09-08-09 Memo in Support

MEMORANDUM IN LAWS SUPPORT TO:
INSTRUCTIONS FOR LAWFUL EXEMPTIONS

&
DOT 1xxxxxx
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARACTER
DERIVATION OF DUE PROCESS
RESCISSION OF DRIVERS LICENSE
RESCISSION OF DMV REGISTRATIONS
CHRISTOPHER J. SUMMERS
AUTHORIZED AGENT
John A. Smith
123 Main Street
San Diego [95102]
Secured party
Plaintiff/beneficiary to:
The US Trust
Authorized representative
P.A.G. 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983
To:
Department of the Motor Vehicle et. al
Coast Guard Stationed in California et. al
Department of Transportation et. al
California Governor et al
Attorney General California et al
Official Notice Requested (West's Ann.Cal.Gov. Code (2004),

SECTIONS (11515)
JUDICIAL NOTICE REQUIRED
(West's Ann. Cal. Evid. Code (2004), sections (451, 453, 459).
" This section [2 of the Motor Vehicle Act] provides that: '... such selfpropelling vehicles as are used neither for the conveyance of persons for hire,
pleasure, or business, nor for the transportation of freight, are hereby
exempted from the payment of the fees in this act prescribed. The department
shall furnish, free of charge, distinguishing plates for motor vehicles thus
exempt.'" Marin Municipal Water Dist. v. Chenu (1922) 188 Cal. 734, 737.
My focus is on how a vested common Right of personal Liberty (usually called

exercising the right of free passage upon the public Right of Way in a "horseless
carriage"), protected by the Constitution for the United States and by the Constitution of
California, supposedly became transformed into a grantable/revocable commercial
"privilege" (usually called "driving" a "motor vehicle" on a "route of transportation") and
on how my "horseless carriage"/"car"/"automobile" may have became someone else's
"motor vehicle".
[The specific statutes and cases I have cited apply ONLY in California, but the pattern
seems to apply in every State in these United States of America.
[I use the form THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA not for emphasis, but to indicate an
entity, which I believe, are doing business in California as a fictitious entity (an
incorporated or un-incorporated Corporation listed on Dunn and Bradstreet for profit).]
[This article documents my informed belief that THE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR
VEHICLES (CALIFORNIA D.M.V.) [a purported California public "agency"], acting
with THE DEPARTMENT OF THE CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL (formerly
The California Highway Patrol; formerly The Enforcement Division of D.M.V.) [another
purported California public "agency"], has successfully Converted, Embezzled, and/or
Extorted legal ownership of billions of automobiles from the People of California since
approximately 1935 to maintain its revenue stream and its control over the People of this
State. It may well be perfectly "legal" within the letter of the statutes, but I believe it is,
and has been since its inception, unlawful within the spirit of the Law.
[I have used square brackets [] to separate my comments from cited material and
boldface for emphasis.
[There is further background material at the end of this article.]

[Attorneys and attorneys-acting-as-judges love 'Statutory' law [THE CALIFORNIA
CODES]. They claim that, in 'Statutory' law, words do not mean what words usually
mean in normal, ordinary, plain, common English. Words in 'Statutory' law are legal
'terms-of-art' which mean exactly and only what they are specifically defined to mean by
each individual statute. And, the attorneys further claim, there does NOT have to be any
consistency between the definition of a term in one CODE Section and the definition of
the same word in another CODE Section. [This is a particularly sneaky form of sleightof-mind or psychological warfare involving deliberately misinterpreting and continually
changing the law. [Fortunately, they are wrong about, at least, the second part:]
In the case of Stillwell v. State Bar (1946), 29 Cal.2d 119, at 123 [173 P.2d 313], the
California Supreme Court expressed the rule of interpretation applicable hereto as
follows: 'It may be presumed that the Legislature, in passing the amendatory legislation,
had in mind the original act (see Robbins v. Omnibus Ry. Co., 32 Cal. 472, 474; 1
Sutherland on Statutory Construction (3rd ed.) Section 1933), and it is a well-established
rule of construction that when a word or phrase has been given a particular scope or
meaning in one part or portion of a law it shall be given the same scope or meaning
in other parts or portions of the law. (Coleman v. City of Oakland, 110 Cal.App. 715
[295 P. 59]; Ransome-Crummey Co. v. Woodhams, 29 Cal.App. 356 [156P. 62].)'
(emphasis added) Sogawa v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1950), 100 Cal.App.2d 181, 187;
223 P.2d 269.
[In order to understand a current CALIFORNIA CODE section, we are thus justified in
going back to the original act of the Legislature as published in The Statutes of California
(after 1881, entitled: The Statutes of California and Amendments to the Codes) to see
how the original act really read and what the term(s) meant in the original context or in
going to the then-contemporaneous references like Bouvier's Law Dictionary or Black's
Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. for the original legal definition of a word or term.
[The acts of the Legislature as published in the form, "An act to ..." in The Statutes of
California and Amendments to the Codes ARE the law. Both West's ANNOTATED
CALIFORNIA CODES and Deering's CALIFORNIA CODES are privately-published
commercial products created by taking the law-as-written and 'codifying' it into various
volumes according to the private-publisher's editors' whim or the Legislature's direction
and by adding annotations to case law. West's ANNOTATED CALIFORNIA CODES is
not "the law" in California; it is prima facie (at first look) evidence of the law and is just
a reference book to help us locate and understand the intent of the actual statutes, which
are the law.
[We also should remember that words-of-art and terms-of-art (whether spoken or written)
and their use and mis-use are the stock-in-trade and the weapons-in-hand of attorneys.]
[Here is a partial result of what THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA has accomplished by
slowly and gradually changing THE VEHICLE CODE in California:]
Section 10751. Levy; trailer coaches; vehicles of banks; application of Vehicle Code
and provisions on vehicle license fee
A license fee is hereby imposed for the privilege of operating upon the public highways
in this state any vehicle of a type which is subject to registration under the Vehicle
Code, or any trailer coach which is required to be moved under permit as authorized in
Section 35790 of the Vehicle Code and which is not subject to local property taxation
pursuant to Part 13 (commencing with Secton 5800) of Division 1. ...
West's Ann.Cal.Rev. & Tax. Code (2003), sec. 10751 (emphasis added).
Section 10702. Vehicle "Vehicle" means every vehicle subject to registration under
the Vehicle Code. West's Ann.Cal.Rev. & Tax. Code (2003), sec. 10702 (emphasis
added).
[THE VEHICLE CODE, sec. 4000(a)(1) claims that you MUST "Register" a motor
vehicle. This section is the kingpin of the statutory scheme which I believe has been
perpetrated upon most of us. DMV may be legally justified in its application of
"registration" to commercially-used "motor vehicles"; however, many automobiles used
in California are not properly "motor vehicles", they are just "household goods and
effects" used to carry their owners and their property from place to place along the public
right-of-way.]
Section 4000. Registration required; offs treet parking facility; compliance with
vehicle air pollution control provisions; exceptions; driver's license as rebuttable
presumption of ownership
(a)(1). No person shall drive, move, or leave standing upon a highway, or in an offstreet
public parking facility, any motor vehicle, trailer, semi-trailer, pole or pipe dolly, or
logging dolly unless it is registered and the apppropriate fees have been paid under this
code or registered under the permanent trailer identification program, except that an offhighway motor vehicle which displays an identification plate or device issued by the
department pursuant to Section 38010 may be driven, moved, or left standing in an off
street parking facility without being registered or paying registration fees.
(g). For the purposes of this section, possession of a California driver's license by the
registered owner of a vehicle shall give rise to a rebuttable presumption that the owner
is a resident of California. West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), 4000 (emphasis
added).
I believe that several legal booby-traps are incorporated into this VEHICLE CODE
section:
A. My Personal Status.
[There is much confusion in legal contemplation over what a "person" is.
[If we could establish clearly once-and-for-all that a "person" [whether 'individual',
'partnership', 'association', or 'corporation'] was always a fictitious entity, then the
concept would be easier to comprehend. So far, I cannot prove that; but I can strongly
suspect it.]
Currently, THE VEHICLE CODE defines "person" as:
Section 470. Person
"Person" includes a natural person, firm, copartnership, association, limited liability
company, or corporation. West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), section 470.
[If "possession of a California driver's license by the registered owner of a vehicle shall
give rise to a rebuttable presumption that the owner is a resident of California" (Veh.
Code, sec. 4000(g)), I need to inquire into what a "resident" is supposed to be.
[When someone else wishes to presume to label me as an "anything", my experience
indicates that the presumption almost always benefits that someone else to my detriment
and that I likely do not want to be labled as whatever that presumption represents.]
I researched "rebuttable presumption": rebuttable presumption.
See PRESUMPTION.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, SEVENTH ED. (1999), p. 1274.
presumption. A legal inference or assumption that a fact exists, based on the known or
proven existence of some other fact or group of facts. Most presumptions are rules of
evidence calling for a certain result in a given case unless the adversely affected party
overcomes it with other evidence. A presumption shifts the burden of production or
persuasion to the opposing party, who can then attempt to overcome the presumption. ...
rebuttable presumption. An inference drawn from certain facts that establish a prima
facie case, which may be overcome by the introduction of contrary evidence. -- Also
termed prima facie presumption; disputable presumption; conditional presumption;
presumptio juris. Cf. conclusive presumption. Ibid., pp. 1203-1205.
presume, vb. To assume beforehand; to suppose to be true in the absence of proof. Id.,
p. 1203.
Assume. To pretend. To undertake; engage; promise. To take upon oneself. Also taking
up, receiving, adopting, taking to oneself, or to put on deceitfully, take appearance of,
affect, or outwardly seem. To take on, become bound as another is bound, or put oneself
in place of another as to an obligation or liability. [citation omitted] See also
Assumption. (emphasis added)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, SIXTH ED. (13th
Reprint, 1999), p. 122.
[Then I researched the statutory definition of "resident".]
516. Resident
"Resident" means any person who manifests an intent to live or be located in this state on
more than a temporary or transient basis. Presence in the state for six months or more in
any 12-month period gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of residency.
The following are evidence of residency for purposes of vehicle registration:
(a) Address where registered to vote.
(b) Location of employment or place of business.
(c) Payment of resident tuition at a public institution of higher education.
(d) Attendance of dependents at a primary or secondary school.
(e) Filing a homeowner's property tax exemption.
(f) Renting or leasing a home for use as a residence.

(g) Declaration of residency to obtain a license or any other privilege or benefit not
ordinarily extended to a nonresident.
(h) Possession of a California driver's license.
(i) Other acts, occurrences, or events that indicate presence in the state is more than
temporary or transient.
West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), sec. 516.
[The following two items, taken together, seem really odd to me:]
ALIENS
Resident aliens,
Drivers licenses, applications, Veh sec. 12801
West's Ann.Cal.Codes, 2003 GENERAL INDEX, A to C, p. 330.
12801. Applications; driver's license; social security numbers; display not
allowed (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the department shall require
every application for a driver's license to contain the applicant's social security number
and any other number or identifier determined to be appropriate by the
department. Notwithstanding any other law, the social security number collected on a
driver's license application shall not be displayed on the driver's license, including, but
not limited to, inclusion on any magnetic tape or strip used to store data on the
license. West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), sec.12801.
[Unless I have badly mis-intrepreted something, I can now reasonably infer from the
immediately preceding information that the holder of a social security number is
presumed to be a resident alien.]
13407. Resident or resident decedent
"Resident" or "resident decedent" means a decedent who was domiciled in California at
his or her death.
West's Ann.Cal.Rev. & Tax. Code (2004), sec. 13407.
[In the foregoing, if I am a "resident", am I presumed to be dead?]
Administrative Code References
[Domicile, defined, see 2 Cal. Code of Regs. Sec. 1138.25.]
West's Ann. Cal.Rev. & Tax. Code (2004), sec. 13407, note.
1138.25. Domicile (a) "Domicile" is the one location with which for legal purposes a
person is considered to have the most settled and permanent connection, the place where
he intends to remain, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of
returning, but which the law may also assign to him constructively. Domicile is acquired
by: (1) birth, (2) operation of law, (3) choice. (in part) 2 Barclays California Code of
Regulations, Chapter 2, State Controller, Sub-chapter 6.5, Rules and Regulations
Relating to California Estate Tax, Article 2, sec. 1138.25 (1996).
[When I was a 'REGISTERED VOTER', I had told THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, by

the built-in structure of the 'VOTER REGISTRATION AFFIDAVIT', that I was not a
Citizen of California, but a 'U.S. CITIZEN' currently 'RESIDENT' in 'THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA'.
Then I found this information:
Legal definitions of 'The United States' from the United States Code:
[Note: 'the several States' mentioned in several sections is the Union of these united
States of America. [Since I could not determine for myself from West's United States
Code Annotated which 'UNITED STATES' I was claiming to be a CITIZEN of, I
cancelled my 'VOTER REGISTRATION AFFIDAVIT' because I didn't want to be lying
on my Voter Registration card. I stopped claiming to be a 'U.S. CITIZEN' (whatever that
term means). I determined that I probably wasn't, and didn't want to be considered as, a
'RESIDENT' of anywhere.]
For more information, see: Idem Sonans: The Game of the Name.
B. The Legal Status of what I thought was my property.
[Then I may have unknowingly turned my privately-purchased and, I thought, privatelyowned vehicle into a DMV-owned or -controlled "motor vehicle":
[The problem here is that many of the people of California probably did not intentionally
purchase a "motor vehicle" (a automobile knowingly purchased with the intention that it
be used for commercial purposes in the transportation of persons or property for hire). I
thought I bought a vehicle (or an automobile) for my own private household and pleasure
use; do not regularly use it as a 'motor vehicle'; and have been mis-informed by D.M.V.
and the vehicle dealers into "registering" it as a "motor vehicle". Generally, someone
knowingly purchasing and using his/her vehicle for business purposes is likely to know
that.]
1. There are at least six non-identical definitions of "motor vehicle" in THE
CALIFORNIA CODES:
[a] sec. 415. Motor vehicle
(a) A "motor vehicle" is a vehicle that is self-propelled.
(b) "Motor vehicle" does not include a self-propelled wheelchair, invalid tricycle, or
motorized quadricycle when operated by a person who, by reason of physical disability,
is otherwise unable to move about as a pedestrian. West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003),
sec. 415.
[b] sec. 2981. Definitions As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise
requires: . . . (k) "Motor vehicle" means any vehicle required to be registered under
the Vehicle Code which is bought for the use primarily for personal or family purposes,
and does not mean any vehicle which is bought for use primarily for business or
commercial purposes or a mobilehome, as defined in Section 18008 of the Health and
Safety Code which is sold on or after July 1, 1981. "Motor vehicle" does not include any
trailer which is sold in conjunction with a vessel and which comes within the definition
of "goods" under Section 1802.1. West's Ann.Cal.Civ. Code (2003), sec. 2981
(emphasis added).
[c] sec. 2985.7. Definitions (a) "Motor vehicle" means any vehicle required to be
registered under the Vehicle Code. Motor vehicle does not include any trailer which is
sold in conjunction with a vessel. West's Ann.Cal.Civ. Code (2003), sec. 2985.7
(emphasis added).
[d] sec. 7325. Motor vehicle "Motor vehicle" includes every self propelled vehicle
operated or suitable for operation on the highway, except a vehicle used exclusively on
stationary rails or tracks. West's Ann.Cal.Rev.& Tax. Code (2003), sec. 7325 (emphasis
added).
[e] sec. 8603. Motor vehicle As used in this part "motor vehicle" includes every selfpropelled vehicle operated or suitable for operation on the highway, except a vehicle
used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks. West's Ann.Cal.Rev. & Tax. Code
(2003), sec. 8603 (emphasis added).
[f] sec. 383.6. Scope of phrase "motor vehicle" or "motor vehicles" The phrase
"motor vehicle" or "motor vehicles" as used in section 383.5 includes, but is not limited
to: (a) Trailers, house trailers, mobilehomes, campers and all other wheeled vehicles or
nonwheeled structures so made as to be capable of being moved as a compatible portion
thereof, or trailed behind, any motor vehicle as that term is defined in the Vehicle Code,
whether in immobile position or not. (b) Motorcycles, motorbikes and motor scooters,
except powered bicycles not manufactured for inclusion of a motor. West's Ann.Cal.Ins.
Code (2003), sec. 383.6.
[Now, from the conflicting definitions, how am I supposed to know whether I bought a
motor vehicle or not? I have been unable to find in any Statute, any VEHICLE CODE
Section, or any Regulation adopted under the authority of the CODE which tells me
clearly and explicitly which makes, types, years, or models of vehicle are "required to
be registered under the Vehicle Code" (Civ. Code, sec. 2985.7). I would reasonably
expect that after over 50 years of THE VEHICLE CODE supposedly being in effect,
there would be such a listing readily available somewhere.]
2. To the extent that Federal law supersedes state law, here is the Federal position:
The accompanying definitional provision, 18 U.S.C. section 31, defines "motor
vehicle" as a carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and
used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers,
passengers and property, or property or cargo[.]
Section 31 also defines "used for commercial purposes" as the: carriage of persons or
property for any fare, fee, rate, charge, or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in
connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit. (emphasis added)
United States v. Lowe (1995), 65 F.3d. 1137, 1142; cert. den. 136 L.Ed.2d 13, 117 S.Ct.
49 (1996).
Sec. 31132. Definitions In this subchapter [Title 49, U.S.C.A., Ch. 311, sub ch. III]-(1) "commercial motor vehicle" means a self-propelled or towed vehicle used on the
highways in interstate commerce to transport passengers or property, if the vehicle-- (A)
has a gross vehicle weight rating or gross vehicle weight of at least 10,001 pounds,
whichever is greater; (B) is designed or used to transport more than 8 passengers
(including the driver) for compensation; (C) is designed or used to transport more than
15 passengers, including the driver, and is not used to transport passengers for
compensation; or (D) is used in transporting material found by the Secretary of
Transportation to be hazardous under section 5103 of this title and transported in a
quantity requiring placarding under regulations prescribed by the Secretary under section
5103. . . . 49 U.S.C.A., sec. 31132
Sec. 31141. Review and preemption of State laws and regulations (a) Preemption
after decision.-- A State may not enforce a State law or regulation on commercial motor
vehicle safety that the Secretary of Transportation decides under this section may not be
enforced. (b) Submission of regulation. -- A State receiving funds made available
under section 31104 that enacts a State law or issues a regulation on commercial motor
vehicle safety shall submit a copy of the law or regulation to the Secretary immediately
after the enactment or issuance. . . . 49 U.S.C.A., sec. 31141
[So, under 'standing' United States statutory and case law, the terms "motor vehicle" and
"commercial motor vehicle" mostly describe a vehicle used for commercial purposes. I
can infer from my own experience that the terms would properly include road tractors
and trailers, delivery trucks or vans, moving vans, tour buses, privately-owned school
buses, taxi-cabs, limousines, etc.
[And those motor vehicles, which really are exercising the privilege of using the public
highways as a place of business by transporting persons or property for profit or gain,
really can be legitimately licensed under the Federal authority to regulate interstate
commerce or under the state's authority to regulate intrastate commerce.]
C. How it may have been done:
[This portion is informed speculation and presumes that 'the government' has done
something similar to 'bundling' and 'securitizing' the Titles to the various "motor
vehicles" which have been "registered" with it.]
Legal versus Equitable Ownership of a Vehicle.
1) [The legal Title to a vehicle seems to be evidenced by a collection of pieces of paper

which taken-together represent the vehicle.
2) [Theoretically, at least, all these Documents physically collected together and in the
buyer's physical possession are the Title to the vehicle.]
3) The Uniform Commercial Code, current successor to the former Negotiable
Instruments Act and portions of the Civil Code, defines "document of title":
Sec. 1201. General definitions
(15) "Document of title" includes a bill of lading, dock warrant, dock receipt, warehouse
receipt, gin ticket, or compress receipt, and any other document that, in the regular course
of business or financing, is treated as adequately evidencing that the person entitled under
the document (Section 7403(4)) has the right to receive, hold, and dispose of the
document and the goods it covers. To be a document of title, a document must purport to
be issued by a bailee and purport to cover goods in the bailee's possession that either are
identified as or are fungible portions of an identified mass.
West's Ann.Cal.Comm. Code, sec. 1201 (15).
[In the following case, notice the cynical conceit that someone could legally "prune
away" any "rights, duties, powers and immunities" of anyone else without themselves
committing crimes in the process:]
There are no property rights innate in objects themselves. Such rights as there are are in
certain persons as against others with respect to the particular objects in question. Since
property or title is a complex bundle of rights, duties, powers and immunities, the
pruning away of some or a great many of these elements does not entirely destroy the
title as pointed out by Professor Hohfeld in "Fundamental Legal Conceptions", 23 Yale
Law Journal, 16; 11 Cal. Law Review, 369. Also in 11 Cal. Law Review, at page et seq.
369, is found a very fine discussion of the rights of a possessor in contraband property,
and the conclusion is there reached that sufficient attributes of ownership are found in the
article to constitute something real and tangible.(emphasis added) People v. Walker
(1939), 33 Cal.App.2d 18, 20.
[I believe the following types of documents are the Documents of Title described in the
Commercial Code:]
1. The Manufacturer's Certificate/Statement of Origin.
[This is a piece of paper containing a physical description of the vehicle and the
identifying number(s) of the new vehicle, together with a statement to the effect that the
manufacturer has assembled this vehicle from new parts; that the vehicle never existed
before and so is new; and that the manufacturer has assigned a identification number to it.
[The following section was the last mention in THE VEHICLE CODE of a
Manufacturer's Certificate of Origin for trailer coaches and has since been repealed. But it
was there once; so THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA cannot claim it did not recognize
Manufacturer's Certificates of Origin at one time.]
Sec. 5350.3. No trailer coach manufactured on or after the effective date of this section,
shall be sold or offered for sale in this state, unless such trailer coach has been issued,
upon completion of the manufacturing process, a certificate of origin, on a form
approved by the department, which contains the following:
(a) The name and address of the manufacturer.
(b) The trade name of the unit.
(c) The series or model name of the unit.
(d) The shipping weight of the unit.
(e) The width and height of the unit.
(f) The serial number of the unit.
(g) The date that the ownership was transferred from the manufacturer and to whom the
ownership was transferred.
(h) A certification of facts signed by a responsible agent of the manufacturer.
Stats. 1972, ch. 672, p. 1255, 1; repealed Stats. 1985, ch. 426, p. 1690, sec. 1.
Sec. 671. Vehicle identification number A "vehicle identification number" is the
motor number, serial number, or other distinguishing number, letter, mark, character, or
datum, or any combination thereof, required or employed by the manufacturer or the
department for the purpose of uniquely identifying a motor vehicle or motor vehicle part
or for the purpose of registration. (Added by Stats. 1993, ch. 386, Sec. 2.) West's
Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), sec. 671.
[Since there wasn't even a legal definition of a "V.I.N." until 1993, there is legally NO
Vehicle Identification Number (V.I.N.) on my pre-1993 vehicle. There is generally a
Manufacturer's "Chassis" or "Factory" Number on a vehicle, the serial number, which
number is used by The D.M.V. as a V.I.N.]
2. The Invoice for the vehicle.
[This is a piece of paper which transfers legal possession (and ownership when the
invoice is marked on its face "Paid in Full") of the vehicle from the manufacturer to the
New Car Dealer (vendor or retailer). The invoice contains a physical description of the
vehicle and the unique identifying number assigned to the vehicle by the manufacturer;
the price at which the manufacturer is billing the dealer, and the designation of the person
who is entitled to receive the vehicle. You may have seen it or something purporting to
be it on the window of a new vehicle. Probably the real invoice or Bill of Lading is in the
dealer's files for that vehicle or is held by the dealer's bank or other creditor. [There is at
least the possibility that the dealer never really owned the vehicle he is "selling" to you; it
may be owned by the manufacturer, a bank, or other lender; and merely consigned onto
the dealer's lot and displayed or offered for sale there.]
3.A. The Bill of Lading or Waybill.
[This is a piece of paper which legally transfers the vehicle into the temporary possession
of a common carrier (onto, and off of, either a truck transport or a railway transport) to
transport (physically move in commerce) it from the manufacturer's plant to the initial
dealer's place of business.]
(6) "Bill of lading" means a document evidencing the receipt of goods for shipment
issued by a person engaged in the business of transporting or forwarding goods, and that,
by its terms, evidences the intention of the issuer that the person entitled under the
document (Section 7403(4)) has the right to receive, hold, and dispose of the document
and the goods it covers. Designation of a document by the issuer as a "bill of lading" is
conclusive evidence of that intention. "Bill of lading" includes an airbill. "Airbill" means
a document serving for air transportation as a bill of lading does for marine or rail
transportation, and includes an air consignment note or air waybill.
West's Ann.Cal.Comm. Code (2003), sec. 1201(6).
"It has been stated that a bill of lading performs 3 functions, serving as (1) a receipt for
the goods, (2) a contract for carriage of goods and (3) evidence of title to the goods. In
the matter of Bills of Lading 52, I.C.C. 671 (1919)." West's Ann.Cal.Comm. Code
(2002), sec.. 7301, California Code Comment 1.
It is well settled that a bill of lading represents the property for which it has been
given, and by its endorsement or by delivery without indorsement the property in the
goods may be transfered, when such is the intent with which the indorsement of delivery
is made. It was so determined in Lickbarrow v. Mason, [an English case] decided by the
House of Lords in 1793. (See 1 Smith's Lead. Cas., 1058; see also Merchants' Bank v.
Union R. R. and Transportation Co., 69 N. Y. 376; City Bank v. Rome, etc. R. Co. 44 id.,
136; Holmes v. German Security Bank, 87 P. St. 525: Emery's Sons v. Irving National
Bank, 25 Ohio St., 366; Civil Code, sections 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131,
2132.) In the last case cited the law is thus stated: "By the rules of commercial law, bills
of lading are regarded as symbols of the property therein described, and the delivery
of such bill by one having an interest in or a right to control the property is equivalent to
a delivery of the property itself. A consignor who has reserved the jus disponendi may
effectuate a sale or pledge of the property consigned by delivery of the bill of sale to the
purchaser or pledgee, as completely as if the property were in fact delivered." (25 Ohio
St. 366.) [The words "bill of sale" in the above sentence should, maybe, be "bill of
lading." The context suggests this.] In the case cited from 69 N. Y. it is said: "Bills of
lading are choses in action, and no rule is better established than that instruments of this
character may be transfered for a valuable consideration by delivery only." (69 N. Y.
379.)... The indorsee for value of a bill of lading which has been delivered to him may
bring an action in his own name for the goods, though he can not generally bring an
action on that instrument in his own name. (Thompson v. Dominy, 14 M. & W. 402;
Dows v. Cobb, 12 Barb. 316; Blanchard v. Page, 8 Gray, 298.) Dodge v. Meyer (1882),
61 Cal. 405, 416-417.
3.B. The Shipping Manifest or Air Bill.
[This is a piece of paper which would legally transfer the vehicle into the possession of
different common carriers, a ship or a cargo airplane respectively, to physically move it
from the manufacturer to the dealer. (Both seem to have been replaced with a Bill of
Lading.)]
4.A. The Customs Declaration.
4.B. The Customs Clearance.
4.C. The Receipt for Customs Duties Paid.
[I haven't found any reference to these documents on the state level, so do not know that
they exist. Theoretically, these are pieces of paper which combined together should
constitute Evidence of the Legal Entry and Legal Presence of the vehicle from a foreign
country into the United States of America.]
5. One or more Warehouse Receipt(s).
[This piece of paper legally transfers possession of the vehicle from a warehouseman to
the next party in the chain of custody. A warehouseman provides secure (bonded) storage
for a fee to an owner(s) of property that the warehouseman stores but does not actually
own.
(44) "Warehouse receipt" means a document evidencing the receipt of goods for
storage issued by a warehouseman (Section 7102), and that, by its terms, evidences the
intention of the issuer that the person entitled under the document (Section 7403(4)) has
the right to receive, hold, and dispose of the document and the goods it covers.
Designation of a document by the issuer as a "warehouse receipt" is conclusive evidence
of that intention.
(h) "Warehouseman" is a person engaged in the business of storing goods for
hire. West's Ann.Cal.Comm. Code (2003), sec. 7102(1)(h).
[See West's Ann.Cal.Comm. Code, sec. 7201-7210 for further explanations.]
6.A. A Bill of Sale
[Theoretically, the bill of sale should be the highest evidence of the ownership of a
vehicle. This is a piece of paper which lawfully transfers Possession, Ownership, and
Title of the vehicle from the seller (vendor) to the buyer (vendee) upon payment of
money or transfer of a "valuable consideration".]
Sec. 1880.1. Definitions
As used in this chapter:
(f) "Bill of sale" means a written instrument, conforming to the requirements of this
chapter, which evidences a transfer of grain. (emphasis added) West's Ann.Cal.Civ.
Code (2003), sec. 1880.1.(f). sec. 7893. Sale procedure; bill of sale or deed;
disposition of unsold portion, risk At the sale the Controller or his or her authorized
agent shall sell the property in accordance with law and the notice and shall deliver to the
purchaser a bill of sale for the personal property and a deed for any real property sold.
The bill of sale or deed vests title in the purchaser. ... West's Ann.Cal.Rev. & Tax. Code
(2003), sec. 7893.
6.B. Or A Conditional Sales Contract
[This is a piece of paper which legally transfers possession of the vehicle to the original
buyer, and ownership and Title to the Legal Owner (the bank or other person providing
the money) until such time as the original buyer fully discharges the obligation of
payment to the Legal Owner. Then possession, ownership, and Title should pass to the
buyer.]
[D.M.V. claims that vehicle ownership is not controlled by the Uniform Commercial
Code, but under the "more-specific" Automobile Sales Finance Act (West's Ann.Cal.Civ.
Code, sec. 2891 et seq.) See: Creditors Bureau v. De La Torre (1971), 16 Cal.App.3d
558, 94 Cal. Rptr. 145. That may be true for financed sales, but probably isn't for cash
sales].
[In the simplest example, if we were to buy a vehicle for cash-in-hand from a dealer, we
should reasonably expect to travel away from the dealer with physical possession of the
vehicle and with lawful and physical possession of the documents constituting the Title,
too.]
[Presuming that the dealer ever actually received the Documents of Title to the vehicle
he/she sold you, where did they go? [It is very much in my interest to have possession
of that Title, so let's examine where it may have gone:]
According to THE CALIFORNIA ROSTER (1994 edition, compiled by THE
SECRETARY OF STATE), p. 33, both THE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES
(D.M.V.) and THE DEPARTMENT OF THE CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL are
sub-agencies of THE BUSINESS, TRANSPORTATION, AND HOUSING AGENCY,
part of the EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT of THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA.
Under West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), 11700 (in part), every new vehicle Dealer
must be a licensee of the D.M.V.
No person shall act as a dealer, re-manufacturer, manufacturer, or transporter, or as a
manufacturer branch, re-manufacturer branch, distributer, or distributer branch, without
having first been issued a license as required in Section 11701 or temporary permit issued
by the department, Under West's Ann.Cal.Veh.Code (2003), sec. 11800 (in part), every
vehicle salesperson also must be a licensee of the D.M.V.
It shall be unlawful for any person to act as a vehicle salesperson without having first
procured a license or temporary permit issued by the department...
However, there is a Legal Maxim which reads, in Latin:
Block-quote>QUOD PER ME NON POSSUM, NEC PER ALIUM. What I cannot do
myself, I cannot do through another. 4 Coke, 24b; 11 Code 87a.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, REV. 4th Ed., 13th Reprint (1975), p 1420. [I do not
see any reason why said maxim should not apply as fully to THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA, to D.M.V., and to all the various licensees of D.M.V.
[In order to "register" my motor vehicle (for presumed commercial operation upon the
highways) with D.M.V., I supposedly have to "surrender" the lawful Title for the
vehicle to D.M.V. in return for a CERTIFICATE of TITLE (the document that says that
Title exists somewhere and that D.M.V. claims to know where that somewhere is, and
MAY be acting in a fiduciary capacity in relation to the current "registered owner" and
the prospective next buyer).
[When I pay the Dealer a "transfer fee" on my brand-new automobile, he magically for a
while ceases to be a licensee of the D.M.V. and becomes my Agent.(Court case coming.)]
[As my Agent, he "Transfers" my vehicle by presumably delivering all the Documents of
Title in his possession to D.M.V., which supposedly holds them on my behalf in Trust for
the purported protection of the next purchaser. [The D.M.V., now apparently claiming a
de facto Fiduciary relationship to me, issues three pieces of paper:
(1) The CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION to the "Owner",
(2) The CERTIFICATE OF TITLE to the "Registered Owner", and
(3) The CERTIFICATE OF OWNERSHIP to the "Legal Owner"; two metal "license
plates", one "registration tab"; and the vehicle is "transferred" from my Legal Ownership
to that of The D.M.V., for "a valuable consideration". [Reread Dodge v. Meyer (1882),
61 Cal. 405, 416-417.
[If I bought a vehicle and knowingly intended to place it into commercial operation
upon the highways as a motor vehicle, and actually did so, knowing I was in business
and was using the motor vehicle in the course of my business, this process should be
legitimate.
Sec. 4450. Certificate of ownership and registration card
The department upon registering a vehicle shall issue a certificate of ownership to the
legal owner and a registration card to the owner, or both to the owner if there is no legal
owner of the vehicle. (emphasis added) West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), sec. 4450.
[I currently have a "CERTIFICATE OF TITLE" (the notorious rainbow-colored "pink

slip"), which makes me the Equitable Owner of my vehicle, but not a "Certificate of
Ownership" from D.M.V.
[Why is that? Who did receive the Certificate of Ownership? Who is the "Legal Owner"
of "my" vehicle?
[By analogy to the Insurance Code:]
Sec. 384. Certificate or verification of insurance of insurance; statement
(a) A certificate of insurance or verification of insurance provided as evidence of
insurance in lieu of an actual copy of the insurance policy shall contain the following
statements or words to the effect of:
This certificate of verification of insurance is not an insurance policy and does not
amend, extend or alter the coverage afforded by the policies listed herein.
(emphasis added) West's Ann.Cal.Ins. Code (2003), sec. 384.
[So a CERTIFICATE OF TITLE is issued in lieu of the Title?]"Certificate of title" is
defined in the West's Ann.Cal.Comm. Code (2003):
Sec. 9102. Definitions and index of definitions:
(a) In this division:
(10) "Certificate of title" means a certificate of title with respect to which a statute
provides for the security interest in question to be indicated on the certificate as a
condition or result of the security interest's obtaining priority over the rights of a lien
creditor with respect to the collateral. West's Ann.Cal.Com. Code (2003), sec.
9102(a)(10).
[If the documents of title for my vehicle somehow get "voluntarily" transferred
(delivered) into the possession of D.M.V., D.M.V. is now presumably the legal owner.]
Sec. 1201. General definitions
(14) "Delivery", with respect to instruments, documents of title, chattel paper, or certified
securities, means the voluntary transfer of possession.
Moreover, under the Ann.Cal.Comm. Code, whoever possesses the Title [those pieces of
paper], is the Legal Owner the Goods represented by the pieces of paper.
[Reread Dodge v. Meyer (1882), 61 Cal. 405, 416-417.]
[Now, why would anyone in his/her right mind want to give that Title (evidence of freeand-clear Ownership) to anyone else except through lawful sale to the next
Purchaser/Buyer?]
If one applies for and gets a CERTIFICATE OF TITLE, one seems to come under
provisions of the Commercial Code, sec. 9303:
Sec. 9303. Law governing perfection and priority of security interests in goods
covered by a certificate of title
(a) This section applies to goods covered by a certificate of title, even if there is no other
relationship between the jurisdiction under whose certificate of title the goods are
covered and the goods or the debtor.
(b) Goods become covered by a certificate of title when a valid application for the
certificate of title and the applicable fee are delivered to the appropriate authority. Goods
cease to be covered by a certificate of title at the earlier of the time the certificate of title
ceases to be effective under the law of the issuing jurisdiction or the time the goods
become covered subsequently by a certificate of title issued by another jurisdiction.
(c) The local law of the jurisdiction under whose certificate of title the goods are covered
governs perfection, the effect of perfection or non perfection, and the priority of a
security interest in goods covered by a certificate of title from the time the goods become
covered by the certificate of title until the goods cease to be covered by the certificate of
title. West's Ann.Cal.Comm. Code (2003), sec. 9303.
Under the "more specific" Vehicle Code, if there is a conditional sales contract involved
in the sale of a vehicle, the secured party (creditor) can register his/her/its interest on the
Certificate of Title:
Sec. 6303. Method is exclusive.
Except as provided in Sections 5905, 5907 and 5908, the method provided in this chapter
for perfecting a security interest on a vehicle registered under this code is exclusive, but
the effect of such perfection, and the creation, attachment, priority and validity of
such security interest shall be governed by the Uniform Commercial
Code. (emphasis added) West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), sec. 6303.
Sec. 6301. Perfection of security interest.
When the secured party, his or her successor, or his or her assignee, has deposited, either
physically or by electronic transmission pursuant to Section 1801.1, with the department
a properly endorsed certificate of ownership showing the secured party as legal owner or
an application in usual form for an original registration, together with an application for
registration of the secured party as legal owner, the deposit constitutes perfection of the
security interest and the rights of all persons in the Vehicle shall be subject to the
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, but the vehicle subject to the security
interest shall be subject to a lien for services and materials as provided in Chapter 6.5
(commencing with Section 3068) of Title 14 of Part 4 of Division 3 of the Civil
Code. (emphasis added) West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), sec. 6301.

[After the "registration" process, D.M.V.'s and the California courts' position appears to
be that I knowingly and voluntarily relinquished my constitutionally-protected Right to
Travel, together with my Right to own my own property, for the "privilege" of
"registering" and "driving" D.M.V.'s "motor vehicle" (with its permission, for just so long
as I keep on paying and paying and paying).
Realistically, there is NO reason why "Registration" should be "renewed" every year
unless the vehicle owner(s) change from one owner to another owner during that period.
Any other reason is merely "revenue-generating" and has nothing to do with "protecting
public health and safety" under the "police power" of the State.
As this Court has observed, "The right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the
citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law. ..." Kent v Dulles, supra, 357 US,
at 125, 2 L ed 2d at 1201. See Aptheker v Secretary of State, 378 US 500, 517, 12 L ed
2d 992, 1003, 84 S Ct 1659 (1964); Zemel v Rush, 381 US 1, 14 L ed 2d 179, 85 S Ct
1271 (1965). ...
...Ordinarily, citizens may not be punished for actions taken in good faith reliance upon
authoritative assurance that punishment will not attach. As this Court said in Raley v
Ohio, 360 US 423, 438, 3 L ed 2d 1344, 1355, 79 S Ct 1257, we may not convict "a
citizen for exercising a privilege which the State clearly had told him was available to
him." As Raley emphasized, criminal sanctions are not supportable if they are to be
imposed under "vague and undefined" commands (citing Lanzetta v New Jersey, 306 US
451, 83 L ed 888, 59 S Ct 618 (1939); or if they are "inexplicably contradictory" (citing
United States v Cardiff, 344 US 174, 97 L ed 200, 73 S Ct 189 (1952)); and certainly not
if the Government's conduct constitutes "active misleading" (citing Johnson v United
States, 318 US 189, 197, 87 L ed 704, 711, 63 S Ct 549 (1943)). United States v. Laub
(1967), 385 U.S. 475, 481, 17 L.Ed.2d. 526, 530-534, 87 S.Ct. 574.
There is no question that the state, in the exercise of its lawful authority, may require
vehicles to be properly licensed and registered. (People v. Kirby, 38 Cal.App.2d Supp.
768 [99 P. 603].) This requirement of registration of vehicles is designed for the
protection of owners and prospective purchasers and other persons who might have
reason to deal with or be affected by the operation of the vehicle in question. (Stoddart v.
Peirce, 53 Cal.2d 105, 119 [346 P.2d 774].)... (emphasis added) People v. Galceran
(1960), 178 Cal.App.2d 312, 316.
[If my premises are correct, this case probably should refer to "motor vehicles" and not to
"vehicles" as it does. Remember, the Vehicle Code is administered by THE
DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES.]
Besides, the certificate of registration does not conclusively establish true ownership of
the vehicle. (Davis v. Joseph, 148 Cal.App.2d 899 [307 P.2d 958].) The registration
requirements protect innocent purchasers and afford identification of vehicles and
persons responsible for accidents and injuries. (Henry v. General Forming, Ltd., 33
Cal.2d 223, [200 P.2d 785]; Dorsey v. Barba, 38 Cal.2d 350 [240 P.2d 604.])...
(emphasis added) Kipp v. Cozens (1974), 40 Cal.App.3d 709, 717, 115 Cal. Rptr. 423.
[Somehow, I just don't feel "protected" anymore. Frankly, I do not want anyone messing
around with the Title to any property I own, or believe I own!]
"The legislative power to regulate travel over the highways and thoroughfares of the
state for the general welfare is extensive. It may be exercised in any reasonable manner
to conserve the safety of travelers and pedestrians. Since motor vehicles are instruments
of potential danger, their registration and the licensing of their operators have been
required almost from their first appearance. The right to operate them in public places is
not a natural and unrestrained right, but a privilege subject to reasonable regulation,
under the police power, in the interest of the public safety and welfare." (Watson v.
Division of Motor Vehicles (1931), 212 Cal. 279, 283 [298 P. 481].)"(emphasis added)
People v. Kimbley (1961), 189 Cal.App.2d 300, 306. [Since People v. Kimbley (above) is
a good example of lying-by-judges, let's look at it in some detail:]
[When I went to the actual print copy of the imbedded quote from Watson v. Division of
Motor Vehicles, 212 Cal. 279, at p. 283, I found that it really reads:]
[2] The legislative power to regulate travel over the highways and thoroughfares of the
state for the general welfare is extensive. It may be exercised in any reasonable manner to
conserve the safety of travelers and pedestrians. Since motor vehicles are instruments of
potential danger, their registration and the licensing of their operators have been required
almost from their first appearance. The right to operate them in public places is not a
natural and unrestrained right, but a privilege subject to reasonable regulation, under the
police power, in the interest of the public safety and welfare. (Hendrick v. Maryland, 235
U. S. 610, 622 [59 L. Ed. 385, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 140].)
[Reading the print copy of Hendrick v. Maryland in 59 L. Ed. 385, at pp. 390 and 391, I
found:
[Note: This is the entirety of 235 U.S. 610, 622 as published in Lawyers' Edition:]
[622] K. & T. R. Co. v. Cade, 233 U. S. 642, 648, 58 L. ed. 1135, 1137, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep.
678, and cases cited.
The movement of motor vehicles over the highways is attended by constant and serious
dangers to the public, and is also ab-normally destructive to the ways themselves. Their
success depends on good roads, the construction and maintenance of which are
exceedingly expensive; and in recent years insistent demands have been made upon the
states for better facilities, especially by the ever-increasing number of those who own
such vehicles. As is well known, in order to meet this demand and accomodate the
growing traffic the state of Maryland has built and is maintaining a system of improved
roadways. Primarily for the enforcement of good order and the protection of those within
its own jurisdiction the state put into effect the above-described regulations, including
requirements for registration and licenses. A further evident purpose was to secure some
compensation for the use of facilities provided at great cost from the class for whose
needs they are essential, and whose operations over them are peculiarly injurious.
In the absence of national legislation covering the subject, a state may rightfully prescribe
uniform regulations necessary for the public safety and order in respect to the operation
upon its highways of all motor vehicles, --those moving in interstate commerce as well
as others. And to this end it may require the registration of such vehicles and the
licensing of their drivers, charging therefor reasonable fees graduated according to the
horse-power of the engines, --a practical measure of size, speed, and difficulty of control.
This is but an exercise of the police power uniformly recognized as belonging to the
states and essential to the preservation of the health, safety, and comfort of their
citizens; and it does not constitute a direct and material burden on interstate commerce.
The reasonable-ness of the state's action is always subject to [623]
Hendrick v. Maryland (1914), 235 U.S. 610, 622, 59 L.Ed. 385, 35 Sup.Ct. 140.
[So "Honorable" Chief Justice William H. Waste, in Watson v. Division of Motor
Vehicles essentially made up out of whole cloth his quotation from Hendrick v.
Maryland and "Honorable" Judge Paul Vallee, in People v. Kimbley appears to have
copied it without even attempting to verify the quote.]
[The "danger" versus "safety" and "police power" position in Hendrick seems to have
been built upon The Minneapolis and St. Louis Railway Co. v. Beckwith (1888), 129
U.S. 29, 32 L.Ed. 585, 586, 95 S.Ct. 207:
The State can now, as before, prescribe regulations for the health, good order and safety
of society, and adopt such measures as will advance its interests and prosperity. And to
accomplish this end special legislation must be resorted to in numerous cases, providing
against accidents, disease and danger in the varied forms in which they may come. The
nature and extent of such legislation will necessarily depend upon the judgment of the
Legislature as to the security needed by society. When the calling, profession or business
of parties is unattended with danger to others, little legislation will be necessary
respecting it. Thus, in the purchase and sale of most articles of general use, persons may
be left to exercise their own good sense and judgment, but when the calling or profession
or business is attended with danger, or requires a certain degree of scientific knowledge
upon which others must rely, then legislation properly steps in to impose conditions upon
its exercise.
[I believe this is important, so let's stop and think about Minneapolis, etc. Railroad Co. v.
Beckwith for a minute.
[If I understand it correctly, what the "Honorable" Justice effectively said was, "Everyone
has a ages-old Common-Law Right (protected by the Constitution for the United States
of America) to work and/or earn a living unless he/she works in a "calling or profession
or business ... attended by danger" or which "requires a certain degree of scientific
knowledge upon which others must rely". I wonder how society managed to exist for
centuries while having to rely on the whims of thousands of unlicensed black-smiths, tinsmiths, carpenters, teamsters, thatchers, or fletchers.
[Supposedly, if I somehow fit, or can be fitted, into the category(s) of doing business in
either of those classes, then I no longer have the constitutionally-protected Common-Law
Right to earn a living, but must now apply to the government to 'grant' me a 'license'
(privilege) for the protection of others. Assuming this was a Justice who had actually
sworn an oath to protect and defend the Constitution, the double-think involved in
creating this bit of sophistry should have immediately fried his every brain cell.
[Here is second example of lying-by-judge which I found:]
It is settled that the streets of a city belong to the people of a state and the use thereof is
an inalienable right of every citizen of the state, subject to legislative control or such
reasonable regulations as to the traffic thereon or the manner of using them as the
legislature of the state may deem wise or proper to adopt and impose. (Ex parte Daniels,
183 Cal. 636, 639 [21 A. L. R. 1172, 192 Pac. 442].)...
Whyte v. City of Sacramento (1924), 65 Cal.App. 534, 547.
[The cited quote from Ex parte Daniels really reads:]
The streets of a city belong to the people of the state, and every citizen of the state has a
right to the use thereof, subject to legislative control. (People v. County of Marin, 103
Cal. 223, 232, [26 L. R. A. 659, 37 Pac. 203]; Elliot on Roads and Streets, 3d ed., secs.
25, 505, 543, 544, 1112, 1115; 3 Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., sec. 1122.)
Ex parte Daniels (1920), 183 Cal. 636, 639.
[And the embedded quote from People v. County of Marin really reads:]
In strictness all public highways belong to the state, which holds them for the public use,
subject to legislative control. In this commonwealth, their custody and control outside of
municipalities is confided to the supervisors of the several counties in which they are
located.
People v. County of Marin (1894), 103 Cal. 223, 232.
[My reasonable inference is that the general public in California is being subjected to a
Special Law (THE VEHICLE CODE) properly applicable only to people actively
involved in driving their (or someone else's) motor vehicle in commerce for
compensation and to THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA employees.
[I believe such subjugation to be unconstitutional in application because of the
information on this page:
General Law in California is NOT Codified.
How we got to where we are today:
A no-longer-brief historic background of THE VEHICLE CODE.

[I transcribed the relevant sections of acts of the California Legislature from the
published volumes of California Statutes and Amendments to the Codes for illustrative
purposes; many of them have been repealed, but they do reveal the original intent of the
Legislature.
[Remember, the Statutes are the Law of the State of California.
[The transcribed sections are word-for-word accurate to the best of my ability.
[I 'Shepardized' all cited cases and they were still standing case law as of December,
1999.
[There isn't space to reproduce the entirety of the historic statutes. If you wish to use any
of these cases in court, re-'Shepardize' them and then find the official Reporter volumes,
photocopy the appropriate pages, get the photocopies Certified by the custodian of the
volumes, and enter the Certified copies into evidence as Exhibits in your case.]
The earliest mention of 'automobile' that I have found is:
An act of 1901.
An act to authorize counties, cities and counties, and incorporated towns, and chartered or
incorporated cities, to license bicycles, tricycles, and similar vehicles, and to collect a fee
therefor, for the purpose of devoting such fee to the construction of paths along county
roads for the use of pedestrians, and the wheeling thereon of such vehicles.
Section 1. Counties, cities and counties, chartered or incorporated cities and towns in the
State of California, are hereby, through the governing bodies thereof, authorized and
permitted to license the use of bicycles, tricycles, automobile carriages and carts, and
similar wheeled vehicles propelled by the power of the rider, or by motor under control
of the rider, owned, rented, and used within the several jurisdictions above named;
provided that such license shall be granted and issued only on payment of a fee not to
exceed one dollar a year for each of such vehicles; and further provided, that the money
so collected shall be appropriated and used only for the purpose of constructing and
maintaining paths and walkways for the use of pedestrians, and the wheeling of the
above-named vehicles; and provided also, that the sum of the taxes paid to the state,
county, town, or municipality, upon any vehicle the use of which is hereby authorized to
be licensed, shall be deducted from the amount of the license fee hereby authorized, and
credited to the license; it being the intention that any license fee hereby authorized shall
be collected in such less sum as is represented by the subtraction of the personal property
tax from the sum of the license fee fixed by such ordinance. (emphasis added) Statutes
and Amendments to the Codes 1901, Ch. CXLIX [149], p. 324.
[So 'automobile' originally appeared used as an adjective modifying 'carriages and carts',
not as a noun.]
In an act, an automobile was held to be a carriage. It is a vehicle which can carry
passengers or inanimate matter and so is such a carriage as the legislature had in view in
the use of that word in the statute. 187 Mass. 53. But in a later case it was held that only
in a broad sense is a automobile a carriage. It is more properly a machine than a carriage,
its features as a piece of machinery being far more striking than those which it possesses
as a carriage. 197 Mass. 245.
An "automobile" is a eminently dangerous article within the meaning of the rule of law
holding manufacturers liable for defects in such articles. 145 Ky. 617, 140 S. W. 1047.
"Automobiles" will be classed as stage coaches where they are used by a stage coach line
in the place of stage coaches. 109 S. W. 319.
One Invited to Ride in Private Automobile Is a Licensee. A person invited to ride in
the private automobile of another is a licensee, and the duty of the person giving
invitation is to refrain from doing any negligent acts by which the danger of riding in the
automobile is increased, or a new danger created. The duty of the owner to his guest is to
use ordinary care not to increase the danger of the guest, or create any new danger. Such
licensee can recover for only the active negligence of the licensor. 158 Ky. 154, 184 S.
W. 319.
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY, Baldwin's Students Ed. (1946), p. 103.
By 1958, a California appellate court held:
...In Webster's International Dictionary, second edition, an automobile is defined as a
self-propelled vehicle suitable for use on a street or roadway, and in Words and Phrases,
permanent edition, 4, it is said that "Automobile is general name adopted by popular
approval of all forms of self-propelling vehicles for use on highways and streets,... Life &
Cas Ins Co. of Tennessee v. Metcalf, 240 Ky. 628 [42 S.W.2d 909, 910]."
Williams v. Standard Accident Ins. Co. (1958), 158 Cal.App.2d 506, 510; 322 P.2d 1026.
The earliest California statute I have found mentioning a motor vehicle is:
The motor vehicle act of 1905. (Stats. 1905, Ch. DCXII, p. 816, Approved March
22, 1905.)
An act to regulate the operation of motor vehicles on public highways, and making an
appropriation for the purpose of carrying out the objects of this act. motor vehicle act
(1905),
Section 1(1). "motor vehicle" shall include all vehicles propelled by any power other
than muscular power, provided that nothing herein contained shall, except the
provisions of subdivisions three, four and five of section three and subdivision one of
section four of this act, apply to motor cycles, motor bicycles, traction engines or road
rollers;
['vehicle' and 'automobile' are not defined in the motor vehicle act (1905).]
motor vehicle act (1905),
Section 1(5). "chauffeur" shall mean any person operating a motor vehicle as mechanic,
employee [sic] or for hire.
['operate', 'operator', 'mechanic', 'driver', and 'owner' are not defined in the motor vehicle
act (1905).]
[Our present-day Driver apparently originally was a 'chauffeur' under the original intent
of the original Law. Apparently, only 'chauffeurs' were required to be licensed under
the motor vehicle act (1905).]
Section 2, Subdivision 1. Every person hereafter acquiring a motor vehicle shall, for
every vehicle owned by him, file in the office of the secretary of state a statement of his
name and address, with a brief description of the vehicle to be registered including the
name of the maker, factory number, style of vehicle and motor power on a blank to be
prepared and furnished by such secretary of state for that purpose; the filing fee shall be
two dollars. ['Person' is not defined in the motor vehicle act (1905).]
[It is quite probable that the use of vehicles (or non-commercial automobiles) by the
public to exercise their Right to Travel in common with those travelling by horse or
horse-and-wagon upon the public highways cannot ever be lawfully or legally restricted
by the state at all, as being a blatant infringement of Rights reserved to themselves by the
People under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
Unfortunately, the current courts appear to refuse to acknowledge these privileges and
immunities.]
The Motor Vehicle Act of 1913. (Stats. 1913, Ch. 326, p. 639, Approved May 31,
1913.)
An act to regulate the use and operation of vehicles upon the public highways and
elsewhere; to provide for the registration and identification of motor vehicles and for
the payment of registration fees therefore; to provide for the licensing of persons
operating motor vehicles; to prohibit certain persons from operating vehicles upon the
public highways; to prohibit the possession or use of a motor vehicle without the consent
of the owner thereof, and to prohibit the offer to or acceptance by certain persons of any
bonus or discount or other consideration for the purchase of supplies or parts for motor
vehicles, or for work or repair done thereon; to provide penalties for violations of
provisions of this act, and to provide for the disposition of fines and forfeitures imposed
thereon; to provide for the disposition of registration and license fees, fines and
forfeitures collected hereunder; to provide for carrying out the objects of this act and to
make an apppropriation and to create a revolving fund therefore; and to repeal all acts or
parts of acts either in conformity or in conflict with this act.
[Notice this was specific legislation to "regulate the use and operation of vehicles" and
to "provide for the registration and identification of motor vehicles". So the Legislature
explicitly recognized two separate, distinct, and different classes of conveyances.]
The motor vehicle act, as amended (1913):
Section 1(2). "automobile" shall include all motor vehicles excepting motorcycles;
[This and the immediate following section are questionable expansions of the scope and
original intent of the law. While an automobile may well be a vehicle, it may not
necessarily be a motor vehicle without stretching the definitions to grant D.M.V. much
more control [Trespass] over our property than it can lawfully or legally have.]
Section 1(1). "motor vehicle" shall include all vehicles propelled otherwise than by
muscular power, except such vehicles as run upon rails or tracks;
['Vehicle' is still not defined. I suppose we should look into the Common Law (old
English case law or Blackstone's Commentaries on the Law of England for it. I suspect
we would find that 'everyone knew' from time immemorial that vehicles were: wagons,
carts, coaches, carriages, hacks, transoms, wains, ox-carts, dog-carts, etc.)]
Section 1(8). "chauffeur" shall mean any person who operates a motor vehicle, and who
directly or indirectly receives pay or any compensation whatsoever for such operation,
or for any work or service in connection with motor vehicles, excepting only
manufacturers, agents, proprietors of garages, and dealers who do not operate for hire;
provided however, that an employee of a manufacturer or of a dealer whose principal
occupation is that of a salesman shall be exempted from this definition and shall be
designated an operator; provided, further, that a person operating a motorcycle shall not
be considered a chauffeur unless such motorcycle is of greater weight than four hundred
pounds un-laden; ['Driver' is not defined in the motor vehicle act (1913).]
...The latter case [In the Matter of Application of Stork (1914), 167 Cal. 294, 295],
upholding the validity of a statute requiring chauffeurs to pay a license fee but
exempting all other drivers from payment, states in respect to the differences between
the two classes of drivers (p. 296): (information in brackets and emphasis added.)
Beamon v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1960), 180 Cal.App.2d 200, 4 Cal.Rptr. 396.
That the occupation of a chauffeur is of this character may not be questioned and has
been decided. (State v. Swagerty, 203 Mo. 517, [120 Am. St. Rep. 671, 11 Ann. Cas. 725,
10 L. R. A. (N.S.) 601, 102 S. W. 483]; Christy v. Elliot, 216 Ill. 31, [108 Am. St. Rep.
196, 3 Ann. Cas. 487, 1 L. R. A. (N.S.) 215, 74 N. E. 1035].) There are unquestionable
elements of similarity, even of identity, between the driving of an automobile by a
professional chauffeur and the driving of a like vehicle by a private owner, designated
in this act as an "operator." ...
All these matters may be conceded, and yet there are others of equal significance where
the differences between the two classes of drivers are radical. Of first importance in this
is the fact that the chauffeur offers his services to the public and is frequently a carrier of
the general public. These circumstances put professional chauffeurs in a class by
themselves and entitle the public to receive the protection which the legislature may
accord in making provision for the competency and carefulness of such drivers. The
chauffeur, generally speaking, is not driving his own car. He is in-trusted with the
property of others. In the nature of things a different amount of care will be exercised by
such a driver than will be exercised by the man driving his own car and risking his own
property. ... The argument of the peril attending the public at the hands of the unlicensed
operator driving his own car is not without force, but it can only successfully be
presented to the legislative department and not to the courts. (emphasis added.) In the
Matter of Application of Stork (1914), 167 Cal. 294, 295-296, 139 P. 684.
An explanation of Stork:
"His [Stork's] sole contention in this regard is that the legislature without reason and
warrant has made an arbitrary classification whereby chauffeurs or drivers of motor
vehicles for hire are required to pay a license, while all other drivers of vehicles are
classed as "operators" and are not required to secure a license or pay a license fee.
"Conceding his construction of the law in this respect to be sound, is the division by
the legislature of drivers of motor vehicles into the two classes indicated and the exaction
of a license fee from the one and not from the other class so unwarranted and arbitrary as
to compel a declaration from this court that it is unconstitutional legislation? [This
question is not answered in the decision.]
"That the occupation of a chauffeur is one calling for regulation and therefore permitting
a regulatory license fee is beyond question. "When the calling or profession or business is
attended with danger or requires a certain degree of scientific knowledge upon which
others must rely, then legislation properly steps in and imposes conditions upon its
exercise." The Minneapolis, etc. Railroad Co. v. Beckwith (1888), 129 U.S. 29, [32 L.Ed.
585, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207]."
It is not the type of vehicle, but the peculiar nature of the business conducted upon and
over the public highways, that justifies the classification of the statute for licensing
purposes. (emphasis added.) In Re Schmolke (1926), 199 Cal. 42, 47.
The motor vehicle act, as amended (1913), Section 1(16):
"operator" shall mean any person other than a chauffeur, who operates a motor vehicle;
[And according to In the Matter of Application of Stork (above), operators did not need
to be licensed.]
"owner" shall also include any person, firm, association, or corporation renting a motor
vehicle or having exclusive use thereof under a lease or otherwise;
"person" shall include any corporation, association, copartnership, company, firm, or
other aggregation of individuals which owns or controls any motor vehicle as owner,
or for the purpose of sale, or for renting as agent, salesman or otherwise.
[Compare Section 1(11), "shall also include", with Section 1(17) "shall include". If we
use "include" in the limiting or restrictive sense as the Legislature did, only the items
actually listed are "included".]
[As the California courts have said:
...the rule of ejusdem generis which has been defined as follows:
...where, in a statute, general words follow a designation of particular subjects or classes
of persons, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be, and
construed as restricted by the particular designation and as including only things or
persons of the same kind, class, character or nature as those specifically enumerated. The
general words are deemed to have been used not to the wide extent which they might bear
if standing alone, but as related to words of more definite and particular meaning with
which they are associated. (50 Am.Jur., (1944) Statutes, sec. 249, pp. 244, 246.)
Market Basket v. Jacobsen (1955), 134 Cal.App.2d 73, 82.]
[So a "person" apparently was originally intended by the Legislature to be a corporate
entity engaged in commerce.]
In the case of Matter of Application of Schuler, supra, (1914) 167 C. 282, 294} there was
involved the interpretation of the 1913 Motor vehicle Act providing for the charging of a
fee for the registration of vehicles, based on horse-power. In holding that the charge there
involved was a charge for the privilege of using the highways, the court relied upon and
quoted with approval the following language from the leading case of Kane v. State,
supra (p. 290).
The character of the imposition is not determined by the mode adopted in fixing its
amount. (Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 142 U. S. 217 [12 Sup. Ct. 121, 163, 35 L. Ed.
994].)" See also, the advisory opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in
Opinion of the Justices, 250 Mass. 591 [148 N. E. 889].
When the act is read as a whole, we are of the opinion that it must be denominated an
excise tax, for revenue purposes, imposed upon the privilege of using the highways for
the purpose of operating thereon registered motor vehicles. ...
In Storaasli v. State of Minnesota, 283 U. S. 57 [51 Sup. Ct. 354, 75 L. Ed. 839], the
United States Supreme Court, in interpreting a statute almost identical with the one here
involved, emphasized the fact that the legislature had denominated the charge a privilege
tax. (emphasis added) Ingels v. Riley (1936), 5 Cal.2d 154, 160-161.
[So if I am not exercising, and do not intend to exercise, a business 'privilege', but am
exercising my Common-Law Right to Travel as protected by Amendment IX of the
Constitution for the United States of America, why should I even consider 'registering'
my vehicle or applying for a 'Driver' license? Have I been bamboozled?]
[In 1915 the Legislature amended the act of 1913 by:]
The Motor Vehicle Act of 1915. (Stats. 1915, Ch. 187, p. 397, Approved May 10,
1915.)
An act to regulate the use and operation of vehicles upon the public highways and
elsewhere; to provide for the registration and identification of motor vehicles and for
the payment of registration fees there for; to provide for the licensing of persons
operating motor vehicles; to prohibit certain persons from operating motor vehicles upon
the public highways; to prohibit the possession or use of a motor vehicle without the
consent of the owner thereof, and to prohibit the offer to or acceptance by certain persons
of any bonus or discount or other consideration for the purchase of supplies or parts for
motor vehicles, or for work or repair done thereon; to provide penalties for violations of
provisions of this act, and to provide for the disposition of fines and forfeitures imposed
thereon; to limit the power of local authorities to enact or enforce ordinances, rules or
regulations in regard to matters embraced within the provisions of this act; to provide for
the disposition of registration and license fees, fines and forfeitures collected hereunder;
to create a motor vehicle department and to provide for the organization and conduct
thereof; to provide for carrying out the objects of this act, and to make apppropriation
there for; and to repeal all acts or parts of acts in conflict with this act.
The Motor Vehicle Act (1915),
Section 1(1). "motor vehicle" shall include all vehicles propelled otherwise than by
muscular power, except such vehicles as run along rails or tracks;
[Finally, "vehicle" is defined:]
The Motor Vehicle Act (1915), Section 1(18):
"vehicle" shall include every wagon, hack, coach, carriage, omnibus, push cart, bicycle,
tricycle, automobile, cycle-car, motorcycle, sleigh, traction engine, tractor, or other
conveyance, in whatever manner and by whatever force or power the same may be
ridden, driven, or propelled, which is or may be operated, ridden, driven or propelled
upon the highway, and implements of husbandry temporarily drawn or driven or
otherwise propelled on the highway, excepting only conveyances designed to be
propelled by pedestrians, and railroad, street, and interurban railway cars;
[So trains, trolleys, and street cars, by definition, were not "vehicles".]
"automobile" shall include all motor vehicles excepting motorcycles;
[This section is a major expansion of THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA's presumption of
control [more Trespass upon Common Law rights.]
[If you can, try to follow this tautology: [By substituting Section 1(2) above into Section
1(18) above, we get: " "vehicle" shall include every wagon, hack, coach, carriage,
omnibus, push cart, bicycle, tricycle, all motor vehicles excepting motorcycles, cycle-
car, motorcycle, sleigh, traction engine, tractor, or other conveyance, in whatever manner
and by whatever force or power the same may be ridden, driven, or propelled, which is or
may be operated, ridden, driven or propelled upon the highway, and implements of
husbandry temporarily drawn or driven or otherwise propelled on the highway, excepting
only conveyances designed to be propelled by pedestrians, and railroad, street, and
interurban railway cars;
"
[Now substituting this definition of "vehicle" back into Section 1(1) above, we get:
" "motor vehicle" shall include every wagon, hack, coach, carriage, omnibus, push cart,
bicycle, tricycle, all motor vehicles excepting motorcycles, cycle-car, motorcycle,
sleigh, traction engine, tractor, or other conveyance, in whatever manner and by whatever
force or power the same may be ridden, driven, or propelled, which is or may be
operated, ridden, driven or propelled upon the highway, and implements of husbandry
temporarily drawn or driven or otherwise propelled on the highway, excepting only
conveyances designed to be propelled by pedestrians, and railroad, street, and interurban
railway cars;"
[Now reducing this definition by the elimination of conveyances propelled by muscular
power, we get: " "motor vehicle" shall include every omnibus, all motor vehicles
excepting motorcycles, cycle-car, motorcycle, traction engine, tractor, or other
conveyance, in whatever manner and by whatever force or power the same may be
ridden, driven, or propelled, which is or may be operated, ridden, driven or propelled
upon the highway, and implements of husbandry temporarily drawn or driven or
otherwise propelled on the highway, and railroad, street, and interurban railway cars;"
[Eliminating "railroad, street, and interurban railway cars", we get: "motor vehicle" shall
include omnibus, all motor vehicles excepting motorcycles, cycle-car, motorcycle,
tractor, or other conveyance, in whatever manner and by whatever force or power the
same may be ridden, driven, or propelled, which is or may be operated, ridden, driven or
propelled upon the highway, and implements of husbandry temporarily drawn or driven
or otherwise propelled on the highway."
[Pretty quickly I discovered that "motor vehicle" shall include all motor vehicles and
other conveyances not powered by muscular power nor running on rails or tracks.]
[The logical error is that "vehicle" is inherently a much larger class than "motor vehicle".
So the class or set "all motor vehicles" does not and cannot include the class or set "all
vehicles".
[This definition of "motor vehicle" should actually be the definition of
"vehicle". [Unfortunately, this ignorant or deliberate mis-definition of "motor vehicle" is
still the one used in the current VEHICLE CODE.]
"chauffeur" shall mean any person who operates an automobile in the transportation
of persons and who receives any compensation for such service in wages, commission
or otherwise, paid directly or indirectly, or who as owner or employee operates an
automobile carrying passengers for hire; provided, however, that this definition shall
not include manufacturers' agents, proprietors of garages and dealers, salesmen,
mechanics, or demonstrators of automobiles in the ordinary course of their business;
"person" shall include any corporation, association, co-partnership, company, firm,
or other aggregation of individuals; and where the term "person" is used in connection
with the registration of a vehicle, it shall include any corporation, association, copartnership, company, firm, or other aggregation of individuals which owns or
controls such vehicle as actual owner, or for the purpose of sale, or for renting, whether
as agent, salesman, or otherwise;
[This is of interest because this definition of "person" still does not include natural-born
people. The law seems still intended to apply only to corporate entities; that is, artificial
creations within the State.]
"operator" shall mean any person other that a chauffeur who operates a motor vehicle
and any person who operates, rides, drives or propels any vehicle other that a motor
vehicle;
[Notice that the Legislature is still making a clear and specific distinction between
vehicle and motor vehicle.]
A 1926 California Supreme Court decision reads:
An instance of a similar classification is noted in the exemption from payment of
registration fees under the California Vehicle Act of vehicles owned by the state or by
any political subdivision thereof (sec. 78, Stats. 1923, p. 538). There would, therefore,
seem to be no objection to the classification of motor vehicles so operated at public
expense apart from those operated for hire by private individuals, associations, and
corporations.
The next exemption applies to those who use said public highways for the transportation
of their own property or employees or both and to those who transport no persons or
property for hire or compensation. It is obvious that those who operate motor
vehicles for the transportation of persons or property for hire enjoy a different and more
extensive use of the public highways. They are thereby enabled to engage in business on
the public highways and to provide themselves a livelihood, particularly because of the
existence of the public highways and the facilities thereby afforded. Such extraordinary
use constitutes a natural distinction and a full justification for their separate classification
and for relieving from the burden of the license tax those who merely employ the
public highways for the transportation of their own property or employees.
(emphasis added) Bacon Service Corporation v. Huss (1926), 199 Cal. 218.
An act of 1925 (Stats. 1925, ch 412, p. 833. Approved by the Governor May 23,
1925.)
An act to impose a license fee for the transportation of persons or property for hire or
compensaton upon public streets, roads and highways in the State of California by
motor vehicle; to provide for certain exemptions; to provide for the enforcement of the
provisions hereof and for the disposition of the amounts collected on account of such
license; to make an appropriation for the purpose of this act; and to repeal all acts or parts
of acts in conflict herewith.
Section 1. The words and phrases used in this act shall for the purposes of this act, unless
the same be contrary to or inconsistent with the context, be construed as follows: ". .
"(b) The word "operator" shall include all persons, firms, associations and corporations
who operate motor vehicles upon any public highway in this state and thereby engage in
the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation, but shall not
include any person, firm, association or corporation who solely transports by motor
vehicle persons to and from or to and from attendance upon any public school or who
solely transports his or its own property, or employees, or both, and who transports
no persons or property for hire or compensation, but all persons operating freight
carrying vehicles so exempted shall be required to obtain from the state board of
equalization and to display exempt emblems in the manner hereinafter
provided. Section 2.
Each operator of a motor vehicle within this state who transports or desires to transport
for compensation or hire persons or property upon or over any public highway within
this state shall apply to and secure from the board of equalization of the State of
California a license to operate each and all of the motor vehicles which such operator
desires to operate or which such operator from time to time may operate.
More applicable court cases:
Section 36 of the Motor Vehicle Act [of 1927, not 1925], subdivision a, defines what
vehicles are to be registered under the Motor Vehicle Act, and reads as follows: "Every
owner of a motor vehicle ...which shall be operated upon the public highways of this
state shall for each vehicle owned, except as herein otherwise provided, apply to the
division for the registration thereof." (Stats. 1927, p. 1423.)[note: ch. 752.]
It appears from the said section that no registration of new automobiles is required under
the terms of said act except those which are to be operated upon the public highways of
this state. ...
It therefore appears that the only automobiles, required to be registered under the
California Motor Vehicle Act (Stats. 1927, p. 1424), are the vehicles to be used upon the
public highway. California Standard Finance Corp. v. Riverside Finance Co. (1931), 111
Cal. App. 151, 162-163.
First. It is well established law that the highways of the state are public property; that
their primary and preferred use is for private purposes; and that their use for purposes
of gain is special and extraordinary, which generally at least, the legislature may prohibit
or condition as it sees fit. Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 144, 68 L. ed. 596, 607, 44
S. Ct. 257, and cases cited; Frost & F. Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, 271 U. S.
583, 592, 70 L. ed. 1101, 1104, 1105, 47 A. L. R. 457, 46 S. Ct. 605; Hodge Drive-ItYourself Co. v. Cincinnati, 284 U. S. 335, 337, 76 L. ed. 323, 326, 52 S. Ct. 144; Johnson
Transfer & Freight Lines v. Perry (D.C.) 47 F.(2d) 900, 902; Southern Motorways v.
Perry (D.C.) 39 F.(2d) 145, 147; People's Transit Co. v. Henshaw (C. C. A. 8th) 20 F.(2d)
87, 89; Weksler v. Collins, 317 Ill. 132, 138,139, 147 N.E. 797; Maine Motor Coaches v.
Public Utilities Commission, 125 Me. 63, 65, 130 Atl. 866. (emphasis added)
Stephenson v. Binford (1932), 287 U.S. 251, 264, 53 S.Ct. 181, 77 L.Ed. 288, 87 A.L.R.
721.
[This case is interesting, but only persuasive, not binding, in California:]
The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his
property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business is a common right
which he has under his right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess
property, and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right in so doing to use
the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day; and under the existing modes of
travel includes the right to drive a horse-drawn carriage or wagon thereon, or to
operate an automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary purposes of life and
business. It is not a mere privilege, like the privilege of moving a house in the street,
operating a business stand in the street, or transporting persons or property for hire
along the street, which a city may permit or prohibit at will. (emphasis added)
Thompson v. Smith (1930), 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579, 71 A.L.R. [Annotated
Lawyers' Reports] 604, 610.
An act of 1933 (Stats. 1933, ch 339, p. 928. Effective May 15, 1933.)
An act imposing a license fee or tax for the transportation of persons or property for
hire or compensation upon the public streets, roads and highways in the State of
California by motor vehicle and providing that this act shall take effect immediately.
Section 1. ...
(a) The word "operator" shall include all persons, firms, associations and corporations
who operate motor vehicles upon any public highway in this State and thereby engage
in the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation, either directly
or indirectly.
(c) The term "motor vehicle" shall include all vehicles, automobiles, trucks, or trailers,
not exempt from registration fees under the laws of this State, whether the same be
propelled or operated by steam or electricity, or propelled or operated by combustion of
gasoline, distillate or other volitile and inflammable liquid fuels.
Sec. 2. Each operator of a motor vehicle within this State who transports or desires to
transport for compensation or hire persons or property upon or over any public
highway within this State shall make application to the State Board of Equalization, on
such forms as said board may prescribe, for a license to operate motor vehicles for the
transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation over public highways in
this State."
Sec. 3. After obtaining the license provided for in the preceding section, the operator of
any motor vehicle or motor vehicles shall obtain from the Department of Motor Vehicles
number plates or emblems for each motor vehicle operated by said operator indicating, in
such manner as said department may determine that the license herein provided for has
been obtained. Such number plates or emblems shall be attached to and conspicuously
displayed upon each of the motor vehicles authorized to be operated by said license in
such manner as may be required and prescribed by the Department of Motor Vehicles. ...
The California Supreme Court held:
The question thus presented is: Does the License Tax Act of 1933 [Stats.1933, p. 928]
apply solely and exclusively to common carriers and private contract carriers in the
business of transporting persons and property upon the public highways for hire or
compensation? ...[p. 48]
Section 1 of said act provides that: "the word 'operator' shall include all persons, firms,
associations and corporations who operate motor vehicles upon any public highway in
this state and thereby engage in the transportation of persons or property for hire or
compensation, either directly or indirectly. ......and the fact that the act expressly defines
an operator as one who operates a motor vehicle for compensation, either directly or
indirectly, supports the conclusion that the act was intended to have a wider application
than to carriers alone....
The fact that subsequent acts enacted in 1935 which are not tax acts but regulatory acts
(Stats. 1935, chaps. 223, 312 and 664) deal with the transportation of property for
compensation or hire as a business and contain many terms employing the words
"carrier" and "in the business" or "as a business" is not persuasive that the License Tax
Act of 1933 was intended to deal solely with transportation operations as a business....
...the act was not intended to be limited to carrier service but was intended to include in
addition other transportation upon the public highways for compensation.
...The history of such legislation discloses two distinct lines of statutes. One line was
enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of transportation by motor vehicles
of persons or property for hire or compensation upon the public highways. (Stats.
1917, p. 330, and amendments; Stats. 1935, chaps. 223, 312 and 664.) The following
cases are pertinent to the subject of the regulation of such transportation operators:
Western Assn. of Short Line Railroads v. Railroad Com., 173 Cal. 802 [162 Pac. 391, 1
A.L.R. 1455]; Frost v. Railroad Com., 197 Cal. 230 [240 Pac. 26]; Frost & Frost
Trucking Co. v. Railroad Com., 271 U.S. 583 [46 Sup. Ct. 605, 70 L. Ed. 1101, 47
A.L.R. 457]; Holmes v. Railroad Com., 197 Cl. 627, [242 Pac. 486]; Haynes v.
MacFarland, 207 Cal. 529 [279 Pac. 436]; Forsyth v. San Joaquin Light etc. Corp., 208
Cal. 397 [281 Pac. 620]; Landis v. Railroad Com., 220 Cal. 470 [31 Pac. (2d) 345].
The License Tax Act of 1933 was enacted as a step in the second line, that of certain acts
and constitutional provisions which were primarily revenue measures, designed to secure
for the state a fair return for the use of the public highways of the state in transporting
persons or property for compensation. (Stats. 1923, p. 706; Stats. 1925, p. 833; Stats.
1927, p. 1708; Stats. 1927, p. 1742; California Const., art. XIII, sec. 15; Pol. Code, sec.
3664aa; Stats. 1933, p. 928.) These enactments have been before the courts of this state in
the following cases: Bacon Service Corp. v. Huss, 199 Cal. 21 [248 Pac. 235]; In re
Schmolke, 199 Cal. 42 [248 Pac. 244]; Los Angeles etc. Transp. Co. v. Suprerior Court,
211 Cal. 411 [295 Pac. 837]; Alward v. Johnson, 208 Cal. 359 [281 Pac. 389]; People v.
Duntley, 217 Cal. 150 [17 Pac. (2d) 715]; People v. Lang Transp. Co., 217 Cal. 166 [17
Pac. (2d) 721]. An analysis of the legislative history discloses the fact that all the statutes
dealing with the regulation of transportation agencies refer to persons in the business of
transportation of persons or property upon the public highways for hire or
compensation....
We are satisfied that the purpose of the enactment of the License Tax Act of 1933 was to
secure a fair return to the state for the use of its public highways not only from carriers,
both common carriers and private contract carriers, but also from the larger class of
persons who fairly answer to the description of "operator" therein defined as taxable and
who receive compensation, either directly or indirectly, from the use of the public
highways. Although it is true that the legislature might legally have limited the
application of such taxes to carriers, it evidently seemed more just and fair to the
legislature, as it does to us, that all those who receive compensation directly or
indirectly from the use of the public highways should bear a proportionate share of the
burden of its maintenance.
(italics in original, bracketed information and emphasis added.) In Re Bush (1936), 6
Cal.2d 43, 48-53.
Finally, we get to the first Vehicle Code:
The Vehicle Code of 1935. (Stats. 1935, Ch.27, p. 93, in effect September 15, 1935.)
An act to establish a Vehicle Code, thereby consolidating and revising the law relating to
vehicles and vehicular traffic, and to repeal certain acts and parts of acts specified herein.
Vehicle Code (1935), Section 4:
Pending Proceedings and Accrued Rights. No action or proceeding commenced before
this code takes effect, and no right accrued, is affected by the provisions of this code,
but all procedure thereafter taken therein shall conform to the provisions of this code so
far as possible.
[I believe that this section is very important. It says that my accrued Right to own private
property, as protected by the Constitution of the United States of America against
interference by the State, and as protected within the State by the Constitution of the State
of California, is not affected by provisions of this Code. It also implies that the accrued
Right to Travel of the People of California is not affected by provisions of the Vehicle
Code. It is very strange to me that this particular Section apparently has never been used
to challenge Vehicle Code impositions or Trespasses upon our Rights to Travel and to
own Property. Just who benefits by ignoring this Section?]Vehicle Code (1935), Section
32: "Motor vehicle." A "motor vehicle" is a vehicle which is self-propelled.
Vehicle Code (1935), Section 31: "Vehicle." A "vehicle" is a device in, upon, or by
which any person or property is or may be propelled, moved or drawn upon a highway,
excepting a device moved by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or
tracks."
['Automobile' is not defined in the 1935 Vehicle Code.]
[Here's a new definition:] Vehicle Code (1935), Section 34 (emphasis added):
"Commercial Vehicle." A "commercial vehicle" is a vehicle of a type required to be
registered hereunder designed, used or maintained for the transportation of persons for
hire, compensation or profit or designed, used or maintained primarily for the
transportation of property.
[This section may be why we are supposedly "required to" Register pick-up trucks;
D.M.V. seems to claim that they are of a "type" "designed" primarily for the
transportation of property.
[Of course, there is still nothing in this section which sets Standards by which anyone can
objectively determine if or whether his/her vehicle is one "required to be registered".
["Transportation" is not defined in the Vehicle Code (1935).]
Vehicle Code (1935), Section 71
"Chauffeur." "Chauffeur" is a person who is employed by another for the principal
purpose of driving a motor vehicle on the highways and receives compensation thereof.
"Operator." "Operator" is a person, other than a chauffeur, who drives or is in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle upon a highway. [This section has been expanded in
scope from that of 1915.] [Here is another new definition:] Vehicle Code (1935),
Section 69:]"Driver." "Driver" is a person who drives or is in actual physical control of a
vehicle.
[So, by these definitions, an "operator" is not a "driver" and a "driver" is neither an
"operator" nor a "chauffeur". And a "vehicle" is still not necessarily a "motor vehicle".]
Vehicle Code (1935), Section 65""Person." "Person" includes a natural person, firm, copartnership, association or corporation.
[Notice how the Legislature has just expanded the scope of this definition to include
natural-born people, who previously were (and probably still should be) exempt from The
Vehicle Code.][Curiously, we now have three Statutory "Owners" of a vehicle:]
Vehicle Code (1935), Section 66: "Owner." "Owner" is a person having the lawful use or
control or the right to the use or control of a vehicle under a lease or otherwise for a
period of ten or more successive days.
Vehicle Code (1935), Section 67: "Legal Owner." "Legal owner" is the person who holds
the legal title to a vehicle or a mortgage therein. Vehicle Code (1935), Section 68:
"Registered Owner." "Registered owner" is a person registered by the department as the
owner of a vehicle.
[Why do we need so many different types of "owner" unless something major has just
changed?
[All these sections, to be legally accurate, probably should apply only to motor vehicles.]
Vehicle Code (1935), Section 81 clearly states:
"Street" or "Highway." "Street" or "highway" is a way or place of whatever nature open
to the use of the public as a matter of right for purposes of vehicular travel.
[As late as 1950, the California Supreme Court said:
"Fundamentally it must be recognized that in this country "Highways are for the use of
the traveling public, and all have ... the right to use them in a reasonable and proper
manner, and subject to proper regulations as to the manner of use." (13 Cal.Jur. 371,
sec. 59) "The streets of a city belong to the people of the state, and the use thereof is an
inalienable right of every citizen, subject to legislative control or such reasonable
regulations as to the traffic thereon or the manner of using them as the legislature may
deem wise or proper to adopt and impose." (19 Cal.Jur. 54, sec. 407) "Streets and
highways are established and maintained primarily for purposes of travel and
transportation by the public, and uses incidental thereto. Such travel may be for either
business or pleasure ...
The use of highways for purposes of travel and transportation is not a mere
privilege, but a common and fundamental right, of which the public and individuals
cannot rightfully be deprived ...[A]ll persons have an equal right to use them for
purposes of travel by proper means, and with due regard for the corresponding rights of
others." (25 Am .Jur. 456-457, sec. 163; see, also, 40 C.J.S. 244-247, sec. 233.)
(emphasis added) Escobedo v. State of California (1950), 35 Cal.2d 870, 875-876.
[Currently, all the privately-published reference volumes mentioned in this case have
been "Revised" and the quoted citations are gone. You may be able to find the original
reference books in a very large law library.]
[So, on one hand, the California Supreme Court tells me that I have a Right to use the
roads to travel by vehicle, and the lower courts simultaneously purport to tell me that
engaging in such travel is a Privilege.
What Vehicles Shall Be Registered.
Subject to the exemptions stated in section 142 hereof, registration of the following
vehicles is required when driven or moved upon a highway: Any motor vehicle, trailer,
semi-trailer, pole or pipe dolly.
[Notice that a "vehicle" is still distinguished from a "motor vehicle".]
Exemptions from Registration. The registration provisions of this chapter shall not apply
to any of the following vehicles:
(a) any vehicle of a type otherwise subject to registration here-under which is driven or
moved upon a highway in conformance with the provisions of this code relating to
dealers, transporters or nonresidents or under a temporary registration permit issued by
the department as authorized by section 147 hereof.
(b) Any vehicle of a type otherwise subject to registration hereunder which is driven or
moved upon a highway only for the purpose of crossing such highway from one property
to another in accordance with a permit issued by the Department of Public Works.
(c) Any implement of husbandry, whether of a type otherwise subject to registration here
under or not, which is only incidentially operated or moved over a highway.
(d) Special mobile equipment.
[Maybe originally "special mobile equipment" was legalese for "my private automobile".]
Unlawful to Drive Unless Licensed.
(a) It is a misdemeanor for any person to drive a motor vehicle upon a highway unless he
then holds a valid operator's or chauffeur's license issued here under, except such
persons as are expressly exempted under this code.
(b) It is a misdemeanor for any person to drive a motor vehicle upon a highway as a
chauffeur unless he then holds a chauffeur's license duly issued here under, except such
persons as are expressly exempted under this code.
[So I could apparently still "travel" or "go from place to place" or "ride down the public
right of way" in a vehicle without a license, since that Right long ago become an accrued
(or vested) Right.] Right?
An act of 1937. (Stats 1937, ch. 679, p. 1919. Approved by the Governor June 30,
1937.)
An act to amend section 1, 2, 3, 4, and 11 of an act entitled "An act imposing a license
fee or tax for the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation
upon the public streets, roads, and highways in the State of California by motor vehicle
and providing that this act shall take effect immediately," approved May 15, 1933; to add
sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, and 21 to said act; to renumber and amend section 5, 6,
7, 8, 9, 12, 14, 16, and 17 of said act; to repeal sections 10 and 15 of said act; relating to
the taxing of operators engaged in the transportation of persons or property upon the
public highways by motor vehicle and providing that this act shall take effect
immediately.
Section 1. ...(a) The term "operator" shall include all persons engaged in the
transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation by or upon motor
vehicles upon any public highway in this State, either directly or indirectly, but shall not
mean or include the following:
(a) Any person transporting his own property in his own motor vehicle; provided,
however, that any person making a specific charge for such transportation shall be
deemed to be an "operator" hereunder; . . .
(b) The term "person" shall include any individual, firm, co-partnership, joint adventure,
association, corporation, estate, trust, business trust, receiver, syndicate, or any other
group or combination acting as a unit and the plural as well as the singular number.
(c) The term "motor vehicle" shall include all automobiles, trucks, tractors, or other
self-propelled vehicles used for the transportation of persons or property upon the
public highways, otherwise than upon fixed rails or tracks, and any trailer, semi-trailer,
dolly, or other vehicle drawn thereby, not exempt from registration under the laws of
this State.
Sec. 2. Each operator of a motor vehicle within this State who transports or desires to
transport for compensation or hire persons or property upon any public highway within
this State shall apply to the board, on such forms as the board may prescribe, for a license
to operate motor vehicles for the transportation of persons or property for hire or
compensation upon the public highways in this State. ...
Sec. 3. After obtaining the license provided for in the preceding section, the operator of
any motor vehicle or motor vehicles shall obtain from the Department of Motor Vehicles
number plates or emblems for each motor vehicle operated by said operator indicating, in
such manner as said department may determine, that the license herein provided for has
been obtained. ... . . .
Section 19. Any person who uses any public highway in this State for the
transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation without first
obtaining the license for which provision is herein made, or without carrying upon each
motor vehicle so used the number plates or emblems for which provision is herein made,
...
[Why would the Legislature have gone to the trouble of specifically enacting this law as a
separate law outside the bounds of The Vehicle Code?]
[More cases and authorities:]
The motor vehicle license or registration fee is a privilege tax levied in exercise of the
police power to control and regulate travel on the public highways. It is not considered as
a tax on the motor vehicle itself, but for the privilege of using the highways. Blashfield,
Cyc. of Automobile Law, Permanent Edition, Sec. 212, Vol. 1, p. 158. A license to
operate a motor vehicle is granted under the inherent right of the state or municipality to
regulate its use on the public highways or streets. Ibid., Sec. 211, p. 157. The only
automobiles required to be registered under the California Motor Vehicle Act are vehicles
used upon the public highway (Cal. Stats. 1927, p. 1424, Sec. 11; California Standard
Finance Corp. v. Riverside Finance Co., 111 Cal. App. 151, 163, 295 P. 555); if the
vehicles were not used, no registration fee would have fallen due under the law of
California. But, in carrying on the business of Richmaid, the motor vehicles were
operated upon the public highways of the state of California and license fees attached. ...
California Vehicle Code, Secs. 370 et seq., St. 1935, p. 147 et seq., California Vehicle
License Fee Act, Sec. 6, as amended.
The motor vehicles in question could not be operated in 1937 without incurring the
license and registration fees. Necessarily, therefore, the fees were an expense of doing
business and were chargeable against the estate. (emphasis added) Ingels v. Boteler
(C.C.A. 1939), 100 F.2d 919, 919; affm'd 308 U.S. 57, 84 L.Ed. 78, 60 S.Ct. 29.
A claim that action is being taken under the police power of the state cannot justify
disregard of constitutional inhibitions. Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 240,
70 L. ed. 557, 564, 46 S. Ct. 260, 43 A. L. R. 1224; Georgia Power Co. v. Decatur, 281
U. S. 505. 508, 74 L. Ed. 999, 1003, 50 S. Ct. 383; Southern R. Co. v. Virginia, supra
(290 U. S. 196, 78 L. ed. 265, 54 S. Ct. 148). ... The police power of a state, while not
susceptible of definition with circumstantial precision, must be exercised within a
limited ambit and is subordinate to constitutional limitations. It springs from the
obligation of the state to protect its citizens and provide for the safety and good order
of society. Under it there is no unrestricted authority to accomplish whatever the public
may presently desire. It is the governmental power of self-protection and permits
reasonable regulation of rights and property in particulars essential to the preservation of
the community from injury. New York & N. E. R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, 38 L. ed.
269, 14 S. Ct. 437. (emphasis added) Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway
Comm. (1934), 294 U.S. 613, 619, 622, 79 L.Ed. 1090, 55 S.Ct. 563.
Section 465.4 Classification as Pleasure Cars or Commercial Vehicles "A classification

of motor vehicles, based on whether they are used for business or commercial purposes,
or merely kept for pleasure or family use, a license being imposed in one case and not
in the other, is a proper one. [27. La.--Gulf States Utilities v. Traigle, 1975, 310 So.2d.
78. Ohio.--Fisher Bros. Co. v. Brown, 146 N.E. 100, 111 Ohio St. 602. Or.--Kellaher v.
City of Portland, 110 P. 492, 112 P. 1076, 57 Or. 575. Tenn.--Ogilvie v. Hailey, 210 S.W.
645, 141 Tenn. 392. Vt.--State v. Caplan, 135 A. 705, 100 Vt. 140.] "Thus a county
ordinance levying a tax for the privilege of using the county roads, and fixing no license
tax on an automobile used by the owner or his family for other than commercial
purposes is not unreasonable and arbitrary in the imposition of the tax on vehicles used
for commercial purposes. [28 Ala.--Hill v. Moody, 93 So. 422, 207
Ala325.] Blashfield, AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE 3d Ed (1998), Ch. 465,
CLASSIFICATION OF MOTOR VEHICLES (emphasis added).
An act of 1941. ([Stats. 1941, c. 39, p. 590] Approved by the Governor March 19,
1941. Filed with Secretary of State March 19, 1941.)
An act to add Part 4, comprising Sections 9601 to 10501, inclusive, to Division 2 of, and
to add Section 50010 to, the Revenue and Taxation Code, thereby consolidating and
revising the law relating to taxation and the raising of revenue, including the provisions
of "An act imposing a license fee or tax for the transportation of persons or property
for hire or compensation upon the public streets, roads and highways in the State of
California by motor vehicle and providing that this act shall take effect immediately,"
approved May 15, 1933, as amended, and repealing acts and parts of acts specified
herein.
Section 1. Part 4, comprising Sections 9601 to 10501, inclusive, is hereby added to
Division 2 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, to read as follows: . . . 9601. This part
is known and may be cited as the "Motor Vehicle Transportation License Tax Law". . .
. 9603. "Operator" includes: (a) Any person engaging in the transportation of
persons or property for hire or compensation by or upon a motor vehicle upon any
public highway in this State, either directly or indirectly. (b) Any person who furnishes
any motor vehicle for the transportation of persons or property under a lease or rental
agreement when pursuant to the terms thereof the person operates the motor vehicle
furnished or exercises any control of, or assumes any responsibility for, or engages either
in whole or in part in, the transportation of persons or property in the motor vehicle
furnished. "Operator" does not include any of the following: (a) Any person
transporting his own property in a motor vehicle owned or operated by him unless he
makes a specific charge for the transportation. This subdivision does not in any way limit
any other exemption granted by this section.
Applicable cases:
First, and foremost in considering the cases before us, it needs to be recalled that the state
owns its highways and consequently may impose reasonable fees for their use by vehicles
moving interstate and intrastate. It may classify the traffic, among other things, according
to the character of the traffic, or the purpose fro which the highways are used, as for
instance whether it be for private gain or not. (Dixie Ohio Express Co. v. State Revenue
Com., 306 U.S. 72 [59 S. Ct. 435, 83 L.Ed. 495]; Aero Mayflower T. Co. v. Georgia Pub.
Serv. Com., 295 U. S. 285 [55 S. Ct. 709, 79 L.Ed. 1439].)...
As the state may prohibit all traffic for gain on its highways--intrastate or interstate--so it
may condition the privilege of the use of its highways by such traffic at a price that is
not excessive or discriminatory to traffic of like character. (Capitol Greyhound Lines v.
Brice, 339 U.S. 542 [70 S.Ct. 806, 94 L.Ed. 1053]; Packard v. Branton, 264 U.S. 140 [44
S.Ct. 257, 68 L.Ed. 596].)
In Packard v. Branton, 264 U.S. 140 [44 S.Ct. 257, 68 L.Ed. 596], the court said: "The
contention most pressed is that the act unreasonably and arbitrarily discriminates against
those engaged in operating motor vehicles for hire in favor of persons operating such
vehicles for their private ends, and in favor of street cars and motor omnibuses. If the
state determines that the use of streets for private purposes in the usual and ordinary
manner shall be preferred over their use by common carriers for hire there is nothing in
the 14th Amendment to prevent. The streets belong to the public, and are primarily
for the use of the public in the ordinary way. Their use for the purposes of gain is
special and extraordinary, and generally, at least, may be prohibited or conditioned as the
legislature deems proper...." (emphasis added) Lord v. Henderson (1951), 105 C.A.2d.
426, 436-437; 234 P.2d 197.
> The California Attorney General published an opinion in 1955:
May public funds be used to improve a road over which the public has acquired a right to
travel by user for a period of over forty years?
...
If the public has acquired a right to travel the road by adverse user, county funds may be
expended on maintenance or improvements. ...
As we understand the problem the right of the public to travel the road is
unquestioned, having been established by adverse user. Such being the case it is a public
road. There is a recognized distinction between public roads and county highways. A
county highway is a road that has been adopted into the county road network pursuant to
law, while a public road is one over which the public has acquired the right to travel, but
which has not been incorporated into the county road system (see 4 Ops. Cal. Atty Gen.
112).
The court [Union Transportation Co. v. Sacramento County, 42 Cal.2d 235] declared that
while public use for any length of time will not constitute a road a county highway,
nonetheless the adverse use by the public over a long period of time constituted a
conclusive presumption of dedication to the public, and that all that is required to bring
the road into the county system is acceptance by the county....
(note in brackets and emphasis added) 25 Ops.Cal.A.G. 81 (1955)
THE VEHICLE CODE of 1959. (Stats. 1959, Ch. 3, p. 1523, in effect September
18, 1959)
"An act to repeal and re-enact the Vehicle Code and to add Chapter 6.5 (commencing at
Section 3067) to Title 14, Part 4, Division 3 of the Civil Code and to amend Section
11004.5 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, relating to vehicles."
VEHICLE CODE (1959), Section 1: "The Vehicle Code is repealed."
VEHICLE CODE (1959), Section 2: "The Vehicle Code is enacted to
read: "GENERAL PROVISIONS "1. This act shall be known as the Vehicle
Code. "2. The provisions of this code, insofar as they are substantially the same as the
existing provisions relating to the same subject matter, shall be construed as restatements
and continuations thereof and not as new enactments. "3. All persons who, at the time
this code goes into effect, hold office under the code repealed by this code, which offices
are continued by this code, continue to hold them according to their former tenure. "4.
No action or proceeding, commenced before this code takes effect, and no right
accrued, is affected by the provisions of this code, but all procedure thereafter taken
shall conform to the provisions of this code so far as possible."
[That translates: "No Right accrued before this code takes effect (pre-1959) is affected by
this CODE."] [Since we all had and have The Right to Travel and The Right to Own
Property and they both had accrued to all Citizens long before 1959, THE VEHICLE
CODE cannot affect those Rights in any way, according to both the spirit and the letter of
the law.]
California courts have held prior to 1959 (emphasis added):
"This rule extends to streets and highways; they are the public property of the state.
While for purposes of travel and common use they are open to the citizens of every
state alike, and no state can by its legislation deprive the citizens of another state of such
common use, ..." St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U. S. 92, [13 Sup. Ct. 485, 37
L. Ed. 380] Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hopkins (1911), 160 Cal. 106, 115-116.
It is well settled that the easement or right which the public acquires by the establishment
of a highway is the right to travel there-over, and that the only control over it which the
board of supervisors, as trustees for the public, can exercise, is such as is necessary to
maintain the highway in a proper and convenient manner for the exercise of the use by
the public. ...All that the public acquires under the easement is declared by section 2631
of the Political Code, as follows: "By taking or accepting land for a highway, the public
acquire only the right of way, and the incidents necessary to enjoying and maintaining the
same, subject to the regulations in this and the Civil Code provided." Gurnsey v. Great
Northern Cal Power Co. (1911), 160 Cal. 699, 705. The street is for the use of the
public, although the [street]car, which can be operated only on the track, has a better
right to that part of the thoroughfare, to which pedestrians must yield when necessary....
Lawyer v. Los Angeles Pacific Co. (1911), 161 Cal. 53, 56, 118 P. 237....Public streets
and highways are made for travel and the convenience and enjoyment of the citizens.
The petitioner [a taxicab driver] has the same rights to their use as others, but he is
demanding a privilege which might greatly inconvenience the general public and impair
its safety. ... As was said in Holmes v. Railroad Commission, 197 Cal. 627 [242 Pac.
486]: "The reason for the rule which authorizes the state to prohibit the private use of the
public highways by such carriers is not that they are common carriers. It is that they
are making a private use of the highways, which are owned and paid for by the public and
are open alike to all persons. In Re Graham (1928), 93 Cal.App. 88, 92.
Streets and highways are for the use of the traveling public, and, as members of the
public, all persons in like situation have equal rights to use the streets and highways
in a reasonable manner in the customary way. (13 Cal.Jur. 317.) However, the
common right to use streets in the ordinary way is quite different from the right to use
them as a place of business for private gain. Ordinary usage is the right of all, but
there is no vested or constitutional right to subject a street to the conduct of private
business. Such use, when authorized, is a special or extraordinary privilege. People v.
Galena (1937), 24 Cal.App.2d 770, 775.
VEHICLE CODE (1959), Section 305:
"A "driver" is a person who drives or is actual physical control of a vehicle."
[We should know enough by now to infer that a "driver" drives a "motor vehicle" and
everyone else "travels" or uses the public right-of-way in their private vehicles. Simply
because one is stuck in the flow of "traffic" does nto make one also "traffic".]
VEHICLE CODE (1959), Section 310: ""Driver's license" includes both an operator's
and a chauffeur's license."
[From 1959, and apparently currently, a "driver" is still hiddenly presumed to be only
either a "chauffeur" (Transporting Passengers or Property (cargo) for hire) or an
"operator" (the corporate owner of a Commercial Carrier).]
A California appellate court held:
There is a statute in this state to the effect that a guest passenger in an automobile can
recover damages from the driver or owner of the car for injuries suffered only because of
his intoxication, wilfull misconduct, or gross negligence. Suppose a passenger in a car
brings suit against the driver for damages suffered in a collision and the testimony shows
beyond dispute that the driver was guilty only of ordinary negligence and that the
passenger, instead of having paid for his ride, was but a guest of the driver. A motion
for nonsuit is made and is, of course, granted. This is for the reason that the court
determined that plaintiff cannot recover because of the statute as to guest passengers.
Hayward v. Superior Court (1933), 130 Cal.App. 607, 610. [Originally the people
Travelling with you in your vehicle were "guests", not "passengers", until The State of
California repealed the Guest Law.
[So passengers are people who are paying to be transported in your motor vehicle.
[Taxicab drivers,limousine drivers, and bus drivers actually do have passengers.]
Vehicle Code (1935), Section 403: "No person who as a guest accepts a ride in any
vehicle upon a highway without giving compensation for such a ride, nor any other
person, has any right of action for civil damages against a driver of such vehicle or
against any other person legally liable for the conduct of such driver on account of
personal injury to or the death of such guest during such ride, unless the plaintiff in any
such action establishes that such injury or death proximately resulted from the
intoxication or wilful misconduct of said driver."
[Normal Travelers would probably have passengers only if the people traveling with
them were literally paying to do so, or maybe were buying gas or food during the trip.]
[Here is a curious little anomaly which has just appeared in THE VEHICLE CODE:]
VEHICLE CODE (1959), Section 325: "A "foreign jurisdiction" is any other state, the
District of Columbia, territories or possessions of the United States, and foreign states,
provinces, or countries."
[Did THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA somehow leave the Constitutional Union of the
united States of America in 1959?]
VEHICLE CODE (1959), Section 360: ""Highway" is a way or place of whatever
nature, publicly maintained and open to the use of the public [...] for purposes of
vehicular travel. Highway includes street."
[You will notice that here someone just deleted "as a matter of right" from the 1935
Vehicle Code with the stroke of a pen. Fortunately that is Legally Impossible; if
something ever was a "matter of right" and was protected by the Constitution of the
United States of America and/or by the Constitution of the State of California, it will
always be a "matter of right".
The regulation of public highways by the state not only falls within the ambit of the
police power, but the state has a substantial state and public interest in its highways to
protect. Highways are constructed and maintained for the benefit of members of the
public, who have an inalienable right to use them in a reasonable manner without
obstruction and interruption. (Escobedo v. State of California (1950) 35 Cal.2d 870,
875-876 [222 P.2d 1]: Arques v. City of Sausalito (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 403, 407 [272
P.2d 58].) .
..
...there is authority to the effect that the state's inherent power to enact statutes pertaining
to the public's right to travel on highways without obstruction or interference is limited
to the promotion of that use and cannot extend beyond what is necessary to facilitate
travel. (See 25 Cal.Jur.2d (1955) Highways and Streets, section 238, p. 125.)
"We also are mindful of the general rule that a judicial body cannot read anything into a
statute in order to save it from an unconstitutional defect. (See 13 Cal.Jur.3d (1974)
Constitutional Law, section 74, pp. 138-139.)emphasis added) Findley v. Justice Court
(1976), 62 Cal.App.3d 566, 572-573, 133 Cal. Rptr. 241.
[Even if THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA could show some legitimate or compelling

public interest in the Trespass upon that right by "the Government", its action would still
be actionable Trespass.
[The "Government" certainly cannot claim "Public Policy" as their excuse:]
VEHICLE CODE (1959) and (1998), Section 4851: "Every license plate shall have
displayed upon it the registration number assigned to the vehicle for which it is issued,
together with the word "California" or the abbreviation "Cal." and the year number for
which it is issued or a suitable device issued by the department for validation purposes,
which device shall contain the year number for which issued."
VEHICLE CODE (1959) and (1998), Section 4853: "The department may issue one or
more stickers, tabs, or other suitable devices in lieu of the license plates provided for
under this code. Except where the physical differences between the stickers, tabs, or
devices and license plates by their nature render the provisions of this code inapplicable,
all provisions of this code relating to license plates may apply to stickers, tabs, or
devices."
[In People v. Kirby (1940), 38 Cal.App.2d Supp. 768, 770, the court said:
The license plates so required by the code are described in section 156(b) [Note: now
section 4851] as follows: "Every license plate shall have displayed upon it the registration
number assigned to the vehicle for which it is issued, together with the word 'California'
or the abbreviation 'Cal.' and the year number for which it is issued." There is nothing in
the slightest degree uncertain or ambiguous in the foregoing language prescribing
what shall be shown on the license plates. That language is obviously both inclusive
and exclusive and it applies to every license plate. ... It was clearly the duty of the
department to furnish defendant with license plates "as required by this code" and he
could not be compelled to display unauthorized plates. To hold otherwise would be to
authorize the taking of his property without due process of law and would countenance an
unwarranted invasion of his personal liberty.
[The point here is that when The Vehicle Code was repealed and readopted in 1959, this
section was not substantially changed. Nor has it been substantially changed to date.
[I believe that ALL the Gold-on-Blue series plates and ALL the Blue-on-White series
plates which have been issued since 1940 which show "CALIFORNIA" or "CA
EXEMPT" on them are unauthorized plates issued by the D.M.V. in blatant violation of
section 4851 and of People v. Kirby.]
[That probably means that every vehicle to which these plates were issued was never
properly "Registered" as a result of deliberate and knowing misconduct on the part of the
D.M.V.]
The statutes involving registration of vehicles, somewhat like the statutes concerning the
recording of real property transfers, are designed, among other reasons, for the
protection of purchasers and injured parties, principally by affording identification of
the vehicle and the person in order to prevent fraudulent practices ...
"[3] Strict compliance with Vehicle Code, section 178, and its allied sections relating to
the transfer of title or interest is required before the transferring owner may escape the
liability imposed. (Stoddart v. Peirce, 53 Cal.2d 105 [346 P.2d 774].)
Helton v. Stewart (1961), 198 Cal.App. 2d 114, 120.
Finally, after that journey into the past, we get to the current
VEHICLE CODE as transcribed from West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003).
[THE VEHICLE CODE (2003), as such, does not exist. What exists is still THE
VEHICLE CODE of 1959, as amended to date.]
[The problem here is that, removed from their just-examined historical context and taken
individually, each of these statutes appears reasonable.]
West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), sec. 250:
Sec. 250. Chop Shop
Historical and Statutory Notes
Former sec. 250, enacted by Stats.1959, c. 3, p. 1530, sec. 250, ... which defined
chauffeur, was repealed by Stats.1961, c. 1615, sec. 1.
Sec. 305. Driver
A "driver" is a person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle. The term
"driver" does not include the tillerman or other person who, in an auxiliary capacity,
assists the driver in the steering or operation of any articulated firefighting apparatus.
[This section for consistency should probably read "person who drives a motor vehicle".]
Sec. 310. Driver's license
"Driver's license" is a valid license to drive the type of motor vehicle or combination of
vehicles for which a person is licensed under this code or by a foreign jurisdiction.
[Another example of the expansion of the Trespass by our supposed employees. Now
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA apparently presumes that everyone, even in foreign
jurisdictions (out of the CORPORATE STATE's jurisdiction), is a commercial driver?]
[If one needs a valid driver's license to drive a motor vehicle, what document does one
need to Travel in a private automobIle for which one apparently, by definition, still does
not need a license?]
West's Ann. Cal.Veh. Code (2003), sec. 670:
Sec. 670. Vehicle

A "vehicle" is a device by which any person or property may be propelled, moved, or
drawn upon a highway, excepting a device moved exclusively by human power or used
exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.
Sec. 415. Motor vehicle
(a) A "motor vehicle" is a vehicle that is self-propelled.
(b) "Motor vehicle" does not include a self-propelled wheelchair, invalid tricycle, or
motorized quadricycle when operated by a person who, by reason of physical disability,
is otherwise unable to move about as a pedestrian.
Sec. 325. foreign jurisdiction
A "foreign jurisdiction" is any other county, or state, the District of Columbia, territories
or possessions of the United States, and foreign states, provinces, or countries.
Sec. 360. Highway
"Highway" is a way or place of whatever nature, publicly maintained and open to the use
of the public for purposes of vehicular travel. Highway includes street.
West's Ann .Cal.Veh. Code (2003), sec. 370:
Sec. 370. Legal owner
A "legal owner" is a person holding a security interest in a vehicle which is subject to the
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, or the lessor of a vehicle to the State or to
any county, city, district, or political subdivision of the State, or to the United States,
under a lease, lease-sale, or rental-purchase agreement which grants possession of the
vehicle to the lessee for a period of 30 consecutive days or more.
Sec. 505. Registered owner:
A "registered owner" is a person registered by the department as the owner of a vehicle.

Sec. 460. Owner
An "owner" is a person having all the incidentals of ownership, including the legal title of
a vehicle whether or not such person lends, rents, or creates a security interest in the
vehicle; the person entitled to the possession of a vehicle as the purchaser under a
security agreement; or the State, or any county, city, district, or political subdivision of
the State, or the United States, when entitled to the possession and use of a vehicle under
a lease, lease-sale, or rental-purchase agreement for a period of 30 consecutive days or
more.
[For consistency, these statutes should read "owner" of a motor vehicle", since D.M.V.
should only have jurisdiction over motor vehicles.]
Sec.12500. Unlawful to drive without valid license
"(a) No person shall drive a motor vehicle upon a highway, unless the person then holds
a valid driver's license issued under this code, except those persons who are expressly
exempted under this code.
Sec. 21052. Public officers and employees
The provisions of this code applicable to the drivers of vehicles upon the highways apply
to the drivers of all vehicles while engaged in the course of employment by this
State, any political subdivision thereof, any municipal corporation, or any district,
including authorized emergency vehicles subject to those exemptions granted such
authorized emergency vehicles in this code.
[Notice this section does not say, "The provisions of this code... shall also apply to the
drivers of all vehicles engaged in the course of employment by this State..."]
[This implies that the provisions of this code only apply to THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA employees only.
[See also 17 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 121.]
What California appellate courts have said about the Right to Travel is:
White's contention that there is a constitutional right to intrastate travel is valid. The
Attorney General is correct that the rational [e] behind Shipiro v. Thompson (1969) 394
U.S. 618, 629-630 [22 L.Ed.2d 600, 612, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1329], is that interstate travel is a
necessary element of a federal union. [fnt. 3 The United States Supreme Court has not yet
specifically considered whether there is any constitutional distinction between interstate
and intrastate travel (see Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County (1974) 415 U.S. 250,
256-257 [39 L.Ed.2d 306, 313-314, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 1081).]
We conclude that the right to intrastate travel (which includes intra-municipal travel) is
a basic human right protected by the United States and California Constitutions as a
whole. Such a right is implicit in the concept of a democratic society and is one of the
attributes of personal liberty under common law. (See 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 134;
U.S. Constitution., art. IV, section 2 and the 5th, 9th and 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art.
I, section 7, subd. (a) and art. I, section 24, which provides:
Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the
United States Constitution. This declaration of rights may not be construed to impair or
deny others retained by the People.")
As the court stated in King v. New Rochell Municipal Housing Authority (2d Cir. 1971)
442 F.2d 646, 648: "It would be meaningless to describe the right to travel between states
as a fundamental precept of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative
constitutional right to travel within a state." [fnt 4. In spite of totalitarian member states
not following this democratic concept in practice the right is even recognized at the
international level. See article 13, section 1, Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(1948) "Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders
of each state." (Expressing more a hope than existing reality.)](Blackstone (loc. cit.)
called this a personal liberty and stated: "This personal liberty consists in the power of
locomotion, of changing situation or moving one's person to whatever place one's
inclination may direct; without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law.
...it is a right strictly natural; that the laws of England have never abridged it without
sufficient cause; and, that in this kingdom, it cannot ever be abridged at the mere
discretion of the magistrate, without the explicit permission of the laws.")(Italics
added.) The court in United States v. Wheeler (1920) 254 U.S. 281, 293 [65 L.Ed. 270,
41 S.Ct. 133, 134] (an interstate travel case) said: "In all the states, from the beginning
down to the adoption of the Articles of Confederation, the citizens thereof possessed the
fundamental right, inherent in citizens of all free governments, to move at will from place
to place therein, and to have free ingress thereto and egress there from with a consequent
authority in the states to forbid and punish violations of this fundamental right." [ftn 5. Of
course, historically it did not apply to incarcerated criminals or slaves and until recently
was limited by laws relating to indigents, vagrants, beggars and the like. On freedom of
movement generally and its history see Chaffee, Three Human Rights in the Constitution
of 1787 (1956) page 162 et seq.] Many other fundamental rights such as free speech,
free assembly, and free association are often tied with the right to travel. It is simply
elementary in a free society. Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of values.
(Kent v. Dulles (1958) 357 U.S. 116, 126 [2 L.Ed.2d 1204, 1210, 78 S.Ct. 1113,
1118])." In re White (1979), 97 Cal. App.3d 141, 148-149, 158 Cal. Rptr 562.
A citizen has a basic constitutional right to intrastate as well as interstate travel. (In
re White, supra, 97 Cal.App.3d 141, 148.) Many other fundamental rights such as free
speech, free assembly and free association are often tied in with the right to travel. (See
Kent v. Dulles (1959) 357 U.S. 116, 126 [2 L.Ed.2d 1204, 1210, 78 S.Ct. 1113].) The
right to acquire, own, enjoy and dispose of property is also a basic fundamental right
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (See 5
Witkin Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed 1974) Constitutional Law, section 273, p. 3563.)
Intrinsic and integral to this right is the basic ability to possess one's own property. Could
it be rationally argued that the enjoyment of the fruits of property ownership does not
directly depend upon the owner's free and unimpared access to, and possession of, said
property?... Constitutional intrusions have been upheld to the extent that they are
required by legitimate governmental demands. (See People v. Arvanites (1971) 17
Cal.App.3d 1052, 1063 [95 Cal.Rptr. 493][upholding a probation condition prohibiting
engaging in demonstrations]; see also United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez (9th Cir. 1975)
521 F.2d 259, 263-265; In re Mannino (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 953, 966-967 [92 Cal.Rptr.
880, 45 A.L.R.3d 996].) People v. Beach (1983), 147 Cal.App.3d 612, 622, 195
Cal.Rptr. 381.
[I could almost infer that, if I routinely travel the public highways in my own private
vehicle, that D.M.V. (under the guise of the "police power") is attempting to "grant" me a
"privilege" to conduct my affairs (as a private or public carrier) which it simply does not
have the authority to grant.
[And that the D.C.H.P. is attempting to "enforce" an "obligation" A duty which simply
does not exist.
[Have we started to wonder yet just exactly why or how any of this "registration" is
D.M.V.'s legitimate business at all?]
So what can I do about this revolting situation?
The only solution I can see is to scratch-build a vehicle from brand-new parts for which I
paid cash and did all the assembly thereof myself and then NEVER register the vehicle.
That way it would, at least, by mine.
[Since THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA seems to take the position that D.M.V. is one of
its agencies and that D.M.V. employees are immune from civil penalties, I started
researching possible remedies.
[The following information is transcribed from CALIFORNIA JURISPRUDENCE,
Third Edition (Revised). (I omitted the superscripts and footnotes as too cumbersome to
reproduce. Read the originals if you need the footnotes.)]
Section 1. In general:
Conversion has been defined as the exercise of dominion over the personal property
of another in exclusion or defiance of the latter's right, as any act of dominion
wrongfully exerted over another's property in denial or inconsistent with his rights
thereto, and as unwarranted interference, by the defendant, with dominion over personal
property of the plaintiff. Conversion involves actual interference with the plaintiff's
dominion or ownership rights. And any wrongful assumption of authority over a chattel,
inconsistent with another's right of possession or subversive of his vested interest therein,
amounts to a conversion. Some definitions include injury as an element of the tort.
Conversion is a continuing tort. It does not necessarily end when the original wrongdoer
transfers physical possession to another, but continues as long as the person entitled to
the use and possession of the property is deprived thereof.
An action in trover or conversion is one for damages, and must, therefor, be distinguished
from an action for recovery of possession of converted personal property. However,
conversion, and claim and delivery, may be alternative remedies.
Section 2. Conversion and "trover" The present-day conversion action is the successor
to the common-law action of "trover." This action was primarily based on the wrongful
conversion of the plaintiff's personal property, and thus, distinguished from trespass, the
gist of which is injury to the plaintiff or to real or personal property in his possession, and
from replivin, which lay for the wrongful taking or detention of the plaintiff's personal
property. These forms of action overlapped, however, so that trover and trespass were
concurrent remedies for most illegal or tortuous takings. Strictly speaking, "trover" is the
name of the action and "conversion" the name of the tort involved. In modern usage,
however, the terms are used interchangeably as designations of the tort, as well as of the
action for damages based on that tort.
Section 3. Intent or mental state Conversion consists of the breach of what may be
called an absolute duty. The act itself is unlawful and is re-dressable as a tort. It is an
instance of strict liability in which care, good faith, and lack of knowledge will not save
the defendant. Negligence is not an element. And the motive for the defendant's act is
ordinarily immaterial. The foundation for the action of conversion rests neither in the
knowledge nor in the intent of the defendant, and conversion does not require proof of
wrongful intent. Though the defendant may have acted in good faith or under a mistake,
he is not exonerated from liability for conversion "where the law charges him with the
duty to know before he intrudes." Although some opinions declare that an intention or
purpose to convert must be shown, and although conversion is sometimes defined as an
intentional exercise of domintion over a chattel which interferes with the right of another
to control it, or as an act of willful interference with a chattel, done without lawful
justification, by which any person entitled thereto is deprived of use and possession,
ordinarily the good faith of the person charged with conversion, his innocent mistake
resulting from ignorance of the true facts, his lack of negligence, and his innocent motive
are irrelevant in determining whether he committed the conversion charged. Thus, the
intent required to constitute conversion is not necessarily a matter of conscious
wrongdoing; it is rather an intent to exercise a dominion over the goods which is, in fact,
inconsistent with the plaintiff's rights. 14 CALIFORNIA JURISPRUDENCE 3d. Ed.
(Rev), CONVERSION, sec. 1 et seq., p. 770.

Section 1149. In general; definition and nature The crime of embezzlement, now
prosecuted as "theft," is defined by the Penal Code as the fraudulent appropriation of
property by a person to whom it has been entrusted. And it has been more specifically
defined judicially as the fraudulent appropriation of property to some use or purpose not
in the due and lawful execution of his trust by one into whose possession it has come by
reason of some relation of trust or confidence mentioned by statute, and existing between
him and another. The code defines a number of specific relations of trust and confidence
whose violation may constitute the offense, [Penal Code 504 et seq.] The essential
elements of theft by embezzlement are (1) that the property belong to the alleged
principal, the prosecuting witness; (2) that it be lawfully in the possession of the accused
at the time of the embezzlement; (3) that the accused act as agent, bailee, servant, or
employee of the prosecuting witness in holding the property; (4) that the accused be
guilty of the conversion or appropriation that the statute denounces; and (5) that he
appropriate it with the intent unlawfully to deprive the prosecuting witness of his
property. Some decisions group the latter of these two elements as one. More briefly, it is
said that the gist of the offense is the appropriation to own's own use of property
delivered to him for devotion to a specific purpose other than his own enjoyment of it. It
has also been said that the essential elements of the offense are the fiduciary relation that
arises when one entrusts property to another person and its fraudulent appropriation by
that person, Again it has been stated that the gist of embezzlement is in the breach of the
trust imposed on an agent, employee, or bailee by his principal, employer, or bailor. In
any event, it seems that the offense necessarily includes a fraud against the person from
whom the property is embezzled, and that in most embezzlements there is an element of
false representation. 18 CALIFORNIA JURISPRUDENCE 3d Ed.(Rev), CRIMINAL
LAW, sec. 1149.
Sec. 1150. -As statutory offense Embezzlement is purely a statutory offense, unknown
to the common law. It has been said that in the common-law definition of larcency there
were two gaps through which, in the expansion and complication of business practices,
many criminals escaped. The first of these was caused by the rule that in larcency it was
necessary that the stolen goods should have been at some time in the possession of the
prosecuting witness. The second lay in the assumption that, when possession of goods
was acquired by a bailee, no subsequent conversion constituted larcency while the
bailment lasted, save in a few excepted cases. It was to meet these defects in the common
law that statutes have been passed in most, if not all, of the states, providing for the
offense of embezzlement. 18 CALIFORNIA JURISPRUDENCE 3d Ed.(Rev),
CRIMINAL LAW, sec. 1150.
Section 1151. Ownership in another for property to be embezzled, title thereto must, as
a rule, be in one other than the embezzler, for it is clear that one cannot be guilty of
embezzling his own property. Though fraud in the transaction may render him guilty of
another offense, an accused cannot be guilty of embezzling the property title to which he
acquired by contract or sale. Nor is it embezzlement where an accused takes property in
good faith, under an open and bona fide claim of title, though his claim is untenable. 18
CALIFORNIA JURISPRUDENCE 3d Ed.(Rev), CRIMINAL LAW, sec. 1151.

B. Conversion of Personal Property. 1. In general. (a) [Sec. 610] Nature of
Tort. Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over personal property of
another. (See Poggi v. Scott (1914) 167 C. 372, 375, 139 P. 815; Gruber v. Pacific States
Savings & Loan Co. (1939) 13 C.2d 144, 148, 88 P.2d 137; Kee v. Becker (1942) 54
C.A.2d 466, 470, 129 P.2d 159; Steele v. Marsicano (1894) 102 C. 666, 669, 36 P. 920;
Fresno Air Service v. Wood (1965) 232 C.A.2d 801, 806, 43 C.R. 276, quoting the text;
Rest.2d [note: Restatement of the Law, Second Edition], Torts, Sec. 222A; Prosser &
Keeton Sec. 15; 1 Harper, James & Gray, Sec. 2.7 et seq.; 18 Am.Jur.2d, Conversion,
Sec. 1 et seq.) The property need not be appropriated to the use of the defendant; it may
be destroyed, or merely damaged. (See Staley v. McClurken (1939) 35 C.A. 2d 622, 628,
96 P.2d 805; Rest.2d, Torts, Secs. 223, 226; see infra, Sec. 621.) The action for
conversion properly lies only where there is some substantial interference with
possession or the right thereto, and the plaintiff in a conversion suit recovers the full
value of the property, in effect forcing the defendant to buy it. Where the act does not
amount to a dispossession, but consists of intermeddling with or use of or damage to the
property, the normal action will be for trespass, in which the plaintiff recovers only the
actual damages suffered by impairment of the property or loss of its use. (See Zaslow v.
Krenert (1946) 29 C.2d 541, 551, 176 P.2d 1...; Rest.2d, Torts, Secs. 217, 218, 219; see
infra, Sec. 1449 et seq.) 5 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, 9th Ed.;
Torts, sec. 610.
It is settled that the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance may be tested by [writ of]
prohibition; the validity of legislation goes to the jurisdiction of the court to proceed to
try the case (Whitney v. Superior Court, 182 Cal. 114 [187 P.12]; Broady v. Jennings, 70
Cal.App. 647 [234 P. 120])...." Chavez v. Municipal Court (1967), 256 C.A. 2d 149, 151,
64 Cal. Rptr. 76. ...We do not agree with respondents' contention that prohibition is not
available to appellant in this case. In Hunter v. Justice Court (1950) 36 Cal.2d 315 [223
P.2d 465], the petitioner was charged with a misdemeanor violation in a justice court.
Although his petition was denied (for other reasons) the Supreme Court unequivocally
stated that prohibition was proper to test the constitutionality of the statute without
indicating or suggesting that there were other special facts or circumstances to warrant
the relief requested. Chavez v. Municipal Court (1967), 256 C.A.2d 149, 152, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 76.
The department of motor vehicles, which is a quasi-judicial department for the purpose
of passing upon facts in granting or revoking operators' licenses, was not authorized to
revoke the defendant's license to drive without notice and without a hearing. ... With
due appreciation of the dangers attending the driving of motor vehicles, in this
progressive age [1935!] when the necessary use of automobiles is so in-despenable and
inseparatable from legitimate business, it would be unjust and extremely harmful to grant
any individual or body the arbitrary right to revoke an operator's license to drive a
machine on mere rumor or hearsay evidence without notice and without a
hearing. People v. Noggle (1935), 7 Cal.App.2d. 14, 17-18 (emphasis added).
[It appears that I may have valid grounds for a civil Remedy against D.M.V. for the Tort
of Conversion.]
[Another possible Remedy could be an Action for the Tort of Trespass against the actual
physical Title, based on the logic articulated by this article:
[Another Remedy that the People of California each individually still have is that of
Arrest. [Maybe I should start applying the California Criminal laws appropriately and
upon the appropriate individuals. [There are no "public citizens" or "public persons" in
California.]
Section 837. Private persons; authority to arrest.
ARRESTS BY PRIVATE PERSONS. A private person may arrest another:
1. For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence.
2. When the person arrested has committed a felony, although not in his presence.
3. When a felony has been in fact committed, and he has reasonable cause for believing
the person arrested to have committed it. (emphasis added) West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code
(2003), sec. 837.
[All "public offenses" are crimes.]
Section 10851. Theft and unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle
(a) Any person who drives or takes a vehicle not his or her own, without the consent
of the owner thereof, and with intent either to permanently or temporarily deprive the
owner thereof of his or her title to or possession of the vehicle, whether with or without
intent to steal the vehicle, or any person who is a party or an accessory to or an
accomplice in the driving or unauthorized taking or stealing, is guilty of a public offense
and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not
more than one year or in the state prison or by a fine of not more than five thousand
dollars ($5,000), or by both the fine and imprisonment.
(b) . . .(in part, emphasis added) West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), 10851.
[This would seem to apply to both every purported peace officer and to every tow truck
operator who tows my Automobile without my explicit direction and permission.]
Section 487. Grand theft defined
Grand theft is theft committed in any of the following cases:
(c) When the property is taken from the person of another.
(d) When the property taken is any of the following:

(1) An automobile, [or various livestock].
(in part, emphasis added) West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code (2003), 487.
Theft is the unlawful taking of property of another, including the crimes of larcency,
embezzlement, larcency by trick and device, and obtaining property by false pretenses.
People v. Creath (App. 2 Dist. 1995) 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 336, 31 Cal.App.4th 312, rehearing
denied, review denied.
To support conviction for grand theft by false pretense, accused must have made
misrepresentation upon which victim relied, but misrepresentation need not be explicitly
made. People v. Gentry (App. 4 Dist. 1991) 285 Cal.Rptr. 591, 234 Cal.App.3d 131,
review denied. West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code (1999), sec. 487, Notes of Decisions, 3.
Elements.
Theft conviction on theory of false pretense requires proof that defendant made false
pretense or representation to the owner of property; he did so with intent to defraud
owner of that property; and owner transferred property to defendant in reliance on
representation. People v. Wooten (App. 2 Dist. 1996) 52 Cal. Rptr.2d 765, 44
Cal.App.4th 1834, review denied. Ibid., sec. 487, Notes of Decisions, 11. False
pretenses-In general.
Requirement that owner's transfer of property be in "reliance" on false representation, as
element of theft by false pretense, means that false representation materially influenced
owner's decision to part with his property; it need not be the sole factor motivating
transfer. People v. Wooten (App. 2 Dist. 1996) 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 765, 44 Cal.App.4th 1834,
review denied.
Reliance on false representation, as element of theft by false pretense, may be inferred
from all the circumstances. People v. Wooten (App. 2 Dist. 1996) 52 Cal. Rptr.2d 765, 44
Cal.App.4th 1834, review denied. Id., sec. 487, Notes of Decisions, 12. Reliance, false
pretenses.
[In other words, every time I go to the D.M.V. and they tell me something which
eventually turns out to be untrue and I rely on it and give them my money or other
property, they have committed or attempted to commit the crime defined above.]
Section 211. ...Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of
another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by
means of force or fear. West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code (2003), section 211.
[In other words, in reference to a "peace officer", he/she is carrying a gun (force); he/she
wants to take my car (felonious taking) against my will; I am afraid (fear); I may have to
defend myself. Fear for my life in the hands of military trained men, with no care and/or
concerns for my health ofr safety and rights.
Section 484.
(a) Every person who shall feloniously steal, take, carry, lead, or drive away the
personal property of another, or who shall fraudulently appropriate property which
has been entrusted to him, or who shall knowingly and designedly, by any false or
fraudulent representation or pretense, defraud any other person of money, labor or real
or personal property, or who causes or procures others to report falsely of his wealth or
mercantile character and by thus imposing upon any person, obtains credit and thereby
fraudulently gets or obtains possession of money, or property or obtains the labor or
service of another, is guilty of theft. In determining the value of the property obtained,
for the purposes of this section, the reasonable and fair market value shall be the test, and
in determining the value of services received the contract price shall be the test. If there
be no contract price, the reasonable and going wage for the service rendered shall govern.
For the purposes of this section, any false or fraudulent representation or pretense made
shall be treated as continuing, so as to cover any money, property or service received as a
result thereof, and the complaint, information or indictment may charge that the crime
was committed on any date during the particular period in question. ...(in part, emphasis
added) West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code (2003), Section 484.
Section 496. Receiving stolen property; punishment; swap meet vendors and others
dealing in or collecting merchandise or personal property; damages and costs;
attempted offenses; penalties
(a) Every person who buys or receives any property that has been stolen or that has been
obtained in any manner constituting theft or extortion, knowing the property to be so
stolen or obtained, or who conceals, sells, withholds, or aids in concealing, selling, or
withholding any property from the owner, knowing the property to be so stolen or
obtained, shall be punished by imprisonment in a state prison, or in a county jail for not
more than one year. ... A principal in the actual theft of the property may be convicted
pursuant to this section. However, no person may be convicted both pursuant to this
section and of the theft of the same property. ...(c) Any person who has been injured by a
violation of subdivision (a) or (b) may bring an action for three times the amount of
actual damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff, costs of suit, and reasonable attorney's
fees. ... (emphasis added) West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code (2003), Sec. 496.
Section 503. Definition Embezzlement is the fraudulent appropriation of property by a
person to whom it has been entrusted by Public Trust, and Public Laws. West's
Ann.Cal.Penal Code (2003), sec. 503.
Section 504. Every officer of this state, or of any county, city, city and county, or other
municipal corporation or subdivision thereof, and every deputy, clerk, or servant of that
officer, and every officer, director, trustee, clerk, servant, or agent of any association,
society, or corporation (public or private), who fraudulently appropriates to any use or
purpose not in the due and lawful execution of that person's trust, any property in his or
her possession or under his or her control by virtue of that trust, or secretes it with a
fraudulent intent to appropriate it to that use or purpose, is guilty of
embezzlement. (emphasis added) West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code (2003), sec. 504.

Section 518. Definition Extortion is the obtaining of property from another, with his
consent, or the obtaining of an official act of a public officer, induced by a wrongful use
of force or fear, or under color of official right. (emphasis added) West's
Ann.Cal.Penal Code (1998), sec. 518 .
[Let me see if I understand this:
[A purported "peace officer" directs a tow truck driver [conspiracy (a felony) and grand
theft under color of authority (a felony)] to steal my car [grand theft auto ( a felony)],
from my immediate presence, without my consent. While the peace officer might have an
interest in my car through D.M.V., where did he get an interest in my private property
within the car?
[When I go to the tow company's storage yard or lot [he is in open and blatant possession
of my stolen car (a misdemeanor) and my private property within it (a felony)], he wants
my money for performing a "service" I did not request [commits extortion (a felony)]
before he will return my car and my private property within it. If I don't pay him, he gets
a lien [embezzlement (?), more extortion (?)] upon my car for the value of the "service"
he provided in initially stealing my car.
[Maybe the new program should be:
The tow truck driver, in conspiracy with the "peace officer", just stole my car; now he
wants my money to return my car; now I arrest the tow truck driver [for grand theft auto,
conspiracy, and possession of stolen property] and his boss/business owner [for
possession of stolen property]; now they go to jail [and maybe out-of-business]; now I get
in my car and go home! Bet they won't touch my car again...]
MEMORANDUM IN LAWS SUPPORT TO:

INSTRUCTIONS FOR LAWFUL EXEMPTIONS
&
DOT 1877402
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARACTER
DERIVATION OF DUE PROCESS
RESCISSION OF DRIVERS LICENSE
RESCISSION OF DMV REGISTRATIONS
CHRISTOPHER J. SUMMERS
AUTHORIZED AGENT
John A. Smith
123 Main Street
San Diego [95102]
Secured party
Plaintiff/beneficiary to:
The US Trust
Authorized representative
P.A.G. 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983
To:
Department of the Motor Vehicle et. al
Coast Guard Stationed in California et. al
Department of Transportation et. al
California Governor et al
Attorney General California et al

09-08-09 Memo in Support

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09-08-09 Memo in Support

Enviado por

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MEMORANDUM IN LAWS SUPPORT TO:

INSTRUCTIONS FOR LAWFUL EXEMPTIONS

Official Notice Requested (West's Ann.Cal.Gov. Code (2004),

My focus is on how a vested common Right of personal Liberty (usually called

[There is further background material at the end of this article.]

(f) Renting or leasing a home for use as a residence.

[When I was a 'REGISTERED VOTER', I had told THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, by

1) [The legal Title to a vehicle seems to be evidenced by a collection of pieces of paper

[I currently have a "CERTIFICATE OF TITLE" (the notorious rainbow-colored "pink

Code. (emphasis added) West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), sec. 6301.

How we got to where we are today:

A no-longer-brief historic background of THE VEHICLE CODE.

Section 465.4 Classification as Pleasure Cars or Commercial Vehicles "A classification

[Even if THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA could show some legitimate or compelling

Sec. 670. Vehicle

A "registered owner" is a person registered by the department as the owner of a vehicle.

(Rev), CONVERSION, sec. 1 et seq., p. 770.

CALIFORNIA JURISPRUDENCE 3d Ed.(Rev), CRIMINAL LAW, sec. 1151.

(d) When the property taken is any of the following:

embezzlement. (emphasis added) West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code (2003), sec. 504.

MEMORANDUM IN LAWS SUPPORT TO:

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