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ACCESSION NO
PO REGISTR
ENGLISH COPY
PARTISAN WARFARE IN CROATIA
Project ^>41
DEPAftV.V:-:T 0? TKE A.
n
':Y
OFFICE OrTiJE CI-iMEF 07MILITARY HISTORY-
WASHINGTON 25, D.C,
HISTORICAL DIVISION EUROPEAN COMMAND
OPERATIONAL HISTORY BRANCH
MS # P-055b
Kar l GAISSER August 1950
Col onel i n t he Wuerttemberg
Pol i ce Force
Pr oj e c t // 41b
"PARTISAN WAHPAKB IN CROATIA"
Tr a ns l a t or s L. SCHAEi-'ER
Edi t or : H. HESITMAH
lieviewer : Capt i i . K. UUFFORD
HI3T0HICAL DIVISION
SUflOPEAM COMMAND
U3 f ?-55b
Index oontainod In the German oopy.
MS #P-055b
TheAuthor
Karl0AIS3ER
Major*
itorn17Mar1880
Ludv/igoburg,
V/uerttemberg.
KarlGAINERfiratJoinedtheArrayIn
1900usasecondlieutenantrif-fieldartillery.
In1899hounderwenttrainingattheCommand
andStaffSchool,Enters,andin1907-08
studiedOrientallanguagesatthoUniversity
ofitorlininpreparationforacareerintho
colonialsorvicos. in1908hewastransferred
totheReichColonialOfflooandsenttotho
ProtectorateofTogoland,aHermancolony
whlohwaslaterlnoorporntdintoFronohEqua-
tor! ,al".Africa,fromwhichhev/actransferred
totheCameroons,alsoincorporatedintoFrench
EquatorialAfricaafterWorldWarI. InNovem-
ber1914GA133ERwaotakenprisonerbythebri-
tiahandsenttoEngland,wherehoremainedun-
tilsenttoSwitzerlandInNovember1917* He
remained Interned InSwitzerlanduntilJuly
1918,whanhewasreleasedandreturnedtoGer-
many
From1920-33QAI33ERoorvadintheWuort-
tember/jPoliceForce, In1933horesignedhia
poaitionandemigrated toBrazil. Therehe
aotodaahonorary-oonsulfrom1956to1942and
wasthenrepatriatedtoGermanytogetherwith
otherGormandiplomats, inthesameyearho
wasplacedinchargeofthoPoliceTrainingCen-
ter,Oranienburg,berlin,whorehetrainedpoli-
ceofficersandNCO
f
&forforeignservioe*
FromJune1943toDeoembor1943GAI33ERwas
incommandoftheRegularPoliceinCroatia,
Yugoslavia,withheadquartersatZagreb,andat
thesametimeservedasadvisortothoCroatian
MilitaryPoliceSchoolatbjelovar. Earlyin
1945hewassenttothe tlonalckleavo. he
wasdischargedfromtheserviceinUaroaofthe
sameyear*
LastrankwasColonelofthePolioeForoe.
MSfitP-055b
Glossary
Regional Organization
Rulea of Pronunciation
-
a
C0HD2HT3
o
d
. o
Foreword by General Franz Haider 1
PARTISAN ORGANIZATION IN C?tOATIA 0
Combing t he Bi l o Gora and t he Papuk,
6 - 1 8 J ul y 1943 23
THE CAPTURE OPTHE SIGNAL C0MMUHICAT1ON PUTO:)N OF
THE UOPPINO UP a*
1
THEFRUSKA DORA B^TKU9TH3S AND
Int roduct i on by Oorural Hans von Oreiffenberg . . . 2
TUB 3ITUAT10N IK CROATIA AFTER 1942 5
OEKMAN ORGANIZATION ANDBATTLE COMMAND 15
TACTICAL EXAMPLES FROM THKPARTISAN WAR 23
Tho S i t u a t i o n 23
Tho Obj ect i ve 24
Command 24
The Pl a n of Oper at i ons 24
Re s u l t s Achi eved . . . . . . . . 25
HOT THE54TH RIFLE REGIMENT PERFORMED ITS MISSION 26
TUB TACTICS OPTHEPARTISANS ' . . - 28
T he Fl aw i n t he Pl anni ng 29
TEE 54TH RIFLE hSOIMENT AT PIVNICA ON13 JUDf 1943 31
POLICE REGIMENT BETWEKN 24 JUET AND 3 AUOU3T 1943 34
ATTACK ONTHEGARKISON OFCASINGI 37
Time 57
Situation . . . . . . 57
US ff P-055b - b -
ATTACK ON UJDBKEQ 43
THE DESTUUCTION Q? TiiK OAKR1SON a*
1
CA3MA 45
FOUH SHORT STORIES * . . . 48
DEFENSE AKSA3 , . 52
Def ens i ve Meaauros . . , 53
BATTISS FOH NAS1CE 55
EVEN BANJA LUKa\ PHOVE3 IMPOSSIBLE TO BOLD 50
Ootober 1044 . 61
CONCLUSIONS 63
TIE BILO OOUA OPEitATION AS A TEST CASK 73
Furt her Pl ans . . . . 75
The Croat i an Popul at i on < 75
Skatoh 1 Croat i a Out l i no OQl1 i
t1,250,000
t
Sket ch 2 3 l l o ora - Popuk - -
1I[ 800,000
Sket oh 3 Pi vni oa - - - - - -
It
Xj
! 100,000
Skat oh 4 Oaai noi - - - - - - - n : 100,000
I
Skatoh 5 Ludbreg - - - - - - . n t v5,000
Skfltoh 6 Casma - - - - -
ti
i!1 100,000
Sket eh 7 Casl oe - - - - - - - n ii1 200,000
113 // P-055b
- o-
CLOSSAKt
Organi zati on
Rei ohafuehrer S3 Hiraraler
Si oherhei tshauptani t
3D or Sl oharhal t i t dl enst
der S3
Httuptamt Ordnungspol i zai
Sohutzpollsel
Organization
Sefehlshaber des RFSS in
Kroatlen
Befehlshaber des Sioharhaltf-
dlenstas
Befehlshaber dar Ordnunga*
pol i zei
In Berl i n
Reich Commandor of t ho S3*
National Department of Seourity
Office of t he Holoh Commander,
33 Political Polioe
Seourity Servioa of the 33 -
executive organ of the National
Department of Security and the
Agencies controlled by it*
National Department of the
iiegular Police - The central
office for al l affairs of tho
uniformed police. It was under
the Jurisdiction of tho Ministry
ot ths Interior and the Heion
Commander of the 3S
Protective Police - Included the
Muniolpal, the Rural, the Water-
ways andthe fc'lre Proteotion
Police.
in Croatia
The Representative in Croatia
of the Reich Commander of the 33-
Major General of the 33 (33 Orup-
penfuehrer) Kammarhofar.
Commander of the Security Service
in Croatia*
Commander of the Qerraan Regular
!
Polioe in Croatia - later re*
designated the German-Croatian
police# This post Ini ti al l y was
hejld by a oolonal of polioe but who
was later up-graded to.a bri-
gadier general of police
MS?-055b
-d-
Croatian Organization
Poglavnik Leader,thehonorarytitleofAntePavelio,
theheadoftheCroatianState.
Ustaaha Anationalistic Croatianpartyofexilea,
whichhaditsheadquartersinItalyduring
theYugoslavianregime* Itsorganisation
resembled thatoftheNationalSocialist
PartyinGermany,
QeoflraphloalTerma
goraorgorje mountainrange
planje mountainplateau
grad city
nail small
veliki large
dolje lower
novi now
REGIONAL ORGANIZATION
Therewerefourdistrictst Zagreb,iianjaLuka,Osijekand
Sarajevo*
Each di s t ri ct was controlled by a Di stri ct Commander(of Zagreb,
et c*) , who was an Sf> officer with military rank equivalent to
that of oolonel or brigadier general. There were al so within
eaoh di st ri ct a oomraander of the Security Service and a com-
mander of the German-Croatian pol i ce.
Special detaohmdnta of the Seourlty Service, which were execu-
ti ve agencies of the Seourlty Service consisting of several
interrogation groups with corresponding auxiliary uni t s, wert
stationed In al l larger oi t i ds .
MS 4 P-055b --
S3 and Police Rogimenta - partly or fully motorized oombat
unita of the Protective Police were activated by the National
Department of the Regular Police (German) for oombat missions,
usually behind the front* They were assigned to occupied
t erri t ori es according to need.
33 Divisions, which wore oombat units activated by the National
Department of-Seourity (Gorman) for oombat sorvlce at the
front* The Reion Commander of the S3 had a deciding voice as
to their employment*
RULES OP PRONUNCIATION
0
Topolovao - Topolovatz
t z,
Bihao - liihatoh, favelio - Pavelitoh
0
tsoh.
s h ,
Sestlne - Sheahtine, Nasioe - Nanhitze
z
Kriz - Krish (at end of word)
- dj.
OJurgJevao - Djurdjevatz.
MS//P-055b -1-
l^oreword byGeneralFranz1ULUER.formerChief of
GermanArmyQonerulStaff
This laaparticularly valuableraanuaoript.Besides
preoentingvaryInformative examples ofpartisanwarfare,
whichareillustratedwithexcellent sketched, itprovides
agood insight intotheterroristmethods bymeana ofwhich
adisciplined partisanorganizationoouldforce intoltaser-
viceaninherentlypeacefulandanti-partisanruralpopula-
tion,aswellasthe systemandmethods ofoommand oforganized
partisanbands* Italsoshows,however,thatthepartisan
threatoar:only bocountered bysystematiccombat conducted
withadequateforces,andnot byhalf-mousurosandimprovl-
sationo. sufficientlyoomprohenaive,systematicpreventive
measures,iftaken intime,cannip inthebudallattempts
tobuildupapartisanmovementandavoidlaterexpenditure
ofeffortandpainfulsacrificea. Effectivepropagandaamong
thepopulation ofaregionthreatenedbypartisansplaysan
essentialpart Ansuchpreventivemeasures*
/s/ FranzHALDER
MS# P-055b - 2-
Koenigsteln/Taunua, 19 September 1950
IntroductionbyGenerallianavon
Thefirst sectionofthemanuscript dealswiththe
situationinCroatiaaswellasthemilitaryandpolitical
organizationofthepartisansandoftheGerman occupation
foroesfrom1942on.
Thesecond sectioncontainstaotioalexamplesofparti-
sanwarfare presentedintheformofseparatenarrations,in
eachofwhichtheGormanandenenymeasuresand,where suitab
le,thepraotloal knowledge gained therebyaresotforth*
Inashort concludingchaptertheprincipal inferences
thatoanbedrawnandlessonsthatcanbelearnedareagain
summarized Theessayisnaturallynotanexhaustivede-
scriptionofthemilitary historyofguerillawarfarein
Croatia;' reliabledooumontsandmapsarelackingforthis
purpose. Itiflbased solelyontheauthor
1
a reoonotruotlon
frommemoryofreportsandmemorandawrittenonthebasisof
aotualexperiencewhichhesubmittedatthetimeunderdis-
cussiontothe centralheadquartersoftheRegularPoliceat
Berlinfortrainingpurposes,andconfines itselftodescrib-
ingthenatureofthepartisanwarinCroatiabetweenJune
MSifP-055b ' .3*
1943andOctober1944.
Thepartisanmovement inCroatiadeservesspecial
notioebeoause itdevelopedfromdifferentmotivesand
therefore oftentookonotherformsthandidtheguerilla
warfare inliuasiaorintheSerbo-Oraeco-Maoedonlanregion
oftheBalkans.
InCroatia,wehavetodowith anutionalstructure,
newlycreatedafterthecollapseofYugoslavia,ustate
whichwasinitiallymoreorlessunderItalian,butlater
completelyunderGermaninfluenoe. Afterallissaidand
done,itwasanalliedstate,theadministrationandpolice
organsofwhich,thoughprecariouslyestablished,wereauto-
nomous,andthepopulationofwhichwasbynomeansuniform
initsviews. InallothertheatersofwarwheretheOerman
Wehrraaohtoameintocontactwithpartisans,theWehrmaohtwas
inenemyterritoryandhadtoaoaumeacorrespondingattitude.
Theauthor,PolioeColonelKarl0AI3SKR,wasassigned to
theoommander oftheregularpolioe inCroatiafromJune1943
toNovember1944and,afteranIndoctrinationperiodofthree
months,wasputatthedisposaloftheCroatianruralpolioe
asanadviser. Hepersonallyparticipated insome ofthe
actionsdescribed.
Duringhis.stormasoommander ofthePolioeSohoolfor
ServiceAbroad*, Oranienburg,theauthorhadalready oooupied
PolltfolaohulefuerAuslandsverwendung.
fciS//P-055b -4-
hiraaelfwithanti-partisanwarfare. Atthisschoolhehad
dlreoted twocourses,ineachofwhichtwenty-five tothirty*
five police officersand400-500aer&eanta(v.'aohtme later)re-
ceived training,whoweresubsequently assigned topolice
units intheEast,theBalkansand inAfrica.
Besidesthis,theauthorhashadabundant practical
experience inmilitarypolice serviceabroad,having served
forfouryearsasadistrict commander intheformerGerman
protectorate ofTogoland.andwiththoGermanArmy inthe
CameroonsduringWorldWarI,afterwhichhespentnine
years intheInterior ofBrazil.
/a/ von
MS#P-055b -5-
THESITUATIONINCROATIAAFTER1942
(SueSketch1)
Afterthedefeat ofYugoslavia on17April1941,
CroatiaatfirstcameintotheItaliansphere ofinfluence
$
Italybeing interestedprimarily intheooaat ofDalmatia
andthe Islandsoffthatooaat* Inthespringof1945,Italy
gaveupherpredominantpositioninCroatia,transferring
thisareatoGermansupervisionbutrotoininghersphereof
influenoe ontheDalmatianooaat. Afterthedefeotionof
Badoglio,inSeptember1943,theItalianunitsandstaffsin
Croatiawhiohhadnotbeenpreviouslydisbandedweretaken
intoGermancustody*
TheItalianmeasurestosecurethecountryagainst
guerillaswore inadequate* Thewill,andperhapseventhe
necessaryforoes,tooombat theguerillathreat effectively
werelaoking* FromCroatiacametheroproaohthatthe Italians
were intentionally lukewarm inthisstruggleagainstthe
guerillasinorderthattheymighthaveareasontomaintain
theoccupationofthe"autonomous"stateofCroatia,whioh
meanwhilehadbeenrecognizedasanally,andthusprovethe
necessityoftheircontinuedpresence intheBalkans.
ThehastilyestablishedCroatianatateadmittedlyhad
MS#P-055b -C- ,
quickly covered thelandwithanet ofadministrative offices
and police stationsoopledfromtheItalianmodel,butmili-
taryunitscapable ofbeingucieainoombat oame intocreation
onlygradually. iJincetheadministration wasdirectedbythe
Utstaaha,whichwashighly,disliked inthecountry andwas
supported atmostbyone-centh ofthepopulation,andslnoa
theUstashaconsidered itsprimemissiontobethesuppression
ofitspoliticalopponentswithintheCroatiantowna,the
guerillabandsforming inmountainnestswere not.seriously
threatened butcouldworkattheirorganizationandsystemati-
callyextendthe.areasundertheiroontrol.
WhentheGermanpolice tookovertheprotection ofthe
country inthe springof1943,thepartisanscontrolled the
BosnianKarat tothelineSlunJ -Bihao-Kljuo-Oorika
Vakuf,andnorthoftheSaverivertheridges ofthebllo
goraandofthePapuk,theheart oftheFruskagoraand
smallerborderregions. fioadsclosetotheseareascouldon-
lybeusedunderprotection ofanescort* From1944on,
Tito'spartisansreceived theirsuppliesfromtheAlliesin
increasingmeasure byairdropandbysea. Withthefailof
Belgrade Intheautumnof1944,thefrontreached Croatian
territory.
TheCroatianpopulationatfirst hadwelcomedGerman in-
tervention,sincetheyexpected therefrommoreeffeotive pro-
MSfP-055 -7-
teotionthantheItalianshadvouchsafed themagainstthe
fii^llfttingpartisanaotivity. Themoreevidentitbecomethat
theinitiativewaspassingtothepartisans,inoonoe^uonoe
ofGermanweakness,thegreaterwerethenumbersthatwent
overtothepartisans* Inthesummerof1944,vonuniversity
studentsfromZagrebservedformonthsinnearbypartisan
territorywhileallegedlyspendingthevacationwithcountry
relatives* ThedesiretoseakfavorwiththeTitoparty
againsttheeventofaGermandefeatgraduallyseizedthe
entireupperstrataoftheCroatianbourgeoisie,whoseguiding
prinoiplewastoavertoratleasttolimitthedestructionof
Croatianproperty*
MS // P-055b - 8 -
PAKTittAN OiiOAMkiATIOM Us
Sketch
A partisan group, the Chotniks, had foraod In S

territoryfromdispersed elementsoftheformerYugoslavian
Army. TheItaliancompandorsdidnotfightitenergetically,
andtherewereevenseveralinstanceaofmutualtoleration*
AtthedefectionofBadoglio,tolerationdeveloped intoopen
supportoftheChetnika throughthesaleofweapons*In
Bosnia,theChatnikawerealaoonSouthCroatiansoil*In
thebeginningthoyweretreated *foraoaringly.
Independentofthisgroupandinopenoppositiontoit
becauseofitsencroachmentonCroatianterritory,aCroatian
partisangrouphaddevelopedundertheleadershipofJosip
Bros,aliasTito,aCroateducatedinMoscow. In ashort
time,thisrouphadplaced itselfinsolepossessionofthe
(Jrmeomountainregionandfromthereproceededtoorganize
thepartisanmovementInBosniaandDalmatiaandonbothsides
oftheSaveriver*
Theobjectivesofthepartisanmovementware separated
Intoclearlydefinedphases* Firsteffortsweredirectedat
establishing areasinthemoatremoteforestandmountain
regionsinwhichthepartisanscouldbuilduptheirorganisat-
ionwithout interference*'?henextphasewastheexpansion
MS</P-055b -9-
oftUofloaroaa. More andmorevillage*!woredrawnIntothe
partisan-controlled area,sothatthepartisanscouldlive
offthornandalaotopreventmanpowerandprovisionsfrom
aidingtheGermanwareffort. Asareault,recruitingfor
Oermanuniteand theprovisioning ofthoseunitaandthe
Croatianterritory protectedbythemropidly beoamomoroand
moredifficult. Theobjectiveswhichhaveboenoutlined above
Ifidtocombat against allGermanandCroatianforces committed
forpartisanwarfare. Thetacticalprinciplefollowedby
thepartisanswastoretreatwhenevertheenemywas superior
instrength,even ifthismeant that temporarily theyhadto
abandontholrprincipalhidingpluooa.
Aftertheautumnof1945,theinitiative passed into
thehandsOfthepartisans. GormanandCroatianprotective
unitswora attacked inincreasingmeasure,andthe partisan
sphere ofinfluencewasextended tothevicinity ofthelarger
citiesandthoprincipallinesofcommunications,whichwere
proteotedbytheVvehrmaoht. Theall-outattackonthessvital
lineswas thelastphase. Initstiming,itcolnoldedwith
theretirement ofthefrontlineofbattlatoCroatia inthe
autumnof1944* The inclusionofthisline ofbattle inthe
partisanterritory concludedthewarofextermination
theforeign invader.
Inaooordanoo withtheobjeotivea already stated,the
MS#P-0551) -10-
partlsanorganizationwasaotiveinthefollowingthren>
fields!
1. Theadministration oftheareadominatedbypartisans.
2* Theformation,inregionsnotyetdominated,ofan
underground net,whichassumedfunctionaldutieswhenthe
regionwasdrawnintothepartisancontrolledarea*
3. Theactivationandmaintenance ofcombatunitain
thepartisan-heldarea,andtheemploymentoftheseunits
outsidethisarea*
Ad1. Administrative agenoies,whichtookCroatian
characteristicsintoconsiderationbutworemodelledonthe
Russianoriginal,weresotupinallareasinwhichtheparti-
sanshadcomplete control. Thesebodieswererunbypolitical
ooramisaara,and,besidessatisfyingtheneedofthepartisans
themselves,theirfunotlonwastocareforthepoorersect-
ionsofthepopulationattheexpenseofthemorewell-to-do*
Intheprimaryphase,theyalsohadthefunctionoflocal
headquarters* Communiat-Titoiat propagandawas immediately
disseminated* Wallsandthesidesofhouseswereplastered
withsuitableposters*
Ad2. Thedeveloperantofanundergroundnetinany
regionwasalwayspreoededbytheestablishment ofhideaways
inthehighestandmost ln&ocofislbiGpartsofwoodedmountain
ranges* Fromauohahideout,recruitersscouredthevicinity
MS/>P-05Cb .11-
farandwide,sought outseoretcollaborator andpledged
themtohelpthepartisans*
Thefirst objeotaofattackwerethesmallestsettle-
ments,thosewhiohweresituatedfarupattheheadsofthe
,highestvalleys* Ineffect,theplanofoperationswasal-
waysthesame* Aboutmidnight,sanevillageoutsidethe
partisansareawouldbesurrounded* Thevillage streets
wouldbe.securedbypatrolsandthedelivery ofprovisions
andstoresdemanded* Throughthewindowsofthehouseswas
passedthecommand,"Makenonoise* Cometothedoor*
11
Then,
11
Inanhourweshalltakeaham,fiveloavesofbread,a
kilogramofbutter,twentyeggs,awicker-bottle ofwine
andasheet." Latartherequisitionswereextendedtoall
sortsofneoesoaryarticles,inoludingbuildingmaterials
andmanpower. Carefullypreparedlistswerodrownupfor
thecollectionsbyseoretpartymembers* Theloadersonthe
spotwerealwayspartymembersfromothervillages,sothat
thepartymembersofthesamevillagewouldnotberevealed*
Contributionswereleviedonlyfromwo11-to-dopeople,and
nomorewasrequisitioned thanthegroupoouldcarryaway
immediately* Afterthebootyhadbeenoollected,afterthree
orfourhoursatthemost,thewholebanddisappearednoise-
lesslyfrqmthevillage* Resistancewasimpossible andwas
notattempted* Inmostcasesnotevenareportofthe indident
:<13,JP-05bo . -12-
reached theproperCroatianauthorities, ifthegeneral
situationpermitted, thevillagewhichhudbo*ntamed in
thismannerwasthenincorporated intopartisan territory.
Ad3.'Themobilo combat unit ofthepartisanwasthe
battalion,about3001U0strong. Asarule,suchsmallfor-
mationoalsowere called brigades. Later,divlslona and
corpsalsoappeared,butthesedesignationshardly aiaed
indetermining theircombat atron^th.
The trainingvvuaverysevere,and irondiscipline was
enforced. Unconditional obodiehcewasdemanded,andpunish-
mentwasdetermined byagroupofcomradesdesignatedbythe
leader* Ashotthroughthobackoftheneckwasnounusual
punishment foroowardloe andtraitor!am. Theexecutionwas
oarried outbefore theassembled unit bytheonenext inlint
tothe offondar.
Equipment wasiassimple asoanbeimagined, consisting
ofacivilian suitwithorwithout insignia,a^unand
ammunition. Themenwent barefoot orworeopanlcen.sandal-
llkouorblanfootwear* They slept onthebaregroundand
inthe oponwhennohutsv/oroavailable. Besidestheir own
equipment,themenhadalsotocarry thenecessary supplies.
Organic combat trainsappeared onlyinthe later,mor*de-
veloped stages. Natives,includingwomen,andprisoners of
warwereusedascarriers.
MS&P-055b -13-
Oroatvaluewasplaceduponability Innightmarohing.
Uarohesorfortykilometerspernightforseveralnightsin
succession,alongpathsandwithfullloads,werethenormal
performancerequiredofabattalion. Inthiswaythetrans-
ferofaunitfromtheBosnianmountainstothemassif north
ofw e Savewuapossible intwoorthreenights* Theroutes
werecarefully raoonnoitored. Onprinciple,onlyfootpaths
andhunting orsheeptrailswereused* Thedetachments
marched insinglefile,avoidingvillages. Fromsectorto
sectorthecommanders locatedthelocalunderground,which
hadbeenreportedbycouriers* Maincommunication lines
were crossedvertically andwhonoverpossibleatnight,with
specialsecuritymeasurosand inout-of-the-way places,while
streamsworeforded inthemostremotespots. Theday'srest
thenfollowed,deepInthewoodsorinsomepartisanvillage.
ThoBosnianmountains offeredextensiveprotectionbut
littlechanceforcollectingprovisions,andsothefirstre-
cognizable operationalobjeotive ofthepartisanswasto
procurefoodforthemenconcentrated there. Brigades,In
battalionstrongth,woreslippedoutofthisregionintothe
regionnorthoftheSave. Theretheyfattenedthemselvesfor
t'ireeweeksonrequisitioned foodandthen,heavily loaded
withprovisions,wererotatedwithnewbrigades,whichbrought
withthemammunition aswellasmedicalandtoohnioalsupplies*
MS#P-055b -14-
Sinoenoeffeotivaoountemeasureawerotakenagainat these
developments,exceptionally capablepartisancombatunits"
andextensive partisanareasdeveloped inthemannerdesoribed
above. Specialfeaturesofcombat
;
training werefiring
discipline,exploitation offorest,bushandotherterrain
cover,quickmovements,carefully contrivedassaultsand
noiselessdisengagement fromtheenemy* Thedispersionof
entireunits,filtrationthroughenemylinesandtheartof
remaining inindividualconcealmentwhiletheenemyforces
passed,inorderthentore-assemble atsomedistantmeeting
point,wereformsofmovementthatwerecompletely mastered*
MS # P-055b - 1 5 .
GERMAN ORGANISATION ANDHATTLE COMMAND
(See Sket ch 1)
The f o l l o wi ng Oernfin agenol oa we r e . i n Zagreb i n the
summer of 1943:
The German general ac c r e di t e d t o the Croat i an
Government, General von Gl ai ae- Horat enau.
The ac c r e di t e d r e pr e s e nt at i ve of the l i el oh Commander
of t he 3S, Major General of the S3 Kammerhofar*
The German ambassador, Major General of the &A Kaaohe.
Eaoh reoeived his instructions from a different offi ce, von
Glalse-Uoratenau from the Wehrraaoht High Command, Kamraerhofer
from the National Department of Jieourity*, which was controlled
by Uimmler, and Kasche from the Foreign Office, controlled by
von ftibbentrop. The autonomous state of Croatia had i t s own
war department, and the Croatian rural and regular police were
under the authority of the Department of tho Interi or. Both
departments reoeived detailed instructions from Ante Pawelio,
the clever and versati l e Poglavnik, or Chief of State, a
Croatian nati onal i st who maintained an attitude of r^uevv
toward Ital y and who was pro-German and anti-iSerbian. The
collaboration of those four groups revolved around a di vi si on
of duti es, each group endeavoring t o avoid responsi bi l i ty tbr
the most unpleasant tasks.
ttichorheltahauptamt
MS#P-QS5b -16-
Theprinciplereaponsibility ofthoWehrmaoht*wasthe
prateotifcnoftheCilly.-Zagreb-Belgraderailwayline,
whichwasthemajorsupplylinetoGreece. Ofsecondary Im-
portancewerethebranchlinesZagreb-Ogulln-Suaakand
Brod-Sarajevo-Moatar-L)ubrovnikandVinkovoi-Osijek*
Onlyterritorialreserves***andtrainingunitswerepermanently
assigned,combat troopsbeingassignedtemporarily according
torequirements*
Theactualmissionofcombattingthepartisanswasthe
responsibility oftheGerman-Croatianpolioe,anassignment
whichthey sharedwiththeCroatianState* The organization
oftheGerman-CroatianpolicewarbaaeduponCroatianpro*
vlnolalandcountydivisions* Itwasdivided intoasecurity
serviceandauniformedregularpoliceforoe* Therepresentati-
veofthelieionCommander oftho33wassupportedbythe com-
manderaofthesecurityservloeandoftheregularpolice*
Fourdistrictswereestablished,eachwithadistrict command"
ingofficer,withheadquarters inZagreb,iianjaLuka,Osijek
andSarajevo* BihaowasintendedtobeAfifthdistrict,but
itfellintothehandsofthepartisansbeforeitsorganization
wasoompleted* Thedistriotoommandor ineaohdiatrlotwas
HermanArmedForces.
*# LandsturmIand11,trainedanduntrainedreservesover
forty-fiveyearsofage*
MS//P-05Sb -17-
aseniorS3offioerwiththerankofS3brigadiergeneral
,(flrlgadefuehrer),whoactuallyhadfulloommandauthority
withinhiszoneandwaaresponsibleforalloperations. Com-
mandingofficers ofboththesecurityserviooandtheregular
polica aervedunderhim. Initiallythesepostswereheldby
officerswiththerank ofmajororlieutenantoolonel,but
latertherankwaaraised tothatofcolonel*
The securityservice supervisedpoliticaldevelopments
inthecountry, itsprincipaldutieswerethecollectionof
reportsandtheprosecution ofpoliticalopponents* Itsexe-
cutiveagenciesconsisted ofseveralInterrogationgroups.
1
Itspersonnelwerenationalandethnic*Germans. Theregular
polioe organizedcombat troops,oarriedoutsecurityandcom-
bat instructionsandprovidedprotectionfortheoperations
oftheSecurityService* Itwasledby.Hermangendarme or
policeofficers,andeaphcompany containedsixtoeightGer-
mangendarme orpoliceteohnioalsergeants^7aohtraelater/,with
Croatianenlistedmen* Croatswhohadreceivedappropriate
trainingintheYugoslavianserviceoouldalsoserveasofflotri
andnon-commissioned offloors*
TheCroatsweregoodfightersandknewtheoountry,and
acme ofthemhadreceivedmilitarytraining* Interpreters
ohosenfromamongtheethnicGermansmaintainedliaisonwith
VolkscToutsoho- ForeignnationalsofGermanextraction*
MS/>P-055b -18-
theCroatianpersonnel* Eachsquadwassupposedtohaveanin-
terpreter,butoftonaplatoonhadonlyoneortwo* AllCroats
whoservedasofficersoouldapeakGerman* AsaruletheGer-
manofficersandnon-comniaaioned offio&rsoamedirectlyfrom
thegendarme andpolice servloesInGermany* Theirtraining
forpartisancombat consistedotservloewiththeArmyin
WorldWarI,athroeorfourmonthtrainingcourseatagen-
darmeorpoliceschoolandtheexercise oftheiroccupation
IntheZIorinoccupiedterritories* Theoampany coriandera
andthenon-oommlssloned officerswereveryoftenover-age*
Theformationoftheunitsprogressed stepbystep,and
replacementswerecontinuouslyfedtotheheadquarters* The
desiretoadaptthemselvestotheCroatianadministrative
organisationresulted inheadquarters
1
funnellngthereplace-
mentsthatoametothemrightontothelargercountycenters*
Thereoompanleswereformedfortrainingandtoaugmentthe
combat strengthofthelooalCroatiangendarmeposts,whomthey
Weretosupport Incombattingthepartisansintheoountysone*
Postsinplatoonstrengthworeplaced inendangered villages
bytheoompanies*
Alargercountytownoouldbedescribe^somewhatas
follows* TheadministrationwashandledbytheCroatian
prefeot,whowassupportedbya,bodyguard ofUataahaaaswell
asbyaCroatiangendarme stationoffromtwentytoforty
MSttP-055b -19-
raon. These latterperformedpolicedutiesinmuohthesame
way asthe ItalianCarublnleri. Physically separated from
them,oGerman-Croatian polico company^undertheoommand of
&districtfirst orsecondlieutenant,wonquartered ina
oohoolhouoe,brewery orsome suchbuilding,whichwan proteoted
bybarbedwireandwindowbarricades. Itservedprimarilyaaa
trainingcenter* Aroundthepolicobarracks',the,dally life
Intheolty of0,000-10,000 inhabitantsproceeded asithad
inpeaoetirae.
Theequipment ofthepolice companieswasatfirstvery
primitive* Itconsisted chiefly ofcaptured longFrench
rifles,oneortwolightmachineguns,and some submachine
guns* Allmeansoftransportation, includingfield kitchens,
hadtobe improvised. Themost thatoouldboreasonably ox-
pected ofsuohacompanywastheprotectionofitsowncenter
andofareaswithinaradiusoftwenty kilometers* Thequality
ofitstrainingdepended indecisivemeasure onthe training
andmilitary,proficiency ofthepostcommander,whohadto
feelhiswaycarefully inworkingouthisline ofaction*
Supervision andguidance bytheresponsible commanderofthe
regularpolicewaslimited togeneraldirectionsand occasional
short inspectiontours. AfterthedefectionofBadogllo,which
madepossible theseisingofItalianatooks,theequipment
situation improved*
MSP-055b -20-
Alloutpostunitsofcompanystrengthorlesswere
weloometargetsforpartisanattacks,andmanymenworelost
insuohattacks* Theywaretheonesthatborethebruntof
Himler'sorderthatundernooiroumstanoeawasanyposition
tobegivenupwithouthisexpresspermission. Thepermission
neverarrivedattherighttime*
Itwasonlyafternumerousreportshadbeensentinthat
Berlinrecognizedthenecessitytoactivatecombattroopsin
regimentsandmuchtimepassedbeforetheseregimentswore
readyforaction. Oncethefrontlineofbattlereached
Croatiansoiltheyhadtobemovedintoactionthere,but
duringthetrainingphasetheyplayedaneffeotlvepartin
resistinglocalpartisanpressureinthelocalitieswherethey
werestationed*
TheCroatianstatehadtwoorganizationsIntendedfor
anti-partisancombat,namely,theCroatianArmyandtheCro-
atianruralpolloe* TheCroatianArmy,atfirstwithItalian
andlaterwithGermansupport,activatedregimentsofthe
mountainInfantrytype,whichfoughtatendangeredpointswith
laudableaggressivenessinspiteofInadequateequipment* They
woreusedprimarilyinBosniaandDalmatic,andfrom1044onward
oombatdivisionsweretrainedonGermantrooptraininggrounds
andthensent.tothefront.* TheCroatianruralpolicemanned
smallergendarmeposts,spreadoutoverthecounty.Thepersonnel,
themajorityofwhoahadbeentakenoverfromtheYugoslavian
MS//P-0f>5b , -21-
areaandtrainedbyexperiencedgendarmeofficersofImperial
Austrianmintage,hadawideknowledgeoftheregionandits
people,woretruatodbythemandwereefficient. Theygave
theQeman-Croatianpoliceunitsvaluableassistanceduring
operations* Beyondthat,howovor,theposts,asexoecutive
instrumentsoftheCroatiangovernment,woretiedtotheir
ownarea. Asfar.astheCroatianpoliceinthelargerolties
wereconcerned,thorewannoquestionofusingthemincombat
againstthepartisans*
TheUatasha,thepolitioalpartyofthePoglavnik,also
activatedoombatforces,ofwhichsmallunitsdevotedthemselves,
inamannersimilartotheGermanseourityservice,tocon-
baptingtheirYugoslavianopponents,anactionwhichdidnot'
increasethepopularityoftherulingparty. In1944,firat- .
.oneandthentwodivisionswereactivatedasaneliteguard,
thebodyguardofthePo^lavnik. Theseunitsperformedwell
inanti-partisanactionintheZagreb-Varazdln-Koprivnioa-
fl,jelovarregion.
Afterthesummerof1945,thebattlecommandagainstthe
partisanswasinthehandsoftherepresentative oftheRoioh
CommanderoftheSS,whothenco-ordinatedthemeasuresofthe
Croatiangovernmentwithhisownaims,whileadaptingthose
almatothelimitsdrawnbytheArmeegruppe*inBelgrade.
headquartersofthereinforoedGermanarmystationedin
Yugoslavia*
MSj0P-055D -22-.
Airforocaappeared onlyinisolated casesin1943. The
airport inZagrebwaaundertiermanandCroatian administration
andservedaaatrunsit.fieldandTorpassengertrafflo* One
solitaryFieaelorStorohowaaavailable tothei3representative
in1943,andnotuntilthefollowingspringwasthere assigned
toZagreb asnailbombardment wing,which,amongotherthings.
Joined inthofightingaroundi3anjaLuka
Inthebeginning,the security ofthoAdriaticwasItaly's
responsibility* AfterItaly'sdefection in1943,thepatroll-
ingofthecoastwasorganizedfromTriestebytheGormans,
butammunition andsuppliescouldnotbeprovontedfromreach-
ingthepartisans.
Germanliaisonplane.
MS if P-055b - 2 3 -
TACTICAL EXAMPLEStfHOMTHE PARTISAN WAS
Sketch 2)
!
'
Combing t he Bl l o Gora and the Papuk, <3-18 Jul y 1943
TheSituation
Therealization thatsomethingdecisivehadtobedone
tohindertheestablishmentofguerillabandsInthewooded
mountainrangesnorthoftheSaveledtoamajordriveIn
July1943againsttheBllogoraandthePapuk,anattack
whichwasplannedandexecutedbytheWehrmaoht. Aregiment
ofthepartiallymotorized 100thLightInfantryDivisionwas
madeavailableonshortnoticebytheWehrmaohtHighCommand
forthispurpose* AtrainingbattalionoftheWehrmacht
fromBJelovarandonefromBrod.alsoparticipatedinthe
operation,aswellasseveralCroatianArmyunits,operational
unitsofthesecurity service,German-Croatianpolice companies
fromthedistrictsofZagrebandOsijekandCroatiangendarme
unit8.
TheterritoryheldbythepartisansextendedfromMosti,
fifteenkilometerssouthofKoprivnica,inasoutheasterly
directionovertheforest slopesoftheBilogoratothePapuk
mountain"range,whichwasregardedasitsoenter. Several
partisanbrigadeswhichwerefit.forcombathadbeenreported
inthePapuk TheMoslavackagoraandthePsunJwere outlying
MS,/P-055b -24-
partisanbases. ThorailwaylinoaZagreb-Urod-Belgrade
andVlnkovol-Osijekwere Inoperation* Partisanunder-
groundactivitywastobeexpeoted ingreaterorlesserde-
greeinthewholeregionadjoiningthepartisanoontrolled
areas*
The Objeotlvfl
TooleorthoBilogoraandthePapukofguerillabands.
Command
Thecommanderofthe100thLightInfantryDivision,
BrigadierOeneralvonAxt,withheadquartersfirstatKopri-
vnloaandlateratVlrovitloa,whichwasprotectedbya
CroatianArmy battalion.
ThoPlanof Operations
Oncetheforegroundhadbeencleared,the54thRifle
Regiment,whichhadbeenreinforcedtofour-battalion strength,
wastobeginwiththeOlogoveo-Kris-Topolavao-Kapola-
Hampovioa -OJurgJevao seotorandthensystematically toocmb
theBllogorasectionbysectionwiththeaidofonebattery
andonecompany ofengineers. CroatianandOerraanunitswere
toclearoutthoforeground tothewestandsouthwest andforoe
thepartisans intothepooketformedbytherifleregiment*
Thepartisanswere'tobedrivenfromoilaidestowardthe
centerofthePapukrangeinaynohronizodmovemonta* The
Koprlvnloa -'Vlrovltioa-DJakovo-Oaljokhighway,northof
MS//P~055b -i!5-
theUllogora,andthe'Zagreb- Ivaniograd- Novska- brod'
railline,south oftherange ofwoodedmountains,were to
serveassupplyroutes.
ResultsAohleved
Sincethehotwastoowidelymeshedandthenumber of
troopstooemail,thepartisans,aftersome initialre-
sistance ,esoapedencirclement inalldirectionsthroughthe
denseforest. Notasinglepartisanwasoaught inthenet,
andonlysurprisedciviliansworetakenprisoner. Sinoethe
oomblng operationwascarriedout inasinglewave,itwas
extremelyeasyforthepartisanstore-assemble behind it*
MS/>P-05Gb -26-
HQV/THE54THRIblF.KF.QIMEMTPKKTOIiMEDITSMISSION
Theregimenthadboonassigneda'trainingbattalion
andthusreinforcedtofourbattalions* Itwasdivided
intotwogroups,oneofwhichwastoformaoordonwhile
theothercarriedoutthecombing* Thegroupdesignated
fortheoombin^operationcarriedlightcombat equipment
.andadvanoedonabroadfrontatrightanglodtothecontour
ofthomountainchain,movingovertheinterveninghillsto
theblockinglinewhere itsmotorizedtrainawaitedit*
Afterthearrivaloftheoorabingunit,thomotorizedblock-
ingunitswiftlymovodaheaddownthevalleytothenew
blockinglinoaroundthonextseotor. Exoesalvefatigueon
thepartofeithergroupwasavoidedbyalternatingthese
assignments* Thenarrowersidesoftheseotorwereclosed
offbyspecialdetachments,whichparticipatedasnoedodin
theJobofdrivingthepartisansintothepocket* Forthe
combingoperations,specifioroutesandobjootlveuwere
assignedtotheindividualoompanles,whichadvanoed Ina
dlreotlinoontheorderedobjectiveswiththeirflanks
secured. Nothoroughsearchofthecombedregioncouldbe
mode,astheday'sobjectivehadtoboreached.andthenumber
ofparticipatingtroopswasnotsufficientforsuchaction.
Thereweregapsalloverintheline,'throughwhichthepar*
M3ifP-055b -27-
tloanscould slipoutorinwhlohtheycouldhideuntilthe
drive had passed*
MS//P-055b -2G-
THSTACTICSOb'TliKPARTISANS
At variouovillages ontheperimeter oftheirareawhich
hadalready ceenorganized asbasesandcontained supplyde-
pota,thepartisans atfirstofferedenergetic resistance,
tacticallywellprepared butprimitive in'respect tomateriel*
The superiorweapons oftheV/ehrraaoht,especially thelight
andmediummortarsandheavymoonine ^unc,soonforoedthe
partisans togiveupcombat. Itseemsthatthey originally
aimed atconcentratingalltheircombatunltu inthePapuk
mountains,butwhenthey sawthattheywerenotequaltothe
Germantroops incombat theylimited themselvestoblocking
pathflinthemountains inordertodelay theadvance ofve-
hioleo. Supplydepotswere camouflagedexcellently,e.g.,a
completely equipped surgicalroomwasdiscovered inavault
hiddenunderadungheap. TheGermantroopswereeluded,and
whenthecenterofthePapukrangehadbeenencircledthe
partisanunitshadalreadyfiltrateatheencirclinglineand
hadre-assembled indistant hideaways. Thetroopswent to
great troubletoremove theroadbarriersandmaketheroads
passable. Zvecevo,thelastmountainsettlement,wasfound
abandonedwhentheGermantroopshad- workedtheirwayupto
itonthe15thofJuly. Therewasnotrace ofthe enemy*
Onthe18th,thetrainswerereadyfortherailtrans-
MS#P-055b .29-
portationoftheregimenttotheSulonikisootorinGreece.
Thepartiaanaknewthedeadlinefortheassembly oftheao
transportsseveraldaysbeforetheoonolusionoftheoperat-
ionandwhenmovingoutoftheirquartersinthePapukin-
formedthepopulationthattheywouldprobablybebacksoon*
Theirreturnwasprompt,andallmembersofthecivilian
populationwhohadsupportedtheGermantroops,evenifsuoh
supporthadbeenlimitedtobilleting;,hadtoexpeot reprisals
andthereforebeoameunquestioningfollowersofthepartisans
inordertoescapeworsoconsequences.
WiththewithdrawaloftheWehrraaoht,thethirteen-day
operationcollapsed. TheGermanandCroatiantroopswhohad
beencommittedreturned totheirstations,andthecombod
territorywasopenforrooooupationbythepartisans. It
remained impenetrable forGermanandCroatiantroops,and
thepopulationsworecompleteallogianoetoTito* Agreat
expenditure ofwork,materiel,timeandmanpowerhadbeen
wasted.
AttheconclusionofthePapukoperation,thePoglavnik
announcedanamnestyforallCroatswhohadbelongedtothe
partisanmovement,butthismaneuvermetwithverylittle
success.
TheFlawinthe Planning
Defensiveactiontopreventthereoccupationofthe
MS#P-055b -30-
oombod areasbythepartisans,anoperationwhichwasreally
muohmore important, shouldhavebeenprepared andexecuted
withthesameoarewithwhichtheoombing operationwas
plannedandcarried out* Aseparatepolioegroupofseveral
battalions shouldhavefollowed thecombat troopsintothe
partisanterritory asitwascombed. Theretheyshouldhave
permanently occupiedthepositionswhichthepartisanshad
heldpreviously andhunteddownthedispersed partisans*
WhatthePapulerangehadbeenforthepartisans,itshould
havebeoomefortheirpursuers inanti-partisan combat. The
primitive artillery rangeanddrillfieldwhichthepartisans
hadonthelevelplainatopthePapuk,anareawhichaotually
wasverywellsuitedforouchpurposes,shouldhavebeoomea
traininggroundforGermanandCroatiantroops.
US P- 055b - 3 1 -
TilE (JAPTUHK OP THE 610NAL COMMUNICATION PLATOON 01-'
TltS 54TH K1FLE Hl-.aiI.JKUT AT P1VNICA ON 13 JUST 1945
Cooettketah3)
ComingfrocaVorovltlcw duringtheBilojjoracombing
operation,theheadquarters ataffandonobattalionofthe*
54thliifleRegimenthadspentthenightof12/13Julyin
Pivnica, Earlyonthe13th,tliiacombat.forceadvancedto
Darivar. Th3departurewaasetfor0400,andthe227thWehr^-
machtTrainingBattalion,whichhadspentthenightinJaaonas,
wastooccupyPivnloaby0430hours. Theregimentwaitedfor
thearrivalofthe227thTrainingBattalioninPlvnicaand
departedatabout0440houra* Duringthemarch,theregiment's
signalcommunication platoon,whichcontainedaboutforty
German soldiers,removedthotelephone linewhichhadbeen
laidtoDarivorthedaybefore. Hear&uard securitywasthe
responsibilityofacompanyofthebattalion:,whichcompany
had spentthenightinMaliPivnica. Justaathis company,
thenaboutakilometerfromthesignalcommunication platoon,
turned intothemainroadtoDarivar,itwasmetbyfire
oomlngfromastripofwoodswestoftheroadandforcedto
take oover. Atthesoundoffighting,the227thTraining
Battaliondeployed InfantryfromPivnioaagainstthestrip
US itP-055b -32-
ofwoods,buttheyalsoworefireduponandwereonlyable
toworktheirwayforwardslowly, Similarfirewaadireoted
againsttheretiringregimentfromawoodedstretchtothe
southwest.
Thesignal.communicationplatoon,whichwasatworkre-
movingthetelephonelineintheinterveningsection,wasover-
runbythepartisans. Someofthemwerekilledandsome,who
surrendered,wereseparatedintogroupstocarrythesignal
materiel. Thehorseswereunharnessedandthewagonsplundered
andsetafire*
Fifteenortwentyminuteslatertheriflefireslackened
anddiedaway,andwhentheHermanforcesreachedthesoene
ofthesurpriseattackitwasemptyexceptfortheburning
wagonsandafewdeadHermansoldierswhohadbeonstripped
oftheiruniformsandequipment. Thepartisanunithaddis-
appearedwiththebootyandtheprisonersinthedirectionof
Crnivrh. AsmallpursuitdetachmentfoundmoredeadGerman
soldiersintheforestanddiscontinuedtheohaae.
Whathappened? Thefollowingexplanationiaprobables
Oneofthepartisanunits,whiohwaswithdrawingfromthe
fightingintheBllogora,triedtobreakthroughtheGerman
linesandreaohthePapukmassif* UnknowntotheGerman,it
hadspentthenightofthe12th/l3thinandaboutIvanovoSelo
andfromtherehadstolendowntotheroadbetweenPivnloaand
MS.^-0o5b . --33-
Daruvar inordertocroaa itinthedireotlonofVooumat
thepropermoment andsogot intothePapukmountains* To
covertheirmenwhile crossing theroad,thepartisansfirst
oooupled theedgea oftheforestalongtheroadand observed
thetrafficuponit. Whentheyrealized thatthesignalpla-
toonwasbuayremovingthewire awithout immediate protection,
theydeterminedtoattaokfromthenearbywoodsandproceeded
tocarry outtheattaokinamasterlymanner*
The successoTthesurpriseattaokcanbeattributed to
thequickdecisionandthedaringofthepartisanleaderand
thoexcellent teamwork ofhisfollowers. Theattackwasfavored
bytheterrainandtheforest cover. Thoaounteraotionbythe
numerically farsuperiorGermantroopscametoolate. It
tooktoolongforthemarchingbattalion tohalt,torecognize
thedangeritssignalplatoonwasinandtodeployforcounter-
action. Thetrainingbattalion,whiohatfirstdidnottakethe
hootingoerioualy,lostatime'likewise* Therearguard com-
pany,hadevidently loitered. NoGermanunitcould.seethe
spotwhere theattacktookplaoe* Itlastedtwentyminutes
atthemoat,andthepartisansmovedwithcatlike speed* The
village ofIvanovoSelwasburnedtothe ground*
MS#P-055b -34-
THS HOPJ'IW) UP OF THE FHUSKA (iOilA 3Y Tim 9TH S3 AMD
POLICEREGIMENTaETOflEH24JULYAND5AUGUST1043
(SQA Sketch2)
InJuly1943,the9thSSandPolicettegiment,whichwas
partiallymotorizedandhadthreebattalionsandsupporting
arms,wasquarteredinKumaandthesurroundingvillageswith
the objectiveofcombattingthepartisans in.thelowlandsof
theSaveandtheFruskagora. Theoperationwasdirectedby
thedistrict commanderofOsIJek,whose security servioeunit
hadcollecteddataandascertainedthenamesofsupportersof
thepartisanmovement*
VariousvillagesinthelowlandsoftheSavewere known
tobeinfectedbypartisansandusedasaprotective soreen
forthecrossingoftheriver. Theyandnearbyforest areas
were surroundedandsearched. Counteractionbythepartisans
wasslightandconsistedforthemostpartofbarriersplaoed
ontherouteofapproach,whloh,duetothemarshy terrain,
couldnotbeeasilybypassed. Mostofthesebarrieruwerenot
defendedbutnevertheless causedacertainamountofdelay.
Therewere only isolatedoasesofpartisanfirefromthewoods*
Allattemptstotakethepartisansbysurprise failed,
andthepopulationfoundtimetoflee intotheswampsor
aoroaatheSavewiththeirprimitivepossessions,onlyvery
MS#f-055b -35-
oldpeople,invalidsandchildrenremainingbehindinthe
villages. SmallsupplydumpsTellintothehandsofthe
troops.
After31July,theoperationwasdivertedtowardthe
Fruskagora,ontheridgeofwhichpartisancombatunitswere
saidtobestaying inforeatcampsandisolatedfarmhouses*
Theregimententeredthefirstvillagesofthel-'ruekagora
ontho.Kumasidewithoutmeetinganyresistance,butthe
operationaimingatpocketingthepartisanson,theridge,.
whichwasstagedon1August,provedafailure. The1st
Battalion,whichhadbeencommittedfromtheKumaside,did
reachthe innerencirclement ringontime,afterputting
severalsnipersoutofactionandsufforlngloaaeainthe
prooess,butthetwomotorizedbattalionsoommitted tooarry
out theenvelopment losttimebeoauseofroadbarriersand
o'ouldmake onlyincomplete contactwiththe1stBattalion*
AshadboonthecaseinthePapule,they,foundanemptynest*
Thepartisanshadslippedthroughtheenoirolement linesin
smalloandflandhadscatteredabouttheDanubeandSave
lowlands*
BeforeanyfurtherpursuitNOfthepartisansoouldbe
undertaken,theregimentreoelved orderstoretiretoOgulin
inordertotake overfromthedefectingItaliansthepfoteot-
ionoftheZagreb-Ogulin-Susakrailroadinthatregion*
K3i/I'-055b -56-
There Itwaatrappedandonlyafteraovaralwoekafreedby
an33divlalonfromtheregionaroundKarat,aouthoatstof
Trieato.
Aftertheregiment hauretiredfromtheFruaka#ora
#
themajority ofthepopulationfledfromthenurrounding
villageaandtookrefuse Inuumu. Thepartisanbands,willoh
hadreassembled quiokly,returnedtotheFruakagoraand
tookrevenge onthepropertyofthe.ethnloGermans,whohad*
fled.
ThepoliceactionugalnattheFruska,3orasufferedfrom
thesamemistakesastheWehrmaoht aotlonagainsttheBllo
goraandthePapuk. Bothwereabletoreport,"Mission
accomplished*ttegionoleared ofguerillau. Allreslstanoe
crushed. Ourlossessmall,enemyloaaeaheavy*
w
Laterre-
ports,however,established thattheoombedareareturned
topartisanhandsafterthetroopshadwithdrawnandthe
enemyloavesworeohiefly Imprisonedclvilianu. Asalogical
ooneequenoe ofthesesupplementaryreports,nofurthersimilar
operationswerestagedtocombat thopartisansinCroatia*
BySeptember1945,thepartisansfelt sostrongthatthey
tooktheoffensiveonallsidesandforoed theGormantroops
togoonthedefensive* Thenfollowed theperiodofattaoka
onoutlyingdetachmentaandacts
1
ofsabotageagainst'oorps
andlinesofcommunication.
US // P-055b - 37-
ATTACft ON TiiK O/IKKIOOJN jj- CA31NCI
Liketoh 4 & 2)
^ ^ -
T i m e
.
Lateharvest,early3epterabor1943. V<eatherwarm;
alightshowei'aatrareintervals*
situation
CombatunitsofthepartisanowereinthoPapukand
inthocountryadjaoonttoitintheaoutheaot. TheCroatian
governmentwasInoontrolinDjakovo,KaaiooandPozo^a.
Traffichadoeenpoaalblehithertoonlywithinaclrcumaoribed
areaandunderarmedescort* Occasionally thepartisanscon-
trolledthetrafficonthehighways,andtheyintez'feredre-
peatedlywiththotiarveatlns,carryingoffintopartisan
territorycropsthatwerereadyfortransportationandburn-
ingthreshingmachines* OneGerman-Croatianpolloebattalion
ofthreeoorapanleswaspresentinDjakovo,towhichithad
beenadvancedfromOsijekwiththegeneralmissionofproteot-
lngtheharvest* Eachcompanyhadtwolightmachinegunsand
anumberofaub-machine guns* Themennotsoarmedcarried
rifles. Thepartisanshadsimilararmsbutnotinequal
numbers. FromDjakovothepolicebattaliondetachedone
companytoSatnica,andthiscompanysentaplatoontoCuain-
olattherequestofnemberoftheCroatianParliamentto
protecthieestatethere*
K3iff'-Q56b -38-
1'heplatoon,conflicting ofaboutfiftymen,moved
intoCaalnciand barricaded itsquarters inthe administrative
enclosure oftheestate. Itprotected thefieldworkers in
theoountryslde duringthedayandguardedtheeatateat
night. OnSaturday evening thequarterswerefiredat,and
theplatoonapentthenight readyforactionwithin itsde-
fensivepoaltiona. Sporadic surpriaefirewasreceiveddur-
ingthenight* Arunner,whohaamanagedtoBlipoutat
night throughanadjacent building,carried areport ofthe
situationtothecompany iniiatnlca,whichstartedfor
Gaainciatdaybreak butcameunderfireattheboaut river,
where itfound thebridgeblown* Atabout0000,bywhichtime
thecompany hadfought itswayclear,stragglersfrom the
platoon InOasincimet itandreported thattheirquarters
hadcaughtfireearly inthemorningandthatatthesumo
time thepartisanshadattackedfromallaides. Ithadbeen
impossible fortheplatoontoremainintheburning building,
andthe individualmembersattempted tomakeabreakfor lt
At least 400partisanswere inthevillage*
Thecompany thereuponreturnedtoSntnica,inorderto
fend offapossible attaokonthatvillage,aridthencoramunl-
oatedwiththebattalion inDJakovo. Thebattalionhadalert-
editstwoothercompanies butdidnotdaretoadvance into
thecountryside,becausepartisanshad beenreported inthe
M3 jfP-055b -39-
vicinity oftheroadtoMajarandthebattalionreared
anattackuponDJakovofromthisdirection^ Tothe(Jatholio
battalionconwandortheImmediateprotectionoftheadmini-
strativecantorandepiscopalaoataearcedthamoat important
mission.
Duringthemorning,areconnaissance*patrolaontoutby
thecompany inSatnicu inthedirectionofCasino1,inorder
tobrlninfurthersurvivorsoftheplatoonwhichhadboon
stationedthere,confirmedthafactthatCaainciwasstill
oocupicdbystrongpartisanunits* Inhabitantswhohadflod
fromthevillagereported inDjakovoonSundayafternoon
thatthepartisans,havingtakenalonj;alltransportable
suppliesandhavingdestroyodthehouaoof thememberof
parliament,hadwithdrawntothemountains. Themornberof
parliamentwaswithhisfamilyInZagro&atthetime. Only
twentymenoftheplatoon,includingeightwounded,managed
toescape,someofthornwiththeaidofthevillageinhabitants*
Thebattalionoomm^ndor,whowasunablotomarohbooausa
ofanattackofsciatica,wassentenced inDeoerabortofour
years'imprisonmentbya2.a^reb33andPolicecourtforfail-
ingtotakeeffectiveactionwiththetwocompaniesthatwere
inDJakovotohelptheplatooninCaalnol. TheKelohCom-
manderoftheSSreversedtheJudgmentanddemandodthedeath
sentence. Sincethebattalioncommanderhadalreadybeen
MS ft ?-055b -40-
tranaportod to a ponal unit in Danzig, further proceedings
continued there, and the fi nal reault was nev&r known.
A capturoU partisan order read as follows:
Commander X i?'auoje, Friday, 0500 hours.
Ordor
1. OnSundaymorninythevillageofCaainciwillbetaken,
thepolioeplatoonstationedtlierewillbdestroyedanathe
harvestwillbecarriedoff.
2. The1stbattalionofthe43rdbrigadewillleaveF'auoje
at1500onSaturdayanaadvancealon;foresttrial3toGaslnoi
aoaatosurroundthoquarternofthepoliceplatooninthe
estateattheedgeof(Jaainciatduskandsealoffthevillage
oftJasinoifromtheoutside* Inhabitantswillnotbepormitt-
edtoleavetheirhousesandmayahownolights Windowahuttera
muatboolosed. Patrolswillmaintainsurvoillanoawithinthe
village.
Duringthenightharraaalngfirowillbocilreotadatthepolice
quarters, Theattackv/illcominonooatdawn. Thepolicequar-
terswillboburnedtotheground.
3. Twocompaniesofthe2dbattalion,4odbrigade,willleave
Fauojeat1400onSaturday,advancealonj;forosttrailsand
arriveattheheightsoetweonUaalnoiandthoUJakovo-Majar
roadby1700attholateat. Theywilltheretakeupconcealed
positionsagainstUaalnoiandthei>Jakovo-kajarroad, break-
outsfromCasino1willboprevented. ?lrewillbeopenedonthe
L>jakovo-MaJarroadonlyifGormantroopsaremovingonit.
4 Thestaffandtwocorapanie3ofthe2dbattalion,45dbri-
gade,willcovorthovillageofLovanjakaVarosfromSaturday
eveningat1800on*
5. Tho5dbattalion,45aiiri^ade,willleave^latinikat1400
onSaturday- Twocowipanloswillbesodeployedonthehilla
betweentheliosutriverandtiraoevolthattheywillbeableto
blocktheroad'from^latnioa-bracevoiinbothdirectionsaa
soonasGermantroopmovomontaodouruponit. Thebattalion
fjtaffandtwocompanieswillreachthoheightswostofthe
Boautatthefallofdusk. GermantroopmovementsfromDJakovo
willbemetwithTire* AnyadvancetowardUascinoiwillbe
halted.
Mo u* P-O55D - 41-
G. The engineer corninand, 45d iiri^adfl, wi l l Join the advance
of the 3d liattalion atari' and fit 0300 Sunday wi l l blow up
the bridge over the boaut between ftatnioa and Caainoi.
7. The Cuainci operation .muot bo completed by 1000 tiunday.
DuOsequently tho country in tho dirootion of i'aucjo and
Sl ati ni k wi l l be vacated. Wounded and vehiole currying
booty wi l l travel by way of Levanjaka Varoa.
6. 1 shal l accompany tha 1st battal i on ua far as tho edge
of tho forest went of Ou^inoi. lioport wi l l be aent there
when the objectives directed have boon reached.
Death to the UsurpersI
Long l i vo Ti t o, tho l i berator of Croatia from the
forei gner!
xiomarico
1. The Oenorasl ordor of the iioich Commander of the 1>3
that no poat be withdrawn without hi s express approval pre-
vented tho only pooolble sol uti on, namely, the timely abandon-
ment of Gaainoi.
.a. Even energetic offorta to aid the platoon In Casinci
would have been frustrated, aa the onomy waa too strong and
his diapooition extremely good. Tho platoon was sacri fi ced
uenl aasl y.
'6m Ho punitive expedition i nto the Papuk mountains was
undertaken; the requisite foroea could not bo auuembl^d.
4. Caainoi waa the ^urolng point of the partisans war.
Thereafter, the partisans, took the offensive and even attacked
UiS ,t^-06oD -42-
iaorostrongly^urriaoneaplacedwnichprotrudod Inconveni-
ently intotaairterritory und impedodtheirateaayexpansion.
xwomonthslaterfiercefivhtln^tookplaceforKasico,which
ohangodhandsrepeatedly.
Mo if P-055 - 4 3 -
OHLWU
(iloo iikfftohes 5 and 2)
November 1045. The ; i i l o gora was occupi ed by par t i s ans ,
many of when were a l s o In t he l vanoi cu mountai ns, whore they
harai'uod t he count rysi de borderi ng on Aus t r i a. Countermoaaures
wor<* tukon by the 19tu S; and Pol i ce Uegiment In Haribor (Mar-
burg) , Aust ri a* To prot ect the communication l i ne V&raadin -
fcoprlvnica, u company of tieruuin-iJroatian pol l en was s t at i oned
i n I^ud'oro^. Croat i an aztny uni t s and a s pe c i a l detachment of
tho ooouri t y oervi oe waro i n Varuzdin, whi l e Ari zevoi was oocu-
pl ed by a Croat i an ariny company.
At 1600 hours, i t l/aa i mpoaai bl e t o ^et any connect i on
whatever at Ludbrog on the s t at e tel ephone syst em. The com-
pany oommander sent a pat rol wi t h repairmen i n the di r e c t i o n
of Kpprivnioa t o di s c ove r t he cause of the breakdown. They
ret urned one and a hal f hours l a t e r t o report t hat t hey had
been f i r e d upon. At the samo t i me, the Croati an gendarme
pos t report ed, "Part i s ans from the regi on of the KalniV moun-
t a i ns are operat i ng In tho country around Ludbreg and have or-
dered tho popul at i on t o withdraw i nt o t he i r houses or l eave
the l o c a l i t y . The gondarme post oannot mai nt ai n i t s po s i t i o n
and reques t s permi s s i on t o j oi n tho Company." Permi ssi on was
qui ckl y grant ed, and t he company was al e r t e d and s e al e d of f
MS//P-055b -44-
thevillage. Partisanswhohadpenetrated intoitwere
forced out* Aboutmidnight thesituationbecomequiet,with
only alight combat aotivity ontheperiphery ofthe settlement*
Thecompany wasseparated intogroups,all ofwhichset
outsimultaneously andsilently at0^00 toeffect thebreak-
through inasurpriseraov.While securitydetachments ad-
vanood laterally alongtheliedujariver,themass oftho
oompany advanced insquad,moving inbothdirections along
thebankandthebed oftheriveruntiltheyworebeyond the
enoiroloment ring ofthepartisans* Thecompany commander
haddesignatedKoprivnica andXricevoiasrallyingpoints,
andtheCroatiangendarmes,whowerefamiliarwiththeregion,
weredistributed amongthevariousgroups* Thowhole oompany
reassembled attherallyingpointsduringthenextfewdays
aftersuffering onlyaboutfifteencasualties* Thoaotion of
thocompany commanderwasapproved byhissuperiors,sinoeha
couldnothaveheld outtillrelnforoements arrived,owingto
lackof ammunition*
USitP-055b -45-
THKDESTRUCTION OFTHEQAIUUSOM QVCASMA
(360Sketches6and2)
XnMay1944thegarrisonofBJelovaroonaiated ofone
Wehrmaoht trainingbattalionandabout500manattendingtha
Croatiangendarmestrainingcenter,whiohwaslocatedthere;
Advanoeunits,stationed InalineGudovac -Narta-Veliki
Severln-Sandrovao-VelikiTroistvo,were Inconstantoon-
tactwithpartisandivisionsfromtheBilogora. Those
companies ofthegendarme schoolwhichhadbeenadvanoedto
OrdjevoandGrublanoPolje inordertoguard tree-felling
operationshadtoberecalledastheywereindangerofbeing
outoff* Severalpartisancombatunitswere intheMoslavaoka
mountains*
Altogether700menwerestationed inG'asma,ocrape-sing
onebattalionandabatteryoftheCroatianArmyandacom-
pany oftheGerman-Croatianpolice,whileDugoSelowaaheld
byabattalionstaffandtwocompaniesofGerman-Croatianpo-
lice. TheZagreb-Sisak-Novska-BrodandZagreb-Ivanio-
grad-Novskarallrosdswere stronglyguardedbytheGermanand
Croatianforces* Bothlineswereutilized onlyduringday-
lightandunderspecialprecautions* Therewereminor attempts
atdisturbance almostdailyonbothrailwaylines. Thearmed
escortsontherailway trainsandwithmotorvehicle oolumni
wereatleastatcompany strength*
MS//P-0551) -46-
AtnoononTuesday,theGarrisoncommander<">!'Casraa
reported byradiothatstrongpartisanunitshadonclrolod
Caamaandthat howasexpectinganattackatanyhour* he
urgentlyrequestedassistance. Theafternoonbroughtanother
oullforholp. 'h6attackhadbegun,andthepartisanshad
considerablenumericalsuperiorityandwerewellequipped.
Mortarswereusedbybothsides. Atthesametimeiijelovar
roportedarevivalofenemycombat activity,therailwayse-
curityheadquartersatSisakreported attacksonvarious
railway securitydetachmentsbetweenLekenlkandSlaak,and
therailway securityheadquartersatIvaniogradreported
interruptionoftherailway stretchbetweenDugoSoloand
Ivanicgrad* Countemeasureawereunderway,butforthetime
beingtrainoervioewassuspended*
TorelieveUasmatheonlyavailablebattalion of(Jerman-
Croatianpolice,includingaheavymachine gunandatrenoh
mortarplatoon,wasalertedanddispatched intruck:/from
2ag2ebduringthonight ofTuesday/Wednesday. Itarrivedin
DugoSoloat0600andtookalongthebattalionunionwas
stationedthere* Atthesanetime,thegarrisoncommander of
iijelovarwasorderedtosendsupportfranhiscommand to
Casmaasquicklyaspossible* SUGruppenfuehreroilammerhofer,
Hlmmler'srepresentative,accompanied thebattalionfrom
Equivalent tobrigadiergeneral.
M3// P-055b . 47.
Zagreb* Seourlty detaohrae.nte f e l t out the flanks enroute,
and Klostar Ivanlo was reached around noon* fc'rom there on
sniper fi re waa received, and the advance cane t o a halt
in the vi l l age of Mali Ivanio because of tenacious partisan
resistance* The fighting i ntensi fi ed in the vi l l age, and
the aeourity detachments which had been sent out on both
sides were attacked by strongly superior partisan forces
and pressed back to the main unit, whloh was now also fired
upon from the flanks* The Oruppenfuehrer now gave the order
t o break off the engagement and withdraw, which only a part
of the oolumn suooeeded in doing before the approach of. dark*
ness, with heavy l osses in offi cers, enl i sted men and vehicles*
Caoma was taken by the partisans during the same night*
Not a man of i t s garrison escaped. The reinforoement dotaola-
ment from bjelovar, which was only of battalion strength, en-
oountered strong rasistanoe noar Stefanje, against whloh i t
could meke no headway* It therefore gave up the attempt to
push forward to Casma* The Oruppenfuehrer's general staff
offi cer oomputed the l osses in and around Casraa at t hi rt y-
fi ve offi cers and more than ipoo men* Casma remained in
partisan hands*
MS // P-055"b . 4 3 .
POUR SHQHT STOKIES
(3ee Sketches 1 and 2)
October 1943. To protect the 3arajevo area, one Qerman-
Croatlan pol i ce company was sent t o Travnik, one to Liostar
and one t o Hogatioa. These spots had r a i l communication* and
the supply transports from Sarajevo wore accompanied by small
e s c or t s . The oompany commanderswent t o Sarajevo by r ai l every
two or throe weeks t o make t he i r report s. In August 1943,
the company commander, a middle-aged di s t r i c t l i eut enant of
the rural pol i c e , i n accordance with orders given by the
di s t r i c t commander, negoti ated with a representati ve of the
Chetnlks from tho nearby ^l at l bor pl at eau. The Chotnlks had
promised t o ai d i n the f i ^ht agai nst the Ti t o parti sans i n
the border regi on along the Drina ri ver i f oertal n ammunition
were del i vered t o thorn. Naturally they wanted the ammunition
f i r s t . The negot i at i ons f a i l e d. Si x weeks l at e r , the l i e ut e -
nant was taken from the t rai n by part i sans at the Praca r a i l -
road s t at i on. A search party sent from ftogatlou found hi s
naked oorps on the same evening about two ki l ometers beyond
the rai l road st at i on* The tongue had been out out and the
eytu put out . . I t oould not bo determined whether the cul pri t s
where Chetniks or f ol l owers of Ti t o.
November 1943. The t rai ni ng bat t al i on, of the German
M34P-055b -49-
forceastationed inSid,whichlaythirtykilometers south
ofVinkovci,hadreceivednowrecruitsfourweeksbefore*
Anidealtrainingfield,apractically levelpasturewith
aclearlineofvisionofabout1200meters,wassituated
aboutoneandahalfkilometersfromSidontheroadSid-
Sot-Xlok# Thefieldwasintersectedbyanalmostdry
ditoh,andonItsnorthernedgewasasmallwoods. The
1stCompanyreachedthefieldat0730,sentasecuritypa-
trolintothelittlestripofwoodsasonotherdays,stacked
itaweaponsandpreparedforearlymorningathletics* Sudden-
lyaburstofmachine gunfirecomingacrossthefieldfrom
adistance ofaboutGOOmeterspoured intothemen,whowere
information, killingfiveand injuringeightofthemand
throwingtherest intooonfualon. Everyone first sought
shelter* Thefiringooasod,andbythetimetheunithad
oolleoted andrecovered itaweaponsthetwopartisanswho
hadmannedthelightmachinegunhadreaohed theedgeofthe
woods,moving inacrouchingpositionintheditch,andhad
'disappeared inthedirectionoftheFruskagora.
February 1944* TheGerman-Croatianpolloocompany sent
fromZagrebtoVelikaOorloahadreinforcedtheCroatianrural
policepost inBuseveoowithamachine gunsection. The sect-
ionscouredtheoutpostarea,lookingforpartisans,whohad
appearedhere inIsolatedoases* Accompanied byhie,driver
M3#P~055b -50-
andtwooaoorta,thecompany commanderdrovetoUuseveoo
everysecond orthirddoy. Oneday,whiletravellingat
highspeed,theyovertookthreesinging,slightlyunsteady
Croats,who,althoughthehornwassounded,wouldnotleave
theatroetandthusforcedthedrivertoapplyhisbrakes*
Atthismomenttwoshotswerefiredfromsomebushesquite
neartothestreet,instantlykillingthedlstrlot lieutenant*
Thenoortinemen,whohadboonreadytofire,shotleftand
right andthedriverstepped onthegas* Thethree inebriates
haddisappearedfromthestreet. Afewshotswhistledbehind
thevehiclewithout hitting it*
August 1944. ThebattlefronthadalreadyroaohedCroatia'
inalinefromOaljok-Yukovar-Tuzla,and intheoutpost
areaofZagrebsouthofthe3avefirewasoccasionally opened
againinfightswithpartisanscomingfromthesouthandthe
west. Partisanswerealsoreported Inthenortherlymountain
slopesoftheZagrebackagora,tothenorthofZagreb* The
SeourltyServloohadsetupapraotloerangeforlightraaohine
gunaendsubmachine ur>8inavalleynearVrapoe,fivekilo-
meterawest ofZagreb* Ontheroadthatledtotherange
werevarioussmallsuburbsandanumberofvillassoattered
aboutthecountryside* At1315aSecurityServioe passenger
oar,headedinthedireotionof*theriflerangeandoccupied
byadriver,acommissionerandtwotechnicalsergeants,was
MS tf P-05e>b - 51-
stopped at a turn in the road. The commissioner was shot
twice and the other oooupanto, with revolvers pointed at them,
put up thdr hands* The two sergeants were taken to a nearby
v l l l e , but the driver, who had been ordered t o bring the oar
to the front yard of the vi l l a, maneuvered himself free in
reverse gear and was able to speed away in the dlreotion of
Zagreb* In an on-the-spot investigation an iromediately alerted
detai l of the Security Service established that the vi l l a be-
longed to a respectable Zagreo business man, who had i nstal l ed
in i t an old married couple as caretakers* That morning, se-
veral men from one of the small vi l l ages in the North had come
t o the oouple, had chatted and asked for lunch and then had
gone down to the road* Apart from the caretakers the vi l l a
was unocoupied at the time of the attack* It was burned to
the ground and the old couple were removed to Zagreb. The
two Security Service sergeants were never found* As soon as
the car had esoaped the partisans departed with them into the
mountains*
P-0S5b -52-
DftFKXS:-: AREAS
(See Sketches 1 and 2)
Dy the end of 1943, and in fact even before that, i t
had become obvioua that the growth of the partisan movement
in Croatia could not be stopped with the noana available.
Extensive areaa were completely under partisan control. In
the partisan territory in iioanla, trains were running and
marketa were hold. Armament and equipment improved, aa tho
Allies were supplying tho partisans by sea and by ai r . The
f i r st bombs from Allied planes hit Zagreb in the spring, and
by tho summer of 1944 the partisans themselves had a small
number of planes* The Germantheater of operations was
narrowing perceptibly*
The German Wehrmaoht. aupportod by the Croatian Army,
directed al l i t s efforts toward protecting the Cllly - Zagreb
iielgrade and the bred - Sarajevo and Vinkovoi - Oaijek r ai l
connections, which were so Important for them* At the order
of the Helen Commander of tho SS, the Gorman-Croatian police
devoted themselves to the protection of tho region inhabited
by ethnic Germans* Tho Croatian Army and tho Croatian mili-
tary polioe attempted to keep the area around the larger ci t -
i es, above al l around Zagreb, free of partisans* The body-
guard of the Poglavnlk, a division of seleot men, and those
U3itl'-QGSb .53,
olasaesoftraineesatthoiijolovorGendarmeSchoolwhioh
hadgraduated InMay 194-1w<?rooommlttedforthispurpose.
ThebodyguardregularlypatrolledtheZagrobaokaandIvan-
eloamountainrange3andtheilalnlkmaaalfandkeptopenthe
communication lineZagreb-Vamzdin-iioprivnioa-ajelovar-
Zagreb* AGerman-Croatianpoliceregimentproteoteathe
SamoborregionagainstactionfromthoQorjanoimountains*
Therewerefurthercontrol^roupo inSlack,hrv.Koatainlca,
Kov3ka,Gradiakaandarod,whileiianjaLukawayheavily
garrlsonodbyunitaoftheCroatianArmyandoftheGerman*
Croatianpolice. InSyrmla,the Oaljek-Vinkovol-Kuma-
Petro-Varazdlnregionwanheld. Thesecurityzonesin
BosniawerearoundTuzlaandSarajevo*
TheGormanandCroatianocrabatunitswere onthedefen-
siveeverywhere. Their.foodsupplieswerorunninglowand
Croatiandesertions inareasad. TheCroatianpopulationwas
reservedandattimesevenhostile initsattitude. The
othnloGermansbegantofearfortheirlivesandmetthe
situationbychoosingtheunoortainfate ofevacueesinthe
Reion.
Defenalve^eaauros
Alongtherailwaylines,especiallyatbridges,oonorete
guardtowerswereconstructedandmannedbystrongguardunits
MS;ii'-055b -54-
whlohkept thevicinityunderobservation,patrolledasfar
asthe nextguard tower,ropalrodminordamagesandmutually
supported oneanother- Inthe largerrailroad stations,
emoryenoy trainswithtechnicalpersonnelaboardwerekept
ready tomove.
Onbothtildeaofthetraoks,theterrainwasclearedof
allgrowthtoadistance of100meters,andtwoempty lumber
flatoarswereooupledbeforethelocomotives oftrainstravell-
ingonthosestz'etohea inordertoexplodepossiblemines
withoutdangertothe trainitself* Damagedoarswereun-
coupled onthoopenwayandtipped overthe railway embank-
ment. Attheendoftho trainwasaoarequippedwithanantl-
airoraft guntoward offlowflyingairplanes. Kaohtrain
wascommanded bythe seniorofficerpresent andeachmanned
oar'by theseniorKCO. Ifthetrainwasattackedbypianos
oroameunderfire,allpersonneltookcoverloftandright,
prepared toopenfire. Onlyaftertherailwaypatrolreported
that thelinewassafe,did thetrainsoontlnuefrom station
tostation* Allpassengerswere instructedastotheircon-
duct beforethetrip,and aninspector oftherailway patrol
hadoommand authorityforallsecuritymeasures*
MS // P-055b - 55-
(See o/wotohea 2 and 7 )
Partinnn detachments from tho Papuk ^orjo hod occuplod
the l ocal i t i es of Pad&orao, Nasico and Farloanol in a sur-
prise advance in June 1044 and had thua severed communicat-
ions botweon Oaijek and Virovitioa. To relievo the three
towns, too following forcea were oommlttad from the Ouijek
area:
The 3d German-Croatian Polioe heglment, with one
company of eninaro and a horae-drawn battery of four 77 ram
f i el d gun3
The 1st Battalion of the 4th Police Hefjiraont, which
was stationed in DJakovo.
One and one-half Croatian army battalions stationed
in Virovitioa, which wero reinforced with two oX'ficera and
aixty men from tho gendarme training school in J-Jelovar,
OnTuesday, the following march objectives had be*n
attained:
The main column, with the 1st and 2d Battalions of
the 3d Regiment, the company of engineers and two f i el d guns
.had reached tho vi l l ages of Prandanovcl and Koska. The
vi l l ages of lzovao and Valpovo were free of partisans*
The f i rs t ooluran on tue l e f t , consisting of the 3d
MO// P-035b -5/5-
Battalion of the 3d Polio* Heglmont and two guns, had reached
the vi l l age of Poganovci.
The detaohment from Vlrovitica had reaohcd the
vi l l age of Mlkloa and Caolnol.
The operational objectives for v.edneaday were ao follows!
The naln ooluuin was to advanoe through breznioa
within combat range of Naaloo.
The attack on Naaloo was to be launohed at dawn on
Thursday.
The f i rs t oolunin on the l ef t wan to advance through
3udimcl to Pod^orao, which was to be taken on Thursday morning
at the l at es t .
Operating in tho Jircoevi region, the seoond column
on the l e f t , consisting of the 1st Battalion of the 4th
Police Hegiment from DJakovo, was to cover the attack of the
3d iiattallon of the 3d Police He^lment on Podgorao.
The detachment from Virovltlca was to occupy
Fericancl.
The operations pro^reoaed moro or l ess acdordin^ to
plan* Ferloanoi and Podgorao we20 taken on Wednesday ovening
after i ni t i al re&lfltanoe, but the resistance In Kasloe on
Thursday was obstinate and abated only after the flank ooluras,
advanoing from Podgorao and Foricanoi, joined in the. fighting
during the course of the afternoon* At about 1600, ahook
Mo 4 P-05SU -57-
ooluma of the l at and 2d battalions or the 3d Police ueglraent,
covered by the supportln,j fire of heavy maohino ^un platoons
whioh had been brought up to within 400 yarda, penetrated into
tho town on both sides of tho road Breznioa-Iiaaioe The parti -
sans fled into the nearby woods in the direction of Oradlate
Masloo waa searched, security detachments advanced into the
oountrysido toward tho i'apuk gorjo and tho outskirts of the
vi l l age were prepared for defense against night attacks*
i'or protection against counter-attneka, the following
forceu remained in the areas
In Naslco, the 3d Police Ko&lmont - minus i t s 3d
battal i on, the company of engineera, the battery, the platoon
from the Croatian Gendarme 3ohool at iijelovar.
In the Orahovica - l''arioanoi - 2demi region, one
Croatian army battalion from Vlrovltlca*
Xn ^od^orao, the 3d battalion of tho 3d Police Regi-
ment
In DJakovo, tho 1st battalion of the 4th ilegiment*
All units wore directed to protect tho harvesting
act i vi t i es of the population* Tho assignment was di f f i cul t
and heavy casual ti es were suffered as a rosult of the act i vi t i es
of snipers* Surprise fi ro from small groups oomin& out of the
Papuk gorje kept the security detachments on the al ert day and
night*
K3,/' P-055b -53-
The events in Rumania made i t necessary to defend the
Vukovar - Petro Vurnzdin - Zemun-Iiol^rado sector of tho right
bank of the iDanubo. The 3d Police Regiment was oommittod for
t hi s purpose and had to leave the Naaloe di st r i ct , i t s duties
being taken over by Croatian army units and the 1st iiattalion
of the 4til Police Iteglmont. At the end of August, the part i -
sans reoonquered Naaioo after a battle lasting three days*
The survivors of tho ovorpowored garrison tried to break out
on the third night* Of trie sixty personnel of the Croatian
gendarme detachment from bjelovar, one offloor and olx men
returned.
MS// P-055b - 59-
KVEM bANJA LUKA PrtOV^S IMPOSSlbLE! TO HOLD
(oo Sketch 2)
Danja Luka was intended as the scat of the Croat i an
government, and const r uct i on work on twogovernment bui l di ngs,
a bank and a l argo hot ol had been completed. I t was a town
of aorae 5, 000-7, 000 i nhabi t ant s , many of whom were Moolorna.
On pr eci pi t ous c l i f f s above t he Vrbaa River wasanold
Turkish ol t adel wi t h bast i ons and a cl ear f i el d of f i r e
ext endi ng from 150t o 200meters a l l around* The old sect i on
of t he ci t y was of puro Turkish char act er and hod numerous
bazaars and mosques. Sect i ons of the narrow gauge railway
t o Prl j odor - Dos* Novl had ceased oporat i ng in August1943,
and a l l t r a f f i o took plaoe on the Okuoani - Stara Oradiska -
Banja Luka r oad. Tothe r i ght and l ef t of t hi s road, as f ar
aa t he Vrbas, were f l our i shi ng vi l l ages i nhabi t ed by et hni o
Germans, which were pr ot ect ed by a bat t al i on of Qorman-Croatiaa
pol i c e . Another company of tferraan-Croatian pol i ce waa i nthe
c i t a de l and a bat t al i on of Croat i an mountain i nf ant r y i n the
o l t y . Wooded h i l l s surrounded Banja Luka t o the northweot,
west , south and eaat , and behind t hese h i l l s l ay sol i d part i -
san t erri t ory.
Bunja Luka was a bottle nook. The oity had to be held
to maintain Croatian prestige. Patrols In the vicinity and
USitx^-Ubob .60-
asfarawayastfrijedor,whore aCroatianarmyunitwas
stationed,kept thooountryaiae rolutlvely safe. Alter
severalsmallattacksonbuwjaLukahadbeenrepulsed,oom-
bataotlvity around the townlnoreaaad inMay1944,oouplod
with incondiary aotlona inthaethnicGormanvillages* A
majoroffensive wasexpeoted,andreinforcementsweremade
ready, before theywereready tomarch,the partisans took
banjaLukaunderartilleryl'lrefrompoaitlona inthehills
andlaunched amajorattack* AllapproachestotianjaLuka
woroblocked. Nevertheless,threedoyspassedbefore the
purtiaana suooeeded inoccupying tho town* Tha garrison
withdrew intothecitadolanaheld outthereforanother
twodaysuntilrelnforoeme;*ts,oomposed ofGermanand Croatian
armyaetachiionta supported byartillery,mortarsandplanes,
couldro&tho town,relieve thegarrison intheoltadalAnd
force thepartisans backintothemountains. Inthisfighting,
bri^adefuehror vonSummern,whowasdistrict commander of
Oaijek,waskilledasarosulcofadirectartilleryhiton
hiacommand post*
Tho relnforoement remained in"ttanjaLukaforfourweeks.
Thenthey,woreurgentlyneededelsewhere andwithdrawn. The
attacks onbanjaLukarecommenoed immediately* Undertbe
preeauro oftheseattaoks,BanjaLukawasfinally evacuated
MS // P-05Gb - 61-
and the troops of i t s garriaon employed In protecting tha
Slaak - Dublea - Move Qradlska railway line* The ethnio
German population of the vi l l ages along the banjo LUka - Boa.
Oradlaka road wore evacuated to Germany and Austria*
October 1944 (3OQ Sketch 1)
The Balkan front was collapsing* Rumania had been l ost
in August 1944* Greaoe had to be abandoned and the German
troopa which had been committed there fought their way
laboriously through the high mountain chain botwoon the
Serbian and Albanian-Montenegrin areas to the bridges over
the Drina itlver. The way through iJel&rado was barred, but
to the oast or Sarajevo an S3 oorps held the Drina crossing
open- The German Array of Orosoe heavily dragged i t s way
through Croatia to an assembly area in Austria, and behind
i t the battlefront advanced to a lino iiudapect - Vukovar -
Drina River. Dubrovnlk (Itagusaa) and Moatar wore evacuated*
Partisan units took ov*r sectors of the frontlines in Croatia,
and on< Russian oorps sufflood to support the slowly advancing
front
About 100,000 men wero under arms on the German side in
Croatia, more .than two-thirds of them employod in protecting
tha communication l i nes and area's bohlnd the battlefront against
the partisans Although at f i rs t only one-fifth of the auto-
nomous 3tato of Croatia was in the hands of the Al l i es , hardly
MS 4 P-055D -62-
one-tonth of what 'remained WQO under rel ati vel y secure oon-
trol, by the Geman^ thanka to partisan act i vi t y. This one-
tenth of Croatlu tied down the remnants of the army thut had
retired from Uorbia under Oonoralobo^t von Weiehs* who, with
hia staff, had constructed ai r raid shelters in the Croatian
Ministry of Health building in Zagreb*
The main enemy drive was dlreoted from Budapest to
Vienna. Croatia waa no longer of intercut to the Al l i es , ac
the German f orooo ti ed up there were an enoiroled army, whos
surrender oould be awaited without neoeuoitatin^ any special
oaorl fi oes. These Oorman foroon were also subjsot to Hi tl er' s
order notto yi el d a foot of ground, but sooner or l ater they
would be completely out off and would col l apse.
Tito was the victor In Croatia. Aa his reward he re-
quested and received authorization to organize Yugoslavia un-
der hi s own rule* He had learned his lesson from what had
happened to Uuraania. Tito i s a communist, but he iti al so
a Croatian Yugoslav. His counterpart. Ante Pavelio, firmly
maintains hl Croatian nationalism in Argentina and carefully
fosters his rel ati ons with those Ustashaa who have emigrated
to the West.
# Equivalent t o f ul l general.
113 tfP-055b -63-
Nodecisive suooessresultedfromthe anti-partisan
actioninCroatia* Itdidnotleadtothesuppressionofthe
partisanmovement,andyetthiaverysuppression shouldhave
beenthemajorobjective inCroatiaweretobeenabledtode-
velophealthily.
Sincethiaobjective,theeradicationofthepartisan
movementwasnotachieved inaplteofthefactthatin1943
alargeproportionofthepopulationwasquitereadyto
aupportapromisingcampaignagainstthepartisans,anti-
partisanoperationshadtobolimitedtowardingoffInter-
ferencewiththesupplylinestothefrontandtho communi-
cationszone* TheGermanstriedtocarryoutthistaakboth
byoffensive anddefensivemeasures,butthecourseofthewar
ontheeasternfrontforcedthem in1944torestrlot thamaelvea
todefonalvo actionandbrought aboutthegradualcollapseof
allanti-partisanwarfare*
Despite thialogicalcourso ofevents,thefollowing
lessonsoanbedrawnfromthischapterofthewart
1 Compromisesresult inhalfmeasures* TheGerman
regularpolioft,whoworecommissioned toactivateaOerman-
Croatianpoliceforoo,weretakenbysurprisewhengiventhia
task* Experienoehadadmittedly beengainedinPoland,in
M3#P-055b .64-
Ruaaiaandalsointherest ofYugoslavia,butconditions
inCroatiahadadifferentaspect*
Thepolioe organizations intheoooupiedeaoternterri-
torieswereexecutive agenciesoftheGerman administrative
bodieswhiohhadbeensetupthere. Theirfocalpointwas
thecities,where themajority oftheGermanpolicereally
wereneeded* Tocombat thepartiap.no,specificSS-andPolloe
regimentswereactivatedand committed*
Croatia,onthe otherhand,wasanalliedland* It
willingly changedfromItaliantoGermansupervision,sinoe
itfeltthat Itwouldreceivemoreeffectiveaidfromthe
Germans inestablishing itsowngovernment thanithadre-
ceivedfromtheItalians* WhenGermansupervisionbegan,
theautonomousState ofCroatiaalreadyhaditsownCroatian
administrationand,intheruralpolioeandcitypolice,its
ownexecutiveagencies,tosupportwhichUstashaforoesatood
ready*
ForthoGerman-Croatianpolloeorganization,whiohnad
tobenewlyactivated,therightthingthereforewouldhave
beentoassumethosemissionswhiohCroatianagenoleswere
notcapable ofhandling,namely,anti-partisanactivities.
Theorganisationshouldhavebeenshapedspecificallyfor
thispurpose* Instead,theorganizationoftheGermanpolioe
InCroatiawasacompromise basedonthenormalpurpose of.a
M3# P-055b -65-
police f ore. , the protection, on the one hand, of the peace- ,
ful ae^ment of the population and, on the other, the wartime
necea; i ty of offensive action against partisans in Croatia
and their eradication if possi bl e. In the activation stage,
the idea of the protective function led to the scattering of
the police force in small units and at places where Croatian
rural police had already been committed for the same purpose,
thereby restri cti ng them to defensive missions*
2. Well directed partisan movements are like a cancerous
growth. Once t hey are recognised aa such, radical counter-
measures must be taken* If the fight i s limited'to tho mere
amputation of a few odd t ent acl es, the growth wi l l oontinue
t o spread rapidly and sooner or l ater wi l l destroy the at -
tacked organism*
It was only gradually recognised that Tito's partisans
had a unified leadership, under which thny worked toward&
posi ti ve goal* The central authorities in itorlln very un-
wi l l i ngl y and hesitantly accepted thi s faot. It did not f i t
i nto the overall pioture desired by top oi rol es. Under the
influence of the decisive defeats on tho eastern front, Berlin
f i rs t took the viewpoint that the si tuati on in Croatia was '
being exaggerated. Nonetheless, in order to do something,
the National Department of Security sent S3 Obergruppecifuehrer
MS I
J
-055b -66-
von der Uaoh-Zalewaicitt, the newly-appolntad Inspector General
for Partisan Operation, to Croatia* he spent two days re-
ceiving voluminous reports and then gave it as hia opinion
that, compared with the eastern front, fighting the partisans
in Croatia waa child
f
a play, pointing out that the partisans
nevor made a stand but ran away whonovfir they were energati-
oally attacked, i t waa the only vi si t that von der liaoh-
Zalewoki paid Croatia, but the consequences of his report
were that the oentrul authorities in itorlln only most re-
luctantly and hesitatingly recognized the unaultablllty of
the i ni ti al organization* When the formation of mobile police
regiments was finally approved, much valuable timo had tieen
lost*
5* In 19413 the participation of the Wehrmucht in com-
batting the partisans consisted of relief operations, which
aimed at ardaohieved a temporary alleviation of the over-all
situation but woro unsatisfactory in their ultimate result
because stops to establish the lasting security of the region
gained in combat did not follow, 30 that the partisans were
able to reoooupy these territories in a very short space of
time and exercise increased pressure on the population*
The objective of every operation against a region that la
already under partisan control must be to secure this region
*Li eutenant general of the 3S*
MS#P-055b -67-
permanently againstpartisanactivity Awell-considered,
limited objective isaoutegorloprerequisiteforsuccess*
Toaimattoomuchwithweakforcesloadatothodissipation
oftheforces,useless sacrificesandfailure
Themission ianotcompletely fulfilledwhenapartisan
diatriothasbeancombed andresistancebroken; itisat
thispoint thatthomoredifficult part ofthajobcommences*
Thepartisansmustbepreventedfromreassembling intheir
oldhideoutsandresumingtheirearlieractivity. Thebeat
meanstoforcethepartifjanaoutoftheiroldresortsisto
occupytheresortsandthusundermine theirpreviousposition
fromtheinside* Ifthissucceeds,theysoonlose organized
controlandstrikingpower. Themajority ofthepartisans
weremenwhohadbeenrecruited compulsorily fromthe immediate
vicinity* Ifthepartisanspermanently lostafocalregion,
many ofthesemembers revertedtopeacefulvillagelife.
Smalldetachmentsandindividualsoouldhavebeenhunted
downbyspecialunits,andthepopulationwouldhaveparti-
olpated inthishunt,justastheysupported the advanoes
intopartisanterritoryaslongastheyoouldhopethatthe
Germanswouldremain intheraidedarea*
, 4.0Justaoistheoasewithairdefense andohemical
warfare,anti-partisanactionisaspeoifiofieldwithinthe
overalloonduot ofwar* Itrequiresoo-operationbetweenthe
MS//P-05ftb 68-
armedforces,thepolice andthenationaladministration
inthecountryaffected. Thesooneraysternatioworkbegins,
thegreaterwillbethechancea ofsuccess. Thenecessary
collaborationmustbesecurely organisedbeforepartisan
battalionsareformed.
Sincepartisans.ppearonlyinoccupiedterritories,it
isadvisable toorganize aplanningstafffortherespective
territorybefore itisoccupied. Thepreparatorydutiesof
thisbodywouldbetooolleotreports,toinvestigate local
conditionsand tomake available thenecessary tacticalunits.
Uponoccupation oftheterritory,thisstaffmusttakeall
measurestocombatpartisansandtoexecutethesemeasures
untilthefinalobjcotlve inhabitingtheterritory* TheOer-
raangeneralaoorodlted tothegovernment inZagrebwasnotgiven
enoughauthority,andthe Armeogruppe*inBelgradehadmore
pressingproblems*
5* Thopeculiarnatureofpartisanwarfarerequirethe
followingorganizationalarrangements:
a. Aquloklyandreliablyfunctioning communication
nettooolleotandevaluatereportsfrom thetroops committed
toaction,fromtheadministration thathadbeensetupand
from thothreatenedpopulation,andtosupplementtheaere-
portebyinformationgathered throughitsownchannels.
# A reinforcedcorps.
MS//P-055b -69-
b* 3poolultroops^a^dtruppenj?whlohoanbe
thrownintothethreatenedareaatthefirstsignofpartisan
activity. Theaetroopsdonotrequirealongperiodofmill-*
tarytrainingbutaremoateffectiveiftheyequalorif
possibleexofllthepartisansinmobility,self-sufficiency,
camouflagingabilityandinstinct* Membersoftheindigenous
populationarouseful,sincetheyhavebasicsimilarities
withthepartisansinmanyreopeotcandarofamiliarwiththe
looolity. Theweaponsandequipmentoftheaetroopsshouldbe
aslightaspossible*
c* Awelltrainedandwellequippedmotorizedooa-
batforoe,tobreakresistance. Thisforcemustbesoorgan-
izedthatitcanbeusedeffectivelyeveninverysmallunits*
Oftenonlyamachinegunnestwillblockaroadorprevent
theremovalofaroodobstaole,andasmalldetaohmentwith
oneortwogunsandasectionofengineers,accompanyingthe
advance/juardofaoulumn,willcufficeforthespeedyremoval
ofsuchblocks* Paokanimalsareusefulforoperationsin
mountainousterritory4 Insteadofpackanimals,theparti-
sonsusedprisonersofwarandthecivilianpopulation,in-
cludingwomenandchildren*
6. IftheGerman-Croatianpoliceweretohavefulfilled
themissionlistedunder5,b,above,thegendarmoandpolice
MS//P-055b -69-
b* Speolultroops/JagdtrupyonJwhichoanbe
thrownintothethreatenedareaatthefirstsignofportloan
aotivity. Theaetroopsdonotrequirealongperiodofmili-
tarytrainingbutaremoateffeotlveiftheyequalorif
possibleexoolthepartisansinmobility,self-sufficiency,
camouflagingabilityandinstinct. Membersoftheindigenous
populationarcuseful,sincetheyhavebasicsimilarities
withthepartisansinmanyrespectsandarefamiliarwiththe
locality Theweaponsandequipmentofthesetroopsshouldbe
aslightaspossible*
c* Awelltrainedandwellequippedmotorizedooa-
batforce,tobreakresistance. Thisforoomustbesoorgan-
izedthatitoanbeusedeffectivelyoveninverysmallunits*
Oftenonlyamachinegunnestwillblockaroadorprevent
theremovalofaroadobstacle,andasmalldetaohmentwith
oneortwogunsandasectionofengineers,accompanyingthe
advance/juardofaoulumn,willsufficeforthespeedyremoval
ofsuchblocks* Paokanimalsareusefulforoperationsin
mountainousterritory4 Insteadofpackanimals,theparti-
sansusedprisonersofwarandtheoivillanpopulation,in-
cludingwomenandchildren*
6* XftheGerman-Croatianpoliceweretohavefulfilled
themissionlistedunder5,b,above,thegendarmeandpolice
MS // P-05Sb -70-
offloero and sergeants arriving from Germany In batches, as
well as the nowly-roorultod Croatian personnel, ahould not
have bron distributed amon,^ polio* companion whioh wore per-
forming sentry duty or amon^ even smaller uni ts, but rather
should have been held together in a polion training battal i on.
The compact battalion unit la the bent guarantee that the
training objective wi l l be attained. The battalion commander
can completely devote hlmaelf to this task in dally co-operat-
ion with the companion.. The battalion typo unit alao makes
possible a much bettor ut i l i zat i on of time, alnco tb<* aeourity
and labor services scarcely require more poraonnol for a
whole battalion than for a single company.
7. Onoo training battalions have been assembled at the
headquarters centers, they must be transferred to nowly
cleared partisan terri tory, the &roon troopa from the very
outset must Qdjuot themselves completely to the pecul i ari ti es
1
partisan warfare, even i f there i s no immediate danger*
The sooner ^rean troopa abaorb the i nsti ncti ve awarenwss of
danger that i s a feature of partisan proximity, the sooner
wi l l they bo serviceable for offnaive partisan combat
8. Tho characteri sti cs essenti al in troops whose Job
la to combat and eradicate partisans are frugal i ty, readiness
for action at short notice, resouroofulnesa in forest and
mountain areas and readiness to engage in man-to-man oombat*
213#P-055b -71-
Thebesttrainingaroalathedangerzonej thebeattrain-
ingmedium isdanger.
Trainingmuatbeginwithsafeguardingofbillets,super-
visionoftheimmediate vicinity,sottingoftrapsandam-
bushes,exercises infeintingmovementsandlarge-soale
patrolstotrackdownpartisanhide-outs. Thefirstthingto
bepracticed isproficiency inwhatwillbeessentialinthis
typeofwork* formaltraining,towhichtheGom a n UQ0in
partialasrerainiaoent ofhisownpeacetime training,should
takeapositionofsecondary importance./apsinthe train-
ingwillbegradually eliminated. Inthistypeoftraining,
individualcasualtiesduringtheinstructionperiodroustbe
aooepted asanunavoidablehazard. Lackofsupplytrains,
andprimitive quarters intemporary billetsofblvouaoks
shouldbethenormalformoflifeforthese troops* Offloors
andNCO'swhooannotadaptthemselvestosuchaguerilla-
likeexistencemustbeculled out ruthlessly.
Excellent rationsmustcompensateforotherprivations,
andrecreationandrelaxationunderurbanconditionsmustbe
providedatregularintervals* Throughremaininginthe
dangerzone,agreenunitofthistypewilldevelop initially
intowhatmightbeoalledaforestrangeroorps/vTaldaufklae-
rungskorp^. Itstransformation intoadisciplined aervioo
unit,sofarasoutwardappearance isconcerned,mustbe
reversed fortherecreationalsojourns inthecity*
MS#P-55b -72-
Itahould notbofelt that suchalife Istoomuch
tobeexpected ofgreentroopa. Itwouldhave succeeded
inCroatia. Themajority ofthaCroatianpersonnelwas
already familiarwithauohalife inoneforn oranother.
Itwasnewonlytothemajority oftheGermanleaders. How-
ever,what thepartiaanamanaged thetroopacommitted tocom-
batthemshould alaohavebeenable toaccomplish. There
were officersaraon^theruralpolicewhowerefittedfor
suchaotivlty. Selection should nothavebeenbased on
seniority* Inaddition,there shouldhavebeenaversatile
training Inspector,thoroughly conversantwithexistin/3con-
ditions,whowould notm*rslyhave Inspected butratherwould
have sharedthe life ofsuchabattalionforthreeorfour
daysat&time,and issued nowritten ordersbutratherad-
visedthe battalioncommander. Therewouldhavebeencertain
difficulties tosurmount,especially inreapnot tosupply
andadministration, buttheyv/ouldhavebeennogreaterthan
inafront sector. Placed inapositionwhere theyare com-
pelled tofendforthemselves,Qreentroopswilllearnin
fourweeksthings that they neverlearnincitygarrisons,or
learnonlywhentheirpost issurrounded andtheyareanni-
hilated intheirfirst battle.
M3 ,/ P-056b - 7 3 -
THE BILO COflA OPERATION AS A TEST CASE
Sket ch 2)
AftertroopsinthestrengthofaWehrmaohtdivision
hadbeenmobilizedforthopenetrationassaultontheBilo
goraandtheFapuk,theoperationshouldhavebeensxeouted
notasareliefbutratherasamoppingupaction. ISeoldea
themilitarymeasures,thepreparationsforthe operation
shouldhave includedplanstoinsurethatonoopartisanre-
sistancehadbeenovercometheterritorycoveredwouldnot
againfallintopartisanhands* Effective combat units
shouldhavebe*nleftintheoperationszoneuntilitwas
sufficientlyseouredagalnnt immediate rooccupationbythe
partisans*
Thepreviousprotective systemfortheoutlyingvillage*
aroundtheoperationszoneshouldhavebeenabandonedtempo-
rarily,andallavailablecompanioaoftheQermarwCroatian
policeshouldhavebeenconsolidatedinbattalions,which
shouldhavebeentransferredtothepartisanquartersinthe
BilogoraandthePapuk. Adequatenumberaoftroopscould
havebeensparedforauohanoccupation* ThoGerman-Croatian
policeevenatthebeginningoftheoperationnumberedsome
10,000men. Ifwoassumethata-trainingregimentwouldhave
oontainedthreebattalions,eachbattalionhavingfourcom-
143//P-055b 74.
.jpaniea of120- 130riflemon,everymanarmedwitheither
ftrifle orasubmachine gun,tworegimentswouldhavere-
quired fewerthen3500officers andmen. Sinoe recruiting
inCroatiaprogressed quickly,thiscommitment wouldhave
beenoffset byreplacements intwomonths atthemoat*
Oneregiment couldhavebeenactivatedfromthe district
ofZagrebandcouldhaveestablished itselfinthe villages
ofZrinsky,Plsanloa velikiandPisanioamail. The otherre*
gimentwouldhave hadtobeassembled fromthegarrisons of
the Osijekdistrictandbilleted inthePapukmountains,the
terrain onthePapukplateaubeing ideally suitedforatroop
drillground andartillery range* Toactivate thetworegi-
mentswouldhavecalledforamasterpiece of improvisation*
Thisnecessity wouldnothave arisen if,from the outset,
newrecruitshadbeenretained intrainingbattalions instead
ofbo ingdistributed amongthedetached companies,v/heretheir
effectiveness waablunted intraining and labor services*
Acommander shouldhavebeenappointed tocontrolall
unitswhichremained inthecombed area bodislodge thepar-
tisans,andhismissionwouldhave been,withalarge degroe
ofindependence,totakeallsuitable- measurestoprevent
reoccupation ofthearea bythepartisans* Anylooality and
region inwhichtheformation ofanewpartisannucleuswaa
reported shouldhavebeenocoupied immediately byasufficiently
v.s if p-os:;b -75-
atrong troop unit and an interrogation ^roup of the 3i> ao-
curity servi ce, whioh oould thn have ben withdrawn in a
rel ati vel y short while. During thi s time, food and so forth
could have boen requisitioned l ocal l y.
Further Plana
With the tfllo gora and Papuk secured, the clearance of
the Uoslavaoka ^ora and the Pounjo would no longer have bean
very di f f i cul t . Uow polloo training battalions would have
had t o be sent up to thia area* The Fruaka &ora was likewise
a minor objective* i f the unification of the partisan forces
hod boon prevented permanently in theso areaa, the entire
region between the Drava and the Save to a great extent would
have been fliocura agalnat partisan influence. Availablo forces
would have had to mop up the ^ave 1owlandu and establ i sh
themselves as a barrier before the Bosnian mountains. The
clearing of the00 mountains required separate plans based on
new premises*
Tho Croatian Population
The treatment of tho native population required careful
oonaldo'ratlon. The inhabitants of the villagea along the
borders of partisan territory received l i t t l e protection from
tho Gorman-Croatian police uni t s. If thoy temporarily
auoaurnbed to partisan influence, thi s was a condoquenoe of
WS^ P-055b -76
thei r defenseleflsness* The population within the partisan
terri tory auocmubod to absolute oooroion. To regard them
col l ect i vel y aa criminal partners o the partisans was
neither just nor wise*
/ a / Karl Ualaser
SKETCH1
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