Why Astrolonyisg Pseudoscience Paul R. Thagard PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1978, Volume One: Contributed Papers (1978), 223-234. Stable URL hitp:/flinks jstororg/siisici=0270-8647% 281978%29 1978%3C223%3AWATAP%3E2,0.CO%3B2-W PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association is currently published by The University of Chicago Press. ‘Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at hup:/www,jstororglabout/terms.hml. ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at hupulwww.jstor.orgijournalsuepress html. Each copy of any part of @ JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the sereen or printed page of such transmission. STOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support @ jstor.org, upslwwwjstor.org/ ri Mar 18 13:14:30 2005Why Astrology Is & Pseudoscience Paul R. Thagard! University of Michigan-Dearborn Most philosophers and historians of science agree that astrology is eudoscience, but there is Tittle agreement on why it 15 2 pseudo- science. Answers range from matters of verifiability and falsifiabti— ity, to questions of progress and Kuhnian normal science, to the different sorts of objections raised by a large panel of sclentists recently organized by The Munanist magazine. Of course there are also Feyerabendian anarchists and others who say that no demarcation of Se¥ence from pseudoscience fs possible. However, I shall propose a complex criterion for distinguishing disciplines as pseudoscient fics Unis criterion ts unlike verifieationist and falsificationist. attempts in that it Introduces social and historical features as well as logical I begin with a brief description of astrology. Tt would be most un- fair to evaluate astrology by reference to the daily horoscopes. found {in newspapers and popular magazines. These horoscopes deal only with sun signs, whereas a full horoscope makes reference to the “Influences” also of the moon and the planets, while also discussing the ascendant Sign and other matters. Astrology divides the sky into twelve regions, represented by the familiar signs of the Zodiac: “Aquarius, Libra and so on. The sun sign ‘represents the part of the sky occupied by the sun at the time of birth. For exanple, anyone born between September 23 and October 22 is a Libran. The ascendant sign, often assuned to be at least as inportant fas the sun sign, represents. the part of the sky rising on the eastern horizon at the tine of birth, and therefore changes every two hours. To determine this sign, accurate knowledge of the tine and place of birth is essential. The moon and the planets (of which there are five or eight depending on whether Uranus, Neptune and Pluto are taken into account) are also Tocated by means of charts on one of the parts of the Zodiac. Each planet 1s said to exercise an influence in a special sphere ‘of husan activity; for example, Mars governs drive, courage and BSA 1978, Volume 1, pp. 223-234 Copyright ©) 1978'by the Philosophy of Science Association24 daring, white Venus governs love and artistic endeavor. The imense rnunber of conbinations of sun, ascendant, moon and planetary influences allegedly determines hunan personality, behavior and fate. Astrology is an ancient practice, and appears to have its origins in Chaldea, thousands of years 8.C. By 700 8.C.. the Zodiac was estab Vished, ‘and a few centuries later the signs of the Zodiac were very similar to current ones. The conquests of Alexander the Great brought astrology to Greece, and the Rosans were exposed in turn. Astrology was very popular during'the fall of the Republic, with many notables such as Jutfus Caesar having their horoscopes cast. However, there was opposi~ ‘tion from such men as Lucretius and Cicero. Astrology underwent © gradual codification cylsinating in Ptolemy's Tetrabiblos(20], written in the second century A.D. "This work describes ‘in great detail the powers of the sun, noon and planets, and their Significance in peopte's lives. Tt 1s still recognized as a fundamental textbook of astrotoay. Ptoteny took astrology as serfousiy as he took his fanous work in geography and astronomy; this 1s evident from the ‘introduction fo the Tetrabiblos, where he discusses two available means of making predictions bused on the heavens. The first and adnittedly tore effective of these concerns the relative novenents of the sun, Roon and planets, which Peoleny ad already treated fn hia celebrated Aimagest [19]"" The Secondary but stil) Tegitinate means OF prediction 1s that in which we use the *natural character" of the aspects of movenent of heavenly bodies to "investigate the changes whch they bring about tn that wich they surround." ( [20], p. 3). He argues that this method of prediction is possible because of the manifest effects of the sun, moon {nd planets on the earth, for example on weather and the tides The European Renaissance 1s heralded for the rise of modern science, but occult arts such as astrology and alcheny flourished as well. Arthur Koestler has described Kepler's interest in astrology: not only did astrology provide Kepler with a livelihood, he also pursued it as a serious interest, although he was skeptical of the particular analyses Of previous astrologers ((I3 1, pp. 244-248). Astrology was popular both among intellectuals and the general public through the seventeenth century. However, astrology lost most of this popularity in the eighteenth century, when it was attacked by such figures of the Enlight~ fenment as Swift (24) and Voltaire [29]. Only since the 1990's has astrol- ogy again getned a huge audience: most people today know at Teast their Sun signs, anda great nany believe that the stars and planets exercise fan important influence on their lives: In an attempt to reverse this trend, Sart Bok, Lawrence Jerome and Paul Kurtz drafted in 1975 a statement attacking’ astrology; the state- nent was signed by 192 leading scientists, including 19 Nobel prize Winners. The statement raises three main {ssues: astrology originated as part of a magical world view, the planets are too distant for there to be any physical foundation for astrology, and people believe it rrerely out’ of longing for comfort ({2], pp. 9f.). None of these25 objections is ground for condemning astrology as pseudoscience, To show this, T shall Briefly discuss articles written by Bok [1] and Jerome (12) jn support of the statenent. According to B0k, to work on statistical tests of astrological pre- dictions ts a waste of tine unless ft is demonstrated that astrology has some sort of physical foundation ([1], p. 31). He uses the snaliness of gravitational and radiative effects of the stars and planets to Suggest that there is no such foundation. He also discusses the psy- chology of belief in astrology, which fs the result of individuals" desperation in seeking solutions to their serious personel problens. Jerome devotes most of his article to the origins of astrology in the nagical principle of correspondences. He clains that astrology 1s a systen of magic rather than scfence, and that it fails "not because of any inherent inaccuracies due to precession or Tack of exact knowledge concerning tine of birth or conception, but rather because its inter Pretatfons and predictions are grounded in the ancients’ magical world view."((12}, p. 46). He does however discuss sone statistical tests of astrology, which I shall return to below. These objections do not show that astrology is a pseudoscience.. First, origins are irrelevant to scientific status. “The alchenical origins of chemistry ({11}, pp. 10-18) and the occult beginnings of medi— Cine [8] are as magical as’those of astrology, and historians have detected saystical influences in the work of many great scientists, Including Newton and Einstein. "Hence astrology cannot be condenned simply for the magical origins of its principles. Similarly, the psychology of popular belief is also in itself irrelevant to the status of astrology: people often believe even good theories for i1legitimate reasons, and even if fost people believe astrojogy for personal. irrational reasons, good ‘reasons may be available. Finally the lack of a physical foundation hardly marks a theory as unsctentific ((221, p. 2 J. Examples: when Wegener [31] proposed continental drift, no méchanism’was known, and a Vink between saoking and cancer has been established statistically [28] though the detafls of carcinogenesis remain to be discovered. Hence the objec tons of Bok, Jerone and Kurtz fail to mark astrology as peeudosctence Now we must consider the application of the criteria of verifiaility and falsifiability to estrotogy. Roughly, a theory fs sad to be veri- fiable if it is possible to dedice observation statenents from it. Then in principle, observations can be used to confirm or disconfirn the theory. A theory 1s sclentific only if it is verifiable. The vicissi- tudes of the verification principle are too well known to recount here ({5}, ch. #). Attenpts by'A. J. Ayer to articulate the principle failed either by ruling out sost of science as unscientific, or by ruling out nothing. Moreover, the theory/observation distinction has. increasingly cone into question. All that remains 1s @ vague sense that testability somehow ts'amark of sctentific theortes " ([3], ch. 4; [1, pp. 30-32 ). Well, astrology is vaguely testable. Because of the multitude of influences resting on tendencies rather than laws, astrology ts incapable of making precise predictions. Nevertheless, attempts have226 been made to test the reality of these alleged tendencies, using large Scale surveys. and statistical evaluation. the ploneer in this area was Hichel Souguelin, who examined the careers and tines of Birth of 25,000 Frencnen. Astrology suggests that people barn under certain stans'or Planets are TYkely £0 adopt certain occupations: for example, the Jnfluence of the warlike. planet Mars. tends to produce soldiers or athletes, white Venus has’an artistic influence. Notably, Gauguel fn found no ‘significant correlation between careers and efther sun sigh, soon sign, ar axcandant-Fign- However, he did find sone staristical iy ‘neeresting correlations between certain occupations of people end the sition of certain planets at the tine of their birth, (Isls ch. Ty F611). For esanoie, just as astrology would suggest, there i's greater than chance association of athletes and Mars, and a grester than chence assoclation of scientists and Saturn, where the planet 15 rising or at jtszenith at the sonent of the Individuals birth. ‘These Findings and their interpretation are highly controversial, as fare subsequent studies tn a similar vein’. [7]... Even if correct, ‘they hardly verify astrology, especially considering the negative results found for the most. important astrological categories. 1 have mentioned Gauguelin in order to suggest that through the use of statistical techniques astrology is at least verifiable. Hence the verification principle does not mark astrology a5 pseudoscience.. Because the predictions of astrologers are generally vague, a Popperian would assert that the real problen with astrology is that it is not falsifiable: astrologers can not make predictions which if un fulfilled would lead them to give up their theory. Hence because it is unfalsifiable, astrology 1s unsclentéfic. But the doctrine of falsifiability faces serious problems as des~ cribed by'buhem {4}, Quine [21], and Lakatos [15]. Popper himself noticed early that no observation ever guarantees falsification: a theory can always be retained by introducing or modifying auxiliary hypotheses, and even observation statenents are not incorrigible (71, p. 50). Methodological decisions about what can be tanpered with are required to block the escape from falsification. However, Lakatos has. persuasively argued that making such decision in advance of tests is arbitrary and may often lead to overhasty rejection of sound theory which ought to bebe saved hy anticfalsificationist serategens (C184, pp. NZ FF.) Falsification only occurs when @ better theory comes aléng. Then falsitiabitfty ts only a matter of replaceability by another theory, and Sine astrology is tn principle replaceable by another theory, falsi- Fiability provides no eriterion for rejecting astrology as pseudo- Scientific. We saw in the discussion of Gauquel in thet astrology can be Used to make predictions about statistical regularities, but the non- existence of these regularities does not falsify astrology; but here astrology does not appear worse than the best of scientific theories, Which also resist falsification until alternative theortes arise. Astrology can not be condemned as pseudosctentific on the grounds proposed by verificationists, falsificationists, or Bok and Jerome.2a But undoubtedly astrotogy today faces a great many unsolved probtens (Toei, ch. 5). One fs. the negative result. found dy euguel in concerning carea’s and signs. Another is the problen of the precession of the fequinoxes, which astrologers. generally take. into. account. when heralding the "Age of Aquarius" but totally neglect when figuring thelr charts. Astrotogers do not always agrae on the significance of the three Planets, Neptune, Uranus. and Pluto, that were discovered since Ptolemy. Studies of twins ‘do not show similarities of personality and fate. that astrology would suggest. Nor does astrology make sense of nase disas~ ters, where nunerous individuals with very different. horoscopes cone to Sintiar ends. But problems such as these do not in themselves show that astrology is either false or pseudoscientific. Even the best theories face unsolved problens. throughout their history. To get a criterion demar- cating astrology from science, we need to consider ft in a wider histor- Yeal"and social context. A demarcation criterion requires a matrix of three elenents: [theory, community, historical context]. Under the first heading, "theory", fall faniliar matters of structure, prediction, explanation and problem solving. ‘Me aight also include the issue raised by Bok and Jerome about Whether the theory has a physical foundation. Previous desarcationists have concentrated on this theoretical element, evident. in the concern of the verification and falsification principles with prediction. But we have seen that this approach 1s not sufficient. for characterizing astrology as pseudoscienti fic. We must also consider the community of advocates of the theory, in this case the community of practitioners of astrology, Several ques- tions are inportant here. First, are the practitioners in agreenent on the principles of the theory and'on how to go about solving problens which the theory faces? Second, do they care, that is, are they con- cerned about explaining anomalies and coaparing the success of their ‘theory to the record of other theories? Third, are the practitioners actively involved tn attenpts at confirming and disconfirming their theory? ‘The question about comparing the success of a theory with that of other theories introduces the third elenent of the matrix, historical context. The historical work of Kun and others has shown that. in ‘general a theory is rejected only when (1) it has faced anonalfes over Tong period of tine and (2) it has been challenged by another theory. Hence under the heading of historical context we must consider two factors relevant to demarcation: the record of a theory over tine in explaining new facts and dealing with anonalies, and the availability of alternative theories. We can now propose the following principle of demarcation: A theory or discipline which purports to be sctentittc ts pseudoscientific 1f and only 'f.228 1) ft has been less progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time, and faces many unsolved problens; but 2) the community of practitioners makes Tittle attenpt to develop ‘the theory towards solutions of the problens, shows no concern for attenpts to evaluate the theory in relation to others, and 1s! selective in constdering confirmations and disconfirmat fons. Progressiveness 1s a matter of the success of the theory in adding to its set of facts explained and problens solved ([15], p. 118; cf. [26]. p. 3 ). ‘This principle captures, I believe, what is most importantly unscien- Liflc about astrology. First, astrology is dramatically unprogressive, in that {t has changed little and has added nothing to its explanatory, power since the tine of Ptoleay. Second, problens such as the preces~ Sion of equinoxes are outstanding. Third, there are alternative theorfes of personality and behavior available: one need not be an uncritical advocate of behaviorist, Freudian, or Gestalt theories to see ‘that since the nineteenth century psychological theories have been expanding to deal with many of the phenomena which astrology explains 1n terme of heavenly influences. The important point 1s not that any of these psychological theories 1s established or true, only that, they are growing alternatives to a long-static astrology. Fourth and finally, The community of astrologers 1s generally unconcerned with advancing astrology to deal with outstanding problens or with evaluating the theory in relation to others. For these reasons, ny criterion marks astrology as pseudoscientitic. ‘This demarcation criterion differs from those implicit in Lakatos and Kuhn, Lakatos has sald that what makes a series of theortes constitut- ‘ng a research progran sclentific is that it is progressive: each theory’ in the series has greater corroborated content than its prede~ cessor ({is], p- 118), While T agree with Lakatos that progressive- hess Is a central notion here, it 1s not suffictent to distinguish Science from pseudosctence. We should not brand a nonprogressive dis~ Cipline as pseudoscientific unless ft 1s being maintained against more progressive alternatives. Kuhn's discussion of astrology focuses on a Gifferent aspect of my criterion. He says that what makes astrology Unscientific is the absence of the paradign-doninated puzzle solving activity characteristic of what he calls normal sctence (D4), p. 9 ). But as Watkins has suggested, astrologers are in sone respects model normal scientists: they concern theaselves with solving puzzles at the level of individual horoscopes, unconcerned with, the foundations of their general theory or paradign — ([30], p. 32 ). Hence that feature of normal sefence does not distinguish science from pseudoscfence. What makes astrology pseudosclentific 1s not that it lacks perfods of Kuhnian formal sefence, but that ts proponents adopt uncritical attitudes of normal” sefentists despite the existence of more progressive alterna tive theortes. (Note that I an not agreeing with Popper [18} that. Kuhn's normal scientists are unscientific; they can become unsctentt fic only when an alternative paradign has been developed.) However $f one Jooks’not at the puzzle solving at the level of particular astrological229 predictions, but at the level of theoretical problens such as the pre- cession of the equinoxes, there 1s some agreement between my criterion ‘and Kuhn's; astrologers do not have a paradign-induced confidence about solving theoretical problens. Of course, the criterion {s intended to have appl ications beyond astrology. { think that discussion would show that the criterion marks as pseudosctentific such practices as witchcraft and pyranidology, while Veaving contenporary physics, chemistry and biology unthreatened. The current fad of biorhythns, implausibly based like astrology on date of birth, can not be branded’as pseudoscientific because we lack alterna~ tive theorfes giving more detailed accounts of cyeligal variations tn human beings, although much research is in progress. One interesting consequence of the above criterion 1s that a theory can be scientific at one tine but pseudoscientific at another. In the tine of Ptoleny or even Kepler, astrology had few alternatives in the explanation of human personality and behavior. Existing alternatives were scarcely more sophisticated or corroborated than astrology. Hence astrology should be judged as not pseudoscientific in classical or Renaissance times, even though it is pseudoscientific today. Astrology was not simply a perverse sideline of Ptolemy and Kepler, but part of their scientific activity, even if a physicist involved with astrology today should be looked at askance. Only when the historical and social aspects of science are neglected does it decane plausible that pseudo- science is an unchanging category. Rationality 1s not a property of ideas eternally: ideas, Tike actions, can be rational at’ tine but irrational at others. lience relativizing ‘the sclence/pseudosctence distinction to historical periods 15 a desirable result. But there remains a challenging historical problem. According to my criterion, astrology only became pseudoscientific with the rise of ‘modern psychology in the nineteenth century, But astrology was already virtually excised fron scientific circles by the beginning of the eighteenth. How could this be? The simple answer 1s that a theory can ‘take on the appearance of an unpromising project well before it deserves ‘the label of pseudoscience. The Copernican revolution and the mechanism Of Newton, Descartes and Hobbes undersined the plausibility of astrol~ ogy.8 Lynn Thorndike [27] has described how the Newtonian theory Pushed aside what had been accepted as a universal natural Taw, that (nferiors such as Inhabitants of earth are ruled and governed by supe- lors such as the stars and the planets. KilTian Staniman [23] has Gescribed how the imense growth of science in the seventeenth century contrasted with stagnation of astrology. These developments provided ood reasons for discarding astrology as a pronising pursuit, but they were not yet enough to brand {t as pseudosctentific, or evento refute ee Because of its soctal aspect, my criterion might suggest a kind of cultural relativism. Suppose there is an isolated group of astrologers ‘in the jungles of South Anerica, practicing their art with no awareness of alternatives. Are we to say that astrology 1s for then sctentific?230 Or, going in the other direction, should we count as alternative theo rigs ones which are available to extraterrestrial beings, or which Someday will be conceived? This wide construal of "alternative" would have the result that our best current theortes are probably pseudo- Selentific. These two questions employ, respectively, a too narrow and 4 too broad view of alternatives. By an alternative theory I mean one Generally available in the world. This assumes first that there is some Kind’ of Comunfeation network to which a community has, or should have, access. Second, it assumes that the onus is on individuals and con hmunfties to find out about alternatives. I would argue (perhaps against. Kuhn) that this second assumption 1s a general feature of rationality; it is at least sufficient to preclude ostrichisa as a defense against being judged pseudoscienti fic. In conclusion, 1 would 11ke to say why I think the question of what constitutes a pséudoscfence 1s important. Unlike the logical positiv- ists, Tam not grinding an anti-metaphysical ax, agd unlike Popper, I am not. grinding an anti-Freudian or anti-Marsian one.! My concern 15, Social:” soctety faces the twin prablens of Tack of public concern with the advancenent of scfence, and lack of public concern with the inpor- tant ethical issues now arising in science and technology, for exanple ‘around the topic of genetic engineering. One reason for this dual Tack ‘Of concern {8 the wide popularity of pseudosctence and the occult asong tthe general public. Eluctdation of how science differs from pseudo- science 1s the philosophical side of an attempt to overcone public neglect of genuine setence, Notes Vy am grateful to dan Hausman and Elias Saungarten for comments. Zrowever, astrology would doubtlessly have many fewer supporters if horoscopes tended less toward compl inents and pleasant predictions and snore toward the kind of analysis included in the following satirical horoscope from the Decenber, 1977, issue of Mother Jones: VIRGO (Aug. 2y-Sept.. 22). You are the logical type and hate disorder. This nit Picking 4s sickening to your friends. You are cold and unenotional and Sometines fall asleep while making love. Virgos make good bus drivers. For an account of the conparative evaluation of theories, see [26]. “there appear to be a few exceptions: see [32]. Sthe fad of biorhythms, now assuming a place beside astrology in the popular press, must be distingulshed fron the very interesting work of Frank Brown and others on Biological rhythns. For a survey. see [5] Spraustbitity is in part a matter of a hypothesis being of an appro- yriate kind, and is relevant even to the acceptance of a theory. See Ee}, p50: and (25).a Ton psychoanalysis see [3]. I would argue that Cioffi neglects the question of alternatives to psychoanalysis and the question of its Progress veness-232 a (2) a a 61 (6 m (8) 3 119) a m2) 131 14) 15) 161 References Bok, Bart J. "A Critical Look at Astrology." In [2]. Pages 21- 3. : Jerome, Lawrence E., and kurtz, Paul. Objections to Astrolog). “Buffalo: Pronethéus Books, 1375. Cioffi, Frank. “Freud and the Idea of a Pseudoscience." In Explanation in the Behavioral Sciences. Edited by R. Borger and =. Clofft. Canbridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. Pages 41-499, Dunem, P. The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. (trans.)P. ener. “New York: “Athena, T95t, [Translated fron 2nd tion of La Theorie Physique’ Son Object, Sa Structure. Paris: Marcel hiviee Ete, ey _ Gauguelin, Michel. The Cosmic Clocks. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1967. ‘The Scientific Basis of Astrology. New York: Stein and Day, 196 - .-, "The Zelen Test of the Mars Effect." 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