Federalist 51: government must be structured so that branches can keep each other. Government should be designed so each branch has a will of its own, he says. If men were angels, no government would be necessary, he writes.
Federalist 51: government must be structured so that branches can keep each other. Government should be designed so each branch has a will of its own, he says. If men were angels, no government would be necessary, he writes.
Federalist 51: government must be structured so that branches can keep each other. Government should be designed so each branch has a will of its own, he says. If men were angels, no government would be necessary, he writes.
# 51: Separation of Powers: Structural Checks and Balances
What method should we use, then, to maintain the necessary partition of power between the different branches as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer is: all outside provisions are inadequate. Therefore, the government must be structured, designed, so that the three constitutional branches and their relationships will have the ability to keep each other in their proper places. [2] Perfect Separation: People Appoint All Officials To a certain extent, everyone agrees that a separation of the different powers of government is essential to the preservation of liberty. As a foundation towards that goal, it is clear that each branch should have a will of its own. Consequently, government should be designed so members of each branch have as little input as possible in the appointment of members of the others. If this principle [separation of powers] was rigorously adhered to, all appointments to the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches would have to be made from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication with one another. However, difficulties and additional expense would accompany its execution. Therefore, some deviations from this principle must be allowed. [2a] Judiciary: Specific Qualifications In the construction of the judiciary, in particular, requiring that the people pick all members might not be very successful. First, specific qualifications in the members are essential. The most important consideration should be to select the method of choice that best secures these qualifications. Second, since judges hold permanent tenure, this would soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority appointing them. [4] Authority, Motives to Resist Usurpations But the best security against a gradual accumulation of powers in one branch, is giving to the administrators of each branch the necessary constitutional tools and personal motives to resist encroachments. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The personal interests of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. [4a] Government Reflects Human Nature; Angels Don't Need Government It may be a reflection on human nature that such devices are necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government that is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed, and in the next place, force it to control itself. Dependency on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government. But experience has taught mankind that other precautions are necessary. [6] Divide Legislative; Fortify Executive But it is not possible to give each branch an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this is to divide the legislature into different houses and make them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will allow. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments with even further precautions. The weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified. At first view, an absolute negative on the legislature (veto) appears to be the natural defense with which the executive should be armed. [7] Constitution and Separation of Powers If these observations are based on just principles, as I persuade myself they are, and if they are applied as a criterion to the State constitutions and the federal Constitution, it will be found that, if the federal Constitution doesn't perfectly meet these principles, the State constitutions are infinitely less able to pass such a test.
Federalist 51 in Modern Language
[8] U. S. Federal System Unique Two special circumstances apply to the federal system in America, making it a unique situation. [9] State Governments: Additional Check on Federal Government First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government. To guard against usurpations, the government is divided into distinct and separate branches. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, state and federal. Then the portion allotted to each is subdivided among distinct and separate branches. Hence the rights of the people are doubly protected. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself. [10] Oppression from Society Second. In a republic, society must not only be protected against the oppression of its rulers, but one part of the society must be guarded against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority is united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are only two methods of providing against this evil. One, create a will in the community independent of the majoritythat is, of the society itself. Or two, include into society so many separate descriptions of citizens that it will be either impossible or impractical to form a majority of the people into an unjust alliance. The first method prevails in all governments possessing a self-appointed authority. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. All authority will be derived from and dependent on the society. The society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government, the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights To all sincere and serious friends of republican government, this must recommend a proper federal system. It shows that in exact proportion as the Union's territory is formed into more States, an oppressive alliance of a majority will not be facilitated. The best security for the rights of every class of citizen will be diminished. Justice is the final goal of government. It is the goal of civil society. It has always and always will be pursued until it is obtained or until liberty is lost in the pursuit. The extended republic of the United States will embrace a great variety of interests, parties, and sects. A coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom happen on any other principles than justice and the general good. Publius