OPUS General Editors Keith Thomas Hani JS. Weiner Scines ©.B, MAGPHERSON The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy Bogazic University Libra wy Ontrd New York Toone Melo OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESSsid Unis Pras, Wlten Ste, Orford ox2 602 on ‘tote its oo row aero Sua St Je ats miso ©. 8. Macohraon 1977 at repute pape na atcback silty Paperback reprined 1979 A rights mstod, Ne pt of hs pabiction may be rpc, Sioa in oil stem, rush, 8 ay fr oF 1) ay ‘mas, chil hobcping, ego eri, ‘the pro erin of Orford Cis Pas. ‘hi book i old sujet eas as it hl tb of wade or ote, be it resol hind xt cei rated wat he buble rors any fr of ong et than at Colic it published and eho a Snr odio ag dieing ig abut ache, ‘Bsitsh Library Cataloguing [a Publication Dats S81 fi Sacpheron, Cert Broah See ter of ed deen ig * Fatt se 81 Jase D5 2 ihe s 30005 Set in Great Brtsin by Gloscester Typesetting Co, Lt Printed Ia Gre Bria Lowe & Beydone Printers Limited, Tet, Novi Preface Readets may wonder at the shortness of this book. ‘The Life and Time, in ttle, usually signals a book ten times as long a8 this one. But no such length is required by my design, which is to set out in bold relief the essence of liberal democracy as it now is conceived, and as it has been and may be conceived, For this purpose brevity is betier than exhanstive detail. I hope however that my analysis is substantial enough both to estab- lish the patterns [have found and to justify the erticism and praise from which T have seen no reazon 29 abstain, Succestive preliminary versions of this work have been pre= sented for erticism in several universities: the earliest, most tentative, version at the University of British Columbia, and subsequent versions, each profiting from earlier eriticisms, at the Institute of Advanced Stadies of the Australian National University, the Institute of Philosophy of Aarhus University, and the University of Toronto, Parts of it have also been pre- sented and effectively criticized at several United States uni- vensties and some other Canadian universities. Colleagues and students who took part in the discussions in all those count will recognize how much I have benefited from their crit isms. Some will wish T had benefited more. But I thank them all. University of Toronto CBM. October 2976 AON, 4 97 poe, g fees Iliilll OUPHANESE A279 teri sasI 1 ur Contents page ‘Models and Precursors : ‘THE NATURE OF THE INQUIRY : G) Why models? 2 (il) Why hstrially sacssioe models? 6 (il) Wy these models? 8 PREOURSORS OF LISERAL nEMOGRAGY 9 (i) Democracy and class 9 (Gi) Preineteontivcentany theres a precwsors 2 Model 1: Protective Democracy 2 ‘TRADITION 23 ‘THE UTILITARIAN BASE 25 BENTHAM'S ENDS OF LEGISLATION 27 Tue POLITICAL REQUIREMENT ot Janes MILL'S Senta? 3 MARKET WAX ra Model 2: Developmental Democracy VELOPMENTAL DEMOCRACY MODEL 28: TWENTIETH-CENTURY DEVELOPMENTAL DEMOCRACY| IV Model 3: Equilibrium Democracy THE ADEQUACY OF MODEL 3 (i) Deseriptve adequacy Explanatory adequacy (ii) Fastifcotory adequacy THE PALTERING OF MODEL 3 V Model 4: Participatory Democracy (@) The protem of size @) A oitows citle and posible loopholes MODELS OF PARTICIPATORY (G) Model g4: an abstract fost approsination (8) Model 42: 0 second approximation Further Reading Index n n ca 83 & 9 98 98 9 8 108 108 me 6 ne zs Models and Precursors num NATURE OF THE IeQUIRY eis not usual to embark on a ‘Life and Times’ until the sub- Jet's life is over Ts liberal democracy, then, to be considered s0 nearly finished that one may presume now to sketch it life and times? The short answer, prejudging the case I shall be putting i: ‘Yes, if iberal democracy is taken to mean, ait scill very generally is, the democracy of a capitalist market society (no matter how modified that society appears to be by the rise of the welfare state); but ‘Not necessarily” if liberal democracy is taken to mean, as John Stuart Mill and the ethical liberal-democrats who followed him in the late nine- teenth and early twentieth centuries took it to mean, a society sviving to ensure that all its members are equally ree to realize their capabilities. Unfortunately, liberal democracy ean mean cither, For ‘liberal’ can mean freedom of the stronger to do ddovn the weaker by following market rales; or it ean mean ‘equal effective freedom ofall to use and develop thelr eapaci- ties, The latter freedom is inconsistent with the former. ‘The difficulty is that liberal democracy during most ofits lie o far (a life which, T shall argue, began only about a hun dred and fifty years ago even as a concept, and later as an actual institution) has tied to combine the two meanings. Its life began in capitalist marker societies, and from the begin- ring it accepted their basic unconscious assumption, which ‘night be paraphrased “Market maketh man’. Yet quite early ‘on, as early as John Stuart Mill in the mid-nineteenth cen ‘try, it presed the claim of equal individual rights to self developinent, and justified itself largely by that claim. The to2 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy ideas of iberal democracy have since then been held cogether tinealy, each with is ups and downs. So far, the market view has prevailed: “liberal” has con- sciously oF unconsciously been assumed to mean ‘capitals’ ‘Thisis tue even though ethical iberals, ftom Millon, tried to combine market freedom with selfedevelopmental freedom, and cried to subordinate the former tothe Ister. They failed, for reasons explored in Chapter 11 "ere Tam simply suggesting that aiberal poston need not be taken to depend forever on an acceptance of capitalist ascoumptions, although historically it has been so taken. The fact tha liberal values grew up in capitalist market societies is not in ivelf a reason why the central ethical principle of liberalism the freedom ofthe individual to realize his or her human capacities need always be confined to such societies. On dhe contrary, it may be argued thatthe ethical principle, or, if you prefer, the appetite for individual freedom, has Out frown its capitalist market envelope and ean now lve as well, Or beter without i just as man’s productive powers, which grew so enormously with competitive capitalism, are not lost twhen capitalism abandons fee competition or is replaced by {ome fm of socialism. hall suggest hat the continuance of anything thatcan pro- perly becalled liberaldemocracy depends on a downgrading of {he market asumptions and an upgrading of the equal ght to selfdevelopment. I think there is some proapect of thi happening. Botitis far from certain that it will happen. So T have fl justified in keeping che sombre tide ‘Life and Times’ “My main concern inthis shore works to examine the limits and posibiliis of iberal democracy. Let me explain now why Thave done his in terms of modes, and why {have chosen certain models as appropriate and sufcent. This will lead into a consideration of certain earlier models which T have relegated to the position of precursors of liberal democracy. Why modes? 1am using the term ‘model in a broad sense, to mean 2 Models and Precursors 3 theoretical construction intended to exhibit and explain the real relations, underlying the appearances, between o within the phenomena under study. In the natural sciences, which are ‘mostly concerned with phenomena not variable by huraan will ‘or by social change, successive models (as those of Ptolemy, Copernicus, Newton, Binstein) aresuccesively fuller and more sufficient explanations of the real, invariant relations. In the social sciences, concemed with phenomena which, within his- torically shifting limits, are variable by human will, model (or theories, as we may equally well call them) may have to additional dimensions. First, chey may be concerned to explain not only the under~ lying reality of the prevailing or past relations between wilful and historically influenced human beings, but also the prob- ability or possibilty of foture changesin those relations, By sort- jing out main lines of change, and apparently unchanging characteristics, of man and society up to the present, they may ‘ry to discern forces of change, and limits of change, which may bbe expected to operate in the fature. Not all the theorists who Ihave formulated laws of change have seen them a8 operating in a straight ine: Machiavell, for instance, thought in terms ‘of a cyclical movement at the historical pattern of social and politcal change which could be expected to prevail indefinitely nto the future, But ever since the eighteenth-centary En- lightenment, with its idea of progress it has been more usual to think in terms ofa straight line. OF the theorists who have seen single main line of past change, not all have projected it far, iat all, into the fiture: for instance, such eighteenth-centary ‘writers as Montesquieu, Turgot, Millar, Ferguson, and Adam Smith, who glimpsed of formulated the law of four stages of society—hunting, pastoral, agricultural, commercial —were apt to assume that the commercial was the final stage. But in the nineteenth century others, at different aa Comte and Marx and Mill, have, with greater or les stringency, projected a main line of past development into the future. Any of these Kinds of theory do of course rely explicitly o implicitly on models, ‘The second additional dimension of models in political theorizing isan ethical one, a concern for what is desirable or4 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy vod or right. The outstanding models in politcal scenes, at Jean from Hobbes on, have been both explanatory and justi- featory or advocatory. They are, in dierent proportions, Sateen about what a poiteal system oF = politcal society is how it does work or otld work, and statements of why iis 2 ood thing or why it would be a good thing o have ior to have more of it Some democratic theorts have seen cleariy fnough that their theres are such & mixture, Somme have no, Grhave even denied it Those who star from the tacit asomp. tion that whatever iyi igh, are apt to deny that they are making any value judgement. Those who start fom the tacit srumption chat whatever i = wong, ive great weight 0 their hia! case [obi trying to show that it praciesbl). ‘And between the wo extemes theres room fora eonsiderable Fange of ernphass ‘any cnt, to show that a madel ofa polteal yatem or a society, whether the existing ne or one not now existing but desired, is practicable, that, that it can be expected 0 ork well over fly long ru, ome must make some assumptions {bout the human beings ly wtom and with whom itis going foun, What kind of political behaviour are they capable of? This is obviously a crucial question. A political sytem that demanded, forinstance, tat the citizens have more rationality or more pallial zeal then they now demonstrably have, al Inve than ty old Be expced to hoe i any tonal ial ica ancy would not be worth much advocacy. The stipulation T have just emphasized i important. We are not necessarily limited tothe way people behave politely now. We are nat limited fo that fw can ahow reaton for expecting that that Could change with changes in, fr instance, the technological posites nd the economfe relations of thie society. ‘Met, hough not al, politcal theorists of all peroasions— conservative trahionaite, Rberalindvialis, radical r= fbrmists, and revoltionares—have underood very well that the workability of any politcal eystem depends Isrgely on bow all he other institutions, social snd economic, have shaped, oF ‘night shape, the people with whom and by whom the paiieal System mast operte, On thi, writer ax diferent aa Bake and Mill and Marx ae in agreement, although mont ofthe earlier Models and Precursors 5 al theorists, from say Locke to Bentham, paid little atten- tion to this, And it has generally been seen, at Teast in the pineteenth and twentieth centuries, that the most important ‘way in which the whole bundle of social institutions and social relations shapes people as political actos is in the way they shape people's consciousness of themselves, Forinstance, when, ‘as in the Middle Ages and for some time afte, the prevailing social arrangements have induced virtually everyone to accept ‘an image of the human being as human by vireue of his accept- ing the obligations ofhisrankor his'station in Hf’, traditional hierarchical political system will work, When & commercial and an industrial revolution have so altered things that that image isno longer accepted, a different image is required. Ifit is an image of man as csentially a masimieing consumer and appropriator we get a new consciousness, which permits and requires & quite different political system. If, later, in revulsion against the results of this, people come to think of themselves in some other way, some other political system becomes pos sible and even needed. So, in looking at models of democracy——paat, present, and prospective—ive should keep a sharp look-out for two things their assumptions about the whole society in which the demo- ‘Ceratie political system is to operate, and their assumptions ‘about the essential nature of the people who are to make the ‘syitem work (which of cours, for a democratic system, means the people in general, not jast a ruling or leading class). ‘To speak, as T have just done, of the society in which a democratic political sysiem isto operate’ may seem to suggest that only a political system is entitled to be called democratic, that democracy is merely 2 mechanism for choosing and authorizing governments or in some other way getting laws and political decisions made, But we should bear in mind that democracy more often has been, and is, dhought of as much more than that. From Mill through L, T. Hobhouse, A. D. Lindsay, Woodfow Wilson, and John Devvey, to the current proponents of participatory democracy, it has been seen as a ‘quality pervading the whole life and operation ofa national or 3 smaller community, orif you like as a kind of soi, a whole sctof reciprocal relations between the people who make up the6 ‘The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy nation or other unit, Some theorists, mostly twentieth-century ‘nes, insist on keeping the two senses separate. Some would ‘even exclude the second sense altogether, by defining demo- racy as simply a system of government, But in any realistic Analysis the two senses merge into each other. For different ‘models of democracy, in the narrow sense, are congruent with, aand require, different kinds of society. Enough now has been said about models in general to indi cate why an analysis of iberal democracy may conveniently be ‘cast in terms of models. To examine models of liberal demo- tracy is to examine what the people who want it, or want more lit, ot want some variant ofthe present form of it, believe it js, and also what they believe it might be or should be. This is imore than one can do by simply analysing the operations and institutions of any existing liberal democratic states, And this extra knowledge is important, For people's belief about a political system are nat something outside i, they are part oft. “Those belie, however they are formed or determined, do eetcrmine the limits and possible development ofthe system they determine what people will put up with, and what they will demand. In short, to work in terms of models makes it easier to keep in mind that liberal democracy (like any other political system) has two necessary ingredients that may not Appear on the surface: (a) to be workable, i¢ must be not far Sut of line with the wants and capabilities of the human beings Sho are to work it; hence, the model of democracy must con- tain (or take for granted) a model of man; and (b), since it needs general assent and support in order to be workable, the ‘model must contain, explicitly or implicitly, an ethically justficatory theory. i) Why historically successive modes? ‘Teour object isto examine che limits and possibilities of cone temporary liberal democracy, why should we indulge ina ‘Life and Times’? Why nat confine ourselves to a current analysis? ‘Would it not be simpler to set up a single model of present liberal democracy, by listing the observable characteristics of | the practice and theory common to those twentieth-century states which everyone would agree to call liberal democracies, Models and Precursors 7 thatis, the ystems in operation inmost ofthe Engishapein totd and est af Wc Europe? Such model eal eter up, The main mipslatons ae fy abvnse, Govern ments and legates are chosen drecly or indizeely by Periodic elections with universal equal Fanchise the vote? Ehvive being normally 4 choice besecen politcal’ pares, ‘There isa suficent degre of cl iberes (teedom ofspech, publeation, and asociation, and freedom ftom arbiary Esrest and inpasontent) to make the ight choose ete, ‘There a frmal equality before the law. There s some pro. tection for minoits, And there Is general aceptanee Of & Prineple of maxima individual fecdom consent with {al eedom for others. ‘Many contemporary political writer do set up such a model, Iecansotve at framework for invenigating and dis playing the actual, the necemary, and the posable workings of contemporary Uberal democracy. Tt ean also be wed to que the cthieal superiority of liberal democracy over other fyrems, Why then should we not use single model cone ‘acted fom present practice and present theory? Why Took Bsuccesive modele tat have prevaled in tum nthe century at no down to our dine? ‘The dmplct reat is that using succenive models reduces the sk of myopia in looking ahead Tia oo easy in ung a $fagle model, to black off ute patsy alto easy fal into thinking that iberal democracy, how that we have attained by vihatver sage, seed in ie prevent mould Indeed, the ‘te of single contemporary model almoxt commits one t hi Puton, Fora single mode of current bral democracy, Bo be realisic as an explanatory model, mut apulae er tain prevent mecianiso, such a the competitive party tem tnd wll indret (ue representative) government Bato do Ubisis to foreclose options that may be made posible by changed, toda and econom reladons. There may be stong diferences ‘ot opinion about whether some covetvable fire forms of ‘democracy can propery be elle ra! democracy, Dut isis Samthing Pat needs to be argudy no: put ot of court by fcinition/One of the things that needs to be considered is whether iberal democracy ina large nation-state capable ofa ‘The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy moving to a mixture ofindirect and direct democracy: that is, is capable of moving in the direction ofa fuller participation, which may require mechanisms other than the standard party nother reason for prefeting auecenive models: their ue Ss more likly to seve! the fll content ofthe cone temporary md th fll uate of te present stem. Por the eco prevalent ode eel a aap, roe by paral rection and paral abuorpion of previons model, Eckard Ihave stn ben ora ine the prevalent model, dati, hat been te one generally c= cepted by those who were a all avourable to democsacy, a Statement of what democracy i, what itis for, and what inte tutons needs. And each suceesive mode) fe hes, wat formulated atanatiack on oneor more of te previous model Bach hat been offered ata conrectve to or eplacement oft predecesar: the pst of deparare has vay been sn attack fn at lear some part of preceding model, even when, a has tite been the cle the new model enbodiedsubxamial el ments ofa eater one, sometimes without the formulators fpparenly being aware of Gi, Thus each of the models ito Some extent an overlay on previous one, So we are more key tose the fll ature contemporary liberal democracy, and 4s poaible future divecion and limits, by loking atthe sc ct ode nda he enn rts ration ad thai fur. (ill), Why these models? TEven if we ate persuaded of the merits of model-building, and ofthe value of analysing liberal democracy by examining succesve prevalent models, the question may be asked, why chose, as Ihave chosen, to go back no farther than the nine teenth century? Why not go back at least to Rousseau of Jefferion, of to the democratic ideas astociated with seven ‘eenth-century Puritanism, a3 is more usvally done by those ‘who want to trace the roots of moder liberal democracy? " This question cannet, without circular reasoning, be setled simply by definition. One could easily put forward a defition of liberal democracy by which some pre-inewentheentury Models and Precursors 9 theories and visions of democracy would qualify for inclusion. ‘Thu if, as soms not unteasonable, one reduced the esentials of liberal democracy to three or four sipulations—say, an ideal of equal individual sight to slfdevelopment, equality before the lw, basic civil iberties, and popular sovereignty ‘with an equal political voice for all cittzens—leaving out any Tipulations about reprerentation, party ystems and so ot, then some eatler ideas of democracy could he included as ‘beral democrat, Equally reasonably, by puting in stipula- tions about representation etc one may exclude various earlier concepts. The definition of the model depends on value judge- tents about what er theesenials, and those judgements cane tot be defended merely by invoking a definition. ‘Are we lef, ten, with no bass for choosing between possible searing points for HBeral democracy? T think not For if our Concern is with the posible future of Iiberal democracy, we ‘ust pay attention to the relation between democratic inatiwe tions end the underlying structure of society, And there is one such relation largely neglected by current theorists of liberal democracy, which may be thought to be decisive, This isthe relation between democracy and clas. T want now to argue that the most serous, and least exarn~ ined, problems ofthe present and fature of liberal democracy drve rom the fact that liberal democracy has typically been designed to fit a scheme of democratic goverament onto a asedsded society; that tis fit was not attempted, either ia ‘theory or in practice, until the nineteenth eenturys and that therelre,eatier models and vision of democracy should not be counted as models of Hberal democracy. PRECURSORS OF LIBERAL DEMOORACY (G)_ Democracy and last 'Assoon as attention is focused on the relation between demo- cracy and class, the historical record falls into a new pattern. Teis, of course, not new to notice that in the main Western tradition of political chought, ftom Plato and Aristotle down. to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, democracy, when. ie was thought of at all, was defined as rule by the poor, the10 The Life and Times of Liberal Demacracy ignorant, and incompetent, at the expense of the leisured, civilized, propertied classes. Democracy, as seen fom the upper layers of elass-ivided societies, meant clas rule, rule by ‘the wrong clas. Te was a class threat, as incompatible with a liberal as witha hierarchical society, The main Western tradi- tion down to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, that isto say, was undemocratic or anti-democratic, But there were, indeed, in that whole stretch of over 2000 yous, recurrent democratic visions, democratic advocates, and even some examples of democracy in practice (though these never embraced a whole politcal community). When we look at these democratic visions and theories we shal find that they hhave one thing in common, which sts them sharply apart from, the liberal democracy of the nineteenth and twentieth cen- turies, This is, chat they all depended on, or were made to fit, a non-clase-divided society. Iti hardly too much to tay that fr imost of them democracy war a classless or a one-class society, not merely a political mechanism to ft uch a society. ‘These carlicr models and visions of democracy were reactions against the classivided societies of thei times. As such they may properly be called utopian, an honourable name derived from the ttle of Thomas More's astonishing sixteenth-century ‘work Upc. ‘This puts them in striking contrast tothe liberal-democratic tradition from the nineteenth century on, which accepted and acknowledged from the begisning—and more clearly at the beginning than tatethe clade socety, and set onto ica democratic structure onto it. ‘The concept of a liberal democracy became posible only when theorists—first a few and then most liberal theotsts— found reasons for believing that ‘one man, one vote’ would aot hhe dangerous to property, or to the continuance of clast- divided societies. The first systematic thinkers to find so were Bentham and James Mill in the early nineteenth century. As We stall see (in Chapter TT) they based that conclusion on a. mixture of two things: first, deduction from their model of man. (which assimilated all men to a model of bourgeois maximi- zing man, from which it followed that all had an interest in maintaining the sanctity of property); aud second, their Models and Precursors u atzervaton of the habitual deference of the lower tthe higher clases. Bo T And the watershed between utopian democracy and eral demoeracy to come in the early ninetemth enaury. That ie my. season for treating the presninetenth-centary Aheories as precursor of liberal democracy, rather than tea {ng any of trem, sy Rouseat or Jeflewon of any of the entendh-censy Puritan theo as pat ofthe “clascal™ Heal democrat tration, ‘This is nat to say thatthe pre~ ninetentireentury concepts have been neglected or dsmised dy the aventitiecentny theorists, On the coirary, the earlier Concepts have not infrequently been drawn in and appealed fo, paticulany by twentiethecentury exponents of what am caing Model 2B tis has not been much help o such Sxponents, for they have generally failed to notice that the Clas asumptions of the eae theovies were Icongraous with their own, have aid that those who presented favourable modes or visions ot democracy before the nineteenth century intended them tor tobe ther cases or predominant one-ass tosis fore looking atthe presninetentvcentry record Roni be well to state more spoeeally what fs meant by cess inthis context. Class unerstod herein terms of property: class taken to conta othowe who stand in the same relation of ownership tr norownership of productive land and/or capital A some that lover conecpt a lt, deed tit simples in terms of THatand poor, or ich and mile and poor, bas been promi henvin palcl theory afar back as one kes go, thou in the cast theories (och as Arnal’) the enterion of elas ras only implicitly ownership of pradatie property. However, the view ta la deed teatime ro “ductive property, was an important criterion of different forms of government, and even an important determinant of what ~ forms of government could come into existence and could work, was a view held by Arielle, by Machiavelli, by the ‘oentGantcenary Engh republicans snd bythe American ‘Eedertinay long bolore Marx found incas confict the motor of history12 The Life and Ties of Liberal Democracy Some of the non-democralc theorists who gave clts a centzl place in their analyses (or instance Hartington) were ‘ich concerned with ditinctions between cases based not just, fu property or no property, but on diferent kind of property lt ch ade onal Bot dea cors generally kept their eyes on a simpler ditncton: that between societies with two clancy, sctetics with only tne cla, and societies with no eases, Phas some of the tarlerulopians {lke the present-day communis) have en vinagd a society with ne individual ownership of productive land or capital, hence no property clasts: thie we may call ass socety. Diferent rom thie the es of scety where ‘here is Individual ownership of productive land and capital and ‘where everyone owns ori in A poiion fo own, Such property: this we may cal = oxecas society Finally there is the tcety where there i individual ownership of productive id nd espital and where not everyone, bu ony one et People, own sch propery: cis I the dase occ, “The dsintion Nee made between clalew” and ‘oneal? nay seam somewhat say te soe ot wos of ‘octery, Tam so descibing might both of them be proper snough described by ether term. Dut sine the two tocieia ste sgniicandy different, two decent terme ate needed to describe them, and its more in accord with modern wage keep the term ‘clase fora society with no private ownership, of productive land or eaptaly ttl ‘one-cler’ for a society ‘where everyone does or may own such productive resourees (ii) Prooinetenti century theres as precesors Lt us now look at the record of democratic theory before the nineteenth century. Tn the ancient world there were of course some outstanding actual fanctioning democracies, most notably the Athens celebrated by Pericles. But no record of any substantial theory justifying or even analysing democracy has survived from that era.t We may surmise that any such * Avid did briefly sont varios kindof emcracy’s nde which headheinchded systems witha moet property qualifeston fer vting Hl was strongly oppotd toll democracy the only ind in which Be found any meri as on i vehich hsbanden and thse of moderate Fovnane®hud supreme power (Pal, 6, s099 by ck ve 41308 bh Models and Precursors 13 theory would have taken, as the required base for democracy, ‘citizen body made up mainly of persons not dependent on ‘employment by others: that, at least, would correspond pretty ‘yell to the facts, a8 far as we know them, about the Athenian city-state in its democratic period, which has been well de- scribed a8 a property-ovening democracy. We do not know if ‘such a requirement, which amounts to the requirement of a ‘onelas citizen body, was but into a theoretical model, since ho theoretical mode! has come down to us: there can be no ‘more than a reasonable supposition that it was. Tn the Middle Ages one would not expect, nor does one find, anj’ theory of democracy, or any demand for a democratic franchise: such popular uprisings as flared up from time to time were not concerned about an electoral franchise, for at that time power did not generally lie in elected bodies. Where feudalism prevailed, power depended on rank, whether i herited ar acquired by force of arms. No popular movement, however enraged, would think that its aims could be achieved by its getting the vote, And in the nations and independent city-states of the later Middle Ages alo, power was not to be Sought in that way. Where voices were raised and rebellions mounted against the late medieval social order, as in the Jacquerie in Paris (1958), the uprising of the Ciompi in Florence (1978), and the Peasants’ Revolt in England (1381), the demands were for levelling of ranks, and sometimes for levelling of property, rather than for a democratic political structure. They wanted either a classless communistic society, fs indicated in the sentiment attributed 1o John Ball, of Peasants’ Revolt fame: "Things cannot go well in England, nor ‘ever vil, until all goods are held in common, and unti there “ill be neither serfr nar gentlemen, and we shall all be equal’,* ‘ora levelled society where all might have property. There is no tedord of any of these movements having produced any sys- tematic theory, nor having sketched a democratic political structure, "When we move on to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries we do find some explicit democratic theories. Two democratic currents appear then in England, One of them has a clasless "Quote in M, Bees A Hisar of Bris Swan, London, 199, 8.14 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy base, the other a one-class base, The democratic utopias of those centuries, the bestcknown of which are More's Utopia (1516) and Winstanley’s The Law of Fridom (2658), were classless societies. They were envisioned ag replacing clsst- divided societies: their authors constructed them to denounce A es of pve, Ping as of hs ppreston and exploltation in the ination of private property, th replaced by ermal property sd cominunal wok, These tatly modern visions of Gemnocracy were vision of funda: tently equa, unoppresive society, at well ay prescriptions fora scheme of government Sicha facet had te clases, and to be claude it had to be without private property. ‘The other seventeenth century democrat cutrent, in ofa asitflowed in poll an not smpiyreligs chanvel, no ies related to class Engst Puts, in that century, was fe with democratcidess. Although these were generated by controversies about church goverment nd were actaly put tat effect only in that sphere (and, very bre, in the arm), they did pill aver nt idea sbout cl government, especialy In the period ofthe Cat Wat and the Commonealth: Bu excepeor sich exteme radical wopian as Winstanley, Te sroups and movements whose pla! thinking may be sid t have emerged from demacrae Poitanis were not polite cally democratic. They didnot go so far as to demas fl popular sovereignty ors filly democrae franchise. "The Pretytrians and the Independents nated ona prop erty qualieation forthe franchise. About the psiton of the other main poltal movement, the Levels, who mer for & few years uring she Gill Wars very ston there i some dispute. T have shown elewher® that the Levellers, at an organized movement, speaking a concerted mania, ine tended to exeode al wage-eariss a ame takers more dat half the adult mals) ffm the fancis, Bul some htoviaest 2 The Patel Ty of Psi Inds, Os gh, ke 93 an Democratic Theory, Essays in Retritoal, Oxford, 1973, Essay 12. * Tika Thom: “Phe Levels andthe Prat ia. . Aer (ck) The Iara te Oper Stones, qty enon rey fa MCA Bargr nite in Crepe Hl: fe Wad Toad Op Daw, London, 107 DP. 9 97 et aE Models and Precursors 15 ee ee ee diel ar ae eee ee eg by ar Sha ils ie ote wr engre ye Senate oe es en eee caw dcr hey sated Se a aad sad ncyed me she ik et a oe do seein se al th ey Soe at ont So eer oa a a aa acd canopies a cea antes sean Caan ee ere sick ata enble Uc be an are et sat haber nota them emieed a to aoe a Fr lal ier a may Poe Levee a Phy and aso cea steak prperty esa pe aa ects ana gS Pt Cease ac eich cvncr ncn hep pee ry acligh Fee a ey we had mee be LE De eae lg groped denne, ME dence, Rowers a Jeon: a a ay les ata a ee or cist pains ire Seca tena Ty of mas in, Eos Mai has ro doubt ene nut as een st ne ern thing: Reber Dal for lane ull ib ‘enat-centarymndel of democracy largely on Macon, And Madion arate ar excep fy geseration fr he nthe 170m Teeth cl ddd sey, and dd uy ofa yen of govern OER Leia ception Re the net be propel ean sno Be16 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy in other respects, both of them requived a society where every ‘one had, oF could have, enough propecty to work on or work with, society of independent producers (peasants or farmers and ‘rafismen), not a society divided into dependent wage. earners on the one hand, and, on the ther Ind and capital owners on whom they were dependent. Rousseau’s position is clear, Private property is indidal righ? But onl the moderate property ot working proprietor is sacred. An unlimited. property ight, Routes argued forcflly in his Dis oe Ong of Aepuality (1755), was the source and the continuing means of exploitation and unfrcedom: only a limited right was morally Jistifiable, He reasserted this postion ia The Socal Couct (1762). The fist property, property in the original means of producing the means of lie, was property in apiece of land. ‘The origina right to land, the right of the fist occupier, was limited in two ways: ‘a man must occupy only the amount he needs for hissubsstence; and... postestion must be taken not by any empty ceremony, but by labour and cultivation’ So Rousseau found a basis in natural right for his insistence on imited property He needed such a limited property right for another reason, whic he also made explicit: only such a mited right was consistent with the sovereignty of the general will A tuly democratic society, a society that would be governed by the {ata dee: ane ad only lok a hs amis to pec ie ‘Sinorisy of the opulent gaint the ajay” (ar Fatrond CE.) 7 ‘raf Pr ont site Ne vena don, “agri 90); hb provision wai the dominance of arn’ wh he ‘the a nur of czy, wheter taj or amine of he ‘ne, who at ied nnd acta byanne onto ape of pon ‘net (Fld Pps, No} atl gh Spel propery wich mat be rotted aut done ling opens (in). He enna hore be ele a= pence tary itera eter 7 thigh of props theo sere fl he igh of teen ‘hip, ad even mere impertaneiasme topes than liber ee Dopey th tu foundation oti socks Dist n Pela Eanany {95} Th Sl Cota and Disure (eat, Gr DH. ot), Every sea abeay, 909 9 Be a9, oi, a0, Models and Precursors 4 acncral wil, requires such an equality of property that ‘ao ‘zen shall ever be wealthy enough toby another, sl none poor enough tobe freed to sell imu The relrence to Buying and sling persons is apparently not a reference to slavery, fe dis ping eat ot se permanent rule Boe ‘gm, free nen: presumably, then, it a profbion of the putcase and sale of fee wage labour. Aga, “avs ate lvaye of us to thre who potest and barf to there who have nothings ftom which it follows that the sci state i ‘advantageous to men only when all have someting and none too much Rouseat's reavon for requiing such equality was clear enough, It flowed divec from his instence on the aver dgnty of the general will Tor where differences of propery divide men into clases with opposed Inerers, nen wl be de by clas interes, which are indi the whole society, Paticuler interests; so they willbe incapable of exprening © ence wil for the common good. The emengence and steady peration of the general sil required a one-clas society of trorking proprietor, Such a society was to be achieved by government action’ ‘Tei therfore on of the most important Functions of government vo prevent extreme inequality offre tunes; not by taking aay wealth from its pesesor, but by depriving al men of means to accumulate; not by bullding howpltals for the poor, but by seeing the cdaens from ‘When we nur tothe theorist who selten accounted the frst accat American proponent of democracy we nd a smile hough les sysetate,srguiment, Thomas Jefemon treated the common people as tuxtwortiy to an extent nnbsal in most subsequent Presidents of the United Stats, Te would be nnduly cynical to thin thet this was Boca he wa ithe tut the temptations aGorded by modern techniques of pres dental public rations. In any case he madet lear, bot in hs pubte statements and bis private letters, eat hie test the people was tut in the Sndependent worker proprietor, 2k Meh nw. WBE can i ads 1 Di ld ay a, pt18 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy whom he saw as the backbone, and hoped would remain the backbone, of American society. In his most substantial published work, the Notes on Virginia (1791), he was clear that his favourable estimate of human nature was confined to those who had substantial economic independence: Dependence begets aubervience afd venality, auffocates che germ oti and prepa ot fr de de anon erally speaking, the proportion which te sggrepate ofthe ther {ieee Bay Seta tin ti ume, the ropotion a tsuneo tot sly part, an isa good enous orice whereby to measure the degree ofits corruption The roof eat cide a0d just vache suppor of pure {government Sores do othe stength of the umn body. ‘The same principle is expressed in a letter to John Adame in 1813: Here everyone may have land to labor for himel ithe chooses; or pecorino ay oe nd yet er ach mpevaion wy of oly lod omic, bt ‘wherewith to provide for a easaton fom labor in od age. Every: aes by hs property o by hi sticoysuntion intr the’ support of law and orden And sich. men ‘nay sfely’ and advantageously reserve to themssives a wholetome contol over their public flair, and degree af eedom, which inde bonds of the coal ofthe cites of Europe, would be instatly perverted to the demolition and destruction of everything pulle and privates Democracy, for Jefferson, required a society in which everyone was independent economically. Reasoning from the America situation, Jefferson did not require that everyone should be a ‘worker-proprictor, but only that everyone could be one if he hed, He had no objection to wage-labosr, but only because, free land available, wage-earners were as independent as hhusbandmen, Nor did he object to some men, like himself, ‘having substantial states, provided that everyone else had, ot ‘could have, a small estate sufficient to make him independent, In the circumstances which Jefferson saw prevailing in Ameri- a, and which he considered prerequisite for democracy any- "Notes on gina, Query XIX, ia Saul K, Padover: The Compete Hii, Now York, 943, Po- 670-. "STi, pos 265-5 Models and Precursors 19 where, there was, therefore, no fundamental class division. He allowed the existence of a wage-relation only because it did not, in those circumstances, make a classdivided society. Jefferson's prerequisite for democracy was, ike Rousseau’, & ‘onesclass society. Ie may be objected that the kind of society envisaged by these pre-nineteentlveentury democratic writers as a pre- requisite of democracy was not after all a onexclas society, in that it would still leave women as @ subordinate class, unable ‘to own productive property in their own right. Moreover, as we have seen, the point emphasized by the democratic oppo- nents of clase-divided tociety was that any class without pro- ductive property was dependent on and exploited by the class with such property. Temay well be argued that women were in Jjust that position, and certainly the early democratic writers ‘were not conspicuous for taking any stand againstit: Rousseau jndeed thought thae women ought to he Kept dependent. Were hot there writers, then, assuming what must be ealfed a class- divided society? T think not, For down to the nineteenth century women were commonly considered not full members of society, They sere in, but not of, civil society. It would scarcely occur to 8 theorist ia describing or prescribing the class character of a society, to treat them as a class. An eighteenth-century demo- frat could think of a one-clas society excluding women as casily as an ancient Athenian democrat could think of a one- class society excluding slaves, "Nor can women he said to have been « class in any full sense. ‘True, in so far a8 women could not own property they mect ‘our minimum definition of a class. And in so far as they were kept dependent and exploited they fit the underlying concept of clas as an exploited/exploter relation. But there i a very [great difference between the way they were exploited and the Way the propertyless working class (Who were also considered jn the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to be not fall ‘members of civil society") were exploited, The difference is 1 thinkso great as to make it inappropriate to describe women as a class SG, Te Palit Thr of Pans Iidalom,pp.281-.20 ‘The Life and Times of Liberal Demoeracy For from the seventeenth century on, asthe capitalist market relation replaced feudal or other status relations as the means by which owners benefited from the work of non-owner, it was understood that the only permisible arrangement for sich, ‘benefit was the relation between free wage-earners aiff owners of the capital which employed them. ‘The wage relation, a strictly market relation, became the criterion of clas, And in the eighteenth century, when Rousseau and Jefferson were stipulating a one-class society, and for some time after that, ‘women were not a class by that criterion. They were indeed exploited by the male-dominated society, which made most ‘of them perform the function of reproducing the labour force for no more reward than their subsistence. But they were made to do this by legal arrangements akin to a feudal (or even slave) relation, rather than by a market relation, In 30 far as ‘lass was, and was seen to be, determined by the capitalist market relation, women as such were not, and would not be thought to be, a class. That being so, writers who inveighed against class-divided society while not treating women a8 a class, were genuinely stipulating a one-lass society. We are therefore, I think, stil entitled to refer to the pre-nineteenth- ‘century democratic theorists as advocates of a one-class (or classles}) society ‘This brief survey of models of democracy earlier than the nineteenth century is, I hope, sufficient to sustain my generale ization that al of them were fitted either to clasless or to a ‘one-class society. And that is why I think that all of the pre-” nineteenth-centity democratic theories are better treated as being outside the liberal-democratic tradition, To be counted in that tradition a theory should surely be both democratic and liberal. But what is usually, and I think rightly, considered to be the liberal tradition, stretching from Locke and the Encyclopédistes down to the present, has from the beginning included an acceptance of the market freedoms of capitalist society. ‘Thepattemnisclearenough. Theseventeenth- andeighteenth- century liberals, who were not at all democratic (from, say, Locke to Burke) fully accepted capitalit market relations. So did the early’ nineteenth-century liberal-democrats, how Models and Precursors an strongly inthe cases of Bentham and James Mill we shall ein Chapter Il. Then from about the iniédle of the nineteenth century fo the middle of the cveotieth, as we shall see in ‘Chapter ITT, the Hiberal-democratic thinkers wied to combine an acceptance ofthe capitalist market society with a humanist ‘ethical position, This produced a model of democracy notably different from Bentham, but sill including acceptance ofthe smarket society. Since the iberal component of liberal demo- racy has pretty constantly included acceptance of capitalist relations and hence of class-divided society, it seems appro- priate thatthe pre-nineteenth-century democratic theories, all of which rejected the clasvdivided society, should be placed outside the liberal-democratic category. They were, 30 1 speak, handicraét models of democracy, snd as such are best considered as precursors of liberal democracy. If this is thought to be stil a somewhat arbitrary division, I shall not insist. The important thing it not the classification, but the recognition of how deeply the market assumptions about the nature of man and society have penetrated liberal- democratic theory. ‘The reader may wonder whether the grounds offered for this clasification do not commit the author to the propesition that beral democracy must alwaye embrace the capitalist market society with its class-division. IF ‘liberal’ has always ‘meant chat, or atleast has always included that, should it con- tye to be used only with that meaning? Ts it not then incon atént to go on to inquire, as I do in Chapter V, into the prospects of a democratic theory which downgrades or aban- done the market assumptions, and to treat this as an inquiry into a possible future model of liberal democracy? T do not think any ofthese questions are to be answered in the affirmative. T would argue that the reason ‘liberal? did ‘mean acceptance of the capitalist market society, during the formative century of liberal democracy, does not apply’ any longer, Liberalism had always meant freeing the individual from the outdated restraints of old established institutions. By “the time liberalism emerged as liberal democracy this became 4 dlaim to free all individvals equally, and to free them to use and develop their human capacities fully. But so long as there22 The Life and Times of Literal Demverocy ‘was an economy of scarcity it still seemed to the liberal demo- ‘rat chat cheonly way to that goal was through the productivity ‘of ree-enterprise capitalism. Whedter this was in fact the only way as late a5 the early twentieth century may be doubted, but there is no doubt that the leading liberal democrats thought it to be so; and as long as they did, they had to accept the linkage of market society with liberal-democratie ends, But this linkage is no longer necessary. It is no longer necessary, “that is to say, if we assume that we have now reached a techno logical level of productivity which makes possible a good life for everybody without depending on capitalist incentives, ‘That assumption may of course be challenged. Bue if it is enied, then there seems no possibility of any new model of democratic society, and no point in discussing such a model under any designation, liberal or otherwise. Ifthe assumption is granted, the previously necessary linkage is no longer neces- sary, and & new model not based on the capitalist market may properly be considered under the heading ‘iberal-democratc Tn the following chapters I shall examine three successive models of liberal democracy that may he said to have prevailed in turn from the early nineteenth century to the present, and shall go on 10 consider the prospects of 2 fourth. The first model I call Proztse Demneray its cate for the democratic system of government was that nothing less could in principle protect the governed from oppression by the government. The second is called Developmental Democracy: it brought in a row oral dimension, seeing democracy primarily as a means of individual self development. The third, Equilibrium Democray, abandoned the moral claim, on the ground that experience of the actual operation of democratic systems had shown that the evelopmental model was quite unrealistic: dhe equilibrium theorists offered instead a description (and justification) of democracy as a competition between élives which produces equilibrium without much popular participation, This is the presently prevalent model. Its inadequacy is becomizag increas ingly apparent, and the possibility of replacing it with some- thing more participatory has become a lively and serious issue, So this study goes on to consider the prospects and problems of a fourth model, Participatory Demseracy. IL Model 1: Protective Democracy ‘Whatever may be thought of Tennyzon’s lines about freedom slowly broadening down ftom precedent to precedent, it is clear that this is not the way we reached our present liberal democracies, It is true that in the present liberal democracies the universal franchise did generally come by stages, start~ ing from a restrictive property qualification, moving at dif- ferent speeds in different countries to manhood sullrage, and finally including women suffrage, But before this expan sion of the franchise had begun at all, the institutions and ideology of liberal individvalism were firmly established, ‘The only apparent exceptions to this rule were no exceptions Some European countries, notably France, did have manhood franchise before the liberal market society had fully established itself there, But since the assemblies elected by that franchise did not have the power to make or unmake governments, the arrangements cannot be deemed democratic: the extent ofthe franchise isa measure of democratic government only in 30 far as the exercise ofthe franchise can make and unmake govern= ‘ments. So we may say that by the time the movement for a fully democratic franchise had gathered momenturn anywhere, the concept of democracy which that franchise was to embody ‘was very different from any ofthe earlier visions of democracy. ‘Thus there is a sharp break in the path from pre-liheral to liberal democracy. A fresh start was made in the nineteenth century, from a very different base. The catlier concepts of democracy, as we have seen, had rejected clas division, believ- ing or hoping that it could be transcended, or even assuming24 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy ‘hatin some places—Rousseau’s Geneva or Jefferon’s America it had been transvended. Liberal democracy, on the con trary, accepted class division, and built on i. The fist formu Jators of liberal democracy came to its advocacy through a chain of reasoning which started from the assumptions of a capitalist market society and the laws of clastieal political economy. These gave them a model of man (as maximizer of| “Utlites) anda model of society (as a collection of individuals ‘with conflicting interes). From those models, and one ethical principle, they deduced the need for government, the desirable funetions of government, and hence the desirable system of choosing and authorizing governments, To see how deeply their ‘models of man and society got into their general theory, and hence into their model of liberal democracy as the best form af government, we shall do well to look more closely than is usually done at the theories of the two earliest systematic exponents of liberal democracy, Jeremy Bentham and James ‘Mal! We may start with Bentham, the original systematizer ofthe theory that came to be known as Utilitarianism, and bring in James Mill when, as sometimes happened, he stated the Utiltarian case more clearly than Bentham, oF when bis reser- vations and ambiguities were different from Beatham's, James ‘Mill was a thorough disciple of Bentham, and a much more disciplined writer, so he often put the Benthamite case more strikingly than the master himself, And by the time Bentham 1 James Mis model can be dated prey a 1820, in hia famous article ‘on Gorn Bentham ray be dated 1820 (ee p. 3, 1.35) 12, ‘when he proce the wena Reino» Parley Raf which would admit the anche “ll such persone a, bing ofthe ral arm of ature age, and of sud sid shall have ben resident ether at houscalderorinmaten within the direc lace nwhic thay are calod {penta wee" (TPs ed.Boveing, Ealabuesh and Landon, 1843 % 497) "Other, indeed, had advocsed ull inashood suleage somewht ‘ate notably Major John Cartwright, ae ery a8 1776 in a Take Tur ‘Gh! aod Cabbet i his Polite! Rite Bat aeither of ther can best tobaweset wp afl reavned mode, nd wich theo grounds they Aid ofr were backardlookag: thir apesl was fo the tural right of {Eechorn Englishmen (before the resco ofthe anche by 9 Henry Vij); and there was a arate ofthe changed le stractuse or of ‘he signlieance of the new indutal working dane Model 1: Protective Democracy 25 pput his mind to the question of the best form of government, their minds ran in parallel, and they were in close touch with each other. So it will do no injustice to either to treat them flmost as a unit. ‘Te must be said that with Bentham and James Mill iberal democracy got off to a poor start. It is not that they were in- competent theorists, On the contrary, Bentham became de- servedly famous as a thinker, and the most influential doctrine fof the English nineteenth century was named after him. And ‘James Mill, though not ofthe very frst rank, was a clear and Torceful writer. And the general theory of Usiitarianism, from they both deduced the need far a democratic franchise, seemed both fundamentally egalitarian and thoroughly busi- nesslike. It was both, and that was the trouble. I shall suggest ‘that jt was the combination ofan ethical principle of equality with = competitive market model of man and society that logically required both thinkers to conclude in favour of a democratic franchise, bat made them do so either ambiguously fr with reservations. ‘The general theory was clear enough. The only rationally defensible criterion of social good was the greatest happiness of atest number, happiness being defined as the amount of idual pleasure minus pain. In calculating the aggregate ret happiness of a whole society, each individual was to count as one, What could be more egalitarian than that as a fanda- ‘mental ethical principle? But toit were added certain factual portulaes, Every indivi- ‘dual by his very nature seeks to maximize his ovin pleasure without limit, And although Bentham sct out a long list of Kinds of pleasure, including many non-material ones, he 48 clear that the possession of material goods was so basic to the attainment ofall ther satisfactions thatit alone could be taken as che measure of them all. “Each portion of wealth has a corresponding portion of happiness.’* And again: “Money is, Principles of the Cit Cade, Past T, ch. 6, ip Bentharn: The Thy of Leptin oC. K. Ogden, London, 19, t0y. (U have preferred this } Bowerici Unwersitesr Kutuphanes26 The Life and Times of Liberal Demoeracy the instrument of measusing'the quantity of pain or pleasure, ‘Those who are not satisfied with the accuraey of this instra- ment must find out some athe that shall be more accurate, oF Bid adieu to politics and morals.’® ‘So each seeks to saximiae his own wealth without Tmt. One way of doing this sto get power over other. “Berween wealth ind power, the connesion i mest close and intimate; so int- toate, indeed, that the disentanglement of them, even in the Inmagloation, is « matter of no small elificulty. They are each ‘of thems reapectively an instrument of production with relation fo the other* And agen, ‘human beings are the most powerful instruments of production, and therefore everyone becomes anxious to employ the services of his fellows in rushtplying his ‘ow comforts, Hence the intense and universal thirst for powers the equelly prevalent hatred of subjection. “James Mill was even more forthright. In his 1820 article Gioerment he wrote: ‘That one Ruma being will desire to render the peron and prop: roy of anther suinenent to is pleurey nobwitutanding the fain or ls of pleasure which thay occasion to that her ini hal, dhe foundation of government. The deste of the object Inmlis the dee ofthe power nevesary to accomplish the abject ‘idee, herr bat pow wht eect toro the Eorand qoversng lw of human sature. ~The grand itr ‘eat for altaining whet » man keri the along of orber men Power... thercbre, mens nur forthe conformity Between the wills ose man andthe aot of other men. Tie, we presume, hot a proposition which wil be dsped® With thie grand governing law of human nature, society is 2 collection of inivicuals incessantly seeking power over and at the expense ofeach other. To keep auch a society from fying pars structure of aw both civil and eriminal was seen to Be ‘tion t the version primed in the Bentham Was eted by Bowring, ‘Sel :) On the abuwacion Eom realty reguited teaser this propo, 12 low, B. 9p, a 1 ‘We Sar (o.):Joumy Bean's Beams Wri, i 117 ‘Contato! Cay Bk ch 9, kn Work, e8 Bowing, 48. = Sar (ed) 90 “Section IV (p17 af the Basher eton, Cambridge, 1937). Model 1: Protective Democracy 7 needed. Various structures of law might be capable of provid- ing the necessary order, but, of course, according to the Utiltarian ethical principle, che best tet of laws, the best dise twibution of rights and obligations, was that which would pro- duce che greatest happiness of the greatest number. This most ‘general end of the laws could, Bentham said, be divided into four subordinate ends: “to provide subsistence; to produce abundance; to favour equality; to maintain securty.”™ Bentham’s arguments aé to how each of these ends could be achieved (and how not) are revealing. Together they amount to a case for a system of unlimited private property and capitalist enterpise, and this apparently deduced from the factual postulates about human nature and a few others. Let us Jook in turn at his arguments under each head. ~Eiest, subsistence. The law need do nothing to ensure that enough will be produced to provide subsistence for everyone. ‘What can the law do for subsistence? Nothing dieecly.Allitcan do {sto create molt, thats, punishanents or rewasds, by the force of ‘which men may be led 19 provide subsistence for themselves, But nature herself has created hese motive, and has given them 2 fulicient energy, Hefore the idea oflaws existed, neds and ejoyments hhad dane in that respect all thatthe best concerted tas could do, “Need, armed with pains ofall ads, even death fell, commanded Inoue eugene fea deep the el tie of nan. Enjoyment, the inseparable companion a every ne SStied, foned an iesbasstsle find of rewards for these who ‘ermouied ota a ale then oat The zat cal tanction would be superioods® ‘What the lars can do isto “provide for subsistence indirectly, by protecting men while they labour, and by making them sure of the fruits of their labour. Security for the labourer, security for the fruit ofabour; such isthe benefit of laws; and iis an inestimable benef.” Prine of the Cbd Coie, Pat Teh 2: Ogden (9): op cts B95 ‘Ti, Past Teh 4: Ogden, p00. i28 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy ‘The curious point here is that Bentham, in invoking fear of, starvation as a natural incentive to the productive labour ‘which would provide subsistence for everybody, has slipped fiom thinking of a primitive society (before the idea of laws existed’), where fear of starvation would have that effect on everybody, to an advanced nineteenth-century industrial society, where that does not apply without an additional pro- viso, Ina primitive society with suck a low level of productive technique thatthe incessant labour ofall was needed (and was seen by all to be needed) to avoid general starvation, the fear fof starvation sould be a suficent incentive to the productive Jabour that would produce subsistence for all, But in a society whose productive techniques are suficient to provide subsist- tence for everyone without auch incesant labour by everyone, like England in Bentham’s time, fear of starvation is not in itselfa sufficient incentive. In such a society, fear of starvation will be an incentive to incessant labour only where the institu tons of property have created » clas who have no property in land or working capital, and no claims on society for their support, and hence must sell their labour or starve. ‘So keen a thinker as Bentham could scarcely have failed to see this, had he not been taking for granted the existence of such a clas as inevitable in any economically advanced society. ‘And we knovr the ke did assume this: ‘In the highest state of social prosperity, the great mass of citizens will have no re- source except their daily industry; and consequently will be flways near indigence." Already we can see the teachings ‘of clasical political economy subverting the egalitarian principle. ‘A similar shift takes place in his argument about ‘abun- dance’. Here he seems to slip from thinking of a society of independent producers to thinking ofhisown advanced society, applying tothe later a generalization about incentives appar- ‘ely drawn from the former. No legislation, he says, is needed to encourage individuals to produce abundance of material ‘goods. Natural incentives ate enough, because everyone's Aesire is infinite, Each want satisfied produces a new want, So there is a strong and permanent incentive to produce more. Thi, Par I, ch. 143 Oss, ps 197- { Model 1: Protective Democracy 29 Bentham doesnot notice that this incentive, which may prope sy enough be postulated ofthe capitalist entrepreneur and Ponibly of the tltemployed independent producer, cannot ery well apply to the wageeamner, who ae ‘alwayr teat indigence’ He docs notsce thi, beeausehehascreated his model ‘man inthe image ofthe entrepreneur or the independent producer, He could do that bees he had no historical ese, Teisonly when we come to his argemene under the heads of equality and security tht oe can see the fll extent to which hnacceptanceofeaptaliem soderininedhisegliterian ethical Principle, The eae for ‘equality, that, for everyone having Thesaine amount of wealth oritome, eset out clearly. yer ‘om what came to be known asthe law of diminishing uit, which points out that succesdve increments of wealth (or ef "ny material goods) bring suecesively lee saisection to thelr holder, of, hat g perio with enor a hundred mes the wealth af another has mach les than ten or a huned tres a mich pleasire. Given tha all individuals have the same capacity for Dleasice, and that ‘cach portion of wealth has» corresponding portion of happines’, it flows that he who has the moat rent has the most happines?, but alo that ‘the excess in happinest of thescher wil not be so great athe excms of bis teal. Prom thsi follows that agaregatehappines will be {rear the more nearly the distibation of wealth approsches Suslty: massmum aggregate happines requires that al individeals have equal wealth, This ease for equality requires, at we have noticed, an sumption of equal capacities for pleasure. Ror if some were sumed to havea greater capacity for plesvre, i. greater Sensvty or seoablty, st coud be argued that aggregate Happiness would be maximized by their having more wealth than the others, Bentham was not very consent sboue this He prefaced the ‘diminishing retary? argument for equality by setting ase ‘the particular senility of individuals, and the exterior Greumstances in which they ray be placed. “Tihee must be st ase, he said, bees “they ave never the fame for two individual o that, without setng those ifs ‘nes aide it will be spose to announce any general Tidy Pat yh 6; Osder psgo The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy proposition’s2 Yet elsewhere he pointed out that, besides par ticular individual differences in sensibility, there were differ ences between whole categories of individuals. There was a difference in sensibility as between the sexes: ‘In point of ‘quantity, the sensibility of the female sex appears in general to be greater than that of the male." And, of more direct importance in an argument that depends on a relation be- tween pleasure and wealth, Bentham saw 2 difference in _Acasiblity between those of different ‘station, or rank in life: “Castors paribus, the quantum of sensibility appears to be greater in the higher ranks of men than in the lower." If Bentham hhad acknowledged such a property-class differential when taking his case for equality of wealth, his case would have been destroyed: he would have been endorsing the position of| Edmund Burke. Perhaps he was, Perhaps he saw no need to mention that differential when stating his case for equality because he had already decided that the claims of equality were entirely subordinate to the claims of security. Tn any case, having said this much under the bead of ‘equality’, Bentham turned to ‘security’, that is, seourity.of property and of expectation of return fiom the use of one's labour and preperty. Without security of property in the fruits of one's labour, Bentham says, civilization is impossible. No ‘one would form aay plan of life or undertake any labour the product of which he could not immediately take and use. Not ‘even simple eulivation ofthe land would be undertaken if one ‘could not be sure that the harvest would be one’s own. The laws, cherefore, must secure individual property. And since ‘men differ in ability and energy, some will get more property than others. Any attempt by the law to reduce them to ‘equality would destroy the incentive to productivity. Hence, ‘as between equality and security, the law must have no hesita- : "Equality must yiela35 “The argument ie persuasive, though invalid, True, if one sm, 29 Inston ote Pring of Morals and Legation, cs 6, fn Calttad Works, London, 197.84 Thy ps 2 rp oft il Co, Pare, c 185 Oren, 180 Model 1: Protective Democracy 3 sce Beis proiieveyniily ie ary SESSA pe ance ne ik Site nat ad i Sones eae ae fate MAMAS she feat red sch el gis sae rte ot iPS bg a as gute Ey ne stfu ie nc den ey STEEL Sitar ached itn hero ‘lnm Cloed yt nce ee eR Km facia er dei ues ntang sgh reds Coiba ent ttc Sie cheat erm oe a cunt apt bold rey ale se a men ee estos ang athe efor Wiebe ha encom onic ci ore ee cy tee as intelli ede center ce Tl tHe oto rnin Se ety Beet wap tt ny ay TELE Satie prac ch Seu end bette eons bar abe gine ts nling te gad pn of mow wa gh Uplate tate rape ie Tas" pope aed) To mince aon icy ie ene ea ee a Ser eh een emcee Hiottg Sets tetohe dA ea sie ieee date inae gridit eae, cag ates atl lon sansa ‘Bentham’s supporting argument demonstrates again his lack “ofhistorical sense, His contention i, that w overturn ayy exst- ing syatem of property is to make impossible any other system ‘Tbid, Pat Tc. #15 Onde, v.19,32 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy of property. It does not need a profound knowledge of history to se that this isnot so, For instance the destruction of the feudal system of propery led tothe esteblimentof an equally fren eaptalin sytem of propery; andthe same sight be sid of many previous averthrows of on exiting atom. TfBenthan’s unhistccal postulate had been tru, he would hhave Bren logically entitled t.coelude that every etablithed system mist be maintained, even where ti no produce the same sun of happiness forthe overtening of any system ‘would then be wane bythe greater happiness criterion, that ‘ay posible Benet from snother system. But the potlat e not valid, So his ‘emonstration” that security has absolute pratty over equality snot val Te might be thought that Bentham could have established is cae of the security of any exablishd system of propery, including those which maintained an_ extremely vneqval discibution of wealth, without relying on his unhistorical pos tulate but simply by invoking another principle which he anc nounced in the chapter on equality, This ete principle that men in general appear tobe moe sesisiveto pai shan to pleasure, ten sehen the cn St equa To such degre, indeed, Goes his Seend, dat alow wih Smiter a man's forte by one fourth wil take away more hppines than he could gain by doubling is property. But Bentham saw that this alone did not justify the mainten- ance of great inequality. All he concluded from this was that, as between two persons of equal wealth, a redistribution would mean a net loss of happiness. He could have shown further, that as between two persons one of whom started with four times the wealth of another, a redistribution of a quarter of A't ‘wealth to B, which would double B's wealth, would still mean some net loss of happiness, Buc if A started with say,-twelve, times the wealth ofB, a redistribution ofa quarter of A's wealth would quadruple B's wealth, which presumably would mean a net gain in happiness. Bentham recognized this. His way of putting it was to say that in such a case ‘the evil done by an attack on security will be compensated in part by a good which Th, Pare, dh. 6; Ogden, p18 Model 1: Protective Democracy 33 will be greatin proportion tothe progress towards equaity’a8 So he needed an independent argument to make his case for the absolute priority of security over equality. And the indee pendent argument was, as we have seen, based on the invalid Fistorieal postulate, From Bentham’s whole treatment of the four subordinate ‘nds of legislation, and from his preceding factual postulates it isclea, then, how deeply his general theory was penetrated by bourgeois assumptions. First we have the general postulates: that every perion always acts to secure his own interest, to raximize his own pleasure oF utility, without limit; and that this confits with everyone else's interest, Then the search for ‘the maximum pleasue is reduced to the search for maximum material goods andjor power over others. ‘Then, postulates dav ftom his contemporary capitalist society are preseted as univerally valid: thatthe great mass of men will never rise above a bare subsistence level; that for them fear of starvation rather than hope of gain is the operative incentive ta labour; that, for the more fortinate, hope of gain is a sufficient incen- tive to maximum productivity; that, for this hope to-operate as an incentive, there must be absolut security of property. Fine ally, we have security of property clevated to a ‘supreme principle absolutely overriding the principle of equality. ‘The ultimate reason Bentham saw no contradiction heze, ‘tie reason underlying his unhistorieal postulate, is, I suggest, ‘that he was really concerned only with the rationale of che Capitalist market society. In thatsocity indeed, atleast accord- {ng to his version of classical political economy, ehere appeared to be no such contradiction: security of unlisted individual appropriation was the very thing which, along with unlimited desire, would induce the maximum productivity ofthe whole stem, Butto say that security of property, while perpetuating inequality, maximizes productivity, is not to say that it maxie izes aggregate pleasure or utility. Bentham has again shifted his ground, now from aggregate utility to aggregate wealth. But these are different. The shift isillegiimate because, by bis ‘own principle of diminishing utility, a smaller national wealth, ‘equally distributed, could yield a larger aggregate utility than “Tei94 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy 1 larger national wealth une(ually distributed. But Bentham ‘was so imbued with the ethos of capitalism, which is for maxi- tization of wealth and sees it as equivalent to maximization of uty, that he did not admit their difference. ‘THE POLITICAL REQUIREMENT Por this kind of vocety, what kind of tate was needed? The political problem was to find a system of choosing and author- iting goveraments, that is, sets oflaw-makersand law-enforcers, ‘who would make and enforce the Kind of laws needed by such 2 society. I was a double problem: the politcal system should both produce governments which would establish and nurture a free market society and protect the citizens from rapacious ‘governments (for by the grand governing principle of human, nature every government would be rapacious unless it were ‘made in its own interest not to be so, oF impossible for it to be 10). ‘The crucial point in the solution of this double problem turned out to be the extent ofthe franchise, along with certain devices such as the secret ballot, frequent elections, and free- dom of the press, which would make the vote a fice and effective expression ofthe voter's wishes. The extent and genue inenessof the franchise became thecentral question because, by ‘the early nineteenth century in England, theorists were able to take for granted the rest of the framework of representative ‘government: the constitutional provisions whereby legislatures and executives were periodically chosen, and therefore periodically replaceable, by the voters at general elections, and ‘whereby the civil service (and the military) were subordinate to a government thus responsible to the electorate. So the ‘model which the nineteenth-century thinkers started from w fa system of representative and responsible government of this “Ikind. The question that was left for them was, what provisions for the extent and genuineness of the franchise would both, produce governments whick would promote a free market society and protect the citizens from the government, Tf only the fist of these requirements had been seen 23 2 problem, something far short of democratic franchise would Model 1: Protective Democracy 35 have been sufficient, Indeed, something far short of that sti- fied Bentham for two decades after he began to think about political systems. Ina work written between 1791 and 1802 he twas for a limited franchise, excluding the poor, the uncdu- cated, the dependent, and women.” Th 1609 he was advocat- ing a householder franchise, one limited to those paying direct taxes on property. By 1817 he was talking about a ‘virtually universal franchise, excluding only those under age and those unable to read, and posibly excluding women (to give a decided opinion on that ‘would be altogether premature in this place’); but in that same work he said that while he had become convinced of the safenes of the principle of universal suffrage, he was also convinced ‘of the ease and consistency ‘with which, for the sake of usin and concard, many exclusions might be made, at any rate for a time and for the sake of quict ‘and gradual experience." By 1820 he was for manhood fran ‘hises but even then he suid that he would gladly support the more limited householder franchise except that he could not sethat this could satisfy those excluded, who ‘would perhaps constitute @ majority of male adult So Bentham was not ‘enthusiastic about a democratic franchise: he was pushed tot, partly by his appraisal of what the people by then would demand, and partly by the sheer requirements of logic as oon ‘a he turned his mind to the constitutional question. ‘Byery body of men [including whatever body has the power to legislate and to govern] is governed altogether by its con- ception of what its interest, inthe narrowest and most selfish ~sense ofthe word interes: never by any regard forthe interest sof others." The only way to prevent the governnient despoil- “Ting all the rest ofthe people is to make the governors frequency “vemavable by the majority ofall the people. The powers of government in the hands of any set of people other than those chosen and removable by the votes of the greatest number Prise of Lagat ch, 19, se. 9512 Open (2): The Thay of Leia, 8, "olen of Pianeta Rao, 1818 ed pp 40m. an 127. 2 Tei, pp. 5-7 and at. 1 Radke Not Donets in Wisk. Bowing, 8.508, Cia! Codi Worse. Bowen 102,36 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy ‘would be necessarily directed to the giving every posible increase to thelr own happiness, whatever became of the hap nes of others. And in proportion as their happines recztved increase would the aggregate happincs ofall the governed be diminished = Happiness is zero-sum game: the more the governors have, the les the governed have ‘The case for a democratic system is purely the protective cases with the siugle exception of an aptly organized demo- racy, the ruling and influential few are enemies of the subject, many: . and by the very nature of man... perpetual and tinchangeable enemies. A democracy, then, has forts characteristic object and effect, he securing is niembers against oppression and depredation af the Inande of thove fanetionaries which i employs forts defence Every other species of government has necessarily, for its charac teristic and primary object and eet, the keeping the people or ron-Runetionarcs i perlecUy defenceles sate, against the func: tinnaries thie rules; who being in respect of their power and the tte they ace disposed and enabled to make oft the natural ade versaies of the people, have for their object the giving facility, cer tiny, unbounded extent and impunity, to the depredation and ‘oppresion exercised on the govemed by tele governors. But while logical deduction from the nature of huinan beings ‘gave an irrefatable ease fora democratic constitution, Bentham ‘as ready to compromise it on grounds of expediency. His final position on female suffrage isa clear example. The cave for universal franchise required that women, equally with men, should have the vote, Indeed, Bentham argued that, to com pnsate for their natural handicaps, women were if anything- ‘entitled to more votes than men, Nevertheless he held that there is now such a general presupposition against female suffrage that he could not recommend it: ‘the contest and coa- fusion produced by the proposal ofthis improvement would entirely engross the public mind, and throw improvement, in all other shapes, toa distance. ® STB, 9 Ibid a tb, baat Tbidsp. 108 Model 1: Protective Democracy 37 So we have Bentham’s whole position on the democratic franchise, He would be happy with a limited franchise but was willing 19 concede manhood franchise, In principle he even made a eae for universal franchise, but held that che time was not ripe for it: to advocate votes for women now would en- anger the chances of any parliamentary refarm, And we should notice that he moved to the principle of the democratic franchise only when he had become persuaded that the poor ‘would not use their votes to level ot destroy property. The poor, he argued, have more to gain by maintaining the institu tion of property than by desttoying it, and as evidence he pointed to the fact that in the United States those ‘without property suficient for their maintenance’ had, for upwards of * ity years, had the property of the wealthy within the compast of their legal power? and had never inftinged property.2* JAMES MILL'S SERSAW Ie was James Mill who, in 1820, made the most powerfl case for universal franchise, and even that was o guarded and put in such hypothetical terms that it can be read, and often has been read, as a ease for a much less than universal franchise. But though he heéged his conclusions, his argument leads irsesstibly to universal franchise. The, main argument is bolder than Bentharn’s but essentaly similar. Iestarts with the assertion of what is surely the most extreme postulate about sellinteret ever made, before or since—that grand governing law of human nature that we have alzeady seen, From this it followed that those who had no political power would be ‘oppressed by those who did have it, The vote was political Dower, or at least the lack of the vote was lack of political power: Therefore everyone needed the vot, for self protectin. | ‘Nothing short of ‘one person, one vote’ could in principle protect all the citizens from the government. Tid Ps 2 The aout readings are cused by Jouph Hamburger: Tames ellen Univenal Stage andthe Mile Cis, ural of Polite (198), Yel 4, pp. 167-00; and in Hamburgers neal Pai, Job St ‘Mit ed he Pops Raa, New Haven an Landa, 15,7 9-3838 ‘The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy But itcannot be said that James Mill was enthusiastic about democracy, any more than was Bentham. For in the same article on Government in which he made the case fora universal franchise, James Mill wed considerable ingenuity in enquiring whether any narrower franchise could give the same security to every citizen's interest as would universal franchise, and he argued that it would be safe to exclude all women, all men under the age of 40, and the poorest one-third of the males over 40. ‘The argument is almost unbelievably crude. His general principle was that ‘all those individuals whose interests are indisputably included in those of other individuals may be struck off without inconvenience’ #® That seems fair enough, bbut his applications of the principle were brusque and over- Dearing. In the first place, Mill held, this took eare of women, “the interest of almott al of whom is involved either in that of their fathers or in that of their husbands’! It also permitted the exclusion of all males under some asigned age, about which age ‘considerable latitude may be taken without inean- venience. Suppose the age of forty were prescribed ... scarcely any laws could be made for the benefit ofall the men of forty Which would not be laws for the benefit ofall the rest of the community.’ And ‘the great majority of old men have sons, ‘hose interest they regard as part oftheir own. This isa law of human nature. There is, therefore, no great danger that, in such an arrangement as this, the interests of the young would be greatly sacrificed to thote of the old'®® (MII was 47 in 1820.) ‘When it came to the question of an allowable property or income qualification, Mill did not even try to apply his princie ple of included interests. The question Mill posed was whether, Somewhere between a qualification s0 low as to be of no use and one so high as to constitute an undesirable aristocracy of ‘wealth, there is one “which would remove the right of Suffrage from the people of small, or of no property, and yet constitute aan elective body, the interet of which would be identical with 2 Bey on Geronimo B Bares, Cambridge, 19875 P45. sbi, bid, pos 46-7 Model 1: Protective Democracy 39 that ofthe community?" Although this is posed as a question ofidentity ofinterests, the answer is in terms ofa calculation of opposed interests. Mill's answer is that a property qualification high enough to exclude up to one-third of the people (presum- ably one-third of the males over 40) would be safe, because teach ofthe tap two-thirds, who would have the vate, and who ‘would of course have an interest in oppressing the excluded one-third, ‘would have only onesbalf the benefit of oppresting ‘single man, In that ease, the benefits of good Government, accruing toall, mightbe expected to overbalance tothe several members of such an elective body the benefits of misrule peculiar to themselves. Good Government would, therefore, have a tolerable security.’ By the same token, a property ‘qualification which excluded more than half of the people was undesirable, for it would mean that each voter ‘would have a benefit equal to that derived from the oppression of more than ‘one man’: this benefit would be irresistible, so that bad government would be ensured. ‘We can scarcely avoid asking why James Mill, ater making his strong postive case for universal suffrage, should have raised the question of exclusions at all, let alone piling up allowable exclusions to such an extraordinary height as he id: of the adule population, some ten-twelfths were exclud- able (one-half by sex; at least half the rest by ages of the remaining quarter, one-third by property). To say the least, this does give grounds for considering Mill less than a whele- hearted democrat, Why did he doit, and especially why did he admit a property qualification? And why, having done this, did he conclude his argument by reverting to his case for universal franchise, and say that it would not be dangerous because the vast majority of the lower class would always be guided by the middle class? ‘Mil’s allowing such exclusions may be due to the fact that he, like Bentham, was primarily interested in an electoral re~ form which would undermine the dominant sinister interest of the narrow landed and moneyed class which was in full control bid, pao bid, 5 bid 30.40 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy before the 1832 Reform Bil, About this he was much more of an activist than Bentharn: he was not above tring, with some succes, to frighten the oligarchy ito granting the 182 [Reform (which was Fr short of manhood suffrage), by holding cout the ikeihood of a popular revolution if such reform were hot granted, though itis doubifal ithe himself believed in the Tikelthood of such revolutionary action. But he was very such aware ofthe importance of getting both working-class and midle-las support for such reform he was convinced of the importance of public opiion, inloding the opinion of both thove classes, In pressing for seform, theretore, he must void offending either clas, ‘Now Mill would not offend either class by permiting the exchision of women: as Bentham at least believed, probably ‘quite correctly, public opinion was far ffom ready to admit ‘women tothe Hanchise. The notion of excluding all men under the age of 40. was #0 palpably absurd chat it would. not offend anybody. One might indeed argue that such an exclusion would reduce the number of working-lass voters ‘nore than in proportion o the wellto-do, in view of the smaller proportion of the poor who reached the age of 40, but this point does not seem to have been taken up by Mill's cries: Macaulay, much his most exhaustive exit, did draw attention to the incompetence of Mille case far excluding women,* but made no reference to the case for ‘excluding the underfordes: presumably he thought i be- neath netic. ‘The only difficult decison for Mill was what to say about a property qualification. To advocate fall manhood sufrage ‘with no property qualification would fighten much midle- clas opinion; 10 advocate & property qualification which ‘would exclude asubstansial part ofthe working class would be to lose thee support So Mill found himselin a postion which is, oddly enough, paralet to that which he attributed to the 2 Joogph Haeaburgers Foner Mill andthe Art f Relin, New Haven: 1964, especialy ch ‘ Macaulay: “Mis Enay on Government Edinburgh Rian, March 80p, episied in The Milan Wrlige oe Spake of Lord Massy, London, Longmann, Green, 189 (Pople Bion, p. 174. Model 1: Protectice Democracy 4“ spokcanen of hath called she opps psy of he rlng ———UrLr TS Smad the rm nue fhe eal Minin ee Jenny 04) on Paria Ltt Milan abi nach onthe Binwgh Re, whch he said Poise he anise wing of he flng das The Tema ofthat prt, be i, was tan order dnd She Bessey nos Be tate iy thoy needed to ext ‘avg epoca opoon d peat oon ‘Seng cas purty by contagion, party by conto, sed inti they cule ot eae pstion lieth pert prover tthe ring ls spor fom SeaEiy apie of mn thy pay aceded 0 get « themselves in, and of which they were of course themselves a part. ‘In their speeches and weitings, therefore, we commonly find them playing at stsau.’ Now they recommend the interests of the ruling class, now the interests of the people. "Having ‘rritten a few pages on one side, they must write a8 many on the other, Te matters not how much the one set of principles are really at variance with the other, provided the discordance is not very visible, or not likely to be clearly seen by the party fon whort it x wished that the delusion should pass. "Mill's seesaw in the asticle Goeernment is quite parallel: the discordance between his two sets of principles, the one requir- ing universal franchise, the other permitting enormous exclu- ‘sions is kept not very visible’ by his recommending a restricted franchise only hypothetically. He later denied that he was tdwcatng the exclusion of worsen, any more chan that of men lunder the age of forty; his son reports him as having said that hhe was only asking Wwhat was the utmost allowable limit of restriction assuming that the franchise was to be restricted;#* but the wording ofthe article suggests not that he regarded the restrictions as unfortunately necessary concessions to political realism, but rather that he regarded them as usefal in securing that the electors would make a good choice.” 8 Wate Rees 28. TTS dani ed La tnd Wats las, 1924 7 ora Teg. ‘his statement that ‘a very low [property] qualification is of no42 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy ‘Theses in the ancl Goran is completed by Mis assurance ohn ender the very end ft ale, nt 20 anger wast be ata from tay enfancisement othe lower las beense the gieat majo of that lass would slay be guided by the dle class Such reamuranee Tos tial clas eade® Mil might have tought advise see ven the excison of the poor ne-thr a the males ight ‘eealeuatd to leave the working cai the majority. "Ten years afer the atcle Conn and sh ear aie his nays ofthe sre, he fae to make his polion somes at clearer In am artle devoted to advocating the sextet Ballon, fe wrote: “Our opinion, therefore that the uses af germentispropeiy he sine of thee, and chat hey vill vay obtain ether by bad means or god. Upon ta crery thing depends If they obtain it by bat mee, the government bud. I ey obtain i by good means, the governments sare tobe god. The oly goed means of obae fngare the ree sfrage ofthe peoples This eatches nicely the best spn of Model the highpoint ofits option the democrat franchise wosld not only prtet the caen, but ‘ould ever improve the performance the ich a goveraos Tisscarely apie ofequali, ‘This was the genesis ofthe frst modern model af democracy. 10h neler inspiing nor inpied, The democrat facie provisions were put in the model only belatedly, Itis hand to say what had the greater effect in moving the founders of this ‘model to make their franchise demoeraticin principle: whether ic wm heal at nohig la tan ‘ne man, oe vote’ would placate a working class which was showing signs of becoming seriously politically articulate (asi suggested by Bentham’ remark in 1820 that he supposed they woulda’t be sauisfied with les), or whether it was the sheer logie of their ‘own case for reform, resting as it did on the assumption of eign may de ep hat wih oad Sahel, Wanda een aly ye" po Model 1: Protective Democracy 4B conficting selfinterested maximizing individuals. Rither way, itis clear that they allowed themselves a democratic conclu sion only because they had convinced themselves that a vast rajority of the working-class would be sure to follow the ad vice and example of ‘that intelligent, that virtuous rank’ the middle clas, It is om that note that James Mill closed his somewhat ambiguous ease for a democratic franchise. Tn this founding model of democracy for a motleen indus- trial society, then, there is no enthusiasm for democracy, no idea that it could be a morally transformative force; it is nothing but & logical requirement for the governance of in- hherentlyselintereated conflicting individuals who are assumed tobe infinite desirers oftheir own private benefits. Its advocacy is based on the assumption that man is an infinite consumer, that his overriding motivation is to maximize the flow of factions or utilities to himaelf from society, and that a national society is simply a collection of such individuals. Responsible government, even tothe extent of responsibilty toa democratic tlectorate, was needed for the protection of individuals and the promotion ofthe Grots National Product, and for nothing more. Thave drawn a harsh, but I think fair, portrait ofthe found ing model of modern Western democracy. It has nothing in ‘common with any of the earlier, pre-industrial visions of = Gemocratic society. The earlier visions lad asked for a new Kind of man, The founding model of liberal democracy took ‘man as he was, man a8 he had been shaped by market society, fand assumed that he wae unalterable. It was on this point ‘chiefly that John Stuart Mill and his humanist liberal followers {in the twentieth century attacked the Benthamist model. But as we shall se, in the next chapter, they were not able to get tentively away fromit. For that model did fit, remarkably wel, the competitive capitalist market society and the individuals who had. been shaped by it, And that society and those individuals were sil well entrenched, in spite of the humanist revulsion against them, later in the nineteenth century and in the twentieth. The revulsion was what sparked the formula- tion of Model 2, fist by John Stuart Ml; but the entrench~ ment of the market society and market man sapped the strength of Model 2 from the beginning.WL Model 2: Developmental Democracy ‘We have sen that Bentham and James Mill had no vision of now kind of society or a new kind of man. They did not need such a vision, because they did not question that their model of society—the hard-driving competitive market society with all its classivision—was justified by it high level of material productivity, and that the inequality was inevitable, In any ‘case, it was law ofhuman nature that every individual would always be trying to exploit everyone else, so nothing could he done about society. All that could be done was to prevent ‘governments oppressing the governed, and for this a mechani- ‘al protective democratic franchise was suficient But by about the middle of the nineteenth century two changes in that society were thrusting themselves on the atten tion of iberal thinkers, changes which required a quite dffer- cent model of democracy. One change was that the working class (which Bentham and James Mill had ehought not dane {erous) was beginning to Seem dangerous to property. The ther was that the condition of the working class was becoming 0 blatantly inhuman that sensitive liberals eould not accept ‘tas either morally justifiable or economically inevitable. Both these changes raised new difficulties for liberal-democratic theory—dificulties which, as we shall see, were never fully overcome. But those changes did make it clear that a new ‘model of democracy was needed. It was first provided by John ‘Stuart Mill. ‘Tha¢ the younger Mill did arrive at his Model 2 because of the two actual changes is evident from his own viitings. He Model 2: Developmental Democrary 45 vcs very much ayare of the growing mane of the working Stat We etdons of 1848%n Europe, andthe phenomenon Sfithe Chart moverene in England made 2 song impres Son on Hn So di the ieesng Hea of he working a he bpead of working cla newpaper and theinrese Se voningclas erganiing ably shown inthe growth of trade unions and stil beneRe sore, Mil was convinced {hate poo cold pote shat utr hel down much longer. “Thus the Pole Boney e wrote, 48! he wkng ey a nthe more advanced Sonne of pace it ny be pronounced certain that the patarchl or aon un Pe Erno i yl ot gn rcpt eget one auto ENS sumed aces hewspan in pel ects when Set mete net Se he ad apa PREG alan on be oer i 2 atl hehe wee eh ae ee dere aoe when a her ar re Ron Yi lc an change ec oe en Sy wee pars and emp i Stas by mee eye tet The tan ies fe tke ey seu hn ep pecny wig i 7 Sr ——— Some a the higher cases ater threes eee ee cam ne tees mont ad elgus — -— = ——— ce ae He fre te Remain Wu a dl ant ding dwt a Ivete grt a vn ar care eta ingen or tene ie ces. cam 2 eid pth ot isin mete Endo thm men Shree St ia espe th pe oe Pee a eS can te ston nue : made the conlsion that something mst be doe had ee ‘plein 1045in the tenon he drow fom the Charts move = hf Pla ao BV, ch 7 ea 2 nil is i tend aad i 848 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy “The democrat n jem! among ih operas ca, com monly known as Chartiam, was the first open separation of interest, Ea and phon, breeyhelabor poten one: ru alleen Te inde See and ga pata epson gaint thet whole elation to soley. Consenous cad peat Hep lias tong he eager ep pa Inge by ils ora ey cl Be ene ining whet rear yan eg il eng cl bes bet is es Se Serle sare by he sce ah atc ae Seth Conan tage hea na ao es quctonstlo-hnad telethon oat hae looked, Ihe poor had reason for ther complaints the lage clases had not fulfiled their duties as governors; i they had. no seem et cas MLS i aoe ta grow aporignnt ani unniteactaesieaee ee Rect Whe ne so af eae ge runt las ner tcl yee rt bythe opie thee war we en Hoephlacneten cel safer anes ecia won wha tevdne sale Wile sane by he pineal ae ee ‘anal they ta nota, eet mae Condom of ihe Ung het AL ee to see that aaa ene to, whether they wished toler no Thesicnyel Sedan he wees ton, ough wna che ncuat oobi e cfen eS, ‘taught a lesion to those who, from the nature of the case, have tieay the py treo te tes ad we oy waned We exten hich ey wee py eng nme ae Pipe perineal nc na ng ge ie aie at ting at Sede oe etal ce content with the existing state of things? — Que of the things tat hao be done to render he i tude more coateat withthe exiting state of things was Abandon or tearm the Benthanise models af nat ad society. Altuough Join Stanrt Mil hoped tat the working clas might in the ftate become rational enough to sccep the law of politcal economy (at he undersioed them, he ould not expect that they would accept Bentham’ view Gat the ‘working clas was inevitably doomed to nearindigence: Nor * “The laima of Labout (1845), reprinted in Disertos end Dis (0067 ge; alc Wo Robson, 16 aro Model 2: Dewdlopmental Democracy 47, did he want them to accept that view, which he believed to be false, He thought they could pull themselves up out of their miserable condition, And he was anxious that they should do £0, for he was morally revolted by the life they were compelled tw lead. The extent of Mill's abandonment or transformation ofthe Benthamite models of man, of society, and of democracy, will appear as we look closely (in the next section) at Mill's theory, butsome ofthe essential differencescan besketchednow. “The striking difference inthe models of democracy isin the piirpose which a democratic political system was supposed to ‘have. Mill did not overlook the sheerly protective Function of a democratic franchise-—the fanetion of which Jamies Mill and Béitham had made so much. The people needed to be pro- tected against the goverament: ‘human beings are only secure from evil at the hands of other, in proportion as they have the power of being, and are, selEpratcting.”® But he saw some~ thing even more important to be protected, namely, the chances of the improvement of mankind. So his emphasis was hot on the mere holding operation, but on what democracy could contribute to human development, Mill's model of ‘emocracy isa moral model, What distinguishes it most sharp- “ly from Model 1 is that it has a moral vision of the posi of the improvement of mankind, and of a free and equal Society not yet achieved, A democratic political system is valued as @ means to that improvement—a necessary though hota sufficient means; and a democratic society is seen as both ‘result ofthat improvement and a means to further improve- ‘ent. The improvement that is expected is an increase in the “mount of personal selfdevelopment ofall the members ofthe foetety, or, in John Stuart Mill's phrase, the ‘advancement of| ‘community . in intellect, in virtue, and in practical activity ndefficiency’, Thecase for a democratic political system is that it promotes this advancement better than any other political syatem as well as making the best use of the amount of ‘moral, intellectual and active worth already existing, so as to operate ‘with the greatest effect on public affaie’.* The worth of an Coats Rpeetie German ch 3 in Calta Works, of J.M. Roteon, sol xx, Toronto and London, 1977, P 44 eh 2, ps 308.48 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy individual is judged by the extent to which he develops his Jhuman capacities: ‘the end of man ... isthe highest and most harmonious development of his powers toa complete and con- siszent whole,"* This takes us to the root of Mill's model of democracy. The toot is a model of man very different ftom that on Which ‘Model 1 was based. Man is a being capable of developing his powers or capacities, The human essence is to exert and evelop chem. Man is estentially not 2 consumer and appro- priator (a8 he was in Model 1) but an exerter and developer and enjoyer of his capacities. The goad society ie one which permits and encourages everyone to act as exerter, developer, and enjoyer ofthe exertion and development, of his or her own, capacities. So Mill's model of the desirable society was very different from the model of society to which Model tof demo racy was fitted. In offering this model of man and of the desirable society ‘Mill set the tone which came to prevail in iberal-democratie: theory, and which dominated at least the Anglo-American concept of democracy until about the middle of the twentieth century. The narrowing stipulation John Stuart Mill put in his model was dropped by later advocates of developmental democracy, but the central vision and the argument for it stayed much the same. This is the democracy of L. T. Hob: hhouse and A. D. Lindsay and Ernest Barker, of Woodrow Wilton and John Dewey and R. M. Maclver: itis the demo- cracy that World War T was to make the world safe fr. It still touches a chord, especially when beral societies are con- fronted by totalitarian ones, although as we shal se it has now been pretty well rejected in favour of what i aid to be a more realistic model, the Model g that we shall be exarnining in the next chapter, But Model 2is worth considerable attention, if only because efforts now being made to go heyond Model 3, 0 remmoralize democracy under the banner of participatory democracy (our Model 4), encounter some of the same (illcles as did Model 2, and wll need to learn fom its lure. ‘The difficulties encountered by Model ints ist formulation On Liberty, ch 95 n Clated Wk, xii. 26, quoting Humbe Model 2: Developmental Democracy 49 ‘were somewhat different from those that beset the later version, So it will be useful to look at the two versions in tar, as Models 24, and 23, One difference between them may be stated briefly in advance. Mill had been deeply troubled by the incompatibility he saw between the claims of equal human development and the existing class inequalities of power and wwealei, Although he did not identity the problem accurately, land so was unable to resolve ft even in theory, he did see that there was a problem and did try to deal with it a leat to the extent of concerning himself with the necessary social and economic prerequisites of democracy. His twentieth-century followers scarcely saw this as a problem, at least not a8 the central problem: when they did not let it érop virtually out of| right, they treated it as something which would or could be ‘overcome in one way or another--for instance, by a revival of idealist morality, a & new level of social knowledge and com- munication Tadeed one can see a enrmulative decline in realism fom Model t through Models 24 and 23. Bentham and James Mill, in formulating Model 1, had recognized that eapitalism ‘entailed great class inequalities of power and wealth: they ‘were realistic about the necessary structure of capitalist society, though untroubled by it sine ie did not conflict with ‘merely protective democracy. John Stuart Mill, in his Model 24, was lest realistic about the necessary structure of Zapisalise society: he saw the existing class inequality, and saw “Ghat it was incompatible with his developmental democracy, ‘Pit thought ie accidental and remediable. The twentieth: century exponents of developmental democracy (our Model to) wae ton ls eal han Mion he sare: they eneraly qwote as if clas janes fad given way, oF were Ging vay, to pluralist difeences which were not only more manggeable but also posvely bene. And on top of tis there was a new wntalom in Model ay, & descr. Sve unreal. “There had ben no question ofthe two caller modes (1 and aa) belag realise a8 dscns of an existing democratic Stem, for in no country in the nineteenth centiry were government choen by mankood sufrage, et lone universal50 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy suffiages The two earlier models were statements of what ‘would be necessary to achieve at least protection and at hest self-development for all. But by the frst half of the twentieth century, with at least fall manhood suffrage the general rule in advanced Western countries, a model could reasonably be expected also to be realistic as a descriptive statement. Model 2 did offer itself asa statement of what the existing system essentially was (which often meant, rather, what the present imperfect system was capable of becoming), as well as a statement of its desirability. But as a statement of how the democratic system actually worked Model 22 was seriously inaccurate, as was demonstrated by the exponents of Mode 3, ‘Model 20 may thus be said to have been doubly uncealistic: it failed both to grasp the necessary implications of capitalist society and to describe che actual twentieth-century liberal- democratic system. To anticipate our argument one further stage, it may now be said that the currently prevalent Model 5, which boasts its realism both as a descriptive and explanatory model and as = demonstration of the necessary limits ofthe democratic princi~ gle fefectve cizen prtipaton, wil be found wf shee fn both counts, MODEL 2A: J. §. MILL'S DEVELOPMENTAL DEMOCRACY Thave emphasized how different J. 8, Mills model ofa desir. able society was from Bentham's and James Mill's. The differ- ence can be made more precise. Bentham and James Mill accepted existing capitalist society without reservation; John Stuart Mill did not. The diference is cleanly exprested in the “although mest states jn the, United States had mankood white fae chs by about themida ofthe nineteenth centary, manhood franchise cok Scarcly be aid to have been effectively in exten inthe Unie Seater ‘unl the tenth century. A few Baropean countries in the afactorndh feontury (France 1248, Gerany 2871) had mantood fanehse forthe ‘tional acembly, but the asemby did nt choose or conte the govern ‘Ben Ta the United Kingdom, a late at vos ony 59 pe cen of dal ‘ales had the fencis, that ied tle name on We pslamentary ‘ctrl val. Ser Neal leet "The Franchise inthe United Kingdom 1885-1918, Pat ad Pron, no. 92 (Des. 1968) Model 2: Developmental Democracy sr ‘younger Mill's position on the desirability of ‘the stationary “state which he, ike they, thought would be the @ulmination of ‘capitalism: they regarded it with dismay, he welcomed it, As he put it in 1848: Teonfess Tata not charmed with the ideal of Ile held out by those ‘who think that the normal state of buman beings is that of steuge (Ging to geton; thas the tampliag, crushing, elbowing, and tread- {ng ou each others heels, which form the extng type of rola if, are the most desirable lot of human kind, or anythiag but the dire ‘agreeable syeaptom of one of the phases of industrial progres. It ‘ty bea atsemary stage ne progr of atin But ie tot a kind of tocal perfection which philanthropists to come will {el any very eager desire to suit in realizing. In the meantime, those wo do not serepe the prowent Very ealy stage of human Jmprovement as its ulumate type, may be excused for being come ‘putatively indifferent tthe kind of economic progeess which exes fhe congratulations of ordinary politicians; the mere increase of production and accumalation.? Society, in the vision of Model 2, need not be, should not be, what Model 1 bad assumed it was and always would be. It need not be and should not be a collection of competing, conflicting, selFinterested consumers and appropriators. It ‘ould and should be a community of exerters and developers fof their human capacities, But it was not that now. The prob- lem was to get it to advance to that. The ease for democracy was that it gave all the citizens a direct interest in the actions ‘of the government, and an incentive to participate actively, at Teast tothe extent of voting for or against the government, and, it was hoped, alo of informing themselves and forming thei views in discusions with others. Compared with any oligarchie system, however benevolent, democracy drew the people into the operations of government by giving them all 2 practical interest, an interest which could be effective because their votes could bring down a government. Democracy would thus make people more active, more energetic; it would advance thera ‘in intellect, in virtue, and in practical activity and ficiency’. + Prins of Pall oman, Bk. 1V, ch 6, set 25 in Caliated Works, ih a.52 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy ‘This isa rather large claim to make for a sytem ofrepre~ sentative government in which the ordinary persons plitial activity is confined to voting every few yeas for a member of Parliament, perhaps alittle oRtener for local councillor, and perhaps actually Helding some elective local ofce. Even 1, the claim might be allowed by contrast with any oligachie system, which posiively discourages general interes: and in- volvement By that contrast, democracy might seem to lead to self-sustaining, even selinceasing, advancement of the cite ens in moral, intellectual, and active worth, every bit of participation giving an ability and an appetite for more. But here Millcame up agains a dificult which curned out to be insuperable. To sce what it was we must look at another basic ference besween John Stuart Mill and Bentham, ‘Underlying the difference father moral evaluations of esting society was a difference in their definitions of happiness of pleasure, the thing they both held should be maximized. Bentham had held that in caleuating the geeatst happiness fone need take into account only the amounts of undiffeent ated pleasure (and pain) actually elt by the individuals. There vwere:no qualitative diferences beeen pleasures: pushpin ‘was 28 god as poetry, And since, as we have seen, he measured pleasure or utlty in terms of material wealth, the aggregate greatest happiness of the whole society was to'be attained by maximizing productivity (though even that conclusion was fallacious, ae we have noticed), J-S. Mill insisted, on the contrary, that there were qualita tive diferences in pleasures, and he refused to equate the greatest aggregate happiness with masimury_ productivity. ‘The great aggregate happines was to be got by permitting and encouraging individuals to develop themselves. That ‘would make them capable of higher pleasures, and so would inrease the aggregate pleasure measured in both quantity and sali ‘But atthe same Gime—and chis was the fundamental diffe culty Mill recognized thatthe existing distribution of wealth and of economic power made it imposible for most members of the working classe develop themselves t all, of even (0 live humanly. He denounced as utterly unjust ‘Model 2: Developmental Demacracy 53 ‘thatthe produce of labour should be apportioned as we now see simat 'n lvoe rl fo the able nop pardons howe who have never worked at al the net large to dae whore ‘work almost novainl, and soi a descending scale, the remuneray tion dwindling as te work grows harder and more disagreeable, ‘pl he mat ping apd nang bly abou ana count ‘with cerainty on being able to earn even the necessaries of ie. > ‘This, he said, was the very opposite of the only ‘equitable principle’ of property, the principle of ‘proportion Between remuneration and exertion’. That was che equitable principle because the only justification of the institution of private prop- erty was that it guaranteed to individuals ‘the fits of thet ‘own Iabour and abstinence’, not ‘the fruits of the labour ond abstinence of others’? A fewr pages later Mill gave an extended definition of prop- exty: ‘The institution of property, when limited to its exental elements consists in the recognition, fn each person, ofa right othe exclusive ‘ispoalefwhat he or she have produced by thee own exersons, ot teecved either by gift or by Ir agreement, without force or fad, fom those iho produced ie The foundation ofthe whole is the right of producers to what they themselves have produced? ‘This scems a reasonable extension of the principle frst an- nounced, at least asfaras ‘fair agreement is concerned, though ‘gift raises a problem. Without a property right in what one Jhas exchanged by agreement forthe fruits of one’slabour, not ‘even the simplest exchange economy would be possible. But Millis ealking about a capitalist exchange econony, where the produce is the result of the combination of current labour with Capital provided by someone else, and where the labourer gets ts bis share only a wage, and the capitalist gets the rest, both shares being determined by market competition, Mil held that this relation was justified also. Speaking of the capitalists acquisition from the wage contract, he wrote: ‘The right of property includes, then, the freedom of acquiring by contract. The right ofeach to what ho has produced, implies a right 1 Tid, Bh. Heh, nt 207. ip a8 bid Bk TE, ch 2, tp a554 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy to what has been produced by others, ifobtained by their fre con- sent snes the producers mast ether have given it fom good will eschanged i wa they Steamed a outaen a fo pe ‘Ye theta om doing so would be to infringe ther right of property Inthe product of thes own indurty. ® ‘The ovner ofthe capital, Mill ase, must have a share of the product, and he held that this was consistent with the equitable principle because capital is simply the product of previous labour and abstinence. This justified the distribution of the ‘product between wage-labourere and owners of eapital: given competition between capitalists for labourers, and between labourers for employment, there was a fair division between those who contributed current labour and those who contti« ‘buted the fits of past labour and abstinence. Mill acknow- Jedged that the capital was not usually created by the labour and abstinence of the present postesvr, but thought he had rade a sufficient case for the labourjcapital distribution by saying that the present postestar of eapital ‘much more prob- ably” got it by gift or voluntary contract than by wrongful disposession of those who had created it by their past Tabour.® ‘The fact that the pretent posseasors may have got some of their capital by gift, .c. by inheritance, gave Mill some un- casiness: it seemed clearly inconsistent with his equitable principle of property. But he held that the right co dispose of ‘one's property by bequest was an essential part ofthe right of| property. The farthest he was willing to go was to recommend limit on the amount any one person could inherit, but he set the limit so high—each could inherit enough ‘to’ afford the ‘means of comfortable independence’!*—that this did nothing ‘tm resolve the inconsistency. Mill fell back on the argument that ‘while ie is true that the labourers are at a disadvantage ‘compared with those whose predecessors had saved, i is also tue that the labourers are far better off than if those pre« decessors had not saved." 2 Bi, p27 2 Tbidy pp. 215-16. tbe Be IL oa sec gp a5. SATB, BL TY ch 2 eee 206 Model a: Devdopmental Demecrasy 55, ‘Thus Mill was satisfied that there was no inconsistency be- ‘yveen his equitable principle of property—reward in propor- tion to exertion—and the principle of reward in pfoportion to the market value of both the capital and the current labour required for capitalist production. ‘Yet, at we have seen, he found the actual prevailing distri- bution of the produce of labour wholly unjust. He found the explanation of that unjust distribution in an historical acci- dent, not in the capitalist principle itself “The principle of private property has never yet had afar tral in ay Counteys and Tes 20, perhaps, inthis county than in some ‘thers ‘The socal arrangements of modern Europe eommenced from a divtbution of property which was the result, not of Jase partioa, or acquisition by industry, but of conquest and valence Bnd nowwithstanding what industey has been daing for many cene furie to madly the work of force dhe system stil etait many and Innge tracer of origin t-was this original violent distrbutior of property, not any- thing in the principle of private property and capitalist enter- prise as such, that had led to the present miserable position of| the balk of the working class, about the injustice of whieh Mill ‘wase0 outspoken: ‘The generality oflabourers in this and most other countries, have as little choice of occupation or freedom of locomotion, ae practically as dependens on fixed rules and ‘on the wil of others, a8 they could be on any system short of actual slavery."8 ‘In thus putting the blame on the original feudal forcible distibution of property, and the failure of subsequent prop- erty law to rectify it, Mill was able to think that the capicalist principle was not in any way responsible for the existing ine equitable distributions of wealth, income, and power, and even to think that it was gradually reducing them. What he failed to see was that the capitalist market relation enhances or replaces ‘any original inequitable distribution, in that it gives to capital part of the value added by current labour, thus steadily in- ‘creasing the mass of capital. Had Mill seen this he could not Ibid, BE TT, oh tet 3, 207 oTbidy pan,36 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy have judged the capitalist principle consistent with his equit- able principle. Failing to see this, he found no fundamental inoonsiteney, and sas not troubled by it. "However, the present debased position of the bulk of the ‘working clas did present an immediate and serious problem to Mill, and he metit forthright. The difficulty was thatin their present condition they were incapable of using political power ‘wisely, Mil believed indeed that people were capable of becom ing something other than selfinterested acquirers ofbenefit for © themselves, but he though that most of them had not yet got ‘muuch beyond that, It would be foolish, he said, to expect the average man, if given the power to vote, to use it with is interested regard for others, and especially for what comes after them, for the idea of posterity, of their country, or of mankind? Governments must be made for human beings at they are, oF as they are capable of speedily becoming: and in any sate of cultiva- {on which tankind, or any class among them, have yet attained, fr ae likely soon to stain, the interests by which they wil be led, ‘hen they are thinking only of selfinterest, will be almost exci: {Svely hove which are obvious at frst sight, and which operate on thie present condition” ‘This being so, what would happen if everyone had a vote? Presumably the selfish society would continue ‘But there was worse to be feared than that. For Mill recog- nized that modern societies were divided into two clases with interests which they believed to be opposed, and which in important respects Mill granted were opposed. The classes ‘were, roughly, the working class (in which he included petey tradesmen) and the employing elas, including those who lived ‘on unearned income and those ‘whose education and way of life assimilate them with the rich’! The working class was of ‘course the more numerous, ‘One person, one vate” would there- fore mean class legslatiow'n the supposed immediate interest of one class, who must be expected ‘to follow their own selfish inclinations and shortsighted notions of their own good, in 1 RapatineGaerman, ch. 6; 3a Called Was, 495. Ted a Model 2: Deotlopmental Democracy 57 epposition to justice, atthe expen of all other clases and of Dovteroy Something must therefore be done to prevent the fore numerous cla fom being able to ‘rec che course of legiaton and administration by is exclsive las iter” {even though this would be lof an ell han the present cass ‘uleby asmall class based merely om established wealth) ‘Mills dilemma was a eal one, for his main ease for a onic versal franchive waa that ft was exe sa means of getting people to develop themelses by parcpation. Mills weny out Ma to recommend a system of poral voting for memes of the smaller cas, such thar neither ofthe two clases should futweigh the other, and neither therefore would be able #9 fimpoe ‘clas leiltion’. 2 Everyone should havea vote, but some shou have several vos, Or sates, everyone with certain exceptions shoul have 2 vote, and some should have several votes. In his Thowgits on Parianntay Reform, bie in 1890, Mil held that perfect ‘lectoral setem required both that every person shold have Ge vote and that some shold have more than one vote, ad Stid that neither ofthese provisions vas aisle without te Sther, But in Reprecntaioe Coerimnt (1951) he argued for Plural ote for some along with the exclusion of other fom ny wot at all, The exclusions reflet Mil’ acceptance ofthe Sandor ofthe market society. Those in reeip of poor eciet Syore to be excluded: they had fled im the marke. So were Tndschanged bankrupt. So were all who did not pay direct taxes, Millnew that the poor paid indirect taxes, but, he ssid, they did't fel them, and therefore would be rece in using thelr votes to demand goverament langes. ‘The diect x Fequiement was not intended to deprive the poor of a vote: the way out was to replace some ofthe indnect taxes by & Alect Read tax which even the poorest would psy. Again, thove who could fot read, write and reckon, were to be ox- tladed, This abo was not intended as a backhanded way of txeluding a lage mumber of the poor, for Mill held that Society had a duty to put eletnentarysehoolng within reach of 2 a Ww Ibid., ch. 8, p. 487. Soa) ch 8 ba58 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy all who wanted it, But it would effectively have excluded the poor, for he held that when society had failed to perform this duty (as ic clearly had in Mill's time], the exclusion from the franchise of those who suffered from that failure was ‘a hard= ship that ought to be borne’.2® ‘Whether or not any ofthese provisions would have excluded a significant oumber of the working class, plural voting was ‘i needed, and was recommended on an additional ground, ‘The system of plural voting would not only prevent class legis lation: it would be positively beneficial by giving more votes to those whose opinion is entitled to a greater weight® by virtue of their superior intelligence, or the superior develop- ment oftheir intellectual or practical abilities. The rough test of this was the nature of a person’s occupation: employers, men of business, and professional people are by the nanure of their work generally more intelligent or more knowledgeable ‘than ordinary wagesearners, so they should have more votes. Foremen, as more intelligent than ordinary labourers, and silled labourers as more intelligent than unskilled, might also be allowed more than one vote each, To meet Mill's stipula- Bion that the working class 2x a whole should not have more votes than the employing and propertied class, members of the latter would have t0 be given considerably more than two votes each, but Mill excused himeelf from working out the details, The closest he came to doing so was his suggestion in ‘Thoughts on Poliamentary Reform that i the unskilled labourer hhad one vote, a skilled labourer should have two; a foreman ppechaps three; a farmer, manufacwurer, or trader, three or four; a professional or literary man, an artist, a public fune~ tionary, a university graduate, and an elected member of learned society, five or six.* Mills gradations are revealing the entrepreneur, (farmer, manufacturer, or trader’), with three or four votes, is not much preferred to the foreman, while the intellectuals, artists, and profesional people, with five or six votes, are the strongly preferred rank, Itis curious, Ibid, hm apo Ibid) 8 Dae Call Wks, 5B 345 Model 2: Developmental Democracy 59 incidentally, in view of Mls concern for the rights of women, that he did not suggest how the entitlement of those women ‘wlio were neither employed nor employers, nor professional or propertied persons, to plural votes was to be determined. ‘The important point of principle in all this is that MGll argued explicitly that plural voting on grounds of superior Attainments was itty desirable, not merely negatively desirable at a way of preventing clas legislation 1 do not propose the plurality as a thing in itself undesiceble, whl ent fart ofthe community om the sifags, Why be temporarily tolerated wile necesary to prevent greater Tels. Fo not look upon equal voting a8 among the things whch fre good in themselves, provided they can be guarded against {nconventences, Took upon it a3 only relatively good; les objes~ eal hen aegis ot petleg grounded en ier or ltdventtious crcummseaces, But im pipe ens, because recog: ising a wrong standard, and cxefcising a bad influence on che Woters mindy Tea not usefl, but burial, thatthe consctuton of Toe country should declare ignorance to be ented Yo as mich ‘olieal power as knowledge ee ce Sencha ro yb ci TE aah it aes fe eo of st sey a ee cal wii in we ot ny Mi eo Eo eee cE aon sconce a lll in alo eae eet ey % Reetatie Gacrment, ch. 8 9 478 (0 ai.Go The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy legislation but should be confined to approving or rejecting, or sending back for reconsideration but not itself’ amending, legislative proposals all of which would be sent up to it by an expert non-eleeted Comission, Mill's impatience with exist- ing parliamentary and cabinet procedure is understandable, but his remedy would reduce the power of the elected legise Tatare, and so would contribute to the disincentive of demo- cratic’ voters 10 participate in the electoral process. If he realized this, he didn't mind it, such was che premium he placed on expertise. ‘So Mill's model, the original version of Model 2, is arth retically a step backward from Model 1, which had stipulated, in principle at least, ‘one person, one vote’. But in its moral dimension Model is more democratic than Model 1. Model 2 isnot satisfied with individuals as they are, with man as infinite ‘consumer and appropriator. Tt wants t move towards 2 society of individuals more humanly developed and more ‘equally so. Ie wants not to impose a utopia on the people but tohave the people reach the goal themselves, improving them- selves by participating actively inthe political process, every instalment of participation leading to an improvement in their politcal capacity, as well as their all-round development, and making them capable of more participation and more self- development. Tt is easy now to point to defects and contradictions in. ‘Mill's model. An obvious one isin the matter of participation and selfdevelopment. Participation in the political process ‘was necessary to improve people’s quality and would improve 4t. But participation with equal weight now would reinforce low quality. Therefore those who had already attained superior quality, a judged by their education or station in life, must rot be made to yield their power to the rest. In the namic of| ‘equal sel-development, a veto is given to those who are already more developed. But the less developed individuals within ‘Mill's model, if they stayed within it (that is if they accepted the inferior electoral weight Mill gave them), would know that their wills could not prevail, so would not have much incentive to participate, so would not become more developed, ‘A deeper difficulty, which is at the root of that one. is in Model 2: Developmental Democracy 6r Mills model of man and of society. Men as shaped by the existing competitive market society were not good enough to Imale themselves better. Mill deplored the effects of the exist ing market society on the human character, which made ‘everybody an aggressive scrambler for his own material bene- fit. He deplored most strongly the existing relation between ‘capital and labour, which debased both eaptalistand labourer. He believed there could not be a decently haman society until that relation was transformed. He put his hopes on an enor- mous spreading of producers’ co-operatives, whereby work- men would become their own capitaliss and work for themselves jointly, He allowed himself to hope that producers? ‘co-ops would call forth such better workmanship, and thus be so much more efficient units of production, that they would displace the capitalist organization of production, ‘Yet he accepted and supported the received capitalist prop- erty institutions, at least until such time as they had ‘been modified or transformed by his producer's co-ops; and even. then the competitive market system would si operate, for the separate co-operative enterprises were expected to compete in the market, and would be driven by the incentive of desire for individual gain, In other words, Mill accepted and supported. a system which required individuals to act as maximizing con- ssumets and appropriators secking to accumulate the means to ensure their future flow of consumer satisfactions, which ‘meant seeking to acguite property. A system which requires ‘men to see themselves, and to act, as consumers and appro- Driators, gives litle scape for most of them to see themselves tnd act as exerters and developers oftheir capacities. Mill did indeed hold out the prospect that the spread of co-operatives ‘would bring a ‘moral revolution to society’: the healing of the standing feud between capital and labour the {tennoration af human i, tom a conict of ewes srugeling {EEppolte rere fa Seady realy in the pat «Good Ege to all the levation of he cigy of lor; new tense Femur and independence inthe labosting elas and the cone Scedow ofcachhumun ings aly occupation ito «ahead ofthe {Dell sympathies and dhe practical intelligence Pail Benen, Ble IV, ch 7st. 6; in Caleta Wart i 92. This62 ‘The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy ‘These high hopes remained unflile, Cass opposition con- Enved, snd song twas ott in other ways wo Hill require Mills watering down of democracy. For the Fatlonal behaviour ofeach of have dest ry to overbeat the opposed cas, hence the danger Mill sa of as goverm men Rene the need to deny ax much poltcal weigh fo each tember ofthe more numerous clas as to each member ofthe tes umerous clas, hese ee iis ele of unequal pare pation jastiying continued unequal participation "The lare of the cooperative ton thas let unreed the contradicdon Milla beeen a universal equal franchise and the greatest happines of society. There wat no way out, {ven histnumpion thae the working cas would wee an al Fach eration ot coment i he ong ra, quaitaiv, geste happines of the whole society ‘nd underying thst contadcion wae the ater one, the contradicdon between capitalist relations of producuon a Schad the democratic ideal ofequal pony ofindvdal scledevelopnent This contacirion Mil never flys. He Came clone to cing tin hie stctures on the ext labour ‘apltal relation especially when he was contrasting morally with he co-operative relation jb ane ave neice ft Snalys of capitalist market relations at such, he jstied Davate property in capital and the wage-contact, a being onasent n principle with an equitable sym. One might hin that the existence of two such seriou hore comings in Mis Uberaldeenocrate theory would have been nought preven minting nthe late snetenth and {went centuries, the poston i had won in mid-nineteenth entry asthe model of liberal democracy. Bu thie snot quite that Happened, Andie easy tas why. Th the fit ples, the undesying contradiction could be cxpeced to lead tothe abandonient of the theory oaly If Mls alower hd seen it ata awit theory. Buin ac Sonia oddly with Mil statement in 188 "The numerical majority of ny society whatever, mos consist of peso al standing nthe same sa Panton and having fa the man, the same push oamnely unalle anus labourers =~" (Beathan’, in Binay on Eas, Religie ad Soy, Caled Warts 107). Model 2: Developmental Democracy 63 ayn ase ne at in of caps, ee why hada ty fee ps 2 alate ga ty at Secs fy ull al uli eR ome MA de ea aes ld ct at en Maan ee Nga Tete chat ie dapeach at che gnc Fanelli ieee Watt it eet bagged Foes dus gga ye ae tc te hee ne estas eed ileal Eri wg wr he a nd ce rs Wily ito SSE Sy de er acne ead Eonpl of he deted glare tour a expert Meee tt Rr tat ‘Seek Tall ao en ke Moe na ae Te a ap ti tl ep seer Be Syeda pte ry Sern a een np ue 2 at a olde na Se cert an bce ae ea ase wee Soy an lei concn ae enh Se recente gansta fat noes act teas ce aloe hematin Renae sce area Sees ee inda eerie SLA conor aeet64 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy century, in deflecting the menacing implications of the demo- cratic franchite, delayed the failure of Model 2 until the ‘mid-twentieth century. And it failed then not because its ‘mid-twentieth-century critics, the exponents of Model g, had realized or exposed the internal contradictions in Model 2, for they did not. It failed for different reasons, which see must snow explore. Before we look at the fortunes of the later developmental ‘model, we must examine the reason why the equal manhood franchise did not bring about the class government that Mill hhad feared, 50 that the way was left open for the later liberal- democrats to redeploy Mills general cate. This will help us eo understand both the sway of the later developmental mode! down to about the middle of the twentieth century, and iis ulmate failure, ‘What happened was something which Mill did not foresee, perhaps could scarcely have foreseen, But the interesting thing is that the later developmental theorists, those who promoted ‘Model 2p, did not seem to see it or understand it, though they should have beon able to see it by then. And 1 shall suggest that their failure to see it was what led to the failure of a8 and its supersession by Model g, ‘The reason thatthe equal mankood franchise did not bring about the class government Mill had feared was the extra- ordinary success with which the party system was able to tame the democracy. This is important because, although it gave ‘Model 2 new lease on life, it was in the end Model 2's une doing. For it left the actual democratic political proces largely tunable to provide the effective degree of participation its advocates claimed or hoped for it, and unable to promote that personal development and moral community which was the ‘main rationale offered for Bberal demacracy. Tt is this which so undermined Model 2 that it could be swept aside in mid- ‘twentieth century by the apparently more realistic Model 3 ‘examined in the next chapter. How did the party system rescue the developmental model Model 2: Developmental Demacrasy 65 and enable it to hold the field, init revised equalfanchise form, for another haf century or more? How was the party sytem able to prevent the class take-over that Mil had feared, And s0 allow the developmental image of democracy to be ‘maintained by liberal advocates after the equal anchise had been inteoduced? A universal equal franchise would obviously give the preponderant voice to the wage-earing working ‘lass in the more industrialized countries, and to the farmers and other small independent operators (or a mixture of them And wage-earnen) inthe les industrialized ones, and in both cases a conlice of interests with established capitalist property ‘vas to be expected. How could a thing as mechanical and neutral asa system of competing parties prevent the take-over ‘of poser bythe mbordinate butrtore numerousclassor classes? ‘Would nota party system, in 0 far ast efficiently represented ‘the numerical weight of the different interes, actually bring about the take-over rather than prevent it? Yet the take-over has been prevented, and through the inserumentalty of the ‘patty system, in all the Western democracies, “The way tit has happened has been somewhat different in diferent countries, depending partly on the class composition ofthe country, arly on whether there was a responsible non ‘emacratie party system in operation before che arrival ofthe ‘democratic franchise, an partly on other diferencesofmational traditions. [cannot atempe here an analy ofall the complex ‘lferences between the ways the part systems performed the ‘same basi fnetion in counties as diferent as England, the United States, Canada, and the various Western European nations. Yet i isnot dificult to se, if one shifts the focus ‘lightly ffom that ofthe usual descriptions ofthe faction ofthe party system, that ita main fanetion isnot merely to produce 4 stable politcal equilibrium hot to produce a particular kind of equitibriom. think iis not overstating the case to say that the chief function the party system has actually performed in Western democracies since the ineption of democratic franchise has been to blunt the edge of apprehended or probable clas con- fic or ifyou Tike, to moderate and smoath over conictoF clas interests soasto save the existing property institutions and66 The Lifo and Times of Liberal Democracy ‘the market system fiom effective attack. This is less evident in America than in Europe, where the relation between party ‘and class is generally more obvious. And iis ess evident than it aight be to twentieth-century observers anywhere, because of the very success ofthe party system in thrusting outofsight class issues which inthe nineteenth century had bulked much larger. ‘The function of blurring classlinesand so mediating between conficting class interests can be seen to be equally well pere formed by any of three varieties of party system: (1) a O#o- party (or two dominane partes) system, even where the parties ‘were intended to represent two oppoted class interests, as in England with the Labour and Conservative partes; (2) a two- party (or two dominant parties) system where each main party isa loose organization of many regional and sectional interests, as in the United States and Ganada; or (g) a multi-party sys tem with so many parties that the government generally bas to he a coalition, asin most Western European countries, In the fist ease, each party tends to move towards a middle posi- tion, which requires thatit avoid an apparently clas position Kt must do this in order to be able ¢o project an image of itself as & national party standing for the common good, with- ‘out which image it fears it will not stand much chance of long- run majority support. In the second case each of the main parties is compelled ta act ina similar way, only moreso: each ‘must offer a platform which is all things to all men and which is therefore very indefinite, True, in such a system, a third or fourth party may start with a position which has a specific class content, but if such a party grows to a size that puts it within reach af being the second or fist party, it has to do the same, In the third ease, a really multicparty system, where no ‘one party can usually expect a majority, no party can give an ‘unequivocal undertaking to the electorate because both the party and the electorate koow that the party will have to ‘compromise continually in the coalition government. "Now itis true chat none ofthese three blurring systems could hhave operated as they have done if'a bi-polar clas-division in the country as a whole had overridden both the sense of national identity and all sectional, religions ethnic, and other cross-currents, None ofthe three systems could operate as they Model 2: Developmental Democracy 67 do if the sumesically largest economic class were a single- ‘minded class, whose members were not pulled in other direc- ‘tions by such eross-curtents of by traditional attachments. But as it happened, in all these countries, at the same time the ‘democratic franchise was becoming operative, there were factors which weakened the expected bi-polar division between ‘those who supported and those who seemed likely to reject the ‘existing system of property and of market competition. In nineteenth-century North America, continental expansion and free land made the largest class, independent farmers and other small working proprietors, te epitomeof the potty-bourgeoisie: they wanted private capitalism and the market economy, pro- vided only it was not rigged in favour of the capitalists of the ‘commercial metropolives. In the same period, the late nine teenth and early twentieth centuries, the imperial expansion in which England and most of the Western European countries were indulging allowed their governments to afford handouts to their electorates which reduced the working-class ~ pressures for fundamental reforms. Had it not been for these factors, the apparently neutral party system could not have done the job. Bot given these factors, without the party systema it is unlikely that the job could have been done. The party. system, in whichever ofits variants, was the means by which the obofblurring thestillunderiying clasdifferences was done. "The party system had builtin ability to do this because of another feature. With every extension of the franchise, a party system becomes necessarily les responsible to the electorate. Take the classic cate ofthe English party system. Tt had been. the effective means of making and unmaking governments for hala century or more before there was anything lke a demo- cratie franchise. As long as the franchise was confined to the propertied class, the relatively small number of electors in each constituency made it possible for the electors to exert con- siderable influence, even control, over their elected member. ‘And because the M.P.s could thus be held responsible to the Constituents, ot atleast to the active party people in the con- Mituency, Le, to the constituency party, however loosely lorganized it might be, they could not be dominated by the ‘cabinet, ic, the leading men in the parliamentary party.68 ‘The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy All this changed with the democratization of the franchise. Appeal to 2 mas: electorate required the formation of well- organized national parties outside the parliamentary parties. Effective organization required centrally controlled party machines, Endorsement by the party machine became vi ‘wally the only way of geting elected to Parliament. The cen+ ‘wal party leadership was therefore able to control its M.P.s. ‘The main power fell to the party leaders in Parliament, for they, ie. the Prime Minister and his leading cabinet ministers, commanded the threat of expulsion from the party and the threat of dissolving Parliament prematurely, thus compelling new elections, The cabinet was thus enabled to dominate Parliament to a high degree. Te still does s0. "Not only is it able to do to: it s now required to do so. For the universal franchise brought a change in the basic job the political system had to do, a change which necesitated {government control, rather than constituency or outside party control, of the parliamentary party. Before the franchise be- ‘came democratic, the funetion of the system was (0 respond to the needs of shifting combinations of various elements of the ppropertied class, which could best be done by governments Which were responsible, through the MPs, to the leading constituents, But with the democratic franchise, the system hhas had to mediate between the demands of two classes, those ‘with and hose without substantial property. This has meant that che system has continually to be arrangiog compromises, ‘or at least apparent compromises, Continual compromise re- ‘quires room for manoeuvre. It is the government that must Ihave this room, In a multi-party system, where every govern- ‘ment is coalition, this is understood. Tt is not always un- derstood that room for manceuve is just as mecessary in a two-party (or two major parties) system, where the government isnormaly all fom one party, But roomformancavreisequally. necessary there, for what requires continual compromise is the ‘opposition of interests the cour, whether or not that opposi- tion is represented within the government. A government, specially a. majority government, cannot have this room for manccuvte if itis held closely responsible even to the parlia- mentary party, let alone to the outside party asa whole Developmental Democracy 69 through an annval party convetion, or to the consiueney pat Bvery tempt, by democrat reform partes and overcast paviatnentary counts, to make the govern- tment and te embers of pariarnent sl espns tothe opulr orgmntation oud ha fled. A sufitent reason for {he afore hat sch tec esponsbily doesnot allow the room for manure and compromise which a government trade up ene fom one pay st hae i ode to catty tuts fencton of mediating between opposed clas ners in the whole sees. “The general conclusion from thie lance atthe party stem is thatthe pany system has been the means of reconaing Univeral equal fanchise withthe mineenance ofan uneqdal tocey, Tas done wo by Bring the snes and by cise Fog govemments responsiblity oleetorate Te has had to do To tee ings inorder to perfor the fonetins required of Kinane ce ha a nce el inde the widespread popular partipation he politcal proces Mich Met» fequred, and hence fa failed to develop the iveindvidual at cidven, and promote moral comment, ts Models expected open 20: ‘TWENTIETH-O2NTURY DEVELOPMENTAL DEMOGRACY ‘Whi all this was happening, the rationale put forward by Liberal democrats remained the developmental case—substan- tially Mill's case minus the plural voting proposal. T shall not take time to examine the democratic theories of the early twentieth-censury weiters in detail, But it may con- fidently be safd that the tone, the ideal, andthe basic justifica- tion are much the same as Mill's in all the leading English and ‘American theorists of the frst half of che twentieth century, ‘whether in the philosophic idealist tradition (Barker, Lindsay, Maclver), or the pragmatist (Dewey), or the modified w ‘arian (Hobhouse). The only exceptions were the few theorists who explicitly tied to combine iberal values with some kind ofsocialism (Cole, Last), but they did not significantly deflect the liberal tradition. And in the main liberal tradition ofthat70 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy period there wan by comparzon even wth Miya ste {etn in the rea ofthe anaes iberal demsonracy Mil ad sen the contaton berween hs developmental ideal andthe clamdiided and explosive society a sen me. He led o saoivetevnin theory, beats eh hot dented secmaty hed not sex tnt was conta, don betwen epialin elton of prosueton as uch ad the evelopment ea, Bue st east he didnot sume that the femoerati plea! proces could sl overcome the css Avision an exploitation. He putt hope in ole go vell~producen co-operative, workingciasedweaton, te ‘These hopes were oe fle ut atta he dd ot pot a ‘he burden on she desnocra proces eel “The theories ofthe Sat ala te ent century in- cvcaingly est ight of class sd expliaton, They gencrally wrote i democray fart at leat democracy tat ee Brace the epustry sd welfare state, oul do mt of what oul be done, and most of what needed tobe done toring sod society. They were indeed, aotanensive to polena of the caneentaton af private econorie powers and they nese ot only cowards the individualist decoy whieh they Saw underlying the exiting onde, Lindsay, fr ostanee, wat Strongly agus "he tome indvddalien which ha dogged mmaer democrat theory fom the begining whic, oddly, fe identified not only itt Bentham but aso wit Mars, And be dd not comple accept the exiting contol of prction by capitals he aplication othe government of dustry ef emocratic pracple® woul be the fulflnen of domo- tracy Bot wha he thought safe for te democrat cone tel of snam wassome contol of monopole bese. The consumer sovreghty ofa fully eompettive mate economy wes perely seep There as sdhing wrong nth cape tain relations of prducon st such. the end his hope for democracy came don oa more ively fowrshing ofpluratc rorepolteal democratic asocatons like. churches. and ‘riven. This neoideatt pluralism was strong cutrent in ely = A.D Linys Th But of Dry andy Lenn, 195 moet Model 2: Developmental Democracy 7 twentetiscentury liberd-democratic theory. And here was Somme excuse, ort lett nme reason for thse ort neglect tof das dvs. The democratic party sytem had apparently solved the problem: ie had overcame the danger of cas governments bat hey did no ace ho fehad done this that Ey seducing the democtatlerxponsvenes of governments to lectoratey, and so preventing caw dvlon fom operating foleally in any eflecive way. So they coud and diy wete Et the democttie procea were an arangoment whereby Taslonal,welrintentioned etzens, who had of couse a whole Sariesy of ferent interes, could adequately adja th Ulevences inthe peal, rational, giveand-take of partes nd presare groupe and the fee pew. They allowed them Seve to bope thatthe class ise would go aways ether that it Sav alendy being replaced by plalse socal groups, or that would beso roluced bythe welfare nd regulatory state that 2 democratic society would be consistent with a eapialst inathet wae “Thus Barker, whlle secing an amount of ‘classdebate that requved giving tome attention to “reckoning gain and los between diferent clases and section and wl recognizing that some redistribution ef righ bebe clases might be ecenary ifthe genet umber ace oenoy the greats poe ble develope ofthe capacities of personality, conidered Sh esttbution to bee nator constant ajastanent and teadjutment, as socal thought about juice gros and asthe Interpretation ofthe principles fbery and equality broadens tev srt An be thoughe atthe ajstments now Tequited may well opin, andy cven sometimes remay at {he evel of voluntary agreement Between voluntary a%0- lations (thse ofthe workers and thise of the employer), fm agreement based on wouter conutaion and suing 2 olustary co-operation’ When inthis way something had ecm wrked ot tat was vay ben sto deserve 0 be fade general role, state action would be appropiate “In tat cao the State, which fr not the enemy of Soe, Di father sands to it in something f te rlaon in which & rt ar: rin of Sl 8 aa! Thr, Or 8 one72 The Life and Tines of Liberal Democracy solicitor may stand to a family, will register and endorse this best as a tule for general application and enforcement. ‘The notion that class differences could be adjusted ‘as social thought about justice grows’, and that this could be done by voluntary class co-operation aided by a family-solicitor state, is something ofa retreat from Mill's appreciation of Oe class problem, Ie also makes Mill's ufilitarian analysis appear hard- headed and realistic in comparison with the later idealists reliance on goodwill In a similar vein, Maclver defined democratic states as those “in which the general wills inclusive ofthe community 18 a whole or of at least the greater portion af the community, and isthe conscious, direct, and active support of the form of government.’ He specifically distinguished democratic states from class-controlled states, and found that in modern civilicar tons classes shaded into one another and had ‘no determinate solidarity of interest.98 He drew attention to the enormous range of interest groups and associations, making up a social universe where there is ‘ceaseless motion and commotion, struggle and accord’. And he sav the party system as the effective way of reducing ‘the multitudinous differences of opinion to relatively simple alternatives’. The task of the democratic state, a task which t did perform, however roughly, ‘was to express and enforce the general will by representing ‘men as citizens rather than a holders of particular interests, ‘The danger isnot that parcalar interests will not be focuted and agserted but rather thatthe general interest maysuller domination Shrouh ter gency. Agata danger he he ua the state, because i organtation presuppones an in some degree reales the aciviey ofthe genetal wil Besides, we must assoc {Ra Grog te rg aod of plea tesmaon he rsa sant mesere cancel outs Nhe Sms wh Bid pp. 275-6. “2 RM, Mactver: The Bde Sate, Onli, 6928, p.942- Thi, p. 405. ug Macie Te We Omer Ne Yon 94 435 Moda at, SMD of Comat, 214. Model 2: Developmental Democracy B Men are ndf content to be represented simply at farmers or as ‘engineers ov as Anglicans or as lovers of music or any other art or ‘ecreaton: they want alo tobe represented as citizens. Otherwise the unity of ther individual lives W unexpressed, no less than the lunigy of society. ‘This representation is achieved, no matter how roughly, trough the development of the party system. We have Seen that though partes are dominated by strong particular inter~ es hy are inten ain pci the rman ofthe rondo Aultude of chizenship. Unless they were the state would fall to Pieces ‘Thus MacIver offered his vision ofthe essential function of the state’ a2 a description of the function actually performed, ‘though imperfectly, by liberal-democratic states through t party systems. u ‘When we turn from the neo-idealist view to John Dewey's pragmatist view of Liberal democracies, we find it less indul- gent about their actual operation. Yet he held out as a possi- Bility and a hope what the idealist pluralists weated as an achievement, He had few illusions about the actual democratic system, or about the democratic quality ofa society dominated bby motives of individual and corporate gain. The root diffi calty lay not in any defects in the machinery of government Ibut in the fact that the democratic public was ‘sil largely inchoate and unorganized’, and unable to see what forces of ‘economic and technological organization it was up against.s® prior problem was ‘that of discovering the means by which a scattered, mobile and manifold public may so recognize itself 18 t0 define and express is interests. The public’ present Jncompetence to do this was traced to it failure to understand the technological andscientifcforces which had madeitso help- less, The remedy was tobe sought in more, and more widespread, social kmowledge: ‘democracy is a name for a life of free and enriching communion, It had its ser in Wale Whitman, It will have its consummation when fre social enquiry is indisolubly wedded to the art of fll and moving communication.’ © Mode Ste wp 5-5. Join Dewey: Te Pu and lt Probes (927), Denier 1954 108 2 Thidy 24s Thi He14 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy What was needed was not ust more edueation-—a remedy to which many ear liberals had had recourye—but an im- provement inthe social siences by applying the experimental hnetlod and "the method of cooperative iatlligence’-> “The essential need . is the improvement of the methods and Conditions of debate, dieussion and petsuasion. That is te problem of the public... this improvement depends esen- Sally upon freeing and perecting the processes of inquiry and of diseminaton of thei conclusions.” ‘Aso needed was large measure ofsoialcontzo ofesonomic forces. Writing under the impact of the great depression, Dewey atgued for ‘a planned co-ordination of industrial development, preferably by voluntary agreement, pethaps by ‘way ofa ‘co-ordinating and directive coun in which captains of industry and fnance would meet with representatives of labor and public ofcials to plan the regulation of industrial activity» «73 in any ease, ‘the intoduction of social respon- Siilty into our business system to such an extent that the dloom of an exclusively pecuniary-proit industry would fol lowet'A few years later, denouncing ‘control by the few of| cst to means of productive labor on the part of many’, and noting “the exntence of class confess, amounting at tines to veiled cil war, he argued that Eberalism should go beyond the provision of tocial services ‘and socialize the frees of pro- ‘duction, now at hand, so tha the Ebert of individuals willbe Supported by the very structure of economic organization’. Bue'the forces of proietion’ which were tobe socialized were science and technology, which were now pesverted ftom their proper end, This could not be dane either by patchwork or by Secialst revolution, bat only by ‘the method of cooperative inteligence™** Although he referred more than once to the desirability of ‘a socialized economy’, i i not at all clear ‘what he had in mind, He was not interested in any analysis of| ‘Liha nd Sil tin 153), Now York, 98,» Bsc Pico 1 Pb om. Pa a rales p 208, 1 Idi on Ne (eg), New York, 198 pp. 17-18 Lai Sil eon 38,80, 88 bid 8 ‘Bid Bo 0,0 Model 2: Developmental Democracy 6 capitalism, He was entirely taken up with the prospects of a democratic liberalism. Acknowledging ‘that our intitutions, democratic in form, tend to favor in substance a privileged plutoeracy’, he went om to say: [Neversheles itis sheer defeatiom to assume in advance of actual ‘yial that democratic politcal institutions are incapable either of farther development or of constructive socal aplication. Even they mow ext the fom of repre goverment ae pote. tially capable of expressing the publi will when that asmes an} thing like unifeadn.® What above all was needed was for liberals to apply to “social relations and social direction’ the method of experimental and cooperative intelligence’ that had already accomplished so ‘mich “in subduing to potential human use the energies of physical nature’ ‘Devrey, then, while far from relying on the existing demo- cratic political machinery to bring about the desired trans formation of society, appealed from democratic machinery to ‘democratic humanism, Democracy “is a way of lie’: it ‘cannot now depend upon or be expressed in political institutions alone’, The humanistic view which he saw as the essential of ‘democracy must be infused into ‘every phase of our eulture— science, aft, education, morals and religion, as well a polities and economics. This was to be done primarily through the spread of a scientific outlook: ‘the Future of democracy is allied with the spread of the scientific attitude.” And it must all be done by ‘plural, partial and experimental method. "The distance between Dewey's pragmatism, with its strong carly twentieth-century influence in the United States, and the pluralist idealiem which was so prevalent in English Wberal- democratic thinking in the same period, is not great. Both saw fa need for ‘plural, partial and experimental methods’. The English theorists were more inclined to revert to the values of 2 Ibid, pp. 85-6. tba, p92 {France Celta, New Yor, 1930, BP 13 125 eh, p15, Thi, pp. 148,17636 ‘The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy ancient Athens, the Americans to the taming of technology; ‘but both were firm believers in the efficacy of pluralism. ‘tis perhaps not unfair to say that all of them had wncon- sciously accepted the image ofthe democratic political process ‘asa market, a free market in which everything would work out to the best advantage of everybody (or tothe least disadvan tage of anybody). They did not make the market analogy explicitly, Because it was too crass, too materialistic: they sil held to the democratic ideal of individual self-development, whereas the market analogy implied narrow seeking of tnedliate selP interest, They did not wish to impute tothe citizen the narrow rationaliey of market man. But they could and did impute a citizen rationality capable of overcoming the imper~ fections of the actual democratic system, They were encoure aged to do this because the actual system had survived: Maclver, for instance, cguld cite the fact of its survival as ens had, in addition to their particular wil, rational general will as citizens, and that the system did allow that will to be expressed.99” What the twentieth-century developmental theorists did not see, as we have noticed, was the extent to which the eystem had survived by reducing the responsiveness of governments to electorates. Tt was the developmental theorists’ failure to see this that enabled them to postulate an overriding citizen rationality and build it into theit descriptive model. And it was their putting this in their descriptive model that left them wide open to the shattering attack of the mid-twentieth-century empirical political scien- tists, In the end, it was the failure of the developmental theorists to see the difference between the actual democratic system which was very much like a market (although far from a flly competitive market), and their idealistic developmental hopes, that led to the failure of Model 23 and its supersesion by Model 5, which was an entirely ough, and seemingly realistic, market model. 6 Aa quoted above, at 2 95- IV Model 3: Equilibrium Democracy Modet 3, the model which came to prevail in the Western ‘world in’ the middle decades of the twentieth century, was ‘offered ae a replacement for the failed Model 2. It i, to an txtent not always realized, a reversion to and elaboration of ‘Model 1, That is the measure at once of its congruence with market society and bourgeois man, and of its increasingly apparent inadequacy. T have called Model 3 the equilibrium model. It may ‘equally well be called, as it sometimes is, the pluralist élitist model, Perhaps the only adequately descriptive name would be one which combined all three terms, ‘the pluralist élitist ‘equilibrium mode? for these three characteristics are equally Central to it. Tt is pluralist in that it stars from the assumption that the society which a modern democratic political syscem ‘must fit isa plural society, thats, a society consisting ofindivi- Guals each of whom is pulled in many directions by his many interests, now in company with one group of his fellows, now ‘with another, Its élitit in that it assigns the main cole in the ‘political process to self-choven groups of leaders. tis an equi- Hbcium model in that it presents the democratic process a8 a system which maintains an equilibrium between the demand and supply of political goods. “Model g was frst systematically, though briefly, formulated in 1942, by Joseph Schumpeter, in a few chapters of his in- fuential book Capitation, Seiotion, and Demeeragy. Since then it hhas been built up and made apparently solid by the work of ‘many political scientists who have amplified and supported it78 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy by & substantial amount of empirical investigation of how votes in Wester democracies actually behave nd how ex ing Water pola eos scaly raj the be “The mainatpslatons of this model arf hat democracy is simply a mechani for chosing and authoring gover: rent fot a Hid of society nor a aet of moral ends and Seon, tha the mechaie costs ofa competion between {vo of more selEchonen sts of poltcians (Eltes) arrayed in polial parts, orth votes which wl ene them t rale Stil he next election. The vote ais notte deide pola eues andthe choce representatives who will ary ut thwe Alecfon: Ts rather to cote the men who wil do the decd fog. Thar Schomperr: te role of he people to produce a government. the democratic method ts that instational rangement fr sriving at pllcal decisions in which indivi Ghat acquze the power eo fede by means of a competitive tergel forthe people's vote’ The fniduals who 30 com: pete are, of cout, the policaos, The cizea ole simply {choo betwee sets of polis periodialy at election time. The elzen ably thus to replace one government by auother protec them fim tranny. And, tothe extent that there any diferencen the platforms of the parte orn the general line of policy to be expected of cach party as a government fon the basis fs record), the voters tn cooing Between partes register their dd for one batch of pied goods rather than anther. The purveyors ofthe batch which ets the most votes become the athoized rulers un the next. flection! they cannot tyrannize beease there wil be a het. flection. "Model 9 deliberately empties out the moral content which Model sha pt nto the ides of desncray. Tere sno none seme about democracy at vehicle forthe improvement of “ding wks ees Heard Heron, Pel Lata, ad Wala nai! Yue, ag uy oes A Dal ef ‘Dente Thay, Cig sos Da Be Cao New Hane rs Da ti Msn esis Hater i jo ent Gabel ‘Nod od Soy are, Fe Ge oy ran Joep Semper Cm Sea, nf Deane and ey eee nd on, 9th Model 3: Equilibrium Democracy 79 mankind, Participation i nota vale in itll, nor even an itsrumental vate for db ackvement of 8 Rigen more socially conscious set of human beings The pnp of emo- Stacy sto eter the desires of peoples hey ae noe toca tribute to what they might be or might wish t be. Democracy Samply a marke nechanfons he vores ate the consumer} the paldcans are the entepreseare Ti not surpiag that the mam iho int propos th model was an eonomit ho had worked alls preessonal Me with market models. Noes it surprising thatthe pola! theorists (and then the pubes andthe public took up ti model a relic one fr they tivo have lived and worked ins society permeated by markt Tataviou. Notonly did the market model seem to correspond {oy and hence to explain he actual pital Behaviour of the train componcoe pars ofthe pola ytem—tie voters and the partes; talosecmed to jay that behaviour, and Renee the whole system. rin the mid-twentieth century, when itl did no seem too naive to talk about consumen’ sovereignty inthe economic fraret twas ean to sea pall inthe polteal markt the polldeal consumers were sovercign becaute they bad a choee Becveen the purveyor of packages of pola goods, Te was uy fr te pola theorist take the same sumption the economic theorist. Inthe economic model, entrepreneurs fn cours wet aimed f be tata maniac of their own good and tobe operating in conditions of ree eom- poiion in which all encrges and resouress were brought to The marker wid the result chat the masket produced the optimum dstbution of labour and capital and consumer gor So in the pial model, polars and voters were Shue tobe rational rosiizem, and to be operating in enulons free plical competition, with the ret that the ‘market poideal sytem produced the optimum distibu- Gon of olden energies and poles good: The democratic Poleal market produced an optimum eqlibium of inputs End outputsof the energies and resqutees people would put into vend the reward the would ge ou oft have pointed tut ebewhere that by the time the poieal scents had * Dna Thy Bag Rail, Os 197 Ban X80 ‘The Life and Times of Liberal Derworacy taken over this economic model it was already being discarded for much modified by economists in favour of an oligopolistic power-bloc model of the economy. But the nation of con- sumers’ sovereignty is stil accepted in the pluralist political ‘model, and serves as an implicit justification of it This model makes another market assumption. Not only oes it assume that political man, like economic man, is estene tially a consumer and an appropriator: it assumes also that the things different people want out of the government—the demands for political goods—are so diverse and shifting that the only way of making them effective, the only way of geting the government's decisions to meet them, the only way of eliciting the required supply of politcal goods and getting it distributed in proportion to the myriad demands, is an entre- ppreneurial system like that which operates in the standard ‘model of the competitive market economy. Given that the political demands are so diverse that ne natural or spontaneous grouping of them could be expected to produce a clear ‘majority position, and given that in a democracy the govern- ‘ment should express the will of the majority, it follows that a device is needed which will produce a majority will out of those diverse demands, or will produce the set of decisions ‘most agreeable to, or least disagreeable to, the whole lot of diverse individual demands, A system of entreprenential polit- cal parties offering isferently proportioned packages of polit- cal goods, of which the voters by majority vote choose one, is offered asthe best, orthe only, device for doing this: it produces a stable government which equilibrates demand ané supply. ‘This pluralism of Model g evidently has something in com- mon with the pluralism we have seen in Model ap, But there is ‘considerable qualitative difference. The pluralism of Model 4 leaves out the ethical component that was so prominent in “Model 2p. It treats citizens as simply political consumers, and political ociety a simply a macketike relation between them ‘and the suppliers of political commodities, From this summary account of Model g and the assumptions ‘on which itis based, we can see that it offers itself as astate- ment of what the prevailing system actually is and as an ex planation, in terms of market principles, of why it works as of Model 3: Equilibrium Democracy 8r well as it does, We have noticed also that the explanation ‘easily merges into justification, Before we look more closely at ‘the adequacy of Model 3, as description, explanation, and Justification, we should notice that there’ are differences of ‘emphasis, if not of substance, between some of its leading ‘exponents. ‘The differences are not so much inthe descriptions they give the extent ofthe claims made for the system, They al see the citizens as politcal consumers, with very diverse wants and demands, They all sce competition between politicians forthe citizens’ votes as the motor of the system. They all find that this mechanism does produce a stable equilibrium. They differ somevat in their views ofthe extent to which it also provides some measure of politcal consumers’ sovereignty. Schumpeter ives the system a rather low rating on this, He finds that the ‘voters have most oftheir choices made for them,§ and that the pressures they can bring to bear on the government between lection times are not very effective, (Other analysts are more optimistic about the effectiveness of consumers’ preferences. Dahl finds ‘somewhat defective’ in Schumpeter’ ‘otherwise excellent analysis’ the view ‘that elee- tions and interelection activity are of trivial importance in determining policy’. But the most Dahl claims for these activie ties i that ‘they are crucial proceses for insuring that political leaders will be somewhat responsive to the preferences of some ordinary citizens’? or that ‘With allts defects, [tie American political system] does nonetheless provide a high probabilicy that any active and legitimate group will make itself heard effectively at some stage in the process of decision. .itappears tw be a relatively efficient system for reinforcing agreement, encouraging moderation, and maintaining social peace in 2 restless and immoderate people operating a gigantic powerful, diversiied, and incredibly complex society." In a later work Dahl rates the responsiveness of the system a little higher: ‘most citizens... possest a moderate degree of indirect influ- cence, for elected officials keep the real or imagined preferences 4 See below, st na. a9 snd 24 & Dajte Demers Tho, Be £3. “Toi pp. 190-1.B2 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy of constituents conatently in mind in deciding what policies to adopt or reject.” Sill higher claims are sometimes made. For instance, the influential study Voting, by Berelson, Lazarseld, and McPhee, alver demonstrating that in the American political system the citizens are not at all lke the cational ccizens of Model 2, and ppointing out that nevertheless the system does work (that i, bas not disintegrated into either dictatorship or civil war), and ‘often works with distinetion’* concluded that it must have hidden merit. Something like the invisible hand celebrated by ‘Adam Smith must be at work. ee rr ‘Eee deme re ern ty on eal Se utes cee Se roe hm ecm: Ae cramping ie de ny Selon atic ae aly rope ee pata ite eames ipa ps, Behn ong nen eden or epee ig i oe cy a Ba Sept sie how th tea en a Seer atten eng tae aa tele teale ee ‘This echo of Adam Smith is not surpriting, for Berelson a. do tend to attribute the success of Model 3 to its marketlke nature: nothing les than the magic ofthe market can explain thesuccessofthesystem, and nothing moreisneeded to justify, ‘THE ADEQUACY oF MODEL 5 ‘We havenoticed that Model presents itselfasdeseription, as explanation, and somtimes as justification, of the actual political system in Western democracies, In asking now how Adequate the model is on each count we must acknowledge that there is some difficulty in treating the three counts separ- ately, since they often merge into each other. Things may be left out of the descriptions because an explanatory framework 2 Wo Ga, 9284 "Benton, Lavan and MePhse! Voting,» 3 hid p30 Model 3: Equilibrium Democracy 83 already adopted treats them at of little oF no importance, Or ‘empirical descriptive findings about, for instance, citizens? pathy or voter” misinformation, may require the theorists to cast about for a principle of explanation to account for the fact that the system works a all. And principles of explanation, sa we have seen, easily shade into juslfications. One may still usefully separate the descriptive from the justfeatory aspece, without hoping to teat the explanatory aspect eel separ ately ©) Descrigive adequagy ‘As description of the actual system now prevailing in Wester liberal-democratic nations, Model must be ad= judged substantially acenrate, Iti clearly a much more reali: Tie statement than any provided by Model Thas been but up by careful and extensive empicial investigations by highly competent scholars, There is no Yeason to doubt their Radings, ‘which depareso drasicalyfeom Model 2. They may have lef some things out of accoune for instance the ability ofthe Ate to decide what issues may be put to the voters at all and what ace nonisues but such omisions may be thougbt to alec the models explanatory oF justicatory adequacy more than ies deseriptive adequacy. Some adjustment may be needed to make thelr findings, which are pre-eminently based on researches into the system in the United States, applicable co Western Burope: the cur- rent strength of the Gommunist Party in France and Tay, for instance, suggests that in those counues party divisions are rote polarized along clas lines than the American pluralistic rote! allows for. But that ean probably be accommodated ‘widhout much dificuly. The subsandal accuracy of Model 3 48 description may he atuibited tothe substantial accuracy of itsassumptions about eurrent Western man and society: 38 long, aswehave market man and market society, they canbe expec- {ed to operate as described in Model 18 As argued by Peter Bachrach and Morton 8. Baatz: ‘Two Fass of over, don Pola See Resin LV, 4 (Desai 62) eprint Jn Charles A MeCoy apd Joh Playford (ds): Aplia Pals, « Gre ef Bahrain, New York,84 ‘The Life and Times of Liberal Demseracy (i) Explanatory adequacy ‘Explanatory principles, intended to show why the system ‘works atall of works as well as it does, grow out of (and grow into) the descriptive findings. But they also merge so generally into justifications of the system that it will be convenient to consider explanatory and justifcatory adequacy together. Tn- ‘deed, most of the recent writing criticizing Model 3 seems to hhave begun from dissatisfaction with its justficatory claims and gone on to challenge its explanatory a even its descriptive adequacy. I shall not attempt to summarize all the critical ‘analyses of Model 3 that have been made in the last decade or 0 by political scientists of what may be called a radical liberal-democratie persuasion, but simply cite their work as evidence of increasing dissatisfaction with the model among the political acience community. I shall then go on to inquire, in the light of the analysis already made of the failure of ‘Models 1 and 2, why Model 3 has begun to appear so unsatis- factory. (il) Justifectoy adequacy Te may be well to begin by considering the claim generally sade of implied by exponents of Model g that their model is not justificatory at all, but only descriptive and explanatory. ‘This claim really cannot be accepted, although Schumpeter, ‘who searcely bothered to make such a claim, might be justified in making it, But the later and more substantial exponents of ‘Model 3 all imply, or even state, a justification at one or both ‘of two levels. They are saying, at the least, thatthe system is, ‘with all ite admitted imperfections, the only one that can do the job, or the one that can do it best. They are the realists, “That is what people are like, so thsis the best they are capable of Generally, even more is claimed—that the system produces ‘optimum equilibrium and some measure of etizen consumers? sovereignty. These are taken to be self-evidently good, so the ‘eg, Pete Bachrach: The Thay of Denar Bm, «Gita, Boston and Forni gy; MeGoy so Payor op Willan Connally (e) ‘The Bie of Poalin, New York, by; Henry Kari (cd): Patios Denote Thy, New Work, #070; Carole Pateman: Paratio ond Dense Try, Cade 170. Model 3: Equilibrium Democracy 85 system which provides them is taken to be justified by the very ‘demonstration that it does provide them. Boti ofthe realists’ claims are thus, at least implicitly, jutificatory. How adequate are they? ‘The first claim amounts to saying that Model g is best be- ‘cause anything loftier is unworkable, The advocates of Model ontrase i with what they usnally eal the “latsieal” model of emocracy, which generally curs out to be a confused mix- ture of a presindustrial model (Rousseau’s or Jefferson's), and our Models 1 and 2. Te would take too long a digression to try to tort out those confusions,"® especially as different pro- ponents of Model 3 set up their ‘classica? straw men rather differently. Schumpeter, for instance, makes his main tanget the oversrationaliste assumptions he finds in Rousseau and in Bentham’s Model 1: average men, he holds, are not capable of forming the rational judgements he thinks required by those models; therefore those models are hopeless. Others have been more concerned to deflate the moral pretensions of Model 2, while accepting the Model 1 view of man as esen- tially a rational maximizing calculator: itis becuse men are ‘on the whole such maximizing ealeulators that most of them ‘may well decide not to spend much time or energy in political participation, thus invalidating Model 2.14 The extent ofthe confsin has been pointy remarked by Carole Patemans the ation of 8 "lasiel theory of democracy” bm ryt? (Partpation et Dessctie Thy, P17). Asmar atooagh la extravagant postion i ten by Berelon (Gerson Lasts, and McPhee: Voting, 921). Tei. Robere Das argument (fr te Rooition? Auten God Suc, New Haven and London, 1970 1. 40-56) that a reaonable man ‘riled in atu praesie everyone dae’ apy to any stem of uthorie ‘ys the “Catrionof Boon, hich t balance the cet of pola ‘Plrtiption aga the expreted beet the cost being the forgone ee Fh tne and energy, Ths notin of paripation av nating bat "ast lhe ity i every ie een as merely 2 masinzng conser) over- Iboks the poste alee of pacipation in enhancing the partipants Understanding of his ew, potion snd im giving a geese see of Durpose and greater anarenee of community. OF Bachrach: “Interst, Participation, and Democratic Theory’ io J- Re Peanock and J. W. Chapa ede): Prato ix Palit (Nomis XVID, New York, 1978, pp arse86 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy Both these views as to why Model git more realistic, more ‘workable, and so ‘beter’, than any previous model, rest ult- mately on an unverifiable assumption that che political eapa bilities ofthe average person in a modern market society are a fixed datum, or at least are unlikely to change in our tne. ‘One might argue, against the validity of that assumption, that it depends on a model of man which eame to prevail only with the emergence or predominance of the capitalist market society? But even iit is granted that that model of man is 0 time-bound and culture-bound, we do not know whether or when it may be superseded. So, although the asumption can- not be verified, neither can it be absolutely fasfied. Hence the jomificatory adequacy ofthe first claim must be left undecided: ‘we can only return the Scottish verdict ‘Not Proven’. ‘What of thesecond claim: that, on the analogy ofthe market in the economic system, the competitive élite party system brings about an optimum equilibrium of the supply and dex ‘mand for political goods, and provides some measure of citizen ‘consumer sovereignty? Prina fase, optimum equilibrium and citizen consumer sovereignty are good in themselves. To most people who live in advanced and relatively stable societies, ‘equilibrium’ sounds better than ‘disequilibrium’; and ‘opt imum’ is hy definition best; so what could be better than “optimum equilibrium’? And ‘citizen consumer sovereignty’ a phrase loaded with good words, So if Model 3 does provide these, surely we might conclude that itis a pretty good kind of, democracy. But this does not follow. All that follows is that it fsa pretty good kind of a market, But a market is not neces- sarily democratic. T want now to show that the Model g political market sys- temis not nearly as democratic a its made out to be: that the ‘equilibrium it produces is an equilibrium in inequality; that the consumer sovereignty it claims to provide is to a large cextéat an illusion; and that, to the extent that the consumer sovereignty is real, itis a contradiction of the central demo- cratic tenet of equality of individual endslement to the use and enjoyment of one’s capacities, The claims for optimum equi- 18 Gf, Karl Polanyi: Te Guat Tresrmatin, New York, 1944, and my Denaratie Thy, Ey 1 Model 3: Equilibrium Democracy 87 librium and consumer sovereignty are virtually the same claim—two sides of the same coin-—and so may be treated together asa single clair. “The claim fails on two counts. First, in so far asthe politcal ‘market system, on the analogy of the economic market, is ‘competitive enough to produce the optimum supply and ribution of political goods, optimum in relation to the de- ‘mands, what it does is to register and respond to what econo- smints call the efetoe demand, that is, the demands that have ‘purchasing power to back them. In the economic market this means simply money, no matter whether the money has been Acquired by an output ofits possessors' energy or in some other ‘vay, In the political market the purchasing power is toa large ‘extent, but not entirely, money—the money needed to support f party or a candidate in an election campaign, o organize a pressure group, or to buy space or time in the mass media (or to own some of the mass media). But political purchasing power includes also direct expenditure of energy in campaign- ing, organizing, and participating in other waysin the political process. Tn so far as the political purchasing power is money, we can scarcely say thatthe oquilibrating process is democrat in any society, ike ours, in which there is substantial inequality of ‘wealth and of chances of acquiring wealth, We may stil call it consumer sovereignty if we wish. But the sovereignty of an aggregate of such unequal consumers is nat evidently demo- cratic, Tn so far as the political purchasing power is direct expendi ture of energy the case seems better. What could be fairer tha a return proportional to the input of political energy? Citizens ‘ho are apathetic should surely not expect as much return as those who are more active. This would be a fair principle, eon- sistent with democratic equality, if the apathy were an in- dependent datum, that is ifthe apathy were in each case the ‘outcame of a maximizing decision by the individual, balancing ‘the most profitable uses of his time and energy as between politcal participation and other things, ad if every individual ‘could expect that each hour he gave to politics would have the ‘same value, the same purchasing power in the political market,88 The Life and Times of Liberal Damaeracy 48 any other person's, Bue cis i just what it cannot have. ‘Those whese education and occupation make it more dificult for them than forthe others to acquire and marshal and weigh the information needed for effective participation are clearly isadvantage: an hour of teit time devoted to political participation will not have as much effect as an hour of one of the otis. They know this, hence they are apathetic. Socal inequality thet creates poitical apathy. Apathy is not an independent dacum. ‘Over and above this, the politica system of Model 3 contr- ‘bute directly to apathy. As we sav in the preceding chapter, the functon® which a parey system in an unegdal society with rast fsnchise must pesform require a blurring of issues and a dligsinuion ofthe eesponsbility of governments to electorates, both of which reduce the incentive ofthe voters to exert them: selves in making a choice. A frequent reason for non-voting i the feling that there is no real choice. Proponents of Mode § have mate much ofthe phenomenon ofvoter apathy, though they have not usually raced ito the ‘causes I have jst mentioned. They do, however, afen point ‘out that succestfal operation of Mode 3 reque something ike the present levels of apathy: greater parucipation would ene danger the stability of the sysiem.* The accuracy of this ‘general proposition is never demonsrated, but the fac that it ib anerted at alls revealing: in the realist of Mode some good is to be found even in something as unpromising 23 Widespread apathy. We may prefer to think that 2 politial Fystem which requires and engourages apathy isnot doing a ‘ery brisk job of optenzing, especially in view of the class Aifexental in apathy.” “Tosum up, then on the fst count, we find that 0 far as Mg, Been a: Vig, ch 14s W.H. MowiJons: a Dene ef ‘pli, Pate Sade HE (ape po 25-97: Seymonr Matin Lip ‘lian New York, tbsp. tgvbs Later irk: Pala Papin Ching, 19h rat there ae ena n pola! patito isthe ne sme ono of oiag sles Fora orugh exploration of hs nd ser dntnom o ape, sz Sdacy Verba and Noman Ni Periiptin dna, Poel Demat Stil Bruty Now York 197 Model 3: Equilibrium Denocrasy 8 the political market system is competitive enough to do the job ‘of equlibrating the supply of and demand for politcal goode— in so far, that i, a8 it dows actually respond to consumer de- ‘mands—ie measures and responds to demands which are very unequally effective. Some demands are more effective than others because, where the demand is expresed in human ‘energy input, one person's energy input cannot get the same return per unit as another persoa’s. And the class of political ‘demands that have the most money to back them is largely the same as the class of those that have the larger pay-off per unit ‘of human energy input. In both eases it is the demands ofthe er socio-economic clasts which are the most effective, So the lower classes are apathetic. In shore the equilibrium and tho consumer sovereignty, in so far as Model 3 does provide them, are far from democratic. “The second count on which the claim to provide a demo- cratic consumer savereignty fails is simply that Model 3 does rot provide asignificant amount of consumer sovereignty. The ‘Model 3 political market is far from fally competitive. For itis, tose an economists’ term, oligopolistic. Thats, there are only afer sellers, a few suppliers of political goods, in other words only a few political partis: in the most favoured variant of ‘Model g there are only two effective partis, with a posibility of ‘one or two more. Where there are 30 few sellers, they need not ‘and do not respond tothe buyers’ demands as they mustdo ina folly competitive system. They can set prices and set the range ‘of goods that will be offered, More than that, they can, to con siderable extent, create the demand. In an oligopolistic market, the demand is not autonomous, not an independent datura. “This exfect of oligopoly, which s a commonplace of econo- ‘mic theory, has been surprisingly litde noticed by the political ‘theorists of Model 5, Even Schumpeter, who ofall the forma lators of Model 3 has economic parallels most in mind, and who makes quite a point of the way that oligopoly and imper~ fect competition require a substantial revision of the classical Dil ho hs explored the impliston of Mode g more fly than ont fi cxpnent pactularty a Af le Reston (1570), here hplic about the sutarting elec fle inequality and aes reducton {3 prerequisite of genuine democracy.92 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy ‘ean provide affluence indefinitely), and as long as we continue ‘to accept the cold-war view that the only alternative to Model 5 is a wholly non-liberal totalitarian state. Putting this in a Slightly different way, we might say thata system of competing Gites with a low level of citizen participation is ryured in an uunequal society, most of whose merabers think of themselves fs maximizing consumers, ‘This requirement took on @ new ungeney with the eatae strophic economic depression of the early 19908 im all the Western nations, The need for the state to intervene in the ‘economy along Keynesian lines, in order to sustain the capital- ise order, meant an inereased need to remove political decisions from any democratic responsiveness: only the experts, whose reasoning was assured to be beyond the comprehension ofthe voter, could save the system. The experts’ advice was fllowed, and it did save the system far the next three or four decades, ‘Model g was, therefore, from its very beginnings in the 19405, understandably aligned against democratic participation. But with increasing dislusionment with the results of this state- regulated capitalism in the 1960s and 70s, the adequacy of Model g is increasingly questioned. "The fact that doubts are increasingly being raised about the adequacy of this system cannot, unfortunately, be taken as ccvidence that we have moved far enough away fom ine ‘equality, and from the consciousness of ourselves as eaentilly consumers, to make a new political model possible. The most we can do isto look at the problems of moving to a new model, find examine posible solutions. v Model 4: Participatory Democracy To call participatory demacracy a model at all, let alone a model of liberal democracy, is perhaps to yield too much to a liking for symmetry, Participatory democracy is certainly nota ‘model as solid or specific as those we have been examining, It began as a slogan of the New Left stadent movements of the 1960s. Iespread into the working cla in the 1g6esand "pas, no doubt as an offthoot of the growing job-disaiisfaction among Doth blue» and whitecollar workers and the more widespread ‘eeling of alienation, which then became such fashionable sub- Jects for sociologists, management experts, government com- ‘missions inquiry, and populae journalists. One manifestation ofthis new spisit was the rise of movements for workers! control inindustry. Tp the same decades, the idea that there should be substantial citizen participation in govermnent decision-making spread so widely that national governments began enrolling themselves, at least verbally, under the participatory bannes, and some even initiated programmes embodying extensive citizen participation.! Tt appears that the hope ofa more par= ticipatory society and system of government line come to stay. ‘We need not attempt to review the voluminous recent liters. ‘ure on participation in various spheres of society. Our concern eg, the Community Acton Programs inaugurated by the United | States federal goverment i 19S tbc call fr “maxi fenile participation of eden ofthe sree and embers of the groupe served For critical account of ths see ‘iizen Participation in Emerging Socal ttn’ by Howard. Kaldner a Priam i Pb, ied in in, below.94 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy eels only with the prospect of «mare paricpatry rem af govemmont for Wescn Hbraldemacate sation, Can fos democratic government be snade tore patipatory, tndifvohow? This quesdon ha nor yethad as much enon sesoemes The ate mong pli ata 0 tthe beginning mainly conceaed withthe pio question! Imorecltaen puripton rable?" The exponents Model Shas we have tony utd no, Tht debate fs nt yt ended? Forour purposes however, that debate may e frend. Tein mufiea i ey at in vew ofthe enguendoned as dicen in polite! partcpationin the presente, and Suing tat tat iffernl both the eect snd the cone tung eave of he nly of vein the lower seta eer foartealate tet wants oto make de demands efctive, Then noting as uspartlpaocy atthe apathetic equim ef Mol nese upto the etal eglrement of demo: tracy, Ths tr ot to ay that a ore prtipatory system ould civelfremoe all he inequities four solty. oly toeay that ow padeipaon and soil egy ae bound Upwth each oer that more eqltable and humane eety ‘euies a more participatory plies yer. the difiete ueston, who ter tchange nthe pie cal sytem or chang inthe society in preeguste of he theyll ocpy ws gen the nest sen of hi chaps nthe meant {sal sume that something more partic patory Dan our present system se deal, he remaining Guosdon is whether pone 15 MORE PARTICIPATION Now POSSIBLE? (The probiem of size Tis not much use simply celebrating the democratic quality * This is been the main oncom ofthe radia liberal eri of Model 3 (as cited in ch TV, p 8g 24, aed ing below. "See Pettit Pals (Somos XV (ee Ju, Pennack and J.W. CChapatnn), New York 1975. Most of the codrbutary to th vlume, ‘eile based on papers geen athe 197¢ annual meting ofthe American ‘Society or Plea! and Legal Phlowpty, arin vous of more prtpa. Hom but there sted defence, by ME BE. Seth, of the oppose paition Model 4: Participatory Democracy 95 oflife and of decision-making (hatis, of government) that can bbe had in contemporary communes or New England town- ‘meetings or that was had in ancient city-states, There may bea Jot to learn about the quality of democracy by examining these face-to-face societies, but that will not show ws how a partici= patory democracy could operate in 2 modern nation of twenty million or two hundred million people. It seems clear that, at the national level, there will have to be some kind of repre- sentative system, not completely direct democracy. ‘The idea that revent and expected advances in computer technology and telecommunications will make it possible o achieve direct democracy at the required milion-fld level is attractive not only to technologists but aso to social theorists and political philosophers.® But it does not pay enough atten- tion to an inescapable requirement of any decision-making process: somebody must formulate the questions. No doubt something could be done with two-way television to draw more people into more active political discussion. And ‘np doubt itis technically feasible to putin every iving-room— or, to caver the whole population, beside every bed—a com- pputer console with Yes/No buttons, or buttons for Agree/ Disagree/Don’t Know, or for Strongly Approve/Mildly Ap- ‘prove/Don't Care/Mildly Disapprove/Steongly Disapprove, or for preferential multiple choices, But it seems inevitable that some government body would have to decide what questions would be asked: this could scarcely be left co private bodies ‘There might indeed be a provision that some stated number ofcitizens have the right to propose questions which must then be put electronically to the whole electorate, But even with such a provision, mast of the questions that would need to be asked in our present complex societies could scarcely be formu Tated by citizen groups specifically enough for the answers 10 sive 2 government a clear directive. Nor-can the ordinary ‘ctizen be expected to respond to the sort of questions that would be required to give a clear directive, The questions would have to be as intricate as, for instance, ‘what per cent +See Michael Routan: On Largan Sacel Change, New York, 1973, pp. agp and Robert Paul Walls fe Dg of dntchim, New York, ‘0, Be. 3796 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy ‘unemployment rate would you accept in order to reduce the ‘ate of inflation by x per cent? or what increase in the rate of {a) income tax, (b) sales and excise taxes, (c) other taxes (Gpecify which}, would you accept in order to increase by blank per cent (fil in [punch in] the blank), the Tevel of (1) ‘old-age pensions, (2) health services, (g) other social services (specify which), (g) any other benefits (specify which)?” Thus ‘even if there were provision for such a scheme of popular {nitative, goveraments would still have to make a lot of the real decisions. “Morcover, unless there were, somewhere in the system, a body whose duty was to reconcile inconsistent demands pre- sented by the buttons, the system would soon break dows. If such a system were to be attempted in anything like our pres cent society there would almost certainly be inconsistent de- ‘mands, People—the same people—would, for instance, very likely demand a reduction of unemployment at the same time as they were demanding a reduction ofinflation, or an increase in government expenditures along with a decrease in taxes, ‘And of course different people—people with opposed interests, such as the presently privileged and the unpeivileged—would also present incompatible demands, The computer could easily eal with the latter incompatibilties by ascertaining the majority position, but it could not sort out the former. To avoid the need for & body to adjust such incompatible demands to each other the questions would have to be framed in a way that would require of each voter a degree of sophistication impossible to expect Nor would the situation be any better in any foreseeable future society. It is true that the sort of questions just men- tioned, which are about the distribution of economic costs and ‘economic benefits among different sections ofthe population, may be expected to become less acute in the measure that rmaterial scarcity becomes les pressing. But even if they were to disappear as internal problems in the economically most advanced societies, they would reappear there as external problem: for instance, how much and what kind of aid should the advanced countries afford to the underdeveloped ones? “Moreover, another range of questions would arise internally, Model 4: Participatory Democracy 9 having to do not with distribution but with production in the broadest sense, thats, withthe uses to be made ofthe society's whole stock of energy and resources, and the encouragement or discouragement of farther economic growth and population growth, And beyond that there would be such questions asthe texteat to which the society should promote or should keep its hands off che cultural and educational pursuits of the people. Such questions, even in the most favourable circumstances imaginable, will require repeated reformulation. And ques- tions ofthis sore do not readily lend themselves to formulation by popular initiative, Their formulation would have to be entrusted f6'a governmental body. Te might sill be argued that even if itis impossible to leave the formulation ofall policy questions to popular initiative, at least the very broadest sort of policy could be left toit. Granted » that che many hundreds of policy decisions that are now made very year by goveraments and legislatures would still have to bemade by chem, i might be urged tha those decisions should be required to conform to the revuls of referenda on the very broadest questions, But itis dificult co see how most of the broadest questions could be left t0 formulation by popular Initiative. Popular initiative could certainly formulate clear «questions on certain singe ses, for instance, capital punishe tent or legalization of marijuana or of abortion on demand cron which the rexponse required is simply yes or no. Bat forthe reasons given above, popula initiative could not formu late adequate questions on the grea interrelated issues of over~ all social and economic policy. That would have tobe lef to Some organ of government, And woles that organ were ether fn elected body or responsible t an elected body, and thus at Some remove responible to the electorate, such a system of Continual referenda would not really be democratic: worse, by tiving the appearance of being democrati, the sytem would Eonceal the teal locaton of power and would thus enable ‘democralic’goverament to be ore autocratic than they are now. We cannot do without elected politicians. We must rly, though we need not rely exclusively, on indirect democracy. ‘The problem is to make the elected politicians responsible. The98 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy electronic console beside every bed cannot do that. Hleetronic technology, then, cannot give us direct democracy. So the problem of participatory democracy on a ma scale scems intractable, Iti intractable if we simply try to draw ‘mechanical blue-prints of the proposed political sytem with- ‘out paying attention to the changes in society, and in people's consciousness of themselves, which a Little thought will show ‘must precede or accompany the attainment of anything like participatory democracy. I want to suggest now that the cen tral problem is not how a participatory democracy would operate but how we could move towards it, (8) A ssi cid and pose ogae begin witha general propstion the main problem about pattelpatory deren rot how to rant at how trench Fe Forstacems likely tha ite ean each orreach any sb “onal nine’ scr oo lw the ond ea wll have made us cape ofranaing io teas eines le than we now ate : * Having announced this proposion, I mst immediately quaily i. The files so far to teach realy parpatory democracy in counties where that hs ben a consow gol, for inne Guechonovaia nthe eas pto 1968 and any of te Thr Werld count, demand some servations about sucha proposition, Por in both the cae, a good deal ofthe Toad hid already been caved: I mean the tnd aa) om Capitalist ase lesion and bourgeois ideology toward he oe cs, « Marist humanism an inthe oer, Rouen oncepe of a society embodying » general wl, and in both Gaus lowardh a songer see of community than we have ‘And, ofonue, the whe the rac had there Been raveled away rom that mitronimage of the eigopotite capil Imarketajtem: Imes, the igopols competion of pote Gal pares whch prevails wth, whichis only not very aripaory, buts recommended, by must cuenta Semocrate thorn a quintesentally non prteipatory. So there stil are diftclis in reaching parlpatory deno- crsey, even when much ofthe road har been ave, Le, then some of the cbs pees changes in soy and Model 4: Participatory Democragy 99 ideology fase taken place. However, the roads they have travelled in such countries as I have just mentioned are signif- ‘cantly different from the road we would have to travel to come near to partiipatory democracy. For [assume that our road in the Western liberal democracies is nat likely to be via com ‘munis revolution; nor, obviously, will it be via revolutions of national independence beset by all the problems of under- evelopment and low productivity that have faced the Third World countries. Te therefore seems worth inquiring what road it may be possible for any of the Western liberal democracies to travel, And whether, or to what extent, moving along that road could make us capable of operating a system substantially more participatory than our present one, This becomes the question? ‘what roadblocks have to be removed, ie, what changes in our present society and the now prevailing ideology are pre- requisite or co-requisite conditions for reaching a pasticipatory democracy? Tf my earlier analysis is at all valid, the present nom participatory oF searcely participatory political system of ‘Model 3 does ft an unequal society of conflicting consumers land appropriatore: indeed, nothing but that system, with its ‘competing politial fites and voter apathy, seems competent to hold such @ society together. IF that is 10, (wo pre- requisites for the emergence of a Model q are fairly clearly indicated. ‘One is a change in people's consciousness {or unconscious ness), fom seeing themselves and acting as essentially con- fumers to seeing themselves and acting as exerters and enjoyers Of the exertion and development of their own capacities. This is requisite not only to the emergence but also to the operation ‘of a participatory democracy. For the latter seltimage brings Wwith it a sense of community which the former does not. One ‘ean acquire and consume by oneslf, for one’s own satisfiction tr to show one’s tiperirity to others: this does not require ot foster a sense of community; whereas the enjoyment and development of one's capacities is to be done forthe most part in conjunction with others, in some relation of community. ‘And it fll not be doubted thatthe operation ofa participatory100 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy democracy would requite a stronger sense of community than now prevails, “ee 2 “The other prerequite is great reduction ofthe present sodal and economie inequality since that inequalty, A Have Bfgoed, requires a not-partiifatry party stem to hold the sovieey together. And along a inequality accepted, the non. partielpatory plial systems Hkely ale to be accepted by all {howe inal canes who prefer stability tothe prospect of come plete socal breakdown. Now ithe to changes in scily—the replacement ofthe image ofman at conser, ad a great reduction of vec and sconomic Inequaley~are prerequisites of partipatory demo- tracy, we seem toe eaughtin'a vicious cele, For iis un They da ether ofthese prerequisite change could be effected ‘without grat deal more democratic participation than there Fr now. The reduction of socal and economic inequality is unlikely without strong democratic ation. And it would seem, whether we fallow Mill or Mars, that only trough actaal Involvement in joint poical action ean people transcend tha conelounae of theres at cone se appropri tors. Hence the vicious circle: we cannot achieve more demo- Crate participa without prior change nso inequality tnd in eomsclousnes, But we cannot achieve the changes toda inequaliey and eonacousness without pio incest democratic parGiption. Ts there any way out? I think Uhre may be, though in our alent capitait societies fi unlitely to fellow the pattern roped or expected inthe nineteenth century ether by Mare fr by Mil, Marx expected the development of eapitalisn to Tead to a sharpening of elas consiouttes, which would lead to vatious kinds of working pola acon, which would further increase te cls conscioutne ofthe working clas and tum it into revloonary consioviness and evelutionary organization, This would be fllowed by a revolutionary take- ver of power by the working cas, which power would be omolidated by a period of ‘ictatosip of the proletariat’ ‘which would Drea down the sorial and economie inequality nd replace man ai mandmiing consumer by man as exeter, nd developer of his human eapaciies. Whatever we may Model 4: Participatory Democracy ror think of the probability of this sequence once it had started, it does require increasing class consciousness to start it, and these is Tete evidence ofthis in prosperous Western societies today, Where it has generally declined since Marx's day. (John. Stuart Mill’ way out does not seem very hopeful cither. He counted on two things. First, the broadening of the Franchise wouldlead to mare widespread political participation ‘which would in tara make people capable of still more political participation and would contribute to a change in conscious- ‘hess. Secondly, the ovner/worker relation would change with the spread of producers’ co-ops: to the extent that they re- placed the standard capitalist relation, both consciousness and inequality would be changed. But the broadening of the fran- chise did not have the result Mill hoped for, aor has the ‘capitalist relation hetween owner and worker changed! in the ‘way required. ‘So neither Marx’s nor Mill's way seems a way out of our vicious ciscle. Bue there is one insight common to both of them that we might well fellow. Both assumed that changes in the two factors which abstractly seem to be prerequisites of each other—the amount of political participation on the one hand, fand the prevailing inequality and the image of man as infnice Consumer and appropriator on the other—would come stage by stage and reciprocally, an incomplete change in one leading to some change in the other, leading to more change in the first, and so on. Even Mars’s scenario, including as it did revolutionary change at one point ealled for this reciprocal incremental change both before and after the revolution. We ‘also may surely assume, ia looking at our vieious circle, that ‘we needn't expect one of the changes to be complete before the other can begin. 'So we may look for loopholes anywhere inthe circle, that i, for changes already visible or in prospect either in the amount of democratic participation or in social inequality or consumer consciousness, If we find changes which are not only already perceptible but which are attributable to forces or circum- stances which are fkely to go on operating wit cumulative "There are some sign that can consciousness eenexging (ee belo, ‘108, but nt that ts Becoming a revolutionary ensiouns.102 The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy effect, then we can have some hope of a break-through, And if dhe changes are ofa sort that encourages reciprocal changes fn the other factors, 20 much the better ‘Are there any loopholes which come up to these specifics- tions? Let usstart from the asumption least favourable o our search, the assumption that most of us are willy-nilly, maxi- mizing calculators of our own benefit, making a cost/benefit analysis of everything, however vaguely we make it; and that most of us consciously or unconsciously see curselves as esen- tially infinite consumers, From these assumptions the vicious circle appears to follow directly: most people will support, or ‘not do much to change, a system which produces affluence, ‘which continually increases the Gross National Product, anc ‘which alto produces political apathy. This makes a pretty strong vicious circle, But there are now some visible loopliles, 1 shall draw attention to three of them, (£) More and more people, in the capacity we have attic buted to them all, namely as costbenefit calculator, are recon- sidering the costfoenehit ratio of our society's worship of| expansion of the GNP. They still ace the benefits of economic ‘growth, but they are now beginning to tee some costs they hadn't counted before. The most obvious ofthese are the costs of air, water, and earth pollution, These are costs largely in terms of the quality of life. Ts i too much to suggest that this awareness of quality is a first step away from being satisfied With quantity, and soa frat step away from secing ourselves a8 infinite consumers, cowards valuing our ability to exer! our ‘energies and capacities in a decent environment? Perhaps itis too much. But at any rate the growing consciousness of these costs weakens the unthinking acceptance of the GNP as the ‘riterion of social good. ‘Other easts of economic growth, notably the extravagant

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