Belgrade, September 2014

Research Team of
the Centre for Foreign Policy, Belgrade

EUROPEAN UNION AND WESTERN BALKANS 2020

ABSTRACT
In this analysis, the authors try to forecast the situation in the Western Balkans
in 2020, taking into account the evaluation of the European Union (EU) relations to date
with the states and entities in the region. Consequently, emphasis is placed on the fact
that there has been evident headway in these states European integration since the
introduction of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) in 1999. The authors pay
particular attention to the analysis of the current achievements in the process of the
states in the region. Moreover, they underline the overall complexity of the modern global
environment, the effects of the EU transformation on the enlargement process, as well as
the potential to deepen the economic crisis in the region, deteriorate inter-ethnic relations
and trigger new crises. Finally, they describe three possible scenarios for the
development of both the situation in the Western Balkans as well as the potential
membership of its states and entities in the EU in 2020.
Key
words:
European
Union,
enlargement,
Western
Balkans,
Serbia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Stabilisation and
Association Process, 2020.

INTRODUCTION
Following Croatias accession to the EU in mid-2013, the Western
Balkans was again re-defined as a geopolitical concept. Namely, unlike in
1999, when the concept was introduced and included all the states emerging
from the ruins of former Yugoslavia (except for Slovenia) as well as the Republic
of Albania, today it includes six states and entities situated in the central and
northwest

part

of

the

Balkan

Peninsula.1

These

are

Albania,

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo2, Macedonia and Serbia.

One should bear in mind the fact that the region is still somewhat
burdened with the heritage of the disintegration of the former Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (1991-1999), so that many of its problems are the result
of the fragmentation of the Balkans into quite a number of smaller states and
entities, as well as the dysfunctionality of some countries and the bad
circumstances which have arisen over the past two and a half decades. A
sudden and non-transparent change in the social system (transition from
socialist self-management to wild capitalism) in all states emerging in the
region and their constitutional definition as ethno-national systems have
meant that some minority ethnic or social groups have remained on the
margins of these processes. This has primarily led to significant economic
stratification between a small number of the very rich and larger segments of
society living on the verge of subsistence. At the same time, a large number of
1

The EU used the term Western Balkans for the first time in the document entitled
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the
Stabilisation
and
Association
Process
for
Countries
of
South-Eastern
Europe
(Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia and Albania, COM (1999) 235 final, 25 May 1999.
As we know, 23 EU member states have recognised Kosovo, while Spain, Slovakia, Cyprus,
Greece and Romania have failed to do so. As for the countries in the region, in addition to
Serbia, Kosovo has not been recognised by Bosnia-Herzegovina, either.

new ethnic minorities3 have emerged and, as a result, there was a great risk of
new conflicts breaking out due to the definition of their position.
In the past two and a half decades, two parallel processes have taken
place in the region, namely a wave of ethno-national homogenisation (early
1990s) on the one hand and a turnabout to European and Euro-Atlantic
integration around the year 2000 and in the years that followed, on the other.4
The development of relations in the Western Balkans has been
overshadowed by broader processes on the European continent having to do
primarily with the expansion of European integration to the Central and East
European countries, including gradually Southeast Europe. In the past few
years, a severe financial and economic crisis has marked the economic and
social transformation of Europe, threatening to deepen the old economic
differences, especially between its north and its south, and give rise to new
ones.
TRANSFORMATION OF THE EU AND THE FUTURE OF ITS ENLARGEMENT
The past decade and the start of this decade saw the EU going through
major changes (rise in the number of its member states from 15 to current 28)
and upheavals (financial and economic crisis, the euro crisis, the EU reform
crisis) due to which the European integration project has been partially
reconsidered in new conditions. Responses to the need for the EUs additional
3

E.g. the Serbs, Montenegrins, Bosniaks, Macedonians and Slovenes in Croatia; the Bosniaks,
Croats, Macedonians and Montenegrins in Serbia etc.

For the above processes, see: Dragan ukanovi, Izmene etnikih struktura drava nastalih
od Jugoslavije: putevi nove etnike homogenizacije, as well as Slobodan Nekovi (ur.),
Bezbednost u postmodernom ambijentu, Centar za strateka istraivanja nacionalne
bezbednosti (CESNA B) i Hanns Seidel Stiftung, Beograd, 2008, str. 418430, and Dragan
ukanovi., Spoljnopolitike orijentacije drava Zapadnog Balkana: uporedna analiza,
Godinjak Fakulteta politikih nauka, godina 4, broj 4, Beograd, 2010, str. 295313.

transformation vary, ranging from the positions held by Eurosceptics, who urge
less Europe or even the withdrawal of some countries from the Union, to those
of Euro-enthusiasts, who, on the contrary, believe that there is a need for
more Europe, i.e. who back the thesis that a standstill in the European
integration process and a rise in nationalism in the member states are chiefly
responsible for the difficulties experienced by the European project. Despite the
euro crisis, the eurozone countries can be defined as the main core of further
integration5.
At the same time, the EU is faced with changes and serious geostrategic
challenges on its eastern and southern borders, ranging from the turbulent
events in Ukraine and the straining of relations with Russia to severe
destabilisation in the vast area of the Southern Mediterranean and the Near
and Middle East. New threats and uncertainties call for new responses which
will shape the EU at the end of this decade. Proposals and forecasts as to what
the Union should look like by the end of this or next decade are numerous,
ranging from the futuristic document of the Gonzalez group on Europe 20306,
and the European Commissions far more formal operational strategy for
boosting Europes economy Europe 20207, to the European Councils recent

The two main options for the Unions future are best illustrated, on the one hand, by the
stance taken by Great Britain, whose government has announced a referendum on the
countrys withdrawal (or not) from the EU (see T. Oliver, Europe without Britain, SWP Research
Paper, September 2013) and, on the other hand, by the position of the Federal Republic of
Germany, which in the 2012-2014 period played the key role in the institutional consolidation
of the eurozone by developing the so-called banking union, see European Commission,
Banking
Union:
restoring
the
Financial
stability
in
the
Eurozone,
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/banking-union/banking-unionmemo_en.pdf
5

Project Europe 2030, Challenges and Opportunities, A Report to the European Council by the
Reflection Group, http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/people/knicolaidis/finalreport.pdf.

See the European Commissions website http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm

containing the relevant documents.

document on the EUs Strategic Agenda for the next few years8, adopted in a
meeting held in June 2014.
The EU member states internal circumstances and international
evolution will also have a bearing on the Unions positions on the further scope
and pace of its enlargement. Over a period of one decade, the enlargement
policy has gone from almost undivided support to the EU enlargement to the
Central and East European countries9 to far more reserved positions resulting
from the Eurosceptics anti-integration offensive and the enlargement fatigue
of both the public as well as political circles in the old EU member states.
Despite the undivided positions on the successful results of the enlargement
policy from the historical perspective, the Unions enlargement has been
pushed to the background as an issue. This is best illustrated by the fact that
the above Strategic Agenda, which the European Council passed in June,
mentions the issue in one sentence only10, while all newly-elected European
Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker had to say on the matter was that
no further enlargement will take place over the next five years11, adding,
however, that the technical negotiations on the EU enlargement to the Western
Balkans and Turkey would continue12.

Strategic Agenda for the Union in Times of Change, European Council, conclusions, 26/27
June 2014,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/143477.pdf.
9 European Commission, 10th Anniversary of the 2004 Enlargement, Brussels, 30 April 2014,
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-325_en.pdf.
10 The Agenda only laconically comments on the enlargement policy, stating that, Our
enlargement policy continues to foster democracy and prosperity, see footnote 7.
11

Junker za proirenje, ali prvo stabilizacija EU, Blic, Beograd, 26. jun 2014, Internet,
http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Svet/476331/Junker-za-prosirenje-ali-prvo-stabilizacija-EU,
7/8/2014.

12http://juncker.epp.eu/my-priorities.

Even though the above facts do not indicate that the EU enlargement to
the Western Balkan countries will not continue, it is evident that the process
will take place in the political circumstances quite different and far less
favourable than those existing in the previous enlargement stage13.

THE WESTERN BALKANS 2014

BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE EAST

Despite the official commitment of all political elites of the Western

Balkan states to membership in the EU and NATO (with the exception of
Serbia, which is militarily neutral), the region is faced today with different
influences not exerted by the so-called West (the EU and the US) due to the
speedy transformation of the world policy centres of power. This primarily
refers to the influence of the Russian Federation, which thanks to some power
supply deals and investments in specific segments of the economy is trying to
restore or preserve its influence in this part of Europe.
The Russian Federations intensified impact on the situation in Serbia
and the Republika Srpska, Bosnia-Herzegovinas entity, is evident.14 Its
investments in the Montenegrin economy, including the Podgorica Aluminium
Plant (KAP), have not yielded any significant results in the past decade. At the

V. J. Brennan, Enlargement Fatigue and its Impact on the Enlargement Process in the Western
Balkans, http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR018/OBrennan.pdf. The
title of a recent publication by L. Macek, L'largissement, met-il en pril le projet europen? (Is
enlargement a threat to the European project?), La Documentation franaise, Paris, 2011,
which gives an overview of the enlargement process, eloquently speaks of the current attitude
towards the process.
13

14

Dragan tavljanin, Mnogo nedoumica oko Junog toka: Ekonomija i ruski uticaj na
Balkan, Radio Slobodna Evropa Balkanski servis, Prag, 30. novembar 2013, Internet,
http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/mnogo-nedoumica-oko-juznog-toka-ekonomija-iruski-uticaj-na-balkan/25185267.html, 15/07/2014.

same time, Russian nationals have bought real estate and land at the
Montenegrin seaside on a large scale.15
The Russian Federations influence in this part of the Western Balkans
became manifest also after the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine, when only
Montenegro, Albania and Kosovo condemned Moscows conduct after its
annexation of Crimea and its support to the pro-Russian separatists in the east
of the country.16 On the other hand, the Belgrade, Sarajevo and Skopje
authorities failure to take a clear and unequivocal stance on the issue was
more than evident.
At the same time, when we speak of the positioning of the Western
Balkans in the global context, we should point out the strengthening of Chinas
role and a gradual rise in its investments in the countries in the region (e.g. the
railway line linking Budapest and Belgrade, the bridge between Zemun and
Borca etc.).17 However, Chinas influence is much smaller than that exerted by
the Russian Federation.
Even though all Western Balkan countries (except for Serbia) have in
particular underlined their strategic partnership with the US in their foreign
15 On legal problems concerning the Podgorica Aluminium Plant, see: Deripaskina blokada
prodaje KAP-a bez posljedica, Radio Slobodna Evropa Balkanski servis, Prag, 8. juli 2014,
Internet,
http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/deripaskina-blokada-prodaje-kap-bezposljedica/25449577.html, 15/07/2014.; Crna Gora upozorava Rusiju: uzdri se na Krimu!,
Vesti
online,
14.
mart
2014,
Internet,
http://www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/ExYU/388890/Crna-Gora-upozorava-Rusiju-Uzdrzi-se-na-Krimu, 15/07/2014.
16 See: Amra Zajneli, Kosovo se jo nije pridruilo Zapadu protiv Rusije, Radio Slobodna
Evropa

Balkanski
servis,
Prag,
24.
mart
2014,
Internet,
http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/kosovo-se-jo%C5%A1-nije-pridruzilo-zapadu-protivrusije/25308075.html, 15/07/2014.
17

Kina hoe prugu BeogradBudimpeta, TANJUG, RTV B92, Beograd, 5. mart 2013,
Internet,
http://www.b92.net/biz/vesti/srbija.php?yyyy=2013&mm=03&dd=05&nav_id=692348,
17/07/2014.

policy documents as a specific guarantee for their speedy road to their full
membership in NATO and the EU, it is evident that, from time to time, foreign
policy goals are reconsidered to some extent in some of these countries, i.e.
they seek to establish closer contacts with other centres of power.18 The
international position of some states in the region is primarily affected by the
prospects of their relations with NATO or the EU. Albania became a NATO
member state in 2009, while Macedonia is waiting for its talks with Greece to
be unblocked in order to join the Alliance. After NATOs summit in Wales,
Montenegro will open talks on its membership in the Alliance late this year,
while the final decision on the issue will be probably taken by the end of
2015.19 In this way, the Western Balkans would be additionally linked to the
Western sphere of influence via its states membership in NATO and would
continue the reforms leading to the strengthening of the principles of liberal
democracy, market economy and the rule of law.
On the other hand, NATO would geostrategically reinforce its position in
the Adriatic region where, with the exception of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which
cannot speed up its efforts to join the Alliance due to its internal problems, and
Serbia

(militarily

neutral

state

since

2007),

all

countries

would

be

incorporated into this collective security system.20

18

Dragan ukanovi., Spoljnopolitike orijentacije drava Zapadnog Balkana: uporedna

analiza, op. cit., str. 295313.
Ratko ivkovi, Crnoj Gori rampa za NATO, Akter magazin, Novi Sad, 29. jun 2014,
Internet,
http://akter.co.rs/weekly/34-bezbednost/94575-crnoj-gori-rampa-za-nato.html,
17/07/2014.
19

See Dragan Djukanovic, NATOs New Strategic Concept and Its Influence on the Stability of the
Western Balkans, Croatian International Relations Review, Zagreb, July-December 2010, pp.
105110.

20

THE EU AND THE WESTERN BALKANS

FIFTEEN YEARS OF THE STABILISATION AND ASSOCIATION PROCESS

Over the past 15 years or so, the Western Balkan countries have
managed to step up the process of their European integration, although one
can hardly say that its pace has been remarkable. The process of stabilisation
and association with the EU, introduced for the countries in the region in
1999, has proved to be successful and effective.21 Following the EU-Western
Balkans summit, held in Thessaloniki, Greece, in 2003 and considered to be a
turning point and encouragement for the countries in this part of Europe,
significant headway could be noticed:
1. On 1 July 2013, Croatia became an EU member state.
2. Montenegro and Serbia opened EU membership talks in the 2012-2014
period, becoming in a way leading countries in the process. Still, both
countries are faced with the problems which could in future drag out the
process. The EU expects Montenegro to intensify its fight against
corruption and organised crime, while Serbia is expected to end
successfully talks with the Pristina authorities on all open issues
resulting from Kosovos unilateral declaration of independence in 2008.
3. Despite the fact that it was granted EU candidate status as far back as
late 2005, Macedonia has not yet opened talks with the Brussels
administration. Due to its two-decade-old dispute with its neighbour
Greece over the use of its constitutional name of the Republic of

21

Duko Lopandi, Jasminka Kronja, Regionalne inicijative i multilateralna saradnja na

Balkanu, Evropski pokret u Srbiji, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Beograd, 2010, str. 21117.

Macedonia, the country has for years been frozen in a stage of an

(unsuccessful) candidate for EU membership.
4. In late June 2014, Albania was granted EU candidate status following
the speeding up of its reforms in the sphere of the political system, the
fight against corruption and organised crime etc.
5. After 2008, Kosovo managed to speed up the process of its European
integration parallel to the development of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue
and is now about to sign the Stabilisation and Association Agreement
(SAA). However, it is evident that the mood of its public is not fully in
tune with the political elites aspirations regarding its accession to the
EU, which is also reflected in the strengthening of the Self-Determination
Movement in the parliamentary elections held in Kosovo in June 2014.
The Kosovo public primarily wishes to see the recognition of the entity by
as many international factors as possible and its joining international
organisations (UN, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) etc.).
6. Bosnia-Herzegovina is the only Western Balkan country that still does
not hold EU candidate status. It is still faced with the blockade of its
Dayton-Accords-based constitutional system and the impossibility of
meeting specific international obligations as regards both its relations
with the EU and NATO as well as the rulings of the European Court of
Human Rights in the case of Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia-Herzegovina,
passed in late 2009, and the case of Zornic v. Bosnia-Herzegovina,
passed in 2014.22 Both rulings underline that the Constitution of
Sud u Strazburu: Manjine mogu u izvrnu vlast BiH, Al Jazeera Balkans, Sarajevo, 15. jul
2014, Internet, http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/sud-u-strazburu-manjine-mogu-u-izvrsnuvlast-bih, 17/07/2014.
22

10

Bosnia-Herzegovina

(1995)

discriminates

against

members

of

non-constituent peoples (ethnic minorities and the people refusing to

declare themselves ethnically) when it comes to their eligibility to stand
for election to become members of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina
or deputies/MPs to the House of Peoples of its Parliamentary Assembly.
It remains to be seen in the coming period whether the pace of accession to
the EU of all Western Balkan countries and entities will speed up and even
up.23 In this context, we can talk about the countries making speedier
progress (Montenegro and Serbia), the countries that are in a way stagnating
(Macedonia as well as Albania to a smaller extent) and Bosnia-Herzegovina as a
country bringing up the rear, together with Kosovo due to economic and social
reasons, as well as reasons related to international law. In view of the
postulates of the process of stabilisation and association with the EU of the
Western Balkan countries, primarily implying an individual approach to these
countries and the evaluation of their progress, specific groups of countries,
which could join the Union together, could still be formed in an ad hoc manner
in the coming period. A similar thing happened in 2004 when ten new
countries joined the Union in a large enlargement wave and in 2007 when
Bulgaria and Romania became its member states.24

23

For a more thorough analysis, see: Dragan ukanovi, Evropska unija i Zapadni Balkan
isekivanja i oekivanja, Kultura polisa, br. 25, Novi Sad, 2014.

The countries in question include Slovenia, Cyprus, Slovakia, Malta, Poland, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Slovakia and Hungary, which joined the EU in 2004. Before that, Sweden, Finland
and Austria formed such one group in 1995, and Portugal and Spain yet another one in 1986.
24

11

MAIN FACTORS VITAL FOR FURTHER RELATIONS AND THE EUS

ENLARGEMENT TO THE WESTERN BALKANS BY 2020

Although the appetite for EU enlargement has considerably decreased in

most of the Unions member states in this decade, this process continues,
while its pace will primarily depend on the future internal as well as
international evolution in Europe, the region included. Different political and
economic factors will have a bearing on it. In particular, the economic and
social situation in the Western Balkan countries and the headway made in
implementing reforms in the region will be a prerequisite for boosting the EU
enlargement prospects in the medium term.
The EU can also be expected to continue gradually implementing its
internal institutional reforms, based on strengthening integration in the
eurozone and stepping up by degrees the development of its political union and
further efforts to build its common foreign and security policy, defence policy
included. The fact that the new EU president was designated in the process in
which European political groups and the European Parliament stole initiative
from the European Council (heads of state or government of the EU member
states)25, which is formally in charge of the process, signals that we are
witnessing the gradual emergence of a European political identity along the
lines of the real political union. Divisions in the Union will probably be
institutionally verified in the future in a process leading to an EU of concentric
circles, built around a core comprising the eurozone countries rallied around
Germany. The next circle will include Great Britain and a number of other
In the elections for the European Parliament, Juncker was the so-called leading candidate
(spietzenkandidat) of the Peoples (Demochristian) Party, which won the majority of votes across
the EU; his opponents included Schulz, the candidate of the European Social Democrats, and
the Liberal and Green Party candidates.

25

12

countries, such as monetary union candidates. As for its economic situation,

the EU can be expected to overcome the difficulties arising from the euro crisis
in the next five years, although with a low growth rate and in the
circumstances in which the economic division between the north and

the

south of the eurozone will not be wiped out. Still, the process will primarily
cause the EU, burdened with its problems, to be above all inward looking,
having no particular wish to include the enlargement issue among its top
priorities again.
On the other hand, the enlargement circumstances and the status of the
Western Balkan countries will be especially affected by the future relations
between the EU and Russia in conditions of their deepened long-term
confrontation. In 2014, the situation in Ukraine and the EUs primary
commitment to the Eastern Partnership policy have somewhat overshadowed
the Unions relations with its rear in the Western Balkans. Despite the fact
that none of the Western Balkan countries are likely to join the EU by 2020,
the Union should send them much more proactive messages, creating a basis
for their further encouragement to work on internal reforms and regional
stability, instead of opting for technocratic messages that there will be no
further enlargement any time soon. Confronted with Russias efforts to preserve
its influence in the Western Balkans, the EU will have to influence additionally
the political and economic stabilisation of the region in the coming period by
innovating the Stabilisation and Association Process and diversifying its
Thessaloniki Agenda and measures contributing to enlargement negotiations.
The innovation programme for the Thessaloniki Agenda should among other
things include the following:

a clearer and more energetic accession negotiations process for

Montenegro and Serbia and, subsequently, Albania, with more

13

specific conditions that depend less on political issues and set

deadlines for specific stages of the negotiations;

unblocking of the situation in order to open negotiations with

Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina;

strengthening

of

top-level

political

dialogue

with

the

SAA

countries and greater involvement of the Western Balkan countries

in the European political family through specific informal forms of
cooperation

and

integration

(European

political

groups,

parliamentary cooperation, informal meetings of governments etc.);

economic measures to set in motion a new investment cycle in the

Western Balkans. In this context, the Southeast Europe 2020
strategy should also play a major role.

THE EU AND THE WESTERN BALKANS 2020

DIFFERENT PROJECTIONS

One should bear in mind the fact that no long-term prognosis in the
Balkans can be reliable. What we can expect in the days to come is a period of
greater uncertainty, new political tensions, potential social destabilisation and
political turbulence. Burdened with traditional historical, ethnic, cultural and
other latent or outstanding difficulties, the Western Balkans is not suitable for
any long-term prognoses or projections. Such a state of affairs is compounded
by the bad economic situation in the region, characterised by a high
unemployment rate, low growth, excessive indebtedness, failures of transition,

14

the lack of an adequate foreign investment environment, unfavourable

conditions for the development of private initiative etc.26
The evaluation of future developments in the Western Balkans will largely
depend on several factors. Firstly, it will depend on the relations among
dominant world policy players and the overlapping of their interests; secondly,
it will depend on the regions potential for economic development through the
implementation of different joint regional projects; the prospects of this part of
Europe will also depend on the continuation of resolution of open issues among
the countries and entities in the region. Naturally, in this context, the fact that
the speeding up of European integration, parallel to the development and new
pace of regional cooperation, can help consolidate relations in this, potentially
turbulent part of Europe should be taken into account.27 In the process, one
should bear in mind the fact that the Western Balkans includes smaller
countries, which are by no means as interesting to the EU member states in
the geopolitical sense as the Central and East European countries have been.
From the Brussels perspective, the EU enlargement to the Western Balkans is
an inevitable task but not a priority, it is a task that can be put on hold, i.e.
slowed down or postponed as long as the internal or external conditions are not
absolutely favourable. However, such an approach carries the risk of new
disruptions and potential destabilisation.
In view of the above comments, we reach the conclusion that, in 2020, the
relations between the EU and the Western Balkans could follow one of the
following three scenarios:
26

Panagiotis Kouparanis, Andrea Jung-Grimm, EU Exports its Crisis to the Balkans, Deutsche
Welle, Berlin, 3 December 2013, Internet, http://www.dw.de/eu-izvezla-krizu-na-balkan/a17267644, 22/07/2014.

27

Jelica Mini, Dragan ukanovi, Jasminka Kronja, Regionalna saradnja na Zapadnom

Balkanu kako dalje?, Istraivaki forum Evropskog pokreta u Srbiji, maj 2014, str. 220.

15

a)

A moderately negative scenario: business as usual -

This scenario

would be the continuation of the EUs current policy, which is

primarily the result of enlargement fatigue and a practical slowdown
in the Unions enlargement process.
The scenario comprises the following elements: fluctuations in the
pace of European integration of all countries and entities in the region,
ranging from the status quo situation to the stop and go strategy, a
cautious and slow process of enlargement negotiations, the stalling of
negotiations with the EU and the uncertainty of how they will end, the
continuation of the economic and social crisis in the region and the
expected standstill in the resolution of outstanding bilateral issues.
b)

A pessimistic/negative scenario: a geopolitical and economic chaos

due to the escalation of confrontation between the EU and Russia to
the Western Balkans, the renewal of clashes and further deepening of
the economic and social crisis in the region.
The scenario would include the following elements: disregarding
enlargement i.e. stalling further talks with some candidate countries
for various reasons such as unrealistic requests placed before them,
general

economic,

political

and

security-related

instability,

disregarding the economic situation in the region, a potential

economic and/or political collapse in some Western Balkan countries,
growing tensions between countries and nations in the region and new
clashes (due to Albanian-Slav divisions and/or inter-religious/ethnic
clashes in Macedonia, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina), the emergence
of authoritarian regimes in the region, attempts to change the foreign
policy orientation of some Western Balkan countries, a partial switch

16

of some states in the region to the Eurasian Union and setting up

strategic partnerships with the countries of the global East.
c)

An optimistic scenario: 2020 the year of the EU enlargement to the

Western Balkan countries. This scenario would be the result of the
EUs greater shift to the Western Balkans, based on its treating the
enlargement issue as a real political priority, and of more serious
innovation of the Thessaloniki Agenda/Stabilisation and Association
Process.
The scenario would include the following elements: speeding up of the
EUs enlargement process and a change in attitude (under the
influence of new threats and dangers in the east and the south) of the
general public and political elites of the leading Union member states
towards the Western Balkan countries integration, a new pace of the
economic development (infrastructure, foreign investment, regional
development), consolidation of the socio-economic situation in the
Western Balkans, successful resolution of open bilateral issues in the
region and strengthened multilateral cooperation. Under the optimistic
scenario, a number of Western Balkan countries (Serbia, Montenegro)
would join the EU by the end of the decade, whereas other countries
(Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina) would make great headway
in the negotiations with a view to becoming EU member states in the
first half of the next decade.

CONCLUSION
As can be seen from the above sections of the paper, it is really hard to
predict what the Western Balkans will look like in 2020. Reserved and

17

sceptical messages about the enlargement issue, such as the newly-elected

European Commission President Junckers statement to this effect, do not
help consolidate the situation or boost pro-European tendencies in the
region.
At the same time, the current crisis in Ukraine is deepening, showing no
signs of ending any time soon. As a result, some countries in the region,
Serbia in particular, will be placed in an additionally unfavourable situation
in terms of foreign policy due to the need to back one of the sides in the new
global cold war (the Russian Federation and/or the EU and the US). One
should not rule out the fact that a potential socio-economic collapse in some
Western Balkan countries or the rekindling of ethnic clashes in some
countries or entities, coupled with the strengthening of authoritarian
political tendencies, could also have an impact on the leading political elites
shift of focus from the European path to closer contacts with the Eurasian
Union.
Consequently,

an

alternative

to

such

developments

should

be

unequivocal support to the process of the EUs enlargement to the Western

Balkans, i.e. directing the attention of the Brussels administration to all
states in the region, which in more recent history very often proved to be
problematic. In this respect, the Unions support to Montenegro, Serbia,
Macedonia and Albania, as candidate countries, is vital so that they could
continue the European reform process despite their numerous internal
problems. Also, the Union should focus on those in the region that have not
been granted candidate status, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina (as well as
Kosovo), due to their dominant internal problems and potential for
instability (coexistence of three ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the
Serbs status in Kosovo). In this context, it would be extremely important for
18

Brussels to encourage efforts to review measures for the innovation of the

Stabilisation and Association Process by strengthening top-level political
dialogue, innovating pre-accession instruments of support to enlargement
talks and boosting economic mechanisms of cooperation.

19

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