The Nature of Mind

David M. Armstrong
Armstrongs task in this article is to
sketch a theory of the mind that is
consistent with a view he calls
materialism.

Materialism

Materialism, as Armstrong understands it, is just

the view that we can give a complete account of
human beings in purely physico-chemical terms.
We dont need to make reference to any sort of soul
or spirit or immaterial mental properties to make
sense of humans.

Materialism

Armstrong contends that our

best science is leading us in
this direction; thus, it is worth
attempting to construct a
theory of the mind that is
consistent with materialism.

The best clue we have to the nature of mind is through modern

science.

Why? Because it is only as a result of scientific investigation that

we ever seem to reach an intellectual consensus about controversial
matters.

Modern science says that we can give a complete account of man in

purely physico-chemical terms.

Called materialism, physicalism or identity theory; the identity

theory claims that sensations and other mental states are brain
processes

However, while we can know about our mental states this

does not mean that we know about our brain states.

The theory that Armstrong presents is actually a synthesis of two

different views

Behaviorism

Dualism

Dualism is just the Cartesian

view that the inner is utterly
different than the outer and
that there are mental
occurrences in just the same
sense as there are physical
occurrences.

Behaviorism, on the other

hand, is the view that all talk of
mental occurrences can be
reduced to talk about outward
behavior.

Armstrong tries to bring these

two views together.

Next step for Armstrong is to Consider

behaviorism and determine the problems.

BehaviorismFatal Objections

Considered a Materialistic view. If mental processes are

connected to their outward expressions, then humans
are simply physico-chemical mechanisms.

The mind is not an inner arena of spiritual substance

as Descartes claimed, but rather an outward act.

A problem with Behaviorism is that there can be mental

processes going on even if no behavior is shown.
(People may think, but not say or do.)

SolutionDispositional Behaviorism

Armstrong defines the notion of a disposition to

behave as a tendency of a person to behave in a certain
way under certain circumstances.

Provides example: Glass does not shatter, but it is still

brittle.

Glass does not shatter, but it is still brittle.

Brittleness is a disposition, a
disposition possessed by materials
like glass. Brittle materials like
which, when subjected to relatively
small forces, break or shatter easily.
But breaking and shattering easily
is not brittleness, rather it is the
manifestation of brittleness.
-Gilbert Ryle

We are still identifying states with

outward acts: there is no
mysterious internal arena
unidentified with behavior.

Gilbert Ryle: Although a

person does not show
behavior, he or she still had a
disposition to behave.

He thinks although he does

not speak or act because at
that time he was disposed to
speak or act in a certain way.

Relies on situational factors

and temporary
dispositions.

Still Problems

Ryles account of
behaviorism denies that
there is something going
on in a person to
constitute thought.

Therefore, it
(Dispositional
Behaviorism) is an
unsatisfactory account of
the nature of the mind.

However, not all parts are wrong:

Behaviorists are wrong in identifying...mental

occurrences with behavior, but perhaps they are right in
thinking that our notion of a mind... is logically tied to
behavior.

Mind not behavior, but the inner cause of behavior.

Conclusionso far

Behaviorism seems to completely

overlook the fact that there seems
to be a lot going on inside us
even when we arent displaying
any outward behavior.
Behaviorists attempt to meet this
objection by talking about
dispositions to behave in certain
ways, but Armstrong thinks that
even talk of dispositions isnt
robust enough to do justice to
what goes on inside our heads.

However, he thinks that the

behaviorists are right to say
that the mind is somehow tied
to behavior.

Indeed, Armstrong suggests

that perhaps the mind is just
whatever it is that causes
outward behavior.

Physicalist View of Mind

This line of thought of mental

states being logically tied to
behavior is compatible with a
physicalist view of mind:

Mental states are nothing

but the cause of behavior
and, therefore, we can
identify them with
physical states of the
central nervous system.

Mental States as Logically Tied to Behavior

A mental state = a state of a person apt for producing

certain ranges of behavior.

Two lines of thought:

The mind brings about our behavior, it is not

behavior itself.

The Behaviorists dispositions are states that

underlie and bring about behavior.

However, this view shares a weakness with Behaviorism.

Problems with this account of the mind...

Behaviorism may be a satisfactory account of the mind from an

other-person point of view, but not as a first-person account.

If we are only considering other people, Behaviorism works as we

are able to observe others behaviors. Physicalists view: the mind is
the central nervous system of the body observed.

In our own case, we are aware of more than just our behavior.

Consciousness: simply something going on within us apt for causing

certain sorts of behavior?

No, therefore account of the mind fails to do justice to the

first-person case.

Absent-minded driving case

Armstrong tries to provide an account of the missing elements of

the materialists theory. He says that the missing elements of the
materialists theory are just like the experiences we neglect when not
paying attention to walking or driving.

Driving without being aware of what one is doing. Something

mental is lacking.

It is conceded that an account of mental processes as states of the

person apt for the production of certain sorts of behavior may very
possibly be adequate to deal with such cases as that of automatic
driving....But...it cannot deal with the consciousness that we
normally enjoy.

Perceptions

Perceptions are inner states defined by the behavior

they enable the perceiver to show, if impelled.

To perceive is like acquiring a key to a door:

You do not need to use the key, but if you want

to open the door, then the key may be necessary.

How is perception related to

consciousness of experience?

Consciousness is perception or awareness of the state of

our own mind.

The absent-minded driver perceives the road, but is not

conscious of his experience (he is not conscious of his
awareness of the road).

He is not conscious of what is going on in his mind.

In Conclusion

Armstrong argues that consciousness of our own mental

state is perception of our own mental state.

It is, therefore, an inner state giving a capacity for

selective behavior towards our own mental state.

Consciousness of our own mental state is the scanning

of one part of our central nervous system by another.

> Physicalist theory of mind is possible!

Three clues to understanding your brain

Vilayanur
Ramachandran
Vilayanur Ramachandran tells us what
brain damage can reveal about the
connection between celebral tissue and
the mind, using three startling delusions
as examples.
http://www.ted.com/talks/
vilayanur_ramachandran_on_your_min
d?language=en