dove The nique Hier plot wigs tere avarded tt the end of the traning pero. The plots would prouly tll tose hated hat the ‘G"stood or guts! Acguirng tags totow the CO-4s ifr training was almost at tata geting ‘the gliders. One method of getting ‘the most from each C47 wre wasto haut WACOs tinder double tow SILENT SSAULT US ARMY GLIDER PILOT TRAINING ITH A MISSION to fly troop and equipment transport gliders, combined with paratroops ‘massed assaults, the US Army glider corps was part of a rapid build-up. Under the relentless pressure of wartime conditions, the team had to mature quickly in ‘order to be ready for aetion when US airborne troops fist deployed. As. result, misconceptions and haste cultivated waste in all aspects of the effort. This was especially evident in the glider pilot training programme, which underwent several marked transformations in recruitment, equipment and curriculum in a short space of time. Despite these problems, a cadre of pilots was created who managed to carry out some challenging combat missions, unlike any achieved before or since ‘When planning for the glider echelon began in February 4941, the inital requirement was for 1,000 glider pilots to support the two new airborne divisions. A new Flying. ‘Training Command (FTO) curriculum had tobe created from. scratch, while suitable training aircraft were acquired and students recruited. Air Corps personnel (Army Air Forces, USAAK, after June 20, 1941) had no prior experience with sliders, having been forbidden to take part in the ‘hazardous sport ince 1931, But the Chief of the USAC, General Henry ‘Hap’ Amold, was a tireless force in propelling the glider programme to meet goals supposting war planning. ‘The UK, which preceded the USA in establishing a glider comps, had at first considered making glider piloting an Additional duty of bomber pilots before choosing to train Army soldiers for the duty. Their American counterparts ‘were always USAAF personnel with a unique qualification, that of working closely with ground troops and landing on the battlefield. In the beginning the leadership believed that formation, night, and instrument flight requirements envisioned for gliders warranted skills equivalent to those instilled via a powered training course. Get Training! The Amy acted quickly to acquire an understanding of glider lying. The Combat Glider Training Program began with a dozen pilots being sent for instruction to the Elmira ‘Area Soaring Corporation School in Elmira, a | Inti nt They and pac ff the period towed alort by ground winch, automobile, and light aireraft. The three-week, 30-hour, programme in June 1941 created a small cadre of knowledgeable officers who helped formulate plans for the glider echelon. Twelve flight instructors were then trained at Elmira through September. The slow pace in establishing the glider programme frustrated General Arnold. On July 7, he ordered a ‘comprehensive plan for pilot training from his chief of staff,sncral Carl Spoate. The fundamental doctrine of hat gliders had yet to be established, as the mission had never been performed and the aireraft did not as yet exist, so planning was built on a great deal of prognostication The envisioned programme was to begin by training 150 existing Army pilots between July and October 1941 to serve as the nucleus of an instructor staff For future advanced bat gliders were available, The students, between 10 and 15 per class, would be trained at civilian Elementary Schools under contract. The same scheme would be followed (instruction on sailplanes) for the 1,000 line pilots, Instruction at the Advanced Army Glider Schools would continue with two-seat gliders, emphasizing tow and providing the transitio the combat gliders then in development Spaatz submitted his plan on August 28, 1941 and it was approved by his boss on September 4, Amold also took on a succession of civilian advisers, experts from the civilian slider community, to fill the service's knowledge and ‘experience gap. ‘Nationwide glider instruction resources had to increase ‘many times over in order to meet Army demand. In July 1940 there had been just 124 registered gliders in the country, along with five schools, and 120 licensed glider pilots, 45 of whom had commercial ratiggs. There was soon keen competition hte instructors oF those who could quiehly quality assuch, Most were Young men willing 10 relocate and live in spartan conditions in order to have the opportunity to fy trom dawn to dusk, six days a week The 150 Officer Power Pilot Program was already behind schedule when it began on September 20, 1941 with the first nine of a 21-man class enrolled at Elmira. The rest were re Dent prepares fora flight with (General Hap Arnold (standing) nthe US Army's st slider, the Scieler TG:2. The event was the Natoma Soaring Contest September 1981 at Ena, New ork ste of the US Army’ fistfider trainin. sox (oot eae the Lister Kaufman 16-44 Showin easly traning ols. AROW/APRIL 2007 ISSUE 126 BEEtobe trained somewhere in the southwest where year-round instruction was possible, For this the largest of the contract schools, Twenty-Nine Palms Air Academy, was formed at Condor Field in the California desert, on the edge of a dry lake bed. The Academy's contract called for training 126 officers between November 30, 1941 and March 21, 1942. Although it was established in November, operations did not star until January 19, 1942. Both locations taught four week courses, with a new’class beginning every other wel seeking 30 hours in sailplanes with launch via winch oF automobile - and aero-tow when a tug was available ~ and ‘with the emphasis on soaring and spot landing. As purpose ‘built military gliders and tow-planes were still lacking, sport aircraft previously employed for civilian instruction continued, that the to be used. The results seemed meagre consider slider programme was aleady a year ol Get Gliders! Without the benefit of much analysis, and with General Amol pressing to move quickly, traning gliders were acquired to-equip contract and Army schools, The solution was to buy spot gliders; two-seat high-performance designs with glide ratios of 20-30:1. Few models were then being produced i the US, and the handful of established manufacturers and, designers were approached in the spring of 1941 to solicit proposals. The smallness of the nation’s glider industry ‘meant that multiple sources had to be pursued to ensure sufficient aircraft could be delivered on an accelerated schedule for the volume of training envisioned. Instead of preparing detailed military specifications, the Air Coxps relied upon established Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) certification guidelines. The fist contract was lt tothe Frankfort Sailplane Company (ater the Aircraft Division of the Globe Corporation), in Joliet, Indiana, for a military version of Its Cinema I two: seat competition glider designed by Stanley Corcoran. The aircraft was slightly stretched to become the training glider 1G-1, a stabiliser and elevator replacing the all-moving tail It possessed a welded steel tube airframe and wood fram surfaces, al fabric covered, The 9201b (417kg) gross weight aircraft had a wingspan of 46ft in (14.Im) and a length of 23ft 21/2in (7.1m) ‘Work began with three experimental XTG-1s ordered on May 26, 1941 for $5,788 and delivered between September 29, 1941 and March 1942. These were subject to flight testing land ground loads trials which verified that the glider met requirements, With some changes, including the addition Of SCR-S8SA radios, the aircraft was found suitable and 40 TG-LAs were ordered in May 1942. Deliveries ran fom J through November ata total cost of $111,016, ot 8 teach. Two more were apparently built offcontract, but subsequently acquired by the Army Despite Frankfort having been the first on contract, the Initial USAAF glider delivered was from the Schweizer Aircraft Corporation of Elmira, which had been asked to manufacture lis wery reputable SGS 28 two-seat high-performance sailplane as the TG-2. This featured a welded steel tube fuselage, al: wing, and aluminium frame control surfaces, with fabric overall. The 860Ib (390kx) aircraft possessed a S2ft (in (15.8m) span and was 2sft 4in (7.7m) long, Three XTG-2s, essentially 2-86 with minor changes, were Asher ptr The tremendous presse to crate ‘combat sider force meant that Jn 1942 taining saiiplanes were ei cgi as quiches ‘he mation’ producers could fur them out dn iaspratioat Danner hans over nwa TDs at Frankfort’ Joliet, Indiana, plant A Schueler Th fs shown nthe Simplified ier dope fish which tres adopted inwartine place of the more ‘lou and traitonal Army The glder was an all.wood and fabric varant ofordered on June 27, 1941 for $6,478 and received in September 1941. The first was delivered to Major Dent, the Materiel Command officer in charge of glider acquisition and testing, atthe 1941 National Soaring Contest at Elmira Where he and General Arnold were photographed in the alrcratt. An order for 18 TG-2s was placed on October 24, 1941 ~ the USAAP?s initial glider production contract ~and the first was delivered in February 1942, with an added an electrical system for lighting. Itwas observed that materials left rom this work could be eadily used in additional glides, and so 14 more TG-2s were ordered in June 1942, the last boeing supplied in July. Total cost was $74,462, or $2,864 per aircraft with trailer. The comparatively low number of TG-2s ordered was the result of a decision to pursue a more suitable variant asthe TG-3. This featured a low-set wing and roomier cockpit, allowing easier access for pilots wearing Army-issue fight ear, and Improving the rear seat instructor's visibility. It also eschewed the use of aluminium in order to conserve the resource for higher priority programmes. The aircraft's lines were simplified for ease of construction in wood. The US Government even built Schweizer a plant at Elmira to speed up production, Three XTG-3s were ordered on October 29, 1941 for $13,209. The static test article was delivered on March 5, 1942 and flight examples by ealy July. However, a contract for 75 TG-3As was placed on March 24, even before light testing, and later increase to 110, All were accepted between August 1942 and July 1943 for $440,416, ot $4,004 each with trailer [At 1,2001b (44h), the TG-3 wing spanned att Oin(16.5m) and the overall length was 27ft7in (8.4m), Manufacturing, tually reached a rate of one per day. The fourth production sailplane was derived from Jack Laister’s pre-war ‘Yankee Doodle” single-seater. Although Jack did not represent a production company, the Army Invited him to submit a bid. He joined forces with St Louis stockbroker John R Kauffmann to undertake production, and the Laister-Kauffman Aircraft Corporation proved exceptionally competent, unlike most of the other ‘start ups’ the Air Forces worked with on gliders. aister Kauffman’s product was the two-seat LK-10A glider, or TG-4, which had a fuselage of welded stee! tube and ‘wood frame aero surfaces all fabric-covered. Wingspan was Soft Oin (15.3m), length 21f¢ din (6.5m), and gross wei 875Ib (397kg) A static test article and three XTG-as were bordered for $10,045 on a contract of October 8, 1941. The ground test specimen was delivered ahead of schedule on The flight tne at Twety-Nine Palins Air Academy, Condor Fld i he southern California desert nthe Summer of 1942. The ets made up most of AAs, lus some pre-war ian types. Apress day at Twenty Nine Pas ino atioof 16-28 ands ready for tow ofthe dy lakebed adjacent the eld. sara ‘MARQAPRIL 2007 SUE 20 BEIshea tiple aco tow by a Stinson (049, Such cian tow planes were ted until Army ‘models were provided S08 firs December 2, the testing completed on the 27th. Th flight-worthy example arrived in late February, less than 90 days after go-ahead, Although the rest of the XTG-4 flight test gliders took most of 1942 to complete the Air Forces pressed alnead with proiction. Minor changes, ineluding the alton ofthe SCR-S8S radio, yielded the TG-4A which was the frst slider order: 75 were requested on March 4, 1942, and 75 ‘more in July. This made the TG-A the most produced US training sailplane of the war, The fst production algcraft was delivered in July 1942 and the balance in June 1943 for around $800,000, at a unit cost of $4,062. ‘Search for all-wood types ‘tone point in 1942 the Wat Department plannes to acquire {646 training sailplanes of the TG-1 through -4 types. But this would clearly have stressed the production capacity of the small manufacturers beyond their limits. Directives stated that gliders were to be procured only from firms not already engaged in priority War Department work. As a ‘some contracts went to less-experienced firms. The results clearly showed the risk this entailed, The bad news stemmed from the USAAF effort to eliminate ‘metal from the trainers. In searching for another source for TG-8s, a June 15, 1942 contract for SO articles was given to Air Glider Inc of Barberton, Ohio. The firm, headed by Dr Frank Gross, had only been formed on June 4 that year. The Army quickly discovered that Air Glider had Virtually no experience, personnel, or the resources to build anything. That it got a contract at all suggest influence from, ‘on high’. As might have been expected, the company’s performance was very poor, with months going by before iteven established production facilities. It insisted that the Schweizer plans had errors and received a TG-3 fr reference. Still i failed to deliver, yet efforts to kill the contract were ‘met with opposition from a powerful Oho congressman, It was May 10, 1943 before the job could be cancelled ~ after $415,421 had been spent on a single aiecrat taken up in July as the last USAAF World Wat Two training glide, this was pethaps the most expensive sallplane ever “...ABTER $415,421 HAD BEEN SPENT ON A SINGLE AIRCRAFT... THIS WAS PERHAPS THE ‘MOST EXPENSIVE SAILPLANE EVER.” Three contracts were let for new all-wood designs. One of these —for a side-by-side seating trainer - went to another startup, Wichita Engineering Company of Wichita Falls Texas, Three XTG-10s were ordered on June 25, 1942 for $10,500. However the company fell far behind schedule and sought additional funds amounting to more than six times the orginal contract value, By summer 1943 it was lear that the Army did not require additional sailplanes and it moved tocancel the XTG-10. Work was finally halted in November and what there was ofthe three gliders was collected. Hawley Bowlus had a good reputation asa sallplane designer and builder. Consequently, Bowlus Sailplanes Inc of San Fernando, California, was awarded a $14,000 contract on April 28, 1942 to construct four all-wood two-seat trainers By January 1943, the company had not delivered anything, Dut requests to ce-negotiate the contract, After months of| effort, twas finally cancelled on August S.A single XTG-12 had flown in summer 1942 at Twenty-Nine Palms and this machine was taken up by the Army. The third all wood trainer was ordered via a June 26, 1942, $9,000 contract to Briegle Sailplane Corp of Bevery Hil California, Its XTG-13 possessed 40ft 4in (12.3m) span, Isft 7¥/ain (3.7m) length, and 445Ib (202kg) maximum gross weight. The firm was late delivering its fist twin tandem glider, finally doing so in November 1942 while seeking additional funding, The contract was cancelled on. February 3, 1943 when the remaining alrcraft were still not forthcoming, One TG-13A was testflown at Twenty-Nin Palms where it was apparently wrecked, The remaining, ‘example was collected and $3,000 paid, Through the Roof A detalle plan for mass traning ofthe 1,000 glider pitots ‘sas finally put forth on December 2, 1941 and approved ‘on December 20 Instruction would follow the four-week pattern before moving on to the Advanced course on actual transport glides, However, the US entry into Word War Two EE Ww. meenTHUSIAST. COM‘made it clear that transferring power pilots to the ranks of slider pilots was unworkable By the end of December, a new scheme was devised for recruiting glider pilot trainees from within the ranks or as new recruits. The initial qualifications were completion ff civilian power pilot training or at least 30-houts glider time and meeting the physical requirements of Army powered pilots. More unusual was the radical decision to, {rain enlisted personnel with promotion to Staff Sergeant upon graduation. However, the pendulum now swung to the opposite side ~ there was a mistaken belief that flying sliders would be easy and the pilots readily trained, with few proficiency requirements The 1,000 Glider Pilot Training Program was approved with, the intention of graduating al personnel by January 1, 1943. Twenty-Nine Palms was the site of a 30-hour Preliminary course, which would be followed by an Advanced course fon combat gliders at an as-yet unidentified site. However even before the programme could get underway, Amold threw everything into uncertainty when on April 1, 1942 he raised the requirement to 4,200 glider plots, with 2,000 required by January 1, 1943 and the rest by July 1 The fei of potential glider pilots had tobe greatly expands Revised qualifications for candidates, established on April 13, ‘were initially similar to those already promulgated. Those accepted were officers or enlisted personnel between 18 land 35, volunteers from within the ranks or new recruits Prior fying experience was measured by a pilot certificate from a powered course, or a glider pilot with 30 hours or 200 glider flights. No one who had ‘flunked out’ of a pilot programme would be accepted. The individual had to complete screening and physical tests, with passing seores reduced from those for power pilots The US Army had never before faced such a challenge in pilot taining, But the curriculum adopted on April 15, 1942 to meet the 4,200-pilot requirements paralleled the earlee plan, with 30 houts in twin-gliders over four weeks plus 72 houts of ground school Included were 2!/2 hours Instrument insteuction (hooded) and one-hout night tow. Advanced instruction was envisioned as SO hours, but was at that time tentative. Preliminary Schools were already boeing placed on contract Planning was upset again on May 8, 1942 when 6,000 pilots became the goal, with 3,000 needed by September 1 and the test by the end of the year. Part of the motivation for this was ealy strategic intent for the Allies to return to Europe in 1943. To meet the new requirement, plans were reformulated, reducing the training period to increase the ro In adton to ow planes, procured custom brut winches or sound taunching Yeas supped y he Glier Equipment Company and photographed fn summer 1942 Pains. A staged phat ofa ‘and to Army Stent dr plots beside w 762 [ARMY GLIDER TRAINING SITES Prtiminary Sebols ly Fig Saves Grrl ts, Nth Data Mier Wit, Css, Mores eran Sol ot aes Rots, Mines Hn Fy Sevi Manta Mrest2 art van Conpry, State, ‘res: Moray Aiae Conga, Jars Wscans k Aniasan ‘Ar Actes. Antigo, scan 140 aang Sore. isu Kans (0 Og ArtCar Gone Kansas Hum Pig Service, peo ih Sone ined, Otho 10 Hat fyrgevi.Ha, ans 10 Anan an Beran leg Saree, Aree. Sout Dak enh Stanes ying Seve, un. sans Ps Ae ways Mo, Cala i ute Car fyeg Sere, Cov New Mao fe Ba Stig yg ‘Savin, Ba Sri, Tsar Ct edo Aas Sv, Peni, Te 2 {Surin capsiyinprertos lomentary Advanced Gliders Schools Contract Sets: ii Nea Sasing Cort. Motil Aba lowing nor Jn Wi ide Sonal ame, Ta: Twenty Nv Pal Ae, “wont Nina Pams Cao ‘Ae Fores Schoo: Ani, Texas Dart, Tows vant to Aderod Schl Litto Teas Wi Yrs bow, Oi Fort Soe: New enzo (tarstanedta Aden Seo Elementary Scots amt Teas Oe Osama Taare Now Moxa Fat Moga Clan Fit Kansas avo, Teas Basic Gier Schools Gruvil, Sut acne Maile, Abana; Veta, Olstema anes, Texas “warty Pans Car Ra ig cary Went Air Fo. Sune Now Mase: Stale, Missi ‘Advanced Sohoal ‘erSunner New Meso. Daan Ts Sata AtansasteLotre acy ‘tse hare Veil, Calli: South Pts AF io Tas Replacement Centres opts {etre Oia Smyra Terese, en Start Akansas Rado, “oa Star, Cat inter etn Fl anv New Mei) graduation rate. Light aicraft instruction was added as the ‘most expedient means of training, via ‘deadstick’ landings. Students would get four weeks, 30 hours, in aircraft followed by one week, eight hours, in sailplanes, and then one week, eight hours, in transpor gliders. ‘On May 11, 1942all Army units were instructed to promote the glider pilot programme within the ranks However, owing tocontinuing lacklustre recruitment, only about a third of the first classes, starting June 1, were filled. Schools ran at reduced capacity. The programme was behind once again. Something dramatic had to be done. As one measure, the Army turned to the CAA, which,sent letters to 85,000 certificated pilots advertising the programme. Public recruitment was widespread, Even the Selection of non-volunteers was considered, which would have marked a significant departure ftom tradition Instead, ‘on June 11 the decision was made to accept personel with no prior flight teaining and to promote everyone to Staff Sergeant upon entering the programme, Students who had washed out ofa pilot course were now accepted provided they had not been outed because of a flying deficiency: Physical and test score requirements were further lowered. The deadline forthe 3,000-pilot requirement was extended to September 28, Entrants lacking flight experience were labeled Class By students, while those with previous training were Class A Instruction for Class B began at Preliminary Light Plane Gliding Schools with 5 weeks, 40 hours - 21 houts solo - of light aircraft day/night instruction (Phase I), and then 2 weeks, 15 hours of ‘deadstick’ landings (Phase ID. Class A students entered the programme in the Preliminary Phase with 4 weeks/30 hours. Both groups then went to an Hlementary-Advanced Glider School for 1 week, 8 hours, in win government contracts, with power institutions now emphasised. Eighteen new Preliminary Schools had to be formed to join the two contract and five USAAF Flementary Advanced Schools already operating. The short timeline meant that many of the activities intially operated out of tents By the end of June 1942, recruitment goals were finally being met. The glider pilot candidates, as a whole, were ff a different educational and social calibre than the usual aviation cadets, and were, on average, older. Many ‘were more motivated by the promise of flight pay, rapid ‘advancement and combat assignments than by the notion, fof an aviation career, although the glamour of flight was certainly’ factor Just as the programme settled into a working routine its {goals were altered again, On August 10, 1942 Washington Set the pilot requirement at 7,800 by March 1, 1943, with the course to continue producing graduates at 12,000 per year with no final number stated, The programme was once Again expanded to graduate 700 pilots every two weeks through February 1943 and 462 thereafter. Pes Se ‘one of tvo-sea gliders, to include formation landings. After this came a planned 1 week, 8 hours, in the 9- or 15-place cargo gliders then being developed, plus 60 hours ground school, which would include light aircraft maintenance The course content was not rigidly followed by the schools, and some of it was altered by the USAAF over the following ‘months in order to meet short-term exigencies. The dual instruction paths only complicated matters, with schools running dozens of students through either phase at any he revised programme required many more training sites, to be rapidly established across the country to handle the ‘massive influx of students, Civilian schools sprang up £0 The US glider industry was straining to produce Army gliders ata high rate, but the numbers were simply insufficient to ‘meet the volume of training. To solve this problem, the USAAF ‘appropriated’ nearly all the serviceable civilian sliders in the country. Unlike many transport aircraft that were commandeeted or impressed, the War Department paid the ownets for the sport sailplanes. However, they ‘were given no option for refusal and received only what the government deemed fair compensation. Sixty-one gliders were bought between April and August 1942 for a total 386,60, or an average $1,421 each. Many were single-seat ‘machines, some with open cockpits and most of litte real military value The commercial gliders were a very mixed lot of foreign Bowtus 16-12 In ight test at Twenty Nine Pals of 199. and domestic products or one-off designs. Many were built by enthusiasts rather than manufacturers, so workmanship varied widely. Acquiring the pats to maintain this menagerie \was frustrating. Few of the appropriated machines survived their Army service; either being destroyed in mishaps or deteriorating after being set aside. However, the Army did not have to rely on this assortment for long. Tehad quickly been recognized that sailplanes were not ideal trainers for anyone intending to fly the combat gliders then | being developed. This, along with the quantity problem, prompted Hap Amold, in the summer of 1942, to seek advice from his friend Charles Stanton, CAA administrator. sexing Goppingen 3 Minima was preiously owned by person close the Army lider programme ano, Fo its way to righ ld be photeruphe. nS aRowaPR 2007 ISSUE 28 ED‘Working with engineer Harold Hoeksta, in three days Stanton conceived the conversion of light civil aircraft into gliders by removing the engines and adding a third seat, installing a skid under the elongated nose, extending the vertical stabilizer forward, and reducing the height of the landing gear, All three seats had flight controls and basic instruments. The Aeronca Model 651 Defender was the basis forthe design It was squat and unattractive, but had the low ground attitude and about 10:1 glide ratio more closely approximating that of transport gliders, Stanton then telephoned Lee Smith, president of Aeronea, to ask if his company would be willing, to manufacture such gliders. Smith agreed, ‘Aeroneca Aircraft Corp of Middletown, Ohio, was placed on Army contract on July’ 8, 1942 to build three XTG-Ss derived from its L- military liaison variant of the Defender. As a "measure of the value of working with a highly experienced high-volume manufacturer, Aeronca had the fist XTG-S ready In just two days, nine days after the idea was fist proposed “The type was accepted by the Alt Forces on July 22, Equipment Shortfalls In July, Flying Teaining Command had an immediate nes for 934 light trainers, 144 one- and two-place sailplanes ora like ‘numberof three-place gliders, and 180 cargo glidets, At that time Materiel Command could provide none of the promised three-plae gliders and no transport machines Liaison airraft were transferred from other activities, and May’and some June 1942 prosction was diverted to the schools, the Stinson e-L and Piper Ll being prominent. It was not until August and September that necessary equipment finally arrived in meaningfal numbers, Programme capacity by summer 1942 was 3,336 students, ‘with 834 entering instruction each week. However, the number of aircraft was simply inadequate fortis instructional load and students were backing up in the system, On July 18 it became necessary to slow the flow temporarily, and some schools closed. reduced goal of 1,500 fully qualified glider pilots by September 26,nd another i,SO0 by December 31, was adopted. This may have been tolerated by strategic planning that had proonype Bree fown a Twenty Nine Pls where ‘tas reputedly wrecked. an “AERONCA HAD THE FIRST XT'G-5 READY IM JUST TWO DAYS, NINE DAYS AFTER THE IDEA WAS FIRST PROPOSED.” Fight testing quickly showed the conversion to bea suitable training glider. Consequently the service turned to the light aircraft industry to rapidly build hundreds of similar gliders, With the XTG-5 as an example, Tayloreraft and Piper made similar conversions of thei liaison designs, All vhs defied the eal edict not to use firms already engaged in military production - but the problem of training glider quantities ‘was rapidly solved The Aeronca contract was extended to 250 T6-5s. Again, the wisdom of the approach was validated when the company delivered $0 within a month, and all but one of the total between July and December 1942. The government spent around $565,000 for the projec, of a unit price of $2,236, Seventy-five were deployed tothe China-Burmalnclia theatre forpilot currency and low-volume priority combat missions, The airraft grossed out at 1,2601b (572k) with its 35 Sin (10.8m) wingspan. The TG-6 was derived from the Taylorcrat -2 (civil Model DC-65 “Tandem. Taylorcraft, based in Alliance, Ohio, called the glider the Model S100 for tanton-laylorcratt- possibly a joke. Modifications closely paralleled those of the TG-s. The company received a contract for 250 on July 23, 1942 and deliveries spanned August 2 to November 28. The cost was $656,754, or $2,596 per aircraft. Wingspan was 35ft Sin (10.8m), length 25ft 21/ain (7.7m), and a gross weight (of 1,2601b (571k). The thied three seat glider conversion was based on the Piper aH (civil J3C Cub). Piper, of Lock Haven, Pennsylvania, signed a contract for 250 TG-8s on August 19, 1942. These ‘had a through axle and hydraulic brakes, plus a steerable tail wheel. All were accepted between September 11, 1942 and April 1943 for $533,435, of $2,108 per aircrat. pushed the re-entry to the Continent back a year. The L-ls served as preliminary trainers as well as for tow: Other tow-planes eventually included the Vultee BE-3 and IES Valiant, and Stearman (1-17 Kaydet. Link trainers had also been introduce to the Hlementary-Advanced course, with about eight hours, although these were of limited usefulness for gliders. Actual instrument fight instruction, no matter how brie, as hindered bya lack of suitable equipment which meant that some students were passed without the training. Aircraft were not the only deficiencies. Instructors proved dificult to secure. The problem was partially resolved by ‘keeping certain graduates on as instructors. However, the quality ‘of ground schooling particularly suffered and standardised instructional texts were completely lacking. Individual Institutions created or procured what they needed, though without uniformity until Army manuals began tobe distributed in 1943, 4s “ficient taining ‘Miers forthe “my were those ‘comertd frm Tight planes, ke the Aeonca TS her, Hundred of such ers ‘stonishingh shart time to fila ne derived from the Taylor 1-2tghptaesue The hin of nts the 768, with the famous Piper ot. sn sss An unknown lt poses fora hero ptr” se @'7G5at the Jahn HH Wison Ger Tes. 300 F “i The hoped-for 40-hour Advanced course required 369 transport gliders to meet the graduation numbers, plus trickle to replace a 3% attrition or supplement grounded machines Alike number of Douglas C-47 Skytrain or C-53 Skytrooper tugs were also essential. But FTC was told to expect only 90 sliders and $2 C-17s for the time being. The WACO CG-3A, hha been procured asa nine-place combat glcer, but evolving tactics had quickly determined that the 15-place WACO CG 4 Haig (or Hadrian) would be the principal assault aircraft The 100 CG-3s were devoted to taining, but these did not satisfy the requirement for advanced training on the CG-4 prior to graduation, Fist conceived in May 1941, the CG-4A, ‘was frustratingly long in reaching training units The first CG-ts were delivered on September 11, 1942 a ‘month later than planned. But the numbers were initially low and by late September the chronic shortage of gliders and tow-planes made it impossible to attain the numerical training goals, Production of C-47s was slowly ramping up and the few aircraft then available were heavily committed to other duties. It took a conference of general officers in July 1942 to assign an embryonic force of Troop Carrier ‘Command (TCC) tow-planes, the 61st Troup Carrer Group, Intended asa ‘combat der the production before 6-4. The Cs wove: Chasen as the US army's primary tctcal fransprt ler the WACO C644 ‘leo had to serve This carly erample has ets to suppor initial training, with the 63rd due to follow in November. The entire production run of Lockheed C-60A Lodestars through January 1943 (79 of 129 machines) was directed tothe programme as tow-planes. These freed up one fof the TCC groups, but the schools had to pilot the C-60s ‘with their own personnel The first group of the 60 men remaining from the original 150 power pilots finally received their CG-4 course (about two hours transition) at the Elementary-Advanced Schoo! in Lockbourne, Ohio, in September 1942, They were then | distributed throughout the Advanced Schools as instructors The Army formed advanced courses in five locations Even when the WACOs began to appea, they were occasionally grounded to fx design deficiencies or manufacturing defects For the first few months typically 50% of the CG-s were grounded. Some ofthe problems stemmed simply from lack ‘of familiarity with the operation andl care ofthe new aecraft Also, as with any new aircraft rushed tothe fe, logistics and ‘depot support was not yet in place Concludes in 4129, the May/June 2007 issue, published on April 27 a MARCWAPRIL 2007 SUE 128 ELst lider, a SccierT6-2, for flight ater beng removed ict copy of sucess tion desig twas contracted in he spn of three months 4 tn atkoscs MASA tt, Read Co LNE-1 was ull for Navy and Marine Corps side plot taining an fstured usual desde eating. ramen 143 aad the ders were transfered tthe Aras the TG-2, though they were simply A Schler Tn clan markings ha porate nea the noses sed to lower the The TG-} was an improved T6-2, mae sltabl 1 hw ARENTHUSASTOM,SILENT US ARMY GLIDER PILOT TRAINING BILL NoRTON ITH SIX MONTHS of experience through late summer 1942, glider pilot training became more efficient and effective. The profusion of types and models of appropriated sport gliders mntract-built two-place trates were a burden. The glide ratios were not representative of combat gliders in {evelopment and sorte rate was slow. Consequently, these re not ideal as military trainers, even when towed aloft on double or triple aero-tows. The three-place gliders began to displace the sallplane in the autumn of 1942, While more ,eof transport lider, these could not be ground Even with two students aboard, they were still only effective for instruction on aero-tow and use of spoilers forspot landings. By mid July 1942.ll ground launches had. been dropped ~as wells soaring instruction, such as use of and t weeks, 35-45 hours, in SO to Intplanes plus 240 hours of students streaming CPT course was ei 6shp (26 10 48.4KW) ground school. The 2,150-plus from the CPT were not always acceptable, as so ‘were physically disqualified from glider training or insufficiently ver, this part of the programme came to an end on January 15, 1943 as the requisite number of pilo passed out, Inthe autumn of 1942 the curriculum shifted to four separate four-week stages. Class B. students received 30 hours in power-planes at Preliminary Schools. These and the Class A candidates then received 30-hours of instruction at Elementary Glider Schools, followed by 30 hours in taining gliders at Basic Glider Schools, and then a planned 4@hours in transport gliders at Advanced, Glider Schools. Basi teaching included some instrument, night, and navigation ined. Ho Bach stage took place at a different Tocation, keeping the students moving eee) ies ew fom the Perrier nr ro anne sot: The unique Pens pena cone enn ois air ed AY/IUNE 2007 SUE 29fother than operation and maintenance. However, some fundamental content was soon established. Glicer development and tactics maturation in the US and the UK made it clear that combat gliders would most likely bbe nothing more than winged trailers towed overa landing zone at no more than a few thousand feet and released for couple of minutes of fight. Furthermore, the CG-4A, a ‘comparatively simple aircraft, was found to be relatively easy to fly. After February 1943, when WACOs had been introduced in sufficient numbers to be used earlier in pilot training, and with most of the students having passed through the Preliminary and Elementary stages, instruction. ‘was further streamlined to a single stage on CG-4s, This ‘created a stable training environment in which standardised Content, methods, and training materials could be developed and disseminated. But it was still May 1943 before CG-4 and Douglas C-47 Skytrain availability, and student load pressures, began to eas Pile-Up By the autumn of 1942 the glider pilot programme was running at full team, but itil appeared that the mandated rate of graduation would not be met, principally because of equipment shortages. Only 300 students, 75 from each Advanced course, were moving along every two weeks. Only 1,800 pilots were expected to graduate by September 28, at arate of 200 a month, or just 2,035 by March 1, 1943, Little could be done to alter the situation so these numbers were accepted. The goa lly in accord with real capabilities. But on September 30 new objectives were set at 4,000 graduates by March 1, 1943 and 400 per month afterwards through to the end of that year, or a total of just Towards the end of 1942 there were 10,294 trainees in the programme. It was taking nine months to move a student through the 16 weeks of instruction, When pupils exceeded available capacity forthe next schools they were moved to ‘replacement centre pools’ to await openings. At the time only 3,258 of them were actively engaged in training: 1,451 via CPT, with the remaining 5,585 languishing in these ‘pools’. An average of six months was spent at these typically remote and dreary bases with litle of nothing to {do and the men were given only meagre information about what to expect. Although some remedial measures were taken, such as half-hearted attempts at infantry training and lightplane availability, morale ~as well as flight proficiency ummeted “AM AVERAGE OF SIX MONTHS WAS SPENT AT THESE TYPICALLY REMOTE AND DREARY BASES WITH LITTLE OR NOTHING TO DO...” Immediate measures to ease the backlog included bringing to an end the training of Class B students in early October 1942, and new ones ceased being recruited on November 16, basic instruction increased to two months ~ one month of ‘deadstick’ work in lightplanes and one in training gliders stil at contract schools, while the Elementary phase was eliminated, Schools began to close at an increasing rate. By th time these courses ceased In March 1943, 8,520 Elementary And 6,760 Basic stage pupils had graduated, with less than 5% washout rate. Twenty-Nine Palms passed out its last class In March 1943. In 13 months of operation it had insteucted 1,240 glider pilots, ‘washing out’ only 39, At the end it had 59 gliders and 17 tow-planes ‘On December 21, 1942 Hap Arnold unexpectedly directed that the Advanced instruction be shortened again to just eight hours to accelerate training. This apparently arbitrary decision would clearly produce pilots with inadequate training and it generated discontentment throughout the programme. It evolved to include three hours of solo flight, and two night flights, one of them solo, Flight 3s co-pilot or passenger was added in an effort to somehow supplement the meagre stick time It was proposed that 9,295 glider pilots would be graduated by October 27, 1943 after which the training programme would probably be shut down. However, the autumn of 1942 had seen hesitation in buying thousands more CG-4, suggesting that fewer pilots would be required than had been previously stated. However, the operational commands were able to make better educated assessments of glider needs as part of integrated airborne assaults and so expressed a need for 6,290 WACOs by 1944, As combat gliders and pilots reached operational units in early 1943, new considerations came into play. Airborne Command and TCC saw the need for only 6,000 gliders and a commensurate number of pilots that year, or as Few as 4,000 men, with no practical ‘means of dealing with a surplus until units began deploying ‘overseas, These Commands were only just learning how to employ their assets and were understandably hesitant to give gliders priority without better appreciation of theit potential contribution, Adltionally, the new TCC groups found it difficult to accommodate glider pilots and their aircraft, with suitable proficiency training, until the units ‘were well established, Clearly some advance planning had been lacking 0 ofthe men most Inflcntal Inthe US Army hae programme ‘nas Corps ‘ef Genera ‘Tap’ Aol (tear) and Major Fred Dent (ron. They are tying out the Army's fist slider Sweet 6-2 during September 1911 in New York: Reputable sapame maker Hawley Bowlus ‘businessman, cventual fy, Inthe Calorie too late and with too ite evidence of production ‘apa 0With these and other mixed signals, on February 11, 1943 there came anew direction that only 4,054 glider pilots were required, on hand by December 31, 1943, With 636 already graduated, this left 3,418 to train during the year. The rate ff graduation was to be slowed to 250 per month. Schools ‘woitld he closed commensurate with this plan The upshot of all this was that thousands of students, including all those in or awaiting Elementary and Basic instruction, were directed to other assignments. he disposition of 7,321 excess glider pilot trainees was determ ned by April 1, 1943: 1,929 personnel continued in the programme. Of the others, those who had entered the programme from within the service were reassigned. Those from civilian life were either ditected to other training oF allowed to separate, although the Army expected few would choose the latter option in light of the wartime emergency But so deep was the disillusionment that 1,147 of these men stepped! out of uniform, Even Keel With a focus simply on getting CG-4 pilots into the field rather than creating well-rounded airmen, the programme Could be reduced to essentials. By the summer of 1943 all the sailplanes were idled. Even the need for the three-seat trainers had passed, although this came when some 238 were still tobe delivered. Despite the fact that they would simply ne stored, Materiel Command decided to let production run its course. On August 5, 1943, the Air Forces also received 88 training gliders from the Navy’s aborted combat glider effort. As these had no role at that late stage, they joined the hundreds of others in what was fast becoming a storage problem. Some semblance of stability in the progeamme permitted concentration on effective taining, Pilots who continued to linger while awaiting training were provided with lightplane flight time and infantry training, both of which later proved valuable in-theatre, The reduced flow of students made it possible to concentrate all CG-4A, training at South Plains in Lubbock, Texas, by mid-April 1943, The Advanced course returned to the four week, hour, curriculum, By Apri 1943, Lockheed C-60 Lodestars hhad taken over all tow duties. The instruction continued tocontain night, formation, and navigation taining with a minimum 20 landings. Ground school was 105 hours with a good balance of military indoctrination, physical and combat training. Many of the students also attended a glider mechanics course at neatby Sheppard Held, Texas. Pest nce seat ier trainer, at acy, ready tf eof omverting las ghplane Despite the change in instruction requirements, Lubbock still required 114 CG-4As, but had only 90 owing to continued maintenance and logistics issues. Training, with these precious few aircraft emphasized safety and ‘preservation of materiel’. However, t was accepted that tore tactical training had to be introduced to ensure that pilots were truly combat-ready. Consequently, in August 1943 activities such as tactical landings, double towing of two CG-4s behind a single tug, ‘snatching’ a glider out of short feld by a passing tow-plane, contour cross-country tow (maximum 200% - 60m), landing over obstacles with ‘minimum ground roll, landing on the fuselage skis, and instrument instruction in the Link Trainer were added, However, this content could only be inserted by an inctease to 25 hours, This was approved in mid-August provided the course did not exceed a month and the graduation rate remained unchanged. The instructors finally felt good about the capabilities of the pilots they were passing out. As the time for graduating the frst glider pilots approaches the service had to face the discomfort felt by many traditionalists within the officer comps atthe idea of enlisted. personnel with minimal training piloting Army altcrat Some of the men being awarded wings had as litle as 16 0.35 hours of flight instruction, although the averag usually much more. The USAAF hit on the Flight Officer (FO) rank 35 @ compromise, established on November 21, 1942, Similar to Warrant Officer, it wasn’t quite a non ‘an officer, Even the wings awarded at com and not quit {graduation were different; a'G’ superimposed on the centre ‘were senior officers who felt the entire da waste shield Still, ther slider echelon scheme had been misbegotten a ff resources. Resistance and antipathy was encountered throughout the war. “SOME OF THE MEN BEING AWARDED WINGS HAD AS LITTLE AS 16 TO 35 HOURS OF FLIGHT INSTRUCTION, ALTHOUGH THE AVERAGE WAS USUALLY MUCH MORE.” After a year of tumultuous effort, the fist 20 glider pilots sgracuated at Stuttgart, Arkansas, on November 23, 1942, By July 31, 1943 the programme had graduated 3,081 pilots: another 1,000 were anticipated by the end of that year. On August 21 the 1944 glide pilot requirement was set at 200 per month, This reflected continued production of combat gliders and some growing appreciation of their role. Nev Standards required that the trainees, stil enlisted USAAF personnel, come in with power experience - such as CAAD> AY DUNE 2007 ISSUE 29 IEWORLD waR Two Few ofthe aircraft employed inthe US combat ier programme could be considered elegant and the TG was farthest fom such am accolade, Bull by Piper, the type provided ficient rating for tough business. Sons si MSN footnoted Osean 16-3.) TGIAM0+21 94, C1), Ose 826193 Sek KA 29608-2061 2579845925, 57188, 57198, BADSTI6 516-570, “S72, CASTE, ST, $78, DAZSTIS Nets: pporista2aaAprecush NCSE20 and NSE29,' Clana le sat wh x30} coring 5714 a NRS202 coming 7180, C Crea IB wich NCD “57S el HC320 acme STB are NIL. 5706, 0 Can PC? ested Cora sls pr NSAZ27 Schwa XT6-215, 1628+ 18 10:2807+ 12) asqueed 192 Sere 4.295121 29616242 57a -725, 4682204654, SOT S02, STD 57,2 5090 <8), €77, 5718 $7198, AZ0) 5728 ows. 88 2876-2 apo wth N24 econ 7189 ae NESE Denny S705, 2am Naw as LN 5g 143 a USAAF so ‘Sehwoter 76-35) 1-30)-seur 82843 Sess 1702 14704, A 4252824 2868, $207 311 ows 585112 ‘Air ier 7-34) sce 9 Seals 4250574, (282575 5202 crol) aster Xottnan X7G-(3) 1-10 1-48 -cxgod a2 Set KAZ 4057 A967 ATS] a 2.5720 -5098, 42ST U0 Yana Dae Tr eee BOSE posit sre at Yaka eae ‘Aeronea XT Sand T6525) 182 Sra 24800260, 4257228 SH era A240 285 fine 6122961 Nets: Covers of, contacto, 310 Naw as LN reed ToylrerftXTO-andT-6125)- su 942 ‘Sle 25861 S01, rer NT 3.12696 0-88 BUN 38426. 9600 training of aviation cadet “washouts' ~ so that only the Advanced course was required, Focus Shift Troop Cartier Commanel began receiving gliders in quantity luring the first months of 1943, working towards a goal ff 38 per squadron. However, it was still months before ‘operational traning came together. This was partally because the required skills were till being defined, but also because it required a new level of co-ordination and co-operation between the ground and air elements. Airborne doctrine and tactics were still nthe formative stage. Considerable texperimentation and establishment of safe practices was tundertaken, and there were frequent changes in training content, Sceptics sil had to be won over to the combat ots: Comoro of 29ST, 250 Navy a NT an tara it ltr Nay 8 DUNT orb ing Piper XT6-tand T6880) soci Swat 25008258 freriNP 4210-26 Baez 3647 Note: ann XTGsated 250 oo eta Noy FNP edit Wichita EmineringXT610(0)- ore 82 Suit 425717 Note: Cot canst pot conary permanent ber Bowles 76-12\o0310-24(-suaso 192 Sel KZ 968000 6802457200 Nos X65 net eat, coats opr dacseprerma, ‘Aimee PUBS Brieglob xT613() 416132) sero 042 Set 2.96879.2.57188-$780 Nos 85-8, A626 own coal careln to er mracser promi oppingen T6201 seq 882 Sls 2571685775578, 57208 Nous: erg G1 Wet NCTE 7175 apport, rest ult undercoat Las Koatnan Prat, Read CoTG-3275)- zit 49 Seri 3.3808 19574-49291 -4391 Nasr Ny NES tones, otra gS, 198 ToloreratTE.30)- sos 84 Sera 28562 Fas 166 rect eprom peach potential of the transport glider ‘With delivery of the CG-4As to the field lagging, early shortage of spares, and TCC initial focus on cargo and parattoop operations, glider operations were slaw in coming, Up to speed. Some TCC groups were deploying overseas without their glider echelon. The 108 glider pilots per group, assigned faster than the resources were available to support them, were largely idle during this period, and morale and proficiency suffered, Local ground courses were organised but there was no opportunity to log hours enough even to ‘eam flight pay ‘One measure which addressed pilot inactivity was the ‘creation of the Glider Pilot Combat Training Unit at Bowman Field, Kentucky, in April 1943, Here comprehensive taining, was Cartied out for men en route to their TCC assignments, 1 Wo. AmEENTHUSIAST. COMPart of this included flying precision landings over an Improvised SOft barrier ~ stich asa wall of bamboo poles or a sheet stretched between posts - toa n point a fev hundred feet from the obstacle. The stents also ings, in which the gliders approached ‘get down speedily where field length or obstacles wete not an overriding concer. But, a slow final ipproach over obstacles to a modest landing speed was favoured, although an initial speedy descent was taught to avoid enemy ground fire. Instruction also sougt basic military skills and battlefield capabilites, in addition. to knowledge for the combat employment of the CG-44, Eventually, squadron training an large-scale manoeuvres in glider pilot knowledge br skills to be reinforced. Those involved in exercises went back to their units and, along with field manuals which began to appear in 1943, helped guide more practical training, This process continued after units deployed and training continued overseas, especially in concert with British airborne forces. As initial combat experience was evaluated and airborne tactics evolved, refinements of the (CG-4A were introduced ancl new techniques taught, these being instilled through continuing training and exercises. At the end of 1944, the Advanced Glider Training Base was established at Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina, where in 30 days students were given intensive taining simulating ‘combat conditions in manoeuvres. ‘Combat operations in Europe showed how vital gliders were to aizborne operations as part of major offensives. Consequently, the autumn of 1944 brought a final surge in glider orders, Most of the combat operations had been -MaYUNE 2007 SUE 29 HEEperformed without co-pilots because many glider pilots were held in reserve for other potential short-notice assaults. This Increased the risk should the pilot be incapacitated, These factors raised the need for additional glider pilots To meet this requirement, the Alt Forces returned to the ‘original intent ofthe taining programme; diverting powee pilot course graduates. By this time the US had a surplus of newly-minted pilots and so could send many off for quick slider conversion, Practice had shown that fully-trained power pilots could fly the CG-4 proficiently after afew hours instruction whereas many glider pilots did not measure up this evel, even ater passing through thei entite programme So, 70 grumbling, non-wolunteer pilots were sent to Lubbock Make/designtion Seria) Notes omar? {253519 Pali gid, NY20727,appepitad fers2700 Brag SalpuneCoXIG-S «262603 BG Sappopi 2strenstsaing voz Sipping x61 {250518 Gppinger 3s NCI38 Stogume TG 257 ZENON Fann 15 seeoaes 42.578, 9777-5178- $78 594, 37198, 572085707, 75:2, ned NOSE, NCSI cue, CAAT, NCTZBG NET CASS NITE ABCSibioneTG16 4257172, NOITIbecane 5772 sata SwoneframinTG:17 257189 NCTM Mawes GiorsT618 «25718, MUNCIE Dacre 57176 sr, S715 KalSenweyeT69 25715 npr Nene Unersy 21 €2577) NO. sao jet NANG MehisoT0.22 {257101 bulky Erne Melee NCVTNT YopercoceanT623 25718 Chara NIELS SiponenT28 257195 GhSThitar 7, Bosra Pant Dai NCI Ponte 25 esr Nc Uv ide Co1G-26 4257188 Ura BeckhktT2, NCTE? GunauT627 (253552 Gemma nea ar ih T628 {255555 Hon ir NCI Verano 265859 2875 ShihB Stare TG-0 <28355¢ Blab NAOEEL Peaindees Technet 25717) G2. NCES a1 Not seca sings ht otal apis orgs we asi USAAF cogtorsandsomoyoterelctadbre Frexampl kona gl seat Bonk By laror ae onn andthe els. Despite ts ungainly nas well haved sin compara ‘ny tof This meat rately Few taining necessary before Fite suchen competent lo performing ‘rap sopping manoeuvre daring tangy hig the ser forward July 1943. The femegeny ext ‘removed for coating Inthe hat sumer sweater and forrapid egress. 1 the centrepiece fora War Bonds la soon ater the US entered the confit Fara Dnieper ger plots were seen In October 1944 for two weeks training on the CG-4 before being shippee! to Europe. Hundreds more 8th Air Force pilots underwent conversion in-theatre. These men took part in the March 24, 1945 crossing of the Rhine, which was the last large-scale glider assault in history Retrospect The US Army trained approximately 6,500 glider pilots during the war. Itspent $3,493,181 on 1,147 training gliders, acquired between February 1942 and July 1943. Ten models were developed and seven placed into production, all were declared surplus before the end of hostilities Following the war the military training gliders were sold to rejuvenate the American soating sport. However, this undercut the wat: expanded glider industry Only Schweizer survived The glider programme was one of the most extraordinary flight training endeavours ever undertaken by the US military. It was a massive effort to train thousands of citizen Soldiets in a short period on a new acraft type only then being developed for a mission yet to be fully defined, Executed in a period of unprecedented military expansion, the programme was turbulent and wasteful. However, it ultimately met requirements. Glider pilots contributed immeasurably to the combat successes that won the wa Then the programme and Flight Officers disappeared entirely. Some of the few glider pilots that remained in the service became power pilots and glider flying became Just another qualification fora rated officer, But this was rare, as the glider force was immediately and dramatically reduced, disappearing entirely by the mi-19S0s, However, the legacy remains ofthe frenetic time when the US Army went to war in thousands of fabrie-covered gliders flown largely by enlisted personnel The Author would like to acknowledge the kind assistance of ‘Charts Day and the personne ofthe Air Force Materiel Comman History Office, Air Force light Test Center History Office, Jay Miller Collection, National Archives, National Museum ofthe United States Ai Force, National Soaring Museu, aad Sar Diego leroypace Museum. The Editor would ike to apologise to Bill for lenin hie into anonymity the last issue ~as ever Els would Tove to blame the ‘Gremlins’ but there are none to hand! IEEE WH. AAREENTHUSIST COM