Maya Louise Barton

Nathan Jones
Debate #4 Analysis
20 April 2015
Whose War Was it Anyway?
Brian VanDeMark argues that the Americanization of the war in Vietnam was, in fact,
inevitable due to the events that preceeded the war. His argument was based on the effects
produced in Vietnam formed by the ideas of American culture during the time of the Vietnam
war and America's confidence in its own power as well as America's extreme aversion to
Communism and Mcarthyism (which was set mostly by the Cold War.)
VanDeMark stresses highly that America had an arrogant mindset following the defeat of
Japan during World War II. This mindset led to American leaders putting themselves into the
adversities and arguments of some other nations (Communist Dictatorships or countries
oppressed by Communism.) America decided to help the struggling South Vietnam after the
French, who had previously been leading South Vietnam, withdrew from the war and the
country. VanDeMark says that America became somewhat the driving force and strongest power
of South Vietnam and that without American intervention, the Nation would have fallen to the
hands of North Vietnam almost immediately.
The American ego during this time gave a false sureity of the intervening actions taking
place by American troops in South Vietnam. In fact, VanDeMark implies, American leaders were
confused and even shocked when South Vietnam continued to go downhill despite the costly
military intervention.
VanDeMark says, on page 340, that the American leaders were proccupied with technique

in use of power, and that characterized the military approach. So when things got worse in South
Vietnam, America used more and more power because they did not yet realize that, as
VanDeMark says, that South Vietnam would not benefit much in the end from the US military
forces because South Vietnam was not a stable or even united country before intervention. The
fact that South Vietnam was very divided in ethnicity, politics, and religion, as VanDeMark states
on page 336 and 339, made the nation too weak to hold itself up, and therefore needed another
force's help. And, in the end, the nation still did not prevail. South Vietnam's shortcomings
taught a proud man and might nation that it could not save a people in spite of themselves
(VanDeMark, p. 339) sums up much of his argument that South Vietnam could not help itself.
In various sections of VanDeMark's argument, he brings up LBJ's dilemma with pride and
power. He even states on page 336: LBJ feared defeat in South Vietnam, but he craved success
and glory at home. LBJ's need to win the war led to an over-use of military intervention, which,
in the end, did not free South Vietnam.
H. R. McMaster however, argues that the Americanization of the war in Vietnam was a
choice that American leaders madenot an inevitable occurance. Lyndon B. Johnson was a main
reason for America's large role in the Vietnam War, McMaster presses that LBJ was not fit to
make important military decisions for America in the case of South Vietnam. LBJ was
distrustful, as he led America and Vietnam downhill with his arrogance and self-interest.
McMaster makes the point that LBJ was not prepared, nor did he want, to go into a war.
His intent during his administration was moreso to prevent the war and take actions to somewhat
procrastinate and postpone the decision to go into an all-out war. The LBJ administration was not
capable of handling the complex situation in Vietnam, mostly due to the personalities of LBJ and
his principal civilian and military advisers. America attacked North Vietnam by air (bombing the

country) in an attempt to end the conflict between North Vietnam and South Vietnam, but instead
of obliterating the conflict, the fight increased into a war.
LBJ did not put very much trust into his Chiefs or advisers at all. He made his decisions
with input from only a few individuals, mostly his Secretary of Defense, McNamara. According
to McMaster, LBJ's Chiefs noticed the president sneaking around and making somewhat sketchy
decisions with the power he was holding, but the Chiefs were apprehensive to speak up, possibly
due to fear of an incident beyond their reach. When it became clear to the Chiefs that they were
to have little influence on the policy-making process, they failed to confront the president with
their objections to McNamara's approach to the war. Instead they attempted to work within that
strategy in order to remove over time the limitations to further action (McMaster, p. 346).
McMaster also says in several paragraphs that LBJ and McNamara at times to protect their
image and were not directly stopped by the Chiefs or advisers.
In my opinion, the No side, represented and argued by H. R. McMaster, provides more
evidence and has a solid case compared to the Yes side (Brian VanDeMark.) In H. R.
McMaster's argument, he addresses LBJ's human nature as the reason for the Americanization in
the Vietnam war, whereas Brian VanDeMark argues that the country's ideas had been previously
set up for taking control in Vietnam. McMaster and VanDeMark, however, both agree that the
president, Lyndon B. Johnson, was not fit for making military decisions in Vietnam.
It seems more logical to me that the Americanization of the war in Vietnam would be
preventable. LBJ's actions and commands, along with North Vietnam's reactions, were the
driving factors in the war. Even though Americans had a mindset in which defeating
Communism was a top goal and priority, the president and his advisers still had the responsibility
and obligation of weighing the possible situations to know if they should become involved in a

war and whether or not it will be an effective strategy in the grander fight against Communism.
In McMaster's argument, he states several times that LBJ did not anticipate the war and
even went to lengths to postpone the decision of complete war on North Vietnam. He even fooled
himself and others into thinking that the decisions he was making would prevent war, but we
know now that is far from the reality. Johnson and McNamara succeeded in creating the illusion
that the decisions to attack North Vietnam were alternatives to war rather than war itself
(McMaster, p. 345).
I side more with McMaster because he brings up several events and ideas that reveal
LBJ's real personality and immaturity in office. The fact that Johnson and McNamara lied, in
meetings even, during the pesidency is a very convincing role in the argument that LBJ was a
cause of the war issuesthat a different president could have had a completely different path in
his presidency that could have prevented the war from happening. I realize that some may argue
that Americanization of the war in Vietnam was inevitable once LBJ was elected and given
power. However, I believe there are an infinite amount of ways a person can be influenced, so I
do not agree that the war's Americanization was set in place once LBJ was elected.
In McMaster's writing, there is a very informative walk-through of Johnson's time in
office, including how he treated and communicated with his Chiefs and McNamara. Indeed he
made his most important decisions at the Tuesday lunch meetings in which Rusk, McGeorge
Bundy, and McNamara were the only regular participants (McMaster, p. 347). This evidence of
LBJ's unreliable nature and his lack of communication with his important Chiefs and advisors
gives a clear answer to the question of whether someone else could have done better in office.
Johnson rarely took any military advice at all! Geopolitical and technological changes of
the last fifteen years, they believed, had rendered advice based on military experience irrevelant

and, in fact, dangerous (McMaster, p. 347). LBJ did not trust his military advisers, so he did not
listen much to what they had to say before making his own military decisions.
Based on the evidence presented by this debate, I side most with H. R. McMaster's No
side. I do not believe that the Americanization of the war in Vietnam was inevitable. It was
definitely preventable, but actions that the president and his close advisers took caused the
Americanization of the war in Vietnam whether they intended for those precise results or not.