PURDUE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL Thesis Acceptance ‘This is to certify that the thesis prepared By Martyn de Bruyn Entitled Machiavelli and the Politics of Virtu Complies with University regulations and meets the standards of the Graduate School for originality and quality For the degree of _ PhD Signed by the final examining committee: Q 2 fle ~ Michael Weinstein Label) : chair a8 anes Hetann pu Go Ure, (—— Approved by: OP O is This thesis aI is not to be regarded as confidential. Format Approved by: ‘Chai, Final Branning Conte “Thesis Format AvionMACHIAVELLI AND THE POLITICS OF VIRTU. A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Purdue University by Martyn de Bruyn, In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy August 2003UMI Number: 3113789 INFORMATION TO USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized ‘copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. UMI UMI Microform 3113789 Copyright 2004 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest Information and Learning Company 300 North Zeeb Road P.O. Box 1346, ‘Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS During the summer of 2000, while preparing to teach my first political theory class, I was struck by the controversy surrounding the work and person of Niccolé Machiavelli. The need to create some order in this chaos led me to write this dissertation. I am pleased to acknowledge some individuals who have greatly contributed to this project. I would like to thank my major adviser and super-editor Michael Weinstein for his endless support and patience during this project. 1 am grateful as well to the other members of my dissertation committee: Professors Louis Rene Beres, Robert Melson, and Jay McCann. 1 have learned a great deal from them about teaching, research, and academic life in general. Special thanks go to Jay McCann for being a wonderful academic mentor, whose spirit of eternal optimism has relieved much of the burden of writing a dissertation. I also would like to thank Traci Emerson for helping me cut through the red tape of the Purdue bureaucracy. Besides my supervisors, I would also like to thank my colleagues at Purdue University, and in particular the members of the Buen Provecho School: Sangmin Bae, ‘Angel Viera-Tirado, and Edward Ssebunya Kasule. I truly appreciate all the enthusiasm, support, and friendship we share. Finally, I would like to acknowledge my parents Marga and Rene de Bruyn, and my sister Mereliii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT. CHAPTER | INTRODUCTION Canonical Readings of Machiavelli. Research Question Readings of Virt.... ‘The Conservative Paradigm Z Liberal Paradigm ‘The Postmodern Paradigm.. Conclusion Notes... CHAPTER 2 MACHIAVELLI AND THE USE OF HISTORY ... Introduction. . Historiography . Renaissance Style ... Renaissance Humanism .. CHAPTER 3 ANCIENTADVI Introduction. : Plato: The Philosopher-King. Aristotle: The Natural Philosopher Isocrates: The Rhetorician RS: FIVE PRECURSORS TO MACHIAVELLI.iv CHAPTER 4 THE MODERN ADVISER: PLATONIC VIRTUE VERSUS MACHIAVELLIAN VIRTU : Introduction, Platonism.. ‘The Role of the Political Adviser... ‘The Role of the Prince .. : . ‘The Philosopher King and the Prince of Virta. Conclusion Notes CHAPTER 5 THE LITERARY CONCEPT OF VIRTU ..sosossntnnnnnnnsi 121 Part I Cunning Reason see Mandragola and Clizia. Contamnatio..... The Benefits of the Plays........ Part II Discourse on Language. The Unarmed Prophet.. The Discourse on Language. Machiavelli's Esoteric and Exoteric Teachings. Prosecution: Yes, Esoteric Teachings: No. Part III Theatre of Modernity, Notes. CHAPTER 6 THE POLITICS OF VIRTU. Introduction... a ‘The Case of Hiero of Syracuse and Castruccio Castracani.. ‘The Case of Cesare Borgia 163 Baitle between the Borgias: A Case of Ecclesiastic Virti. 165 The Case of Agathocles, Liverotto, and Nabis Requisites of Virtd ‘The Centauric Prince. Conelusion ... Notes... BIBLIOGRAPHY... VITA wsABSTRACT de Bruyn, Martyn, Ph.D., Purdue University, August, 2003. Machiavelli and the Politics of Virti. Major Professor: Michael A. Weinstein. Even though most scholarly attention has been placed on his political writings, Machiavelli’s role as adviser has been relatively unexamined. We can find his ideas on advising not only in his correspondence with the republican regime of Soderini, in which Machiavelli served as the second Chancellor, but also in his political and literary writings under the Medici regime. At the heart of Machiavelli's advice I seek to explore the concept of virti, Machiavelli wrote his political treatises in an unstable political era, in which the Italian city-states were under constant attack from abroad. In order to create a stable form of government, I argue, Machiavelli relied not on the perfection of the institutions of the state, but instead on the virtuosity of the individual leader. The virtuosity of the leader is, according to Machiavelli, determined by the flexibility of his mind, A good leader is, therefore, in Machiavelli's famous words, “able to be not good, and use it and not use it according to necessity.” In other words, a leader should be good when possible and evil when necessary. Through examples of ancient history and philosophy, Machiavelli shows how the virtuous have made use of the flexibility of their mind to succeed. I conclude that Machiavelli’s pragmatist attitude towards the use of vice has contributed to his questionable reputation today, but from his perspective, the political situation demanded a new ethics in the realm of polities, which goes beyond ‘good and evil.CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Canonical Readings of Machiavellian Virti In the Machiavelli literature we can distinguish three major paradigms for interpreting his work in general and the concept of virti in particular.' The first, which shall refer to as the conservative paradigm, states that Machiavelli is an adviser of evil. Machiavelli’s thought corrupts modern Christian morality by compromising with evil out of a supposed political necessity. Machiavelli does not only argue against the Christian mores, conservative scholars argue, but he also tries to counter these mores with a new science of politics. Machiavelli's division between private and public morals, and his further argument that Christian morals only apply to the private arena are seen as subversive. The idea that politics has a need for a novel set of morals that describe how to be successful rather than how to be a good Christian is strongly rejected. Machiavelli is seen as ‘old Nick’ or the anti-Christ who should be exorcised rather than read. ‘The second paradigm, which I shall refer to as the liberal paradigm, states that Machiavelli was a republican freedom fighter who wanted to end the system of autocratic despotism, Contrary to the conservative paradigm, Machiavelli is seen as a responsible intellectual who urged the princes of his time to govern through the consent of the people. The fact that Machiavelli is willing to advise the use of violence is interpreted as a necessary means to achieve the ultimate state of cooperation under the rule of law. The liberal paradigm points out that Machiavelli's means may at times be shocking, but his ends are always laudable, Moreover, they point out that Machiavelli does not simply preach for violence for the sake of violence, in their typology that would be Georges Sorel, but violence for the sake of stability and the prevention of more violence. Machiavelli is seen as a realistic moralist, who hates to see any type of violence used, but at the same time realizes that in our world it has become a necessity for survival.Machiavelli is certainly not evil, because, they argue, he states that a prince should be ‘good when possible and evil when necessary, and not the other way around. The third paradigm, which shall be referred to as the postmodem paradigm, states that Machiavelli’s writings are the work of a rhetorical strategist. The rhetorical qualities of his writings have been greatly underestimated, according to this paradigm. Postmodern interpreters of Machiavelli focus on his writings rather than on the person Machiavelli. They are not interested in the question of whether the author Machiavelli had an evil or a liberal mind, but instead they are interested in the analysis of his discourse.* Where the conservative and liberal paradigms characterize Machiavelli as standing in the tradition of the great ancient philosophers, the postmodemists place Machiavelli in the sophist tradition. Where the conservative and liberal paradigms read in Machiavelli's enthusiasm for dissimulation a need to deal with the realities of polities, the postmodem interpreters argue that it is Machiavelli himself who dissimulates to his readers. ‘These three paradigms represent more or less coherent blocks of scholars who together form the contemporary American scholarship on the work of Machiavelli. All the paradigms try to answer the same questions, even if they are tilted somewhat towards ethics and morality in the case of the conservative paradigm, politics and responsibility in the case of the liberal paradigm, and language and ideology in the case of the postmodern paradigm. These paradigms are not officially recognized labels but merely my own way of creating order in the huge volume of the contemporary American Machiavelli literature. Research Question Machiavelli is well known as secretary to the Soderini Republic, a military strategist, a playwright, and a poet, but he is known most as a political adviser. Neither his career as, head of the second Chancellery, nor his success as a diplomat have gained him the fame he enjoys today. On the contrary, Machiavelli is predominantly known for his post- political career, as the author of many works on politics, such as The Prince, The Discourses, Florentine Histories, and The Art of War. These treatises are not the work ofan historian who is interested in describing the past, but instead of a political adviser who ‘wants to teach his contemporaries. What are the lessons Machiavelli is trying to teach his audience? In order to know what Machiavelli’s advice to his audience is, we first need to know to what ends he offers his advice. Machiavelli presents us with a survival ethics which aims at the establishment of a stable and civil state. Whereas stability refers to the idea that a state should have solid foundations, civility refers to the idea that the state should be founded on the people. The foundation of Machiavelli's stable and civil state is based on the ancient idea that the people can only become civilized as citizens of a city/state. Machiavelli's teachings are best summed up in the word virti. An individual can be virtuous when he contributes to the stability of a state, but the most virtuous are those who found a stable and civil state, What are the elements of virti’? What is Machiavelli's politics of virth? These questions will be discussed in great detail in the literature review below. Virtuosity is based on the imitation of the great in history. In the second chapter I will discuss Machiavelli’s use of history. Machiavelli’s examples from history come largely from Antiquity. In the third chapter I will discuss the political lessons that ‘Machiavelli draws from the ancients, I will present Machiavelli’s ancient advisers. In chapter four I will contrast Machiavelli’s advice with that of some of his contemporaries. In this chapter I will discuss which ancient advisers were actually imitated in the Renaissance. In the fifth and sixth chapters I will discuss the literary and political aspects of virti respectively. Readings of Vi This research is devoted to the study of Machiavelli’s concept of virti At this point I will iscuss the major works on virti through the aforementioned paradigms. The major contributions to the conservative paradigm are Leo Strauss’s Thoughts on Machiavelli (1958) and Harvey C. Mansfield’s Machiavelli's Virtue (1995). Isaiah Berlin’s Against the Current (1958), Friedrich Meinecke’s Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison D'etatand its Place in Modern History (1962), J.H. Whitfield’s Machiavelli (1965), Sheldon Wolin’s Politics and Vision (1960), Quentin Skinner’s Foundations of Modern Political ‘Thought (1978), Hanna Fenichel Pitkin’s Fortune is a Woman (1999), Neal Wood's article “Machiavelli's Concept of Virti Reconsidered,” (1967) and Russell Price’s article “The Sense of Virtd in Machiavelli” (1973) are the major contributions to the liberal paradigm. The major contributions to the postmodern paradigm are Nancy Struever's Theory as Practice (1992), Victoria Kahn’s Machiavellian Rhetoric (1994) and Wayne Rebhorn’s Foxes and Lion's: Machiavelli's Confidence Men (1988). While this is only a small selection out of the huge Machiavelli literature, these are the most significant readings of Machiavelli’s concept of virti. The Conservative Paradigm I was Leo Strauss who first argued against Benedetto Croce’s thesis that separated political from ethical life in Machiavelli.’ According to Strauss, itis essential to understand Machiavelli's major works (The Prince and The Discourses) as both political and ethical works. Separating ethics from polities, in other words, not being able to hold Machiavelli accountable ethically for what he proposes politically, is misguided, according to Strauss. In his Thoughts on Machiavelli Strauss argues: “Their [other interpreters of Machiavelli] seemingly open-minded study of Machiavelli's thought is based on the dogmatic acceptance of his principles. They do not see the evil character of his thought because they are heirs of the Machiavellian tradition; because they, or the forgotten teachers of their teachers, have been corrupted by Machiavelli” (1978, 12). ‘Strauss seems to be looking for some kind of ‘scientific objectivity’ that would exclude all those who have been interpellated by Machiavelli from seriously pursuing the study of his works. By separating political from ethical life, we accept implicitly the necessity of non-cthical, or evil, practice in politics. Besides ‘objectivity’ Strauss is also concerned with Machiavelli’s way of dealing with the truth, Strauss considers Machiavelli's relativism (not humanism) with regard to (the Christian) religion repulsive. Strauss is so upset by the idea that Machiavelli simplycannot subscribe to the Christian truth unconditionally that he has to convert Machiavelli into a ‘believer’ in the Roman pagan faith. That is to say, Strauss argues that for Machiavelli there exists a higher truth than the Christian one, namely that of pagan Rome. Strauss states Machiavelli’s position as follows: “The truth of Christianity then depends on whether Christianity is in agreement and sympathy with the most perfect truth, mentioned. The most perfect truth upholds the demand for the strength of the world. Hence if Christianity has led the world into weakness, it cannot be true” (1978, 178). It is interesting to sce that Strauss interprets Machiavelli in terms of the Christian notion of truth and not in terms of effectual truth.‘ Instead of reasoning that Machiavelli might adhere to no particular truth, Strauss has to argue that if he is not with Christian truth, then he has to be against it. In distinguishing Christian ethics from its Machiavellian counterpart Strauss makes an unintended connection with Nietzsche’s idea of slave morality. Strauss argues with Machiavelli: “The belief in Passion fosters passivity or the life of humility or contemplation rather than the active life. This mode of life then appears to have rendered the world weak and given it up in prey to criminal men who can manage the world with safety seeing that the large majority, in order to enter Paradise, think more of bearing their beatings than of avenging them” (1978, 179). Strauss presents Machiavelli as a pre- Nietzschian thinker. Otherworldly ethics are a means of the strong to oppress the weak into believing that their suffering in this world will be ‘paid of? in Paradise. In the meantime, the strong, who do not believe in Paradise, can do as they please. Strauss argues further: “When Machiavelli teaches that Christianity has rendered the world weak by commanding men not to glory in their virtue and power, he also means that Christianity has lowered the status of man by rejecting the seeking of one’s own honor and one’s own glory as such” (1978, 189). Nietzsche related slave morality to ressentiment and bad conscience. The weak are resentful towards the strong and try to undermine their position by playing on their presumed bad conscience. For Nietzsche, as well as Machiavelli, the whole idea of conscience is regarded as a form of censoring of the mind. Strauss states withMachiavelli: “If man is compelled to sin, there is no reason why he should have a bad conscience for sinning. If human goodness and conscience belong to two different orders, there may be badness undisturbed by conscience” (1978, 194). Whereas Nietzsche would argue that bad conscience, or for that matter religion, is a way of getting back at the strong by the weak, Machiavelli argued more than 350 years earlier in favor of the use of religion by the strong to temper the weak.° The fear of God or gods is useful for the prince in order to ‘legitimate’ his position as well as his actions. By ‘legitimate’ I do not try to suggest that the prince is trying to rid his own bad conscience by public approval of his policies, but rather that religion has the power to create the necessary fear without producing its evil twin, hate. Besides showing that in Machiavelli's doctrine effectual truth (Roman pagan truth, according to Strauss) precedes Christian truth, Strauss also argues that there is something wrong in his notion of the ancients. Ancient philosophy, according to Strauss, deals with notions of the good, the good citizen, and ideal forms of statehood. Strauss is undoubtedly correct when one takes Plato’s Republic as an example of classical philosophy. Plato, in order to determine the exact nature of justice, looked at the relationship between the state and its subjects, which can be seen as a mirror image of relations between subjects. ‘One can easily find examples in ancient philosophy that are not in line with the Platonic example presented above, for example in the works of Xenophon or Isocrates. In their works, itis not at all clear that the goodness of the state and the goodness of the citizens are as intimately related to each other as is the case for Plato. It almost seems that Strauss cannot seriously argue that Machiavelli does not address the issue of good and evil, and therefore has to argue that he does not make the right choice, in favor of justice and goodness, instead. This is probably the reason why Strauss keeps on referring to the fact that Machiavelli does not distinguish between the prince and the tyrant in The Prince. If Machiavelli would have distinguished between a ‘good’ prince and a ‘bad’ tyrant in his major work on princely rule, he would have fit into the Straussian categorization of philosophy as study of goodness and justice, while at the same timerenouncing his ‘evil’ idea of effectual truth, “On this basis [of justice and goodness] one can easily make a distinction between the prince and the tyrant: the prince in the strict, sense is informed by virtue and dedicates himself to the common good, whereas the tyrant is prompted by ambition and greed and is concerned only with his own good; the prince being loved by his subjects, lives in much greater security than the tyrant, who is hated by them” (1978, 135). This is, of course, not an equal comparison, since one compares ‘love’ to ‘hatred’ as opposed to ‘fear.’ From Machiavelli's point of view, love is not a basis for security since it is short lived.° Fear, on the other hand, is the most secure state for a prince (or tyrant), since it keeps the people in place and does not drive them into violence. Machiavelli’s example of Agathocles comes to mind, as a tyrant who, on the one hand ruled through crime and violence, and, on the other hand, acquired and sustained a stable principality, This does not imply, as I will show in chapter six, that tyrants of the caliber of Agathocles are therefore virtuous. Harvey C. Mansfield Jr. in his Machiavelli's Virtue comes up with ‘innovations’ in Machiavelli scholarship. The word innovations might suggest that Mansfield is trying to come up with something unique, but nothing is less true. In fact, he argues that on every “uninhabited island” of Machiavelli scholarship he finds a sign that says “Leo Strauss was here” (1998, 219). The omnipotence of his prince, Leo Strauss, might also be his downfall in that recent scholars have either misunderstood or simply forgotten about ‘Strauss. With his innovations, Mansfield does not try to outsmart or even complement Strauss, but merely to bring him back into memory. What Mansfield tries to bring back are the following two innovations: 1. do not discard the evil in Machiavelli, and 2, Machiavelli's personal virtue rather than his teaching on virtue is what is at stake in his major works, The Prince and The Discourses. I will discuss these two innovations in some detail. Machiavelli is well known for his advice that a prince “ought not to depart from the good, if he is able, but know how to enter the bad, when necessitated to do so” (1989, 109). Some scholars have regarded this as an example of the amoral -as opposed to i. Machiavelli, according to this line of thought, is not,interested in moral questions, i.e. he operates outside the spectrum of morality. Mansfield argues that by “excusing” Machiavelli for his anti-moral attitude one disregards the fact that evil is an essential element of Machiavelli’s notion of virtue. Scholars do not seem to be willing to deal with the bipolar nature of Machiavelli's virtue, because it is easily dismissed as being irrational. Virtue is considered to be substantially about the good, and evil belongs to its opposite, vice. According to Mansfield, Machiavelli did not try to fool us by combining both good and evil in his conception of virtue, as can be seen in the example of Hannibal whose virtue could only come out by way of his vice (his unlimited cruelty, 1989, 102). Besides arguing that evil is an essential element in understanding Machiavelli, Mansfield also argues that Machiavelli’s own virtue, separated from Machiavellism, is crucial. “Machiavelli's own virtue, we shall see, is the key to the puzzle of his notion of virtue” (1998, 8). For Mansfield, Machiavelli is an “extraordinary prince” who is author of a book about princes, but also stands above all princes as he reigns from a Gods-eye point of view. In other words, in order to understand virtl, we first have to understand Machiavelli's own virtue. Mansfield does not, however, specify what virtue in ‘Machiavelli he is referring to. Machiavelli's virtue as a diplomat, as a writer, as a Renaissance thinker, or maybe as my neighbor?’ Mansfield starts his search for ‘Machiavelli’s virtue with Aristotle, the most systematic virtue theorist in Antiquity. Moral virtue is, according to Mansfield’s reading of Aristotle, virtue for the sake of itself (1998, 12). The reason for this expedition to the Nicomachean Ethics is that Machiavelli’s own moral virtue will present us with the key to his notion of virti. Mansfield argues that Machiavelli was most certainly familiar with the work of Aristotle, in particular his “Nicomachean Ethics.”* Therefore Machiavelli, Mansfield argues, was aware of the fact that his conception of virtue, no matter how identical it may have been to Xenophon, was not ‘representative’ of a more general notion of virtue as it ‘was known in ancient times, Mansfield points this out by way of a comparison between Aristotle and Machiavelli. Mansfield concludes that: “Machiavelli wants to give ‘Renaissance humanism a hard face: to deflate its esteem for classical rhetoric, attack itsadherence to philosophical tradition, to unsettle its accommodation with Christianity, to refute its belief in the virtues of the classical gentleman, and to remind it of the value and glory of the military” (1998, 11). Is Xenophon too easily dismissed as being similar to Machiavelli when it comes to virtue? In this regard, it is interesting to include what Strauss has to say about that idea that Machiavelli ‘forgot’ to mention Aristotle. “The rule which Machiavelli tacitly applies can be stated as follows: if a wise man is silent about a fact that is commonly held to be important for the subject he discusses, he gives us to ‘understand that that fact is unimportant” (Strauss 1978, 30). Or does the choice of Aristotle better suit Mansfield’s design of Renaissance humanism? Strauss’s argumentation in his Thoughts on Machiavelli is quite similar when he argues: “As Machiavelli says in the Epistle Dedicatory his intention is to regulate, or to give rules for, princely government, ic, to continue the tradition of political philosophy, especially the Aristotelian tradition” (1998, 23). Machiavelli may very well follow the Aristotelian tradition, but that does not imply that he also follows Aristotle in his thoughts or ideas. Under the Aristotelian tradition we understand —with Strauss- a school of thought that includes many more thinkers than Aristotle, and many more ideas about polities than Aristotle wrote in the Politics and the Nicomachean Ethics. Instead of concluding that not all ancients were humanists, Mansfield concludes that Machiavelli is cheating on his ancients! Of course, Mansfield concludes that Machiavelli does not subscribe to ancient virtue in the sense that it was meant by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics. “When Aristotle supposes that virtue is for its own sake, he takes human praise of virtue for its reality and essence” (1998, 13). For Machiavelli, virtue is never for its own sake. For Machiavelli virtue is conditional; depending on the situation, something can be seen as virtuous or not virtuous. If the political situation is corrupt, itis virtuous to behave badly rather than well, because the latter will ruin the prince. Aristotle has an economic definition of virtue. Virtue can be produced in citizens. The regime that best produces good citizens is considered the most. virtuous. Politically the most virtuous regime is just. Justice is only present in the most virtuous regime, that which produces the best citizens. Machiavelli is not interested in10 justice. For Machiavelli, justice is one of the instances where people praise the ideal for the real. The prince does not produce good citizens in terms of Aristotelian justice, but produces good arms and good laws instead (1989, 71). Machiavellian institutions produce dependable and submissive ~not justice orientated- subjects. Machiavelli’s revolution in morality is that he regards virtue as something flexible. Hannibal was virtuous because he realized that cruclty was an essential element in his chances to be successful. Hannibal’s cruelty was part of his virtue, according to Machiavelli (1989, 102). Cruelty is not always a necessity for virtue, Machiavelli does not create dogmatic categories that follow natural ‘generalizable’ laws, On the contrary, the fact that virtue is flexible means that under certain circumstances an act of violence can be virtuous, whereas, given different circumstances the same act of violence cannot be considered virtuous. At the same time, Machiavelli realizes that, contrary to the concept of virtue, people are not flexible. A prince should be cruel and stingy with his subjects most of the time and, in order not to be hated, the prince should not use violence all of the time. The downfall of almost all the principalities that Machiavelli describes is a consequence of the inflexibility of the prince. Princes who are gentle with their subjects are always gentle even at times when cruelty is required, and vice versa. As stated above, Machiavelli's concept of virtue, according to Mansfield, can best be understood in relation to Machiavelli’s own virtue. The key to Machiavelli’s own virtue is the distinction Machiavelli makes in The Discourses between using and showing virti (1998, 41). Machiavelli states: “Hence if men do not, as individuals, display their valour [virti], it is not due to artillery, but to bad methods and to the weakness of [modem] armies, for since they lack valour [virti ] as a whole, they cannot display it in part” (1983, 326). Modern armies are not endowed with virti, which means that they are unable to show their virti, or for that matter use it. Mansfield argues that there could be a difference between showing and using virt, if itis possible to use virti without showing it (1998, 41). Machiavelli, in his role as adviser, is the “mastermind” behind the prince (1998, 43). “His virtue is the virtue of the prince behind the prince [...] that allows others to claim the glory (or take the blame)” (1998, 43). Machiavelli’s virtue does not show,ul according to Mansfield (1998, 44). As the adviser, Machiavelli is the invisible force behind the prince. “Although his virtue uses others’ virtue, it also shows in their virtue; their virtue is the effectual truth of his” (1998, 44). In other words, Machiavelli turns the prince’s virtue, not into what it potentially is, but into Machiavelli's own virtue [viti] By taking the prince’s virtue, and turning it into his, Machiavelli is presented as, the devil [old Nick] who wants to buy the prince’s soul (or spirit) “His animo, in the ink sense of ‘mind’ and ‘intent’ as well as ‘spirit,’ is behind theirs animating them to and to actin, if not under, his direction” (1998, 44). Machiavelli as mastermind, takes control of the mind of the prince and uses it for his own devilish purposes, while showing the prince’s virti and not his, What are Machiavelli's devilish purposes? Mansfield suggests that Machiavelli is using the prince for the betterment of his own personal glory as a political adviser or thinker. “His virtue appears greater, therefore, than his art. That is why Machiavelli's own virtue cannot be separated from his notion or doctrine of virtue. He had the opportunity, the good fortune, to make his revolution; and this he could not share with us in his teaching” (1998, 46). In other words, Machiavelli used the prince to launch his revolution in political advising, through the rhetorical strategy of shocking people into agreement, for the sake of his own personal glory and fulfillment. Proponents of the conservative paradigm argue that Machiavelli has interpellated his readers into thinking within the parameters of his own narrowly defined science of evil polities. Strauss and Mansfield warn us, the modern readers of Machiavelli, against the dangers of accepting both Machiavelli’s moral relativism and his depiction of politics as incompatible with Christian ethics. According to Strauss, Machiavelli's teaching of virtd is aimed at shocking the fundaments of our Wester Christian heritage, whereas Mansfield believes that shocking was only a tactic used by Machiavelli to acquire his place among the great in history. There exists an interesting parallel between the conservative and the post modem paradigm. Proponents of both paradigms point out that Machiavelli, through the use of rhetorical strategies, tries to win over his readers for his ideas. Proponents of the conservative paradigm try to look through Machiavelli's rhetorical facade to reveal and denounce his evil intentions, whereas the postmodemists,12 as we shall see below, see his rhetorical facade as part and parcel of his political philosophy. The Liberal Paradigm Liberal scholars of Machiavelli are not the least interested in his rhetorical qualities. Rather than condemning Machiavelli for corrupting our morals, liberals are more interested in understanding Machiavelli’s need to compromise with evil. Rather than expecting to be tricked into some kind of rhetorical argument, liberal scholars are looking for a logical or rational explanation for Machiavelli’s deviation from the path of moral rectitude. Whereas the conservative paradigm is focused on the conviction of Machiavelli, the liberal paradigm focuses on his rationalization. Within the conservative paradigm, there seems to exist the idea that, once Machiavelli is labeled evil, we do not have to understand him, or for that matter take him seriously, anymore, whereas, in the liberal paradigm, there seems to exist the idea that once we can rationalize Machiavelli's advice we do not have to be afraid of him anymore. Isaiah Berlin, like Leo Strauss, critiques Benedetto Croce’s thesis, but for different reasons. “What Machiavelli distinguishes is not specifically moral from specifically political values; what he achieves is not the emancipation of politics from ethics or religion, which Croce and many other commentators regard as his crowing achievement; what he institutes is something that cuts deeper still — a differentiation between two incompatible ideas of life, and therefore two moralities” (1982, 45). These are a Pagan and a Christian morality. The Pagan morality focuses on the honors of a public life and worldly goods, whereas the Christian morality focuses on the humble goods of private life and otherworldly glory. What distinguishes Berlin from his predecessors is that he sees Machiavelli as a moral thinker. Machiavelli’s ideas are “Beyond good and evil in some non-Aristotelian, religious, or liberal-Kantian sense; but not beyond good and evil of those communities, ancient or modem, whose sacred values are social through and through” (1982, 53). In other words, “Machiavelli values are not Christian, but they are moral values” (1982, 55).1B Machiavelli, according to Berlin, does not separate private and public morality, but rather insists that one opts for either one of them. For those who have political ambitions, Machiavelli offers a new morality that brings success in the public arena. “To choose to lead a Christian life is to condemn oneself to political impotence: to be used and crushed by powerful, ambitious, clever, unscrupulous men; if one wishes to build a glorious community like those of Athens or Rome at their best, then one must abandon Christian education and substitute one better suited to the purpose” (1982, 47). Berlin oes not say this directly, but his interpretation implies that one should either opt for Christian virtue or Machiavellian virti, Berlin does not see any differences between The Prince and The Discourses, with regard to Machiavellian virti. “The qualities he admires and thinks capable of being welded into ~ indeed, indispensable to ~a durable society, are not different in The Prince and the Discourses: energy, boldness, practical skill, imagination, vitality, self discipline, shrewdness, public spirit, good fortune, antigua virtus, virtii— firmmess in adversity, strength of character, as celebrated by Xenophon or Livy” (1982, 60). Berlin’s conclusion is worth quoting at length, since it seems to apply directly to Berlin himself. “The conflict between his scale of values and that of conventional morality clearly did not (pace Croce and the other defenders of the ‘anguished humanist’ interpretation) seem to worry Machiavelli himself. It upsets only those who came after him, and were not prepared, on the one hand, to abandon their own moral values (Christian or humanist) together with the entire way of thought and action of which these were part; nor, on the other hand, to deny the validity of, at any rate, much of Machiavelli's analysis of the political facts, and the (largely pagan) values and outlook that went with it, embodied in the social structure which he painted so brilliantly and convincingly” (1982, 70).14 Berlin sketches his own dilemma very accurately. He is not ready to surrender his Christian-humanist philosophy, but at the same time cannot discard the validity Machiavelli’s political morality. There seems to be only one solution for Berlin's dilemma, which is a return to the division of public and private morality. Where I agree with Berlin that Machiavelli's political teachings are a form of morality, to boost success in the public arena, I disagree with him that we have to choose between the two forms of morality. Machiavelli argued that one should be moral, in the Christian sense, some of the time, and not moral most of the time, but should always act in accordance with the times. Part of virtd, which sets the virtuosi apart, is their flexibility of mind, which allows them to be good, or evil, as times command it. Friedrich Meinecke argues that Machiavelli stands at the beginning of the development of the modern conception of raison d’etat. “The state is an organic structure whose full power can only be maintained by allowing it in some way to continue to growing; and raison d’etat indicates both the path and the goal for such growth” (1962, 1). Meinecke does not argue that raison d’etat was invented by Machiavelli, but rather that he gave it its modem meaning. In ancient times, authors like Plato, Aristotle, Thucydides, Xenophon, Cicero and Tacitus, had written extensively on raison d’etat but from a different perspective. “Polytheism and a secular view of human values were what nourished raison d’etat in antiquity” (1962, 26). Polytheism had in Machiavelli time made way for monotheism (Catholicism), and human values were interpreted in terms of the dominant religion. The states of Italy were a special case in this respect given the influence of the Vatican in Rome. The city of Rome signifies the change in raison d’etat because it is both the city of the ancient as well as the modern Catholic raison d’etat. At the same time, Machiavelli was not completely modern in his conception of raison d'etat. “Altogether the ancient conception of raison d’etat remained at this time firmly fixed in personalities, and served to vindicate the mode of action which was forced on contemporary rulers by pressure of the situation” (1962, 26). Machiavelli may have been modern in terms of the dominant religion, but he was still ancient in his focus on1s personalities and the glorification of heroism. Meinecke rightly points out that the tension between raison d’etat on the one hand, and ethics and law on the other hand is modern and had very little significance for Machiavelli. “It was therefore a historical necessity that the man, with whom the history of the idea of raison d’etat in the modern Wester world begins and from whom Machiavellism takes its name, had to be a heathen; he had to be a man to whom the fear of hell was unknown, and who on the contrary could set about his life-work of analysing the essence of raison d’etat with all the naivety of the ancient world” (1962, 29). Machiavelli, according to de Grazia, writes in a letter to Guicciardini: “I think that this would be the true way to go to paradise: to leam the way to hell in order to flee it” (1989, 360), \Virtit had for Machiavelli a broad and dynamic meaning, which also included heroism and “first and foremost, perhaps, strength for the founding and preservation of flourishing states, particularly republics” (1962, 32). According to Meinecke, one can find two types of virti in Machiavelli. The first or higher order virti is the ability of the leader to “distil out of the thoroughly bad and wretched material of average specimens of (1962, 32). In other words, our contemporary form of virtue civic virtue- is only a part of Machiavelli's notion of humanity the other kind of virtl in the sense of civic virtu: ‘higher’ virti, “The separation of virtt into two types, one original and the other derived, is of exceptional significance for a complete understanding of the political aims of Machiavelli. For it shows that he was a long way from believing uncritically in the natural and imperishable virtue of a republican citizen, and that he viewed even the republic ‘more from above, from the standpoint of the rulers, than from undemeath, from the standpoint of broad-based democracy” (1962, 32). This combined with the idea, derived from Polybius, that political systems change according to a natural cycle (from Monarchy to Tyranny to Democracy to Oligarchy etc.) made the concept of virti applicable to republics as well as monarchies. This is how Meinecke tries to ‘solve’ the puzzle concerning the different natures of Machiavelli’s The Prince and The Discourses. “Thus his concept of virti formed a close link between republican and monarchical tendencies,16 and, after the collapse of the Florentine Republic, enabled him without inconsistency to set his hopes on the rule of the Medicis...” (1962, 32). Meinecke agrees with Isaiah Berlin that Machiavelli was not an amoral or immoral thinker. “These encroachments and infringements, these ‘sins’ in the Christian sense, never ceased to be judged by him as immoral, and did not indeed constitute virtir itself but they could in the last resort [...] arise out of virth” (1962, 33). In other words, the necessity for evil does not excuse it, as it is merely a matter of choice for Machiavelli, “Besides virtd there is another term in Machiavelli’s work that deserves special attention, namely necessity. Machiavelli believed that virtu can only come through some form of necessity, Pleasure and leisure make people lazy and ignorant whereas cruelty and poverty make people industrious, innovative and virtuous. Necessity does not undermine Machiavell’s belief in virth as special ‘heroic’ capacity of wise man, because it applies more to the masses rather than the elite. A wise leader will therefore make use of necessity ~by creating necessities- while holding on to state power” (1962, 33). Civie virti is only derived from higher order virtd, and a good leader will invest his people with this stabilizing force. “One sees clearly what is the real central idea in Machiavelli’s life: namely, the regeneration of a fallen people by means of the virtd of a tyrant, and by means of the levering power of all the measures dictated by necessita” (1962, 41). Machiavelli would distinguish between more or less excellent leaders based on their virti. Tyrants, such as Agathocles, or the Spartan Nabis, do not receive any glory or virti from Machiavelli.” It follows from Meinecke’s thesis that the people who live in a republic are endowed with more virti than those who live in a principality. “The quantity of virti, which existed in a people, was the factor that decided whether a monarchy or a republic was more suitable. So it was only consistent that, for his disjoined times, he demanded a monarchical despot and took this to be a necessity of state” (1962, 43). ‘LH. Whitficld argues: “There is no doctrine of virtit in Machiavelli” (1965, 95). That Machiavelli sometimes uses virti in a way that does not coincide with our contemporary use of virtue many scholars acknowledge, according to Whitfield.17 However, there are also examples in Machiavelli’s work where he does use virti in the context of virtue. This shows, according to Whitfield, that there is no systematic doctrine of virtii in the work of Machiavelli (1965, 95-6). Besides arguing that there is no consistent doctrine of virtd in Machiavelli, Whitfield also argues : “where he touches some such doctrine fleetingly itis a common [...] inheritance” (1965, 99). In other words, Machiavelli’s use of virti is no different from Dante’s use of that term. The reason scholars have distinguished Machiavelli from other Renaissance or ancient thinkers is based on their pre-conceptual understanding of ‘Machiavelli as champion of cunning and evil polities. “And in precisely the same way, we know how wicked Machiavelli is, so therefore what was righteous indignation in Dante, or moral analysis in Cicero, or social reflection in La Rochefoucauld, becomes th repulsive cynicism in Machiavelli. One cannot, it seems, bear a name like his impunity” (1965, 101). Whitfield wants to show that Machiavelli is not the monster that other have proclaimed him to be, by discussing his analysis of Julius Il and Philip of Macedon, Both men, in their respective positions as Pontiff and general, were great Machiavellians. Machiavelli does not praise these two Machiavellians, but, on the contrary, he strongly criticizes them. He does not, as one might expect, criticize them for their political ‘wrongs, but instead, for their cruelty. From a cold political strategic perspective Philip of Macedon was a very successful general, but Machiavelli criticizes the fact hat he “transferred whole peoples as herdsmen do their cattle” (1965, 104). Machiavelli, in his assessment of the great is no different than Cicero or Dante in his moral conclusions, according to Whitfield. Whitfield concludes: “Once we have realized that this matter of rtd rests largely on prejudice, and not on reason, we are ready to approach Machiavelli’s main statement of his political ideas in his commentary to Livy” (1965, 105). Whitfield seems to discard The Prince because of its lack of a systematic doctrine of virti. We are left to wonder what Machiavelli’s main statement of his political ideas is, if not virt? Given Whitfield’s exclusive attention to The Discourses, it will probably turn out to be another republican reading on Machiavelli. Virti is discarded because it is not presented18 in a systematic way, and it does not distinguish Machiavelli from other Renaissance thinkers. It seems to me that, based on The Prince and The Discourses, we can conclude that Machiavelli is not merely regurgitating Dante, and that these ‘prejudices’ are in fact significant differences. Sheldon Wolin sees Machiavelli as the father of the new science of politics. Wolin argues that with Machiavelli a “pure political theory” was bom (1960, 199). Wolin stales that Machiavelli's new science of politics was primarily formulated against the aristocracy and the system that kept them in power, hereditary rule (1960, 199). At the center of Machiavelli’s new science stands the concept of virti. Only the prince who establishes a new principality can attain “double glory,” that is glory for the founding of the state and glory for the establishment of new modes and orders (1960, 200). It is important to notice that the new science focuses on political issues without a “presupposing philosophy” (1960, 211). In other words, Machiavelli's new science is not subject to an already existing politico-philosophical program. Unfortunately, as becomes clear from the way I have organized this literature review section, and Wolin is no exception to this rule, many Machiavelli scholars present him within the context of a political philosophy. Machiavelli's new science is at the same time a new political ethic in terms of an economy of violence (1960, 216-7). Political knowledge is no longer the privilege of the prince, but has been externalized and has become teachable (1960, 216). In other words, virth is teachable through the imitation of the examples of the ancients, ‘The major contribution of the new science is its focus on the management of the ‘common people, rather than on the relationship between the (hereditary) prince and the aristocracy. Wolin argues that Machiavelli’s thinking shifted from a focus on virtd to a focus on civic virtd (1960, 229). In The Discourses, Wolin argues, “the political hero largely disappears,” and due to the “capabilities of the masses in a republic,” there is “no need for political heroes” (1960, 229). In other words, the virtd of one leader becomes displaced by the civie virtd of the masses in a republic. Wolin goes even further by stating: “But while the people’s virtue came from submitting to the law, the virti of the prince necessarily took the form of creative destruction of laws and institutions. Hence at19 the stage where a republican system was feasible, heroic virtti was anachronistic” (1960, 231). There are, however, two things to keep in mind when analyzing Wolin’s argument. First, the idea that the hero disappears in The Discourses is questionable, especially since book III is devoted to the examples of Rome’s great man. Second, the example of a principatio civile is not considered among the most excellent forms of statehood. Machiavelli clearly prefers those who acquire a state on the basis of their own arms and virti to those who use “fortunate astuteness”, as is the case with those who found on the people. The example of Nabis the Spartan is certainly not one of the most flattering accounts given by Machiavelli.'° Wolin correctly states that the rule of success for a founder is measured in the stability of the transition of rule after his death. “If princely virth were to be superseded, what was now needed was a form of virth which would support rather than create institutions” (1960, 231-2). Wolin is correct again when he argues that this support comes from the masses, rather than the aristocracy. However, this does not imply that ‘Machiavelli bestows civic virti on the people. Machiavelli still needs a leader who guides the people. In other words, itis the prince’s virtit and not, as it is according to Wolin, “civie virti which would serve to discipline and curb the desires and ambitions of the masses” (1960, 236). Quentin Skinner also distinguishes between two forms of virti, but contrary to Meinecke, does not separate them in terms of a higher and a lower form of virti. “In The Prince he associated the quality [virtl] exclusively with the greatest political leaders and military commanders; in the Discourses he explicitly insists that, if city is to attain greatness, it is essential that the quality should be possessed by the citizen body as a whole” (1981, 53-4). In other words, there are two types of virti, one possessed by leaders, and the other possessed by the people. Not all leaders are equipped with sufficient virti to gain stability and prosperity for their state. Republics, contrary to principalities where the prince has to fear the virtd of the people, have the advantage that the leadership can make use of the virti of the people to enhance the public good.20 Machiavelli argues, according to Skinner, that it is easy for a prince of virti to establish a state but difficult to maintain it, whereas in the case of a republic, it is much harder to establish ~since it needs to be established by one great man who is not likely to give up his position after the republic has been founded- but more easy to maintain (1981, 55). The reason that republics are maintained with more ease than principalities is ‘twofold; first, instead of relying on one person’s virti, a republic relies on the virti of all the people, and second, virti is almost never hereditary and therefore does not guarantee that the son of the prince will be able to hold onto the principality his father established (1981, 56). However, Skinner argues, “For while we can expect to find a surpassing degree of virtt among the founding fathers of cities, we cannot expect to find the same quality occurring naturally among ordinary citizens” (1981, 56). Therefore, after the founding fathers have passed away, a certain decay will set in and corruption will rule over virtil. The question that Skinner, in Machiavelli’s name, raises is: “How can the body of the people —in whom the quality of virti is not naturally to be found — have this quality suecessfully implanted in them’ (1981, 57)? There are, according to Skinner's Machiavelli, two ways to implant virtt into the citizen body. The key to the problem of corruption lies in the modes and order of the republic or principality. The way the state is organized, in terms of institutions and constitutional arrangements, will greatly influence the prospects for civic virti (1981, 61). The two institutional arrangements that can bestow virtii on the people, or otherwise force or frighten them into behavior consistent with virtd, are religion and the law. “Religion can be used, that is, to inspire ~and if necessary to terrorize ~ the ordinary populace in such a way as {o induce them to prefer the good of their community to all other goods” (1981, 62). Law can do the same “by using the coercive powers of the law in such a way as to force them to place the good of their community above all selfish interests” (1981, 64). The leaders can use religion and the law as tools to equip the people, either through fear, force or inspiration, with the necessary vir ‘The essence of Machiavelli's concept of virtt, according to Neal Wood, is clouded by the many different meanings given to the word by Machiavelli. However,21 Wood argues, the multitude of meanings is also the key for understanding virth. “I wish to argue that the very plurality of meanings suggests a special meaning” (1967, 160). ‘Wood's study of virtt: enumerates all the persons to whom Machiavelli attributes virtd Based on a list of fifty-three persons, taken from The Prince and The Discourses, Wood concludes that “Machiavelli’s heroes are largely ancients”, and “they are all warriors, soldiers, generals” (1967, 161-2). Based on his enumeration of Machiavellian heroes, Wood argues that “men of virti are predominantly warriors who triumph in circumstances of extreme danger, hardship, and chance” (1967, 165). As Russell Price rightly points out, the fact that Wood uses only The Prince and The Discourses for his ‘enumeration gives him a biased sample of Machiavellian heroes skewed towards the ancient warriors, given that The Discourses are based on the first ten books of Livy (1973, 335). Wood also does not show how his enumeration sheds light on the different uses of virti in Machiavelli. ‘What Wood does show is that Machiavelli’s use of virti is based on the ancient view of history in terms of cyclical pattems (1967, 166). Machiavelli does not introduce virtd in opposition to vizio [vice]or cattivo [bad], but rather in opposition to ozio [idleness). Virti is part of a cyctical patterns that has the following form: virti leads to peace and prosperity; peace leads to ozio; and ozio leads to disorder and turmoil; order is again established by virti, It is necessita [necessity] that allows virti to create order out of chaos, and it is the lack of necessita that comes with the success of virti that turns the onder again into chaos. Wood’s enumeration comes into play again when he argues that the stage on which the necessity of virth becomes most clear is war. Most of the Machiavellian heroes in Wood's enumeration are warriors and politics in Wood’s interpretation of Machiavelli’s thought becomes a synonym of war.!! “Virti, therefore, is a set of qualities, or a pattern of behavior most distinctively exhibited under what may be described as battlefield conditions, whether actual war or politics provide the context” (1967, 171). Wood’s definition of virth has become very limited, especially compared to its broad basis, which Wood himself insists on, because of his biased and unnecessary enumeration of Machiavellian heroes. But if we forget about the limited definition of2 virti or politics in terms of war, we are left with the important insight into Machiavelli's use of virti in opposition to ozio. This insight is essential for understanding Machiavelli's use of virtd, because it invalidates the common way of interpreting Machiavelli in terms of bontét [good] versus cattivo or virtt versus vizio. Price enhances out understanding of virti by pointing out that Machiavelli often uses it in the context of virtit di animo e di corpo (1973, 328). Virti is here divided into ‘wo parts, namely a spiritual and a physical part. Whereas Wood focused on the enumeration of all Machiavellian heroes blessed with virth, Price enumerates all uses of virti in the work of Machiavelli. Price distinguishes between moral virti, political virta, military virta, and even a combination of political and military virti. Price’s eagerness to show the breadth of virti in the work of Machiavelli by way of his typology undermines his ability to show its depth. In other words, Price’s analysis does not explain or even define the underlying meaning of virti that all the different types share in common. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin is the first theorist, to my knowledge, who constructively steps beyond the Crocean enigma and tries to understand Machiavelli within the scope of his limitations and inconsistencies, without, for the most par, trying to solve them. With her focus on Machiavelli’s ambivalence, she opens up the possibility for indecisiveness and inconclusiveness in his work. Pitkin’s accounts for Machiavelli's ambivalence on the basis of his manhood: “...anxiety about being sufficiently masculine and concern over ‘hat it means to be a man” (1999, 5). The words virtue and the Machiavellian virti are based on “vir,” which is the Latin root for “man.” Virti stands for the masculine energy that oppose the feminine forces of the goddess Fortune. The battle between the sexes is symbolized in The Prince in terms of two metaphors: Fortune as a river and Fortune as a woman, Both metaphors symbolize the problematic of human control over the human condition. Fortune as a river causes floods and disaster. In order to tame or control Fortune men can build dikes and protect the city against high tides. This control only ‘works partially, because dikes can only protect against some floods but not against all. It is nonetheless virtuous to protect the city with dikes even ifit is no guarantee of safety. The second metaphor, Fortune as a woman, can be interpreted in two ways. Machiavelli23 can be building on the1 6th century idea of women as fickle and unreliable. Fortune as a woman is unreliable and thus unpredictable, which means that men have to build on their virtues rather than trust their interest to Fortune. Another interpretation of the same metaphor would suggest that Fortune is not just any woman, but instead a goddess. Goddesses in the ancient Greek-Homerian tradition were oftentimes involved in all kinds of intrigues with one another, while making use of humans as the pieces in their game. ‘Again it boils down to the dependence of virti on Fortune’s wishes and commands. Pitkin focuses on autonomy as opposed to authority. “Autonomy thus forms a unity behind the apparent inconsistencies in the texts, not by resolving and making them consistent, but by providing a clear overview of the unresolved tensions and their sources” (1999, 19). It is autonomy that all the figures in Machiavelli’s plays strive for. Autonomy implies a certain freedom from extemal influences, be they natural phenomena, fate or the opposite sex. The interesting thesis that Pitkin is posing is that there is a relationship between Machiavelli's autonomy as a political adviser and his conception of virti, Limitations on autonomy produce male anxiety in terms of masculinity, virtd, and, in the case of Machiavelli, the energy produced by this mechanism was sublimated into intellectual effort. Machiavelli's diplomatic status was limited by his position, he was not a full ambassador, and by the fact that he represented only a small state, These limitations had their effect on Machiavelli’s power position, which was negligible. In other words, Machiavelli did walk on the same stage as the great leaders who dominated Europe at the time, but he lacked the means to force himself and Florentine interests into the spotlight. What Machiavelli lacked in pure masculine force of power politics he compensated for by feminine intellectual means of maneuvering and diplomacy. Machiavelli had to outsmart the more powerful to advance Florentine interests, to use deceit rather than force. “His work depended, therefore on his personal ability to gain intimate, behind the scenes access to the great, to see and understand what they were really up to, and to manipulate, cajole, dissemble, fatter, and trick them into doing what he could not force them to do” (1999, 28). Pitkin argues that Machiavelli's notion of virti was strongly influenced by the conditions under which he experienced24 power. Machiavelli's appreciation of the cunning fox is only a ‘logical’ consequence of his personal need to maneuver like a fox, due to the lack of the lion in him, Machiavelli's appreciation of the fox leads Pitkin to assume a prevalence of the fox over the lion. In other words, she suggests that Machiavelli understood the position of the fox from his own experience, which made him regard the fox superior to the lion. “But though the lion in some ways presents a competing image of character, the lion is not a standard of manhood Machiavelli ever takes seriously, either for himself or for those he admires” (1999, 46). Pitkin cuts away the importance of the symbolically ‘masculine lion, making the lion part of the bestial world Machiavelli does not associate with. “Though Machiavelli says that success in corrupt times depends on knowing how to play the parts of fox and lion, he nevertheless implies that fighting by laws is a superior achievement, suited to our true nature, Thus the real rival to both the lion and the fox is a different sort of world, a world that is not corrupt” (1999, 46). Ido not see any textual evidence in chapter XVIII of The Prince that would support the claim that fighting with the laws is superior. In fact, Machiavelli argues that “...the first [fighting with the laws] proves many times to be insufficient...[...] Therefore itis necessary for a prince to know well how to use the beast and the man” (1989, 107). Machiavelli, it seems to me, is not, the least concemed about a corrupt world. Machiavelli's pragmatic position, derived from focus on effectual truth, gives him the opportunity to act in accordance with any world, corrupt or not corrupt. “And if all men were good, this precept would not be good; but since they are wicked, and would not be faithful to you, you also do not have to be faithful to them” (1989, 108), Pitkin needs the distinction between the corrupt and the not corrupt world as a means for her ultimate goal, which is the creation of the “true virtt.”"? Pitkin’s Machiavelli is a republican ideologue and the finest form of virtt can be found in the citizenship of a healthy, non-corrupt, republic. True virtii seems to represent a turn away from the masculine origin of virtue to the gender neutral concept of citizenship. This in turn indicates a step away from the fox and the lion conception of virti in the direction of fighting with the laws and a citizenship conception of true virti. Machiavelli never25 distinguished between ‘virtl’ and “true virti,’ and virti never lost its manliness in Machiavelli, Since Pitkin has done away with the lion, only the fox is left to represent beastly virtt. The problem of the fox is that his method is deception, which does not particularly make him a model citizen. “The fox not only sees through the deception of others, he himself is a consummate deceiver, and these two abilities together are the measure of his manly achievement” (1999, 37). In other words, the abilities of the fox conflict with the aims of true virtil. The citizen has to be self-affirming and open faced about his position in public whereas the fox operates in secluded arena’s under false pretenses. “Though a strategy to achieve manly autonomy, foxiness ends up threatening a loss of self and implying contempt for self. In the name of self-reliance, the fox becomes impotent” (1999, 42). In the name of the self-reliance of a good citizen of a healthy republic, Pitkin is correct in her assessment of the fox’s potency, but what about the case of an unhealthy, corrupt republic? All of a sudden the roles seem to have turned around, and the citizen, rather than the fox, ends up impotent. Now lets apply the situation to Machiavelli ‘Machiavelli operated as a fox in diplomatic circles in Europe between 1498 and 1512, because he (Florence) lacked the overt political power that would have given him the ‘opportunity of direct political action as demanded by the good citizen model. Does this mean that he was impotent, or did he have some other, foxy, kind of influence? Machiavelli's inability to create new policies, rather than to influence policies that were being created by others, can be compared to the inability of the fox to use his “patriarchal power to create manhood” (1999, 49). The fox is impotent because he cannot create citizens, just as Machiavelli is impotent because he cannot create politics and has to be satisfied with a minor role on the sideline influencing those who create politics. “As standard of manhood, the image of the Founder puts that of the fox to shame because of the Founder’s capacity to father. Yet that implies that the Founder himself is only a means to Machiavelli's real goal: the new uncorrupt society to be created” (1999, 80). Besides the issue of the uncorrupt society, which has been discussed sufficiently above, the capacity of the Founder as father is questionable.26 In order to overcome the ‘problematic’ Founders Pitkin suggests : “Could it be after all that the great historical Founders were only lions [back on the stage] being used by foxes who had a larger, nonfoxy vision” (1999, 102). What distinguishes animals from ‘human beings is that they do not betray their origins, they do not, cannot, deceive themselves. A fox is therefore always foxy, and cannot become nonfoxy for the benefit of some greater good. This inflexibility, which is also present in many people, is typical for animals. “Thus the generating of virti [now without the adjective ‘true’] must be the work of foxes, or foxes using lions, after all; and the apparently so masculine Founder is only a product of the theorist, the ‘mind’ that stands behind him and manipulates” (1999, 105). From a completely different vantage point, Pitkin has arrived at the same conclusion as Mansfield. Machiavelli is presented as mastermind or theorist who, as adviser, with the precision of a fox, manipulates the lion prince into the creative myth of the Founding Father. The Founder is no more than a showing of virti by the lion prince on the instructions of the foxy adviser. The invisible virti of the adviser has trumped the showy virti of the prince. The liberal paradigm is certainly not as homogenous as the conservative paradigm, Most liberal thinkers argue in favor of the idea that there are two types of virti, but some argue for a division between Christian and pagan virth (Berlin), while others argue for a division between civic and aristocratic virti (Meinecke and Skinner). All embrace Wolin’s idea of an economy of violence, while none seem to accept Wolin’s deep pessimistic view about the chances of breaking the cycle of violence. Not surprisingly, Machiavelli is portrayed as a liberal republican thinker who is mostly interested in the improvement of the position of the common people. In fact, the common people become the heart of Machiavelli’s analysis, and his advice, absent of the support of the common people, is considered completely impotent. ‘The Postmodern Paradigm ‘The postmodern paradigm shares with the conservative paradigm the idea that Machiavelli’s texts consist of many layers, which cannot be understood by simply reading27 the words. The difference is that the conservatives read Machiavelli as if he was Plato, ‘whereas the postmodemists read him as if he were a sophist. Victoria Kahn’s Machiavellian Rhetoric, which in an uncanny way depends on Pocock’s The Machiavellian Moment, is a good example of this literature. Kahn argues: “In response to the humanist ideal of a rhetoric that is grounded in morality and also effective, Machiavelli demonstrates that even those practical ‘virtues for which men are called good’ are insufficiently attuned to the rhetorical concems of effective political action” (1994, 24), Moral correctness is not good enough for success in politics; therefore, Kahn argues, success in polities depends on knowledge of moral as well as amoral action. “Knowledge in utramque partem is necessary according to Machiavelli because ‘the conditions of human life simply do not allow’ one ‘to have and exercise” only morally good qualities (65, 45). Rather, the conditions of human life require the ruses of imitation and persuasion - and the amoral, flexible faculty of judgment — that Machiavelli calls virti” (1994, 24-5). Kahn shows that the humanist rhetorical mode of arguing for and against the same concept as epitomizes Machiavelli’s use of virti. Machiavelli, according to Kahn, purposely does not serve the reader with a unified concept of virth, “for only a destabilized virti can be effective in the destabilized world of political reality” (1994, 25). Kahn makes the point that Machiavelli’s concept of politics and thus his teaching is full of irony and is therefore theatrical and hyperbolic (1994, 25). When comparing Cesare Borgia and Agathocles the Sicilian she even speaks of a “Machiavellian coup de théatre” (1994, 26). The paradox in Machiavelli’s comparison between Cesare Borgia and Agathocles is that the former is praised as virtuous whereas the latter is not, while, at the same time, it was Agathocles who successfully founded and held onto his state and Cesare who lost his state as quickly as he conquered it. Kahn argues that Machiavelli (secretly?) attributed virti to both men. In fact, Kahn’s reading of Machiavelli’s case of Agathocles makes him even more important than Cesare Borgia. “As we will see, the longevity of Agathocles” reign is related to a different sort of ruse of representation, according to which the exigencies of representing oneself to one’s subjects prove to be a forceful constraint on tyrannical power” (1994,27). Agathocles will teach us the importance of the role of the common people, whose support for the tyrant allowed him to sustain his position, and at the same time made him incorporate the interests of these citizens into his decision making. Virti, according to Kahn, “cannot be called one thing” and “the aim of the passage in chapter 8 [on Agathocles] is to dehypostatize virth, to empty it of any specific ‘meaning’ (1994, 31). The example of Agathocles shows us, according to Kahn, that there is no clear distinction between crime and virtt. Virti, in Kahn’s analysis, becomes an empty concept in that itis not equal to crime, but can involve crime, and that it is not equal to glory, but it does involve glory, and so forth Machiavelli uses the example of ‘Agathocles for the rhetorical purpose of satisfying his readers by not equating virti with crime, while he, at the same time, does not deny this equation in the example of Cesare Borgia. “Virti cannot be simply equated, once and for all, with violence and deception or what we would call crime. For if the goal of the prince or tyrant is to ‘mantenere lo stato” (maintain his power), he will eventually have to moderate his use of force and fraud and take into account the interests of his subjects” (1994, 40) Thus, the example of Agathocles shows that even the worst tyrant has to consider the interest of his subjects if he wants to maintain his position. Virtd, as defined by Kahn, does not guarantee success, but it may force a tyrant to reform his state into a republic “because republics are capable of greater longevity and greater virti than principalities” (1994, 40). “What I would like to suggest is that the nearest analogue to The Prince in sixteenth-century genres is the picaresque novel, and that further the likeness to the picaresque is primarily in the structure of moral response, precisely in the depicted relations of virtue and vice; both excel in what I regard as felicitous discourse on the problem of evil. And both The Prince and the picaresque represent perverse fulfillments of the promise of Renaissance rhetoric, for both sharply focus on tactics of symbolic manipulation by their protagonists, tactics which respond to, as well as create, the dominant fraudulence of the contemporaneous social domain” (1992, 148-9),29 Naney Struever, in her Theory as Practice discusses Machiavelli's work in the context of Renaissance rhetoric. While focusing mostly on The Prince and The Discourses, Struever argues that Machiavelli’s writings should not be discussed in the context of an opposition between moral and amoral philosophy, or even as history- philosophy as such, but instead as a rhetoric of action. “Yet the Machiavellian practice differs sharply from a pious practice of recovering a past tradition; here the argument defines a hypothetical, rather than a historical, domain” (1992, 152). Machiavelli, according to Struever, is not concemed with formulating a political philosophy or ideology, but rather with the active creation of hypotheses that can be imitated. “The deployment of tentative dilemmas, the tactics of dereification and reduction, the overall homogeneity mark an argumentative zeal; Machiavelli’s I I and syntactic strategies are a piece of his primary commitment to the domain of theorizing, to the hypothetical, then, [...] political and ethical competence requires virtuosity in dealing with the illusive, a virtuosity which is nourished by working through hypothetical possibilities as well as by considerations of the scenarios of familiar experience or the condensed narratives of Roman history. The master of illusion is a master of hypotheses” (1992, 158). Machiavelli’s discursive strategy is aimed at implicating the reader in his thinking process. Machiavelli makes us think through the examples with him while at the same time reducing our options, and offering limited possibilities for imitation. Struever makes the point that “Machiavelli counsels us to theorize” (1992, 166). “Machiavelli’s genius, 1 shall argue, is the integration of the achievements of his internal discipline with the opportunities of external address. His discipline evades his counsel. His procedure both assumes and demands: first he assumes counselees who are not already inquirers in the disciplined Machiavellian mode; second, he insists that the counselees must inquire; rather than impose theory on practice, the moralist tactic, he asks practical men to theorize” (1992, 166). By making his reader part of his project, Machiavelli, the “discursive ruffian,” persuades them to accept his conclusions (1992, 175). In other words, “Machiavelli, felicitously, compels the sharing of unwanted knowledge” (1992, 175). It is not merely the sharing of “unwanted knowledge” but its acceptance that is30 forced upon the reader. “Machiavelli forces the reader, addressed as noninquirer, into the role of inquiry while making inquiry a close, dangerous encounter” (1992, 175). Machiavelli’s rhetorical project in The Prince and The Discourses is to win the reader’s consent by, on the one hand, limiting his space of thought, and, on the other hand, implicating him in the process of inquiry. “Machiavelli may address the reader as extemal to his inquiry, but he forces the reader into a speculative mode, into internal discipline. And a controlling motive is to secure the experience of constraint, to replicate political constraint in unpleasant discursive constraint” (1992, 181). The teaching of virtd is a not merely a transfer of knowledge on political survival, but a disciplining of the reader into “unpleasant” or “unwanted” new modes and orders of thinking about the nature of the political. Wayne Rebhom in Foxes and Lions presents a reading of Machiavelli in terms of a confidence game. According to Rebhor, in a Machiavellian world politics is reduced to a confidence game, and all players are either confidence men or dupes. In Machiavelli’s conception of politics, as well as in his literary works, “all shamelessly use deceit and trickery to gain morally dubious ends” (1988, 8). Rebhorn sees a clear connection between the literary work of the Renaissance and Machiavelli's political writings. The difference between Boccaccio’s Decameron or Machiavelli's Mandragola, and Machiaveli’s political writings is that the confidence men in the latter “seldom make ridiculous spectacles of themselves” (1988, 8). All confidence men are “brilliant actors and rhetoricians, egocentric individuals who pursue pleasure, status, and power with enormous energy and daring and who willingly violate moral principles and social rules when they must” (1988, 16). We are talking about a category of people, not necessarily but predominantly men, ranging from fictional characters such as Machiavelli's Ligurio and Sofronia to historical figures such as Cesare Borgia, and half fictional half historical figures such as Castruccio Castracani. On the literary level, people need the confidence men to satisfy their desires, which are usually related to status and sex. That the confidence men also have desires of their own, seems to be something that those who take these people into their confidence31 do not realize, For example, in Mandragola, Messer Nicia never gives it any thought whether Ligurio is in faet satisfying his own desires by introducing ‘doctor’ Callimaco to him. On the political level, rulers need the confidence men to provide them with advice on the art of statehood. On both levels, the confidence men are covertly in control over the person they serve. Rebhom discusses three strategies in which the literary confidence ‘men can persuade the audience, and the political confidence men their rulers of their necessity. First, the world is presented to them as consisting of only scoundrels (1988, 20). The audience or ruler cannot distinguish any morality between the two evils presented and will therefore opt for the most cunning solution. Morality is taken out of the equation from the beginning. Second, the world is presented in terms of a “split between confidence men and dupes” (1988, 21). The audience or ruler is given the option to act morally, but is, at the same time, assured that this will bring ruin. The real choice is only limited to one option, cunning. Third, the confidence man should distance the audience or ruler from the dupe, by presenting the dupe in an unfavorable way, or by not presenting the dupe at all. The audience or ruler does not get emotionally attached to the dupe and can therefore easily focus his/their action on the tricks that are being played out Inall three strategies the options and the information of the audience or ruler are limited in such a way as to force them into ‘unconscious’ submission to the confidence men. Rebhor argues that Machiavelli's confidence men are of a special status in Renaissance literature. “Machiavelli not only departed from his predecessors by extending the social range of the confidence man and by seeing virtually all of life as a confidence game; he also increased the figure’s historical significance and personal stature” (1988, 38). Machiavelli's confidence men, especially his political confidence men such as Cesare Borgia and Castruccio Castracani, are more political than other Renaissance confidence men, and strive with greater energy for higher goals and honors (1988, 39), Rebhorn never makes the distinction between political and literary confidence men. By classifying the characters of Boccaccio’s Decameron, Machiavelli's Mandragola and Clizia under the same eategory of confidence men as Cesare Borgia and Castruecio Castracani, Rebhom takes the political element out of the confidence men. Machiavelli is32 not a confidence man, but a political adviser. The reason that Machiavelli's confidence men are of “historical significance” is because they are political figures. In order to account for the literary elements in Machiavelli’s political writings, Rebhom produces an interpretation of Machiavelli that depoliticizes his work. Rebhomn acknowledges that Cesare Borgia was not a simple schemer on the level of Ligurio, but a political survivor who threatened all around him with his unlimited energy and desire for power and glory. ‘At the same time, because he has linked Cesare Borgia with Ligurio, Rebhorn has to explain Machiavelli by assigning his confidence men an exceptional status. Once we take into account that Machiavelli was a political adviser, as opposed to a confidence man, we can understand his political contribution in both his fictional and non-fictional works. Conclusion Machiavelli and the Politics of Virti deals primarily with Machiavelli as political adviser. Machiavelli’s work as adviser can be divided into two distinct periods, the period in which he worked as the secretary of the second Chancellery, and the period in which he wrote his great works on politics. The year 1512 can be seen as the division line between these two periods. This research is focused on the second, post 1512, period, and thus on Machiavelli’s political works rather than on the letters and dispatches to the Florentine government that he wrote during the many missions he performed. Occasionally, I will refer to some of the earlier letters in this research, because there is no clear break in Machiavelli’s thinking after the collapse of the Florentine Republic in 1512. The title Machiavelli and the Politics of Virtit has been chosen because I want to show that Machiavelli's theory of politics centers around vi ii, and that his theory of politics itself is highly political. Machiavelli's political program (I do not want to name it a ‘science’) is very seductive in that it leads the reader into a world of conclusions and forsaken choices, while at the same time disciplining the reader into obedience. ‘Machiavelli is an adviser, but simply advising may not be enough for a man of his intellectual caliber. Certainly, Mansfield, but also Struever and Pitkin argue that velli wanted more than just to serve the prince, Machiavelli, as mastermind behind33 the prince, operated as a great manipulator of both the prince and the people, through the myth of the Founding Fathers. Itis interesting to see that conservative, liberal and postmodem readers of Machiavelli focus on Machiavelli's private intentions, gaining the glory of an adviser of virti. Fortunately, all three paradigms contribute something interesting to the Machiavelli literature. The conservative paradigm focuses not only on Machiavelli's manipulation of the prince, but of his audience in general, including his contemporary audience of scholars. The liberal paradigm, by focusing on its own ideal, the uncorrupt republic, sheds a clear light on the violent undertones of Machiavelli's politics. By focusing on civic virti, liberals unintentionally showed the limitations of virti in general asa theory of action. Through their, not Machiavelli's, establishment of the new science of polities, they also unintentionally showed the punitive and disciplinary character of religion and law in the production of civic virti. The postmodern paradigm contributed to our understanding of the spectacular element of virti, its ability to “satisfy and stupefy” (1989, 45). Even if one does not agree that virtii is merely an empty signifier, this does not undermine the idea that Machiavelli’s politics of virti are highly rhetorical in its contribution of “unwanted knowledge.”34 Notes ' When I speak about the Machiavelli literature I mean the contemporary American scholarly literature on the work of Machiavelli, ? His discourse should not be confused with The Discourses, since the latter is only a subset of the former. > Benedetto Croce’s interpretation of Machiavelli as an ‘anguished humanist’ in his Elementi di Politica (1925) was the dominant Machiavelli interpretation the first half of the twentieth century. Croce pleaded for a reading of Machiavelli in which political and ethical life were strictly separated. * For effectual truth see chapter XV of The Prince (1989). * See chapter XXI of The Prince (1989). © See chapter XVI of The Prince (1989). 7 In the style of Klosowski's Sade my Neighbor (1980) we could also have Machiavelli my Neighbor. * Machiavelli was most likely also familiar with the fifth chapter of Aristotle’s Politics, which specifically deals with monarchies and tyrannies. ° See Chapter 6 for a more close reading of these two ‘Machiavellians.” See chapter 6 for a more detailed analysis of civil principalities and the case of Nabis in particular, "Wood does not take into account the important distinction Machiavelli makes between war and statecraft. When under attack at the French court, Machiavelli defends himself against the claim that the Italians don’t know anything about war, with the statement that the French don’t know anything about statecraft, because if they did they would not allow the Pope (Alexander V1) to build a strong state in the center of Italy. ” She starts using the adjective ‘true’, from page 47 onwards, where it ranges in meaning from the birth of a republic [Foundling Founder ] to citizenship in a healthy republic{[ Fraternal Citizen]. True virti seems to be distinguished from the regular (non- true) beastly virtu of the lion and the fox, as fighting with the laws is distinguished from fighting with arms.35 CHAPTER 2 MACHIAVE AND THE USE OF HISTORY Introduction In the first chapter I have discussed the role and meaning of virtd in the Machiavelli literature. Virtuosity is, according to Machiavelli, not acquired through training but through imitation instead. By imitating the examples of the great in history some level of virti can be achieved. Machiavelli warns leaders of newly established principalities not to engage in political experiments, but encourages them to follow the beaten path of success. “...a prudent man ought always enter into the ways beaten by great men and imitate those who have been most excellent, so that, if your virtue does not reach up to there, at least in gives some odor of it...” (1989, 32). History becomes the source from which virtuosity through imitation can be derived. History in the Renaissance was a creative art, a form of literature, rather than science. Machiavelli has been interpreted in the framework of the humanist Renaissance historical narrative without much regard for his own use of history. In this chapter I will propose an interpretation of Machiavelli based on his use of history. ‘What are the things that Machiavelli, in his use of history, shares with Renaissance historiography. Besides as a proponent of the Renaissance, Machiavelli has been interpreted in terms of humanism. I will address the relationship between humanism and the Renaissance, and how Machiavelli has been interpreted within the scope of ‘humanism. Finally, I will address Machiavelli’s contribution to the ‘new science of politics.” ‘This chapter is focused on interpretations of the work of Machiavelli rather than any specific work by him, and does not by any means present a ‘representative’ overview of all the available interpretations of Machiavelli. Mark Hulliung in his, book Citizen Machiavelli developed an interesting dichotomy in terms of interpreting Machiavelli. He distinguishes between a genetic and a synthetic approach to the interpretat and focuses on (trivial) details without being able to make any substantive of Machiavelli (1983, 229). The genetic approach is highly scholastic36 ‘generalizations. Every work of Machiavelli is considered unique, and should therefore be read without reference to any of his other works. The synthetic approach, as ‘opposed to the genetic approach, focuses almost entirely on the generalization of that ‘what all Machiavelli's works have in common. The core of the synthetic approach is that one works should always be interpreted in terms of the complete works of Machiavelli In terms of interpreting Machiavelli, can one suffice with only looking at The Prince? Most research on Machiavelli has been following the genetic approach. This is partly a consequence of the fact that most research is focused on The Prince. The problem does not lie in the interpretation but in the generalization of work of Machiavelli to his whole oeuvre. There is no real good solution for this problem, since there is no way to determine how many or even which works of Machiavelli one should read in order to be able to find an “appropriate” common denominator. We can cither follow Machiavelli's own use of (ancient) history that is totally synthetic, or combine both approaches in whatever form we like. Historiography History has been the source of political debate for centuries. The way we look at the past tells us something about the present. Every political regime has their own reading of the past in which some events are emphasized while others are de- emphasized. History is much more than just the past; it implies something for the future, as if'a dark shadow of determinism has been cast over it. History has innumerable times been used in order to prove the superiority of one nation over others. Histories, memories of the past, have been used as guidance for the future, even though memories have often turned out to be very selective. History rather than being an objective representation of foregone reality is a value judgment of the past, and, more importantly, of the present and future. Even, though there is no beginning and no end to history it has often been divided into segments, time periods. I will focus on one particular time period, namely the Renaissance. The Renaissance is roughly situated between the Middle Ages and the Enlightenment, and runs from approximately 1480 to 1527.' The contemporary interpretation of the work of Machiavelli has been in terms of Renaissance-humanism. Machiavelli wrote almost his entire oeuvre, with the exception of his diplomatic37 letters, between 1513 and 1527. This makes him, from a chronological point of view, a Renaissance thinker. ‘The categorization of Machiavelli as representative of this time period is, even though not entirely wrong, something that will be disputed in this paper. I will argue that the key to this question lies in the use of history. More specifically, I will argue that the best evaluation of Machiavelli’s Renaissance qualities is based on his use of history, in other words, his historical method. I will first establish the most important, characteristics of Renaissance historiography and contrast them with mediaeval and ancient historiography. Rather than interpreting Machiavelli according to his times, 1 will show that he is better understood when seen as a person who stands on the border of. set of timelines. In fact itis his ‘untimetiness’ that makes him as a theorist so interesting ‘The way scholars viewed history has changed remarkably from Antiquity to the Renaissance. It is therefore important to recognize the dangers of the “historical fallacy.” We should not expect ancient or Renaissance historians to view or interpret, history the same way as contemporary historians, As Emst Cassirer argues: “To us it seems to be quite natural to envisage everything in its own surroundings. We consider this maxim to be a sort of categorical imperative for every sound interpretation of human action and the Phenomena of culture, Accordingly we have developed a feeling about individuality of things and the relativity of judgment that often makes, us oversensitive. We hardly dare to make a general statement; we ‘mistrust all clear-cut formulae; we are skeptical of the possibility of eternal truths and universal values. But this was not the attitude of Machiavelli nor was it that of the Renaissance.” (1955, 155) ‘As Cassirer implies, Machiavelli relied heavily on the repetitive nature of history. The idea of a cyclical or repetitive nature of history assumes that history can bbe generalized into etemally recurring ‘true’ laws. The purposes of writing history as well as the style in which historical documents were written have changed endlessly, In the Antiquity the didactic motive was central in the historians view of history, while in the Middle Ages the focus shifted towards an ‘end-goal’ objective; the end of38 history and the establishment of Paradise on earth. The Renaissance distinguishes itself from these earlier periods in that history is seen from a ‘back to the furure” perspective on Antiquity. Ancient historiography is characterized by a realistic temperament, that is to say, ancient historians focused on the real life examples of great man and their deeds. From the didactic perspective, on which ancient historiography was based, this strategy was important because future leaders were supposed to learn from the success stories of their ancestors. According to Benedetto Croce: “Above all they (historians ‘and theorists) desired that history should remain faithful to real life, since itis the instrument of life, and a form of knowledge useful to the statesman...” (1960, 187), ‘This did not necessarily imply that historians were nothing more than fact finders. On the contrary, the real historians were busy interpreting all the facts in the most, promising and educative way. The underlying tone of ancient historiography was, pessimistic. Historians believed in a cyclical pattern of historical development in which, like the seasons in a year, times of fortune alternated with times of suffering. Political systems were inherently unstable, and natural rotation from one to another ‘was inevitable, “The doctrine principally proposed and accepted was that of the natural law of the circle in human affairs, the perpetual alternation of good and evil, ‘or the passage through political forms, which always returns to the form which it has taken its start, or as growth from infancy to manhood, declining into old age and decrepitude and ending in death” (1960, 194). This strong belief in the ‘perpetuum mobile’ of history did not encourage fatalism or dooms-day thinking among the ancients. On the contrary, they still believed it to be a necessary good to learn from history. The course of history may be inevitable, the grand scheme of things may be determined, but man still holds some control over his individual decisions. History is seen from a tragic and at the same time pragmatic perspective. The harsh reality of political struggles led many scholars to believe that history had an external law —later in the Renaissance under influence of Machiavelli this extemal law is prescribed for polities- on the basis of which history is determined, and thus interpreted. Teaching lessons from history in ancient times has to be seen within the framework of this historical determinism. “Ancient historiography has been called ‘pragmatical,’ and such it is, in the double sense of the word, ancient and modern: in so far as it limits itself to the earthly side of things and39 especially to the political (the ‘pragmatic’ of Polybius), and in so far as it adorns them with reflections and advice” (1960, 197). The style of historiography itself was determined by the tragic pragmatic interpretation of history. The most common styles were the Socratic dialogues of Plato, orations such as Nicocles by Isocrates, and Pericles’ famous funeral oration by Thucydides. “...speeches or orations of historical personages, not delivered or not in agreement with what was really said, but inverted or arranged by the historian and put into the mouth of the personages. This, in my opinion, has been wrongly looked upon as a survival of the epic spirit in ancient historiography or as a simple proof of the rhetorical ability of the narrators, because, [...] the origin of those falsifications was with the greater historians nothing but the fulfillment of the obligation of teaching and counseling accepted by them” (1960, 198). A realistic account of history did not imply that the historian would search for the ultimate truth. On the contrary, if the ‘truth’ did not fit the didactic lesson that was ‘supposed to be taken from the event, it was simply left out. The interpretation of the past was subordinate to the meaning that the interpreter was willing to get out of history. In other words, ancient historiography was based on pragmatism and not, positivism. ‘Since the Renaissance, humanism has been an assumed characteristic of ancient historiography. Croce rightly points out that, if we want to use the word humanism, it shoul (1960, 200). It was based on the idea that even in the ancient world of cyclical the first place be referred to as Graeco-Roman humanism historiography education was essential for the formation and the improvement of man. Graeco-Roman humanism was for the Renaissance man what others have referred to as realism, the idea that real political figures and their deeds stood at the center of historical education. The values that became attached to humanism in the Renaissance ‘were not yet present in Antiquity, because they were, mote than anything else, a reaction against mediaeval influences. In the Middle Ages historiography became less historical and history was used solely as a benefactor of Christendom. “This means that for the first time is really broken the idea of the circle, of the perpetual return of human affairs to their starting- point, of the vain labour of the Danaids...” (1960, 205). Historiography lost its pessimistic interpretation s well as the drive to educate the deeds of great man from a realist perspective, Instead, so called “stages of progress” were formulated that fitted40 the Christian doctrine (1960, 206). History was no longer interpreted in terms of a cyclical pattem of the rise and decline of empires, but rather in terms of an end goal approach with one etemal empire waiting on the horizon, “Hence, too, history understood as universal history, no longer in the sense of Polybius, who narrates the transactions of those states which enter into relations which each other, but in the profounder sense of a history of the universal, of the universal of excellence, which is history in labour with God and towards God” (1960, 206). ‘Two essential elements of mediaeval historiography are dogmatism and asceticism (1960, 210). ‘The first implies that all life became simplified to one single value; everything was interpreted in accordance with the Christian mores. Ancient historiography had been more than just fact gathering because interpretation was considered the real job of the historian; the ancient historian was very creative in arranging his historical narrative because he had to educate, and thus persuade, future statesmen of his particular reading of events. This creativity was Tost in the Middle Ages because all history was supposed to be re-arranged according to the religious doctrine. This is not to suggest that this new mediaeval interpretation of history did not depend on creativity. Indeed, an equal amount of creativity was necessary to make history ft the religious mores of Christianity, but the difference is that mediaeval creativity is focused on a ier aim, something beyond the pragmatics of future history or polities. “Asceticism, diminishing the interest for things of the world and for history, assisted in the neglect and dispersion of books and documents promoted credulity towards everything heard or read...” (1960, 211). Asceticism relates to the “unhistorical’ element of mediaeval historiography. From a multitude of sources on which scholars could rely in ancient times, mediaeval scholars were confined to only a single book: the bible, Other sources were systematically ignored and this indifference towards outside ‘voices’ has led to the pejorative interpretation of the Middle Ages as ‘dark ages.’ “History itself was now the teaching, the knowledge of the life of the human race from its creation upon earth, through struggles, up to its final stage, which was indicated in the near or remote horizon. History thus became the work of God, teaching by His direct word and presence, which is to be seen and heard in every part of it” (1960, 215).4 Because mediaeval historiography focused solely on the teachings of God as a given reality, rather than an interpretation of reality they appeared to the Renaissance ‘man as truly inferior to Antiquity. The Dark Ages, the name itself already makes it clear, was seen as a period in which civilization had come to a standstill from the decline of the Roman Empire until its ‘revival’ at the end of the fifteenth century. Frederico Chabod argues that the idea that the Middle Ages were only dark and barbarous is too simple, “Scholars have come to see how ancient civilization was not entirely swamped by the tide of the barbarian invasions, how instead it bequeathed to the Middle Ages a legacy of juridical standards, economic customs and, moreover, cultural traditions. They have emphasized how, beneath the apparent ‘religious’ uniformity of the period extending from the sixth to the fourteenth centuries, there existed a world distinguished by the complexity of its sentiments and ideas, which cannot easily be reduced to a single common denominator of other worldly aspirations” (1958, 160). Mediaeval man may have had another focus in life than his, ancient counterpart, but there exists a strong link between the two time-periods, In other words, the idea of two separate time-periods is rather artificial. ‘This does not imply that Chabod argues that there are no differences between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, Chabod argues against the claim that the Renaissance did not produce anything novel that did not already exist - in latent form - in the Middle Ages (1958, 166). Chabod is willing to admit that the concepts of realism and individualism, traditionally core qualities of the Renaissance, already ‘existed in mediaeval Europe. This does not diminish the apparent differences between classical Antiquity and the Middle Ages in terms of the way people looked at life as well as the way in which they looked at history. Renaissance man was active in his pursuit of ancient “imitation,” whereas mediaeval man was not. “In place of admiration, mingled with regret, for that what can never return, we find a determination to act in scrupulous conformity with the teachings of the Ancients. Legere becomes exercere. And instead of an elegy we have an exhortation to revive the ancient splendours, the glories of Rome” (1958, 169). Nowhere in the mediaeval literature do we find a glorification of ancient (pagan) Rome. In mediaeval times people did embrace certain classical virtues, such as temperance and self-control, but rot necessarily for the same reasons. “The fact is that the mediaeval spirit, for all its indebtedness to classical authors —poets, historians and philosophers — had never42 ceased to be dominated essentially by another consideration and by another paramount motif, to wit, the problem of the relationship between God and man, and the Christian and Augustinian sense of sin and grace. Hence classical Antiquity had been a mere instrument, a cultural tool placed at the disposal of a spiritual way of life which derives its raison d’étre from quite a different source” (1958, 170). Whereas in the Renaissance people tried to reconstruct ancient times in the Middle Ages people used ancient concepts without taking the possibility of a re-birth of classical Antiquity seriously or as something desirable. “.. ancient Rome had indeed found favour in the eyes of mediaeval man, but only in so far as it was compatible with, or rather served the interest of, Christian Rome. Classical culture had survived merely as a subordinate element. Its function ‘was to provide an aesthetic outlet, a vision of the world, a means by which men might contemplate a life which possessed an organic structure of its own, totally independent of classical influence” (1958, 172). As Chabod puts it correctly: “In the Middle Ages, classical Antiquity was purely an ornament, a decorative fringe, a stylistic pattern. Now, it becomes a patter of life” (1958, 173). According to Croce, in the Renaissance historiography became “secularized” (1960, 224). History lost its aim in the end of history and the promise of Paradise. Instead, man took over the central role of God and individual actors and their actions ‘once again stood in high esteem for historians. “An acute analysis of individual characters and interests is substituted for the intervention of divine providence and the actions of the popes, and religious strfes (sic) themselves are apt to be interpreted according to utilitarian passions and solely with the eye to their political bearing” (1960, 224). History, for the first time, was interpreted in terms of a political history and the political element seemed to have differentiated itself finally from the historical analysis. In ancient times the political was still subsumed under the historical, but this ended in the Renaissance, and in particular with Machiavel Machiavelli sought for the laws of polities independent of the ancient historical cyclical- laws. According to Croce, there are two aspects of Antiquity that were preserved in ‘Renaissance thinking: 1, “the human-abstract or pragmatical conception, as it is called, which inclines to explain facts by the individual in his singularity and in his atomism, or by means43 of abstract political forms, and the like. For Machiavelli the prince is not only the ideal but the criterion that he adopts for the explanation of events” (1960, 234). 2. “The idea of chance or fortune persisted alongside that pragmatic conception, its ancient companion. Machiavelli assigns the course of events half to fortune and half to human prudence...” (1960, 235). Human affairs are not solely governed by the mystic plan of an omnipotent creator but instead are influenced by human action as well as fortune or chance. As in ancient times, human activity and chance coexist harmoniously within the cyclical nature of history. It may almost be suggested that the division between human prudence and chance functions as the engine behind the cycles of historical development. If everything was determined solely by human virtue, a rise in princely power would never be followed by a decline. If, on the other hand, all history was based on chance, there would be no need for human interference with things. “The ancient Oriental idea of the circle in human affairs retumns; it dominated all the historians of the Renaissance, and above all Machiavelli, History is an alternation of lives and deaths, of goods and ills, of happiness and misery, of splendour and decadence” (1960, 236). For Machiavelli it is the ‘perpetuum mobile” of nature that creates the necessity that drives human excellence. Because half of the events are based on chance, human beings are always confronted with change. Change makes it necessary for leaders to act and only in this condition can virtuous decision making take place. “And since history thus conceived (from a tragic, pessimistic perspective) does not represent progress but a circle, and itis not directed by the historical law of development, but by the natural law of the circle, which gives it regularity and uniformity, it follows that the historiography of the Renaissance, like the Graeco-Roman, has its end outside itself, and affords nothing but material suitable for exhortations toward the useful and the good, for various forms of pleasure or as ornament for abstract truths” (1960, 237). In the Renaissance, God is replaced by nature as the leading force behind all events. The difference between nature and God is that the former is not perceived as a superhuman fatherly figure deciding our fate. “‘The Renaissance everywhere reveals, its effort to oppose the one term to the other, and since scholasticism had sought the things of God and of the soul, it wished to restrict itself to the things of nature” (1960,44 239-240). Nature seems to be based on some random process that does not take a persons’ moral qualities into account. On the other hand, nature is not seen as completely random since the belief in a cyclical pattem in history was deeply vested. Nature was seemingly “determined? by the cyclical pattem of rise and decline. On the basis of this deterministic pattern, laws conceming the movement of history were formulated. This shows that even though nature was substituted for God, the mindset of the Renaissance man was still very much mediaeval in that he was thinking about, nature in terms of a closed system. Just as Christianity in the Middle Ages was a closed system in that thinking outside the realm of God or religion was impossible, in the Renaissance nature was a closed system which guided the laws of history. Renaissance Style Renaissance historiography differed in style more than in content from its mediaeval counterpart. In its style the Renaissance possibly came the closest to its project of a re-birthing Antiquity. As stated above, one of the typical characteristics of the Renaissance, besides individuality, is its realism. Realism was not foreign to the Middle Ages, but the description of men in real-life situations was always overshadowed by the omnipresence of the eternal Christian essence without qualities, God. In order to present the reader with the difference in realism between a fourteenth century and a sixteenth century thinker Chabod compares Villani with Machiavelli (1958, 178). “Yet this man (Villani) is still so dominated by typically mediaeval ideas and even superstitious that when he comes to survey the general course of events his, realistic grasp of detail deserts him and we witness the re-appearance in human history of God and the d (1958, 179). Villani is a realist in the sense that he describes the practical life of real |, who alone pull the strings that control earthly affairs” people and “eschews vain fancies and dreams” (1958, 178). Realism for Villani and his contemporaries in the fourteenth century was still embedded in the biblical view of worldly affairs. This changed in the sixteenth century as we can see in the work of Machiavelli. Machiavelli does not make use of the mediaeval “deus ex machina,” in fact, in his work “everything is reduced to a purely worldly level, there is no interference from the other world” (1958, 180). For Villani, punishment for our sins was still a central element, whereas for Machiavelli the word sin had lost its direct link with God, “... Machiavelli regards the45 ‘sins’ which led Italy's political ruin not as moral sins, as Friar Gerolamo Savonarola had proclaimed them to be, but as purely political sins, the ‘sins’ of princes...” (1958, 181). It was not the wrath of God that Machiavelli feared, but bad polities and political ruin, Machiavelli is a realist just like Villani in terms of his interest in practical politics rather than utopian philosophical reflections on polities. At the same time, Machiavelli differs from Villani in that, for him, practical politics is all there is, there is no larger, religious, stage on which politics is acted out, “The man (Machiavelli) who seeks to discover this ‘effective reality’ will confine himself to living and being, without troubling about ‘how one ought to live’, that is to say how things should be; and his attitude will reflect exactly that of the historian, who, finding that men and their passions condition his life, seeks in them the immediate ‘causes’ of events and refrains from asking supernatural Will to explain the ultimate reason for things” (1958, 182). For Chabod, the greatest novelty of the Renaissance still remains its “realism and individualism” (1958,184). Taking into account that realism and individualism are not unique to the Renaissance, Chabod argues that the fact that they were disconnected from a particular worldview is symbolic for the Renaissance. “In other ‘words, they lead to the abandonment of the typical mediaeval conception of the world according to which no branch of human activity could be considered independently of its relationship to life as a whole” (1958, 184). Based on this analysis, Chabod concluded that: 1. the tink between ancient and Renaissance culture is itself dependent on the link between ancient and mediaeval culture (a link which in most popular descriptions of the Renaissance is assumed to be non-existent), and 2. the Renaissance is unique not because it draws from ancient culture, but in the way in which it celebrated Antiquity. “...reatism, individualism, love of glory and the imitation of ancient culture, which admittedly were sanctioned by the mediaeval world, but only as incidentals serving a loflier purpose, are now freely proposed as ends in themselves” (1958, 185) Chabod’s analysis concludes that Machiavelli's work is a fine example of Renaissance humanist literature. Machiavelli is a realist in that he portrays real-life political situations in which all responsibility in terms of success or failure lies on the shoulders of the individual; there is no divine intervention, In comparing, Machiavelli's writing with his mediaeval counterparts, one can see a clear shift in the46 way he deals with history, especially Antiquity, as was shown above in Chabod’s comparison of Machiavelli and Villani. Peter Bondanella in his Machiavelli and the Art of Renaissance History also examines Machiavelli’s position in the Renaissance-humanist tradition but comes to a somewhat different conclusion. Bondanella looks at the literary qualities of Machiavelli's work and places it within the Renaissance tradition. This does not prevent Bondanella from being critical with regard to Machiavelli's place in that historical period. Bondanella argues that some features of Machiavelli’s work are clearly Renaissance in character, but overall his work is first and foremost ‘Machiavellian’ in character —that is not to say ‘evil,’ but rather that it is Machiavelli's own work instead of work that follows conventional Renaissance patterns. “His faith in the imitation of classical political practice is based upon the assumption that man’s nature is constant, and thus men who study the past can leam. from it, for the constancy of human nature ensures that these ancient lessons can be applied to moder polities” (1973, 16). The assumptions that Bondanella articulates are Renaissance in nature and core assumptions of Machiavelli, Especially in The Prince, the assumption that human nature is constant is made clear by the fact that Machiavelli prescribes to the prince a certain position to take given a variety of circumstances. If the circumstances or the time period would themselves affect human nature, Machiavelli would not be able to give his advice. The fact that Thucydides ‘wrote about two thousand years before Machiavelli does not inhibit the latter from leaming from his history. Machiavelli did not think that he could look through the spectacles of the ancient Greek philosopher; instead, the nature of Machiavelli's use of history allowed him to interpret any thinker within his own parameters. ‘The main question here is whether Machiavelli's parameters are typically Renaissance in nature, and, if this is the case, whether this makes him a Renaissance thinker, As Bondanella points out, Machiavelli did not take the fifth century BC Greek historian Thucydides as his great example, but rather the first century BC roman historian Livy and the first century AD Greek historian Plutarch. Whereas ‘Thucydides “avoided specific judgment of his characters,” Livy and Plutarch “stressed historical individuals as makers of history” (1973, 17). For the latter, history had a core purpose that was didactic. “...didactic history led him (Livy) to falsify history by design, not by chance or error” (1973, 17). This coincides remarkably with47 ‘Machiavelli's use of history. In didactic history truth-secking or descriptive reality are not central, but what the reader can learn from it. The lessons to be learned are more important than the truth of the historical details ‘This does not imply that Machiavelli simply re-wrote Livy’s first ten books on Roman History in his Discourses. What Machiavelli took from Livy was his method, didactic history, but not his interpretation of the events. “Machiavelli may have learned from Livy how to use history as an educational tool, but he had his own specifically ‘Machiavellian’ rules of conduct for which he sought to provide historical evidence, and thus, he approaches his characters from an essentially different point of view” (1973, 18-19). Both Livy and Plutarch stressed the moral qualities of the characters they described, whereas Machiavelli was more interested in the political lessons that could bbe learned from them (1973, 20). Greatness for Machiavelli was not expressed in terms of how virtuous a leader was, but in terms of the effectiveness of his political program, This brings us to the humanist part of Renaissance humanism, “As Felix Gilbert has noted, Machiavelli used the humanist pattern of writing history as a framework onto which he hung his political message: ‘Machiavelli adhered to the humanist principle that history teaches by example, only the examples which Machiavelli adduced were intended to demonstrate the existence and the functioning of political laws” (1973, 23), Bondanella argues, with Felix Gilbert, that Machiavelli ‘was primarily interested in ‘proving’ his art of politics by example. In other words, but the nature of his teaching does not lie in the improvement of the human condition, rather in the functioning of the political body. Machiavelli tries to persuade his readers to buy into his examination of his art of politics. “Machiavelli's historical exempla are usually placed in a dynamic environment of political activity surrounded by a theoretical framework of his own political ideas; they are rarely presented as historical personifications of simple vice or virtue” (1973, 25). Bondanella points out that whereas Machiavelli is focused on his art of politics, this does not imply that he has set the trend for contemporary empirical political science. On the contrary, Machiavelli used history, as stated above, as a didactic tool in order to persuade his reader of the dynamic nature of politics ‘Machiavelli does not try to deduce a general law from a great number of particular ‘examples, but his particular examples themselves are symbolic representations of a general nature of polities. “It is important to note that Machiavelli does not work48 empirically in the modem statistical manner; he does not deduce his general rules after examining a significant number of cases. Instead, he works upon the readers imagination by citing a few vivid examples from history, the ‘deeds of great men,” which are far more persuasive” (1973, 57). Persuasion is exactly what Machiavelli attempted in his writings, and the praise of great historical figures was his means to this end, In this respect, Machiavelli differed somewhat from other, earlier, Renaissance writers. “Witty remarks, dying words, summary judgments, and symbolic physical details are all used in the elogium, which is itself often constructed upon rhetorical devices that reinforce Machiavelli's judgments, Machiavelli's use of such symbolic physical details in his description is an innovation in Renaissance historical narrative; itis a stylistic trait completely absent in the narratives of earlier humanist historians such as Bruni or Bracciolini” (1973, 139). Machiavelli developed the elogium to perfection in his most famous works. According to Bondanella, Machiavelli was a Renaissance-humanist writer in style but not in content. Bondanella even suggests that his imitation of the popular style may have been ‘forced’ upon him by his situation; the fact that he was exiled and was considered suspicious by the ruling Medici regime, That Machiavelli in terms of content did not follow the humanist tradition can partly be explained by the immediate fact that he was not educated as a humanist. According to J.R. Hale: “Machiavelli was not a professional humanist: he could not edit a Latin text (though in the Discourses on Livy he commented on one), he was not capable of teaching the humanities, but the tone of humanism sounds clearly enough in the most famous of his letters” (1977, 276). In terms of content Machiavelli wrote in accordance with the criteria of his own art of politics, which did clearly not overlap with the common morality of those days. Bondanella makes a teresting suggestion when he states that the style of ‘Machiavelli's historiography may be a closer imitation of the ancient biography than of ancient history. “Plutarch, for instance, stated unequivocally that his work was a biography and not history. Classical history usually described in detail the actions of its characters, while biography was more concerned with what kinds of persons its, characters were. As a result, biography did not usually attempt a comprehensive analysis of a man’s actions but stressed only those deeds and anecdotes that helped to uncover his personality, Machiavelli's portraits are thus closer to classical biography49 than history with one important caveat: Machiavelli typically employs what a person does to reflect what kind of person he is, relying more upon political actions than anecdotes to uncover his personality” (1973, 140). This is especially true when one looks at Machiavelli’s account of his archetypal prince Castruccio Castracani. In The Life of Castruccio Castracani of Lucca, Machiavelli uses the same style he employs in his major works while drawing a detailed picture of his ideal prince. According to Hale, the humanist element of the Renaissance was more than simply a omament of style. Because of its humanist element, Renaissance writing provided a good breading ground for the discourse on the role of the political adviser. “Thanks, however, to the dispatches and reports of the burgeoning number of long- term diplomats, the schoolmasterly confidence of the humanist scholars, and the increasing trust in legally trained professional administrators, the role of the effective political adviser was easier to imagine than it has been in the past, and this gave him a new sense of pertinence of what he said” (1977, 306). If the role of the political adviser becomes more secure due to humanist endeavors, does this make Machiavelli indebted to this tradition? To what extent was Machiavelli's political adviser (or for that matter political advise) established in the humanist tradition? e Humanism ‘The Renaissance was the time period of the supposed return to Antiquity. Benedetto Croce points out correctly that this was a mere illusion, “But the greatest proof and monument of the illusion of the return was the formation of the humanistic type of historiography, opposed to he medieval” (1960, 227). Humanism, in the Renaissance was greatly influenced by mediaeval thought to make it foreign to any great thinker of Antiquity. “...the Middle Ages preserved Antiquity deep in its heart as the Renaissance preserved the Middle Ages. And what is ‘humanism’ but a renewed formula of that ‘humanity’ of which the ancient world knew little or nothing, and which Christianity and the Middle Ages had so profoundly felt? [...] And setting aside the word, is not the conception of humanism perhaps the affirmation of a spiritual and universal value, and in so far as itis that, altogether foreign, as we know, to the mind of Antiquity, and an intrinsic continuation of the ecclesiastical and spiritual history which appeared with Christianity” (1960, 230)?50 ‘The question arises of whether the ancients had indeed some kind of conception of humanism. The answer to the question should be that they did, but not in the manner proclaimed by Renaissance humanism. According to Diogenes Laertius, Protagoras of Abdera (490-420 BC) stated that: “Of all things man is the ‘measure, of the things that are that they are and of the things that are not that they are not” (1950, 463). According to Runia, Protagoras argues against absolute norms or values and should be classified as a relativist rather than a humanist (1993, 53). Truth is something relative, a human construction, and is defined by each individual person, that is why man is the measure of all things. Protagoras’ philosophy is greatly differs from the Renaissance humanistic appeal to moral guidance. ‘The link between mediaeval and Renaissance humanist historiography can be ‘made more explicit when we look how they were influenced by Antiquity. Humanists often re-interpreted ~or to speak with Neal Wood “demythologized” - mediaeval interpretations of the ancients (1972, 35). Their focus led them to a corrected or secular interpretation of Plato, Aristotle, or Cicero rather than focusing on those ancients that had been ‘forgotten’ during the Middle Ages. With Hale we can conclude that their newly found “alter ego” was limited to those philosophers who had rendered useful to, and thus been accepted into the cannon of, Christianity (1977, 275). Felix Gilbert in his Machiavelli and Guicciardini argues that Machiavelli followed the humanist in terms of style, but without the aim of achieving some kind of public moral improvement. Instead he sought to build the foundations of his new science of politics. “...the humanists were the first in the post-classical world to conceive of historical writing as an important and independent literary genre” (1965, 203). bibl stated above, in mediaeval times the past was seen through the staging of I history. The past was interpreted within the context of Christendom, and thus history was not a genre for itself. Renaissance humanism, with its aim of leaning ‘moral lessons from the past, is the time-period in which men for the first time look at the past as a way of interpreting the present as well predicting the future. In Antiquity there was no strict division between ‘history’ and other forms of literature. “The humanists, following Aristotle, compared poetry and history and placed poetry above history; and in accordance with Cicero the humanists characterized truth as the basic requirement for historical writings. The humanists also explained the particular31 features of historical style and elaborated on Cicero's suggestions for the contents of history: military campaigns and topographical details” (1965, 206). It is clear that topic wise Machiavelli was following the humanist authors, but not in the way that they dealt with the issue of truth. Machiavelli, as stated above, was primarily interested in the investigation of his art of politics, and truth or truth seeking ‘was of less importance to him. The idea that Machiavelli tried to persuade was itself also not uncommon in the Renaissance. In fact, persuasion was the main power of Renaissance historiography, given that authors tried to persuade the reader to act in accordance with accepted morality. “Because the most important classical statements about the writing of history were contained in Cicero's De Oratore, the humanists regarded history as a branch of rhetoric, as an instrument by which the accepted doctrines of moral philosophy would be presented in such a persuasive manner that people would act according to the tenets of moral philosophy” (1965, 216). From a didactic standpoint, persuasion was an important reinforcement of humanist morality. ‘At the same time, given that history was still seen as a literary form, there had to be some relationship with the real. “In accepting Aristotle’s view that poetry is superior to history, the humanists agreed that although both poetry and history taught man how to act morally, poetry developed moral rules from the actions of an imagined world whereas history drew its lessons from the way in which men had actually behaved. Thus factual basis was a prerequisite for achieving the purposes of history” (1965, 218). This did not imply that historians were reduced to simply fact-finders. The ‘moral duty of correctly interpreting the facts that were presented to them, in such a way that history was from a didactic as well as moralistic point of view served well, ‘was the job of the true historian. “This humanist distinction between two forms of historical writings one containing chiefly facts and thereby providing the material from which the other, the true history, could be constructed- placed the true historian far above those who just collected and described facts. Not factual completeness and accuracy, but moral guidance was expected from the true historian, and he was therefore permitted to select and to stylize the events of the past” (1965, 225). The Renaissance differed from the Middle Ages in that ancient sources, could be just as, valuable in terms of moral guidance. Machiavelli had all that it took to be a good Renaissance-humanist historian with one important exception; he did not underwrite the moral basis of humanist52. historiography. “The interest in history had become pragmatic; history was to serve the understanding of the existing political situation and give guidance in political action” (1965, 233). “The ‘true histories,’ in the humanist sense, were political histories; but the political content of these ‘true histories’ subserved the humanists’ aim of moral instruction. The pattern, rules and method, which humanists had established, defined and restricted the writing of history in such a way that analyses of the details of practical politics could hardly be fitted to the humanist mode of historical literature” (1965, 234). It seems to be the case that Machiavelli used humanist historiography as a ‘pre-scribed” form of discourse rather than as his personal choice. “But there are indications that Machiavelli considered the humanist prescripts as a literary convention rather than as an appropriate form for the writing of history” (1965, 237). Ifit is the case that Machiavelli was only using humanism as a form and not as a doctrine, as has often been claimed, what does this mean for our Machiavelli interpretation? “But the impact of the humanist concept of history showed itself in & still more profound and more fundamental way. To the humanists, the purpose of history had been to give man moral guidance. With the realization that politics had its ‘own rules and its own laws this belief was shaken, and to many the past became chiefly a guide to successful political action, But the political catastrophe which showed the futility of all human calculations also dealt a blow to such pragmatic uses of the past” (1965, 299). It is insightful for understanding commentaries on Machiavelli to see how he is interpreted within the humanist tradition. In other words, what do contemporary scholars find in humanism that is ;portant for understanding Machiavelli? The assessment of humanism in the work of Machiavelli takes different forms based on whether the author stresses the importance of The Prince over The Discourses ot vise versa, Mark Hulliung falls under the second category of interpreters, who argue that the essential Machiavelli is the Machiavelli of The Discourses. Hulliung argues in favor of an interpretation of Machiavelli in terms of civic humanism (1983, 11). Contemporary scholarship, Hulliung argues, ignores the distance between Renaissance humanism and contemporary humanism. This distinction is explained in terms of Wood's distinction between cultural and secular humanism. Neal Wood differs somewhat from Hulliung in that he tries to interpret Machiavelli in terms of53 “an impassioned theorist of action” (1972, 35). Wood, contrary to Hulliung, as I will show below, acknowledges that humanism is a “cultural and educational phenomenon with a distinct literary bias” (1972, 36). According to Wood, Machiavelli is a cultural humanist, or more specifically a vernacular humanist, since he did not write in Latin, as was the standard among humanists. The claim that Machiavelli was a cultural- vernacular humanist, insofar not a contradiction in terms, is being explained in terms of his republicanism, communal spirit, civic participation, his believe in meritocracy, and last but not least, his obsession with the threat of tyranny and civic corruption (1972, 37). Without attempting to disqualify every item on Woods list itis at least clear that one should completely disqualify The Prince when it comes to any of these items. Besides being a cultural humanist, Machiavelli is also granted a role in secular humanism. Secular humanism in Woods comes down to the belief in a separation between church and state, “No longer is the state viewed as having a moral end or purpose. Its end is not the shaping of human souls, the molding of morally virtuous ‘men according to some trans-historical principle of religious or moral authority, but the creation of conditions which would enable men to fulfill their basic desires of self preservation, security, and happiness” (1972, 38). Values, in particular happiness, are presented here as having nothing to do with morality. The state may have lost some of its ‘divine mandate’ but this does not mean that the happiness and security that the slate is to provide are not derived from the same ‘trans-historical principle.” The basic desires of men are no ‘value free.” ‘Wood avoids the solution to the question under which type of humanism Machiavelli can be categorized by creating a third option, humanism of action. Humanism of action combines both cultural (vernacular or not) and secular humanism, and is specially developed in order to fit Machiavelli in terms of humanism. Humanism of action presents Machiavelli as a precursor to the Utilitarians. “Indeed, to an important extent, man can consciously shape and direct history for human betterment, All such action is fraught with moral ambiguity, but given the necessity of preservation and security in a world of violence, man must act, and act fully aware of the moral implications of the course of action open to him in a way which will minimize the immoral consequences and maximize the utilitarian results of the intersecting chains of actions and reaction set in motion” (1972, 40). It is54 not clear whether Wood is speaking of individual or societal utility maximization, Individual utility maximization would contradict Machiavelli's use of state rather than. individual level of analysis, and I certainly do not assume that Wood is arguing in favor of a ‘greatest good for the greatest number’ interpretation of Machiavelli Action is an important concept in Machiavelli because of its relation to necessity. Machiavelli’s bitter words on the account of his former chief, Piero ‘Soderini, are based on the latter's incapability to act under the condition of necessity.” Action is not a way to escape from the grim nature of polities. Machiavelli understands the necessity of action in terms of a pragmatic and not a utilitarian understanding of politics. There is a qualitative difference between something being ‘200d in term of usefulness or expediency and something being good in terms of being effective, the former being the ‘objective’ of utilitarianism and the latter of pragmatism. According to William James, the difference between pragmatism and utilitarianism is that the latter is a theory of rationality. In order for there to be utility ‘or usefulness there has to be some kind of ready-made world on the basis of which ‘these things can be calculated. “...for rationalism reality is ready-made and complete from all eternity, whi for pragmatism itis still in the making, and awaits part of its complexion from the future” (1981, 115). At any fork in the road, utilitarianism has to be able to calculate the expected utility for each option in order to maximize the overall utility. Pragmatism, for James, is a method for settling metaphysical disputes, not for creating new ones (1981, 25). ‘Pragma’ in ancient Greek means action or the use of practice, not the calculation of the usefulness of practice.’ ‘Humanism of action appears to be a reaction against the threat of tyranny. Indeed, neither Machiavelli, nor his ancient teacher Xenophon, was charmed of tyrannical leadership. The idea in Wood that the necessity of conflict in Machiavelli is “socially constructive” or even “therapeutic” force, which “strengthens a citizens liberties, thereby preventing tyranny" is odd (1972, 41). Necessity in Machiavelli is praised in that it brings out the best in people, it forces people to overcome, and does not provide assistance in healing. Tyranny is not necessary a bad political system, if only it was not more unstable than other systems. Other systems are not unstable; afl are, based on the nature of politics and the role of necessity (cyclical pattern of history). Necessity does not bring about civil liberties.35 Fora moment I would like to retum to Hulliung and pick up on his notion of civic humanism, Civic humanism seems mostly to parallel cultural humanism in Wood. Hulliung criticizes that contemporary scholarship has misrepresented civic humanism in the following way: 1. ancient heroism is de-emphasized, and 2. the significance of speech is over-emphasized (1983, 21). Hulliung argues against Arendt in two ways: 1. supposedly she argues that “speech abolishes the distinction between ‘means and ends”, and 2. she shows no serious effort to prove that her vision of the ancient city state has about it anything of historical reality” (1983, 21). As stated above, humanist writing were characterized by a “distinct literary bias” (1972, 36). T s tradition can be traced back to the influence of ancient philosophy on the Renaissance, Machiavelli was influenced by thinkers like Xenophon and Isocrates (after whose example he wrote the dedication letter in The Prince) for whom the logos (word or speech) is a central element of their philosophy. Isocrates became famous for his speeches (especially To Nicocles) and also Xenophon used the oration in his work as a literary construction. The point that Arendt was stressing is that rhetoric or speech making as a literary form or construction was widely used by the ancients, and equally widely copied by Renaissance theorists. As far as the criticism that ancient heroism is de-emphasized I can only refer to Arendt on Machiavelli: “Machiavelli's criterion for political action was glory, the same as in classical Antiquity, and badness, can no more shine in glory than goodness (1958, 77)."* Moreover, and this is a more grave misperception, ancient historiography, and with it Renaissance historiography, was not based on the preservation of historical reality. As spelled out above in great detail, the didactic function of history superseded any kind of fact finding for its own sake. In terms of civic humanism Hulliung critiques Hans Baron’ interpretation of Machiavelli for its incapacity to understand that for Machiavelli humanism and power polities may be one and the same thing (1983, 235). Hulliung ‘corrupted humanism” thesis, which states that Machiavelli corrupted rather than ignored humanism, seems to be another example of framing humanism in terms of Machiavelli rather than Machiavelli in terms of humanism. Rather than establishing a special type of humanism that fits Machiavelli, Felix Gilbert shows that Machiavelli deliberately refuted the “humanist catalogue of virtues (1939, 478).”® This is not to say that Machiavelli did not adapt his writings to56 the conventional literary form, ~as I argue in the part on Renaissance style- such as chapter headings in Latin, ‘The main distinction between Machiavelli and humanist thinkers, according to Gilbert, is based on the formers realism. In The Prince Machiavelli states: “But since it is my object to write what shall be useful to whoever understands it, it seems to me better to follow the real truth of things than an imaginary view of them” (1989, 93). Gilbert argues that the humanist literature is, like the mediaeval, “determined by a political conception which is fundamentally peaceful and idealistic” (1939, 461). “Thus it can be said that, although in the decisive factor of political realism, this literature did not, in any sense, pave the way for Machiavelli, Machiavelli nevertheless incorporated in his book intellectual trends which had already been developed by the humanists” (1939, 477). Gilbert argues that Machiavelli did share some common conception with the humanists, such as the separation of virtue in a private and a public one, but that this did not make him a humanist. The idea behind the divided virtue is that the link between the king and God, and the notion of divine right, had lost its appeal in the Renaissance. The reason why this does not turn Machiavelli into a humanist is that for the latter divided virtue is part of the celebration of individuality, whereas for Machiavelli, if one adheres to Gilberts reading, itis only a consequence of the inner workings of politics. ‘The Art of Politics At several places in the text I have referred to the art of politics or political Jaws as the main intellectual focus of Machiavelli. Both Gilbert and Croce speak about a ‘new science’ in which the past is used as a guide to successful political action. This new science distinguishes itself from Renaissance humanism in that it does not extract moral but political lessons from the past. The new science functions within the framework of the ancient cyclical interpretation of history. At the same time it opens up ancient historiography in that it allows for chance and fortune to play significant roles. One could characterize the new science as Renaissance in style, ancient in content, and as a whole Machiavellian. ‘The most systematic account of Machiavelli's new science, given that he himself never discussed his novelty in terms of science, is Sheldon Wolin’s chapter on Machiavelli in Polities and Vision. Wolin argues that the reason that Machiavelli is seen as the first modem political scientist is “his rejection of traditional norms, such37 as natural law, and the exploration of a pragmatic method of analysis concentrating almost exclusively on questions of power” (1960, 199). Furthermore, Wolin argues that Machiavelli's work was novel in that it was “inspired by problem orientation rather than an ideological orientation” (1960, 203). The pragmatic nature of ‘Machiavelli's work is unquestionable, but at the same time not unique. Machiavelli’s pragmatic use of history was very much in line with ancient historiography. Teaching by example and imitating the deeds from great men in history were essential characteristics of ancient historiography. Pragmatic political theory requires by definition flexible political minds. tis important to learn from the great deeds of one’s intellectual ancestors that worked. Machiavelli does not have the mindset of a positivistic modem-day historian with a claim to completeness as well as truth. Wolin seems to have trouble with the fact that Machiavelli is not interested in a well- balanced picture of the past. “In his case novelty was not simply the function of certain positive and assertive elements in his theory, but was equally the product of certain significant omissions” (1960, 209). Significant omissions for Wolin were not significant for Machiavelli, not because he was not aware of them, but because he was all too aware of them. The idea behind pragmatic historiography is that one portrays what works in terms of one’s didactic purposes. If the addition of one of Wolin’s “significant omissions” would disrupt the leamiing process, there is, from a pragmatic point of view, all the more reason not to include them, Also these “significant omissions” are not novel to Machiavelli, but an integral part of ancient historiography. So far what is novel about Machiavelli's new science has still remained part of the enigma surrounding him. What Wolin tries to pass as new or modem political science is in fact as old as the roads to Rome. In the “new route” or “new political metaphysics"(1960, 211), as Wolin addresses it interestingly enough, “...crimes committed by political actors fell under the judgment of history not morality” (1960, 209). Exactly! That is because Machiavelli is following the ancient historians and not ‘the moralists.® If anything, Wolin argues, Machiavelli's “theory of imitation did suggest a radical break with the older notion that philosophical wisdom ought to be possessed by those engaged in politics. What was now implied was that political wisdom formed a body of knowledge external to the political actor, something which could teach him what to do in appropriate circumstances” (1960, 216). Machiavelli took the theory of imitation directly from his ancient predecessors. Imitation in58 Antiquity as well as in the Renaissance was based on the advice given by a particular political adviser. Plato offered his body of knowledge to Dionysius the Younger, Aristotle to Alexander the Great, Isocrates to Nicocles of Salamis, and Xenophon to ‘Cyrus the Younger.’ The role of political adviser, which Machiavelli loved to play, is as old as philosophy itself. The idea that there exists “a body of knowledge external to the political actor” is not something that can be uniquely attributed to Machiavelli, he simply followed the ancients in this respect. According to Quentin Skinner, Machiavelli's novelty does not lie in his role as, adviser but in the advice (1981, 31). The novelty comes down to his use of virti, fortuna, and necessita. Fortune is not simply chance but rather luck, something which ‘you can command. Fortune can be influenced and used to ones advantage “for the attainment of worldly honour and glory” (1981, 30). Fortune is the opening up of a possibility; it takes virtue to be able to turn fortune to your advantage. Machiavelli “treats it (virtue) as the quality which enables a prince to withstand the blows of fortune, to attract the goddess favour, and to rise in consequence to the heights of princely fame, winning honour and glory for himself and security for his government” (1981, 35). Necessity is the situational force that makes people behave virtuously. Necessity presses the prince to act, which in The Prince always comes down to the ‘most forceful and direct protection of the prince’s interests. The novelty of Machiavelli's approach is that he rejects humanist values such as liberalism, mercifulness and truthfulness. He does rejects the idea that a prince should strive to uphold these humanist values as higher order virtues (1981, 37). ‘The interplay of fortune and virtue is not something unique in the writings of Machiavelli. Machiavelli derived these ideas directly from ancient, most notably Roman, historians. Skinner points out how distinct Machiavelli's use of fortune is from mediaeval thinkers, such as Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy (1981, 30). ‘What this shows is a break with the ancient traditions in the Middle Ages rather than the uniqueness of Machiavelli in this respect. According to Emst Cassirer, itis not the dynamics but rather the statics of politics that is unique in Machiavelli's approach (1955, 155). The dynamics of history; the interplay between fortune and virtue, is considered subordinate to its static elements, its repetitive nature, The repetitive nature of history makes it immune to unique events; “historical events are interchangeable” (1955, 156). The passions of59 fortune and ability of virtue alike are not able to break with static nature of history. In a comparison between Machiavelli's science of politics and Galileo's natural science Cassirer argues that: “They start from the axiom of the uniformity and homogeneity of nature. Nature is always the same; all natural events obey the same invariable laws, This leads, in physics and cosmology, to the destruction of the distinction between the ‘higher’ and the ‘lower’ world” (1955, 195), The same holds true for political science, ‘where the higher world is represented by religion and the lower by the worldly power or leadership. The use of political power by religious authorities, especially the Pope, is quite forcefully addressed by Machiavelli in, for example, what turns out the fatal error of Cesare Borgia, namely his support of Pope Julius Il. Machiavelli describes in chapter XI of The Prince how Borgia had been successful by the grace of fortune and his father Pope Alexander VI. After the latter's death Borgia mistakenly assumed continued support from the Vatican, which brought him his downfall, It seems to be the case that Machiavelli's new science is not as novel as it has appeared to some. The attribution of novelty, in the case of Wolin, is most likely a function of the moralistic reading of Machiavelli, which seems to disappear when Machiavelli is approached historically. Does this imply that there is absolutely nothing special, or unique, about Machiavelli? One may recall that above I have talked about Machiavellism in a non-normative sense as the sum of attributes that are characteristic for Machiavelli and do not fall under the numerator Renaissance. ‘Whether or not the static or dynamic elements in Machiavelli are unique for his work, they were at least typical, which pushes the discussion in a slightly different direction. Instead of focusing on the novelty of Machiavelli as the ereator of a new science, one should focus on the ingredients of the new science; be they novel or imitations. If anything is unique about Machiavelli itis his borderliner position, the fact that he is Renaissance in some respects and non-Renaissance in others. His pragmatic use of history makes it impossible to pin him down to one tradition.60 Notes " The choice of these dates is somewhat arbitrary. In the case of 1480 I am following IR. Hale, and I chose 1527 as the year in which Machiavelli died and the Florentine republic was restored, > According to de Grazia, Machiavelli wrote after the death of Piero Soderini “The night that Piero Soderini died his soul went to the mouth of hell, Pluto shouted: What hell? silly soul. Go up to limbo with the other children” (1994, 323). * Neal Wood's essay Machiavelli's Humanism of Action was published in an edited volume under the title The Political Caleulus: Essays on Machiavelli's Philosophy, which is a misleading name for all the reasons stated above. * Hulliung’s reference to Arendt is based on The Human Condition chapter V, ‘whereas the direct references to Machiavelli can be found in chapters I and I ss The cardinal virtues: Prudentia, Justitia, Fortitudo, and Temperantia. «6 Ido not want to get into the discussion about the moralist interpretation of Machiavelli at this point. This will be saved for later. 7 See chapter 3 for an analysis of Machiavelli’s ancient predecessors.6 CHAPTER 3 ANCIENT ADVISERS; FIVE PRECURSORS TO MACHIAVELLI Introduction Machiavelli is one of the most famous political advisers in the history of political thought. One of the key elements of his advice, as discussed in chapter two, is a warning not to experiment with all kinds of new systems of statehood, but instead to imitate the successful examples from history. Machiavelli's great source of inspiration was Antiquity, and he argues that only by imitating the great from Antiquity can we achieve greatness in our modem times. In Antiquity many philosophers were attached to the political elite of their time as advisers on the matters of state. These advisers and the works they have left us have influenced Machiavelli in his role as political adviser and author of works on polities. I have chosen to discuss the works of advice of Plato, Aristotle, Isocrates, Xenophon and Seneca, because these ancient thinkers were, just as was Machiavelli, deeply involved in politics. The aforementioned thinkers, as Machiavelli's predecessors, shed an interesting light on the works of Machiavelli Plato: The Philosopher-King Plato's Republic is probably the most famous ancient political treatise on statehood. Plato’s ideal state, represented in his Republic, is characterized by meritocracy, communitarianism, a strict division of labor and formal state education. ‘There is, however a major difference between Plato's and Machiavelli's political writings, namely that the former are based on an ideal type of statehood while the latter focuses on political praxis. In Plato’s vision there is no interference, divine or natural, that would disturb or even ruin the theoretical ideal, while for Machiavelli the interference of Fortune is so significant that he does not even consider it worth his time to think in terms of ideal states. Itis the interference, the noise of the human condition, that conditions Machiavelli's political advice. It, therefore seems that a ‘comparison between Plato and Machiavelli with regard to political practice would not2 be very fruitful. Plato’s teachings in The Republic are, however, not his final words on the matter. After having written The Republic, Plato produced another major work on the polities of statehood, The Laws. ‘The major distinction between The Republic and The Laws is the empha laws in the latter work. In Plato’s Republic laws don’t really seem to matter because the state- educated prince, the philosopher-king, has been trained to rule based on knowledge of the ideas. In other words, the ruler(s) are ideal rulers who make the use of laws obsolete. Laws fumetion to protect the people from the nuler as well as from cach other. In the ideal state, due to the extreme division of labor, everyone knows what to do, so conflict should theoretically be discarded. ‘The ideal rulers know the ‘real’ interests of the people and rule accordingly. This eliminates the two forms of possible conflict and therefore the usefulness of laws. The change in accent from The Republic to The Laws is Plato’s introduction in the latter of limited laws due to his, Jack of trust in the ideal functioning of his philosopher-kings. The Laws puts laws as the highest good of the state, and even the rulers should not live above the law. This shift in Plato’s thinking can partially be explained by his political experience at the court of Dionysius of Syracuse. The coming to power of Dionysius the Younger gave Plato, pushed by his friend at the Syracusan court Dion, the unique opportunity to put into practice his ideas set down in The Republic. We can conclude from the fact that Plato revised his ideas, and even went so far as to write a new work on the state, The Laws, that his experience as political adviser of Dionysius the Younger was not altogether successful. Whatever happened, or did not happen, at Syracuse made Plato change his mind and build some structure into his political system that would be able to prevent rulers such as Dionysius the Younger from transgressing the mores of the ideal state, The most direct account of Plato’s experience at Syracuse that we can find is, in his letters to the friends and companions of Dion. In particular Plato's seventh and ‘eight letters are very insightful for understanding Plato’s shift in thinking after his experience with Dionysius the Younger. Before getting into a discussion of these letters I should make the link with Machiavelli. In comparing Plato with Machiavel we should focus on their respective roles as political advisers. Whether Plato can be seen as a precursor to Machiavelli will depend on the advice he gives to Dionysius the Younger.63 ‘When Plato came to Syracuse to educate and advise Dionysius the Younger, he had already been there before. Plato had earlier in his life been the guest of Dionysius the Elder. During that period he had met Dion who tumed out to be a motivated pupil, unlike the elder Dionysius. Jealousy of Plato’s good friendship with Dion made Dionysius the Elder request that Plato return to Athens where he founded the Academy and wrote his Republic. Plato did not seem to have had very high expectations of this first mission and he was already quite satisfied with his new pupil and friend Dion. As stated above, it was Dion who urged Plato to retum to Syracuse after the elder Dionysius had died and his son took over. It seemed like an ideal opportunity becanse, unlike the old Dionysius, the younger was still malleable and could be trained into the first Republic-style philosopher-king. It tums out that Dionysius the Younger was very interested in Plato’s presence at his court, but he did not prove to be quite the diligent student of philosophy that Plato had expected. The presence of Plato brought Dionysius the Younger great honor, but this does not imply that the ruler was willing to do his famous guest equal honor. One of the things of which Plato tried to convince Dionysius the Younger was that he should establish a ‘monarchy instead of ruling Syracuse as a tyrant, as his father did. Dionysius the ‘Younger wanted to know nothing of this, which greatly frustrated Plato and Dion. ‘Things got even worse when Dion was sent into exile after a dispute with Dionysius the Younger and Plato, after formulating his discontent with the situation, ‘was banned from the palace and sent to the countryside, At first, Plato tried to reason with Dionysius the Younger to get his friend Dion back to Syracuse, but when that failed he was ready to leave. Unfortunately for Plato, Dionysius was not willing to let him go and Plato was trapped. Only because of the good will of some merchants was Plato able to escape Syracuse and Sicily, and travel back to Athens. On his trip back, he met Dion who was arranging a conspiracy against Dionysius the Younger. Plato, however, did not want to be engaged in Dion’s vengeance and simply wished him luck. Dion struck out against Dionysius the Younger and was able to successfully remove him from the throne. Dionysius the Younger escaped into exile and Dion took control over Syracuse only to be assassinated within a few days.” Plato wrote to the friends and companions of Dion in order to advise them how to bring order into their state and remember his good spirit and ideas.’The seventh letter opens with Plato assuring the friends and companions of Dion of the latter’s good intentions. Plato compares Dion’s good intentions with the corrupt government of Athens (The Thirty) who put his dear friend Socrates to death. Tfonly the friends of Dion govern Syracuse in his spirit, they will achieve stability, happiness and prosperity. Because Dion is not among them anymore, Plato argues, they need his advice. It seems that even though Plato was too old to travel to Syracuse again, he was not able to refrain from gi ing his political advice to the people of Syracuse. Plato might have felt that he owed this to his friend Dion, and at the same time he might have seen it as another opportunity to test his renewed ideas as set down in The Laws. Plato begins by explaining why he left Syracuse and did not continue to put pressure on Dionysius the Younger to allow Dion to return home. In his seventh letter Plato argues: “There really was no honor for him in my taking flight from him, but rather in my remaining, which explains the great pretense he made of requesting it” (1961, 1579). In other words, Plato’s leaving of Syracuse was considered as a sign of opposition to Dionysius, while staying could be interpreted as support for the tyrant. “In the case, however, of those who are altogether astray from the path of right government, and will by no means consent to go on the track of it, ‘who on the other hand give notice to their adviser to keep his hands off the constitution under penalty of death if he disobeys, and order him to cater to their wishes and desires by pointing out the easiest and quickest method of attaining them permanently, in that case I should think the adviser who consented to such conditions 1 poltroon — the one who refused a real man” (1961, 1580). ‘An adviser needs the freedom to speak openly and should not simply be used as an excuse that will enable the ruler to do exactly as he feels. One of the signs of a conupt leader, according to Plato, is that he has no real friends in whom he can trust. Of course, tyrants have many flatterers as friends but as with Dionysius they trust no Aether he is or is one, there is no surer sign of a man’s moral character than this, not destitute of such [real] friends” (1961, 1581). Tyrants have no such friends and can trust no one. Trust is, however, important to the ruler; if anything, he has to be able to trust his advisers. ‘That Plato has adapted his advice in accordance with his new insights becomes ‘most clear when he advises Dion’s friends on the rule of law. “Let not Sicily nor any city anywhere be subject to human masters ~ such is my doctrine ~ but to laws”65 (1961, 1583), Plato learned through experience that one should never put all faith in human masters, not even philosopher-kings, without having good laws to protect one asa last resort. “The slayer of Dion does not know that his action has had the same self confidently in the case of a man, that if Dion had come into power, he would never result as that of Dionysius, I am certain, as far as a man can express have adopted any other form of government than the following. In the first place, after he had made Syracuse, his native city, clean and fair, on putting an end to her slavery, and had set her up arrayed as one free, thereupon he would by all means have brought the citizens under discipline by instituting an appropriate and ideal system of laws” (1961, 1584), The murder of Dion has undoubtedly delayed the institution of the laws in Syracuse, but by no means made it impossible. It is now up to the friends and companions of Dion to establish a fair and free state in which no citizens are oppressed by others, as all are oppressed by a tyrant. In matters of statehood, itis of vital importance that the new laws are good from the beginning. In other words, the importance of matters concerning statehood are so great that rulers cannot afford to experiment with different kinds of systems in otder to pick the one they prefer. These experiments would be devastating for the people and therefore only appropriate for despots. “Now there is an experimental ‘method for determining the truth in such cases that, far from being vulgar, itis truly appropriate for despots, especially those stuffed with secondhand opinions, which I perceived, as soon a I arrived, was very much the case with Dionysius” (1961, 1588). Plato was quite perturbed that Dionysius the Younger, while in exile, had taken up the position of a teacher of philosophy. Only Plato knew that Dionysius was never interested in learning anything from him; for the outside world, the tyrant was one of his students. In his eight letter Plato states: “Now that the despotic power has been overthrown throughout all Sicily, you are at odds only on one issue. On one side are those who desire to restore the empire once more, on the other those who wish to set, the final seal on their escape from tyranny” (1961, 1598). Restoration of the empire will fulfill the need for immediate stability, but also risks the chance of a restoration of tyranny. There are several ways to solve this problem, Plato argues, one of which is to do damage to the other side. It should, however, be kept in mind that it is “by no ‘means easy to do a great deal of damage to the other side without also receiving a66 good deal yourselves in retum” (1961, 1598) Rather than risking the chance of getting entangled in a vicious circle of violence, Plato suggests that he will speak with both parties as an arbitrator. Plato gives the advice he already gave to Dionysius, that is, to transform a tyranny into a kingship, and to avoid the conditions of a tyrant, That this is possible, Plato shows us with the historical example of Lycurgus. Lycurgus saw that other tyrants brought ruin on themselves and “alarmed for his own city, and for his family as well, he applied a remedy. He girded the kingship with a rope of safety, the senate, that is, and the ephorate — with the result that his people have been gloriously preserved through these many generations, because law was made rightful lord and sovereign of men, and men no longer ruled laws with arbitrary power” (1961, 1600). As in the seventh letter, Plato starts the eight letter with waming against tyranny. “T urge those who are intent on establishing a tyranny to turn back and to flee for their lives from that which is accounted happiness by men who are insatiably greedy and bereft of sense. Let them endeavor to change to a kingly pattern and to be subject to kingly laws, enjoying the highest honors by the consent of willing subjects and the laws” (1961, 1600). As in the seventh letter, Plato urges the friends of Dion not to fight over their differences of opinion but to accept the compromise Plato as arbiter has to offer. The compromise he offers is the establishment of a kingdom in which the law is supreme over king and subjects. Plato advises the friends of Dion to establish a troika leadership over Syracuse, so that all the parties in the current dispute are represented. The troika kingship should consist of Plato’s son, Hipparinus [Dionysius’ son] and Dionysius the Younger. “If the race of Dionysius and Hipparinus are willing for the salvation of Sicily to put an end to their present misfortunes and to receive honors for themselves and their race, both now and hereafter, then on these conditions, as I said before, summon to a meeting such representatives as they choose to invest with full power to arrange an agreement” (1961, 1602). There are several interesting things to point out here. Plato wants his own son. to be part of the new leadership. Plato argues that he saved Syracuse twice from tyranny and thus deserves to be honored in this way. Besides Plato’s son, the former tyrant and his son are to participate in the troika, This means that Plato believes that the old tyrant can be reformed into a new king, It also implies that Plato is willing too accept as king in the new state of Syracuse someone who is not a philosopher. Dionysius the Younger may regard himself to be a philosopher, but surely he is not one by the standards of Plato. It seems that Plato is willing to give up a lot of his initial wishes and is willing to compromise on major philosophical issues for the sake of stability. Stability is what Plato’s compromise seems to be all about. Plato as an arbitrator wants to prevent any group in Syracuse from being alienated, and he thus includes both those who want to restore the tyranny and those who want to prevent this from happening in one government. This means that Plato had developed a great ‘rust in the effectiveness of the rule of law, and in effect trusted the law as much as he used to trust the benevolence of the philosopher-king Aristotle, himself adviser of Alexander the Great, also comments on the tragic clash between Dionysius the Younger and his relative Dion, Aristotle is just as resolute in his conviction that tyranny is the worst form of state: “Tyranny is a compound of the extreme forms of oligarchy and democracy, and this is why itis, ‘more injurious to its subjects than any other form of government; it is composed of ‘two bad forms, and it combines the perversions and errors of both” (1968, 235). A tyranny is, according to Aristotle, a composite form of state which is openly hostile against both the nobility and the masses. In an oligarchy the ruling elite are simply interested in increasing their own personal wealth by oppressing the masses, while in ‘a democracy the masses rule over the wealthy few. A tyrant oppresses the masses and the nobility, and at the same time cashes in all the wealth for himself. Tyrannies are inherently unstable because the tyrant lacks the support of both the elite and the masses. The major danger for tyrants, according to Aristotle, is contempt. “Dionysius the Younger of Syracuse was similarly attacked by Dion in a spirit of contempt: he saw that he was despised even by his own subjects and was always drunk” (1968, 238). Machiavelli similarly expresses his concern with contempt when he argues that hatred and contempt are the two things a prince should always avoid. Machiavelli already concluded in his discussion that it is better for a prince to be feared than loved (1989, 101). Once a prince is able to avoid contempt and hatred, there is no danger from his indulgence in other vices (1989, 111). Whereas Machiavelli and Aristotle agree on what a ruler should not do, there is little agreement in their advice to the68 prince about what he should do, This is primarily a function of the way they look at the state. Aristotle, like Plato, is still of the conviction that the ultimate goal of the state is to create better people, better citizens. For Machiavelli, the state is primarily engaged in controlling the desires of people, not with improving, but at most with redirecting them, “The good life, or felicity, is obviously the end at which all men aim” (1968, 312). The state in Aristotle’s perspective is a means to an end. The end is described as the good life, or felicity of men. There are three ways in which felicity can be achieved, and people can become virtuous. “These three means are the natural endowment we have at birth; the habits we form; and the rational principle within us” (1968, 314), With natural endowments Aristotle is referring to our body and soul, while the rational principle is what distinguishes us from the animals. Because we are humans, of rational animals, happiness is our end in life, which we can achieve through felicity. Animals, which are not naturally endowed with the same gift of rationality, don’t have any aim in life other than immediate satisfaction of their desires. This is what distinguishes men from animals, according to Aristotle. Machiavelli is more skeptical about this distinction. When we look at Machiavelli's unfinished poem The[Golden] Ass we can see that the main character is speechless after talking to a human who was tumed into a hog by Circe. The hog speaks the following truth: “130 Nature gave you hands and speech, and with them she gave you also ambition and avarice, with which her bounty is cancelled. 133 To how many ills Nature subjects you at starting! And afterwards Fortune -how much good she promises you without fulfillment. 142 One hog to another hog causes no pain, one stag to another; man by another man is slain, crucified and plundered. 145 Consider now how you ask that I again become man, being exempt from all the miseries that I endured as long as I was a man. 148 And if any among men seem to you a god, happy and rejoicing, do not believe him such, because in this mud [ live more happily; 151 here without anxiety I bathe and roll myself” (1965, 772).Co) From an Aristotelian point of view the transformation of the human into the hhog has ended the human qualities of the person in question. In other words, a hog is a hog and even if the hog was formerly a human, it can only reason from its present hog state of being. If hogs were endowed with the same rationality as human beings, no hog would want to lie idle in the mud. Machiavelli in his poem counters this ‘Aristotelian idea of rational supremacy by suggesting that most people would rather opt for the carefree life of the hog than the pain- staking life of humans. Most people don’t want to have the responsibility of having to aim at a good and virtuous life. This major difference between Aristotle and Machiavelli in regard to the understanding of human nature is clearly reflected in their respective views of the state. Felicity of the state is considered in terms of the best constitution. In other ‘words, “the best constituted state is the state which possesses the greatest possibility of felicity” (1968, 312). Felicity is an absolute and not a relative term, This means that felicity is not formed by circumstances, like crime and punishment, but is absolute and independent, as in the case of giving honors (1968, 313). Absolute felicity is present when one does good freely, without any extemal force conditioning it Besides being the adviser of Alexander the Great, Aristotle was also a student of Plato, Aristotle was one of Plato’s most critical students, which shows in the fact that he did not agree with almost anything proclaimed by his famous teacher, For Aristotle, it was important that all men be treated equally, and not according to their class as Plato proposed in his Republic, “All should share alike in a system of government under which they rule and are ruled by turns” (1968, 315). At the same time, Aristotle also understood the need for some kind of hierarchy. There should be differences between those who govern and those who are governed, otherwise the former will lack authority. Rather than to impose an artificial class structure on the people, in which through division of labor the governors and the governed are distinguished, Aristotle argues that nature has provided us with a solution: the distinction between age groups (1968, 316). The older men govern and the young obey until their time has come to govern, Rather than a philosopher-king, restrained or not by laws, Aristotle proposes a rotation of older men for the government of the state. ‘The disagreement between Aristotle and his teacher Plato becomes most clear ‘when we look at how they evaluate Sparta. It should be noted that many aristocratic70 young men in Athens admired Sparta, the enemy of Athens in the Peloponnesian war. Plato was no exception, and some of his relatives even served in the dictatorship of the Thirty, the puppet regime that was set up by Sparta in Athens after it had lost the war. Sparta was admired because of its militaristic and aristocratic tradition. Athens was traditionally ruled by rhetoric, by public discourse, while Sparta was ruled by the sword and by iron discipline, Both thinkers agree that the state should produce good citizens through good institutions of education, but they disagree on the type of education these citizens should receive, More specifically, Plato and Aristotle disagree about the means to this end. ‘What for Plato were ends in themselves, parts of being a good man, are for Aristotle merely means towards that goal. War is a means to peace, action a means to leisure, and acts of necessity a means to acts of goodness (1968, 317). The Spartan state was only focused on one part of felicity, that of the soldier. Aristotle argues that this created a blind spot for the Spartan state, which ultimately led to its demise. Temperance, wisdom and courage should be cultivated for their own sakes, and not, for one particular excellence, as was the case in Sparta. “Training for war should not be pursued with a view to enslaving men who do not deserve such a fate, Its objects should be these ~ first, to prevent men from ever being enslaved themselves; secondly, to put men in a position to exercise leadership — but leadership directed to the interest of the led, and not to the establishment of a general system of slavery; and thirdly, to enable men to make themselves masters of those who naturally deserve to be slaves” (1968, 319). ‘The end goal of the state is, I have argued, for both Plato and Aristotle quite similar. The means to this end are, however, a world apart. Both thinkers want a ruling elite to govern the state in such a way that better human being are created. Better can be translated in the case of Plato as ‘more obedient,’ while in the case of Aristotle better means ‘felicitous’ Isocrates: The Rhetorician According to Wemer Jaeger: “It is impossible not to compare this very personal document [Plato’s seventh letter] with Isocrates' justification of himself in the Antidosis speech. It is certainly an important sign of the times that two such men should end by taking the public into their confidence about their personal aspirations1 and defeats” (1986, 212). Isocrates is mainly known as the great opponent of Plato’s ‘Academy who educated his pupils in rhetoric rather than in mathematics. Isocrates is often characterized as merely a sophist who wrote speeches in which the wrong is presented as the right and the truth is sacrificed for the sake of winning the argument. ‘This rather simplistic view of Isocrates’ work is fed by the commentaries written by members of the Academy about him. When we read Isocrates’ speeches we must conclude that the truth behind his teaching is more complex than his opponents would have us believe, Isocrates wrote speeches, rather than dialogues, because he was, ‘teaching rhetoric rather than philosophy. Isocrates notion of rhetoric is, however, not a banal as his opponents present it to us, butis instead bas ed on moral principles. Isocrates wrote two works of advice to Nicocles, King of Salamis at Cyprus. Both To Nicocles and Nicocles are written in speech form and are Isocrates’ most direct works of advice to a ruling prince. To Nicoeles is a speech in which Isocrates advises King Nicocles on how to govern his state, whereas Nicocles is a speech written by Isocrates in name of Nicocles to be addressed to the people of Salamis One could say that To Nicocles is Isocrates’ advice to the King on how to deal with his subjects, and Nicocles is the King’s address to the people on how to behave, Before I get into the details of Isocrates’ teachings to Nicocles, I first want to discuss in some more detail the complex relationship between Plato and his Academy, and Isocrates. Isocrates wrote his Antidosis, which is primarily a speech about the exchange of property, because he was challenged by another Athenian to pay for the expenses of a warship. During the fourth century BC, it was not uncommon that the richest men in Athens would be expected to pay for the expenses of the equipment of the fleet. In order for the burden to be distributed equally, everyone chosen to contribute was allowed to name a richer citizen to pay for the expenses in his place. Anyone could in this way challenge a richer man to exchange his entire fortune with him, to assure that he was in fact mote poor than the man he had challenged. Isocrates was challenged in such a way and the Antidasis is his defense speech (1986, 132). The most famous defense speech at the time was Plato's Apology. Both the Apology and the Antidasis are works in which the author has to publicly defend his case. That the stakes were a Jot higher in the case of the Apology is obvious, but more interesting is Isocrates’ aptness to compare his situation with Socrates. “Of course, his life had none of that,2 background of heroic struggle wi sets off the noble and steadfast figure of Socrates in the Apology; and yet he clearly felt that his position was closely similar to Socrates, for he took every opportunity to remind the reader of it by verbal imitations of Plato’s words and of the accusation aimed at Socrates.” (1986, 133) Socrates was charged with several things, among which was the corruption of the minds of the ‘youth, and Isocrates tries to show in his Antidosis that he also was accused of this crime by teaching thetoric to his students. Isocrates was more successful than Socrates in his defense speech in that the he was not convicted, let alone executed, as in the case of the latter. Isocrates was clearly impressed by Socrates, but there was one other philosopher he greatly admired and that was himself. Isocrates narcissistic attitude, or vanity, can partly be explained by his immense popularity. The Athenians did not necessarily admire Isocrates for his speeches, but rather for the fame of his pupils. Most of the famous statesmen at the time studied with Isocrates rather than in the Academy, because the lessons of rhetoric were considered more usefill than Plato’s focus on arithmetic and geometry. The great statesmen gave Isocrates his reputation, but also blemished that same reputation, Isocrates asked himself to what extent the educator is responsible for the product of his education. In other words, is the teacher responsible for the political actions of his student? Socrates was the teacher of Alcibiades and Critias who, as members of the Thirty, functioned as tyrants in the Spartan puppet regime after the Peloponnesian war. Does this make Socrates a teacher of evil? The most famous student of Isocrates was undoubtedly the Athenian general ‘Timotheus. Can we go so far as to blame Isocrates directly for the fall of the second Naval League? “The problem there was the same: how can the feeling of the megalopsychos, the great soul, be bound down, how can the man of might be fitted into the framework of human society, which is not always ready to give thanks and gratitude when they are due? The tragic failure of the attempt — which, in Homer as in life, is due to the hero’s own proud nature ~ casts a cold and ominous shadow on this scene between Timotheus and Isocrates” (1986, 141). We can in this respect also think about Plato and his failure to reform Dionysius of Syracuse. ‘The problem of all ancient advisers, Plato, Aristotle, Isocrates, Xenophon and Seneca, was how to deal with tyranny. All knew that tyranny is a very unstable form of state, which can only be maintained as the cost of its inhabitants. The mainB question therefore is how to transform the tyranny into a more stable form of state. Isocrates frames his answer to the threat of tyranny in the form of rhetoric. Unlike the thinkers mentioned above, Isocrates did not aspire to overtum the tyrannical state of his student Nicocles, but rather to make it look less bad. “The Greeks usually thought ‘that tyranny was nothing but the arbitrary exercise of a man’s will. Here, however, it is made part of a political ideal, and thereby legalized: the tyrant’s willis interpreted ‘as being the will to rule his people in accordance with established laws and a higher moral code” (1986, 87). The monarchy is Isocrates” ideal form of state, because it resembles the gods in heaven, and is the form of many successful states such as, Sparta, Carthage and Athens in times of war. “Isocrates does not attempt to limit the tyrant’s power by written laws or constitution [as Plato in his Laws]. Nothing remains him [tyrant] except the virtues of justice and self control. ‘These — not the warlike qualities usually ascribed to great monarchs — are the qualities which Nicocles read: Isocrates] describes as the pillars of his rule, and he solemnly claims them for himself” (1986, 87). The basis of the loyalty to the monarch and his power is his virtue [areté]. The basis of the monarch’s virtue lies, according to Isocrates, in his use of the word [logos] or his speech. All philosophy is based on the gift of speech and whoever controls the logos controls the state. “It was speech which enabled us to perfect almost everything we have achieved in the way of civilization, For it was speech which laid down the standards of right and wrong, nobility and baseness, without which we should be unable to live together” (1986, 89). The importance of the logos, as the source of virtue, flies in the face of all Plato’s teachings about the absolute moral values and ideas which are grounded in the abstract idea or form. The idea that speech, language, can in some way determine the value, the right or wrong, of given thing is unthinkable in Plato’s world. In the seventh letter Plato stresses the inadequacy of language when he states that: “Hence no intelligent man will ever be so bold as to put into language those things which reason has contemplated, especially not into a form that is unalterable ~ which must be the case with what is expressed in written symbols” (1961, 1590), Isocrates does not accept the superhuman standard of Plato and therefore accepts rhetoric as the highest possible form of philosophy that is still of practical value for politics. Virtue for Isocrates is not knowledge of the ideas; it is the ability of speech making that distinguishes the ideal ruler from the others. The ruler is not checked by74 any standards but his own moral code. Therefore, since who becomes king is decided by birthright, we can only influence the virtue of the king through training and advising him in rhetoric. It is also important to notice that, for Isocrates, it is not the perfection of the individual through education by the state that is his highest good, as in Plato, but something more mundane, namely material greatness and prosperity. “In this point itis easiest for us to see the practical bourgeois character of Isocrates and his teaching. Only compare it with the high-minded attitude of Plato, who never made ‘a business of philosophy” (1986, 142). This does not imply that Isocrates” rhetoric is simply based on some kind of business ethics. On the contrary, Isocrates’ demands on a nuler are very high with respect to his moral capabilities. “He who wants to rule over others must apply that principle to himself and be able to justify his position by his own true superiority to them all. Hence, Isocrates does not believe that the principle of legality on which monarchies are usually based is enough to ensure a man’s right to succeed to a throne and give orders to other men” (1986, 96). It is not enough, in other words, to be the heir to the throne, one should excel over all others in order to legitimately be king, What one should excel in is, of course, the art of the logos, or rhetoric. “The ruler must be both patriot and philanthropist, he must love both mankind and the state. He is, as it were, to be both Creon and Antigone” (1986, 97). ‘The goal of To Nicocles is to “prescribe what pursuits you [King Nicocles] should aspire to and from what you should abstain in order to the best advantage your state and kingdom” (1991, 41). Isocrates starts out explaining to Nicocles why the people often think that kings live like gods with all the wealth and honors they receive. The people are blind to the dangers and responsibilities the king has, and it is up to the king to educate his people and correct this popular misconception before it leads to contempt, “...if one can tum those who rule over the multitude toward a life of virtue, he will help both classes, both those who hold positions of authority and, their subjects; for he will give to the king a greater security in office and to the people a milder government” (1991, 45). In other words, if the people respect the monarch and the monarch respects the people in tum, the latter will be able to rule over the former with relative ease and thus be able to establish a mild form of government. Monarchies create very little opposition in Isocrates’ view, which creates a stable state for the king and allows the people to prosper. “It is a king’s business to relieve5 the state when it is in distress to maintain it in prosperity, and to make it great when it is small” (1991, 45), Itis not the function of the king to make the people great but to expand the state and make the people rich. This is a much more populist message than ‘we would hear from the philosophers of the Academy, The way to create a great state and prosperity among its people is for the king to be virtuous. “In proportion as you are above others in rank so shall you surpass them in virtue” (1991, 47). ‘What constitutes virtue for Isocrates? The concept of self-control, as mentioned above, really lies at the center of Isocrates’ thought. Isocrates seemed to have some idea of the modem notion of the body politic, The body of the king represents the people and therefore the king functions as the example for the people to follow. The king rules over the people through his actions rather than through the institutions. Isocrat s understood very well that without popular support the position of the king would be undermined. “Knowing that all governments -oligarchies as well as others —have the longest life when they best serve the masses [...] the best among them shall have the honors, while the rest shall suffer no impairment of their rights” (1991, 49), Besides the trust of the people, itis also important for the king to have the confidence of some good friends. Friends have to be able to advise the king in an ‘open manner without flattery. “Grant freedom of speech to those who have good judgment, in order that when you are in doubt you may have friends who will help ‘you to decide” (1991, 57). Not everyone should be granted freedom of speech because that will allow people to openly criticize the king, which would undermine his position. The king also should not give his friendship “to everyone who desires it, but ‘only to those who are worthy of him” (1991, 55). ‘The people should love their king and not fear or hate him. “Deliver your citizens from their many fears, and be not willing that dread should beset men who have done no wrong [...] Do nothing in anger, but simulate anger when the occasion demands it” (1991, 53, Italics are mine). The king should punish those who have done ‘wrong by rational means and not based on his emotions. While simulating anger the king is not in danger of looking effeminate and being contemptible. War is the ‘greatest evil for the people because it means that many of them will die. A king who is prone to making war is therefore not acting in the interest of his people. “Be warlike in your knowledge of war and in your preparations for it, but peaceful in your avoidance of all unjust aggression” (1991, 55). Governing in the interest of your16 people means to “govern yourself no less than your subjects, and consider that you are in the highest sense a king when you are a slave to no pleasure but rule over your desires more firmly than over your people” (1991, 57). Self government is the most important prerequisite for the king’s ability to govern well. Isocrates’ teachings are based on the lessons he has learned from the past. Only those rulers who were well educated and disciplined and were able to make politically wise decisions were successful in their reign. The past is an important source of information for the ruler that he can use to prevent making the same mistakes that others have before him. “But the truth is that in discourses of this sort we should not seek novelties, for in these discourses it is not possible to say what is paradoxical or incredible or outside the circle of accepted belief; but rather we should regard that man as the most accomplished in this field who can collect the ‘greatest number of ideas scattered among the thoughts of all the rest and present them in the best form” (1991, 63). In other words, the prince should not try all kinds of new ‘ways of ruling, but instead rely on the ways that history teaches him were suecessfl. The best ruler is the one who can read history and base future decisions on past experiences. It is the role of the adviser to present the king with his knowledge of past events, The best ruler is thus the ruler who has the ability to make iis decisions on the advice of the best adviser. “a good counselor is the most useful and the most princely of all possessions” (1991, 69). Since the people are such an important force forthe stability of the state, Isocrates addresses his second treatise not to Nicocles but via Nicocles to the people of Salamis, Isocrates, through the voice of Nicocles, argues that since the people cannot be blamed for what they did not know, it is important that the king convey to the people what he has decided so that if they do not obey itis clear who justly can be blamed (1991, 83). Besides the fact that the people should know the king’s intentions, it is also important that they should know why the current form of government, the ‘monarchy, is the best one. Isocrates, through Nicocles, comes up with ten reasons why the monarchy is the best form of state (1991, 83-5). First, the individual character and action of a man is more praised in a monarchy than in any other form of state. ‘The best man will be king and only those with exceptional virtues will be his advisers. Second, the monarchy is a milder form of government. This point has already been discussed above. Third, in a monarchy, people are constantly in charge of the samen office, so that not only are the best people on the job, but also the most experienced. Fourth, in other forms of state, itis hard to establish who is accountable when things go wrong, while in a monarchy there is only one person to blame. Fifth, in other forms of state, people are led to mutual rivalries, which harm the common good. Sixth, the monarch can assure that public interests are put above private interests, while in other forms of state this is not the case. Seventh, rulers in other forms of state, in order to be seen in a positive light, hope to attribute to their predecessors and. successors who govern the state the greatest possible misfortune. Eighth, a monarch considers the affairs of the state as his personal business and does not separate the ‘two. Ninth, in times of war one-man rule is more efficient than other forms of state, Isocrates gives the example of Sparta (Oligarchy) and Athens (Democracy) that in times of war transform into one-man rule. Tenth, even the gods are said to be ruled by Zeus as a king. ‘The most sovereign of all virtues are temperance and justice. What Isocrates exactly means by that he shows with two examples. “...I did not think it right to take even the land which was offered to me, but prefer to hold through just means what is my own than to acquire through base means territory many times greater than which I now possess” (1991, 97). In other words, Nicocles only wants to be king in those tertitories over which he has a natural claim and he does not think it prudent to take on new territories, Rather than focusing on expansion, Nicocles focuses on the just ‘means by which he governs the territories he already owns. *...from the time I became king, no one can charge me with having approached any woman but my own wife” (1991, 99). This shows that Nicocles (read: Isocrates) was aware of the idea that there are only two things that will really upset the people and these are taking away their women or property. “However, we ought not to test all the virtues in the same set conditions, but should test justice when a man is in want, temperance when he is in power, continence when he is in the prime of youth” (1991, 103). Self control only shows itself when people are forced to it by necessity. Not only the monarch but also the people have to exar 1 their virtues and lear how to act upon them. Derived from the principle that what is good for the monarch is good for the state [the people], Isocrates argues that only those things can be labeled ‘good’ which people do with the expectation of being approved. “Scrutinize your actions and believe that they are evil8 when you wish to hide from me what you do, and good when my knowledge of them will be likely to make me think better of you" (1991, 107). As the monarch should not, hide his intentions, the people should not hide their wishes or desires. Put more forcefully Nicocles [through Isocrates] states: “Let none of you imagine that even what he secretly thinks in his own heart will be hidden for me” (1991, 107). The people should imitate, not simply praise, their role model, the monarch, in his virtues, “Be not satisfied with praising good men, but imitate them as well. Regard my words as your law” (1991, 113). Besides Isocrates, who certainly influenced Machiavelli but is never directly mentioned in his works Machiavelli is also greatly influenced by Xenophon. In the case of Isocrates, it is not at all certain whether Machiavelli actually read him or only heard about him through secondary sources, but the case of Xenophon is different in that Machiavelli refers his readers in his Discourses to Xenophon’s treatise On Tyrannicide (1983, 276).4 Also in The Prince, Machiavelli refers to Xenophon and his account of Cyrus (1989, 90). Cyrus, together with Moses, Romulus and Theseus are, according to Machiavelli, examples of the most excellent men who have become princes by their own virtue and not by fortune (1989, 33) Although Cyrus is described in great detail in Xenophon’s Anabasis as well as in his Cyropaideia, it is not at all clear that Machiavelli based his evaluation of Cyrus only on Xenophon (1989, n.3: 37). In Xenophon’s Cyropaideia, or The Education of Cyrus, he presents a long biographical overview of Cyrus’ life, whereas in his Anabasis, or The March up Country, he presents the reader with his political lessons drawn from personal experience of Cyrus’ leadership. Xenophon distinguishes himself from the other political advisers in that he joins Cyrus in a march against his brother Artaxerxes, king of Persia. Plato, Aristotle and Isocrates all advised their students from a relatively safe position at the court, whereas Xenophon actually went to war with his prince, Xenophon was advising an influential statesman, as was the case with Aristotle and Seneca, whereas Plato and Isocrates were advisers to rulers who in comparison were nothing more than petty tyrants. Xenophon was also a student of Socrates, and his Conversations of Socrates are the major alternative source on Socratic thought to the works of Plato.’ Xenophon publicly defended Socrates in his Memorabilia when the latter was under attack by the sophist Polycrates (1986, 158).9 Xenophon: The Soldier ical lessons can be found first and foremost in the Since Xenophon’s pol Anabasis, I will focus on this work rather than his Cyropaideia ot other works on ‘hunting, horsemanship or agriculture. As was the case with Machiavelli, Xenophon had first hand experience of the polities and wars of the prince. Contrary to Machiavelli, Xenophon did not represent his own state, Athens, but traveled with Cyrus, the Persian prince who was a strategic ally of Athens’ major opponent, Sparta. (One could compare Xenophon’s position at the court of Cyrus with Machiavelli's position while staying at the court of Cesare Borgia, Both Xenophon and Machiavelli were greatly impressed and influenced by their respective princes. As can be read in ‘Atkinson and Sices, Machiavelli admired Borgia to such an extent that he was warned by his loyal friend Biagio Buonaccorsi not to report too positively from the court of Borgia because it might discredit him (1996, 88). Machiavelli's enthusiasm for Borgia did not have any negative consequences for him, but Xenophon was exiled from his native Athens after he returned from the great march through the Persian Empire. Machiavelli identified with Xenophon not only because he was also exiled, after the republican regime had been overthrown, but also because he shared with Xenophon the same teaching style, Jaeger argues: “To narrate the exploits and the successes ofa ‘monarch famous in history was one way to educate pupils, Plato and Isocrates tried other ways ~ one chose dialectic traini 1, and the other offered his collective maxims 1986, 162-3). Xenophon and Machiavelli both educate and advise their students through the use of examples of the great in and reflections on the duty of the prince” history. Rather than teaching a set system from which everything can be explained, ‘Xenophon and Machiavelli rely on their own experience as well as the experience of the great men in history. Their advice is truly pragmatic and not normative, as is the case with Plato and Isocrates. Xenophon and Machiavelli are not mere ideologues of their own system, the Athenian and the Florentine respectively, but they praise the best government over their own, Both thinkers were very critical of the political system in their home state and advised the imitation of the best elements of the political systems of their opponents. Xenophon was enthusiastic about some of the features of the Persian system of education at a time in which it was unheard of that a Greek would approve of a barbarian institution. Where Xenophon had Persia and80 Sparta as his educational models, Machiavelli looked back at ancient Rome as the ‘model that the modem Italian states should imitate ‘According to Jaeger, “All Xenophon’s books are more or less dominated by the desire to educate. [...] The reader is meant to learn how he ought to speak and act, in certain situations. Like the Greeks in their desperate straits, surrounded by threatening savages and hostile armies, he must manage to discover and develop the areté within himself” (1986, 159). This holds especially true for his Anabasis. Shortly before Persian King Darius II died he sent for his son Cyrus who was satrap of an area in the west of the Persian Empire. Cyrus did not make it in time and Artaxerxes, Cyrus’ brother, took over the crown from his father. Cyrus, convinced that he was the rightful heir to their throne, was determined to rebel against him. Cyrus, back in the west, built his army steadily without Artaxerxes’ knowledge, because he kept his soldiers dispersed throughout his state. At the same time Cyrus was in conflict with another Satrap, Tissaphernes, which also accounted for some of the build up of the army in the eyes of Artaxerxes. Among the soldiers that Cyrus recruited was a large division of Spartans who would assist him in his rebellion against Artaxerxes. Cyrus’ troops had in the past helped the Spartans in the Ionian phase of the Peloponnesian ‘War and a covert friendship between Cyrus and the Spartan Lysander had developed. ‘Now Lysander had the chance to pay his debt to Cyrus in the form of ten thousand soldiers who would serve as auxiliary troops under Cyrus.° ‘The Anabasis starts at the point where Cyrus is secretly conducting his preparations to round up his army. In order for Artaxerxes not to find out, Cyrus used a pretext for his army build up; he wanted to drive the Pisidians out of his land. Cyrus not only tried to trick his brother in believing that he was not arming himself against him, but he also tried to trick his soldiers into believing that he was not leading them against the king. Once his armies were large enough, Cyrus moved them eastwards with great speed. Several local leaders paid tribute to Cyrus, in order not to be plundered or killed, which enabled Cyrus to pay his soldiers on time. This was very important, since a large part of Cyrus’ army consisted of mercenaries and auxiliary troops. The soldiers did, however, find out at Tarsus that they were not simply fighting some local forces but instead were marching against the king. Since they ‘were not hired for that, a large group of soldiers refused to continue and one of the generals, Clearchus, the Spartan, was almost stoned to death when he tried to force81 the soldiers to continue. Right from the beginning, the problems with mercenary soldiers became clear.’ They were in the business of war to make money and they were loyal when they were paid, but by the time real danger came around, when it became clear they were marching against the king, they were the first ones to refuse to continue. Clearchus was only able to convince the troops to continue after he had threatened them with the alternative of being left alone in the middle of the Persian Empire without the support of Cyrus’ friends and the food supply of the barbarian market that traveled along with them. What Clearchus in effect did was to cut off the way back, which created a situation of necessity for the army, which was the only way that they would fight most virtuously. The men agreed to continue after their salaries had been increased and Cyrus had made the promise that whoever did not want to follow him was free to leave without the fear of repercussions. Even though the soldiers really did not have a choice, for Xenophon, this shows how honorable Cynus was. Menon, the Thessalian, convinced his soldiers that, since it was inevitable that they had to go, it would be profitable for them to be the first ones the cross the tiver at which they rested, so that Cyrus would especially reward their virtue. After Menon’s soldiers crossed the river, all the others followed their example. The army was so large that there were several generals who led their troops. It was therefore inevitable that some of these generals would come to blows with one another. Menon and Clearchus were especially hostile towards each other, partly because of the differences in their leadership styles, and Cyrus could barely prevent the two generals from attacking one another. Internal division would surely bring rain to Cyrus’ army and therefore he did everything in his power to keep these two generals away from each other. Besides, internal divisions, conspiracies can potentially be the cause of an army’s ruin. Xenophon shows in the story of Orontas, however, that conspiracies almost never work. In order to find out how strong the enemy was, Orontas proposed to Cyrus that he and his men would march before Cyrus’ army and get a close look at their opponents. Orontas demanded most of the horses Cyrus owned so that he could catch up with the enemy and also return as quickly as possible. Orontas’ plan was, however, to take the horses directly to Artaxerxes whom he thought would be able to reward him better than Cyrus for his deeds, In order to let Artaxerxes know about his plans, Orontas wrote him a letter explaining them. The messenger who was supposed to deliver the letter was82 somewhat suspicious and handed the letter over to Cyrus instead. Cyrus had Orontas arrested and put on trial. This example shows how dangerous conspiracies are, especially when there is evidence in writing that falls into the wrong hands. ‘After discussing Orontas, Xenophon introduces himself into the story, as if he wanted to contrast the evil conspirator Orontas with the good and brave Xenophon. ‘Artaxerxes by now was fully aware of Cyrus’ mission and, convinced that he would turn out the stronger one in a direct confrontation, marched his army in the direction of his enemies, The watchword ‘Zeus Saviour and Victory’ went through the ranks and the decisive battle of Cunaxa was about to unfold. As soon as Cyras caught sight of his brother, the great king, he lost his temper and marched straight up to him, leaving his guards behind. Cyrus managed to wound but not kill Artaxerxes, who, since Cyrus had maneuvered himself in a defenseless position, was able with relative case to kill his opponent. Xenophon states in Anabasis: “In this way, then, Cyrus came to his end, a man who was most kingly and most worthy to rule all of the Persians who have been born since Cyrus the Elder, as all agree who are reputed to have known Cyrus intimately.” (1998, 127) In the first book of the Anabasis, or march up country, Cyrus dies. Since from that time on the Greeks were spending their time getting out of the Persian Empire, the work could more appropriately have been named ‘march down country.’ The rest of the first book is devoted to Xenophon’s description of the virtue of Cyrus. Cyrus’ virtuous qualities are summarized as follows: he was the most modest, more obedient than elders who were inferior in rank; the most devoted to horses and the most skillful in managing them; the most eager to learn, most diligent in practices fondest of hunting and dangerous pursuits; he was trusted and never broke his word; whenever a man conferred any benefit upon him or did him any harm, he always strove to outdo him. Although virtuous in words and deeds, his preference for dangerous pursuits cost him his life. The Greeks, unfamiliar with the news of the death of Cyrus, were fighting a hard but successful battle with Artaxerxes’ troops. Only the next day did it become clear that Cyrus had died, and then Artaxerxes’ companion, Tissaphemes, tried to persuade the Greeks to hand over their arms in exchange for a truce. Xenophon is skeptical of Tissaphernes’ proposal because “we have no other possessions save arms and valour. Now if we keep our arms, we imagine that we can83 make use of our valour also, but if we give them up, then we shall likewise be deprived of our lives” (1998, 153). The generals in Cyrus’ army, especially Clearchus, were interested in a truce and they discussed the possibility of a truce, while keeping their arms, with ‘Tissaphernes. After Clearchus and Tissaphernes both took oaths to their gods not to injure each other, the latter invited all the generals to his home for a dinner party. Clearchus, who again competed with Menon over the leadership position of the complete army, wanted to establish himself in that position by making a deal with ‘Tissaphernes. All generals and high officers were invited to the dinner party at which they were seized and killed by Tissaphernes’ men, All were killed with the exception of Ariaeus, Cyrus’ closest friend, who was sent to the remaining Greek armies with the story that Clearchus had tried to violate the truce and that he was captured thanks to Proxenus and Menon, Ariaeus also pushed the Greeks to give up their arms and surrender to Artaxerxes’ and Tissaphernes’ troops. The Grecks first wanted to discuss ‘the matter with Menon and the other generals, and when they were not allowed to speak with them, they became even more distrustful of the enemies” truce. It became clear that Cyrus’ former friend had joined forces with Cyrus’ enemy, Tissaphernes, and that the generals were all executed. Xenophon concludes the second book with a number of portraits of the Greek generals. Clearchus, the Spartan, is presented as a ‘man who lived for war, a lover of war. He was a harsh commander who punished out of principle; a soldier must fear the commander more than the enemy. Men stayed with him not out of friendship but out of fear for his punishment (1998, 205-7). Proxenus, the Boeotian, studied rhetoric with Gorgias of Leontini. He was a gentleman who could not inspire his soldiers with respect or fear; he was more afraid of the hatred of his soldiers than of their disobeying him (1998, 207-9). Menon, the ‘Thessalian, was eager for wealth and honor by way of perjury and falschood and deception. He felt affection for nobody. A man who was not a rascal, he thought of as, uneducated. He, when still young and beardless, had an older lover, which was considered shocking (1998, 209-11). About Agias, the Arcadian, and Socrates, the ‘Achaean, Xenophon hed nothing more to say than that they were “just fine men” (1998, 213). Xenophon, realizing that the morale of the men was extremely low after the slaughter of the leadership, quickly took over the leadership position. He knew that84 nothing could be more dangerous to them than low morale when they were thousands of miles into enemy territory without any leadership. Xenophon had joined the expedition on the invitation of his friend Proxenus, who was killed with the other generals at the dinner party. Before joining Cyrus, Xenophon discussed this matter with his mentor Socrates. Socrates had advised him to seek advice from the Oracle of Delphi. But instead of asking the oracle whether he had to go, Xenophon asked to which God he had to offer before going. The answer turned out to be Zeus. To the great dismay of his mentor, Xenophon’s question had determined the outcome of the question Socrates had advised him to ask. Now forced by necessity into a leadership position, Xenophon argued in front of the troops that the god would be on their side since “our enemies have swom falsely by them and we have not so we can go into contest with far greater courage” (1998, 231). Xenophon knew that Artaxerxes had high regard for the Greek troops and that he would try to do anything in his power either to destroy them or hunt them out of his empire, “The enemies did not muster up courage to begin hostilities against the G thi s up until they had seized the generals, ing in the chaos it would create they would be easily victorious. Let's show that ‘we can all muster discipline and elect new leaders. Let's show we have not one Clearchus but ten thousand” (1991, 253) ‘The methods employed by Xenophon, as leader of the Ten Thousand, as well as the author of the Anabasis, clearly anticipate Machiavelli's, but his motives do not. Xenophon, as opposed to Machiavelli, was strongly influenced by the supernatural ‘No decision was made without sacrificing to the gods and a reading of the omen. Xenophon believed that the Greeks were under guidance of the gods while marching through Persia. Machiavelli's judgement was not based on rituals, sacrifices and the reading of omens. Two examples will clarify this distinction. Xenophon had a dream that he was caught in fetters and that, when he resisted, the fetters came down from his body, symbolizing that the troops could safely move ahead. After discussing the dream with Cheirisophus and when the sacrifices to the gods came out positively, they decided to go. Machiavelli never discussed his dreams with Piero Soderini, let alone based his decisions on his interpretation of dreams. Further, Xenophon states that the Greeks were saved by divine intervention, ‘when the citadel of the stronghold of the Drilae, which the Greeks were not able to conquer, burned to the ground (1998, 397). Besides dreams, Xenophon describes the