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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF _______
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
_____________________,
Defendant.

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Case: ________
MOTION TO QUASH SEARCH
WARRANT
Date: ________
Time: ________
Place: ________

TO THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF _______________ COUNTY AND/OR ________ [HIS

OR HER] REPRESENTATIVE:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on ________[date], at the hour of ________ or as soon
thereafter as counsel may be heard in the courtroom of the above-entitled court, the defendant
will move that the Court quash search warrant ________(number) and suppress as evidence and
restore to the defendant all property seized under authority of and during the execution of the
above-numbered warrant. This motion will be made on the ground that the search and seizure
was unreasonable in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and violated the defendants reasonable expectation of privacy. This motion will be
made on the following grounds:
1) the affidavit lacked sufficient probable cause for its issuance, 2) the search warrant is
void on its face, because the address to be searched is overly broad, 3) the information contained
in the statement of probable cause was stale, 4) the officers executing the warrant violated the
constitutional and statutory knock-notice requirements, 5) the officers did not execute the
search warrant with a good faith belief in its validity, 6) the warrant failed to describe with
sufficient particularity the items to be seized.

This motion will be based on this notice of motion, on the attached declaration and
memorandum of points and authorities served and filed herewith, on such supplemental
memoranda of points and authorities as may hereafter be filed with the court or stated orally at
the conclusion of the hearing on the motion, on all the papers and records on file in this action,
and on such oral and documentary evidence as may be presented at the hearing of the motion.

Dated: April 27, 2015

Respectfully submitted,
________________________
________________________
Attorney for Defendant,
________________________

AddressBlock
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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF _______
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
_____________________,

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Case: ________
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO QUASH SEARCH
WARRANT AND SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
Date: ________
Time: ________

Defendant.

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Place: ________

Defendant submits the following points and authorities in support of the motion to quash
the search warrant and suppress evidence:
I. THE AFFIDAVIT LACKED SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ITS ISSUANCE
Under Penal Code 1527, an affidavit of probable cause in support of the search warrant
must set forth the facts tending to establish the grounds of the application, or probable cause for
believing that they exist. Probable cause to issue a search warrant exits when, based on the
totality of circumstances described in the affidavit, there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. (Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103
S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983)). As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v.
Gates,
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity

and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a
reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for
conclud[ing] that probable cause existed.
The affidavit must therefore state facts that make it [fairly probable] that there is specific
property lawfully subject to seizure presently located in the particular place for which the
warrant is sought. However, the affidavit must not merely recite the opinions or conclusions of
the affiant. As again emphasized by the Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76
L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983):
A mere conclusionary statement gives the magistrate virtually no basis at all for
making a judgment regarding probable cause [H]is action cannot be a mere ratification of the
bare conclusions of others. In order to ensure that such an abdication of the magistrates duty
does not occur, courts must continue to conscientiously review the sufficiency of affidavits on
which warrants are issued.
As such, a search warrant may be properly set aside where the affidavit fails as a matter
of law to set forth sufficient competent evidence supportive of the magistrates finding of
probable cause. (People v. Glenos, 7 Cal. App. 4th 1201, 1207, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 363 (5th Dist.
1992))
II. THE SEARCH WARRANT IS VOID ON ITS FACE, BECAUSE THE ADDRESS TO
BE SEARCHED IS OVERLY BROAD
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched or things to
be seized.
The fundamental protections of the Fourth Amendment are guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment against invasion by the states. Penal Code 1525 codifies the requirements for the
issuance of a warrant in California, [a] search warrant cannot be issued but upon probable

cause, supported by affidavit, naming or describing the person, and particularly describing the
property and place to be searched. A warrant is void on its face if it fails to adequately describe
the place to be searched.
[W]hen a warrant directs a search of a multiple occupancy apartment house or building,
absent a showing of probable cause for searching each living unit, the warrant is void.
[emphasis added] (People v. Estrada, 234 Cal. App. 2d 136, 44 Cal. Rptr. 165, 11 A.L.R.3d 1307
(1st Dist. 1965)). In People v. MacAvoy, 162 Cal. App. 3d 746, 209 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1st Dist.
1984)). the affidavit established probable cause to believe that contraband would be found in a
particular room of a fraternity house, but the search warrants property description described the
entire building. Holding that the warrant authorizing the search of the entire house was overly
broad, the Court of Appeal concluded as to apartment houses, the particular place to be
described means a single living unit, that is to say the residence of one person or family, and a
warrant describing an entire building issued on probable cause to search only one apartment
therein is void.
A search warrant designating more than one location to be searched, must contain
sufficient independent probable cause to justify issuance as to each discrete location named in
the warrant. Adequate probable cause to search one location is not necessarily sufficient to search
another. (See People v. Frank, 38 Cal. 3d 711, 726, 214 Cal. Rptr. 801, 700 P.2d 415 (1985);
Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 249250, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 529 P.2d 590 (1974);
People v. Murray, 77 Cal. App. 3d 305, 308, 143 Cal. Rptr. 502 (5th Dist. 1978); Thompson v.
Superior Court, 70 Cal. App. 3d 101, 107, 138 Cal. Rptr. 603 (5th Dist. 1977) (1977; Ybarra v.
Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S. Ct. 338, 342, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979)).
III. THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE
WAS STALE
A finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant will be unfounded when
the information relied upon in the affidavit is stale. Information is stale, and hence unworthy of
weight in the magistrates consideration of an affidavit, unless the information consists of facts
so closely related to the time of the issue of the warrant as to justify a finding of probable cause
at that time. (Alexander v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 387, 393, 107 Cal. Rptr. 483, 508 P.2d

1131 (1973)). There is no clear cut rule governing when information relied upon in a search
warrant affidavit is deemed stale. The length of the time lapse alone is not controlling since
even a brief delay may preclude an inference of probable cause in some circumstances .
(Alexander v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 387, 393, 107 Cal. Rptr. 483, 508 P.2d 1131 (1973))
Probable cause to issue a search warrant in a narcotics investigation has unfounded when
the affidavit alleged that sales of narcotics took place 34 days before the search warrant was
issued. (Hemler v Superior Court, 44 Cal 3d 430, 433 (1975).). Information relied upon in a
search warrant affidavit for a narcotics investigation that is 12 days old has been held to be on
the fringe of unreasonableness. (People v. Hernandez, 43 Cal. App. 3d 581, 586, 118 Cal. Rptr.
53 (2d Dist. 1974))
IV. THE OFFICERS EXECUTING THE WARRANT VIOLATED THE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY KNOCK-NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
The term knock-notice refers to Penal Code 1531s requirements that law
enforcement officers, prior to entering a house to execute a search warrant, give notice of their
authority and purpose for entering, and then to wait and be refused admittance before entering
the dwelling. (People v. Howard, 18 Cal App. 4th 1544, 1546 fn 1, (1993); Pen C 844). Penal
Code 1531 provides in pertinent part,
The officer may break open any outer of inner door or window of a house, or any part of
a house, or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose,
he is refused admittance.
Accordingly, before entering a residence, police officers must (1). knock or use other
means reasonably calculated to give adequate notice of their presence of the occupants, (2).
identify themselves as police officers, (3). explain the purpose of their demand for admittance,
and (4). be refused entry, verbally, by conduct, or the passage of time. (Penal Code 1531;
People v. Ramsey, 203 Cal. App. 3d 671, 680, 250 Cal. Rptr. 309 (5th Dist. 1988); Wilson v.
Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 131 L. Ed. 2d 976 (1995)). Announcement and demand
for entry before entry to serve a warrant are part of the Fourth Amendment requirement of
reasonableness. (Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 131 L. Ed. 2d 976 (1995))

The general purpose behind the knock and notice requirements is to protect the privacy
of a person in his home, to minimize the possibility of a violent confrontation between police and
private citizens which might occur if the police make sudden, surprise, unannounced entries, and
to avoid needless destruction of propertylike the battering of the front door. (People v. Trujillo,
217 Cal. App. 3d 1219, 266 Cal. Rptr. 473 (6th Dist. 1990)). Knock and notice requirements
may be excused where consent to enter the premises is given, where it is certain no one is at the
residence, or where the exigency of increased danger to the officers, destruction of evidence, or
the frustration of arresting a fleeing, dangerous felon exists. (People v. Jacobs, 43 Cal. 3d 472,
233 Cal. Rptr. 323, 729 P.2d 757 (1987))
V. THE OFFICERS DID NOT EXECUTE THE SEARCH WARRANT WITH A GOOD
FAITH BELIEF IN ITS VALIDITY.
In U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920, 104 S Ct 3405 (1984), the United States Supreme
Court held that evidence may not be suppressed if the officer executing the warrant relied in
good faith on a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate that later is determined to be
invalid. The United States Supreme Courts ruling is based upon the premise that since the
exclusionary rule is to deter illegal police conduct, when an officer with objective good faith
has obtained a search warrant there is no police illegality and thus nothing to deter.
However, an officer has no reasonable grounds for believing a warrant was properly
issued: 1). where the magistrate was misled by information in an affidavit which the officer knew
or should have known was false, 2). where the magistrate wholly abandoned his role, 3). where
the affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render belief in its existence
entirely unreasonable; and 4). where the warrant was so facially deficient that the officer could
not reasonably presume it to be valid. (U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923, 104 S Ct 3405 (1984))
With regard to sufficient probable cause in the affidavit, the issue becomes whether a
well-trained officer should reasonably have known that the affidavit failed to establish
probable cause. (People v. Camarella, 54 Cal. 3d 592, 596, 286 Cal. Rptr. 780, 818 P.2d 63
(1991)). The standard of objective good faith derives from something more substantial than a
hunch. (Bailey v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. App. 4th 1107, 1113, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 17 (2d Dist.
1992)). This standard requires the officer have a reasonable knowledge of what the law

prohibits. (Bailey v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. App. 4th 1107, 1113, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 17 (2d Dist.
1992) U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919, fn. 20, 104 S Ct 3405 (1984)). Harried magistrates may
not always take the care necessary to ensure that the application for the search warrant contains
sufficient allegations of probable cause, (Bailey v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. App. 4th 1107, 1113,
15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 17 (2d Dist. 1992), citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345-346, 106 S. Ct.
1092, 89 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1986)). and an officer may not shift all the responsibility for the
protection of an accuseds Fourth Amendment rights to the magistrate. (Bailey v. Superior Court,
11 Cal. App. 4th 1107, 1113, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 17 (2d Dist. 1992), citing People v. Camarella, 54
Cal. 3d 592, 604, 286 Cal. Rptr. 780, 818 P.2d 63 (1991))
VI. THE WARRANT FAILED TO DESCRIBE WITH SUFFICIENT PARTICULARITY
THE ITEMS TO BE SEIZED.
The Fourth Amendment states unambiguously that no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. The fact that the application adequately
describes the things to be seized does not save the warrant from its facial invalidity. The Fourth
Amendment by its terms requires particularity in the warrant, not in the supporting documents. A
court may construe a warrant with reference to a supporting application or affidavit only if the
warrant uses appropriate words of incorporation, and if the supporting document accompanies
the warrant. However, a search warrant is invalid if it fails to describe the persons or things to be
seized on its face, notwithstanding that the requisite particularized description is provided in the
search warrant application, if this description is not incorporated by reference in search warrant
itself, and the application, having been sealed, does not accompany the warrant. Groh v.
Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557558, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1068 (2004):
We have clearly stated that the presumptive rule against warrantless searches applies
with equal force to searches whose only defect is a lack of particularity in the warrant. [citations]
The uniformly applied rule is that a search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform
to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional. [citations] That
rule is in keeping with the well-established principle that except in certain carefully defined
classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is unreasonable unless it

has been authorized by a valid search warrant.

Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559560, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1068 (2004).
The particularity rule requires the magistrate to make sure that the warrant describes
things with reasonable precision, since vague language can cause the officer performing the
search to seize objects on the mistaken assumption that they fall within the magistrates
authorization. (citation) The probable cause rule prevents the magistrate from making a mistaken
authorization to search for particular objects in the first instance, no matter how well the objects
are described. Id. The two separate rules must both be met since an unnecessary invasion of
privacy can occur either when the magistrate has a firm command of the doctrine of probable
cause and a poor command of the English language, or vice versa.
U.S. v. Weber, 923 F.2d 1338, 1342 (9th Cir. 1990).
VII. A SEARCH CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED BY ITS RESULTS.
We have had frequent occasion to point out that a search is not to be made legal by what
it turns up. In law it is good or bad when it starts and does not change character from its
success. U.S. v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595, 68 S. Ct. 222, 229, 92 L. Ed. 210 (1948).
Dated: April 27, 2015
Respectfully submitted,
________________________
________________________
Attorney for Defendant,
________________________

In a motion to quash, the defendant must prove that the search or seizure under the warrant was
unreasonable, because: (1). the warrant was insufficient on its face; (2). the property seized was
not described in the warrant; (3). there was no probable cause to support the issuance of the
warrant; (4). the method of execution of the warrant violated federal or state law.
In a motion to traverse, the defendant must prove that the facts recited in the affidavit in support
of the issuance of the warrant were inaccurate. The issues to be resolved in a motion to traverse
are: (1). did the affidavit contain material factual misstatements, and if so, (2). if the
misstatements were not intentional, did the affiant act reasonably in believing the facts to be true.
(Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 77, 101, 104 Cal. Rptr. 226, 501 P.2d 234 (1972))
Grounds for issuance: Pen C 1524(a) authorizes a search warrant to issue on the following
grounds, among others:
(1). When property was stolen or embezzled.
(2). When the property or things were used to commit a felony.
(3). When the property is in the possession of a person who intends to use it to commit a public
offense, or in the possession of another for the purpose of concealing it.
(4). When the property to be seized constitutes evidence that tends to show a felony has been
committed or that a particular person has committed a felony.
(5) When the property or things to be seized consist of evidence that tends to show that sexual
exploitation of a child;
(6) When there is a warrant to arrest a person;
(7) When the property or things to be seized include a firearm at the premises occupied by a
person arrested in connection with, a domestic violence incident involving a threat to human life
or a physical assault;
(8) When the property or things to be seized include a firearm that is in the possession of a
person who, as a result of mental disorder, is a danger to others, or to himself or herself (see W &

I 8120);
Probable cause standard: There are two probable cause prerequisites for the issuance of a
search warrant. The first is the commission element, i.e., probable cause to believe a crime has
been committed and, second, the nexus element, i.e., a factual showing that evidence related to
the suspected criminal activity probably will be found at the location to be searched at the time
of the search and not some other time. (U.S. v. Zayas-Diaz, 95 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 1996); U.S. v.
Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 126 S. Ct. 1494, 164 L. Ed. 2d 195, 31 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 635 (2006); U.S. v.
Kennedy, 427 F.3d 1136 (8th Cir. 2005); U.S. v. Greany, 929 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1991); U.S. v.
Hove, 848 F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejected by, U.S. v. Taxacher, 902 F.2d 867 (11th Cir.
1990)); Alexander v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 387, 107 Cal. Rptr. 483, 508 P.2d 1131 (1973)).
Such probable cause consists of a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will
be found in a particular place at the time of the search. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.
Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983); U.S. v. $191,910.00 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir.
1994) (mere suspicion that items will be found insufficient); U.S. v. Ramos, 923 F.2d 1346
(9th Cir. 1991) (overruled by, U.S. v. Ruiz, 257 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2001)); U.S. v. Grubbs, 547
U.S. 90, 126 S. Ct. 1494, 164 L. Ed. 2d 195, 31 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 635 (2006) (anticipatory warrant
cannot be executed before occurrence of triggering event, otherwise there would be no reason to
believe the item described in the warrant could be found at the searched location); People v.
Hirata, 175 Cal. App. 4th 1499, 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 918 (2d Dist. 2009), citing U.S. v. Grubbs, 547
U.S. 90, 126 S. Ct. 1494, 164 L. Ed. 2d 195, 31 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 635 (2006)). (See 17:10.10
Quash Search warrant Staleness)
Telephonic and electronic warrants: The sworn statement supporting a search warrant affidavit
may be taken by telephone or electronic mail. (Pen C 1526(b)(2))
Good faith exception: The Supreme Court has adopted a good faith warrant exception to the
exclusionary rule. The prosecution may use evidence seized by officers acting in reasonable
reliance on a search warrant ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause. (United
States v Leon (1984). 468 U.S. 897, 919, 104 S Ct 3405). The exception also applies to an
insufficient description of the items to be seized. (Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 989,
104 S. Ct. 3424, 82 L. Ed. 2d 737 (1984))

The standard for the good faith exception is not based on the officers subjective belief, but
rather that the officers reliance on the search warrant was objectively reasonable. (Bailey v.
Superior Court, 11 Cal. App. 4th 1107, 1113-1114, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 17 (2d Dist. 1992)). The
exception is applied on the basis of what a reasonable, well-trained police officer would have
known under the circumstances. (People v. Camarella, 54 Cal. 3d 592, 605-606, 286 Cal. Rptr.
780, 818 P.2d 63 (1991)). Under this standard, despite the good faith exception, suppression is
appropriate when the affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to make reliance on it
unreasonable. (People v. Camarella, 54 Cal. 3d 592, 596, 286 Cal. Rptr. 780, 818 P.2d 63 (1991))
Insufficient probable cause: The requirement that the affidavit supporting a search warrant
must contain facts establishing probable cause is contained in both the United States
Constitution, the California Constitution and is codified in the Penal Code. (U.S. Const, 4th
Amend; Cal Const, Art I, 13; Pen C 1525). Probable cause exists when, based on the totality
of circumstances described in the affidavit, there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. (Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103
S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983)). Mere conclusionary statements are insufficient, because
the magistrates action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others. (Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983))
Overly broad description: Both the United States Constitution and the Penal Code require that
no warrant shall issue unless the place to be searched the property to be seized is particularly
described. (U.S. Const, 4th Amend; Cal Const, Art I, 13; Pen C 1525). A warrant is void on
its face if it fails to adequately describe the place to be searched. (People v. MacAvoy, 162 Cal.
App. 3d 746, 209 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1st Dist. 1984))
Stale information: Information that is remote in time may be deemed stale and thus unworthy of
consideration in determining whether an affidavit for a search warrant is supported by probable
cause. Such information is deemed stale unless it consists of facts so closely related to the time
of the issuance of the warrant that it justifies a finding of probable cause at that time. (Alexander
v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 387, 393, 107 Cal. Rptr. 483, 508 P.2d 1131 (1973); People v.
Hulland, 110 Cal. App. 4th 1646, 1652, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 919 (2d Dist. 2003))
Knock-Notice: The officer executing the warrant must give notice of his authority and purpose,

and then, if refused admission, may break down any outer or inner door. (Pen C 1531).
Announcement and demand for entry before entry to serve a warrant are part of the Fourth
Amendment requirement of reasonableness. Refusal of entry may be communicated verbally, by
conduct, or by the passage of time. (Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 131 L.
Ed. 2d 976 (1995)). There is no exception to the knock-notice requirement because the object of
the warrant is drugs. (Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615
(1997)). However, an interval of 15 to 20 seconds, from time that police officers conducting
afternoon execution of narcotics trafficking search warrant loudly knocked on apartment door
until they forcibly entered after getting no response, was reasonable given exigency of possible
destruction based on facts known to officers. (U.S. v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L.
Ed. 2d 343 (2003)).
Time of execution: A search warrant may be served only between the hours of 7 a.m. and 10
p.m., unless, on a showing of good cause, the magistrate inserts a direction on the warrant that it
may be served at any time of day or night. (Pen C 1533). The warrant must be executed within
10 days after it is issued. After 10 days the warrant is void unless it has been served. (Pen C
1534(a))
Applicable law: Proposition 8 (Cal Const, Art I, 28(d)), adopted in 1982, requires the
admission of all relevant evidence except where suppression is required by the Fourth
Amendment of the federal Constitution. (In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 879, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631,
694 P.2d 744 (1985)). All state courts are bound by the United Sates Supreme Court
interpretations of the federal constitutional protections. (People v. Bradley, 1 Cal. 3d 80, 86, 81
Cal. Rptr. 457, 460 P.2d 129 (1969)). Decisions of the lower federal courts on questions of
federal law are persuasive, and entitled to great weight, but are not binding precedent, especially
when the law on a particular question is not well settled. (Wagner v. Apex Marine Ship
Management Corp., 83 Cal. App. 4th 1444, 1451, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 533 (1st Dist. 2000); Yee v.
City of Escondido, 224 Cal. App. 3d 1349, 1351, 274 Cal. Rptr. 551 (4th Dist. 1990)). However,
deference is required where decisions on federal law by lower federal courts are numerous and
consistent. Conrad v. Bank of America, 45 Cal. App. 4th 133, 150, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336 (3d Dist.
1996))

All issues must be joined: All Fourth Amendment suppression issues and arguments should be
raised in the motion because the court may prevent the defendant from serially litigating different
claims or different theories. (Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 626, 640, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585,
511 P.2d 33 (1973); Anderson v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. App. 3d 533, 545, 253 Cal. Rptr. 651
(4th Dist. 1988))
Computer searches: The seizure of a defendants whole computer system is not unreasonable,
so long as there was probable cause to conclude that evidence of a crime would be found on the
computer, the programs or the disks. (People v. Ulloa, 101 Cal. App. 4th 1000, 1004, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 799 (4th Dist. 2002); Hatch v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 4th 170, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d
453 (4th Dist. 2000); U.S. v. Hay, 231 F 3d 630, 637, (9th Cir. 2000).). However, a warrant that
authorizes the seizure of every document on a computers hardware or software does not provide
any guidance to the officers executing the warrant and thus may be overly broad. (U.S. v. Kow,
58 F.3d 423 (9th Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Stubbs, 873 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1989))
Internet subscriber information: In Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 61 L. Ed.
2d 220 (1979), the Supreme Court held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties. An internet user has no legitimate
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in subscriber information he provides to an
internet service provider (ISP). The internet user may not challenge the admissibility of
identifying information the ISP provides in response to a search warrant requiring ISP to identify
the user of his Internet Protocol address. (People v. Stipo, 195 Cal. App. 4th 664, 124 Cal. Rptr.
3d 688 (2d Dist. 2011), review filed, (June 16, 2011)).
Like the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) (18 U.S.C.A. 2701 et seq.,
the state equivalent (Pen. Code, 1524.2, subd. (a)(1)), sets forth procedures for obtaining
subscriber information from Internet service providers. However, defendants do not have
exclusionary relief remedies under the ECPA or its state law counterpart. (People v. Stipo, 195
Cal. App. 4th 664, 124 Cal. Rptr. 3d 688 (2d Dist. 2011), review filed, (June 16, 2011)).
Discovery: The defendant is entitled to discover any previous application for a search warrant in
the case which was refused by a magistrate for lack of probable cause. (Pen C 1539(c))

Failure to specify items to be seized: The Fourth Amendment states unambiguously that no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. The fact that the
application adequately describes the things to be seized does not save the warrant from its
facial invalidity. The Fourth Amendment by its terms requires particularity in the warrant, not in
the supporting documents. The courts have held that a court may construe a warrant with
reference to a supporting application or affidavit if the warrant uses appropriate words of
incorporation, and if the supporting document accompanies the warrant. However, a search
warrant is invalid if it fails to describe the persons or things to be seized on its face,
notwithstanding that the requisite particularized description is provided in the search warrant
application, if this description is not incorporated by reference in search warrant itself, and the
application, having been sealed, does not accompany the warrant. (Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S.
551, 557-558, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1068 (2004)).
We have clearly stated that the presumptive rule against warrantless searches applies with equal
force to searches whose only defect is a lack of particularity in the warrant. [citations] The
uniformly applied rule is that a search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to
the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional. [citations] That rule is
in keeping with the well-established principle that except in certain carefully defined classes of
cases, a search of private property without proper consent is unreasonable unless it has been
authorized by a valid search warrant. (Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559-560, 124 S. Ct.
1284, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1068 (2004)).
Informant information: Search warrants based on information received form informants must
be analyzed under the Gates standard (Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238239, 103 S. Ct. 2317,
76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983)). Information received from sources who are themselves the focus of
pending criminal charges or investigations is inherently suspect. (People v. Campa, 36 Cal. 3d
870, 882, 206 Cal. Rptr. 114, 686 P.2d 634 (1984)). For this reason the Gates court recognized
the value of corroboration of details of an informants tip by independent police work. For
corroboration to be adequate, it must pertain to the alleged criminal activity. The accuracy of
information regarding the suspect generally is insufficient. Unreliable informants, whose
statements interlock only on pedestrian details, do not sufficiently corroborate each other to

justify issuance of a warrant. (People v. French, 201 Cal. App. 4th 1307, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 383
(1st Dist. 2011)).