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Seth Millsap 1

Zhao, Qi. Relation-Centered Ethics in Confucius and Aquinas. Asian Philosophy 23.3 (2013):
291-304. Philosophers Index. Web. 17 Mar. 2015.
Qi Zhao, professor of philosophy at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, provides an
article that seeks to support the redefinition of a certain cross-cultural conversation. Specifically,
he appraises the reposition of the Confucian-Aristotelian virtue debate to a Confucian-Thomistic
one (Thomistic refers to Thomism, or thinking originating in St. Thomas Aquinas). The
followers of Aristotle and Confucius have long done battle in the cold, windy fields of Eastern
versus Western relation-philosophy, on earth marred by ever-conflicting essays. Zhaos remedy
to this deadlock is that Aristotle and Confucius are incompatible: Aristotle rejects love as a
virtue. Rather, St. Thomas Aquinas writes in depth on love theory; specifically, the Catholic
belief of caritas. Caritas, understood by Aquinas as the love of that which is truly good, comes
into English as charity and is frequently used today as the act of benevolent giving. In Aquinas,
it tends towards a non-personal good and for the sake of another person. In other words, caritas
love is composed of the good that a man wishes towards a person, whether towards he himself or
towards another person, and that to which he wishes that good. Zhao uses this to preface his
comparison to Confucian philosophy and the concept of ren , or exemplar character, which is a
bit too heavy of a concept for this summary.
Zhaos argument may not please Western rhetoric, as he is not a Western professor.
Objectivity is not a goal of his and neither does he present the argument in such a way. Due to
the nature of the topic, especially the inclusion of Thomism, certain bases must be met for the
topic to be relevant or meaningful. A reader may be alienated if he or she does not possess JudeoChristian beliefs, primarily the monotheistic belief in a god. The target audience is, blatantly, a
well-read scholarly community. In the analysis, I shall explain this blatancy, as it is key to the
nature of the article.
Zhao concludes that, Moral life for both [Confucius and Aquinas] is not the struggle of

Seth Millsap 2
an autonomous individual among others who are alien and stranger to ones self, as most modern
ethics presume; rather other human beings are the necessary constitution of ones own moral
life (12). Relations are the expressed form of morality. However, this interpretation alone would
introduce a selfish model, wherein a person creates relations that are founded on his or her ego:
to a similar question, Confucius responds, a person of ren is slow to speak (6). My
interpretation of this statement is that a person of ren is selective in his or her interactions with
the world around himself/herself. He or she does not develop by painting the ego on every wall,
but by his or her own shell being painted.
Other Quotes: Ren is not a good but an efficacious good at, good in, good to, good for, good
with that describes a relational dexterity within the unfolding of social experience []. Ren is
not primarily a retrospective what but a prospective how. And ren is not ones intrinsic worth
alone, but necessarily includes what one means to and for others (Ames, 2011, p. 182).
In serving your father and mother, remonstrate with them gently. On seeing that they do not
heed your suggestion, remain respectful and do not act contrary. Although concerned, voice no
resentment (Analects 4.18).
Analysis: The blatancy mentioned earlier is in two parts. First, the terms used in reference to
both Aquinas and Confucius would demand a significant amount of further research from
unfamiliar readers, so much so that it might double the amount of reading necessary. Second, the
essay appeals to a very specific logic, each step of which must be accepted to reach the next. A
scholarly audience is most ideal because this audience can more easily accept these premises
despite personal views, for the sake of arbitration.

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