Man-portable air-defense systems have developed sophisticated counter-countermeasures (CCM) to try and defeat any expendable countermeasure that is deployed by an aircraft. One of these is a seeker that is able to detect in two different parts of the electromagnetic spectrum and reject the countermeasure. The release time of expendable decoys as a countermeasure against a MANPAD with a two-color CCM is critical.
Descrição original:
Título original
Countermeasures Effectiveness Against Man-Portable Air-Defense System.pdf
Man-portable air-defense systems have developed sophisticated counter-countermeasures (CCM) to try and defeat any expendable countermeasure that is deployed by an aircraft. One of these is a seeker that is able to detect in two different parts of the electromagnetic spectrum and reject the countermeasure. The release time of expendable decoys as a countermeasure against a MANPAD with a two-color CCM is critical.
Man-portable air-defense systems have developed sophisticated counter-countermeasures (CCM) to try and defeat any expendable countermeasure that is deployed by an aircraft. One of these is a seeker that is able to detect in two different parts of the electromagnetic spectrum and reject the countermeasure. The release time of expendable decoys as a countermeasure against a MANPAD with a two-color CCM is critical.
containing a two-color spinscan infrared seeker James Jackman Mark Richardson Brian Butters Roy Walmsley Downloaded From: http://opticalengineering.spiedigitallibrary.org/ on 10/24/2014 Terms of Use: http://spiedl.org/terms Optical Engineering 50(12), 126401 (December 2011) Countermeasure effectiveness against a man-portable air-defense system containing a two-color spinscan infrared seeker James Jackman Mark Richardson Craneld University Defence Academy of the UK Department of Informatics and Systems Engineering Shrivenham, Swindon, SN6 8LA United Kingdom E-mail: j.jackman@craneld.ac.uk Brian Butters Roy Walmsley Chemring Countermeasures Ltd. High Post Salisbury Wiltshire, SP4 6AS United Kingdom Abstract. Man-portable air-defense (MANPAD) systems have developed sophisticated counter-countermeasures (CCM) to try and defeat any ex- pendable countermeasure that is deployed by an aircraft. One of these is a seeker that is able to detect in two different parts of the electromagnetic spectrum. Termed two-color, the seeker can compare the emissions from the target and a countermeasure in different wavebands and reject the countermeasure. In this paper we describe the modeling process of a two-color infrared seeker using COUNTERSIM, a missile engagement and countermeasure software simulation tool. First, the simulations model a MANPAD with a two-color CCM which is red against a fast jet model and a transport aircraft model releasing reactive countermeasures. This is then compared to when the aircraft releases countermeasures through- out an engagement up to the hit point to investigate the optimum are ring time. The results show that the release time of expendable decoys as a countermeasure against a MANPAD with a two-color CCM is critical. C 2011 Society of Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engineers (SPIE). [DOI: 10.1117/1.3657507] Subject terms: man-portable air-defense; simulation; infrared; electro-optics; coun- termeasures. Paper 110863RR received Jul. 22, 2011; revised manuscript received Oct. 3, 2011; accepted for publication Oct. 12, 2011; published online Nov. 16, 2011. 1 Introduction Man-portable air-defense (MANPAD) systems employ infrared (IR) seekers to lock-on to and track target aircraft. They are shoulder red, quickly operational, and offer re-and-forget capability. Coupled with the large numbers proliferated worldwide and relatively lowcost, they currently represent the most serious threat to all types of aircraft. 1, 2 To combat the threat of IR guided missiles, aircraft have been tted with expendable decoys, i.e., ares, as a counter- measure. These proved very effective against rst generation MANPADs that had no countercountermeasures (CCM) ability incorporated into their IR seeker. This led to devel- opments in MANPAD design to give the missile the ability to discriminate between a are and the target and continue tracking the aircraft. 3, 4 In this paper we investigate whether pre-emptive ares can prove more successful against a MANPAD with a two-color CCM than reactive ares. 2 IR Seekers The design of an IR seeker consists of the dome, an optical telescope, some formof scanning technique, the detector, and the electronics for signal processing. The scanning technique looked at in this paper uses a reticle as a spatial lter to discern the target from the background and optical modulation to give target tracking. 4, 5 The purpose of spatial ltering is to maximize the signal-to-noise ratio of the target with regard to the background radiation. As the target is a hot point source its signal will be a series of pulses with a chopping frequency of f c = nf r , (1) 0091-3286/2011/$25.00 C 2011 SPIE where n is the number of pairs of opaque and transparent spokes of the reticle and f r is its rotational frequency. By comparison, the background will cover many spokes so it will be seen as an extended source with no chopping. The combined signal is then amplied and electrically ltered with a bandpass lter centered at the chopping frequency suppressing the background radiation. An error signal is pro- duced giving guidance information in the form of polar co- ordinates projected onto the image plane. The seeker will use this information to plot a proportional navigation (PN) guidance course to intercept the target. 6 The PN law issues acceleration commands, n c , which are proportional to the line of sight rate, . , the closing velocity, V c , and the PN constant k. n c = kV c . . (2) As the seeker will not know the closing velocity, an estimate has to be incorporated into the PN law. This can be based on the known maximum velocity of the missile and likely target velocity. 2.1 Reticle Seekers There are two ways a reticle systemis commonly used to pro- duce the error signal: spinscan and conical scan (conscan). 4, 5 In a spinscan systemthe optical telescope is xed and the ret- icle rotates, as shown in Fig. 1. The reticle can have a rising sun pattern with a 50% transmission portion which modu- lates the amplitude of the signal from the target, Fig. 2(a). The amplitude of the signal from the target when it is in the wagon wheel section is proportional to the radial distance of the target image from the center of the reticle. To measure the phase variation, a phase reference is needed and one way to achieve this is through a pickup at every rotation from Optical Engineering December 2011/Vol. 50(12) 126401-1 Downloaded From: http://opticalengineering.spiedigitallibrary.org/ on 10/24/2014 Terms of Use: http://spiedl.org/terms Jackman et al.: Countermeasure effectiveness against a man-portable air-defense system. . . Fig. 1 Layout of a spinscan reticle IR seeker. the 50% transmission portion. 5 A gimballed head gives the seeker a eld of regard of typically 120
. These systems give
the unique position of the target within the eld of view (FOV), but are insensitive to on-axis targets due to a loss of amplitude modulation (AM) when the target image is at the center of the reticle. Because of this they are sometimes termed center null systems. In a conscan seeker the problem of on-axis insensitivity is overcome by rotating the optics instead of the reticle. In this arrangement the rotating secondary mirror is tilted and the reticle is xed. The design of the reticle can be a wagon wheel with a checkerboard center, Fig. 2(b). When the target image is on-axis, a nutation circle is produced centered on the reticle pattern. In this instance the detector output is a constant carrier frequency. When there is a tracking error the nutation circle is no longer centered on the reticle and the detector output is then a frequency modulated signal. This is the case for small tracking errors when the nutation circle of the target image is still fully on the reticle. For large tracking errors when part of the nutation circle is off the reticle, the output is essentially an AM signal. The magnitude of the frequency modulation gives the off-axis distance and a pick- off gives phase variation to yield the position of the target in the FOV. 2.2 CounterCountermeasures Flares proved to be very successful at decoying any IRseeker that had no CCM capability. CCMs use the inherent differ- ences between the signatures of an aircraft and a are. 7 When a are is released there will be a sudden, very large increase in the radiation incident on the detector. There will also be an effect on the tracking caused by the are quickly separating from the aircraft, which increases the rate of change of the line of sight rate in the current PN guidance course. These two events can trigger the IR seeker to apply a track angle bias (TAB) or a track memory for a specied duration. A track angle bias will stop the tracking and push the seeker head forward at a preprogrammed angle at a certain rate. When this is completed the are should have exited the FOV and the seeker recommences tracking the target. For track memory, the seeker will stop tracking but continue on its current PN guidance course, i.e., applying the same rate of turn acceleration commands. Again, this is for a xed dura- tion, and when the tracking is turned back on the are should have exited the FOV but not the target. Both of these CCMs require there to be some amount of crossing rate in the en- gagement. This limitation means they are not designed for tail-on or head-on scenarios. However, the easiest scenario for the missile to obtain lock-on and track an aircraft is in the rear aspect due to the greater emissions from a hot tail pipe and an exhaust plume. An improved CCM that was designed to be more robust and work for all engagement geometries is two-color. In this instance the IR seeker is able to detect in two different wavebands where the emission from the aircraft and are do not match. The seeker can then either compare the ratio of the signal in the two wavebands or try and null the signal received froma are; both of which can be incorporated into the signal processing of the reticle tracker. Modeling a two-color seeker allows the chance to test current countermeasures against this type of threat. Also, a two-color CCM is more likely to be active prior to missile launch so the use of pre-emptive ares can be studied. Previous papers have modeled reticle seekers and two- color CCMs. 812 They have concentrated on the design of Fig. 2 Reticle designs for (a) spinscan and (b) conscan seeker. Optical Engineering December 2011/Vol. 50(12) 126401-2 Downloaded From: http://opticalengineering.spiedigitallibrary.org/ on 10/24/2014 Terms of Use: http://spiedl.org/terms Jackman et al.: Countermeasure effectiveness against a man-portable air-defense system. . . Fig. 3 Hierarchy of items in COUNTERSIM. CCM, whereas in this paper we have modeled the CCM to test the effectiveness of the aircrafts countermeasures. 3 Modeling and Simulation The software used to model a missile engagement with an air- craft is called COUNTERSIM, which is designed and developed by Chemring Countermeasures, Ltd. 13 COUNTERSIMis a dis- crete event simulation tool that is designed to be modular and capable of being tailored to the end users requirements. 14 Figure 3 shows the list of items needed to model a MANPAD engagement with an aircraft. The inputs depend on the type of scenario trying to be modeled and the outputs from the simulation can be chosen by the user. Each chosen output, e.g., target position/missile acceleration, is logged at time intervals in the simulation and saved in a data le. 3.1 MANPAD Model The rst item in the MANPAD model is the tracker, Fig. 3. This mimics the operator of a MANPAD who has to track the target and obtain a lock-on. The designator item species which target to track. Next, the missile system denes the prelaunch ring sequence. First, the seeker head is uncaged, then lead and super elevation are applied, and nally missile launch. All these actions are dependent on the seeker main- taining lock-on. Super elevation is needed in every scenario as there is a half second delay to the boost thrust until the missile is a safe distance from the operator. The initial ejec- tion is at a speed of 30 m/s, and in this time the missile will have dropped slightly fromthe initial launch angle. Lead also has to be applied in scenarios where there is a crossing rate between the MANPAD and aircraft. The amount of lead and super elevation, and timings for each action, are set to enact a ring by a real operator. The missile body item denes its physical characteristics. This includes the size, mass, drag coefcient, lateral accel- eration limit, and the timings/force of the boost and sustain motors. All the values have been taken from open source literature so the missile is an unclassied generic model. 15, 16 The guidance unit item species guidance type and con- stant used in the PN law. The generic seeker item denes the maximumgimbal limits and rates, which affect the maximum rate of turn achievable by the missile. Also, this is where the main detector and guard band waveband limits are set for the two-color CCM. In the simulations the main band is 4 to 5 m and the guard band 2 to 3 m. Finally, the parameters of the optical system are set, focal length, F number, and optical efciency. The reticle tracker sets the scanning technique and reticle design. In this case it is an AM spinscan seeker with a rising sun reticle design, Fig. 2(a). In the two-color conguration, alternate spokes in the reticle design are transparent to the different detector wavebands. The signal processor item is where the block diagram de- tail is designed, Fig. 4. This allows the user to implement a design of their choosing; the following describes the imple- mentation chosen for this paper. Input 1 is the main band and input 2 is the guard band. A bandpass lter centered on the carrier frequency (or chop- ping frequency) is applied to the two waveforms of the sig- nals separately. Next, a full wave limiter is applied to the Fig. 4 Block diagram design of the signal processor. Optical Engineering December 2011/Vol. 50(12) 126401-3 Downloaded From: http://opticalengineering.spiedigitallibrary.org/ on 10/24/2014 Terms of Use: http://spiedl.org/terms Jackman et al.: Countermeasure effectiveness against a man-portable air-defense system. . . Fig. 5 Signal processor view for (a) aircraft and (b) aircraft and are. two signals set to the maximum signal level received from the aircraft. Then, a full wave rectier turns both waveforms positive. The two low-pass lters applied to each waveform act as envelope detectors, essentially smoothing out the sig- nal, tp1 and tp2 in Figs. 5(a) and 5(b). As the shape of input 2 is a mirror image of input 1 (1 and 2 in Fig. 5), due to alternate reticle spokes being transparent to the dif- ferent wavebands, input 2 is multiplied by minus 1. After this, the two resulting waveforms are added together, tp3 in Fig. 5, and another lter applied to further smooth out the signal, tp4 in Fig. 5. Finally, another full wave limiter set to the maximum signal level received from the aircraft gives the tracking signal. The amplitude of the tracking waveform gives the radial distance, r, and the phase variation the polar angle, , in polar coordinates. The parameters for the lters and limiters were calculated by running simulations with just the aircraft and no ares then, just the ares with no target signature. Figure 5(a) shows the signal when just the target aircraft is in the FOV and Fig. 5(b) when the aircraft and a are are in the FOV. In Fig. 5(b), tp3 is the combined signal from the two detectors showing the suppression of the signal tp2 from detector 2, the guard band. This detects in the 2 to 3 m waveband and therefore will be dominated by the are as it burns at a higher temperature than the target. Another effect of the suppression of the signal from the highest temperature region in the FOV is that during the end game of an engage- ment the missile will aim away from the hot tail pipe and exhaust plume toward the cooler metal parts of the aircraft. This can be a desirable result because the aircraft will most likely suffer more structural damage and be unable to land safely. 3.2 Target Models The two target models are a generic transport aircraft and fast jet, Fig. 6. The fast jet model is based on a three-dimensional (3D) model of the AMX-A1; however, the temperature of the metal components and plume are based on open source literature. 5 Therefore, the results may or may not be indica- tive of a real AMX-A1. On an AMX-A1, the are dispensers are located on the side of the airframe. In the simulations, the ares ejected from the dispenser nearest the wingroot, highlighted by the largest oval in Fig. 7(a). The are model used is a square format 2 1 8 in. magnesium Teon vi- ton (MTV) are with a radiant intensity prole provided by Chemring Countermeasures. Fig. 6 The two target aircraft models shown in the 3 to 5 m waveband. Optical Engineering December 2011/Vol. 50(12) 126401-4 Downloaded From: http://opticalengineering.spiedigitallibrary.org/ on 10/24/2014 Terms of Use: http://spiedl.org/terms Jackman et al.: Countermeasure effectiveness against a man-portable air-defense system. . . Fig. 7 Flare dispenser locations for (a) AMX-A1 (Ref. 17) and (b) C130 (Ref. 18). The transport aircraft model is based on a 3D model of the C130. Again, temperature contours for the plume and metal components were taken from open source literature. There are two sets of are dispensers on the C130 model. The rst set is located under the nose and the second set is located on the side of the aircraft in the aft end of the main landing gear fairings, highlighted by circles in Fig. 7(b). For the C130 model, the are used is a 1 1 8 in. square format MTV are, again with a radiant intensity prole provided by Chemring Countermeasures. 3.3 Engagement Models In the rst set of simulations the aircraft y straight and level, on a constant bearing at an altitude of 1 km. The AMX-A1 model travels at 200 m/s and the C130 at 150 m/s. To repre- sent the operational envelope of the MANPAD, the simula- tion start distance between the missile systemand the aircraft ranges from 1 to 5.5 km in steps of 0.5 km. Also, the aircraft azimuth angle with respect to the missile launch position ranges from 0 deg to 345 deg in steps of 15 Deg. An aircraft azimuth of 0 deg represents a tail-on engagement where the aircraft is ying directly away from the MANPAD operator position. This gives a total of 240 simulations (24 aircraft azimuths 10 aircraft distances). In the simulations both air- craft release ares reactively at a detection range of 1500 m. The AMX-A1 res two ares, one fromthe dispenser on each side of the airframe, Fig. 8(a). For the C130 the simulations are repeated, once for the front are dispensers and another for the side are dispensers. In each case two ares are red at the same time, Figs. 8(b) and 8(c). In the second set of simulations ares are released ev- ery 0.5 s throughout an engagement up to the hit point. The slant range is kept constant and the aircraft azimuth varied from 0 deg to 180 deg in steps of 45 Deg. Again, an aircraft azimuth of 0 deg represents a tail-on scenario. The simula- tions were repeated for constant slant ranges of 2, 3, and 4 km. A limit was set on the aircraft altitude by a maximum launch elevation of 60 deg. For the 2 km slant range the al- titude varied from 300 to 1500 m in 100 m steps, for 3 km 500 m to 2700 m and for 4 km 700 m to 3000 m. This gave 13 simulations for each are release time for a slant range of 2 km, 23 simulations for 3 km, and 24 simulations for 4 km. In all the simulations there is no cloud background, no atmospheric attenuation, and no noise included in the seeker system. Modtran (Ref. 18) can be included but this greatly increases the computational time and makes large numbers of simulations unfeasible. This will therefore give the best results possible for the MANPADand represents a worst case scenario for the aircraft, which provides a good examination for the countermeasures. 4 Results The primary simulation output is the miss distance, which is recorded as the smallest distance from the missile body to Fig. 8 Flare release characteristics for (a) the AMX-A1, (b) C130 front are dispensers, and (c) C130 side are dispensers. Optical Engineering December 2011/Vol. 50(12) 126401-5 Downloaded From: http://opticalengineering.spiedigitallibrary.org/ on 10/24/2014 Terms of Use: http://spiedl.org/terms Jackman et al.: Countermeasure effectiveness against a man-portable air-defense system. . . Fig. 9 Results for the rst set of simulations where (a) is the AMX-A1 with no countermeasures and (b) is the AMX-A1 releasing reactive ares. (c) is the C130 releasing no countermeasures and reactive ares deployed from (d) the front dispensers and (e) the side dispensers. Optical Engineering December 2011/Vol. 50(12) 126401-6 Downloaded From: http://opticalengineering.spiedigitallibrary.org/ on 10/24/2014 Terms of Use: http://spiedl.org/terms Jackman et al.: Countermeasure effectiveness against a man-portable air-defense system. . . Table 1 PEH for each IR seeker and aircraft model releasing no ares and reactive ares. AMX-A1 C130 Reactive ares No ares Reactive ares No ares Front Side Spinscan 0.19 1.00 0.27 1.00 1.00 Conscan 0.11 1.00 0.05 1.00 1.00 Conscan TAB 0.11 0.47 0.05 0.61 0.48 Spinscan Two-Color 0.23 0.38 0.17 0.63 0.45 Conscan Two-Color 0.20 0.34 0.09 0.27 0.33 Fig. 10 Results for the AMX-A1 model for constant slant ranges of (a) 2 km, (b) 3 km, and (c) 4 km. Optical Engineering December 2011/Vol. 50(12) 126401-7 Downloaded From: http://opticalengineering.spiedigitallibrary.org/ on 10/24/2014 Terms of Use: http://spiedl.org/terms Jackman et al.: Countermeasure effectiveness against a man-portable air-defense system. . . Fig. 11 PEH versus are release time for 2, 3, and 4 km slant ranges. Results for the C130 model using the front dispensers (a), (c), and (e) and side dispensers (b), (d), and (f). Optical Engineering December 2011/Vol. 50(12) 126401-8 Downloaded From: http://opticalengineering.spiedigitallibrary.org/ on 10/24/2014 Terms of Use: http://spiedl.org/terms Jackman et al.: Countermeasure effectiveness against a man-portable air-defense system. . . any point on the 3D model of the aircraft. A hit is dened as a miss distance of less than 2 m, near miss between 2 and 10 m, and a miss greater than 10 m. The miss distance is permanently logged so the results can be reassessed using different hit/miss criteria. The results for the rst set of sim- ulations are shown in Fig. 9 where the aircraft is at the center of the polar plot and each point represents where the MAN- PAD is placed in relation to the aircraft at the start of the simulation. Figure 9(a) shows the results for the AMX-A1 releasing no countermeasures. Of the 240 simulations, 186 were hits, giving a probability of escaping a hit (PEH) of 0.23. This compares to previous simulations of a spinscan IR seeker detecting only in the 2 to 2.7 m waveband where the PEH was 0.19. 19 Therefore, the results are slightly worse for the two-color seeker, but the large improvement occurs when the aircraft deploys countermeasures. When ares are released reactively, Fig. 9(b), the PEH is 0.38, compared to 1.00 for the single detector IR seeker. This is also an improvement for the IR seeker compared to previous simulations where a TAB CCM was modeled. For a spinscan seeker detecting in the 2 to 2.7 m waveband, the PEH was 0.53, and for a conscan seeker detecting in the 3 to 5 m waveband the PEH was 0.47. 7 For the C130 aircraft model when no countermeasures are released, Fig. 9(c), there are 199 hits, giving a PEH of 0.17. This compares to previous simulations of a spin- scan IR seeker detecting only in the 2 to 2.7 m waveband where the PEH was 0.27. When ares are red reactively from the front dispensers, Fig. 9(d), the PEH is 0.63. When ares are red reactively from the side dispensers, Fig. 9(e), the PEH is 0.45. Again, this compares to a PEH of 1.00 for both the front and side dispensers when reactive ares are red against a spinscan 2 to 2.7 m single detector IR seeker. Table 1 gives a summary of the different IR seekers mod- eled to date; this includes one-color spinscan and conscan, one-color conscan with a TABCCM, and two-color spinscan and conscan. See Ref. 20 for details on the two-color con- scan MANPAD model. The results give the PEH for each IR seeker and aircraft model releasing no ares and reac- tive ares. They conrm the effectiveness of reactive ares against one-color IR seekers with no CCM capability. How- ever, the inclusion of a CCM, either TABor two-color, greatly reduces the PEH. The results for the second set of simulations for the AMX- A1 model are shown in Fig. 10, where Figs. 10(a)10(c) are for the slant ranges 2, 3, and 4 km, respectively. The graphs show the PEH for each are release time for different aircraft azimuths. For the 2 kmslant range there is no aircraft azimuth of 90 deg or 135 deg because all the engagements resulted in a miss, even when no ares were released. This is due to the faster target having a greater crossing rate and the missile being unable to apply the required rate of turn for a successful PN course. Figures 10(a)10(c) clearly show the timing of are re- lease is critical if you want maximum protection for the aircraft. Firing after 4 s is too late for any engagement with a crossing rate. The worst performing is 0 deg azimuth, tail-on, where ares need to be red prior to 2 s from the start of the simulation. Also, in head-on engagements, 180 deg azimuth, releasing ares before 1 s is too early. This leaves a very short window in which releasing ares gives the highest values of PEH. The time is around 1 s, which corresponds to the period of missile launch, and shows that a are can still be effective against a two-color CCM if released at this time. The results for the C130 model are shown in Fig. 11. Figures 11(a) and 11(b) are for a slant range of 2 km with ares red from the front and side dispensers, respectively. Figures 11(c) and 11(d) are for the 3 km slant range, and Figs. 11(e) and 11(f) are for the 4 km slant range. For a slant range of 2 km, the worst performing countermeasure is ares red from the front dispensers in a tail-on engagement, Fig. 11(a). Whereas for the side dispensers. there is still the window around 1 s in which the releasing are gives maximum protection to the aircraft, Fig. 11(b). For slant ranges of 3 and 4 kmthere is no are release time when the PEH is 1, irrespective of are dispenser or aircraft azimuth, Figs. 11(c)11(f). However, the highest values for the PEH still occur between the times of 1 and 2 s from the start of the simulation. This stage of the simulations covers the period just prior to missile launch and the half second ignition delay on the boost thrust. At this time the missile is either stationary or traveling at a low velocity. The presence of ares in the seeker FOV at this time is likely to have an effect on the PN guidance course implemented by the seeker as it has to estimate the closing velocity. Overall, the deployment ares around the time of missile launch gives the best results for the aircraft independent of the aircraft platform, distance, and angle of attack. 5 Conclusions and Future Work An IR spinscan seeker with a two-color CCM was success- fully modeled. The model was then used to test expendable decoys against this more advanced CCM. First, reactive ares were red at a detection range of 1500 m which resulted in low values for the PEH, especially with the AMX-A1. Then, ares were red throughout an engagement to nd the op- timum release time. For all aircraft platforms, distances and angle of attack releasing ares around the time of missile launch gave the highest values for the PEH. Therefore, ares can still prove to be a valid countermeasure against a more sophisticated MANPAD with a two-color CCM capability. Future work will be to model IR seekers with different scanning techniques, such as rosette scan, which has bet- ter tracking than spinscan. The aim is to develop the best performing MANPAD model against which different coun- termeasures can be tested. References 1. M. Richardson, The anatomy of the MANPAD, Technologies for Optical Countermeasures IV, Proc. SPIE 6738, 67380h (2007). 2. Janes Intelligence Review, January 2003. 3. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/systems/ircm .htm (accessed 2/21/2011). 4. J. May and M. Van Zee, Electro-optic and infrared sensors, Microwave J. 1983(9), 121 (1983). 5. R. D. Hudson, Infrared Systems Engineering, Wiley, New York (1969). 6. P. Zarchan, Tactical and Strategic Missile Guidance, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Reston, Virginia. 7. J. Jackman, M. Richardson, B. Butters, R. Walmsley, P. Yuen, and D. James, Simulating pre-emptive countermeasures of varying perfor- mance against a Man-Portable Air-Defence (MANPAD) system with a track angle bias counter-countermeasures (CCM), Infrared Phys. Technol. 54, 121129 (2011). 8. S.-H. Han, H.-K. Hong, and J.-S. Choi, Dynamic simulations of in- frared reticle seekers and an efcient counter-countermeasure algo- rithm, Opt. Eng. 36(8), 23412345 (1997). 9. H. K. Hong, S.-G. Jahng, K.-S. Doo, and J.-S. Choi, Adaptive infrared counter-countermeasures for two-color spinning concentric-annular- ring reticle seeker, Opt. Eng. 40(6), 10931099 (2001). Optical Engineering December 2011/Vol. 50(12) 126401-9 Downloaded From: http://opticalengineering.spiedigitallibrary.org/ on 10/24/2014 Terms of Use: http://spiedl.org/terms Jackman et al.: Countermeasure effectiveness against a man-portable air-defense system. . . 10. J. S. Oh, K.-S. Doo, Y.-I. Yoon, and J.-S. Choi, New two-color cancel- lation algorithm for counter-countermeasures of infrared seekers, Opt. Eng. 40(8), 16991708 (2001). 11. J. S. Oh, S.-H. Lee, J.-S. Choi, and J.-T. Kim, Two-color infrared counter-countermeasures based on the signal ratio between two detec- tion bands for a crossed-array tracker, Opt. Eng. 44(9) (2005). 12. G. Kim, B.-I. Kim, T.-W. Bae, Y.-C. Kim, S.-H. Ahn, and K.-I. Sohng, Implementation of a reticle seeker missile simulator for jamming ef- fect analysis, in Proceedings of Image Processing Theory Tools and Applications (IPTA), pp. 539542 (2010). 13. http://www.chemringcm.com/AboutUs/TechnologyServices/Modelling Simula/ (accessed 8/17/2010). 14. J. Jackman, M. Richardson, P. Yuen, D. James, B. Butters, R. Walmsley, and N. Millwood, The effect of pre-emptive are deployment on rst generation man-portable air-defence (MANPAD) systems, J. Defense Model. Simul. 7(3), 181189 (2010). 15. General dynamics, The Worlds Missile Systems, 8th Ed. (1988). 16. J. F. Rouse, Guided Weapons, 4th Ed., Brasseys Land Warfare, E. L. Korb, Ed., Brasseys UK, London, General Dynamics, Pomona, CA (2000). 17. http://www.enemyforces.net/aircraft/amx.htm (accessed 2/21/2011). 18. http://www.bahe.be (accessed 2/21/2011). 19. http://www.modtran.org (accessed 2/21/2011). 20. J. Jackman, M. Richardson, B. Butters, and R. Walmsley, Modelling a MANPAD system with a conical scan two-colour IR seeker, Proc. SPIE 8187, 81870S (2011). James Jackman is currently a PhD student at Craneld University in the Sensors Group based at the Defence Academy of the UK. He has a BSc degree in mathematics and physics from the Open University and an MSc degree in astrophysics from University College London. Mark Richardson has over 25 years experience of electro-optics and infrared systems and countermeasures in the defense industry and UK academia, and has written over 100 classied and unclassied papers on these subjects. He is currently head of the Sensors Group at the Defence Academy of the UK. Brian Butters is the manager of Modeling and Simulation at Chem- ring Countermeasures Ltd. He is a member of the Institute of Physics and a Chartered Physicist who has worked in the EW industry for more than 30 years. Roy Walmsley gained a BSc degree in chemistry from Leeds Uni- versity and has over 25 years experience in the pyrotechnic industry, including new product development, performance testing and instru- mentation, and latterly simulation and modeling. Optical Engineering December 2011/Vol. 50(12) 126401-10 Downloaded From: http://opticalengineering.spiedigitallibrary.org/ on 10/24/2014 Terms of Use: http://spiedl.org/terms