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China Disadvantage

Negative

Shells

1NC China Econ


Chinas expanding into Latin America---US influence is key to crowd them out
Dowd 12 (Alan, Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, Crisis in the America's,
http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas)
Focused on military operations in the Middle East, nuclear threats in Iran and North Korea, and the global threat of terrorism, U.S. policymakers have
neglected a growing challenge right here in the Western Hemisphere: the expanding influence and reach of China.
Eyeing energy resources to keep its economy humming, China is engaged in a flurry of investing and spending in Latin America. In
Costa Rica, China is funding a $1.24-billion upgrade of the countrys oil refinery; bankrolling an $83-million soccer stadium; backing infrastructure and
telecommunications improvements; and pouring millions into a new police academy. In Colombia, China is planning a massive dry canal to link the countrys
Pacific and Atlantic coasts by rail. At either terminus, there will be Chinese ports; in between, there will be Chinese assembly facilities, logistics operations and
distribution plants; and on the Pacific side, there will be dedicated berths to ship Colombian coal outbound to China. In mid-January, a Chinese-built oil rig arrived in
Cuba to begin drilling in Cubas swath of the Gulf of Mexico. Reuters reports that Spanish, Russian, Malaysian and Norwegian firms will use the rig to extract Cuban
oil. For now, China is focusing on onshore oil extraction in Cuba. New offshore discoveries will soon catapult Brazil into a top-five global oil producer. With some
38 billion barrels of recoverable oil off its coast, Brazil expects to pump 4.9 million barrels per day by 2020, as the Washington Times reports, and China has used
generous loans to position itself as the prime beneficiary of Brazilian oil. Chinas state-run oil and banking giants have inked technology-transfer, chemical, energy
and real-estate deals with Brazil. Plus, as the Times details, China came to the rescue of Brazils main oil company when it sought financing for its massive drilling
plans, pouring $10 billion into the project. A study in Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) adds that Beijing plunked down $3.1 billion for a slice of Brazils vast offshore oil
fields. The JFQ study reveals just how deep and wide Beijing is spreading its financial influence in Latin America: $28 billion in loans to Venezuela; a $16.3-billion
commitment to develop Venezuelan oil reserves; $1 billion for Ecuadoran oil; $4.4 billion to develop Peruvian mines; $10 billion to help Argentina modernize its rail
system; $3.1 billion to purchase Argentinas petroleum company outright. The New York Times adds that Beijing has lent Ecuador $1 billion to build a hydroelectric
plant. There is good and bad to Beijings increased interest and investment in the Western Hemisphere. Investment fuels development, and much of Latin America is
happily accelerating development in the economic, trade, technology and infrastructure spheres. But

Chinas riches come with strings. For instance, in

exchange for Chinese development funds and loans, Venezuela agreed to increase oil shipments to China from 380,000 barrels per day to one
million barrels per day. Its worth noting that the Congressional Research Service has reported concerns in Washington that Hugo Chavez might try to supplant his
U.S. market with China. Given that Venezuela pumps an average of 1.5 million barrels of oil per day for the U.S.or about 11 percent of net oil importsthe results
would be devastating for the U.S. That

brings us to the security dimension of Chinas checkbook diplomacy in the Western


had approached every country in our area of
responsibility and provided military exchanges, aid or training to Ecuador, Jamaica, Bolivia, Cuba, Chile and Venezuela. The JFQ study
adds that China has an important and growing presence in the regions military institutions. Most Latin American nations, including
Hemisphere. Officials with the U.S. Southern Command conceded as early as 2006 that Beijing

Mexico, send officers to professional military education courses in the PRC. In Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia, Beijing has begun to sell sophisticated
hardwaresuch as radars and K-8 and MA-60 aircraft. The JFQ report concludes, ominously, that Chinese defense firms are likely to leverage their experience and
a growing track record for their goods to expand their market share in the region, with the secondary consequence being that those purchasers will become more
reliant on the associated Chinese logistics, maintenance, and training infrastructures that support those products. Put it all together, and the southern flank of the
United States is exposed to a range of new security challenges. To be sure, much of this is a function of Chinas desire to secure oil markets. But theres more at work
here than Chinas thirst for oil. Like a global chess match, China is probing Latin America and sending a message that just as Washington has trade and military ties in
Chinas neighborhood, China is developing trade and military ties in Americas neighborhood. This is a direct challenge to U.S.
primacy in the regiona challenge that must be answered. First, Washington needs to relearn an obvious truththat Chinas rulers do not share Americas values
and needs to shape and conduct its China policy in that context. Beijing has no respect for human rights. Recall that in China, an estimated 3-5 million people are
rotting away in laogai slave-labor camps, many of them guilty of political dissent or religious activity; democracy activists are rounded up and imprisoned; freedom
of speech and religion and assembly do not exist; and internal security forces are given shoot-to-kill orders in dealing with unarmed citizens. Indeed, Beijing viewed
the Arab Spring uprisings not as an impetus for political reform, but as reason to launch its harshest crackdown on dissent in at least a decade, according to Director
of National Intelligence James Clapper. In short, the ends always justify the means in Beijing. And that makes all the difference when it comes to foreign and defense
policy. As Reagan counseled during the Cold War, There is no true international security without respect for human rights. Second, the

U.S. must stop


taking the Western Hemisphere for granted, and instead must reengage in its own neighborhood economically, politically
and militarily. That means no more allowing trade dealsand the partners counting on themto languish. Plans for a hemispheric free trade
zone have faltered and foundered. The trade-expansion agreements with Panama and Colombia were left in limbo for years, before President
Obama finally signed them into law in 2011. Reengagement means reviving U.S. diplomacy. The Wall Street Journal reports that due to political
wrangling in Washington, the State Department position focused on the Western Hemisphere has been staffed by an interim for nearly a year, while six Western
Hemisphere ambassadorial posts (Uruguay, Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Barbados) remain empty. Reengagement means reversing plans to slash
defense spending. The Joint Forces Command noted in 2008 that China has a deep respect for U.S. military power. We cannot overstate how important this has been
to keeping the peace. But with the United States in the midst of massive military retrenchment, one wonders how long that reservoir of respect will last.
Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties. A good model to follow might be whats happening in Chinas backyard. To deter China and prevent an

Perhaps its time to do the same in Latin America.


We should remember that many Latin American countries from Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chileborder the Pacific.
Given Beijings actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners on the Pacific Rim into the alliance of alliances that
is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, all of this needs to be part of a revived Monroe Doctrine. Focusing on Chinese
encroachment in the Americas, this Monroe Doctrine 2.0 would make it clear to Beijing that the United States welcomes
Chinas efforts to conduct trade in the Americas but discourages any claims of controlimplied or explicitby China over
territories, properties or facilities in the Americas. In addition, Washington should make it clear to Beijing that the American people would look
accidental war, the U.S. is reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region.

unfavorably upon the sale of Chinese arms or the basing of Chinese advisors or military assets in the Western Hemisphere. In short, what it was true in the 19th and
20th centuries must remain true in the 21st: There is room for only one great power in the Western Hemisphere.

The plan limits Chinas influence in the region restarts U.S. Latin Ties
Pham 10

[Dr. J. Peter Pham is senior vice president of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy and the incoming
editor of American Foreign Policy Interests., Chinas Strategic Penetration of Latin America: What It Means for
U.S. Interests, 2010, American Foreign Policy Interests, 32: 363381]
All of this led to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton telling an audience of Foreign Service officers during a town hall meeting at the State Department last

the gains that China was making in Latin America quite disturbing. She went on to add, I mean they are
building very strong economic and political connections.... I dont think thats in our interest.85 How then, in the face
of Chinas growing commercial and political relationships across the region, might American interests be secured and,
year that she found

indeed, advanced ? First, U.S. policymakers need to acknowledge that Americas Latin American and Caribbean
neighbors matter to the United States not only for its traditional security interest in limiting the influence of outside powers

in the

Americas but also because globalization has accelerated the momentum for the increased integration of all of the nations in the Western Hemisphere and regional
cooperation is required to meet a whole host of transnational challenges ranging from spurring economic growth to illegal immigration to narcotics trafficking to
environmental issues. Hence it

is in the interests of the United States to renew relations with the countries to its south by developing and
articulating a comprehensive strategy that clearly puts to rest the legacy of benign neglect of the region. Second, rather than
lament the passing of an era when the United States unilaterally dictated the terms of engagement with its Latin American neighbors, the fact that the region
is shaping its future far more than it shaped its past86 ought to be welcomed. Engaging Latin American governments and
peoples on mutually agreeable terms is by far a more

sustainable foundation for what ought to be the goals of U.S. policy in the
region: the stability, security, and, ultimately, prosperity of the nations of the Western Hemisphere. When the trends to greater ownership by the countries of the
region of their own individual destinies are added to the limitations that the current fiscal crisis and the burdens of other challenges impose upon U.S. policy, it
becomes apparent that American interests are best advanced by more modest expectations and better targeting of available resources. In its engagements with its Latin
American and Caribbean neighbors, the United States should privilege building institutional capacity over the mere provision of aid. Third, despite Chinas efforts to
secure access to Latin Americas natural resources and markets, the region remains an important source of energy and other commodities for the United States as well
as a major market for American goods and services. About 25 percent of U.S. energy imports come from Central and South American countries and the region buys

U.S. businesses still have a


comparative advantage over overseas competitors in the markets of the Western Hemisphere.87 Thus the administration must
recommit itself to building on those solid foundations to reinforce and expand Americas economic ties with its neighbors to the
20 percent of all of U.S. exports, more than the European Union. Thanks to proximity as well as longstanding familiarity,

south.

In his 2010 State of the Union address, President Obama singled out Colombia and Panama as key partners with which he promised to strengthen trade

relations.88 Yet absent

proactive White House leadership, the free trade agreements with those two countries have still not been
ratified, while the North American Free Trade Agreement that came into force under President Bill Clinton was undermined by last years enactment of a measure
canceling a pilot program that allowed carefully screened Mexican trucks to carry cargo in the United States. Movement to repeal U.S. tariffs on Brazilian ethanol and
to settle a dispute over cotton subsidies with the South American giantwould not only promote trade but would also clear the air between Washington and Brasilia,
especially since the World Trade Organization has already ruled the subsidies illegal and, in a rare move, authorized the imposition of punitive sanctions against
American products.89

Chinese influence in the region key to the global economy and regime stability preventing US influence key
Ellis 11
[R. Evan, Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the
National Defense University.Chinese Soft Power in Latin America, 1st quarter 2011,
http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf]
Latin American markets are becoming increasingly valuable for Chinese companies because they
allow the PRC to expand and diversify its export base at a time when economic growth is slowing in traditional markets such
as the United States and Europe. The region has also proven an effective market for Chinese efforts to sell more sophisticated, higher
value added products in sectors seen as strategic, such as automobiles, appliances, computers and telecommunication equipment, and aircraft. In expanding
Access to Latin American Markets.

access for its products through free trade accords with countries such as Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica, and penetrating markets in Latin American countries with

the PRC has often had to overcome resistance by organized and often politically
interests in those nations. In doing so, the hopes of access to Chinese markets and investments among key groups of
businesspeople and government officials in those nations have played a key role in the political will to overcome the
existing manufacturing sectors such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina,
well-connected established

resistance . In Venezuela, it was said that the prior Chinese ambassador to Venezuela, Zheng Tuo, was one of the few people in the country who could call
President Chvez on the telephone and get an instant response if an issue arose regarding a Chinese company. Protection of Chinese Investments in and Trade Flows
from the Region. At times, China has applied more explicit pressures to induce Latin America to keep its markets open to Chinese
goods. It has specifically protested measures by the Argentine and Mexican governments that it has seen as protectionist: and, in the case of Argentina, as informal
retaliation, China began enforcing a longstanding phytosanitary regulation, causing almost $2 billion in lost soy exports and other damages for Argentina.14 China has
also used its economic weight to help secure major projects on preferential terms. In the course of negotiating a $1.7 billion loan deal for the Coco Coda Sinclair
Hydroelectric plant in Ecuador, the ability of the Chinese bidder SinoHidro to self-finance 85 percent of the projects through Chinese banks helped it to work around
the traditional Ecuadorian requirement that the project have a local partner. Later, the Ecuadorian government publicly and bitterly broke off negotiations with the
Chinese, only to return to the bargaining table 2 months later after failing to find satisfactory alternatives. In Venezuela, the Chvez government agreed, for example,

to accept half of the $20 billion loaned to it by the PRC in Chinese currency, and to use part of that currency to buy 229,000 consumer appliances from the Chinese
manufacturer Haier for resale to the Venezuelan people. In another deal, the PRC loaned Venezuela $300 million to start a regional airline, but as part of the deal,
required Venezuela to purchase the planes from a Chinese company.15 Protection of Chinese Nationals. As with the United States and other Western countries, as
China becomes more involved in business and other operations in Latin America, an increasing number of its nationals will be vulnerable to hazards common to the
region, such as kidnapping, crime, protests, and related problems. The heightened presence of Chinese petroleum companies in the northern jungle region of Ecuador,
for example, has been associated with a series of problems, including the takeover of an oilfield operated by the Andes petroleum consortium in Tarapoa in November
2006, and protests in Orellana related to a labor dispute with the Chinese company Petroriental in 2007 that resulted in the death of more than 35 police officers and
forced the declaration of a national state of emergency. In 2004, ethnic Chinese shopkeepers in Valencia and Maracay, Venezuela, became the focus of violent
protests associated with the Venezuelan recall referendum. As such incidents increase ,

the PRC will need to rely increasingly on a combination of


goodwill and fear to deter action against its personnel, as well as its influence with governments of the region , to resolve such
problems when they occur.The rise of China is intimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and
information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation . Because of this, some
within the PRC leadership see the countrys sustained growth and development , and thus the stability of the regime ,
threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from
supporting Chinese interests . In Latin America, Chinas attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance
efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used against
Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure
bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated
into the IADB in 2009 were

trading block

(the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in

which the PRC would have been disadvantaged.

Econ decline causes war


ROYAL 10 Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense
[Jedediah Royal, 2010, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, in Economics of War and Peace:
Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215]

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science
literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of
interdependent stales. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow.
First, on the systemic level. Pollins (20081 advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms

in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition
from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a
redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 19SJ) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk
of miscalculation (Fcaron. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive
environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately. Pollins
(1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium
and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain
unknown. Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a
significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states arc likely to gain
pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade
decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources , the likelihood for conflict increases, as
states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade
expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link
between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Mom berg and Hess (2002) find a strong
correlation between internal conflict and external conflict , particularly during periods of economic downturn . They
write. The linkage, between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing.
Economic conflict lends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a
recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other (Hlomhen?
& Hess. 2(102. p. X9> Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blombcrg.
Hess. & Wee ra pan a, 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions . Furthermore, crises
generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government . "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing

unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external
military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DcRoucn (1995), and Blombcrg. Hess, and Thacker (2006)
find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force arc at least indirecti) correlated. Gelpi (1997). Miller (1999). and
Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that Ihe tendency towards diversionary tactics arc greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due
to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000)
has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are
statistically linked lo an increase in the use of force. In summary, rcccni economic scholarship positively correlates economic
integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises , whereas political science scholarship links

economic decline with external conflict al systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and
armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

Goes global
Kaminski 7
(Antoni Z., Professor Institute of Political Studies, World Order: The Mechanics of Threats (Central European Perspective), Polish Quarterly
of International Affairs, 1, p. 58)
As already argued, the economic advance of China has taken place with relatively few corresponding changes in the political system, although
the operation of political and economic institutions has seen some major changes. Still, tools are missing that would allow the establishment of
political and legal foundations for the modem economy, or they are too weak. The tools are efficient public administration, the rule of law, clearly
defined ownership rights, efficient banking system, etc. For these reasons, many experts fear an economic crisis in China. Considering the
importance of the state for the development of the global economy, the crisis would have serious global repercussions. Its political
ramifications could be no less dramatic owing to the special position the military occupies in the Chinese political system, and the existence of
many potential vexed issues in East Asia (disputes over islands in the China Sea and the Pacific). A potential hotbed of conflict
is also Taiwan's status. Economic recession and the related destabilization of internal policies could lead to a political, or
even military crisis. The

likelihood of the global escalation of the conflict is high, as the interests of Russia, China, Japan,
Australia and, first and foremost, the US clash in the region.

1NC Taiwan
Chinas expanding into Latin America---US influence is key to crowd them out
Dowd 12 (Alan, Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, Crisis in the America's,
http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas)
Focused on military operations in the Middle East, nuclear threats in Iran and North Korea, and the global threat of terrorism, U.S. policymakers have
neglected a growing challenge right here in the Western Hemisphere: the expanding influence and reach of China.
Eyeing energy resources to keep its economy humming, China is engaged in a flurry of investing and spending in Latin America. In
Costa Rica, China is funding a $1.24-billion upgrade of the countrys oil refinery; bankrolling an $83-million soccer stadium; backing infrastructure and
telecommunications improvements; and pouring millions into a new police academy. In Colombia, China is planning a massive dry canal to link the countrys
Pacific and Atlantic coasts by rail. At either terminus, there will be Chinese ports; in between, there will be Chinese assembly facilities, logistics operations and
distribution plants; and on the Pacific side, there will be dedicated berths to ship Colombian coal outbound to China. In mid-January, a Chinese-built oil rig arrived in
Cuba to begin drilling in Cubas swath of the Gulf of Mexico. Reuters reports that Spanish, Russian, Malaysian and Norwegian firms will use the rig to extract Cuban
oil. For now, China is focusing on onshore oil extraction in Cuba. New offshore discoveries will soon catapult Brazil into a top-five global oil producer. With some
38 billion barrels of recoverable oil off its coast, Brazil expects to pump 4.9 million barrels per day by 2020, as the Washington Times reports, and China has used
generous loans to position itself as the prime beneficiary of Brazilian oil. Chinas state-run oil and banking giants have inked technology-transfer, chemical, energy
and real-estate deals with Brazil. Plus, as the Times details, China came to the rescue of Brazils main oil company when it sought financing for its massive drilling
plans, pouring $10 billion into the project. A study in Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) adds that Beijing plunked down $3.1 billion for a slice of Brazils vast offshore oil
fields. The JFQ study reveals just how deep and wide Beijing is spreading its financial influence in Latin America: $28 billion in loans to Venezuela; a $16.3-billion
commitment to develop Venezuelan oil reserves; $1 billion for Ecuadoran oil; $4.4 billion to develop Peruvian mines; $10 billion to help Argentina modernize its rail
system; $3.1 billion to purchase Argentinas petroleum company outright. The New York Times adds that Beijing has lent Ecuador $1 billion to build a hydroelectric
plant. There is good and bad to Beijings increased interest and investment in the Western Hemisphere. Investment fuels development, and much of Latin America is
happily accelerating development in the economic, trade, technology and infrastructure spheres. But Chinas

riches come with strings. For instance, in

exchange for Chinese development funds and loans, Venezuela agreed to increase oil shipments to China from 380,000 barrels per day to one
million barrels per day. Its worth noting that the Congressional Research Service has reported concerns in Washington that Hugo Chavez might try to supplant his
U.S. market with China. Given that Venezuela pumps an average of 1.5 million barrels of oil per day for the U.S.or about 11 percent of net oil importsthe results
would be devastating for the U.S. That

brings us to the security dimension of Chinas checkbook diplomacy in the Western


had approached every country in our area of
responsibility and provided military exchanges, aid or training to Ecuador, Jamaica, Bolivia, Cuba, Chile and Venezuela. The JFQ study
adds that China has an important and growing presence in the regions military institutions. Most Latin American nations, including
Hemisphere. Officials with the U.S. Southern Command conceded as early as 2006 that Beijing

Mexico, send officers to professional military education courses in the PRC. In Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia, Beijing has begun to sell sophisticated
hardwaresuch as radars and K-8 and MA-60 aircraft. The JFQ report concludes, ominously, that Chinese defense firms are likely to leverage their experience and
a growing track record for their goods to expand their market share in the region, with the secondary consequence being that those purchasers will become more
reliant on the associated Chinese logistics, maintenance, and training infrastructures that support those products. Put it all together, and the southern flank of the
United States is exposed to a range of new security challenges. To be sure, much of this is a function of Chinas desire to secure oil markets. But theres more at work
here than Chinas thirst for oil. Like a global chess match, China is probing Latin America and sending a message that just as Washington has trade and military ties in
Chinas neighborhood, China is developing trade and military ties in Americas neighborhood. This is a direct challenge to U.S.
primacy in the regiona challenge that must be answered. First, Washington needs to relearn an obvious truththat Chinas rulers do not share Americas values
and needs to shape and conduct its China policy in that context. Beijing has no respect for human rights. Recall that in China, an estimated 3-5 million people are
rotting away in laogai slave-labor camps, many of them guilty of political dissent or religious activity; democracy activists are rounded up and imprisoned; freedom
of speech and religion and assembly do not exist; and internal security forces are given shoot-to-kill orders in dealing with unarmed citizens. Indeed, Beijing viewed
the Arab Spring uprisings not as an impetus for political reform, but as reason to launch its harshest crackdown on dissent in at least a decade, according to Director
of National Intelligence James Clapper. In short, the ends always justify the means in Beijing. And that makes all the difference when it comes to foreign and defense
policy. As Reagan counseled during the Cold War, There is no true international security without respect for human rights. Second, the

U.S. must stop


taking the Western Hemisphere for granted, and instead must reengage in its own neighborhood economically, politically
and militarily. That means no more allowing trade dealsand the partners counting on themto languish. Plans for a hemispheric free trade
zone have faltered and foundered. The trade-expansion agreements with Panama and Colombia were left in limbo for years, before President
Obama finally signed them into law in 2011. Reengagement means reviving U.S. diplomacy. The Wall Street Journal reports that due to political
wrangling in Washington, the State Department position focused on the Western Hemisphere has been staffed by an interim for nearly a year, while six Western
Hemisphere ambassadorial posts (Uruguay, Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Barbados) remain empty. Reengagement means reversing plans to slash
defense spending. The Joint Forces Command noted in 2008 that China has a deep respect for U.S. military power. We cannot overstate how important this has been
to keeping the peace. But with the United States in the midst of massive military retrenchment, one wonders how long that reservoir of respect will last.
Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties. A good model to follow might be whats happening in Chinas backyard. To deter China and prevent an

Perhaps its time to do the same in Latin America.


We should remember that many Latin American countries from Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chileborder the Pacific.
Given Beijings actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners on the Pacific Rim into the alliance of alliances that
is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, all of this needs to be part of a revived Monroe Doctrine. Focusing on Chinese
encroachment in the Americas, this Monroe Doctrine 2.0 would make it clear to Beijing that the United States welcomes
Chinas efforts to conduct trade in the Americas but discourages any claims of controlimplied or explicitby China over
territories, properties or facilities in the Americas. In addition, Washington should make it clear to Beijing that the American people would look
accidental war, the U.S. is reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region.

unfavorably upon the sale of Chinese arms or the basing of Chinese advisors or military assets in the Western Hemisphere. In short, what it was true in the 19th and
20th centuries must remain true in the 21st: There is room for only one great power in the Western Hemisphere.

The plan limits Chinas influence in the region restarts U.S. Latin Ties
Pham 10

[Dr. J. Peter Pham is senior vice president of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy and the incoming
editor of American Foreign Policy Interests., Chinas Strategic Penetration of Latin America: What It Means for
U.S. Interests, 2010, American Foreign Policy Interests, 32: 363381]
All of this led to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton telling an audience of Foreign Service officers during a town hall meeting at the State Department last

the gains that China was making in Latin America quite disturbing. She went on to add, I mean they are
building very strong economic and political connections.... I dont think thats in our interest.85 How then, in the face
of Chinas growing commercial and political relationships across the region, might American interests be secured and,
year that she found

indeed, advanced ? First, U.S. policymakers need to acknowledge that Americas Latin American and Caribbean
neighbors matter to the United States not only for its traditional security interest in limiting the influence of outside powers

in the

Americas but also because globalization has accelerated the momentum for the increased integration of all of the nations in the Western Hemisphere and regional
cooperation is required to meet a whole host of transnational challenges ranging from spurring economic growth to illegal immigration to narcotics trafficking to
environmental issues. Hence it

is in the interests of the United States to renew relations with the countries to its south by developing and
articulating a comprehensive strategy that clearly puts to rest the legacy of benign neglect of the region. Second, rather than
lament the passing of an era when the United States unilaterally dictated the terms of engagement with its Latin American neighbors, the fact that the region
is shaping its future far more than it shaped its past86 ought to be welcomed. Engaging Latin American governments and
peoples on mutually agreeable terms is by far a more

sustainable foundation for what ought to be the goals of U.S. policy in the
region: the stability, security, and, ultimately, prosperity of the nations of the Western Hemisphere. When the trends to greater ownership by the countries of the
region of their own individual destinies are added to the limitations that the current fiscal crisis and the burdens of other challenges impose upon U.S. policy, it
becomes apparent that American interests are best advanced by more modest expectations and better targeting of available resources. In its engagements with its Latin
American and Caribbean neighbors, the United States should privilege building institutional capacity over the mere provision of aid. Third, despite Chinas efforts to
secure access to Latin Americas natural resources and markets, the region remains an important source of energy and other commodities for the United States as well
as a major market for American goods and services. About 25 percent of U.S. energy imports come from Central and South American countries and the region buys

U.S. businesses still have a


comparative advantage over overseas competitors in the markets of the Western Hemisphere.87 Thus the administration must
recommit itself to building on those solid foundations to reinforce and expand Americas economic ties with its neighbors to the
20 percent of all of U.S. exports, more than the European Union. Thanks to proximity as well as longstanding familiarity,

south.

In his 2010 State of the Union address, President Obama singled out Colombia and Panama as key partners with which he promised to strengthen trade

relations.88 Yet absent

proactive White House leadership, the free trade agreements with those two countries have still not been
ratified, while the North American Free Trade Agreement that came into force under President Bill Clinton was undermined by last years enactment of a measure
canceling a pilot program that allowed carefully screened Mexican trucks to carry cargo in the United States. Movement to repeal U.S. tariffs on Brazilian ethanol and
to settle a dispute over cotton subsidies with the South American giantwould not only promote trade but would also clear the air between Washington and Brasilia,
especially since the World Trade Organization has already ruled the subsidies illegal and, in a rare move, authorized the imposition of punitive sanctions against
American products.89

Chinese influence key to prevent Taiwan independence


Li 07
[He Li, Professor of Political Science at Merrimack College, Boston ENTER THE DRAGON? Chinas Presence in
Latin America, 2007, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf]
Latin America has been a major battleground of the foreign policy war between China and Taiwan over
international legitimacy, recognition, and status. Chinas quest to recover what it calls the province of Taiwan is one of the
top issues on its foreign policy agenda. Its strategy against Taiwan has been both bilateral and global. Bilaterally, China has used a mix of
economic diplomacy and military and political moves to keep Taiwan from claiming independence. Globally, Chinas strategy
has focused on developing an international united front designed to marginalize Taiwan. Fearing Taiwans push for
international recognition will lead to its declaration of independence, Beijing is determined to contain Taiwan in
every corner of the world, especially in Central America and the Caribbean, the stronghold of Taiwan .Taiwan has 23 million people and
well protected territory. Yet, of the United Nations 193 member states, only 23 recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state. Of the 23 countries that
recognize Taiwan, 12 are in Latin America and the Caribbean. Taiwan has been devoting enormous efforts to retain diplomatic recognition.
If these states were to switch recognition from Taipei to Beijing, the damage to Taiwans political condence and its claims of
legitimacy as a state would be seriously undermined. According to then-prime minister of Taiwan Yu Shyi-kun in 2002, Taiwans allies in Latin
America and the Caribbean have helped us a lot and therefore we consider this an area of maximum diplomatic importance. 2 Under such
circumstances, the strategic competition between China and Taiwan has been intensied in a region far away from Asia.

Causes war
Yardley 5 (Jim Yardley and Thom Shanker (Staff Writers Jim reported from Zhanjiang and Thom reported from
Washington.) Chinese Navy Buildup Gives Pentagon New Worries. The New York Times. April 8, 2005)
The growing friction between Japan and China, fueled by rising nationalism in both countries, is just one of the political developments adding to
tensions in East Asia. In March, China

passed a controversial new ''antisecession'' law authorizing a military attack if

top leaders in Beijing believe Taiwan moves too far toward independence -- a move that brought hundreds of
thousands of people in Taiwan out to protest China's most recent military white paper also alarmed American
policy makers because it mentioned the United States by name for the first time since 1998 . It stated that the American
presence in the region ''complicated security factors.'' China , meanwhile, accused the United States and Japan of meddling in
a domestic Chinese matter when Washington and Tokyo recently issued a joint security statement that listed peace
in Taiwan as a ''common strategic objective.'' ''The potential for a miscalculation or an incident here has actually
increased, just based on the rhetoric over the past six months to a year,'' one American intelligence analyst in Washington said.
Goes global and nuclear
Hunkovic 9 (Lee J, American Military University, The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict: Possible Futures of a
Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America, http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/
Hunkovic.pdf)
A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a
third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both
Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in
the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If
China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as
well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to
contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world
that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its
eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

Uniqueness

1NC Uniqueness
Chinas expanding into Latin America---US influence is key to crowd them out
Dowd 12 (Alan, Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, Crisis in the America's,
http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas)
Focused on military operations in the Middle East, nuclear threats in Iran and North Korea, and the global threat of terrorism, U.S. policymakers have
neglected a growing challenge right here in the Western Hemisphere: the expanding influence and reach of China.
Eyeing energy resources to keep its economy humming, China is engaged in a flurry of investing and spending in Latin America. In
Costa Rica, China is funding a $1.24-billion upgrade of the countrys oil refinery; bankrolling an $83-million soccer stadium; backing infrastructure and
telecommunications improvements; and pouring millions into a new police academy. In Colombia, China is planning a massive dry canal to link the countrys
Pacific and Atlantic coasts by rail. At either terminus, there will be Chinese ports; in between, there will be Chinese assembly facilities, logistics operations and
distribution plants; and on the Pacific side, there will be dedicated berths to ship Colombian coal outbound to China. In mid-January, a Chinese-built oil rig arrived in
Cuba to begin drilling in Cubas swath of the Gulf of Mexico. Reuters reports that Spanish, Russian, Malaysian and Norwegian firms will use the rig to extract Cuban
oil. For now, China is focusing on onshore oil extraction in Cuba. New offshore discoveries will soon catapult Brazil into a top-five global oil producer. With some
38 billion barrels of recoverable oil off its coast, Brazil expects to pump 4.9 million barrels per day by 2020, as the Washington Times reports, and China has used
generous loans to position itself as the prime beneficiary of Brazilian oil. Chinas state-run oil and banking giants have inked technology-transfer, chemical, energy
and real-estate deals with Brazil. Plus, as the Times details, China came to the rescue of Brazils main oil company when it sought financing for its massive drilling
plans, pouring $10 billion into the project. A study in Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) adds that Beijing plunked down $3.1 billion for a slice of Brazils vast offshore oil
fields. The JFQ study reveals just how deep and wide Beijing is spreading its financial influence in Latin America: $28 billion in loans to Venezuela; a $16.3-billion
commitment to develop Venezuelan oil reserves; $1 billion for Ecuadoran oil; $4.4 billion to develop Peruvian mines; $10 billion to help Argentina modernize its rail
system; $3.1 billion to purchase Argentinas petroleum company outright. The New York Times adds that Beijing has lent Ecuador $1 billion to build a hydroelectric
plant. There is good and bad to Beijings increased interest and investment in the Western Hemisphere. Investment fuels development, and much of Latin America is
happily accelerating development in the economic, trade, technology and infrastructure spheres. But Chinas

riches come with strings. For instance, in

exchange for Chinese development funds and loans, Venezuela agreed to increase oil shipments to China from 380,000 barrels per day to one
million barrels per day. Its worth noting that the Congressional Research Service has reported concerns in Washington that Hugo Chavez might try to supplant his
U.S. market with China. Given that Venezuela pumps an average of 1.5 million barrels of oil per day for the U.S.or about 11 percent of net oil importsthe results
would be devastating for the U.S. That

brings us to the security dimension of Chinas checkbook diplomacy in the Western


had approached every country in our area of
responsibility and provided military exchanges, aid or training to Ecuador, Jamaica, Bolivia, Cuba, Chile and Venezuela. The JFQ study
adds that China has an important and growing presence in the regions military institutions. Most Latin American nations, including
Hemisphere. Officials with the U.S. Southern Command conceded as early as 2006 that Beijing

Mexico, send officers to professional military education courses in the PRC. In Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia, Beijing has begun to sell sophisticated
hardwaresuch as radars and K-8 and MA-60 aircraft. The JFQ report concludes, ominously, that Chinese defense firms are likely to leverage their experience and
a growing track record for their goods to expand their market share in the region, with the secondary consequence being that those purchasers will become more
reliant on the associated Chinese logistics, maintenance, and training infrastructures that support those products. Put it all together, and the southern flank of the
United States is exposed to a range of new security challenges. To be sure, much of this is a function of Chinas desire to secure oil markets. But theres more at work
here than Chinas thirst for oil. Like a global chess match, China is probing Latin America and sending a message that just as Washington has trade and military ties in
Chinas neighborhood, China is developing trade and military ties in Americas neighborhood. This is a direct challenge to U.S.
primacy in the regiona challenge that must be answered. First, Washington needs to relearn an obvious truththat Chinas rulers do not share Americas values
and needs to shape and conduct its China policy in that context. Beijing has no respect for human rights. Recall that in China, an estimated 3-5 million people are
rotting away in laogai slave-labor camps, many of them guilty of political dissent or religious activity; democracy activists are rounded up and imprisoned; freedom
of speech and religion and assembly do not exist; and internal security forces are given shoot-to-kill orders in dealing with unarmed citizens. Indeed, Beijing viewed
the Arab Spring uprisings not as an impetus for political reform, but as reason to launch its harshest crackdown on dissent in at least a decade, according to Director
of National Intelligence James Clapper. In short, the ends always justify the means in Beijing. And that makes all the difference when it comes to foreign and defense
policy. As Reagan counseled during the Cold War, There is no true international security without respect for human rights. Second, the

U.S. must stop


taking the Western Hemisphere for granted, and instead must reengage in its own neighborhood economically, politically
and militarily. That means no more allowing trade dealsand the partners counting on themto languish. Plans for a hemispheric free trade
zone have faltered and foundered. The trade-expansion agreements with Panama and Colombia were left in limbo for years, before President
Obama finally signed them into law in 2011. Reengagement means reviving U.S. diplomacy. The Wall Street Journal reports that due to political
wrangling in Washington, the State Department position focused on the Western Hemisphere has been staffed by an interim for nearly a year, while six Western
Hemisphere ambassadorial posts (Uruguay, Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Barbados) remain empty. Reengagement means reversing plans to slash
defense spending. The Joint Forces Command noted in 2008 that China has a deep respect for U.S. military power. We cannot overstate how important this has been
to keeping the peace. But with the United States in the midst of massive military retrenchment, one wonders how long that reservoir of respect will last.
Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties. A good model to follow might be whats happening in Chinas backyard. To deter China and prevent an

Perhaps its time to do the same in Latin America.


We should remember that many Latin American countriesfrom Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chileborder the Pacific.
Given Beijings actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners on the Pacific Rim into the alliance of alliances that
is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, all of this needs to be part of a revived Monroe Doctrine. Focusing on Chinese
encroachment in the Americas, this Monroe Doctrine 2.0 would make it clear to Beijing that the United States welcomes
Chinas efforts to conduct trade in the Americas but discourages any claims of controlimplied or explicitby China over
territories, properties or facilities in the Americas. In addition, Washington should make it clear to Beijing that the American people would look
accidental war, the U.S. is reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region.

unfavorably upon the sale of Chinese arms or the basing of Chinese advisors or military assets in the Western Hemisphere. In short, what it was true in the 19th and
20th centuries must remain true in the 21st: There is room for only one great power in the Western Hemisphere.

2NC Uniqueness
Chinese influence is high now they are developing trade and military ties as a result of diminished U.S.
focus thats Dowd
Chinese economic influence is growing in Latin America, but targeted policies can erode dominance
Sarmiento-Saher 13
[Sebastian Sarmiento-Saher is an editorial assistant for The Diplomat., China and Latin America: Big Business and
Big Competition, 3/14/13, http://thediplomat.com/china-power/china-and-latin-america-big-business-and-bigcompetition/]
the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) now ranks as the worlds second largest economy. A
byproduct of this rapid expansion has been Chinas search for new markets and resources to sustain its economic growth. While there has been much
analysis of its activity in Africa and Central Asia, another region of growing importance for China is Latin America. It is not without serious challenges or difficulties that Latin
America and the Caribbean (LAC) are gradually emerging as a region of stable economic development. Although LAC is not a single country, many of its independent states have an abundance of
natural resources and emerging manufacturing and service sectors that are projected to achieve solid growth in the coming years. Latin Americas
prospects have attracted serious attention, especially from Chinese firms and policymakers keen to benefit from growing opportunities and access to raw materials in LAC. Under President Hu
Jintao China deepened its ties with Latin American countries through initiatives like the 2008 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Lima, Peru.
Chinas new President, Xi Jinping, is also no stranger to the region after having made several state visits there as vice president. According to Barbara Stallings, Chinese exports to Latin America
Despite a slowdown in Chinas impressive economic growth,

grew substantially from U.S. $6.9 billion in 2000 to U.S. $69.7 billion in 2008; while LAC exports to China increased from U.S. $5.3 billion in 2000 to U.S. $70.3 billion in 2008. However, despite these dramatic increases of 910
percent and 1,226 percent, the United States and the EU are still ahead of China in terms of trade flows with Latin America.

China is quickly catching up to many of LACs

traditional trading partners , however. Already Chinas trade numbers with LAC have surpassed those of Japan, the previously
dominant Asian trading partner for Latin America. What is most significant about these developments overall is how rapidly Chinese businesses and organizations have
expanded their activity in the region a trend that continues to grow . In terms of foreign direct investment (FDI), a study by Enrique Dussel Peters found that
Latin America received 11.41 percent of total Chinese FDI from 2000-2011 making the region the second largest recipient of Chinese FDI behind
only Hong Kong. Echoing the speed of the trade increases above, Chinese investment in Latin America jumped from 1 to 9 percent of total FDI in LAC from 2008 to 2010; thus making the PRC the third largest investor in Latin

These investments come in addition to massive loan credits

America behind only the Netherlands and the United States that year.
which, according to a report by researchers
at Tufts University, have topped U.S. $75 billion since 2005 and may account for approximately half of the PRCs lending abroad from 2009-2010. The results of this expanded Sino-Latin American economic relationship have been

Much of the trade, investment, and loans from the PRC have been focused on the countries, companies, and
infrastructure that underpin the extraction of natural resources and other commodities in the region. This has been good news for the
mixed.

large agricultural, mining, and energy industries of Latin America, as well as for countries like Chile and Venezuela. On the negative side, however, this has raised questions about Latin American dependence on resource exports and
the specter of Dutch disease. Another adverse effect is the growing resentment among some Latin Americans in some sectors that have been increasingly displaced by Chinas industrial or manufacturing exports to LAC. Mexico has
been among the hardest hit among countries in the Western hemisphere as its large industrial base has struggled to compete with Chinese manufacturing in a diminished, post-financial crisis U.S. market. Chinese exports to Mexico
have also undercut indigenous industry and resulted in a substantial trade deficit. Chinas competitiveness has complicated the Sino-LAC honeymoon period in recent years. Most notably, Brazils government has been forced to
manage a sensitive balancing act, fostering lucrative relations with China while addressing the frustration of Brazilian manufacturing industries that struggle against cheaper Chinese goods. Labor movements and environmental groups
have also begun to take a stand against the extractive industries of countries like Peru and Chile, whose exports and growth are tied closely to the PRCs demand for resources. Despite these issues, recent external and internal

Chinas comparative advantage may be eroding due to


increased production costs and Beijings desire to lead its economy toward higher-end manufacturing and domestic consumption. If this trend continues, it would help beleaguered Mexico, whose security
and political problems may finally start to improve and give Mexican industries a chance to compete on the global stage. Using targeted policies , other countries with
manufacturing sectors may benefit from Chinas economic restructuring. In terms of development overall, alarmism about China keeping LAC economies dependent on natural resources is
developments may be creating an opportunity for the region to balance its growing economic relations with China. Notably,

overblown. As Latin America continues to grapple with deficits in infrastructure, education, and social mobility, the question about whether growing economic ties with the PRC will be a burden or a key opportunity lies in the actions
of Latin America, not China. The central issue is about governance: those countries that benefit over the long term from the current commodity boom will be the ones most judicious when it comes to future investments and industrial

As Latin
America continues to develop, China will undoubtedly play a significant role in its progress and advancement. There will continue to be
cases of cooperation and competition between LAC countries and the PRC as their relations mature but as long each side has much to offer the other, the people of both
Latin America and China have a lot to look forward to in the evolution of their South-South relations.
policy. Fighting corruption is difficult anywhere, and Latin America is no exception. As democracy deepens and middle classes emerge in the region, new stakeholders will hold governments accountable.

Chinese influence is high now the U.S. is slipping


Xiaoxia 13
[Wang, Economic Observer/Worldcrunch, 5/6/13, IN AMERICA'S BACKYARD: CHINA'S RISING INFLUENCE
IN LATIN AMERICA, http://www.worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-risinginfluence-in-latin-america/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/]
China is busy in America's backyard. Over the past five years, Chinese businesses have been expanding their footprint in
Latin America

in a number of ways, beginning

with enhanced trade to ensure a steady supply of bulk commodities such as oil,

copper and soybeans. At this year's Boao Forum for Asia, for the first time a Latin American sub-forum was created that included the participation of several heads of
state from the region. Since 2011, China

has overtaken the Netherlands to become Latin Americas second biggest investor behind the United

States. China

has signed a series of large cooperation agreements with Latin American countries in such fields as finance,
Sino-Latin American trade grew in 2012
to a total of $261.2 billion, a year-on-year increase of 8.18%. This trend risks undermining the position of the United States as
Latin Americas single dominant trading partner. In 2011, the U.S.-Latin American trade volume was $351 billion. Some prominent Chinese have
resources and energy. According to the latest statistics of the General Administration of Customs of China,

condemned the United States' high-profile Return to Asia strategy, with its intention of containing China's front door. Shouldnt the United States, which put
forward the Monroe Doctrine two centuries ago, also question how China is quietly arriving in Americas backyard? An American blind spot? In their book America's
Blind Spot: Chavez, Oil, and U.S. Security, Andres Cala and Michael J. Economides avoid the usual patter of linking South Americas "China factor" with

investigate Latin Americas subtle choice between China and the United States,
attributing Washington's weakened influence in the region to its failure in foreign policy and economic
some sordid conspiracy theory. Instead, they

development

-- while

China rises on the back of globalization . Since 1823, when America put forward the Monroe Doctrine and

declared its sphere of influence to Europeans, it has maintained the unique position of the United States in the Americas. Military intervention has always served as
the most important tool for the United States. Especially after the start of the Cold War, in order to curb Communism from taking root in Latin America, the U.S. used
military means largely without restraint. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States faced new external challenges such as the threat of global terrorism.

Latin Americas strategic significance has quickly slipped to a secondary and more local ranking. The United States has shifted its
focus in Latin America to specific issues such as illegal immigration and drug smuggling. The realism that ran through Americas foreign
policy during the Cold War has gradually transformed towards idealism, which in consequence weakens its influence in
Latin America. Under the doctrine of realism, America broke any illusion of moral constraint in its foreign interventions; the protection of American interests
was its pragmatic principle. Washington didnt care that some Latin American countries were dictatorial or that they violated human rights, as long as their leaders
firmly stood on the side of the anti-Communist camp. Since adopting idealism, America considers that whatever is best for itself is also best for the rest of the world.
Its foreign policy is aimed at maintaining democracy, human rights and a free market economy around the world. America began to demand that its former dictatorial
allies quit their attachment to power and carry out a transition to democracy. Since 1989, the U.S. has pushed Latin American countries -- many facing a severe debt
crisis -- to accept the Washington Consensus oriented by market economy theory. The ultimate goal set by this theory may not be a problem. However, it did not
pull Latin America out of the quagmire of its lost decade of the 1980s. In the 1990s, Latin America suffered another severe economic downturn, which exacerbated
the division between the rich and the poor -- leading to serious social problems. The idealism exported by the United States intensified the existing contradictions in
Latin American society, and eventually led to the downfall of most of the brutal totalitarian military governments. China as a new favorite Initially, Chinas activities
in Latin America were limited to the diplomatic level. By providing funds and assisting in infrastructure constructions, China managed to interrupt diplomatic ties

with China's economic boom, the supply of energy and resources has
gradually become a problem that plagues China -- and its exchanges with Latin America thus are endowed with real
substantive purpose. Among the numerous needs of China, the demand for oil has always been the most powerful driving force. In the past 30 years, China
has consumed one-third of the world's new oil production and become the world's second-largest oil importer. More than half of China's oil
demand depends on imports, which increases the instability of its energy security. Diversification is inevitable. In this context, Latin America and its
huge reserves and production capacity naturally became a destination for China. China must better protect its energy
supply, and can't just play the simple role of consumer. It must also help solidify the important links of the petroleum industry supply chain. Indeed, the China
National Petroleum Corporation frequently appears in Latin American countries , and Chinas investment and trade in the Latin
between poor Latin countries and Taiwan. Since then,

American countries are also focused on its energy sector. In the opinion of many European and American scholars, China's current practice isnt much different from
that of Western colonizers of the last century. These scholars believe that China doesnt care about local human rights or the state of democracy when dealing with
countries. All

China is interested in is establishing long-term, stable economic relations. This realistic path is exactly
opposite to that of America's newfound idealism. Thus China has become a close collaborator of certain Latin American countries, such as
Venezuela, that are in sharp conflict with the United States.

China Influence High Popularity


The Latin American public loves China
Olson 4/2
[Eric, Wilson Center, China seen favorably in Latin America, 4/2/13, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/latinamerican-program-the-news-china-seen-favorably-latin-america]
Large majorities of people in countries across Latin America and the Caribbean believe China has at least "some influence"
in their region and most see that influence as positive, according to a survey partly funded by the United States government. The
views on China were culled from a broad assessment of public opinion , conducted in 2012, that involved 26 countries and over
41,000 individual interviews, researchers said in issuing their findings at a think-tank seminar in Washington on Thursday. Only 20 percent of
respondents, on average, in the multinational survey described China as the "most influential" country in the region. In response to a separate
question, 23 percent said they expect China to have that status within 10 years. Of those who deemed China "most influential", more
than two-thirds (68 percent) characterized that influence as either "positive" or "very positive", according to the findings
from the Latin American Public Opinion Project, led by Vanderbilt University in Tennessee with funding from the US Agency for International
Development, the government's main conduit for foreign assistance. Among respondents in the 22 Latin American and Caribbean

countries asked about China - including, but not limited to, those who ranked it first in regional influence - the
nation was rated neutral to positive along a 1-to-5 scale.

China Influence High U.S. Abandonment


Chinese influence is surging due to lack of American engagement
Chuggani and Lamadrid 13
[ Sumeet Chugani and Ricardo Ortiz Gil Lamadrid, Diaz Reus Investing, Chinas surging influence in Latin
American finance, 3/15/13, http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=87ca72b7-b9e3-474e-9f5232e88dc93056]
The ongoing financial crisis in Europe and the United States continues to raise red flags for the Latin American
branches of multinational banks. Latin American financial institutions anticipate that U.S. and European banks will soon pull
back from their international lending activitiescausing a substantial decrease in the regions overall liquidity. As of June 2011, European banks
provided $206 billion in credit lines to their Latin American counterpartsmaking them the largest providers of external funding to the region. The United States also
provides a steady flow of credit lines throughout Latin America. A

reduction of foreign credit lines will reduce the supply of dollar


funding for exporters and increase the premiums charged by local financial institution s. Still, local subsidiaries of U.S. and
European banks that are well entrenched in Latin American countries and hold a large deposit base and copious amounts of local currency will survive. The
expected pullback of American and European banks may cause local banks in Latin America to adopt a more conservative approach to
credit expansion. It also holds the potential for a detrimental impact on exports flowing in and out of the region. The reduction of
credit facilities will require Latin American countries to search elsewhere for valuable credit lines. It is a highly probably that this new scenario will give
Chinese and Japanese banks new opportunities to further expand their already surging influence in the Latin American
regions financial affairs.
Latin American governments are siding with China- lack of U.S. investment key
Watts 13
[Jonathon, The Guardian, China's hunger for resources has big environmental impact in Latin America, 3/29/13,
http://news.mongabay.com/2013/0329-gen-china-amazon-impact.html]
The world's most populous nation has joined the ranks of wealthy countries in Europe, North America and east Asia that have
long consumed and polluted unsustainably. This has led to what author Michael T Klare calls " a race for what's left" and its impact is particularly
evident in the continent with much of the untapped, unspoiled natural resources. Even more than Africa, Latin America has become a major focus
of Beijing's drive for commodities. A study last year by Enrique Dussel Peters, a professor at the National Autonomous University of Mexico, found
that the region has been the leading destination for Chinese foreign direct investment mostly for raw materials and by big
government-run companies such as Chinalco and CNOOC. Since the 2008 financial crisis, China has also become the main lender to the region.
In 2010, it provided $37 billion (24 billion) in loans more than the World Bank, Inter-American Bank and the US ImportExport Bank combined. Most of this has gone to four primary exporters Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina and Ecuador for mining or transport
infrastructure. The economic benefits have been enormous. Trade between China and Latin America was just $10 billion in 2000 . In
2011, it had surged to $241 billion. While the distribution has varied enormously from country to country, this helped Latin America avoid the worst
of the financial and economic crises that gripped much of the developed world and provided extra revenue for poverty alleviation
programs that have eased the region's notorious inequality. It also played a major part in bolstering left-leaning governments that
are seeking an alternative to neo-liberal prescriptions from Washington and Wall Street.

China Influence High A2: U.S. Bigger


Chinese economic ties are up due to U.S. declines
Aquino 12
[Carlos, professor of economics at San Marcos National University , China's influence grows in US' 'backyard',
6/25/12, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2012-06/25/content_15520252.htm]
Not so long ago, Latin America was considered the "backyard" of the United States, but this is now changing . In the past decade
China's trade, investment and economic cooperation with the region has increased, challenging the US' position in
Latin America. The US' importance as a market for Latin American goods was so big that there was a time it was
said: "When the US economy sneezes, Latin American countries catch a cold. " But as China has now become a
larger export destination for some Latin American countries, the same can now be said of China. For example, its influence in the
Peruvian economy is very big, to the point that Luis Miguel Castilla, Peru's finance minister, has said "the truth is I light a little candle every day
and pray that China's growth doesn't fall ". China's emergence as an economic power and its needs for natural resources and
food, which Latin American countries have in abundance, means China is now the biggest trade partner of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru. And
China has free trade agreements with Chile, Costa Rica and Peru that will enhance that relationship. In the past decade trade between the US and Latin American
countries increased twice but the trade

is growing at a fast pace.

between China and Latin American countries grew 17 times. Also investment from China
US is still the biggest trade partner of the region but it is only a matter

In global terms, the

of time before China claims that role . Latin American countries are interested in China not only because it buys their raw materials at higher
prices, but also because they want to sell manufactured goods to the growing and affluent Chinese middle class, and because they find it easier to do business with
China. For example, China lends money to them more easily than institutions such as the World Bank, and countries such as Venezuela and Argentina that cannot get
loans from international banks get loans from China, which attaches few conditions to the loans. In fact, China, through entities like the Export-Import Bank of China
and the China Development Bank, lent more money to Latin American countries in 2010 than the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank and US
government put together. Another reason for the US losing its influence in Latin America is that its economy is not doing so well. While

Latin American
countries are growing, due in no small part to the demand from China, the US is facing the same problems Latin
American countries suffered 20 years ago, namely a big government deficit and debt. The US demanded economic reforms in Latin American
countries 20 years ago, and now it is the turn of Latin American countries to demand that the US do those reforms, mainly slashing government spending. Also

Latin American countries are not happy with the US because it still opposes Cuba' s integration in the Organization of American
States. Also the region does not agree with the US' approach to fighting the drug trade and resolving the immigration problem from the region to the US.

Not for long - U.S. is falling and China is gaining


Cerna 11
[Michael, China Research Center, China's Growing Presence in Latin America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese
Presence in the Region, 4/15/11, http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implicationsfor-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/]
By 2007 two-way trade between China and Latin America had already eclipsed $100 billion , almost 50% more than the
previous year and three years ahead of schedule. In 2008, two-way trade and investment reached $140 billion, with approximately $120
billion devoted to bilateral trade (Miller, 2009). China appears to be slowly closing the gap on the U.S. In 2009, Latin American
exports to China jumped nine times, reaching $41.3 billion, almost 7% of all Latin American exports, according to Kevin Gallagher of The Guardian.
U.S. exports and imports with the entire region are still vastly greater than Chinas, but year by year, China is
catching up and in some countries, surpassing the U.S. Even though China has become a major player over the past decade, trade between
the China and Latin America still pales in comparison to Latin American-U.S. trade. Regional trade with the U.S. totals $560 billion compared to just over $140
billion in trade with China. But the trend is significant when looking at where China was in 2000 ($13 billion) (Painter, 2008). When we look at Latin American trade
over the past decade with both the U.S. and China, one would find that the percentage of trade is slightly shifting. At the beginning of the 2000s the U.S. had more
than half of the trade with the region; China had less than 10% for China. Now

China is now nearing

the U.S. has roughly the same amount of total trade, but

12%. Going back a little further, total U.S. trade in Latin America increased from 7.2% in 1996 to 8.3% in 2009 (Hornbeck, 2011).

However, Mexico is the largest trading partner of the U.S., which brings that number up significantly. If trade with Mexico through NAFTA is taken away, U.S. trade
growth with Latin America is even less impressive. Meanwhile,

investment has also increased.

Sino-Latin American trade increased tenfold over the last decade and

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China Influence High A2: Europe


Europe is pale in comparison to China
De Oliveria 13
[Astrid Prange De Oliveira, Deutsche Welles, Europe losing out to Chinese conquista, 1/26/13,
http://www.dw.de/europe-losing-out-to-chinese-conquista/a-16551832]
China's growing economic presence in Latin America comes at Europe's expense . European leaders are trying to
make up lost ground at this year's annual EU-Latin America Summit in Chile. A battle for access to Latin America's markets is
being wagedb between Europe and Asia. German companies, too, are increasingly exposed to Asian competition. That is why German Chancellor
Angela Merkel is set to seek closer ties with her Latin American counterparts at the summit between the EU and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean
States (CELAC) in the Chilean capital Santiago this weekend (26-27.01.2013). "The most important Latin American countries have very dynamic trade with the
countries of the Pacific Rim and China," said Gnther Maihold, deputy director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, who currently teaches at
the Humboldt Institute in Mexico City. "The Europeans need to consider how to position themselves," Maihold told DW. "More is expected of them than just free
trade agreements." China conquers Latin America Ten years ago, Asia's presence in Latin America was insignificant.Chinese and South Korean cars on Latin
America's roads were as unthinkable as Chinese trains and roads. But today, Chinese manufacturers JAC Motors and CN Auto have set up shop along with Ssangyong
from South Korea - and competition for European manufacturers such as VW, Audi or BMW is gearing up."Chinese companies sometimes come with very attractive
financing options with which we can not compete," said Rafael Haddad, head of Brazil Board, an association of German companies investing in Brazil, concedes.
Chinese companies are increasingly trying to buy up Latin American companies, Haddad told DW. "Germany can't catch up" According to the UN Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), China

increased its direct investment in Latin America and the Caribbean from $621
million in 2001 to nearly $44 billion in 2010 (including investment in the Caribbean offshore financial centers). By comparison, German direct
investment in the region grew over the same period from $4 billion to $50 billion. Oliver Parche, coordinator of the German industry's Latin America Initiative, does
not see the growing competition between Asia and Europe as a huge problem. "We cannot catch up with the Asian countries," he says, "but we will
certainly improve our position in the coming years." As Division Head for North and South America at the German Chamber of Commerce and Industry (DIHK),
Parche says he believes there is a "great future" for collaboration between German and Latin American small and mid-sized businesses.Germany is still one of the
major foreign investors in Latin America. The production volume of local German subsidiaries alone totaled $160 billion in 2010. According to a survey by the
Chamber of Commerce's Latin American Association, German direct investment in Latin America doubled from 2001 to 2010, from $36 billion to $72 billion.
Germany is losing market share However, Germany's economic influence in Latin America has waned compared to the 1990s. "After German reunification, the door
opened to the east, and mid-sized businesses concentrated their resources there," Parche said. In the 1990s, many Latin American countries embarked upon radical
privatization programs. But Germany lagged behind its European neighbors when it came to buying up Latin American companies and resources: Spain

the second-largest investor after the United States, while Germany lost market shares.

became

Link

1NC Link
The plan limits Chinas influence in the region restarts U.S. Latin Ties
Pham 10
[Dr. J. Peter Pham is senior vice president of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy and the incoming
editor of American Foreign Policy Interests., Chinas Strategic Penetration of Latin America: What It Means for
U.S. Interests, 2010, American Foreign Policy Interests, 32: 363381]
All of this led to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton telling an audience of Foreign Service officers during a town hall meeting at the State Department last

the gains that China was making in Latin America quite disturbing. She went on to add, I mean they are
building very strong economic and political connections.... I dont think thats in our interest.85 How then, in the face
of Chinas growing commercial and political relationships across the region, might American interests be secured and,
year that she found

indeed, advanced ? First, U.S. policymakers need to acknowledge that Americas Latin American and Caribbean
neighbors matter to the United States not only for its traditional security interest in limiting the influence of outside powers

in the

Americas but also because globalization has accelerated the momentum for the increased integration of all of the nations in the Western Hemisphere and regional
cooperation is required to meet a whole host of transnational challenges ranging from spurring economic growth to illegal immigration to narcotics trafficking to
environmental issues. Hence it

is in the interests of the United States to renew relations with the countries to its south by developing and
articulating a comprehensive strategy that clearly puts to rest the legacy of benign neglect of the region. Second, rather than
lament the passing of an era when the United States unilaterally dictated the terms of engagement with its Latin American neighbors, the fact that the region
is shaping its future far more than it shaped its past86 ought to be welcomed. Engaging Latin American governments and
peoples on mutually agreeable terms is by far a more

sustainable foundation for what ought to be the goals of U.S. policy in the
region: the stability, security, and, ultimately, prosperity of the nations of the Western Hemisphere. When the trends to greater ownership by the countries of the
region of their own individual destinies are added to the limitations that the current fiscal crisis and the burdens of other challenges impose upon U.S. policy, it
becomes apparent that American interests are best advanced by more modest expectations and better targeting of available resources. In its engagements with its Latin
American and Caribbean neighbors, the United States should privilege building institutional capacity over the mere provision of aid. Third, despite Chinas efforts to
secure access to Latin Americas natural resources and markets, the region remains an important source of energy and other commodities for the United States as well
as a major market for American goods and services. About 25 percent of U.S. energy imports come from Central and South American countries and the region buys

U.S. businesses still have a


comparative advantage over overseas competitors in the markets of the Western Hemisphere.87 Thus the administration must
recommit itself to building on those solid foundations to reinforce and expand Americas economic ties with its neighbors to the
20 percent of all of U.S. exports, more than the European Union. Thanks to proximity as well as longstanding familiarity,

south.

In his 2010 State of the Union address, President Obama singled out Colombia and Panama as key partners with which he promised to strengthen trade

relations.88 Yet absent

proactive White House leadership, the free trade agreements with those two countries have still not been
ratified, while the North American Free Trade Agreement that came into force under President Bill Clinton was undermined by last years enactment of a measure
canceling a pilot program that allowed carefully screened Mexican trucks to carry cargo in the United States. Movement to repeal U.S. tariffs on Brazilian ethanol and
to settle a dispute over cotton subsidies with the South American giantwould not only promote trade but would also clear the air between Washington and Brasilia,
especially since the World Trade Organization has already ruled the subsidies illegal and, in a rare move, authorized the imposition of punitive sanctions against
American products.89

2NC Link
The plan locks China out of Latin America it causes a sustainable foundation for relations with the U.S.
which will limit the influence of outside powers in the region thats Pham
Engagement is perceived as Zero-sum shuts out China
Watson 07
[Cynthia A. Watson, Professor of Strategy at National War College, Washington, D.C. ENTER THE DRAGON?
Chinas Presence in Latin America, 2007, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf]
Beijing probably might not have increased its role in Latin America had the Middle East not been a major distraction for
Washington over the past ve and a half years. Washington has wanted Beijing to modernize its economy. This was bound to create more economic, diplomatic,
and trade prowess for China as it has reached beyond the isolationism of the Cultural Revolution, particularly in the newly globalized world. In many ways,

Beijings increased involvement in Latin America reects the unanticipated consequence of getting what the West hoped
for from China. But, the inability of Washington to consider anything beyond the concerns about terrorism spreading around the world, and
trying to salvage a peace of some sort without nuclear weapons in the Middle East, is having consequences for U.S. interests in other parts of
the world. For cultural and geographic reasons, the ties between the United States and Latin America ought to be stronger than
those between China and the Latins. Expectations of the strength of Latin AmericaU.S. ties have probably always
been unrealistic and frankly ahistorical; the two parts of the world actually have a number of fundamental differences. But the distance between
Latin Americas experiences and those of China are even vaster, ranging from religion to ethnic homogeneity to historical roles in the
world. Washington must make a more concerted effort to act as a genuine partner with the region, rather than
relegating it to the position of secondary or tertiary thought that assumes absolute U.S. leadership. The United States and China
claim that each is serious about adopting the economic philosophy that undergirds capitalism : economic growth is a
net benet for all, not a zero sum game. If true, China, Latin America, and the United States bene t from the greater Chinese
engagement in this region because it creates competition . Pure economic theory, however, always runs up against political
philosophies , leading to trade con icts, protectionism, and all-too-often a zero sum view based on the international relations
theory of realpolitik: whats good for my adversary must be bad for me. The risks of arousing realpolitik in the United
States, particularly as the nation faces increased frustration with the reality of the Middle East, is signi cant, probably more than the PRC bargained
for when it began engaging more with Latin America over the past decade. It appears unlikely that Beijing will seriously accelerate its
involvement in the region because of the number of Congressional hearings, public conferences and assessments, and other warnings alerting the United States to
China having discovered Latin America. To accelerate its involvement would risk the relatively strong relations with Washington at a time when other trade problems
and overall concerns about Chinas growing power are already rising in the United States. At the same time, Washingtons

ability to focus equally on


all areas of the world is not possible. With U.S. interests directed elsewhere, it seems highly likely that Beijing will be
able to maintain the level of involvement in the region it already has, without Washington raising too great a ruckus. Indeed,
Beijings best outcome from its current balance of involvement in the area is probably going to be the long-term
development of trust and ties over several decades with the leaders of this region, rather than immediately creating crucial, highly public ties between
itself and Latin American leaders. As so often appears true in the international system, probably the old tale of the tortoise and hare applies here, where Chinas
biggest gain will be accomplished over a long time of getting to know the region , rather than showing up
repeatedly in the rock star role which is too soon and too rash for a long-term, stable set of ties. Washington seems likely to worry
about the rock star phenomenon, rather than attempting to manage the emergence of another state becoming a long-term partner with its Latin
American neighbors.

China is beating the U.S. the reason solely due to economic relations
Pham 10
[Dr. J. Peter Pham is senior vice president of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy and the incoming
editor of American Foreign Policy Interests., Chinas Strategic Penetration of Latin America: What It Means for
U.S. Interests, 2010, American Foreign Policy Interests, 32: 363381]
Admittedly there is great variation as one examines Chinas

relationships with each country in the region, but its links with regimes like Hugo Chavezs

with its ambitions to export its Bolivarian Revolution and build a broad anti United States coalition in the hemisphere65 certainly do not put
American policymakers and analysts at ease. From Washingtons perspective, if the Venezuelan leaders support for the Castro brothers dictatorship in Cuba were
not bad enough, his increasing dalliances with the Islamic Republic of Iran and assorted Middle Eastern rogues have raised further hackles.66 That

the PRC
Ministry of Foreign Affairs nonetheless formally describes Beijings relations with Venezuela as being a strategic
partnership67 is certainly not very reassuring. One Chinese analyst even argues that the PRCshould view the Venezuelan regimes schemes

What
Chinese policymakers truly wish to see, and some Latin American leaders are also determined to pursue, is the revival of the Latin
American integration project started by Simon Bolivar at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Hugo Chavez of Venezuela sees himself as the
standard-bearer of a modern version of this concept, as he attempts to take on Bolivars mantle to restart this centuries-old dream. In China, Chavezs socalled Bolivarian Revolution has begun to draw attention , particularly as a potential vehicle for countries in
Latin America to move away from the Monroe Doctrine concept. Should the Bolivarian regional integration proposal gain traction,
the first logical priority would be to reduce the regions dependence on the North American market . Hence Chinas
opportunistically. The current geopolitical atmosphere in the Western Hemisphere seems more conducive to Chinese economic expansion than restrictive.

attractiveness as an alternative market and partner.68

Link A2: Not Zero Sum


Chinese influence depends on U.S. desertion- plan reverses that
Johnson 05
[Stephen Johnson is Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign
Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Stud-ies, at The
Heritage Foundation.Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin America, 10/24/05,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/10/balancing-chinas-growing-influence-in-latin-america]
China's main rival for global preeminence is the United States. China sees the United States as preventing Tai-wan's
reunification with the mainland and thwarting Beijing's rise as a power. Previously, China was isolated, but now plays key
roles in Asian geopolitics and aspires to do so elsewhere. Besides status as a nuclear nation, it is a member of the U.N. Security Council, the World Trade Organization,
the Group of 77 developing nations, and the Asia Pacific Economic Coopera-tion group. It also holds observer status in the Organization of American States. While China has become the
second-largest U.S. trade partner after Canada, it challenges U.S. influence wherever it can. In fact, it will soon have more attack submarines than the United
States, with the addition of four Russian Kilo-class subs and new diesel-electric vessels equipped with technology that will allow them to run quieter than nuclear submarines.[1] According to
former U.S. Ambassador to Beijing James Lilly, "[T]he facts are that [the Chinese] run massive intelligence operations against us, they make open statements against us, their high-level
documents show that they are not friendly to us." Chinese military white papers promote power pro-jection and describe U.S. policies as "hegemonism and power politics."[2] In the Western

, the Chinese are taking advantage of failures of half-hearted mar-ket reforms and Washington's
unwillingness to pursue neighborhood relations with much enthu-siasm. National Defense University professor Cyn-thia A. Watson notes,
"[T]he 1990s turned into a period of severe disappointment as free markets led to rampant corruption and unfulfilled expec-tations
in Latin America while Washington became the world's superpower rather than a part-ner for the region."[3]
Hemisphere

Link A2: Its Too Late


Not too late- the relationship is still fragile
Ferchen 12
[Matt, RESIDENT SCHOLAR CARNEGIE-TSINGHUA CENTER FOR GLOBAL POLICY, Chinas Latin
American Interests, 4/6/12, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/06/china-s-latin-american-interests/a7av]
The Chinese government goes to great lengths to emphasize that its relations with the developing world, including
with Latin America, represent a different approach than that of the United States or Europe. To highlight this
difference, China has long promoted its foreign policy principles of respect for sovereignty and commitment to
noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. Yet, there is, in fact, a heated battle to portray the
relationship in a positive or negative light and much wealth and prestige are on the line. But the irony is that lost in
all of this debate is that Chinas economic ties to Latin America have important similarities to the historical
experience of other rapidly industrializing countries. That is, China is undergoing an intense period of
industrialization and urbanization and therefore has a voracious appetite for raw materials. Whether or not this
industrialization is healthy, sustainable, or even the product of Chinese government policies is debatable. What is
clear is that for all of Chinas efforts to emphasize its different approach to dealing with developing countries, the
structure of its trade relationship with Latin America looks very similar to historical relationships between the
industrializing countries of the North and the commodity-rich developing countries of the South. And difficult
questions that Chinese mining or other firms in Latin America face about labor or the environment are very similar
to those confronted by American or European firms in the past. The real challenges for government and business
officials in China and Latin America attempting to create a sustainable and stable long-term economic and political
relationship are: the relationship is still very new, is relatively narrow (in its commodity basis), and is
potentially more fragile than often understood (commodity booms can be followed by busts, or at least prices
reverting to their historical downward trend). That is, those officials in China and Latin America might be best
served by recognizing that China, at least in terms of its trade and investment relationship with commodity-rich
countries in Latin America and elsewhere, is more normal than many recognize or would like to admit.

Link Trade
Increasing economic engagement through trade shuts out Chinese interests
Johnson 05
[Stephen Johnson is Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign
Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Stud-ies, at The
Heritage Foundation.Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin America, 10/24/05,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/10/balancing-chinas-growing-influence-in-latin-america]
The United States and China have competing inter-ests in Latin America . Washington would like to see its
hemispheric neighbors develop into stable, demo-cratic, prosperous trade partners that embrace the rule of law. Beijing sees
the region as a source of raw materials, a market for manufactured goods, and a platform for power projection. U.S.
interests probably coincide more with Latin American needs. In con-trast, China represents an opportunity to temper
American dominance with broader alliances. Regrettably, Chinese aid and commodity imports may buy time for state industries, powerful presi-dents, and
influential oligarchs. Most of all, such commerce could delay needed reforms and indus-trialization that might lift Latin America's near majority underclass out of
poverty. America's

strength is competition, and it should influence the rules of the game in that direction . As a good
neighbor and in its own and Latin America's interests, the United States should: Accelerate free trade agreements. Free trade
agreements have been the hallmark of U.S. pol-icies toward the region since the 1990s. As an inducement, America should drop its agricul-tural
and steel subsidies that dissuade potential partners and cost taxpayers money. Improved U.S. trade relations with Andean neighbors (and eventually
Southern Cone countries) will open market access for both U.S. and Latin American enterprises and provide an outlet for industrial
growth. Adopt more comprehensive relationships. Single-issue diplomacy that emphasizes U.S. interests, such as counternarcotics, leaves
vacu-ums in other areas such as security assistance and trade capacity development that other powers can fill. Plan Colombia is working
because the United States is helping Colombia to combat terrorism, expand public safety zones, strengthen institutions, reactivate the
economy, and promote rural peace.[11] Cut red tape on assistance. This policy should be followed to the greatest extent possible. Per-formance requirements are
blunt instruments that do not cover every situation. Constraints such as annual certifications on counternarcot-ics cooperation and Article 98 letters that with-hold
security assistance occasionally backfire by withdrawing support for allies in areas of mutual interest. If Congress considers such restrictions absolutely necessary, it
should tai-lor them to suspend only economic aid that is not crucial to immediate U.S. interests. Press harder for reforms and use public diplomacy. Once Latin
America had elected leaders and fledgling markets in the 1990s, U.S. support for democracy and economic reforms declined. Although each country is responsible for
solving its own problems, exter-nal pressure can encourage progress.

U.S. pub-lic diplomacy, which is mostly reactive toward Latin America, should be
strengthened and more supportive of U.S. development goals.

Link Mexico
Economic integration with Mexico key to check Chinese influence
Mares and Canovas 10
[David R. Mares & Gustavo Vega Cnovas, the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies (San Diego), the Mexico Institute
of the Woodrow Wilson Center (Washington DC), El Colegio de la Frontera Norte (Tijuana), and El
Colegio de Mxico (Mexico City).The U.S.-Mexico Relationship: Towards a New Era?, 2010,
http://usmex.ucsd.edu/assets/024/11635.pdf]
This chapter begins by briefly characterizing the most recent period of US-Mexico relations, the NAFTA era since 1994. We trace the origins, purposes, and the
impact of NAFTA in the two economies and societies. A second section lays out the parameters of a new era in the bilateral relationship, paying particular attention to

Globalizations impact on the relationship is best


captured in the rise of China and c onsequent displacement of Mexico in trade relations with the US .
the challenges to both countries raised by the processes of globalization and democratization.

Democratization complicates policy responses but improves the likelihood that policy will have some consistency over time. The

inadequate manner in
which the two countries have responded up to now to these challenges is highlighted. A third section discusses the essence of any
appropriate response to these challenges: economic integration . The failure of integration at a regional level is discussed,
but we note that Mexicos long border with the US means that the options open to Brazil, Argentina and Chile in diversifying their economic relations simply are not
viable for Mexico. A fourth section evaluates the current relationship and offers suggestions to improve the two countries abilities to respond effectively to todays
challenges. Whether

Mexico or the US like it or not, they are destined to walk together if they want to be successful in this globalized
towards a more collaborative or distant relationship , thus

economy. The conclusion speculates on whether the countries will move


helping to set the context for the in-depth discussions in subsequent chapters

Mexico is a key partner for China in Latin America


Brandt 12
[Jon Brandt Derek Hottle Nicole Adams Nav Aujla Christina Dinh Kirsten Kaufman Devin Kleinfield-Hayes
Wanlin Ren Andrew Tuck AMERICAN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL SERVICE, Chinese
Engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean: Implications for US Foreign Policy, December 2012,
http://www.american.edu/sis/usfp/upload/Chinese-Engagement-in-LAC-AU_US-Congress-FINAL.pdf]
The PRCs military interests in LAC are closely aligned with its commercial objectives. Bilateral security ties build political goodwill
with regional players, thus reducing the likelihood of actions against Chinese exports and investments.57 Chinas economic priorities are seen in
its official system of cataloguing states as cooperative,
allocation of economic resources.58 Chinas four strategic

friendlycooperative or strategic partnerswith the implication that this has for the

partners in Latin America - Argentina, Mexico , Brazil and Venezuela serve as

important trading partners and commodity suppliers. Chinas strategic posture in the Western Hemisphere is
consistent with its publically stated national security priorities. The PRCs 2010 national defense white paper emphasizes a defensive Chinese
military strategy, focusing on strengthening international military relations and countering foreign interference in domestic affairs. The paper highlights Chinese
concerns about international military competition in the areas of missile defense, cyberspace, outer space, and the polar regions, while simultaneously insisting the
PRC does not seek confrontation or global hegemony. While Chinas

ties with LAC reflect a growing desire to protect economic and


security interests, the PRC is promoting cooperation which reflects mutual trust and benefit, not offensive measures
that would directly threaten the United States. A number of high-level defense visits have occurred between China and Latin American nations.59 While
these interactions have not resulted in groundbreaking bilateral strategic initiatives, they serve as confidence building measures and provide
openings for arms transactions.606

Link Cuba
Cuba engagement reverses Chinese dominance
Luko 11 (James Served in Washington DC with the National Council For Soviet East European Research, the
Smithsonian Institute and two years as an analyst with the Canadian Department of National Defence, China's
Moves on Cuba Need to Be Stopped, 6/29, http://www.nolanchart.com/article8774-chinas-moves-on-cuba-need-tobe-stopped.html)
The Red Dragon takes another wide step of not only flexing its muscles in Asia, but now wishes to supplant Russias and (former USSRs) forward base presence 90 miles from the United States- CUBA. Cuba is
China's biggest trade partner in the Caribbean region, while China is Cuba's second-largest trade partner after Venezuela. Over the past decade, bilateral trade
increased from $440 million in 2001 to $1.83 billion in 2010. [1] In 2006 China and Cuba discussed offshore oil deals and now China's National Petroleum Corporation is a
major player in Cuban infrastructure improvements. [ibid] In 2008, none other than China's President himself, Hu JinTao visited Cuba with a sweet package of loans, grants and trade deals. If Cuba
becomes a 'client' state of China, it will be a source of leverage against America whenever the U.S. Pressures China on Tibet and Taiwan. Soon
we will witness the newly constructed blue-water navy of China cruising Cuba's coast in protection of their trade routes and supply of natural resources. In 2003 it was reported that Chinese personnel were operating at least TWO (2)
intelligence signal sations in Cuba since at least 1999 ! [2] This month, June 2011, the Vice President of China made an important visit, extending more financial aid, interest-free, as well as related health projects to be paid for by

The best way to counter the Chinese in Cuba is to reverse Americas 50 year old, ineffective and
obsolete policy of isolationism and boycott of Cuba. The Chinese threat in Cuba should be the catalyst for the US to establish
open and normalized relations, with economic incentives to re-Americanize Cuba, return of American investments and security agreements. Checking the Chinese move in Cuba early on is vital to
China. A client state in the making ! [3]

preventing a strategic Chinese foothold 90 miles from Florida. Allowing China to replace Russia in Cuba would be a strategic disaster. China is dangling financial assistance and investments in order to establish a beachhead close to
the shores of America. This is a counter-response to Americas continued military presence in Asia, continued support of Taiwan and recent increased American aid to the Philippines in its spat with China over sovereignty of the
Spratly Islands. The Cuban people wish to return to the American fold and re-establish the traditional relationship with the Cuban anchor in Florida- namely the almost 900,000 Cubans living in Florida alone! [4]

Plan shores up US-Cuban relationsstops Chinese engagement


Benjamin-Alvadaro 06 (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, PhD,
Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers
of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, The Current
Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special, http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissionedreports/oil-cuba-alvarado.pdf)
Given that there are no formal diplomatic of economic relations between the governments of the U nited S tates and Cuba, the
level of interest has grown significantly in the 3 years due primarily to three reasons in the following interest areas: energy security interests; broader regional strategic; and
purely economic interests. First, the energy security interests in the potential of Cuban oil although it really would not minimize the immediacy of an American energy crisis is seen as

as Cuba, in part because of the increasing number of oil partnerships


furthers its diplomatic and economic ties to with countries like Venezuela, China, Brazil and members of the European Union it
may prove to provide Cuba for a sufficient buffer against U.S. opposition as it solidifies it economic and diplomatic role in the region. This is
important inasmuch as there is a de facto trend in the Americas that clearly disavows and attempts to minimize the influence of the
possible if only partial remedy to energy supply concerns. Second,

United States in the region, and with the growing demands on the world economy by China, it stands to reason that Cuba may assume an
increasing stature that almost potentially lessens the presence of American influence in Cuban and hence regional
affairs . Finally, and as demonstrated by the presence of American oil interests in the February 2006 U.S.- Cuban Energy Summit in Mexico City, there may be interest in
cooperating in joint venture projects, and by extension assisting in the long-term development in Cubas oil industry. To
accomplish this task the report seeks to lay out some national security policy considerations applying strategic thought to what I will term Post-Oil Cuba a Cuba that has a small but vibrant
and growing oil and gas production capacity with extensive relations with a number of partners, and an increasingly positive outlook toward addressing energy and economic development
questions that have plagued the Castro regime since the Cuban Revolution.3 The primary consideration is to determine the present state of Cuban energy and what possibilities exist that would
be available to American foreign policy decision makers and business interests as the relations with Cuba evolve over the coming years.4

This is important because any

realistic appraisal of how Cuba is to take advantage of its oil bonanza involves the United States.

Previous research in

this area has clearly laid out the scope and objectives of Cuban energy development schemes in the period since the demise of Cubas favorable trade arrangements with the former Soviet Union.

as a result of the oil discovery and Cubas energy arrangement with the government of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela there is
renewed interest in Havanas energy policies. Most of that analysis has been focused on concrete possibilities where there can be cooperation in the energy field
between these two neighbors. Specifically, the work has looked at areas for the convergence of energy interests as they apply to the near- and longterm energy development scenarios facing both countries. Myers Jaffe and Soligo have addressed this possibility by looking at the potential to
increase diversification and dispersion of energy resources. This is an important consideration when one takes into consideration that well over one-third of
Recently, and

all oil refining capacity resides on or near the Houston shipping channel. The potential negative impact on Americas refining capacity following Hurricane Rita5 made a significant impression
on oil industry analysts for the necessity of diversifying the location of these vital national resources. The potential of viewing Cuba as a staging area for American oil storage and refining is
plausible because of the proximity of the island. The also becomes more attractive because of the growing climatic concerns over the uncertain security of oil resources in the Gulf region as

there
are still many other possibilities open and available to American companies, as well as a growing number of foreign
firms.6 Additionally, Venezuela remains the fourth largest importer of oil to the United States and one can surmise that the existing trade arrangements between the U.S. and Venezuela will
clearly demonstrated by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. While it is true that Venezuela has initiated an investment of $1 billion dollars to bring the Cienfuegos refinery online,

pursuing such a path would


allow United States policymakers to take advantage of what Cuba has to offer in the following areas: domestic technical
remain intact, the evolution of the Bolivarian revolution under Chavez and a growing Chinese presence in the region notwithstanding. Additionally,

capabilities ; continuing human capital development; strategic positioning in the Caribbean, and an improved diplomatic
stature.

Cuba, by any measure, possesses a largely untapped technical capacity owing to advanced training and education in the core mathematic and scientific areas. This was clearly

demonstrated by its attempt to develop a nuclear energy capability in the 1980s and 1990s whereby thousands of Cubans pursued highly technical career paths leaving Cuba with among the
highest ratios of scientists and engineers to the general population in all of the Americas. Moreover, the foundation of Cubas vaunted public education system remains intact and increased
investment under various scenarios suggests that Cuba will continue to produce a welleducated workforce that will be critical to its future economic vitality. This raises an important

Cuba remains the strategically important state

consideration that being the role that Cuba will play in the region in the 21st century. It suffices to say that
by virtue
of its geographical location alone, in efforts against drug and human trafficking and related national and regional security matters. The extent to which a stable Cuban government has cooperated
with the U.S. in drug interdiction efforts in the past suggests that the results from

improved diplomatic relations between neighbors would have the effect of improving
may

national security concerns related to terrorist activity, illicit weapons transfers and the like. Ultimately, a successful normalization of relations between the U.S. and Cuba in these areas

well enhance and stabilize regional relations that could possibly lessen
incursion in hemispheric affairs.

(or at a minimum, balancing)

fears of a Chinese

To lessen those fears it may be useful to review the present structure of joint-venture projects in the energy sector in Cuba to ascertain

the feasibility and possible success of such an undertaking become available to American firms. Moreover, it is interesting to note that U.S. firms in the agriculture sector have successfully
negotiated and consummated sales to Cuba totaling more than $1 billion dollars over the past four years under conditions that are less than optimal circumstances but have well-served the
commercial interests of all parties involved.

That ensures lock-out- allies Latin America with the U.S.


Tisdall 3-5 Simon Tisdall, writer for the Guardian, March 5th, 2013, "Death of Hugo Chvez brings chance of
fresh start for US and Latin America" www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/05/hugo-chavez-dead-us-latinamerica/print
Hugo Chvez's departure furnishes Barack Obama with an opportunity to repair US ties with Venezuela , but
also with other Latin American states whose relations with Washington were adversely affected by Chvez's
politics of polarisation and the Bush administration's viscerally unintelligent reaction . In particular, the change of
leadership in Caracas could unlock the deadlock over Cuba , if the White House can summon the requisite political will. Possibly anticipating a transition,
Washington quietly engineered a diplomatic opening with Caracas last November after a lengthy standoff during which ambassadors were withdrawn. Roberta Jacobson, assistant secretary of state for western hemisphere affairs,
telephoned Nicols Maduro, Venezuela's vice-president and Chvez's preferred successor, and discussed, among other things, the restoration of full diplomatic relations. "According to US officials, the Venezuelan vice-president
offered to exchange ambassadors on the occasion of the beginning of President Barack Obama's second term. Jacobson, in turn, is said to have proposed a step-by-step approach to improve bilateral relations, starting with greater cooperation in counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism and energy issues," Andres Oppenheimer reported in the Miami Herald. There is much ground to make up. "Relations between the United States and Venezuela have ranged from
difficult to hostile since Chvez took office in 1999 and began to implement what he calls 21st-century socialism," wrote a former US ambassador to Caracas, Charles Shapiro. "Chvez blamed a failed 2002 coup against him on the
United States (not true), nationalised US companies, insulted the president of the United States and blamed 'the empire' his term for the United States for every ill In foreign affairs, the government actively supports the Assad
regime in Syria, rejects sanctions on Iran and generally opposes the US at every turn." Despite such strains, economic self-interest always prevented a complete rupture. The US remained Venezuela's most important trading partner
throughout Chvez's presidency, buying nearly half its oil exports. Caracas is the fourth largest supplier of oil to the US. In fact, the US imports more crude oil annually from Mexico and Venezuela than from the entire Persian Gulf.
This shared commerce now provides a formidable incentive and a launch platform for a fresh start. Whether the opportunity is grasped depends partly on Maduro, a Chvez loyalist but a reputed pragmatist with close ties to Ral

it depends even more on Obama, whose first term, after a promising start, ended up perpetuating
Washington's historical neglect of Latin America. He now has a chance to do better. The political climate
seems propitious. Economic and cultural ties are also strengthening dramatically. Trade between the US and Latin
America grew by 82% between 1998 and 2009. In 2011 alone, exports and imports rose by a massive 20% in both directions. "We do three times more business with Latin America
Castro in Cuba. Yet

than with China and twice as much business with Colombia [as] with Russia," an Obama official told Julia Sweig of the US Council on Foreign Relations. Latinos now comprise 15% of the US population; the US is the world's second
largest Spanish-speaking country (after Mexico). Despite this convergence, high-level US strategic thinking about the region has continued to lag, Sweig argued. "For the last two decades, US domestic politics have too often driven

Obama
could change this dynamic if he tried and one way to do it would be to unpick the Cuban problem , which
Washington's Latin America agenda whether on issues of trade, immigration, drugs, guns or that perennial political albatross, Cuba, long driven by the supposedly crucial 'Cuban vote' in Florida," she said.

continues to colour the way Latin Americans view Washington . "Having won nearly half of the Cuban
American vote in Florida in 2012, a gain of 15 percentage points over 2008, Obama can move quickly on Cuba. If
he were to do so, he would find a cautious but willing partner in Ral Castro, who needs rapprochement with
Washington to advance his own reform agenda ," Sweig said.

Impact Economy

Chinese Economy 1NC


Chinese influence in the region key to the global economy and regime stability preventing US influence key
Ellis 11
[R. Evan, Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the
National Defense University.Chinese Soft Power in Latin America, 1st quarter 2011,
http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf]
Access to Latin American Markets. Latin

American markets are becoming increasingly valuable for Chinese companies because they
allow the PRC to expand and diversify its export base at a time when economic growth is slowing in traditional markets such
as the United States and Europe. The region has also proven an effective market for Chinese efforts to sell more sophisticated, higher
value added products in sectors seen as strategic, such as automobiles, appliances, computers and telecommunication equipment, and aircraft. In expanding
access for its products through free trade accords with countries such as Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica, and penetrating markets in Latin American countries with

the PRC has often had to overcome resistance by organized and often politically
interests in those nations. In doing so, the hopes of access to Chinese markets and investments among key groups of
businesspeople and government officials in those nations have played a key role in the political will to overcome the
existing manufacturing sectors such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina,
well-connected established

resistance . In Venezuela, it was said that the prior Chinese ambassador to Venezuela, Zheng Tuo, was one of the few people in the country who could call
President Chvez on the telephone and get an instant response if an issue arose regarding a Chinese company. Protection of Chinese Investments in and Trade Flows
from the Region. At times, China has applied more explicit pressures to induce Latin America to keep its markets open to Chinese
goods. It has specifically protested measures by the Argentine and Mexican governments that it has seen as protectionist: and, in the case of Argentina, as informal
retaliation, China began enforcing a longstanding phytosanitary regulation, causing almost $2 billion in lost soy exports and other damages for Argentina.14 China has
also used its economic weight to help secure major projects on preferential terms. In the course of negotiating a $1.7 billion loan deal for the Coco Coda Sinclair
Hydroelectric plant in Ecuador, the ability of the Chinese bidder SinoHidro to self-finance 85 percent of the projects through Chinese banks helped it to work around
the traditional Ecuadorian requirement that the project have a local partner. Later, the Ecuadorian government publicly and bitterly broke off negotiations with the
Chinese, only to return to the bargaining table 2 months later after failing to find satisfactory alternatives. In Venezuela, the Chvez government agreed, for example,
to accept half of the $20 billion loaned to it by the PRC in Chinese currency, and to use part of that currency to buy 229,000 consumer appliances from the Chinese
manufacturer Haier for resale to the Venezuelan people. In another deal, the PRC loaned Venezuela $300 million to start a regional airline, but as part of the deal,
required Venezuela to purchase the planes from a Chinese company.15 Protection of Chinese Nationals. As with the United States and other Western countries, as
China becomes more involved in business and other operations in Latin America, an increasing number of its nationals will be vulnerable to hazards common to the
region, such as kidnapping, crime, protests, and related problems. The heightened presence of Chinese petroleum companies in the northern jungle region of Ecuador,
for example, has been associated with a series of problems, including the takeover of an oilfield operated by the Andes petroleum consortium in Tarapoa in November
2006, and protests in Orellana related to a labor dispute with the Chinese company Petroriental in 2007 that resulted in the death of more than 35 police officers and
forced the declaration of a national state of emergency. In 2004, ethnic Chinese shopkeepers in Valencia and Maracay, Venezuela, became the focus of violent
protests associated with the Venezuelan recall referendum. As such incidents increase ,

the PRC will need to rely increasingly on a combination of


goodwill and fear to deter action against its personnel, as well as its influence with governments of the region , to resolve such
problems when they occur.The rise of China is intimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and
information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation . Because of this, some
within the PRC leadership see the countrys sustained growth and development , and thus the stability of the regime ,
threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from
supporting Chinese interests . In Latin America, Chinas attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance
efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used against
Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure
bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated
into the IADB in 2009 were

trading block

(the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in

which the PRC would have been disadvantaged.

Econ decline causes war


ROYAL 10 Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense
[Jedediah Royal, 2010, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, in Economics of War and Peace:
Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215]

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science
literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of
interdependent stales. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow.
First, on the systemic level. Pollins (20081 advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms

in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition
from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a
redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 19SJ) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk

of miscalculation (Fcaron. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive
environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately. Pollins
(1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium
and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain
unknown. Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a
significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states arc likely to gain
pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade
decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources , the likelihood for conflict increases, as
states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade
expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link
between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Mom berg and Hess (2002) find a strong
correlation between internal conflict and external conflict , particularly during periods of economic downturn . They
write. The linkage, between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing.
Economic conflict lends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a
recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other (Hlomhen?
& Hess. 2(102. p. X9> Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blombcrg.
Hess. & Wee ra pan a, 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions . Furthermore, crises
generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing

unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external
military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DcRoucn (1995), and Blombcrg. Hess, and Thacker (2006)
find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force arc at least indirecti) correlated. Gelpi (1997). Miller (1999). and
Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that Ihe tendency towards diversionary tactics arc greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due
to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000)
has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are
statistically linked lo an increase in the use of force. In summary, rcccni economic scholarship positively correlates economic
integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises , whereas political science scholarship links
economic decline with external conflict al systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and
armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

Goes global
Kaminski 7
(Antoni Z., Professor Institute of Political Studies, World Order: The Mechanics of Threats (Central European Perspective), Polish Quarterly
of International Affairs, 1, p. 58)
As already argued, the economic advance of China has taken place with relatively few corresponding changes in the political system, although
the operation of political and economic institutions has seen some major changes. Still, tools are missing that would allow the establishment of
political and legal foundations for the modem economy, or they are too weak. The tools are efficient public administration, the rule of law, clearly
defined ownership rights, efficient banking system, etc. For these reasons, many experts fear an economic crisis in China. Considering the
importance of the state for the development of the global economy, the crisis would have serious global repercussions. Its political
ramifications could be no less dramatic owing to the special position the military occupies in the Chinese political system, and the existence of
many potential vexed issues in East Asia (disputes over islands in the China Sea and the Pacific). A potential hotbed of conflict
is also Taiwan's status. Economic recession and the related destabilization of internal policies could lead to a political, or
even military crisis. The

likelihood of the global escalation of the conflict is high, as the interests of Russia, China, Japan,
Australia and, first and foremost, the US clash in the region.

Chinese Economy 2NC


Disad outweighs and turns the case Chinese econ decline causes global decline and lashout thats
Kaminski and Royal- prefer our scenario its grounded in statistical studies and empirical analysis
And our Ellis evidence indicates it would collapse the CCP
Causes bioweapon use
Rexing 5 (San, Staff Epoch Times, The CCPs Last Ditch Gamble: Biological and Nuclear War, 8-5,
http://english.epochtimes.com/news/5-8-5/30975.html)
Since the Partys life is above all else, it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological,
chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to extend its life. The CCP, which disregards human life, would not
hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, along with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends.
These speeches let the public see the CCP for what it really is. With evil filling its every cell the CCP intends to wage a war against humankind in
its desperate attempt to cling to life. That is the main theme of the speeches. This theme is murderous and utterly evil. In China we have seen
beggars who coerced people to give them money by threatening to stab themselves with knives or pierce their throats with long nails. But we
have never, until now, seen such a gangster who would use biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons to threaten the world, that they will die
together with him. This bloody confession has confirmed the CCPs nature: That of a monstrous murderer who has killed 80

million Chinese people and who now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.
Extinction
Sandberg et al 8Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University. PhD in computation neuroscience,
StockholmANDJason G. MathenyPhD candidate in Health Policy and Management at Johns Hopkins. special consultant to the Center for
Biosecurity at the University of PittsburghANDMilan M. irkovisenior research associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade.
Assistant professor of physics at the University of Novi Sad. (Anders, How can we reduce the risk of human extinction?, 9 September 2008,
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-can-we-reduce-the-risk-of-human-extinction)
The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing
the number of nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear
winter. We may face even greater risks from emerging technologies . Advances in synthetic biology might make it
possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics. The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer
pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens are selfreplicating, allowing a small arsenal to become exponentially destructive. Pathogens have been implicated in the extinctions of
many wild species. Although most pandemics "fade out" by reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with wide
host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or unintentional release of engineered
pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing human extinction. While such an event
seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore's Law.

A2: Collapse Doesnt Go Nuclear


Goes nuclear
Merlini 11
[Cesare Merlini, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian
Institute for International Affairs (IAI) in Rome. He served as IAI president from 1979 to 2001. Until 2009, he also occupied the position of
executive vice chairman of the Council for the United States and Italy, which he co-founded in 1983. His areas of expertise include transatlantic
relations, European integration and nuclear non-proliferation, with particular focus on nuclear science and technology. A Post-Secular World?
DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2011.571015 Article Requests: Order Reprints : Request Permissions Published in: journal Survival, Volume 53, Issue 2
April 2011 , pages 117 - 130 Publication Frequency: 6 issues per year Download PDF Download PDF (357 KB) View Related Articles To
cite this Article: Merlini, Cesare 'A Post-Secular World?', Survival, 53:2, 117 130]

One
or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps
even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of
which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the
first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism,
including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to
immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated . One way or another, the secular
rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular
absolutes such as unbridled nationalism.
Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system.

Ext Latin America K2 Econ


Latin America key to Chinas economy- trade and resources
Jiang 2007
[Shixue Jiang, Deputy Director of the Institute of Latin American Studies (ILAS) of the Chinese Academy of Social
SciencesThree Factors in the Recent Development of Sino-Latin American Relations, ENTER THE DRAGON?
Chinas Presence in Latin America, 2007, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf]
Chinese achievements in the realm of reform and opening to the outside world have been impressive. But there are
problems. First of all, China is facing increasing friction with the developed countries, which have frequently used anti-dumping
practices and other means to restrict Chinese exports. From time to time, the United States uses economic leverage to exert
political pressure on China. Therefore, it is imperative for China to reduce economic dependence upon the United States
and other developed countries. To realize this goal, China needs to diversify its trade partners . In this regard, Latin
America, a continent with a population of more than 500 million people and an economic size of more than US$2 trillion, is certainly a big
market for Chinese products. Second, while China is a nation with a great amount of natural resources, because of its huge population,
China is also lacking resources in terms of per capita distribution. Consider forest area and timber, for example. According to recent
statistics, Chinas forest area is 1.2 million square kilometers, and timber resources are about 10 billion cubic meters. These two absolute
numbers are huge compared to many other countries in the world. But in per capita terms, Chinas forest area is merely 0.10 hectares, and timber
resources are less than 10 cubic meters, as compared with the world average of 1.07 hectares and 83 cubic meters, respectively. According to a
report published in 2006, Chinas per capita reserves of coal, oil and gas are only 70 percent, 11 percent, and 4 percent of
the world average.1 On the one hand, the nation should make strenuous efforts to upgrade the ef ciency of using its resources; on the other,

it needs to locate supplies from abroad. Latin America is the perfect place from which China can import many kinds
of needed resources. Additionally, the importance of Latin America goes beyond the economic area. Politically speaking, Latin America
could be a partner for China and other developing countries in their efforts to oppose hegemony, establish a just world order, and a
harmonious world. Both Latin America and China share many common or similar positions towards some of the major
international issues. Also noteworthy is the fact that in the United Nations, each country enjoys one vote, and China has the potential
to win support from Latin American countries on many issues.

Chinese Oil 2NC


Specifically key to Chinese oil security
Cerna 11
[Michael, China Research Center, China's Growing Presence in Latin America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese
Presence in the Region, 4/15/11, http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implicationsfor-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/]
Chinas thirst for natural resources has sent the country in search of sustainable supplies of oil, soy and iron ore. In
South America, China has found some of the most well-endowed partners in the world. China is devouring Latin American
commodities and eyeing a market of 500 million people. Countries in South America have arable land and need our technology and
investment , and they welcome our companies. Its a win-win solution, said Wang Yunkun, deputy director of the Agriculture and Rural Affairs
Committee of the National Peoples Congress, as reported by MercoPress. In 2006, more than 36% of Chiles total exports were directed toward Asia, with China
taking 12% of the total. Chile was the first Latin American country to complete a major bilateral trade agreement with China (Santiso, 2007). Since then China has
looked beyond Chile, also targeting Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Argentina and Peru. In 2009, China became Brazils largest single export market, eclipsing the U.S.
for the first time in history. Later, Brazils then-president, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, and his Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao, signed an agreement that allowed the
China Development Bank and Sinopec to loan Brazils state-controlled oil company, Petrobras, $10 billion in return for as many as 200,000 barrels a day of crude oil
for ten years (Economist, 2009). This is but one example of how China is seizing lending opportunities in Latin America when traditional
lenders such as the Inter-American Development Bank are being pushed to their limits. Just one of Chinas loans, the $10 billion for Brazils national oil company, is
almost as much as the $11.2 billion in all approved financing by the Inter-American Bank in 2008, according to The New York Times. It was not only in Brazil that
China went after oil. In

order to meet rising industrial needs and consumer demand, China has pursued investments and
agreements with a variety of Latin American oil producers. In 2007 Venezuela agreed to a $6 billion joint investment fund
for infrastructure projects at home and for oil refineries in China able to process Venezuelan heavy crude oil (Santiso, 2007).
Venezuela planned to increase oil exports to China by 300,000 barrels per day. Then in 2009, Venezuela announced a $16 billion investment deal with
the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation ( CNPC) for oil exploration in the Orinoco River to develop heavy crude oil resources
(Economist, 2009). Meanwhile, the CNPC has invested $300 million in technology to use Venezuelas Orimulsion fuel in Chinese power plants. This
exemplifies Venezuelas desire to break away from the U.S . During a visit to China in 2004, President Chavez said shifting
exports to China would help end dependency on sales to the United States (Johnson, 2005).
Chinese energy insecurity causes Asia war
Brandenburg , 3/24/2011 (Colonel James A. United States Air Force, Chinas Energy Insecurity and the South
China Sea Dispute, USAWC Strategy Research Project, p. 6-7)
In 2010, China reasserted ownership to nearly 80 percent of the S outh C hina S ea, supplementing its claims to the Spratly
and Paracel Islands. For China and its neighbors, territorial ownership is integral to state sovereignty and security.
However, overlapping EEZs, disputes over ownership of the Spratly and Paracel Islands, and Chinas

mercantilist approach to

securing resources stand to raise the energy security stakes of interested parties including the US .16 Feelings of
insecurity of those with competing interests in either the EEZ or the Spratly or Paracel Islands could prove challenging especially if China
expands its offshore production of oil/natural gas and extends its control over the vessels or pipelines that deliver them via the South China Sea.

Experts suggest energy shortages provide the necessary catalyst for arms races , nuclear proliferation , and
other forms of instability in essence, greater energy insecurity equates to the greater probability of
geopolitical rivalry .17 Like the US, as China becomes more dependent on oil imports, its ability to ensure access to energy at an
affordable price becomes even more critical and could prove difficult given increasing global market uncertainty. Ultimately, Chinas

dependence on imports could lead to a vicious cycle as it struggles to find ways to mitigate risks and protect its
investments in order to offset its insecurity.18 Given global dependence on Chinas economy and the potential impact of shrinking
energy supplies, this warrants special consideration in the geo-political realm.

Goes nuclear
Cirincione 2000 (Joseph, Director of the Non-Proliferation Project CEIP, Foreign Policy, 3-22, Lexis)
The blocks would fall quickest and hardest in Asia, where proliferation pressures are already building more quickly than anywhere else in the
world. If a nuclear

breakout takes place in Asia, then the international arms control agreements that have been

painstakingly negotiated over the past 40 years will crumble. Moreover, the U nited S tates could find itself embroiled in its fourth
war on the Asian continent in six decades--a costly rebuke to those who seek the safety of Fortress America by hiding behind national missile
defenses. Consider what is already happening: North Korea continues to play guessing games with its nuclear and missile programs;

South Korea wants its own missiles to match Pyongyang's;

India and Pakistan shoot across borders while running a slow-motion

nuclear arms race; China modernizes its nuclear arsenal amid tensions with Taiwan and the United States; Japan's vice defense
minister is forced to resign after extolling the benefits of nuclear weapons; and Russia--whose Far East nuclear deployments alone make it the
largest Asian nuclear power--struggles to maintain territorial coherence. Five of these states have nuclear weapons; the others
are capable of constructing them. Like neutrons firing from a split atom, one nation's actions can trigger reactions throughout the
region, which in turn, stimulate additional actions. These nations form an interlocking Asian nuclear reaction chain that
vibrates dangerously with each new development. If the frequency and intensity of this reaction cycle increase, critical decisions taken
by any one of these governments could
and

cascade into the second great wave of nuclear-weapon proliferation, bringing regional

global economic and political instability and, perhaps, the first combat use of a nuclear weapon since 1945.

Ext China Oil I/L


China taking advantage of low U.S. commitment now key to energy security
Forero 05
[Juan, New York Times, China's oil diplomacy lures Latin America, 3/2/05,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/01/business/worldbusiness/01iht-oil.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0]
Latin America is becoming a rich destination in China's global quest for energy , with the Chinese signing accords with Venezuela,
investing in largely untapped markets like Peru and exploring possibilities in Bolivia and Colombia. China's sights are focused mostly on Venezuela, which ships more than 60 percent of its

With huge oil reserves and a president who says that his country needs to diversify its energy business, Venezuela has emerged as
an obvious contender for Beijing's attention. Vice President Zeng Qinghong of China, accompanied by a delegation of 125 officials and businessmen, signed 19 cooperation
crude oil to the United States.

agreements with the Venezuelan leader, Hugo Chavez, in Caracas late in January. The agreements included long-range plans for Chinese stakes in oil and gas fields that are now mostly
considered marginal but which could become valuable with big investments. Despite tensions between Chavez and the Bush administration, Venezuela remains a major source for American oil
companies, one of four main providers of imported crude oil to the United States. Analysts and Venezuelan government officials say that tie will not be severed, as Venezuela is a relatively short
tanker trip from the United States. "The United States should not be concerned," Rafael Ramirez, Venezuela's energy minister, said in an interview. "This expansion in no way means that we will

China's voracious economy is an attractive market for Venezuela and other


South American energy producers. "The Chinese are entering without political expectations or demands," said Roger Tissot, an analyst who evaluates political and
economic risks in leading oil-producing countries for PFC Energy Group in Washington. "They just say, 'I'm coming here to invest ,' and they can invest
billions of dollars. And obviously, as a country with billions to invest, they are taken very seriously." China's entry is worrisome to some American energy officials, especially
be withdrawing from the North American market for political reasons." Still,

because the United States is becoming more dependent on foreign oil at a time when foreign reserves remain tight. It was fear of supply shortages that pushed a barrel of oil to $55 in October,
driving up retail prices and hurting economies. On Tuesday, crude oil for April delivery was at $51.69 a barrel in premarket trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange. The U.S. Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, headed by Richard Lugar, Republican of Indiana, recently asked the Government Accountability Office to examine contingency plans should Venezuelan oil stop

Chinese interest in Venezuela, a senior committee aide said, underlined Washington's lack of attention to Latin America.
the hemisphere has been a low priority for the U.S., and the Chinese are taking advantage of it," the aide
said, speaking on condition of anonymity. "They're taking advantage of the fact that we don't care as much as we should about
Latin America." China, the world's second-largest consumer of oil, is already a leading competitor to the United States in its global search for
flowing.

"For years and years,

oil,

gas and minerals - notably in Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa. China accounted for 40 percent of global growth in oil demand in the last four years, according to the U.S. Energy

Department, and its consumption in 20 years is projected to rise to 12.8 million barrels a day from 5.56 million barrels now. The United States now uses 20.4 million barrels a day, nearly 12
million of them imported.

Chinese companies, which have substantial government help, can dispense government aid to secure deals , take

advantage of lower costs in China and draw on hefty credit lines from the government and Chinese financial institutions to compete with U.S. and other rivals. "These companies tend to make
uneconomic bids, use Chinese state bilateral loans and financing, and spend wildly," Frank Verrastro, director and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in

Chinese investors pursue market and strategic objectives, rather than commercial
China already operates two oil fields in Venezuela. Under accords signed in Beijing in December and in Caracas in January, it would develop 15
declining fields in Zumano in eastern Venezuela, buy 120,000 barrels of fuel oil a month and build a plant in Venezuela to produce fuel for Chinese power plants. Energy
analysts say these deals, though mostly marginal, show that China is willing to wade in slowly, with larger ambitions in
Washington, told the Senate Energy Committee early in February. "
ones."

mind . "These are steps you have to take to have a longer-term relationship ," said Larry Goldstein, president of the Petroleum Industry
Research Foundation in New York. "

they will."

We don't know enough about whether they will lead to larger projects, but my sense is that

Under the agreements, Venezuela has invited China to participate in promising projects like exploring for oil in the Orinoco belt, which has one of the world's great deposits

of crude oil, and searching for natural gas offshore - where Venezuela hopes to be a world competitor. Analysts say that part of China's effort is to learn about Venezuelan technology, particularly

In return, China is
offering the Venezuelans a $700 million credit line to build housing, aid that helps Chavez in his goal of lifting his compatriots out of poverty. "It's a country that permits you
the workings of its heavy-oil refineries. Much of the oil that will be exploited in the future will be tarlike, requiring an intricate and expensive refining process.

to get more out of agreements than just energy accords," Bernardo Alvarez, Venezuela's ambassador to the United States, said of China. Venezuela, with a view to exports to China, says it is
exploring plans to rebuild a Panamanian pipeline to pump crude oil to the Pacific. Another proposal would lead to the construction of a pipeline from Venezuela to Colombia's Pacific ports.
Chavez has promoted these plans in three visits to China. In the most recent, in December, he unveiled a statue of Simon Bolivar in Beijing. Trade between the two countries could rise to $3
billion this year from $1.2 billion, Chavez said. "We have been producing and exporting oil for more than 100 years," Chavez told Chinese businessmen in December. "But these have been 100

ch of
Latin America has become crucial to its need for raw materials and markets, with trade at $32.85 billion in the first 10 months of 2004,
about 50 percent more than in 2003. Mining, analysts say, is among China's priorities, whether it is oil in Venezuela, tin in Chile or gas in Bolivia. Chinese involvement in
Latin America is "growing by leaps and bounds," said Eduardo Gamarra, director of the Latin America and Caribbean Center at Florida International
years of domination by the United States. Now we are free, and place this oil at the disposal of the great Chinese fatherland." China, though, is not just interested in Venezuela. Mu

University.

Chinese economic ties key to Oil imports


Ferchen 12
[Matt, RESIDENT SCHOLAR
CARNEGIE-TSINGHUA CENTER FOR GLOBAL POLICY, Chinas Latin American Interests, 4/6/12,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/06/china-s-latin-american-interests/a7av]

China-Latin America relations, especially economic ties , have boomed in the last decade . Between 2000 and 2010 China-Latin
America trade expanded over 1,500 percent , and between 2008 and 2010 alone Chinas investment in the region expanded more than
180 percent. This boom in economic relations has been primarily driven by strong Chinese demand for South American
mineral, agricultural, and energy resources like copper, iron ore, soybeans, and oil. At the same time, Latin America has become an
important destination for increasing amounts of Chinese manufactured-good exports ranging from modems to motorcycles. While there are
other dimensions to the Latin America-China relationship, including a history of Chinese immigration to countries like Cuba and Peru, the recent decadelong surge in relations has been primarily driven by trade and investment ties. Though those ties have also underpinned
renewed and strengthened diplomatic relations between China and countries throughout the region, the main binding force remains economic
rather than political or ideological. This has fueled a mixture of rising hopes and anxieties among government and business leaders in Latin America. The hopes
ride on ever-expanding trade and investment links as well as the possibility that China might prove to be a positive alternative to longstanding American economic and political power in the region. Anxieties are rooted in concerns that the regions ties to China repeat dysfunctional
historical patterns of commodity dependence and a hollowing out of local industry in the face of Chinese manufacturing and export prowess. The main
beneficiaries of the boom in economic relations have been a small number of commodity-rich South American countries. In particular, in
recent years China has become the number-one trading partner (including exports and imports) for Brazil, Chile, and Peru and the number-two trading partner for
Argentina. Within the last two years China has also quickly leapt to become the number-one source of foreign direct investment in Brazil and Peru. In order to further
solidify trade ties to key Pacific coast trading partners, China has also signed free trade agreements with Chile, Peru, and more recently Costa Rica. At the same time,

China has made significant energy deals, for oil in particular , with countries like Venezuela, Ecuador, and Brazil. Some Latin American
leaders have reached out to China in an effort to develop more extensive political ties. Left-leaning political leaders from Cuba and
Venezuela to Ecuador and Bolivia have all emphasized the importance of shared socialist values with China, even if China has been careful to downplay the
ideological aspects of these relationships. China

has, however, been eager to cooperate

with its fellow BRIC member, Brazil, in leading multilateral

calls for revisions to the international financial system in the wake of the 200809 financial crisis. Hope remains that China

will continue to explore


increased investment opportunities in Mexico (and also possibly in Panama and Colombia, with whom the United States recently signed free trade
agreements) in order to leverage the benefits of proximity to North American export markets. As the second-largest economy in Latin America, thus far Mexico has
been a key counterexample to the South American trend of booming commodity exports to China. Instead, the Mexican economy has been challenged not only by a
negative trade balance with China but also by increased Chinese competition for exports to key North American markets.

Ext China War


Energy is the core issue of island disputes
Jackson, 1/31/2013 (Allison, The Senkaku Islands Dispute Is Forcing Japan to Rethink How It Trades With the
World, Business Insider, p. http://www.businessinsider.com/diaoyu-dispute-hurts-sino-japanese-trade-2013-1)
Nevertheless, the dispute over the islands will continue to cause political and economic headaches for China and Japan,
with neither acting to defuse the tensions . Abe warned recently that there was no room for negotiations with
China over the islands. My resolve to defend our waters and territories has not changed at all, the hawkish Abe said, according to The Daily
Yomiuri, shortly after announcing the first increase in Japanese defense spending in more than a decade. The Chinese also have taken a
hard line . Last week, an editorial in the state-controlled Global Times warned its readers to prepare for the worst and said the Chinese
military shouldnt be hesitant to take military revenge in response to Japanese provocations. A mixture of historical animosity, selfserving politics and energy security is fueling the dispute . As the US increases its strategic engagement in the Asia-Pacific
region, China is eager to use the spat with Japan as an opportunity to show off its strength and boost its influence in the region. But energy and
the control of potentially large hydrocarbon reserves are at the core of the dispute which ensures lasting tensions
between Asias economic giants. They will give you a long, historical explanation of their sovereignty claim. But
the idea that there are vast resources under the East China Sea just off their coast is a tremendous motivation for the
intensity of their territorial dispute, Sheila Smith, a senior fellow at the C ouncil on F oreign R elations in Washington,
National Geographic late last year.

D.C, told

They escalate.
Auslin, 1/28/2013 (Michael scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, The Sino-Japanese Standoff, National
Review, p. http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/338852/sinondashjapanese-standoff-michael-auslin?pg=2)
This SinoJapanese standoff also is a problem for the United States, which has a defense treaty with Tokyo and is pledged to come to the aid of Japanese forces under
attack. There are also mechanisms for U.S.Japanese consultations during a crisis, and if Tokyo requests such military talks, Washington would be forced into a
difficult spot, since Beijing would undoubtedly perceive the holding of such talks as a serious provocation. The Obama administration has so far taken pains to stay
neutral in the dispute; despite its rhetoric of pivoting to the Pacific, it has urged both sides to resolve the issue peacefully. Washington also has avoided any stance
on the sovereignty of the Senkakus, supporting instead the status quo of Japanese administration of the islands. That may no longer suffice for Japan, however, since
its government saw Chinas taking to the air over the Senkakus as a significant escalation and proof that Beijing is in no mind to back down from its claims.

One

does not have to be an alarmist to see real dangers in play here . As Barbara Tuchman showed in her classic The Guns of August,
events have a way of taking on a life of their own (and one doesnt need a Schlieffen Plan to feel trapped into acting). The enmity between Japan and
China is deep and pervasive ; there is little good will to try and avert conflict . Indeed, the people of both countries
have abysmally low perceptions of the other . Since they are the two most advanced militaries in Asia, any
tension-driven military jockeying between them is inherently destabilizing to the entire region. Perhaps of even greater
concern, neither

government has shied away from its hardline tactics over the Senkakus, despite the fact that

trade between the two has dropped nearly 4 percent


return to the status quo ante, there
to back down or decide to

since the crisis began in September. Most worrying, if the two sides dont agree to

are only one or two more rungs on the ladder of military escalation before someone has

initiate hostilities when challenged. Whoever does back down will lose an enormous amount of

credibility in Asia , and the possibility of major domestic demonstrations in response. The prospect of an armed
clash between Asias two largest countries is one that should bring both sides to their senses, but instead the two
seem to be maneuvering themselves into a corner from which it will be difficult to escape . One trigger-happy or
nervous pilot,

and Asia could face its gravest crisis perhaps since World War II.

Impact Taiwan

Taiwan Independence 1NC


Chinese influence key to prevent Taiwan independence
Li 07
[He Li, Professor of Political Science at Merrimack College, Boston ENTER THE DRAGON? Chinas Presence in
Latin America, 2007, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf]
Latin America has been a major battleground of the foreign policy war between China and Taiwan over
international legitimacy, recognition, and status. Chinas quest to recover what it calls the province of Taiwan is one of the
top issues on its foreign policy agenda. Its strategy against Taiwan has been both bilateral and global. Bilaterally, China has used a mix of
economic diplomacy and military and political moves to keep Taiwan from claiming independence. Globally, Chinas strategy
has focused on developing an international united front designed to marginalize Taiwan. Fearing Taiwans push for
international recognition will lead to its declaration of independence, Beijing is determined to contain Taiwan in
every corner of the world, especially in Central America and the Caribbean, the stronghold of Taiwan .Taiwan has 23 million people and
well protected territory. Yet, of the United Nations 193 member states, only 23 recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state. Of the 23 countries that
recognize Taiwan, 12 are in Latin America and the Caribbean. Taiwan has been devoting enormous efforts to retain diplomatic recognition.
If these states were to switch recognition from Taipei to Beijing, the damage to Taiwans political condence and its claims of
legitimacy as a state would be seriously undermined. According to then-prime minister of Taiwan Yu Shyi-kun in 2002, Taiwans allies in Latin
America and the Caribbean have helped us a lot and therefore we consider this an area of maximum diplomatic importance. 2 Under such
circumstances, the strategic competition between China and Taiwan has been intensied in a region far away from Asia.
Causes war
Yardley 5 (Jim Yardley and Thom Shanker (Staff Writers Jim reported from Zhanjiang and Thom reported from
Washington.) Chinese Navy Buildup Gives Pentagon New Worries. The New York Times. April 8, 2005)
The growing friction between Japan and China, fueled by rising nationalism in both countries, is just one of the political developments adding to
tensions in East Asia. In March, China

passed a controversial new ''antisecession'' law authorizing a military attack if

top leaders in Beijing believe Taiwan moves too far toward independence -- a move that brought hundreds of
thousands of people in Taiwan out to protest China's most recent military white paper also alarmed American
policy makers because it mentioned the United States by name for the first time since 1998. It stated that the American
presence in the region ''complicated security factors.'' China , meanwhile, accused the United States and Japan of meddling in
a domestic Chinese matter when Washington and Tokyo recently issued a joint security statement that listed peace
in Taiwan as a ''common strategic objective.'' ''The potential for a miscalculation or an incident here has actually
increased, just based on the rhetoric over the past six months to a year,'' one American intelligence analyst in Washington said.
Goes global and nuclear
Hunkovic 9 (Lee J, American Military University, The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict: Possible Futures of a
Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America, http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/
Hunkovic.pdf)
A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a
third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both
Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in
the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If
China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as
well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to
contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world
that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its
eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

Taiwan Independence 2NC


Taiwan independence causes nuclear war- China would be forced to retaliate which forces U.S. intervention
and nuclear escalation thats Yardley and Hunkovic
Draws in everyone- causes extinction
Straits Times, 2000
Straits Times, 6-25-2000, No one gains in war over Taiwan, ln

a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude
would embroil other countries far and
near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases
THE high-intensity scenario postulates

that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable.Conflict on such a scale

and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore.

east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to
overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The
balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its
own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew
If China were to retaliate,

Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from
military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US
was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before

there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons.
China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems
prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding
nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for
Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered
the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen
Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation . There would be no victors in such a war. While the
prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China
puts sovereignty above everything else. Gen Ridgeway recalled that the biggest mistake the US made during the Korean War
was to assess Chinese actions according to the American way of thinking.
the latter acquired a similar capability,
The US estimates that

Ext Solves Independence


Chinese economic influence key to prevent Taiwan recognition
Ellis 11
[R. Evan, Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the
National Defense University.Chinese Soft Power in Latin America, 1st quarter 2011,
http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf]
Diplomatic Recognition of Taiwan. For the PRC, the government of Taiwan represents an important issue of
Political legitimacy and internal security . Currently, 12 of the 23 nations in the world that diplomatically
recognize the government of Taiwan are found in Latin America and the Caribbean . Although the Peoples
Republic of China does not publicly threaten to block investment in or loans to countries that do not recognize the
PRC, China repeatedly emphasizes the issue in its public diplomacy in the region, and makes such investments and
market access difficult for those countries that do not recognize it, while simultaneously nurturing expectations
regarding the opportunities that diplomatically recognizing the PRC could bring. When Costa Rica changed its
diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in May 2007, for example, it received an aid package that included
an $83 million soccer stadium, the purchase of $300 million in government bonds, various highway, public works,
and aid projects, and a $1 billion joint venture to expand the countrys petroleum refinery, as well as PRC aid in
facilitating access to Chinese markets by traditional Costa Rican products such as coffee. In part, such Chinese
generosity was directed toward the other countries in the region that still recognized Taiwan in order to demonstrate
the types of benefits that could be made available if they too were to change their diplomatic posture.
Isolation key to prevent independence
Johnson 05
[Stephen Johnson is Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign
Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Stud-ies, at The
Heritage Foundation.Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin America, 10/24/05,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/10/balancing-chinas-growing-influence-in-latin-america]
Since the 1949 civil war,

Tai-wan has been separate from the PRC, and the PRC views Taiwan as a "renegade province"
that must be reunified with the rest of China. Part of Beijing's plan to bring it back into the fold has been to iso-late
Taiwan diplomatically.

In the 1950s, most of Latin

America had diplomatic relations with Tai-wan . Then, Cuba's Fidel Castro
only 25 countries accord Taiwan
diplomatic status, and one-fourth of them are in Latin America: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicara-gua, Panama, and
regime established ties with China in 1960. In the 1970s, Chile led a major shift in favor of the PRC. Currently,

Paraguay. Taiwan pays dearly for this recognition, providing development aid and disaster assistance to these states.

Key to prevent independence


Jiang 2007
[Shixue Jiang, Deputy Director of the Institute of Latin American Studies (ILAS) of the Chinese Academy of Social
SciencesThree Factors in the Recent Development of Sino-Latin American Relations, ENTER THE DRAGON?
Chinas Presence in Latin America, 2007, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf]
Latin America is also relevant for Chinas efforts to reunite Taiwan with the motherland . To resolve the Taiwan issue is
one of the most important tasks for the Chinese people . Beijing is willing to ac hieve this reunication
peacefully , with utmost sincerity and great effort, but Taiwan independence cannot be tolerated . Currently, 23 countries have
diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and 12 of them are found in Latin America . They are Paraguay, the only country in South
America which recognizes Taiwan, six of the seven Central American countries, and ve Caribbean island nations (the Dominica n Republic, Haiti, Saint Kitts and
Nevis, St. Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines). The Peoples Republic of China has established diplomatic relations with 169 countries around the world. It is
a member of more than 130 international organizations. But the above-mentioned 12 Latin American countries keep a blind eye to this fact .
They ignore the resolutions passed by the United Nations on the Taiwan issue, belittle themselves by keeping ties with a province of a sovereign nation, and hurt the
feelings of the Chinese people.

A2: Economic Influence Not Key


Economic influence key prevents Taiwan competition
Li 07
[He Li, Professor of Political Science at Merrimack College, Boston ENTER THE DRAGON? Chinas Presence in
Latin America, 2007, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf]
In the future, Chinas

growing involvement could have serious political and military implications. At present, the most
important dimension in the relations between China and Latin America is no doubt economic . China will
continue leveraging its economic clout in the region to support its political preferences, pressing countries to fall in line
regarding its top foreign policy priority: its claims over Taiwan. Over the long run, due to Chinas growing economic might and soft
power, as well as the changing dynamics of Latin American domestic politics, it might become increasingly difcult for Taiwan to
compete with the PRC in Latin America.

A2: You Isolation Evidence is Old


Economic power is being used to isolate Taiwan
Cohen 12
[Trevor, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, and the former Latin America Editor at Fair
Observer., China Comes to Latin America, 12/5/12, http://www.fairobserver.com/360theme/china-comes-latinamerica]
China has brought cheaper imports, a more diverse clientel of trading partners and a significant amount of extra capital. However, many lament
the practices of Chinese state corporations for buying up land, paying below industry wages and deepening Latin Americas dependence on the export of natural
resources. From

a practical perspective, China seems like a great deal. Chinese lenders are much more lenient in their standards,
providing Latin American states with the immediate captial necessary to develop their infrastructure . In 2010 alone, China
granted Latin American countries $37bn in low interest loans as a form of economic assistence outnumbering contributions from the World Bank, the InterAmerican Development Bank, and the US Import-Export Bank combined. In

exchange for resource consesions from Latin America, the


Chinese have financed new highways, raillines, and irrigation systems in these countries. However, these loans are extremely concetrated in a handful of
countries and sectors. More than 90% went to Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina and Ecuador, and most were invested in improvements in mining and transportation
infrastructure. Likewise, 90% of all foreign direct investment (FDI) was directed toward the extractive industries. Essentially, China

has mastered the


use of aid and investment to facilitate resource exploitation, requiring exclusive access to certain resources in exchange for loan interest
loans. Diplomatically, China has been less concerned with undermining the influence of the United States in Latin America and more focused on
gaining recognition as the true China, in its ongoing rivalry with Taiwan. As He Li, a scholar on Sino-Latin American relations pointed
out, Beijing is determined to contain Taiwan in every corner of the world, especially in Central America and the
Caribbean, the stronghold of Taiwan. Indeed, twelve of the twenty-three countries that still recognize Taiwan as the legitimate government of
China are located in Central America and the Caribbean.

A2: Latin America Not Key


Latin America is the key battleground for diplomatic recognition
Erikson and Chen 07
[Daniel P. Erikson is Senior Associate for U.S. policy at the Inter-American Dialogue. He is coeditor of
Transforming Socialist Economies: Lessons for Cuba and Beyond. Janice Chen is a joint-degree candidate at The
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Georgetown University Law Center. She was an intern at the InterAmerican Dialogue during the summer of 2006., China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America, 2007,
http://ww.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Erikson-Chen-1%20(2).pdf]
While increasing economic and political ties between China and Latin America have attracted significant attention from
U.S. policymakers in the past few years, the extent to which Beijings foreign policy is shaped by its desire to isolate Taiwan
internationally is often overlooked. Yet, this crucial dimension of Chinese foreign policy is indispensable to a full
understanding of Chinas rising influence in the global system, and its possible repercussions for U.S. national interests. Today, in
some of the most remote corners of the world, a fierce contest for diplomatic recognition and political influence is being
fought between Taiwan and the PRC. In particular, Latin America has emerged as the crucial battleground
where a dozen struggling nations, mainly in Central America and the Caribbean, have become ensnared in the crossstrait dispute. The strategically significant swing states among them face growing pressures to abandon their
have

longstanding relationships with Taiwan in favor of cementing diplomatic ties with China. Meanwhile, officials in Washington
yet to fully consider the possible implications for U.S. policy of this intensifying competition in their own backyard.

Economic clout is the key to isolation Latin America is critical


Erikson and Chen 07
[Daniel P. Erikson is Senior Associate for U.S. policy at the Inter-American Dialogue. He is coeditor of
Transforming Socialist Economies: Lessons for Cuba and Beyond. Janice Chen is a joint-degree candidate at The
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Georgetown University Law Center. She was an intern at the InterAmerican Dialogue during the summer of 2006., China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America, 2007,
http://ww.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Erikson-Chen-1%20(2).pdf]
In addition to its campaign of military intimidation, Beijing

has pursued a sustained policy of isolating Taiwan diplomatically, most often


by promising large sums of aid to the rapidly dwindling ranks of the latters allies. Beijing rigorously promotes its
One China policy, which means that non-recognition of the Taiwanese government is a prerequisite for conducting
formal diplomatic relations with the PRCin effect forcing other governments to choose between Beijing and Taipei .
Currently there are only 25 countries in the world that officially recognize Taiwan; more than half of these are located in the Western Hemisphere.1 Although each of
the 13 Latin

American countries involved in this geopolitical chess match have little individual clout, together they make up the
most significant group of states caught in the cross-strait tug-of-war. Taiwan is recognized by all seven nations of the Central

American isthmus, a prized contiguous bloc that includes Guatemala, Belize, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama. Not coincidentally, this
group also represents the strongest bulwark of support for the United States in the Western Hemisphere. Several of these countries sent troops to Iraq as part of the
U.S.-led coalition, and they have dutifully partnered with Washington in efforts to contain regional adversaries such as Cubas Fidel Castro and Venezuelas Hugo
Chvez. In November 2006, Panama won a two-year term as the Latin American representative on the United Nations Security Council, breaking a lengthy impasse
between Chvez, who campaigned aggressively for Venezuela to assume the post, and the United States, which backed Guatemalaan ally of Taiwanfor the vacant
seat.

A2: U.S. Influence Doesnt Affect It


Perception of U.S. abandonment key allows for Chinese fill in and Taiwan isolation
Erikson and Chen 07
[Daniel P. Erikson is Senior Associate for U.S. policy at the Inter-American Dialogue. He is coeditor of
Transforming Socialist Economies: Lessons for Cuba and Beyond. Janice Chen is a joint-degree candidate at The
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Georgetown University Law Center. She was an intern at the InterAmerican Dialogue during the summer of 2006., China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America, 2007,
http://ww.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Erikson-Chen-1%20(2).pdf]
For their part,

Latin Americans are intrigued by the idea of China as a potential partner for trade and investment . As a

rising superpower without a colonial or imperialist history in the Western Hemisphere, China is in many ways more politically attractive
than either the United States or the European Union, especially for politicians confronted with constituencies that are increasingly anti-American and
skeptical of Western intentions.12 Nevertheless, most analysts recognize that Latin Americas embrace of China to the extent that this has actually
occurredis intimately linked to its perception of neglect and disinterest from the United States . Nervousness about
Chinas rise runs deeper among the smaller economies such as those of Central America, which do not enjoy Brazils or Argentinas abundance in export commodities
and are inclined to view the competition posed by the endless supply of cheap Chinese labor as a menace to their nascent manufacturing sectors. But even as China
seeks to reassure the United States that its interests in South America are purely economic, Beijing

has begun enlisting regional powers like


Mexico to aid its effort to woo Central American diplomats. Pressure is also being placed on Paraguay by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, its
partners in the South American Common Market (Mercosur), which places certain constraints on member states bilateral foreign policy prerogatives. Despite its
avowals to Washington, China

appears to be using its economic might as a means to achieve the patently political objective of
stripping Taiwan of its democratic allies in the Western Hemisphere .

A2: Side With Taiwan Inevitably


Countries will seek to maximize economic gains whoever has the most money wins
Erikson and Chen 07
[Daniel P. Erikson is Senior Associate for U.S. policy at the Inter-American Dialogue. He is coeditor of
Transforming Socialist Economies: Lessons for Cuba and Beyond. Janice Chen is a joint-degree candidate at The
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Georgetown University Law Center. She was an intern at the InterAmerican Dialogue during the summer of 2006., China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America, 2007,
http://ww.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Erikson-Chen-1%20(2).pdf]
his intensifying attention from China and Taiwan is not necessarily unwelcome for Central America and the Caribbean.
countries are struggling to achieve successful integration into the global economy, and they are only too eager
to both seek out new partners and maximize the economic gains from existing relationships. Both China and Taiwan have
T

Indeed, most of these

shown interest in funding infrastructure projects that have fallen out of favor among Western donors, and the Latin American landscape is
becoming host to an archipelago of bridges, roads, tunnels, and stadiums built as by-products of the cross-strait
competition. Moreover, diplomatic relations with one partner does not preclude sustained economic trade with the other; many nations that recognize China still do business with Taiwan,
and the reverse is also true.

A2: Your Impact Evidence is Old


Taiwan escalates and goes nuclear---no defense
William Lowther 3-16, Taipei Times, citing a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 3/16/13,
Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report,
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211
Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China and the US, a new academic
report concludes. Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict between the US and China, says the
42-page report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prepared by the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues
and resulting from a year-long study, the report emphasizes that Beijing continues to be set on a policy to prevent Taiwans
independence, while at the same time the US maintains the capability to come to Taiwans defense. Although tensions
across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008, the

situation remains
combustible , complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait military capabilities and persistent political
disagreements, the report says. In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at the US Council on Foreign Relations Richard Betts describing
Taiwan as the main potential flashpoint for the US in East Asia. The report also quotes Betts as saying that neither Beijing nor
Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a Taiwan crisis. This is a classic recipe for surprise,
miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation , Betts wrote in a separate study of his own. The CSIS study says: For the foreseeable
future Taiwan is the contingency in which nuclear weapons would most likely become a major factor , because the fate
of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and the reliability of US defense
commitments in the Asia-Pacific region. Titled Nuclear Weapons and US-China Relations, the study says disputes in the East and South
China seas appear unlikely to lead to major conflict between China and the US, but they do provide kindling for potential conflict between the
two nations because the disputes implicate a number of important regional interests, including the interests of treaty allies of the US. The danger
posed by flashpoints such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and maritime demarcation disputes is magnified by the potential for mistakes, the
study says. Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms, such as the
Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, the

bases for miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep historical reservoirs of suspicion , the
is unclear whether either side understands what kinds of actions would result in a
military or even nuclear response by the other party. To make things worse, neither side seems to believe the others
declared policies and intentions, suggesting that escalation management , already a very uncertain endeavor, could be
especially difficult in any conflict, it says. Although conflict mercifully seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that it cannot
be ruled out and may become increasingly likely if we are unwise or unlucky. The report says: With both sides possessing and looking
set to retain formidable nuclear weapons arsenals , such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly
devastating.
report says. For example, it says, it

Ext Independence =War


Taiwan independence triggers conflict and Chinese nationalism
Robert Kagan, Prepared Testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, Subject: Trade with China and Its
Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, March 23, 2000, LN.
In fact, trends which began to be visible in 1989, and which have persisted until the present, have suggested that the
present crop of Chinese leaders are more than ever inclined to resist what they regard as Western entrapment. In
response to both internal and external pressures, they have resorted to a common tactic of governments in such
perilous times. They have appealed to a fervent Chinese nationalism , based on resentment at their past century of
subjugation at the hands of the West and on a conviction that their new economic and military power entitles them
to a bigger place on the world stage. Much of the appeal to nationalism has been a necessary antidote to the
dangerous ideological vacuum created by economic reform. As domestic changes have "undermined faith in
communism," Kenneth Lieberthal points out, China's leaders have turned to nationalism "to tighten discipline and
maintain support." And there are signs that this strategy works, at least up to a point. Many ordinary Chinese seem
to have been genuinely stirred up by anti-American or anti-Japanese campaigns in the Chinese media, and especially
on specific issues like Taiwan. As Thomas Christensen reports, "continuing economic reforms and exposure of the
Chinese people to Western ideas and international news (have) cut ever more deeply into CCP legitimacy," and
there are "few issues left that do not trigger debate and exacerbate tensions between the state and society. Yet in all
sectors of politically aware Chinese society a consensus remains on the legitimacy of using force , if necessary, to
prevent Taiwan's independence ."
Taiwan independence riles the Dragon to attack, draws in the US
The New Atlantis 2004 (NQA, Summer, pg. 107 The Assassins Mace)
As China's military power grows, so, too, does the danger that Beijing will make a horrible miscalculation of
America's commitment and capability to defend its interests and the security of East Asia. The Pentagon analysis
describes an increased level of discussion in China's military and political ranks about the "strategic window of
opportunity" opened in East Asia with the U.S. military's commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and, for the foreseeable
future, with the war on terrorism. And this past May, Beijing delivered one of its most explicit threats so far to
Taipei's pro-independence leaders: Either abandon your "dangerous lurch toward independence " and submit to
Chinese sovereignty, or the "Chinese people will crush (your) schemes firmly and thoroughly at any cost." Clearly,
the Chinese dragon is crouching in "strategic ambiguity" no longer. With China's rise as a military power looming
over the Asian-Pacific, and Beijing stifling the voices of dissent everywhere under its immediate control, the
window of opportunity for democracy in East Asia is shrinking fast. To date, Taiwan's commitment to its own
defense has been inadequate and unfocused, in part because of its fear of Chinese retribution, but also because of its
strategic reliance on the U.S. to repel any Chinese aggression. Ultimately, however, if Taiwan is to become and
remain a fully sovereign democracy, it will have to acquire the means to defend itself. The United States has been
reluctant to impress that point upon Taipei, and only modest in its efforts to arm Taiwan, out of concern for
upsetting the already fragile military balance in the region. But the time has come for a serious consideration of the
consequences and potential perils of American "strategic ambiguity" in the Taiwan Strait.

A2: Taiwan wont risk it


Taiwan is willing to risk Chinese assault declaring independence causes massive air strikes
Yang 2004 [Andrew Nien-Dzu, teacher at the National Sun Yat-sen University, Peace and Security Across the
Taiwan Strait, The Alternatives to Peace: War Scenarios, Palgrave Macmillian Publishing, New York, 2004, pg.
169-170]
In the PRC's calculation , a war against Taiwan independence will require massive air strikes, special forces
operations, and a naval blockade that will enable it to impose its will in an extremely short timeframe and with
minimal losses. The PRC has learned lessons of the recent US campaigns in Kuwait, Bosnia, Kosovo, and
Afghanistan. Its planners believe that it could rely on advanced technology, the deployment of small numbers of special operations troops
supported by amphibious landing forces, and an effective blockade to achieve a satisfactory outcome. Whereas on the Taiwan side, it
knows that the PRC's attack will open with devastating air attacks, but they are confident that they can survive such
attacks and that the PRC will as a result hesitate to launch a high-intensity conflict on the ground. From the
Taiwanese point of view, without air superiority and effective control of the sea, the PLA cannot launch amphibious
landing operations and sustain a ground war on the island of Taiwan. Therefore, the Taiwanese view is that if they
can survive the initial attack, the advantage will shift to them.

A2: Deterrence
This will escalate- Deterrence fails

Monken

2003

Virginia
, IDA Analyst, August
, Chinas New Leadership and a Taiwan Confrontation: Implications for Deterrence, Institute for Defense Analysis,
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA418474&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

Chinas national security strategy has a notably internal focus

In contrast to the security strategies of comparable powers,


, and its emphasis on protecting
the socialist system is a conspicuous one. The strategy does not promote a Chinese vision for world development, or look to wield great external, global influence. Chinas objectives are
reactive in nature. They focus on resisting aggression, stopping separatist movements, averting the subversion of the governing political system and leadership, and opposing expansion.11 This is

these are arguably the objectives of a weak, unstable regime

not the defense doctrine of a rising, strong, stable, nationally unified state. Instead,
that is
focused on its own permanence, and worried about its ability to sustain itself. The PRC actions at the negotiating table reflect this concern as well. China is far more flexible on issues such as

issues that threaten internal governance


comprise the PRC national defense policys chief objectives.12 Coincidentally, it is on such matters that Chinas leadership has proven virtually
weapons proliferation and nuclear testing than it is on issues such as Taiwan or human rights. This indicates that those

immovable. Tiananmen Square provides a particularly poignant example of the premium that the PRC places on the Partys survivability because it demonstrated that the CCP will even use force
against its own people if it perceives a threat to its power.13 In fact, throughout the PRCs history, the Party has deployed military force more often against domestic opposition than against

This
pattern carries potentially dangerous ramifications for a Taiwan crisis scenario for two primary reasons. First, the outcome of a Taiwan confrontation
could destabilize Chinas economic, social, and political landscape, and the fallout could feasibly threaten CCP
regime security. In a country that boasts a history of popular uprising and sudden revolution spurred by domestic instability, a Taiwanese bid for independence and subsequent conflict
could provoke dramatic upheaval.15 Second, Taiwan threatens CCP regime survival because it embodies those principles the Communist Party has used to
establish its legitimacy and accrue political capital: nationalism and unity. In the wake of Tiananmen Square and amidst the push for market reform, the CCP lost its ideological
external aggression.14 This record indicates the CCPs risk perception can, and does, drive PRC policy, and will surely play a significant role in any PRC deterrence equation.

footing, and has since embraced nationalist and unifying rhetoric in order to drive Chinas modernization efforts. The Partys socialist mantra of the past no longer applies to the current reality. It

Taiwan
has become such a principal symbol of Chinese nationalism and pride that its loss would essentially constitute
national humiliation. As a result, any of the nations leaders responsible for Taiwans loss are likely to be cast as lishi zuiren, or the people condemned by history16 not a legacy
the CCP is anxious to secure. This daunting prospect leaves the leadership little room to maneuver . Through its nationalist rhetoric and
underpinnings, the Party may have inextricably linked its fate with that of Taiwan. This concept is developed fully later in this paper. In sum, the Taiwan question is closely
associated with Chinas most fundamental national objectives, and has the potential to shake the foundation of the
Communist regime. This indicates that deterring China will indeed be difficult, and flat out impossible in certain cases. In
now looks to nationalism to confer legitimacy on Party doctrine and bolster support for the political leadership. This draws the CCPs ability to handle a Taiwan crisis into question.

fact, Chinas Defense White Paper states that China will use force against Taiwan under any of three conditions: formal declaration of independence by Taipei; acquisition of nuclear weapons by
Taiwan; or a failure to return to the negotiating table sooner or later. There seems little question but that Beijing would not be deterred from the use of force in the first two circumstances. In the
third, deterrence could well be expected to play a role in determining if, when, and how China would use force to bring Taipei back to the negotiating table. The focus of this paper is not a
discussion on deterring China from initiating military confrontation under any of these scenarios; rather, it is on the role of deterrence once a conflict has begun, for whatever reason.

A2: Interdependence Checks

Interdependence doesnt check


Monken, 2003
Virginia Monken, IDA Analyst, August 2003, Chinas New Leadership and a Taiwan Confrontation: Implications for Deterrence, Institute for Defense Analysis, http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA418474&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

the PRC leadership feels that the survival of the CCP regime in fact would
hang in the balance of a Taiwan confrontation. The CCP has come to rely heavily on the Chinese peoples
nationalist sensibilities to promote its own agenda and mask its ideological contradictions as it tries to reconcile an obsolete Communist doctrine and corresponding political
system with its desire to develop a market economy. Consequently, Taiwan, which has come to represent the most fundamental of Chinas national
interests (territorial integrity, state sovereignty, future economic development and prosperity, and reunification of the motherland), is emblematic of the very principles for which the
Communist Party purportedly stands. Therefore, should the CCP lose Taiwan, it would essentially delegitimize its self-proclaimed role
as the PRCs guarantor of national pride and prosperity. The public, already skeptical of the CCP and its motives, is not likely to
tolerate such failure. S- 2 The rise of the new CCP leadership also has brought potential fragmentation and power struggle to the political establishment. Outgoing CCP Chairman
With these primary drivers in mind, the analysis concludes that

and PRC President Jiang Zemin retained his chairmanship of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and essentially created multiple power centers within the PRC leadership. Although Hu
Jintao is the constitutionally recognized head of the Party and the state, Jiang Zemin controls the military and, in the PRC political tradition, he who holds the gun holds the power. Consequently,
should a Taiwan crisis arise in the absence of a clearly delineated chain of command or formally recognized principal decision-making authority, the leadership will most likely take a harder-line

the decision to escalate will not be the preferred choice. The Fourth
leadership largely comprises a group of young, pragmatic, educated technocrats focused on Chinas domestic economic development. Their top priority is facilitating
the PRCs modernization and economic growth to secure long-term domestic stability and to demonstrate the Communist Partys ability to provide for the Chinese people a critical
undertaking if the CCP is going to perpetuate its power. Thus, a Taiwan confrontation , which would undermine the PRCs foreign trade, investment, and stature, would
debilitate the CCPs development plan. Furthermore, as the government tries to implement the reform needed to facilitate this same economic growth strategy, it faces fallout in the
approach to any Taiwan confrontation in the hopes of preserving internal unity. Nevertheless,
Generation

political, social, and economic arenas. On the political front, the CCP is struggling to respond to calls for greater openness, transparency, and reform to match those changes being made in the
economic arena. Similarly, the transition from a Communist, largely state-supported industrial complex to a market-oriented economy has wreaked havoc on the PRCs socio-economic stability.

, the CCP leadership finds itself in a precarious position: respond to Chinas fervent nationalism and win reunification no
to potentially secure the Partys survival, or compromise for fear of an economic fallout that could prove equally
detrimental to the regimes longevity. U.S. defense strategists can consequently anticipate the following: the PRC will avoid initial
confrontation at all costs but, should conflict arise, the CCP leadership will pose a significant deterrence problem
its very survival is at stake in such a scenario and the loss of Taiwan would likewise signify the loss of the regimes grip on power.
Thus

matter the cost so as

A2: No Nationalism/China Will Be Nice


Taiwan crisis makes escalation inevitable
Shlapak, 2009
David A. Shlapak, Senior International Policy Analyst @ RAND, et al, 2009, A Question of Balance, RAND, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG888.pdf

the
tense stability that characterized the cross-strait confrontation prior to the mid-1990s is suffering from gradual
erosion. The debate concerning sovereignty over Taiwan has evolved dramatically. Today, this dispute pits a Beijing government that insists there is only
one China of which Taiwan is a part against a Taiwan that still retains many formal trappings of being a Chinese state but increas- ingly develops an
independent national identity. Notwithstanding the collapse of voter support for the DPP, nearly all significant political parties in Taiwan now accept the notion that any future
arrangement with China must receive the separate approval of Taiwans 23 million voters. For Beijing, the emerging Taiwanese national identity raises
the profoundly worrisome prospect that if unification is delayed for too long, the Taiwanese people will be unwilling
to accept any arrangement that subsumes them within a Chinese state or confederation. Gradual changes along these lines seem unlikely to provide the spark for conflict, but
they could provide a backdrop for crisis if Beijing concludes that long-term trends are turning powerfully against
them. The rapidly growing cross-strait economic relationship means that Beijing can now inflict significant pain on Taiwan if it so chooses. But, to date, Beijing has had difficulty translating
this economic leverage into meaningful political results, other than as a device for signaling its irritation with Taipei. If Beijing loses hope that economic and social maneuvers can
slow or reverse forces on Taiwan that run athwart of at least eventual reunificaton, the attractiveness, in a crisis, of military options is likely to
increase. In Taiwan, meanwhile, advocates of greater independence fear that growing economic ties will mean time is not on their
side, and they may feel the need to push more provocative measures when political circumstances give them the chance. Beijings anger at what it saw
The factors described in this chapter present something of a mixed bag, and their collective impact, in terms of the future stability of the crossstrait relationship, is somewhat unpredictable. But we believe that, in general,

as Chen Shui-bians provocative behavior encouraged a dangerous shift in the PRCs red lines for threatening force against Taiwan. Beijing sees Chen and his allies as pathological envelopepushers constantly looking for ways to promote the islands independence, and the perceived need to keep Chen boxed in caused China to shift away from the four clear, relatively easytofollow red lines that it warned Taiwan not to cross in the past. Instead, China has gravitated toward more vague, ambiguous red areas and it is more likely to define (or redefine) these

ambiguity and improvisation could become dangerous sources of misperception


during a crisis. The combination of more than a decade of PRC military modernization and flat Taiwanese defense spending have transformed the balance
across the strait away from one that had long favored Taiwan. In the heat of any future cross-strait crisis, this shift in the perceived balance of forces seems to remove an
important impediment to Chinese use of force.
situationally and reactively during periods of crisis. This

Nationalism will force Chinese aggression over Taiwan


James Manicom, Ph.D Research Fellow in the Asian Institute at the University of Toronto, February 2007, Near-term Instability in the Taiwan Strait? Security Challenges,
Volume 3 Number 1, http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePDFs/vol3no1Manicom.pdf

growing nationalist pressures in Chinese government and society could pressure governing elites into a
demonstration of force in the Taiwan Strait in the near future. In doing so, it challenges the two prevailing orthodox assessments of crossThis article illustrates how

Strait security. The first views the cross-Strait relationship as tense but stable, the second views war between the US and China in the Strait as inevitable in the long term. In contrast, this

a military crisis is possible in the short term as a result of internal domestic pressures on the
leadership. In a crisis over Taiwan, Chinese leadership elites will be under pressure from three domestic sources
that could inhibit their ability to pursue a conciliatory solution. These three sources are: hardline elements of the
PLA, remaining Third Generation elites, and nationalist segments of the population. It concludes with an examination
article contends that

of the policy implications for all actors in the Strait. In short, it is imperative that the Fourth Generations Taiwan policy appears to be making progress towards reunification.

Impact A2: China Bad/Random

Turns Case
Turns the case- Chinese cooperation key to extract concessions from the U.S. and ensures aid they want
Johnson 05
[Stephen Johnson is Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign
Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Stud-ies, at The
Heritage Foundation.Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin America, 10/24/05,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/10/balancing-chinas-growing-influence-in-latin-america]
From Latin America's perspective, expanding

relations with China might seem like a good idea. It offers the following advantages: Prestige.
Dealing with China, a major world power, elevates a small country into the big leagues of global actors. It supplies respect for those
living in the shadow of the prosperous U.S. colossus. The novelty of frequent high-level Chi-nese visits suggests that American leaders, who visit less often, have
ignored the region. Deals with few requirements. China

can bar-gain on the spot without a lot of caveats. Its transactions are

based on simple exchanges. Their leaders have broad authority to negotiate foreign deals without worrying about
legislative oversight, the rule of law, or altruistic objec-tives. Unlike Western leaders, Chinese leaders represent state
monopolies-which mesh well with Latin American government ownership or management of telecommunications, mining, and energy
industries. They do not need to build up Latin American trade capacity to deal with diverse businesses. Leverage against Uncle Sam.
China's expand-ing industries are a temporary boon to resource-rich Latin America. Exports (mostly commodities) to China
have grown by more than 600 percent in five years.[7] Compared with U.S.-Latin America trade ($410 billion in 2004), China's $40 billion trade with
the region might seem inconsequential.[8] However, Chi-nese trade and investment gives Latin politi-cians and business elites , who
largely control commodities, a bargaining chip when dealing with the United States.

A2: China Kills Heg


Chinese influence in Latin America doesnt hurt hegemony
Jiang 2007
[Shixue Jiang, Deputy Director of the Institute of Latin American Studies (ILAS) of the Chinese Academy of Social
SciencesThree Factors in the Recent Development of Sino-Latin American Relations, ENTER THE DRAGON?
Chinas Presence in Latin America, 2007, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf]
The news media in the United States have been portraying a wrong perception of the development of Chinese
relations with Latin America. One editorial in the Wall Street Journal, for instance, says, The rise of China in the
region could complicate U.S. efforts to control illegal immigration, weapons shipments, the drug trade and money
laundering because China is cooperating with Latin countries that are not especially friendly toward those efforts.
Some of these nations may try to use the Chinese alternative to challenge U.S. hegemony.5 The United States
concern over the closer relationship between China and Latin America is misplaced and unnecessary . It is wellknown that Latin America has been on the path of reform and opening to the outside world for almost two
decades. It endeavors to attract more foreign investment and liberalize the market so as to stimulate growth. As a
result, China is only one of the economic partners with whom Latin America has been trying to cooperate. China
understands well that Latin America is the backyard of the United States, so China has no intention whatsoever to
challenge the American hegemony in Latin America. Both China and Latin America have been opening to the
outside world. In the age of globalization both of them should cooperate to push forward South-South
cooperation . As a matter of fact, further cooperation between China and Latin America will benet regional
peace and development in the Asia-Paci c region and in Latin America. Such an outcome would also certainly
favor the United States.

Lots of factors prevent great power conflict without hegemony


Fettweis 10 (Christopher J. Professor of Political Science at Tulane, Dangerous Times-The International Politics of
Great Power Peace, pg. 175-6)
If the only thing standing between the world and chaos is the US military presence, then an adjustment in grand strategy would be exceptionally

of the other explanations for the decline of war nuclear


complex economic interdependence , international and domestic political

counter-productive. But it is worth recalling that none

weapons,

institutions , evolution in ideas and norms necessitate an activist America to maintain their
validity. Were American to become more restrained, nuclear weapons would still affect the
calculations of the would be aggressor; the process of globalization would continue, deepening the
complexity of economic interdependence; the United Nations could still deploy peacekeepers where necessary; and
democracy would not shrivel where it currently exists. More importantly, the idea that war is a
worthwhile way to resolve conflict would have no reason to return. As was argued in chapter 2, normative
evolution is typically unidirectional. Strategic restraint in such a world be virtually risk free.

A2: China Kills Local Economies/Stability


Chinese influence key to Latin Americas economy
ONeil 12
[Shannon, Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies, Chinas Economic Role in Latin America,10/26/12,
http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2012/10/26/chinas-economic-role-in-latin-america/]
On the good side, trade

with China has helped spur Latin Americas economic growth . Increased ties with China have
played a big part of the strong (by Latin American standards) GDP growth of last decade. Especially for Brazil, Argentina, and Peru,
connections to the worlds economic engine were important in wake of the world financial crisis. Comparing Brazils and
Mexicos growth rates in 2010 tells that storyand the positive role that China can and does play. Chinas trade has also benefited Latin Americas
consumers. The big story of the last two decades is the rise of a middle class in many Latin American countries. Achieving a middle class lifestyle
relies in part on higher incomes, but also on greater purchasing power. Access to more goods of better quality and at
lower prices, has changed the lives of many. Chinas sales of clothing, electronics, and even cars have benefited those in the middle and
lower middle ranks.
Instability is inevitable
Blanco, 09 (Long Live Democracy: The Determinants of Political Instability in Latin America,
https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http://www.ou.edu/cas/econ/wppdf/instabilityinla%2520rg.pdf&embedded=true
&chrome=true)
Ranked as the third most unstable region in the world in the post-war era, political instability has been a
pervasive problem in Latin America. 1 In our sample of 18 Latin American countries from 1971-2000, there were 20
coups detat, 451 political assassinations, 217 riots, and 113 crises that threatened to bring down the sitting
government. 2 Only three Latin American countries were consistently democratic over the thirty year period:

Costa Rica, Colombia, and Venezuela. 3 All of the rest of the countries switched from a democracy to an
autocracy (or vice versa) at least once. In sum, political instability is a persistent and pernicious problem in the
region. 4 Given the many studies that document the negative relationship between instability and capital
accumulation (Alesina & Perotti (1996); Alesina et.al. (1996)), it is likely that this instability has hampered
economic development in the region. In this paper, we seek to uncover the factors behind this instability. In a
In this paper we analyze the determinants of political instability in a panel of 18 Latin American countries
from 1971 to 2000. Not only is Latin America an interesting region to study because of its unusually
persistent problems with instability, but focusing on a small sample helps us to avoid potential problems with
pooling data from a large set of very different countries. 5 We find three main interesting results: First, regime
type is a significant determinant of instability in the area. Countries with higher democracy scores also have lower
average political instability, which indicates that recent moves to increased democracy in the region may bring

about less instability in the future. This result is tempered though by our finding that long lived democracies
have a greater chance of experiencing instability than equally long lived autocracies. Second, we find that
income inequality and ethnic fractionalization are both important factors behind instability. Countries with low (or
high) levels of inequality have less average instability than countries with average levels of inequality, and ethnic
fractionalization has a non linear effect on political instability. Increases in ethnic fractionalization lower instability
until a certain level of diversity, at which point any increases in diversity are associated with higher political
instability. Third, we find that many of the macroeconomic variables included in our estimation (including the

level and standard deviation of inflation and government budget deficit) are only weakly significant at best.
Only lagged values of trade openness and investment are helpful in explaining current political instability.
Drug war fuels instability in Latin America
CSIS, APR 27, 2010 (Katherine Hubbard, Areas to Watch: The Drug War in Central
America, http://csis.org/blog/areas-watch-drug-war-central-america, CW, accessed on 10/16/10)
Central American states are finding themselves increasingly caught in the crossfire as Mexico, Colombia, and the
U.S. step up efforts to combat drug-trafficking cartels. Crackdowns on airborne and maritime shipments from South
America are forcing Mexican drug traffickers to switch to land-based smuggling through Central America. As the
smugglers increase their presence, they are bringing violence, corruption, and political instability to states that are
already weak, poor, and unprepared to deal with the looming threat.

Evidence shows that the level of drug traffic passing through Central America has skyrocketed in the past two years
alone. According to a report from the U.S. National Drug Intelligence Center, less than one percent of the estimated
600 to 700 tons of cocaine that departed South America for the U.S. in 2007 transited Central
America. Todayofficials estimate that between sixty and ninety percent of the cocaine that enters the U.S. travels
through Central America.
This astounding increase in land-based trafficking is the result of concerted efforts by the American, Mexican, and
Colombian governments to increase monitoring and interdiction of large ships and aircraft, the vehicles traditionally
used for smuggling drugs. As a result of these efforts, officials estimate that the aerial trafficking of cocaine has
decreased by as much as ninety percent, and maritime trafficking has decreased by an estimated sixty percent.
Because of this challenge to traditional trafficking mechanisms, smugglers were forced to find other means of
transporting their drug shipments. According to a STRATFOR report*, by early 2008 a series of developments in
several Central American countries suggested that drug-trafficking organizations Mexican cartels in particular
were increasingly establishing new land-based smuggling routes through Central America.
The effects of this increase in drug-smuggling activity are already beginning to be felt in some Central American
countries. Drug violence is on the rise in Honduras, a key transit point for Colombian cocaine headed for the United
States, where approximately 1,600 people were killed in 2009 in drug-related incidents.
Another area of particular concern is Guatemala, which the U.S. State Department calls the epicenter of the drug
threat. In Guatemala, corruption and inadequate law enforcement efforts have led to low interdiction levels during
the past several years. Mexican drug trafficking organizations have taken advantage of this situation and moved
some of their operations into Guatemala. Entire regions of the country are now essentially under the control of these
organizations, the most visible of which is the Mexican group known as the Zetas.
There is reason for concern that the region will increasingly become a battleground in the Mexican cartel war
because the conditions in many Central American countries make them particularly vulnerable to attack. They are
underdeveloped, have weak judicial systems, and have often recently emerged from conflicts that left them awash
with weapons. One UN official said, All of these are conditions for violence and chaos, and in some instances even
loss of control of territory, and so traffickers are aware of that and they always look for the path of least resistance.

Affirmative

Uniqueness Answers

China Influence Low Generic


Chinese soft power is low
Shambaugh 13
[David Shambaugh, a professor of political science and international affairs at the George Washington University
and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, Falling Out of Love With China, 3/18/13,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/19/opinion/falling-out-of-love-with-china.html]
NOW that China

is becoming a world power, it is beginning to recognize the importance of its global image and the need to enhance its soft power. It is
tracking public opinion polls worldwide and investing huge amounts into expanding its global cultural footprint, external
propaganda work and public diplomacy. Unfortunately for China, thats not enough . While pockets of positive views
regarding China can be found around the world, public opinion surveys from the Pew Research Centers Global Attitudes Project and the BBC reveal
that Chinas image ranges between mixed and poor . And the negative view is expanding: for almost a decade, European
public opinion toward China has been the most negative in the world, but that is now matched in America and Asia. There are likewise increasing signs of strain with
Russia: on the surface, there is considerable harmony of worldviews and interests, but underneath lie lingering historical suspicions, growing trade frictions, problems
stemming from Russias military sales to China, immigration controversies and nascent strategic competition in Central Asia. Chinas reputation has also deteriorated
in the Middle East and among the Arab League due to the countrys support for the Syrian and Iranian regimes as well as its persecution of Muslim minorities in far
western China, a policy that has also sullied its image in Central Asia. Even in Africa where relations remain positive on the whole Chinas

image has
deteriorated over the past three years as a result of the flood of Chinese entrepreneurs, its rapacious extraction of oil
and other raw materials, aid projects that seem to benefit Chinese construction companies as much as recipient
countries and support for unsavory governments. A similar downturn is apparent in Latin America for the same
reasons.

China Influence Low U.S. Trade


Chinese trade is nothing compared to the U.S. and not in the topic countries
ONeil 12
[Shannon, Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies, Chinas Economic Role in Latin America,10/26/12,
http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2012/10/26/chinas-economic-role-in-latin-america/]
There is much talk of Chinas escalating economic influence in Latin America . But its worth looking at what has (and
hasnt) actually happened in the three main ways that China interacts with the regions economies: trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and loans
(from state-owned banks). Trade is the most visible and important connection. Over the last several years, goods flowing back and forth have
increased some 30 percent per year, bringing todays total to roughly US$250 billion. This trade leans in Chinas favor, with a deficit (nearly all
with Mexico) of nearly US$100 billion. While sizable numbers, this is still just a quarter of Latin Americas trade with the United
States . And it appears to be leveling off, suggesting that China wont overtake the United States as the regions
primary trading partner anytime soon. This trade is also quite concentrated. Exports to China come primarily from Brazil,
Chile, Peru, and Argentina, and are mainly raw materials (copper, iron ore, lead, tin, soya, and sugar). Of the goods China sends east nearly half go to
Mexicoa mix of consumer goods and capital goods (equipment for production). Trade with China has expanded dramatically over the past decade. But it is worth
remembering that it both started from a low base and is unevenly distributedaffecting a few countries significantly and others very little. Chinese foreign direct
investment has been the focus of numerous high-level state visits and has been much touted in the press. Money

flowing from China to Latin


America has increasedtotaling some $10 billion in 2010. Still, this continues to be less than the US$25 billion coming from the
United States or the US$60 billion from European countries, and is roughly equal to US$10 billion heading from Latin American
countries into their neighbors. The vast majority of Chinese funds head to the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands
suggesting tax considerations instead of productive investments . The money that is invested remains heavily
concentrated on raw materials and energymostly in Brazil, and some in Peru. Though promises continue, so far Chinese FDI has yet
to make a serious regional mark . Finally loans are a means of engaging Latin American nations. These have increased to countries such as
Venezuela, Brazil, and Ecuador, nearly all in exchange for oil. These tens of billions of dollars comprise a decent portion of Chinas development loans abroad, and
outpace Latin American resources from the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and the United States Export-Import Bank. Still, since

most
countries have easy access to world financial markets, most financing comes through non-governmental sources.
Overall economic ties are indeed increasing. But these trade, FDI, and loan numbers suggest the rise is slower than either the
cheerleaders or naysayers might suggest . The next question is whether these links are good or bad for the region.

China Influence Low L.A. Distancing


Latin America is distancing from China
Ferchen 12
[Matt, China Brief, China-Latin American Relations: The End of the Honeymoon?, 1/16/12,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/01/16/china-latin-american-relations/925n]
But at the same time, anxieties

about expanding economic ties with China are rising in some countries and economic sectors in Latin
Even in countries that have benefited the most from expanding commodity ties to China, through a combination of exports to
China and an inflow of Chinese investment, there are worries. Such anxieties are often based on historical patterns of export dependency
and the trauma of commodity boom-and-bust cycles that have afflicted the region for well over a century. Countries like Brazil that have fought
America.

to move away from commodity-based export growth worry about de-industrialization and over-reliance on demand from a single market like China. Moreover,

rising Chinese foreign investment in the regions mineral and agricultural resources have raised concerns about Dutch disease and
its negative impact on Latin American manufacturing exports. (Dutch disease refers to the tendency for a commodity boom to result in
currency inflation, which subsequently makes non-commodity exports less competitive). The surge in investment from China has also brought to
the fore local sensitivities about foreign ownership of agricultural land. After a nearly decade-long period of increasingly close economic ties
between China and Latin America, the relationship now stands at a turning point. The honeymoon period based on the initial Latin American euphoria over
expanded trade and investment with China is giving way to anxieties. Even the relatively small number of South American countries that have benefited the
most from commodities ties with China have long expressed a desire to move beyond a narrow Chinese focus on natural resource trade and investment. Initial
hopes for a broadening of the relationship , including increased exports of Latin American manufactured goods to the huge Chinese market, have
largely been disappointed.

Link Answers

No Link Competition
Chinas competing with Latin America now
Montufar-Helu 12
[Alfredo Montufar-Helu is a guest blogger to AQ Online. His expertise is in the analysis of global affairs including
political risk, emerging markets, international security, energy security, and Latin American geopolitics as well as
Mexico and China., Mexico: Latin Americas rising star
DECEMBER 11, 2012, http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/mexico-latin-america%E2%80%99s-rising-star]
The honeymoon between China and Latin America seems to have ended. Though Chinas money is still tempting, especially
when facing low GDP growth, Latin American governments have (or need to) come to the realization that there is no such thing
as an East-South fraternity. The Chinese government has its own particular interests and its actions are geared to fulfill them. As
Carnegie Endowments Wei Hongxia explained in a recent panel, Chinas agenda with Latin America, more than anything, responds to its
domestic dynamics. This is precisely why Mexico is in a comparatively better position than Brazil, and why it has the potential to
become Latin Americas largest economy. For one, Mexico was probably the one Latin American country for whom the expansion of
Chinas presence in the hemisphere was not a honeymoon, but a nightmare marked by bitter competition . After
gaining admittance to the WTO in 2001, China quickly overtook Mexico as the U.S.s second-largest trading partner. According to a Barclays report, Mexican
manufacturers experienced their largest contraction of the pre-Lehman crisis period. To get a better sense of these numbers, consider that from January to October
2012, about 78 percent of Mexicos total non-oil exports were sent to the United States. In 2004, it amounted to 89 percent of such exports. Now, Gallagher and
Porzecanski find that, from 2000 to 2006, over 80 percent of Mexican non-oil exports to the U.S. faced a direct or partial threat from Chinese competition. Mexico lost
market share in 11 of its top-20 exports to the U.S. and only gained in two products. Meanwhile, China gained market share in 18 of the 20 sectors most important for
Mexicos export industry. Mexico also started experiencing a drop in its oil production in 2005, which, fortunately, was offset by an increase in international oil
prices. But it was still clear that something needed to be done. The

only way to compete with China was to become more productive


and innovative. As the U.S. and Mexican economies have started recovering, it has become clear that Mexican manufacturers have
started regaining their position within the American market . Exports have been going up, contributing to a 3.8
percent GDP growth, higher than other developing countries and the United States . According to the Barclays report, Mexicos
productivity grew 12.8 percent from 2009 to 2012, due in part to higher capital per worker. In other words, Mexican manufacturers have become
more competitive. Meanwhile, the World Economic Forum (WEF) raised Mexico 13 positions in its competitiveness rankings from 2010 to 2012.

No Link Thumper
U.S. shifting emphasis to economics now triggers the link
Shear and Archibold 13
[Michael and Randal, New York Times, In Latin America, U.S. Focus Shifts From Drug War to Economy, 5/4/13,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/world/americas/in-latin-america-us-shifts-focus-from-drug-war-toeconomy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0]
Last week, Mr. Obama

returned to capitals in Latin America with a vastly different message. Relationships with countries racked by drug
focus more on economic development and less on the endless battles against drug traffickers and
organized crime capos that have left few clear victors. The countries, Mexico in particular, need to set their own course on security, with the
violence and organized crime should

United States playing more of a backing role. That approach runs the risk of being seen as kowtowing to governments more concerned about their public image than
the underlying problems tarnishing it. Mexico, which

is eager to play up its economic growth, has mounted an aggressive effort


to play down its crime problems, going as far as to encourage the news media to avoid certain slang words in reports. The problem will not just go
away, said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue. It needs to be tackled head-on, with a comprehensive strategy that includes but goes beyond
stimulating economic growth and alleviating poverty. Obama becomes vulnerable to the charge of downplaying the regions overriding issue, and the chief obstacle
to economic progress, he added. It is fine to

and fits with the new story line.

change the narrative from security to economics as long as the reality on the ground reflects

No Link Not Zero Sum


Not Zero-Sum mutual benefits
Xiaoxia 13
[Wang, Economic Observer/Worldcrunch, 5/6/13, IN AMERICA'S BACKYARD: CHINA'S RISING INFLUENCE
IN LATIN AMERICA, http://www.worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-risinginfluence-in-latin-america/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/]
China's involvement in the Latin American continent doesnt constitute a threat to the United States , but brings
benefits. It is precisely because China has reached "loans-for-oil" swap agreements with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador
and other countries that it brings much-needed funds to these oil-producing countries in South America. Not only
have these funds been used in the field of oil production, but they have also safeguarded the energy supply of the
United States, as well as stabilized these countries' livelihood -- and to a certain extent reduced the impact of illegal
immigration and the drug trade on the U.S. For South America, China and the United States, th is is not a zero-sum
game , but a multiple choice of mutual benefits and synergies. Even if China has become the Latin American
economys new upstart, it is still not in a position to challenge the strong and diverse influence that the United
States has accumulated over two centuries in the region.

Impact Answers

China Influence Bad Heg


Chinese influence in Latin America is a litmus test for power globally undermines Hegemony
Cerna 11
[Michael, China Research Center, China's Growing Presence in Latin America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese
Presence in the Region, 4/15/11, http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implicationsfor-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/]
With both the U.S. and China making gains in the region in different sectors, there is seemingly room for each side to grow; which implies that, in fact, trade with
Latin America is not a zero-sum game.

China presents an alternative to the United States , but that is not necessarily a bad thing. The U.S.

is much more diversified than China at the moment and therefore does not need to enter into direct competition. However, as China responds to calls from Brazil and
diversifies its investments, there

is increasing worry that China is going to outmatch U.S. trade in the region. These fears may be
economically based, but there are potentially harmful political consequences primarily, providing Latin America with a
quasi-world power as an alternative to the U.S. Since the Monroe Doctrine, Latin America has been considered a secure sphere of influence
for the U.S. The fact that China presents a less democratic alternative to U.S. influence presents a major problem .
The third BRICS summit in April provided more insight into the potential consequences of Chinas growing place in Latin America via its relations with Brazil. One
proposal to emerge from the summit of the five nations (Brazil, India, China, Russia and South Africa) was a broad-based international reserve currency system
providing stability and certainty. The idea was to set up a new exchange rate mechanism that would bypass the U.S. dollar as the reserve currency of the world. In
addition, banks of the five BRICS nations agreed to establish mutual credit lines in their local currencies, not in U.S. currency. While the chances of such a proposal
gaining support are debatable, it

sets a clear example of a possible shift in power away from the U.S . and toward a more

global organization, one that is arguably anchored by China. If China becomes a preferred partner in Latin America, it
will show that U.S. dominance around the globe also is at risk . So what does Chinas growing place in the region mean for the
intensifying relations with Latin
America offer a clear sign of the end of U.S. dominance in the region, and in a greater sense, the entire world .
future? Depending on whom this question is posed to, there are two probable answers. The first is that Chinas

There is enough evidence to show that the tides have changed in favor of China.

The other answer is that it means nothing.

The U.S. is obviously still the more dominant power in the region, and Chinese presence will eventually subside, again leaving the United States as the regions
premier partner. The real answer probably falls somewhere in the middle. Is China the preferred partner for Latin America? At this point, the definitive answer is no.
However, the

United States should not take its place in the region for granted . There is clear evidence of an
increasingly symbiotic relationship with China throughout Latin America . While the U.S. is the most dominant trade partner
to the region as a whole, it is losing ground in key countries, namely Brazil, which is blossoming on the world stage and is emerging as the clear leader
in the region. Increasing trade and investment can be beneficial for all, but the power that China can derive from its growing economic
influence could bring increased political and ideological influence that the U.S. might find unnerving. China
already has replaced the U.S. as the largest trading partner for Brazil and Chile, and is on pace to do the same in Peru and Venezuela. At the very least, this should
cause the U.S. to pay more attention to its southern neighbors and take steps to make sure that China only
benefits economically and not politically at the expense of the U.S. The world will be watching . As it stands, the Chinese
are not broadening their relations with the region in a way that directly competes with the United States. China is strictly concerned with commodities, including oil.
U.S. President Barack Obama recently signed an agreement with Brazils Petrobras that will allow the oil company to drill in the Gulf of Mexico. This

symbolic
move could cause tensions to increase as the worlds two largest oil consumers battle over rights to Brazilian oil. In that regard,
the competition may go beyond a race to Latin commodities and move into the realm of fighting for political
influence . It is odd to think that the United States would need to compete for hemispheric dominance with a country on the other side of the globe, but
Chinas actions and increasing integration into the region tell us that such a scenario may one day arise. Given the
proximity and importance of Latin America to the United States, this region could be the symbolic battle that best
measures the continued hegemony of the U.S. versus China.
US primacy prevents global conflict withdrawl causes a power vaccum that causes transition wars in
multiple places
Brooks et al 13 [Stephen G. Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College.G.
John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the
Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He is also a Global
Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University.William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the

Department of Government at Dartmouth College. Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment,
Winter 2013, Vol. 37, No. 3, Pages 7-51,http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ISEC_a_00107]
engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted
the United States overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action

A core premise of deep

above,
.
Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their
incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of
anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the American Pacifier is provided in the
works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive wartemptations, regional
rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are
complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in
Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what
would happen to Eurasias security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for
retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of
anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be
used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasias major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without theAmerican pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this
scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point tosuch as democratic governance or dense institutional linkagesare either absent or weakly
present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no
consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a postAmerican Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result

Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region
and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable
to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military
presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins toswing toward pessimists concerned that states currently
backed by Washington notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabiamight take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that
would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimismregarding the regions prospects without the
American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain
might be a

a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China . It is notable that during the
Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by astill-engaged United States. 75 The second body of
scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realisms sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realisms optimism about what
would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on itsparticularand highly restrictiveassumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of
its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with
security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are

research across the social and other sciences,


undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and
theyengage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many
and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive
behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major
clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning
however,

countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive

U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the
worlds key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts thatthe withdrawal of the
American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms
racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of
local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war).
leverage,

Ext China Influence Kills Heg


Chinese influence in Latin America is a litmus test for power globally undermines Hegemony
Cerna 11
[Michael, China Research Center, China's Growing Presence in Latin America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese
Presence in the Region, 4/15/11, http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implicationsfor-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/]
With both the U.S. and China making gains in the region in different sectors, there is seemingly room for each side to grow; which implies that, in fact, trade with
Latin America is not a zero-sum game.

China presents an alternative to the United States , but that is not necessarily a bad thing. The U.S.

is much more diversified than China at the moment and therefore does not need to enter into direct competition. However, as China responds to calls from Brazil and
diversifies its investments, there

is increasing worry that China is going to outmatch U.S. trade in the region. These fears may be
economically based, but there are potentially harmful political consequences primarily, providing Latin America with a
quasi-world power as an alternative to the U.S. Since the Monroe Doctrine, Latin America has been considered a secure sphere of influence
for the U.S. The fact that China presents a less democratic alternative to U.S. influence presents a major problem .
The third BRICS summit in April provided more insight into the potential consequences of Chinas growing place in Latin America via its relations with Brazil. One
proposal to emerge from the summit of the five nations (Brazil, India, China, Russia and South Africa) was a broad-based international reserve currency system
providing stability and certainty. The idea was to set up a new exchange rate mechanism that would bypass the U.S. dollar as the reserve currency of the world. In
addition, banks of the five BRICS nations agreed to establish mutual credit lines in their local currencies, not in U.S. currency. While the chances of such a proposal
gaining support are debatable, it

sets a clear example of a possible shift in power away from the U.S . and toward a more

global organization, one that is arguably anchored by China. If China becomes a preferred partner in Latin America, it
will show that U.S. dominance around the globe also is at risk . So what does Chinas growing place in the region mean for the
intensifying relations with Latin
America offer a clear sign of the end of U.S. dominance in the region, and in a greater sense, the entire world .
future? Depending on whom this question is posed to, there are two probable answers. The first is that Chinas

There is enough evidence to show that the tides have changed in favor of China.

The other answer is that it means nothing.

The U.S. is obviously still the more dominant power in the region, and Chinese presence will eventually subside, again leaving the United States as the regions
premier partner. The real answer probably falls somewhere in the middle. Is China the preferred partner for Latin America? At this point, the definitive answer is no.
However, the

United States should not take its place in the region for granted . There is clear evidence of an
increasingly symbiotic relationship with China throughout Latin America . While the U.S. is the most dominant trade partner
to the region as a whole, it is losing ground in key countries, namely Brazil, which is blossoming on the world stage and is emerging as the clear leader
in the region. Increasing trade and investment can be beneficial for all, but the power that China can derive from its growing economic
influence could bring increased political and ideological influence that the U.S. might find unnerving . China
already has replaced the U.S. as the largest trading partner for Brazil and Chile, and is on pace to do the same in Peru and Venezuela. At the very least, this should
cause the U.S. to pay more attention to its southern neighbors and take steps to make sure that China only
benefits economically and not politically at the expense of the U.S. The world will be watching . As it stands, the Chinese
are not broadening their relations with the region in a way that directly competes with the United States. China is strictly concerned with commodities, including oil.
U.S. President Barack Obama recently signed an agreement with Brazils Petrobras that will allow the oil company to drill in the Gulf of Mexico. This

symbolic
move could cause tensions to increase as the worlds two largest oil consumers battle over rights to Brazilian oil. In that regard,
the competition may go beyond a race to Latin commodities and move into the realm of fighting for political
influence . It is odd to think that the United States would need to compete for hemispheric dominance with a country on the other side of the globe, but
Chinas actions and increasing integration into the region tell us that such a scenario may one day arise. Given the
proximity and importance of Latin America to the United States, this region could be the symbolic battle that best
measures the continued hegemony of the U.S. versus China.

China Influence Bad Stability


Chinese dominance causes Latin American instability
Johnson 05
[Stephen Johnson is Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign
Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Stud-ies, at The
Heritage Foundation.Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin America, 10/24/05,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/10/balancing-chinas-growing-influence-in-latin-america]
Growing trade deficits. Latin

American lead-ers who sign trade and investment deals with the PRC have noticed that China's
exports are more affordable than their own goods, which contributes to trade deficits. Chinese goods are made by laborers
who work for one-third of the wages of Latin American counterparts and who tolerate worse working conditions. Officials in Argentina,
Brazil, and Mexico have signaled their unease about trade with such a hot com-petitor. In September 2005, Mexican President Vicente Fox made it clear to visiting
President Hu Jintao that dumping electronics and cloth-ing was unacceptable. For every dollar that Mexico makes from exports to China, the PRC makes $31 from
exports to Mexico.[9] Disinterest in economic reform. Some ana-lysts believe that the commodities-based trade model used by China

will undermine the


progress that Latin America has made toward industrialization. While countries like Chile and Brazil have moved beyond raw materials
exports, others with powerful presidents or rul-ing oligarchies may be tempted to fall back on plantation economics. Income gaps between the rich and poor may
widen as a result. More-over,

such narrowly focused economies are vul-nerable to downturns in commodity prices. Some 44
If these countries fail to adopt reforms, social inequality and political

percent of Latin Americans already live below the poverty line.

instability

could depress U.S. exports to the region and

increase migration problems.

Latin American instability causes global war


Manwaring 05 (Max G., Retired U.S. Army colonel and an Adjunct Professor of International Politics at Dickinson
College, VENEZUELAS HUGO CHVEZ, BOLIVARIAN SOCIALISM, AND ASYMMETRIC WARFARE,
October 2005, pg. PUB628.pdf)
The Issue of State Failure. - President Chvez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term security
challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state status is the breeding ground

for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed massive
humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host evil networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business
enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all
kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of
infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation,
disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional
weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these
actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.62 Perus Sendero
Luminoso calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure armed propaganda. Drug cartels operating
throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities business incentives. Chvez
considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for
the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate
actors strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regimes credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to
govern and develop its national territory and society. Chvezs intent is to focus his primary attack politically and
psychologically on selected Latin American governments a bility and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular
perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct
the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political,
economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a government are real.64 But
failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The
tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a
consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new peoples democracies. In
connection with the creation of new peoples democracies, one can rest assured that Chvez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be
available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue,
criminal, and narco-states and peoples democracies persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and
prosperity.65

Ext- China Influence Kills Econ/Stability


China will exert pressure on trade partners kills cooperation
ONeil 12
[Shannon, Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies, Chinas Economic Role in Latin America,10/26/12,
http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2012/10/26/chinas-economic-role-in-latin-america/]
The downsides also exist. These same imports that make consumers happy hit the economy at large. They directly
compete with Latin American producers, both in home markets as well as abroad in the United States and the European Union.
Anecdotal evidence points to factories closing, and aggregate trade data shows Latin American producers losing world market share
to China. Still, estimates suggest this head to head competition occurs in roughly 12 percent of exports from Latin Americas biggest
economiessignificant, but not everywhere. The indirect effects of Chinas rise have also caused problemsespecially through the
Dutch disease . This occurs when the success of commodity exports raises the currency, making it harder for manufacturing companies to
compete internationally. Many argue that this has occurred in Brazil (and helps account for the decline in manufacturing production as a percent
of exports) it may also be happening in Venezuela, Argentina, and Peru. The bigger worry for Latin American countries is that they

are losing their hard fought gains . Over the last few decades many both successfully opened their economies and
diversified their production. Looking at the breakdown of exports, one can see a manufacturing surge in Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia since the

Chinas pressure on its trading partners threatens to undo these gains . Whether or not Latin America
can continue to climb the economic value-added chain matters for the long term. Commodity dependency leaves
countries more vulnerable to global commodity price swings, and makes it harder to plan and implement longterm policies as a result. It also limits the job opportunities for the growing number of educated, urban, and
ambitious peoplethe new middle class.
1980s. But

Chinese trade causes commodity overdependence kills Latin Economies


Cerna 11
[Michael, China Research Center, China's Growing Presence in Latin America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese
Presence in the Region, 4/15/11, http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implicationsfor-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/]
While Chinas

commodity-based trade structure is currently lucrative, it does not encourage diversification of Latin
Americas exports into more value-added goods, manufactured products, and modern services. Economic relations are dependent on often
unstable commodity market demands . U.S. investment in the region is far more diversified and spans a range of valueadded activities, including manufacturing, finance, telecom, retail and other services. Going back to a comparison with the United States, while China accounts
for 6.7% of the regions total exports, the United States continues to be the largest buyer, with a 40% share. Latin Americas exports to the U.S. are
more diversified and remain fairly balanced so it is better suited to survive a possible commodity cut-off in Latin
America. Roughly 24% of the regions exports are raw materials, another 12% consists of resource-based goods and 60% is manufactured products. Karen Poniachik

steep overvaluation of the regions currencies due in part to the flood of


investment flows and export proceeds is eroding the competitiveness of its higher-value added goods and services. This could in
turn fuel its already high level of overdependence on commodities .
of Latin Trade also sees enormous risks for the region: The

A2: China Econ Impact


U.S. is still biggest economy wont cause war
Shor 12 (Francis, Professor of History Wayne State, Declining US Hegemony and Rising Chinese Power: A
Formula for Conflict?, Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, 11(1), pp. 157-167)
While the United States no longer dominates the global economy as it did during the first two decades after WWII, it still is
the leading economic power in the world. However, over the last few decades China, with all its internal contradictions,
has made enormous leaps until it now occupies the number two spot. In fact, the IMF recently projected that the Chinese
economy would become the world's largest in 2016. In manufacturing China has displaced the US in so many areas, including becoming the
number one producer of steel and exporter of four-fifths of all of the textile products in the world and two-thirds of the world's copy
machines, DVD players, and microwaves ovens. Yet, a significant portion of this manufacturing is still owned by foreign

companies, including U.S. firms like General Motors. [5] On the other hand, China is also the largest holder of
U.S. foreign reserves , e.g. treasury bonds . This may be one of the reasons mitigating full-blown conflict
with the U.S. now, since China has such a large stake in the U.S. economy, both as a holder of bonds and as the leading exporter of
goods to the U.S. Nonetheless, "the U.S. has blocked several large scale Chinese investments and buyouts of oil companies, technology
firms, and other enterprises." [6] In effect, there are still clear nation-centric responses to China's rising economic power, especially as an
expression of the U.S. governing elite's ideological commitment to national security.

Economic decline doesnt cause war


Tir 10 [Jaroslav Tir - Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is an Associate
Professor in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia, Territorial Diversion:
Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict, The Journal of Politics, 2010, Volume 72: 413-425)]
Empirical support for the economic growth rate is much weaker. The finding that poor economic performance is
associated with a higher likelihood of territorial conflict initiation is significant only in Models 34.14 The weak
results are not altogether surprising given the findings from prior literature. In accordance with the insignificant relationships
of Models 12 and 56, Ostrom and Job (1986), for example, note that the likelihood that a U.S. President will use force is
uncertain, as the bad economy might create incentives both to divert the publics attention with a foreign adventure
and to focus on solving the economic problem, thus reducing the inclination to act abroad. Similarly, Fordham (1998a,
1998b), DeRouen (1995), and Gowa (1998) find no relation between a poor economy and U.S. use of force. Furthermore,
Leeds and Davis (1997) conclude that the conflict-initiating behavior of 18 industrialized democracies is unrelated to
economic conditions as do Pickering and Kisangani (2005) and Russett and Oneal (2001) in global studies. In contrast and
more in line with my findings of a significant relationship (in Models 34), Hess and Orphanides (1995), for example, argue that economic
recessions are linked with forceful action by an incumbent U.S. president. Furthermore, Fordhams (2002) revision of Gowas (1998) analysis
shows some effect of a bad economy and DeRouen and Peake (2002) report that U.S. use of force diverts the publics attention from a poor
economy. Among cross-national studies, Oneal and Russett (1997) report that slow growth increases the incidence of militarized disputes, as does
Russett (1990)but only for the United States; slow growth does not affect the behavior of other countries. Kisangani and Pickering (2007)
report some significant associations, but they are sensitive to model specification, while Tir and Jasinski (2008) find a clearer link between
economic underperformance and increased attacks on domestic ethnic minorities. While none of these works has focused on territorial diversions,
my own inconsistent findings for economic growth fit well with the mixed results reported in the literature.15 Hypothesis 1 thus receives strong
support via the unpopularity variable but only weak support via the economic growth variable. These results suggest that embattled

leaders are much more likely to respond with territorial diversions to direct signs of their unpopularity (e.g., strikes,
protests, riots) than to general background conditions such as economic malaise. Presumably, protesters can be distracted via
territorial diversions while fixing the economy would take a more concerted and prolonged policy effort. Bad economic conditions seem to
motivate only the most serious, fatal territorial confrontations. This implies that leaders may be reserving the most high-profile and risky
diversions for the times when they are the most desperate, that is when their power is threatened both by signs of discontent with their rule and by
more systemic problems plaguing the country (i.e., an underperforming economy).

No impact to the Chinese economy and the CCP solves econ collapse
Coonan 8 (10/25, Clifford, IrishTimes.com, China's stalling boom has globe worried,
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/2008/1025/1224838827729.html)

All of this downbeat news feeds into a growing suspicion that China has had its cake and eaten for way too long, and that there is simply no
precedent for a country growing and growing without some kind of respite. Establishing what that pause will look like and what it means to
the rest of the world is the latest challenge facing global analysts. A hangover is considered inevitable and the Olympics, while
meaningless economically, are widely considered the psychological trigger for China to face a slowdown. Despite all this gloom, however,
writing China off is premature. The Beijing government is well placed to help protect the economy from the worst ravages
of a global downturn. It has spent the last two years trying to fight inflation and cool the overheating economy , so it's
a lot easier for it to take the foot off the brakes than it is to put them on in the first place. The central bank has lowered its

interest rate twice in the past two months, the first time in six years. The State Council is increasing spending on
infrastructure, offering tax rebates for exporters and allowing state-controlled prices for agricultural products to rise. Expect
significant measures to kick-start the property market to avoid house prices falling too drastically. China has a lot of
plus points to help out. Chinese banks did not issue subprime loans as a rule, and the country's 1.43 trillion in hardcurrency reserves is a useful war chest to call on in a downturn . The currency is stable and there are high
liquidity levels, all of which give China the most flexibility in the world to fend off the impact of the global financial
crisis, says JP Morgan economist Frank Gong. China is now a globalised economy, but its domestic market is still massively
underexploited, and it is to this market that the government will most likely turn. While it is a globalised economy committed
benchmark

to the WTO, China is also a centralised economy run by the Communist Party, and it has no real political opposition at home to stop it acting
however it sees fit to stop sliding growth. Should the economy start to worsen significantly, public anger will increase, but China has been so
successful in keeping a tight leash on the internet and the media that it is difficult for opposition to organise itself in a meaningful way.
Recent years of surging growth in China have certainly done a lot to keep global economic data looking rosy, but perhaps China's
influence has been somewhat oversold. It is not a big enough economy by itself to keep the global economy ticking
over, accounting for 5 per cent of the world economy , compared to the United States with a muscular 28 per cent. And
whatever about slowing growth, 9 per cent is still an admirable rate, one that European leaders gathered this weekend in Beijing for the
Asian-Europe Meeting would give their eye teeth to be able to present to their constituencies.

A2: CCP Stability Impact


No CCP collapsethe government represses instability
Pei 9 (Minxin, Senior Associate in the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3/12. Will the Chinese Communist
Party Survive the Crisis? Foreign Affairs. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64862/minxin-pei/will-the-chinese-communist-party-survivethe-crisis)
It might seem reasonable to expect that challenges from the disaffected urban middle class, frustrated college graduates, and unemployed
migrants will constitute the principal threat to the party's rule. If those groups were in fact to band together in a powerful coalition, then the
world's longest-ruling party would indeed be in deep trouble. But that is not going to happen. Such a revolutionary scenario overlooks
two critical forces blocking political change in China and similar authoritarian political systems: the regime's capacity for
repression and the unity among the elite. Economic crisis and social unrest may make it tougher for the CCP to

govern, but they will not loosen the party's hold on power. A glance at countries such as Zimbabwe, North Korea,
Cuba, and Burma shows that a relatively unified elite in control of the military and police can cling to power through
brutal force, even in the face of abysmal economic failure . Disunity within the ruling elite, on the other hand, weakens the regime's
repressive capacity and usually spells the rulers' doom. The CCP has already demonstrated its remarkable ability to contain and
suppress chronic social protest and small-scale dissident movements. The regime maintains the People's Armed
Police, a well-trained and well-equipped anti-riot force of 250,000. In addition, China's secret police are among the most capable in
the world and are augmented by a vast network of informers. And although the Internet may have made control of information more difficult,
Chinese censors can still react quickly and thoroughly to end the dissemination of dangerous news . Since the Tiananmen
crackdown, the Chinese government has greatly refined its repressive capabilities. Responding to tens of thousands of riots each year
has made Chinese law enforcement the most experienced in the world at crowd control and dispersion . Chinese state
security services have applied the tactic of "political decapitation" to great effect, quickly arresting protest leaders and leaving their followers
disorganized, demoralized, and impotent. If worsening economic conditions lead to a potentially explosive political situation, the party will stick
to these tried-and-true practices to ward off any organized movement against the regime.

Even if, no escalation


Copley 7 Award-winning historian and global strategist; founding Director of Future Directions International Pty.
Ltd. and its Acting Chief Executive; Editor, GIS
(Gregory, 3/30. "Avoiding an Economic Pandemic: The Critical Global Significance of the Health of the PRC Economy,"
Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, Lexis.)

There is scope or flexibility for the PRC to somewhat transform its energy demands in the global marketplace. Amb.
Freeman makes the point that domestic and international pressures seem likely to cause the PRC to improve its
energy efficiency through internal innovation. He noted that despite the PRC's "very low rates of per capita energy
consumption (which are only about 14 percent of US per capita consumption), China consumes between seven and
111/2 times more energy than Japan to produce one dollar of gross domestic product (GDP), and it's about 41/2
times less efficient than is the United States". And many of the innovations which the PRC is exploring are in the
area of clean coal and nuclear energy. It seems clear that it is in the interests of the international community to help
the PRC stabilize its energy situation, and to improve energy usage efficiency, in order to minimize risks to the
global security framework, within the framework of competing energy needs. The only alternative, from the
standpoint of external powers, to assisting in the process of stabilizing the PRC's energy supply, currency credibility,
and population unrest is to plan for the containment of any implosion of political stability within the PRC should its
transition during the next two decades to entrenched power status be interrupted.

A2: Oil Impact


Public opinion and nationalism are the driving source of tension in the South China Sea oil isn't key
Nehru 8/23/12 (Vikram, The National Interest, senior associate and Bakrie Chair in Southeast Asian Studies at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Collision Course in the South China Sea,"
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/collision-course-the-south-china-sea-7380?page=1)
Certainly, the potential costs of conflict for the region and the world far outweigh any potential economic benefits
contained in the seabed of the South China Seamuch of which is unknown in any case. Rather than the availability
of hydrocarbons and fisheries, the South China Sea dispute is now increasingly being driven by domestic public
opinion in the countries concerned that is fueled by military lobbies and strong nationalist sentiments.
Chinese resource grabs will be peaceful
Dannreuther 11 -- Professor and Head of Department of Politics and International Relations, University of
Westminster (Roland, 11/1/11, "China and global oil: vulnerability and opportunity," Int'l Affairs 87(6), EBSCO)
The picture that emerges is a mixed and complex one. On the one hand, there is evidence that Chinas energy-related diplomacy
and engagement have become increasingly supportive of the efficient operation of international energy markets. As a
consequence, China has become more willing to recognize the international public goods provided by the West in supplying
security and military protection for these markets. There has been a notable shift, as argued above, in Chinas strategy away from a neomercantilist approach which seeks to avoid reliance on markets and to ensure supplies through physical control of foreign sources of energy.
This growing confidence in the role of markets has been combined with an implicit recognition by the Beijing government
that China, as a major oil-importing state, has a number of congruent interests with other oil-importing states, such as the
US, the EU and Japan. Chinas intense economic interdependence with the West, most notably with the US, means that there

is also considerable caution in Beijing about supporting the anti-western policies of many energy-rich revisionist
states. The public pronouncements and statements issued by the Chinese leadership seek to reassure all external actors, including those
in the West, that its energy-directed diplomacy is driven by economic rather than political necessity and seeks
cooperation rather than confrontation.

A2: Taiwan Impact I/L Turn


Chinese influence in Latin America causes Taiwan war
Fergusson 12 (Robbie, Researcher at Royal Society for the Arts, Featured Contributor at International Business
Times, Former Conference & Research Assistant at Security Watch, Former Researcher at University College
London, Master of Science, China in the International Arena, The University of Glasgow, The Chinese Challenge
to the Monroe Doctrine, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-americaninterests/)
Taiwan domestic, or foreign policy? Chinas goals in the region amount to more than the capture of natural resources.
Although the Peoples Republic of China considers resolution of the Taiwan issue to be a domestic issue, it is with some
irony that one of Chinas main foreign policy goals is to isolate Taipei internationally . The PRC and the ROC
compete directly for international recognition among all the states in the world. . Nowhere is this more evident than in Latin
America, where 12 of the 23 nations that still have official diplomatic relations with the ROC reside. The historical
background Following the mainland Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the nationalist Kuomintang retreated to the island of
Formosa (Taiwan) where it continued to claim to be the legitimate government of all of China. In June 1950 the United States intervened by
placing its 7th fleet in the Taiwan straits to stop a conclusive military resolution to the civil war and slowly the battlefield became primarily
political, concerned with legitimacy. When the United Nations was formed in 1945, the Republic of China (ROC) became one of the five
permanent members of the Security Council. This gave the ROC a de facto advantage over the PRC in attaining recognition from other nation
states; particularly as the diplomatic clout of the hegemonic United States supported its position as the true representative of the Chinese people,
until the rapprochement of the 1970s, when the Nixon administration wished to improve ties with the de facto rulers of China in order to exploit
the Sino-Soviet split. UN Resolution 2758 granted the China seat to the PRC at the expense of the ROC who were in effect exiled from the
organization, and the famous 1972 visit of President Nixon to China further added legitimacy to the communist regime. All this resulted in a
thawing of world opinion, and gradually as the durability and permanence of the PRC regime became ingrained, countries began switching their
diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. The economics of international recognition In the Americas, the PRC had international
recognition and longstanding support from ideological allies such as Cuba. However, the ROC has maintained more diplomatic

support in the Americas than any other region, mainly due to the small nature of the states involved and the
importance of Taiwanese aid to their economies. Li notes that from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, roughly 10 percent of
Taiwans direct foreign investment (FDI) went to Latin America and the Caribbean, [51] highlighting the concerted effort made in the region.

Economic solidarity is increasingly important to the formation of the Taiwan-Latin America relationship, for two
reasons. The first is that for Latin American states, the decision of which China to support is less ideological and
political than it ever has been; which makes the decision a straight up economic zero-sum choice. The second is that
Latin America is home to natural resources which are of great significance to the hungry growing economies of the
PRC and the ROC regardless of international recognition. However, while the decision is not political for Latin American countries, for
Taiwan, every country which switches its recognition to the PRC damages its legitimacy as a nation state in the
international arena. The Table below shows the designation of diplomatic recognition in the region in 2008. Countries Recognising the PRC
(China)Countries Recognising the ROC (Taiwan)Central AmericaMexico, Costa RicaEl Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua,
PanamaCaribbeanAntigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, Trinidad & TobagoBelize,
Dominican Republic, Haiti, St Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the GrenadinesSouth AmericaArgentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, VenezuelaParaguay On the other hand, for the PRC, every state which withdraws its support for the

ROC takes it one step closer to being in a position where it can resolve the Taiwan issue unilaterally .
Subsequently, undermining Taiwan is of the utmost importance to China, and it has taken to outbidding Taiwan in
offers of foreign aid, a strategy made possible by the decline in aid from the defunct Soviet Union, and the West, which is pre occupied with
terrorism and the Middle East. Li notes that the regions leaders have turned to Asia for help to promote trade and financial assistance, and
consequently played the PRC and Taiwan against each other. [53] Despite its smaller size, Taiwan has fared remarkably well in this bidding
war; focusing its aid investments on infrastructure such as stadiums in St Kitts & Nevis for the Cricket World Cup in 2007. However, even
Taiwans economy can be put under strain by the seemingly relentless stream of foreign aid which has brought only debateable and mild gains to
the Taiwanese cause. This has contributed to the PRC picking off the few remaining supporters of the ROC take for
example, the Dominican case. In early 2004, Commonwealth of Dominica asked Taipei for a $58 million aid, which is unrelated to public
welfare. The Caribbean nation had relied on Taiwan to develop its agriculture-based economy since 1983. Diplomatic relationship was soon
broken after Taipei turned down the request. [54] This incident showcased the fact that in economic terms, the PRC is winning the battle for
Latin America. Political strategies of the PRC In political terms too; the PRC is in an advantageous position, thanks in part again
to its position within the UN. While it can be argued that China provides incentives but does not threaten harm to induce countries to defect from
recognizing Taiwan, [55] the reality is that the use of force and direct harm are not the only means available to an economic entity as powerful
as China. It refuses to maintain official relations with any state that recognises the ROC; an action which can be quite
prohibitive to the country being able to take advantage of the growing Chinese market. Although Domnguez suggests that
the PRC has not been punitive toward those states that still recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan), [56] the legitimacy of this claim has to
be brought into question for example in June 1996, China fought the extension of the UN mission in Haiti, to punish the Caribbean nation for
its appeal for UN acceptance of Taiwan. [57] This incident showed that China is prepared to use its global clout to play spoiler and apply
indirect pressure on countries to adopt its position. Similarly, Chinas experience with one-party rule has taught it the

importance of party-to-party relations in addition to state-to-state relations, further cementing the PRC by
establishing a relationship based on goodwill and common understanding. Indeed by the start of 1998 the CCP had established
relations with almost all major political parties in the countries that were Taiwans diplomatic allies in Latin America, [58] further isolating the
ROC. The effect on American interests Were the ROC to be deserted by its remaining allies in Latin America, the USA
would be disadvantaged in attempting to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. A Taiwan that was not
recognised by any state from the Americas, or Europe (with the exception of the Vatican) would not be seen as a genuine sovereign entity whose
defence would be more important than the upkeep of good relations between China and the West. As Chinas economic and political

position in the world improves vis--vis both America and Taiwan, so might its ambitions. The U.S.A might find
itself in a position where it could no longer withstand the diplomatic pressure to allow the PRC to conclude a settlement
on Taiwan, perhaps by force .

A2: Taiwan Impact- Defense


Alt cause- Africa
Brookes and Shin 6 (Peter, Director of the Asian Studies Center Heritage, and Ji Hye, Research Assistant in the
Asian Studies Center Heritage, China's Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States, The Heritage
Foundation, 2-22, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/02/chinas-influence-in-africa-implications-for-theunited-states)
Another significant Chinese objective in Africa is to isolate Taiwan diplomatically in an effort to pressure Taipei
toward unification. Seven African countries-Burkina Faso, Chad, Gambia, Malawi, Sao Tome and Principe,
Senegal, and Swaziland-currently maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Curtailing Taiwan's diplomatic
influence was not a high priority on China's Africa policy agenda until the early 1990s, when the competition
between China and Taiwan to win diplomatic recognition from individual African countries escalated drastically.
Now, through offers of massive economic assistance, Beijing has secured recognition from six additional African
countries at Taiwan's expense. Lesotho and Niger switched their diplomatic recognition to the PRC in 1994 and
1996, respectively. The Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, and South Africa switched their recognition from
Taipei to Beijing in 1998, and Liberia switched recognition to Beijing in 2003 shortly before China dispatched PLA
troops to assist with Liberian water-supply projects. In addition to ongoing efforts to sever Taiwan's few remaining
connections in Africa, China has also sought repeatedly to maintain the support of its African partners for its "one
China" policy via diplomatic attention, economic investment, and other assistance.

Taiwan-China relations higher than ever


Cole 12 -- Taipei-based journalist who focuses on military issues in Northeast Asia and in the Taiwan Strait (J.
Michael, 9/3, "Taiwan Hedges its Bets on China," http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/09/03/taiwanhedges-its-bets-against-china/)
By a number of yardsticks , relations in the Taiwan Strait today are the best theyve been in years , if not ever . But
if a report released by Taiwans Ministry of National Defense (MND) on Friday is any indication, Taiwanese government officials dont appear
to be convinced that such dtente will last for very long. Without doubt, the pace of normalization in relations between Taiwan and
China, especially at the economic level, has accelerated dramatically since Ma Ying-jeou of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT)
was elected in 2008, a process that is expected to continue with Ma securing a second four-year term in January. In addition to the landmark
Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed in June 2010, the governments on both sides have inked at least 16 agreements
touching on various aspects of cross-strait relations, including an agreement reached on Friday that will allow banks in Taiwan to clear renminbi
transactions, a move that obviates the need for converting the currency into U.S. dollars before a transaction can be made. Beyond trade, visits
to Taiwan by Chinese officials have become almost routine, a limited number of Chinese can now study at Taiwans
universities, Chinese tourism to the island has boomed, and joint exercises by the countries respective coast guards
are now held every other year since 2010, mostly for the purpose of sea-rescue operations in the waters off Taiwans Kinmen and Chinas
Xiamen.

No military invasion to regain Taiwan - -they'll use other methods


Fischer 11/27 -- clean energy entrepreneur and is the founder and CEO of Lumicity Ltd (Tristan, 2012, " Why
China could invade Taiwan and get away with it," http://www.historyfuturenow.com/wp/why-china-could-invadetaiwan-and-get-away-with-it/)
The Peoples Republic of China has been very patient with Taiwan. It knows that time is on its side. However, it could
also force the issue within the next few years and force Taiwan to rejoin mainland China under the authority of the PRC. It
could show Taiwan a stick and a carrot. The stick is that mainland China will invade to reestablish control over Taiwan.
Both the Taiwanese government and the mainland Chinese government say that they are not separate nations, but one, with
different governments. The US would not enter into a civil war with the two Chinas . In addition, bearing in
mind that the US has a huge trade deficit with both China and Taiwan and that the Taiwan Straits are effectively already off
limits to the US Navy, it is hard to see the US defending Taiwan , even if it could afford to do so, which it cannot, or
were able to do so, which it could not . As a carrot, the mainland Chinese market has become increasingly attractive

to Taiwanese businesses. The PRC could offer increased incentives, such as low cost loans from the PRC, to Taiwanese
companies, and better market access making the business classes increasingly open to reunification with mainland China.