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CONFIDENTIAL

UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)


UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)

United Nations Security Risk Assessment


South Sudan
Country:
Area:
Month/Year:
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Executive Summary
Programme Assessment
Mandates and Objectives
Main UN Operations
Projected changes to UN Operations
Threat Assessment
Structured Threat Assessment
Vulnerability Assessment
Security Risk Management Measures
Security Risk Analysis
Conclusion
Annex A
Annex B
Annex C

South Sudan
Country
Sept 2015
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SRA Matrix, dated August 2015


Programme Criticality, dated Jan 2014 [currently under review]
Recommendations, dated Aug 2015

Submitted by (UN Security Professional): CSA, South Sudan


Revision submitted by (UN Security): PSA South Sudan
E-approved SMT Members
Approved by (UN Designated Official) & SMT South Sudan:
Endorsed by (DRO Chief of Reg. Section): Chief of Desk, POSS
15/09/15

Date: 2 May 2015


Date: 18 Aug 2015
Date: 22 Aug 2015
Date: 11 Sept 2015
Date:

UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)


UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)
CONFIDENTIAL
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PSA Office
UNDSS
South Sudan

CONFIDENTIAL
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)

1. Executive Summary for South Sudan SRA


Introduction
1.1 The purpose of this Security Risk Assessment (SRA) is to define the risk profile of
the security environment within which the UN must operate to deliver its mandate in
2015. The assessment provided in the document will be used to guide the ongoing
planning and risk management approach within the UN Security Management System
(UNSMS).
1.2 The SRA focusses on the generic security risks to the UN as a whole at the country
level. It is further complemented by geographically specific SRAs (State SRAs) and
where applicable Quick SRAs on a case by case basis. The security situation in South
Sudan is complex and varies geographically. The UN implements a broad range of
programmes in South Sudan that involves engagement with a diverse range of
interlocutors and beneficiaries.
1.3 It is therefore prudent that the UN identifies the root causes of the conflict and
potential conflict drivers, to understand the security conditions and associated risks and
challenges and define how best to address it. The current conflict in South Sudan has
many intermediary conflict drivers and this dynamic must be taken into account as it
concerns regional involvement in the crisis, including the presence or active
involvement of foreign military forces and Other Armed Groups (OAGs). Moreover,
there are other intermediary conflict drivers including active and dormant armed
groups that can switch allegiance without notice; the global plummeting of the price of
oil for which South Sudan is reliant for the majority of its revenues; and the ailing
economy which is now leading to food shortages amongst most of the communities and
a sharp rise in violent criminal activity in urban areas.
1.4 The UNSMS requires constant assessments given the evolving situation, an
uncertain peace accord, and the dire economic status. Moreover, South Sudanese States
& Counties have their own unique set of evolving dynamics and what is true for one
county does not necessarily reflect the situation in another.
1.5 A key success factor for effective access is the acceptability of programme delivery
in a specific area. Therefore, the development and maintenance of effective
relationships with the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) at National
and State level, and communicating with elements of the parties to the conflict,
beneficiaries and other stakeholders is a collective UN family responsibility that would
require a cohesive approach with more flexible and timely responses.
1.6 Following the onset of the conflict in December 2013, UNMISS could not fully
perform its mandate given to it under Security Council resolution 1996 (2011) because
of the security situation and the need to maintain impartiality. Subsequently, Security
Council resolution 2155 (2014), 27 May 2014, fundamentally shifted the basis of
UNMISS mandate from support to the Government in capacity-building in traditional
UN peacebuilding areas to four key areas. In line with UN Security Council resolution
2223 (2015), UNMISS activities are:
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UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)

Protection of civilians
Monitoring and investigating human rights
The creation of conditions conducive for humanitarian assistance
Supporting the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities agreement

1.7 This shift in UNMISS mandate1 has had a direct impact on many government
ministries, commissions and bureaus in their perception of the UN Mission. It is
imperative that the public is aware and understands the reprioritised UNMISS mandate,
this would be to mitigate against disinformation, distortion of facts, misperceptions at
all levels but especially the population of South Sudan.
Assumptions
1.8 To direct an appropriate Risk Management Approach, the following assumptions
serve to guide for 2015/16:
1. The risk profiles of UN programmes vary as it bears programme specific inherent
or associated risks that would require programme specific mitigation measures
in addition to current MOSS or SOPs.
2. Some programmes might be tainted / restricted by association with other
programmes.
3. Despite the attacks on the Akobo CSB and the BOR PoC in April 2014, that were
more linked with ethnic based targeting of South Sudanese sheltering within UN
premises, generally speaking the UN is not the primary target for hostilities.
Moreover, the UN is more often caught in crossfire during armed conflict and
access is affected as a result of armed conflict. This will continue to be a risk.
4. The fact that UNMISS hosts over 166,000 Internally Displaced People (IDP)
increases the UNs operational risk profile and reputation2.
5. Where a POC site is within a UN compound/ near where staff reside or have
offices it significantly increases the risk to staff and to UN assets that would be
difficult to police. This is therefore not the best practice.
6. The risk profile of the UN requires a cohesive security approach by all UN
security elements including an integrated pro-active public relations approach.
7. Access does not necessarily mean that the beneficiary must be reached
physically on all occasions. Therefore needs must direct approaches towards
programme implementation.
8. Given the deteriorated security environment in South Sudan and the lack of
government capacity and will to provide security for its entire population, the
UN would need to ensure it maintains capacity to protect all UN staff under all
conditions so they can effectively carry out the UN Mandate.
9. PoC sites are volatile with the potential that the high levels of tension amongst
the IDPs may spill over in violent clashes. Staff members are therefore at a higher
risk working within these sites.
1

Current UNMISS mandate is UN SC Resolution 2223 (2015), 28 May 2015.


http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11910.doc.htm (accessed 6 July 2015)

(166,142 IDPs) Figure correct as of 10 July 2015

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UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)

Security Conditions in South Sudan


1.9 In 2015/16 South Sudan three major factors would influence the evolving security
environment namely the political peace process, the socio-economic situation, the
continuing humanitarian crisis and further inter-communal violence. It has to be seen
how various stakeholders / spoilers react and/or exploit the dynamics they generate
and its impact on the volatility of the security situation.
1.10 Over the past 20 months, peace talks have resulted in a peace deal on 26 August
culminating 20 months after the initial signing of a Cessation of Hostility Agreement
between the warring parties in January 2014. During this period, the economy has
significantly deteriorated, further impoverishing the population and resulting in
increased food insecurity and criminality. The 17 August deadline for the government
and rebels to sign the new IGAD-plus proposal passed without the government signing
however the President finally signed on 26 August in Juba, with reservations.
1.11 For the warring parties, when there was an absence of an incentive to make the
compromises necessary to conclude a peace agreement, both sides seem to believe that
a military solution in their favour was possible. Even with a peace deal in place they
could continue fighting, suggesting the possibility of lasting peace is low. External
political pressure and UN targeted sanctions have so far failed to affect change in the
country, with the likelihood of renewed suspicion towards UN and their future mandate.
1.12 The armed conflict, which is now in its second year, followed last years pattern
where the dry season was the fighting season enabling forces to take control of vast
areas of the country. During the rainy season (July- Nov) the roads become impassable
curbing the direct clashes for a period. Even with the IGAD peace agreement signed in
Juba on 26 August 2015, the assessment is that the country security situation in
2015/16 will remain insecure.
1.13 Within South Sudan the inextricable link with the Governments political party
SPLM with the SPLA military has exacerbated the crisis and this bond is also a potential
stumbling block to finding a peaceful solution in the future. Through its security
agencies the Government has the primary responsibility to provide security for its
population and institutions which it does through the SPLA military, the SSNPS (Police
Force), the Wildlife Service and the Ministry of National Security.
Currently the
Government cannot adequately protect its population or institutions and therefore by
extension is also unable to provide adequate protection to UN personnel or assets. The
fragmentation of the military from the beginning of the crisis, the misuse of national
security agencies and the economic status resulting from the collapse of state structure
and drop in income, has led to further political instability.
UN Security Management System (UNSMS)
1.14 This assessment defines that the UN is not a primary target for direct violence.
However, this situation could change if the economic situation declines further, the
military armed conflict continues and tensions rise within PoC sites.

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1.15 It is therefore imperative that some of the key mitigating measures of the UNSMS
will remain a priority approach namely: the UN engages with the Non-State Actors
under strict protocols; the UN profile, image and public perception/ understanding of
the UN mandates must be represented in a positive and objective manner at all levels of
society in South Sudan; the UN should apply an approach of acceptability to gain
programme reach and access; programme managers and security officers would need to
engage at all levels with the beneficiaries and share their assessments in a cohesive
manner, especially in planning programme delivery; the UN should endeavour to obtain
timely, relevant and accurate security information and jointly analyses this information
with UNMISS entities and AFPs as applicable; the UN should provide effective and
timely distribution of security advice to staff and managers that would inform quality
security and programme decision making; UN partners work very closely with the GoSS
and other national interlocutors including non-state actors and regional role players
and engage pro-actively at all times.
1.16 The UNSMS needs to further develop into a robust, effective system that is capable
of adapting to the continuously evolving security environment. This capacity will have
to be maintained for an unforeseeable long term period.
1.17 While consultation between security and programme managers with interlocutors
at all levels exists, it would require consistent strengthening and would require that
more joint planning between programme delivery and security support should take
place in a proactive and structured manner.
1.18 Currently there is no mainstreaming of Security within the planning of UN
activities/ programmes. Therefore, the policy that defines that security needs to be
involved at all levels of management to ensure security is considered/ mainstreamed
into all activities or programmes is not applied, specifically in UNMISS.
1.19 The provision of reporting through the JOC, SOCs and SIOC would need to be fused
better and provide more cohesive and seamless reporting whilst alerts and advisories
issued by the SIOC needs to be integrated with the JOC/SOCs. The provision of timely,
relevant and accurate information/analysis through the SIOC/JMAC is effective but
would need to be fused better and provide more cohesive, seamless, timely, accurate
and relevant reporting.
1.20 Maintaining security training would enhance the functional expertise of all
international and national staff although programme managers would need to receive
training in order to learn to identify inherent and associated risks in a timely manner.
Moreover, UNMISS and AFPs need to further deepen their understanding of inherent
risks of their programmes and identify corresponding mitigating strategies.
Underscored by the MOSS, the Standing Operational Procedures (SOPs) for South Sudan
support the UNSMS effectively but require a significant overhaul that includes the ongoing simplification of procedures and processes.
1.21 Finally, the responsibility to enable access for the UN requires creative thinking as
a shared responsibility between UN security and programme managers whilst utilising
the full scope of their collective networks and influences..
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1.22 Recommendations
A consolidated list of recommendations that serves as the basis for the security plan and
as identified throughout the various sections of this SRA, have been attached as Annex
C to allow tracking and compliance of effective implementation of the
recommendations.

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UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
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Table 1: UN and Humanitarian Partner presence in South Sudan 2014

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UNDSS
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UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)

2. Programme Assessment
UN Security Management System (UNSMS) and Personnel
2.1 In South Sudan the UN Security Management System (UNSMS) presence includes
the UN Mission In South Sudan (UNMISS) and encompasses the elements that make up
the UN Country Team which incorporates the Agencies, Funds and Programmes (AFP)
of the UN System, namely: UNDSS, UNDP, UNHCR, UN WOMEN, UNAIDS, UNFPA, OCHA,
UNMAS, UNESCO, UNICEF, WHO, WFP, UNOPS, FAO, UNHabitat, UNEP, UNIDO, ILO and
IOM.
2.2 The UNSMS has a decentralised field presence with the headquarters for UNMISS
and the UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes (AFPs) based in the South Sudanese
capital Juba. In all ten (10) states of South Sudan UNMISS have team sites which host the
state offices. There are a further nine (9) operational County Support Bases (CSBs) and
three (3) Company Operating Bases (COB) installed in areas identified as needing
mission or agency support. The mission is currently reprioritising cost benefits from an
operational point of view and this will effect changes in the numbers of CSBs at the end
of the year; Pibor (Jonglei State) will remain; decisions still pending on Melut (UNS) and
Kapoeta (EE) due to the continued presence of IDPs within these CSBs and from 31
December 2015 six (6) CSBs will close including Yirol (Lakes), Gok Machar (NBEG),
Pariang (Unity), Nasser & Renk (UNS) & Turalei (Warrap). Some facilities may be
handed over where UN parties have expressed interest.
2.3 Presently the UNSMS supports 2854 international staff (incl UNPOL, Corrections,
MLOs, SOs UNVs), 3105 national staff and approximately 8,500 for National Staff
dependants. (Figures correct as of 17 August 2015)
3.

UN Mandates and Objectives

3.1 UNMISS Mandate: Under UN Security Council resolution 2155 (2014), the mandate
of UNMISS was reprioritised into four core areas: protection of civilians; monitoring and
investigating human rights; creating conditions conducive for the delivery of
humanitarian assistance; and supporting the implementation of the Cessation of
Hostilities agreement. This means that there is no longer large-scale capacity building
for the Government of the Republic of South Sudan, which until that point had been a
significant part of the UNMISS mandate since its inception under UN Security Council
Resolution 1996 (2011). The reprioritised mandate was extended with the same focus
areas under UN Security Council resolutions 2187 (2014) and 2223 (2015). The current
Mission mandate, UN SC Resolution 2223 (2015), expires on 30 November 2015.
3.2 The current mandate under UN Security Council Resolution 2223 (2015) reflects the
continued conflict between the SPLA and SPLA in Opposition (SPLA-io) (including
militia groups affiliated to both sides), inter-communal violence, a breakdown in rule of
law and subsequent insecurities which are resulting in threat of violence to civilians,
large-scale displacement, human rights violations and security risks to humanitarian
partners. The mandate also reflects the continued presence of the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD) Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, which
monitors and reports on violations on the Cessation of Hostility (CoH) Agreement.

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3.3 Peace Operations: To help implement the mandated tasks, UNMISS will consist of a
military component of up to 12,500 troops of all ranks and of a police component,
including appropriate Formed Police Units, of up to 1,323 personnel.
3.4 Pursuant to SC Resolution 2206 (2015) a special Committee was established to
oversee the sanctions measures imposed by the Security Council for South Sudan, they
are supported by a team of Panel of Experts. The Panel of Experts are entirely
independent from UNMISS and report directly to the Committee, they have visited
South Sudan throughout June, July and August. The mission has been helping on a
logistical level as the Panel of Experts seek and review information regarding
individuals and/or entities engaging in acts violating peace agreements and
International Law, as laid out in SCR 2206 (2015). The Panel of Experts interim report
was presented to the Security Council Committee on 21 August 2015.3
3.5 Work of UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes: In South Sudan, the basic needs of
the most vulnerable, conflict-affected populations are being provided for through the
work of the UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes (AFP) in collaboration with their
national and international implementing partners. Some AFPs in South Sudan have
crosscutting obligations which involve them in both humanitarian and development
programmes. Sudden onset emergencies and other lifesaving operations may be
addressed outside of the Crisis Response Plan (CRP), depending on the circumstances.
The planning of humanitarian activities takes place through the cluster system under
the guidance of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), while the UNs Development
Programmes are coordinated at UN Country Team (UNCT) and Programme
Management Team levels.
3.6 Since the onset of the crisis and with the declaration of an IASC system-wide Level3
Humanitarian Emergency Response, the context of the operation of humanitarian AFPs
has changed considerably. AFP numbers increased dramatically to support the IDPs
arriving at PoC sites looking for protection and assistance. The ongoing fighting has
meant that UN staff are working in high risk armed conflict / hostile areas and in areas
of increased health risks. As a result security has often to respond rapidly to requests
for assistance for relocation, requiring access to enable programme delivery, medical
evacuations and other security support services.
The IASC Level 3 response
designation has been repeatedly reviewed throughout the duration of the conflict and
extended until August 2015.

UN Panel of Experts Interim Report on South Sudan, S/2015/656, 21 August 2015


http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/656 (accessed 25 August 2015)

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(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)

4.

Main UN operations/activities; UN programme and operational priorities;

4.1 In line with UN Security Council resolution 2223 (2015), UNMISS activities are
focused in four key mandate areas:

Protection of civilians
Monitoring and investigating human rights
The creation of conditions conducive for humanitarian assistance
Supporting the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities agreement

4.2 In line with the High-Level Committee on Managements Programme Criticality


Framework, UNMISS is finalising the criticality levels for its outputs under the missions
budget for 2015-2016. UNMISS is continually implementing the key mandate areas
nationwide.
4.3 What is of paramount importance is to ensure that the programme activities
identified indicate where these activities are taking place to assist in the definition of
acceptable risk for each programme activity and therefore, enable UN security to plan
and position resources in support of its implementation.
4.4 In line with the 2015 Humanitarian Response Plan, humanitarian partners have
three Strategic Objectives:
Save lives and alleviate suffering by providing multi-sector assistance to people
in need;
Protect the rights of the most vulnerable people, including their freedom of
movement;
Improve self-reliance and coping capacities of people in need by protecting,
restoring and promoting their livelihoods.
Humanitarian programme assessments have indicated that, as the violence deepens, the
humanitarian needs and risk to aid workers increases. 27 aid workers are presumed to
have been killed in South Sudan since December 2013 and over 150 NGO staff are
unaccounted for. Aid workers are regularly reporting harassment, arrest and detention
of their staff or partners. National NGO staff have also been targeted based on their
ethnicity. High numbers of humanitarian convoys and compounds have been looted
with impunity, especially in Unity and Upper Nile states resulting in humanitarians
being forced to temporarily suspend their operations in several locations due to the
deteriorating situation. In Juba, there have been a growing number of armed attacks
against humanitarian compounds.
4.5 The purpose of defining a programme as critical at different levels is to ensure that
the associated risk is mitigated downwards (risk management) to allow that the
programme can be implemented: to enable implementation, management has to accept
a certain level of risk. How much risk programme managers want to accept is depicted
in the Security Risk Management (SRM) model.
4.6 The Security Risk Management Model (SRM) defines that whether risk is acceptable
at any level lower than unacceptable (black), is a question of programme priority. The
table 9 List of Most Significant Risks to UN Operations gives definitions of Programme
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Criticality, the level of programme decision making and the highest level of risk at which
this programme is acceptable.
Table 9 : Summary of Most Significant Risks to UN Operations:
[Transferred from Risk Analysis Table may be separated for different Security Level
Areas and/or UNSMS Organisations]
#

1
2
3
4
5

6
7
8
9
10

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Risk
Collateral effects of direct fire (small arms, hand
grenades) in Central Equatoria, Jonglei, Unity
and Upper Nile States.
Collateral effects of indirect fire (mortars, RPGs,
aerial bombardment) in Jonglei, Unity and Upper
Nile State
Direct attack on UN convoys by armed groups
with direct or indirect fire countrywide
especially in conflict affected states.
Demonstrations against the UN could become
violent and influence anti-UN sentiments.

Current Residual Risk Level


Risk
(After implementing
Level
of SRM Measures)
High

High

High

High

Medium

Medium

Medium

Medium

Armed attack on UN personnel such as in Akobo,


Jonglei State, in Dec 13 and attack on POC sites
such as in Bor, Jonglei State on 17 April 14 after
breach of UN compound by unruly youths/mob
that may not be under control of SPLA or SPLA-io.
Unity and Upper Nile State and areas where force
protection is limited or non-existent.

High

Medium

Roadside banditry and other forms of violent


crime countrywide

High

Medium

Medium

Medium

Medium

Medium

Medium

Low

High

Medium

Harassment and intimidation of UN personnel


countrywide, especially in Central Equatoria,
Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile States.
Arbitrary arrest and detention of UN personnel
especially national staff.
Collateral effects of UXOs and other explosive
remnants of war in border areas and Jonglei,
Unity and Upper Nile States
Communicable diseases countrywide, but
especially where UN personnel are working in
remote areas or in very close proximity to POC
areas

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11

12

Risk
Looting and destruction of UN assets in conflict
affected states especially when towns are
changing hands when UN military and security
cannot move out in cities. Majority of UN AFP
premises were directly affected in Bor, Malakal
and Bentiu and this cycle is likely to continue.
Thefts of UN assets by IDPs dwelling in POC
areas. Unrest in POC sites potentially impacting
safety and security of UN/humanitarian
personnel and especially where UNMISS
office/residential areas are in close proximity.

Current Residual Risk Level


Risk
(After implementing
Level
of SRM Measures)

High

High

High

Medium

Table 2: Balancing Security Risk with Programme Criticality

Combining the risk matrix (see colour code below) and the new categories for
programme importance and decision-making, now enables a clearer understanding of
who makes the decision on acceptable risk. Each box with the matrix shows the
minimum level of Programme Criticality that would be acceptable.

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Table 3. Acceptable Risk Decisions

5.

Projected Changes in UN Operations and Deployment;

Context
5.1 The number of people in need continues to rise as insecurity drives more people
from their communities. According to UN OCHA (July 2015) there are an estimated 1.6
million people internally displaced by the conflict that began in December 2013, with
almost 8 million people being food insecure, including 4.6 million who are severely food
insecure. Since April 2015 there has been an upsurge in hostilities in Unity and Upper
Nile states that has left more than 750,000 civilians without life-saving aid. Aid agencies
continue to scale up humanitarian assistance in areas where people are most vulnerable
although as the rainy season sets in the humanitarian crisis could be further
exacerbated due to mobility constraints of displaced populations resulting from
insecurity and flooding.
5.2
At the height of the conflict large numbers of people spilt over the borders into
neighbouring countries seeking refuge in Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan, Kenya and Abyei;
these numbers stand at approximately 510,000 individuals.
5.3
Following the signing of the Cessation of Hostility (COH) agreement by the
Government and the SPLA in Opposition (SPLAio) on 23 January 2014, the leaders of the
two warring parties had on several previous occasions reaffirmed their commitment to
the previous agreement in order to end the conflict. The IGAD plus brokered peace deal
was signed by President Kiir on the 26 August 2015, and a cessation of hostilities agreed
by both sides within the 72 hour time frame but sporadic fighting has continued mainly
in Upper Nile State. Previously, the South Sudan National Legislative Assembly has
extended the term of the Executive Head, i.e. the President, the National Legislature and
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State Legislative Assemblies by three years until July 2018. At that time all the elected
Governors of the States have also had their mandates extended by three years in line
with the National Legislature bill of March 2015, however recent surprise decrees have
sacked some State Governors on the day before the IGAD deadline leaving potential for
further political upheaval.
Prioritisation
5.4
UNMISS and AFPs activities have been significantly re-prioritised into the
Protection of Civilians, Human Rights monitoring, facilitating humanitarian access and
providing support to the IGAD peace process in view of the ongoing volatile security
situation that began in December 2013. A number of development programmes are still
being implemented by AFPs in safer regions in an attempt to maintain progress and
prevent spill over of the crisis into these relatively stable areas.
5.5 The UN operational deployment could change further keeping some CSBs in place
however this will result in a re-profiling of security support in the field.
5.6 The increased risk specifically in Malakal and Bentiu would require an increase in
the deployment of security staff and expansion of the collective security posture.
Air and River operations
5.7 In the rainy season as large areas of the country are flooded and roads inaccessible
the conduct of air operations is heavily reliant on helicopter support. UNMISS currently
uses the SOP Aviation Risk Management (ARM). This includes the implementation of
mitigation measures that ensure that UNMISS flights are conducted with associated
risks reduced to as low as reasonably possible. One such measure is the utilisation of
Flight Safety Assurances (FSAs) to minimise the risk of misidentification and collateral
damage from warring parties. One of the primary methods of mitigating risk to
locations above Low Risk is the notification of UNMISS flights to both SPLA, SPLAio and
to Other Armed Groups (OAGs) in control of the location, and gaining their assurance of
safe passage for UNMISS flight.
5.8 Safety of air movement, its processing of clearances and the interaction with GoSS
and non-state actors requires an urgent review has been processed ensuring a quicker
turnaround and integrity of the clearances to further enable a more effective delivery.
This SRA allows for rapid programme delivery in areas where fast response is required
as requested by Humanitarian providers.
5.9 As the rains of 2015 began to cut off supply lines, military offensives increasingly
used riverine methods of transporting goods and fighters to the frontline. This method
of delivery was also being used by humanitarian agencies to transfer large quantities of
food to communities in need. In April 2015 a barge convoy hired by UNMISS to carry
food and fuel supplies for the base in Malakal was attacked by RPGs and small arms fire,
injuring four persons. In July the government gave strict warnings that all river
transportation should stop, further restricting aid delivery around the country. In
September there have also been reported incidents of alleged attacks on government
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owned barges and gunboats in Upper Nile State, the SPLA-io claimed responsibility
ahead of verification.
Residential arrangements
5.10 The vast majority of international UN staffs live and work in secured UN
compounds in all States. In Juba some staff lives in secure civilian complexes that are
MORSS compliant. No UN staff should live in private homes by themselves.
Recommendations on the way forward
5.11 To maintain and increase their reach to beneficiaries, UNMISS substantive sections
and AFPs need to seek creative ways through air and ground mobility, their networks,
communication means/ technology, use of virtual offices, utilisation of different
contracts, utilisation of more national staff, careful vetting of staff and empowering their
interlocutors to meet in safer venues, etc.
5.12 Developing strong collectively shared networks with interlocutors at all levels of
management is a key success factor for access, for example clearance is given for flights
and their manifested passengers out of Juba International Airport, assurance is also
given by either party to the conflict at the receiving base. Equally important is
supporting conditions or modalities to the security process including effectiveness of
communications or developing relationships with interlocutors or beneficiaries; a good
rapport with the Governor/ County Commissioner/Paramount Chief regularly facilitates
programme access and protected staff members.
With the density of UN operations
and subsequent staff presence in a given operational area this sharing of networks
needs to be through the combined UN entities and staff.
5.13 Programmes should work towards an approach that gains acceptance by their
beneficiaries, interlocutors and communities, as part of mitigating a programmes risk.
If accepted in advance by the local community leaders (including parties to the conflict),
it can offer a significant mitigating measure.
5.14 Programme Managers need to receive training as to how to identify the inherent
and associated risk of their programmes and share it with security officers during SRAs
to improve deployment mitigation.
5.15 From a Security Risk Management (SRM) point of view, the footprint does not
only reflect the number of UN facilities, but also includes the profile of ground and air
movement. This profile has a psychological footprint that is as important when it
comes to matters such as the image and perception of the UN. These two imperatives
can be either very powerful threats or mitigating measures. It is therefore important
that the Public information and media messaging provide guidelines on a cohesive
approach of messaging and monitor the impact of media and public opinion on the UN
programmes and image. It seems this aspect requires further development.

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5.16 In ensuring in-country presence is efficiently represented, the Joint Support Office
in Entebbe delivers remote support for financial and human resource management. It
can therefore also serve to facilitate any evacuations should they be required. The
Security Unit in Juba provides support to the Security Unit in Entebbe
5.17 The GoSS does not have adequate security capacity to provide dedicated security
to the UN and therefore this service will need to be continued to be provided by the UN
military force for UN facilities and by the military force and UNPOL for PoC sites.
Table 4 UNMISS Protection of Civilian (PoC) SITES as at 10 July 2015
State
Central Equatoria State
Unity State
Upper Nile State
Jonglei State
Western Bahr El Ghazal State
Total

Location
UN House PoC I & PoC 2
UN House PoC3
Bentiu
Malakal
Melut
Bor
Wau

No. of IDPs
8,011
20,652
103,913
30,410
665
2,289
202
166,142

5.18 Since the beginning of the conflict (December 2013) until June 2015, there were a
total of 594 security incidents involving IDPs in UNMISS PoC sites. Cases include serious
assaults, civil unrest, mob violence, robbery, death threats and harassment, and several
locations have also recorded serious disruption to humanitarian operations. UNMISS
and AFP assets are also at risk, with thefts from containers and staff residences
common. The high prevalence of alcohol and illicit drug use within the PoC sites has
exacerbated violence and criminal behaviour directly impacting upon UN and AFP
personnel working or living within or adjacent to the PoC sites. The smuggling of
weapons into the PoCs poses a potential Direct Threat to UNMISS and AFP staff. See
Annex C, for Premises Security recommendations.
5.19 Continued accusations by government actors or affiliates that the PoC sites are a
sanctuary for supporters of the SPLA in Opposition also make the PoC sites a target; this
point was actively demonstrated in the attack in the Bor in April 2014 resulting in the
death of 55 IDPs within the UNMISS site. Similar incidents have occurred near PoC
sites in Juba, Bentiu and Malakal. (See Annex C, for Premises Security recommendations
& Residual Risk Mitigation Measures).
5.20 Overcrowded conditions and poor sanitation in the camps can lead to a higher
possibility of communicable diseases breaking out and spreading rapidly. An outbreak
of cholera started in South Sudan on 18 May 2015 reaching a total of 1718 cases [date 4
September 2015], this rapid spread is largely affecting areas of the state capital Juba and
also a separate smaller spread in Bor. One death has been reported at the POC site in
Juba with a total of 76 cases of people who contracted cholera inside the site. (See
Annex C, for Training, & Residual Risk Mitigation Measures).

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5.21 UN Security, RRP, UNPOL and UN Forces regularly coordinate with Humanitarian
organisations to ensure security within PoCs including the following activities:
Maintaining general law and order within PoCs
Checking for weapons, alcohol and other contraband items
Screening all individuals entering UNMISS PoC sites
Facilitate access to IDPs for humanitarian assistance and aid delivery
Community engagement on security issues
Preventing evictions and forced relocations to other areas
Facilitating departure of IDPs who violate ground rules when community
mediation has failed
Crowd control during operations and incidents
Providing armed escorts to humanitarian agencies when requested
(See Annex C, for Premises Security & Residual Risk Mitigation Measures)
5.22 The UNSMS will have to work much closer with the GoSS security agencies to
ensure an improved security response to UN security related incidences. As such
networks and personal relationships need to be forged to develop a relationship of
mutual trust, respect and support towards the UN SMS and effective communication
systems needs to be reviewed.
5.23 The UNSMS would need to establish/ strengthen multiple communication means
with the Host Nation (HN) that complements one another to ensure effective liaison and
manage emergency responses.
5.24 To further improve early warning and situational awareness; the UNSMS would
need to fuse UN staff and asset related security management functions with the JMAC
and the JOC to ensure that the flow of information of all programmes and stakeholders
is captured in a timely fashion and distributed effectively with the intent to mitigate risk
proactively.
5.25 In Juba a blue zone was implemented to manage the locations which were
approved by UN security for International UN staff to reside in based on accessibility to
the area, crime rates and distance to UN bases in case of relocation and emergencies.
This needs updating regularly to take into account new dynamics in security and crime.
Also the careful consideration of planning for evacuation of UN House, both residential
and office area in case of emergency.
5.26 Where the UN has a presence Operational Zones have been created where security
clearances are not required in all main urban areas to allow for improved access. This
approach is underscored by risk management as opposed to a risk adverse approach,
this concept needs to be maintained and where possible further enhanced or monitored.
5.27 Programme staff engaging in activities where the residual risk remains high and/
or where it is felt that the required protection is inadequate, a UN dedicated protection
or an UN escort entity can be requested on a case-by-case basis.
5.28 A unified tracking system based on available technology should be a strong
consideration for field mission movement. The TETRA (which requires line of sight
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mainly in cities), HF radio system and web-based systems with smart phones offer free
or low cost tracking options.
6. Threat Assessment: 2015 Security Situation in South Sudan
Situational Analysis
General Description
6.1 After months of a series of tense standoffs within the political leadership, in midDecember 2013 conflict broke out in Juba within the ranks of the elite presidential
guard, or as they are known Tiger Division, which quickly split allegiances through the
Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) to that of the government and that of the
former Vice-President Riek Machar whose forces are now known as the SPLM-inopposition (SPLA-io). Violence continued in Juba for some days including ethnically
targeted killings and other human rights violations. This resulted in hundreds of
thousands of civilians to flee their homes, which created a humanitarian emergency. In
rapid succession the conflict spread to Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile States with regular
clashes between army and rebel forces resulting in the towns and oilfields changing
hands several times. Both sides were engaging in the targeting of civilians in their
attacks, whole communities and groups armed themselves and both sides recruited
children. There is weak command and control between the military commanders and
the political leadership structures that leaves the situation in a volatile state in many
areas of the country.
6.2 The conflict also took on regional dimensions with the Ugandan Peoples Defence
Force (UPDF) providing key military support to government forces in Juba and in Bor,
Jonglei State. Other regional forces are believed to be playing a key role in support
either for government or Opposition forces including Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).
6.3 Regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace talks and high
level summits trying to reach power-sharing agreements have brought limited
successful outcomes, with multiple Ceasefire of Hostilities (COH) resulting in temporary
pausing rather than stopping fighting altogether. The rigid deadline of 17 August 2015
for signing the peace deal put forward by IGAD-Plus resulted in only the Former
Detainees and the SPLAio signing, without the signature of the President on behalf of
the Government of South Sudan and head of the SPLA, instead requesting for a further
15 days to allow for consultations. IGAD has a monitoring violations role with teams
placed in key areas of the country. The African Union Commission of Inquiry on South
Sudan (AUCISS) has completed an investigation into violation of international human
rights and humanitarian law but they have delayed publishing the report so as not to
jeopardise the ongoing IGAD-led peace process.
6.4 Even prior to the latest outbreak of armed conflict, South Sudan faced five (5) major
sets of security challenges:

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a. Armed conflict involving armed opposition groups.


b. Unresolved post-independence issues with Sudan including disputes over oil
sharing, border security, nationality and border demarcation (including the
future of Abyei)
c. Internal inter-ethnic and communal violence;
d. Violent crime;
e. Hazards: communicable diseases, UXOs and road traffic accidents.
6.5 The disruption in oil revenues and devaluation of the currency as a result of the
fighting has had a detrimental effect on the already weakened economy; government,
civil servants, armed forces and police are having their salaries delayed. The breakdown
in social infrastructure has reduced employment opportunities; creating desperation
which has translated into crime. The overall crime rate in the country has gone up and is
likely to keep rising.
6.6 Even during this time of conflict the outstanding challenges are still prevalent
throughout South Sudan, such as inter-ethnic violence, however there are examples of
notable determination to end certain conflicts to attempt to prevent them becoming
part of the bigger crisis controlling the country.
6.7 For example, the on-going cattle raiding and the inter-clan revenge clashes that
have been served in retaliation have devastated Lakes State. Current efforts by the
government are to encourage peace forums and to create opportunities for youths in an
attempt to reduce the insecurity across the state.
6.8 Other peace initiatives included the signing of peace deal forming the Greater Pibor
Administrative Area (GPAA) with David Yau Yau, rebel commander of the South Sudan
Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A) Cobra Faction in May 2014.
6.9 Prior to December 2013, the UN was well regarded by the South Sudanese for its
role in the drive towards independence from Sudan, for its humanitarian interventions
and for efforts to protect civilians.
6.10 But the ongoing crisis in South Sudan has also negatively impacted on sentiments
and threats directed to UN personnel in the course of their work, for example IDPs
insisting that national staff not from their preferred ethnic group are removed from
programme activities in POC sites and some Ugandan UNPOL having to wear civilian
clothes and be removed from POC duty due to active UPDF military support for the
Government of South Sudan.
6.11 Government officials have sometimes exacerbated tense situations with alienating
remarks on their perception of the UN, often with accusations that the UN is favouring
one side over the other within the conflict itself.
6.12 This pressure and intimidation by the parties to the dispute is designed to
maximize future concessions from the UN in their favour. It also represents a deliberate
distortion of facts by either party to prejudice the mind-set of the civilian population in
their understanding the ongoing conflict. Whether directly arising out of this kind of
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animosity or not, harassment, intimidation, obstruction and attacks against the UN have
increased over the last year. It is worth noting that while the UN has catalogued
numerous such violations, the government has rarely acted upon these violations. The
inaction has created impunity and emboldened the perpetrators.
6.13 Animosity grew when the government made accusations that the UN was
harbouring rebels within its Protection of Civilian (POC) sites. Direct and veiled threats
to attack POCs became widespread.
6.14 The effect of this was in April 2014 when armed youths attacked the UNMISS
base in Bor resulting in the deaths of 55 IDPs and injuring many others including UN
peacekeepers.
6.15 In March 2014, a labelling error was discovered whilst transporting containers
loaded with duty equipment for the UN Ghanaian peacekeepers in Unity State which
brought strained relations to even a lower point. The error was exploited to galvanise
hostility towards the UN in favour of the government by falsely presenting the UN as
supplying weaponry to the opposition. It took elaborate interventions, investigations
and communications to clear the false impression that this created.
6.16 On 26 August 2014 under suspicious circumstances a UN contracted helicopter
crashed near Bentiu in Unity State, killing three (3) aircrew and injuring one (1) other,
underlining the threats involved in working within South Sudan. Investigations into the
cause of the crash were inconclusive.
6.17 Since the start of the conflict in December 2013 thousands of civilians of varying
ethnicities and nationalities have sought shelter, food and protection within UNMISS
compounds. In the middle of July 2015 there are approximately 166,142 people staying
in seven (7) UNMISS bases.
6.18 There have been increasing reports of criminal acts occurring within the
Protection Of Civilian (POC) sites; also there have been a number of serious assaults
against the UN and other humanitarian workers, sometimes involving weapons which
has resulted a few times of hospitalisation of personnel. These incidents have, and
continue to affect not only the civilians seeking refuge at UN sites, but also the safety
and security of individual UNMISS and Agencies Funds and Programmes (AFP)
personnel. In February 2015 there was an alleged sexual assault of a Canadian INGO by
a subcontractor for a UN Agency in UNMISS Bentiu team site. It is, therefore, essential
that the Mission continues to take concrete measures to address acts of criminality on
its premises. The UNDSS Headquarters South Sudan Security Assistance Visit (SAV)
report dated January 2015 highlights the need to address a balance between UN
personnel and property security and the security being provided to the Internally
Displaced Peoples (IDPs) including a better response to criminal activities, maintenance
of UN gates to improve perception to deter criminal activity and moving of IDPs to
create easier provision of security for POC sites.

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7. Structured Threat Assessment


7.1 ARMED CONFLICT: Since mid-December 2013 the overall security situation in
South Sudan remains volatile and unpredictable. Various manifestations of armed
conflict have affected South Sudan most notably the ongoing fighting between SPLA
with the SPLA-iO; also violence involving Other Armed Groups (OAGs).
Summary of Recent Armed Conflict:
7.2 In Central Equatoria State (CES), random shooting is regularly heard in parts of
Juba especially late at night. On the night of 15 February 2014 there was spill-over of a
fight between a couple of South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS), which triggered
shooting by other military or police in the area. In the morning of 5 March 2014 there
was gunfire between Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) forces allegedly over
salary payments, which resulted in shelling, and heavy explosion, which resulted in
numerous military and civilian casualties. Later the same evening there was a further
confrontation with SPLA soldiers with heavy calibre weapons firing close to the UNMISS
compounds resulting with a 7.62mm landing in the compound injuring an IDP in the leg
and damaging a UN vehicle causing panic around the IDP sites. The Ugandan Peoples
Defence Force (UPDF) is supporting the SPLA in holding the capital city; their presence
is visible at the airport. There is also a notable internal political friction between the
Central Government and the Equatoria States who have been calling for greater
autonomy via a federal government system.
This has led to local Equatorian
communities feeling threatened and evacuating their families from the area. From
January 2015 a fresh round of armed clashes took place between the pastoralist
Mundari cattle keepers and Bari land owners, as local chiefs urged the Mundari to leave
the state. There were also reports of Equatorian SPLA soldiers deserting the frontlines
and returning to their communities, which have in turn led to government fearing an
uprising from non-conflict states.
7.3 In Jonglei State the capital city of Bor changed hands several times since the
conflict started although government forces presently hold the town and supported by
troops from the Ugandan Peoples Defence Force (UPDF). Jonglei State is a very
ethnically diverse area between the Dinka, Nuer, Murle and other tribes making it one of
the most volatile and disputed areas of South Sudan. Sporadic clashes with the SPLA
and SPLA-io have continued especially in the northern counties of Ayod, Duk, Pigi and
Fangak. On 17 April 2014 the UNMISS compound in Bor was over-run by protesting
armed youths accessing the perimeter of the base resulting in the deaths of 55 IDPs.
During rainy season in 2014 there were major skirmishes between the SPLA and SPLAio reported in Jonglei. The SPLA-io has continued to threaten to fire upon aircraft flying
in their areas, which were seven of the eleven counties during this period; the last
threat was on 17 July 2014. Vast areas of the state are cut off during rainy season
leaving territorial gains largely stable until dry season resumes.
7.4 Upper Nile (UNS) remains one of the most contested and militarised states in
South Sudan due to it having oil fields. There have been numerous clashes between
over the control of the different oil fields notably Paloich and Adar, north of Malakal.
Upper Nile State has been particularly affected by the destruction, looting and killings
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by irregular forces/youth allied to either parties. Several clashes have been reported in
Maban, Renk, Amduluz, Duk-Duk and other locations with each trying to capture more
ground. The situation in other parts of the state remains tense with both SPLA and
SPLA-io trying to take/keep control of the oil fields and other strategic locations.
Currently the oil fields in Upper Nile are under control of SPLA.
For short periods from mid-February 2014 the state capital Malakal temporarily came
under the control of SPLA-io forces before being taken back by government forces. Also
areas in southern Upper Nile including Nassir have alternated between SPLA to SPLA-io
control but overall, most urban areas remain under SPLA control. The UN base in Nassir
is just one kilometre away from the SPLA-io/ White Army base, which has created a
constant threat to UN personnel through small arms fire and shelling.
Several major clashes between the SPLA and the SPLA-io have occurred; during one
heavy exchange some stray bullets entered UNMISS camp killing and injuring IDPs and
causing structural damage to UN resources. All UN personnel remain concentrated in
UNMISS camp including several agencies who had to abandon their own compounds.
In April 2015 there has been a marked development in UNS, three UN staff have
disappeared in the course of their work. Also the government SPLA with aligned
support troops tasked with protecting Malakal and areas of UNS have split factions
internally (Dinka/Shilluk). SPLA Maj Gen Johnson Olony for a time defected and worked
alongside the SPLAio to take Malakal temporarily. Malakal has changed hands 6 times
in the last six (6) months; while, Melut two (2) times, both Melut and Malakal raised
their Security Alert Level to Red which resulted in the relocation of staff, Malakal staff
have since returned. Currently both Malakal and Melut are under the control of the
SPLA.
7.5 Unity State has remained one of the most contested states by the government and
opposition forces alongside their allied militias throughout the crisis. Bentiu town is
currently under control of the SPLA while most of the surrounding areas are under
control of the SPLA-io with the frontline in dangerously close vicinity of Bentiu UNMISS
team site and POC area. South of the state capital Bentiu, the town of Leer is a key
hotspot for attack due to its symbolism as the birthplace of the opposition leader. To
the west of Bentiu, UN staff previously based in the former Mayom UNMISS County
Support Base (CSB) regularly were caught in cross fire incidents when the parties to
conflict attempted to take control of the strategically important town, which is
principally inhabited by the Bul Nuer. UN mission and Agencies Funds and Programme
(AFP) staffs have become the target with regular ambushes, the demand for their trucks,
and/or fuel and the forceful attempt to board UN flights by military. Stray bullets and
heavy artillery pose a threat to UN residential and office areas including two incidents,
which resulted in the death of a child within the POC area. The oil fields in Unity State
are currently under the control of the SPLA but hotly contested and at risk for attack.
7.6 Other Armed Groups (OAGs): The Government of South Sudan managed to
integrate some armed groups prior to the outbreak of conflict, but some Other Armed
Groups (OAGs) continue to be active, notably in areas of Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei
States. Whilst some of these OAGs have declared allegiance to either the SPLA or SPLAiO, others are threatening to choose to fight independently (creating splinter factions)
and others who so far remained neutral still could resume armed activity at any time.

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7.7 In Jonglei, at the onset of the crisis the government quickly signed a ceasefire deal
and subsequent peace agreement with the South Sudan Democratic Movement/ Army
(SSDM/A) Cobra Faction led by rebel leader David Yau Yau. This led to the creation of
the Greater Pibor Administration Area (GPAA). In February 2015 the demobilisation of
3,000 children previously fighting in his ranks began in conjunction with UNICEF and
the National Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (NDDRC).
7.8 There are cracks appearing on forces allied within the current crisis in South Sudan,
as wages and weaponry disappear so the affiliations appear to fluctuate. Defectors are
rallying calls through the diaspora communities to bring their troops with them. One
example is Brig Gen Lul Ruai Koang who was spokesperson for SPLA-io who in his
defection called for Lou-Nuer youth to create a new state in Akobo area, called Kobo.
Another recent example from august within the SPLAio is the renewed denouncement
and questioning the legitimacy of Riek Machar as the head of rebel command by Gen
Peter Gatdet, this came just a couple of weeks after Gatdet and Gen Gathoth Gatkuoth
were relieved of their positions within SPLAio.
7.9 Also in Upper Nile State UNICEF reports that 89 boys were forcibly recruited by an
unnamed armed group in late February 2015. They were taken in an area currently
under government control, which is defended by government-allied Shilluk militia
commanded by Maj Gen Johnson Olony.
7.10 The regional presence of the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) continues to deliver
violence in South Sudan. Although this Uganda rebel force headed by Joseph Kony is
believed to move freely in Central African Republic (CAR), DR Congo & Darfur, Sudan,
the porous borders make attacks in the south and west of South Sudan likely. Attacks in
South Sudan have usually resulted in looting food and medicines.
7.11 There are reports of an LRA attack in Western Equatoria State in March 2015
when one person was killed, the village was looted and eleven people were abducted
but four were later released. This resuming of LRA attacks has increased fear amongst
the population as the last attack was in 2012.
7.12 Also an LRA commander indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC)
Dominic Ongwen surrendered in CAR, except for the leader Mr Kony all the other
indicted criminals are believed to have died.
7.13 Armed Conflict in the Northern Border Areas: Agreement of the Sudan/ South
Sudan border delineation was never resolved within the remit of the 2005
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), initially because of the oil fields but also many
other outstanding historical grievances including claims to the territories. The border
region between the two countries continues to have wide reaching issues although
engagement through bilateral diplomacy has helped ease tensions a little. The oil
pipelines exit South Sudan in both Unity and Upper Nile State, oil is refined in Sudan
before being exported. The potential loss of oil revenue affects both nations so good
trade relations remains key to maintaining income.

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7.14 An affiliation with some regional armed forces has had a definite impact on the
security of the border area of Sudan with South Sudan. Whilst government forces are
alleged to work alongside Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in their frontline
fighting activities in Unity State, South Sudan, also it is reported that the SPLA-io are
working in collaboration with the government of Sudan by obtaining resources and
military backup. As the fighting also continues at a pace within Sudan on two fronts
Darfur and Nuba Mountains (South Kordofan in particular) the impact for the whole
border region cannot be ignored. Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) are also carrying out
aerial bombing campaigns in the Nuba Mountains but also extending into South Sudan
in November 2014 to hit alleged JEM targets in Raja, Western Bahr el Ghazal which
killed 24 people including women and children. Further raids reportedly by SAF
aircraft include in the border areas of Unity and Northern Bahr el Ghazal states with the
last aerial attacks taking place between the 31 December 2014 and 01 Jan 2015.
Currently the flow of refugees is affecting both countries as fighting affects the
communities and so they move on, in Sudan the fighting in South Kordofan has created
an influx of refugees into South Sudan and the fighting in northern Unity State in South
Sudan has meant many refugees travelled north to refugee sites within Sudan. The
Refugee Camps in Yida and newly established camp in Ajoung Touk protect refugees
fleeing from neighbouring Sudan for last many years as the fighting intensity fluctuates
between Sudan Armed Forces and Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement-North (SPLMN) in the South Kordofan area/ Nuba Mountains/ Blue Nile State.
7.15 Cross border grazing & migration rights are also areas of dispute as they host
well-armed Sudanese Misseriya cattle herders who move around South Sudan in search
of feed for their animals.
7.16 In anticipation of a resolution by acceptable referendum for the ownership of the
Abyei area, the border area town of Abyei remains with a United Nations Interim
Security Force providing protection for the population.
7.17 Inter Communal Armed Conflict: Prior to the most recent armed conflict, intercommunal conflict has long been the most prominent threat in the category of armed
conflict. These clashes continue to occur with variable intensities in identified areas/
states depending upon seasonal and other contributing factors such as ethnic identity,
cultural practice and historical territorial rights.
Table 5: Key conflict drivers within some ethnic tribes in South Sudan
STATE

TRIBE A)

JONGLEI
JONGLEI

Murle
Lour Nuer

JONGLEI
UNITY
UNITY
UNITY
WBEG

Dinka Bor
Misseriya
Misseriya
Dinka

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TRIBE B)
Lou Nuer
Jikaney
Nuer
Mundari
Nuer
Dinka
Nuer

ISSUES
Dormant, was grazing issues
Dinka Bor cattle camps in Mundari territory
Migration
Migration
Conflicts
Cattle herders

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STATE
WARRAP
WARRAP
WARRAP
LAKES
NBEG
CES
CES
CES
WES
EES

TRIBE A)

TRIBE B)

Misseriya
Dinka
Dinka
Misseriya
Dinka Bor
Bari
Kakwa
Bari
Toposa

Dinka
Nuer
Nuer
Dinka
Mundari
Mundari
Pojulu
Mundari
Turkana
(Kenya)
Acholi
Jur (Mvolo
(WBEG) &
Mapourdit
(lakes)

EES
Madi
Lakes/WBEG Dinka
Atuot
(Yirol
west)

ISSUES
Cattle herders
Migration
Conflicts
Conflicts
Migration
Dinka Bor Cattle Camps in Mundari territory
Land, grazing
Land issues
Land, grazing
Conflict
Land issues
Conflict

The table above is a summary of inter-communal armed conflict in different parts of the
country, which varies in intensity based on political, economic and seasonal factors:
Aviation and Riverine Threats:
7.18 South Sudan lacks an adequate air traffic control system, countrywide. The
government took control of the countrys airspace from Sudan in 2011, but to date has
not issued any Notice to Airmen (NOTAMs.). There are areas, however, that the
government has declared a no fly zone (i.e. over the Presidential Palace in Juba),
suggesting that the government reserve the right to fire upon an aircraft that violates
this airspace.
7.19 The units of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) are equipped with truckmounted surface-to-air missiles (ZU-23-2/4). Presently most aviation threats come
from indiscriminate small arms fire (i.e. AK-47) from both the conflicting parties
originating on the ground. Since the fatal shooting down of the UNMISS helicopter in
Likuangole, Jonglei State in December 2012, UNMISS and UNHAS air operations obtain
flight safety assurances from the local authorities and implement a regime of stricter
risk assessments and mitigation measures such as flying at higher cruising altitudes for
aircraft depending upon the risk levels. Due to the recent conflict it has become more
pertinent to get these guarantees from both SPLA and/or SPLA-io entities in areas
under their respective control. Even with assurances in place, during this active fighting
season aviation incidents have continued to occur sometimes with aircraft being shot at
and other more serious incidents including the fatal crash of a routine UNMISS flight
near Bentiu, Unity State on 26 August 2014 where three crewmembers died and
another was injured.

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7.20 At this time it is increasingly difficult to ascertain whether the official aircraft
flight clearances that have been received are actually communicated to troops on the
ground, and by association whether the command structure has control over its troops
in these remote areas. There have been unfounded accusations in the past from both
sides in the conflict of UN aircraft being used to re-supply SPLA/SPLA-io forces. Both
these challenges could increase the number of threats to UN aircraft if the conflict
becomes prolonged.
7.21 Use of the River Nile for transportation of UN supplies and fuel has proved difficult
with the government threat against all river travel by humanitarian agencies. With
military supply vessels regularly travelling the river to the frontline it is not a safe
option for delivery of humanitarian provisions.
TERRORISM:
7.22 To date there have been no terrorist attacks in South Sudan, with the posed threat
from Al-Qaeda, Al Shabaab, Islamic State (IS) or other alleged extremist groups
appearing to be low. There is currently a heightened regional potential threat to UN
personnel and property, mainly for Kenya and Uganda, largely due to UN support to the
Federal Government of Somalia. The risk of Al Shabaab operating in South Sudan is
believed to be low, yet the potential of such a threat manifesting itself also cannot be
ruled out.
7.23 Given the volatile nature of the current crisis in South Sudan there is higher risk of
insurgency terrorist style attacks, techniques or procedures being absorbed into the
combat strategy by any armed military, group or splinter faction as a Strategic Weapon
System (SWS). These threats could include roadside Improvised Explosive Device (IED)
which can be indiscriminate and could cause collateral threats to UN personnel and
assets.
CRIME:
7.24 Throughout South Sudan criminal threats exist with petty theft constituting the
most common problem. Armed criminality is escalating in recent months in Juba,
Rumbek, Wau and such urban centres, which is a direct consequence of the economic
downturn.
7.25 The spate of crime has become worse with the mounting economic challenges that
characterised the last half of 2014 to date due to declining oil revenues, conflict and
inflation.
7.26 Wide sections of the population are increasingly less able to cope economically
and in a region with ready a supply of illicit arms; these developments are likely to leave
the personnel and facilities of the UN, AFPs and the wider international community at
risk in terms of spiralling violent crime.

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7.27 There are regular reports of roadside banditry often occurring at night in remoter
areas, with an elevated threat of roadside banditry on major arterial routes, with the
criminals seeking instant cash and 4WD vehicles.
7.28 In the capital Juba, and many other urban communities such as Rumbek, they have
witnessed waves of violent crime against UN national personnel including daytime
armed robberies. Two notable robbery incidents in Juba on 1 February and the 3
February 2015 resulted in five UN personnel being directly affected; leaving one
national policeman dead with another injured.
7.29 With the weakened security institutions being fractured even further due to the
fighting, law enforcement capabilities have not been able to cope with the multitude of
rising challenges. This is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future while the crisis
persists.
7.30 During the crisis widespread looting and destruction of humanitarian supplies has
taken place especially prominent criminal activity was seen in the state capitals of Bor,
Malakal and Bentiu. Many UN, AFP and INGO offices in Bor, Bentiu and Malakal and
other locations have been looted and vandalised during the intermittent changes in
control of the cities. There are many incidents of UN and AFP national staff members
who were also directly affected during this crisis through the destruction of their
accommodation and the looting of personal items.
7.31 Even before the latest armed conflict, multiple challenges within the SPLA and
SSNPS in terms of morale, professionalism, training, resources, command and control or
discipline were highly evident as impediments to their ability to maintain law and order
and effectively respond to criminal incidents. Coming as a direct fallout from the crisis
these challenges have become more glaringly obvious. The fractures caused by the
largely ethnically divided conflict have permeated through all levels of security organs
leaving them even weaker and severely degraded. Coupled with the economic
challenges the country is grappling with, the capacity of the law enforcement organs to
cope has diminished even further.
7.32 Criminality within the POC sites continues with numerous incidents of UN
property being stolen from containers both within the POC area and in adjacent to
UNMISS camp areas. Losses to the UN in terms of assets are estimated to be worth
millions of dollars.
7.33 The SPLA have reportedly fired shots towards UNMISS POC sites on a number of
occasions as they allege that IDPs are to blame for crime when outside the POC sites and
then return at night to be protected or they allege that IDPs are bringing in weapons
into the POC sites.
7.34 There have also been incidents of serious assaults including targeted killings
within the POC areas since they opened, also putting UN personnel and assets at
considerable risk. In April 2015 an ethnic targeted killing on the perimeter of the
Malakal UNMISS base by an IDP led to intervention by UN RwanBatt forces, on arrest
one of the IDP hit a BanFPU. In Malakal it is reported that external ethnic dynamics
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outside the POC site are often played out inside especially after the change of hands
when Malakal town falls to the opposing side.
7.35 In mid-2014 UN DPKO HQ drew up clearer guidance on how to deal with serious
criminality within the POC sites which has adequately managed the challenges as they
arise, however due to the POC living conditions serious incidents continue to occur.
Within the POC sites Community Watch Group deals with petty crimes, trained IDP
volunteers, who identify the parties involved. Depending on the crime they can then be
passed onto the Traditional Justice Court made up of community leaders but 100%
male. Traditional Justice is handed down usually through fines or promises. Both of
these nationally owned providers of justice with the POC sites are unarmed. For more
violent criminals UNPOL become involved and remove the offenders to the holding
facility or securely held in their offices in the regions.
7.36 There have also been incidents where UN and humanitarian personnel have been
attacked in POC sites on account of their nationalities; both local and international or
due to dissatisfaction on the services provided.

CIVIL UNREST:
7.37 Outbreaks of civil unrest, in the form of large groups of individuals ransacking and
destroying urban areas, have been a significant hallmark of the latest armed conflict,
especially in Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile States. The civil unrest has been worse
immediately before and after a community changes hands between the major armed
protagonists, as a result, many urban communities became largely de-populated. Civil
unrest has largely been discriminate with specific communities targeted and
systemically pushed out of the area. Other outbreaks of civil unrest include the Lakes
State capital Rumbek which has been suffering from inter-clan fighting but youths have
used the opportunity of this period of unrest to demonstrate, rampage and loot. This
has affected the population of the city since end of 2014 into 2015 with the government
now getting involved with peace & training initiatives for the youths to control the area.
7.38 Despite the considerable amount of anti-UN rhetoric at times during the last year,
and the direct attack on the UN camp in Bor, violent demonstrations against the UN by
large groups have not been an ongoing feature of the security situation so far. There
have not been many pronounced demonstrations specifically targeting the UN in the
second half of 2014. Most demonstrations involving the UN had previously been
appeals in one form or the other for intervention in certain prevailing matters.
7.39 Outbreaks of communal violence within POC areas have occurred particularly
within the Juba UN House and Malakal POCs with the most serious incident occurring on
the 18 February 2014 within the Malakal POC site resulting in the deaths of seven
persons. Being caught in cross fire remains the principal threat to UN personnel
resulting from clashes between opposing groups within POCs through direct and
indirect weapon use as sharp and blunt instruments are easily acquired.

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HAZARDS:
7.40 Communicable diseases in South Sudan constitute a major cause of morbidity and
mortality largely due to limited access to clean water and sanitation being extremely
poor with open defecation rates, which reaches 60% in urban areas and 80% in rural
areas. Health care facilities and services are severely underdeveloped, particularly in
rural areas. Service quality in Government hospitals is very poor because of inadequate
staffing, equipment, medications, as well as meagre infrastructure. UN personnel can
encounter tremendous challenges in terms of obtaining quality and timely medical
attention due to serious shortcomings in the available health services, especially in a
few state HQs and remote field locations. South Sudan relies heavily on foreign aid and
services provided by AFPs and NGOs.
7.41 Effective training of medical staff for Ebola airport screening & intensive
sensitisation has mitigated the risk of an Ebola outbreak in South Sudan.
7.42 For the Internally Displaced People (IDP) within the Protection of Civilian (POC)
sites the habitable areas are cramped, hazardous and disease-prone. Whilst most of
infectious and communicable diseases are transmitted by contaminated water others
such as tuberculosis, measles and influenza are transmitted through the air. UN
personnel in close proximity to large numbers of people who are infected with malaria
may increase infection rates amongst UN and AFP staffs.
7.43 According to the World Health Organisation (WHO) Early Warning and Disease
Surveillance System (EWARN) in February 2015 the top causes of deaths for IDPs are
malaria, Acute Respiratory Infections (ARI), Acute Watery Diarrhoea (AWD), Acute
Bloody Diarrhoea (ABD) and suspected measles (in Bentiu, Renk, Awerial & Melut).
Hepatitis E Virus (HEV) has been detected in IDPs but no deaths so far in 2015. A new
Cholera outbreak that has mainly affected Central Equatoria State has resulted in 46
confirmed deaths out of 1718 cases between 18 May 4 Sept 2015.
Road Traffic Accidents (RTA):
7.44 The roads in South Sudan are mostly unpaved, becoming dusty and compacted in
the dry season. During the rainy season many roads, including major supply routes, are
largely impassable due to being swamped and the terrain eroding forming major
potholes that fill with water with some roads and bridges simply just washed away. It is
common to see large vehicles stuck up to their axels in mud and water for days, if not
for the whole rainy season. The danger of road accidents is exacerbated by poor driving
skills and trucks travelling at relatively high speeds despite the poor state of roads. It is
worth noting that there is a wide spread tendency in the country to heap blame for any
accident involving a UN element to the UN party which imposes risk to individual staff
members involved in these incidents. Several personnel have been assaulted
sometimes severely following minor road traffic accidents including being ill-treated by
national security authorities attending the scene.
Infrastructure:

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7.45 In regard to infrastructure, the entire country remains underdeveloped. Road and
air mobility is seriously jeopardised especially during the rainy season where whole
regions are cut off. Electricity, food and clean water supplies are scarce and seriously
impact UN operations in remote duty stations.
7.46 Due to poor road conditions in both dry and rainy season and lack of
infrastructure there is a heavy reliance on UNMISS and UNHAS air assets for the
delivery of humanitarian aid. During 2014 rainy season Agency, Funds and
Programmes (AFP) were particularly hard hit as hundreds of trucks had to be
abandoned across the country when they became stuck in mud or ditches attempting to
deliver aid. The lack of infrastructure poses great threats if UN air/ road transport
assets are requirement for sudden relocation/evacuations as they cannot always be
used in adverse weather and with large stretches of road networks inaccessible during
the April to November rainy season this can leave UN, AFP staffs and assets at risk.
7.47 South Sudan has very rudimentary government fire-fighting capabilities. Outside
the capital Juba UNMISS and UNHAS has limited firefighting capacity, prioritising
resources towards the state airports and relying on drills and well placed fire
extinguishers for team-sites. Fires within UNMISS camps have resulted in substantial
loss of mission-owned property largely due to a lack of adequate firefighting equipment.
There is a shortage of trained firefighting personnel at UNMISS locations in state
capitals and County Support Bases.
Mines/UXOs
7.48 The latest armed conflict between two factions of the SPLA has involved indirect
fire weapons (such as RPGs, mortars and bombs dropped from aircraft) as well as small
arms. Therefore the threat of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and explosive remnants of
warfare has increased significantly since the conflict began. This is especially the case
in urban areas and along arterial roads. In early 2014, several UXOs were discovered
along the Bor-Juba road. The SPLA-io has reportedly mined the roads to the north of
Bentiu resulting in several incidents of vehicles being destroyed and civilian casualties.
This is of particular concern to the UN as these routes are a vital corridor in delivering
humanitarian aid. Even before the latest conflict, South Sudans civil war left a
considerable legacy of landmines and other explosive remnants of war. This was
especially the case in areas within Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity States and other areas
bordering Sudan that have yet to be cleared of mines and UXOs. Furthermore, there are
situations where old mines are exposed during the rainy season as the water washes
away the surface dirt.

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TT(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)

Table 6: Structured Threat Assessment (STA) Summary:

Threat
Category

Armed
Conflict

Assessment Summary / Comment


Threats
Intent

Capability

Inhibiting Context

Inter-Intra
Communal
Violence

Isolated,
limited/spora
dic armed
conflict
occurring.

Small arms/automatic
(light) weapons (AK-47, RPG
etc.) but minimal military
type training/experience
and loosely organised.

Pressure/
Other incentives/
Agreements against
hostilities.

Armed
engagement
between SPLA and
SPLA-io.

Between
isolated,
limited/spora
dic armed
conflict
occurring and
full scale
armed
conflict
occurring.
Isolated,
limited/spora
dic armed
conflict
occurring.
Intent to use
terrorism
against the
UN
acknowledge
d worldwide.
Al-Qaeda
affiliate Al
Shabaab has
attacked UN
bases in
Somalia

Organized and structured


weapons/Heavy Weapons
deployed and /or large
numbers of forces fully
engaged.

Peace talks or
unstable
peace/ceasefire
agreement.

Small arms/Automatic
(light) weapons (AK-47, RPG
etc.) but minimal military
type training/experience
and loosely organised.
Regional capability, but no
known capability in South
Sudan

Pressure/
other incentives/
Agreements against
hostilities.

Conflict between
SPLA and Other
Armed Groups
(OAGs)
No history of
terrorist attack in
Terrorism South Sudan,

31

Security forces have a


strong presence in the
capital Juba.
Government is aware
of threats made by Al
Shabaab. Despite a
sizeable Somali
community, a terror
cell would have
difficulties carrying
out covert operations.

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Threat
Category

Threats
Banditry on the
roads, looting and
commandeering of
vehicles.

Intent

Capability

Inhibiting context

Violent
crimes focus
on the UN,
AFPs & INGOs
and relatively
affluent
elements of
the
community.
Opportunistic
crime against
individuals,
becoming
increasingly
violent.

Armed criminals operating


in small teams.

Minimal social or
Police/CJ controls on
criminal activity.

Armed criminals operating


in small teams.

Minimal social or
Police/CJ controls on
criminal activity.

Arbitrary Arrest
and detention of
UN personnel.
Widespread
harassment &
obstruction to
movement.

Increasing in
regularity,
often
accompanied
by violence,
extortion and
threats.

Host Country Security,


Police and military
personnel operating in small
teams and SPLA-io in
controlled areas of authority

Demonstrations
against the UN.
IDPs in POC areas
overrunning,
vandalising and
looting the
UNMISS camps.

Crowds
become
violent
(localised)

<1000 people.

Crime

Office/ residential
compound breakins with theft of
UN personnel
property

Civil
Unrest

Assessment Summary / Comment

32

Minimal social or
police/CJ controls on
criminal activity. Lack
of awareness in the
lower ranks of SOFA
and UN related
immunities as a whole
or acting with
impunity at time of
crisis.
Host Government
control mechanisms
stressed (equipment
etc). UNMISS Force
and UNPOL possess
effective equipment &
training to mitigate
small to moderate
sized crowds
depending on duty
station location.

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Threat
Category

General
Hazards

Threats

Assessment Summary / Comment


Intent

Capability

Explosive
remnants of war,
including UXOs

Hazard event
occurs
occasionally

Severe.

Road Traffic
Accidents.

Hazard event
occurs
frequently.

Moderate to severe.

Medical Epidemic.

Hazard event
occurs
occasionally

Severe.

Aviation Hazards.
Ground fire
targeting low
flying UN aircraft

Hazard event
occurs
occasionally

Severe.

33

Inhibiting context
Partial/limited
warning and/or
preparedness system
in place.
Partial/limited
warning and/or
preparedness systems
in place.
Partial/limited
warning and/or
preparedness systems
in place.
Effective Ebola airport
screening, training &
sensitisation led to
zero cases in South
Sudan
Semi effective
dialogue with host
government and
SPLA-io leadership to
emphasise UN
impartiality

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Table 7: Security Level System Map 2015

34

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8 Vulnerability Assessment
Strengths:

Existing Security Risk Management Measures

8.1 Current Country Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS):


a. All UN Premises have vehicle access control, guarded by security guards,
and operating as per UN established MOSS and Standard Operating
Procedures (SOP).
b. The UN compounds perimeter fence are either made of brick walls or
constructed with chain-linked fence and re-enforced with
concertina/barbed wire, HESCOs with adequate security lights
c. Regular Security Risk Assessments (SRA), review of mitigation measures
and implementation of recommendations.
d. Ensure compliance with mandatory training (B/ASITF and SSAFE).
e. Rehearsal of all emergency procedures, including office evacuation, fire
safety plans and relocation
f. Training on emergency radio communications.
g. Ensure compliance with staff/vehicle tracking procedures.
h. Use of armed escorts whenever advised by security
i. Use of body armour and helmets for field missions.
j. Mandatory Security Briefing prior to any field missions/ visits.
k. Establishment of SIOC and Emergency Response Team (ERT) in State
capitals and County Support Bases on a 24/7 basis to respond to all
security emergencies and coordinate with all concerned.
8.2 Current Security SOPs and other Regulations:
a. Some of the SOPs and Regulations are as follows: UN Security
Management System (UNSMS) Internal Security Clearance Procedures,
Safety and Security Procedures while conducting field missions, and
arrest/detention of UN personnel, Safety in Small Boats, Visitors
Guidelines to UNMISS premises and updated locations of out of bounds
areas
b. UNSMS SOPs and Regulations are regularly reviewed and revisions are
constantly underway to respond to any emerging threat.
8.3 Current Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards (MORSS);
The current MORSS of November 2014 is currently under review.
8.4 Host Country capacity and support
Good timely exchange of information with host government & entities to ensure
support.

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8.5 Implemented Risk Avoidance and/or Risk Transfer Options:


a. Utilising air transport to avoid road options.
b. Enhanced mitigating measures in place for critical missions including
restrictions on movements, relocations of personnel based on
programme criticality, the use of UN Military armed escorts, enhanced
contingency planning.
c. Using local implementing partners to carry-out UN programmes.
d. Movement restriction and UN curfew hours based on respective
SMT/ASMT recommendations and decisions.
e. Exercise/rehearsal of all emergency procedures, including office
evacuation, fire plan and relocation.
f. Enhanced surveillance and physical security upgrades at UNMISS
locations where IDPs are located.
8.6 Additional measures as recommended by SMT since December 2013:
a. UN Curfew hours adjusted depending upon security situation in urban
centres;
b. Safe emergency shelters are available in compounds affected by ongoing
conflict; identified weaknesses in physical security measures are being
implemented.
c. Some international personnel stay in the secured zone called blue zone
in Juba, majority in UN compounds and in all other conflict affected
locations in UN compounds;
d. UNMISS military ensures better perimeter security of camps and
enhanced deployments in UNMISS locations where IDPs are located.
e. Regular advisories and reminders given to UN personnel, including on the
radio network.
f. Essential UNMISS escorts for road convoys whenever recommended.
g. UNMISS area patrols of POC sites by UNPOL and Formed Police Units
(FPU) also in order to secure the POC areas from internal/external
threats.
h. Updated guidelines on how to handle crime in POC sites.
i. Close daily coordination between UNMISS Force, UNPOL and UN Security
perform joint patrols in and around UNMISS controlled POC areas.

36

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UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
TT(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)

9 Existing Security Risk Management Measures Vulnerabilities Weaknesses;


Table 8: Operational Security

Operation /
Activity

Road Travel:
Field missions

Humanitarian &
development
operations

Current Vulnerabilities/Weaknesses

The potential for commandeering an UN or contracted vehicles


by host security/ opposition and local militias authorities
during certain periods of increased mobility of the forces.

Increased threat for UN staff when using non-MOSS compliant


vehicles.

Risk of non-adherence to other UN recommended security


measures

SSAFE training is compulsory however not all UN personnel


are SSAFE trained.
Priority is being given to UN personnel being deployed to field
missions. Still a backlog due to surges in deployments for
humanitarian AFP personnel when level 3 emergency declared
in the country

Poor adherence to speed limits, seat belt use, etc.

Working within IDP sites that can become volatile

Warehouse goods of high value (economic and tactical) in


humanitarian AFP stores (food, fuel, machetes, etc.) and are
vulnerable to looting during active conflict in any area.

9.1 Road Movement Vulnerabilities (Safety and Security):


a. Not using MOSS compliant vehicles on road missions.
b. Not all UN personnel travelling on field missions may be SSAFE trained.
9.2 Air Movement Vulnerabilities (Safety and Security):
Unreliable weather forecasting is a factor when flying during the rainy season. UN has a
number of air assets, which are vulnerable to bad weather conditions. UN aircraft are
particularly vulnerable to ground fire from armed factions, as evident with two UN
helicopters downed in 3 years although the cause of the second aircraft crash is not
conclusive. Delays in flight safety assurances from both SPLA and SPLA-io further
complicate this vulnerability. Also flying large numbers of UN staff from Juba
International Airport where passenger and cargo security is substandard.

37

CONFIDENTIAL

UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)


UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
TT(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)

9.3 Premises Physical Security and Operational Vulnerabilities:


a. Lack of vehicle anti-ram features at access points: Majority of Vehicle Access
Control mechanisms at UN locations are susceptible to vehicle ramming.
b.

Poor perimeter physical security features: Although AFP compounds have


adequate hard walls which provide good protection, the current UNMISS
compound perimeters generally are constructed out of hurricane fencing, earth
berms, and or HESCO bastions topped with concertina/ barbed wire. These
fences provide moderate protection however they can be cut easily and offer
limited protection from light and heavy weapon fire and are vulnerable to
intruders and infiltrators. In many locations ditch-berm-fence systems are
severely dilapidated due to a lack of maintenance and severe weather conditions
and therefore not currently MOSS compliant according to a recent UNDSS
Security Assistance Visit report conducted in December 2014.

c.

Limited capability of guard force: The access control at the UNMISS compounds
and POC areas mainly by the unarmed individually contracted Security Guards
under the supervision of Guard Force Unit, UNMISS. Their impartiality and
utility in the event of an armed disturbances and/or intrusion by large groups of
IDPs from adjacent or internal POC areas could be questionable.

9.4 Medical Support Vulnerabilities:


Limited medical capability - UN medical services are struggling to manage
caseloads much larger than the facilities were designed for and would be quickly
overwhelmed in the event of a mass casualty event.
9.5 Shortcomings in Telecommunications Capacity:
a. UN personnel compliance with radio checks is lower than what it should be in
locations affected by constant/protracted conflict
b. UN AFPs operate with VHF radios that are not compatible with UNMISS Tetra
radios.
9.6 Shortcomings in Security and Protection Equipment:
a. Although UNMISS now has enough Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) for
each member, due to large influxes of AFP personnel they may not have enough
PPE for each member (flak jackets and helmets). Due to harsh conditions in
South Sudan and basic UN facilities particularly in CSBs, PPE kits are vulnerable
to spoiling if kept in make shift conditions.
b. Post Exposure Prophylaxis (PEP) kits are held centrally and issued to staff on
field missions. Because the kits contain drugs they are susceptible to heat and
humidity and can only be stored in suitable state HQ locations where persons are
trained in their use.
9.7 Other MOSS Implementation Shortcomings:
a. Short-fall in the protective equipment such as Shatter Resistant Film, HESCO, and
Trauma Bags, other material used to upgrade physical security measures.
b. MOSS will be reviewed in 2015.

38

CONFIDENTIAL

UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)


UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
TT(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)

9.8 Residential Security/MORSS Vulnerabilities:


a. Regular non-availability of protective materials such as concertina wire private
security companies that are evaluated as having effective and efficient, well
trained security guards.
b. Occasional non-adherence to MORSS recommendations by UN personnel, which
leaves them vulnerable to the identified threats, mainly criminality.
9.9 Shortcomings in Host Country capacity and support:
a. One of the most critical challenges is to establish and reform the existing South
Sudan Security Sector. The lack of literacy, training of professional police force,
tremendous shortage of infrastructure like police stations and equipment such as
vehicles and communications significantly impairs their ability to intervene
rapidly in local conflicts or combat criminal activity. This is further compounded
by underdeveloped infrastructure such as roads. With these shortcomings the
National Police (SSNPS) capacity to support UN is limited. Since mid-Dec. 2013
all parts of country are highly militarised. Whether they are SPLA and SPLA-io
their lack of command and control is evident. Obstructions of UN personnel and
convoys through ad hoc checkpoints and harassment of UN personnel at access /
check points including the International Juba airport and other state airports
have become the norm. Whatever limited training capacity SSNPS had obtained
has been lost in most of the areas in the affected states. With UNMISS no longer
having a Capacity Building mandate, SSNPS is currently lacking structured
support in improving their efficiency and productivity.
b.

The prevalence of small arms among the community especially the youths leads
to intra group conflicts and contributes to crime. Militias, as a stop-gap to the
lack of security forces, provide protection to the community with little or no
regards to the rule of law which can lead to human rights abuse. Reports of
crimes by soldiers or police in uniforms are very common.

9.10 Non Mainstreaming of Security in Planning


The policy that defines that security needs to be involved at all levels of
management to ensure security focus is considered/ mainstreamed into all
activities or programmes is not applied, specifically in UNMISS.
9.11 Other Weaknesses Identified since December 2013 crisis:
a. In mid July the continued presence of more than 166,12 civilians within the
UNMISS POC sites in Juba / Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile States, the possibility of
weapons smuggled into the sites and an increasingly hostile community in the
surrounding area indicates weaknesses that need to be addressed.
b. Since December 2013 there are large numbers of international and national
civilian personnel living and working inside UNMISS compounds where IDPs are
also located in close proximity
c. Weak perimeter fencing and constant breaching of repaired fencing by IDPs in
some portions of POC areas
d. Not all UN AFPs compounds are MOSS compliant.

39

CONFIDENTIAL

UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)


UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
TT(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)

e.

f.

g.
h.
i.

j.

The office contingency/evacuation plans have been updated, however, the large
number of IDPs raises serious question on workable ability of these plans should
IDPs get out of control due to flooding, medical emergency or any other internal
unrest/riots.
UN AFPs operate throughout the country where there is a lack of infrastructure.
The humanitarian teams are operating in more than 100 locations country wide
often in remote locations.
Insufficient force protection elements in the event of further armed conflict in
affected states
Insufficient accommodation at UN compounds (UNMISS and AFPs)
Insufficient Force and FPU capability to defend POC areas and in turn UNMISS
bases from armed, deliberate attacks by militia groups as occurred on 17 April
2014 in the UNMISS Bor POC.
Insufficient indirect fire shelters/bunkers in UNMISS locations where threats of
getting caught in cross fire due to armed conflict are possible.

10 Security Risk Analysis


Analysis of significant Developments:
10.1 As the armed conflict continues well into its second year the cyclical seasonal
fighting opportunities are synonymous with the dry season and rainy season becoming
time for calm by holding ground, strategizing, re-arming and taking breaks back home.
This is a nod back to the twenty-year civil war within Sudan as seemingly the comfort of
fighting period becomes habitual once more in South Sudan.
10.2 The initial key fighting broke out in Juba in December 2013 created by an ethnic
divide within the elite Presidential Guards, it was dry season and movement of troops
was possible allowing a division of the SPLA to defect bringing heavy artillery weaponry
with them. Throughout the dry months in 2014 the fighting continued within four
states: Central Equatoria, Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile with the strategic towns of Bor,
Bentiu and Malakal changing hands several times between the SPLA and the SPLA-io.
Casualties were not accurately monitored however it is expected to be in excess of
50,000 people. Death, displacement of whole communities, wilful destruction and
looting of properties and humanitarian supplies has caused untold misery for millions.
The SPLA military have held the upper-hand militarily by holding state capital cities and
the oil fields, largely due to bringing in sizeable support from the Uganda Peoples
Defence Force (UPDF).
10.3 In Addis Ababa the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
brokered peace talks began in earnest in January 2014 however over the past year
seven Ceasefire of Hostility (COH) Agreements were signed and broken before the ink
was even dry on the paper. With each signing of a COH there was a mini temporary
reduction in the warfare but generally outweighed by the spike in fighting for territorial
advantage beforehand. Ignoring the key sticking points of the crisis itself and bringing
other new items onto the agenda have worked to great effect to distract the population
with them focusing on the federalisation debate or the title for the opposition within

40

CONFIDENTIAL

UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)


UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
TT(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)

the government structure rather than putting down arms and reaching basic
agreements.
10.4 During rainy season South Sudan warring parties have used the lull in fighting as
an opportunity to rearm and shape their military strategies further As per the reports
received weapons and troops have been procured, requested and placed in anticipation
of a protracted fighting season. SPLA as the government force are within their
sovereign right to buy weapons, military hardware and supplementary support (UPDF)
for protection so to meet these exponentially increased budget requirements money
was diverted from basic state provision programmes such as clean water, health,
education and infrastructure. This shortfall has been picked up through the
Humanitarian/, programmes/ international donors including providing humanitarian
aid, education and healthcare for the displaced and vulnerable populations. The South
Sudan government in Juba has openly accused the Sudan government in Khartoum of
re-arming the SPLA-io. Many militias are affiliated or directly absorbed into the two
factions of the SPLA or SPLA-io and increasingly public announcements that they lack
resources, food supplies and armoury. These tensions are worrying given that
desperate militias can move in any direction, whether through hunger or lack of arms,
which could turn to asymmetric guerrilla warfare, which is resource light, but
nevertheless damaging, such as landmines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). UN
and AFP personnel could be more vulnerable as they protect others and provide
humanitarian assistance in remote areas as the situation becomes less secure for those
on the battlefield.
10.5 The existing EU sanctions delivered in July 2014 had little impact on the deescalating of the crisis, however further extensive UN sanctions were delivered in a
tough UN Security Council Resolution on the 3 March 2015, the decision affects
individuals through the freezing of their bank accounts and travel bans will affect all
players who do not work towards peace and security There is also an African Union
(AU) report which has investigated human rights abuses last dry season which is
completed but yet to be published.
10.6 The integration of some of the many militias in South Sudan into the SPLA prior to,
and after the start of the conflict, have benefited the government military strength
through having troops pre-placed in frontline areas and by paying their wages has
prevented them affiliating themselves with the opposition. With wage payments to the
military being sporadic, promises of resources are not always being met and the
breakdown of faith between some of these partners has led to multiple tensions and
factions merging. Individual sackings and defections, some at high level, have been
widespread and have had a public humiliation factor too.
10.7 Payoffs have been forthcoming with both high-profile individuals and groups,
including the peace agreement with the SSDM/A Cobra Faction, which led to the
creation of the Greater Pibor Administration Area (GPAA), rewarding rebel militias with
land rights for the Murle ethnic group in return for not joining the opposition. It is
feared that many other militias will request the same annexing of territory which
although appeases in the short-term will have devastating effect for many years to
come, encouraging fighting over land and ethnic division. Inter communal violence over

41

CONFIDENTIAL

UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)


UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
TT(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)

long running land disputes recently broke out in the Upper Nile areas in and around
Malakal Town and Akoka between Shilluk and Dinka groups. The fighting in early April
2015, has caused insecurity in the way of civilians being displaced and seeking
protection from the UN along with disruption to the delivery humanitarian supplies
with reports of WFP contracted trucks being commandeered and drivers detained.
Some states not affected during this conflict were requested to provide recruits for the
frontline; later further tensions have risen initially through the federalisation debate
and could lead them to be drawn into the conflict at a later stage. Given the mix of intercommunal violence and land issues, the distinction between the two fighting factions,
peace related challenges; ethnic divisions and seasonal cattle raiding are increasingly
blurred.
10.8 There is an increase of visible signs of South Sudan being a failing state: there is no
free media, intimidation by government security is commonplace, economy close to
collapse and lack of provision or accountability of the civilian population by the state
with most funds diverted to fund the war effort. Law and order is collapsing too, in
some states wages have been stolen or simply delayed for months on end, in urban
areas reports of police becoming active criminals, local courts do not function and
reports that crimes are committed due to perpetrators acting with impunity. Insecure
times lead to insecure methods with weapon carrying by civilians is becoming more
commonplace and the need to protect ones property and communities are accepted
norms in both urban and rural areas. Further breakdown will lead to escalation of
retaliatory attacks, which could easily be directed at UN and AFP personnel members in
the course of their duty. Large numbers of IDPs rely on the security of UNMISS
peacekeeping forces for their protection, however crowd control measures can never
maintain order if the IDPs turn on their protector if the tensions rise inside the confines
of the POC sites, the numbers are simply overwhelming.
10.9 The main characteristic of threats to UN personnel in the event of a protracted
low-level insurgency would be as follows:
a. Collateral effects of small scale assaults and hit and run attacks, including in Juba;
b. Increased risk of direct attacks such as harassment and intimidation especially
against UN/ AFP activities intended to provide support to civilians;
c. Increased risk of indirect fire;
d. Increased criminality in urban areas;
e. Un-attributable attacks, especially in areas under contested control, aimed at
casting blame on the other side to the dispute;
f. Increased risks in road movements including stopping of humanitarian delivery,
roadblocks and increased roadside banditry. Possible placement of IEDs or
landmines;
g. Tensions between authorities and IDPs within and outside POC areas;
h. Altered patterns of intra-ethnic armed conflict and cattle raiding

42

CONFIDENTIAL

UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)


UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
TT(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)

11 Conclusions and Proposed Security Risk Mitigating Measures :


Possible security developments and impact to UN personnel, assets and
operations:
11.1 As security challenges would continue to be significant in the period of transition,
in addition to the security threats would include:
a. On-going security challenges associated with the POC and Human Rights
mandates;
b. IDP frustrations in view of limited humanitarian assistance, peace negotiation
deadlocks and their future;
c. Criminality with the POC sites in close proximity to UNMISS bases and tensions
between POC inhabitants and host communities/ authorities;
d. Continued suspicions on the role and functions of the UN, particularly UNMISS
resulting in or increasing reputational risk.
e. Further degradation of law and order especially in some urban areas;
f. Increased roadside banditry by elements previously engaged in armed conflict;
g. Unusual patterns of violence associated with the somewhat disrupted seasonal
migrations;
h. Collateral effects of small scale assaults and hit and run attacks, including in Juba
i. Increased risks of road movements in view of threats of roadside banditry,
rains and IEDs/landmines;
j. Harassment, intimidation and various forms of direct attacks, especially against
UN activities intended to provide support to civilians in SPLA-IO controlled
areas;
k. Difficulties negotiating access and obtaining flight safety assurances; most
pronounced in contested areas such as Bentiu and parts of Upper Nile State.
l. Un-attributable attacks (including against the UN), especially in areas under
contested control, aimed at casting blame on the other side to the dispute; a case
in point is the reported attack on a UN convoy on 01 February 2015 along the
Mayom-Bentiu road.
m. Increased criminality in urban areas;
n. Tensions between authorities and IDPs in both PoC areas and outside;
o. Risk of indirect fire;
p. Civil unrest situations in the event of further economic downturn.
q. Increased health risks associated with proximity to IDPs.
r. Increasing reports of thefts of UN assets.
s. Internal unrest/riots in IDP areas spilling out of control impacting the UN
personnel, assets and operations.
t. Possibility of armed attacks on PoC sites in UNMISS bases.
Requirements for Security Support:
11.2 Since December 2013 the existence of IDPs have put unprecedented demands on
UN security at UNMISS locations. In February 2014 the highest Level 3 Humanitarian
Emergency was declared in South Sudan given the scale of the humanitarian disaster in
the country that needs an adequate response. The increased demand on UN Security to

43

CONFIDENTIAL

UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)


UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
TT(Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling ST/SGB/2007/06)

enable such operations on behalf of the UN mission and AFP has stretched resources
and the need for operational flexibility, innovation and security assessments.
11.3 As per various SRAs the following recommendations are being acted upon, subject
to funds and resources:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

Enhance perimeter security to prevent intrusions into the UN.


Provide better security for both UNMISS personnel and IDPs.
Realign security operation to conform to the mandate of UNDSS.
Provide UN personnel with protection from direct and indirect fire.
Increase the risk on the part of criminals and protect offices and medical
facilities.
Establish warning capacity to timely reaction to security incidents.
Promote accuracy, consistency and cohesive uniformity information reporting.
Ensure effective communication within UNSMS organisations and improve
communications between radio rooms and UNSMS staffs.
Operationally to continue to focus on:

Conduct snap assessments of accessibility of certain roads, airstrips, towns,


IDP camps and other discrete areas;
Advice on pre-positioning stocks of humanitarian supplies;
Advice on use of secure corridors for the transportation of humanitarian
supplies, the deployment of staff and other assets, particularly in areas not
under SPLA control;
Developing MOSS/MORSS requirements for humanitarian staff in outlying
areas, such as IDP camps;
Close security coordination with the de facto authorities on the ground in a
particular location;
Security officers deployed/embedded with humanitarian partners away
from UNMISS bases such as OCHA base in Juba;
Security officers dedicated to enabling humanitarian UN AFP activities
through CERF and donor mechanisms;
Greater use of aircraft for positioning of supplies, for assessments and for
monitoring;
Quick reaction teams able to deploy to locations at short notice;
Enhanced MOSS and MORSS to mitigate increased threats of criminality;
Enhanced capacity for security analysis;
Continued use of DSS dedicated aircraft.
Close coordination with UNMISS military and police in ensuring POC site
security issues do not impact UN activities in compounds.

11.4 The more significant recommendations in the Country SRA have been
consolidated in Annex C.

44

August 2015

ANNEX A RISK ANALYSIS MATRIX


Threat Category: Armed conflict

Collateral
effect of direct
fire (ie. small
arms, hand
grenades).

Various manifestations of armed conflict


have affected South Sudan notably the
ongoing fighting between SPLA and
SPLA-IO factions, violence involving
other Armed Non-State actors, armed
conflict in border areas with Sudan, and
inter-communal armed conflict

Activities involving movement


outside of secure MOSS
compliant UN compounds and
UNMISS bases most notably in
Jonglei, Unity and Malakal
states are affected UNMISS
bases with PoC areas have and
are likely to continue to be
affected by the threat

Existing DSS provision

Vulnerabilities

Residual Security Risk


Threat
Current
Risk Level

Where

Recommended Security Risk Management


Measures

Impact

Cause

Current Security Risk


Threat

Likelihood

Challenge

Vulnerability
Assessment

Current
Risk Level

Programme Activities
Affected

Impact

Available Information

Likelihood

Threat

Established MOSS and MORSS

With high numbers of IDPs sharing


Central Equatoria, Jonglei, Prioritising the increase of armoured vehicles Central Equatoria, Jonglei,
compounds with UN personnel or adjacent Unity and Upper Nile States in conflict affected states
Unity and Upper Nile States
to UN compounds elevates threats of crime,
trespass, rioting, flooding and disease.

Re-enforced perimeter security


measures

Perceived threat: with a PoC mandate, some


believe UN assisting opposition and
harbouring rebels/ criminals

Indirect fire shelters/safe rooms in UN staffs using soft skin vehicles, offices and
some UN compounds
residential containers.
In volatile areas all international
Lack of solid wall perimeters
and many national personnel live
inside UN compounds

Continuing diplomatic, UNMISS and UN


humanitarian campaign emphasising UN
impartiality & the distinction between mission
and humanitarian programmes Increased
UNMISS
and FPUs/UNPOL
at all
UN
CreationFP
of more
security officer
posts.
Physical reinforcements at POC areas in UN
compounds as per FSSS reviews.

UNMISS military and FPU force


protection
Use of PPE, VHF radios, staff
tracking, security briefings and
advisories

Weak perimeters and access control points -

Contingency planning for


relocation/evacuation of staff in a
crisis.

Not all UN compounds are fully MOSS


compliant

Ensure that all UN personnel are SSAFE


trained.

Insufficient force protection and Formed


Police Units/UNPOL and Security officers

Enhanced contingency planning for the


relocation of staff, including liaison with NGOs.

Lack of adequate In-Direct Fire (IDF)


shelters in UN compounds

PPE Kits for staff

Difficulty in controlling weapons smuggling


in compounds due to weak perimeters and
large numbers of IDPs.

Prioritise construction of additional and more


robust In-Direct Fire IDF shelters
Conduct of emergency evacuation/medical
emergency drills in UN compounds

Information campaign directed towards UN


staffs

ANNEX A RISK ANALYSIS MATRIX

August 2015

Threat Category: Armed conflict

Collateral
effects of
indirect fire
(mortars,
RPGs, artillery,
aerial
bombardment)
.

Ongoing armed conflict between SPLA


and SPLA-io factions includes use of
indirect fire weapons hitting UNMISS
bases and killing/injuring IDPs
Despite ongoing CoH Agreements,

fighting is continuing and both sides


assessed to have IDF capability in some
locations

Existing DSS provision

Vulnerabilities

All UN activities are affected.


Established MOSS and MORSS
UN bases close to proximity of
conventional fighting and close
to elements of critical
infrastructure are particularly
vulnerable including sites such Re-enforced perimeter security
as airfields, govt offices/
measures
residences, oilfields

With high numbers of IDPs sharing or


Jonglei, Unity and Upper
adjacent to compounds with UN personnel, Nile States
increased threats of crime, trespass,
invading civilian areas and the spread of
diseases.
Perceived threat: with a PoC mandate, some
believe UN assisting opposition and
harbouring rebels/ criminals
Indirect fire shelters/safe rooms in UN personnel using soft skin vehicles,
some UN compounds
offices and residential containers.

ALL MEASURES LISTED ABOVE ARE


RELEVANT TO THIS THREAT. THE
FOLLOWING ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT

All international and many national Weak perimeters and access control points
staffs in volatile areas are
in some UN compounds, no solid wall
accommodated in UN compounds perimeters

Conduct of emergency evacuation/medical


emergency drills in UN compounds

UNMISS military and FPU force


protection

Difficult controlling weapons smuggling in


compounds due to weak perimeters and
large numbers of IDPs.
Use of PPE, VHF /Tetra radios, staff Not all UN compounds are MOSS compliant
tracking, security briefings and
advisories
Contingency planning for
Insufficient Force Protection resources
relocation/evacuation of staff in a
crisis.
Lack of adequate In-Direct Fire (IDF)
shelters in UN compounds

Residual Security Risk


Threat

Enhancing contingency planning for the


relocation of staff, including liaison with
INGOs.
Prioritise construction of additional and more
robust IDF shelters

Current
Risk Level

Where

Recommended Security Risk Management


Measures

Impact

Cause

Current Security Risk


Threat

Likelihood

Challenge

Vulnerability
Assessment

Current
Risk Level

Programme Activities
Affected

Impact

Available Information

Likelihood

Threat

Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile


States

ANNEX A RISK ANALYSIS MATRIX

August 2015

Threat Category: Armed conflict

Direct attacks
on UN by
armed groups
with direct or
indirect fire

Intermittent hostility towards the UN

This hostility is likely to increase in the


event of sanctions. UN has falsely been
accused of bias and providing material
assistance in favour of the rebels
Criticism has come from the highest
levels and security organs have
repeated the claims.

Existing DSS provision

Vulnerabilities

All UN activities are potentially Keeping with the UN position of


affected by the threat
impartiality

UN susceptible to negative propaganda.


Central Equatoria, Jonglei,
With low levels of literacy, poor
Unity and Upper Nile States
communication systems, civilians can be
easily influenced by powerful figures with
self-serving agendas
Ensuring all civilians irrespective of UN personnel using soft skin vehicles, offices
ethnic /political affiliation are
and residential containers.
assisted to the fullest extent
possible.

ALL MEASURES LISTED ABOVE ARE


RELEVANT TO THIS THREAT. THE
FOLLOWING ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT

UN humanitarian programmes
informing public of UN
programmes
activities/humanitarian effortscountry wide
Ensuring IDPs entering POCs are
disarmed and stay disarmed

Weak perimeters and access control points


in some UN compounds, no solid wall
perimeters

Physical UN military reinforcements at UN


Compounds particularly within conflict
effected states and UN compounds with large
number of IDPs

Not all UN compounds are fully MOSS


compliant
Insufficient force protection resources

Prioritise construction of additional and more


robust IDF shelters
Conduct of emergency evacuation/medical
emergency drills in UN compounds

Inadequate or complete absence of bunkers


to protect against IDF in UN compounds

Residual Security Risk


Threat

UN humanitarian campaign to continually


emphasise UN impartiality and the distinction
between UNMISS and humanitarian
programmes to be maintained.

Current
Risk Level

Where

Recommended Security Risk Management


Measures

Impact

Cause

Current Security Risk


Threat

Likelihood

Challenge

Vulnerability
Assessment

Current
Risk Level

Programme Activities
Affected

Impact

Available Information

Likelihood

Threat

Central Equatoria, Jonglei,


Unity and Upper Nile States

ANNEX A RISK ANALYSIS MATRIX

August 2015

Threat Category: Terrorism

Various forms
of Improvised
Explosive
Devices (IED)

No AQ-related terrorist attacks to date All UN static locations and road


with threats from extremists appearing movement potentially affected
to be low. Because of UN support to the by the threat
Federal Government of Somalia, there is
a potential low risk that the UN in South
Sudan, like elsewhere in the -region,
may become a target of Al Shabaab.

Existing DSS provision

Prior to start of the current crisis


the perception of the UN was
generally positive among the
national population
Good level of collection of
information and analysis on
potential terrorist threats.
Good level of liaison and
coordination with Host Country

Vulnerabilities

Lack of armoured vehicles for UN civilian


use.

Targeted against the UN

Introduce/ increase the use of K9 explosive


Targeted against the UN
detecting capabilities at main UN compounds.

UN staffs are vulnerable in soft skin vehicles,


offices and residential containers.
Since beginning of crisis the host
government security organs focusing on
mitigating potential terror threats are now
focusing on the conflict including mass
defections

Installation of Shatter Resistance Film (SRF)


on all glass elements.

Increase the availability of armoured vehicles.

In mid-2013, UN received credible


information from multiple sources
warning that Al Shabaab was planning
an attack on UN H.Q. In although this
did not materialize.

Awareness training conducted to


staff members.

Relations with host government including


information sharing and security
cooperation, has deteriorated.

Security personnel awareness training with


an emphasis on terrorism, surveillance
detection and screening.

In the event that the current armed


conflict morphs into a more traditional
insurgency, any force or militia may
resort to asymmetric attacks, including

Mass Casualty Plans (MCP) in place. Weak terrorism related awareness among
UN staffs especially truck/car, roadside
bomb/ IED threats.

Enhanced passengers & luggage control and


screening procedures

Exchange of information

Lack of adequate anti-terror protective


equipment and medical facilities vis a vis
number of deployed staff
Poor luggage and passenger screening
systems at airports.

Adequate number of Trauma Kits and Medical


supplies at Field Locations.

Inadequate screening of service delivery


vehicles.

Standoff distance from office premises to be


implemented.

No SRD Plan
Weak perimeters and access control points
in some UN compounds, no solid wall
perimeters. Inadequate standoff in some UN
compounds

Ongoing installation of Electronic Security


System in Juba UNMISS compounds along with
equipment necessary for detecting IEDs and
VBIEDs.

MOSS/ MORSS

Timely Security Advisories.

Insufficient force protection resources


Inadequate IDF shelters to protect against
terror attacks in UN compounds.

Residual Security Risk


Threat
Current
Risk Level

Where

Recommended Security Risk Management


Measures

Impact

Cause

Current Security Risk


Threat

Likelihood

Challenge

Vulnerability
Assessment

Current
Risk Level

Programme Activities
Affected

Impact

Available Information

Likelihood

Threat

Mass casualty preparedness procedures


implemented and training provided.

ANNEX A RISK ANALYSIS MATRIX

August 2015

Threat Category: Crime

Roadside
banditry and
other forms of
violent
criminality

Criminal threats exist throughout the


All UN activities are potentially
country. Petty theft constitutes the
affected by the threat
most common problem; there are also
regular reports of roadside banditry,
usually occurring at night in remote
areas. In relation to th on-going conflict
major arterial routes are also
experiencing elevated threats of
roadside banditry, partly as a result of
disparate elements of those involved in
fighting or defectors seeking food, cash
and vehicles. In view of continuing
economic difficulties and the disruption
and dislocation caused by fighting,
incidents of petty crime, including fuel
theft, will likely continue to increase and
that UN facilities and personnel are
likely to be increasingly targeted by
thieves. During the reported period,
Juba and many other urban centres,
including Rumbek and Malakal,
witnessed waves of at times violent
crime including day light armed
robberies affecting especially UN
national personnel.

Existing DSS provision

Good level of UN compliance with


MOSS.

Vulnerabilities

Residual Security Risk


Threat
Current
Risk Level

Where

Recommended Security Risk Management


Measures

Impact

Cause

Current Security Risk


Threat

Likelihood

Challenge

Vulnerability
Assessment

Current
Risk Level

Programme Activities
Affected

Impact

Available Information

Likelihood

Threat

Increase the availability of armoured vehicles Major urban centres, roads


for UN civilian use.
through conflict zones and
HAZs

Efficient tracking of UN vehicles/


staffs movement.
Cooperation with the host
government.

Since the beginning of the current crisis,


Major urban centres, roads
host government officials, police and
through conflict zones and
Security offices have been seriously affected HAZs
by conflict. They have also shown at times
increased hostilities towards UN for
perceived assistance to SPLA-io. As a result
of the above, response to crime especially
involving UN has dropped.

Staff/driver SSAFE trainings.


Most UN missions to vulnerable
field areas are conducted under
armed escorts.

Many criminal / anti-government groups


have taken advantage of the security
vacuum to deliberately target UN contracted
convoys in volatile areas.

UN personnel /driver training on convoy,


emergency, and ambush procedures

Issuance of travel advisories


Security road travel guideline and
SCFZ systems in place.

UN has limited resources to conduct patrols


and escorts in all high risk areas.
Since the beginning of the current conflict
law enforcement offices are ill equipped,
inadequately trained and limited in their
response.

For staff going on field mission for UN Security


to Enhance Mitigating Measures Check (MMC)
list is prepared for staff reference for
compliance

Limited radio rooms at county level.

Emphasis on notification system to Field


Commanders.

Ensure robust compliance of MOSS/vehicle


tracking procedures

Enhance timely information sharing within


UN/ AFP/ NGO community. Force Protection
capabilities to be enhanced especially in

ANNEX A RISK ANALYSIS MATRIX

August 2015

Threat Category: Crime

Looting and
destruction of
UN assets

Existing DSS provision

With ongoing violence between SPLA


Warehouses and other storage Before the conflict the UN enjoyed
and SPLA-io, widespread looting and
facilities are affected, as well as widespread local civilian
destruction of humanitarian supplies is trucks etc. carrying supplies
acceptance.
likely to continue as seen in all 3 volatile
states at the height of the crisis last year

UN facilities required to be MOSS


compliant with physical perimeter/
access control measures with
private security contractors and UN
security personnel

Vulnerabilities

Since the conflict began host government


officials, police and security offices have
been seriously affected by conflict. They
have also shown increased hostilities
towards UN for perceived assistance to
SPLA-io This has led to a less effective
response to crime involving UN staffs or
assets.

Jonglei, Unity and Upper


Nile States where Force
protection is inadequate

UN assets especially related to life saving/POC Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile
operations conflict affected states to be
States where Force protection
secured in main UN bases with robust MOSS is inadequate
compliant security measures.

Many criminal / anti-government groups


have taken advantage of the security
vacuum and targeted UN contracted convoys
in volatile areas.

Enhance timely information sharing within


UN/AFP communities.

UN has limited resources to conduct patrols


and escorts in all high risk areas.

Force Protection capabilities within main UN


bases to be enhanced prioritising conflict
affected states .
Mission Support Division (MSD) in
conjunction with UN Security to enhance
Facilities Security Management (FSM) efforts
to improve physical perimeter security at UN
bases,

Since the outbreak of the crisis state law


enforcement offices are ill equipped and
inadequately trained and limited in their
response.
Limited radio rooms at county level.

Residual Security Risk


Threat
Current
Risk Level

Where

Recommended Security Risk Management


Measures

Impact

Cause

Current Security Risk


Threat

Likelihood

Challenge

Vulnerability
Assessment

Current
Risk Level

Programme Activities
Affected

Impact

Available Information

Likelihood

Threat

ANNEX A RISK ANALYSIS MATRIX

August 2015

Threat Category: Crime

Harassment
and
intimidation of
UN staff

Due to ongoing conflict, both sides hold


deep suspicions of UN activities
especially involving air, weapon and
some UN national staff movements.

All UN personnel outside of


controlled UN compounds are
potentially affected by the
threat. Ongoing incidents of
SPLA and SPLMio delaying
convoys and flights - detaining
national staff alleged to be
sympathetic to one side or the
other.

Due to ongoing conflict, only UN


staffs deemed essential are
working from compounds in
conflict affected states.

UN is vulnerable to acts of aggression as


command and control structures within
SPLA and SPLA-io are weakened and with
little understanding and respect for the
SOFA especially within the lower ranks.

International Staff

Residual Security Risk


Threat

UN to better equip security for Emergency


Response (ER) capabilities to assist UN
Personnel.

UN staffs now reside inside UN


camps including vulnerable
national staff.
Restricted movements outside UN
bases including the increasing of
curfew hours.

All managers to ensure all personnel are SSAFE trained as soon as they arrive in mission.

Liaising with host government to


highlight and mitigate incidents of
SOFA violations including at UN H.Q
level.

Despite challenges, UN to continue to conduct


sensitisation sessions with SPLA, NISS, SSNPS
and other law enforcement agencies by senior
leadership and UNDSS, UNPOL, UN Military in
order to educate them on the UN immunities/
privileges and SOFA.

Maintain broadcasts to remind personnel of


how to avoid these situations or what to do if
confronted by harassment and intimidation.

Conduct Code of Conduct training for UN staff.


Risk assessments to be conducted for UN staff
that are specifically targeted by any force or
militia

International Staff

Current
Risk Level

Vulnerabilities

Recommended Security Risk Management


Measures

Impact

Existing DSS provision

Current Security Risk


Threat

Likelihood

Cause

Vulnerability
Assessment

Current
Risk Level

Challenge

Programme Activities
Affected
Where

Impact

Available Information

Likelihood

Threat

ANNEX A RISK ANALYSIS MATRIX

August 2015

Threat Category: Crime

Arbitrary
arrest and
detention of
UN personnel

There are multiple cases of arbitrary


arrest and detention, mostly of national
staff. Ethnic considerations may apply
to finding solutions or dealing with this
threat.

All UN personnel outside of


controlled UN
compounds/bases are
potentially affected by the
threat

Due to ongoing conflict, only UN


personnel deemed essential are
working from compounds in
affected statesNon-critical UN
international and national staffs
relocated/evacuated from worst
affected areas
UN staff directed to reside inside
UN camps including vulnerable
national staff.
Restricted movements outside UN
bases via increasing the hours of
curfew.
Liaising with host government to
highlight and mitigate incidents of
SOFA violations including at UN H.Q
level.

Since the crisis began host government


officials, military, police and security
apparatuses have shown increased
hostilities towards UN for perceived
assistance to SPLA-io forces.
UN especially national staffs are vulnerable
to arbitrary arrest and detention. This is due
to ethnicity, poor discipline especially in
lower ranks and lack of command and
control structures that have deteriorated
significantly since the crisis began. There is
little understanding and respect for the
SOFA within the lower ranks, complicated
by low literacy rates.

All staff

Residual Security Risk


Threat

UN to better equip security for Emergency


Response (ER) capabilities to assist staffs

All managers to ensure all personnel are SSAFE trained as soon as they arrive in mission.

Frequent broadcasts to remind personnel of


how to avoid these situations or what to do if
arrested or detained.
Despite challenges, UN to continue to conduct
sensitisation sessions with SPLA, NISS and
SNPS law enforcement /security agencies by
senior leadership and UNDSS, UNPOL, UN
Military in order to educate them on the UN
immunities/ privileges and SOFA.
Provide Code of Conduct training for UN staff.

All staff

Current
Risk Level

Vulnerabilities

Recommended Security Risk Management


Measures

Impact

Existing Mitigation

Current Security Risk


Threat

Likelihood

Cause

Vulnerability
Assessment

Current
Risk Level

Challenge

Programme Activities
Affected
Where

Impact

Available Information

Likelihood

Threat

ANNEX A RISK ANALYSIS MATRIX

August 2015

Threat Category: Civil Unrest

Violent
Outbreaks of civil unrest have been a
demonstration significant effect of the ongoing armed
s
conflict. Many urban centres in some
areas remain largely de-populated.

All UN activities are potentially Most UN offices have perimeter


affected by the threat, most
wall/fences guard force and access
notably static UN compounds
control system in place.
and bases

Despite periods of considerable anti-UN


rhetoric, violent demonstrations against
the UN by large groups have not been a
feature of the security situation so far.

Timely security advisories and


movement restrictions Good
coordination with government
authorities.

Marchers have protested vociferously


against alleged interference, and
bias by UNMISS in favour of the SPLAio. Previously most demonstrations
mentioning the UN had been appeals in
one form or the other for intervention in
certain prevailing matters.

ERT/QRF capabilities in place.

Residual Security Risk


Threat
Current
Risk Level

Vulnerabilities

Recommended Security Risk Management


Measures

Impact

Existing Mitigation

Current Security Risk


Threat

Likelihood

Cause

Vulnerability
Assessment

Current
Risk Level

Challenge

Programme Activities
Affected
Where

Impact

Available Information

Likelihood

Threat

Since the outbreak of the conflict the


Targeted against the UN
UN has been susceptible to negative
propaganda. With low levels of literacy, poor
communication systems,leaving civilians to
be easily influenced by powerful figures
with self-serving agendas.

Increase sensitisation of local communities on Targeted against the UN


the mandates of the UN including, impartiality
and POC activities to negate allegations of bias
and prevent unrealistic expectations.

Weak perimeters and access control points


in some UN compounds
Insufficient FPU and Force Protection
resources

Ensure FPU have the numbers and equipment


for effective crowd control
Ensure regular security information,
advisories and broadcasts

Inadequate or complete absence of IDF


shelters to protect against civilian mob
attacks including from POC areas.

Enhancement and compliance to emergency


communication systems to enable rapid
dissemination of information and alerts to
staff.

UN Security UNPOL and UN military to


coordinate contingency planning in the event
of large scale demonstrations, both from
within UN POC areas and outside.

ANNEX A RISK ANALYSIS MATRIX

August 2015

Threat Category: Hazards

Explosive
remnants of
war

Theongoing armed conflict between two


factions of the SPLA has involved
indirect fire weapons (such as RPGs,
mortars and bombs dropped from
aircraft) as well as small arms.
Therefore the threat of unexploded
ordnance (UXO) and explosive
remnants of warfare has increased
significantly. This is especially the case
in urban areas and along arterial roads.
Even before the latest conflict, South
Sudans civil war left it very prone to
landmines and other explosive
remnants of war.
During the rainy season old mines are
becoming exposed as the water washes
away the surface dirt.

All UN activities which involve


movements along roads and in
other locations (outside of
secure UN compounds) which
have not been specifically
cleared of landmines and UXOs
by the government or UNMAS

The UN and Agencies are well


equipped with air support to
supplement in part road movement
and relocation.

Robust road travel guide and


security clearance procedures to
ensure staffs do not travel on roads
UNMAS has comprehensive
procedures in place to detect and
remove mines and UXOs

Due to the on-going conflict, there are often Border areas and Jonglei,
restrictions of movement within conflict
Unity and Upper Nile States
affected states, UNMAS regularly l has
difficulty clearing UXOs from areas
surrounding UN compounds including some
important road routes the UN has been
informed by the SPLA-io not to
maintain/check for mines on some roads
including roads north of Bentiu towards
Mayom junction.

Residual Security Risk


Threat
Current
Risk Level

Vulnerabilities

Recommended Security Risk Management


Measures

Impact

Existing Mitigation

Current Security Risk


Threat

Likelihood

Cause

Vulnerability
Assessment

Current
Risk Level

Challenge

Programme Activities
Affected
Where

Impact

Available Information

Likelihood

Threat

Senior management to liaise with host


Border areas and Jonglei,
government and if necessary SPLA-io in order Unity and Upper Nile States
for UNMAS to gain access to affected areas and
remove mines and explosive remnants of war.

UN information campaign warning civilians


not to touch suspicious objects and to report
UXO to the UN.

ANNEX A RISK ANALYSIS MATRIX

August 2015

Threat Category: Hazards


Challenge

Cause

Programme Activities
Affected
Where

Vulnerability
Assessment

Current Security Risk


Threat

Recommended Security Risk Management


Measures

Residual Security Risk


Threat

Increase efforts to quickly decongest the


overcrowded POC areas by creating new areas
with functioning drainage, sewage capabilities
while providing protection

Where UN staff are working in


remote areas or in close
proximity to IDPs in POC
areas

Since the outbreak of conflict large numbers


of civilians have sought protection and
assistance within UN Compounds. As of
February 2015, approximately 120,000 IDPs
are crowded into seven UNMISS POC camps

Access to clean water is limited. Vector


borne disease, includesmalaria, dengue
fever, yellow fever and leishmaniasis.

MEDEVACpPlan in Place.

With the approaching rainy season, health


officials are predicting a large serge in
communicable diseases within POC areas
that will inevitably affect UN personnel
living and working in the same camps.

IDPs in cramped, hazardous and diseaseprone POC areas in close proximity to


large numbers of UN staff.

UN Mission has established aviation IDPs are already overwhelming the modest
capacity.
UN medical facilities meant to treat UN
personnel

Rehearse all contingency plans including


Mass Casualty Plan Liaise with WHO and
advise Personnel on health safety and hygiene

UNDSS administered aircraft is


available for MEDEVAC.

Maintain regular fumigation of office and


residential compounds

All UN personnel

Mass Casualty Plan

Non availability of local resources and


limited number of ICU beds in South Sudan
and neighbouring countries.
No routine night time flying capability.

Where UN staff are working


in remote areas or in close
proximity to IDPs in POC
areas

Likelihood

Current
Risk Level

Coordinated health and sanitation


programmes between UN and AFP
partners including clean water,
satiation, immunisation and health
clinics.

Communicable Major cause of morbidity and mortality


diseases such is due to poor sanitiation.
as malaria, TB,
measles,
cholera

Impact

Vulnerabilities

Likelihood

Existing Mitigation

Increase the capacity of UN health facilities


and prepare for large scale outbreaks of
communicable diseases.

Current
Risk Level

Available Information

Impact

Threat

ANNEX A RISK ANALYSIS MATRIX

August 2015

Threat Category: Hazards

Road traffic
accidents

Only very limited infrastructural


developments were undertaken in
South Sudan before and after
independence. The roads in South
Sudan are mostly unpaved, becoming
dusty in the dry season and largely
impassable in the rainy season with
routes covered in large potholes, deep
mud and often flooded

The danger of road accidents is


exacerbated by poor driving skills and
trucks or buses travelling at relatively
high speeds despite the poor state of the
roads.

All UN personnel

UN Speed Limits

Poor road conditions

UN Traffic Rules

Drunk driving by UN staffs

Transport to enforce speed limits via the car


log system and send out warnings to
offending drivers and informing SIU Security.

Mission tracking

Not adhering to speed limits

Zero Tolerance for drunk- driving via regular


combined Security, UNPOL and FPU
checkpoints

Speeding and poor road safety practices by


local drivers & motorbike riders

Residual Security Risk


Threat

Between urban centres and Increase broadcasts to UN staffs on road


in rural locations
safety.

Current
Risk Level

Vulnerabilities

Recommended Security Risk Management


Measures

Impact

Existing Mitigation

Current Security Risk


Threat

Likelihood

Cause

Vulnerability
Assessment

Current
Risk Level

Challenge

Programme Activities
Affected
Where

Impact

Available Information

Likelihood

Threat

Between urban centres and in


rural locations

CONFIDENTIAL

Annex B: Country SRA


Report on Programme Criticality support mission to South Sudan, Jan 2014
On request by the UNCT and RC a.i. in South Sudan, a PC roll-out support mission was deployed to Juba 20 29
January 2014, consisting of Katarina Herneryd (UNICEF, team leader) and Karson Snyder (UNHCR).
The mission started on 22 January with a presentation to the UNCT and UNMISS on the PC framework and
methodology, as well as discussion on the inputs to the exercise (namely geographical scope, timeframe and
strategic results). The decision was to do one exercise for all of South Sudan, and the agreed timeframe was 12
months based on the fact that agencies had recently updated their response plans and implementation cycles to
take account of the current context. It was recognized that a review might be needed after 6 months or if the
programmatic priorities change significantly within the timeframe. The Strategic results were agreed through a
subsequent email endorsement process (see annex I).
A PC workshop with agency focal points (FAO, IOM, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF,
UNMAS, UNMISS, UNOCHA, UNOPS, UN WOMEN, WFP, WHO) was held on 24 and 25 January (1.5 days), where
the PC framework and methodology were explained in detail, and DSS held a presentation on the current status
of the SRA. Four working groups undertook the PC ratings. The results were reviewed and a discussion on PC 1
activities ensued on 25 January. The results had the endorsement in principle of the focal points group, but it
was recommended that a number of activities were revisited to ensure consistency of results.
A UNCT + UNMISS meeting chaired by the RC/HC a.i. was held on 25 January at 1 pm immediately following the
focal points meeting where the results of the exercise were shared with heads of agencies. The team was
appreciative of the work conducted by focal points and the exercise that had been undertaken. However, due to
the fact that members had not had to time to be briefed by their respective focal points in advance of the
meeting, they asked for more time to review the results before approving them. The PMT was asked to reconvene on Tuesday 28 January to undertake the recommended revision of certain activities following UNCT
feedback over the next two days. Further, the UNCT discussed the next steps in the use and management of PC
results, where it was agreed that this be a standing item on the PMT agenda with concrete action points related
to security risk management and the process of agency decision making. The action points of the UNCT are
summarized below.

Work by agencies focal points over the last two days to produce the PC results are highly appreciated
by the UNCT.
While agency focal points are in general in agreement with the results, some agency heads noted that
there is need to review some of the PC results as agency focal points may not be fully aware of the
proposed activities and consequently the ratings may be compromised. Action Point: Agency Heads to
review the PC results and fully brief your technical staff who will attend the next PMT meeting on
activities that need to be revisited
PMT will meet on Tuesday at 14:00 (venue to be confirmed) to review activities that are yellowhighlighted in the attachment, additional activities brought forward by agencies as well as activities of
remaining agencies (UNEP, UNHABITAT, UNODC, UNIDO).
1

CONFIDENTIAL

Agencies of which activities are not yet rated (mentioned above) will be communicated separately on
how we can do the ratings while you are not in the country
The result after Tuesday meeting will be shared with UNCT for review and endorsement before it being
submitted to the RC and SRSG for approval
It is agreed that the discussion on whats next and how to use the PC results effectively (in relation
with the SRA) will take place at the PMT level on a regular basic
It is proposed that UNDSS to include the PC reference in their risk template to facilitate the discussion
between agencies and DSS when it comes to the implementation of the PC activities
It is agreed that while the PC exercise is an internal UN exercise, it is important to bring this to the
Governments attention when situation allows for sensitization and information purposes
UNCT highly appreciated the support of the two facilitators (Katarina Herneryd and Karson Snyder)
without which the exercise will not be completed at a record time. UNCT also request for the
facilitation team to extend their stay to help facilitate the remaining work on Tuesday.

On 28 January the PMT convened to review flagged activities. A number of agencies also nominated additional
activities for review. The final results were agreed and transferred to the UNCT focal point for Programme
Criticality (Ms. Van Nguyen, Head of the Secretariat for the South Sudan Recovery Fund) for consolidation and
subsequent preparation to the UNCT. It was agreed that the PMT would be responsible to maintain the PC
process for South Sudan.
Observations and recommendations:

There was strong commitment by agencies and departments in South Sudan to complete the PC
exercise, and it was undertaken in record time with a very cooperative spirit. Overall, the exercise went
well and produced expected outcomes, working within the constraints that existed, primary of which
was the limited amount of time available to complete it. More preparatory time would have facilitated
the inputs to the exercise (such as the agreement on strategic results and the listing of activities) and
ensured these were better harmonized.
Time constraints also led to there being insufficient time between the completion of the exercise and
the validation discussion in the UNCT, which should be kept in mind for the future. To ensure that
senior leadership can validate and approve results, sufficient time to review and consult staff must be
given.
Given the absence of RC/HC and Chief CSA DSS during the course of the exercise, it will be key for the
team to provide a full briefing and follow up with a comprehensive discussion on the results of the PC
assessment, and most importantly, its use.
Having the PMT (including UNMISS staff) as the custodian for PC is an excellent choice, and it is
recommended that PC, along with the linkages to the SRA and discussions on security risk mitigation, be
a standing item on the PMT agenda. This is necessary in order to actively use the results of the PC
assessment.
It is crucial to regularly convene discussions between programme staff and DSS + agency security focal
points on how to enable activities to the maximum extent possible and work on security risk mitigation.

CONFIDENTIAL

In terms of next steps, each agency should look internally at what the PC results mean for their
operations, and share this within the dedicated fora.
As was noted by focal points, the security situation in South Sudan remains very dynamic and can
change quickly from day to day. In order to make full use of the PC results, it is important that security
risk analyses done are frequently communicated to agencies so that decisions can be adjusted
accordingly. This point re-emphasizes the need for a regular follow up mechanism to discuss security risk
mitigation.
The South Sudan team may consider to review the PC results after 6 months to ensure that all inputs
and the ratings are in accordance with the context and remain valid.

Ends.

Annex 1: Strategic Results for the PC exercise in South Sudan


1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Provision and Facilitation of Humanitarian Assistance (CAP #1)


Increased availability of and access to Basic Services including strengthened capacity of the delivery
system (CAP #1 and #3; UNDAF #3)
Protection of Civilians and Their Human Rights including access to justice (UNMISS RBB; UNDAF #5)
Reconciliation, Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building (UNMISS RBB; UNDAF # 4&5; PBSP)
Laying economic foundations and building resilience, including the protection of livelihoods and
food security (CAP #2; UNDAF #2; PBSP)
Promote good governance, democratic participation and the rule of law (UNMISS RBB; PBSP;
UNDAF #1)

Annex II: Preliminary PC Results

Activities of UN AFPs in South Sudan with Program Criticality Level_Version


260214
Agency

1 FAO

2 FAO

3 FAO

4 FAO

Activity requiring UN staff

PC
Level

Construction of hafirs to provide water for livestock and


domestic use in the dry period
Rural Finance initiatives to support producer groups to
boost household income through agricultural and nonagricultural enterprises
Facilitate the formation of Farmers Field School (FFS) groups
to boost agricultural production and productivity

PC3

Diversify livelihoods and incomes sources among the target

PC3

Justifications

PC4

PC3

CONFIDENTIAL

5 FAO

6 FAO

7 FAO

8 FAO

9 FAO

10

10 FAO

11

11 FAO

12

12 FAO

13

13 FAO

14

14 FAO

15

15 FAO

16

16 FAO

17
18

17 FAO
1 IOM

19

communities
Plant pest and disease protection, resilience building and
awareness
Food security and livelihood responses supported through
information, analysis and coordination

PC3
PC2

Rapid emergency livelihood support provided to most


affected areas
Effective emergency livestock response mechanisms in
place and operational
Food production and availability protected in less-affected
areas
Environmental impact of improvised encampments
minimized
Conduct socio-economic assessment and analysis of water
harvesting facilities impacts on conflict reduction and peace
building + guideline development for knowledge
management and capacity building
Build capacity of Government at state, county and payam
levels to support resilience at community level

PC2

Improved access to production inputs that enhance


sustainable crop production, post-harvest handling, value
addition and marketing
Enhanced capacity of advisory service actors and enhanced
community capacity for planning and improved agropastoral production systems
Climate Smart Agriculture (CSA) and Conservation
Agriculture (CA) innovations introduced and inputs and
advisory services provided in target states
Capacity developed for effective Natural Resource
Management (NRM)
Enhance household and community capacity for DRR
Carryout DDR community support projects to facilitate the
reintegration of ex-combatants into communities

PC3

2 IOM

Carryout peace building activities to foster inter-communal


cohesion in areas prone to inter-communal violence

PC3

20

3 IOM

PC3

21

4 IOM

Complete small scale infrastructure work in areas with high


returnee populations to promote reintegration into the
communities
Coordinate camp management activities to facilitate the
provision of basic services to IDPs in displacement sites

22

5 IOM

PC2
PC3
PC4
PC3

PC3

PC3

PC4

PC3
PC3
PC4

PC1

Coordinate Shelter/NFI reponse, including management of


PC1
the core pipeline to ensure that Shelter and NFI assistance is

Supports lifesaving;
manages delivery of
lifesaving services;
need to be there to
directly, immediately
deliver services
Supports lifesaving
activities
4

CONFIDENTIAL
provided to vulnerable populations as the need is identified.
23

6 IOM

Facilitate rapid response funding mechanisms to enable


humanitarian partners to immediately carry out life-saving
actions at the immediate onset of an emergency
Improve border management capacities of the State
through capacity building and infrastructure support

PC2

24

7 IOM

25

8 IOM

Monitor population movements (IDPs, Returnees) to ensure


that updated information is available to humanitarian
partners to facilitate immediate response as the need is
identified
Operate the Common Transport Service to facilitate the
delivery of humanitarian supplies to field locations

PC2

26

9 IOM

27
28

10 IOM
11 IOM

Provide emergency health care services to IDPs in IDP sites


Provide emergency transport assistance to stranded
returnees in the event of an acute emergency in Renk

PC3
PC4

29
30

12 IOM
13 IOM

PC3
PC1

31

14 IOM

Provide emergency WASH support to IDPs in IDP sites


Provide frontline response for shelter and NFI activities to
immediately address the sector specific needs of vulnerable
populations
Provide transport support to IDPs to address issues of overcongestion in sites.
Implementation of targeted high-impact HIV prevention
programmes with focus on key populations (girls and young
women, SW and their partners, MSM, truckers and
populations of humanitarian concern)
Mobilize communities & their leadership for HIV testing and
counseling
Support implementation of HIV and GBV programming in
post conflict settings
Increased demand generation and uptake through roll out
of PMTCT Communication Strategy
PMTCT uptaken and scaled up including for pediatric
treatment through increased civil society and community
engagement
Increased dissemination and monitoring of HIV information
and awareness through greater media capacity
Increased ART uptake, scale up, retention and adherence as
a result of increased civil society and community
involvement
Collection, analysis and dissemination of Strategic
Information on the scale up of PMTCT and ART

PC2

Build leadership capacity and structures at national and


decentralized level, including CSO partnerships for a
sustained HIV response

PC4

32

1 UNAIDS

33

2 UNAIDS

34

3 UNAIDS

35

4 UNAIDS

36

5 UNAIDS

37

6 UNAIDS

38

7 UNAIDS

39

8 UNAIDS

40

9 UNAIDS

PC4

PC3

When supporting a
lifesaving activity

Lifesaving

PC3
PC3

PC3
PC3
PC3
PC3

PC3

PC3

CONFIDENTIAL
41

10 UNAIDS

High level advocacy for increased shared responsibility at


country level through an investment case and domestic
financing, including from GFATM NFM and PEPFAR.
Coordinate HIV assessment and service delivery activities
targeted at IDP populations
Conflict mitigation and conflict resolution

PC4

42

11 UNAIDS

43

1 UNDP

44

2 UNDP

Promote Access to Justice and Rule of Law through capacity


development and Institutional strengthening

PC2

45

3 UNDP

PC3

46
47
48
49

4
5
6
7

50

8 UNDP

Continue contributing to the improvement of the quality of


life of the people of South Sudan by reducing dramatically
the burden of the TB by 2015 in line with the Millennium
Development Goals and Stop TB Partnership Targets.
Establish mechanisms for the protection against SGBV
Extension of State and County-level infrastructure
Implement sustainable Energy for ALL (SE4ALL)
Implementation of Enabling Activities (EAs) for the Global
Environmental Facility (GEF)
Increased access to justice through coordinated institutional
presence at State & County levels

51
52

9 UNDP
10 UNDP

PC3
PC1

53

11 UNDP

54

12 UNDP

55

13 UNDP

56

14 UNDP

57

15 UNDP

Protected Areas Network Management


Provide continued access to essential HIV/AIDS care and
treatment, including prevention of mother-to-child
transmission (PMTCT) services, to patients on treatment by
the grants end dates.
Reduction of Case backlog & Addressing Prolonged and
Arbitrary detention
Strengthen the health system of South Sudan to scale up
HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria services.
Social Protection through capacity building for basic service
delivery
Support for Constitutionally mandated Accountability and
Oversight Mechanisms
Support for national political transition processes
(Constitutional Review and Elections)

58

16 UNDP

PC2

59

17 UNDP

60
61

18 UNDP
1 UNESCO

Support Harmonization of Traditional with the Formal


Justice Sector
Support sustainable Human Development and Inclusive
Growth
Support the development of an integrated national army
Adapt existing teaching materials to the needs and

UNDP
UNDP
UNDP
UNDP

PC2
PC1

Directed by SG;
political/ethnic
implications

PC2
PC2
PC4
PC4
PC2

PC3
PC2
PC3
PC3
PC1

Directed by SG;
Election support;
prevents
resurrection of an
issue that sparked
violence.

PC3
PC4
PC2
6

CONFIDENTIAL
environment of displaced communities.
Assessment of conflict and oil leaks impact on water
sources and resources
Coordinate a travelling campaign of the arts for conflict
transformation.
Coordinate the preconstruction phase of the National
Archives with the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports.

62

2 UNESCO

PC3

63

3 UNESCO

64

4 UNESCO

65

5 UNESCO

Develop and deliver Literacy and Numeracy Emergency


Education Materials in displaced populations

PC2

66

6 UNESCO

PC2

67

7 UNESCO

68

8 UNESCO

69
70

9 UNESCO
10 UNESCO

71

11 UNESCO

72

12 UNESCO

73

13 UNESCO

74
75
76

14 UNESCO
15 UNESCO
16 UNESCO

77

17 UNESCO

78

18 UNESCO

79

1 UNFPA

80

2 UNFPA

81

3 UNFPA

Equip national and state media professionals with skills and


infrastructure requirements to enhance their security level
during conflict.
Establishment of youth centers for skills and peace and
dialogue
Link Education in Emergencies activities with Alternative
Learning Programme (ALP) / longer-term education
qualifications.
Organization of a peace and reconciliation national forum.
Produce radio drama to disseminate messages for peace
building and reconciliation.
Produce targeted training sessions for young people to
acquire media and information literacy skills to interact
responsibly with new technology.
Promote youth engagement in political, civil society and
faith-based groups and discussions, through UNESCOs
Youth Peacemaker Network (YPN).
Provide psychosocial support through participatory culture
activities within the IDP camps.
Provide space for sports and film activities
Resilience to floods, mitigation and early warning
Supporting State-level Education Ministries with Emergency
Response Planning.
Transport and secure the archival collection of the National
Archives of South Sudan.
Travelling exhibition and cultural mapping of tangible and
intangible heritage in three states.
Conduct refresher training in life saving interventions
including the rational use of kit items, clinical care of rape
survivors, emergency obstetrical care procedures, and
syndromic treatment of STIs etc.
Conduct sensitization and awareness raising sessions for
adolescents and youth on sexual and reproductive health
including STIs and HIV/AIDS prevention and management
Deploy international midwives in health facilities to provide
lifesaving maternal and RH services

PC4
PC3

PC3
PC2

PC2
PC3
PC3

PC2

PC3
PC3
PC2
PC3
PC2
PC3
PC2

PC2

PC1

Lifesaving;
population is
pregnant women,
7

CONFIDENTIAL
IDPs; emergency
obstetric care;
82

4 UNFPA

Capacity development of nurses and midwives to provide


emergency obstetric care and reproductive health services

PC3

83

5 UNFPA

PC1

84

6 UNFPA

Provide lifesaving emergency RH commodities, drugs and


supplies
Provide psychosocial support including creation of safe
spaces livelihood support for GBV survivors

85

7 UNFPA

PC4

86

8 UNFPA

87

9 UNFPA

88

10 UNFPA

Provide support for the conduct of targeted assessments


and household surveys to obtain critical information on
reproductive health, gender and population and
development
Provide technical assistance for strengthening the health
management information systems and health technology to
improve data collection and use on reproductive health
Rehabilitation/ renovation of health infrastructures to
provide critical maternal care
Support capacity building for health workers to provide
youth-friendly SRH and HIV information and services

89

11 UNFPA

PC2

90

12 UNFPA

91

13 UNFPA

92

14 UNFPA

93

15 UNFPA

94

16 UNFPA

Capacity building of health workers in Emergency obstetric


care and reproductive health as part of task shifting
initiative
Deploy GBV experts to initiate actions for prevention and
response to sexual violence
Support sensitization activities on availability and access to
SRH services in partnership with community based
structures
Support policy dialogue and advocacy on SRH rights and
gender equality as well as dissemination and
implementation of gender policy within the health sector
Capacity development for provision of essential family
planning services
Capacity development and provision of services for
treatment and management of obstetric fistula

95

17 UNFPA

PC4

96

18 UNFPA

97

1 UNHCR

Technical and institutional capacity building support to the


National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in data collection,
analysis and dissemination.
Rapid needs assessment for emergency response to
reproductive health needs and GBV
Basic services (water, sanitation, hygiene, domestic energy,
etc.) provided

98

2 UNHCR

Capacity building and technical support of NGOs and


partners working with the refugees to increase their
response capacity to the needs of the affected population

PC3

Lifesaving

PC2

PC3

PC2
PC4

PC2
PC3

PC4

PC2
PC3

PC2
PC1

Lifesaving; delivery
of lifesaving
services;200K people

CONFIDENTIAL
99

3 UNHCR

Continuous registration of all refugees in camps and


settlements conducted

PC1

100

4 UNHCR

PC1

101

5 UNHCR

102
103
104

6 UNHCR
7 UNHCR
8 UNHCR

105
106

9 UNHCR
10 UNHCR

107
108

11 UNHCR
12 UNHCR

Coordination support provided (protection, multisector and


camp management)
Delivery of direct assistance to refugees (cash, food,
accommodation, grant)
Emergency / transitional shelter provided
Health services provided to Refugees
IDPs have their protection and assistance needs assessed
and action taken for EVI as well as information shared with
relevant interlocutors.
Nutritional well-being assessed and improved
Participation of community in SGBV prevention and
response enabled and sustained
Providing documents to refugees in camps and settlements
Provision of social services in such as child friendly spaces,
emergency educational services and recreational activities

109

13 UNHCR

Refugees and asylum-seekers are assessed for their


protection and assistance needs

PC1

110
111

14 UNHCR
1 UNICEF

PC2
PC1

112

2 UNICEF

113

3 UNICEF

114

4 UNICEF

Self-reliance and livelihoods


Provide integrated case management services for common
childhood illnesses in emergency and non-emergency
settings
Communities in UNICEF selected counties that adopt ODFfree and good hygiene practices
Formal and informal justice systems are able to protect
children in contact with the law in line with justice for
children standards
Immunization systems and provisions strengthened to
deliver routine and supplementary immunization services.

115

5 UNICEF

PC2

116

6 UNICEF

117

7 UNICEF

118

8 UNICEF

Improved availability of affordable and sustainable WASH


facilities and services in guinea worm endemic areas,
schools and health facilities as well as underserved
communities.
Improved capacity for humanitarian response,
preparedness and resilience in line with South Sudan
Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies.
Improved capacity of government and partners in the
implementation of life skills and peace education
programmes for children and youth.
Improved enabling environment (legislation, policy, budget
and information) at national and state level for WASH

Lifesaving; need
registration to have
access to services;
need to know what
services to deliver;
Lifesaving; ensure
delivery of services

PC1
PC1
PC1
PC1

PC1
PC2
PC2
PC2
Need to know how
to distribute scarce
resources
Lifesaving; 3 main
killer diseases for
children

PC3
PC3

PC1

Lifesaving

PC2

PC3

PC3

CONFIDENTIAL
decisions making and planning
119
120

9 UNICEF
10 UNICEF

Emergency Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Services


WASH Cluster Coordination

PC1
PC1

121

11 UNICEF

PC3

122

12 UNICEF

123

13 UNICEF

124

14 UNICEF

Improved policies, legislation and systems for equitable


access and completion of quality and inclusive basic
education.
Improved provisions of integrated MNH/PMTCT/EID
services accessed by pregnant and lactating women and
newborns in targeted 14 counties.
Improved systems and provisions of nutrition humanitarian
and development interventions accessed by children,
adolescent and pregnant and lactating women.
Increased national, state and county level capacity to
prepare and respond to emergencies in line with CCCs

125

15 UNICEF

PC1

126

16 UNICEF

127

17 UNICEF

Key child protection actors are able to provide appropriate


services for children at risk of, or those who have
experienced violence, exploitation and abuse
Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare and State
ministries of social development are able to lead and
coordinate the implementation of child protection services
MoH, health facilities and community institutions are able
to provide birth registration services

128

18 UNICEF

PC2

129

1 UNMAS

130

2 UNMAS

Strengthened community and school based education


service delivery for equitable access to quality basic
Education
Capacity Development of South Sudan National Mine Action
Authority
Capacity Development of South Sudan National Police
Service in conventional munitions disposal

131

3 UNMAS

Coordinated clearance and survey of land contaminated by


UXO and/or landmines

PC1

132

4 UNMAS

PC1

133
134

5 UNMAS
6 UNMAS

135
136

7 UNMAS
1 UNMISS

Coordinated clearance and survey of routes closed due to


landmines and UXO
Coordinated provision of UXO/landmine risk education
Improve Physical Security and Stockpile Management within
the organised forces.
Support landmine casualty victims.
Combating impunity and improving enjoyment of human
rights

Lifesaving; Identify
gaps; coordinate
delivery of lifesaving
services

PC3

PC1

Lifesaving

PC3
SG Directed;
Contested

PC3

PC4

PC4
PC2
Lifesaving; Bor,
Malakal, Bentiu;
saves lives; allows
access for lifesaving
activities

PC2
PC3
PC3
PC1

SG Directed

10

CONFIDENTIAL
137

2 UNMISS

Conflict mitigation and prevention mechanisms, including in


areas of inter-communal tension
Government security sector institutions that function in
accordance with relevant best practices

PC2

138

3 UNMISS

139

4 UNMISS

Inclusive, effective, transparent government institutions


throughout South Sudan, including outside State capitals

PC3

140

5 UNMISS

PC3

141

6 UNMISS

142

7 UNMISS

143

8 UNMISS

144

9 UNMISS

145

10 UNMISS

146

11 UNMISS

Popular participation in political processes, including in the


formulation of national policies
Protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical
violence in high-risk areas and improved humanitarian
access throughout South Sudan including security for United
Nations personnel, installations and equipment
Strengthened capacity of South Sudan to establish a safe,
secure and humane prison system and to end prolonged,
arbitrary detention
Provide mine action services and strengthen capacity of
South Sudan to protect civilians from the threat posed by
mines and explosive remnants of war in compliance with
relevant international humanitarian conventions and
standards
Strengthened capacity of the Government and other key
actors to protect women and children affected by armed
conflict, violence, abuse and exploitation and to prevent,
address and respond to conflict-related sexual
violence/sexual and gender-based violence
Strengthened capacity of the Government of South Sudan
to implement the South Sudan national disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration programme
Strengthened capacity of the South Sudan National Police
Services (SSNPS) to maintain public order and safety

147

12 UNMISS

Strengthened military and civilian justice capacities in the


Government, with complementarities between civilian and
military justice systems
Advocacy with Host Government or Opposition or defacto
authorities to ensure the delivery of lifesaving humanitarian
assistance (HoO, DHoO)
Needs assessments by OCHA staff where direct information
is required to ensure the delivery of life saving humanitarian
assistance (HAO, IMO)
Delivery of Assistance where the presence on OCHA
international or national staff may enable the delivery of life
saving humanitarian assistance (HAO)
Support to the humanitarian architecture (HC, HCT, and
cluster coordination mechanism) to identify, assess, and
respond to humanitarian crises

PC2

148

1 UNOCHA

149

2 UNOCHA

150

3 UNOCHA

151

4 UNOCHA

PC3

PC1

Lifesaving

PC3

PC1

Lifesaving

PC3

PC4

PC3

PC1

Facilitates Lifesaving
activities

PC1

Facilitates Lifesaving
activities

PC1

Facilitates Lifesaving
activities

PC1

Facilitates Lifesaving
activities

11

CONFIDENTIAL
152

5 UNOCHA

Advocacy (acceptance generation, liaison, etc) to all key


stakeholders to enable the response, address access issues,
ensure protection and dignity of affected people
Access negotiations will all stakeholders (state and nonstate) to ensure access to affected people and a timely and
sustained humanitarian response
Civil Military Coordination (with all state and non-state
actors) to enable timely and principled humanitarian
response
Information - collection, collation and dissemination of
information on the humanitarian needs and response to
those needs (needs assessments, information product
production, monitoring missions etc.)
Financing - appropriately financed humanitarian response.
Conduct trial road research to ascertain the best method of
surfacing for longer term usage across region

PC2

153

6 UNOCHA

154

7 UNOCHA

155

8 UNOCHA

156
157

9 UNOCHA
1 UNOPS

158

2 UNOPS

Construct / rehabilitation of key transport corridors to


enable humanitarian assistance, post-conflict stabilization,
economic growth and consistent food supply
Construct / repair of infrastructure to improve national
capacity, humanitarian assistance and agricultural activities

PC2

159

3 UNOPS

160

4 UNOPS

Further enhancement of conflict prevention activities


through access to water points
Provision of water supply to enable good WASH practices
and limit disease transfer
Provision of community capacity building and access to
livelihoods through road maintenance projects

PC2

161

5 UNOPS

162

6 UNOPS

163

7 UNOPS

Renovation of, and WASH installation for Health Centers to


provide critical community based care

PC2

164

8 UNOPS

Strengthen government resilience through technical


assistance and on-the-job capacity building programmes

PC2

165

9 UNOPS

PC2

166

1 UNWOMEN

167

2 UNWOMEN

168

3 UNWOMEN

169

4 UNWOMEN

Support and undertake prioritized PoC and IDP


infrastructure improvements for humanitarian assistance
and security
Support initiatives contributing towards developing and
implementing gender -responsive policy measure and
intervention for humanitarian action
Support opportunities and enterprise development
assistance for women to enhance their sustainable
livelihoods
Support and advocate for law enforcement agents
including customary court officials to provide gender
responsive services to respond to violence against women
and girls.
Provide support for gender responsive conflict mediation
and peace building initiatives in key selected conflict prone

PC1

Facilitates Lifesaving
activities

PC1

Facilitates Lifesaving
activities

PC2

PC2
PC2

PC2

PC2
PC2

PC3

PC3

PC3

PC3

12

CONFIDENTIAL
areas.
170

5 UNWOMEN Leadership skills and capacity of women leaders to actively


participate and engage in elections, parliament, and public
administration.
1 WFP
Conduct joint emergency assessments (EFSA, Nutrition, etc.)
in South Sudan
2 WFP
Conduct Monitoring and Evaluation of WFP food
distributions in project sites
3 WFP
Conduct quarterly food security monitoring assessments in
South Sudan
4 WFP
Construct warehouse facilities to establish a national
strategic food reserve system, including the provision and
development of technical support to manage this resource
5 WFP
Enhance physical access for rural communities through
construction and maintenance of feeder roads, including
the development of state-level capacity in transport
infrastructure management
6 WFP
Provide air service (UNHAS) support to the humanitarian
community in South Sudan

PC3

177

7 WFP

Provide common ICT services in support of the


humanitarian community through the ETC/Telecom Cluster

PC1

When supporting /
enabling lifesaving
activities
Lifesaving

178

8 WFP

PC1

Lifesaving

179

9 WFP

Provide emergency food assistance to refugees in camps,


internally displaced people (IDPs), returnees and severely
food insecure households
Provide food assistance to patients in hospital being treated
for TB, HIV and Kalazar, as well as their families.

180

10 WFP

PC2

181

11 WFP

182

12 WFP

183

13 WFP

184

14 WFP

Provide food support to schoolchildren through School


Feeding as a social safety net
Provide joint coordination of food security and livelihoods
activities in South Sudan (Food security and livelihoods
cluster)]
Provide livelihood support to communities through
Food/Cash-For-Assets (FFA) and Food/Cash for Training
(FFT) interventions to enhance resilience
Provide Logistics support to humanitarian community
programme activities through the Logistics Cluster (road
assessments, trucking, river transport, air transport, storage
availability, deep field humanitarian hubs, etc.)
Provide support to prevent moderate acute malnutrition
among children under five years of age (BSFP)

PC1

Lifesaving; nutrition

185

15 WFP

Provide support to Targeted supplementary Feeding centres


for malnourished children to treat and prevent moderate
acute malnutrition (TSFP)

PC1

Lifesaving;

171
172
173
174

175

176

PC1

Lifesaving

PC2
PC2
PC4

PC2

PC1

PC3

PC1

Lifesaving;
coordination needed
for deliver services

PC2

PC1

13

CONFIDENTIAL
186

16 WFP

187

17 WFP

188

18 WFP

Provide support to Targeted supplementary Feeding centres


for Pregnant and Lactating Women to reduce the incidence
of low birth weight and prevent malnutrition (TSFP)
Provide technical support to small holder farmers in order
to improve income levels, including through local
procurement of food stuffs.
Provide WFP assistance to the reintegration of former
combatants through skills trainings, livelihood support,
asset creation and agricultural activities
Availability and access to quality-assured neglected tropical
disease drugs at all levels of health care ensured

PC1

Lifesaving;

PC3

PC3

189

1 WHO

PC3

190

2 WHO

Emergency Response Framework and plans developed and


its emergency response procedures Implemented

PC3

191
192

3 WHO
4 WHO

PC1
PC4

193

5 WHO

194

6 WHO

195

7 WHO

196

8 WHO

Provide polio immunization services in all states


Integrated National Policy, Strategy and action plan for
neglected tropical disease control, elimination and
eradication developed and implemented
National Capacity on Emergency Preparedness and
Response and assessment for vulnerability and capacity
gaps conducted
Capacity for EPI program management at all levels with
emphasis on the introduction of new vaccines/Underutilize
vaccine developed
Capacity of medical officers and nursing staff at the state
hospitals and PHC in delivering comprehensive ANC, Child
brith, PNC & newborn care strengthened
Guidelines on universal safety precautions and Post
Exposure Prophylaxis updated and disseminated

197

9 WHO

PC1

198

10 WHO

199

11 WHO

Health cluster coordination mechanisms across the ten


states of South Sudan developed
MOH capacity on universal health coverage policies
,strategies and plans developed
Provide CEMONC services in all states

200

12 WHO

National capacity for provision of CEMONC including


rehabilitation/construction health workers strengthen

PC1

201

13 WHO

PC4

202

1 UNEP

National health information system strengthening strategy


based on the health metrics network framework developed
and implemented
Assessment of water harvesting structures for sustainable
livelihoods and peace building in selected three states

203

2 UNEP

Provide technical support in building capacity of Juba City


Council in Integrated Solid Waste Management

PC3

Lifesaving

PC4

PC3

PC3

PC3
Lifesaving;

PC4
PC1

Lifesaving; the direct


surveillance, but not
the capacity-building
component
Lifesaving

PC3

14

CONFIDENTIAL
204

3 UNEP

Development and implementation of a comprehensive


environmental management programme for the oil sector

PC3

205

4 UNEP

PC2

206

5 UNEP

207

6 UNEP

208

7 UNEP

209
210

1 UN-Habitat
2 UN-Habitat

211

3 UN-Habitat

212

4 UN-Habitat

213

5 UN-Habitat

214

1 UNIDO

215
216

2 UNIDO
3 UNIDO

Development of community forestry management plan for


selected areas in CES and EES
Support the relevant ministries in implementation of
Enabling Activities (EAs) for the Global Environmental
Facility (GEF)
Supporting South Sudans accession to the Ramsar
Convention on Wetlands and preparation of wetland
inventory framework
Technical support to the Ministry of Environment for
finalisation of draft Environmental Bill
Construct housing for returnee populations
Provide basic infrastructure (eg roads, water supply
systems) at new returnee settlements
Provide support to government in the development of
urbanisation and housing policy
Provide vocational training and other livelihoods support to
returnee populations
Provide water supply infrastructure (new or rehabilitated)
at county centre locations
Support the development of a national quality system
framework
Support the development of the National Quality Policy
Capacity building for the South Sudan National Bureau of
Standards SSNBS & Ministry of Industry MCII

217
218

4 UNIDO
5 UNIDO

Capacity building support for micro-enterprise development


Support for practical business management skills transfer in
farm and non farm manufacturing focussing on youth

PC2
PC2

219

6 UNIDO

PC2

220
221

7 UNIDO
8 UNIDO

Support for development of technical skills in post harvest


management and food processing
Support for industrial policy review process
Fish receiving centres, collection points, landing sites, and
markets are constructed, equipped and operational

222

9 UNIDO

PC3

223

10 UNIDO

Community fishery associations are provided with improved


technologies and relevant training on how to decrease postharvest losses and increase overall fish production
Targeted institutions provided with skills, knowledge and
materials to support the development of the fishery sector
in Upper Nile State

PC3

PC3

PC2
PC3
PC3
PC4
PC3
PC4
PC3
PC3
PC3

PC3
PC3

PC3

15

ANNEX C:

Country SRA, Summary of Recommendations

Action
Priority

1. Identification of programmes and appropriate criticality levels


Ensure that the programme activities are identified and indicate where these activities are taking place to assist in the definition of acceptable risk
for each programme activity and therefore, enable the security to plan and position resources in support of implementation. Therefore each State
SRA will reflect the specific programme locations and number of staff engaged in programme implementation and the risks including programme
specific risks needs to be correctly identified in order for the UNCT to allocate appropriate criticality levels.

Priority 1

2. Improvements to Flight Safety Assurance (FSA) process


Adherence to FSA SOP which sets uniform guidelines and identifies responsibilities for obtaining FSA for UN flights that require such mitigation
measures to lower the risk for incorrectly identifying or possible ground-fire by SPLA/ SPLA-IO or Other Armed Groups (OAGs).

Priority 1

3. Enabling Programme Rapid Response Deployments


To help improve response and support to Humanitarian Programmes, particularly in remote areas where communities or IDPs have congregated to
avoid ongoing conflict, Security has developed a Q-SRA for remote assessments to enable faster deployment which is endorsed by South Sudan
SMT members to further enable programme access. Some locations clearly need a physical Security Risk Assessment (SRA), based on clear threat
indicators such as: recent fighting, troop movements and banditry.

Priority 1

4. Security Cooperation within the UN


Apart from the UN SMS that supports and provides advice to the DO, through the security cell, the SMT WG and the SMT, more efforts should be
made through these forums to define a more comprehensive common approach to access/ reach in the field and also which best practices should
be shared.
5. Business Continuity Planning for Endurance and Resilience

Priority 1

Resilience planning can dramatically reduce the impact of a security incident, attack, disaster etc. Business Continuity plans should be made by
each UN Agency that is realistic in nature and in line with the UN-wide policies and guidelines. In the case of a relocation of international staff
within or evacuation outside the country, in absentia predesignated national staff should be available to continue business. Field Security
Handbook refers. Country and State Security Plans is to include a check list of what to do with assets in case of full relocation covering removing
sensitive IT equipment, safely destroy hard drives, disabling vehicles and large equipment to deny /restrict non-UN use.

Priority 1

6. Training Programmes to enhance the preparedness of the staff


Taking into consideration the evolving security situation and the demanding environment that staff are operating from, UN Security South Sudan
should continue to conduct the following courses of training either independently or with / through other entities sections:
SSAFE Training for all new staff plus refresher every 3 years.
Emergency Trauma Bag Training (ETB) for Security Staff and refresher every 2 years.
SCP Course for Security Officers
LSA Training
Fire Wardens Training (Every 6 months for Wardens)
Basic Life Support and pre-hospital care Training
Advance Life Support Training
Basic Fire Fighting Course (All UN staff)
ASC Training
SAPP Course (On case by case basis depending on role)
Radio Communication
7. Compatible Emergency Communications Systems (ECS) Country Wide
The UN AFPs and UNMISS must continue to ensure the implementation of a compatible communication system countrywide that supports or
complements each other under the telecommunications cluster system. The agencies should be able to patch into the TETRA communication
system. The JOC and the State Operations Centres (SOC) must maintain communications with first and second responders, medical and air support
and have a secure CCC comms system in place.
8. MOSS for South Sudan

Priority 2

Priority 2

The current Country MOSS (Minimum Operating Security Standard) was approved by the SMT in August 2014. This may need to be reviewed at the
end of the year or should the operational environment change significantly. Every compound / office location should be MOSS compliant including
all the vehicles. MORSS needs to be reviewed due to increased general criminality with special consideration to UN residential areas near to
UNMISS POC sites.

Priority 2

9. Premises Security Physical Security and the related Operational Requirements


Sufficient Safe rooms/Safe Haven Indirect Fire Shelters or Bunker available to cater for all UN and humanitarian personnel working in UN sites and
to contain Tetra or Tetra compatible Communications Systems and Mobile Sat Phone docking stations; Emergency rations (food and water for 7
days), PPE and ETB

Priority 1

Considering the ongoing threats relating to crime, violence and caught-in-cross-fire situations eminating around/from POC sites , the following
measures to lower the risk to UN personnel assets and operations are recomended; Continuous perimeter monitoring, upgrading of ditch berm,
razor wire systems, repairs to damaged fences, robust access control protocals.
UN TCC troops to monitor and secure the perimeter in appropriate numbers.
UNPOL/ FPU to ensure Law and Order inside POC Sites, numbers of UNPOL/FPU and must be proportionate to the numbers of IDPs inside the POC
Site. Access/Egress procedures (entry/exit) to be monitored and improved.

Priority 1

All UN compounds should be allocated walk -through metal detectors and baggage X-ray machines with robust operational training and
maintenance programmes.

Priority 2

For States which have POC Sites, SOC is to accommodate 24/7 UNPOL and Force response capabilities to coordinate their elements responding to
incidents within or near POC sites including demonstrations, riots and criminal behavior.

Priority 1

Vehicle Access Control. All large UN compounds should ideally have canine teams or explosive detective devices and vehicle search areas /
inspection bays.
10. Contingency planning for natural disasters should be developed
An updated Crisis Management Response plan to incorporate Operational Resilience Management System (ORMS) strategies must be developed
and approved by the SMT.

Priority 2
Action
Priority 2

11. Projected Change in UN Operations and Deployment


The Government of South Sudan currently does not have adequate security capacity to provide effective security/ support to the UN due to the
ongoing conflict. Therefore, there needs to be strengthening of Quick Response Force (QRF)- Force Armed Escort capacity to enable on-going
security support for programme delivery given the concern of a deteriorated security condition.

Priority 2

Due to falsification of ID cards and theft an Electronic/integrated Security System including an ID card Swipe card system is being installed at
UNMISS Tomping and UN House, to ensure safe/secure access to all main UN facilities. All ID cards countrywide must be processed by the systems
data base.

Priority 2

12. Recommended Outstanding/ Residual Risk Mitigation Measures


Security Management Procedures
UN Security UNPOL and UN military to improve coordination and contingency planning in the event of a large scale demonstrations, both from
within UN POC areas and outside.

Priority 1

Enhanced contingency planning for the relocation of staff including liaison with NGOs
Mass casualty preparedness procedures implemented and training provided
Despite challenges, UN to continue to conduct sensitisation sessions with SPLA, NISS and SNPS law enforcement /security agencies by senior
leadership and UNDSS, UNPOL, UN Military in order to educate them on the UN immunities/ privileges and SOFA agreement.
Increase sensitisation of local communities on the mandates of the UN including, impartiality and POC activities to negate allegations of bias and
prevent unrealistic expectations.
Training
All managers to ensure all personnel are S-SAFE trained as soon as they arrive in mission.

Priority 2

Priority 1
Priority 1

Communications
Priority 1

Enhancement and compliance to emergency communication systems to enable rapid dissemination of information and alerts to staff

Priority 1

Medical/Equipment and Supplies


Ensure FPU have the numbers and equipment for effective crowd control
number of Trauma Kits, Medical supplies & PEP Kits at Field Locations

Adequate

Physical Security/Premises with additional risks/Transport


Mission Support Division (MSD) in conjunction with UN Security to enhance Facilities Security Management (FSM) efforts to improve physical perimeter
security at UN bases,
Introduce/ increase the use of K9 explosive detecting capabilities at main UN compounds.
Installation of Shatter Resistance Film (SRF) on all glass elements
Zero Tolerance for drunk- driving via regular combined Security, UNPOL and FPU checkpoints. Speed limits via the car log system and send out warnings to
offending drivers and informing SIU Security
13. Mainstreaming Security
Mainstream/ consider security in all activities / programmes at all levels of management

Priority 2

Priority 1
Priority 3
Priority 1

Priority 1

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