only and under
unlawful and undue pressure or influence exercised upon the person of the testator who thus
signed through fraud and deceit; and prayed that for that reason the said will be declared null
and of no value.

On March 27, 1915, the judge rendered judgment, denied probate to the will. dated March 27,
1915, denying probate to the will. Counsel for Monica Bona appealed On March 31, 1915, the
judge admitted the appeal, ordered the original records to be brought up, and reiterated his
order of December 28, 1913, declaring Bona as a pauper, for the purposes of the appeal
interposed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not in the execution of the will in question the solemnities prescribed by section
618 of Act No. 190 have been observed.

HELD:

Yes. It is indispensable to note that the will in question was executed by Francisco Briones on
September 16, 1911, the order denying probate was rendered on March 27, 1915, both dated
being prior to that of Act No. 2645 amending said section 618 and promulgated on February 24,
1916, which took effect only from July first of the last named year: so that, in order to explain
whether or not the above-mentioned will was executed in accordance with the law then in
force, the last named law cannot be applied and the will in question should be examined in
accordance with, and under the rules of, the law in force at the time of its execution.

The oft-repeated section 618 of Act No. 190 says:
No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate,
real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the
testator, or by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and
attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
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testator and of each other. But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render
the will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this
section provided.

A mere reading of the last four paragraphs or parts of the will shows in a clear manner that the
said will in its form and contents expresses without shadow of doubt the will of the testator;
and that in its execution the solemnities prescribed by the above-mentioned section 618 of Act
No. 190 have been observed.

Moreso, it is not proper to just invalidate the will of Francisco Briones merely because of some
small defect in form which are not essential or of great importance, such as the failure to state
therein that Domingo de la Fuente was also a witness to the said will when he signed it twice.
As a matter of act, he understood the contents of the will better than the two other attesting
witnesses, for he really was a witness and he attested the execution of the will during its
making until it was terminated and signed by the testator, by the witnesses, and by himself,
even though he did it in the capacity of a notary.

The requisites established by Act No. 2645, which amended the oft-repeated section 618
cannot be required in the probate of the will here, inasmuch as this document was executed in
September, 1911, five years before said amendatory law began to take effect (July 1, 1916),
while the testator died on August 14, 1913, two years and some months before the
enforcement of the said law; and so, the only law applicable to the present case is the provision
contained in section 618 of Act No. 190, and in accordance with the provisions of this section,
the said will should be probated; for it has been presented to the court many months before
the amendatory act went into effect.

It is well-known that the principle that a new law shall not have retroactive effect only governs
the rights arising from acts done under the rule of the former law; but if the right be declared
for the first time by a subsequent law it shall take effect from that time even though it has
arisen from acts subject to the former laws, provided that it does not prejudice another
acquired right of the same origin.

The judgment appealed from should be reversed and it should be declared that the will has
been executed in due form by Francisco Briones on September 16, 1911, and that the said will
contains and expresses the last will and testamentary wishes of the deceased testator. Without
any special ruling as to costs.So ordered.

JAAFAR, KAIZER A.
LLB III-B





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VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL vs. MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL
G.R. No. L-7188
August 9, 1954

Topic/Doctrine: Forms of Wills

FACTS:

On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a
holographic will. That time, holographic wills were not yet allowed. Abadia died on January 14,
1943. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees in the will, filed a petition
for its probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Thereafter, some cousins and nephews of
the deceased filed an opposition.

On January 14, 1952, the Trial Court admitted to probate the holographic will of the deceased
on the ground that, the same was in the handwriting of the testator and that although at the
time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not
permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided
the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic
wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to the
trial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect in form.

The oppositors are appealing from that decision; and because only questions of law are
involved in the appeal, the case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the holographic will should be allowed.

HELD:

No. The will should not be allowed. Although the New Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under
article 810 thereof provides that a person may execute a holographic will which must be
entirely written, dated and signed by the testator himself and need not be witnessed, it is a
fact, however, that at the time the will was executed in 1923 and at the time that Father Abadia
died in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted, and the law at the time imposed certain
requirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each page (not folio or
sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by the three attesting
witnesses, requirements which were not complied with in Exhibit "A" because the back pages
of the first two folios of the will were not signed by any one, not even by the testator and were
not numbered, and as to the three front pages, they were signed only by the testator.

Furthermore, Article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will
as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made." For the
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reason that, although the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of
the testator about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given
solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then
becomes a completed act.

In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and the Will is denied probate.
With costs.

JAAFAR, KAIZER A.
LLB III-B


































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TORRES vs LOPEZ
G.R. No. L-24569
February 26, 1926

Topic/Doctrine: Testamentary Capacity and Intent

FACTS:

In 1924, Tomas Rodriguez died in the City of Manila Philippine Islands leaving a considerable
estate. Manuel Torres, one of the executors named in the will asked that the will of Rodriguez
be allowed. Opposition was entered by Margarita Lopez, the first cousin of the deceased on the
grounds: (1) That the testator lacked mental capacity because at the time of senile dementia
and was under guardianship; (2) that undue influence had been exercised by the persons
benefited in the document in conjunction with others who acted in their behalf; and (3) that
the signature of Tomas Rodriguez to the document was obtained through fraud and deceit.

After a prolonged trial judgment was rendered denying the legalization of the will. In the
decision of the trial judge appeared, among others:

The topics suggested by the assignments of error Testamentary Capacity and Undue
Influence will be taken up separately and in order. An attempt will be made
under each subject first to make findings of fact quite separate and apart from those of
the judge and second to make findings of law and the law by rendering judgment.

I. TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY

FACTS:

For a long time prior to October, 1923, Tomas Rodriguez was in feeble health. His breakdown
was undoubtedly due to organic weakness, to advancing years and to an accident which
occurred in 1921 (Exhibit 6). Ultimately, on August 10 1923, on his initiative, Tomas Rodriguez
designated Vicente F. Lopez as the administrator of his property (Exhibit 7).

On October 22, 1923, Margarita Lopez petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila to name
a guardian for Tomas Rodriguez because of his age and pathological state. This petition was
opposed by Attorney Gregorio Araneta acting on behalf of Tomas Rodriguez for the reason that
while Rodriguez was far from strong on account of his years, he was yet capable of looking after
his property with the assistance of his administrator, Vicente F. Lopez. The deposition of Tomas
Rodriguez was taken and a perusal of the same shows that he was able to answer nearly all of
the questions propounded intelligently). At the conclusion of the hearing, an order was
declaring Tomas Rodriguez incapacitated to take care of himself and to manage his property
and naming Vicente F. Lopez as his guardian.
Tomas Rodriguez was taken to the Philippine General Hospital on November 27, 1923. There he
was to remain sick in bed until his death. On the door of the patients room was placed a
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placard reading No visitors, except father, mother, sisters, and brothers. (Ppermitted to visit
the patient only the following named persons: Santiago Lopez, Manuel Ramirez, Romana Lopez,
Luz Lopez de Bueno, Remedio Lopez, Benita Lopez, Trinidad Vizcarra, Apolonia Lopez, Antonio
Haman, and Gregorio Araneta ((Exhibit 9). The list did not include the names of Margarita Lopez
and her husband Antonio Ventura. Indeed the last named persons experienced considerable
difficulty in penetrating in to the room of Rodriguez.

Santiago Lopez states that on one occasion when he was visiting Tomas Rodriguez in the
hospital , Rodriguez expressed to him a desire to make a will and suggested that the matter be
taken up with Vicente F. Lopez (S. R., p. 550). This information Santiago Lopez communicated to
Vicente F. Lopez, who then interviewed Maximino Mina, a practicing attorney in the City of
Manila, for the purpose of securing him to prepare the will

As the witness stated, the will which was prepared by him is identical with that signed by the
testator and the attesting witnesses with the single exception of the change of the date from
December 31, 1923, to January 3, 1924. Two copies besides the original of the will were made.
The will is brief and simple in terminology.

On the afternoon of January 3, 1924 there gathered in the quarters of Tomas Rodriguez in the
Philippine General Hospital, Santiago Lopez and Dr. A. De Asis, attesting witness; and Dr. Elias
Fernando Calderon, Dr. Elias Domingo and Dr. Florentino Herrera, physicians, there for
purposes of observation. (Testimony of Elias Bonoan, S. R., p. 8 of Vl. Legarda, S. R. p. 34. )
Possibly also Mrs. Luz Lopez de Bueno and Mrs. Nena Lopez were present; at least they were
hovering in the background.

Not even prior to demise of the deceased, the two actions in the Lopez family had prepared
themselves for a fight over the estate. The Luz Lopez faction had secured the services of Doctor
Domingo, the physician in charge of the Department of Insane of San Lazaro Hospital an
Assistant Professor of Nervous and Mental Diseases in the University of the Philippines, as
attending physician; as associated with him for purposes of investigation Dr. Fernando Calderon
the Director of the Philippine General Hospital and Dr. Florentino Herrera, a physician in active
practice in the City of Manila; and had arranged to have two members of the medical fraternity,
Doctors De Asis and Bonoan as attesting witnesses. The Margarita Lopez faction had taken
equal precautions by calling a witnesses in the guardship proceedings Dr. Sixto de los Angeles
Professor and Chief of the Department of Legal Medicine in the University of the Philippines,
and Dr. Samuel Tietze, with long experience in mental diseases; thereafter by continuing
Doctors de Los Angeles and Tietze to examine Tomas Rodriguez and by associating with them
Dr. William Burke, a well-known physician of the City of Manila. Skilled lawyers were available
to aid and abet the medical experts. Out of such situations, do will contests arise.

An examination of the certificates made by the two sets of physicians and of their testimony
shows that on most facts they concur. Their deductions from these facts disclose a substantial
divergence of opinion. It is a hopeless task to try to reconcile the views of these distinguished
gentlemen who honestly arrived at definite but contradictory conclusions. The best that we can
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do under the circumstances is to set forth the findings of the Calderon committed on the hand
and of the De Los Angeles committee on the other.
Doctors Calderon, Domingo and Herrera examined Tomas Rodriguez individually and jointly
before the date when the will was executed. All of them, as we have noticed were, present at
the signing of the will to note the reactions of the testator

Doctor Calderon while on the witness-stand expressed a definite opinion as to the mentality of
Tomas Rodriguez.

Tomas Rodriguez was likewise examined thoroughly by Doctors De los Angeles, Tietze, and
Burke. Doctor De los Angeles had been a witness in the gurardianship proceedings and had
seen the patient of November 6 and 7, 1923. Doctor Tietze had also been a witness in the
guardianship case and had visited the patient on November 9 and 12, 1923, and on January 15,
1924. Doctors Tietze and Burke together examined Rodriguez on January 17, 20, and 24, 1924.
The three physicians conducted a joint examination result.

Another angle to the condition of the patient on or about January 3, 1924, is disclosed by the
treatment record kept daily by the nurses, in which appear the nurses remarks.

On certain facts pertaining to the condition of Tomas Rodriguez there is no dispute. On January
3, 1924, Rodriguez had reached the advanced age of 76 years. He was suffering from anemia,
hernia inguinal, chronic dypsia, and senility. Physically he was a wreck.

As to the mental state of Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, Doctors Calderon, Domingo and
Herrera admit that he was senile. They, together with Doctors De los Angeles, Tietze, and
Burke, further declare that his memory however for remote events was generally good. He was
given to irrational exclamations symptomatic of a deceased mind.
While, however, Doctors Calderon Domingo, and Herrera certify that the intellectual faculties
of the patient are sound, except that his memory is weak, and that in executing the will the
testator had full understanding of the act he was performing and full knowledge of the contents
thereof, Doctors De Los Angeles, Tietze and Burke certify that Tomas Rodriguez was of unsound
mind and that they diagnosed his case as senile dementia of the simple type approaching the
deteriorated stage.

The Code of Civil Procedure prescribes as a requisite to the allowance of a will that the testator
be of sound mind A sound mind is a disposing mind. One of the grounds for disallowing a
will is If the testator was insane or otherwise mentally incapable of the execution. Predicated
on these statutory provisions, this court has adopted the following definition of testamentary
capacity: Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction
in which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the
persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to
comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his property among the objects
of his bounty. The mental capacity of the testator is determined as of the date of the
execution of his will (Civil Code, art. 666).
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On the issue of testamentary capacity, the evidence should be permitted to take a wide range
in order that all facts may be brought out which will assist in determining the question. The
testimony of subscribing witnesses to a will concerning the testators mental condition is
entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent. The evidence of those present
at the execution of the will and of the attending physician is also to be relied upon. The
presumption is that every adult is sane. It is only when those seeking to overthrow the will have
clearly established the charge of mental incapacity that the courts will intervene to set aside a
testamentary document.

Counsel for the appellee make capital of the testator being under guardianship at the time he
made his will. Citing section 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure and certain authorities, they
insist that the effect of the judgment is conclusive with respect to the condition of the person.
To this statement we cannot write down our conformity. The provisions of the cited section
were taken from California, and there the Supreme court has never held what is now urged
upon us by the appellee. The rule announced that in some states, by force of statute, the
finding of insanity is conclusive as to the existence of insanity during the continuance of
adjudication, is found to rest on local statutes, of which no counterpart is found in the
Philippines. Even where the question of insanity is out in issue in the guardianship proceedings,
the most that can be said for the finding is that it raises a presumption of incapacity to make a
will but does not invaluable the testament if competency can be shown. The burden of
providing sanity in such case is cast upon the proponents.

It is here claimed that the unsoundness of mind of the testator was the result of senile
dementia. This is the form of mental decay of the aged upon which will are most often
contested. A Newton, Paschal, a Cooley suffering under the variable weather of the mind, the
flying vapors of incipient lunacy, would have proved historic subjects for expert dispute. Had
Shakespeares King Lear made a will, without any question it would have invited litigation and
doubt.

ISSUE:

Did Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, possess sufficient mentality to make a will which
would meet the legal test regarding testamentary capacity and have the proponents of the will
carried successfully the burden of proof and shown him to be of sound mind on that date?

II. UNDUE INFLUENCE

FACTS:

The will was attacked on the further ground of undue influence exercised by the persons
benefited in the will in collaboration with others. The trial judge found this allegation to have
been established and made it one of the bases of his decision
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Tomas Rodriguez voluntary named Vicente F. Lopez as his administrator. The latter
subsequently became his guardian. There is every indication that of all his relatives Tomas
Rodriguez reposed the most confidence in Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de
Bueno. Again, it was Vicente F. Lopez, who, on the suggestion of Rodriguez secured Maximino
Mina to prepare the will, and it was Luz Lopez de Bueno who appears to have gathered the
witnesses and physicians for the execution of the will. This faction of the Lopez family was also
a favor through the orders of Doctor Domingo as to who could be admitted to see the patient.
The trial judge entertained the opinion that there existed a preconceived plan on the part of
the persons who surrounded Tomas Rodriguez to secure his signature to the testament. The
trial judge may be correct in this supposition. It is hard to believe, however, that men of the
standing of Judge Mina, Doctors Calderon, Domingo, Herrera, and De Asis and Mr. Legarda
would so demean themselves and so fully their characters and reputation as to participate in a
scheme having for its purpose to delude and to betray an old man in his age, rather named was
acting according to the best of his ability to assist in a legitimate act in a legitimate manner.
Moreover, considering the attitude of Tomas Rodriguez toward Margarita Lopez and her
husband and his apparent enmity toward them, it seems fairly evident that even if the will had
been made in previous years when Rodriguez was more nearly in his prime, he would have
prepared somewhat a similar document.

One of the grounds for disallowing a will is that it was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence on the art of the beneficiary or some other person for his benefit (Code
of Civil Procedure, sec., 634[4]). Undue influence, as here mentioned in connection with the law
of wills and as further mentioned in the Civil Code (art. 1265), may be defined as that which
compelled the testator to do that which is against the will from fear the desire of peace or from
other feeling which is unable to resist.

The theory of undue influence is totally rejected as not proved.

HELD:

Two of the subscribing witnesses to the will, one a physician clearly to the regular manner in
which the will was executed and to the testators mental condition. The other subscribing
witness, also, a physician on the contrary testified to a fact which, if substantiated, would
require the court to disallow the will. The attending physician and three other eminent
members of the medical fraternity, who were present at the execution of the will, expressed
opinions entirely favorable to the capacity of the testator. As against this we have the
professional speculations of three other equally eminent members of the medical profession
when the will was executed. The advantage on those facts is all with those who offer the will
for probate.

The will was short. It could easily be understood by a person in physical distress. It was
reasonable, that is, it was reasonable if we take into account the evident prejustice of the
testator against the husband of Margarita Lopez.
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Tomas Rodriguez comprehended the nature of the transaction in which he was engaged. He
had two conferences with his lawyer, Judge Mina, and knew what the will was to contain. The
will was read to him by Mr. Legarda. He signed the will and its two copies in the proper places
at the bottom and on the left margin. At that time the testator recollected the property to be
disposed of and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon him. While
for some months prior to the making of the will he had not manage his property he seem to
have retained a distinct recollection of what it consisted and of his income. Occasionally his
memory failed him with reference to the names of his relatives. Ordinarily, he knew who they
were, he seemed to entertain a prediliction towards Vicente F. Lopez as would be natural since
Lopez was nearest in which the instrument distributed the property naming the objects of his
bounty. His conversations with Judge Mina disclosed as insistence on giving all of his property
to the two persons whom he specified.

On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez may have been of advanced years, may have been
physically decrepit, may have been weak in intellect, may have suffered a loss of memory, may
have had a guardian and may have a been extremely eccentric, but he still possessed the spark
of reason and of life, that strength of mind to form a fixed intention and to summon his
enfeebled thoughts to enforce that intention, which the law terms testamentary capacity.
That in effect is the definite opinion which we reach after an exhaustive and exhausting study
of a tedious record, after weighing the evidence for the oppositors, and after giving to the case
the serious consideration which it deserves.

The judgment of the trial court is set aside and the will of Tomas Rodriguez is admitted to
probate without special pronouncement as to costs in this instance.


JAAFAR, KAIZER A.
LLB III-B















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Jaboneta us. Gustilo
No. 1641.
January 19, 1906

Topic/Doctrine:WILLS; PRESENCE OF TESTATOR AND WITNESSES; VALIDITY.The true test of presence
of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they actually saw each other
sign, but whether they might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their
mental and physical condition and position with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of
each signature.

FACTS:

Probate of the last will and testament of Macario Jaboneta, deceased, was denied by the lower court
because the latter was of the opinion from the evidence adduced at the hearing that Julio Javellana, one
of the witnesses, did not attach his signature thereto in the presence of Isabelo Jena, another of the
witnesses, as required by the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

According to the testimony of Jena, he left the room seeing Javellana holding the pen in position to sign
the last will and testament of the testator.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the last will and testament of Macario Jaboneta complied with the requirement of the
provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

HELD:

Yes. The fact that Jena was still in the room when he saw Javellana moving his hand and pen in the act of
affixing his signature to the will, taken together with the testimony of the remaining witnesses which
shows that Javellana did in fact there and then sign his name to the will, convinces us that the signature
was affixed in the presence of Jena. The fact that he was in the act of leaving, and that his back was
turned while a portion of the name of the witness was being written, is of no importance. He, with the
other witnesses and the testator, had assembled for the purpose of executing the testament, and were
together in the same room for that purpose, and at the moment when the witness Javellana signed the
document he was actually and physically present and in such position with relation to Javellana that he
could see everything which took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction, and without
any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so, therefore we are of opinion that the document was in
fact signed before he finally left the room.

We are of opinion that the statutory requisites as to the execution of the instrument were complied
with, and that the lower court erred in denying probate to the will on the ground stated in the ruling
appealed from.

JAJURIE, FATIMA BADRIA J.
LLB-III B



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Nera vs. Remando
No. 5971.
February 27, 1911

Topic/Doctrine:The question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign
the instrument in the presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes
were actually cast upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but whether at
that moment existing conditions and the position of the parties, with relation to each other, were such
that by merely casting their eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign.

FACTS:

The only question raised by the evidence in this case as to the due execution of the instrument
propounded as a will in the court below, is whether one of the subscribing witnesses was present in the
small room where it was executed at the time when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses
attached their signatures; or whether at that time he was outside, some eight or ten feet away, in a
large room connecting with the smaller room by a doorway, across which was hung a curtain which
made it impossible for one in the outside room to see the testator and the other subscribing witnesses
in the act of attaching their signatures to the instrument.

ISSUE:

Whether or not one of the subscribing witnesses was present in the small room where the will was
executed at the time when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their signatures.

HELD:

A majority of the members of the court is of opinion that this subscribing witness was in the small room
with the testator and the other subscribing witnesses at the time when they attached their signatures to
the instrument, and this finding, of course, disposes of the appeal and necessitates the affirmance of the
decree admitting the document to probate as the last will and testament of the deceased.

It is to be noted that the position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment of the
subscription of each signature, must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so.
This, of course, does not mean that the testator and the subscribing witnesses may be held to have
executed the instrument in the presence of each other if it appears that they would not have been able
to see each other sign at that moment, without changing their relative positions or existing conditions.

JAJURIE, FATIMA BADRIA J.
LLB-III B







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Icasiano vs. Icasiano
No. L-18979
June 30, 1964

Topic/Doctrine:The inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a
testament is not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate.

FACTS:

The late Josefa Villacorte executed a last will and testament in duplicate at the house of her
daughter, published before and attested by three instrumental witnesses, namely: attorneys
Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Jose V. Natividad, and Mr. Vinicio B. Diy. The will was acknowledged by
the testatrix and by the said three instrumental witnesses on the same date before attorney
Jose Oyengco Ong, Notary Public in and for the City of Manila. The records show that the
original of the will which consists of five pages, and while signed at the end and in every page, it
does not contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on
page three (3) thereof; but the duplicate copy attached to the amended and supplemental
petition is signed by the testatrix and her three attesting witnesses in each and every page.

Oppositors-appellants in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect that the signatures of
the testatrix in the duplicate are not genuine nor were they written or affixed on the same
occasion as the original,

ISSUE:

Whether or not the inadvertent failure of an attesting witness to affix his signature to one page
of a will invalidates the same.

HELD:

No. The inadvertent failure of an attesting witness to affix his signature to one page of a
testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se
sufficient to justify denial of probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not
only the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by
its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament
was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses.


JAJURIE, FATIMA BADRIA J.
LLB-III B




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IN RE WILL OF LUCINA ANDRADA
G.R. No. 16008
September 29, 1921

Doctrine: In relation to Article 805 of the Civil Code (Forms of Wills)

FACTS:

Lucina Andrada died on June 5, 1919, in the Municipality of Capiz, Province of Capiz; and soon thereafter a
petition was presented to the Court of First Instance of Capiz by Lucila Arce to establish a document
purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased. Upon hearing the petition, his Honor, Judge
Antonio Villareal, declared that the document in question had not been executed in conformity with the
requirements and he therefore refused to admit the purported will to probate, and the petitioner appealed.

The attesting clause of the will in question is incorporated in the will itself, constituting the last paragraph
thereof; and its defect consists in the fact that it does not state the number of sheets or pages upon which
the will is written, though it does state that the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses signed on every
page, as is in fact obvious from an inspection of the instrument. Each of the pages moreover bears
successively the Visayan words, "isa," "duha," "tatlo," "apat," "lima," which mean respectively "one," "two,"
"three," "four," "five," Visayan being the dialect in which the instrument is written.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the document in question had not been executed in conformity with the requirements of
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645 of the Philippine Legislature.

HELD:

According to 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, it is required that each and
every page of the will shall be numbered correlatively in letters and that the attesting clause shall state the
number of sheets or pages used. Without deciding in this case whether the will in question is rendered
invalid by reason of the manner in which the pages are numbered, the court is unanimous upon the point
that the defect pointed out in the attesting clause is fatal. The law plainly says that the attestation shall state
the number of sheets or pages used, the evident purpose being to safeguard the document from the
possibility of the interpolation of additional pages or the omission of some of the pages actually used. It is
true that this point is also safeguarded by the other two requirements that the pages shall be consecutively
lettered and that each page shall be singed on the left margin by the testator and the witnesses. In light of
these requirements it is really difficult to see any practical necessity for the additional requirement that the
attesting clause shall state the number of sheets or pages used. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the
last mentioned requirement affords additional security against the danger that the will may be tampered
with; and as the Legislature has seen fit to prescribe this requirement, it must be considered material. It
results that the trial judge did not err in refusing probate of the will, and the judgment must be affirmed. It is
so ordered, with costs against the appellant.




JAUHARI, SITTI BERKIS E.
LLB-III B

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Cagro v. Cagro et al.
G.R. No. L-5826
April 29, 1953


Topic/Doctrine: In relation to Art. 805 of the Civil Code (Forms of Will)


FACTS:

The case is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Samar which admitted to probate a will allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro who died in Pambujan,
Samar on Feb. 14, 1949.The appellants insisted that the will is defective because the attestation
was not signed by the witnesses at the bottom although the page containing the same was signed
by the witnesses on the left hand margin. Petitioner contended that the signatures of the 3
witnesses on the left hand margin conform substantially to law and may be deemed as their
signatures to the attestation clause.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will is valid.

HELD:

Will is not valid. The attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the
will. It is required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses and it must necessarily bear their
signatures.

An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses since the omission
of their signatures at the bottom negatives their participation. Moreover, the signatures affixed on
the left hand margin are not substantial conformance to the law. The said signatures were merely in
conformance with the requirement that the will must be signed on the left-hand margin of all its
pages. If the attestation clause is unsigned by the 3 witnesses at the bottom, it would be easier to
add clauses to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of
the witnesses. The probate of the will is denied.

JAUHARI, SITTI BERKIS E.
LLB-IIIB








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Cruz vs. Villasor
G.R. No. L-32213
November 26, 1973

Topic/Doctrine: Article 805 and 806 of the Civil Code (Forms of Wills)

FACTS:

Petition to review on certiorari the judgment of the Court First Instance of Cebu allowing the
probate of the last will of testament of the late Valente Z. Cruz. The surviving spouse of the said
decease opposed the allowance of the will, alleging the will was executed through fraud, deceit,
misrepresentation and undue influence; that the said instrument was execute without the
testator having been fully informed of the content thereof, particularly as to what properties he
was disposing and that the supposed last will and testament was not executed in accordance
with law. The first requiring at least three credible witnesses to attest and subscribe to the will,
and the second requiring the testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the will before a
notary public.

In which three instrumental witnesses thereto, namely Deogracias T. Jamaloas Jr., Dr. Francisco
Paares and Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr., one of them, the last named, is at the same time the
Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged. As the third
witness is the notary public himself, petitioner argues that the result is that only two witnesses
appeared before the notary public to acknowledge the will. Notwithstanding her objection, the
Court allowed the probate of the said last will and testament Hence this appeal by certiorari
which was given due course.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz was executed in accordance with
law, particularly Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code?

HELD:

After weighing the merits of the conflicting claims of the parties. We are inclined to sustain that
of the appellant that the last will and testament in question was not executed in accordance
with law. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as
the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed
the will. Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to
avow assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done
because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to
acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. To permit such a situation to obtain
would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity.

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Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or
immoral arrangement ( Balinon v. De Leon, 50 0. G. 583.) That function would defeated if the
notary public were one of the attesting instrumental witnesses. For them he would be
interested sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves him and the validity of his own
act. It would place him in inconsistent position and the very purpose of acknowledgment, which
is to minimize fraud . He the notary public acted not only as attesting witness but also
acknowledging witness, a situation not envisaged by Article 805 and 806 of the Civil Code.

JAUHARI, SITTI BERKIS E.
LLB-IIIB


































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[80]

Cuevas v. Achacoso
GR No. L-3497
MAY 18, 1951

Topic/Doctrine: Formalities of a will

FACTS:

The attestation clause in this case was signed by the testator, but signed below his name by the
witnesses. The clause was made by the testator himself more than by the instrumental
witnesses.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will is valid.

HELD:

Valid. It substantially complies with the statute. The apparent anomaly is not serious to
invalidate the will, it appearing that right under the signature of the testator, there appear the
signatures of the 3 witnesses.


JIMENEZ, MAY MARIE ANN A.
LLB III-B




.














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[81]


MERZA v. PORRAS
GR No. L-4888
May 25, 1953

Topic/Doctrine: Codicil

FACTS:

Pilar Montealegre died leaving a will (Exhibit A) and a so-called codicil (Exhibit B), disinheriting
her husband Pedro Porras and some of her relatives. The two documents were submitted to
probate but were denied by the trial court, upon the grounds such as the defect of the
attestation clause on Exh. A and that Exh. cannot be considered a codicil for it was executed by
the testator a day before Exhibit A, thus it cannot be included in the probate proceedings.

ISSUE:

Should a document, expressly disinheriting certain heirs, executed by the testator prior to a
supposed last will, be probated?

HELD:

Yes. The trial court and the CA is correct that Exhibit B having been executed one day before
Exhibit A could not be considered as a codicil "because a codicil, as the word implies, is only an
addition to, or modification of, the will." The Court of Appeals added that "the contents of
Exhibit B are couched in the language ordinarily used in a simple affidavit and as such, may not
have the legal effect and force to a testamentary disposition."
However, Exhibit B does partake of the nature of a will. A will is defined in article 667 of the
Civil code of Spain as "the act by which a person dispose of all his property or a portion of it,"
and in article 783 of the new Civil Code as "an act whereby a person is permitted, with the
formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take
effect after his death. Exhibit B comes within this definition.


JIMENEZ, MAY MARIE ANN A.
LLB III-B







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[82]


Dichoso v. Gorostiza
GR No. L-35586
October 31, 1932

Topic/Doctrine: Formalities of the Will

FACTS:

The will of the deceased Caridad Alcantara de Gorostiza was denied probate in the trial court,
for the reason that the attestation clause failed to state that the testatrix signed every page of
the will as required by section 618, as amended, of the Code of Civil Procedure.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the attestation clause is fatally defective as to annul the will.

HELD:

It was held that the attestation clause is legally sufficient for the will to be admitted to probate.
Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable. However, it is not
imperative that a parrot-like copy of the words of the same statute be made. It is sufficient if
from the language employed it can reasonably deduced that the attestation clause fulfils what
the law expects of it.


JIMENEZ, MAY MARIE ANN A.
LLB III-B












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[83]

GAN VS. YAP
Reference: G.R. No. L-12190
Date: August 30, 1958

Doctrine: In the probate of a holographic will, the document itself must be produced.
Therefore, a lost holographic will cannot be probated

FACTS:

On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure in the University of
Santo Tomas Hospital, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in the City of Manila.

On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated these proceedings in the Manila court of first
instance with a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the
deceased.

Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not
left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime.

After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Hon. Ramon R. San Jose, Judge,
refused to probate the alleged will. A seventy-page motion for reconsideration failed. Hence
this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have
allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator.

HELD:

NO. The court ruled that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will
may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.
The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof. Even if oral
testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will, we think the
evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies
that it fails to measure up to that clear and distinct proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6. 11.



JOHASAN, WALDEMAR B.
LLB III-B



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[84]

AZAOLA VS. SINGSON
Reference: G.R. No. L-14003
Date: August 5, 1960

Doctrine: The three-witness provision in case of contested holographic wills is directory, not
mandatory.

FACTS:

Fortunata S. Vda. De Yance died in Quezon City on September 9, 1957. Petitioner submitted for
probate her holographic will, in which Maria Azaola was made the sole heir as against the
nephew, who is the defendant. Only one witness, Francisoco Azaola, was presented to testify
on the handwriting of the testatrix. He testified that he had seen it one month, more or less,
before the death of the testatrix, as it was given to him and his wife; and that it was in the
testatrixs handwriting. He presented the mortgage, the special power of the attorney, and the
general power of attorney, and the deeds of sale including an affidavit to reinforce his
statement. Two residence certificates showing the testatrixs signature were also exhibited for
comparison purposes.

The probate was opposed on the ground that (1) the execution of the will was procured by
undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner and his wife, and (2)
that the testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her last will, and that the same
was actually written either on the 5th or 6th day of August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956
as appears on the will.

The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent
must present three witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature are in the
writing of the testatrix, the probate being contested; and because the lone witness presented
"did not prove sufficiently that the body of the will was written in the handwriting of the
testatrix."

Petitioner appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to produce more than one witness
because the will's authenticity was not questioned; and second, that Article 811 does not
mandatorily require the production of three witnesses to identify the handwriting and
signature of a holographic will, even if its authenticity should be denied by the adverse party.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory or permissive.

HELD:

Article 811 is merely permissive and not mandatory. Since the authenticity of the will was not
contested, petitioner was not required to produce more than one witness; but even if the
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[85]

genuineness of the holographic will were contested, Article 811 cannot be interpreted to
require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the
testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been present
at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it
becomes obvious that the existence of witness possessing the requisite qualifications is a
matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and
producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know the handwriting and
signature of the testator" and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not so
express) "that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator". There may be
no available witness of the testator's hand; or even if so familiarized, the witnesses may be
unwilling to give a positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811 may
thus become impossibility.

This is the reason why the 2nd paragraph of Article 811 allows the court to resort to expert
evidence. The law foresees the possibility that no qualified witness may be found (or what
amounts to the same thing, that no competent witness may be willing to testify to the
authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency.

What the law deems essential is that the court should be convinced of the will's authenticity.
Where the prescribed number of witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by their
testimony that the will is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On
the other hand, if no competent witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing,
the Court may still, and in fact it should, resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the Court, in
fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the
proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect.


JOHASAN, WALDEMAR B.
LLB III-B















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[86]

GONZALES VS. CA
Reference: G.R. No. L-37453
Date: May 25, 1979

Doctrine: Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or
at any time during the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for
trustworthiness and being reliable, his honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony may
be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in
Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with.

FACTS:

Isabel Gabriel died on June 7, 1961 without issue. Lutgarda Santiago (respondent), niece of
Isabel, filed a petition for probate of Isabel's will designating her as the principal beneficiary and
executrix. The will was typewritten in Tagalog and was executed 2 months prior to death of
Isabel.

The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gonzales (petitioner), also a niece of Isabel, on the
following grounds: 1. the will is not genuine, 2. will was not executed and attested as required
by law, 3. the decedent at the time of the making of the will did not have testamentary capacity
due to her age and sickness, and 4. the will was procured through undue influence.

The trial court disallowed the probate of the will but the Court of Appeals Reversed the said
decision of the trial court. The petitioner filed a petition for review with SC claiming that the CA
erred in holding that the will of the decedent was executed and attested as required by law
when there was absolutely no proof that the 3 instrumental witnesses are credible.

ISSUE:

1. Can a witness be considered competent under Art 820-821 and still not be considered
credible as required by Art. 805?

2. Is it required that there must be evidence on record that the witness to a will has good
standing in his/her community or that he/she is honest or upright?


HELD:

1. YES. The petitioner submits that the term credible in Article 805 requires something more
than just being competent and, therefore, a witness in addition to being competent under
Articles 820-821 must also be credible under Art. 805. The competency of a person to be an
instrumental witness to a will is determined by the statute (Art. 820 and 821), whereas his
credibility depends on the appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and
conclusion of the Court that said witness is telling the truth. In the case of Vda.de Aroyo v. El
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[87]

Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May 3, 1968, the Supreme Court held
and ruled that: "Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is another to be a credible
witness, so credible that the Court must accept what he says. Trial courts may allow a person to
testify as a witness upon a given matter because he is competent, but may thereafter decide
whether to believe or not to believe his testimony."

2. NO. There is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time during
the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and for
being reliable, his honesty and uprightness (such attributes are presumed of the witness unless
the contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party) in order that his testimony may be
believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in
Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that the soundness of his mind can be
shown by or deduced from his answers to the questions propounded to him, that his age (18
years or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony , or competently proved otherwise, as
well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the
satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the
Civil Code.


JOHASAN, WALDEMAR B.
LLB III-B
























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[88]

IGNACIA DIAZ vs. ANA DE LEON
No. 17714
May 31, 1922

Topic/Doctrine: WILLS; REVOCATION; "ANIMO REVOCANDI."According to the statute governing
the subject in this jurisdiction the destruction animo revocandi of a will constitutes, in itself, a
sufficient revocation. (Sec. 623, Code of Civil Procedure.) The original will herein presented for
probate having been destroyed animo revocandi, cannot be declared the will and last testament of
the testator.

FACTS:

The testator, shortly after the execution of the first will in question, asked that the same be
returned to him. The instrument was returned to the testator who ordered his servant to tear the
document. This was done in his presence and before a nurse who testified to this effect. After some
time, the testator, being asked by Dr. Cornelio Mapa about the will, said that it had been destroyed.

The petitioner denies such revocation, while the contestant affirms the same by alleging that the
testator revoked his will by destroying it, and by executing another will expressly revoking the
former.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will executed by Jesus de Leon, now deceased, was revoked by him?

HELD:

We find that the second will Exhibit 1 executed by the deceased is not clothed with all the
necessary requisites to constitute a sufficient revocation.

But according to the statute governing the subject in this jurisdiction, the destruction of a will with
animo revocandi constitutes, in itself, a sufficient revocation. (Sec. 623, Code of Civil Procedure.)

The intention of revoking the will is manifest from the established fact that the testator was anxious
to withdraw or change the provisions he had made in his first will. This fact is disclosed by the
testator's own statements to the witnesses Canto and the Mother Superior of the Hospital where
he was confined.

The original will herein presented for probate having been destroyed with animo revocandi, cannot
now be probated as the will and last testament of Jesus de Leon. Judgment is affirmed with costs
against the petitioner.

KINANG, JEZRILL C.
LLB III-B


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[89]

JESUSA LACSON VDA. DE ARROYO vs. EL BEATERIO DEL SANTISSIMO ROSARIO DE MOLO
No. L-22005
May 3, 1968

Topic/Doctrine: Remedial law; Appeal; Findings of fact of Court of Appeals conclusive upon
Supreme Court; Meaning of question of law.The Supreme Court can review decisions of the
Court of Appeals only on errors of law, its findings of fact being conclusive. For a question to be
one of law, it must involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by
the litigants or any of them. If the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence,
considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole and the probabilities of the
situation, the question must be deemed factualfor the Court of Appeals to solve.

Same; Evidence; Who are competent to testify on land value; Competency and credibility of
witness distinguished.A witness who personally knows the land sought to be expro priated
because he had possessed it as owner or had administered it or lived on it for a long time, or
because he had bought and sold much land situated in the same municipality, or had engaged
in farming and business and had therefore acquired experience and knowledge of the value of
lands in the locality, is competent to testify on the value of said land. Professional appraisers
and dealers engaged in the business of buying and selling similar property are also competent
to testify as to value or are competent to express their judgment as to its value. Competency as
a witness is one thing, and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that the Court must
accept what he says. Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a witness upon a given matter
because he is competent but may thereafter decide whether to believe or not to believe his
testimony.

FACTS:

Appeal by certiorari taken by Jesusa Lacson Vda. de Arroyo and other heirs of the late Ignacio
Arroyo, from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.28555 affirming the one
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Civil Case No. 4759 entitled Jesusa Lacson
Vda. de Arroyo, et al. vs. Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, et al. holding that the
plaintiffs have failed to establish fair and reliable basis upon which the donation in question
may be justly declared inofficious, and, for this reason, dismissing the case, without costs.

On July 2, 1924, the late Ignacio Arroyo partitioned his entire estate inter vivos among his
three children, by executing with them a public instrument called Convenio de Reparticion de
Bienes y Adjudicacion de Herencia. The three children also received therein their inheritance
from their deceased mother Maria Pidal, the first wife of Ignacio Arroyo. The estate of Ignacio
Arroyo was apportioned in four parts, with specified properties being given to each of the three
children, and the remaining properties, likewise specified, being adjudicated to Ignacio Arroyo,
or reserved for himself, as comprising- his one-third portion of free disposal.

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On March 8, 1927 Jose Arroyo died leaving his widow Jesusa Lacson Vda. de Arroyo and their
children as his only heirs.

On January 9, 1928, Ignacio Arroyo, in a public document called Escritura de Donacion,
disposed of almost all of the properties adjudicated to him in the aforementioned Convenio de
Reparticion, in favor of Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, a religious corporation. This
donation.with all the conditions thereof, was accepted by the donee on the same date and in
the same instrument. Subsequent documents clarifying the properties subject matter of the
donation, and modifying the conditions imposed thereby, were executed.

On October 22. 1931 Ignacio Arroyo executed his last will and testament. The Convenio de
Reparticion aforementioned was reproduced in said will as an integral part thereof, following a
statement therein regarding its execution, and regarding its being confirmed and reproduced
therein so that its validity will never be questioned. The donation in favor of the Beaterio del
Santissimo Rosario de Molo, its acceptance and

On January 8, 1935 Ignacio Arroyo died and his last will and testament was probated, without
any opposition, by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo on February 25, 1935.

On January 20, 1936 Ricardo Carreon, as administrator of the intestate estate of Concepcion
Gerona, filed an amended complaint against Lucio Lacson as executor of Ignacio Arroyo, Jose
Arroyo, Jr. as administrator of the intestate estate of Jose Arroyo, the Beaterio del Santissimo
Rosario do Molo and the Municipality of Iloilo seeking the recovery, inter alia, of one-half of the
properties adjudicated to Jose Arroyo and Mariano Arroyo in the Convenio de Reparticion And
one-half of the properties donated to the Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo in the
Escritura de Donacion. The court rendered judgment against the defendants, but cleared the
Beaterio and the municipality of Iloilo from any liability, and refrained from disturbing the
status of the properties donated to them, reserving the right of the plaintiff to claim from the
executor of Ignacio Arroyo one-half of the value of these donated properties. The Arroyos
appealed the decision to the Supreme Court but war destroyed the records of the case, so that
a new trial was ordered. Civil Case No. 9137 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo was then
tried anew, but on November 3, 1949, the plaintiffs therein and Jesusa Lacson Vda. de Arroyo,
as administratrix of the intestate estate of Jose Arroyo entered into an agreement whereby the
former renounced and waived in favor of the latter all their rights and interests on any and all
the properties therein litigated in consideration of the sum of P65,000.00 and the assumption
of the obligation to pay the attorneys fees of the counsel of the plaintiffs in the sum of
P40,000.00. Upon motion of both parties the Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint in
Civil Case No. 9137 on the same date.

On March 13, 1958, Jesusa Lacson Vda. de Arroyo and her children, as the heirs of Jose Arroyo,
filed the complaint in this case, seeking declaration of the donation made by Ignacio Arroyo to
the Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo in 1928 as inofficious and to recover the excess
thereof. After due trial, decision was rendered on August 29, 1960, dismissing the complaint for
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failure of the plaintiffs to establish fair and reasonable basis upon which the donation in
question may be justly declared inofficious. The counterclaim was likewise dismissed.
After a careful consideration of the foregoing facts, the trial court held that the plaintiffs have
failed to establish fair and reasonable basis upon which the donation in question may be justly
declared inofficious. For its part, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court
because, in its opinion, the decision appealed from does not err in finding no fair and
reasonable basis for declaring the Beaterio donation inofficious.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is sufficiency of plaintiffsappellants evidence as a fair and reasonable
basis for resting a finding that the donation in question is inofficious.

HELD:

A question of law has been declared as one not calling for the examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the are to the effect that For a question to be one of law, it
must involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants
or any of them.

The review should be confined to the facts and circumstances found by the Court of Appeals.
That such facts and circumstances in this case do not sustain the theory of the appellant.
Indeed it is seriously to be doubted whether we could reverse the conclusion of the appellate
court to the effect that those facts and circumstances are not enough evidence to show clearly
and beyond doubt that the parties intended the contract to be a mortgage instead of a
conditional conveyance. That conclusion is obviously ONE OF FACT, not a bit different from the
verdict of a jury in a murder trial that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution
has proved, or has not shock and similar injuries, and accordingly, ordered plaintiffs to pay .

In the light of the foregoing it is clear that petitioners now seek a reversal of the decision of the
Court of Appeals not upon a question of law but upon one of factone which necessarily
involves the examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by them, it being
their contention that such evidence, which the Court of Appeals precisely held to be insufficient
to justify the granting of the relief sought, is, in fact, sufficient for that purpose. In other words,
petitioners seek to have Us substitute our judgment in lieu of that of the Court of Appeals in the
resolution of a question of fact.

But to avoid the necessarily fatal application of the well settled rule on the matter, petitioners
lone assignment of error in the brief submitted to Us attempts to state the issue somewhat
differently, saying that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in not declaring the donation in
question inofficious and in not ordering the return to petitioners of the excess thereof. Re-
stating the issue at page 2 of their brief they submit again that the only question presented in
this appeal is whether the conclusions of the

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What We said in Manila Railroad Company vs. Attorney General, 41 Phil. 160, 169, is simply to
the effect that a witness who personally knows the land sought to be expropriated because he
had possessed it as owner or had administered it or levied on it for a long time, or because he
had bought and sold much land situated in the same municipality, or had been engaged in
farming and business and had therefore acquired experience and knowledge of the value of
lands in the locality, is competent to testify on the value of said land. To hold that a particular
person is competent to testify upon a given matter does not mean that his testimony upon the
same must be believed by the Court or must be deemed by the Court or must be deemed by
the latter to be of sufficient probative value to establish the point which it was intended to
prove. Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is another to be a credible witness, so
credible that the Court must accept what he says. A perusal of the decision subject of review
clearly .shows that the Court of Appeals did not hold that witness Doromal was not a
competent witness in relation to the value of the properties involved in the questioned
donation; it simply declined to believe his testimony or to give it probative value sufficient to
prove what petitioners were trying to establish. Had the Court of Appeals considered him not to
be a competent witness upon that matter, it would have completely ignored or disregarded his
testimony instead of weighing it or evaluating it; this, however, resulting in the Court arriving at
the conclusion that such evidence did not have sufficient probative value to convince the Court.

As regards the Court of Appeals refusal to believe or to be bound by the testimony of
petitioner Jesusa Lacson Vda. de Arroyo because a sale between brothers can not be a reliable
index of the fair market value of a property, petitioners now contend that there is no evidence
at all that the deceased Jose Arroyo (late husband of said petitioner) or the deceased Mariano
Arroyo were trying to help one another when they executed the deed of conveyance involving
one-half share of Haciendas Manolita and Conchita in favor of the former. This obviously
raises the same question of whether or not the Court of Appeals committed any error in
evaluating the testimony of the witness already nameda question purely of fact which We are
not authorized to review.

KINANG, JEZRILL C.
LLB III-C







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Rosario Guevara vs. Ernesto Guevara
74 Phil. 479

Topic/Doctrine: Subsection 8. Allowance & Disallowance of Wills

FACTS:

This is an action commenced by Rosario Guevara to recover from Ernesto Guevara what she
claims to be her strict legitimate as an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased
Victoriano Guevara. Ernesto is a legitimate son of the decease. It appears that the deceased had
left a will disposing of his properties in favor of the defendant and the rest of his relatives, the
plaintiff among them. This will have not been probated. Rosario who has her fathers will, died
and nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary dispositions made there in her favor. But four
years after her fathers death, she commenced this action. Wherein she presented the will, to
prove that she has been acknowledged as a natural daughter by the deceased. Because the will
has not been probated both Trial Court and Court of Appeals sustained the theory.

ISSUE:

Whether the procedure adopted by the plaintiff in accordance with law, invoicing the
provisions of the different sections of Rule 76 (now Rule 75) of the Rules of Court.

HELD:

It cannot sanction the procedure adopted by the respondent Rosario in violation of procedural
law and an attempt to circumvent and disregard the last will and testament of the decedent left
a will and no debts and heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the
estate, they must first present that will to the Court for probate and divide the estate in
accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those
provisions are contrary to law.


LAGBAS, HJA. LORMALYN B.
LLB III B










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Ernesto Guevara vs. Rosario Guevara
98 Phil. 249/G.R. No. L-48840
December 29, 1943

Topic/Doctrine: Subsection 8. Allowance and Disallowance of Wills

FACTS:

This case is a sequel and aftermath of the aftermath of the case of Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil.
479. A Motion to dismiss was filed by Ernesto on the ground, among others, that the petition
for probate is barred by the Statute of Limitations considering that the testator died on Sept.
27, 1933, and that petition was filed 12 years after on Oct. 5, 1945. As a consequence, the
lower court dismissed the petition. The petitioner thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals
which reversed the order of the Lower Court. The case thereafter was elevated to the Supreme
Court for review by Certiorari.

ISSUE:

WON the Statute of Limitations is applicable to the Probate of the Wills.

HELD:

The Court failed to notice, that its Doctrine, was destructive of the right of testamentary
disposition and violative of the owners right to control his property within the legal limits. The
appeal ordered in fact leaves wills at the mercy and whim of custodians and heirs interested in
their suppression. The Lower Court would in effect abdicate the tutelary power that passed to
the Republic from the former sovereigns, that potestad suprema que en mi reside para
velarpor un punctual cumplimento de las ultimas voluntades, asserted as one of the royal
prerogatives in the Real Cedula of March 18, 1776.

These decisions are of high persuasive value; they represent the trend of authority, and enable
us to conclude that reason and precedent reject the applicability of the Statute of
Limitations to probate proceedings because these are not exclusively established in the interest
of the surviving heirs, but primarily for the protection of the testators expressed wishes that
are entitled to respect as an effect of his ownership and right of disposition. If the probate of
validly executed will is required by public policy, as declared by the Supreme Court in the
previous case, the state could not have intended the statute of limitations to defeat the policy.


LAGBAS, HJA. LORMALYN B.
LLB III B



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Mercado vs. Santos
66 Phil. 215/G.R. No. 45629
September 22, 1938

Topic/Doctrine: Allowance and Disallowance of Wills

FACTS:

The records show that the petitioner had presented a will purporting to the last will and
testament of his deceased wife for probate. The will was admitted to probate without any
opposition. Sixteen months after the allowance of the will, a complaint for forgery of the
probated will was instituted by the brothers and sisters of the deceased against the petitioner.
The latter moved to dismiss claiming that the will alleged to have been forged had already been
probated and that the order of allowance is conclusive as to its due execution. The motion was
overruled. Whereupon, the petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals denied the petition. As a result, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court for review
by certiorari.

ISSUE:

WON the probate of the will is a bar to the subsequent criminal prosecution of the petitioner
for the alleged forgery of the said will.

HELD:

The aggrieved party may file an application for relief with the proper court within a reasonable
time, but in no case exceeding six months after said court has rendered the judgment of
probate, on the ground of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. An appeal lies
to review the action of a court of first instance when that court refuses to grant relief. After a
judgment allowing a will to be probated has become final and unappealable, and after the
period fixed by law has expired, the law as an expression of the legislative wisdom goes to
further and the case ends there.

The court held that, that the criminal action will not lie in this jurisdiction against the forger of a
will which has been duly admitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction.


LAGBAS, HJA. LORMALYN B.
LLB III B




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NERI v. AKUTIN
GR No.L-47799
May 21, 1943

Topic/Doctrine: Institution of Heirs

FACTS:

This is a case where the testator AgripinoNeri in his will left all his property by universal title to
the children by his second marriage, the herein respondents, with omission of the children by
his first marriage, the herein petitioner. The omission of the heirs in the will was contemplated
by the testator with the belief that he had already given each of the children portion of the
inheritance, particularly a land he had abandoned was occupied by the respondents over which
registration was denied for it turned out to be a public land, and an aggregate amount of
money which the respondents were indebted to their father.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will shall be cancelled in view of the omission of heirs. Whether or not
there was disinheritance.

HELD:

Yes. The Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared a total intestacy on the ground
that testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage,
without expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage but upon the erroneous belief
that he had given them already more shares in his property than those given to the children by
his second marriage. Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, if contested, shall
annul the institution of heirs in so far as it is prejudicial to the disinherited person. This is but a
case of preterition which annuls the institution of heirs.


LIM, EKEENA, O.
LLB III-B










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Nuguid vs Nuguid
17 SCRA 449
June 23, 1966

Topic/Doctrine: Effects of Preterition

FACTS:

Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents
Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters.Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will
allegedly executed by Rosario instituting the former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She
prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letter of administration be issued to her.

Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of Remedios as
universal heir of the deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line
were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is void.

Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir.Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance
rather than one of preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal heir preterited
the compulsory heirs.

HELD:

Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left forced heirs in the
direct ascending line her parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them but
simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of preterition of the parents, not a case of
ineffective disinheritance.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance, in turn, is a testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.

Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits the parents
of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution of petitioner,
by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.

LIM, EKEENA, O.
LLB III-B



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CRISOLOGO vs SINGSON
G.R. No. L-13876
February 28, 1962

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Testamentary Disposition

FACTS:

This involves a lot and improvements thereon. Complaint alleged that Singson owned half pro
indiviso of said property and that Florentino owned the other half by virtue of the duly
probated last will of Singson (original owner). Defendant's defense was that
ConsolacionFlorentino was a mere usufructuary of and not owner of one-half pro-indiviso of
the property in question, and that therefore, she was not entitled to demand partition thereof.
Lower court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff. Singson appealed. At the time of the
execution of the will, the nearest living relatives of the original owner were her brothers
Evaristo, Manuel and DionisioSingson, her nieces Rosario, Emilia and Trinidad, and her
grandniece Consolation, all surnamed Florentino.

ISSUE:

Whether the testamentary disposition provided for sustitucion vulgar or for sustitucion
fideicomisaria?

HELD:

The old Civil Code governs this case. Testator may not only designate heirs wholl succeed him,
but also substitutes in the event that said heirs dont accept or are in no position to accept
inheritance or legacies, or die ahead of him.

Testator may also bequeath his properties to particular person with obligation, on part of latter,
to deliver the same to another, totally or partially, upon occurrence of particular event. The
particular testamentary clause provides for substitution of heir in this manner: upon death of
ConsolacionFlorentino, whether before or after that of testatrix, property bequeathed to her
shall be delivered or shall belong in equal parts to testatrix's three brothers, Evaristo, Manuel,
Dionisio, or their forced heirs, should anyone of them die ahead of ConsolacionFlorentino. If
this created sustitucion vulgar, necessary result would be that ConsolacionFlorentino, upon
death of testatrix, became owner of one undivided half of the property,but if it provided for
sustitutionfideicomisaria, she would have acquired nothing more than usufructuary rights over
same half. In the former, she would be entitled to partition, but not in the latter.

As Manresa says, a careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration shows that
the substitution of heirs provided for therein is not expressly made of the fideicommissary kind,
nor does it contain a clear statement to the effect that appellee, during her lifetime, shall only
enjoy usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof being
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vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As already stated, it merely provides that upon
appellee's death whether this happens before or after that of the testatrix. Her share shall
belong to the brothers of the testatrix. In the light of the foregoing, we believe, and so hold,
that the last will of the deceased Da. Leona Singson, established a mere sustitucion vulgar, the
substitution ConsolacionFlorentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be effective or to take
place upon the death of the former, whether it happens before or after that of the testatrix.



LIM, EKEENA O.
LLB III-B

































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[100]

Pecson vs. Coronel
G.R. No. L-20374
October 11, 1923

Doctrine: Undue Influence

FACTS:

Dolores Coronel, a resident of Pampanga executed her last will and testament whereby having
no forced heirs, willed to her nephew, Lorenzo Pecson, who is married to her niece Angela
Coronel, her properties, both movable and immovable, in consideration of the good services he
has rendered to the former. Further, Dolores also appointed Lorenzo Pecson executor of all
that is willed and ordained in her will, without bond and in his default, she appointed as
substitute executor her grandson Victor Pecson. As the testatrix does not know how to write
her name, she requested Vicente J. Francisco to sign her name under her express direction in
the presence of the witnesses and the witnesses do the same. The petitioner for the probate of
the will is Lorenzo Pecson, and the opponents are Eriberto Coronel et al, blood relatives of the
testatrix who contend that it was not, nor could it be, the will of the testatrix, because it is not
natural nor usual that she should completely exclude her blood relatives from her vast estate.

Issue:

Whether or not there was an undue influence in appointing Lorenzo Pecson and not the blood
relatives as the beneficiary of the estate of the testatrix.

HELD:

There was no undue influence in appointing Lorenzo Pecson as the beneficiary of the estate of
the testatrix. The liberty to dispose of ones estate by will when there are no forced heirs is
rendered sacred by the Civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1889. It is so provided in the
first paragraphof Article 763 (now Art. 842). As to Lorenzo Pecson, we do not find in the record
sufficient proof to believe that he should have tried, through fraud or any undue influence, to
frustrate the alleged intention of the testatrix to leave her estate to her blood relatives.
Further, the preference given to Lorenzo Pecson is not purely arbitrary, nor a caprice or a whim
of the moment. The proof adduced by this appelle, although contradicted, shows by a
preponderance of evidence that besides the services which the opponents admit had been
rendered by him to Dolores Coronel since the year 1914, he had also rendered services prior to
that time and was the administrator and manager of the affairs of said Dolores in the last years
of her life.

LUYAO, RODELO D.
LLB-IIIB


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Lajom vs. Leuterio
G.R. No. L-13557
April 25, 1960

Doctrine: Preterition

FAC TS:

Maximo Viola died on September 3, 1933. Judicial proceedings of his testate estate were instituted in
the Court of First Instance. An agreement of partition and distribution was executed by and between
Jose P. Viola, Rafael Viola and Silvio Viola, legitimate children of Maximo Viola and Juana Toura, whereby
the properties left by their father, Maximo Viola, were divided among themselves. Donato Lajom filed a
complaint praying, among other things, that he be declared a natural child of Maximo Viola, impliedly
recognized and acknowledged in accordance with the laws in force prior to the Civil Code, thereby being
a co-heir of Jose P. Viola, Rafael Viola and Silvio Viola; that the agreement of partition and distribution
executed in 1935 by these three legitimate children of Maximo Viola be declared null and void.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is a victim of preterition.

HELD:

It is alleged that petitioner having been the victim of preterition, the institution of heirs made
by the deceased Dr. Maximo Viola became ineffective, and that Civil Case No. 8077 was thereby
converted into an intestate proceedings for the settlement of his estate. This contention is
clearly untenable. There might have been merit therein if we were dealing with a special
proceedings for the settlement of the testate estate of a deceased person, which, in
consequence of said preterition, would thereby acquire the character of a proceeding for the
settlement of an intestate estate, with jurisdiction over any and all properties of the deceased.
But, Civil Case No. 8077 is an ordinary civil action, and the authority of the court having
jurisdiction over the same is limited to the properties described in the pleadings, which
admittedly do not include the aforementioned riceland.


LUYAO, RODELO D.
LLB-IIIB







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Aznar vs. Duncan
G.R. No. L-24365
June 30, 1966

Doctrine: Preterition

FACTS:

Christensen died testatewherein he declared that he has no living descendant or ascendant except a
natural daughter Lucy Duncan; that he is leaving the residue of his estate to said Lucy Duncan; and that
he is bequeathing the amount of P3,600.00 to Helen Garcia to whom he is not related in any way. The
will was admitted to probate. In the decision allowing the will the court declared that Helen Garcia was a
natural child of the deceased. Subsequently, in the partition proceedings, an order was issued approving
a project of partition wherein the estate was divided equally between Lucy Duncan, whom the testator
had expressly recognized in his will as his natural daughter, and Helen Garcia, who had been judicially
declared as such after his death. The said order was based on the proposition that Helen Garcia had
been preterited in the will thus resulting in the annulment of the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir;
hence the estate passed to both of them as if the deceased had died intestate. Lucy Duncan appealed on
the sole question of whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should pertain to her and to Helen
Garcia in equal shares, or whether the inheritance of Lucy Duncan as instituted heirs should be merely
reduced to the extent necessary to cover thelegitime of Helen Garcia to 1/4 of the entire estate. She
contends that the case should be governed by Art. 906 of the Civil Code.Helen Garcia, on the other
hand, contends that the case should be governed by Art. 854 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was preterition in the instant case.

HELD:

It is submitted that in this case there is no preterition within the meaning of Art. 854 of the Civil Code. It
is true that there is a total omission of the acknowledged natural child in the testators will, and
apparently the rule regarding preterition should, therefore, be applied. But then, we must consider the
fact that a donation inter vivos is actually given to a compulsory heir as an advance on his inheritance.
That is why in the partition of the estate of the donor upon the death of the latter, it must be collated
and subsequently, it must be charged against the legitime of such compulsory heir. Consequently, there
is no omission in this case which is complete and total in character. Hence, if there is an impairment of
the legitime of the acknowledged natural child because the value of the property donated is less than
the legitime to which he is entitled by operation of law, his remedy lies in the right granted in Art. 906 of
the Civil Code. He can ask for the completion of his legitime.

LUYAO, RODELO D.
LLB-IIIB





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Gallanosa vs Arcangel
83 SCRA 676|G.R. No. L-29300
June 21, 1978

Topic/Doctrine: Allowance and Disallowance of Wills

FACTS:

FlorentinoHitosis executed a will in 1938 when he was eighty years old wherein he instituted as
his only heirs his stepson Pedro Gallanosa and the latters wife Corazon Grecia. He died in 1939,
survived by his brother Leon Hitosis and several nephews and nieces. A petition for probate was
duly filed by the testamentary heirs. Opposition to the probate was registered by the legal
heirs. After hearing, the probate court admitted the will to probate and appointed Gallanosa as
executor. In 1943, a project of partition of sixty-one (61) parcels of land constituting the bulk of
the testators estate was finally approved. There was no appeal from the decree of probate and
from the order of partition and distribution. In 1952, the testators legal heirs instituted an
action for the recovery of the 61 parcels of landon the ground of acquisitive prescription. The
action was dismissed. Again, there was no appeal from the order of dismissal. In 1967, said legal
heirs instituted another action in the same court against the testamentary heirs for the
annulment of the will and the recovery of the 61 parcels of land, alleging that the Gallanosa
spouses caused the execution of the will through fraud and deceit. Upon motion of defendants,
the court dismissed the action. Plaintiffs fi led a motion for reconsideration. Respondent Judge
granted it and set aside the order of dismissal. From this order of dismissal, defendants went up
to the Supreme Court by certiorari. Petitioners (defendants) contend that private respondents
(plaintiffs) do not have a cause of action for the annulment of the will and for the recovery of
the 61 parcels of landby reason of res judicata and of prescription. On the other hand, private
respondents contend that the will is void, and therefore their right of action is imprescriptible.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the private respondents have a cause of action for the annulment of the will of
FlorentionHitosis and for the recovery of the parcels of land.


HELD:

Speaking through Justice Aquino, the Supreme Court held:

It is evident from the allegations of the complaint and from defendants motion to dismiss that
plaintiffs 1967 action is barred by res judicata, a double-barrelled defense, and by prescription,
acquisitive and extinctive, or by what are known in the jus civile and the jus gentium as
usucapio, longitemporispossesio and praescriptio (See Ramos vs. Ramos, L-19872, December
3, 1974, 61 SCRA 284).

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[104]

Our procedural law does not sanction an action for the annulment of a will. In order that a
will may take effect, it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper testamentary
proceeding. The probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838, Civil Code; Sec. 1, Rule 75, formerly
Sec. 1, Rule 76, Rules of Court; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479; Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phil.
249).

The 1939 decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of the will
(Sec. 625, Act. 190; Sec. 1, Rule 76, now Sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court; Last par. of Art.838, Civil
Code). That means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he
executed the will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence; that the
will was signed by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses, and that the will is
genuine and is not a forgery. Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a
subsequent proceeding, not even in a criminal action for the forgery of the will. (3 Morans
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, p. 395; Manahan vs. Manahan, 58 Phil. 448).


MACROHON, JENIELYN, A
LLB III-B














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[105]

MacamvsGatmaitan
60 Phil 358| G.R. No. 40445
August 17, 1934

Topic/Doctrine: Allowance and Disallowance of Wills

FACTS:

The records show that NicolasaMacam fi led a petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the probate of a
will and a codicil. Both will and codicil were executed by LeonardoMacam. The will was admitted to probate
without any opposition, but with regard to the codicil, however, an opposition to its probate was fi led by Juana
Gatmaitan. After hearing, the court ordered the dismissal of the petition for the probate of the codicil as well as of
the opposition thereto on the ground that since the allowance of the will had already become fi nal and executory,
it was too late to consider the codicil. Both parties appealed.


ISSUE:

W/N a probate of a will would be a final judgment prior to that of a codicil, thereof a bar to the probate of the
codicil?

HELD:

The Supreme Court, speaking through JusticeVillareal, held:

The fact that a will has been allowed without opposition and the order allowing the same has become final and
executor is not a bar to the presentation of a codicil, provided it complies with all the necessary formalities for
executing a will. It is not necessary that the will and the codicil be probated together as the codicil may be
concealed by an interested party and it may not be discovered until after the will has already been allowed; and
they may be presented and probated one after the other, since the purpose of the probate proceeding is merely to
determine whether or not the will and the codicil meet all thestatutory requirements for their extrinsic validity,
leaving the validity of their provisions for further consideration. The appeal taken by the petitioner
NicolasaMacam is, therefore, well-founded and the court a quo erred in flatly denyingher petition for the probate
of the codicil on the erroneousground that said codicil should have been presented at the sametime as the will.

With respect to the opposition of the oppositor-appellantJuana Gatmaitan, the fact that she failed to file
opposition tothe probate of the will does not prevent her from filing oppositionto the probate of the codicil
thereof, inasmuch as the willmay satisfy all the external requisites necessary for its validity,but the codicil may, at
the time of its execution, not be in conformitytherewith. If the testator had testamentary capacity atthe time of
the execution of the will, and the will was executedin accordance with all the statutory requirements, opposition
toits probate would not lie. On the contrary, if at the time of theexecution of the codicil, the testator lacked some
of the subjectiverequisites legally capacitating him to execute the same, orall the statutory requirements were not
complied with in theexecution thereof, opposition to its probate would lie.


MACROHON, JENIELYN, A
LLB III-B





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[106]

Cosovs Fernandez Deza
42 Phil 585|G.R. No.L- 16763
December 22, 1921

Topic/Doctrine:Allowance and Disallowance of Wills

FACTS:

The testator, a married man, became acquainted with Rosario Lopez and had illicit relations
with her for many years. They begot an illegitimate son. The testators will gives the tercio de
libredisposicion to the illegitimate son and also provides for the payment of nineteen hundred
Spanish duros to Rosario Lopez by way of reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in
talking care of the testator when he is alleged to have suffered from severe illness. The will was
set aside on the ground of undue influence alleged to have been exerted over the mind of the
testator by Rosario Lopez. There is no doubt that Rosario exercised some influence over the
testator.

ISSUE:

W/N the influence exercised was of such a character to vitiate the will.

HELD:
It is worthwhile to recall the basic principles on undue pressure and influence as laid down by
the jurisprudence of this Court: that to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must
be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free
agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own


MACROHON, JENIELYN, A
LLB III-B














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[107]

CARMEN G. DE PEREZ, trustee of the estate of Ana Maria Alcantara
vs.
MARIANO GARCHITORENA, and JOSE CASIMIRO, Sheriff of the Court of First Instance of
Manila,
G.R. No. L-31703
February 13, 1930

TOPIC/DOCTRINE:FIDEICOMMISSARY SUBSTITUTION

FACTS:

The amount of P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff's name with the association known as La
Urbana in Manila, as the final payment of the liquidated credit of Ana Maria Alcantara,
deceased, whose heiress is said plaintiff, against Andres Garchitorena, also deceased,
represented by his son, the defendant Mariano Garchitorena.

And as said Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for P7,872.23 against Joaquin Perez
Alcantara, husband of the plaintiff, Carmen G. de Perez, the sheriff pursuant to the writ of
execution issued in said judgment, levied an attachment on said amount deposited with La
Urbana. The plaintiff, alleging that said deposit belongs to the fideicommissary heirs of the
decedent Ana Maria Alcantara.
The appellants contend that in these clauses the testatrix has ordered a simple
substitution, while the appellee contends that it is a fideicommissary substitution.

ISSUE:

WON the deposited amount belong to the fideicommisary heirs of Ana Maria Alcantara.

HELD:

This will certainly provide for a substitution of heirs, and of the three cases that might give rise
to a simple substitution (art. 774, Civil Code). The testatrix institutes the plaintiff herein her sole
and universal heiress, and provides that upon her death (the testatrix's) and after probate of
the will and approval of the report of the committee on claims and appraisal, said heiress shall
receive and enjoy the whole hereditary estate. Although this clause provides nothing explicit
about substitution, it does not contain anything in conflict with the idea of fideicommissary
substitution.

The disposition contained in clause IX of the will, that said heiress shall receive and enjoy the
estate. In fact the enjoyment of the inheritance is in conformity with the idea of
fideicommissary substitution, by virtue of which the heir instituted receives the inheritance and
enjoys it, although at the same time he preserves it in order to pass it on the second heir.

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[108]

It should also be noted that said clause IX vests in the heiress only the right to enjoy but not the
right to dispose of the estate. It says, she may enjoy it, but does not say she may dispose of it.
This is an indication of the usufruct inherent in fideicommissary substitution.

Another clear and outstanding indication of fideicommissary substitution in clause X is the
provision that the whole estate shall pass unimpaired to the heiress's children, that is to say the
heiress is required to preserve the whole estate, without diminution, in order to pass it on in
due time to the fideicommissary heirs.

MOLEJON, JAYSON T.
LLB III-B




























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[109]

ELENA MORENTE
vs.
GUMERSINDO DE LA SANTA
G.R. No. L-3891
December 19, 1907


TOPIC/DOCTRINE: MODAL INSTITUTION

FACST:

The will of Consuelo Morente contains the following clauses:
1. I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to me shall pass to my husband,
Gumersindo de la Santa.
2. That my said husband shall not leave my brothers after my death, and that he shall
not marry anyone; should my said husband have children by anyone, he shall not convey
any portion of the property left by me, except the one-third part thereof and the two
remaining thirds shall be and remain for my brother Vicente or his children should he
have any.
3. After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin in which the bakery is
located, which is one of the properties belonging to me.

Her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa, married again within four months of the death of the testatrix.
Elena Morente, a sister of the deceased, filed a petition in the proceeding relating to the probate of the
will of Consuelo Morente pending in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas in which she
alleged the second marriage of Gumersindo de la Santa and asked that the legacy to him above-
mentioned be annulled. Objection was made in the court below by the husband to the procedure
followed by the petitioner.

ISSUE:

WON the will of Consuelo contained modal institution

HELD:

Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions may be made conditional and article
793 provides that a prohibition against another marriage may in certain cases be validly imposed upon
the widow or widower. But the question in this case is, Did the testatrix intend to impose a condition
upon the absolute gift which is contained in the first clauses of the will?

It is to be observed that by the second clause she directs that her husband shall not leave her sisters. It
is provided in the third clause that he must continue to live in a certain building. It is provided in the
second clause that he shall not marry again. To no one of these orders is attached the condition that if
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[110]

he fails to comply with them he shall lose the legacy given to him by the first clause of the will. It is
nowhere expressly said that if he does leave the testatrix's sisters, or does not continue to dwell in the
building mentioned in the will he shall forfeit the property given him in the first clause; nor is it
anywhere expressly said that if he marries again he shall incur such a loss
We are bound to construe the will with reference to all the clauses contained therein, and with
reference to such surrounding circumstances as duly appear in the case, and after such consideration we
cannot say that it was the intention of the testatrix that if her husband married again he should forfeit
the legacy above mentioned. In other words, there being no express condition attached to that legacy in
reference to the second marriage, we cannot say that any condition can be implied from the context of
the will. In order to make a testamentary provision conditional, such condition must fairly appear from
the language used in the will.

MOLEJON, JAYSON T.
LLB III-B




























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[111]

Santos vs. Buenaventura
18 SCRA 47

Doctrine: Timely withdrawal of opposition to the probation of no contest and forfeiture will
must not be penalized.

FACTS:

Decedent: Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas.
Nearest kin: Brothers, a sister, nephews and nieces.
Rosalinda Santos, petitioner-appellee, is one of the nieces.

Among the grounds for the opposition of Flora Blas and Justo Garcia were that the will was not
executed in accordance with law; that undue and improper pressure was exerted upon the
testatrix Maxima was secured through fraud; and that at the time of the will Maxima was
mentally incapable of making a will.

After the probate court had received the evidence for both the petitioner and oppositions, but
before the latter could close their evidence, Flora filed a manifest action that she is
withdrawing her opposition to the probate of the will.
The will provides a NO-CONTEST & FORFEITRURE clause.

ISSUE:

Did Flora actuations amount to violation of no-contest and forfeiture clause of the will?

HELD:

No. Where after realizing her mistake in contesting the will a mistake committed in good faith
because grounded on strong doubts appellant withdrew her opposition and join the appellee
in the latters petition for the probate of the will, appellant must not now be penalized for
rectifying her error. Such act of withdrawing before she rested her case contributed to the
speedy probate of will.

OMBRA, JHEMHAR I.
LLB III-B








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[112]

Villaflor v. Villaflor
4 SCRA 550

Doctrine: Intent of testator must govern.

FACTS:

Don Nicolas Villaflor of Zambales devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Fausta
Nepumoceno, of all his real and personal pproperties, giving the other half to his brother.
It was provided in the will that clause for the provision for his brother would be deemed
annulled from the moment he bore any child with his wife.

Don Nicolas died without begetting any child.Thereafter, Dona Fausta died without having
second marriage. Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the
administration of the estate of the widow Fausta contending that upon the widows death. Said
plaintiff became vested with the ownership of the properties bequeathed by the late Nicolas.

ISSUE:

Is that the title to the properties became absolute vested in the widow upon her death.

HELD:

Yes. The intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the
fixed law of interpretation, and all question raised at the trial, relative to its execution and
fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith. Following the plain and literal meaning of
the testators words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise.

OMBRA, JHEMHAR I.
LLB III-B














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[113]

Chua vs. CFI
78 SCRA 412

Doctrine: There is reserve troncal if its four requisites concur.

FACTS:

In the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia, he sired 3 children, Ignacio, Lorenzo, &
Manuel. When Fatricia died, Jose remarried with Consolaccion with whom he had a child
named Juanito. Manuel died without leaving any issue. Then, Jose died intestate leaving his
widow consolaccion and his son Juanito of the second marriage and sons Ignacio & Lorenzo of
his first marriage.

Lower court ordered that 1/2 portion of the disputed lot and the sum of p8,000 in favor of
Consolaccion, the other half lot in favor of Juanito. P3,000 in favor of Lorenzo and P1500 in
favor of Ignacio.

Thereafter, Juanito died intestate without issue. His mother Consolaccion succeeded him pro-
indiviso share of said lot.

ISSUE:

WON there is reserve troncal?

HELD:

Yes. The requisites for reserve troncal are present. Thus, as borne out by the records, Juanito of
the second marriage died intestate. He died without leaving any issue. His pro-indiviso of 1/2
share was acquired by his mother by operation of law. When his mother died, Juanito who died
intestate had relatives within 3
rd
civil degree. These relatives are Ignacio, Dominador and
Remidios, the supposed legitimate child of Lorenzo who are the petitioner herein.

OMBRA, JHEMHAR I.
LLB III-B










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[114]

EDROSO v SABLAN
September 13 1913

Topic/Doctrine: RESERVA TRONCAL

FACTS:

Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on Sept. 22, 1882.In this
marriage they had a son named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at his
father's death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15,1902, unmarried and
without issue, and by his decease the two parcels of land inPagsanjan, Laguna, passed through
inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso.Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the
application for registration of her ownership.-Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan
[uncles german of Pedro] appeared in the case to oppose the registration, claiming either (1)
that the registration be denied OR (2) that if granted to her the right reserved by law to the
opponents be recorded in the registration of each parcel.-The Court of Land Registration denied
the registration and the applicant appealed through a bill of exceptions. Registration was
denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in question partake of the nature of
property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could only be
presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.

ISSUE:

WON the lands which are the subject matter of the application are required by law to be
reserved

HELD:

YES.-The hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration [gratuitous title]. He who
acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives-Art. 811, OCC provides:
The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a
valuable consideration from another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under obligation
to reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are within the third
degree and belong to the line whence the property proceeded.-Marcelina Edroso, ascendant
of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land which he acquired without a
valuable consideration that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his father Victoriano.
Having acquired them by operation of law, she is obligated to reserve them intact for the
claimants, who are uncles or relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano
Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they
partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance
with the law.-If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his
property, all he left at death would not be required by law to be reserved, but only that he
would have perforce left her as the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant.[Art. 809, OCC.] In
such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required by law to be reserved,
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[115]

because it is what by operation of law would fall to the mother from her son's inheritance; the
other half at free disposal would not have to be reserved. This is that in article 811 of the Civil
Code says.-Proof of testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. In this
case, the interested party has not proved that either of the lots became Marcelinasinheritance
through the free disposal of her son. Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are
distinguished in the Civil Code. Article 968: "Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the
widow or widower contracting a second marriage shall be obliged to set apart for the children
and descendants of the first marriage the ownership of all the property he or she may have
acquired from the deceased spouse by will, by intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer
w/out a valuable consideration."-From principles of jurisprudence laid down by the Supreme
Court of Spain, it is inferred that if from December, 1889, to July, 1893, a case had occurred of a
right required to be reserved by article 811, the persons entitled to such right would have been
able to institute, against the ascendants who must make the reservation, proceedings for the
assurance and guaranty that articles 977 and 978 grant to the children of a first marriage
against their father or mother who has married again. The proceedings for assurance, under
article 977, are: Inventory of the property subject to the right reserved, annotation in the
property registry of such right reserved in the real property and appraisal of the personal
property; and the guaranty, under article978, is the assurance by mortgage, in the case of
realty, of the value of what is validly alienated.-Article 199 of amended Mortgage Law: "The
special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code can only be
required by the relatives in whose favor the property is to be reserved, if they are of age; if
minors, it will be required by the persons who should legally represent them. In either case the
right of the persons in whose favor the property must be reserved will be secured by the same
requisites as set forth in the preceding articles (relative to the right reserved by article968 of
the Civil Code), applying to the person obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect
to the father."-The lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by prescription of the period
for the exercise of this right of action by the persons in whose favor the right must be reserved,
but really the commencement thereof, and enables them to exercise it at any time, since no
limit is set in the law. So, if the annotation of the right required by law to be reserved in the two
parcels of land in question must be made in the property registry of the Mortgage Law, the
persons entitled to it may now institute proceedings to that end, and an allegation of
prescription against the exercise of such right of action cannot be sustained. What are the
rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the reservation of article 811 of the
Civil Code?-The person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt at
all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, the legal title and dominion, although
under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision of the law, the right
to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a
condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess
it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and
dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right required
by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.-On
the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right is reserved cannot
dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in
their possession; and, moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of fee simple
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[116]

which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who must
reserve the right should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and
only then will they take their place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are
relatives within the third-degree, that is to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate
succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy. If any of the persons in whose
favor the right is reserved should, after their right has been assured in the registry, dare to
dispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of the property to be reserved his act would
be null and void, for it is impossible to determine the part "that might pertain therein to the
relative at the time he exercised the right, because in view of the nature and scope of the right
required by law to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may disappear
by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just as it may even become absolute
should that person die."-No act of disposal inter vivos of the person required by law to reserve
the right can be impugned by him in whose favor it is reserved, because such person has all,
absolutely all, the rights inherent in ownership, except that the legal title is burdened with a
condition that the third party acquirer may ascertain from the registry in order to know that he
is acquiring a title subject to a condition subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us that only an
act of disposal mortis causa in favor of persons other than relatives within the third degree of
the descendant from whom he got the property to be reserved must be prohibited to him,
because this alone has been the object of the law: "To prevent persons outside a family from
securing, by some special accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained
therein. Can the heir of the property required by law to be reserved himself alone register the
ownership of the property he has inherited?-YES when the persons in whose favor the
reservation must be made agree thereto and provided that the right reserved to them in the
two parcels of land is recorded, as the law provides.


OPAY, EMMAE ROSE B.
LLB III-B
















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[117]

SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL ALCALA,
vs.MANUELA ALCALA and JOSE DEOCAMPO,
G.R. No. L-13386
October 27, 1920


FACTS:

Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva, married
Francisco Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo Deocampo was born. Julian Nieva died intestate
on April 19, 1889, and her said son, Alfeo Deocampo, inherited from her, ab intestate, the
parcels of land described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint.

Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and without issue on July 7, 1890. Thereupon the two parcels of
land above-mentioned passed to his father, Francisco Deocampo, by intestate succession.
Thereafter Francisco Deocampo married the herein defendant Manuela Alcala, of which
marriage was born Jose Deocampo, the other defendant herein.

Francisco Deocampo died on August 15, 1914, whereupon his widow and son, the defendants
herein, took possession of the parcels of land in question, under the claim that the said son, the
defendant Jose Deocampoo (a minor) had inherited the same, ab intestate, from his deceased
father.

On September 30, 1915, the plaintiff herein, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter
of the said Juliana Nieva, instituted the present action for the purposes of recovering from the
defendants the parcels of land in question, particularly described in Paragraphs V and X of the
complaint, invoking the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the plaintiff was an
acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva, she was not entitled to the property here in
question because, in its opinion, an illegitimate relative has no right to the reserva troncal
under the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.

The first question presented by this appeal is, whether or not the plaintiff is an acknowledged
natural daughter of the deceased Juliana Nieva. It appears from the record that the said Juliana
Nieva, while unmarried, gave birth to the plaintiff on March 29, 1882, and that the plaintiff was
duly baptized as her natural daughter, of unknown father (Exhibit C, baptismal certificate); that
the said Juliana Nieva nourished and reared her said child, the plaintiff herein; that the plaintiff
lived with her said mother until the latter was married to Francisco Deocampo; that the said
mother treated the plaintiff, and exhibited her publicly, as a legitimate daughter.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not an illegitimate relative within the third degree is entitled to the reserva
troncal provided for by article 811 of the Civil Code.
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2. Is every ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to reserve? Should the natural father
or grandfather reserve the properties proceeding from the mother or other natural ascendant?

HELD:

Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the latter
gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
of the property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives within
the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came.

The property here in question was inherited, by operation by law, by Francisco Deocampo from
his son Alfeo Deocampo, who, in turn, had inherited it, in the same manner, from his mother
Juliana Nieva, the natural mother of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is the natural sister of Alfeo
Deocampo, and she belongs to the same line from which the property in question came. Was
Francisco Deocampo obliged by law to reserve said property for the benefit of the plaintiff, an
illegitimate relative within the third degree of Alfeo Deocampo? If he was, then, upon his death,
the plaintiff, and not his son the defendant Jose Deocampo, was entitled to the said property; if
he was not, the plaintiff's action must fail.

under said article 811 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff would be entitled to the property in
question if she were a legitimate daughter of Julian Nieva. (But in said article 811 the legislator
uses the generic terms "ascendant," "descendant," and "relatives," without specifying whether
or not they have to be legitimate. Does the legislator, then, refer to legitimate as well as to
illegitimate relatives? Counsel for the appellant, in a lengthy and carefully prepared brief,
attempts to maintain the affirmative.

Is every ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to reserve? Should the natural father or
grandfather reserve the properties proceeding from the mother or other natural ascendant?
Article 811 does not distinguish; it speaks of the ascendant, without attaching the qualification
of legitimate, and, on the other hand, the same reason that exists for applying the provision to
the natural family exists for applying it to the legitimate family. Nevertheless, the article in
referring to the ascendant in an indeterminate manner shows that it imposes the obligation to
reserve only upon the legitimate ascendant.

Lastly, the principle which underlies the exception which article 811 creates in the right to
succeed neither admits of any other interpretation. Whether the provision is due to the desire
that the properties should not pass, by reason of new marriage, out of the family to which they
belonged, or is directly derived from the system of the so-called "reserva troncal," and whether
the idea of reservation or that of lineal rights (troncalidad) predominate the patrimony which is
intended to be preserved is that of the legitimate family. Only to legitimate ascendants and
descendants do article 968 et seq. of the Code refer, arising as they do from the danger of
second or subsequent marriage; only to legitimate parents do the special laws of Navarra,
Aragon, Vizcaya and Catalua concede the right to succeed with respect to lineal properties
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(bienes troncales); only to the legitimate ascendants does article 811 impose the duty to
reserve.
Persons in whose favor the reservation is established. This is one of the most delicate points
in the interpretation of article 811. According to this article, the reservation is established in
favor of the parents who are within the third degree and belong to the line from which the
properties came.

It treats of blood, relationship, which is applicable to questions on succession, according to
articles 915 to 920. It could not be otherwise, because relationship by affinity is established
between each spouse and the family of the other, by marriage, and to admit it, would be to
favor the transmission of the properties of the family of one spouse to that of the other, which
is just what this article intends to prevent.

It also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reserve it a legitimate ascendant
who inherits from a descendant property which proceeds from the same legitimate family, and
this being true, there can be no question, because the line from which the properties proceed
must be the line of that family and only in favor of that line is the reservation established.

Article 943, above referred to by Manresa, provides as follows:A natural or legitimated child has
no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother
who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives so inherit from the natural or
legitimated child.To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural
brother, Alfeo Deocampo, by operation of law, would be a fragrant violate of the express
provision of the foregoing article (943).


OPAY, EMMAE ROSE B.
LLB III-B
















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[120]

Celedonia Solivio vs CA and Javellana
G.R. No. 83484,
February 12, 1990

Topic/Doctrine: RESERVA TRONCAL

FACTS:

This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-
war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a bachelor, without descendants,
ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his
maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia
Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased
father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.

He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his marriage in
December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban, Jr. was born.

Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his second wife Josefa
Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial High School, brought up Esteban, Jr. Salustia
brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land in Calinog, Iloilo
covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's
first wife (p. 325, Record), but no conjugal property was acquired during her short-lived
marriage to Esteban, Sr.

On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr.,
including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due
time, the titles of all these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.During his
lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some close
friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but
deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on
February 26, 1977 without having set up the foundation.

Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's
properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation
to be named after his mother, from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping
indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased.
This fact was admitted by her in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider the Order dated
April 3, 1978" which she filed on July 27, 1978 in Special Proceeding No. 2540, where she
stated:

"4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the immediately preceding paragraph
[that herein movant is also the relative of the deceased within the third degree, she being the
younger sister of the late Esteban Javellana, father of the decedent herein], because prior to
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the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana)
have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they have closely known
each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each other's house
which are not far away for (sic) each other." (p. 234, Record; italics supplied.)

Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the
formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed
on March 8, 1977 Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special administratrix of the
estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later, she filed an amended petition (Exh. 5) praying
that letters of administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased;
and that after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be
adjudicated to her (p. 115, Rollo).

After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended petition, she was
declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. She explained that this was done for
three reasons: (1) because the properties of the estate had come from her sister, Salustia
Solivio; (2) that she is the decedent's nearest relative on his mother's side; and (3) with her as
sole heir, the disposition of the properties of the estate to fund the foundation would be
facilitated.
On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC) declared her the sole heir of
Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations
of the deceased and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA
FOUNDATION" which she caused to be registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission
on July 17, 1981 under Reg. No. 0100027 (p. 98, Rollo).

Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva filed a motion for
reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because
she too was an heir of the deceased. On October 27, 1978, her motion was denied by the court
for tardiness (pp. 80-81, Record). Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed on January 7,
1980 (or one year and two months later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo, Branch 26, entitled "Concordia Javellana-Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio" for partition,
recovery of possession, ownership and damages.

On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 13207, in favor
of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva. On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution
of its judgment pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit an inventory and accounting
of the estate. In her motions for reconsideration of those orders, Celedonia averred that the
properties of the deceased had already been transferred to, and were in the possession of, the
"Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation." The trial court denied her motions for
reconsideration.




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ISSUES:

1. Whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor of Celedonia, his
relative within the third degree on his mother's side from whom he had inherited them; and
2. Whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she had agreed to place the
same in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation," and notwithstanding the fact that
conformably with said agreement, the Foundation has been formed and properties of the
estate have already been transferred to it.

HELD:

I. The question of jurisdiction On the question of reserva troncal
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased was subject to
reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative within the third degree on his
mother's side. The reserva troncal provision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads
as follows:
"ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may
have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives
who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came."
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
"1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista) the ascendant who inherits by
operation of law property from his descendants.
"2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees (reservatarios) relatives
within the third degree counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line
from which the property came.
"3. The propositus the descendant who received by gratuitous title and died without issue,
making his other ascendant inherit by operation of law." (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II,
1956 Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana Jr., is not reservable property, for
Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from
whom he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance
subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the
third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an
ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or a brother or sister. It
does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the
situation covered by Article 891.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply in the
distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code which provide:
"ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance
with the following articles.
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"ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the
other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
"The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of
relationship by the whole blood."
Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:
"Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the decedent within the
third degree in the collateral line, each, therefore, shall succeed to the subject estate without
distinction of line or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood, and
is entitled to one-half (1/2) share and share alike of the estate." (p. 57, Rollo)
"The Foundation has a Special scholar, Fr. Elbert Vasquez, who would be ordained this year. He
studied at St. Francis Xavier Major Regional Seminary at Davao City. The Foundation likewise is
a member of the Redemptorist Association that gives yearly donations to help poor students
who want to become Redemptorist priests or brothers. It gives yearly awards for Creative
writing known as the Esteban Javellana Award. "Further, the Foundation had constructed the
Esteban S. Javellana Multipurpose Center at the West Visayas State University for teachers' and
students' use, and has likewise contributed to religious, civic and cultural fund-raising drives,
amongst others. Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the
Foundation, Concordia is obligated to honor her commitment as Celedonia has honored hers.


OPAY, EMMAE ROSE B.
LLB III-B






















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Encarnacion Florentino et al vs. Mercedes Florentino et al
40 Phil. 480
November 15, 1919

Topic/Doctrine: Reserva Troncal


FACTS:

In 1908, Severina Foz de Leon died leaving by will her entire estate including the property,
which is the subject matter of this litigation, to her only daughter and compulsory heir,
Mercedes Florentino. The records show that she inherited the property in question from her
deceased son Apolinio Florentino III, who, in turn, had inherited it from his deceased father
Apolinio Florentino II. The right instituted heir, Mercedes Florentino, to the property is now
contested by the children and grandchildren of Apolinio Florentino II by a previous marriage
with the provision of Art. 811 ( now Art. 891) of the Civil Code and that they, together with
Mercedes Florentino, are entitled to the property as reservatorios.

ISSUE:

W/N the property is reservable and that the right of representation is applicable.

HELD:

YES. The Supreme Court held: Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession,
when there are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest
relative over the property which the reservista should return to him, excludes that of the ones
more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming the same as
a reservatorio of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil
Code in Article 811 ( now Art. 891) is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive
benefit of designated persons who are the relatives within the third degree of the person from
whom the reservable preoperty came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding
degrees can never be considered as reservatorios, since the law does not recognize them as
such. Nevertheless, there is right of representation on the part of reservatorios who are within
the third degree, as the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable
property came. These reservatorios have the right to represent their ascendants who are the
brothers of the said deceased person and relatives within the third degree in accordance with
Article 811 of the Civil Code (now Art. 891).


ROJAS, RAE-ANN THEA, G.
LLB III-B

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Dionisia Padura et al vs. Baldovino et al
104 Phil. 1065
Date: December 27, 1958

Topic/Doctrine: Reserva Troncal

FACTS:

Agustin Padura contracted two marriages during his lifetime. With his first wife, he had one
child. Manuel, and with his second wife, Benita, he had two children, Fortunato and Candelaria.
Agustin died in 1908, leaving all his properties to Benita and the three children. Four parcels of
land were adjudicated to Fortunato. Shortly thereafter, Fortunato died without a will. Not
having any issue, the four parcels of land passed to his mother, Benita. In 1934, Candelaria also
died, leaving as her only heirs four legitimate children, petitioners herein. In 1940, Manuel also
died, leaving his only heirs seven legitimate children, oppositors herein. In 1952, Benita died.
The children of Manuel and Candelaria were declared to be the rightful reservatorios.
Subsequently, the children of Candelaria filed the instant petition seeking to have the
reservable properties partitioned, such that of the same be adjudicated to them on the basis
that they inherit by right of representation. The children of Manuel filed their opposition,
maintaining that they (the 11 reservatorios) should all deemed as inheriting in their own right,
as a consequence of which, they should all inherit in equal shares.

ISSUE:

How shall the reservable properties be divided among the eleven reservatorios?

HELD:

The reservatorios nephews of the full blood are entitled to a share twice as large as that of the
others in conformity with Arts. 1006 and 1008 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The reserva
troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable property to the
third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid
its being dissipated by the relatives of the inheritance ascendant (reservista). The stated
purpose of the reserve is accomplished once the property has devolved to the specified
relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on, there is no call for applying Art. 891 any
longer; wherefore, the respective shares of each in the reversionary property should be
governed by the ordinary rules of intestate succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of this
Court and that of Spain has resolved that upon death of the ascendant reservista, the
reservable property should pass, not to all the reservatorios as a class, but only to those nearest
in degree to the descendant (propositus), excluding those reservatorios of more remote degree.
And within the third degree of relationship from the descendant (propositus), the right of
representation operates in favor of nephews (Florentino vs. Florentino).

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Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate
succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double
that of brothers and nephews of half-blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios
inter se, proximity of degree and the right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the
rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be likewise operative.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives (reservatorios) to
whom the property should be returned; but within that group, the individual right to the
property should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art.
891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by the circumstances that the
reserve being an exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is strictly needed to
accomplish the purpose of the law. The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view
of the new Civil Codes hostility to successional reserves and reversions, as exemplified by the
suppression of the reserve viudal and the reversion legal of the Code of 1889 (Art. 812 and 968-
980).

Even during the reservistas lifetime, the reservatorios, who are the ultimate acquirers of the
property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista from doing anything that might
frustrate their reversionary right; and for this purpose they can compel the annotation of their
right in the Registry of Property even while the reservista is alive. This right is incompatible with
the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista. It is likewise clear
that the reservista, who may dispose of them by will, so long as there are reservatorios existing.
The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista, but from the descendant-propositus, of
whom the reservatorios are the heirsmortis causa, subject to the condition that they must
survive the reservista. Had the nephews of whole and half blood succeeded the propositus
directly, those of full blood would undoubtedly receive a double share compared to those of
the half-blood. Why then should the latter receive equal shares simply because the
transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva? The decedent
(causante), the heirs and their relationship being the same, there is no cogent reason why the
hereditary portions should vary.



ROJAS, RAE-ANN THEA, G.
LLB III-B










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Teodoro Delos Reyes vs. Maximo Paterno
34 Phil. 420
March 27, 1916

Topic/Doctrine: Reserva Troncal

FACTS:

The records show that the reservista registered the property in question as free property under
the Land Registration Act without any opposition on the part of the reservatorios. After this
death, six years late, the plaintiff, commenced this action for the recovery of the property on
the ground that he is entitled to the ownership and possession thereof in accordance with the
provision of Art. 811 (now Art. 891) of the Civil Code. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that
his failure to present any opposition to the registration within a period of one year after the
decree of registration had been entered has the effect of extinguishing his right to the property.
Subsequently, his counsel presented a motion for rehearing wherein he invoked the doctrine in
the case of Edroso vs. Sablan.

ISSUE:

W/N the right to the property has extinguished when the reservista registered the property.

HELD:

YES. In the case of Edroso vs. Sablan, the persons holding the reservable rights presented their
opposition to the registration of the land in question during the pendency of the action in the
Court of Land Registration. In the present case, the land in question was registered in the
month of September, 1909. No objection was presented to the registration of the property. No
question is now raised that the proceedings for in accordance with the provisions of the Land
Registration Act. Moreover, the plaintiff presented no claim whatever for a period of six years.



ROJAS, RAE-ANN THEA, G.
LLB III-B









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BONIFACIA MATEO vs. GERVACIO LAGUA
29 SCRA 864
October 30, 1969

FACTS:

Sometime in 1917, the parents of Alejandro Lagua donated two lots to him in consideration of
his marriage to petitioner Bonifacia Mateo. The marriage was celebrated on May 15, 1917 and
thereafter the couple took possession of the lots, but the certificates of title remained in the
donors name.

In 1923, Alejandro died, leaving behind his widow Bonifacia with their infant daughter, who
lived with the father-in-law Cipriano Lagua who in turn undertook to farm on the donated lots.
At first, Cipriano gave to Bonifacia the share from the lots harvests, but in 1926 he refused to
deliver to petitioner the said share, which reason prompted her to initiate an action and won
for her possession of the lots plus damages.

On July 31, 1941, Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the said lots in favor of his younger son,
herein respondent Gervacio. Petitioner learned of this only in 1956 when Cipriano stopped
giving to petitioner her share to the harvest. A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued
under respondents name by the Registry of Deeds (ROD) of Pangasinan.

The CFI of Pangasinan declared the TCT issued to respondent null and void and ordered
cancelled by the ROD, and for respondent to vacate and deliver the lots to petitioner. In 1957,
Gervacio and Cipriano filed with the CFI for the annulment of the donation of the two lots.
While the case was pending, Cipriano died in 1958. It was dismissed for prescription, having
been filed after the lapse of 41 years. When appealed, the CA in 1966 held that the donation to
Alejandro of the two lots with the combined area of 11,888 sq. m. exceeded by 494.75 sq. m.
his legitime and the disposable portion that Cipriano could have freely given by will, and to the
same extent prejudiced the legitime of Ciprianos other heir, Gervacio. The donation was thus
declared inofficious and herein petitioners were ordered to reconvey to Gervacio a portion of
494.75 sq. m. from any convenient part of the lots.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly reduced the donation propter nuptias for being
inofficious.

HELD:

Decision of CA based on unsupported assumptions set aside; trial courts order of dismissal
sustained.

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Before the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the net estate of the decedent
must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the
property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to
collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitimes of the
compulsory heirs can be established, and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a
donation had prejudiced the legitimes. Certainly, in order that a donation may be reduced for
being inofficious, there must be proof that the value of the donated property exceeds that of
the disposable free portion plus the donees share as legitime in the properties of the donor. In
the present case, it can hardly be seen that, with the evidence then before the court, it was in
any position to rule on the inofficiousness of the donation involved here, and to order its
reduction and reconveyance of the deducted portion to the respondents.

Article 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator
shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in
the will.

To the value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator
that are subject to collation, at the time he made them.


RUBIO, CAMILLE ANNE M.
LLB III-B






















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[130]

Parish Priest of Roman Catholic vs Rigor
89 SCRA 493

FACTS:

This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of ricelands located at
Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of around forty- four hectares That devise was made in
the will of the late Father Pascual Rigor, a native of Victoria Tarlac, in favor of his nearest male
relative who would study for the priesthood.

The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands, appealed to this
Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the order of the probate court
declaring that the said devise was inoperative (Rigor vs. Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic
Church of Victoria, Tarlac, CA-G.R. No. 24319-R, August 1, 1963).

The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August 9,
1935, leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933 which was probated by the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. Named as devisees in the will were the
testators nearest relatives, namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina Rigor-
Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a devise to his cousin, Fortunato
Gamalinda.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the parish priest of Victoria could administer the rice lands in the absence of
the qualified devisee?

HELD:

It is contended by the legal heirs that the said devise was in reality intended for Ramon
Quiambao, the testator's nephew and godchild, who was the son of his sister, Mrs. Quiambao.
To prove that contention, the legal heirs presented in the lower court the affidavit of Beatriz
Gamalinda, the maternal grandmother of Edgardo Cunanan, who deposed that after Father
Rigor's death her own son, Valentin Gamalinda, Jr., did not claim the devise, although he was
studying for the priesthood at the San Carlos Seminary, because she (Beatriz) knew that Father
Rigor had intended that devise for his nearest male relative beloning to the Rigor family (pp.
105-114, Record on Appeal).

Mrs. Gamalinda further deposed that her own grandchild, Edgardo G. Cunanan, was not the
one contemplated in Father Rigor's will and that Edgardo's father told her that he was not
consulted by the parish priest of Victoria before the latter filed his second motion for
reconsideration which was based on the ground that the testator's grandnephew, Edgardo, was
studying for the priesthood at the San Jose Seminary.

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Parenthetically, it should be stated at this juncture that Edgardo ceased to be a seminarian in
1961. For that reason, the legal heirs apprised the Court of Appeals that the probate court's
order adjudicating the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria had no more leg to stand on (p.
84, Appellant's brief).

Of course, Mrs. Gamalinda's affidavit, which is tantamount to evidence aliunde as to the
testator's intention and which is hearsay, has no probative value. Our opinion that the said
bequest refers to the testator's nephew who was living at the time of his death, when his
succession was opened and the successional rights to his estate became vested, rests on a
judicious and unbiased reading of the terms of the will.

Had the testator intended that the "cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano que estudie la
camera eclesiatica" would include indefinitely anyone of his nearest male relatives born after
his death, he could have so specified in his will He must have known that such a broad provision
would suspend for an unlimited period of time the efficaciousness of his bequest.

What then did the testator mean by "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario
acondicionado"? The reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation whereby his
nephew living at the time of his death, who would like to become a priest, was still in grade
school or in high school or was not yet in the seminary. In that case, the parish priest of Victoria
would administer the ricelands before the nephew entered the seminary. But the moment the
testator's nephew entered the seminary, then he would be entitled to enjoy and administer the
ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the trusteeship would be terminated.

Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the time Father Rigor
died in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had manifested his
desire to follow the ecclesiastical career. That query is categorically answered in paragraph 4 of
appellant priest's petitions of February 19, 1954 and January 31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged
therein that "not male relative of the late (Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the
priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on Appeal).

Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the
unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative.
Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in
the wilt was likewise inoperative.

The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted by the testator in is
favor assumes that he was a trustee or a substitute devisee That contention is untenable. A
reading of the testamentary provisions regarding the disputed bequest not support the view
that the parish priest of Victoria was a trustee or a substitute devisee in the event that the
testator was not survived by a nephew who became a priest.

It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only when the
testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to become a priest, had not yet
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entered the seminary or, having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated. Those two
contingencies did not arise, and could not have arisen in this case because no nephew of the
testator manifested any intention to enter the seminary or ever became a priest.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the old Civil Code,
now article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it
shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in which the right of
accretion exists" ("el legado ... por qualquier causa, no tenga efecto se refundira en la masa de
la herencia, fuera de los casos de sustitucion y derecho de acrecer").

This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960 (2), which
provides that legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all that belongs to
the testator." There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands the same should
be distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no
disposition as to the said ricelands.

The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or that there
may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the indivisibility of the testator's win is no longer
valid. Thus, if a conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as to
the property recovered by the said legacy (Macrohon Ong Ham vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267).



RUBIO, CAMILLE ANNE M.
LLB III-B




















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Rodriguez vs Ravilan
17 PHIL 63
G.R. No. 5343
September 16, 1910

FACTS:

The property of the said four children, which remained undivided, consists of one parcel of
agricultural land in the pueblo of Mandaue, of an area such as is usually sown with a ganta of
seed corn, bounded on the north by property of Damasa Manlili, on the south by that of
Telesfora Barte, on the east by that of Maria Mendoza, and on the west by that of Feliciana
Barte; another parcel of agricultural land in the barrio of Banilad of the same pueblo, of an area
usually covered in sowing a ganta and a half of seed corn, bounded on the north by the street
that leads to Talamban, on the south by the land of Dionisio Cortes, and on the east and west
by that of Dionisio Cortes and Lucio Ceniza, respectively; another parcel of land, situated in the
same barrio and of and an area required for the sowing of 2 gantas of seed corn, bounded on
the north by the street leading to Talamban, on the south by the land Dionisio Cortes, on the
east by an alley, and on the west by the property of Marcelo Oano.

That said brothers and sisters purchased, out of the profits obtained from these lands, other
lands, to wit, a parcel of land in the barrio of Libog and pueblo of Bogo, of an area usually sown
with 14 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east and west by property of
Hermenegildo Pelayo, Feliciano Cortes, Domingo Nuez, and Feliciano Cortes, respectively;
another parcel in the same barrio, of an area sufficient for 3 gantas of seed corn, bounded on
the north by the property of Benito Cabajug, on the south by the lands of Mariano Cabajug, on
the east by those of Amadeo Elorde, and on the west by that of Mariano Mendoza; another
parcel in the same barrio, of sufficient area for 10 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north,
south, east and west by the lands of Ciriaco Dajuna, Crisanto Zurra, Feliciano Cortes, and
Mariano Fontanosa; another parcel in the same barrio, of an area ordinarily sown with
3 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east, and west by the lands of Benito
Cabajug, Monico Pajuga, Mariano Cabajug, and Mariano Fontanosa, respectively; another
parcel in the said barrio, bounded on the north, south, east, and west by lands of Damiano
Pelagio and Crisanto Zurra; another parcel of an area sown by 4 gantas of seed corn, bounded
on the north, south, east, and west by lands of Mariano Cabajug, Anacleto Lambojon, Ciriaco
Dajuna, and Anacleto Lambojon, respectively; another parcel, situated in the barrio of Tabayho
of the aforesaid pueblo, of an area sown by 14 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north,
south, east and west by lands of Maximino Fernan, Domingo Fontanosa, Vicente Odian, and
Meliton Mendoza; another parcel in the barrio of Cadaohan of the pueblo of Tabugon, bounded
on the north, south, east, and west by lands of Santiago Ortelano, a creek, and lands of Jose
Arfon and Santiago Ortelano, respectively; and another parcel in the barrio of Dughoy,
Tabugon, of an area sown with 25 gantas of seed, bounded on the north, south, east, and west
by property of Feliciano Cortes, Felix Manalili, Santiago Ortelan, and Donato Mendoza; eleven
plow carabaos, three carabao cows with four calves, and four head of cattle, acquired by the
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community; a mortgage credit of 130 pesos against Laureano Soliano, secured by a mortgage
on his land in the barrio of Bagacay of the pueblo of Bogo, and three carabaos.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the plaintiffs desire that a division be made and therefore pray that a partition
of the property, both real and personal, be decreed and also of the profits that may have
accrued thereto during the time that it was in the possession of and usufruct enjoyed by the
defendant?

HELD:

Although it be decided that it was not necessary to prove that the said nine brothers and sisters
were unquestionably the children of the deceased Javier Barte and Eulalia, and are therefore
their only heirs, it should at least have been shown that a lawful partition was made among
their nine children, of the property left by both spouses at their death, and that the three
parcels of land situated in the pueblo of Mandaue, and said to be possessed by the said four
brothers and sisters associated together, were awarded to the same. Such a partition, were it
made, should appear in an authentic document, which was not exhibited with the complaint,
since article 1068 of the Civil Code provides "A division legally made confers upon each heir the
exclusive ownership of the property which may have been awarded to him."

Even though titles of ownership of the said property were not exhibited, if it had been shown
that the Mandaue lands had been awarded by partition to the four brothers and sisters
aforementioned, there would have beenprima facie proof that they were and certainly are the
owners thereof.


RUBIO, CAMILLE ANNE M.
LLB III-B















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Pavia vs. Iturralde
5 PHIL 176
October 27, 1905

FACTS:

Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez having died intestate, Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde asked that
she be judicially declared the legitimate heir of the deceased. There being no legitimate heirs to
the estate either in the direct ascendant or descendant line of succession, the petitioner
presented herself as a collateral descendant. Carmen Linart, through her guardian, Rafaela
Pavia, claimed one-half of all of the estate of the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez, and
asked at the same time that Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, who had been declared the lawful
heir of the deceased. What she claims is that, although she is one degree lower in the line of
succession that her aunt, Maria Juana Iturralde y Gonzalez, yet she is entitled to a share of the
estate of the deceased through her father, Pablo Linart, by representation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the right of representation in the collateral line can extend to grandnieces?

HELD:

As a matter of law, the right of representation in the collateral line can only take place in favor
of the children of brothers or sisters of the intestate, and the plaintiff in this case is not a
daughter of one of the sisters of the deceased, such as is the appellant, but the daughter of a
son of a sister of the deceased. It would have been quite different had it been shown that her
father, Pablo Linart, had survived the deceased. In that case he would have succeeded to the
estate with his cousin, Maria Juana Ugarte, and then, by representation, she, the plaintiff,
might have inherited the portion of the estate corresponding to her father's. It is not an error to
consider that the word "children" in this connection does not include "grandchildren." There is
no precedent in our jurisprudence to warrant such a conclusion. We, therefore, hold that in an
intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased can not participate with a niece in the
inheritance, because the latter, being a nearer relative, the more distance grandniece is
excluded. In the collateral line the right of representation does not obtain beyond sons and
daughters of the brothers and sisters, which would have been the case if Pablo Linart, the
father of the plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle.



SALA, Reeny B.
LLLB III-B



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ROSALES v. ROSALES
148 SCRA 69
February 27, 1987

FACTS:

- Petra Rosales died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunato and their 2 children
Magna and Antonio. Another child, Carterio, predeceased her, leaving behind a child,
Macikequerox, and his widow Irenea, the petitioner. The estate of the deceased has an
estimated gross value of about P30,000.

- In the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order declaring the following individuals
the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate: Fortunato
(husband), 1/4; Magna (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox (grandson), 1/4; and Antonio (son), 1/4.

- Irenea insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the
late Carterio, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law
together with her son, Macikequerox. The trial court denied her plea. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter, her
mother-in-law.

HELD:

NO.A surviving spouse is not an intestate heir of his/her parent-in-law.Intestate or legal heirs
are classified into 2 groups, namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit
by the right of representation. Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his own
right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the CC or by the right of
representation provided for in Art 981 of the same law.

- The relevant provisions of the CC are Arts. 980, 981, 982 and 999. There is no provision which
states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code
is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in-law either by her
own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order
of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the
intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. If the legislature
intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so
provided in the Code.

- Irenea argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of Art 887. The
provision refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow
or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
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- By the same token, the provision of Art 999 does not support Irenea's claim. The estate
contemplated in the article is the estate of the deceased spouse. The subject matter of the
intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra Rosales, the mother-in-
law of Irenea. It is from the estate of Petra that Macikequerox draws a share of the inheritance
by the right of representation as provided by Art 981.

- Art 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox is called to succession by law because of his
blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio (the person represented) who
predeceased his grandmother, Petra, but the latter whom his father would have succeeded.
Irenea cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her
mother-in-law.

- Irenea also contends that at the time of the death of her husband, he had an inchoate or
contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said
right of her husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox who
succeeded from Petra by right of representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father
Carterio.


SALA, Reeny B.
LLLB III-B























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[138]

Sarita vs. Candia
G.R. No. L-7768
November 14, 1912

FACTS:

The spouses Apolinario Cedeo and Roberto Montesa acquired during their marriage a piece of
land, apparently of an area of 2 cavanes of corn upon which they had planted fruit trees.
Apolinario Cedeo died in 1895 and Roberta Montesa in 1909. Andres Candia was holding and
cultivating the said land, but that as stated in the complainant, he did so merely under a lease
and paid the said spouses one hundred pesos semiannually; that, from May, 1909, he refused
to pay the emphyteutic rent for the cultivation of the land, appropriated the land and claimed
ownership thereof; and that he also took possession of four mares, twelve carabaos, and
several pieces of furniture which were in the house erected on the said land a house worth
50 pesos which he also seized and claimed as his property. Andres Candia, a nephew of
Roberta Montesa as the son of her sister said Apolonio Cedeo, otherwise known as Isidario
Cedeo, was a cabeza de barangay of the pueblo of Sibonga, who, in order to pay certain
shortages of the cabeceria under his charge, on the 24th of June, 1881, sold the said land to
Juan Basa Villarosa, who held it in quiet and peaceable possession for twenty-four years and at
his death such possession was continued by his sons, Sinforoso and Vicente Villarosa, from
whom witness, Andres Candia, acquired the property by purchase.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the parties are entitled to the estate by way of order of succession?

HELD:

First. That Manuel Sarita, the principal plaintiff, in whose house, according to Exhibit D, there
was drawn up at his request the engagement of all the plaintiffs to confide the suit to the
attorney who has conducted it, has absolutely no such right, because he cannot represent his
grandfather Domingo, since, as aforesaid, in the collateral line the right of representation can
only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, but not in favor of the grandson of
a brother, such as is the said Manuel Sarita, the son of Sofia Cedeo who, in turn, was the
daughter of Domingo Cedeo.

Second. That, on the hypothesis that such hereditary right derived from the intestate
succession of Apolinario Cedeo, does exist, it could only be exercised by Cristeta Cedeo, the
children of Macario Cedeo, and those of Domingo Cedeo, but not by Manuel Sarita, because
in inheritances the nearer relative excludes the more remote, excepting the right of
representation in proper cases (Civil Code, art 921); from which it is inferred that, in pushing
forward Cristeta Cedeo, the children of Macario Cedeo and those of Domingo Cedeo, to
exercise such a hereditary right, it should have been noticed that the personality of these
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parties as the nearest relatives excluded that of Manuel Sarita, the son of Sofia Cedeo, of a
more remote degree.
Third. That, on the same hypothesis, in the eyes of the law no meaning whatever could be given
to the document, Exhibit H of the plaintiffs, wherein it is made to appear that the widow of
Apolinario Cedeo, Roberta Montesa implored of the heirs of her deceased husband that she
be allowed to continue in her possession of the land and the house of the family; inasmuch as,
as coowner of such property, she was entitled to one-half of it and, besides, had a right of
usufruct to one-half of the other half of the same, pursuant to the provisions of articles 837 and
953 of the Civil Code, and until she was satisfied for her part of usufruct, this half of the other
half remained liable for the payment of such part of usufruct. (Civil Code, art. 838.)

Fourth. The hypothesis disappears from the moment that it is proved that at the death of such
alleged predecessor in interest in the inheritance, the land in question was not owned by him, it
having been transferred in 1881, according to a conclusion established by the trial judge.
Therefore, the action for the recovery of possession, derived from such alleged inheritance,
cannot exist.


SALA, Reeny B.
LLB III-B
























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Prasnick vs RP
G.R. No. L-8639
March 23, 1956

Topic/Doctrine: Adoption of Acknowledge Natural Children
FACTS:
Leopoldo Prasnik was formerly married to one Catherine Prasnik but their marriage was dissolved by
virtue of a decree of divorce issued on December 12, 1947 by the Circuit Court of Miami, Dade Country,
Florida, U.S.A. Thereafter, he and Paz Vasquez lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage and out of this relation four children were born who are the minors he is now seeking to
adopt. He claims that it is his intention to marry Paz Vasquez as soon as he is granted Philippine
citizenship for which he has already applied and in the meantime he wants to adopt them in order that
no one of his relatives abroad could share in his inheritance. He averred that he had no child with his
former wife and acknowledged said minors as his natural children.

The Solicitor General, in his opposition to the petition, invokes Article 335 of the new Civil Code which
provides that a person who has an acknowledged natural child cannot adopt and considering
that Petitioner has acknowledged the minors in question as his children, he contends that he is
disqualified from adopting them under that article.
ISSUE:
Whether person who has an acknowledged natural child cannot adopt.

HELD:
We believe that the Solicitor General has not made a correct interpretation of that article for he is
confusing the children of the person adopting with the minors to be adopted. A cursory reading of said
article would reveal that the prohibition merely refers to the adoption of a minor by a person who has
already an acknowledged natural child and it does not refer to the adoption of his own children even if
he has acknowledged them as his natural children.

It may be contended that the adoption of an acknowledged natural child is unnecessary because there
already exists between the father and the child the relation of paternity and filiation which is precisely
the purpose which adoption seeks to accomplish through legal fiction. But it should be borne in mind
that the rights of an acknowledged natural child are much less than those of a legitimate child and it is
indeed to the great advantage of the latter if he be given, even through legal fiction, a legitimate status.
And this view is in keeping with the modern trend of adoption statutes which have been adopted
precisely to encourage adoption (In re Havagords Estate, 34 S. D. 131, 147 N. W. 378). Under this
modern trend, adoption is deemed not merely an act to establish the relation of paternity and filiation
but one which may give the child a legitimate status. It is in this sense that adoption is now defined as a
juridical act which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from
legitimate paternity and filiation.


SALI, EL-SHAL S.
LLB III-B
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[141]

LLORENTE VS. RODRIGUEZ ET AL.
10 PHIL 585, No. 3339
March 26, 1908

Topic/Doctrine:Right of Representation

FACTS:
Martina Avalle, widow of Llorente, had during her marriage four legitimate children named Jacinta, Julio,
Martin, and Francisco, all with the surname of Llorente y Avalle. In the will executed by her, she
instituted as her sole and general heirs, Jacinta, Julio, and Martin, and the children of the late Francisco,
named Soledad and Adela Llorente. Jacinta died prior to the testatrix, leaving several legitimate children
with the surname of Rodriguez y Llorente, and besides them, a natural daughter named Rosa Llorente.

Rosa Llorente, the natural daughter of Jacinta Llorente, wanted to become a party in the proceedings for
the probate of the will of Martina Avalle, but the legitimate children of the said Jacinta Llorente objected
thereto on the ground that they were the sole and exclusive heirs of their mother, the late Jacinta
Llorente, and that the plaintiff, Rosa Llorente, absolutely cannot be a party thereto.

ISSUE:
Whether the hereditary portion which Martina Avalle left in her will to her legitimate daughter Jacinta
Llorente, and which the latter had not been able to possess because of her death before that of the
testatrix, should also pass to her natural daughter, Rosa Llorente, the same as to her legitimate children.

HELD:
From the fact that a natural son has the right to inherit from the father or mother who acknowledged
him, conjointly with the other legitimate children of either of them, it does not follow that he has the
right to represent either of them in the succession to their legitimate ascendants; his right is direct and
immediate in relation to the father or mother who acknowledged him, but it cannot be indirect by
representing them in the succession to their ascendants to whom he is not related in any manner,
because he does not appear among the legitimate family of which said ascendants are the head.

If Jacinta Llorente had survived her mother, Martina Avalle, she would have inherited from her, and in
what she inherited from her mother, her natural daughter, Rosa Llorente, would have participated, in
conjunction with her legitimate children, from the day in which the succession became operative,
because she would then appear by virtue of her own right to inherit from her mother the legal quota
that pertained to her; but, not because she has said right, would she also be entitled to that of
representation, inasmuch as there is no legal provision establishing such a doctrine; that Rosa Llorente
might and should inherit from her natural mother is one thing, and that she should have the right to
inherit from her who would be called her natural grandmother, representing her natural mother, is
quite another thing. The latter right is not recognized by the law in force.

SALI, EL-SHAL S
LLB III-B


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Oyao vs. Oyao,
94 Phil. 204, No. L-6340
December 29, 1953

Topic/Doctrine: Natural children have no right to represent their natural father or mother in the
succession of the legitimate ascendants of the latter.

FACTS:
This is an action to recover a piece of land alleged to have been inherited by plaintiffs from their
maternal grandfather, Aniceto Oyao, and to have been usurped by defendant. Defendant denies
the alleged usurpation and claims ownership of the land, one-half of it as an inheritance from his
deceased father, Abundio Oyao, brother of Aniceto Oyao, to whom it had been donated by the
latter, and the other half by purchase from Aniceto Oyao himself.

There is no question that the disputed property formerly belonged to Aniceto Oyao, who died
intestate. Aniceto had two legitimate children, Simeona and Eulalia, both of whom died before him
but were survived by their recognized natural children, the plaintiffs herein, who now lay claim to
his hereditary estate in representation of their deceased mothers and dispute the validity of the
donation in favor of Abundio Oyao and the sale in favor of defendant. Being of the opinion that
plaintiffs, as mere natural children could not represent their respective mothers in the inheritance
of their grandfather Aniceto Oyao.

ISSUE:
Whether the plaintiffs has the right of claim to the hereditary estate, as natural children in
representation of their deceased mothers.
HELD:
There can be no question on the proposition that natural children have not the right to represent
their natural father or mother in the succession of the legitimate ascendants of the latter. This has
been made clear in the case of Llorente vs. Rodriguez et al., 10 Phil. 585.

In that case Rosa Llorente, a natural daughter of one of the legitimate children of the deceased
Martina Avalle, tried to intervene in the settlement of the estate of the said deceased in
representation of her father, a legitimate son of said Martina Avalle, who had predeceased the
latter. But Rosa Llorente was not allowed to intervene because, as a natural child of one of Martina
Avalle's legitimate children, she had no right to the inheritance. Plaintiffs in the present case are in
that same position. Their claim to their grandfather's inheritance is, therefore, without legal basis.


SALI, EL-SHAL S
LLB III-B


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Grey Vs Fabie
GR. No. L-45160
May 28, 1939

FACTS:

After the death of Rosario Fabie y Grey, her alleged will was presented to the court for probate.
It was assailed by Serafin Fabie and Jose Fabie, the court, held that, they could not inherit
intestate from Rosario Fabie , had no interest in the will in question, hence, they have no right
to impugn it, whereupon, it ordered the continuation of the probate proceedings without the
intervention of the said oppositors.
The oppositors contend that they do not attempt to succeed their cousin by their own right but
by the right of representation. If Ramon Fabie were living, so they say, he would undeniably be
entitled to succeed his niece Rosario Fabie y Grey, in which case, upon the death of Ramon
Fabie, his natural children, the herein oppositors would succeed him, because Ramon Fabie had
no legitimate children. They cited article 924 and 925 of the Civil Code to support their
contentions.
After trial, the court probated the said will of the deceased Rosario Fabie y Grey, and appointed
the petitioner, Jose Grey, executor upon filing a bond for P10,000.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the oppositors-appellants are entitled to inherit from their natural cousin
Rosario Fabie y Grey

HELD:

No, they are not entitled to inherit even through the right of representation because they dont
have such right. The oppositors-appellants are not children of brothers or sisters of the
deceased Rosario Fabie y Grey, but of the latter's uncle, Ramon Fabie, hence, it is unnecessary
to state that the right of representation does not lie in this case. From this it inevitably follows
that the oppositors have no interest whatsoever in the will of the deceased Rosario Fabie y
Grey, wherefore, they are not entitled to intervene in the proceedings for the probate of the
said will.
SAN JUAN, ANGELITA T.
LLB III-B

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Director of Lands Vs Aguas
GR. No. L-42737
August 11, 1936

FACTS:
This appeal was taken by Teodoro Santos, Amado L. Santos, Mercedes Santos and Bartola
Santos from an order of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in cadastral case No. 4, G. L. R,
O. Cadastral Record No. 127, ordering the cancellation of transfer certificate of title No. 4811 of
the deceased Lucina Guesa to the land designated as lot No. 2450-B of the cadastral case in
question, and the issuance of another certificate in favor of the appellee Cayetano Guesa. The
appellants' petition, which was denied by the court, sought the issuance of the new certificate
in their name, alleging that they were the ones favored by the reservation to which the land
described in said certificate of title was subject.
The land in question had belong to Isidro Santos. He donated it to Tomas Santos upon whose
death, which took place on April 29, 1927, the property was inherited by the latter's legitimate
son, Romeo Santos. Upon the death of Romeo Santos on April 23, 1928, it passed to his
legitimate mother Lucina Guesa to whom transfer certificate of title No. 4811 was issued with
the notation that the property was subject to the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
Lucina Guesa died on April 14, 1933, and was succeeded by her legitimate father Cayetano
Guesa as sole heir. Tomas Santos was an adulterous son, and the appellants and petitioners are
the legitimate children of Isidro Santos. Therefore, the appellants are not legitimate relatives of
Romeo Santos, although, with relation to him, they are within the third degree and belong to
the same line.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the reservation established by article 811 of the Civil Code, for the benefit of
the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line of the descendant from whom the
ascendant reservor received the property, should be understood as made in favor of all the
relatives within said degree and belonging to the line above-mentioned, without distinction
between legitimate, natural and illegitimate ones not having the legal status of natural children
HELD:

The provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code apply only to legitimate relatives. Is every
ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to reserve? Should the natural father or
grandfather reserve the properties proceeding from the mother or other natural ascendant?
Article 811 does not distinguish; it speaks of the ascendant, without attaching the qualification
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of legitimate, and, on the other hand, the same reason that exists for applying the provision to
the natural family exists for applying it to the legitimate family. Nevertheless, the article in
referring to the ascendant in an indeterminate manner shows that it imposes the obligation to
reserve only upon the legitimate ascendant.
Articles 809 and 810 themselves speak only of ascendants. Can it in any way be maintained that
they refer to legitimate as well as to natural ascendants? They evidently establish the legitime
of the legitimate ascendants included as forced heirs in number 2 of article 807. And article
811, and as we will see also article 812, continues to treat of this same legitime. The right
of the natural parents and children in the testamentary succession is wholly included in the
eighth section and is limited to the parents, other descendants of such class being excluded in
articles 807, No. 3, and 846. Therefore, the place which article 811 occupies in the Code is proof
that it refers only to legitimate ascendants. And if there were any doubt, it disappears upon
considering the text of articles 938, which states that the provision of article 811 applies to
intestate succession which is just established in favor of the legitimate direct ascending line, the
text of articles 939 to 945, which treat of intestate succession of natural parents, as well as that
of articles 840 to 847, treating of their testamentary succession, which do not allude directly or
indirectly to that provision.


SAN JUAN, ANGELITA T.
LLB III-B


















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[146]

Anuran Vs Aquino
GR. No. L-12397
April 02, 1918

FACTS:
The plaintiff, Florencia Anuran, is the widow of Ambrosio Aquino, to whose estate the property
described in the complaint belongs. The defendant, Ana Aquino, is the natural child of a sister
of Ambrosio Aquino, deceased, that on the death of Ambrosio Aquino, one Norberto Capia
was appointed administrator of his intestate estate, at the instance of Ana Aquino, acting
collusion with the administrator fraudulently represented to the court that Ambrosio Aquino,
had died intestate, leaving no heirs other than Ana Aquino, a daughter of his deceased sister. At
the time when these representations were made, both Ana Aquino and the administrator well
knew that the plaintiff, Florencia Anuran, was the surviving spouse of Ambrosio Aquino, and
that Ana Aquino was not a legitimate but a natural daughter of the deceased sister of Ambrosio
Aquino. Without notice to the widow, Ana Aquino, acting in collusion with the administrator
appointed at her instance, fraudulently procured the entry of an order in the administration
proceedings dated March 12, 1912, authorizing and approving the delivery by the administrator
of all property of the estate to the alleged sole heir, Ana Aquino, the defendant in this suit, and
that the motion of the administrator on which this order was based was supported by the
affidavit of Ana Aquino, setting forth the false and misleading statement of the alleged facts as
hereinbefore indicated.
The widow, Florencia Anuran, who was not a party of record in the administration proceedings,
did not discover that this order had been entered until about the 14th day of February, 1914,
when she promptly entered her appearance in the administration proceedings and moved that
the order be set aside, and that she be declared the sole heir of the deceased, who, as she
alleged, had died without leaving either ascendants, or descendants, or collateral relatives
entitled to share in the estate.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the plaintiff, Florencia Anuran, the widow of Ambrosio Aquino be declared the
sole heir of the deceased
HELD:
Yes, In the light of the facts presented, there is not and cannot be any substantial question as to
the right of the widow to take the estate of her deceased husband as his sole heir under the
provisions of articles 943 and 952 of the Civil Code. These articles are as follows:
A natural or legitimized child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives
inherit from the natural or legitimated child.
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[147]

In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews, children, whether of the whole blood or
not, of the same surviving spouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce, shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased.
We conclude that the judgment entered in the court below should be affirmed, with the costs
of this instance against the appellant.

SAN JUAN, ANGELITA T.
LLB III-B


































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[148]

Diaz vs Pamuti
GR L-66574
Feb. 21, 1990

FACTS:

Felisa is a niece of Simona who together with Felisas mother Juliana werethe only legitimate children of
spouses Felipe and Petronilla; Juliana married Simon and out of their union were born Felisa and
anotherchild who died during infancy; Simona is the widow of Pascual and mother of Pablo; Pablo was
the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual and Simona; Pascual died in 1970; Pablo in 1973 and
Simona in 1976; Pablo at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona and sixminor natural
children: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and twominor children with Felixberta. 1976 Judge
Jose Raval declared Felisa as the sole legitimate heir of Simona. Petitioners Anselma and Felixberta as
guardians of their minor childrenfile for opposition and motion to exclude Felisa from further taking part
orintervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona. 1980 Judge Bleza issued an order
excluding Felisa from further takingpart or intervening and declared her to be not an heir of Simona.
Felisas motion for recon was denied, and she filed her appeal to theIntermediate Appellate Court
declaring her as the sole heir of Simona.


ISSUE:

Who are the legal heirs of Simona, her niece Felisa or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo)
Felisa?


HELD:

The 6 minor children cannot represent their father Pablo in the successionof the latter to the intestate
estate of his legitimate mother Simon because of the barrier provided for under Art. 992 of the Civil
CodeArt 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother;nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner fromthe
illegitimate child. Pablo is a legitimate child. However, his 6 minor children are illegitimate.

Art 992 provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely asuccession ab intestate between
the illegitimate child and the legitimatechildren and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate
child. Theymay have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for thepurposes of Art. 992.

An illegitimate child cannot inherit ab intestate from the legitimatechildren and relatives of his father
and mother.


SING, MARC ERIC W.
LLB III-B




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[149]

SANTILLON vs. MIRANDA.
G.R. No. L-19281
June 30, 1965

Topic/Doctrine: Legitime

FACTS:

Santillon died without testament in leaving one son, Claro, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. About four
years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of administration. Opposition to said
petition was entered by the widow Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario
Corrales. On April 25, 1961, Claro filed a Motion to Declare Share of Heirs and to resolve the
conflicting claims of the parties with respect to their respective rights in the estate. Invoking Art. 892 of
the New Civil Code, he insisted that after deducting 1/2 from the conjugal properties is the conjugal
share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be divided as follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him. Oppositor
Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of
the New Civil Code to another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro claimed 3/4 of Pedros
inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2.

ISSUE:

How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be divided when the only survivors are the spouse
and one legitimate child?

HELD:

On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession the widow or widower gets only
one-fourth. She or he may get one-half if the testator so wishes. So, the law virtually leaves it to each
of the spouses to decide (by testament, whether his or her only child shall get more than his or her
survivor).

Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance that whereas Article 834
of the Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was taken, contained two paragraphs governing two
contingencies, the first, where the widow or widower survives with legitimate children (general rule),
and the second, where the widow or widower survives with only one child (exception), Art. 996 omitted
to provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the legislators desire to promulgate just one
general rule applicable to both situations.


SORRONDA, NIA MAY T.
LLB III-B






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[150]

RE: MARIO V. CHANLIONGCO 79 SCRA 364
A.M. No. 190
October 18, 1977

Topic/Doctrine: Legitime

FACTS:

This matter refers to the claims for retirement benefits filed by the heirs of the late ATTY. MARIO V.
CHANLIONGCO an attorney of the Supreme court .Atty. Chanliongco died ab intestato. The above
named flied the appellants for benefits with the accruing and with the Government Service System.
Aside from his widow, Dra. Fidel B. Chanliongco and an only Intimate Mario it appears that there are
other deceased to namely, Mrs. Angelina C. , Jr., both born out of wedlock to Angelina R Crespo, and
duly recognized by the deceased. Except Mario, Jr., who is only 17 years of age, all the claimants are of
legal age.

ISSUE:

What, therefore, to be settled are the retirement benefits and the money value of leave, both of which
are to be paid by this court as the deceased's last employer.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, THE CLAIMS ARE HEREBY APPROVED. THE FINANCE AND/OR DISBURSING OFFICER OF THIS
COURT IS ORDERED To pay IMMEDIATELY TO EACH AND EVERY CLAIMANT HE VARIOUS SUMS
HEREUNDER INDICATED OPPOSITE THEIR NAMES, AS FOLLOWS:
1
. FIDELA B. CHANLIONGCO
A. HER 4/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT
GRATUITY
P19,535.025
B. HER SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE
OF TEAL LEAVE, UNPAID SALARY AND
10% ADJUSTMENT:

(1) AS HER CONJUGAL SHARE 6,752.72
(2) AS A LEGAL HEIR P1,688.18
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HER P27,975.93
2. MARIO CHANLIONGCO II
A. HIS 8/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT
GRATUITY
P39,070.05
B. HIS SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF
TERMINAL LEAVE, UNPAID SALARY
AND 10% ADJUSTMENT
3,376.36
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[151]

TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HIM P42,446.41
3. MA. ANGELINA C. BUENAVENTURA:
A. HER 2/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT
GRATUITY
P9,767.51
B. HER SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE
OF TERMINAL LEAVE, UNPAID SALARY
AND 10% ADJUSTMENT
844.10
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HER P10,611.61
4. MARIO CHANLIONGCO JR. TO BE
PAID THROUGH HIS MOTHER AND
NATURAL GUARDIAN, ANGELINA
CRESPO):

A. HIS 2/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT
GRATUITY
P9,767.51
B. HIS SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF
TERMINAL LEAVE, UNPAID SALARY
AND 10% ADJUSTMENT
844.10
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HIM P10,611.61




SORRONDA, NIA MAY T.
LLB III-B














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[152]

Vda. De Consuegra vs GSIS
37 SCRA 315, 325
Topic/Doctrine: Heirs

FACTS:

Jose Consuegra was employed as a shop foreman of the Office of the District Engineer in Surigao Del
Norte.When he was still alive, he contracted two marriages:
o First Rosario Diaz; 2 children = Jose Consuegra Jr. and Pedro but both predeceased him
o 2
nd
Basilia Berdin; 7 children. (this was contracted in GF while the first marriage subsisted)
Being a GSIS member when he died, the proceeds of his life insurance were paid by the GSIS to Berdin
and her children who were the beneficiaries named in the policy.
Since he was in the govt service for 22.5028 years, he was entitled to retirement insurance benefits, for
which no beneficiary was designated.
Both families filed their claims with the GSIS, which ruled that the legal heirs were Diaz who is entitled
to one-half or 8/16 of the retirement benefits and Berdin and her children were entitled to the
remaining half, each to receive an equal share of 1/16.
Berdin went to CFI on appeal. CFI affirmed GSIS decision.

ISSUE:

To whom should the retirement insurance benefits be paid?

HELD:

Both families are entitled to half of the retirement benefits.The beneficiary named in the life insurance
does NOT automatically become the beneficiary in the retirement insurance. When Consuegra, during
the early part of 1943, or before 1943, designated his beneficiaries in his life insurance, he could NOT
have intended those beneficiaries of his life insurance as also the beneficiaries of his retirement
insurance because the provisions on retirement insurance under the GSIS came about only when CA 186
was amended by RA 660 on June 18, 1951.

Sec. 11(b) clearly indicates that there is need for the employee to file an application for retirement
insurance benefits when he becomes a GSIS member and to state his beneficiary. The life insurance and
the retirement insurance are two separate and distinct systems of benefits paid out from 2 separate and
distinct funds.

In case of failure to name a beneficiary in an insurance policy, the proceeds will accrue to the estate of
the insured. And when there exists two marriages, each family will be entitled to one-half of the estate.


SORRONDA, NIA MAY T.
LLB III-B




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[153]

Del Rosario vs. Conanan
G.R. No. L-37903
March 30, 1977

Topic/Doctrine: Share of Surviving Spouse Concurring With Legitimate Ascendants and
Illegitimate Children (Article 1000 in relation to Article 343)

FACTS:

On November 13, 1972, petitioner filed with the court subject of which is the estate left by her
late son, Felix L. del Rosario, who died in a plane crash on September 12, 1969 at Antipolo,
Rizal.

The oppositor admits that petitioner is the legitimate mother of the late Felix L. Del Rosario. The
latter admits that oppositor Dorotea Otera del Rosario, is the legitimate surviving wife of the
deceased Felix Del Rosario. Petitioner also admits that Marilou Del Rosario, is the legally
adopted child of the late Felix and Dorotea Otera del Rosario. They are the only surviving
nearest relatives of Felix(deceased). A petition for summary settlement is allowed under the
provision of the rules of court, the same rule specifically limits the action to estates the gross
value of which does not exceed P10, 000.00. In the instant petition, however, clearly alleges
that the value of the real properties alone left by the deceased Felix amounts to P33,000.00
which is obviously over and above the value of the estate allowed under the rules. The action
taken by the petitioner construed as one filed under an intestate proceeding as the
requirements provided by law for the same has not been complied with.

The contention of the petitioner that Article 343 is applicable in the instant case where it does
not exclude the surviving parent of the deceased adopter, not only because a contrary view
would defeat the intent of the framers of the law, but also because in intestate succession,
where legitimate parents or ascendants concur with the surviving spouse of the deceased, the
latter does not necessarily exclude the former from the inheritance.

The respondents countered petitioners record on appeal violates the material data rule in that
it does not state when the notice of appeal and appeal bond were filed with the lower court in
disregard of the requirement of Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court that the record on
appeal must contain such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time. Further, the
petitioner not being included as intestate heir of the deceased cannot be considered as a co-
owner of or have any right over the properties sought to be partitioned and under the
provisions of Section 1, Rule 69 in relation to Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court,
such action must be commenced or instituted by the party in interest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the legitimate mother is included as intestate heir to be considered as
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[154]

Co-owner with the surviving spouse and adopted child of Felix Del Rosario (deceased) over the
properties sought to be partitioned


HELD:

YES. As provided under Article 343 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 1000 should apply in
resolving their hereditary rights. Under Article 343, an adopted child surviving with legitimate
parents of the deceased adopter, has the same successional rights as an acknowledged natural
child, which is comprehended in the term illegitimate children. Consequently, the respective
charges of the surviving spouse, ascendant and adopted child should be determined by Article
1000 of the New Civil Code, which reads: Art. 1000.If legitimate ascendants, the surviving
spouse and illegitimate children are left, the ascendants shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance, and the other half shall be divided between the surviving spouse and the
illegitimate children so that such widow or widower shall have one-fourth of the estate, the
illegitimate children the other fourth.Thus, Dorotea Otera del Rosario, the legitimate surviving
wife, shall be entitled to , Marilou Del Rosario, the legally adopted child gets , and the
legitimate mother . The adopted child in such case gets the rights of an acknowledged natural
child (Articles 343, 341, and 1000 of the Civil Code), not of a legitimate child, otherwise the
legitimate ascendant (the mother) would be excluded. The presence of adopted child does not
exclude the legitimate parent or ascendant.


TANJUSAY, MARIA KATRINA S.
LLB III-B



















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[155]

GSIS vs. Custodio
G.R. No. L-26170
January 27, 1969

Topic/Doctrine: Share of Brothers and Sisters Concurring With Nephews and Nieces
(Article 1005)

FACTS:

The late Simeon Custodio who during his lifetime was a member of the Retirement Insurance
Fund administered by plaintiff GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), died
intestate at Tanay, Rizal, on February 16, 1957. He was survived by his only sister, SUSANA
CUSTODIO and his nephews and nieces, namely, ROMUALDO, JULIAN, MACARIO A., MOISES,
MACARIO C., ADRIANO, CELESTINA, LUISA and DAVID, all surnamed CUSTODIO. After Simeons
death, there was found among his personal belongings an undated and unsigned application
form for Retirement accomplished by said SIMEON CUSTODIO wherein his sister, SUSANA
CUSTODIO was named the beneficiary, although said application form was never submitted to
the GSIS.

On July 7, 1957, at the residence of Leon K. Tongohan, son-in-law of Susana Custodio, at Tanay,
Rizal, SUSANA, ROMUALDO, JULIAN, MACARIO A., MOISES, ADRIANO, and CELESTINA, all
surnamed CUSTODIO, and JULIA TONGOHAN 'executed a document entitled 'Extra Judicial
Settlement of Estate Among Heirs' which provides, among other things that For any amount
due the decedent SIMEON CUSTODIO, holder of GSIS policy No. 73557, our Aunt Susana
Custodio, as the decedent's only living sister, is hereby recognized by the aforementioned heirs
as the sole and only beneficiary of the decedent SIMEON CUSTODIO, and giving unto our Aunt
Susana Custodio, the right to file, sign and receive whatever retirement pay under Republic Act
660, as amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 728 and 1123, and other amendments thereof.

The Custodio heirs wrote a letter to the Manager of the Government Service Insurance System
stating, among other things, that they 'inadvertently signed on July 7, 1957, without properly
having understood, a document whereby it was made to appear therein that the
aforementioned persons are waiving their claims on the benefits legally accruing to the
aforementioned deceased'. Appellee Susana Custodio made clear her non-opposition to the
division of the estate where Macario C., Luisa and David would share per stirpes.


ISSUE:

Whether or not the non-signatory intestate heirs of late Simeon Custodio be considered as
having recognized Susana Custodio (sister) as the only beneficiary of Simeon's retirement
money?


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[156]

HELD:

NO. The intestate heirs, Macario C., Luisa and David Custodio, who did not sign the deed of
extrajudicial settlement, cannot be considered as having recognized Susana Custodio as the
only beneficiary of Simeon's retirement money. There is no evidence, the case having been
submitted for decision below solely on a stipulation of facts, that these non-signatory heirs had
agreed, or accepted other benefits under the deed of partition, as appellee now claims. Susana
Custodio did not oppose their separate motion for reconsideration and, actually, even prayed
that said motion be granted (Record on Appeal, page 56), although the court denied it just the
same. These three (3) heirs should inherit per stirpes, in accordance with Article 1005 of the
Civil Code. As Macario C. Custodio (as distinguished from Macario A., who signed the
agreement) is the only child of Crispin, said Macario C. inherits by representation the onefourth
(1/4) share pertaining to his father, while Luisa and David Custodio, being two (2) of six (6)
children of Jacinto, are each entitled to a sixth of one-fourth (1/6 x 1/4) equivalent to 1/24 of
the hereditary mass.


TANJUSAY, MARIA KATRINA S.
LLB III-B

























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[157]

PADURA vs BALDOVINO
G.R. No. L-11960
December 27, 1958

Topic/Doctrine: Full Blood Concurring With Half Blood

FACTS:

During the lifetime of Agustin Padura, he contracted two marriages, one with Gervacia Landig,
to whom he had one child, Manuel Padura, and second with Benita Garin to whom he had two
children, Fortunato and Candelaria Padura. Agustin died on April 26, 1908, leaving a last will
and testament, duly probated, wherein he bequeathed his properties among his three (3)
children and his surviving spouse, Benita Garin.

Fortunato was adjudicated four parcels of land. He died unmarried on May 28, 1908, without
having executed a will and not having any issue, the parcels of land were inherited exclusively
by his mother Benita. Benita was issued a Torrens Certificate of Title in her name, subject to the
condition that the properties were reservable in favor of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which said property came.

On Aug 26, 1934, Candelaria died, leaving as her heirs her four(4) legitimate children: Cristeta,
Melania, Anicia, and Pablo Baldovino (Oppositors-appellants). On Oct 6, 1940, Manuel also
died, survived by his legitimate children Dionisia, Felisa, Flora, Cornelio, Francisco, Juana, and
Severino Padura (Petitioners-appellees). Upon the death of Benita (the reservista) on Oct 15,
1952, the heirs took possession of the reservable properties.

The CFI Laguna declared the children of Manuel and Candelaria to be the rightful reservees, and
as such, entitled to the reservable properties (the original reservees, Candelaria and Manuel,
having predeceased the reservista).

The Baldovino heirs (children of Candelaria) filed a petition seeking to have the properties
partitioned, such that one-half be adjudicated to them, and the other half to the appellees,
allegedly on the basis that they inherited by right of representation from their respective
parents, the original reservees. Padura heirs opposed, maintaining that they should all be
deemed as inheriting in their own right, under which, they claim, each should have an equal
share. In essence, the Baldovino heirs, who are whole blood relatives of the reservista, were
contending that they should get more than their half-blood relatives, the Padura heirs. They
anchor their claim on Articles 1006 and 1008 of the Civil Code. The CFI (now RTC) of Laguna
declared all the reservees, without distinction, co-owners, pro-indiviso, in equal shares of the
parcels of land.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the the reserved properties should be apportioned among the heirs
equally?
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[158]

HELD:

NO. As to the rule between brothers and sisters of the full blood survive with brothers and
sisters of half blood. The former shall be entitled a share double that of the latter (Article 1006).
The rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should likewise be
operative. On ther hand, the children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed per
capita or per stirpes (Article 1008). Thus the Baldovino heirs shall get more than their half-blood
relatives, the Padura heirs.

In other words, reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives (reservatarios) to
whom the property should be returned but within that group. The nephews of the whole blood
should take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half blood.The reserva troncal
is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable property to the
third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid
its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista). The
purpose of the reserva troncal is accomplished once the property has devolved to the specified
relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on, there is no further occasion for its
application. In the relations between one reservatario and another of the same degree, there is
no call for applying Art 891 in this case to the respective share of each in the reversionary
property should be governed by the ordinary rules of interstate succession.

In the same case of Florentino vs Florentino (as restated in the case) where upon the death of
the ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all the reservatorios as a
class, but only to those nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus), excluding those
reservatarios of more remote degree... And within the third degree of relationship from the
descendant (prepositus), the right of representation operates in favor of nephews. Proximity of
degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate succession so is
the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to share double that of brothers
and nephews of half-blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity
of degree and the right of representation of nephews are made to apply.



TANJUSAY, MARIA KATRINA S.
LLB III-B








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[159]

BICOMONG v ALMANZA
80 SCRA 421
November 29, 1977

FACTS:

The subject matter is the half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in 5 parcels of land w/c she inherited
from SilvestraGlorioso.

There are 3 sets of plaintiffs: the Bicomongs. The Tolentinos, and Francisca Bagsic, for their shares in
the properties of Maura Bagsic.

When Maura Bagsic died, the properties passed on to CristetaAlmanza, who also died without division
of the properties.

Trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Almanzas appealed to CA. It was contended that
since Maura died ahead of Felipa, Felipa succeeded to Mauras estate, to the exclusion of the plaintiffs.
They said the relatives nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones.The plaintiffs claim that Felipa
died ahead of Maura. CA certified case to SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Maura is succeeded by Felipa to the exclusion of nephews and nieces of half-blood.

HELD:

NO. In the absence of descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, collateral
relatives succeed to the entire estate of deceased. Since Maura died intestate and her husband and her
ascendants died ahead of her, she is succeeded by surviving collateral relatives, namely the daughter of
her sister of full blood and the children of her brother and sisters of half blood, in accordance with Art
975 of New Civil Code.

The nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their own right. Nephews and nieces alone do not
inherit by right of representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the
deceased. The contention that Maura should be succeeded by Felipa to the exclusion of the nephews
and nieces of half-blood is erroneous. As it was shown, Felipa predeceased her sister Maura.



TINGKAHAN, MARVEEN BAZAR S.
LLB III-B







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[160]

ALVIAR VS ALVIAR, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-22402
June 30, 1969

TOPIC/DOCTRINE:Collateral Relatives

FACTS:

Clemente Alviar and Belen Alviar were legitimate children of Florentino Alviar and Bibiana Carillo.
Sometime after the latter's deatH, Florentino Alviar married Flora Erasga, who begot him five (5)
children, namely; Cesareo, Fabiana, Luisa, Zenaida and Castor, all surnamed Alviar. Belen Alviar died
intestate. She was single and had been survived by her brother Clemente Alviar, and five (5) half
brothers and sisters. Belen's estate consisted of two (2) parcels of agricultural land and a residential lot.

The six brothers and sisters executed a deed of extrajudicial partition adjudicating to Clemente Alviar
the two parcels of agricultural land, and to the five (5) half brothers and sisters of the deceased the
residential lot. In pursuance of said deed, the parties took possession of their respective shares.
Moreover, Clemente Alviar titles to said Lots 2 and 3. The residential land in Pasay City was, in turn,
partitioned among his aforesaid half brothers and sisters and subdivided into lots Nos. 223-D-1 and 223-
D-2. The first was allotted to Luisa and Zenaida Alviar, who secured thereto TCT No. 8495 in their names,
whereas the second was covered by TCT No. 8496 in the name of Cesareo Alviar, his sister Fabiana
having renounced her share therein in his favor. Their brother Castor had, likewise, waived his share in
said residential land.

Over five years later, Clemente commenced the present action, against his half brother and sisters,
Cesareo, Fabiana, Luisa and Zenaida Alviar, and their mother, and his step-mother, Flora Erasga, to annul
the deed of extrajudicial partition, upon the ground that, acting in bad faith and conspiring,
confederating and conniving with each other, as well as "taking advantage of plaintiff's lack of
education, illiteracy and ignorance, and knowing fully well that" the "children by second marriage of
Florentino Alviar had no rights, participation and interest over" the 3 lots left by Belen Alviar, the
defendants had "misled" the plaintiff "into signing" said deed. Inasmuch as Clemente Alviar died soon
thereafter, his widow, Paulina Pamulaklakin and their children, Ramon and Norma Alviar, substituted
him as plaintiff in this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, as a full brother of Belen Alviar, the degree of relationship to her of the deceased
Clemente Alviar was nearer than that of their half brothers and sisters, the children of their father by
second marriage.


The lower court decided this question in the negative and correctly. Indeed, "proximity of relationship
HELD:
is determined by the number of generations" and "each generation forms a degree." In relation to Belen
Alviar, her full brother, Clemente Alviar, is, therefore, in the same degree of relationship as their half
brothers and sisters, the aforementioned defendants, for all of them constitute the first generation of
descendants of their common father, Florentino Alviar. In fact, this rationalization is rendered
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[161]

superfluous, apart from being confirmed, by the explicit language of Arts. 1003, 1004 and 1006 of our
Civil Code, reading:

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles.

ART. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal
shares.

ART. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers and sisters of the
half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter.

These provisions, particularly the last, leave no room for doubt that brothers and sisters of full blood do
not exclude those of half blood, for, otherwise, there would be no occasion for the concurrence of both
classes and the application of said Art. 1006.

More important than this, however, is the fact that Clemente Alviar had entered into a contract with his
half brothers and sisters for the extrajudicial partition of the properties of the deceased Belen Alviar and
that there is nothing in the stipulation of facts submitted by the parties to warrant the annulment or
rescission of said agreement. The validity thereof thus being indubitable, there is absolutely no reason
why the same should be disturbed.



TINGKAHAN, MARVEEN BAZAR S.
LLB III-B





















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[162]

Celedonia Solivio vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 83484
February 12, 1990

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Collateral Relatives

FACTS:

This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., who died a bachelor,
without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving
relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his
mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister
of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr. Salustia and her sister, Celedonia brought up
Esteban, Jr.

Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties which she had inherited from her
mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife but no conjugal property was acquired
during her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.

On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr.,
including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due
time, the titles of all these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.

During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some
close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor
but deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack
without having set up the foundation.

Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's
properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation
to be named after his mother, from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping
indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased.
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the
formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed
for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. She was
declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr.

Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order declaring
Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. On
October 27, 1978, her motion was denied by the court for tardiness. Instead of appealing the
denial, Concordia for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages.Trial court
rendered judgment in favor of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva.


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[163]

ISSUE:
Whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor of Celedonia, his
relative within the third degree on his mother's side from whom he had inherited them.

HELD:

The Court heldthat the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for
Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he
inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation
in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his mothers side.
The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it
from another ascendant or a brother ora sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant
from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Art. 891.


TINGKAHAN, MARVEEN BAZAR S.
LLB III-B




























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[164]

In re Estate of Lao Sayco
21 Phil 815

Topic/Doctrine: Escheat

FACTS:

Lao Sayco died. The administrator of his estate requested that the property of the decedent be
delivered to his nephew (allegedly his sole heir). Notices were sent to interested parties to
establish the right of the alleged heir, and the notice of the date of the hearing was made thru
publication for three weeks prior to the date set. The municipality of Mambajao entered its
opposition, claiming that the property of the decedent should be delivered to it because the
decedent had no legal heirs. The lower court ruled in favor of Mambajao. The administrator
appealed the judgment.

ISSUE:

W/N the municipality of Mambajao was entitled to the property left by the decedent.

HELD:

No, for failure of Mambajao to comply with procedural requirements. In order that the
property which belonged to the decedent Lao Sayco may be decreed to have reverted to the
Senate, pursuant to the provisions of section 751 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is
indispensable that the requirements contained in the above-quoted section of the said code
should have been complied with. The municipality of Mambajao merely prayed for an order of
reversion and for the adjudication in behalf of the municipality of the property aforementioned;
it did not comply with the provisions of the law by furnishing the required proofs in regard to
the matters hereinabove indicated, which must be the subject of an investigation. It does not
appear that there was an inquisition provided by law, for the record is not accompanied by any
certified copy of the investigatory of the real andpersonal property that belonged to the said
decedent, with a statement of the places where the realty is located. Neither is it shown to have
ascertained whether the deceased Chinaman executed any will during his lifetime, or whether the
deceased Chinaman executed any will during his lifetime, or whether he left in Mambajao or in any
other place any relative entitled to inherit from him. Moreover, the notice summoning the persons
who believed they were entitled to his property should have been published for at least six
consecutive weeks, and not for three as was directed in the order.


TORRES, ROMEL G
LLB-IIIB



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[165]


City of Manila vs. Archdiocese of Manila
36 Phil 815

Topic/Doctrine: Escheat

FACTS:

The City of Manila wants certain properties being administered by the Roman Catholic Church
to be declared escheated. It claims that the original owner of said properties, a certain Ana
Sarmiento, has died sometime in 1668 intestate with no heirs to succeed. The Archbishop
contends that the church has rightfully and legally succeeded to the possession and
administration of said property that it had been managing for more than 200 years.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said properties should be escheated.

HELD:

No. It was shown that Ana Sarmiento did not die intestate. Evidence presented has shown a
genuine will and codicils. It was further shown that the heir named therein, her nephew, has
religiously complied with the terms of said will. Therefore, the properties cannot be escheated
in favor of the government.



TORRES, ROMEL G
LLB-IIIB















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[166]

Municipality of San Pedro vs. Colegio de San Jos
65 Phil 318


Topic/Doctrine:Escheat

FACTS:

The Municipality of San Pedro, Laguna filed in the CFI a petition claiming the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan
by the right of Escheat. Colegio de San Jose, claiming to be the exclusive owner of the said hacienda, assailed
the petition upon the grounds that the petition does not allege sufficient facts to entitle the applicants to the
remedy prayed for. Carlos Young, claiming to be a lessee of the hacienda under a contract legally entered
with Coelegio de San Jose, also intervened in the case. Municipal Council of San Pedro, Laguna objected to
the appearance and intervention of CdSJ and Carlos Young but such objection was overruled. Furthermore
the lower court dismissed the petition filed for by Municipal Council of San Pedro.

ISSUE:

W/N the petition for escheats should be dismissed?

HELD:

YES. According to Sec. 750 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now Sec 1 of Rule 91), Sec. 751 (now Sec 3 of Rule
91) provides that after the publications and trial, if the court finds that the deceased is in fact the owner of
real and personal property situated in the country and has not left any heir or other person entitled there to,
it may order, after payment of debts and other legal expenses, the escheat and in such case, it shall
adjudicate the personal property to the municipality where the deceased had his last residence and the real
property to the municipality/ies where they are situated.

When a petition for escheat does not state facts which entitle the petitioner to the remedy prayed for and
even admitting them hypothetically, it is clear that there is no ground for the court to proceed to the
Inquisition provided by law, an interested party should not be disallowed from filing a motion to dismiss the
petition which is untenable from all standpoint. And when the motion to dismiss is entertained upon this
ground the petition may be dismissed unconditionally.

In this case, Colegio de San Jose and Carlos Young had a right to intervene as an alleged exclusive owner and
a lessee of the property respectively.

The Municipal base its right to escheat on the fact that the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, temporal
property of the Father of the Society of Jesus, were confiscated by the order of the King of Spain. From the
moment it was confiscated, it became the property of the commonwealth of the Philippines. Given this fact,
it is evident that the Municipality cannot claim that the same be escheated to them, because it is no longer
the case of real property owned by a deceased person who has not left any person which may legally claim it
(2
nd
requirement lacking).

TORRES, ROMEL G
LLB-IIIB


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[167]

Manuel Torres and Luz Lopez de Bueno vs. Margarita Lopez
G.R. No. L-24569
February 26, 1926

Topic/Doctrine: Right of Accretion

FACTS:

This case concerns the probate of the alleged will of the late Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez. Tomas
Rodriguez died in the City of Manila and leaving a considerable estate. Shortly thereafter
Manuel Torres, one of the executors named in the will asked that the will of Rodriguez be
allowed. Opposition was entered by Margarita Lopez, the first cousin of the deceased. In the
said will, the testator instituted as his only heirs his cousin, and the latters daughter. But the
cousin was incapacitated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the share of the cousin should go to the testators legal heirs, or should it go to
the co-heir, namely, the cousins daughter.

HELD:

The co-heir gets the share by accretion. It follows therefore that the instate heirs cannot claim
by intestacy said share, for accretion is preferred over intestacy. As has been stated by the
Supreme Court, intestate succession to vacant portion can only occur when accretion is
impossible.


TUBO, MARK JOSEPH G.
LLB III-B














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[168]

In re Will of the deceased Felisa Javier.SULPICIO RESURRECCIONvs.
AGUSTIN JAVIER, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-42539
October 23, 1936

Topic/Doctrine: Capacity to Succeed by Will or by Intestacy

FACTS:

Felisa Francisco Javier made a will instituting her husband Sulpicio Resurreccion as her universal
heir and, among other things, left a legacy of P2,000 in favor of her brother Gil Francisco Javier.
The testatrix died and her will was probated. The court, finding that Gil Francisco Javier died
before the testatrix made her will, ordered that the legacy of P2,000 in his favor revert to the
fund of the estate.

Gil Francisco Javier's children and heirs, claiming that they are entitled to receive the legacy of
P2,000 in favor of their father, appeal from the court's resolution ordering the reversion of this
amount to the funds of the estate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs of Gil Javier be represented for his share in the legacy.

HELD:

No. The testatrix, having no forced heirs, may dispose by will of all her property or any part
thereof in favor of any person qualified to acquire it. Upon being instituted as legatee by the
testatrix, Gil Francisco Javier lacked civil personality, which is extinguished by death, and,
therefore, lacked capacity to inherit by will on the ground that he could not be the subject of a
right. Consequently, his institution as a legatee had absolutely no legal effect and his heirs are
not now entitled to claim the amount of legacy. They cannot even claim under the principle of
representation because this takes place only in intestate inheritance. Furthermore, as the
legatee died before the testatrix, he could transmit nothing to his heirs.



TUBO, MARK JOSEPH, G.
LLB III-B





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[169]

In the matter of the will of the deceased Eugenio Zuiga del Rosario.
VICENTE REYES VILLAVICENCIOvs. SANTIAGO QUINIO, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-45248
April 18, 1939

Topic/Doctrine: Disposition of Property for Prayers and Pious Works

FACTS:

Eugenio Zuiga del Rosario died, leaving a will executed with all the legal formalities, which was
probated, over the opposition of some relatives.

The third clause of the said will translated from Tagalog into Spanish, reads as follows:
TERCERO: Declaro que tengo bienes inmuebles, muebles, semovientes, casa y camarin que he
heredado de mis padres y hermanos y, no teniendo yo heredero forzoso como ya he dicho mas arriba,
he dispuesto que mis citados bienes sean destinados solamente para la paz y felicidad de mi alma y de
las de mis padres y hermanos, y tambien para el beneficio de la iglesia, en la manera siguiente: x x x

Subsequently, Santiago Quinio and twenty-eight relatives of the testatrix within the fifth degree in the
collateral line, filed a motion with the conformity of the Bishop of Lipa wherein they asked that they be
declared heirs of said testatrix charged with the duty to comply with its provisions and contended that
after the deduction of the amounts for the alms and masses provided for by the testatrix in her will,
there will still be a sizable balance left out of her properties, which, in the absence of any disposition
made by the said testatrix, must pass by operation of law to her legal or intestate heirs. The executor
Vicente Reyes Villavicencio opposed the foregoing petition and the court denied the latter. The movants
appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the relatives of the deceased are entitled to succeed as to the remaining properties

HELD:

No. Such contention on the part of the appellants is based on something entirely inconsistent with what
the testatrix has ordered in the third clause of her will. The testatrix in said clause had disposed of her
proportions in accordance with the provision of Article 747 (now Art. 1029) of the Civil Code, a
disposition absolutely within her right, having no forced heirs.

The collateral relatives of the deceased, not being forced heirs, are not entitled to succeed her as to the
remainder of her properties, which does not exist, or as to the naked ownership of the same. The
provisions of the will disposing her properties for masses and pious works, the validity of which is not
questioned herein, should be complied with because the testatrix, not having forced heirs, may dispose
of her properties as she did in her will, for masses and pious works for the benefit of her soul and those
of her relatives.


TUBO, MARK JOSEPH, G.
LLB III-B
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[170]

ALMEIDA VS. CARILLO
G.R. No. L-45320
January 26, 1939

Topic/Doctrine: General Provisions
FACTS:
Macario Carillo died in the City of Manila on May 17, 1931, leaving as next of kin, his widow,
Rosenda Almeida, the appellee, and his three children by his first marriage, Corazon Edelmira
Carillo, Romulo Carrillo and Gracia Carrillo, the appellants. With the consent of all the relatives,
the appellee caused the remains of the deceased to be buried in the private lot of the Intengan
family in the North Cementery, Manila, to be transferred later after a period of three years but
not more than five, upon paying P100 for the use of the lot. Later on, in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, the intestate proceedings of the decedent were commenced, special
proceedings No. 39632, and in the project of partition submitted by all the co-heirs, and
approved by the court. Sometime in January, 1963, the appellee built a mausoleum in Binan,
Province of Laguna, for the remains of her late husband. Shortly before the expiration of the
period of five years for the exhumation of said remains, the appellants secured the consent of
the appellee to have the remains of the deceased transferred to the Ermita Church in
Manila.Such transfer would only be a temporary and that it would be easier to transfer the
remains from that place to mausoleum, which she had built in Binan, the appellee gave her
consent. Having been informed by her lawyer that she should not have given her consent, she
withdrew it, and inasmuch as the appellants were about to remove and transfer the remains,
the appellee moved the court to enjoin the appellants from removing the remains to the Ermita
Church. The motion ws duly herd and thereafter the court made permanent the preliminary
injunction which had been issued, and ordered the ppellants to abstain from removing the
remains of the deceased and transferring them to another place. Thereupon, the appeal was
perfected.
ISSUE:
Whether or not they have a better right than the appellee to disinter the remains of the
deceased and transfer them to the place they had chosen.
HELD:
The Court held that the appellees right, as the widow, is preferred, as may be gathered from
the spirit of section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code and from some American cases.
We hold that the court correctly decided the case and did not commit any of the assigned
errors. In this jurisdiction there is no express law which determines the preference, among the
next of kin of a deceased, with regard to the disposition of his remains. Under the terms of said
agreement, the appellee has a better right than the appellants, and the latter cannot object to
the transfer of the remains of the deceased by the appellee to the mausoleum she built in
Binan, Laguna. In this jurisdiction there is no law that expressly dteremines the right care,
possession and disposition of the remains of the deceased. Section 1103 of the Revised
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[171]

Administratice Code of 1917, quoted by the court, provides that the obligation to bury the
remains of a deceased, falls, firstly, on the surviving spouse; if the deceased was not married,
the obligation falls upon the closest next of kin; and if he dies with no surviving relative, the
burial is the concern of the authorities of the municipality where he died.

ABDURAJAK, PSAMIERA A.
LLB III-B





















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[172]

ARANETA VS. MONTELIBANO
G.R. No. 4177
September 15, 1909

Topic/Doctrine: General Provisions
FACTS:
On the 10
th
day of February, 1895, the plaintiff commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Occidental Negros against the defendant, for the purpose of compelling the defendant (1) to
execute and deliver a deed in favor of the plaintiff, for a certain parcel of land situated in the sitio of
Malisburg, barrio of Tansa, in the municipality of Saravia, in the Province of Occidental Negros; (2) to
deliver the possession of the said property in question is found in the complaint filed in said cause.No
further steps were taken in the prosecution of said cause until the 25
th
of April, 1907, when the
defendant filed a demurrer to said complaint, which demurrer was overruled by the court upon 30
th
day
of April 1907. The original action was commenced by Felix Araneta having died and Agaton Araneta
having been appointed as administrator of the said estate, he presented a motion in the Court of First
Instance to be substituted as plaintiff in said cause for Felix Araneta, which motion was granted. On the
Ist day May, 1907, the defendant, Braulio Montelibano, filed his answer. Upon the issues thus presented
the plaintiff went to trial. The letters do not show whether a demand was made for the payment of the
P6,000 in question or not. During the trial of the cause, the defendant offered proof. After hearing the
evidence adduced during the trial of the cause. From the judgment of the lower court the plaintiff
appealed, making several assignments of error, all of which relate to the sufficiency of the proof to
sustain the plaintiffs claim. There was no proof whatever offered by the plaintiff showing that the
original indebtedness had not been paid.
ISSUE:
Whether an action can be brought against an administrator or tutor for the purpose of the compelling
him to carry out a contract for the conveyance of land under the circumstances existing in this case.
HELD:
Under the provisions of article 661 of the Civil Code, the heirs, by virtue of the right of succession, are
subrogated to all the rights and obligations of the deceased. The heirs are more than the continuation of
the juridical personality of their predecessor in interest. The heirs having succeeded to whatever
interest their ancestry had in the land and contract in question, they may, by virtue of articles 1279 and
1280 of the Civil Code, be compelled in a proper action to execute the public instrument required under
the contract between their ancestor and Araneta. All of the heirs were not made parties defendant in
the present action. A part of them can not be required to execute the document prayed for by the
plaintiff. They must all be made parties defendant. They are all equally interested. Of course when they
are all made parties they will be permitted to show, providing they have evidence to justify it, that Leon
Lopez was, by the consent of the said Araneta, substituted for their ancestor in the contract which the
representatives of the said Araneta are now attempting to enforce. That is a question of defense.
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Whether Leon Lopez, being actually in possession should be made a party defendant in the present
action, we do not decide. Therefore all of the heirs of the said Aniceto Montelibano were not made
parties in the present action, the judgment of the lower court is hereby revoked and the cause is hereby
remanded to the lower court, with permission on the part of the plaintiff to amend his complaint.


ABDURAJAK, PSAMIERA A.
LLB III-B




















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[174]

JAYME VS. GAMBOA
G.R. No. L-47820
November 28, 1942

Topic/Doctrine: General Provisions
FACTS:
Fortunato E. Jayme claims the right to inherit from the deceased Antonio Jayme as the latters legally
acknowledged natural son. His claim is contested by the window and the legitimate children and
grandchildren of the deceased, who deny the status of acknowledged natural child asserted by him. It is
not disputed that Fortunato E. Jayme is the son of Antonio Jayme and Efigenia Enriquez, who appeared
to have known each other with intimacy in Manila. Antonio brought her to his home town, Bacolod,
where not long after her arrival she gave birth on April 17, 1883, to a child that was baptized on the 21
st

of the same month as Fortunato Enriquez, Lucio Jayme, a younger brother of Antonio, acted as the
godfather of the child. He had been commissioned by Antonio to arranged for the baptism. At the age of
five or six years, when he began to remember things, Fortunato came to know Antonio Jayme as his
father, for the latter used to visit him two or three times a week in the house where he live with his
,mother. In 1889 Fortunato and his mother moved from Bacolod to Pilr, Capiz where he stayed until
1899. In that year her mother sent her back to Bacolod for education. The father supported the child
until the latter went to Manila in the early part of the American Occupation. He departed with the
consent of his father. In short time Fortunato secured employment as a room boy in Malacanan of one
Major Kinley. Eight monts later Major Kinley took Fortunato to the United States after Fortunto had
obtained the consent of his father. He stayed in the United States from 1901 to 1910 as a self-
supporting student. After Fortunatos return to the Philippines in the yer 1910 until Antonio Jaymes
death, which occurred on October 19, 1937, he continued to be recognized and treated as a son not
only by ntonio Jayme but also by the latters legitimate children. After hearing the evidence Judge Soter
Rods, in an order dated July 10, 1939, declared Fortunato Jayme an acknowledged natural son of the
deceased Antonio Jayme, with the right to inherit from him. But upon motion for new trial filed by
counsel for the oppositors, the same judge on September 21, 1939, modified the said order by holding
that although Fortunto Jayme is a legally acknowledges son of the deceased Antonio Jayme, he is not
entitled to inherit from the latter because his rights as a natural acknowledged son of the decedent
cannot be enforced. From that order both parties appealed-the oppositors attacking it insofar as it
declares that the claimant is a legally acknowledged natural son of the deceased, and the claimant
insofar as it declares that he is not entitled to inherit.
ISSUE:
Whether Rule 1 or Rule 12 should be applied.
HELD:
Both reasons an authority sustain the contention of the claimant that rule 12 of the transitory provisions
is the one applicable. The circumstance that the claimant and the first two legitimate children of the
deceased were born before the present Civil Code went into effect constitutes no legal obstacle against
the exercise by the claimant of the right recognized by said Code. The decedent died long after it
entered into effect. Both the claimant and the oppositors base their right to inherit upon the provisions
of the Civil Code. The claimant and the oppositors acquired no vested right to the decedents
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[175]

inheritance until the moment of his death. That is another reason why rule 1 of the transitory provisions
is not applicable. Article 657 and 661 of the Civil Code read as follows Art. 657. The rights to the
succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death, Art. 661. Heirs succeed to all the
rights and obligations of the decedent by mere fact of his death. Rule 12 of the transitory provisions
expressly ordains that the inheritance of those who die after the Civil Code was in force shall be
allotted and divided in accordance with this code; even if a decedent made will under the prior
legislation and the testamentary dispositions should be harmonized with the latter; the legitimes,
betterments, and legacies shall be respected, but their amounts should be reduced when it is not
possible in any other manner to give each participant in the inheritance the share pertaining to him
according to this code. We find inescapable the application herein of rule 12 invoked by the claimant-
appellant.

ABDURAJAK, PSAMIERA A.
LLB III-B































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[176]

QUISON VS. SALUD
G.R. No. L-4314
November 21, 1908

Topic/Doctrine: General Provisions
FACTS:
Claro Quison owned land to the north of the estero, is undisputed, but the defendant claims that he
never owned any land south of the estero. A large amount of evidence, principally parol, was
introduced upon this question, and after an examination thereof, we are satisfied that it clearly
preponderates in favor of the decision of the court below, and that it was proven at the trial that
the land in question belongs to the heirs of Quison. The defendant relied to a great extent upon the
record of an action brought by Claro Quison in 1887 against one Perdeguera. Quison alleged in his
complaint in that action that the defendant therein had in unlawfully possessed himself of a portion
of his, the then plaintiffs land. In executing this judgment the officers of the law apparently gave
Quison possession of the land. The defendant also claims that Fidel Salud was given judicial
possession of the property here in controversy in 1895. The plaintiffs asked leave to present a
supplementary complaint against Higina Salud. The court ordered the dismissal of the action so far
as the defendant Fidel Salud and Gregorio De Villa were concerned. The plaintiffs then presented a
complaint against Higina Salud as the only defendant. She is the only one who appealed from the
judgment. Claro Quison died in 1902. It was proven at the trial that the present plaintiffs are the
next of kin and heirs, but it is said by the appellant that they are not entitled to maintain this action
because there is no evidence that any proceeding have been taken in court for the settlement of
the estate of Claro Quison, and that, without such settlement, the heirs cannot maintain this action.
ISSUE:
Whether, as to the land itself, it being the separate property of the wife, the husband of Lorenza
Quison could have any interest or right therein.
HELD:
It is very clear that as to the rents and profits of the land he does necessarily have such an interest
or right. The most that can be said in favor of the plaintiffs is that these lands were bienes
parafernales. In regard to the rents of such lands, articles 1385 and 1401 of the Civil Code shall be
followed. Therefore that the husband of Lorenza Quison was necessary party to this action. The
court shall, in furtherance of justice, and on such terms, if any, as may be proper, allow a party to
amend any pleading or proceeding and at any stage of the action, in either the Court of First
Instance or the Supreme Court, by adding or striking out the name or any party, either plaintiff or
defendant, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistaken or inadequate allegation
or description in any other respect, so that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be
determined, without regards to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner.
ABDURAJAK, PSAMIERA A.
LLB III-B

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[177]

Riera vs. Palmaroli
G.R. No. 14851
September 13, 1919

FACTS:
On April 19, 1918, the respondent Vicente Palmaroli, Consul General for Spain in the Philippine
Islands, produced in the Court of First Instance in the city of Manila a document dated on March 16,
1918, purporting to be the will of Juan Pons y Coll, and asked that it be admitted to probate. Publication
was accordingly made, and on May 20, 1918, order was entered admitting the will to probate.
Owing to the great distance between Palma de Mallorca and the city of Manila and to the lack of
adequate means of communication between the two places a difficulty then greatly exaggerated by
conditions incident to the European War the petitioner received no information of the probate
proceedings until after November 14, 1918. She had, however, received information of the fact of her
husbands death on or before June 19, 1918, for upon that date an attorney employed by her in Palma
de Mallorca addressed a letter to Wolfson & Wolfson, attorneys in the city of Manila, requesting them
to look after the interests of the petitioner in the estate of her deceased husband.
The present application was thereupon made to the Supreme Court on December 21, 1918, under
section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as already stated.
Issue:
Whether or not admitting the wills to probate will prosper.
Held:
In the course of the preceding discussion we have, for the purpose of explaining the situation
more clearly, permitted ourselves to refer to at least one detail not stated in the petition, as where we
state that the will purports to disinherit the petitioner. This fact, however, if not admitted, is
incontrovertible and apparent from the copy of the will exhibited with the answer. Moreover, the point
that no decisive influence on the decision. Our opinion therefore is to be taken as an expression of our
opinion upon the legal sufficiency of the petition exclusively upon the statements contained therein.
As will be discovered from the opinion, the inability of this court to grant relief in the case
before us is really due to the fact that the remedy conceded in section 513 admitting wills to probate.
The defect from which the petition suffers is therefore not curable by amendment and cannot be aided
by the taking of proof. The request for an order allowing proof to be submitted must therefore be
denied, and judgment absolute will be entered dismissing the petition with costs.

Alawi, Muhaidir II
LLB III-B




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CASTANEDA vs. ALEMANY
3 PHIL 426
March 19, 1904

FACTS:

The appellant contends that the court erred inholding that all legal formalities had been complied with
in the execution of the will of Dona Juana as the proof shows that the said will was not written by the
testatrix.

ISSUE:

WON the will is valid.

HELD:

The mechanical act of drafting the will can be left to a third person. What is important is the testator
signs the will or he let another person to sign but under his direction. ARTICLE 785. The duration or
efficacy of the designation of heirs, devisees or legatees, or the determination of the portions which
they are to take, when referred to by name, cannot be left to the discretion of a third person. ARTICLE
786. The testator may entrust to a third person the distribution of specific property or sums of money
that he may leave in general to specified classes or causes, and also the designation of the persons,
institutions or establishments to which such property or sums are to be given or applied. ARTICLE 787.
The testator may not make a testamentary disposition in such manner that another person has to
determine whether or not it is to be operative. ARTICLE 788. If a testamentary disposition admits of
different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative
shall be preferred.






Alawi, Muhaidir II
LLB III-B













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Rivera vs. Dizon
33 SCRA 554
June 30, 1970


FACTS:

The testatrix distributed her properties to her heirs. It turns out that some of the heirs were prejudiced
of their legitime because the property actually given to them were not approximate to their correct
legitime. So these heirs wanted that to complete their rightful share certain other properties should be
given to them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property were given to the correct legitimes.

RULING:

But it is very clear in the will of the testatrix that she wanted to give certain properties to certain
persons and those dispositions or those persons should be respected. If the legitime or the rightful
shares of the other heirs are prejudiced, then that should be completed by the delivery of cash in
accordance with the wishes of the testator.



Alawi, Muhaidir II
LLB III-B





















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Benedicto vs. Javella
10 Phil 198

FACTS:

The testator was a Visayan who lived in San Juan, Rizal. He executed his will in Manila in the Spanish
language. It was contended that the language requirement of the law on wills ahs not been complied
with in this case. There was no expression in the body of the will itself or in its attestation clause that
the testator knew Spanish, the language in which it is written.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there were a specific language in the will required by law.

HELD:

Where there is want of expression in the body of the will itself or in the attestation clause that the
testator knew the language in which the will was written, proof thereof may be established by evidence
aliunde. Although the lack of such evidence may be cured by presumption of knowledge of the language
or dialect used in the will, no such presumption can arise where, as in the case at bar, the will was
executed in Spanish, while the testator was a Visayan residing in San
Juan, Rizal at the time of his death.

Alawi, Muhaidir II
LLB III-B






















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In re Estate of Calderon 26 Phil 333
G.R. No. L-7856
December 26, 1913

FACTS:
Tthis case were made by the attorneys for Basilisa Salteras, Potenciana de la Cruz and Benigno Calderon,
the latter as the natural guardian of the minors Maria and Josefa Calderon, and also by counsel for
Mauro Sulat, Encarnacion Gutierrez Calderon, Benigno Calderon, and Calixto Salteras, from the order of
December 6, 1911, which directed that the administrator be authorized to make a conveyance of the
property, classed as urban, consisting of a house and lot situated on Calle Anloague, Binondo, and
designated, under the old numeration, as No. 29, and under the new, as No. 173, to Petronila Eugenio,
in accordance with the petition of Ramon Fabie, who is made a party by the order.
ISSUE:
WON A testator cannot prohibit the contest of his will in the cases in which there exists nullity specified
by law
HELD :
The testator's will, as recorded in the above clause 12, is so clear and definite that, in order duly to
comply therewith, it needs but be determined who are the persons that must be considered as the
legatees on account of their having served and cared for the testator's widow until her death.
From a due examination of the evidence, taken at trial on the petition of the appellants, who appeared
and claimed a share in the aforementioned estate and legacy, it is concluded that those entitled thereto
are Encarnacion Gutierrez Calderon, Filomena Calderon, Potenciana de la Cruz, Basilisa Salteras, Candida
Reyes, Benita Garcia, Maria and Josefa Calderon, and Petronila Eugenio, and so the trial judge also held
in his order of September 23, 1911, except with respect to the little girls Maria and Josefa Calderon,
whom he considered to be too young to have been able to serve the widow Maria Cristina Calderon as
domestics; but the record shows that these children, as the widow's protegees, lived in her house until
her death and, sometimes the one and sometimes the other, used to accompany her, even when she
went to church, and that, although they were minors, they could have rendered the widow assistance
and services sufficient and proportionate to their respective ages; and we are of the opinion that, from
the testator's intention as expressed in his will, it is undeniable that the assistance and services rendered
to the widow, required as a condition for meriting the legacy in question, were sufficient to the needs
and conveniences of the testator's widow in respect many chores in the house, and enough to fill the
requirements of a woman sickly and infirm in her already advanced age. The company of obliging and
obedient little girls is usually more agreeable and useful to elderly and sick persons than that of adults.
With the report of the testator's brother, Ramon Fabie, the testator's will is not legally fulfilled, and it is
not just that the other persons, besides Petronila Eugenio, who rendered services to and assisted the
widow Maria Cristina Calderon should be deprived of the proportionate share of the legacy to which
they are entitled.
Petronila Eugenio was already in the house serving the wife of the testator while the latter was still
living, and had he seen that Petronila alone could serve and attend her during the widowhood of his
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wife and that the latter would not need other servants, he would have bequeathed the whole of the
said house to Petronila; and if the deceased Miguel Fabie provided in his will that the property should be
delivered to the person or persons who should render useful services to and assist his widow until her
death, it was because he knew and was aware that there were other servants in the house, and
evidently imposed this condition in order that those who were servants there might continue as such
until his wife's death. Since some of them did do so, as proven by the record, the law must be fulfilled in
accordance with the tenor of the last will of the testator.
For the foregoing reasons we reverse the order of December 6, 1911, and declare that Petronila
Eugenio, Filomena Calderon, Encarnacion Gutierrez Calderon, Potenciana de la Cruz, Basilisa Salteras,
Candida Reyes, Benita Garcia, Maria Calderon, and Josefa Calderon are entitled to receive pro rata the
sale value of the property situated at No. 173, formerly No. 29, Calle Anloague, now Juan Luna. No
special finding is made as to costs


Amilbahar,Nurulain L
LL-IIIB





























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[183]

Solla vs. Ascueta
G.R. No. 24955
September 4, 1926


FACTS:
Dona Maria Sollas will read: "I desire and hereby name Leandro Serrano, my grandson and I desire him
to comply with the obligation to give or to deliver to the parish priest of this town a sufficient sum of
money necessary for a yearly novena and for an ordinary requiem mass for the 1st to 8th days thereof
and on the9th or last day, a solemn requiem mass with a vigil and a largebier (a stand on which a corpse
or coffin is placed before burial),- for these masses are for the repose of my soul and those of my
parents, husband, children, and other relatives. I repeat and insist that my heir shall execute and comply
with this request without fail. And at the hour of his death, he will insist that his heirs comply with all
that I have here ordered". In the earlier part of the will, Dona Maria ordered the distribution of legacies
to her brothers, nephew, protges and servant.Leandro Serranos will on the other hand read: "I
command my executor to put all of my property in order. I order my son Simeonnot to forget annually
all the souls of the relatives of my grandmother and also of mine and to have a mass said on the 1stand
9th days of the yearly novena and that he erect a 1st classbier. I sincerely desire that the property of my
deceased grandmother, Capitana Maria (Solla) be disposed of in conformity with all the provisions of her
will and of mine". Leandro named his son Simeon Serrano, as executor of his will and that he directed
him to put all of his property in order and to separate.
ISSUE:
WON the facts proven by the documentary evidence, and in accordance with law, with the costs against
defeated party.
HELD:
It clearly appearing that it was Mari Sollas intention, in ordering her universal heir Leandro Serrano in
her will at the hour of his death, to insist upon the compliance of her orders by his heirs, that the latter
should comply with her pious orders and that she did not mean her orders concerning her legacies, the
compliance of which she had entrusted to Leandro Serrano, we are authorized to restrict the application
of the words all that I have here ordered used by the said Maria Solla and the words all her orders
used by Leandro Serrano in their respective wills limiting them to the pious orders and substituting the
phrase in regard to the annual masses after the words used by both testators, respectively.
The trial court, therefore, committed an error in interpreting the order to Leandro Serrano mentioned in
his will as applicable to the provisions of Maria Sollas will relative to the legacies and not to pious
bequests exclusively.
As to the remaining assignments of error, they being merely corollaries of the fifth and sixth, the points
raised therein are impliedly decided in our disposition of said two assignments last mentioned.
With respect to the appeal of the plaintiffs-appellants, the two assignments of error made therein are
without merit in view of the foregoing considerations and the conclusions we have arrived at with
regard to the assignments of error made by the defendants-appellants.
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the judgment appealed from must be, as hereby,
reversed in all its parts and the complaint dismissed, without special findings as to costs.


Amilbahar,Nurulain L
LL-IIIB

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BALANAY, JR. vs. MARTINEZ
G.R. No. L-39247
June 27, 1975
Topic/Doctrines: Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An interpretation that will render a
testamentary disposition operative takes precedence over a construction that will nullify a
provision of the will (Arts. 788 and 791, Civil Code).
FACTS:
Leodegaria Julian died. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and six legitimate
children. Felix Balanay, Jr. filed a petition for the probate of his mothers notarial will, which
was written in English. In that will, Leodegaria declared that it was her desire her properties
should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes
should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties. She devised and partitioned the conjugal
lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one-half share
of the conjugal assets.
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will.There after, Felix
Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument waiving and renouncing his right in Leodegarias estate in
favor of their 6 children.Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the
affidavit and "conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void; that the testatrix illegally claimed
that she was the owner of the southern half of the conjugal lots and; that she could not
partition the conjugal estate by allocating portions of the nine lots to her children. She prayed
that the will be declared void for being contrary to law and that an intestacy be declared. The
probate court declared the will void on the basis of its own independent assessment of its
provisions and not because of party's arguments.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before
ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.

HELD:
The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its
formalvalidity had been established. But the probate court erred in declaring that the will was
void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding.The will is
intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the
creditors and impair the legitimes. As aptly stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, "the very existence of
a purported testament is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed testator has willed that
his estate should be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the
state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given effect independent of the attitude of the
parties affected thereby" (Resolution, Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso, L-27200, August 18, 1972, 46
SCRA 538, 565). To give effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix is the first and
principal law in the matter of testaments (Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, June 30, 1970, 33
SCRA 554, 561). Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An interpretation that will render a
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testamentary disposition operative takes precedence over a construction that will nullify a
provision of the will (Arts. 788 and 791, Civil Code).

Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will evinces an
intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. So compelling is
the principle that intestacy should be avoided and that the wishes of the testator should prevail
that sometimes the language of the will can be varied for the purpose of giving it effect (Austria
vs. Reyes, L-23079, February 27, 1970, 31 SCRA 754, 762). As far as is legally possible, the
expressed desire of the testator must be followed and the dispositions of the properties in his
will should be upheld (Estorque vs. Estorque, L-19573, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 540, 546).

AMING, RHASDY P.
LLB-IIIB




























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BONA VS BRIONES
G.R. No. L-10806
July 6, 1918
Topics/Doctrines: The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force
at the time it is made (Art. 795, NCC).
FACTS:
On September 16, 1911, Francisco Briones executed a will in the presence of three witnesses, one of
whom is the notary public, who also drafted the will and certifies the will of the testator and the
signatures of the testator as well as the witnesses. He died on August 14, 1913. Monica Bona, his
widow by the second marriage applied for the probate of the will and present evidence that the will was
executed with solemnities prescribed by law at that time. Hospicio, Gregoria, and Carmen, all surnamed
Briones, the legitimate children by the first marriage of the testator, by a pleading dated March 5, 1915,
opposed the probate of the will presented by the widow of the deceased Briones, alleging that the said
will was executed before two witnesses only and under unlawful and undue pressure or influence
exercised upon the person of the testator who thus signed through fraud and deceit; and he prayed that
for that reason the said will be declared null and of no value, with costs against the petitioners.
ISSUE:
The whole issue discussed by the parties and submitted for the decision of this court resolves itself as to
whether or not in the execution of the will in question the solemnities prescribed by section 618 of Act
No. 190 have been observed.
HELD:
The oft-repeated section 618 of Act No. 190 says: "No will, except as provided in the preceding section,
shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing
and signed by the testator, or by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and
attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each
other. But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it is proven that the
will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided". Even though Domingo de la Fuente
drafted the will and intervened in its preparation as a notary, by the order and under the express
direction of the testator, it is nevertheless true that he did it as a witness to the execution of the said
will with positive and concrete acts, while the two other witnesses Gregorio Bustilla and Sixto
Barrameda merely attested all that appeared in the second of the four paragraphs mentioned; for in its
they certify that the foregoing testament contains the last will of the testator Francisco Briones; that the
latter told them that before and at the time that he dictated his will, there was no inducement nor
threat by anybody; and that as he did not know how to write the Spanish language, said testator
requested Domingo de la Fuente to write the will, and he did it as it is now drafted, certifying also, that
the testator Briones signed his will voluntarily with his own hand, in the presence of the declarants who,
as witnesses, signed the instrument on the date expressed. Domingo de la Fuente on his part declared
that the two said witnesses formally swore before him on the certification which precedes the said will
and, according to this testimony as shown in the records and the testimony of the above-mentioned
witnesses, the said Domingo de la Fuente wrote and drafted the said will Exhibit A by the order and
under the direction of the testator Francisco Briones, who signed in the presence of the witnesses,
Bustilla and Barrameda and of Notary Domingo de la Fuente, all of whom immediately signed also in the
presence of the testator, each doing it in the presence of each other. So that, although it is not shown
expressly that Domingo de la Fuente was an attesting witness to the will, yet it cannot be denied that it
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was he who wrote it by the order and under the direction of the testator; that he was a witness to its
execution from the first to its last line; and that he was perfectly aware of the fact that all that he had
written in the document Exhibit A expresses the genuine and true will of the testator. He saw and was
present when the latter signed his will, as also when the two witnesses Bustilla and Barrameda affixed
their signatures; said witnesses also saw and were present when Domingo de la Fuente signed at the
end of the said document.
This is a case in which the judicial criterion should be inspired in the sense that it is not defeated, and if
the wish of the testator is so manifest and express as in the instant case, it is not proper nor just to
invalidate the will of Francisco Briones merely because of some small defect in form which is not
essential nor of great importance, such as the failure to state therein that Domingo de la Fuente was
also a witness to the said will when he signed it twice. As a matter of act, he understood the contents of
the will better than the two other attesting witnesses, for he really was a witness and he attested the
execution of the will during its making until it was terminated and signed by the testator, by the
witnesses, and by himself, even though he did it in the capacity of a notary.
The last paragraph of section 618 of Act No. 190 supplies a legal basis to support the validity of the will
in question with the conditions for its probate because, notwithstanding the existence of such defect
merely in the form and not in the substance, the certification of authenticity and the very text of the will
show in a clear and indubitable manner that the will Exhibit A contains the last will of the testator, and
that it was signed by the latter and attested as being true and legitimate not only the two witnesses
Bustilla and Barrameda but also by the one who wrote it, Domingo de la Fuente, who was also a truthful
and reliable witness, even though he be called a notary public.
The requisites established by Act No. 2645, which amended the oft-repeated section 618 cannot be
required in the probate of the will here, inasmuch as this document was executed in September, 1911,
five years before said amendatory law began to take effect (July 1, 1916), while the testator died on
August 14, 1913, two years and some months before the enforcement of the said law; and so, the only
law applicable to the present case is the provision contained in section 618 of Act No. 190, and in
accordance with the provisions of this section, the said will should be probated; for it has been
presented to the court many months before the amendatory act went into effect.


AMING, RHASDY P.
LLB-IIIB










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In Re Will of Riosa
G.R. No. L-14074
November 7, 1918

Topics/Doctrines: The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force
at the time it is made (Art. 795, NCC).

FACTS:
The issue which this appeal presents is whether in the Philippine Islands the law existing on the date of
the execution of a will, or the law existing at the death of the testator, controls. Jose Riosa died on April
17, 1917. He left a will made in the month of January, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library, in which he disposed of an estate valued at more than P35,000. The will was duly executed in
accordance with the law then in force, namely, section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will was
not executed in accordance with Act No. 2645, amendatory of said section 618, prescribing certain
additional formalities for the signing and attestation of wills, in force on and after July 1, 1916. In other
words, the will was in writing, signed by the testator, and attested and subscribed by three credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other; but was not signed by the testator and the
witnesses on the left margin of each and every page, nor did the attestation state these facts. The new
law, therefore, went into effect after the making of the will and before the death of the testator,
without the testator having left a will that conforms to the new requirements.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is valid?

HELD:
This court has heretofore held in a decision handed down by the Chief Justice, as to a will made after the
date Act No. 2645 went into effect, that it must comply with the provisions of this law. (Caraig vs
Tatlonghari, R. G. No. 12558, dated March 23, 1918 [not published].) The court has further held in a
decision handed down by Justice Torres, as to will executed by a testator whose death took place prior
to the operative date of Act No. 2645, that the amendatory act is inapplicable. (Bona vs. Briones, [1918],
38 Phil., 276.) The instant appeal presents an entirely different question. The will was execute prior to
the enactment of Act No. 2645 and the death occurred after the enactment of this law. The rule
prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that the validity of the execution of a will must be tested by the
statutes in force at the time of its execution and that statutes subsequently enacted have no
retrospective effect. Retrospective laws generally if not universally work injustice, and ought to be so
construed only when the mandate of the legislature is imperative. When a testator makes a will,
formally executed according to the requirements of the law existing at the time of its execution, it would
unjustly disappoint his lawful right of disposition to apply to it a rule subsequently enacted, though
before his death. (Taylor vs. Mitchell [1868], 57 Pa. St., 209)

This court, under such circumstances, should naturally depend more on reason than on technicality.
Above all, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the testator has provided in detail for the disposition of
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his property and that his desires should be respected by the courts. The act of bequeathing or devising
is something more than inchoate or ambulatory. In reality, it becomes a completed act when the will is
executed and attested according to the law, although it does not take effect on the property until a
future time. The will of Jose Riosa is valid and section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure is the
applicable law.


AMING, RHASDY P.
LLB-IIIB
































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IN RE: ESTATE OF JOHNSON
G.R. No. L-12767
November 16, 1918

Topics/Doctrines: Will made here by alien. A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or
subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country
of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own state or
country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect
as if executed according to the laws of these Islands ( sec. 636, Act No. 190)

FACTS:
Emil H. Johnson was born in Sweden in 1877; in 1893, he emigrated to the United States and lived in
Chicago, Illinois. In 1898, at Chicago, he married Rosalie Ackeson, and immediately afterwards left for
the Philippine Islands as a US Army soldier. A daughter, Ebba Ingeborg, was born a few months after
their marriage. After Johnson was discharged as a soldier from the service of the United States he
continued to live in the Philippines. In 1902, Rosalie Johnson was granted a decree of divorce on the
ground of desertion. In 1903, Emil Johnson procured a certificate of naturalization at Chicago, after
which he visited family in Sweden. When this visit was concluded, the deceased returned to Manila. In
Manila he had 3 children with Alejandra Ibaez: Mercedes, Encarnacion, and Victor. Emil Johnson also
had 2 children with Simeona Ibaez: Eleonor and Alberto. He died in Manila, leaving a holographic will.
This will, signed by himself and 2 witnesses only, instead of the 3 required witnesses, was not executed
in conformity with Philippine law. A petition was presented in the CFI of Manila for the probate of this
will, on the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United
States of America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and hence
could properly be probated here. The hearing on said application was set, and three weeks publication
of notice was ordered. In the hearing, witnesses were examined relative to the execution of the will; and
thereafter the document was declared to be legal and was admitted to probate. Victor Johnson was
appointed sole administrator of the estate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine court had jurisdiction?

HELD:
YES. The proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and that the publication was sufficient to
give the court jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to allow the will to be probated.
"The proceeding as to the probate of a will is essentially one in rem, and in the very nature of things the
state is allowed a wide latitude in determining the character of the constructive notice to be given to the
world in a proceeding where it has absolute possession of the res. It would be an exceptional case
where a court would declare a statute void, as depriving a party of his property without due process of
law, the proceeding being strictly in rem, and the res within the state, upon the ground that the
constructive notice prescribed by the statute was unreasonably short." (Citing In re Davis) Whether the
order of probate can be set aside in this proceeding on the other ground stated in the petition, namely,
that the testator was not a resident of the State of Illinois and that the will was not made in conformity
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[191]

with the laws of that State. - NO

The CFI found that the testator was a citizen of the State of Illinois and that the will was executed in
conformity with the laws of that State, the will was necessarily and properly admitted to probate.
Section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure:

Will made here by alien. A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state
or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen
or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be
proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed
according to the laws of these Islands.


AMING, RHASDY P.
LLB-IIIB


























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[192]

PCIB vs. Escolin
GR No.L- 27860 & L-27896
September 30, 1975

Topic/Doctrine: Nationality Principle

FACTS:
Linnie Jane Hodges, a married woman and a citizen of Texas, USA, was a domiciliary of the Philippines at
the moment of her death. With respect to the validity of certain testamentary provisions she had made
in favor of her husband, a question arose as to what exactly were the laws of Texas on the matter at the
precise moment of her death (for while one group contended that the Texan law should result to renvoi,
the other group contended that no renvoi was possible).

ISSUE:
Whether or not Texas Law should apply.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved
by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. Texas law at the time of her death and
not said law at any other time.



AROLA, ALNASHRIP AKMADUL
LLB III-B



















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[193]

Amata vs. Tablizo
GR No.L- 23483
December 18, 1925

Topic/Doctrine: MENTAL CAPACITY TO MAKE A WILL

FACTS:
This is a proceeding commenced in the Court of First Instance of Albay by a petition filed by Antonio
Amata and Felipe Almojuela, praying for the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased
Pedro Tablizo, and the issuance of letters of administration to the petitioners. Juana Tablizo and others
opposed the probate of the will applied for on the following grounds: (1) That it was not signed by the
witnesses, nor executed by the deceased Pedro Tablizo, as prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure; (2)
that the deceased Pedro Tablizo was not habitually of sound mind, but on the contrary, was unconscious
at the time of the execution of said document; (3) that said document was not signed by the testator
freely and voluntarily, nor did he intend it to be his will on the date when it was executed; and (4) that
said document was maliciously and fraudulently prepared by the two beneficiaries Antonio Amata and
Felipe Almojuela, causing a date to appear thereon which is not the true date of its execution. And they
prayed that the petition be denied, and it be held that Pedro Tablizo died intestate, and Tomas Tablizo be
appointed special administrator of the estate left by said deceased.
After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by the petitioners, as well as the opponents, the court
below entered an order declaring that the deceased Pedro Tablizo was unconscious when the document
Exhibit A was executed, and that said document did not contain the last will of the testator, and denying
the probate thereof as the last will and testament of said deceased; and declaring, further, that Pedro
Tablizo died intestate.
From this order the petitioners took an appeal in due time and form, assigning the following supposed
errors as committed by the trial court, to wit: (1) Its declaration that it entertains a reasonable suspicion
that the document Exhibit A, the testament of the deceased Pedro Tablizo, does not contain the will of
the testator; (2) its refusal to admit the will Exhibit A to probate and its finding that Pedro Tablizo died
intestate; and (3) it failure to render judgment against the opponents for the costs of the action.
The opponents, who are all brothers and sisters and children of brothers and sisters of the testator,
attempted to prove that the will was clandestinely prepared by Antonio Amata and Felipe Almojuela and
signed on the midnight of June 19, 1924, Pedro Tablizo then lying down on his bed, weakened by old age
and his sickness, lying down with his mouth upward and open, the eyes closed and the feet and arms
extended, being unable to move, see, speak or know those surrounding him, it being necessary that
Antonio Amata should, as he did, place the pen in his fingers, hold him by the arm and guide him while
signing the will upon a pillow.

ISSUE:
(1) When was the will made and signed?;
(2) Who drew and signed it?; and
(3) Was the mind of the testator perfectly sound when he made and signed the will?


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HELD:

As to the first question, the preponderance of the evidence shows that the testator dictated to Felipe
Almojuela the rough draft of his will, the latter having typewritten it clean, and finished the drawing
thereof at midnight. Notwithstanding the distrust with which the trial judge received the testimony of
the petitioners, as they had intervened in the preparation of the will, and are the ones most benefited,
he could not help giving credit to their testimony and that of their witnesses upon the date when the will
was made and signed, that is, from 3 oclock in the evening of the third day up to 1 oclock in the
morning of the 4th June, 1924. In view of the fact that the testator did not die until June 20, 1924, in
order to make credible the theory that the testator was unconscious when his will was executed and
signed.
Turning now to the second question, the very witness for the opponents, Father Cecilio Penilla, testified
that at 10 oclock approximately in the night of June 4, 1924, the date when the will was signed, and on
the 12th day of the same month and year, the testator had sent for him in order to confess and on both
occasions he intelligently and intelligibly talked with him, relating his spiritual life coherently and clearly
although he was lying down on his bed and could not move or stand up without assistance. It is a fact
also uncontroverted that on June 9, 1924, he ordered a carabao sold, designating it by its name
Tibayong. On the 10th day of the same month, he received the visit of Father Andres Tablizo and
Mariano Surtida with whom he has been conversing. All these prior, coetaneous and subsequent
circumstances show that Pedro Tablizo was perfectly of sound mind at the time of making his last will.
With regard to the third question, the court have already seen that the will was made on June 3, 1924,
and signed immediately thereafter at an early hour in the morning of the 4th day of the same month and
year. The date of the execution of the will is important in the determination of the mental condition of
the testator. If the opponents and their witnesses testified falsely upon this essential point, under the
rule falsus in uno falsus in omnibus, they are not entitled to any credit upon the other essential points of
their testimony, unless corroborated by other witnesses whose credibility is beyond suspicion. On the
other hand, the testimony of the petitioners and their witnesses upon the making if the will is so clear,
positive and consistent, and the succession of facts upon which they testified and their incidents is so
natural, that it cannot but convince any one who should read it without bias. If, as above stated, the
petitioners and their witnesses are entitled to a greater credit that the opponents and their witnesses,
and if, as above seen, the testator was in perfectly sound mental condition, there can be no doubt that it
was the testator who signed his signature on the will placed upon a book of music. The testimony of the
opponents and their witnesses is improbable that the will was signed upon a pillow. A pillow being soft,
as it is, cannot serve as a support for writing purposes.
For the foregoing reasons, the court are of their opinion that the order appealed from must be, as is
hereby, revoked with the costs against the appellees, and it is ordered that the will of Pedro Tablizo be
admitted to probate. So ordered.


AROLA, ALNASHRIP AKMADUL
LLB III-B


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Garcia vs. Garcia, de Bartolome
GR No.L- 43367
September 9, 1936

Topic/Doctrine: Credibility of the subscribing witness

FACTS:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila allowing the probate of the will
of Paulina Vazquez Viuda de Garcia. The will was executed on June 12, 1934. The testatrix died on June
27, 1934. Testamentary proceedings were commenced on July 25, 1934, in the Court of First Instance of
Manila for the probate of this will, the petitioners being Marieta, Luisa and Purifi-cacion Garcia who are
among the forced heirs instituted in the will and who are also named as the universal heirs for the
residue of the estate left undisposed in the will.
The probate of the will was contested on August 29, 1934 by the oppositor-appellant called to the stand two
witnesses to substantiate her averments. Asuncion Bartolome, a daughter of the oppositor-appellant and
who was living with the deceased at the time, testified that in the afternoon of June 12, 1934, she did not see
the deceased execute any will; neither did she remember having seen any of the instrumental witnesses in
the house at the time. Luz Lopez corroborated Asuncion Bartolome by declaring that in the afternoon of the
said date, she went to the house of the testatrix to borrow some money and that during her stay she did not
see "a algunos hombres all".
These two witnesses for the appellant were, however, contradicted by the proponent Luisa Garcia who was
present when the will was signed. Luisa Garcia testified further that Asuncion Bartolome was on June 12,
1934, confined in bed suffering from cough and lung trouble and therefore could not have witnessed the
execution of the will, and that Luz Lopez was never in the house of the testatrix in the afternoon of said day.
Of Luz Lopez the trial judge observes that "era demasiado locuaz, habiendo, adems, incurrido en serias
contradicciones".
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimonies of the subscribing/attesting witnesses are credible?
HELD:
The court held that the subscribing witnesses are much relied upon to establish due execution of the
will; nor can the testimony of persons accidentally present, who had nothing to do with the transaction,
be entitled to equal consideration. Though strangers personally to the testator, their concurring
testimony alone may well establish the due execution in which they participated; and even in a conflict
of evidence great weight is given to their several statements. By signing a will as witnesses, the persons
who thus sign impliedly certify to the truth of the facts which admit to probate, including the sufficiency
of execution, the capacity of the testator, the absence of undue influence and the like.
The judgment of the lower court admitting the last will and testament (Exhibit A) of Paulina Vazquez
Viuda de Garcia to probate is hereby affirmed, with costs against the oppositor-appellant. So ordered.




AROLA, ALNASHRIP AKMADUL
LLB III-B

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Neyra vs. Neyra
GR No.L- 8075
March 25, 1946

Topic/Doctrine: Test of SIGNING BY THUMBMARK; PRESENCE OF ATTESTING WITNESSES

FACTS:
That Severo Neyra died intestate in the City of Manila, on May 6, 1938, leaving certain properties and
two children, by his first marriage, named Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, and other children by
his second marriage; that after the death of Severo Neyra, the two sisters, Encarnacion Neyra and
Trinidad Neyra, had serious misunderstandings, in connection with the properties left by their deceased
father, and so serious were their dissensions that, after March 31, 1939, they had two litigations in the
Court of First Instance of Manila, concerning said properties. In the first case, filed on March 31, 1939,
Trinidad Neyra and others demanded from Encarnacion Neyra and others the annulment of the sale of
the property located at No. 366 Raon Street, Manila, which was finally decided in favor of the
defendants, in the court of first instance, and in the Court of Appeals, on December 21, 1943.
In the meanwhile, Encarnacion Neyra had become seriously ill, suffering from Addison's disease, and on
October 31, 1942, she sent for her religious adviser and confessor, Mons. Vicente Fernandez of the
Quiapo Church to make confession, Father Garcia talked to Encarnacion Neyra and advised reconciliation
between the two sisters, Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra. Encarnacion accepted said advise and, at
about noon of the same day (November 1, 1942) the two sisters became reconciled. only in the
afternoon of the following day, November 2,1942, when Encarnacion gave him instructions for the
preparation of the document embodying their agreement, and other instructions for the preparation of
her last will and -testament; that Attorney Panis prepared said document of compromise as well as the
new will and testament, naming Trinidad Neyra and Eustaquio Mendoza beneficiaries therein, pursuant
to Encarnacion's express instructions, and the two documents were prepared, in duplicate, and were
ready for signature, since the morning of November 3, 1942; that in the afternoon of that day,
November 3, 1942, Attorney Panis read said document of compromise and last will and testament to
Encarnacion Neyra, slowly and in a loud voice, in the presence of Father Teodoro Garcia, Dr. Moises B.
Abad, Dr. Eladio Aldecoa, Trinidad Neyra, and others, after which he asked her if their terms were in
accordance with her wishes, or if she wanted any change made in said documents; that Encarnacion
Neyra did not suggest any change, and asked for the pad and the two documents, and, with the help of a
son of Trinidad, placed her thumb mark at the foot of each one of the two documents, in duplicate, on
her bed in the sala, in the presence of the attesting witnesses, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio R. Aldecoa
and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, after which said witnesses signed at the foot of the will, in the presence of
Encarnacion Neyra, and of each other. The agreement was also signed by Trinidad Neyra, as party, and by
Dr. M. B. Abad and Eustaquio Mendoza, a proteg, as witnesses. Father Teodoro Garcia was also present
at the signing of the two documents, at the request of Encarnacion Neyra.
The foregoing facts have been established by the witnesses presented by Trinidad Neyra, who are all
trustworthy men, and who had absolutely no interest in the final outcome of this case. Two of them are
ministers of the Gospel, while three of the attesting witnesses are professional men of irreproachable
character, who had known and seen and actually talked to the testatrix.
Petitioner Teodora Neyra, half sister of Encarnacion, and her young daughter Ceferina de la Cruz, and
Presentacion Blanco, daughter of petitioner Maria Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, substantially corroborated the
testimony of the witnesses presented by Trinidad Neyra, with reference to the signing of documents, in
the bedroom of Encarnacion Neyra, in the afternoon of November 3, 1942. Teodora Neyra, Presentacion
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Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz testified, however, that when the thumb mark of Encarnacion Neyra was
affixed to the agreement in question, dated November 3, 1942, she was sleeping on her bed in the sala;
and that the attesting witnesses were not present, as they were in the caida.

ISSUE:
Is the contentions of the petitioners are tenable?

HELD:
The contention that the attesting witnesses were not present, at the time E. N. thumbmarked the
agreement and will in question, on her bed, in the sala of the house, as they were allegedly in the caida,
is untenable. It has been fully shown that said witnesses were present, at the time of the signing and
execution of the agreement and will in question, in the sala, where the testatrix was lying on her bed.
The true test is not whether they actually saw each other, at the time of the signing of the documents,
but whether they might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so; and the attesting
witnesses actually saw it. all in this case, (Jaboneta vs. Gustilo, 5 Phil., 541.) And the thumbmark placed
by the testatrix on the agreement and will in question is equivalent to her signature.

The petition for reconsideration filed by Atty. Lucio Javillonar, on November 23, 1942, on behalf of a
client, Encarnacion Neyra, who had been dead since November 4, 1942, and some of her relatives, who
have appeared, in accordance with the provisions of section 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, is hereby
denied; and the decision of the Court of Appeals for Manila, dated November 10, 1942, dismissing the
appeal, is hereby re-affirmed, without costs. So ordered.



AROLA, ALNASHRIP AKMADUL
LLB III-B















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[198]

Bugnao vs. Ubag
G.R.No. 4445
September 18, 1909

Topic: Testamentary capacity.

Facts:
Before Domingo Ubag died, he allegedly executed a will while he was not of sound mind by making his
wife the sole heir of the said will. The appellant contend that the testator was so sick that he was unable
to speak and understand, or make himself understood and that he was incapacitated to make a will.

Issue:
When a person can be considered of sound mind and capable of executing a will?

Held:
To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the mind should be unbroken or unimpaired, unshattered
by disease or otherwise. It is sufficient that a testator knows and appreciate the nature and effects of
the act he is engaged.



Badeo, Michael J.
LLB III-B

















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[199]

Bagtas vs. Paguio
G.R.No.L- 6801
March 14, 1912

Topic: Testamentary Capacity

Facts:
Pioquinto Pagiuo executed a will; the wife was propounded as executrix and opposed by the son and
grandchildren by a former marriage on the ground that the will was executed while the testator was
suffering from debility of the body and poor memory which allegedly lacks testamentary capacity.

Issue:
Whether or not physical debility or poor memory constitutes incapacity to execute a will?

Held:
Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility will affect the capacity to make a will, if
sufficient intelligence remains, failure of memory is not sufficient to create incapacity.





Badeo, Michael J.
LLB III-B
















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Galvez vs. Galvez
G.R. No. L-6650
December 5, 1913

Topic: Testamentary Capacity

Facts:
Victor Galvez executed a will that he affix his signature by directing Lorenzo Galvez at his request in his
presence.

Issue:
Whether or not directing another person to affix testators signature affects the testamentary capacity?

Held:
The formalities prescribed under the law where complied with as observed the writing transpired under
his direction and presence with the required number of witnesses, this requisites must concur to comply
with the statutory requirements in the affixing or writing of wills.


Badeo, Michael J.
LLB III-B



















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[201]

Lopez vs. Torres
G.R. No. L-25966
November 1, 1926

Topic: No Testamentary provision shall be valid when made by a ward in favor of a guardian before final
accounts of the latter have been approved.

Facts:
Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will, instituting his cousin Vicente and daughter Luz. Prior to the
execution of the will Tomas was judicially declared incapable of taking care of himself and Vicente
served as guardian.

Issue:
Whether or not Vicente as guardian is disqualified to inherit from Tomas?

Held:
Vicente was not only a general incapacity on his part, but special incapacity due to accidental relation of
guardian and ward relation existing between the parties.



Badeo, Michael J.
LLB III-B










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[202]

ABQUILAN vs. ABQUILAN
49 Phil 450
October 13, 1926

Topic/ Doctrine: Testamentary Capacity and Intent

FACTS
This appeal has been brought to reverse an order of the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Occidental Negros, refusing to legalize an instrument (Exhibit A) purporting to be the last will and
testament of Isidra Abquilan, deceased. It appears that the deceased left no forced heirs, and her only
heirs, in case of intestacy, are her brother, Atanasio Abquilan, the proponent of the will, and Feliciana
Abquilan, a sister.
Upon hearing the cause the trial court found that the document propounded as the will of the deceased
is apocryphal, that the purported signatures of the deceased to the supposed will are forgeries, and that
the instrument in question was not executed by the deceased. He therefore denied probate, and the
proponent appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is valid; whether or not the testatrix was capable of executing a will

HELD:
The supposed testatrix was not in a condition such as to enable her to have participated in the act, she
being in fact at that time suffering from paralysis to celebral hemorrhage in such degree as completely
to incapacitate her for intelligent participation in the act of making a will. A careful comparison of the
name of the testatrix as signed in two places to the Exhibit A, with many of her authentic signatures
leads to the conclusion that the signatures to the supposed will were made by some other person.
Furthermore, the combined testimony of Juan Serato and Alejandro Genito completely demonstrate in
our opinion that no will at all was made on November 6, the date attributed to the questioned
document, and that, instead an attempt was made on the night of that day to fabricate another will,
which failed of completion because of the refusal of Alejandro Genito to be party to the making of a will
in which the testatrix took no part. The instrument before us was undoubtedly fabricated later, probably
on November 7, at a time when the condition of the deceased was such as to make rational
participation on her part in the act of making a will impossible.ch







BUNDA, JILL CARMEN D.
LLB-3B



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LIM vs. CHINCO
55 Phil 891
March 31, 1931

Topic/Doctrine: Testamentary Capacity and Intent

FACTS:
This is a contest over the probate of a paper writing purporting to be the will of Victorina Villaranda y
Diaz, who died on June 9, 1929. The deceased left no descendants or ascendants, and the document
produced as her will purports to leave her estate, consisting of properties valued at P50,000, more or
less, chiefly to three collateral relatives, Eusebia, Crispina, and Maria, of the surname of Lim. This
instrument was offered for probate by Eusebia Lim, named in the instrument as executrix. Opposition
was made by Juliana Chinco, a full sister of the deceased.
The purported will was prepared by Perfecto Gabriel, a practicing attorney of Manila, whose wife
appears to be related to the chief beneficiaries named in the will. In the end three persons served as
witnesses, all of whom were in friendly relations with the lawyer, and two relatives of his wife. The
intended testatrix was not able to affix her signature to the document, and it was signed for her by the
attorney.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the supposed testatrix had testamentary capacity at the time the paper referred to was
signed.

HELD:
The deceased, on the morning of June 5, 1929, was in a comatose condition and incapable of performing
any conscious and valid act. The testimony of the witnesses is convincing to the effect that the patient
was in a continuous state of coma during the entire period of her stay in the hospital, she did not have
sufficient command of her faculties to enable her to do any valid act. Doctor Lim, the physician from
Manila, testified that the patient was not suffering from cerebral hemorrhage but from urmic trouble,
and that, after the first attack, the patient was much relieved and her mind so far cleared up. The
attorney testified that he was able to communicate with the deceased when the will was made, and that
he read the instrument over to her clause by clause and asked her whether it expressed her wishes. He
says that she made signs that enabled him to understand that she concurred in what was written. But it
is clear, even upon the statement of this witness, that the patient was unable to utter intelligent speech.
The paper offered for probate was properly disallowed.




BUNDA, JILL CARMEN D.
LLB-3B



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HERNAEZ vs. HERNAEZ
1 Phil 689
February 10, 1903

Topic/Doctrine: Testamentary Capacity and Intent

FACTS:
The subject of this action is the will executed by Doa Juana Espinosa, widow of Don Pedro Hernaez,
before a notary public, and three witnesses, and with the aid of an interpreter, the testatrix not
understanding Spanish. The action brought is for the annulment of the will upon the ground: (1) of the
incapacity of the testatrix; (2) the incapacity of the notary, attesting witnesses, and the interpreter; and
(3) a substantial formal defect in the will.

The incapacity of the testatrix according to the complaint is alleged to consist in this: That on the 5th of
December, 1894, she was over 80 years of age and was so ill that three days before she had received the
sacraments and extreme unction, and that two days afterwards she died; and that prior thereto she
walked in a stooping attitude, and gave contradictory orders, as a result of her senile debility. The
incapacity of the notary is that he did not understand the Visayan dialect, the language of the testatrix.
The incapacity of the attesting witnesses is supposed to consist in their not having a perfect knowledge
of Spanish, and the incapacity of the interpreter in that he was an amanuensis of the notary and was the
person who wrote out the will. The substantial formal defect of the will is supposed to consist in the fact
that two physicians were not present to certify to the sanity of the testatrix at the time of its execution,
and the absence of two interpreters to translate the will, because it was executed in a foreign language.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is valid

HELD:
Yes, the will is valid and efficacious. It is sufficient to state that neither from the facts elicited by the
interrogatories nor the documents presented with the complaint can the conclusion be reached that the
testatrix was deprived of her mental faculties. The fact that on old woman gives contradictory orders,
that she walks in a stooping position, that she has fainting fits, that she received the sacraments some
days before making her will, are circumstances which even if fully demonstrated by proof could no lead
the court to establish a conclusion contrary to the mental soundness of a person who is to be presumed
to be in the full enjoyment of the mental faculties until the contrary is conclusively proven. The notary in
compliance with the requirements of article 695 of the Civil Code certifies that in his judgment the
testatrix had the necessary legal capacity and the use of the necessary mental faculties for the purposes
of the execution of the will.
It has at no time been regarded as a ground for the annulment of a public instrument executed before a
notary public by a native of these Islands, ignorant of Spanish, that the notary was not acquainted with
the dialect of the party executing the same. If this officer, upon whom the law imposes the obligation of
drawing the instrument in the official language, that is, Castilian, does not know the dialect he can avail
himself of an interpreter in accordance with the provisions of the law itself; hence the fact that the
notary who legalized the will in question did not know the Visayan dialect spoken by the testatrix is by
no means an argument in favor of the nullity of this public instrument, nor has it been for the nullity of
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any one of the long series of instruments executed before Spanish notaries, and even Filipino notaries,
unacquainted with the dialect or dialects of the locality in which they performed their duties or the
special dialect of the party.

With respect to the attesting witnesses it has been fully proven by the manner in which they testified at
the trial, "without the necessity of an interpreter," as to those called as witnesses and by conclusive
evidence as to the deceased attesting witness whose signature and competency have been completely
established, that they knew the dialect of the testatrix in accordance with section 5, article 681, of the
Civil Code, and also understood Spanish. As alleged, but not proven, their knowledge of the latter
language may not have been perfect, but this does not make them incompetent, nor is it a ground for
annulment. Finally, the prohibition of article 681, section 8, is not applicable to the interpreter, of whose
services the notary availed himself for the execution, drafting and legalization of the will, for the simple
reason that it does not refer to the interpreter but the witnesses, and there is nothing to authorize the
extensive interpretation attempted to be made of its precepts.
The presence of two physicians, as required in the case covered by article 665, was not necessary. "This
precept refers clearly and expressly to the conditions which must be complied with in order that a
demented person may make a will by availing himself of a lucid interval, and is entirely distinct from the
cases governed by article 685 when the testator has not been declared demented." (Judgment of June
10, 1897.)
Nor was it necessary that two interpreters be present as required by article 648 of the Civil Code. This is
a requisite for the execution of a will in a foreign language, and neither by the letter nor by the purpose
of this article could it be required with regard to the will in question. Not by the letter, because neither
the testatrix nor the notary expressed themselves in a foreign language. Neither the Castilian spoken by
the notary nor the Visayan spoken by the testatrix are foreign languages.



BUNDA, JILL CARMEN D.
LLB-3B

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[206]

AVELINO vs. DE LA CRUZ
21 Phil 521
February 21, 1912

Topic/Doctrine: Testamentary Capacity and Intent

FACTS
The present is an appeal from an order of the Honorable George N. Hurd, judge of the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila, in which he had legalized the will of the said Pascual de la Cruz, deceased.
The contention of the opponent is that at the time of the making of the will the said Pascual de la Cruz
was blind and had been for a number of years, and was incompetent to make the will in question.
Against this contention of the opponent, all of the witnesses who signed the will were called as
witnesses, and each declared that the deceased was of sound mind at the time said will was made and
fully understood its contents and signed the same in their presence and that they each signed the will in
the presence of each other, as well as in the presence of the deceased.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the decedents will is valid

HELD:
Yes, it is valid. The appellant attempted to show that the deceased was incompetent to make his will
because he was blind at the time the same was executed and had been for several years theretofore.
There is absolutely no proof to show that the deceased was incapacitated at the time he executed his
will. No presumption of incapacity can arise from the mere fact that he was blind. The only requirement
of the law as to the capacity to make a will is that the person shall be of age and of sound mind and
memory. (Sec. 614, Code of Procedure in Civil Actions.) Section 620 of the same code prohibits blind
persons from acting as witnesses in the execution of wills, but no limitation is placed upon the
testamentary capacity, except age and soundness of mind.





BUNDA, JILL CARMEN D.
LLB-3B








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[207]

CUYUGAN vs. BARON
G.R. No. L-41947
January 16, 1936

DOCTRINE: Testamentary capacity and intent
The doctrine that where the testator has had an opportunity to revoke his will
subsequent to the operation of an alleged undue influence upon him but makes no change in it,
the courts will consider this fact as weighing heavily against the testimony of undue influence,
has no application to cases in which there has been an initial lack of testamentary capacity. It
has no application, moreover, where from the day of execution until the death of the testator
his mental condition is such that he cannot judge the propriety of revoking the will. Nor
obviously does it apply to a case where the alleged testator harbors the belief that he had not
executed the will in question.

Facts:
Silvestra Baron died of heart failureand was eighty-six years of age. She left an estate exceeding
in value the sum of P80,000 which she disposed of by will. She died single without forced
heirs.The will appointed VivencioCuyugan, her nephew, as executor. The original of this will is
signed "Silestra On" and the copy is signed "Silestra Baron" Both copies are written in the
Pampanga dialect and consist of one sheet and are witnessed in due form by Vicente David,
Valeriano Silva and ZacariasNuguid (known to the testator).The oppositorsGuillermo Baron,
brother of the deceased, and Faustina Baron, sister of the deceased, allege in substance first,
that at the time of the execution of the alleged will, Silvestra Baron was mentally and physically
incapacitated for the execution of a will; and, second, that her signature and alleged consent to
the said will was obtained and the attorney who prepared the document and the witnesses
who affixed their signatures thereto.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Silvestra Baron, a woman of advanced years and in a critical state of health,
possesses testamentary capacity to make a will.

HELD:
NO.The evidence shows that the same morning when Silvestra Baron signed the alleged will she
suffered a physical collapse of such a serious nature that a physician and a nurse were
immediately called in. By reason of her advanced age and the gravity of her illness, she was
unable to do anything for herself. Silvestra had an attack and was in a serious condition and
requested that a doctor be sent immediately. As the doctor and the nurse were leaving,
VivencioCuyugan, with an attorney and three witnesses, entered the house prepared to obtain
the will of Silvestra Baron. Neither the doctor nor the nurse were presented as witnesses by the
proponent. EpifaniaSampang, testified that when she reached the house she found her
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grandaunt lying in bed, very pale and unconscious; that she called to her but she did not answer
and only groaned; that her mouth was twisted and her lower lip swollen.
There is no evidence that Silvestra Baron took any active part in the preparation of the alleged
will except that when she was asked if she wished to include her sister Faustina in the will she
said "Yes" in Pampanga. There is no affirmative evidence that she understood the document
when it was read to her. Standing at her bedside was the attorney with three witnesses and the
chief beneficiary, VivencioCuyugan, and yet so far as this record shows, not a word was
exchanged between any of them and the suffering old woman. We don't know what drug the
doctor administered but it is clear to us from the evidence that in her dazed physical and
mental condition she had no adequate understanding of what she was doing at that time. She
could not even sign her name to the original will properly or correctly, and when this defect was
noted by one of the astute subscribing witnesses, he suggested that they have her sign another
copy which was done.She never saw the alleged will at any time again prior to her death which
occurred forty-four days later. It was immediately taken away by an attorney who kept it in his
possession alleging that she had instructed him to keep it secret. There is, however, credible
evidence in the record that before her death she had denied to several persons that she made
any will.This belief on her part that she had not made any will explains her failure to do any act
of revocation in the forty-four days during which she lingered in this life.


De La Cruz, Fatima Nica Q.
LLB-3B























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[209]

SAMSON vs.CORRALES TAN, ET AL
G.R. No. L-23729
December 5, 1925

TOPIC:Unless the acknowledgment is made in a will or other public document, it must be made
in the record of birth, or in other words, in the civil register.

FACTS:
Flaviana Samson was legally married to the deceased Mariano Corrales Tan, that she and her
children Arsenia, Gregoria, Santiago, Dativa, Aurelio, and Amancio Corrales Tan y Samson, are
his legal heirs, and the appellant Vicente Corrales Tan, while a natural child of said Mariano
Corrales Tan, has not been legally acknowledged as such and is therefor not entitled to a share
in the inheritance beyond the amount bequeathed to him in the will of the deceased.

ISSUE:
Whether or not upon the facts found Vicente Corrales Tan can be considered an acknowledged
natural child of the deceased.

HELD:
The court below found that before his marriage to Flaviana Samson, Mariano Corrales Tan was
living with a woman by the name of Prudencia Santos and with her had a child, the herein
appellant, that in his certificate of baptism, it is stated that he was the natural child of Mariano
Corrales Tan and Prudencia de los Santos; that in another document of the same date on file in
the archives of the parish church where the child was baptized, Mariano Corrales Tan, in the
presence of two witnesses, recognized Vicente Corrales Tan Quintin as his natural child had
with Florentina de los Santos.

Vicente Corrales became of age long before the death of his father. Hence, paragraph 1 of
article 137 above quoted is not applicable to his case and, in order to establish his status as an
acknowledged natural child, he must show that he was so acknowledged during the life of the
deceased. According to article 131, such acknowledgment "must be made in the record of birth,
in a will, or in some other public document." The record of birth mentioned in article 131 is that
provided for in article 326 of the same Code and as the application of that article to the
Philippine Islands was suspended by decree of the Governor-General dated December 29, 1889,
and was never put into effect, it follows that form of acknowledgment did not exist in this
country in the year 1894. Whether entries in the civil register provided for in section 2214 of
the Administrative Code will meet the requirements of article 131, we need not here decide.
But it is argued that article 327 of the Civil Code is applicable to the present case. That article
reads:
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The records of the registry shall be evidence of civil status and no other evidence
thereof shall be admitted, unless such records have never existed or the books of the
registry have disappeared, or the question arises in the course of litigation.
In our opinion that article only lays down a rule of evidence and has no bearing on the
formalities for a valid acknowledgment of a natural child; as we have seen, article 131 requires
that unless the acknowledgment is made in a will or other public document, it must be made in
the record of birth, or in other words, in the civil register.
The fact that a person in the will of the deceased is named as one of the legatees is an implied
acknowledgment. There is, of course no merit in this suggestion; legatees are as often as not
unrelated to the testator.

It is also suggested that Exhibit B is a public document and, therefore, in itself a sufficient
acknowledgment. Assuming without conceding that it is a public document, it would
nevertheless not constitute an acknowledgment unless duly approved by a court.


De La Cruz, Fatima Nica Q.
LLB-3B





















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ACOP vs. PIRASO
52 Phil 660
January 16, 1929
DOCTRINE:
The will must be executed in a language or dialectknown to the testator.If the testator resides
in ascertain locality, it can be presumed that he knows the language or dialect in said
locality.Naturally,it is useless to avail of this presumption if the willis not written in the dialect
of the locality. Moreover, the presumption is only prima facie, and therefore, the contrary may
be proved. Thus, it may be shown, for example, by proof in court that the testator was
reallyignorant of the language of the community or locality, or of the language in which the will
had been written.
FACTS:

The CFI of Benguet denied the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased Piraso
because the will sought to be probated was written in English. Evidence showed that Piraso
knew how to speak the Ilocano dialect, although imperfectly, and could make himself
understood in that dialect. Proponent-appellant SixtoAcop alleged that the lower court erred in
not holding that the testator did not know the Ilocano dialect well enough to understand a will
drawn up in said dialect.

ISSUE:

Should the will be probated?

HELD:

NO.The will is not valid. The testator is presumed to know the dialect of the locality where he
resides, unless there is proof to the contrary. The decedents alleged will, being written in
English, a language unknown to the decedent, cannot be probated because it is prohibited by
the law, which clearly requires that the will be written in the language or dialect known the
testator. Nor can the presumption in favor of a will established by the SC in the case of Abangan
vs. Abanganto the effect that the testator is presumed to know the dialect of the locality where
he resides, unless there is proof to the contrary. First, it was not proven that English is the
language of Baguio where the deceased lived and where the will was drawn. The record
contains positive proof that the testator knew no other language other than the Igorrote
dialect, with a smattering of Ilocano. He did not know the English language in which the will was
written.

De La Cruz, Fatima Nica
LLB-3B

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[212]

PERRY vs. ELIO
G.R. No. L-9089
January 5, 1915

DOCTRINE:"If a party writes or prepares a will under which he takes a benefit, that is a
circumstance which ought generally to excite the suspicion of the court, and calls upon it to be
vigilant and zealous in examining the evidence in support of the instrument, in favor of which it
ought not to pronounce unless the suspicion is removed, and it is judicially satisfied that the
paper propounded does express the true will of the deceased

FACTS:
Upon the deceased of SoteraBarrientos, a resident of the municipality of Mambajao, Province
of Misamis, 68 years of age, the wife of Samuel Perry in her third marriage, in the said
municipality on August 31, 1912, two documents were presented in the Court of First Instance
of the said province, each of which, according to those who respectively presented them, was
the last will and testament of the said deceased.
The first document was filed on September 4, 1912, that is, four days after the death of the
testatrix, by Vicente Elio, son of her first husband, and her brother-in-law; and the second on
December 20 of the same year, 1912, by Samuel Perry, her surviving husband. Perry opposed
probate of the first document, and Elio, in turn, that of the second. By agreement of both
parties the two petitions were heard jointly, in order that the evidence introduced to support
the one might be used to impeach the other. Likewise the court, on February 1, 1913, made
one single order in both cases, whereby, after giving due weight to the evidence introduced and
setting forth the findings of fact and of law that he deemed pertinent with respect to each of
the said petitions and to the documents to which they respectively referred, he held that the
said two wills were true and authentic, but that the one executed on September 21, 1910, had
been revoked by the one subsequently executed on August 26, 1912. He therefore denied the
probate of the first, that is, of the one executed in favor of Samuel Perry, and ordered that the
second will, in favor of the other petitioner, Vicente Elio, be probated as the last will and
testament of the said SoteraBarrientos, disallowing with costs the claim of the respondent
Perry.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the deceased understood the terms and knew the effects of the document, the
legalization of which as a will had been ordered by the court.

HELD:
NO.Based from the testimony obtained from this case, on the occasion to which the witnesses
refer, that is, at the time they and Elio presented themselves at the house of SoteraBarrientos
with the document prepared by Elio in order that it might be executed as her will, the weakness
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of the testatrix was so great that not only was she unable to sign the said instrument, all the
means employed for that purpose having been in vain, but she had also lost the power of
speech, for, according to Matayabas, what she said could no longer be understood, nor were
the signs that she made well understood. According to Sabido, she was no longer able to talk;
she merely made movements with her head, although, as all these witnesses testified, she gave
it to be understood that the document that had been read to her was her will and expressed
her wishes, because she replied to the questions which were put to her ascertain whether such
it was, by saying yes; but, according to the witness Rivera, this reply was made with great effort.



De La Cruz, Fatima Nica
LLB-3B

































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[214]

ABANGAN v ABANGAN
46 Phil 476

Topic: WILLS- FORMS OF WILLS

FACTS:
On September 19, 1917, CFI of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will executed July, 1916. From
this decision the opponents appealed. The will consists of 2 sheets. The first contains all the disposition
of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban and by three witnesses. The following
sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental
witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses,
nor numbered by letters. These omissions, according to appellants' contention, are defects whereby the
probate of the will should have been denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the will was duly admitted to probate.

HELD:
YES. In requiring that each and every sheet of the will be signed on the left margin by the testator and
three witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No. 2645 evidently has for its object the avoidance of
substitution of any of said sheets which may change the disposition of the testatrix. In a will consisting
of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by
the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the attestation clause and is signed also
at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on their
margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged. The object of the solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be
interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not
lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to
make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation
whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and
frustration of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.




DELATADO, VANESSA JOY, R.
LLB III-B






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[215]

GONZALEZ vs. LAUREL
G.R. No. L-19079
January 15, 1923

Topic: WILLS- FORMS OF WILLS

FACTS:
By an order dated December 16, 1921, the Court of First Instance of Batangas allowed the document, to
probate as the last will and testament of the deceased Maria Tapia, thus granting the petition of
Primitivo L. Gonzalez and overruling the opposition presented by Jovita Laurel.
Jovita Laurel now appeals to this court from that ruling of the court below, alleging that court erred:
1. The supposed will of the deceased Maria Tapia y Castillo, was executed with the solemnities
prescribed by the law, notwithstanding that there was no proof of the dialect known by the said
deceased and of the fact that it was the same in which said was written.
2. In not holding that the signatures of Maria Tapia appearing had been obtained through deceit,
surprise, fraud, and in an illegal and improper manner.
3. It was obtained through unlawful pressure, influence and machinations of the applicant, Primitivo L.
Gonzalez, one of the legatees, in connivance with Attorney Modesto Castillo.
4. In not finding that the deceased Maria Tapia was physically and mentally incapacitated at the time
she is said to have executed.
5. A valid and authentic and allowing it to probate as the will and testament of the deceased Maria Tapia
y Castillo.
The deceased Maria Tapia was a resident of the Province of Batangas, a Tagalog region, where said
deceased had real properties for several years. It also appears that she requested Modesto Castillo to
draw her will in Tagalog. From the record taken as a whole, a presumption arises that said Maria Tapia
knew the Tagalog dialect, which presumption is now conclusive for not having been overthrown nor
rebutted.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the testatrix acted voluntarily and with full knowledge in executing and signing the will.

HELD:
The preponderance of evidence in this respect is that said document was executed and signed by Maria
Tapia voluntarily and with full knowledge, without fraud, deceit, surprise, or undue influence or
machinations of anybody, she being then mentally capacitated and free. Such is the fact established by
the evidence, which we have carefully examined.


DELATADO, VANESSA JOY, R.
LLB III-B
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[216]

REYES vs. ZUIGA VDA. DE VIDAL
G.R. No. L-2862
April 21, 1952

Topic: WILLS- FORMS OF WILLS

FACTS:
On November 6, 1945, a petition for the probate of said will was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila. On December 21, 1945, Dolores Zuiga Vda. de Vidal, sister of the
deceased, filed an opposition based on several grounds. And, after several days of trial, at
which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered its decision
disallowing the will on the ground that the signatures of the deceased appearing therein are
not genuine, that it was not proven that the deceased knew the Spanish language in which it
was written, and that even if the signatures are genuine, the same reveal that the deceased
was not of sound mind when she signed the will. From this decision petitioner appealed to this
Court.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the signatures of the deceased appearing in the will are genuine
2) Whether or not there is evidence to show that the testatrix knew the language in which the
will was written
3) Whether or not the testatrix was of sound and disposing mind when she signed the will.

HELD:
1. To prove that the will was signed by the testatrix in accordance with law, petitioner
presented as witnesses the three persons who attested to the execution of the will. These
witnesses are: Cornelia Gonzales de Romero, Quintin Ulpindo and Consuelo B. de Catindig.
These witnesses testified in their own simple and natural way that the deceased signed the will
seated on her bed but over a small table placed near the bed in their presence, and after she
had signed it in the places where her signatures appear, they in turn signed it in the presence
and in the presence of each other. The standards should, if possible, have been made by the
same time as the suspected document. It is preferable that the standards embraced the time of
the origin of the document, so that one part comes from the time after the origin. If possible
less than five or six signatures should always be examined and preferably double that number.
2. Another ground on which the lower court base the disallowance of the will is the failure of
the petitioner to prove that the testratrix knew and spoke the language in which the will in
question appears to have been written. According to the lower court, the law requires that the
will should be written in the dialect or language known to the testator and this fact having been
proven, the probate of the will must fail. And the wIll was disallowed.
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3. The remaining ground which the lower court has considered in disallowing the will is the fact
that the deceased was not of sound and disposing mind when she signed the will, and it
reached this conclusion, not because of any direct evidence on the matter, but simply because
the deceased signed the will in a somewhat varied form. They do not reveal a condition of
forgery or lack of genuineness. These differences or irregularities are common in the writings of
old people and, far from showing lack of genuineness, are indicative of the age, sickness, or
weak condition of the writer. A comparison of the three disputed signatures in the will readily
give this impression.
DELATADO, VANESSA JOY, R.
LLB III-B

































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[218]

Testate Estate of Pilapil
GR No. L-47931
June 27, 1941

Topic: WILLS- FORMS OF WILLS

FACTS:
The probate of the will was opposed on the ground that the will was not properly paged as it was
numbered with letters. At the foot of the 1
st
page appears pase ala 2 (pass on to the 2
nd
page). The
bottom of the 2
nd
page also has the phrase pase ala 3 (pass on the 3
rd
page). The third page contains
the will is comprised of 2 articles, containing 16 dispositions and written in 3 pages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the will must be duly admitted for probate.

HELD:
Yes, the will must be admitted for probate. The paging in this case was a sufficient compliance with the
law. It is sufficient that the number of pages can be identified. Indeed, the will in this case, as stated in
the 3
rd
page, contains no more, no less than 2 articles, containing 16 dispositions and written in 3 pages.




DELATADO, VANESSA JOY, R.
LLB III-B










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[219]

ANDALIS VS. PULGUERAS
59 Phil 643
Date:

Topic/Doctrine: Forms of Wills


FACTS:
The alleged will of Victor Pulgueras was admitted to probate. The testimony of only one to the attesting
witnesses was taken. The testimony was: a) that the 6 pages of the will were signed on the margin by
the testator and two of the witnesses on January 4, 1931; b) the remaining three pages were signed by
the testator and the three attesting witnesses on January 11, 1931, and that the third attesting witness
then signed the first six pages.

ISSUE:
Was the will executed properly?

HELD:
Such an execution of the will was not in conformity with the law. Under our statute, the execution of a
will is supposed to be one act and cannot be legally effective if the various participants sign on various
days and in various combinations of those present.





FALCATAN, GARY
LLB III-B















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[220]

MAMERTO GILLESANIA, ET ALvs NICOLAS MENASALVAS, ET AL
13 Phil 116

Topic/Doctrine: Forms of Wills

FACTS:
On the 27th day of June, 1903, GracianoFadrigon executed his last will and testament. On the 5th day of
November, 1905, the said Fadrigon died. Later the said will was presented to the Court of First Instance
of the Province of Antique for probate. The probation of the will was opposed by some of the relatives
of the deceased. The opposition seems to be based upon two grounds:
First. That the witnesses who signed the will did not all sign in the presence of the testator and in the
presence of each other as required by section 618 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions; and
Second. That the said testator was mentally incapable of making said will at the time the same was
authorized and made.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the will should be admitted to probate

HELD:
An examination of the evidence shows that each of the six persons who signed the said will were
examined as witnesses and it appears, beyond peradventure of doubt, that five of the six witnesses
signed the said will at the request of the testator, in the presence of the testator and in the presence of
each other. It is true that one of the witnesses, Mateo Mena, who was the first witness to sign the will,
immediately left the room where the will was executed, and did not see the other witnesses sign the
said will. We are of the opinion and so hold, that, when three of all the witnesses who signed the will,
signed at the request of the testator and in his presence and in the presence of each other, the
requirements of the law were thereby complied with. The mere fact that there six witnesses to the said
will and that one of them did not see the others sign is not sufficient to invalidate the said will when the
other requirements of the law are satisfied.



FALCATAN, GARY
LLB III-B









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[221]

YAP TUA vs YAP CA KUAN and YAP CA LLU
27 Phil. 579

Topic/Doctrine: Forms of Wills

FACTS:
One Perfecto Gabriel, representing the petitioner, Yap Tua, presented a petition in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila, asking that the will of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be admitted to probate,
as the last will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, deceased. It appears that the said Tomasa
died in the city of Manila on the 11th day of August, 1909. Accompanying said petition and attached
thereto was the alleged will of the deceased. It appears that the will was signed by the deceased, as well
as Anselmo Zacarias, Severo Tabora, and Timoteo Paez. Said petition, after due notice was given, was
brought on for hearing. Timoteo Paez declared that he was 48 years of age; that he had known the said
Tomasa; that she had died on the 11th day of August, 1909; that before her death she had executed a
last will and testament; that he was present at the time of the execution of the same; that he had signed
the will as a witness; that Anselmo and Severo had also signed said will as witnesses and that they had
signed the will in the presence of the deceased. Pablo Agustin also declared as a witness and said that
he was 40 years of age; that he knew Tomasa during her lifetime; that she died on the 11th day of
August, 1909, in the city of Manila; that before her death she had executed a last will and testament;
that he was present at the time said last will was executed; that there were also said will. The court
appointed Gabriel La O as guardian ad litem of said parties. Gabriel La O accepted said appointment,
took the oath of office and entered upon the performance of his duties as guardian ad litem of said
parties.

ISSUE:
Whether or not decedent complied with the requirements in making a will.

HELD:
Yes. While the rule is absolute that one who makes a will must sign the same in the presence of the
witnesses and that the witnesses must sign in the presence of each other, as well as in the presence of
the one making the will, yet, nevertheless, the actual seeing of the signatures made is not necessary. It is
sufficient if the signatures are made where it is possible for each of the necessary parties, if they desire
to see, may see the signatures placed upon the will. Where there is so much conflict in the proof, it is
very difficult for the courts to reach conclusions that are absolutely free from doubt. Great weight must
be given by appellate courts who do not see or hear the witnesses, to the conclusions of the trial courts
who had that opportunity. Upon a full consideration of the record, we find that a preponderance of the
proof shows that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did execute, freely and voluntarily, while she was in the
right use of all her faculties, the will dated August 11, 1909.




FALCATAN, GARY
LLB III-B
[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS] LLB III-B, BATCH 2013-2014

[222]

In the matter of the estate of REMIGIA SAGUINSIN
vs.
RUFINA SAGUINSIN
41 Phil. 875

Topic/Doctrine: Forms of Wills

FACTS:
There was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for allowance an instrument
which the petitioner calls the will of Remigia Saguinsin. It is a manuscript signed by the alleged testatrix
and three witnesses on October 3, 1918, these three signature together with that of the alleged testatrix
are written also on the left margin of the first page or folio and on the third page or second folio, but not
on the second page or reverse side of the first page where, as is seen, the manuscript is continued, the
second folio not containing anything but the date and the and of the manuscript.
Under these, conditions the instrument was impugned by a sister of the alleged testatrix and after the
taking of the declaration of the authors of the signatures which appear three times and in different parts
of the manuscript, the court declared that the document attached to the record could not be allowed as
a will. Certain person who allege themselves to be legatees appealed jointly with the lawyer for the
petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the making of the will complied with the requirements prescribed by law.

HELD:
No, Two pages constitute one leaf. One page represents only one-half of one leaf. The English text
requires that the signature which guarantees the genuineness of the testament shall be placed on the
left hand margin of each page and that each page should be numbered by letter in the upper part This
requirement is entirely lacking on the second page that is, on the reverse side of the first. The first folio
and the reverse side, should have been stated, and the second page would then have been included in
the citation. By the failure to comply with this requisite the law has been obviously violated. This failure
to comply with the law also vitiates the will and invalidates it, as the second page is lacking in
authenticity. It may very well be that it was subsequently added thereby substituting the will of the
testatrix, a result for the prevention of which this manner of authenticity by affixing the signature on
each page and not merely on each folio was provided for by law. This defect is radical and totally vitiates
the testament. It is not enough that the signatures guaranteeing authenticity should appear upon two
folios or leaves; three pages having been written, the authenticity of all three of them should be
guaranteed with the signature of the alleged testatrix and her witnesses.





FALCATAN, GARY
LLB III-B
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[223]

AVERA vs. GARCIA.
G.R. No. 15566
September 14, 1921

Topic/ Doctrines: Forms of Will

FACTS:
In proceedings in the court below, instituted by Eutiquia Avera for probate of the will of one Esteban
Garcia, contest was made by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, the latter in the capacity of guardian for
the minors Jose Garcia and Cesar Garcia. Upon the date appointed for the hearing, the proponent of the
will introduced one of the three attesting witnesses who testified - with details not necessary to be here
specified - that the will was executed with all necessary external formalities, and that the testator was at
the time in full possession of disposing faculties. Upon the latter point the witness was corroborated by
the person who wrote the will at the request of the testator. Two of the attesting witnesses were not
introduced, nor was their absence accounted for by the proponent of the will. When the proponent
rested the attorney for the opposition introduced a single witness whose testimony tended to show in a
vague and indecisive manner that at the time the will was made the testator was so debilitated as to be
unable to comprehend what he was about. After the cause had been submitted for determination upon
the proof thus presented, the trial judge found that the testator at the time of the making of the will
was of sound mind and disposing memory and that the will had been properly executed. He accordingly
admitted the will to probate. law library

ISSUE:
a. whether or not a will can be admitted to probate, where opposition is made, upon the proof of a
single attesting witness, without producing or accounting for the absence of the other two;
b. whether or not the will in question is rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the signature of the
testator and of the three attesting witnesses are written on the right margin of each page of the will
instead of the left margin.

HELD:
a. When the petitioners for probate of a will is contested the proponent should introduce all three of the
attesting witnesses, if alive and within reach of the process of the court; and the execution of the will
cannot be considered sufficiently proved by the testimony of only one, without satisfactory explanation
of the failure to produce the other two.
b. A will otherwise properly executed in accordance with the requirement of existing law is not rendered
invalid by the fact that the paginal signatures of the testator and attesting witnesses appear in the right
margin instead of the left.




Fernandez, Elaine Joy
LLB III-B
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[224]

NAYVE vs. MOJAL
G.R. No. L-21755
December 29, 1924

Topic/ Doctrines: Forms of Will

FACTS:
This is a proceeding for the probate of the will of the deceased Antonio Mojal instituted by his surviving
spouse, Filomena Nayve. The probate is opposed by Leona Mojal and Luciana Aguilar, sister and niece,
respectively, of the deceased. The Court of First Instance of Albay, which tried the case, overruled the
objections to the will, and ordered the probate thereof, holding that the document in controversy was
the last will and testament of Antonio Mojal, executed in accordance with law. From this judgment the
opponents appeal, assigning error to the decree of the court allowing the will to probate and overruling
their opposition. The will in question, Exhibit A, is composed of four sheets with written matter on only
side of each, that is, four pages written on four sheets. The four sides or pages containing written matter
are paged "Pag. 1," "Pag. 2," "Pag. 3," "Pag. 4," successively. Each of the first two sides or pages, which
was issued, was signed by the testator and the three witnesses on the margin, left side of the reader. On
the third page actually used, the signatures of the three witnesses appear also on the margin, left side of
the reader, but the signature of the testator is not on the margin, but about the middle of the page, at
the end of the will and before the attestation clause. On the fourth page, the signatures of the witnesses
do not appear on the margin, but at the bottom of the attestation clause, it being the signature of the
testator that is on the margin, left side of the reader.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is valid for: (a) not having been signed by the testator and the witnesses on
each and every sheet on the left margin; (b) the fact of the sheets of the document not being paged with
letters; (c) the fact that the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages actually
used of the will; and (d) the fact that the testator does not appear to have signed all the sheets in the
presence of the three witnesses, and the latter to have attested and signed all the sheets in the
presence of the testator and of each other.
HELD:
a. The rule laid down in that case is that the document contained the necessary signatures on each page,
whereby each page of the will was authenticated and safeguarded against any possible alteration. In
that case, the validity of the will was sustained, and consequently it was allowed to probate.
b. paging with Arabic numerals and not with letters, as in the case before us, is within the spirit of the
law and is just as valid as paging with letters.
c. attestation clause must state the number of sheets or pages composing the will; but when, as in the
case before us, such fact, while it is not stated in the attestation clause, appears at the end of the will
proper, so that no proof aliunde is necessary of the number of the sheets of the will, then there can be
no doubt that it complies with the intention of the law that the number of sheets of which the will is
composed be shown by the document itself, to prevent the number of the sheets of the will from being
unduly increased or decreased.
d. The act of the testator and the witnesses seeing reciprocally the signing of the will is one which
cannot be proven by the mere exhibition of the will unless it is stated in the document. And this fact is
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expressly stated in the attestation clause now before us. But the fact of the testator and the witnesses
having signed all the sheets of the will may be proven by the mere examination of the document,
although it does not say anything about this, and if that is the fact, as it is in the instant case, the danger
of fraud in this respect, which is what the law tries to avoid, does not exist.


Fernandez, Elaine Joy
LLB III-B





















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[226]

MARTIR vs. MARTIR
G.R. No. 46995
June 21, 1940

Topic/ Doctrines: Forms of Will

FACTS:
On December 22, 1936, Hermogenes Martir filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Occidental
Negros for the probate of the will of his deceased father, Hilarion Martir, the document being then
identified as Exhibit AA. The said document appears to have been prepared by attorney and notary
public, Esteban H. Korral, in the Visayan dialect, with one original and two carbon copies. On August 14,
1935, the will was signed by said testator and the three attesting witnesses: Valeriano Gatuslao, Dionisio
Gonzaga, and Olimpio de la Rama. It was decided that one of the witnesses read the will to the testator,
and for this purpose Dionisio Gonzaga was selected. This was done. After the reading to the document
the testator wrote on the space immediately beneath the last paragraph of the instrument on page 3,
the following: "Murcia, Occidental Negros - Agosto 14. 1935." This addition in the handwriting of the
testator appears both in the original Exhibit AA and in the carbon copy Exhibit AA-1. The testator than
proceeded to sign the original on the left margin of the four pages and at the foot of its body over his
typewritten name and surname on page 3 thereof in the presence of the above-named attesting
witnesses. Then the witnesses, one after another and in the presence of the testator and of each other.
signed each and every one of the four pages on the left margin, Olimpio de la Rama also signing at the
foot of the attestation clause on page 3, and Valeriano Gatuslao and Dionisio Gonzaga likewise affixed
their signatures at the foot of the same clause, but, for lack of conveniently sufficient space on page 3,
on the upper part of page 4. Below the signatures of the witnesses Gatuslao and Gonzaga on the upper
part of page 4 there appears a "Nota" over the signature of the testator containing certain instruction to
his children. Under this note appears the declaration signed by the oppositor Salvacion Angela
expressing conformity to the conditions set forth above.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library. On January 26, 1937, an opposition was entered to the probate of this will by Salvacion
Angela, daughter of the testator. The opposition was amended on February 12, 1937, alleging as
principal grounds that the will was not executed and signed by the witnesses in accordance with law;
that the signatures of the testator were obtained through deceit and fraud and that undue influence
was used by the proponent Hermogenes Martir over the testator. After hearing, the trial court allowed
the will to probate and, as stated, confirmed the appointment of Hermogenes Martir as
executor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is valid because: ( a) the first sheet is not numbered as required by law; ( b)
Arabic numerals, instead of letters, were used in the pagination of the other sheets of the will.

HELD:
a. The first sheet of the will bears no number and the oppositor claims that this circumstance is fatal to
its validity. The authenticity of this unnumbered page, however, is not questioned, nor the genuineness
of the signatures of the testator of the witnesses on this sheet. There is no suggestion either that the
deceased had executed another will either before or after the execution of the controverted will. The
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principal object of the requirement with reference to the numeration of the pages of the will is to
forestall any attempt to suppress or substitute any of the pages thereof. In the absence of collusion or
fraud and there being no question regarding the authenticity of the first page and the genuineness of
the signatures appearing thereon, we hold that the mere fact that the first, sheet is unnumbered is not
sufficient to justify the invalidation of the will.
b. The opposition to the attestation clause is based on two grounds: (1) the statement of the attestation
clause that the will consists of four pages when it is written on sheet and (2) the said clause does not
recite that the testator signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the witnesses. An
examination, however, of Exhibit AA shows that the will really consists of four pages, the first page
bearing no number and the other three pages correlatively numbered in Arabic numerals. The
attestation clause as follows:This will is composed of four pages and had been made and published by
Hilarion Martir who was the testator therein named, and that will was signed at the foot and on the left
margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of the said witnesses. We are of the opinion
that when the witnesses certified in the attestation clause that the same was signed in their presence,
they could not probably refer to another person than the testator himself.


Fernandez, Elaine Joy
LLB III-B














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[228]

VILLAFLOR vs. TOBIAS
G.R. No. L-27440
December 24, 1927

Topic/ Doctrines: Forms of Will

FACT:
This is an appeal from the judgment denying a petition for the probate of a will alleged to have been
executed by one Gregoria Villaflor who died in the municipality of Santo Domingo, Province of Ilocos Sur
on October 7, 1925. The petition was presented by Jose Villaflor, one of the testamentary heirs of the
deceased. Pilar Villaflor, Deogracias Tobias, and several others whose names do not appear in the
record, contested the will upon the following grounds: (1) That it was not signed by the alleged testatrix
personally though she was able to do so at the time of the execution of the document; (2) that said
testatrix did not authorize any one to sign the alleged will in her name; (3) that both before and after
the execution of the document, Gregoria Villaflor signed various documents by thumb marks; (4) that
although it is true that the testatrix requested that the will be prepared, she nevertheless refused to sign
it because it was contrary to her desires and instructions; (5) that subsequent to the date upon which
the alleged will was executed, Gregoria Villaflor on several occasions stated that it was not her
testament; (6) that the alleged will was not executed or signed in conformity of the law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is valid.

HELD:
That the attestation clause of the will is written on a separate page and not on the last page of the body
of the document is, in our opinion, a matter of minor importance and is explained by the fact that if the
clause had been written on the eight page of the will in direction continuation of the body thereof, there
would have been sufficient space on that page for the signatures of the witnesses to the clause. It is also
to be observed that all of the pages, including that upon which the attestation clause is written, bear the
signatures of all the witnesses and that there is no question whatever as to the genuineness of said
signatures. Held, that is these circumstances the writing of the attestation clause on a separate page did
not invalidate the will and that the writing of the name of the testatrix by another person at her request
was in sufficient compliance with the law.




Fernandez, Elaine Joy
LLB III-B

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[229]

NAYVE vs MOJAL
G.R. No. L-21755
December 29, 1924

Topic/Doctrine: Forms of Wills- If the page of the will are numbered by Arabic numerals, there is
sufficient compliance with the statutory requirement.
FACTS:
This is a proceeding for the probate of the will of the deceased Antonio Mojal instituted by his surviving
spouse, Filomena Nayve. The probate is opposed by Leona Mojal and Luciana Aguilar, sister and niece,
respectively, of the deceased. The Court of First Instance of Albay, which tried the case, overruled the
objections to the will, and ordered the probate thereof, holding that the document in controversy was
the last will and testament of Antonio Mojal, executed in accordance with law. From this judgment the
opponents appeal, assigning error to the decree of the court allowing the will to probate and overruling
their opposition.The will in question, Exhibit A, is composed of four sheets with written matter on only
side of each, that is, four pages written on four sheets. The four sides or pages containing written matter
are paged "Pag. 1," "Pag. 2," "Pag. 3," "Pag. 4," successively. Each of the first two sides or pages, which
was issued, was signed by the testator and the three witnesses on the margin, left side of the reader. On
the third page actually used, the signatures of the three witnesses appear also on the margin, left side of
the reader, but the signature of the testator is not on the margin, but about the middle of the page, at
the end of the will and before the attestation clause. On the fourth page, the signatures of the witnesses
do not appear on the margin, but at the bottom of the attestation clause, it being the signature of the
testator that is on the margin, left side of the reader.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the fact that the sheets of the document are not paged with letters invalidate the will

HELD:
No. Where this court held that paging with Arabic numerals and not with letters, as in the case before us,
is within the spirit of the law and is just as valid as paging with letters.


FLORENDO, KATHERINE GAY V.
LLB III-B










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[230]

SAO vs QUINTANA
G.R. No. L-24556
December 18, 1925

Topic/Doctrine: Forms of Will- Under the rule of strict interpretation, the contents of the attestation
clause were mandatory, and noncompliance therewith invalidated the will.
FACTS:
The judgment appealed from allowed the probate of the will of the deceased Victoria Quintana executed
on March 22, 1924. Without going into discussion of the points raised by the parties as to the formalities
of this will we find a sufficient reason for reversing the judgment appealed from and denying the probate
thereof. In the attestation clause there is no statement that the witnesses to the will have signed on the
left margin of each page of the will in the presence of the testatrix. Section 618 of Act No. 190, as
amended by Act No. 2645, provides that he attestation clause shall state the fact that the testator signed
the will and all the pages thereof, or caused another persons to place his name thereon at his expressed
direction in the presence of the three witnesses to the will, and that the latter signed the will and all its
pages in the presence of the testator and of each other.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure of the instrumental witnesses to state one or some of the essential facts,
which according to law, must be stated in the attestation clause, would be fatal to the validity of the will

HELD:
Yes. In the case of Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca (43 Phil., 405), this court has held that the requirement
that the attestation clause must contain the statement that the witnesses signed in the presence of each
other is imperative and non-comfort in said case in support of this doctrine may be adduced for holding
that the will is also null and void when in the attestation clause it does not appear that the witnesses to
the will signed it and every page thereof on the left margin and in the presence of the testatrix. In order
to insure the authenticity of a will, which is the object of the law, it is just as important, if not the most
important, that the witnesses should sign in the presence of the testator and of each other.


FLORENDO, KATHERINE GAY V.
LLB-IIIB







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[231]

GUMBAN vs GORECHO
G.R. No. L-26135
March 3, 1927

Topic/Doctrine: Forms of Will- Under the rule of strict interpretation, the contents of the attestation
clause were mandatory, and noncompliance therewith invalidated the will.
FACTS:
This is an appeal by the widow, Inocencia Gorecho, and eighteen other opponents, from an order of the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo probating the document presented by Petronilo Gumban as the last will
and testament of the deceased Eustaquio Hagoriles. Among the errors assigned is included the finding of
the trial court that the alleged will was prepared in conformity with the law, notwithstanding it did not
contain an attestation clause stating that the testator and the witnesses signed all the pages of the will.
In the case of Sao vs. Quintana, supra, it was decided that an attestation clause which does not recite
that the witnesses signed the will and each and every page thereof on the left margin in the presence of
the testator is defective, and such a defect annuls the will. The case of Uy Coque vs. Sioca, supra, was
cited, but the case ofNayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra, was not mentioned. In contrast, is the decision
in Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar,supra, wherein it was held that the attestation clause must state the fact
that the testator and the witnesses reciprocally saw the signing of the will, for such an act cannot be
proved by the mere exhibition of the will, if it is not stated therein. It was also held that the fact that the
testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of the will can be proved also by the mere
examination of the signatures appearing on the document itself, and the omission to state such evident
fact does not invalidate the will.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure to contain an attestation clause stating that the testator and the witnesses
signed all the pages of the will invalidate the will

HELD:
Yes. The right to dispose of property by will is governed entirely by statute. The law of the case is here
found in section 618 of the Code of Civil procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, and in section 634 of
the same Code, as unamended. It is part provided in section 618, as amended, that"No will. . .shall be
valid. . .unless. . . ." It is further provided in the same section that "The attestation shall state the number
of sheets or pages used, upon which the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to
write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed
and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other." Codal
section 634 provides that " The will shall be disallowed in either of the following cases: 1. If not executed
and attested as in this Act provided." The law not alone carefully makes use of the imperative, but
cautiously goes further and makes use of the negative, to enforce legislative intention. It is not within
the province of the courts to disregard the legislative purpose so emphatically and clearly expressed. We
adopt and reaffirm the decision in the case of Sao vs. Quintana, supra, and, to the extent necessary,
modify the decision in the case of Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra.
FLORENDO, KATHERINE GAY V.
LLB-IIIB

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[232]

QUINTO vs MORATA
G.R. No. L-31732
February 19, 1930

Topic/Doctrine: Forms of Will - Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of
wills are very strictly construed. As stated in 40 Cyc., at page 1097, "A will must be executed in
accordance with the statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely void. All these requirements stand
as of equal importance and must be observed, and courts cannot supply the defective execution of a
will. No power or discretion is vested in them, either to superadd other conditions or dispense with
those enumerated in the statutes."
FACTS:
The application for probate was filed on October 26, 1928 by Carmen Quinto, executrix of said will. It
was a joint and mutual will of Gregorio Pueblo and his said wife Carmen Quinto and contained a
provision that the surviving spouse shall take charge of the properties therein described and that they
shall pass to the heirs and legatees at the time of the death of the surviving spouse. To said application
an opposition was filed by Mateo Pueblo, a brother of the deceased, on the following grounds: (1) That
the attestation clause of said will does not state the number of pages of which the will is composed, and
(2) that the attestation clause does not state that each and every page of the will was signed by the
testators in the presence of the witnesses, and that the latter signed the same in the presence of the
testators and in the presence of each other. Upon the issue thus raised, and after hearing the evidence,
the court rendered a judgment denying the petition on the ground that the attestation clause did not
state that the witnesses signed the will in the presence of the testators, or that both the testators and
the witnesses signed the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of each other. From the
judgment the petitioner appealed .

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court committed an error in denying the application of the petitioner for the
probate of the will of the deceased Gregorio Pueblo

HELD:
No. In the case of Sao vs. Quintana (48 Phil., 506) this court held that "an attestation clause which does
not recite that the witnesses signed the will and each and every page thereof on the left margin in the
presence of the testator is defective, and such defect annuls the will." This doctrine was restated and
reaffirmed in the case of Gumban vs. Gorecho (50 Phil., 30).




FLORENDO, KATHERINE GAY V.
LLB-IIIB


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[233]

Diaz v. De Leon
G.R. No. 17714
May 31, 1922

Topic/Doctrine: Revocation of a will

FACTS:
Jesus de Leon executed 2 wills, the second will was not deemed in conformance to the requirements
under the law. After executing his first will, he asked it to be immediately returned to him. As it was
returned, he instructed his servant to tear it. This was done in the testator's presence and his nurse.
After sometime, he was asked by his physician about the incident wherein he replied that the will has
already been destroyed.

ISSUE:
WON there was a valid revocation of the will?

HELD:
Yes. His intention to revoke is manifest from the facts that he was anxious to withdraw or change the
provisions he made in the first will. This fact was shown from his own statements to the witnesses and
the mother superior of the hospital where he was subsequently confined. The original will which was
presented for probate is deemed destroyed hence, it cannot be probated as the last will and testament
of testator.


IJIN, MOHAMMAD IJIN E.
LLB III-B



















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[234]

TIMBOL VS. MANALO
G.R. No. L-2696
May 5, 1906

Topic/Doctrine: Testamentary Dispositions

FACTS:
On the 17th of May, 1898, Adolfo Garcia Feijoo, a resident attorney and notary public, by request of the
party interested was called to the house of Sixto Timbolfor the purpose of taking the acknowledgment
of Cesarea Manalo y Manalo, the mother of the plaintiff, Sixto Timbol, to her last will and testament
which contained wherein she named the said Sixto Timbol as one of her heirs. Timbol was also
appointed as executor of the said will, without bond, and given full power to do all things necessary in
connection with the execution of its provisions, the testatrix declaring that any prior or subsequent will
executed by her which did not comply with the legal requirements should be considered null and void.
The will in question was attested by the witnesses Eugenio Ayuyao, Ignacio Sugay, and Pablo Torres.
Sugay interpreted the will into Pampango and Torres signed the will at the request of the testatrix who
could not write.Counsel for Januaria, Alejandra, Lino Lacson, and Sinforoso Manalo objected to its being
admitted to probate, alleging that the will was not executed in accordance of the law.

ISSUE:
WON the said will was executed in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code?

HELD:
Yes. The will in question seems to have been executed in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Code that is, in the presence of a notary public and in the presence of three competent witnesses,
residents of the same place, who saw the testatrix, witnessed the execution of the will, and understood
everything she said to the notary public in regard to her last will. The will further contains the place,
year, month, day, and hour of its execution and it recited therein that after being drawn up it was read
to the testatrix in the presence of the witnesses, by one of whom it was interpreted to her; that one of
the witnesses signed for the testatrix because she was unable to sign her name; that the will was
executed at one time, without interruption; that the notary was acquainted with the testatrix; that she
has legal capacity to execute the same, she being in the full enjoyment of her mental faculties, and that
all the other solemnities required by law in the execution of wills were complied with.




IJIN, MOHAMMAD IJIN E.
LLB III-B





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[235]

LIPANA VS. CFI
G.R. No. 47174
June 28, 1940

Topic/Doctrine: Testamentary Disposition

FACTS:
One Eliodora Lipana filed in the respondent court an application for the probate of a will supposedly
executed by the deceased, Manuela Lipana, a carbon copy of which was attached to the application.
Natividad Lipana filed an opposition, and her "oposicion supletoria" she claimed that evidence was
unnecessary upon the facts alleged in the application, the copy of the will attached thereto showing, in
itself, that the will had not been executed in accordance with law. The respondent court, after
inspecting the copy of the will but without a hearing, dismissed the application on the ground that such
copy could not be admitted to probate, it not having been signed by the testatrix and the attesting
witnesses at the end thereof and on the left margin of each page. It is against this order of dismissal that
the petition for certiorari has been filed with this court.

ISSUE:
WON the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction?

HELD:
Yes. There can be no doubt that the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in rendering a
judgment upon the merits of the case without a previous hearing. The pronouncement made by the
respondent court that the will had not been executed in accordance with law, is founded undoubtedly
on the erroneous assumption that the probate of the carbon copy of the will was being applied for, It is
apparent from the application that what is sought to be admitted to probate is the original of the will.
Such copy was attached to the application merely to corroborate the allegation as to the existence of its
original and not to establish a full compliance with the requirements of the law as to the execution of
the will. Such requirements are alleged in the application to have been complied with and may proved
at the hearing.




IJIN, MOHAMMAD IJIN E.
LLB III-B








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[236]

Gago vs. Mamuyac
G.R. No. L-26317
January 29, 1927

Topic/Doctrine: Revocation of a will

FACTS:
Previously, Francisco Gago filed a petition for the probate of a will of Miguel Mamuyac executed on July
27, 1918. The oppositors alleged that the said will was already annulled and revoked. It appeared that
on April 16, 1919, the deceased executed another will. The lower court denied the probate of the first
will on the ground of the existence of the second will. Another petition was filed to seek the probate of
the second will. The oppositors alleged that the second will presented was merely a copy. According to
the witnesses, the said will was allegedly revoked as per the testimony of Jose Tenoy, one of the
witnesses who typed the document. Another witness testified that on December 1920 the original will
was actually cancelled by the testator. The lower court denied the probate and held that the same has
been annulled and revoked.

ISSUE:
WON there was a valid revocation of the will

HELD:
Yes. The will was already cancelled in 1920. This was inferred when after due search, the original will
cannot be found. When the will which cannot be found in shown to be in the possession of the testator
when last seen, the presumption is that in the absence of other competent evidence, the same was
deemed cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption applies when it is shown that the testator has
ready access to the will and it can no longer be found after his death.




IJIN, MOHAMMAD IJIN E.
LLB III-B












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[237]

BALUYUT vs. PAO
G.R. No. L-42088
May 7, 1976

Topic/Doctrine: Section 4-Executors and Administrators

FACTS:
Sotero Baluyut died in Manila on January 6, 1975 at the age of eighty-six. On February 20 of the same
year, his nephew, Alfredo G. Baluyut, filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City a verified petition
for letters of administration. He alleged that the deceased was survived by his widow, Encarnacion
Lopez, who was mentally incapable of acting as administratrix of the decedent's estate. Alfredo
surmised that the decedent had executed a will. He prayed that he be appointed regular administrator
and in the meantime as special administrator.
On February 24, 1975, the lower court appointed Alfredo G. Baluyut as special administrator with a
bond of P100,000.
The deceaseds surviving spouse alleged that she was unaware that her deceased husband executed a
will and characterized as libelous the allegation of Alfredo Baluyut as to her mental incapacity. She
prayed that she be named administratrix and that the appointment of Alfredo G. Baluyut as special
administrator be set aside.
On March 24, 1975, the lower court cancelled Baluyut's appointment as special administrator and its
order noted that after asking Mrs. Baluyut a series of questions while on the witness stand, it found that
she "is healthy and mentally qualified".
Alfredo G. Baluyut moved for the reconsideration of that order. On March 31, 1975 appointed Baluyut
and Jose Espino as special administrators.
On November 12, 1975 Mrs. Baluyut filed an urgent motion praying that she be appointed
administratrix. which was opposed by Alfredo G. Baluyut
Alfredo G. Baluyut opposed the urgent motion. He alleged that Espino was not a natural child of Sotero
Baluyut because Espino's parents were the spouses Elino Espino and Josefa de Guzman. Alfredo further
alleged that Mrs. Baluyut was declared an incompetent by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Quezon City in its order of September 25, 1975 in Special Proceeding No. QC-00939 for the guardianship
of Mrs. Baluyut. That proceeding was instituted by her sisters, Cristeta Lopez Vda. de Cuesta and
Guadalupe Lopez-Viray.
At the hearing of Mrs. Baluyut's urgent motion on November 17, 1975 no oral and documentary
evidence was presented. The lower court merely examined Mrs. Baluyut.
On November 27, 1975, the appointments of Espino and Alfredo G. Baluyut as special administrators
was terminated and Mrs. Baluyut was then appointed as regular administratrix with a bond of P20,000.
Hence, this special civil action of certiorari.

ISSUE:
The issue is whether the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Mrs. Baluyut as
administratrix.

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HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court has held that, while the probate court correctly assumed that Mrs. Baluyut as
surviving spouse enjoys preference in the granting of letters of administration (Sec. 6[a), Rule 78, Rules
of Court), it does not follow that she should be named administratrix without conducting a full-dress
hearing on her competency to discharge that trust.
Even the directive of the testator in his will designating that a certain person should act as executor is
not binding on the probate court and does not automatically entitle him to the issuance of letters
testamentary. A hearing has to be held in order to ascertain his fitness to act as executor. He might have
been fit to act as executor when the will was executed but supervening circumstances might have
rendered him unfit for that position.
Thus, it was held that a hearing is necessary in order to determine the suitability of the person to be
appointed administrator by giving him the opportunity to prove his qualifications and affording
oppositors a chance to contest the petition.
The court did not give Alfredo G. Baluyut a chance to contest her qualifications. He had squarely raised
the issue as to her competency. The probate court assumed that Alfredo G. Baluyut had no interest in
the decedent's estate.
Moreover, it is necessary to convert the proceeding in the lower court into a testamentary proceeding.
The probate of the will cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy (Art. 838, Civil Code;
See. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249).
Whether Sotero Baluyut died testate or intestate, it is imperative in the interest of the orderly
administration of justice that a hearing be held to determine Mrs. Baluyut's fitness to act as executrix or
administratrix. Persons questioning her capacity should be given an adequate opportunity to be heard
and to present evidence.
The lower court departed from the usual course of probate procedure in summarily appointing Mrs.
Baluyut as administratrix on the assumption that Alfredo G. Baluyut was not an interested party. That
irregularity became more pronounced after Alfredo G. Baluyut's revelation that the decedent had
executed a will. He anticipated that development when he articulated in his petition his belief that
Sotero Baluyut executed wills which should be delivered to the court for probate.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of November 27, 1975 appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix is
set aside. The letters of administration granted to her are cancelled. The probate court is directed to
conduct further proceedings in consonance with the guidelines delineated in this decision. Costs against
respondent Mrs. Baluyut.



JAAFAR, KAIZER
LLB III-B




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[239]

MANG-OY VS CA
G.R.144 SCRA 35
SEPTEMBER 12, 1986

Topic/Doctrine: Subsection 8-Allowance and Disallowance of Wills

FACTS:
Old Tumpao begot 3 children (respondents) with his first wife. Upon her death, he took himself a second
wife but without issues. However she had adopted 2 children according to the practice of Igorots. On
September 4, 1937, Old Tumpao executed what he called last will and testament which were read to
and thumb mark affixed by all of the beneficiaries who at the time were already occupying the portions
respectively allotted to them. After the death of Old Tumpao, the parties remained to be in possession
of the lots assign to them which was in accordance of the wishes of old Tumpao which was also agreed
upon by the parties in a public document.
On November 4, 1960, respondents executed an extra-judicial partition in which they divided the
property of Old Tumpao among the three of them only. Petitioners sued for reconveyance , sustained by
trial court but reversed by CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the will and testament of Old Tumpao be duly allowed even without being proved in
the court

RULING:
In accordance with the rules of court, no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved or allowed in court.
However the document maybe sustained by art 1056 of the Old Civil Code which was the law in force at
the time the document was made. The law says: If the testator should make a partition of his
properties by an act inter vivors, or by will such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the
legitime of the forced heirs.
Such partition is not governed by the rules of wills or donation inter vivos, which is a consequence of its
special nature. Thus, the last will and testament of Old Tumpao is sustained by the provision of Art 1056,
Old Civil Code, which became a binding law when the beneficiaries, parties herein, agreed and
confirmed with the disposition made by Old Tumpao.


JAAFAR, KAIZER
LLB III-B




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[240]

MANINANG v CA
114 SCRA 478
June 19, 1982


Topic/Doctrine: Subsection 3-Forms of Wills

FACTS:
Clemencia Aseneta, single, died and left a holographic will saying that all her real properties located in
Manila, Makati, Quezon City, Albay and Legaspi City and all her personal properties shall be inherited by
Dra. Soledad L. Maninang with whose family she have lived with.- Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for
probate of the Will of the decedent with the CFI.- Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted son, claims to
be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings.- The two cases were
ordered consolidated.- Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that the
holographic will was null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir, was preterited and,
therefore, intestacy should ensue.- The lower Court ordered the dismissal of the Testate Case. MR
denied. Maninang resorted to a certiorari Petition before CA.

ISSUE:
WON the Courta quoa quo acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the Testate Case.

HELD:
YES. Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory. Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its
intrinsic validity.- The Nuguid and the Balanay cases provide the exception rather than the rule. The
intrinsic validity of the Wills in those cases was passed upon even before probate because "practical
considerations" so demanded. Moreover, for the parties in the Nuguid case, the "meat of the
controversy" was the intrinsic validity of the Will; in fact, the parties in that case "shunted aside the
question of whether or not the Will should be allowed probate." Not so in the case before us now
where the probate of the Will is insisted on by petitioners and a resolution on the extrinsic validity of
the Will demanded.- Moreover, in the Nuguid case, this Court ruled that the Will was intrinsically invalid
as it completely preterited the parents of the testator. In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for
resolution is whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or
disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance are
two diverse concepts.- By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination of that
controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. We gather from the assailed Order of the trial
Court that its conclusion was that respondent Bernardo has been preterited We are of opinion,
however, that from the face of the Will, that conclusion is not indubitable


JAAFAR, KAIZER
LLB III-B

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[241]

Cayetano v. Leonidas
G.R. No. L-54919
May 30, 1984

Topic/Doctrine: Subsection 3-Forms of Wills
GENERAL RULE: Limited jurisdiction of the probate court
EXCEPTION: Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will
be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issues.
FACTS:
Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving Hermogenes Campos (father) and her sisters, Nenita Paguia,
Remedios Lopez, and Marieta Medina as the surviving heirs. As the only compulsory heir is
Hermogenes, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication, adjudicating unto himself the entire
estate of Adoracion.
Later that same year, Nenita filed a petition for reprobate of a will, alleging among others that
Adoracion was an American citizen and that the will was executed in teh US. Adoracion died in
Manila while temporarily residing in Malate.
While this case was still pending, Hermogenes died and left a will, appointing Polly Cayetano as
the executrix. Hence, this case.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the will was valid
Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over probate proceedings

HELD:
As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will,
the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity normally comes only after the
court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is
probated, the court should meet the issues.
In this case, it was sufficiently established that Adoracion was an American citizen and the law
which governs her will is the law of Pennsylvania, USA, which is the national law of the
decedent.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, the national
law of the decedent must apply.
As to the issue of jurisdiction:
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[242]

The settlement of estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the CFI of Manila where
she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a
citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, USA and not a usual resident of Cavite.
Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in
the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate
or question that same jurisdiction.

JAAFAR, KAIZER
LLB III-B

































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[243]

De Guzman vs. Angeles
No. L-78590.
June 20, 1988

Topic/Doctrine:
Before a court may acquire jurisdiction over the case for the probate of a will and the administration of
the properties left by a deceased person, the application must allege the residence of the deceased and
other indispensable facts or circumstances and that the applicant is the executor named in the will or is
the person who had custody of the will to be probated.

Facts:
On March 22,1987, Manolito de Guzman died in Makati, Metro Manila. At the time of his death, the
decedent was a resident of Makati, Metro Manila. He left personal and real properties as part of his
estate. These properties were acquired after the marriage of the private respondent to the decedent
and therefore are included in their conjugal partnership. His estate has a probable net value which may
be provisionally assessed at P4,000,000.00 more or less. The possible creditors of the estate, who have
accounts payable. and existing claims against the firm C. SANTOS Construction are also listed. The
compulsory heirs of the decedent are the surviving spouse and their two (2) minor children namely:
Charmane Rose de Guzman 11 years and Peter Brian de Guzman, 9 years old. A diligent search and
inquiry to ascertain whether the decedent left a last will and testament, none has been found and
according to the best knowledge information and belief of the petitioner, Manolito de Guzman died
intestate and the petitioner as the survey surviving spouse of the decedent, is most qualified and
entitled to the grant of letters of administration.

The private respondent filed a motion for writ of possession over five (5) vehicles registered under
the name of Manolito de Guzman, alleged to be conjugal properties of the de Guzman's but which are at
present in the possession of the private respondent's father-in- law, herein petitioner Pedro de Guzman.
The motion stated that as co-owner and heir, the private respondent must have the possession of said
vehicles in order to preserve the assets of her late husband.
The private respondent filed her "Ex-Parte Motion to Appoint Her as Special Administratrix of the Estate
of Manolito de Guzman." When the motion was set, no notice of the order was given to the petitioner.
The lower court granted the private respondent's motion to be appointed as special administratrix.

The petitioner contends that the order is a patent nullity, the respondent court not having acquired
jurisdiction to appoint a special administratrix because the petition for the settlement of the estate of
Manolito de Guzman was not yet set for hearing and published for three consecutive weeks, as
mandated by the Rules of Court.

Issue:
Whether or not a probate court may appoint a special administratrix and issue a writ of possession of
alleged properties of a decedent for the preservation of the estate in a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of the said deceased person even before the probate court causes notice to be served
upon all interested parties pursuant to section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court.

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Held:
Before a court may acquire jurisdiction over the case for the probate of a will and the administration of
the properties left by a deceased person, the application must allege the residence of the deceased and
other indispensable facts or circumstances and that the applicant is the executor named in the will or is
the person who had custody of the will to be probated.
In the instant case, there is no doubt that the respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the
proceedings upon the filing of a petition for the settlement of an intestate estate by the private
respondent since the petition had alleged all the jurisdictional facts, the residence of the deceased
person, the possible heirs and creditors and the probable value of the estate of the deceased Manolito
de Guzman pursuant to Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. When a petition for letters of administration
is filed in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for hearing the
petition, and shall cause notice thereof to be given to the known heirs and creditors of the
decedent, and to any other persons believed to have an interest in the estate, in the manner
provided in sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76.
It is very clear from this provision that the probate court must cause notice through publication of the
petition after it receives the same. The purpose of this notice is to bring all the interested persons within
the court's jurisdiction so that the judgment therein becomes binding on all the world.
Verily, notice through publication of the petition for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person is
jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court orders affecting other persons, subsequent to the
petition void and subject to annulment.
In the instant case, no notice as mandated by section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court was
caused to be given by the probate court before it acted on the motions of the private respondent to be
appointed as special administratrix, to issue a writ of possession of alleged properties of the deceased
person in the widow's favor, and to grant her motion for assistance to preserve the estate of Manolito
de Guzman.





Jajurie, Fatima Badria
LLB III-B






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[245]

Salazar vs CFI
No. 45642.
September 25, 1937

Topic/Doctrine:
A Court of First Instance acquires jurisdiction to probate a will when it is shown by evidence
before it: (1) That a person has died leaving a will; (2) in the case of a resident of this country,
that he died in the province where the court exercises territorial jurisdiction; (3) in the case of a
nonresident, that he has left a estate in the province where the court is situated and (4) that
the testament or last will of the deceased has been delivered to the court and is in the
possession thereof.

Facts:
The petitioner instituted special proceeding No. 3109 in the court of First Instance of Laguna
and, in the petition filed by him, prayed for the probate of the will allegedly made on May 13,
1924, by his deceased mother Damiana Capistrano, who died in the municipality of Pagsanjan,
Laguna, on December 21, 1936. The petition was opposed by the respondent Sabina Rivera,
who filed a pleading entitled "Opposition and Counter-Petition." In her pleading the
respondent, after opposing the probate of said will for the reasons stated therein, prayed for
the probate of the will of the deceased alleged made on May 11, 1930, copy of which was
attached thereto, and for the issuance, to that effect, of the order setting the hearing thereof
and directing such publications as required by law. The court denied the motion for publication
and ordered the respondent to institute another proceeding and apply separately for the
probate of the alleged will. The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and the court, on
March 31, 19937, issued an order setting aside the former one and directing that the will
presented by the respondent be set for hearing, that the publications required by law be made
and that said will be heard jointly with the will presented by the petitioner in the same
proceeding instituted by the latter. Sometime later, the court ordered that the expenses for the
publications made in the newspapers be defrayed by the respondent. The petitioner filed two
motions for reconsideration which were denied and, finally, instituted this certiorari
proceeding. In order that the hearing and publications ordered by the court may be carried out,
the respondent, on July 20, 1937, deposited P24 and filed the original of the will the probate of
which had been sought by her.

Issue:
Whether or not the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the counter-petition for the
probate of the second will, or to set the same for hearing of said will to be held in the same
proceeding jointly with the first will.

Held:
According to the facts alleged and admitted by the parties, it is evident that the court has
acquired jurisdiction to probate the second will, presented by the respondent, in view of the
presence of all the jurisdictional facts. The respondent's counter-petition should, in this case, be
considered as a petition for the probate of the second will, the original of which was filed by her
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[246]

on July 20, 1937. The payment of the fees of the clerk of court for all services to be rendered by
him in connection with the probate of the second will and for the successive proceedings to be
conducted and orders to be issued, in accordance with section 788, as amended, is not
jurisdictional in the sense that its omission does not deprive the court of its authority to
proceed with the probate of a will, as expressly provided for by section 630. It is the inevitable
duty of the court, when a will' is presented to it, to appoint hearing for its allowance and to
cause notices thereof to be given by publication. The duty imposed by said section is imperative
and non-compliance therewith would be a mockery at the law and at the last will of the
testator.




Jajurie, Fatima Badria
LLB III-B





























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[247]

United States vs Guimco
No. 12184.
September 27, 1917

Topic/Doctrine:
A court cannot make a valid order committing a person to jail for failure to produce the will of a
deceased person, pursuant to section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure except when acting in the
exercise of its jurisdiction over the estates of deceased persons.

Facts:
The testator, Joaquin Cruz, having executed his will, confided it to the keeping of Chiu Guimco, one of
the executors named therein. After the death of the testator this Chiu Guimco failed to present the
instrument to the court within the time provided by law; and a criminal prosecution was thereupon
instituted against him under section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The judge of first instance believed that he had authority to give the notice and make the order in
question under section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides the testator neglects without
reasonable cause to deliver the same to the court having jurisdiction, after notice by the course so to do,
he may be committed to the prison of the province by a warrant issued by the court and there kept in
close confinement until he delivers the will.
Chiu Guimco appealed to this Court to reverse the judgment of the Court of First Instance.

Issue:
Whether or not a court may make an order committing a person to jail for failure to produce the will of
a deceased person, pursuant to section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure

Held:
No. It is in the opinion of this court that this provision can only be applied when a court is acting in the
exercise of its jurisdiction over the administration of the estates of deceased persons; and where
administration proceedings are not already pending, the court, before taking action under this section,
should require that there be before it some petition, information, or affidavit of such character as to
make action by the court under this section appropriate.
The proceedings in this case, under section 628 of the Code of the Civil Procedure, is an ordinary
criminal prosecution. The act penalized in that section (628) is a special statutory offense and is properly
prosecuted upon complaint or information as other criminal offenses created by law. The fact that this
penal provision is contained in the Code of Civil Procedure does not make the proceeding to enforce the
penalty a civil proceeding in any sense. The remedy provided in section 629 of the Code of Procedure is
evidently a totally different remedy, having no relation with that provided in section 628; and it is in our
opinion not permissible in a prosecution under the last mentioned section to superimpose upon the
penalty of fine therein prescribed the additional penalty of imprisonment prescribed in section 629.


Jajurie, Fatima Badria
LLB III-B
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[248]

De Aranz vs. Galing
No. L-77047
May 28, 1988

Topic/Doctrine:
Civil Law; Wills and Succession; The requirement of the law for the allowance of will was not
satisfied by mere publication of notice of hearing; Notice of hearing to the designated heirs,
legatees and devisees, required.

Facts:
private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, a petition for the
probate and allowance of the last will and testament of the late Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola
The petition specified the names and ad- dresses of herein petitioners as legatees and devisees
the probate court issued an order selling the petition for hearing on 5 May 1986 at 8:30 o'clock
in the morning. Said order was published in the "Nueva Era" A newspaper of general circulation
in Metro Manila once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. On the date of the hearing, no
oppositor appeared. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the probate court.
On appeal, Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. It is the view of petitioners that the Court
of Appeals erred in holding that personal notice of probate proceedings to the known legatees
and devisees is not a jurisdictional requirement in the probate of a will. Petitioners allege that
under Sec. 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court, notice on individual heirs, legatees and devisees is
mandatory and its omission constitutes a reversible error for being constitutive of grave abuse
of discretion

Issue:
Whether or not personal notice of probate proceedings to the known legatees and devisees is a
jurisdictional requirement in the probate of a will

Held:
Yes. Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court reads:

SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally.
The court shag also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the
will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of
the testator resident in the Philippines at their places of residence, and deposited in the
post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the
hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice must in like manner
be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not, the petitioner; also, to any
person named as co-executor not petitioning, if their places of residence be known.
Personal service of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the day of hearing
shall be equivalent to mailing.

It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing for the
allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and
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[249]

devisees residing in the Philippines at their places of residence, if such places of residence be
known. There is no question that the residences of herein petitioners legatees and devisees
were known to the probate court. The petition for the allowance of the will itself indicated the
names and addresses of the legatees and devisees of the testator, But despite such knowledge,
the probate court did not cause copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement
of the law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of
hearing for three (3) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
Jajurie, Fatima Badria
LLB III-B

































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[250]

Paras Vs Narciso
G.R. No. 10959
November 2, 1916

Topic/Doctrine: In relation to Allowance and Disallowance of Wills

FACTS:
An appeal denying probate of a document purporting to be the last will and testament of the
deceased named Mariano Magsino, on the ground that the signature thereto was forged; and
that the instrument had been prepared and signed by the witnesses after the death of the
alleged testator. The alleged error in the admission of certain testimony as to the handwriting
of the deceased, the appellants assignment of errors deals exclusively with alleged errors of
the trial court in accepting as true or declining to believe the testimony of certain witnesses.
The trial judge saw and heard these witnesses testify, and there is nothing in the record which
would justify us in disturbing his findings as to the respective credibility or lack of credibility of
the various witnesses.

ISSUE:
Whether or not certain witnesses who testified as to the genuineness of certain signatures of
the deceased were properly qualified as handwriting experts.

HELD:
The genuineness of the signatures in question was duly established in the manner and form
prescribed in section 327 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and, indeed, these signatures appear
to have been admitted in evidence as genuine signatures of the deceased without objection by
the appellant. In like manner the other matters testified to by the alleged handwriting experts
appear to have been established by other evidence in the record, and it is quite clear from the
opinion filed by the trial judge that he relied rather on his own opinion, after comparison of the
undoubtedly genuine signature of the deceased with the signature attached to the alleged will
as authorized in the section of the Code of Civil Procedure just mentioned, rather than upon the
statements of the alleged experts. It is to be observed further that the judgment of the court
below, denying probate to the instrument propounded as the last will and testament of
Mariano Magsino, deceased, was based on the evidence introduced at the hearing on the
probate proceedings. That evidence, as we have said, fully sustains the findings of the probate
judge that this instrument is not the last will and testament of the deceased.


JAUHARI, SITTI BERKIS E.
LLB-3B
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[251]

Asinas Vs CFI
G.R. No. L-29038
March 10, 1928

Topic/Doctrine: In relation to Allowance and Disallowance of Wills

FACTS:
An application for the probate of what purports to be the will of the deceased Mauricio Asinas, a
resident of the municipality of Looc of the Province of Romblon was filed in the office of the clerk of the
Court of First Instance of Romblon. Opposition was entered to said application by the respondent Felisa
Asinas, alleging that she is an acknowledged natural daughter of Mauricio Asinas, and by Justo Asinas,
brother of said deceased. In view of the fact that the petitioner Catalina Asinas denied Felisa Asinas'
right to intervene in the proceeding for the probate of said alleged will.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction in authorizing Felisa Asinas to intervene
in the proceeding for the probate of the alleged will of the deceased Mauricio Asinas and the
administration of his estate.

HELD:
The Court of First Instance does not exceed its probate jurisdiction in authorizing one claiming to be an
acknowledged natural child of a decedent to intervene in the probate of the alleged will of said
decedent, upon presentation of prima facie evidence of such civil status. Section 630 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, in requiring the publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, for three
consecutive weeks, of the date fixed by the competent court for the probate of a will, in order to afford
all those interested an opportunity to appear and oppose said probate, does not specify who are the
interested parties who may appear, nor what proof they must submit to show such interest. A person
alleging an interest in opposing the probate of a will as an acknowledged natural daughter need not
conclusively prove the existence of such a civil status, or that such status has been judicially declared; it
is sufficient that there be prima facie evidence to that effect.


JAUHARI, SITTI BERKIS E.
LLB-3B






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[252]

Rodelas v. Amparo
G.R. No. L-58509
December 7, 1982

Topic/Doctrine: In relation to Allowance and Disallowance of Wills

FACTS:
Petitioner-appellant filed a petition with the CFI-Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo
B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The petition was opposed by appellees
Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes, Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla. With the
several grounds of their opposition that the appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased
left a will by failing to produce the will within twenty days of the death of the testator. That the alleged
copy of the will did not contain a disposition of property after death and was not intended to take
effect. That the original must be presented and not the copy thereof and lastly the deceased did not
leave any will. The appellees also moved for the dismissal of the petition for the probate of the will.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of
photostatic copy.

HELD:
Yes. A photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can
be made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam V. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, the Court
ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by
the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented;
otherwise, it shall produce no effect. Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy.
Even a mimeograped or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the
handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court. Evidently, the
photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.





JAUHARI, SITTI BERKIS E.
LLB-3B



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[253]

Limpin vs Yalung
G.R. No. L-19077
January 23, 1923

Topic/Doctrine: In relation to Allowance and Disallowance of Wils

FACTS:
The first error assigned by the appellant to the order of probate of the alleged will of Genoveva Yalung,
which is the subject-matter of this proceeding is made to consist, among other things, in that all the
witnesses who attested said will were not called to testify. That is really the fact.

HELD:
Of course three attesting witnesses, only two testified at the hearing of the case, Cirilo Lacsamana not
having done so, notwithstanding that said will was contested. It is a rule well settled and adopted by the
courts and applied by this court in the case of Cabang vs. Delfinado (34 Phil., 291), that "the attesting
witnesses required by statute must be called to prove a contested will or a showing must be made that
they cannot be had." The applicant has not shown that the witness Cirilo Lacsamana could not be found,
nor is there any circumstance whatever in the record satisfactorily accounting for the proponent's
omission to introduce his testimony as evidence. We deem it unnecessary to examine the other points
raised by the appellant, the one above indicated being sufficient for the purposes of this decision. The
order appealed from is reversed, and it is ordered that the record be remanded to the court of origin for
the holding of a new trial whereat the applicant shall have opportunity to complete her evidence, and
the opponent to rebut what may be offered, it being understood that the evidence already introduced
by both parties shall subsist, without special pronouncement as to costs.



JAUHARI, SITTI BERKIS E.
LLB-3B













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[254]

ESCUIN v ESCUIN
11 PHIL 332
September 24, 1908

Topic/Doctrine: PRETERITION


FACTS:
On the 19th of January, 1899, Emilio Antonio Escuin de los Santos executed a wi ll before a
notary public of Sevilla, Spain, stating therein that he was a native of Cavite, the son Francisco Escuin
and Eugenia de los Santos, the latter being deceased; thathe was married about six months previously to
Maria Teresa Ponce de Leon, and thathe had no lawful descendants; the testator, however, stated in
clause three of his will,that in case he has a duly registered successor, his chil d would be his
sole anduniversal heir; but that if, as woul d probably be the case, there shoul d be no
suchheir, then in clause four he named his said father Francisco Escuin, and his wife Maria Teresa Ponce
de Leon and his universal heirs, they to divide the estate in equal sharesbetween them.- The testator
died on the 20th of January, 1899- Upon the will having been admitted to probate, commissioners were
appointed toconsider claims against the estate- On the 10th and 12th of July 1907, the attorney for the
widow, Ponce de Leon, andthe attorneys who represented the guardian to the minor, Emilio
Escuin y Batac, a p p e a l e d t o t h e C o u r t o f F i r s t I n s t a n c e f r o m t h e f i n d i n g s
o f t h e a f o r e s a i d commissioners.- I t appear s i n t he pr opos ed par t i t i on t hat ,
ac c or di ng t o t he opi ni on of t he administrator by whom it was signed in the result of the
proceedings, the property leftby the estator, in accordance with the accounts passed upon by the court,
amountedto P8,268.02- From said sum the following must be deducted the credit alluded to be
admitted bythe commissioners, 10% remuneration due to the administrator, al l legal
expensespai d and approved. Deducti ng the abovementioned amounts, there remains
abalance of P5,014.81.- The partition and adjudication was proceeded with of the sum of
P5,014.81 intothree shares of P1,671.60 to each one of the parties in interest, that is, the
natural son, Emilio Escuin y Batac, in full control as general heir; the widow, Teresa Ponce deLeon, as
legatee of one-half of the two-thirds of the funds of free disposition; and thesaid widow the usufruct of
the other half of the aforesaid two-thirds of free disposition,the bare ownership of the last third held in
usufruct by the widow being adjudicated toFrancisco Escuin, as legatee taking into account the
provisions of article 817 of theCivil Code upon making the division.- The representative of the minor
natural child of the testator objected in writing tothe partition proposed by the administrator,
and for the reasons he set forth askedt hat t he s ame be di s appr oved, and t hat i n
l i eu t her eof t he ent i r e es t at e be adjudicated to Emilio Escuin y Batac, the said minor.- It was
also presented that in a certified proceedi ng, plai ntiff asked on the 12th of January, 1905,
that an allowance be granted to him for subsistence for account of the estate of the late testator, Emilio
Escuin de los Santos, and that the same be paid him monthly in advance; that judgment be entered
declaring that the minor, Emilio Escuin y Batac, is a natural child of the testator; that the said minor, as
the only natural son of the same is his general heir; that it be held that the said testator had died
without either lawful ascendants or descendants; that the designation of heirs made under his above-
ment i oned wi l l be dec l ar ed nul l and voi d; and t hat t he def endant s be
sentenced to pay the costs in case they did not conform to the complaint, with any further
remedy that the court might consider just and equitable.- The administrator, Ricardo Summers, in
answer to the complaint denied all and every one of the facts alleged in all and every one of its
paragraphs.- The court below found that Escuin y Batac was the recognized natural child of the late
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[255]

Emilio Escuin de l os Santos, had by Jul ia Batac; that the testator was also the natural son
of the defendant Francisco Escuin and Eugenia de los Santos, and was recognized by his
father; and that the plaintiff minor, Emilio Escuin y Batac, is one of the heirs of the late testator.- By an
order of the lower court, the judge expressed an opinion that a natural child is only entitled to one-
fourth of the hereditary property, the clause in the will being annull ed only in so far as
the amount to be divided shoul d be reduced, taki ng into account the share due to the natural
son and the right of the father and the widow of the testator, each to one-half of the remainder of the
property of the estate.

ISSUE:
1. WON there was preterition
2. WON the testator could be considered to have died intestate

HELD:
1. YES There is preterition to 1/3 of the estate, which amount constitutes the legal portion of a natural
child; and for the reason that mino9r was ignored in the will, the designationof heirs made therein was,
as a matter of fact annulled by force of law, insofar as thelegal portion of the said minor was thereby
impaired. Legacies, and betterments shallbe valid, insofar as they are not illegal, for the reason that a
testator cannot deprivethe heirs of their legal portions, express in the cases expressly indicated by law.
2. NO. Notwithstanding the fact that the said designation of heirs was annulled and that thelaw
recognizes the title of the minor, Escuin y Batac, to one-third of the property of hisnatural father, as his
lawful and general heir, it is not proper to assert that the lateEmilio Escuin de los Santos died intestate
in order to establish the conclusion that hissaid natural recogni zed chil d is entitled to succeed
to the entire estate under theprovisions of article 939 of the Civil Code, inasmuch in
accordance with the law acitizen may die partly testate and partly intestate (art. 764, Civil Code). It
is clear andunquestionable that it was the wish of the testator to favor his natural father and hiswife
with certain porti ons of his property which, under the l aw, he had the right todispose of by
will, as he has done, provided the legal portion of his general heir wasnot thereby impaired, the two
former persons being considered as legatees under thewill.


Jimenez, May Marie Ann
LLB-3B







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[256]

Tolentino v Francisco
G.R. No. L-35993
December 19, 1932

Topic/Doctrine: Formalities of a Will

FACTS:
A petition was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Adelaida Tolentino de
Concepcion, for the purpose of procuring probate of the will of Gregorio Tolentino. Opposition
was made to the probate of the will by Ciriaco Francisco, Natalia Francisco, and Gervasia
Francisco. the trial court overruled the opposition, declared the will to have been properly
executed, and allowed the probate thereof. From this order the three opponents appealed.
Gregorio Tolentino was had been married to Benita Francisco (predeceased), The pair had no
children. Tolentino contemplated leaving his property mainly to these kin of his wife, he had
kept a will indicating this desire. However, strained relations, resulting from grave
disagreements, developed between Tolentino and the Francisco relations and he determined to
make a new will. To this end, Tolentino went to an attorney Repide and informed him that he
wanted to make a new will and desired Repide to draft it for him. Tolentino stated that he
wanted the will to be signed in Repides office, with Repide himself as one of the attesting
witnesses. For the other two witnesses Tolentino requested that two attorneys attached to the
office. Tolentino returned to him the draft of the will with certain corrections. Among the
changes thus made was the suppression of the names of Monzon, Sunico, and Repide as
attesting witnesses, these names being substituted by the names of Jose Syyap, Agustin Vergel
de Dios, and Vicente Legarda. Tolentino further stated to his attorney that he had arranged
with the three intending witnesses to meet at five oclock in the afternoon of the next day, for
the purpose of executing the will.
It is a custom in the office of Repide not to number the consecutive pages of a will, on the
typewriting machine, the duty of numbering the pages being left to the testator himself.
Arriving at the place, the three entered the office of Legarda. Tolentino asked Legarda to permit
the will to be signed in his office, and to this request Legarda acceded.
Tolentino thereupon drew two documents from his pocket saying that it was his last will and
testament, done in duplicate, and he proceeded to read the original to the witnesses. After this
had been completed, Legarda himself took the will in hand and read it himself. He then
returned it to Tolentino, who thereupon proceeded, with pen and ink, to number the pages of
the will. He then paged the duplicate copy of the will in the same way. He next proceeded to
sign the original will and each of its pages by writing his name G. Tolentino in the proper
places. Following this, each of the three witnesses signed their own respective names at the
end of the will, at the end of the attesting clause, and in the left margin of each page of the
instrument. During this ceremony all of the persons concerned in the act of attestation were
present together, and all fully advertent to the solemnity that engaged their attention.

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ISSUE: whether or not the will is valid.

HELD:
Yes. A will may be admitted to probate notwithstanding the fact that one or more of the
subscribing witnesses do not unite with the other, or others, in proving all the facts upon which
the validity of the will rests. (Fernandez vs. Tantoco, 49 Phil. 380.) It is sufficient if the court is
satisfied from all the proof that the will was executed and attested in the manner required by
law. The order appealed from will therefore be affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So
ordered.


Jimenez, May Marie Ann
LLB-3B




























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[258]

NABLE JOSE vs USON
G.R. No. L-8927
March 10, 1914

Topic/Doctrine: Codicil

FACTS:
The question involved in this appeal arises from the interpretation of the first and second clauses of a
codicil to the will of Filomena Uson.
first, that the testatrix, in the first paragraph thereof, declares that after her husband's death she desires
that "my sisters and nieces, as hereinafter named, shall succeed him as heirs."
the testatrix, in the second paragraph of the codicil, names and identifies each one of her heirs then
living, in each one of the persons whom she desires shall succeed her husband in the property. Among
those mentioned specially are the nieces as well as the sisters. The nieces are referred to in no way
different from the sisters. Each one stands out in the second paragraph of the codicil as clearly as the
other and under exactly the same conditions.
The court below found that the children of the deceased sisters should take only that portion which
their respective mothers would have taken if they been alive at the time the will was made; that the
property should be divided into six equal parts corresponding to the number of sisters; that each living
sister should take one-sixth, and the children of each deceased sister should also take one-sixth, each
one- sixth to be divided among said children equally.
appellants asserted that under a proper construction of the paragraphs of the codicil above-quoted the
property should be divided equally between the living sisters and the children of the deceased sisters,
share and share alike, a niece taking the same share that a sister receives.

ISSUE:
WON the appellants contention is correct.

HELD:
Yes. it was the intention of the testatrix to divide her property equally between her sisters and nieces.
the last clause of the second paragraph of the codicil which, it seems to us, taken together with the last
clause of the first paragraph of the codicil, is decisive of the intention of the testatrix. In the last clause
she says that she names all of the persons whom she desires to take under her will be name "so that
they must take and enjoy the property in equal parts as good sisters and relatives."
We have then in the first paragraph a declaration as to who the testatrix desires shall become the
owners of her property on the death of her husband. Among them we find the names of the nieces as
well as of the sisters. We have also the final declaration of the testatrix that she desires that the sisters
and the nieces shall take and enjoy the property in equal parts. That being so, it appears to us that the
testatrix's intention is fairly clear, so clear in fact that it is unnecessary to bring in extraneous arguments
to reach a conclusion as to what she intended.
Jimenez, May Marie Ann
LLB-3B
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[259]

ACAIN vs IAC
G.R. No. 72706,
October 27, 1987

Topic/Doctrine: Preterition

FACTS:
Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court a petition for the probate of the will of his late
Uncle, Nemesio Acain, on the premise that the latter died leaving a will in which the former and
his brothers and sisters were instituted as heirs. After the petition was set for hearing in the lower
court, Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson, a legally adopted daughter and the widow of the
deceased respectively, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1) Constantino Acain has no
legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow
and the adopted daughter have been pretirited. Said motion was denied as well as the
subsequent motion for reconsideration. Consequently, Fernandez and Diongson filed with the
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was
subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court. IAC granted Fernandez and
Diongsons petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for probate of the will. Due to
the denial of Acains motion for reconsideration, he then filed a petition for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson have been pretirited.

RULING:
Article 854 of the Civil Code:
The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time
of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees
and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator,
the institution shall be effectual, without prefudice to the right
of representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them
either because they are not mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither instituted
as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not
apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir.
However, the same thing cannot be said of the legally adopted daughter. Under Article 39 of P.D.
No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the
same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted
person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited
in the will and that both the adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime.
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Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of
preterition of the legally adopted child.
The universal institution of Acain together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance
of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution
of universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a
declaration that nothing at all was written.


Jimenez, May Marie Ann
LLB-3B

















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[261]

Azuela vs. CA
GR No. 122880
April 12, 2006

Topic/Doctrine: Formal requisites of a Will

Facts:
Will was two pages long. The number of pages were also not stated in the attestation, only a blank was
there. The will was not properly acknowledged. (Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 Hunyo, dito
sa Manila.) The witnesses also did not sign under the attestation clause but on the left hand margin of
the page.

Issue:
Is the will valid?

Held:
Invalid will.
Issue of number of pages: no substantial compliance in this case because no statement in the attestation
clause or anywhere else in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will.
Issue of witnesses not signing under the attestation clause: the signatures to the attestation clause
establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself.
The attestation clause is separate and apart from the disposition of the will. They should sign below it.
Issue of not properly acknowledged: contrary to Art 806. Acknowledgement is the act of one who has
executed a deed in going before some competent officer and declaring it to be his act or deed.
Moreover, will must be acknowledged and not merely subscribed and sworn to. A notarial will that is
not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it
is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public.

Jimenez, May Marie Ann
LLB-3B









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[262]

AUSTRIA VS. HON. ANDRES REYES
G.R. No. L-23079
February 27, 1970

Doctrine: Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the CivilCode, the
following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will;
second, the cause must be shown to be false;and third, it must appear from the face of the will that the
testator would not havemade such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.

FACTS:
Basilia Austria vda.de Cruz filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her last will
and testament. The probate was opposed by the present petitioners, who are nephews and nieces of
Basilia. The will was subsequently allowed with the bulk of her estate designated for respondents, all of
whom were Basilias legally adopted children. The petitioners, claiming to be the nearest of kin of
Basilia, assert that the respondents had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in accordance with
law, thereby making them mere strangers to the decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs.
Petitioners argue that this circumstance should have left the whole estate of Basilia open to intestacy
with petitioners being the compulsory heirs.
It is alleged by petitioners that the language used imply that Basilia was deceived into believing that she
was legally bound to bequeath one-half of her entire estate to the respondents as the latter's legitime,
with the inference that respondents would not have instituted the respondents as heirs had the fact of
spurious adoption been known to her. The petitioners inferred that from the use of the terms,
"sapilitangtagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and "sapilitangmana" (legitime), the impelling reason or
cause for the institution of the respondents was the testatrix's belief that under the law she could not
do otherwise. Thus Article 850 of the Civil Code applies whereby, the statement of a false cause for the
institution of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it appears from the will that the testator
would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of such cause.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion in barring the petitioners nephews
and niece from registering their claim even to properties adjudicated by the decedent in her will.

HELD:
NO. Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the following
requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second, the
cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face of the will that the testator
would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause. The decedent's will does
not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs. Absent such we look
at other considerations. The decedents disposition of the free portion of her estate, which largely
favored the respondents, compared with the relatively small devise of land which the decedent left for
her blood relatives, shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give the respondents more than what
she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Excluding the respondents from the inheritance,
considering that petitioner nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of the testate by virtue of
intestacy, would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.
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[263]

Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces an intention on
the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate, as was done in this case. Intestacy
should be avoided and the wishes of the testator should be allowed to prevail. Granted that a probate
court has found, by final judgment, that the decedent possessed testamentary capacity and her last will
was executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence, it follows that giving full
expression to her will must be in order.



JOHASAN, WALDEMAR B.
LLB III-B




































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[264]

REYES-BARRETO VS. BARRETO-DATU
G.R. No. L-17818
January 25, 1967

Doctrine: If there is a compulsory heir in the direct line, such heir is instituted in thewill, and
the testamentary disposition given to such heir is less than her legitime,there is no preterition.
There is no total omission, inasmuch as the heir receivedsomething from the inheritance. The
remedy is for completion of legitime under Articles 906 and 907.

FACTS:
BibianoBarretto was married to Maria Gerardo. When BibianoBarretto died he left his share in
a will to SaludBarretto and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two
sisters Rosa Barretto and FelisaBarretto and his nephew and nieces. The usufruct of a fishpond
was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo. Maria Gerardo, as administratrix prepared a
project of partition. It was approved and the estate was distributed and the shares delivered.
Later on, Maria Gerardo died. Upon her death, it was discovered that she executed two wills, in
the first, she instituted Salud and Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as her heirs; and, in the
second, she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagros Barretto alone.
The later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso
Reyes, as guardian of the children of SaludBarretto, the LC held that Salud was not the daughter
of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband BibianoBarretto. This ruling was appealed to
the SC, which affirmed the same.
Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a legitimate heir of
Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased
BibianoBarretto, which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo. Hence, this action for
the recovery of one-half portion, thereof. This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to
set up her right of ownership, not only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other
properties willed and delivered to SaludBarretto, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to
any share in the estate of BibianoBarretto, thereby directly attacking the validity, not only of
the project of partition, but of the decision of the court based thereon as well.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond is void ab initio and Salud
did not acquire valid title to it.

HELD:
NO. SaludBarretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the late BibianoBarretto's last will and
testament together with defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had between them could not
be one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, and was
not null and void. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak of children, or descendants,
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but of heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact that
Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her being one of the
heirs expressly named in his testament; for BibianoBarretto was at liberty to assign the free
portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share () assigned to Salud impinged
on the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of
BibianoBarretto.
Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share smaller than her
legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was here no preterition, or total
omission of a forced heir.




JOHASAN, WALDEMAR B.
LLB III-B






























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RESURRECCION VS. JAVIER
G.R. No. L-42539
October 23, 1936

Doctrine: A legatee should be capacitated to inherit. A person who was already dead not only before the
death of the testator but even before the will was madecannot be a legatee/devisee. Principle of
representation takes place only in intestate inheritance.

FACTS:
On October 18, 1932, Felisa Francisco Javier made a will instituting her husband SulpicioResurreccion as
her universal heir and, among other things, left a legacy of P2,000 in favor of her brother Gil Francisco
Javier. The testatrix died on January 22, 1933, and her will was probated on March 8th of said year.
On October 12, 1933, the court, finding that Gil Francisco Javier died in August, 1930, even before the
testatrix made her will, ordered that the legacy of P2,000 in his favor revert to the fund of the estate.
Gil Francisco Javier's children and heirs, claiming that they are entitled to receive the legacy of P2,000 in
favor of their father, appeal from the court's resolution ordering the reversion of this amount to the
funds of the estate.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Gil Francisco Javier is capacitated to be a legatee who was already dead not only
before the death of the testatrix but even before the will was made.
2. Whether or not Gil Francisco Javier can be represented by his heirs and entitled to the amount of
legacy.

HELD:
1. NO. The testatrix, having no forced heirs, may dispose by will of all her property or any part thereof in
favor of any person qualified to acquire it (art. 763, Civil Code). Upon being instituted as legatee by the
testatrix, Gil Francisco Javier lacked civil personality, which is extinguished by death, and, therefore,
lacked capacity to inherit by will on the ground that he could not be the subject of a right (art. 32, Civil
Code).
2. NO. Gil Francisco Javiers institution as a legatee had absolutely no legal effect and his heirs are not
now entitled to claim the amount of legacy. They cannot even claim under the principle of
representation because this takes place only in intestate inheritance. Furthermore, as the legatee died
before the testatrix, he could transmit nothing to his heirs (Art. 766, Civil Code).



JOHASAN, WALDEMAR B.
LLB III-B



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TESTATE ESTATE OF RAMIREZ VS. VDA. DE RAMIREZ
G.R. No. L-27952
February 15, 1982

Doctrine: Art. 863 of the Civil Code validate a fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution
does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted." One degree means one generation.
The second heir must be related to and be one generation from the first heir.

FACTS:
The principal beneficiaries of Jose are his widow, his 2 grandnephews and his companion Wanda.The
widow is French who lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in
Spain.Moreover, the testator provided for substitutions. Jose, a Filipino, died in Spain with only his
widow as compulsory heir. A project partition was submitted wherein one part shall go to the widow
and the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez, the grandnephews. It was
provided that 1/3 of the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining 2/3 with a
usufruct in favor of Wanda. The grandnephews opposed the project of partition and one of the grounds
was that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are invalid because the first heirs are not
related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree.

ISSUE:
Whether or not fideicommissary substitution is valid.

HELD:
The fideicommissary substitution is void. The substitutes are not related to Wanda. The second heir
mustbe related to and be one generation from the first heir. It follows that the fideicommissary can only
be either a child ora parent of the first heir. Therefore, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby
ordered distributed as follows:1/2 thereof to his widow as her legitime and 1/2 of the estate which is
the free portion goes to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de
Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez, the
substitutes.



JOHASAN, WALDEMAR B.
LLB III-B









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NATIVIDAD VS. GABINO
G.R. No. L-11386
March 31, 1917

Doctrine:A person is entirely free to make his will in such manner as may best please him, provided the
testamentary provisions conform to law and meet its requirements. He may impose conditions, either
with respect to the institution of heirs or to the designation of legatees, and, when the conditions
imposed upon the former or the latter do not fall within the provisions of those articles of the Civil Code
touching heirs and legatees, they shall be governed by the rules therein prescribed for conditional
obligations.

FACTS:
Tiburcio Salvador executed a notarial will and instituted his grandchildren Emilio and Purificacion as sole
heirs. However, clause six is as follows: I bequeath to BasiliaGabino, the ownership and dominion of the
urban property, consisting of a house and lot in CalleLavezares If the said legatee should die, Lorenzo
Salvador shall be obliged to deliver the same to my grandson Emilio, upon payment of the latter to the
former P4,000.00. Executor Emilio presented a project of partition wherein it was stated therein that the
clause six should be interpreted as giving the right of usufruct only to Basilia, and a general legacy in
favor of Lorenzo Salvador of P4,000 whenever Basilia should die, but that the ownership belongs to
Emilio. Basilia, through counsel, opposed claiming ownership over the legacy. The trial judge decided
ownership and dominion should be given to legatee Basilia, subject to reservation made in behalf of
Lorenzo and Emilio.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a testator can validly imposed a condition on the legacy.
2. Whether or not the testator meant to bequeath to BasiliaGabino the mere usufruct of the property.

HELD:
1. YES. A person is entirely free to make his will in such manner as may best please him, provided the
testamentary provisions conform to law and meet its requirements. He may impose conditions, either
with respect to the institution of heirs or to the designation of legatees, and, when the conditions
imposed upon the former or the latter do not fall within the provisions of those articles of the Civil Code
touching heirs and legatees, they shall be governed by the rules therein prescribed for conditional
obligations, (Civ. Code, arts. 790 and 791.). In the sixth clause of the will executed by the decedent
Tiburcio Salvador y Reyes, he bequeathed to BasiliaGabino the ownership and dominion of the property
therein specified as to its location and other circumstances, on condition that if the legatee should die
Lorenzo Salvador would be obliged, upon the payment of P4,000 by the testator's grandson and heir
Emilio Natividad, to hand over this property to the latter.
The condition imposed by the testator in the double legacy mentioned depends upon the happening of
the event constituting the condition, to wit, the death of the legatee BasiliaGabino, a perfectly legal
condition according to article 1114 of the Civil code, as it is not impossible of performance and is not
contrary to law or public morals, as provided in article 1116 of said code. The moment the legatee
Gabino dies the other legatee, Lorenzo Salvador, is obliged to deliver the property to the heir Emilio
Natividad who, in his turn and in exchange, must pay the legatee Salvador the sum of P4,000, thereby
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fulfilling the double legacy contained in the said sixth clause of the will, the first of these legacies being
the voluntary reservation to BasiliaGabino of the ownership of the said house, and the second, the
conditional legacy of P4,000 to Lorenzo Salvador.

2. NO. If the provisions of article 675 of the Civil Code are to be complied with, it cannot be understood
that the testator meant to bequeath to BasiliaGabino the mere usufruct of the property, inasmuch as, by
unmistakable language employed in the said sixth clause, he bequeathed her the ownership or
dominion of the said property language which expresses without the slightest doubt his wishes which
should be complied with literally, because it is constant rule or jurisprudence that in matters of last wills
and testaments the testator's will is the law.



JOHASAN, WALDEMAR B.
LLB III-B































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MICIANO vs. BRIMO
No. 22595.
November 1, 1924]

Topic/Doctrine: SUCCESSIONS; CONDITIONAL LEGACY; CONDITION CONTRARY TO LAW; NULLITY OF.
If the condition imposed upon the legatee is that he respect the testators order that his property be
distributed in accordance with the laws of the Philippines and not in accordance with the laws of his
nation, said condition is illegal, because, according to article 10 of the Civil Code, said laws govern his
testamentary disposition, and, being illegal, shall be considered unwritten, thus making the institution
unconditional.
Facts:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case. The judicial
administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the
deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are: (1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2)
the denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the
order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by Pietro Lanza of the deceaseds
business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are
impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and
the delivery of the deceaseds business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in
reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellants opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph G. Brimos will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality,
for which reason they are void as being in violation of article 10 of the Civil Code.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary dispositions are not in accordance
with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are
on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those
of the Philippines.
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it
when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he
assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the
receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter. The refusal to give the
oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error, It is discretionary with
the trial court. and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to
introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular.
There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was
violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force must
be complied with.

Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in approving the scheme of partition of the estate of Joseph G. Brimo?
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Held:
No. The approval of the scheme of partition in respect was not erroneous. In regard to the first
assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he
is one of the persons designated as such in the will, it must be taken into consideration that such
exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees
must respect the testators will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his
nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. If this condition as it is expressed were
legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in
these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving
his legacy. The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of
the Civil Code. And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testators national
law when, according to article 10 of the Civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the
one to govern his testamentary dispositions. Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions
above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and
consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor. Gomez vs. North Negros Sugar Co.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to
the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law. All of the remaining
clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it not
appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testators national laws.
The orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in
such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of
partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any
pronouncement as to costs.

Kinang, Jezrill
LLB III-B
















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MACARIO MACROHON ONG HAM vs. JUAN SAAVEDRA
No. 27531
December 24, 1927

Topic/Doctrine: SUCCESSION; MIXED SUCCESSION.A person having executed a will may die partially
intestate. The rule of indivisibility of the testator's will is not in force in this jurisdiction.
CONDITIONAL LEGACY; INTESTATE SUCCESSION.The conditional legatee does not acquire the
legacy, if the event on which it depends has not occurred, in which case the legacy will pass to the
persons named to succeed the testator in accordance with the law, that is to say, legal or intestate
succession will take place as to that legacy.
SUBSTITUTION.When a will executed jointly by husband and wife provides that in case of the
death of the husband before the wife certain relatives will inherit specified property, and if any of said
relatives die before the husband the survivor will inherit all, the acquisition of the property by said
relatives depends upon the husband's dying before the wife, the last part of said testamentary provision
being a substitution of legatees in case some of them die before the husband.
Facts:
Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, widower and executor of the joint last will and testament of Victoriana
Saavedra and himself, presented said will for probate, which was ordered by the Court of First Instance
of Zamboanga in its decree of February 21, 1924.
This executor submitted a scheme of partition and distribution of the property in accordance with the
terms of the joint will, to which Juan Saavedra and others filed an opposition. The executor rejoined
insisting upon the approval of the scheme and asking that the opposition of Juan Saavedra and others
be overruled.
On March 25, 1926, the parties submitted a statement of facts, which reads as follows:
"1. That Victoriana Saavedra died in the municipality and Province of Zamboanga, P. I., without
descendants or ascendants, being at that time married to Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, both of them
having executed a joint will, which joint will has been duly admitted to probate in this court.
"2. That the only near relations of the said Victoriana Saavedra, with the right to inherit her estate are
her brothers Juan and Segundo Saavedra; her nephews and nieces, Teofilo Saavedra, Manuel Saavedra,
Victoriana Saavedra, Mariano Saavedra, Froilan Saavedra, Josef a Saavedra, Encarnacion Carpio and
Macra Carpio, in case that the said Victoriana Saavedra died intestate, or did not dispose of her property
in said will.
"3. That aside from the estate mentioned in the said last will and testament, duly probated by this
Honorable Court, there exists another parcel of land, acquired by Ong Ham the year 1920, by purchase
from Ong Tah, and adjudicated to the said Ong Ham in Expediente No. 6 (Cadastral).
"Lot No. 3057, with the improvements thereon in favor of the persons named below in the following
proportions: Ong Ham, aged 65 years, married to Victoriana Saavedra, 19/20 parts; Crispulo Macoto
Cruz, of legal age, 1/40 part; and Juan Mocoto, 1/40 part.
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"4. That the interested parties in this proceeding herewith submit to this Honorable Court the rights of
the respective parties in this estate, in accordance with the terms of this joint last will and testament of
the spouses, Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, and of Victoriana Saavedra, deceased.
"5. That the parties representing Macario Macrohon Ong Ham admit that he sold lots Nos. 34 and 35, of
Expediente No. 8196, for the sum of P1,900, believing in good faith that he could sell the same for his
personal uses.
"6. That the party representing Juan Saavedra, and the other relations heretofore named hereby
withdraw their opposition which they have presented to the final account of the surviving spouse,
Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, and conform to the same, and ask that the Court approve the said final
account."
The lower court solving the question raised by the parties in their agreement of facts, held that one-half
of the property described in the will, all of lot No. 3057, cadastral case No. 6; one-half of the cash
balance of the final account to be rendered by the executor, and half of the proceeds of the sale of lots
Nos. 34 and 35 of Proceeding No. 8196, belong to Macario Macrohon Ong Ham; and as it appears from
the will quoted, as well as from the agreement dated March 25, 1926, that Victoriana Saavedra left no
legitimate ascendants or descendants at the time of her death, Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, her
widower, is, according to the provisions of article 837 of the Civil Code, entitled to the usufruct of one-
half of the estate of the said Victoriana Saavedra, consisting of onehalf of the property described in the
will, excluding lots Nos. 817 and 768 of proceeding No. 7880, given to Segunda Saavedra with the
consent of Macario Macrohon Ong Ham; of one-half of the cash balance of the executor's final account,
and of half of the proceeds of the sale of lots Nos. 34 and 35 in proceeding No. 8196, and said estate is
adjudicated as f ollows: one-half of the same belongs in usuf ruct to the widower Macario Macrohon
Ong Ham, and the naked ownership of this half as well as the full ownership of the other half is
adjudicated to Victoriana Saavedra's heirs, named in the said agreement dated March 25, 1926, in the
following manner: sixteenths of the naked ownership of the one-half in usufruct and sixteenths of the
other half in f ull ownership, -to Juan Saavedra; sixteenths of the naked ownership of the one-half in
usufruct and sixteenths of the other half in full ownership, to Segunda Saavedra; and, sixteenths of the
naked ownership of the one-half in usufruct and sixteenths of the other half in full ownership to Teofilo
Saavedra, Manuela Saavedra, Victoriana Saavedra, Mariano Saavedra, Froilan Saavedra and Josefa
Saavedra, children of Mateo Saavedra, deceased brother of Victoriana Saavedra, in equal parts; and to
Encarnacion Carpio and Macra Carpio, daughters of Petrona Saavedra, deceased sister of Victoriana
Saavedra, sixteenths of the naked ownership of the one-half in usufruct and sixteenths of the other half
in full ownership, in equal parts.
"As regards lots Nos. 817 and 768 of proceeding No. 7880, given to Segunda Saavedra, the court
adjudicates the same to the said Segunda Saavedra, in accordance with the clauses on lines 99-111 of
the will.
"Finally, the court orders that the executor, after paying the inheritance tax, distribute among Victoriana
Saavedra's heirs named in the agreement of March 25, 1926, the part belonging to each of them as
hereinabove stated, and after this delivery is made and the inheritance tax, if any, is paid, this
proceeding is to be considered closed ipso facto."
Counsel for the executor appealed from this decision and assigns in his brief the following alleged errors
as committed by the lower court:
"I. In holding in its auto, of November 26, 1926, that the deceased, Victoriana Saavedra, died partially
intestate, and did not dispose of all her' property by the joint last will and testament executed by herself
and her husband, Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, and in not finding that under the terms of the aforesaid
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joint will the legatees, Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian, named therein, were entitled to receive her estate
and participation in the sixteen parcels of land devised under the said joint will, by the said spouses.
"II. In holding that the brother and the sister of Victoriana Saavedra, by name, Juan Saavedra and
Segunda Saavedra, and her nephews and nieces, by name, Teofilo Saavedra, Manuela Saavedra,
Victoriano Saavedra, Mariano Saavedra, Froilan Saavedra, Josefa Saavedra, Encarnacion Carpio and
Macra Carpio, her next of kin were entitled to receive any part of her estate and participation in the said
sixteen parcels of land, devised to the above named legatees, Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian, under the
terms of the said joint last will and testament."
According to this, there are three ways in which succession may be effected: by the will of man, by the
law, or by both at the same time. In the first case the succession is called testamentary, because it is
based on the last will and testament, which is the orderly manifestation of the testator's will; in the
second, it is called legal, because it takes effect by operation of the law; and the third is called mixed,
because it partakes of the character of both testamentary and legal succession.
Commenting on the third mode of effecting succession, Mr. Manresa says: "The rule of indivisibility and
incompatibility was transferred to our laws from pure Romanism, and it remained in them until the XV
Century, when the law of the Ordenamiento previously cited repealed the maxim nemo pro parte
testatus pro parte intestatus decedere potest. This same repeal is confirmed in paragraph 3 of the
article under consideration (658), which prescribes that it may also be effected partly by the will of man
and partly by operation of law, and in articles 764 and 912 above cited which call the legal heirs to the
enjoyment of the part of the inheritance not disposed of by the testator in his will."
This is a refutation of the appellant's argument that no one who has executed a will can die partly
intestate. That the rule of indivisibility of the testator's will invoked by the appellant does not hold good
in this jurisdiction, is shown, moreover, by articles 764 and 912 of the Civil Code. According to the first of
these articles, a will is valid even though it does not contain any institution of an heir, or if such
institution does not include the entire estate, and even though the person instituted does not accept
the inheritance or is disqualified to inherit; according to the second, one of the ways in which legal
succession may take place is when the will does not institute an heir to all or part of the property, or
does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator, in which case legal succession shall take place only
with respect to the property which the testator has not disposed of.
Assuming that the joint will in question is valid, it follows that the deceased Victoriana Saavedra
specified therein that parcels 187 and 768 in proceeding No. 7880 be delivered as a legacy to her sister
Segunda Saavedra, the first parcel free of all liens and encumbrances, and the second on the condition
that the legatee devote the products of the same to having masses said for the repose of the testatrix's
soul. As to the remaining sixteen parcels, the testatrix disposed of her part in them conditionally, that is
to say, in case her husband Macario Macrohon Ong Hamdied before she did, said parcels were to be
awarded to her husband's nephews, or to either of them in case one should have died before the said
Macario Macrohon Ong Ham. The condition imposed in the will as precedent to the vesting in the
alleged legatees Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian of the right to the legacy, not having been complied
with, the trial court found that the part of said property belonging to the testatrix should be partitioned
among the persons called on to succeed her under the law. We are of the opinion that this finding is in
accordance with the law, since, under article 791 of the Civil Code, conditions imposed upon heirs and
legatees shall be governed by the rules established for conditional obligations in all matters not
provided for by this section (articles 790 to 805). And, in accordance with article 1114 of the Code, in
conditional obligations the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinction or loss of those already
acquired, shall depend upon the occurrence of the event constituting the condition.
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Another error assigned by the appellant consists in the trial court not having found that, under the
terms of the joint will, the legatees Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian were entitled to receive the testatrix's
share in the sixteen parcels of land mentioned in said will.
The part of the will invoked by the appellant, states:
"In case of the death of Macario Macrohon Ong Ham before Victoriana Saavedra, we hereby order that
the properties hereinafter described be jointly given to Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian, and should either
of the two die before Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, we order that all the said properties be given to the
survivor."
The trial court, in interpreting this paragraph of the will in regard to legatees Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka
Jian, reached the right conclusion, and rightly, in our opinion, that it provides for the substitution of
legatees in case either of them should die before Macario Macrohon Ong Ham; and that the acquisition
by these legatees of any right to the property described in the will depended on the condition that
Macario Macrohon Ong Ham died before Victoriana Saavedra.
The appellant also assigns as error the holding of the trial court that the opponents, the brother, sister,
nephews, and nieces of the testatrix, were entitled to receive her share in the said sixteen parcels of
land, given to the legatees, Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian, under the terms of the said joint will. Such a
contention is untenable. As we have said, the acquisition of right by the alleged legatees depends on the
occurrence of the event constituting the condition, that is, the death of Macario Macrohon Ong Ham
prior to that of his wife; and this condition not having been complied with, the' said Ong Ka Chiew and
Ong Ka Jian have not acquired any right, and therefore the testatrix's estate is to be divided among her
heirs in accordance with the law.
To the sixteen parcels of land to which reference is here made, that is, those given to the nephews of
the testator, should be added lot No. 838-A, proceeding No. 7880, certificate 1257, which the testatrix
had reserved to herself (together with lots 817 and 768), in case she survived her husband Macario
Macrohon Ong Ham.
One-half of these seventeen parcels of land belong to the widower, Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, and
the trial court shall order the division of the other half, that is, the estate of the deceased Victoriana
Saavedra, being onehalf of the conjugal property, between the widower and the opponents, as provided
for in articles 945, 948 and 953 of the Civil Code. With this modification, the order appealed from is
affirmed in all other respects. So ordered.



Kinang, Jezrill
LLB III-B








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Madarcos vs. De la Merced
G.R. No. 39975
June 30, 1989

Topic/Doctrine: The term legal heirs is broad enough to cover any person who is called to the
succession either by provision of a will or by operation of law.The term legal heirs is used in Section
119 in a generic sense. It is broad enough to cover any person who is called to the succession either by
provision of a will or by operation of law. Thus, legal heirs include both testate and intestate heirs
depending upon whether succession is by the will of the testator or by law. Legal heirs are not
necessarily compulsory heirs but they may be so if the law reserves a legitime for them.
Same; Same; Same; Petitioners considered as among the legal heirs contemplated by section 119 as
entitled to redeem the homestead.Verily, petitioners are legal heirs. Having been decreed under the
rules on intestacy as entitled to succeed to the estate of the Catain spouses due to the absence of
compulsory heirs, they now step into the shoes of the decedents. They should be considered as among
the legal heirs contemplated by Section 119 as entitled to redeem the homestead.
Facts:
At issue in this petition for review on certiorari is the proper construction of the term legal heirs as
used in section 119 of the Public Land
Petitioners Francisca Madarcos and Telesforo Catain are the niece and nephew respectively of the
spouses Benito Catain and Andrea Madarcos. Francisca is the daughter of the deceased brother
(Joaquin) of Andrea Madarcos while Telesforo is the son of a deceased brother (Gregorio) of Benito
Catain.
The Catain spouses died without issue and ab intestato. They left a tract of land situated in Salvacion,
Roxas, Palawan, covered by Homestead Patent and Bureau of Lands No. H-27580 and described in
Certificate of Title G-25 issued in the name of Benito Catain on September 28, 1925 by the Register of
Deeds of Palawan.
The only heirs of the deceased homesteaders were their nephews and nieces. In their duly registered
Affidavit of Adjudication, said heirs divided the above parcel of land into several lots. The rest of the lots
were adjudicated to the other nephews and nieces of the deceased couple. On 1972, Francisca
Madarcos sold her share of the inheritance to respondent Loreto Sta. Maria for a consideration by
reason of which the latter was issued Transfer Certificate of Title by the Register of Deeds of Palawan.
Subsequently, petitioners Francisca Madarcos and Telesforo Catain demanded the reconveyance of Lot
B pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land Act.1 Respondent vendee Loreto Sta. Maria having refused;
they instituted an action for repurchase with damages in the Court of First Instance of Palawan.
Respondent moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that petitioners had no legal
capacity to sue because they are not the legal heirs contemplated in Section 119 of the Public Land Act.
The trial court sustained respondents motion and dismissed the action in its order of August 30, 1974.
That order is the subject of the present appeal.

Issue:
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Whether or not the court erred in interpreting legal heirs to mean compulsory heirs as enumerated in
Article 887 of the New Civil Code, thus excluding petitioners, who are collateral relatives of the grantees,
from the operation of Section 119.
Held:
The term legal heirs is used in Section 119 in a generic sense. It is broad enough to cover any person
who is called to the succession either by provision of a will or by operation of law.2 Thus, legal heirs
include both testate and intestate heirs depending upon whether succession is by the will of the testator
or by law. Legal heirs are not necessarily compulsory heirs but they may be so if the law reserves a
legitime for them.
As the decedents had left no will, the law supplanted their intention. Their estates were distributed by
intestate succession. Under the rules of intestacy in the Civil Code, the following inherit successively and
exclusively:
1. Legitimate children and their descendants (Art. 979);
2. Legitimate parents and ascendants (Art. 985);
3. Illegitimate children (Art. 988) and their descendants (Art. 990);
4. Surviving spouse (Art. 995) without prejudice to rights of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the
deceased (Art. 1001);
5. Collateral relatives within the fifth degree (Art. 1010); and
6. The State (Art. 1011).
Since the Catain spouses were childless and were survived only by their nephews and nieces, the latter
succeeded to the entire estate of the deceased. Article 975 states that when children of one or more
brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they
survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.
Verily, petitioners are legal heirs. Having been decreed under the rules on intestacy as entitled to
succeed to the estate of the Catain spouses due to the absence of compulsory heirs, they now step into
the shoes of the decedents. They should be considered as among the legal heirs contemplated by
Section 119 as entitled to redeem the homestead.
But even as both are decidedly legal heirs of the Catain spouses, only petitioner Francisca Madarcos can
invoke the right of repurchase. The other petitioner, Telesforo Catain, cannot claim that prerogative as
an heir of his deceased uncle because the homestead had already been partitioned and distributed
among the nieces and nephews
The questioned dismissal order of the trial court dated August 30, 1974 in Civil Case No. 945 entitled
Francisca Madarcos and Telesforo Catain vs. Loreto Sta. Maria is MODIFIED. Respondent Loreto Sta.
Maria is hereby ordered to execute a deed of resale of Lot B, Psd 37486 in favor of petitioner Francisca
Madarcos upon payment by the latter of the redemption price. The dismissal of the complaint as to the
other petitioner, Telesforo Catain, is AFFIRMED. No costs.


Kinang, Jezrill
LLB III-B
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Maria Uson vs. Maria del Rosario
No. L-4963
January 29, 1953

Topic/Doctrine: Descent and Distribution; Husband and Wife; Rights of Lawful Wife as Affected by the
New Civil Code.The right of ownership of the lawful wife of a decedent who had died before the new
Civil Code took effect became vested in her upon his death, and this is so because of the imperative
provision of the law which commands that the rights of suc-cession are transmitted from the moment of
death (Art. 657, old Civil Code; Ilustre vs. Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). The new right recognized by the new
Civil Code in favor of the illegi-timate children of the deceased can not be asserted to the impairment
of the vested right of the lawful wife over the lands in dispute. While article 2253 of the new Civil Code
provides that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the
event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, yet this is so only when
the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin.
Renunciation of Inheritance Made by Lawful Wife; Future Inheritance, Not Subject to
Contract.Although the lawful wife has expressly renounced her right to inherit any future property
that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death, such renunciation cannot be entertained for
the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced.
Donations by Deceased; Essential Formalities of Donation.Assignments, if any, made by the
deceased of real property for which there was no material consideration, should be made in a public
document and must be accepted either in the same document or in a separate one (Art. 633, old Civil
Code). Assignments or donations which lack this essential formality have no valid effect.
Facts:
This is an action for the recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land situated in
Labrador, Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson agakist Maria del Rosario and her four children who are all of
minor age, before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.

Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved
in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff
claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took
possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment.

Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and her
husband executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in
consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by way of alimony and in return
she renounced her right to inherit any other property that may be left by her husband upon his death.
After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered decision
ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the ownership and possession of the lands in dispute
without special pronouncement as to costs. Defendants interposed the present appeal.

Defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of the
late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights, however,
under the new Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950, they are given the status and rights of
natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter.

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Issue:

Whether or not successional rights that were declared for the first time in the new code shall be given
retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior
legislation?

Held:

No. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall
have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the
former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right
of the same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a right should be declared for the first time in this
Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise thereto may have been
done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said new right does not prejudice or
impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin."

There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former owner
of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario,
one of the defendants-appellants, was merely a common-law wife of the late Faustino Nebreda with whom
she had four illegitimate children, her now co-defendants. It like-wise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in
1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident that when
Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed from the moment
of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson. As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the
heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered
to them a deed for the same before his death". From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of
Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested.

The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question because
she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his
death in the deed of separation they had entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot be entertained for the
simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced. The right
of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late
husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to
succession are transmitted from the moment of death based on Article 657, old Civil Code.

The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased
cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in
dispute. As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in state, in a
gesture of pity or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in question to the minor children for the
reason that they were acquired while the deceased was living with their mother and Maria Uson wanted
to assuage somewhat the wrong she has done to them, this much can be said; apart from the fact that
this claim is disputed, we are of the opinion that said as-signment, if any, partakes of the nature of a
donation of real property, inasmuch as it involves no material consideration, and in order that it may be
valid it shall be made in a public document and must be accepted either in the same document or in a
separate one. Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been followed, it results that the alleged
assignment or donation has no valid effect. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without
costs.

Kinang, Jezrill
LLB III-B

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PISALBON vs. BEJEC
G.R. No. 48430
January 30, 1943

Topic/Doctrine: Legitime

FACTS:
Hipolito Manuel, who dies on April 26, 1926, left two widows and a homestead. The widows are
Floretina Pisalbon and Placida Bejec, whom he married on June 23, 1903, and November 9,
1914, respectively. In his homestead application which was filed on September 3, 1917, and
approved by the Director of Lands on August 23, 1918, Hipolito Manuel named Placida Bejec as
his lawful wife; and in fact he and she were the ones who cleared and worked in the land from
the date the homestead application was filed until the death of Hipolito Manuel on April 26,
1926. In view of the conflicting claims of the two widows, the Director of Lands, on August 23,
1934, ordered that the homestead patent be issued in favor of the heirs of Hipolito Manuel,
and accordingly the register of deeds of Pangasinan subsequently issued original certificate of
title No. 1749 in favor of the heirs of Hipolito Manuel. No child was born to the second
marriage, but a daughter was born to the first, namely, Margarita Manuel, one of the original
plaintiffs herein, who died on August 17, 1939, during the pendency of this action, leaving two
children named Cristeta and Esmedia Ancheta. This action was instituted on June 28, 1938, by
Florentina Pisalbon and her daughter Margarita Manuel, the latter assisted by her husband
Pedro Ancheta, against Placida Bejec to recover from her the ownership and possession of the
homestead above mentioned. Upon a stipulation of facts the substance of which has been set
forth above, the trial court held that in view of the fact that Placida Bejec together with Hipolito
Manuel cleared and worked the land in question, and considering that homesteads are granted
to actual occupants of the public land, she is entitled to the homestead both in law and in
equity, and dismissed plaintiffs' action with costs against the plaintiffs.

ISSUE:
WON the doctrine laid down in Lao and Lao vs. Dee Tim (45 Phil,. 739),won their prayer "that
the decision of the lower court be reversed and another entered in lieu thereof declaring that
the plaintiffs-appellants are entitled to and own one half () pro indiviso of the land described
in homestead patent title No. 1749 issued by the registered of deeds of Pangasinan in the name
of the heirs of Hipolito Manuel.

HELD:
This Court, applying the Laws of the Partidas, held that where two women innocently and in
good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same man, their children born will be
regarded as legitimate children and each family will be entitled to one half of the estate of the
husband upon the distribution of his estate. Under that doctrine, the half of the homestead in
question corresponding to Hipolito Manuel belongs to his heirs, Cristeta Ancheta and Esmedia
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Ancheta, the children of his now deceased legitimate daughter Margarita Manuel, subject to
the usufruct of the two widows over one third thereof. (Article 834, Civil Code.) The right to
usufruct of the defendant Placida Bejec may equitably be considered compensated by the
legitimate claim of the plaintiffs for one-half share in the products of the homestead in
question from June 28, 1938, the date of the filing of the complaint.
LAGBAS, HJA. LORMALYN B.
LLB III B




































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RIOSA vs.ROCHA
G.R. No. L-23770
February 18, 1926

Topic/Doctrine: Legitime

FACTS:
Maria Corral was united in marriage with the deceased Mariano Riosa, it being her first and only
marriage and during which time she bore him three children named Santiago, Jose and Severina. The
latter died during infancy and the other two survived their father, Mariano Riosa. Santiago Riosa, no
deceased, married Francisca Villanueva, who bore him two children named Magin and Consolacion
Riosa. Jose Riosa, also deceased, married Marcelina Casas and they had one child who died before the
father, the latter therefore leaving no issue. Mariano Riosa left a will dividing his property between his
two children, Santiago and Jose Riosa, giving the latter the eleven parcels of land described in the
complaint. Upon the death of Jose Riosa he left a will in which he named his wife, Marcelina Casas, as
his only heir. It appears that the eleven parcels of land described in the complaint were acquired by Jose
Riosa, by lucrative title, from his father Mariano Riosa and that after the death of Jose Riosa, by
operation of law, they passed to his mother Maria Corral. By virtue of article 811 of the Civil Code these
eleven parcels of land are reservable property. It results, furthermore, that parcels 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
and 9 still belong in fee simple to Maria Corral, and that parcels 10 and 11 were successively sold by
Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas and by the latter to Pablo Rocha. Lastly, it appears that Magin and
Consolacion Riosa are the nearest relatives within the third degree of the line from which this property
came. This action was brought by Magin Riosa, for whom the property should have been reserved,
against Maria Corral, whose duty it was to reserve it, and against Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha as
purchasers of parcels 10 and 11. Consolacion Riosa de Calleja who was also bound to make the
reservation was included as a defendant as she refused to join as plaintiff.

ISSUE:
WON that the plaintiffs Jose and Consolacion Riosa be declared reserves.

HELD:
As already intimated, the provisions of the law tending to give efficacy to a reservation by the widowed
spouse mentioned in article 968 are applicable to the reserva troncal provided for in article 811. But as
these two reservations vary in some respects, these rules may be applied to the reserva troncal only in
so far as the latter is similar to a reservation by the widowed spouse. In the reserva troncal the property
goes to the reservor as reservable property and it remains so until the reservation takes place or is
extinguished. In a reservation by the widowed spouse there are two distinct stages, one when the
property goes to the widower without being reservable, and the other when the widower contracts a
second marriage, whereupon the property, which theretofore has been in his possession free of any
encumbrance, becomes reservable. These two stages also affect differently the transfer that may be
made of the property. If the property is sold during the first stage, before becoming reservable, it is
absolutely free and is transferred to the purchaser unencumbered. But if the sale is made during the
second stage, that is, when the duty to reserve has arisen, the property goes to the purchaser subject to
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the reservation, without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law. This is the reason why the law
provides that should the property be sold before it becomes reservable, or before the widower
contracts another marriage, he will be compelled to secure the value of the property by a mortgage
upon contracting a new marriage, so that the reservation may not lose its efficacy and that the rights of
those for whom the reservation is made may be assured. This mortgage is not required by law when the
sale is made after the reservation will follow the property, without prejudice to the contrary provisions
of the Mortgage Law and the rights of innocent purchasers, there being no need to secure the value of
the property since it is liable for the efficacy of the reservation by a widowed spouse to secure the value
of the property sold by the widower, before becoming reservable are not applicable to the reserva
troncal where the property goes to the ascendant already reservable in character. A sale in the case of
reserva troncal might be analogous to a sale made by the widower after contacting a second marriage in
the case of a reservation by the widowed spouse.
Since Maria Corral did not appeal, it cannot modify the appealed judgment in so far as it is unfavorable
to her. As she has been ordered to record in the registry the reservable character of the other parcels of
land, the subject of this action, the questions raised by the appellant as to her are decided.



LAGBAS, HJA. LORMALYN
LLB III B


















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CONDE VS ABAYA
GR L- 4275; 13 PHIL 249
MARCH 23, 1909

Topic/Doctrine: Legitime
FACTS:
Casiano Abaya died unmarried however leaving two unaknowledged children by herein plaintiff-
appellee Paula Conde. The latter, as a ascendant heir of her children, sued for the settlement of the
intestate estate of Casiano along with the acknowledgment of the two as natural children of the
deceased. The trial court, with the opposition of the defendant-appellant Roman Abaya, brother of the
deceased, rendered judgment bestowing the estate of Casiano to Conde as legitimate heir of the
decedent's natural children.

ISSUE:
May the mother of a natural child now deceased, bring an action for the acknowledgment of the natural
filiation in favor of such child in order to appear in his behalf to receive the inheritance from the
deceased natural father.

HELD:
The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole life, while
the right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child lasts only during the life of his presumed
parents. An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an exception, be exercised against
the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the event of the death of the latter during the
minority of the child, and second, upon the discovery of some instrument of express acknowledgment of
the child, executed by the father or mother, the existence of which was unknown during the life of the
latter.
But such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised by him. It cannot be
transmitted to his descendants, or his ascendants.

LAGBAS, HJA. LORMALYN B.
LLB III B






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Del Val v Del Val
G.R. No. L-9374
February 16, 1915

Topic/Doctrine: Legitime
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila dismissing the
complaint with costs. The parties are siblings who were the only heirs at law and next of kin of Gregorio
del Val, who passed away intestate. An administrator was appointed for the estate of the deceased, and,
after a partial administration, it was closed. During the lifetime of the deceased he took out insurance
on his life for the sum of P40,000 and made it payable to Andres del Val as sole beneficiary. After his
death, the defendant Andres collected the face of the policy. He paid the sum of P18,365.20 to redeem
certain real estate which the decedent had sold to third persons with a right to repurchase. The
redemption of said premises was made by the attorney of the defendant in the name of the plaintiff and
the defendant as heirs of the deceased vendor. Andres, on death of the deceased, took possession of
most of his personal property and that he has also the balance on the insurance policy amounting to
P21,634.80.
Plaintiffs contend that the amount of the insurance policy belonged to the estate of the deceased and
not to the defendant personally, hence they are entitled to a partition not only of the real and personal
property, but also of the P40,000 life insurance. The complaint prays a partition of all the property, both
real and personal, left by the deceased, and that the defendant account for P21,634.80. They also
wanted to divide this equally among the plaintiffs and defendant along with the other property of
deceased.
The defendants claim was that redemption of the real estate sold by his father was made in the name
of the plaintiffs and himself instead of in his name alone without his knowledge or consent. He also
averred that it was not his intention to use the proceeds of the insurance policy for the benefit of any
person but himself, he alleging that he was and is the sole owner thereof and that it is his individual
property.
The trial court refused to give relief to either party and dismissed the action due to the argument that
the action for partition failed to comply with the Civil Procedure Code sec. 183, in that it does not
'contain an adequate description of the real property of which partition is demanded.'

ISSUE:
Can the proceeds of the policy be divided among the heirs?

HELD:
No. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
The proceeds of the life-insurance policy belong exclusively to the defendant as his individual and
separate property. That the proceeds of an insurance policy belong exclusively to the beneficiary and
not to the estate of the person whose life was insured, and that such proceeds are the separate and
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individual property of the beneficiary, and not of the heirs of the person whose life was insured, is the
doctrine in America. The doctrine is embedded in the Code of Commerce where:
The amount which the underwriter must deliver to the person insured, in fulfillment of the contract,
shall be the property of the latter, even against the claims of the legitimate heirs or creditors of any kind
whatsoever of the person who effected the insurance in favor of the former.
The plaintiffs invoked Article 1035 of the Civil Code, where it reads:
An heir by force of law surviving with others of the same character to a succession must bring into the
hereditary estate the property or securities he may have received from the deceased during the life of
the same, by way of dowry, gift, or for any good consideration, in order to compute it in fixing the legal
portions and in the account of the division.
They also invoked Article 819. This article provides that "gifts made to children which are not
betterments shall be considered as part of their legal portion."
The court didnt agree because the contract of life insurance is a special contract and the destination of
the proceeds is determined by special laws which deal exclusively with that subject. The Civil Code has
no provisions which relate directly and specifically to life- insurance contracts or to the destination of
life insurance proceeds. That was under the Code of Commerce.
The plaintiffs claim that the property repurchased with the insurance proceeds belongs to the heirs in
common and not to the defendant alone. This wasnt agreed upon by the court unless the facts
appeared that Andres acted as he did with the intention that the other heirs should enjoy with him the
ownership of the estate.


LAGBAS, HJA. LORMALYN B.
LLB III - B










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MANINANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R.No. L-57848
June 19, 1982

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Disinheritance

FACTS:
Soledad Maninang filed a petition with the CFI-Quezon City for the probate of the holographic will of
Clemencia Aseneta who instituted her and her husband as heirs. Later on, Bernardo Aseneta(herein
private respondent), claiming to be the adopted child of the deceased and her sole heir instituted
intestate proceedings with the CFI-Rizal. The two cases were consolidated with the latter court.
Bernardo filed a motion to dismiss the testate case on the ground that the will was null andvoid because
he, being the only compulsory heir, was preterited; thus, intestacy should ensue. In her opposition,
Soledad averred that the courts area of inquiry is limited to an examination of andresolution on the
extrinsic validity of the will and that Bernardo was effectively disinherited by thedecedent. The motion
was granted. The motion for reconsideration by Soledad Maninang wasdenied for lack of merit. In the
same order, the court appointed Bernardo Aseneta as administrator considering he is a forced heir and
is not shown to be unfit to perform the trust.Soledad Maninang filed petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals. It was denied. Hence, this petition was filed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the court a quo of the testate case is proper?

HELD:
No, it was not proper. Probate of a will is mandatory as required by law and public policy.Ordinarily, the
probate of the will does not look into its intrinsic validity; but on the extrinsicvalidity which includes the
capacity of the testator to make a will and the compliance with therequisites or solemnities which the
law prescribes for the validity of wills.However, when practical considerations demand, the intrinsic
validity of the will may be passedupon like when on its face there is really preterition or invalid
disinheritance making the will void.The probate might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears
to be intrinsically void. Suchwould shorten the proceedings if the issues are decided as early as during
the probate proceedings.In the instant case, there is still doubt to the alleged preterition or
disinheritance of the privaterespondent cannot be clearly seen on the face of the will and needs further
determination which canonly be made if the will is allowed to be probated.




LIM, EKEENA O.
LLB III-B




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[288]

PECSON VS MEDIAVILLO
G.R. No. 7890
September 29, 1914

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Disinheritance

FACTS:
The last will and testament of Florencio Pecson was presented to the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Albay for probate. Mr. Tomas Lorayes, an attorney at law, opposed the legislation of the will
on the ground that it had not been authorized nor signed by the deceased. After hearing the respective
parties, the Honorable Percy M. Moir (judge) found that the will had been signed and executed in
accordance with the provisions of law, and denied the opposition .
Lorayes, representing Basiliso Mediavillo and Rosario Mediavillo, presented a motion averring:
That Rosario is and Joaquin was the grandchild of the testator, Florencio Pecson
That Rosario, was disinherited by Florencio, according to clause 3 of the will, because she failed
to show him due respect and on a certain occasion raised her hand against him
Paragraph 3 of the will disinherited Rosario Mediavillo states:
I declare that one of my daughters, named Teresa, now deceased, left a legitimate daughter named
Rosario Mediavillo. I also declare that I disinherit my granddaughter, Rosario, because she was grossly
disrespectful to me and because on one occasion, when it was I do not remember, she raised her hand
against me. Therefore, it is my will that the said Rosario Mediavillo shall have no share in my property.
That the interested party did not commit such an act, and if perhaps she did, it was due to the
derangement of her mental faculties which occurred a long time ago and from which she now
suffers in periodical attacks.
It also appears from the evidence that Teresa (daughter of Florencio, mother of Rosario) also died. Her
son Joaquin died, unmarried and childless, before the death of the testator.
The lower court found out that the evidence shows that Rosario became insane in 1895, when she went
to Nueva Caceres to study in college, and it has been proved that it was previous to this date that she
disobeyed her grandfather and raised her hand against him. But since she was 14 years old, and shortly
afterwards became insane, she was not responsible for her acts and should not have been disinherited
by her grandfather.
The court therefore decreed that clause 3 of the will is contrary to law and is set aside for being of no
force or value whatever.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts, when a parent disinherits his children, may inquire into the cause of the
disinheritance and decide that there was or was not ground for such disinheritance.

HELD:
Yes. The Civil Code (Art. 848) provides that disinheritance shall only take place for one of the causes
expressly fixed by law. Article 849 of the Civil Code provides that the disinheritance can only be effected
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by the testament, in which shall be mentioned the legal grounds or causes for such disinheritance. The
right of the courts to inquire into the causes and whether there was sufficient cause for the
disinheritance or not, seems to be supported by express provisions of the Civil Code. Disinheritance
made without statement of the reason, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, should not be
proven shall annul the designation of heirship, in so far as it prejudices the person disinherited.

In the case, It appears from the record that when Rosario Mediavillo was about 14 years of age, she had
received some attentions from a young man that she had received a letter from him and that her
grandfather, Florencio, took occasion to talk to her about the relations between her and the said young
man. It was upon that occasion when the disobedience and disrespect were shown to her grandfather,
and that was the cause for her disinheritance by her grandfather. The record shows that after said
event, she lost the use of her mental powers and that she has never regained them, except for very brief
periods, up to the present time.

The lower court is correct in taking into consideration her tender years, that she was probably not
responsible for the disrespect and disobedience shown to her grandfather in the year 1894 or 1895.






LIM, EKEENA O.
LLB III-B






















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[290]

EDUARDA BENEDICTO, administratrix of the estate of Maximino Jalandoni
vs.
JULIO JAVELLANA
10 Phil. 197
February 21, 1908
Title/Doctrine: Legacies and Devises

FACTS:
The will of the testator provided, among other things: On my entire estate I impose the obligation that
out of the products thereof, all my debts shall be paid, the same being about 2,300 pesos which I owe
Francisco Villanueva, without interest, and 2,550 pesos which I received on loan from Julio Javellana,
with interest thereon at the rate of 10 percent per annum, provided, however, that one-half of the
products which each parcel of land pertaining to the estate may yield this year shall be devoted to the
payment of said debts, and should the said one-half not prove sufficient to meet the liabilities, two-
thirds of the said products, or the total amount thereof, shall be applied; and provided, further, that in
any case, the balance of such products shall remain in charge of the administrator for the settlement of
such other charges as the estate may be subjected to.
And further on Francisco and Sofia Jalandoni I particularly impose the obligation to pay Teodora Berola,
for a period of ten years, an annuity of 300 pesos, Mexican currency, or the equivalent thereof in
Philippine currency; said obligation becoming extinguished by the death of the said Teodora, in case of
her demise before the expiration of the said period of ten years.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the obligation to pay all the debts of the deceased was imposed upon the entire
inheritance, or on any particular property or party in interest named in the will?

HELD:
Yes. The testator has imposed on his entire estate the obligation to pay his debts with the products of
the same, and has prescribed the manner in which the same shall be done untill all obligations are
extinguished.



LIM, EKEENA O.
LLB III-B







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[291]

SANTOS VS MANARANG
G.R. No. L-8235
March 19, 1914

Title/Doctrine: Legacies and Devises


FACTS:
Don Lucas de Ocampo died on November 18, 1906, possessed of certain real and personal
property which, by his last will and testament dated July 26, 1906, he left to his three children.
The fourth clause of this will reads as follows:
I also declare that I have contracted the debts detailed below, and it is my desire that
they may be religiously paid by my wife and executors in the form and at the time
agreed upon with my creditors.
Among the debts, two in favor of the plaintiff, Isidro Santos. In his petition, asking that the
committee be reconvened to consider his claims, plaintiff states that his failure to present the
said claims to the committee was due to his belief that it was unnecessary to do so because of
the fact that the testator, in his will, expressly recognized them and directed that they should
be paid.
He alleges that the committee on claims should have been reconvened to pass upon his claim
against the estate. It is clear that this committee has nothing to do with legacies. It is true that a
debt may be left as a legacy, either to the debtor, or to a third person. But this case can only
arise when the debt is an asset of the estate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the testator intended to leave the plaintiff a legacy or a debt?

HELD:
The creation of a legacy depends upon the will of the testator, is an act of pure beneficence,
has no binding force until his death, and may be avoided in whole or in part by the mere with
whim of the testator, prior to that time. A debt arises from an obligation recognized by law and
once established, can only be extinguished in a lawful manner. Debts are demandable and must
be paid in legal tender. Legacies may, and often do, consist of specific articles of personal
property and must be satisfied accordingly. In order to collect as legacy the sum mentioned in
the will as due him, the plaintiff must show that it is in fact a legacy and not a debt. As he has
already attempted to show that this sum represents a debt.
The testator left the total net assets of his estate, without reservation of any kind, to his
children per capita. There is no indication that he desired to leave anything by way of legacy to
any other person. These considerations clearly refute the suggestion that the testator intended
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[292]

to leave plaintiff any thing by way of legacy. His claim against the estate having been a simple
debt, the present action was improperly instituted against the administratrix.
But it is said that the plaintiff's claims should be considered as partaking of the nature of a
legacy and disposed of accordingly. If this be perfect then the plaintiff would receive nothing
until after all debts had been paid and the heirs by force of law had received their shares. From
any point of view the inevitable result is that there must be a hearing sometime before some
tribunal to determine the correctness of the debts recognized in the wills of deceased persons.
This hearing, in the first instance, cannot be had before the court because the law does not
authorize it. Such debtors must present their claims to the committee; otherwise their claims
will be forever barred.





LIM, EKEENA O.
LLB III-B




























[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS] LLB III-B, BATCH 2013-2014

[293]

Chingen vs Arguelles and wife, et al.
G.R. No. 3314
January 3, 1907

Topic/Doctrine: Legacies and Devises

FACTS:
The object of the action brought by the plaintiff, Anselmo Chingen was to recover one half of the jewels
mentioned in his complaint and one half of the rent accruing from a certain property, which said
property, as well as the jewels in question, were delivered as part of their legacies to the legatees,
Carmen Reyes, Jose Reyes, and Pedro Reyes, under the will of the deceased Raymunda Reyes.
The plaintiff insists to recover the remainder of the property which belonged to him in usufruct under
the law as the surviving spouse of the testatrix, citing to this end article 815 of the Civil Code.
The testatrix left no legitimate descendants or ascendants. Her surviving husband was therefore entitled
to the usufruct of one half of the estate, where the surviving husband is also an heir under the will.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Chingen is entitled to recover the remainder of the property in usufruct.

HELD:
No. It is absurd and contrary to all justices that the plaintiff should received his share as an heir under
the will from one half of the estate and be further entitled to the usufruct of the other half to the
prejudice of his coheir and the various legatees under the will. There is no law or article of the code
which authorizes such an iniquitous privilege. In any event the portion of the estate subject to the
usufruct must be claimed from the heir or heirs in due time, and in the manner and form prescribed by
law. We are of the opinion that judgment should be affirmed, and the defendants are hereby absolved
of the complaint of the plaintiff, Anselmo Chingen.




LIM, EKEENA O.
LLB III-B










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[294]


Delos Santos vs. Dela Cruz
G.R. No. L-29192
February 22, 1971

Facts:

Gertrudes de los Santos filed a complaint for specific performance against Maximo de la Cruz,
alleging she and several co-heirs, including the defendant, executed an extrajudicial partition agreement
over a certain portion of land with and that the parties thereto had agreed to adjudicate three (3) lots to
the defendant, in addition to his corresponding share, on condition that the latter would undertake the
development and subdivision of the estate but in spite of demands the defendant refused to perform
his aforesaid obligation although he had already sold the aforesaid lots. The plaintiff prayed the court to
order the defendant to comply with his obligation while the defendant admitted the due execution of
the extrajudicial partition agreement, but set up the affirmative defenses that the plaintiff had no cause
of action against him because the said agreement was void with respect to her, for the reason that the
plaintiff was not an heir of Pelagia de la Cruz, deceased owner of the property, and was included in the
extrajudicial partition agreement by mistake; and that although he had disposed of the three lots
adjudicated to him, nevertheless the proceeds of the sale were not sufficient to develop and improve
properly the subdivided estate.

Issue:

Whether or not the plaintiff-appellee can inherit from decedent Pelagia de la Cruz

Held:

The plaintiff-appellee, Gertrudes de los Santos cannot inherit from the decedent as she is not an heir of
the latter.Plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, she could not inherit from the
latter by right of representation. Article 972 provides that the right of representation takes place in the
direct descending line, but never in the ascending. In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the
children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood. Much less could plaintiff-
appellee inherit in her own right. Article 962 further added that in every inheritance, the relative nearest
in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes
place. In the present case, the relatives "nearest in degree" to Pelagia de la Cruz are her nephews and
nieces, one of whom is defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a grandniece is excluded by
law from the inheritance.



Luyao, Rodelo D.
LLB-IIIB






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[295]

Linart y Pavia vs. Ugarte
G.R. No. L-2599
October 27, 1905

Facts:

Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez having died intestate, Maria Juana Ugarte yIturralde asked that she be
judicially declared the legitimate heir of the deceased. There being no legitimate heirs to the estate
either in the direct ascendant or descendant line of succession, the petitioner presented herself as a
collateral descendant that is to say, as the legitimate niece of the deceased which was granted by the
court. But later, Carmen Linart, through her guardian, Rafaela Pavia, claimed one-half of all of the estate
of the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez, and asked at the same time that Maria Juana Ugarte
yIturralde, who had been declared the lawful heir of the deceased a fact which this new relative did
not deny be required to render an account of the property of the estate. The father of the petitioner
was in the same collateral degree of succession as Maria Juana Ugarte yIturralde. The court entered
judgment declaring that the petitioner had the same right to participate in the inheritance as had Maria
Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, and ordered the latter to render an account of the estate, enjoining her, at the
same time, from disposing of any part thereof until such accounting had been made and the estate
distributed. Maria Juana Ugarteexcepted to the judgment and has brought the case to this court.

Issue:

Whether or not grandniece is entitled to the same share of the estate that the niece is entitled to.

Held:

A grandniece is not entitled to the same share of the estate that the niece is entitled to. The court holds
that in an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased cannot participate with a niece in the
inheritance, because the latter, being a nearer relative, the more distance grandniece is excluded. In the
collateral line the right of representation does not obtain beyond sons and daughters of the brothers
and sisters, which would have been the case if Pablo Linart, the father of the plaintiff, had survived his
deceased uncle.



Luyao, Rodelo D.
LLB-IIIB











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[296]

Salao vs. Salao
G.R. No. L-26699
March 16, 1976

Facts:

The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio begot four children named Patricio, Alejandra, Juan
(Banli) and Ambrosia. Manuel Salao died in 1885. His eldest son, Patricio, died in 1886 survived by his
only child, ValentinSalao. After the death of the spouses their estate was administered by their
daughter Ambrosia and partitioned extrajudicially and the deed was signed by her four legal heirs,
namely, her three children, Alejandra, Juan and Ambrosia, and her grandson, ValentinSalao, in
representation of his deceased father, Patricio. The documentary evidence proves that in 1911 or
prior to the death of Valentina Ignacio her two children, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao,
secured a Torrens title in their names for a forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at SitioCalunuran,
Lubao, Pampanga. Ambrosia Salao sold and redeem twice the Calunuranfishpond. Juan Y. Salao, Sr.
and his nephew, ValentinSalao, died and the intestate estate of ValentinSalao was partitioned
extrajudicially between his two daughters, Benita Salao-Marcelo and VictorinaSalao-Alcuriza.
Ambrosia Salao donated to her grandniece, plaintiff Benita Salao, three lots and asdonee Benita Salao
signed the deed of donation and to Juan S. Salao, Jr. At her old age, Ambrosia also donated the
Calunuran fishpond.

Issue:

Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled for the reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond.

Held:
Having reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the reconveyance of the
Calunuran fishpond, it is no longer n to Pass upon the validity of the donation made by Ambrosia
Salao to Juan S. Salao, Jr. of her one-half share in the two fishponds The plaintiffs have no right and
personality to assail that donation. Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not
have any successional rights to Ambrosia's share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her nephew,
Juan, Jr., her nearest relative within the third degree. ValentinSalao, if living in 1945 when Ambrosia
died, would have been also her legal heir, together with his first cousin, Juan, Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao,
the daughter of Valentin, could not represent him in the succession to the estate of Ambrosia since in
the collateral line, representation takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters
whether they be of the full or half blood is (Art 972, Civil Code). The nephew excludes a grandniece
like Benita Salao or great-gandnephews like the plaintiffs Alcuriza (Pavia vs. Iturralde 5 Phil. 176).



Luyao, Rodelo D.
LLB-IIIB






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[297]

Intestate Estate of Pablo Luce vsPabellon
GR No. L-1367
Aug 16, 1949

Topic/Doctrine:Order of Intestate Succession - Ascending Direct Line


FACTS:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Quezon holding that upon the death
of Pablo Luce, "all his properties were inherited by his legitimate daughter Cristeta Luce who survived
him for at least half an hour, she having died about half an hour after" the death of her father.The
maternal grandparents are claiming inheritance from their grandchild Cristeta Luce while the appellants
are claiming the inheritance by right of representation.

ISSUE:
W/N a right of representation accrues to the appellants

HELD:
Reliance is placed on article 925 of the Civil Code providing that the right of representation shall always
take place in the direct descending line but never in the ascending, and that in the collateral line it shall
take place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters, whether they may be of the whole or half
blood. It is intimated that because the oppositors-appellees are not in the direct descending line, but are
only maternal grandparents of Cristeta Luce, they cannot inherit by representation. Aside from the fact
that the trial court correctly withheld any adjudications as to the estate of Cristeta Luce, because it is
not included in the intestate proceedings instituted by the petitioner-appellant, said oppositors-
appellees are claiming inheritance from their grandchild Cristeta Luce in their own rights as ascendants,
and not merely by right of presentation, it appearing that the said Cristeta Luce did not leave any
legitimate children or ascendants.





MACROHON, JENIELYN, A
LLB III-B








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[298]

Uson vs. Del Rosario
GR No. L-4963
Jan 29, 1953

Topic/Doctrine:Order of Intestate Succession - Illegitimate Children

FACTS:
Maria USON (petitioner) is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who died in 1945. Nebreda left 5 parcels
of land in Labrador Pangasinan, which lands are thesubject of an action for recovery of possession and
ownership filed by USONagainst Maria DEL ROSARIO.DEL ROSARIO is the common law wife of Nebreda
to whom he begotten four illegitimate children. USON contends that DEL ROSARIO deprived her of the
possession andenjoyment of the lands in question. The latter, meanwhile, argues that Uson andNebreda
executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate ashusband and wife. USON was given an
alimony in consideration of which shegave up her rights to inherit any property from Nebreda. DEL
ROSARIO contends that the 4 illegitimate children she had with Nebreda areentitled to successional
rights by virtue of the new civil code promulgated on 1950.The CFI ruled in favor of USON.

ISSUE:
W/N the renouncement of inheritance executed before the decedents death is valid and enforceable
W/N the illegitimate children have the right to inherit from the decedent

HELD:
No. When Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land passed from themoment of his death
to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old CivilCode). As this Court aptly said, "The property
belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had
executed anddelivered to them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. AlarasFrondosa, 17
Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Usonover the lands in
question became vested. The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over
thelands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future propertythat her husband
may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separationthey had entered into on February 21,
1931, cannot be entertained for the simplereason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a
contract nor can it berenounced.
No. The court ruled that while it is true that rights first declared in the newcivil code are to be given
retroactive effect, the same is subject to the condition thatthe said rights will not prejudice vested or
acquired rights. Hence, given thebackground of the case, the children cannot have successional rights
since USONsrights would be prejudiced.





MACROHON, JENIELYN, A
LLB III-B
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[299]

Leonardo vs. CA
120 SCRA 890|G.R. No. L-51263
February 28, 1983

Topic/Doctrine:Order of Intestate Succession - Illegitimate Children

FACTS:
Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 12, 1942 was survived by two (2) daughters, Maria and
SilvestraCailles and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son of her daughter, PascualaCailles who
predeceased her. Sotero Leonardo died in 1944, while SilvestraCailles died in 1949 without any issue. On
October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of the late Sotero Leonardo,
filed a complaint for ownership of properties, sum of money and accounting in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be declared one of the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca
Reyes. However, the name of the child described in the birth certificate is not that of the plaintiff but a
certain 'Alfredo Leonardo' who was born on September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and Socorro
Timbol. Other than his bare allegation, plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence showing that the
'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in the birth certificate is no other than he himself. Granting the
Cresenciano is the son of Sotero, as found by the Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as
shown by the fact that when he was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and
mother were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting.

ISSUE:
W/N an illegitimate child can inherit by right of representation from the legitimate relatives of his father

HELD:
No. An illegitimate child cannot inherit from his great grandparent for being an illegitimate child.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines states that:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father and mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate
child.




MACROHON, JENIELYN, A
LLB III-B




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[300]

Centeno vs. Centeno
52 Phil 322|G.R. No. L-28265
November 5, 1928

Topic/Doctrine:Order of Intestate Succession - Illegitimate Children

FACTS:
Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo were husband and wife who brought no property to the marriage
but acquired much property during their married life. Isaac Centeno died on October 7, 1905, and was
survived by his wife Melchora Arroyo, and their three son, Valentin, Faustino and Antonio Centeno.
Before his death, that is, on June 30, 1904, Isaac Centeno executed a will, one of the clauses of which
contained the following provision: "I hereby named and institute as my sole and universal heirs my three
sons Antonio, Valentin and Faustino Centeno or their heirs, if any, to one-half of the above-named
property, provided, that the same be divided equally among my three said sons."
On October 30, 1907, Antonio Centeno died leaving a widow, Gabriela Fernadez, and a will executed on
October 9, 1907, clauses 3 and 8 of which are as follows:
Third. I declare that I was married once, being still married to Dna. Gabriela Fernandez y Bribiesca,
and during our union we had not a single child; I also declared that although I said I have no child, the
God of pity has given me eight, who are my children by another woman, three of whom are called
natural, who are Martina, Jose (alias Pepe), and TelesforoCenteno, because they were born even before I
married my aforesaid wife, Dna. Gabriela the five are Sisenando, Antonina, Gregorio, Jose (alias Peping),
and Gabriel Centeno, and are called illegitimate, because they were born after my marriage;
nevertheless I acknowledge them all for I have had them since theit birth supporting and bringing all of
them, up until now.
Eight. Of my portion from my deceased father Isaac CentenoPurugganan, and of my future portion
from my mother Dna. Melchora Arroyo, I institute as my universal heirs my three children called natural,
to have and to hold in fee simple during their lives, under God's blessing and my own.
Melchora Arroyo de Centeno died on December 8, 1909, leaving one son named ValentinCenteno, and a
will executed on November 3, 1909, clause 3 of which provides:
(c) The third part shall be divided equally, neither more nor less, among my sons Antonio and
Faustino Centeno, may they rest in peace, and ValentinCenteno. (Exhibit E of plaintiffs and Exhibit 5 of
defendants.)

ISSUE:
1. Are the defendants entitled, as acknowledged natural children of Antonio Centeno, to inherit from his
legitimate father Isaac Centeno?
2. Are said defendants entitled, as such acknowledged natural children of Antonio Centeno, to the
reservation of one-half of said hereditary portion which Melchora Arroyo inherited from her legitimate
son Antonio Centeno which hereditary portion the latter had inherited from his likewise legitimate
father Isaac Centeno?
3. Are the defendants entitled, as such acknowledged natural children of Antonio Centeno, to represent
their natural father Antonio Centeno in the inheritance of their natural grandmother Melchora Arroyo,
legitimate mother of Antonio Centeno?
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HELD:
Articles 843 and 941 specifically provide that the portion corresponding to natural children in the
hereditary estate of the parents who acknowledged them, is transmitted upon the death of these
children to their legitimate or natural descendants. The latter's right, however, to represent their natural
father in the hereditary estate of their grandfather is not admitted, because they are not called by law
to participate in their grandfather's estate.
Hence,
(1) That the defendants, as acknowledged natural children and named heirs of Antonio Centeno in his
will, are entitled to inherit the one-half of hereditary portion which their deceased natural father had
inherited from his legitimate father by will; (2) that said defendants, though they are acknowledged
natural children of Antonio Centeno, are not entiltled to the reservation of the one-half which Melchora
Arroyo received as her legitimate from the hereditary portion which her son had received from his
father, Isaac Centeno also legitimate; (3) that the defendants, thought they are acknowledged natural
children of Antonio Centeno, are not entitled to represent the latter in the inheritance of his legitimate
mother Melchora Arroyo.




MACROHON, JENIELYN, A
LLB III-B

























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[302]

ANSELMA DIAZ vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. L-66574
February 21, 1990

FACTS:
The facts of the case, as synthesized in the assailed decision, are as follows:
It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the
spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and
out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3)
that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of
Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual
Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo
Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his
death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to
wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta
Pacursa.
Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the old Civil Code (Civil Code of Spain)
by Articles 990 and 992 of the new Civil Code (Civil Code of the Philippines) constitute a substantial and
not merely a formal change, which grants illegitimate children certain successional rights.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

HELD:
Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are
transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who
may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever
manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are
themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of
representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a
legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a
legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that
"the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is
erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his
father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is
inapplicable to instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between
the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be
amiss to state that Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.
Molejon, Jayson
LLB III-B
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[303]

TOMAS CORPUS vs RAFAEL CORPUS
G.R. No. L-22469
October 23, 1978

FACTS:
Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age of seventy-seven years. His will dated
August 29, 1934 was probated in the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 54863.
The decree of probate was affirmed in this Court's 1941 decision in Corpus vs. Yangco, 73 Phil. 527.
Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1) his half brother, Luis
R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus,
and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus, and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the
daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus. Juanita died in October, 1944 at Palauig, Zambales.
Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the widow of Tomas
Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children with Tomas
Corpus, two of whom were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose Corpus.
On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita corpus, filed an action in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to recover her supposed share in Yangco intestate estate. He alleged in his complaint
that the dispositions in his Yangcos will sing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void
under article 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949 partition is invalid and, therefore, the
decedent's estate should be distributed according to the rules on intestacy.

ISSUE:
WON the petitioners has cause of action for the recovery of hereditary share of Teodoro Yangco.

HELD:
Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus
was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus
has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus,
as a legal heir, in Yangco's estate. Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no
reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.
Article 943 "prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa between legitimate and illegitimate
relatives" 16 Sanchez Roman, Civil Code, pp. 996-997 cited in Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279,
287. See 16 Scaevola Codigo Civil, 4th Ed., 455-6).
The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which provides that "an
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate
child"

Molejon, Jayson
LLB III-B

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS] LLB III-B, BATCH 2013-2014

[304]

EUFRACIA VDA. DE CRISOLOGO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-44051
June 27, 1985

FACTS:
The petitioners filed an action against the private respondent for ownership, annulment of sale, and
delivery of possession of various properties, with writ of preliminary injunction and damages. Claiming
to be legal heirs of the vendor, they sought the annulment of four deeds of sale covering seventeen (17)
parcels of land and a residential house executed by Lutgarda Capiao in favor of respondent Mallillin.

ISSUE:
WON herein plaintiff can inherit from Lutgarda Capiao.

HELD:
The original complaint and the amended complaint filed by the plaintiffs alleges in quintessence or in
substance the following: 'That Julia Capiao who maintained extra-marital relations with one Victoriano
Taccad, begot with him one child and/or forced heir, named Lutgarda (Leogarda) Capiao who was
married to Raymundo Zipagan both of whom died at Cauayan, Isabela in 1970 and 1964, respectively,
without any children and/or immediate forced heirs' (paragraph 5 of the amended complaint); That
Lutgarda (Leogarda) Capiao having died on November 11, 1970 at Cauayan, Isabela, without any
children and/or immediate forced heir and without any will therefore inestate succession took place and
the herein plaintiffs, as relatives within the fifth civil degree to her (Lutgarda [Leogarda] Capiao were
consequently instituted as Lutgarda's legal heirs and were legally entitled to inherit all the properties
which were hers by virtue of the extra- judicial partition.
The source of these properties in question deceased Lutgarda Leogarda is undoubtedly an illegitimate
child. In fact, her surname is Capiao and not Taccad, retaining the surname or family name of her
mother Julia Capiao Article 992 of the Civil Code, cited by the movant, the defendant, provides:
Art. 992. Illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit
in the same manner from the illegitimate child.'
Clearly, they can not because the legitimate relatives of Julia Capiao cannot inherit from an illegitimate
child of the latter, because that is the clear and unmistakable provision of Article 992 of the New Civil
Code. Neither can Lutgarda Capiao inherit from the legitimate relatives of Julia Capiao who are the
plaintiffs in the instant case.


Molejon, Jayson
LLB III-B


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[305]

Intestate estate of Julia de la Pea vs. RUFINO SEVILLA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-21570
August 30, 1924

FACTS:
This is an appeal from an order dated July 20, 1923, of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija denying
the petition both of the petitioners and of the opponents for declaration of heirs and denying also the
authority to sell certain property, which was applied for by the former. Both parties have appealed from
this order, each assigning errors thereto.
This case is concerned with the inheritance of the deceased Julia de la Pea.
The evidence shows that this Julia de la Pea was daughter of Julio Sevilla and Catalina de la Pea, who
were not married. The petitioners have introduced evidence to the effect that Julia de la Pea was an
adulterous child because Julio Sevilla was married with Josefa Gutierrez who was alive at the time. The
fact is that Julia de la Pea was a child of unmarried parents, and therefore she was not a legitimate
child, nor does she appear to have been legitimated, and is, at most, an acknowledged natural child,
supposing it not to have been proven that she was an adulterous child, as alleged by the petitioners.

ISSUE:
WON the petitioners and opponents herein are entitled to hereditary estate of Julia

HELD:
Now, the persons entitled to succeed a natural child in an intestate succession are the father or mother
who acknowledged it (art. 944, Civil Code), and in default of either, its natural brothers (art. 945, Civil
Code). It was not proven nor it is contended that the petitioners or the opponents are parents or
brothers of the deceased Julia de la Pea; and with the exception of the relatives mentioned in said
articles 944 and 945 of the Civil Code, no other relative of the natural child has the right to succeed it, as
is clearly provided by article 943 of the same Code.
It is, therefore, clear that neither the petitioners nor the opponents can be declared heirs of the
deceased Julia de la Pea without a will.



Molejon, Jayson
LLB III-B




[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS] LLB III-B, BATCH 2013-2014

[306]

BERCILES v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
L-57257
March 05, 1984


Topic/Doctrine: Premiums are presumed conjugal without proof of payment though exclusive funds
FACTS:
GSIS recognized Pascual Berciles as an acknowledged natural child and other private respondents Maria
Luisa Berciles Vallreal, mercy Berciles Patacsil and Rhoda Berciles as illegitimate children of Judge
Pascual Berciles with Flor Fuentebella and thus have rights to his retirement benefits
This was contested by his wife Iluminada Ponce and their children.

ISSUE:
WON GSIS was correct in upholding their status as a natural child and illegitimate children

HELD:
NO, Art 287 pf NCC illegitimate children other than natural are entitled to support and such
sucsessional rights are granted in the code, but for this article to be applicable there must be admission
or recognition of paternity of illegitimate child.
No evidence of admission:
1. There was no evidence that he intervened when his name was put in the birth certificate of Pascual
Berciles, thus his part in the birth certificate is null and void
2. Baptismal certificate has no weight as well
3. Living together does not prove filiations
4. Pictures are not proof of filiations
Their mother was not recognized to be married to the deceased
RESULT: retirement benefits are distributed equally to the five recognized heirs from his marriage to
Iluminda Ponce who is also an heir.

Art 966 of NCC if a widow or widower and legit children or descendants are left, surviving spouse has
in the succession the same share as that of each of the children

Art 980 of NCC children of deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the
inheritance in equal shares.



Molejon, Jayson
LLB III-B





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[307]

Delrosario v Delrosario
2 Phil 321

Doctrine: Construction: In the interpretation and construction of testamentary provisions the intent of
the testator controls.
Facts:
Testator Nicolas declares in his will the following:
Eight. The testator declares that the P5000 which he brought to his marriage he hereby bequeaths to his
nephews Enrique and Ramon, natural children of his brother Clemente, notwithstanding the fact that
they purport to be the issue of the marriage of Escolastico and Rosendo, successively.
Ninth. The testator declares that the said sum of P5000 is to be divided , P3000 to the first named and
P2000 to the second named, the delivery of the sum is to be effected by the wife of the testator,
provided that this young men behave themselves as they have done up to the present time, and do not
cease to study until taking a degree of Bachelor Arts and then take a business course, if their health will
permit, their support to paid out of the testamentary estate and they to live in the house of the widow.

Issue:
WON the description of the legatees make the legacy conditional?

Held:
No. where legatees are appointed out by name in the will the fact that they are referred to as natural
sons of third person does not make the legacy conditional upon proof of such relationship but is
descriptive merely.


Jhemahar Indasan Ombra
III-B













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[308]

Resureccion v Javier
63 Phil 599

Doctrine: Incapacity to inherit from the deceased person.
Facts:
On Oct. 18 1932, Felisa Javier made a will instituting her husband Sulpiccio universal heir and among
other things, left a legacy of P2000 in favor of her brother, Gil.
The testator died on Jan 22, 1933 and her will was probated on March 4 of said year.
On Oct. 12, 1933, the court finding that Gil died on August 1930, even before the testatrix made her will,
and ordered that the legacy of P2000 in his favor revert to the fund of the estate.
Gils children claiming that they are entitled to receive the legacy of P2000 in favor of their father.

Issue:
WON Gils children are entitled to such legacy?

Held:
Not. Gil, now deceased, upon being instituted a legatee by the testatrix, lacked civil personality, which is
extinguished by death, and, therefore, lacked capacity to inherit by will on the ground that he could not
been subject of the right.


Jhemhar Indasan Ombra
III-B










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[309]

NEPOMUCENO v CA (GOMEZ)
139 SCRA 206
October 9, 1985

FACTS
Martin Jugo died with last Will and Testament with all the formalities required bylaw. In the
said Wil l, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J.Nepomuceno
as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Willthat the testator was
legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had twolegitimate children, Oscar and
Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged fromhis lawfully wedded wife and had been
living with petitioner as husband and wife. Infact, on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin
Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J.Nepomucenowere married i n Victoria, Tarlac
before the Justice of the Peace. Thetestator devised to his forced heirs, namely,
his legal wife Rufina Gomez and hischildren Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the
free portion thereof to hereinpetitioner. The petitioner filed a petition for the probate
of the last Will and Testament of thedeceased Martin Jugo in the CFI Rizal and
asked for the issuance to her of letterstestamentary. The legal wife of the testator, Rufina
Gomez and her children filed an opposition. The lower court denied the probate of the
Will on the ground that as the testatoradmitted in his Will to cohabiting with
the petitioner from December 1952 until hisdeath on July 16, 1974, the Will' s
admission to probate wil l be an idle exercisebecause on the face of the Will, the
invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident. The case reached the CA and the respondent court
set aside the decision of the CFI of Rizal denying the probate of the will. The CA declared the
Will to be valid except thatthe devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant to
Article 739 in relation with Article 1028.

ISSUE
WON the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring thelast Will
and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to passupon the intrinsic
validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner.

HELD
NO. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry
islimited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The
rule,however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the
probatecourt is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass
uponcertain provisions of the Will.
Reasoning:
a.InNuguid v. Nuguid, the testator instituted the petitioner as universal hei rand
completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, nomat t er
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[310]

how val i d i t may appear ext r i ns i cal l y, woul d be nul l and voi d. Separate
or latter proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of thetestamentary provisions
would be superfluous.b. The pr ohi bi t i on i n Ar t i cl e 739 of t he Ci vi l Code i s
agai ns t t he maki ng of adonation between persons who are living in adultery or
concubinage. It is thedonation which becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that
therecipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the
legacybecausethe testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a personwith whom
he had been living in concubinage.




OPAY, EMMAE ROSE ROSE B.
LLB III-B





























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[311]

Villavicencio vs. Quino
G.R. No. 45248.
April 18, 1939

FACTS:
Considering theprovisions of the will of the deceased E. Z. del R. in their entirety, her collateral relatives,
not being forcedheirs, are not entitled to succeed her as to the remainder of her properties, which does
not exist, as to the naked ownership thereof. Said testamentary provisions, whose validity is not here
questioned, should be complied with because the testatrix, not having forced heirs, may dispose of her
properties as she did in her will, formasses and pious works for the benefit of her soul and those of her
relatives, as provided in article 741 of thecivil Code.EugeniaZuiga del Rosario died in Batangas, , on
December 19, 1934, leaving a will executed with all the legal formalities, which was probated on
February 1, 1935, over the opposition of some relatives.Subsequently, Santiago Quino and twenty-eight
relatives of the testatriz within the fifth degree in the collateral line, filed a motion with the conformity
of the Bishop of lipa wherein, after stating how the said deceasedEugenia Zuiga del Rosario has
disposed in her will of her properties by way of masses and alms, etc., theyasked that they be declared
heirs of said testarix charged with the duty to comply with its provisions, as towhich compliance, so they
stated, they had already reached an understanding with the Bishop of Lipa wherebythe said movants,
within ninety days from the adjudication to them of the properties constituting the inheritance,would
deposit with the said Bishop the necessary amount to defray the masses for three years, and
wouldlikewise deposit in any bank designated for the purpose an amount the interest of which would be
sufficient tocover the other expenses for the annul masses and alms ordained in the will. The executor
Vicente ReyesVillavicencio opposed the foregoing petition and the court denied the latter by its order of
March 30, 1936. "The lower erred in not recognizing as proper and lawful under the circumstances, the
compromise entered intoby and between the Bishop of Lipa and the herein oppositors-appellants, with
regards to the matter by whichParagraph III of the will may be carried out and given effect, it being
understood that the said mutualunderstanding will best promote and safeguards the manifest and
premordial intention of the testatrix."cralawvirtua1awlibraryThe appellants contend that even after full
compliance with the will of the testatriz, a substantial balance wouldstill remain after deducting the
necessary expenses for masses and alms and the amount of the allowance forsupport of Eulalia del
Rosario, and excluding the legacy left to UbaldoMagbuhat and Eugracioalegria. As tothat balance, the
appellants contend that the deceased Eugenia Zuigadel Rosario died partly intestate and thatthey are
entitled to succeed her with respect to that part.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the will are valid.

HELD:
Such contention is based on something entirely inconsistent with what the testatrix ordered in the third
clause ofher will. As will be seen, the appellants proceed on the false assumption that for every mass
celebrated for thesoul of the testatrix and those of her parents, brothers and sisters, something or a
determinate amount from thefruits of her properties had to be given. Proceeding on this assumption, it
is possible that the fruits of saidproperties would leave an excess which the testatrix has not disposed
of. However, as we have stated, such anassumption is untenable because the testatrix has not provided
that a certain amount be taken the fruits of herproperties for the celebration of the masses ordered by
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[312]

her, but has said: "I have that may said properties bedevoted only for the peace and happiness of my
soul and those of my parents, brothers and sisters, and also forthe benefit of the church, etc." ; and,
continuing, she ordered "that the fruits of the lands and the income of thehouse and warehouse, be
spent for masses. . . ." Hence, the testatrix has provided, not that something out of thefruits and income
of her properties be paid for the masses which she has ordered to be celebrated for her souland those
of her parents, brothers and sisters, but that all the fruits of the lands and all the income be spent
formasses. For this purpose, and doubtless foreseeing that the income of her properties would be
insufficient tocover the amount of the masses and of its other provisions, the testatrix has ordered in
the sixth and nightparagraphs of her will that, if necessary, her properties be sold with leave of court.
Considering the provisionsof the will of the deceased Eugenia Zuiga del Rosario in their entirely, her
collateral relatives not being forcedheirs, are not entitled to succeed her as to the remainder of her
properties, which does not exist, or as to thenaked ownership thereof.Said testamentary provisions,
whose validity is not here questioned, should complied with because the testatrix,not having forced
heirs in the present case, may dispose of her properties for masses and pious works for thebenefit of her
soul, as provided in article 747 of the Civil Code. The circumstances that the appellants had a n
understanding with the Bishop of Lipa as to show they (not theexecutor) were to comply with the
provisions made by the testatrix after they had been declared heirs and afterthe properties left by the
deceased relative had been adjudicated to them, does not support their contentions inthe slightest,
because the Bishops intervention in this case cannot validate any arrangement calculated to defeatthe
testamentary provisions inasmuch as the testatrix did not leave anything to the Roman Catholic under
theadministration or supervision of the Bishop.The appealed order is affirmed with hecosts of both
instances to the appellants.





OPAY, EMMAE ROSE ROSE B.
LLB III-B


















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[313]

CAYETANO v LEONIDAS
129 SCRA 524
May 30, 1984

FACTS
Adoracion Campos died, leaving her father, Hermogenes and her sisters, NenitaPaguia,
Remedios Lopez and MarietaMedina as the surviving heirs.- As Hermogenes Campos was the
only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication whereby headjudicated unto
himself the ownership of the entire estate of Adoracion- Eleven months after, NenitaPaguia
filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of Adoracion, which was allegedlyexecuted in the US
and for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.- An
opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by Hermogenes alleging among other things,
that he has everyreason to believe that the will in question is a forgery; that the intrinsic
provisions of the will are null and void; and thateven if pertinent American laws on intrinsic
provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they wouldwork injustice and
injury to him.- Hermogenes filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or
Interests) stating that he "has been able toverify the veracity thereof (of the will) and now
confirms the same to be truly the probated will of his daughter Adoracion." Hence, an ex-parte
presentation of evidence for the reprobate of the questioned will was made.- Respondent
judge issued an order admitting the Last Will and Testament of Adoracion and allowed probate
in thePhilippines, and NenitaPaguia was appointed Administratrix of the estate of said
decedent.- Hermogenes filed a petition for relief, praying that the order allowing the will be set
aside on the ground that thewithdrawal of his opposition to the same was secured through
fraudulent means. He filed another motion entitled"Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside the
Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.- Respondent judge
issued an order dismissing the petition for relief for failure to present evidence in support
thereof.Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. In the same
order, respondent judge also deniedthe motion to vacate for lack of merit.

ISSUE
WON the provisions of the will are valid.

HELD
NO. As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the
will, the due executionthereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with
the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law.The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes
only after the court has declared that the will has been dulyauthenticated. However, where
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon,even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.- Although on its face, the will appeared
to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should havedenied its
reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at
the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, U.S.A.- Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
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[314]

The law which governs AdoracionCampo'swill is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the
national law of the decedent. It is a settled rule that as regards theintrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national
lawof the decedent must apply.- The settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was
correctly filed with the CFI of Manila where she had an estatesince it was alleged and proven
that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania,
and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is
estopped fromquestioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief.



OPAY, EMMAE ROSE ROSE B.
LLB III-B

































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[315]

Pimentel vs. Palanco
5 Phil 436, 439-440

FACTS:
Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court a petition for the probate of the will of his
late Uncle, Nemesio Acain, on the premise that the latter died leaving a will in which the former
and his brothers and sisters were instituted as heirs. After the petition was set for hearing in
the lower court, Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson, a legally adopted daughter and the
widow of the deceased respectively, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1)
Constantino Acain has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal
heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited. Said motion was
denied as well as the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Consequently, Fernandez and
Diongson filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court. IAC granted
Fernandez and Diongsons petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for
probate of the will. Due to the denial of Acains motion for reconsideration, he then filed a
petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson have been pretirited.

HELD:
Article 854 of the Civil Code:
The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are
not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual,
without prejudice to the right of representation.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them
either because they are not mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854
may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a
compulsory heir. However, the same thing cannot be said of the legally adopted daughter.
Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to
the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter
and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was
totally omitted and preterited in the will and that both the adopted child and the widow were
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[316]

deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly
disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.

The universal institution of Acain together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance
of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution
of universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a
declaration that nothing at all was written.


Opay Emmae Rose B.
LLB III- B
































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[317]

TORRES vs. JAVIER
34 Phil. 382;
March 24, 1916


FACTS:
Two women are claiming to be the legal wife of deceased Tan Po Pic.Marta Torres objected to the
appointment of any except herself. Juan Cailles Tan Poo, on behalf of the Chinese woman Yu Teng New,
opposed the appointmentof Marta Torres.-The probate court being unable to determinewho, if either,
was the lawful wife of the deceased, appointed a disinterested third person(Juan L. Javier) to act as
administrator.-This appeal is taken by Marta Torres from tha torder of appointment.

ISSUE:
WON the probate court may validly appoint adisinterested third person as the administrator of the
estate

HELD:
YES, the court had a right in view of the controversy between the women to name adisinterested third
person as administrator and leave the controversy between them to be settledin the administration
proceedings at the propertime.-The probate court did not find as a fact thatthere was a wife in China.
The court consideredthe facts and circumstances as they werepresented in the proceedings and upon
the whole believed it for the best interest of all concernedto appoint as administrator a disinterested
thirdperson, particularly in view of the fact that therewas likely to be litigation between Marta
Torresand the Chinese wife as to which is in fact hislegal wife and entitled to an interest in the estateof
the deceased Tan Po Pic.



Opay Emmae Rose B.
LLB III- B









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[318]

Valeriana Quion vs. Vicente Claridad et al.
74 Phil. 100
January 30, 1943

Topic/Doctrine: Capacity to Succeed by Will or by Intestacy


FACTS:
In the intestate proceedings of a deceased, prosecuted by appellants, the latter knowingly concealed the
fact that the said deceased left a second wife with whom he had two children, namely, herein appellees.

ISSUE:
W/N the appellees is entitled to recover one-half of decedents estate.

HELD:
YES. That the trial court, in a subsequent action brought by appellees to recover their legal participations
in the deceaseds estate, correctly declared said appellees co-owners of the estate in question to the
extent of one-half thereof, with right to its possession.


ROJAS, RAE-ANN THEA, G.
LLB III-B






















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[319]

Ramirez vs. Gmur
42 Phil. 855
August 5, 1918

Topic/Doctrine: Capacity to Succeed by Will or by Intestacy

FACTS:
Samuel Bischoff Werthmuller, native of the Republic of Switzerland, but for many years a resident of the
Philippine Islands, died in the city of Iloilo leaving a valuable estate of which he disposed by will. A few
days after his demise the will was offered for probate in the CFI of Iloilo and upon publication of notice
was duly allowed and established by the court. His widow, Doa Ana M. Ramirez was named as
executrix in the will, and to her accordingly letters testamentary were issued. By the will everything was
given to the widow with the exception of a piece of real property located in the City of Thun,
Switzerland which was devised to the testators brothers and sisters. However, the children of Leona
Castro which was the natural child of the deceased, claims that theyre entitled to a share of the estate
of the deceased. There are two sets of children of Leona, the children by her first marriage and in the
second marriage.

ISSUE:
W/N the claimants filed within the period as prescribed by law.

HELD:
Sec. 41 of the Old Code of Civil Procedure provides that ten years actual adverse possession by
occupancy, grant, descent, or otherwise shall vest title in the possessor (now the applicable law, Art.
1040 of the New Civil Code). This would indicate that a decree of distribution under which one may be
placed in possession of land acquired by descent, is not in itself conclusive, and that the action of
revindication may be brought by the heir against the persons put in possession by decree of the probate
court at any time within the period allowed by the general statute of limitations. The SC concludes that
the children by first marriage presented its case in ample time and that the judgment entered in their
favor was correct. As to the children by second marriage, are debarred from participation in the estate
on other grounds.

ROJAS, RAE-ANN THEA, G.
LLB III-B










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[320]

Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Anastacia Abadilla
46 Phil. 642
December 10, 1924

Topic/Doctrine: Acceptance and Repudiation of the Inherictance

FACTS:
This is an appeal from a judgment in cadastral land registration case in which case lots nos. 3464, 3464,
and 3470 are claimed by the municipality of tayabas and the governor of the province on one side and
by the Palads on the other. Lot no. 3470 is also claimed by Dorotea Lopez. The court below ordered the
registration of all three lots in the name of the governor of tayabas in trust for a secondary school to be
established in the municipality of tayabas. The claimants Palad and Lopez appealed.

ISSUE:
W/N the governor may receive a devise in trust without previous approval.

HELD:
YES. A provincial governor cannot be regarded as public establishment within the meaning of the Civil
Code and may therefore accept and receive a testamentary devise in trust without the previous
approval of the central government.




ROJAS, RAE-ANN THEA, G.
LLB III-B


















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[321]

Vda. De Tupas v. RTC
G.R. No. L-65800
October 3, 1986


FACTS:
Among the assets listed in the will of the deceased were several lots, admittedly his private capital.
However, at the time of his death, these lots were no longer owned by him, he having donated them the
year before to the Tupas Foundation, Inc. Tupas' widow brought suit against Tupas Foundation, Inc. to
have the donation declared inofficious insofar as it prejudiced her legitime, therefore reducible.

HELD:
The fact that the donated property no longer actually formed part of the estate of the donor at the time
of his death cannot be asserted to prevent its being brought to collation. Indeed, it is an obvious
proposition that collation contemplates and particularly applies to gifts inter vivos.
Since it is clear that the questioned donation is collationable and that, having been made to a stranger
(to the donor) it is, by law chargeable to the freely disposable portion of the donor's estate, to be
reduced insofar as inofficious.
If the value of the donation at the time it was made does not exceed that difference, then it must be
allowed to stand. But if it does, the donation is inofficious as to the excess and must be reduced by the
amount of said excess. In this case, if any excess be shown, it shall be returned or reverted to the
petitioner-appellant as the sole compulsory heir of the deceased.



RUBIO, CAMILLE ANNE M.
LLB III-B

















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[322]

Buhay De Roma v. CA
G.R. No. L-46903
July 23, 1987

Facts
Candeleria De Roma adopted two daughters, Buhay and Rosalinda. She diedintestate. When
administration proceedings was ongoing, Buhay was appointedadministratrix and filed an inventory of
the estate. Opposed by Rosalinda on theground that certain properties donated by their mother to
Buhay and fruits thereof had not been included. The Parcels of Land totaled P10,297.50 and the value
is notdisputed. The TC issued an order in favor of Buhay because when Candelariadonated the
properties to Buhay she said in the Deed of Donation sa pamamagitanng pagbibigay na din a
mababawing muli which the TC interpreted as a prohibitionto collate and besides the legitimes of the
two daughters were not impaired. Onappeal, it was reversed as it merely described the donation as
irrevocable not anexpress prohibition to collate.

Issue:
Whether or not these lands are subject to collation.

Held:
The pertinent Civil Code provisions are:Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other
compulsory heirs, mustbring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have
receivedfrom the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any othergratuitous
title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of thelegitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition. (1035a)Art. 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if
the donor shouldhave so expressly provided, or if the donee should repudiate the inheritance, unlessthe
donation should be reduced as inofficious. (1036) The SC affirmed the appellate courts decision and
that it merely described thedonation as irrevocable. The Fact that a donation is irrevocable does not
necessarilyexempt the donated properties from collation as required under the provisions of the NCC.
Given the precise language of the deed of donation the decedent donorwould have included an express
prohibition to collate if that had been the donorsintention. Absent such indication of that intention, the
rule not the exemptionshould be applied.-MJA


RUBIO, CAMILLE ANNE M.
LLB III-B









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[323]



Lesaca vs Lesaca

FACTS:
Baldomaro J. Lesaca died in the City of Manila on November 8, 1946. He was survived by his second wife
(Juana Felix), two minor children by the latter, two children by his marriage, and three acknowledged
natural children by a third woman. In his will he named Juana F. Lesaca and Consuelo F. Lesaca, his
children by his first marriage, coexecutrices. It appears that the deceased and his widow, Juana Felix,
had lived together martially since 1924 but were not married until December 18, 1945; that is, less than
a year before his death. Issues and Holdings.

ISSUE:
1.Whether the allowances for support granted by the court tolegitimate minor children of the deceased
pending liquidation of his estate are subject to collation and deductible from their share of the
inheritance?
Obviously, the answer should bethe affirmative.
2. Whether money received after marriage, as purchase price of land solda retrovendendo
before such marriage to one of the consorts, constitutes conjugal property or not.

HELD:
In our opinion the question calls for a negative answer.
Whether a standing crop of palay planted during covertures, and harvested after the death of the one of
the consorts, constitutes fruits and income within the purview of Article 1401 of the Civil Code, and one-
half of such crop should be delivered to the surviving spouse.
It should belong to the conjugal partnership



RUBIO, CAMILLE ANNE M.
LLB III-B










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[324]

Adan vs. Casili
76 Phil 279
March 18, 1946

FACTS:
The plaintiff Felix Adan commenced this action in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against his
sister Victoria Adan and the latter's husband, Agapito Casili, to secure the judicial partition of the estate
left by their deceased mother, Simplicia Nepomuceno, alleged to consist of six parcels of land which are
specifically described in the complaint. Parcels 1 and 3, however, were subsequently discarded, the first
having been sold by the parties to the municipality of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, and the second being
admittedly the property of Maria Adan, a half sister of the parties litigant. The remaining four parcels,
referred to in the record as lots Nos. 2, 4, 5, and 6, are valued by both parties at P2,783.55.
The defendants interposed the following defense: That the four lots in question were ceded by the
deceased Simplicia Nepomuceno to her daughter Victoria Adan as her share of the inheritance; and that
the plaintiff has received more than his share consisting of money, livestock, palay, and real property,
namely:
Expenses of the plaintiff as a student from 1918 to 1925 P8,000.00
Twelve carabaos received by the plaintiff from his mother, at
P30 each 9;360.00
Three hundred cavans of palay, at P4.20 a cavan 1,260.00
Cash taken by the plaintiff from his mother in 1927 1,110.00
Two parcels of land bought by the plaintiff with money he
received from his mother 1,220.00

ISSUE:
Whether or not record to disprove or impeach the testimony of the defendants to the effect that the
plaintiff took and received from his mother during the latter's lifetime?

HELD:
We find no competent evidence in the record to disprove or impeach the testimony of the defendants
to the effect that the plaintiff took and received from his mother during the latter's lifetime P1,110 in
cash and 300 cavans of palay in the manner and under the circumstances narrated by the defendant
spouses as witnesses in their own behalf. The 300 cavans of palay was taken by the plaintiff from the
granary of his mother in 1927. The cash consisting of twenty-peso and five-peso bills and amounting in
all to P1,110 was taken by the plaintiff from his mother's trunk on an occasion when she suffered a
collapse and when the plaintiff took some money from the same trunk with which to pay for injections.
As we have said, the plaintiff did not testify to deny the testimony of the defendants. It is admitted in
the brief for the plaintiff and appellant that the latter took 300 cavans of palay from his mother's
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granary, but it is claimed that said palay belonged to him. In the absence of plaintiff's testimony to
support such claim, there is no basis upon which to sustain it. It was also proved during the trial that the
plaintiff took possession of twelve carabaos belonging to his mother and that the value of said animals
was P30 a head.
It was also established during the trial that the plaintiff studied surveying in Manila and that during his
studies his mother and sister sent him money for his support and expenses, amounting to approximately
P500 a year. Although the defendants claim that his studies lasted from 1918 to 1925, we sustain the
contention of the plaintiff and appellant in his brief that it took him only two years to finish the course
of surveying, because it is a matter of common knowledge that surveying is a two-year course, and it is
probable that the rest of the time was spent by him in acquiring a high-school education.
Under the article 1041 of the Civil Code, allowances for support, education, attendance in illnesses, even
though unusually expensive, apprenticeship, ordinary equipment, or customary presents are not subject
to collation. But article 1042 of the same Code provides that expenses which may have been incurred by
the parents in giving their children a professional or artistic career shall not be brought to collation
unless the parent so orders or they encroach upon the legitimate. It also provides that in cases in which
it is proper to collate them, the money which the child would have spent if it had lived in the house and
company of its parents shall be deducted there from. Since the career of surveyor is a professional one,
and since the expenses incurred by plaintiff's mother in giving him that career encroached upon the
legitimate, it is proper to collate one-half of the amount spent by her for him during the two years he
studied surveying, the other half being considered as the amount which the plaintiff would have spent if
he had lived in the house and company of his mother.

RUBIO, CAMILLE ANNE M.
LLB III-B












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[326]

Guinging vs. Abuton
G.R. No. L-23035
October 13, 1925
FACTS:
In the course of the administration of the estate of Ignacio Abuton, it appeared that the deceased died
testate on March 8, 1916, leaving two sets of children by two different wives, the first of whom was
Dionisia Olarte, who died about twenty years ago, and by whom the deceased had twelve, children,
three of whom died without issue. The second wife was Teodora Guinguing, to whom the testator was
married on July 14, 1906, and by whom he had four children, all still living. . In this inventory he included
only the lands which the testator had devised to the children of the second marriage, omitting other
lands possessed by him at the time of his death and which were claimed by the children of the first
marriage as having been derived from their mother. Accordingly, on March 14, 1922, Teodoro
Guinguing, in representation of herself and her four minor children, presented a motion in court, asking
that the administrator be required to amend his inventory and to include therein all property pertaining
to the conjugal partnership of Ignacio Abuton and Dionisia Olarte, including property actually in the
hands of his children by her which (the motion alleged) had been delivered to said children as an
advancement. The purpose of the motion was to force the first set of children to bring into collation the
properties that had been received by them, in conformity with article 1035 of the Civil Code

ISSUE:
Whether or not the first set of children should bring into collation the property received by them?

HELD:
As we gather from the record, the crux of the controversy consists in the fact that among the properties
remaining in possession of Ignacio Abuton at the time of his death was a piece of land covered by a
composition title No. 11658, issued in 1894 in the name of Dionisia Olarte. At the same time that this
title was issued, Agapito Abuton procured two other titles, Nos. 11651 and 11654, covering adjacent
properties to be issued in his own name. From the circumstance that title No. 11658 was issued in the
name of Dionisia Olarte the opponents appear to believe that this land was her particular property and
should now vest exclusively in her heirs. This conclusion is erroneous. There is nothing to show that the
land covered by title No. 11658 was not acquired by the spouses during their marriage, and the
circumstance that the title was taken in the name of the wife does not defeat its presumed character as
ganacial property. Therefore, in liquidating the ganacial property of the first marriage it was within the
power of the surviving husband to assign other property to the first set of children as their participation
in the estate of their mother and to retain in his own hands the property for which a composition title
had been issued in the name of the wife. Upon the whole we are unable to discover any reversible error
in the appealed order, and the same is accordingly affirmed, with costs. So ordered.



SALA, Reeny B.
LLB III-B

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[327]


Hernaez vs. Hernaez
G.R. No. L-10027
November 13, 1915

FACTS:
The spouses, Pedro Hernaez and Juana Espinosa, died, leaving several legitimate descendants. Neither
of their estates had been divided up to the date of the institution of this action, but were both under
administration. Their son, Domingo Hernaez y Espinosa, sold all his interest in both his father's and
mother's estate to his son, Vicente Hernaez y Tuason. Domingo Hernaez y Espinosa had thus parted with
all his interest in the estates of his two parents, he executed a document of sale in favor of Alejandro
Montelibano y Ramos. . On the same date he executed another document of sale in which he purported
to convey to Jose Montelibano Uy-Cana four-eighteenths of his interest in his mother's estate. Both of
these sales were made with the connivance of his son, Vicente Hernaez y Tuason. On August 19, 1912,
Jose Montelibano Uy-Cana sold his interest in the estate to Alejandro Montelibano y Ramos. By this
transfer, the latter stood owner of all the interest of Domingo Hernaez y Espinosa in the estate of Pedro
Hernaez, and five-eighteenths of his interest in the estate of Juana Espinosa as against Vicente Hernaez
y Espinosa.

ISSUE:
Whether or not co-heirs heir may exercise this right of subrogation upon the payment to the purchaser
of another heir's interest.

HELD:
Article 1067 of the Civil Code provides that the co-heir may exercise this right of subrogation upon the
payment to the purchaser of another heir's interest, "el precio de la compra" (the purchase price).
Obviously, if the interest had not been resold, the plaintiff, Rosendo Hernaez y Espinosa, would have
had to pay only the price for which Uy-Cana acquired it. The purpose of the article cannot be evaded by
a reconveyance of the interest to a third person at a higher price. Subsequent purchasers of the interest
acquire it burdened with the right of subrogation of co-heirs at the price for which the heir who sold it
parted with it. It is urged that the prices in some of the deeds of sale by which Alejandro Montelibano y
Ramos purchased the interest of various heirs in the estates are fictitious. This is a question of fact upon
which both parties adduced evidence, and we concur in the opinion of the trial court that there is no
basis to the charge. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court is modified by substituting, as
the price of subrogation of the interest originally purchased by Jose Montelibano Uy-Cana, the sum of
P4,500, as set out in Exhibit 7, for the sum of P10,000, the consideration expressed in Exhibit 10. As
modified, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

SALA, Reeny B.
LLB III-B



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[328]

Guerrero vs. De la Cuesta
59 PHIL 464
February 8, 1934


FACTS:
The herein plaintiffs and defendants are relatives, all being direct descendants of the spouses Hilarion
de la Cuesta and Valentina Zumel both of whom died intestate, Hilarion in 1873 and Valentina in 1921.
The original complaint in this case filed July 24, 1923 was for the partition of 199 parcels of land. The
remaining 14 parcels described in the amended complaint, filed July 5, 1932, were not included in said
agreement due to irreconcilable differences arising among the parties. In this amended complaint the
plaintiffs pray that the remaining 14 parcels of land be divided among all the parties herein in the same
proportion and manner adopted in the partition agreement above-mentioned. In the original decision of
the trial court, which is date