Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Executive Summary
Programme Assessment
Mandates and Objectives
Main UN Operations
Projected changes to UN Operations
Threat Assessment
Structured Threat Assessment
Vulnerability Assessment
Security Risk Management Measures
Security Risk Analysis
Conclusion
Annex A
Annex B
Annex C
South Sudan
Country
Sept 2015
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PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
Protection of civilians
Monitoring and investigating human rights
The creation of conditions conducive for humanitarian assistance
Supporting the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities agreement
1.7 This shift in UNMISS mandate1 has had a direct impact on many government
ministries, commissions and bureaus in their perception of the UN Mission. It is
imperative that the public is aware and understands the reprioritised UNMISS mandate,
this would be to mitigate against disinformation, distortion of facts, misperceptions at
all levels but especially the population of South Sudan.
Assumptions
1.8 To direct an appropriate Risk Management Approach, the following assumptions
serve to guide for 2015/16:
1. The risk profiles of UN programmes vary as it bears programme specific inherent
or associated risks that would require programme specific mitigation measures
in addition to current MOSS or SOPs.
2. Some programmes might be tainted / restricted by association with other
programmes.
3. Despite the attacks on the Akobo CSB and the BOR PoC in April 2014, that were
more linked with ethnic based targeting of South Sudanese sheltering within UN
premises, generally speaking the UN is not the primary target for hostilities.
Moreover, the UN is more often caught in crossfire during armed conflict and
access is affected as a result of armed conflict. This will continue to be a risk.
4. The fact that UNMISS hosts over 166,000 Internally Displaced People (IDP)
increases the UNs operational risk profile and reputation2.
5. Where a POC site is within a UN compound/ near where staff reside or have
offices it significantly increases the risk to staff and to UN assets that would be
difficult to police. This is therefore not the best practice.
6. The risk profile of the UN requires a cohesive security approach by all UN
security elements including an integrated pro-active public relations approach.
7. Access does not necessarily mean that the beneficiary must be reached
physically on all occasions. Therefore needs must direct approaches towards
programme implementation.
8. Given the deteriorated security environment in South Sudan and the lack of
government capacity and will to provide security for its entire population, the
UN would need to ensure it maintains capacity to protect all UN staff under all
conditions so they can effectively carry out the UN Mandate.
9. PoC sites are volatile with the potential that the high levels of tension amongst
the IDPs may spill over in violent clashes. Staff members are therefore at a higher
risk working within these sites.
1
15/09/15
PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
15/09/15
PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
1.15 It is therefore imperative that some of the key mitigating measures of the UNSMS
will remain a priority approach namely: the UN engages with the Non-State Actors
under strict protocols; the UN profile, image and public perception/ understanding of
the UN mandates must be represented in a positive and objective manner at all levels of
society in South Sudan; the UN should apply an approach of acceptability to gain
programme reach and access; programme managers and security officers would need to
engage at all levels with the beneficiaries and share their assessments in a cohesive
manner, especially in planning programme delivery; the UN should endeavour to obtain
timely, relevant and accurate security information and jointly analyses this information
with UNMISS entities and AFPs as applicable; the UN should provide effective and
timely distribution of security advice to staff and managers that would inform quality
security and programme decision making; UN partners work very closely with the GoSS
and other national interlocutors including non-state actors and regional role players
and engage pro-actively at all times.
1.16 The UNSMS needs to further develop into a robust, effective system that is capable
of adapting to the continuously evolving security environment. This capacity will have
to be maintained for an unforeseeable long term period.
1.17 While consultation between security and programme managers with interlocutors
at all levels exists, it would require consistent strengthening and would require that
more joint planning between programme delivery and security support should take
place in a proactive and structured manner.
1.18 Currently there is no mainstreaming of Security within the planning of UN
activities/ programmes. Therefore, the policy that defines that security needs to be
involved at all levels of management to ensure security is considered/ mainstreamed
into all activities or programmes is not applied, specifically in UNMISS.
1.19 The provision of reporting through the JOC, SOCs and SIOC would need to be fused
better and provide more cohesive and seamless reporting whilst alerts and advisories
issued by the SIOC needs to be integrated with the JOC/SOCs. The provision of timely,
relevant and accurate information/analysis through the SIOC/JMAC is effective but
would need to be fused better and provide more cohesive, seamless, timely, accurate
and relevant reporting.
1.20 Maintaining security training would enhance the functional expertise of all
international and national staff although programme managers would need to receive
training in order to learn to identify inherent and associated risks in a timely manner.
Moreover, UNMISS and AFPs need to further deepen their understanding of inherent
risks of their programmes and identify corresponding mitigating strategies.
Underscored by the MOSS, the Standing Operational Procedures (SOPs) for South Sudan
support the UNSMS effectively but require a significant overhaul that includes the ongoing simplification of procedures and processes.
1.21 Finally, the responsibility to enable access for the UN requires creative thinking as
a shared responsibility between UN security and programme managers whilst utilising
the full scope of their collective networks and influences..
15/09/15
PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
1.22 Recommendations
A consolidated list of recommendations that serves as the basis for the security plan and
as identified throughout the various sections of this SRA, have been attached as Annex
C to allow tracking and compliance of effective implementation of the
recommendations.
15/09/15
PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
15/09/15
PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
2. Programme Assessment
UN Security Management System (UNSMS) and Personnel
2.1 In South Sudan the UN Security Management System (UNSMS) presence includes
the UN Mission In South Sudan (UNMISS) and encompasses the elements that make up
the UN Country Team which incorporates the Agencies, Funds and Programmes (AFP)
of the UN System, namely: UNDSS, UNDP, UNHCR, UN WOMEN, UNAIDS, UNFPA, OCHA,
UNMAS, UNESCO, UNICEF, WHO, WFP, UNOPS, FAO, UNHabitat, UNEP, UNIDO, ILO and
IOM.
2.2 The UNSMS has a decentralised field presence with the headquarters for UNMISS
and the UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes (AFPs) based in the South Sudanese
capital Juba. In all ten (10) states of South Sudan UNMISS have team sites which host the
state offices. There are a further nine (9) operational County Support Bases (CSBs) and
three (3) Company Operating Bases (COB) installed in areas identified as needing
mission or agency support. The mission is currently reprioritising cost benefits from an
operational point of view and this will effect changes in the numbers of CSBs at the end
of the year; Pibor (Jonglei State) will remain; decisions still pending on Melut (UNS) and
Kapoeta (EE) due to the continued presence of IDPs within these CSBs and from 31
December 2015 six (6) CSBs will close including Yirol (Lakes), Gok Machar (NBEG),
Pariang (Unity), Nasser & Renk (UNS) & Turalei (Warrap). Some facilities may be
handed over where UN parties have expressed interest.
2.3 Presently the UNSMS supports 2854 international staff (incl UNPOL, Corrections,
MLOs, SOs UNVs), 3105 national staff and approximately 8,500 for National Staff
dependants. (Figures correct as of 17 August 2015)
3.
3.1 UNMISS Mandate: Under UN Security Council resolution 2155 (2014), the mandate
of UNMISS was reprioritised into four core areas: protection of civilians; monitoring and
investigating human rights; creating conditions conducive for the delivery of
humanitarian assistance; and supporting the implementation of the Cessation of
Hostilities agreement. This means that there is no longer large-scale capacity building
for the Government of the Republic of South Sudan, which until that point had been a
significant part of the UNMISS mandate since its inception under UN Security Council
Resolution 1996 (2011). The reprioritised mandate was extended with the same focus
areas under UN Security Council resolutions 2187 (2014) and 2223 (2015). The current
Mission mandate, UN SC Resolution 2223 (2015), expires on 30 November 2015.
3.2 The current mandate under UN Security Council Resolution 2223 (2015) reflects the
continued conflict between the SPLA and SPLA in Opposition (SPLA-io) (including
militia groups affiliated to both sides), inter-communal violence, a breakdown in rule of
law and subsequent insecurities which are resulting in threat of violence to civilians,
large-scale displacement, human rights violations and security risks to humanitarian
partners. The mandate also reflects the continued presence of the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD) Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, which
monitors and reports on violations on the Cessation of Hostility (CoH) Agreement.
15/09/15
PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
3.3 Peace Operations: To help implement the mandated tasks, UNMISS will consist of a
military component of up to 12,500 troops of all ranks and of a police component,
including appropriate Formed Police Units, of up to 1,323 personnel.
3.4 Pursuant to SC Resolution 2206 (2015) a special Committee was established to
oversee the sanctions measures imposed by the Security Council for South Sudan, they
are supported by a team of Panel of Experts. The Panel of Experts are entirely
independent from UNMISS and report directly to the Committee, they have visited
South Sudan throughout June, July and August. The mission has been helping on a
logistical level as the Panel of Experts seek and review information regarding
individuals and/or entities engaging in acts violating peace agreements and
International Law, as laid out in SCR 2206 (2015). The Panel of Experts interim report
was presented to the Security Council Committee on 21 August 2015.3
3.5 Work of UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes: In South Sudan, the basic needs of
the most vulnerable, conflict-affected populations are being provided for through the
work of the UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes (AFP) in collaboration with their
national and international implementing partners. Some AFPs in South Sudan have
crosscutting obligations which involve them in both humanitarian and development
programmes. Sudden onset emergencies and other lifesaving operations may be
addressed outside of the Crisis Response Plan (CRP), depending on the circumstances.
The planning of humanitarian activities takes place through the cluster system under
the guidance of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), while the UNs Development
Programmes are coordinated at UN Country Team (UNCT) and Programme
Management Team levels.
3.6 Since the onset of the crisis and with the declaration of an IASC system-wide Level3
Humanitarian Emergency Response, the context of the operation of humanitarian AFPs
has changed considerably. AFP numbers increased dramatically to support the IDPs
arriving at PoC sites looking for protection and assistance. The ongoing fighting has
meant that UN staff are working in high risk armed conflict / hostile areas and in areas
of increased health risks. As a result security has often to respond rapidly to requests
for assistance for relocation, requiring access to enable programme delivery, medical
evacuations and other security support services.
The IASC Level 3 response
designation has been repeatedly reviewed throughout the duration of the conflict and
extended until August 2015.
15/09/15
PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
4.
4.1 In line with UN Security Council resolution 2223 (2015), UNMISS activities are
focused in four key mandate areas:
Protection of civilians
Monitoring and investigating human rights
The creation of conditions conducive for humanitarian assistance
Supporting the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities agreement
PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
Criticality, the level of programme decision making and the highest level of risk at which
this programme is acceptable.
Table 9 : Summary of Most Significant Risks to UN Operations:
[Transferred from Risk Analysis Table may be separated for different Security Level
Areas and/or UNSMS Organisations]
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
15/09/15
Risk
Collateral effects of direct fire (small arms, hand
grenades) in Central Equatoria, Jonglei, Unity
and Upper Nile States.
Collateral effects of indirect fire (mortars, RPGs,
aerial bombardment) in Jonglei, Unity and Upper
Nile State
Direct attack on UN convoys by armed groups
with direct or indirect fire countrywide
especially in conflict affected states.
Demonstrations against the UN could become
violent and influence anti-UN sentiments.
High
High
High
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
High
Medium
High
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Low
High
Medium
PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
11
12
Risk
Looting and destruction of UN assets in conflict
affected states especially when towns are
changing hands when UN military and security
cannot move out in cities. Majority of UN AFP
premises were directly affected in Bor, Malakal
and Bentiu and this cycle is likely to continue.
Thefts of UN assets by IDPs dwelling in POC
areas. Unrest in POC sites potentially impacting
safety and security of UN/humanitarian
personnel and especially where UNMISS
office/residential areas are in close proximity.
High
High
High
Medium
Combining the risk matrix (see colour code below) and the new categories for
programme importance and decision-making, now enables a clearer understanding of
who makes the decision on acceptable risk. Each box with the matrix shows the
minimum level of Programme Criticality that would be acceptable.
15/09/15
PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
5.
Context
5.1 The number of people in need continues to rise as insecurity drives more people
from their communities. According to UN OCHA (July 2015) there are an estimated 1.6
million people internally displaced by the conflict that began in December 2013, with
almost 8 million people being food insecure, including 4.6 million who are severely food
insecure. Since April 2015 there has been an upsurge in hostilities in Unity and Upper
Nile states that has left more than 750,000 civilians without life-saving aid. Aid agencies
continue to scale up humanitarian assistance in areas where people are most vulnerable
although as the rainy season sets in the humanitarian crisis could be further
exacerbated due to mobility constraints of displaced populations resulting from
insecurity and flooding.
5.2
At the height of the conflict large numbers of people spilt over the borders into
neighbouring countries seeking refuge in Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan, Kenya and Abyei;
these numbers stand at approximately 510,000 individuals.
5.3
Following the signing of the Cessation of Hostility (COH) agreement by the
Government and the SPLA in Opposition (SPLAio) on 23 January 2014, the leaders of the
two warring parties had on several previous occasions reaffirmed their commitment to
the previous agreement in order to end the conflict. The IGAD plus brokered peace deal
was signed by President Kiir on the 26 August 2015, and a cessation of hostilities agreed
by both sides within the 72 hour time frame but sporadic fighting has continued mainly
in Upper Nile State. Previously, the South Sudan National Legislative Assembly has
extended the term of the Executive Head, i.e. the President, the National Legislature and
15/09/15
PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
State Legislative Assemblies by three years until July 2018. At that time all the elected
Governors of the States have also had their mandates extended by three years in line
with the National Legislature bill of March 2015, however recent surprise decrees have
sacked some State Governors on the day before the IGAD deadline leaving potential for
further political upheaval.
Prioritisation
5.4
UNMISS and AFPs activities have been significantly re-prioritised into the
Protection of Civilians, Human Rights monitoring, facilitating humanitarian access and
providing support to the IGAD peace process in view of the ongoing volatile security
situation that began in December 2013. A number of development programmes are still
being implemented by AFPs in safer regions in an attempt to maintain progress and
prevent spill over of the crisis into these relatively stable areas.
5.5 The UN operational deployment could change further keeping some CSBs in place
however this will result in a re-profiling of security support in the field.
5.6 The increased risk specifically in Malakal and Bentiu would require an increase in
the deployment of security staff and expansion of the collective security posture.
Air and River operations
5.7 In the rainy season as large areas of the country are flooded and roads inaccessible
the conduct of air operations is heavily reliant on helicopter support. UNMISS currently
uses the SOP Aviation Risk Management (ARM). This includes the implementation of
mitigation measures that ensure that UNMISS flights are conducted with associated
risks reduced to as low as reasonably possible. One such measure is the utilisation of
Flight Safety Assurances (FSAs) to minimise the risk of misidentification and collateral
damage from warring parties. One of the primary methods of mitigating risk to
locations above Low Risk is the notification of UNMISS flights to both SPLA, SPLAio and
to Other Armed Groups (OAGs) in control of the location, and gaining their assurance of
safe passage for UNMISS flight.
5.8 Safety of air movement, its processing of clearances and the interaction with GoSS
and non-state actors requires an urgent review has been processed ensuring a quicker
turnaround and integrity of the clearances to further enable a more effective delivery.
This SRA allows for rapid programme delivery in areas where fast response is required
as requested by Humanitarian providers.
5.9 As the rains of 2015 began to cut off supply lines, military offensives increasingly
used riverine methods of transporting goods and fighters to the frontline. This method
of delivery was also being used by humanitarian agencies to transfer large quantities of
food to communities in need. In April 2015 a barge convoy hired by UNMISS to carry
food and fuel supplies for the base in Malakal was attacked by RPGs and small arms fire,
injuring four persons. In July the government gave strict warnings that all river
transportation should stop, further restricting aid delivery around the country. In
September there have also been reported incidents of alleged attacks on government
15/09/15
PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
owned barges and gunboats in Upper Nile State, the SPLA-io claimed responsibility
ahead of verification.
Residential arrangements
5.10 The vast majority of international UN staffs live and work in secured UN
compounds in all States. In Juba some staff lives in secure civilian complexes that are
MORSS compliant. No UN staff should live in private homes by themselves.
Recommendations on the way forward
5.11 To maintain and increase their reach to beneficiaries, UNMISS substantive sections
and AFPs need to seek creative ways through air and ground mobility, their networks,
communication means/ technology, use of virtual offices, utilisation of different
contracts, utilisation of more national staff, careful vetting of staff and empowering their
interlocutors to meet in safer venues, etc.
5.12 Developing strong collectively shared networks with interlocutors at all levels of
management is a key success factor for access, for example clearance is given for flights
and their manifested passengers out of Juba International Airport, assurance is also
given by either party to the conflict at the receiving base. Equally important is
supporting conditions or modalities to the security process including effectiveness of
communications or developing relationships with interlocutors or beneficiaries; a good
rapport with the Governor/ County Commissioner/Paramount Chief regularly facilitates
programme access and protected staff members.
With the density of UN operations
and subsequent staff presence in a given operational area this sharing of networks
needs to be through the combined UN entities and staff.
5.13 Programmes should work towards an approach that gains acceptance by their
beneficiaries, interlocutors and communities, as part of mitigating a programmes risk.
If accepted in advance by the local community leaders (including parties to the conflict),
it can offer a significant mitigating measure.
5.14 Programme Managers need to receive training as to how to identify the inherent
and associated risk of their programmes and share it with security officers during SRAs
to improve deployment mitigation.
5.15 From a Security Risk Management (SRM) point of view, the footprint does not
only reflect the number of UN facilities, but also includes the profile of ground and air
movement. This profile has a psychological footprint that is as important when it
comes to matters such as the image and perception of the UN. These two imperatives
can be either very powerful threats or mitigating measures. It is therefore important
that the Public information and media messaging provide guidelines on a cohesive
approach of messaging and monitor the impact of media and public opinion on the UN
programmes and image. It seems this aspect requires further development.
15/09/15
PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
5.16 In ensuring in-country presence is efficiently represented, the Joint Support Office
in Entebbe delivers remote support for financial and human resource management. It
can therefore also serve to facilitate any evacuations should they be required. The
Security Unit in Juba provides support to the Security Unit in Entebbe
5.17 The GoSS does not have adequate security capacity to provide dedicated security
to the UN and therefore this service will need to be continued to be provided by the UN
military force for UN facilities and by the military force and UNPOL for PoC sites.
Table 4 UNMISS Protection of Civilian (PoC) SITES as at 10 July 2015
State
Central Equatoria State
Unity State
Upper Nile State
Jonglei State
Western Bahr El Ghazal State
Total
Location
UN House PoC I & PoC 2
UN House PoC3
Bentiu
Malakal
Melut
Bor
Wau
No. of IDPs
8,011
20,652
103,913
30,410
665
2,289
202
166,142
5.18 Since the beginning of the conflict (December 2013) until June 2015, there were a
total of 594 security incidents involving IDPs in UNMISS PoC sites. Cases include serious
assaults, civil unrest, mob violence, robbery, death threats and harassment, and several
locations have also recorded serious disruption to humanitarian operations. UNMISS
and AFP assets are also at risk, with thefts from containers and staff residences
common. The high prevalence of alcohol and illicit drug use within the PoC sites has
exacerbated violence and criminal behaviour directly impacting upon UN and AFP
personnel working or living within or adjacent to the PoC sites. The smuggling of
weapons into the PoCs poses a potential Direct Threat to UNMISS and AFP staff. See
Annex C, for Premises Security recommendations.
5.19 Continued accusations by government actors or affiliates that the PoC sites are a
sanctuary for supporters of the SPLA in Opposition also make the PoC sites a target; this
point was actively demonstrated in the attack in the Bor in April 2014 resulting in the
death of 55 IDPs within the UNMISS site. Similar incidents have occurred near PoC
sites in Juba, Bentiu and Malakal. (See Annex C, for Premises Security recommendations
& Residual Risk Mitigation Measures).
5.20 Overcrowded conditions and poor sanitation in the camps can lead to a higher
possibility of communicable diseases breaking out and spreading rapidly. An outbreak
of cholera started in South Sudan on 18 May 2015 reaching a total of 1718 cases [date 4
September 2015], this rapid spread is largely affecting areas of the state capital Juba and
also a separate smaller spread in Bor. One death has been reported at the POC site in
Juba with a total of 76 cases of people who contracted cholera inside the site. (See
Annex C, for Training, & Residual Risk Mitigation Measures).
15/09/15
PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
5.21 UN Security, RRP, UNPOL and UN Forces regularly coordinate with Humanitarian
organisations to ensure security within PoCs including the following activities:
Maintaining general law and order within PoCs
Checking for weapons, alcohol and other contraband items
Screening all individuals entering UNMISS PoC sites
Facilitate access to IDPs for humanitarian assistance and aid delivery
Community engagement on security issues
Preventing evictions and forced relocations to other areas
Facilitating departure of IDPs who violate ground rules when community
mediation has failed
Crowd control during operations and incidents
Providing armed escorts to humanitarian agencies when requested
(See Annex C, for Premises Security & Residual Risk Mitigation Measures)
5.22 The UNSMS will have to work much closer with the GoSS security agencies to
ensure an improved security response to UN security related incidences. As such
networks and personal relationships need to be forged to develop a relationship of
mutual trust, respect and support towards the UN SMS and effective communication
systems needs to be reviewed.
5.23 The UNSMS would need to establish/ strengthen multiple communication means
with the Host Nation (HN) that complements one another to ensure effective liaison and
manage emergency responses.
5.24 To further improve early warning and situational awareness; the UNSMS would
need to fuse UN staff and asset related security management functions with the JMAC
and the JOC to ensure that the flow of information of all programmes and stakeholders
is captured in a timely fashion and distributed effectively with the intent to mitigate risk
proactively.
5.25 In Juba a blue zone was implemented to manage the locations which were
approved by UN security for International UN staff to reside in based on accessibility to
the area, crime rates and distance to UN bases in case of relocation and emergencies.
This needs updating regularly to take into account new dynamics in security and crime.
Also the careful consideration of planning for evacuation of UN House, both residential
and office area in case of emergency.
5.26 Where the UN has a presence Operational Zones have been created where security
clearances are not required in all main urban areas to allow for improved access. This
approach is underscored by risk management as opposed to a risk adverse approach,
this concept needs to be maintained and where possible further enhanced or monitored.
5.27 Programme staff engaging in activities where the residual risk remains high and/
or where it is felt that the required protection is inadequate, a UN dedicated protection
or an UN escort entity can be requested on a case-by-case basis.
5.28 A unified tracking system based on available technology should be a strong
consideration for field mission movement. The TETRA (which requires line of sight
15/09/15
PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
mainly in cities), HF radio system and web-based systems with smart phones offer free
or low cost tracking options.
6. Threat Assessment: 2015 Security Situation in South Sudan
Situational Analysis
General Description
6.1 After months of a series of tense standoffs within the political leadership, in midDecember 2013 conflict broke out in Juba within the ranks of the elite presidential
guard, or as they are known Tiger Division, which quickly split allegiances through the
Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) to that of the government and that of the
former Vice-President Riek Machar whose forces are now known as the SPLM-inopposition (SPLA-io). Violence continued in Juba for some days including ethnically
targeted killings and other human rights violations. This resulted in hundreds of
thousands of civilians to flee their homes, which created a humanitarian emergency. In
rapid succession the conflict spread to Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile States with regular
clashes between army and rebel forces resulting in the towns and oilfields changing
hands several times. Both sides were engaging in the targeting of civilians in their
attacks, whole communities and groups armed themselves and both sides recruited
children. There is weak command and control between the military commanders and
the political leadership structures that leaves the situation in a volatile state in many
areas of the country.
6.2 The conflict also took on regional dimensions with the Ugandan Peoples Defence
Force (UPDF) providing key military support to government forces in Juba and in Bor,
Jonglei State. Other regional forces are believed to be playing a key role in support
either for government or Opposition forces including Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).
6.3 Regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace talks and high
level summits trying to reach power-sharing agreements have brought limited
successful outcomes, with multiple Ceasefire of Hostilities (COH) resulting in temporary
pausing rather than stopping fighting altogether. The rigid deadline of 17 August 2015
for signing the peace deal put forward by IGAD-Plus resulted in only the Former
Detainees and the SPLAio signing, without the signature of the President on behalf of
the Government of South Sudan and head of the SPLA, instead requesting for a further
15 days to allow for consultations. IGAD has a monitoring violations role with teams
placed in key areas of the country. The African Union Commission of Inquiry on South
Sudan (AUCISS) has completed an investigation into violation of international human
rights and humanitarian law but they have delayed publishing the report so as not to
jeopardise the ongoing IGAD-led peace process.
6.4 Even prior to the latest outbreak of armed conflict, South Sudan faced five (5) major
sets of security challenges:
15/09/15
PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
animosity or not, harassment, intimidation, obstruction and attacks against the UN have
increased over the last year. It is worth noting that while the UN has catalogued
numerous such violations, the government has rarely acted upon these violations. The
inaction has created impunity and emboldened the perpetrators.
6.13 Animosity grew when the government made accusations that the UN was
harbouring rebels within its Protection of Civilian (POC) sites. Direct and veiled threats
to attack POCs became widespread.
6.14 The effect of this was in April 2014 when armed youths attacked the UNMISS
base in Bor resulting in the deaths of 55 IDPs and injuring many others including UN
peacekeepers.
6.15 In March 2014, a labelling error was discovered whilst transporting containers
loaded with duty equipment for the UN Ghanaian peacekeepers in Unity State which
brought strained relations to even a lower point. The error was exploited to galvanise
hostility towards the UN in favour of the government by falsely presenting the UN as
supplying weaponry to the opposition. It took elaborate interventions, investigations
and communications to clear the false impression that this created.
6.16 On 26 August 2014 under suspicious circumstances a UN contracted helicopter
crashed near Bentiu in Unity State, killing three (3) aircrew and injuring one (1) other,
underlining the threats involved in working within South Sudan. Investigations into the
cause of the crash were inconclusive.
6.17 Since the start of the conflict in December 2013 thousands of civilians of varying
ethnicities and nationalities have sought shelter, food and protection within UNMISS
compounds. In the middle of July 2015 there are approximately 166,142 people staying
in seven (7) UNMISS bases.
6.18 There have been increasing reports of criminal acts occurring within the
Protection Of Civilian (POC) sites; also there have been a number of serious assaults
against the UN and other humanitarian workers, sometimes involving weapons which
has resulted a few times of hospitalisation of personnel. These incidents have, and
continue to affect not only the civilians seeking refuge at UN sites, but also the safety
and security of individual UNMISS and Agencies Funds and Programmes (AFP)
personnel. In February 2015 there was an alleged sexual assault of a Canadian INGO by
a subcontractor for a UN Agency in UNMISS Bentiu team site. It is, therefore, essential
that the Mission continues to take concrete measures to address acts of criminality on
its premises. The UNDSS Headquarters South Sudan Security Assistance Visit (SAV)
report dated January 2015 highlights the need to address a balance between UN
personnel and property security and the security being provided to the Internally
Displaced Peoples (IDPs) including a better response to criminal activities, maintenance
of UN gates to improve perception to deter criminal activity and moving of IDPs to
create easier provision of security for POC sites.
15/09/15
PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
by irregular forces/youth allied to either parties. Several clashes have been reported in
Maban, Renk, Amduluz, Duk-Duk and other locations with each trying to capture more
ground. The situation in other parts of the state remains tense with both SPLA and
SPLA-io trying to take/keep control of the oil fields and other strategic locations.
Currently the oil fields in Upper Nile are under control of SPLA.
For short periods from mid-February 2014 the state capital Malakal temporarily came
under the control of SPLA-io forces before being taken back by government forces. Also
areas in southern Upper Nile including Nassir have alternated between SPLA to SPLA-io
control but overall, most urban areas remain under SPLA control. The UN base in Nassir
is just one kilometre away from the SPLA-io/ White Army base, which has created a
constant threat to UN personnel through small arms fire and shelling.
Several major clashes between the SPLA and the SPLA-io have occurred; during one
heavy exchange some stray bullets entered UNMISS camp killing and injuring IDPs and
causing structural damage to UN resources. All UN personnel remain concentrated in
UNMISS camp including several agencies who had to abandon their own compounds.
In April 2015 there has been a marked development in UNS, three UN staff have
disappeared in the course of their work. Also the government SPLA with aligned
support troops tasked with protecting Malakal and areas of UNS have split factions
internally (Dinka/Shilluk). SPLA Maj Gen Johnson Olony for a time defected and worked
alongside the SPLAio to take Malakal temporarily. Malakal has changed hands 6 times
in the last six (6) months; while, Melut two (2) times, both Melut and Malakal raised
their Security Alert Level to Red which resulted in the relocation of staff, Malakal staff
have since returned. Currently both Malakal and Melut are under the control of the
SPLA.
7.5 Unity State has remained one of the most contested states by the government and
opposition forces alongside their allied militias throughout the crisis. Bentiu town is
currently under control of the SPLA while most of the surrounding areas are under
control of the SPLA-io with the frontline in dangerously close vicinity of Bentiu UNMISS
team site and POC area. South of the state capital Bentiu, the town of Leer is a key
hotspot for attack due to its symbolism as the birthplace of the opposition leader. To
the west of Bentiu, UN staff previously based in the former Mayom UNMISS County
Support Base (CSB) regularly were caught in cross fire incidents when the parties to
conflict attempted to take control of the strategically important town, which is
principally inhabited by the Bul Nuer. UN mission and Agencies Funds and Programme
(AFP) staffs have become the target with regular ambushes, the demand for their trucks,
and/or fuel and the forceful attempt to board UN flights by military. Stray bullets and
heavy artillery pose a threat to UN residential and office areas including two incidents,
which resulted in the death of a child within the POC area. The oil fields in Unity State
are currently under the control of the SPLA but hotly contested and at risk for attack.
7.6 Other Armed Groups (OAGs): The Government of South Sudan managed to
integrate some armed groups prior to the outbreak of conflict, but some Other Armed
Groups (OAGs) continue to be active, notably in areas of Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei
States. Whilst some of these OAGs have declared allegiance to either the SPLA or SPLAiO, others are threatening to choose to fight independently (creating splinter factions)
and others who so far remained neutral still could resume armed activity at any time.
15/09/15
PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
7.7 In Jonglei, at the onset of the crisis the government quickly signed a ceasefire deal
and subsequent peace agreement with the South Sudan Democratic Movement/ Army
(SSDM/A) Cobra Faction led by rebel leader David Yau Yau. This led to the creation of
the Greater Pibor Administration Area (GPAA). In February 2015 the demobilisation of
3,000 children previously fighting in his ranks began in conjunction with UNICEF and
the National Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (NDDRC).
7.8 There are cracks appearing on forces allied within the current crisis in South Sudan,
as wages and weaponry disappear so the affiliations appear to fluctuate. Defectors are
rallying calls through the diaspora communities to bring their troops with them. One
example is Brig Gen Lul Ruai Koang who was spokesperson for SPLA-io who in his
defection called for Lou-Nuer youth to create a new state in Akobo area, called Kobo.
Another recent example from august within the SPLAio is the renewed denouncement
and questioning the legitimacy of Riek Machar as the head of rebel command by Gen
Peter Gatdet, this came just a couple of weeks after Gatdet and Gen Gathoth Gatkuoth
were relieved of their positions within SPLAio.
7.9 Also in Upper Nile State UNICEF reports that 89 boys were forcibly recruited by an
unnamed armed group in late February 2015. They were taken in an area currently
under government control, which is defended by government-allied Shilluk militia
commanded by Maj Gen Johnson Olony.
7.10 The regional presence of the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) continues to deliver
violence in South Sudan. Although this Uganda rebel force headed by Joseph Kony is
believed to move freely in Central African Republic (CAR), DR Congo & Darfur, Sudan,
the porous borders make attacks in the south and west of South Sudan likely. Attacks in
South Sudan have usually resulted in looting food and medicines.
7.11 There are reports of an LRA attack in Western Equatoria State in March 2015
when one person was killed, the village was looted and eleven people were abducted
but four were later released. This resuming of LRA attacks has increased fear amongst
the population as the last attack was in 2012.
7.12 Also an LRA commander indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC)
Dominic Ongwen surrendered in CAR, except for the leader Mr Kony all the other
indicted criminals are believed to have died.
7.13 Armed Conflict in the Northern Border Areas: Agreement of the Sudan/ South
Sudan border delineation was never resolved within the remit of the 2005
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), initially because of the oil fields but also many
other outstanding historical grievances including claims to the territories. The border
region between the two countries continues to have wide reaching issues although
engagement through bilateral diplomacy has helped ease tensions a little. The oil
pipelines exit South Sudan in both Unity and Upper Nile State, oil is refined in Sudan
before being exported. The potential loss of oil revenue affects both nations so good
trade relations remains key to maintaining income.
15/09/15
PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
7.14 An affiliation with some regional armed forces has had a definite impact on the
security of the border area of Sudan with South Sudan. Whilst government forces are
alleged to work alongside Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in their frontline
fighting activities in Unity State, South Sudan, also it is reported that the SPLA-io are
working in collaboration with the government of Sudan by obtaining resources and
military backup. As the fighting also continues at a pace within Sudan on two fronts
Darfur and Nuba Mountains (South Kordofan in particular) the impact for the whole
border region cannot be ignored. Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) are also carrying out
aerial bombing campaigns in the Nuba Mountains but also extending into South Sudan
in November 2014 to hit alleged JEM targets in Raja, Western Bahr el Ghazal which
killed 24 people including women and children. Further raids reportedly by SAF
aircraft include in the border areas of Unity and Northern Bahr el Ghazal states with the
last aerial attacks taking place between the 31 December 2014 and 01 Jan 2015.
Currently the flow of refugees is affecting both countries as fighting affects the
communities and so they move on, in Sudan the fighting in South Kordofan has created
an influx of refugees into South Sudan and the fighting in northern Unity State in South
Sudan has meant many refugees travelled north to refugee sites within Sudan. The
Refugee Camps in Yida and newly established camp in Ajoung Touk protect refugees
fleeing from neighbouring Sudan for last many years as the fighting intensity fluctuates
between Sudan Armed Forces and Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement-North (SPLMN) in the South Kordofan area/ Nuba Mountains/ Blue Nile State.
7.15 Cross border grazing & migration rights are also areas of dispute as they host
well-armed Sudanese Misseriya cattle herders who move around South Sudan in search
of feed for their animals.
7.16 In anticipation of a resolution by acceptable referendum for the ownership of the
Abyei area, the border area town of Abyei remains with a United Nations Interim
Security Force providing protection for the population.
7.17 Inter Communal Armed Conflict: Prior to the most recent armed conflict, intercommunal conflict has long been the most prominent threat in the category of armed
conflict. These clashes continue to occur with variable intensities in identified areas/
states depending upon seasonal and other contributing factors such as ethnic identity,
cultural practice and historical territorial rights.
Table 5: Key conflict drivers within some ethnic tribes in South Sudan
STATE
TRIBE A)
JONGLEI
JONGLEI
Murle
Lour Nuer
JONGLEI
UNITY
UNITY
UNITY
WBEG
Dinka Bor
Misseriya
Misseriya
Dinka
15/09/15
TRIBE B)
Lou Nuer
Jikaney
Nuer
Mundari
Nuer
Dinka
Nuer
ISSUES
Dormant, was grazing issues
Dinka Bor cattle camps in Mundari territory
Migration
Migration
Conflicts
Cattle herders
PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
STATE
WARRAP
WARRAP
WARRAP
LAKES
NBEG
CES
CES
CES
WES
EES
TRIBE A)
TRIBE B)
Misseriya
Dinka
Dinka
Misseriya
Dinka Bor
Bari
Kakwa
Bari
Toposa
Dinka
Nuer
Nuer
Dinka
Mundari
Mundari
Pojulu
Mundari
Turkana
(Kenya)
Acholi
Jur (Mvolo
(WBEG) &
Mapourdit
(lakes)
EES
Madi
Lakes/WBEG Dinka
Atuot
(Yirol
west)
ISSUES
Cattle herders
Migration
Conflicts
Conflicts
Migration
Dinka Bor Cattle Camps in Mundari territory
Land, grazing
Land issues
Land, grazing
Conflict
Land issues
Conflict
The table above is a summary of inter-communal armed conflict in different parts of the
country, which varies in intensity based on political, economic and seasonal factors:
Aviation and Riverine Threats:
7.18 South Sudan lacks an adequate air traffic control system, countrywide. The
government took control of the countrys airspace from Sudan in 2011, but to date has
not issued any Notice to Airmen (NOTAMs.). There are areas, however, that the
government has declared a no fly zone (i.e. over the Presidential Palace in Juba),
suggesting that the government reserve the right to fire upon an aircraft that violates
this airspace.
7.19 The units of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) are equipped with truckmounted surface-to-air missiles (ZU-23-2/4). Presently most aviation threats come
from indiscriminate small arms fire (i.e. AK-47) from both the conflicting parties
originating on the ground. Since the fatal shooting down of the UNMISS helicopter in
Likuangole, Jonglei State in December 2012, UNMISS and UNHAS air operations obtain
flight safety assurances from the local authorities and implement a regime of stricter
risk assessments and mitigation measures such as flying at higher cruising altitudes for
aircraft depending upon the risk levels. Due to the recent conflict it has become more
pertinent to get these guarantees from both SPLA and/or SPLA-io entities in areas
under their respective control. Even with assurances in place, during this active fighting
season aviation incidents have continued to occur sometimes with aircraft being shot at
and other more serious incidents including the fatal crash of a routine UNMISS flight
near Bentiu, Unity State on 26 August 2014 where three crewmembers died and
another was injured.
15/09/15
PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
7.20 At this time it is increasingly difficult to ascertain whether the official aircraft
flight clearances that have been received are actually communicated to troops on the
ground, and by association whether the command structure has control over its troops
in these remote areas. There have been unfounded accusations in the past from both
sides in the conflict of UN aircraft being used to re-supply SPLA/SPLA-io forces. Both
these challenges could increase the number of threats to UN aircraft if the conflict
becomes prolonged.
7.21 Use of the River Nile for transportation of UN supplies and fuel has proved difficult
with the government threat against all river travel by humanitarian agencies. With
military supply vessels regularly travelling the river to the frontline it is not a safe
option for delivery of humanitarian provisions.
TERRORISM:
7.22 To date there have been no terrorist attacks in South Sudan, with the posed threat
from Al-Qaeda, Al Shabaab, Islamic State (IS) or other alleged extremist groups
appearing to be low. There is currently a heightened regional potential threat to UN
personnel and property, mainly for Kenya and Uganda, largely due to UN support to the
Federal Government of Somalia. The risk of Al Shabaab operating in South Sudan is
believed to be low, yet the potential of such a threat manifesting itself also cannot be
ruled out.
7.23 Given the volatile nature of the current crisis in South Sudan there is higher risk of
insurgency terrorist style attacks, techniques or procedures being absorbed into the
combat strategy by any armed military, group or splinter faction as a Strategic Weapon
System (SWS). These threats could include roadside Improvised Explosive Device (IED)
which can be indiscriminate and could cause collateral threats to UN personnel and
assets.
CRIME:
7.24 Throughout South Sudan criminal threats exist with petty theft constituting the
most common problem. Armed criminality is escalating in recent months in Juba,
Rumbek, Wau and such urban centres, which is a direct consequence of the economic
downturn.
7.25 The spate of crime has become worse with the mounting economic challenges that
characterised the last half of 2014 to date due to declining oil revenues, conflict and
inflation.
7.26 Wide sections of the population are increasingly less able to cope economically
and in a region with ready a supply of illicit arms; these developments are likely to leave
the personnel and facilities of the UN, AFPs and the wider international community at
risk in terms of spiralling violent crime.
15/09/15
PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
7.27 There are regular reports of roadside banditry often occurring at night in remoter
areas, with an elevated threat of roadside banditry on major arterial routes, with the
criminals seeking instant cash and 4WD vehicles.
7.28 In the capital Juba, and many other urban communities such as Rumbek, they have
witnessed waves of violent crime against UN national personnel including daytime
armed robberies. Two notable robbery incidents in Juba on 1 February and the 3
February 2015 resulted in five UN personnel being directly affected; leaving one
national policeman dead with another injured.
7.29 With the weakened security institutions being fractured even further due to the
fighting, law enforcement capabilities have not been able to cope with the multitude of
rising challenges. This is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future while the crisis
persists.
7.30 During the crisis widespread looting and destruction of humanitarian supplies has
taken place especially prominent criminal activity was seen in the state capitals of Bor,
Malakal and Bentiu. Many UN, AFP and INGO offices in Bor, Bentiu and Malakal and
other locations have been looted and vandalised during the intermittent changes in
control of the cities. There are many incidents of UN and AFP national staff members
who were also directly affected during this crisis through the destruction of their
accommodation and the looting of personal items.
7.31 Even before the latest armed conflict, multiple challenges within the SPLA and
SSNPS in terms of morale, professionalism, training, resources, command and control or
discipline were highly evident as impediments to their ability to maintain law and order
and effectively respond to criminal incidents. Coming as a direct fallout from the crisis
these challenges have become more glaringly obvious. The fractures caused by the
largely ethnically divided conflict have permeated through all levels of security organs
leaving them even weaker and severely degraded. Coupled with the economic
challenges the country is grappling with, the capacity of the law enforcement organs to
cope has diminished even further.
7.32 Criminality within the POC sites continues with numerous incidents of UN
property being stolen from containers both within the POC area and in adjacent to
UNMISS camp areas. Losses to the UN in terms of assets are estimated to be worth
millions of dollars.
7.33 The SPLA have reportedly fired shots towards UNMISS POC sites on a number of
occasions as they allege that IDPs are to blame for crime when outside the POC sites and
then return at night to be protected or they allege that IDPs are bringing in weapons
into the POC sites.
7.34 There have also been incidents of serious assaults including targeted killings
within the POC areas since they opened, also putting UN personnel and assets at
considerable risk. In April 2015 an ethnic targeted killing on the perimeter of the
Malakal UNMISS base by an IDP led to intervention by UN RwanBatt forces, on arrest
one of the IDP hit a BanFPU. In Malakal it is reported that external ethnic dynamics
15/09/15
PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
outside the POC site are often played out inside especially after the change of hands
when Malakal town falls to the opposing side.
7.35 In mid-2014 UN DPKO HQ drew up clearer guidance on how to deal with serious
criminality within the POC sites which has adequately managed the challenges as they
arise, however due to the POC living conditions serious incidents continue to occur.
Within the POC sites Community Watch Group deals with petty crimes, trained IDP
volunteers, who identify the parties involved. Depending on the crime they can then be
passed onto the Traditional Justice Court made up of community leaders but 100%
male. Traditional Justice is handed down usually through fines or promises. Both of
these nationally owned providers of justice with the POC sites are unarmed. For more
violent criminals UNPOL become involved and remove the offenders to the holding
facility or securely held in their offices in the regions.
7.36 There have also been incidents where UN and humanitarian personnel have been
attacked in POC sites on account of their nationalities; both local and international or
due to dissatisfaction on the services provided.
CIVIL UNREST:
7.37 Outbreaks of civil unrest, in the form of large groups of individuals ransacking and
destroying urban areas, have been a significant hallmark of the latest armed conflict,
especially in Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile States. The civil unrest has been worse
immediately before and after a community changes hands between the major armed
protagonists, as a result, many urban communities became largely de-populated. Civil
unrest has largely been discriminate with specific communities targeted and
systemically pushed out of the area. Other outbreaks of civil unrest include the Lakes
State capital Rumbek which has been suffering from inter-clan fighting but youths have
used the opportunity of this period of unrest to demonstrate, rampage and loot. This
has affected the population of the city since end of 2014 into 2015 with the government
now getting involved with peace & training initiatives for the youths to control the area.
7.38 Despite the considerable amount of anti-UN rhetoric at times during the last year,
and the direct attack on the UN camp in Bor, violent demonstrations against the UN by
large groups have not been an ongoing feature of the security situation so far. There
have not been many pronounced demonstrations specifically targeting the UN in the
second half of 2014. Most demonstrations involving the UN had previously been
appeals in one form or the other for intervention in certain prevailing matters.
7.39 Outbreaks of communal violence within POC areas have occurred particularly
within the Juba UN House and Malakal POCs with the most serious incident occurring on
the 18 February 2014 within the Malakal POC site resulting in the deaths of seven
persons. Being caught in cross fire remains the principal threat to UN personnel
resulting from clashes between opposing groups within POCs through direct and
indirect weapon use as sharp and blunt instruments are easily acquired.
15/09/15
PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
HAZARDS:
7.40 Communicable diseases in South Sudan constitute a major cause of morbidity and
mortality largely due to limited access to clean water and sanitation being extremely
poor with open defecation rates, which reaches 60% in urban areas and 80% in rural
areas. Health care facilities and services are severely underdeveloped, particularly in
rural areas. Service quality in Government hospitals is very poor because of inadequate
staffing, equipment, medications, as well as meagre infrastructure. UN personnel can
encounter tremendous challenges in terms of obtaining quality and timely medical
attention due to serious shortcomings in the available health services, especially in a
few state HQs and remote field locations. South Sudan relies heavily on foreign aid and
services provided by AFPs and NGOs.
7.41 Effective training of medical staff for Ebola airport screening & intensive
sensitisation has mitigated the risk of an Ebola outbreak in South Sudan.
7.42 For the Internally Displaced People (IDP) within the Protection of Civilian (POC)
sites the habitable areas are cramped, hazardous and disease-prone. Whilst most of
infectious and communicable diseases are transmitted by contaminated water others
such as tuberculosis, measles and influenza are transmitted through the air. UN
personnel in close proximity to large numbers of people who are infected with malaria
may increase infection rates amongst UN and AFP staffs.
7.43 According to the World Health Organisation (WHO) Early Warning and Disease
Surveillance System (EWARN) in February 2015 the top causes of deaths for IDPs are
malaria, Acute Respiratory Infections (ARI), Acute Watery Diarrhoea (AWD), Acute
Bloody Diarrhoea (ABD) and suspected measles (in Bentiu, Renk, Awerial & Melut).
Hepatitis E Virus (HEV) has been detected in IDPs but no deaths so far in 2015. A new
Cholera outbreak that has mainly affected Central Equatoria State has resulted in 46
confirmed deaths out of 1718 cases between 18 May 4 Sept 2015.
Road Traffic Accidents (RTA):
7.44 The roads in South Sudan are mostly unpaved, becoming dusty and compacted in
the dry season. During the rainy season many roads, including major supply routes, are
largely impassable due to being swamped and the terrain eroding forming major
potholes that fill with water with some roads and bridges simply just washed away. It is
common to see large vehicles stuck up to their axels in mud and water for days, if not
for the whole rainy season. The danger of road accidents is exacerbated by poor driving
skills and trucks travelling at relatively high speeds despite the poor state of roads. It is
worth noting that there is a wide spread tendency in the country to heap blame for any
accident involving a UN element to the UN party which imposes risk to individual staff
members involved in these incidents. Several personnel have been assaulted
sometimes severely following minor road traffic accidents including being ill-treated by
national security authorities attending the scene.
Infrastructure:
15/09/15
PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
7.45 In regard to infrastructure, the entire country remains underdeveloped. Road and
air mobility is seriously jeopardised especially during the rainy season where whole
regions are cut off. Electricity, food and clean water supplies are scarce and seriously
impact UN operations in remote duty stations.
7.46 Due to poor road conditions in both dry and rainy season and lack of
infrastructure there is a heavy reliance on UNMISS and UNHAS air assets for the
delivery of humanitarian aid. During 2014 rainy season Agency, Funds and
Programmes (AFP) were particularly hard hit as hundreds of trucks had to be
abandoned across the country when they became stuck in mud or ditches attempting to
deliver aid. The lack of infrastructure poses great threats if UN air/ road transport
assets are requirement for sudden relocation/evacuations as they cannot always be
used in adverse weather and with large stretches of road networks inaccessible during
the April to November rainy season this can leave UN, AFP staffs and assets at risk.
7.47 South Sudan has very rudimentary government fire-fighting capabilities. Outside
the capital Juba UNMISS and UNHAS has limited firefighting capacity, prioritising
resources towards the state airports and relying on drills and well placed fire
extinguishers for team-sites. Fires within UNMISS camps have resulted in substantial
loss of mission-owned property largely due to a lack of adequate firefighting equipment.
There is a shortage of trained firefighting personnel at UNMISS locations in state
capitals and County Support Bases.
Mines/UXOs
7.48 The latest armed conflict between two factions of the SPLA has involved indirect
fire weapons (such as RPGs, mortars and bombs dropped from aircraft) as well as small
arms. Therefore the threat of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and explosive remnants of
warfare has increased significantly since the conflict began. This is especially the case
in urban areas and along arterial roads. In early 2014, several UXOs were discovered
along the Bor-Juba road. The SPLA-io has reportedly mined the roads to the north of
Bentiu resulting in several incidents of vehicles being destroyed and civilian casualties.
This is of particular concern to the UN as these routes are a vital corridor in delivering
humanitarian aid. Even before the latest conflict, South Sudans civil war left a
considerable legacy of landmines and other explosive remnants of war. This was
especially the case in areas within Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity States and other areas
bordering Sudan that have yet to be cleared of mines and UXOs. Furthermore, there are
situations where old mines are exposed during the rainy season as the water washes
away the surface dirt.
15/09/15
PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan
CONFIDENTIAL
Threat
Category
Armed
Conflict
Capability
Inhibiting Context
Inter-Intra
Communal
Violence
Isolated,
limited/spora
dic armed
conflict
occurring.
Small arms/automatic
(light) weapons (AK-47, RPG
etc.) but minimal military
type training/experience
and loosely organised.
Pressure/
Other incentives/
Agreements against
hostilities.
Armed
engagement
between SPLA and
SPLA-io.
Between
isolated,
limited/spora
dic armed
conflict
occurring and
full scale
armed
conflict
occurring.
Isolated,
limited/spora
dic armed
conflict
occurring.
Intent to use
terrorism
against the
UN
acknowledge
d worldwide.
Al-Qaeda
affiliate Al
Shabaab has
attacked UN
bases in
Somalia
Peace talks or
unstable
peace/ceasefire
agreement.
Small arms/Automatic
(light) weapons (AK-47, RPG
etc.) but minimal military
type training/experience
and loosely organised.
Regional capability, but no
known capability in South
Sudan
Pressure/
other incentives/
Agreements against
hostilities.
Conflict between
SPLA and Other
Armed Groups
(OAGs)
No history of
terrorist attack in
Terrorism South Sudan,
31
CONFIDENTIAL
Threat
Category
Threats
Banditry on the
roads, looting and
commandeering of
vehicles.
Intent
Capability
Inhibiting context
Violent
crimes focus
on the UN,
AFPs & INGOs
and relatively
affluent
elements of
the
community.
Opportunistic
crime against
individuals,
becoming
increasingly
violent.
Minimal social or
Police/CJ controls on
criminal activity.
Minimal social or
Police/CJ controls on
criminal activity.
Arbitrary Arrest
and detention of
UN personnel.
Widespread
harassment &
obstruction to
movement.
Increasing in
regularity,
often
accompanied
by violence,
extortion and
threats.
Demonstrations
against the UN.
IDPs in POC areas
overrunning,
vandalising and
looting the
UNMISS camps.
Crowds
become
violent
(localised)
<1000 people.
Crime
Office/ residential
compound breakins with theft of
UN personnel
property
Civil
Unrest
32
Minimal social or
police/CJ controls on
criminal activity. Lack
of awareness in the
lower ranks of SOFA
and UN related
immunities as a whole
or acting with
impunity at time of
crisis.
Host Government
control mechanisms
stressed (equipment
etc). UNMISS Force
and UNPOL possess
effective equipment &
training to mitigate
small to moderate
sized crowds
depending on duty
station location.
CONFIDENTIAL
Threat
Category
General
Hazards
Threats
Capability
Explosive
remnants of war,
including UXOs
Hazard event
occurs
occasionally
Severe.
Road Traffic
Accidents.
Hazard event
occurs
frequently.
Moderate to severe.
Medical Epidemic.
Hazard event
occurs
occasionally
Severe.
Aviation Hazards.
Ground fire
targeting low
flying UN aircraft
Hazard event
occurs
occasionally
Severe.
33
Inhibiting context
Partial/limited
warning and/or
preparedness system
in place.
Partial/limited
warning and/or
preparedness systems
in place.
Partial/limited
warning and/or
preparedness systems
in place.
Effective Ebola airport
screening, training &
sensitisation led to
zero cases in South
Sudan
Semi effective
dialogue with host
government and
SPLA-io leadership to
emphasise UN
impartiality
CONFIDENTIAL
34
CONFIDENTIAL
8 Vulnerability Assessment
Strengths:
35
CONFIDENTIAL
36
CONFIDENTIAL
Operation /
Activity
Road Travel:
Field missions
Humanitarian &
development
operations
Current Vulnerabilities/Weaknesses
37
CONFIDENTIAL
c.
Limited capability of guard force: The access control at the UNMISS compounds
and POC areas mainly by the unarmed individually contracted Security Guards
under the supervision of Guard Force Unit, UNMISS. Their impartiality and
utility in the event of an armed disturbances and/or intrusion by large groups of
IDPs from adjacent or internal POC areas could be questionable.
38
CONFIDENTIAL
The prevalence of small arms among the community especially the youths leads
to intra group conflicts and contributes to crime. Militias, as a stop-gap to the
lack of security forces, provide protection to the community with little or no
regards to the rule of law which can lead to human rights abuse. Reports of
crimes by soldiers or police in uniforms are very common.
39
CONFIDENTIAL
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
The office contingency/evacuation plans have been updated, however, the large
number of IDPs raises serious question on workable ability of these plans should
IDPs get out of control due to flooding, medical emergency or any other internal
unrest/riots.
UN AFPs operate throughout the country where there is a lack of infrastructure.
The humanitarian teams are operating in more than 100 locations country wide
often in remote locations.
Insufficient force protection elements in the event of further armed conflict in
affected states
Insufficient accommodation at UN compounds (UNMISS and AFPs)
Insufficient Force and FPU capability to defend POC areas and in turn UNMISS
bases from armed, deliberate attacks by militia groups as occurred on 17 April
2014 in the UNMISS Bor POC.
Insufficient indirect fire shelters/bunkers in UNMISS locations where threats of
getting caught in cross fire due to armed conflict are possible.
40
CONFIDENTIAL
the government structure rather than putting down arms and reaching basic
agreements.
10.4 During rainy season South Sudan warring parties have used the lull in fighting as
an opportunity to rearm and shape their military strategies further As per the reports
received weapons and troops have been procured, requested and placed in anticipation
of a protracted fighting season. SPLA as the government force are within their
sovereign right to buy weapons, military hardware and supplementary support (UPDF)
for protection so to meet these exponentially increased budget requirements money
was diverted from basic state provision programmes such as clean water, health,
education and infrastructure. This shortfall has been picked up through the
Humanitarian/, programmes/ international donors including providing humanitarian
aid, education and healthcare for the displaced and vulnerable populations. The South
Sudan government in Juba has openly accused the Sudan government in Khartoum of
re-arming the SPLA-io. Many militias are affiliated or directly absorbed into the two
factions of the SPLA or SPLA-io and increasingly public announcements that they lack
resources, food supplies and armoury. These tensions are worrying given that
desperate militias can move in any direction, whether through hunger or lack of arms,
which could turn to asymmetric guerrilla warfare, which is resource light, but
nevertheless damaging, such as landmines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). UN
and AFP personnel could be more vulnerable as they protect others and provide
humanitarian assistance in remote areas as the situation becomes less secure for those
on the battlefield.
10.5 The existing EU sanctions delivered in July 2014 had little impact on the deescalating of the crisis, however further extensive UN sanctions were delivered in a
tough UN Security Council Resolution on the 3 March 2015, the decision affects
individuals through the freezing of their bank accounts and travel bans will affect all
players who do not work towards peace and security There is also an African Union
(AU) report which has investigated human rights abuses last dry season which is
completed but yet to be published.
10.6 The integration of some of the many militias in South Sudan into the SPLA prior to,
and after the start of the conflict, have benefited the government military strength
through having troops pre-placed in frontline areas and by paying their wages has
prevented them affiliating themselves with the opposition. With wage payments to the
military being sporadic, promises of resources are not always being met and the
breakdown of faith between some of these partners has led to multiple tensions and
factions merging. Individual sackings and defections, some at high level, have been
widespread and have had a public humiliation factor too.
10.7 Payoffs have been forthcoming with both high-profile individuals and groups,
including the peace agreement with the SSDM/A Cobra Faction, which led to the
creation of the Greater Pibor Administration Area (GPAA), rewarding rebel militias with
land rights for the Murle ethnic group in return for not joining the opposition. It is
feared that many other militias will request the same annexing of territory which
although appeases in the short-term will have devastating effect for many years to
come, encouraging fighting over land and ethnic division. Inter communal violence over
41
CONFIDENTIAL
long running land disputes recently broke out in the Upper Nile areas in and around
Malakal Town and Akoka between Shilluk and Dinka groups. The fighting in early April
2015, has caused insecurity in the way of civilians being displaced and seeking
protection from the UN along with disruption to the delivery humanitarian supplies
with reports of WFP contracted trucks being commandeered and drivers detained.
Some states not affected during this conflict were requested to provide recruits for the
frontline; later further tensions have risen initially through the federalisation debate
and could lead them to be drawn into the conflict at a later stage. Given the mix of intercommunal violence and land issues, the distinction between the two fighting factions,
peace related challenges; ethnic divisions and seasonal cattle raiding are increasingly
blurred.
10.8 There is an increase of visible signs of South Sudan being a failing state: there is no
free media, intimidation by government security is commonplace, economy close to
collapse and lack of provision or accountability of the civilian population by the state
with most funds diverted to fund the war effort. Law and order is collapsing too, in
some states wages have been stolen or simply delayed for months on end, in urban
areas reports of police becoming active criminals, local courts do not function and
reports that crimes are committed due to perpetrators acting with impunity. Insecure
times lead to insecure methods with weapon carrying by civilians is becoming more
commonplace and the need to protect ones property and communities are accepted
norms in both urban and rural areas. Further breakdown will lead to escalation of
retaliatory attacks, which could easily be directed at UN and AFP personnel members in
the course of their duty. Large numbers of IDPs rely on the security of UNMISS
peacekeeping forces for their protection, however crowd control measures can never
maintain order if the IDPs turn on their protector if the tensions rise inside the confines
of the POC sites, the numbers are simply overwhelming.
10.9 The main characteristic of threats to UN personnel in the event of a protracted
low-level insurgency would be as follows:
a. Collateral effects of small scale assaults and hit and run attacks, including in Juba;
b. Increased risk of direct attacks such as harassment and intimidation especially
against UN/ AFP activities intended to provide support to civilians;
c. Increased risk of indirect fire;
d. Increased criminality in urban areas;
e. Un-attributable attacks, especially in areas under contested control, aimed at
casting blame on the other side to the dispute;
f. Increased risks in road movements including stopping of humanitarian delivery,
roadblocks and increased roadside banditry. Possible placement of IEDs or
landmines;
g. Tensions between authorities and IDPs within and outside POC areas;
h. Altered patterns of intra-ethnic armed conflict and cattle raiding
42
CONFIDENTIAL
43
CONFIDENTIAL
enable such operations on behalf of the UN mission and AFP has stretched resources
and the need for operational flexibility, innovation and security assessments.
11.3 As per various SRAs the following recommendations are being acted upon, subject
to funds and resources:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
11.4 The more significant recommendations in the Country SRA have been
consolidated in Annex C.
44
August 2015
Collateral
effect of direct
fire (ie. small
arms, hand
grenades).
Vulnerabilities
Where
Impact
Cause
Likelihood
Challenge
Vulnerability
Assessment
Current
Risk Level
Programme Activities
Affected
Impact
Available Information
Likelihood
Threat
Indirect fire shelters/safe rooms in UN staffs using soft skin vehicles, offices and
some UN compounds
residential containers.
In volatile areas all international
Lack of solid wall perimeters
and many national personnel live
inside UN compounds
August 2015
Collateral
effects of
indirect fire
(mortars,
RPGs, artillery,
aerial
bombardment)
.
Vulnerabilities
All international and many national Weak perimeters and access control points
staffs in volatile areas are
in some UN compounds, no solid wall
accommodated in UN compounds perimeters
Current
Risk Level
Where
Impact
Cause
Likelihood
Challenge
Vulnerability
Assessment
Current
Risk Level
Programme Activities
Affected
Impact
Available Information
Likelihood
Threat
August 2015
Direct attacks
on UN by
armed groups
with direct or
indirect fire
Vulnerabilities
UN humanitarian programmes
informing public of UN
programmes
activities/humanitarian effortscountry wide
Ensuring IDPs entering POCs are
disarmed and stay disarmed
Current
Risk Level
Where
Impact
Cause
Likelihood
Challenge
Vulnerability
Assessment
Current
Risk Level
Programme Activities
Affected
Impact
Available Information
Likelihood
Threat
August 2015
Various forms
of Improvised
Explosive
Devices (IED)
Vulnerabilities
Mass Casualty Plans (MCP) in place. Weak terrorism related awareness among
UN staffs especially truck/car, roadside
bomb/ IED threats.
Exchange of information
No SRD Plan
Weak perimeters and access control points
in some UN compounds, no solid wall
perimeters. Inadequate standoff in some UN
compounds
MOSS/ MORSS
Where
Impact
Cause
Likelihood
Challenge
Vulnerability
Assessment
Current
Risk Level
Programme Activities
Affected
Impact
Available Information
Likelihood
Threat
August 2015
Roadside
banditry and
other forms of
violent
criminality
Vulnerabilities
Where
Impact
Cause
Likelihood
Challenge
Vulnerability
Assessment
Current
Risk Level
Programme Activities
Affected
Impact
Available Information
Likelihood
Threat
August 2015
Looting and
destruction of
UN assets
Vulnerabilities
UN assets especially related to life saving/POC Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile
operations conflict affected states to be
States where Force protection
secured in main UN bases with robust MOSS is inadequate
compliant security measures.
Where
Impact
Cause
Likelihood
Challenge
Vulnerability
Assessment
Current
Risk Level
Programme Activities
Affected
Impact
Available Information
Likelihood
Threat
August 2015
Harassment
and
intimidation of
UN staff
International Staff
All managers to ensure all personnel are SSAFE trained as soon as they arrive in mission.
International Staff
Current
Risk Level
Vulnerabilities
Impact
Likelihood
Cause
Vulnerability
Assessment
Current
Risk Level
Challenge
Programme Activities
Affected
Where
Impact
Available Information
Likelihood
Threat
August 2015
Arbitrary
arrest and
detention of
UN personnel
All staff
All managers to ensure all personnel are SSAFE trained as soon as they arrive in mission.
All staff
Current
Risk Level
Vulnerabilities
Impact
Existing Mitigation
Likelihood
Cause
Vulnerability
Assessment
Current
Risk Level
Challenge
Programme Activities
Affected
Where
Impact
Available Information
Likelihood
Threat
August 2015
Violent
Outbreaks of civil unrest have been a
demonstration significant effect of the ongoing armed
s
conflict. Many urban centres in some
areas remain largely de-populated.
Vulnerabilities
Impact
Existing Mitigation
Likelihood
Cause
Vulnerability
Assessment
Current
Risk Level
Challenge
Programme Activities
Affected
Where
Impact
Available Information
Likelihood
Threat
August 2015
Explosive
remnants of
war
Due to the on-going conflict, there are often Border areas and Jonglei,
restrictions of movement within conflict
Unity and Upper Nile States
affected states, UNMAS regularly l has
difficulty clearing UXOs from areas
surrounding UN compounds including some
important road routes the UN has been
informed by the SPLA-io not to
maintain/check for mines on some roads
including roads north of Bentiu towards
Mayom junction.
Vulnerabilities
Impact
Existing Mitigation
Likelihood
Cause
Vulnerability
Assessment
Current
Risk Level
Challenge
Programme Activities
Affected
Where
Impact
Available Information
Likelihood
Threat
August 2015
Cause
Programme Activities
Affected
Where
Vulnerability
Assessment
MEDEVACpPlan in Place.
UN Mission has established aviation IDPs are already overwhelming the modest
capacity.
UN medical facilities meant to treat UN
personnel
All UN personnel
Likelihood
Current
Risk Level
Impact
Vulnerabilities
Likelihood
Existing Mitigation
Current
Risk Level
Available Information
Impact
Threat
August 2015
Road traffic
accidents
All UN personnel
UN Speed Limits
UN Traffic Rules
Mission tracking
Current
Risk Level
Vulnerabilities
Impact
Existing Mitigation
Likelihood
Cause
Vulnerability
Assessment
Current
Risk Level
Challenge
Programme Activities
Affected
Where
Impact
Available Information
Likelihood
Threat
CONFIDENTIAL
Work by agencies focal points over the last two days to produce the PC results are highly appreciated
by the UNCT.
While agency focal points are in general in agreement with the results, some agency heads noted that
there is need to review some of the PC results as agency focal points may not be fully aware of the
proposed activities and consequently the ratings may be compromised. Action Point: Agency Heads to
review the PC results and fully brief your technical staff who will attend the next PMT meeting on
activities that need to be revisited
PMT will meet on Tuesday at 14:00 (venue to be confirmed) to review activities that are yellowhighlighted in the attachment, additional activities brought forward by agencies as well as activities of
remaining agencies (UNEP, UNHABITAT, UNODC, UNIDO).
1
CONFIDENTIAL
Agencies of which activities are not yet rated (mentioned above) will be communicated separately on
how we can do the ratings while you are not in the country
The result after Tuesday meeting will be shared with UNCT for review and endorsement before it being
submitted to the RC and SRSG for approval
It is agreed that the discussion on whats next and how to use the PC results effectively (in relation
with the SRA) will take place at the PMT level on a regular basic
It is proposed that UNDSS to include the PC reference in their risk template to facilitate the discussion
between agencies and DSS when it comes to the implementation of the PC activities
It is agreed that while the PC exercise is an internal UN exercise, it is important to bring this to the
Governments attention when situation allows for sensitization and information purposes
UNCT highly appreciated the support of the two facilitators (Katarina Herneryd and Karson Snyder)
without which the exercise will not be completed at a record time. UNCT also request for the
facilitation team to extend their stay to help facilitate the remaining work on Tuesday.
On 28 January the PMT convened to review flagged activities. A number of agencies also nominated additional
activities for review. The final results were agreed and transferred to the UNCT focal point for Programme
Criticality (Ms. Van Nguyen, Head of the Secretariat for the South Sudan Recovery Fund) for consolidation and
subsequent preparation to the UNCT. It was agreed that the PMT would be responsible to maintain the PC
process for South Sudan.
Observations and recommendations:
There was strong commitment by agencies and departments in South Sudan to complete the PC
exercise, and it was undertaken in record time with a very cooperative spirit. Overall, the exercise went
well and produced expected outcomes, working within the constraints that existed, primary of which
was the limited amount of time available to complete it. More preparatory time would have facilitated
the inputs to the exercise (such as the agreement on strategic results and the listing of activities) and
ensured these were better harmonized.
Time constraints also led to there being insufficient time between the completion of the exercise and
the validation discussion in the UNCT, which should be kept in mind for the future. To ensure that
senior leadership can validate and approve results, sufficient time to review and consult staff must be
given.
Given the absence of RC/HC and Chief CSA DSS during the course of the exercise, it will be key for the
team to provide a full briefing and follow up with a comprehensive discussion on the results of the PC
assessment, and most importantly, its use.
Having the PMT (including UNMISS staff) as the custodian for PC is an excellent choice, and it is
recommended that PC, along with the linkages to the SRA and discussions on security risk mitigation, be
a standing item on the PMT agenda. This is necessary in order to actively use the results of the PC
assessment.
It is crucial to regularly convene discussions between programme staff and DSS + agency security focal
points on how to enable activities to the maximum extent possible and work on security risk mitigation.
CONFIDENTIAL
In terms of next steps, each agency should look internally at what the PC results mean for their
operations, and share this within the dedicated fora.
As was noted by focal points, the security situation in South Sudan remains very dynamic and can
change quickly from day to day. In order to make full use of the PC results, it is important that security
risk analyses done are frequently communicated to agencies so that decisions can be adjusted
accordingly. This point re-emphasizes the need for a regular follow up mechanism to discuss security risk
mitigation.
The South Sudan team may consider to review the PC results after 6 months to ensure that all inputs
and the ratings are in accordance with the context and remain valid.
Ends.
1 FAO
2 FAO
3 FAO
4 FAO
PC
Level
PC3
PC3
Justifications
PC4
PC3
CONFIDENTIAL
5 FAO
6 FAO
7 FAO
8 FAO
9 FAO
10
10 FAO
11
11 FAO
12
12 FAO
13
13 FAO
14
14 FAO
15
15 FAO
16
16 FAO
17
18
17 FAO
1 IOM
19
communities
Plant pest and disease protection, resilience building and
awareness
Food security and livelihood responses supported through
information, analysis and coordination
PC3
PC2
PC2
PC3
2 IOM
PC3
20
3 IOM
PC3
21
4 IOM
22
5 IOM
PC2
PC3
PC4
PC3
PC3
PC3
PC4
PC3
PC3
PC4
PC1
Supports lifesaving;
manages delivery of
lifesaving services;
need to be there to
directly, immediately
deliver services
Supports lifesaving
activities
4
CONFIDENTIAL
provided to vulnerable populations as the need is identified.
23
6 IOM
PC2
24
7 IOM
25
8 IOM
PC2
26
9 IOM
27
28
10 IOM
11 IOM
PC3
PC4
29
30
12 IOM
13 IOM
PC3
PC1
31
14 IOM
PC2
PC4
32
1 UNAIDS
33
2 UNAIDS
34
3 UNAIDS
35
4 UNAIDS
36
5 UNAIDS
37
6 UNAIDS
38
7 UNAIDS
39
8 UNAIDS
40
9 UNAIDS
PC4
PC3
When supporting a
lifesaving activity
Lifesaving
PC3
PC3
PC3
PC3
PC3
PC3
PC3
PC3
CONFIDENTIAL
41
10 UNAIDS
PC4
42
11 UNAIDS
43
1 UNDP
44
2 UNDP
PC2
45
3 UNDP
PC3
46
47
48
49
4
5
6
7
50
8 UNDP
51
52
9 UNDP
10 UNDP
PC3
PC1
53
11 UNDP
54
12 UNDP
55
13 UNDP
56
14 UNDP
57
15 UNDP
58
16 UNDP
PC2
59
17 UNDP
60
61
18 UNDP
1 UNESCO
UNDP
UNDP
UNDP
UNDP
PC2
PC1
Directed by SG;
political/ethnic
implications
PC2
PC2
PC4
PC4
PC2
PC3
PC2
PC3
PC3
PC1
Directed by SG;
Election support;
prevents
resurrection of an
issue that sparked
violence.
PC3
PC4
PC2
6
CONFIDENTIAL
environment of displaced communities.
Assessment of conflict and oil leaks impact on water
sources and resources
Coordinate a travelling campaign of the arts for conflict
transformation.
Coordinate the preconstruction phase of the National
Archives with the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports.
62
2 UNESCO
PC3
63
3 UNESCO
64
4 UNESCO
65
5 UNESCO
PC2
66
6 UNESCO
PC2
67
7 UNESCO
68
8 UNESCO
69
70
9 UNESCO
10 UNESCO
71
11 UNESCO
72
12 UNESCO
73
13 UNESCO
74
75
76
14 UNESCO
15 UNESCO
16 UNESCO
77
17 UNESCO
78
18 UNESCO
79
1 UNFPA
80
2 UNFPA
81
3 UNFPA
PC4
PC3
PC3
PC2
PC2
PC3
PC3
PC2
PC3
PC3
PC2
PC3
PC2
PC3
PC2
PC2
PC1
Lifesaving;
population is
pregnant women,
7
CONFIDENTIAL
IDPs; emergency
obstetric care;
82
4 UNFPA
PC3
83
5 UNFPA
PC1
84
6 UNFPA
85
7 UNFPA
PC4
86
8 UNFPA
87
9 UNFPA
88
10 UNFPA
89
11 UNFPA
PC2
90
12 UNFPA
91
13 UNFPA
92
14 UNFPA
93
15 UNFPA
94
16 UNFPA
95
17 UNFPA
PC4
96
18 UNFPA
97
1 UNHCR
98
2 UNHCR
PC3
Lifesaving
PC2
PC3
PC2
PC4
PC2
PC3
PC4
PC2
PC3
PC2
PC1
Lifesaving; delivery
of lifesaving
services;200K people
CONFIDENTIAL
99
3 UNHCR
PC1
100
4 UNHCR
PC1
101
5 UNHCR
102
103
104
6 UNHCR
7 UNHCR
8 UNHCR
105
106
9 UNHCR
10 UNHCR
107
108
11 UNHCR
12 UNHCR
109
13 UNHCR
PC1
110
111
14 UNHCR
1 UNICEF
PC2
PC1
112
2 UNICEF
113
3 UNICEF
114
4 UNICEF
115
5 UNICEF
PC2
116
6 UNICEF
117
7 UNICEF
118
8 UNICEF
Lifesaving; need
registration to have
access to services;
need to know what
services to deliver;
Lifesaving; ensure
delivery of services
PC1
PC1
PC1
PC1
PC1
PC2
PC2
PC2
Need to know how
to distribute scarce
resources
Lifesaving; 3 main
killer diseases for
children
PC3
PC3
PC1
Lifesaving
PC2
PC3
PC3
CONFIDENTIAL
decisions making and planning
119
120
9 UNICEF
10 UNICEF
PC1
PC1
121
11 UNICEF
PC3
122
12 UNICEF
123
13 UNICEF
124
14 UNICEF
125
15 UNICEF
PC1
126
16 UNICEF
127
17 UNICEF
128
18 UNICEF
PC2
129
1 UNMAS
130
2 UNMAS
131
3 UNMAS
PC1
132
4 UNMAS
PC1
133
134
5 UNMAS
6 UNMAS
135
136
7 UNMAS
1 UNMISS
Lifesaving; Identify
gaps; coordinate
delivery of lifesaving
services
PC3
PC1
Lifesaving
PC3
SG Directed;
Contested
PC3
PC4
PC4
PC2
Lifesaving; Bor,
Malakal, Bentiu;
saves lives; allows
access for lifesaving
activities
PC2
PC3
PC3
PC1
SG Directed
10
CONFIDENTIAL
137
2 UNMISS
PC2
138
3 UNMISS
139
4 UNMISS
PC3
140
5 UNMISS
PC3
141
6 UNMISS
142
7 UNMISS
143
8 UNMISS
144
9 UNMISS
145
10 UNMISS
146
11 UNMISS
147
12 UNMISS
PC2
148
1 UNOCHA
149
2 UNOCHA
150
3 UNOCHA
151
4 UNOCHA
PC3
PC1
Lifesaving
PC3
PC1
Lifesaving
PC3
PC4
PC3
PC1
Facilitates Lifesaving
activities
PC1
Facilitates Lifesaving
activities
PC1
Facilitates Lifesaving
activities
PC1
Facilitates Lifesaving
activities
11
CONFIDENTIAL
152
5 UNOCHA
PC2
153
6 UNOCHA
154
7 UNOCHA
155
8 UNOCHA
156
157
9 UNOCHA
1 UNOPS
158
2 UNOPS
PC2
159
3 UNOPS
160
4 UNOPS
PC2
161
5 UNOPS
162
6 UNOPS
163
7 UNOPS
PC2
164
8 UNOPS
PC2
165
9 UNOPS
PC2
166
1 UNWOMEN
167
2 UNWOMEN
168
3 UNWOMEN
169
4 UNWOMEN
PC1
Facilitates Lifesaving
activities
PC1
Facilitates Lifesaving
activities
PC2
PC2
PC2
PC2
PC2
PC2
PC3
PC3
PC3
PC3
12
CONFIDENTIAL
areas.
170
PC3
177
7 WFP
PC1
When supporting /
enabling lifesaving
activities
Lifesaving
178
8 WFP
PC1
Lifesaving
179
9 WFP
180
10 WFP
PC2
181
11 WFP
182
12 WFP
183
13 WFP
184
14 WFP
PC1
Lifesaving; nutrition
185
15 WFP
PC1
Lifesaving;
171
172
173
174
175
176
PC1
Lifesaving
PC2
PC2
PC4
PC2
PC1
PC3
PC1
Lifesaving;
coordination needed
for deliver services
PC2
PC1
13
CONFIDENTIAL
186
16 WFP
187
17 WFP
188
18 WFP
PC1
Lifesaving;
PC3
PC3
189
1 WHO
PC3
190
2 WHO
PC3
191
192
3 WHO
4 WHO
PC1
PC4
193
5 WHO
194
6 WHO
195
7 WHO
196
8 WHO
197
9 WHO
PC1
198
10 WHO
199
11 WHO
200
12 WHO
PC1
201
13 WHO
PC4
202
1 UNEP
203
2 UNEP
PC3
Lifesaving
PC4
PC3
PC3
PC3
Lifesaving;
PC4
PC1
PC3
14
CONFIDENTIAL
204
3 UNEP
PC3
205
4 UNEP
PC2
206
5 UNEP
207
6 UNEP
208
7 UNEP
209
210
1 UN-Habitat
2 UN-Habitat
211
3 UN-Habitat
212
4 UN-Habitat
213
5 UN-Habitat
214
1 UNIDO
215
216
2 UNIDO
3 UNIDO
217
218
4 UNIDO
5 UNIDO
PC2
PC2
219
6 UNIDO
PC2
220
221
7 UNIDO
8 UNIDO
222
9 UNIDO
PC3
223
10 UNIDO
PC3
PC3
PC2
PC3
PC3
PC4
PC3
PC4
PC3
PC3
PC3
PC3
PC3
PC3
15
ANNEX C:
Action
Priority
Priority 1
Priority 1
Priority 1
Priority 1
Resilience planning can dramatically reduce the impact of a security incident, attack, disaster etc. Business Continuity plans should be made by
each UN Agency that is realistic in nature and in line with the UN-wide policies and guidelines. In the case of a relocation of international staff
within or evacuation outside the country, in absentia predesignated national staff should be available to continue business. Field Security
Handbook refers. Country and State Security Plans is to include a check list of what to do with assets in case of full relocation covering removing
sensitive IT equipment, safely destroy hard drives, disabling vehicles and large equipment to deny /restrict non-UN use.
Priority 1
Priority 2
Priority 2
The current Country MOSS (Minimum Operating Security Standard) was approved by the SMT in August 2014. This may need to be reviewed at the
end of the year or should the operational environment change significantly. Every compound / office location should be MOSS compliant including
all the vehicles. MORSS needs to be reviewed due to increased general criminality with special consideration to UN residential areas near to
UNMISS POC sites.
Priority 2
Priority 1
Considering the ongoing threats relating to crime, violence and caught-in-cross-fire situations eminating around/from POC sites , the following
measures to lower the risk to UN personnel assets and operations are recomended; Continuous perimeter monitoring, upgrading of ditch berm,
razor wire systems, repairs to damaged fences, robust access control protocals.
UN TCC troops to monitor and secure the perimeter in appropriate numbers.
UNPOL/ FPU to ensure Law and Order inside POC Sites, numbers of UNPOL/FPU and must be proportionate to the numbers of IDPs inside the POC
Site. Access/Egress procedures (entry/exit) to be monitored and improved.
Priority 1
All UN compounds should be allocated walk -through metal detectors and baggage X-ray machines with robust operational training and
maintenance programmes.
Priority 2
For States which have POC Sites, SOC is to accommodate 24/7 UNPOL and Force response capabilities to coordinate their elements responding to
incidents within or near POC sites including demonstrations, riots and criminal behavior.
Priority 1
Vehicle Access Control. All large UN compounds should ideally have canine teams or explosive detective devices and vehicle search areas /
inspection bays.
10. Contingency planning for natural disasters should be developed
An updated Crisis Management Response plan to incorporate Operational Resilience Management System (ORMS) strategies must be developed
and approved by the SMT.
Priority 2
Action
Priority 2
Priority 2
Due to falsification of ID cards and theft an Electronic/integrated Security System including an ID card Swipe card system is being installed at
UNMISS Tomping and UN House, to ensure safe/secure access to all main UN facilities. All ID cards countrywide must be processed by the systems
data base.
Priority 2
Priority 1
Enhanced contingency planning for the relocation of staff including liaison with NGOs
Mass casualty preparedness procedures implemented and training provided
Despite challenges, UN to continue to conduct sensitisation sessions with SPLA, NISS and SNPS law enforcement /security agencies by senior
leadership and UNDSS, UNPOL, UN Military in order to educate them on the UN immunities/ privileges and SOFA agreement.
Increase sensitisation of local communities on the mandates of the UN including, impartiality and POC activities to negate allegations of bias and
prevent unrealistic expectations.
Training
All managers to ensure all personnel are S-SAFE trained as soon as they arrive in mission.
Priority 2
Priority 1
Priority 1
Communications
Priority 1
Enhancement and compliance to emergency communication systems to enable rapid dissemination of information and alerts to staff
Priority 1
Adequate
Priority 2
Priority 1
Priority 3
Priority 1
Priority 1