109" Congress 2d Session SENATE REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ON THE USE BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS together with ADDITIONAL VIEWS September 8, 2006 - Ordered to be printedSos” See Wnited States Sate aug nara ma een September 8, 2006 The Honorable Ted Stevens President Pro Tempore United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510 Dear Mr. President: On behalf of the Select Committee on Intelligence, we submit the following unclassified reports, together with additional and minority views, for filing with the Senate: (1) Postwar Findings about Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How they Compare with Prewar Assessments and (2) The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress. Senate Resolution 400 of the 94" Congress (1976) charges the Committee with the duty to oversee and make continuing studies of the intelligence activities and programs of the United States Government, and to report to the Senate concerning those activities and programs. Pursuant to its responsibilities under Senate Resolution 400, the Committee has undertaken an in-depth examination of the matters described in the reports. Both reports have been approved by the Committee in both classified and unclassified form. The classified reports are available to Members for reading at the Committee. The classified reports will also be provided to appropriately cleared officials of the Executive branch. The unclassified versions of the reports, which are hereby transmitted for printing, are intended to provide the Senate, and through it, the American public, a substantial factual record upon which to consider the issues covered by the reports. it Roberts John D. Rockefeller 1V Chairman Vice ChairmanREPORT ON THE USE BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS together with ADDITIONAL VIEWS September 8, 2006 - Ordered to be printed SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE United States Senate 109" Congress PAT ROBERTS, KANSAS, CHAIRMAN JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, WEST VIRGINIA, VICE CHAIRMAN ORRIN G. HATCH, UTAH CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN MIKE DEWINE, OHIO DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, MISSOURI RON WYDEN, OREGON ‘TRENT LOTT, MISSISSIPPI EVAN BAYH, INDIANA OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, MAINE BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, MARYLAND CHUCK HAGEL, NEBRASKA RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, WISCONSIN SAXBY CHAMBLISS, GEORGIA BILL FRIST, TENNESSEE, EX OFFICIO HARRY REID, NEVADA, EX OFFICIO JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA, EX OFFICIOTABLE OF CONTENTS LINTRODUCTION ............--55 eee eee 3 II. BACKGROUND ON IC RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE INC .......- s III. INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE INC A. INC Documents B. INC-Affiliated Sources . 1. Source One . a. Suspect Nuclear Fac d. Posewar Findings 2. Source Two 3. Source Three ... a. Mistaken Identity ......... b. Intelligence Assessments . 4, Source Four .....-- 06600005 a. Postwar Information on Salman Pak 5. Source Five . 6. The Would-Be Defector..........000e00ee eres C. INC Reporting During DIA’s Management of the ICP. bees 1. CIA Debrief of INC-walk in (Source Eighteen) ........ IV. ALLEGED INC-LINKED SOURCES . A, CURVE BALL ........+ B. Source Nineteen .. es — ——__ —_ Page 1V. CONCLUSIONS ........-+ COMMITTEE ACTION 8 | ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CHAIRMAN ROBERTS .. - B ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CHAIRMAN ROBERTS JOINED BY SENATORS HATCH, DEWINE, LOTT, CHAMBLISS, AND WARNER .....-.. +--+ eee eee aloo ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF VICE CHAIRMAN JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, SENATORS CARL LEVIN, DIANNE FEINSTEIN, RON WYDEN, EVAN BAYH, BARBARA MIKULSKI, AND RUSS FEINGOLD ....... 0002020202080 158 MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR HATCH JOINE (CHAIRMAN ROBERTS ... . 190 ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR DEWINE saeeseeee 199 MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATORS BOND, LOTT, AND CHAMBLISS . . 203 Page 2— ——___—_ _—_— I. INTRODUCTION (U) On February 12, 2004, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence agreed to refine the terms of reference of the Committee’s ongoing inquiry into prewar intelligence with regard to Iraq. The Committee agreed that five of the new elements, including “the use by the Intelligence Community of information provided by the Iraqi National Congress (INC),” would be reviewed in “phase II” of the Iraq inquiry. The Committee released the first phase of the Iraqi review, the Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, on July 9, 2004. (U) In reviewing the “use by the Intelligence Community of information provided by the INC,” Committee staff endeavored to keep the scope of the review consistent with specific terms of reference to which Committee Members unanimously agreed on February 12, 2004. Consistent with the overall scope of the inquiry ~ “prewar intelligence with regard to Iraq” — this report focuses only on the Intelligence Community’s use of prewar INC information, information provided to the Intelligence Community prior to the March 19, 2003 start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The report describes, in brief, the fact that the Intelligence Community did continue to use and fund the collection of INC information for over a year after the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, but does not provide details regarding how the Intelligence Community used that information and does not include a review of the quality or utility of INC information after the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. (U) This report also does not focus on the Intelligence Community's use of INC information in the early and mid-1990s. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which was the agency with primacy in handling the INC following the 1991 Gulf War, has had a long and tumultuous relationship with the INC, in particular, with the INC’s executive council Chairman Ahmed Chalabi. In Page 3SS reviewing the history of this interaction, the Committee found significant differences of opinion regarding what led to the termination of the relationship, with each side blaming the other for its failure. The report describes the history of that relationship to provide context to the Intelligence Community’s later interaction with the INC, but does not attempt to resolve lingering questions regarding what led to the CIA’s and INC’s mutual disaffection. (U) Finally, the report does not provide a review of the INC’s collection efforts or methods, the INC’s analysis of its own information, or information the INC may have provided to parties other than the U.S. Intelligence Community. The Committee understands that the INC made an effort to widely disseminate its information and brought its information to the attention of U.S. and foreign government officials, think tanks, the international media, foreign intelligence services, and others, all of which are outside the scope of the terms of reference agreed to by Committee Members. The report describes INC defector referrals to US. government and former government officials, the media, and foreign intelligence services, only when those referrals pertain to the Intelligence Community’s use of the information. (U) The report describes the general history of the Intelligence Community’s use of INC information and the genesis of how the handling of INC information transitioned from the CIA to the Department of State and, eventually, to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The report focuses on information provided to the Intelligence Community by the INC, in particular, whether and how the Intelligence Community used that information, the inclusion of that information in Intelligence Community analysis, and whether the information played a role in the Intelligence Community’s judgments about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities and links to terrorism. rr Page 4a (U) For clarity, the report makes a distinction between information provided to the Intelligence Community by members of the INC and information provided by sources who were referred to the Intelligence Community by the INC. Because those sources were not members of the INC, the report refers to them as INC- affiliated sources. (U) The Committee notes that the Intelligence Community may have received information from additional INC-affiliated source information from foreign intelligence services that has not been identified as INC-related. The CIA told the Committee “we believe it is likely that some reporting from INC sources may have been fed to the US Intelligence Community via liaison services.” CIA said this belief reflected its lack of visibility into liaison sources and anecdotal information that the INC was bringing sources or allegations about Iraq WMD to other intelligence services, including key liaison partners. II. BACKGROUND ON IC RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE INC! (U) In the Spring of 1991, President George H. W. Bush approved efforts aimed at influencing those in the Iraqi government and military to undertake action to change the Iraqi leadership. This authorization included encouraging individuals or groups, both inside and outside Iraq, who wished to remove Saddam from power and supporting those efforts in a material fashion. It was not the objective or intent of the U.S. Government that Saddam Hussein, or members of his regime, be physically harmed, but this authorization took note that there was a strong possibility that violence of some degree would occur. " this section of the report has been redrafted substantially from the classified version to accommodate classification restrictions. a Page 5