ARANDA vs.

REPUBLIC
FACTS:
ICTSI-WI filed a petition for original registration of a parcel of land before the RTC,
but the Republic opposed the same on the ground that the land applied for is part of the
public domain and the applicant has not acquired a registrable title thereto under CA 141.
ICTSI-WI amended its petition, and was filed in the name of petitioners. Petitioners claimed
that the deeds of confirmation of the 1946 sale in favor of Anatalio Aranda and the 1965
donation to petitioner are competent proof of transfer of ownership notwithstanding that
these were executed only in the year 2000. Petitioner invokes the liberal provisions of
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, having been in continuous
possession of the subject land in the concept of owner, publicly, openly and adversely for
more than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application. The trial court granted the
decree, but the same was reversed on appeal by the CA on the ground that petitioners
evidence does not satisfactorily prove the character and duration of the possession required
by law. Hence, the present petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition for registration should be granted.
RULING:
No. The Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529) provides for original registration
of land in an ordinary registration proceeding. Under Section 14(1) thereof, a petition may be
granted upon compliance with the following requisites: (a) that the property in question is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (b) that the applicants by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation; and (c) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute. Petitioner has not explained the discrepancies in the dates of classification in the
government certifications. Further, the status of the land applied for as alienable and
disposable was not clearly established. a person who seeks the registration of title to a piece
of land on the basis of possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest must prove
his claim by clear and convincing evidence, i.e., he must prove his title and should not rely
on the absence or weakness of the evidence of the oppositors. Furthermore, the court has
the bounden duty, even in the absence of any opposition, to require the petitioner to show,
by a preponderance of evidence and by positive and absolute proof, so far as possible, that
he is the owner in fee simple of the lands which he is attempting to register. Since petitioner
failed to meet the quantum of proof required by law, the CA was correct in reversing the trial
court and dismissing his application for judicial confirmation of title.

CHAVEZ vs. PEA and AMARI

FACTS:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas
of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion of the Philippines
(CDCP).PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084,
tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the
care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project
(MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects under the
MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA. By 1988, President Aquino issued Special
Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three Titles
(7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three
reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS. Subsequently, PEA entered into a
joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the
Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which
would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda
assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously
known as the mother of all scams). Petitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer
praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of
reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these events,
under President Estradas admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr.
Chaves claim that the contract is null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands,
reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution
RULING:
Yes. Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified
as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain Section 3 of the Constitution:
Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private
corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except
by lease The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain.
PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of
these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens,
subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. Clearly, the
Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under
Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose object or purpose is contrary to law, or
whose object is outside the commerce of men, are inexistent and void from the beginning.
The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore
declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.

REPUBLIC vs. CA and NAGUIT

FACTS:
Naguit filed a petition for registration of title which seeks judicial confirmation of
imperfect title over a parcel of land. It was alleged that Naguit and her predecessors-ininterest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of an owner without any objection
from any private person or the government until she filed her application for registration. The
Trial court granted the petition, but the same was opposed by the Republic on the ground
that the property must first be alienable before the open, continuous and exclusive
possession be applied. Naguit could have not maintained a bona fide claim of ownership
since the subject land was declared as alienable and disposable only on October 15, 1980.
The alienable and disposable character of the land should have already been established
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
ISSUE:
Whether it is necessary under Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 that the subject land be first
classified as alienable and disposable before applicants possession under bona fide claim
of ownership could start.
RULING:
No. The provision merely requires that the property sought to be registered is
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. To follow
petitioners argument in the construction of the said provision would render it inoperative for
it would mean that lands of public domain which were not declared as alienable and
disposable before June 12, 1945 would be susceptible to original registration, no matter the
length of unchallenged possession by occupant. In effect, it precludes the government from
enforcing the said provision as it
decides to reclassify lands as alienable and disposable.
Further, upon investigation, the land in question was found to be agricultural. Thus, there is
no impediment to the application of the said provision. Naguit had the right to apply for
registration owing to the continuous possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of
the land since 1945.

HEIRS OF LACAMEN vs. HEIRS OF LARUAN

FACTS:
Respondent Laruan executed a deed of sale conveying his parcel of land in favor of
petitioner Lacamen. Immediately thereafter, Laruan delivered the certificate of title to
Lacamen. Thereupon, Lacamen entered in possession and occupancy of the land without
first securing the corresponding transfer certificate of title in his name. He introduced various
improvements and paid the proper taxes. His possession was open, continuous, peaceful,
and adverse. After his death in 1942, his heirs remained in and continued possession and
occupancy of the land. They too paid the taxes. In or about June, 1957, they discovered
that Laruan's heirs, respondents-appellants, were able to procure a new owner's copy of
Certificate of Title No. 420 by a petition filed in court alleging that their copy has been lost or
destroyed. Through this owner's copy, respondents-appellants caused the transfer of the title
on the lot in their names. respondents-appellants traversed the averments in the complaint
and claim absolute ownership over the land. They asserted that their deceased
father, Laruan, never sold the property and that the Deed of Sale was not thumbmarked by
him. The trial court ruled in favor of respondents, and the CA subsequently on appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in its decision.
RULING:
No. CA 141 provided in Section 118 thereof that "Conveyances and encumbrances
made by persons belonging to the so-called 'non-Christian tribes', when proper, shall not be
valid unless duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes." Any
violation of this injunction would result in the nullity and avoidance of the transaction. During
the regime of the Commonwealth, C.A. 141 otherwise known as "The Public Land Act" was
passed November 7, 1936 amending Act No. 2874. However, it contained a similar
provision in its Section 120 that "Conveyances and encumbrances made by illiterate nonChristians shall not be valid unless duly approved by the Commissioner of Mindanao and
Sulu. The contracting parties, Lacamen and Laruan, are bound by the foregoing laws, since
both of them are illiterate Igorots, belonging to the "non-Christian Tribes" of the Mountain
Province, and the controverted land was derived from a Free Patent or acquired from the
public domain. Nevertheless, the thrust of the facts in the case before Us weakens the
gathered strength of the cited rule. The facts summon the equity of laches.
From the transfer of the land on January 28, 1928, Lacamen possessed and occupied the
ceded land in concepto de dueo until his death in April 1942. Thereafter his heirs,
petitioners-appellants herein, took over and exercised dominion over the property, likewise
unmolested for nearly 30 years (1928-1957) until the heirs of Laruan, respondentsappellants, claimed ownership over the property and secured registration of the same in their
names. At the trial, petitioners-appellants have been found to have introduced improvements
on the land consisting of houses, barns, greenhouses, walls, roads, etc., and trees valued at
P38,920.00. At this state, therefore, respondents-appellants' Claim of absolute ownership
over the land cannot be countenanced. It has been held that while a person may not acquire
title to the registered property through continuous adverse possession, in derogation of the
title of the original registered owner, the heir of the latter, however, may lose his right to
recover back the possession of such property and the title thereto, by reason of laches.

BINALAY vs. MANALO, CA

FACTS:
Respondent Manalo filed a complaint for quieting of title, possession and damages
before CFI against petitioners. Manalo alleged ownership of two parcels of land he bought
separately from Faustina Taccad and Gregorio Taguba for which reason he prayed that
judgment be entered ordering petitioners to vacate the western strip of the unsurveyed
portion. Respondent Manalo likewise prayed that judgment be entered declaring him as
owner of Lot 821 on which he had laid his claim during the survey. Petitioners filed their
answer denying the material allegations of the complaint claiming that they occupy the outer
edges of Lot 821 along the river banks, i.e., the fertile portions on which they plant tobacco
and other agricultural products. They also cultivate the western strip of the unsurveyed
portion during summer. CFI ruled in favor of Manalo, which ruling was affirmed by CA.
ISSUE:
Whether Manalo acquired ownership over the eastern branch of the riverbed, and
over Lot 821.
RULING:
No. Pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code, respondent Manalo did not acquire
private ownership of the bed of the eastern branch of the river even if it was included in the
deeds of absolute sale executed by Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad in his favor.
These vendors could not have validly sold land that constituted property of public dominion.
Pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code, respondent Manalo did not acquire private
ownership of the bed of the eastern branch of the river even if it was included in the deeds of
absolute sale executed by Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad in his favor. These vendors
could not have validly sold land that constituted property of public dominion. Further, the
Court considers that there was no evidence to prove that Lot 821 is an increment to Lot 307
and the bed of the eastern branch of the river. he Court considers that there was no
evidence to prove that Lot 821 is an increment to Lot 307 and the bed of the eastern branch
of the river. The Court notes that the parcels of land bought by respondent Manalo border on
the eastern branch of the Cagayan River. Any accretion formed by this eastern branch which
respondent Manalo may claim must be deposited on or attached to Lot 307. As it is, the
claimed accretion (Lot 821) lies on the bank of the river not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly
opposite Lot 307 across the river. If respondent Manalo had proved prior possession, it was
limited physically to Lot 307 and the depressed portion or the eastern river bed. The
regularly submerged portion or the eastern bed of the Cagayan River is hereby DECLARED
to be property of public dominion. The ownership of Lot 821 shall be determined in an
appropriate action that may be instituted by the interested parties inter se.

REPUBLIC vs. CA and Republic Real Estate Corporation

Pasay City and Republic Real Estate Corporation vs. CA and Republic
FACTS:
At bar are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court. RA 1899, which was approved on June 22, 1957, authorized the
reclamation of foreshore lands by chartered cities and municipalities. Invoking the said law,
Pasay City council passed an ordinance for the reclamation of 300 hectares of foreshore
lands in Pasay City. The said Ordinance was amended by Ordinance No. 158, which
authorized the Republic Real Estate Corporation (RREC) to reclaim foreshore lands of
Pasay City under certain terms and conditions. The Republic filed a Complaint for Recovery
of Possession and Damages, questioning the Agreement between Pasay City and RREC, on
the grounds that the subject-matter of such Agreement is outside the commerce of man, that
its terms and conditions are violative of RA 1899, and that the said Agreement was executed
without any public bidding. The trial court dismissed the complaint filed by the Republic and
enjoined Pasay City and RREC to conduct a public bidding and to have all plans and
specifications in the reclamation approved by the Director of Public Works. Aggrieved,
Republic moved for appeal, but the CA denied the same. It is the submission of the
petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, that there are no foreshore lands along the seaside of
Pasay City; that what Pasay City has are submerged or offshore areas outside the
commerce of man which could not be a proper subject matter of the Agreement between
Pasay City and RREC in question as the area affected is within the National Park, known as
Manila Bay Beach Resort, established under Proclamation No. 41, dated July 5, 1954,
pursuant to Act No. 3915, of which area it (Republic) has been in open, continuous and
peaceful possession since time immemorial.
ISSUE:
Whether the Agreement between Pasay City and RREC should be upheld.
RULING:
No. To begin with, erroneous and unsustainable is the opinion of respondent court
that under RA 1899, the term foreshore lands includes submerged areas. As can be gleaned
from its disquisition and rationalization aforequoted, the respondent court unduly stretched
and broadened the meaning of foreshore lands, beyond the intentment of the law, and
against the recognized legal connotation of foreshore lands. It bears stressing that the
subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and
the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA
1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and void. What is worse, the same Agreement was
vitiated by the glaring absence of a public bidding. To repeat, the term foreshore lands refers
to: The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately
wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. A strip of land margining a body of water (as a
lake or stream); the part of a seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward
margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by
a beach scarp or berm.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. IAC and ACME PLYWOOD AND VENEER CO.
FACTS:
The land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel,
both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities. Possession of the
Infiels over the land dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan. Further,
the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute
ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their
ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public
domain. Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of
improvements, and ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly
recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela donated
part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela. The Director of Lands takes no issue
with any of these findings except as to the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter
at hand. Section 11 of its Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution prohibits private corporations
or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to
exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in
1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to
decree registration in favor of Acme.
ISSUE:
Whether the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations
or associations applies.
RULING:
No. Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering
possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the
equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself that the
possessor shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. No proof being admissible to
overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more
than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the
required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but
simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the
land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by
operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. If it
is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a
legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said
owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition.
The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public
agricultural lands in excess of 1,000 hectares. Furthermore, alienable public land held by a
possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and
exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said
period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land
subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels

by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition
against said corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical
person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY vs. LILIA A. ABAIRO,
CELSO ABAIRO and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ISABELA
FACTS:
Respondent Lilia Abairo filed an application for registration under the Land
Registration Act of a parcel of land alleging open, public, peaceful and uninterrupted
possession thereof in the concept of owner by herself and through her predecessors-ininterest since time immemorial up to the present. The assistant provincial fiscal entered his
opposition in behalf of the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry, but subsequently
withdrew his opposition on the ground that there was a new law extending the period for
filing registration petitions up to 1976. After the case was heard, respondent Court rendered
a decision confirming the ownership of respondent Abairo over the land in question after
finding, inter alia, that respondent Abairo and her predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the land in the concept of owners
since 1912 up to the present. It is the contention of petitioners that respondent Court should
have dismissed the application of respondent Lilia Abairo because it has no jurisdiction over
it inasmuch as it was filed on March 1, 1971, that is, after December 31, 1968, the expiry
date for filing such kind of applications based on imperfect or incomplete titles under RA No.
2061.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners contention is with merit.
RULING:
No. R.A. No. 6236, enacted on June 19, 1971, further amended Section 47 of C.A.
No. 141 by extending to December 31, 1976 the time limit for the filing of applications for the
judical confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. Further, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1073, promulgated on January 25, 1977, the filing of such application has been
extended to December 31, 1987. It is clear from the law itself that those who applied for
judicial confirmation of their titles at any time prior to the cutoff date of December 31,
1976 (as provided for in R.A. No. 6236) did so on time, even if such application were filed
during the intervening period from January 1, 1969 to June 18, 1971, like the application of
respondent Abairo, who instituted the same on March 1, 1971. Respect should be given to
the obvious intention of the lawmaker in extending the period for filing such applications time
and time again, to give full opportunity to those who are qualified under the law to own
disposable lands of the public domain and thus reduce the number of landless among the
citizenry.

OH CHO vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

FACTS:
Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the Lagdameos a parcel of land in
Tayabas, which they openly, continuously and adversely possessed since 1880. On January
17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for registration of this land. The Solicitor General opposed on the
ground that Oh Cho lacked title to said land and also because he was an alien.
ISSUE:
Whether Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of registration.
RULING:
Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot, which may be confirmed under the
Land Registration Act. All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any
land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in
interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the
land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even
before the Spanish conquest. The applicant does not come under the exception, for the
earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880. Under the
Public Land Act, Oh Cho is not entitled to a decree of registration of the lot, because he is an
alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Oh Cho's predecessors in
interest would have been entitled toa decree of registration had they applied for the same.
The application for the registration of the land was a condition precedent, which was not
complied with by the Lagmeos. Hence, the most they had was mere possessory right, not
title. This possessory right was what was transferred to Oh Cho, but since the latter is an
alien, the possessory right could never ripen to ownership by prescription. As an alien, Oh
Cho is disqualified from acquiring title over public land by prescription.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES

MARIO B. LAPIA AND FLOR DE VEGA
FACTS:
Respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348 as their residence. At the time of the
purchase, spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens. On Feb. 5, 1987, the spouses
filed an application for registration of title of the two parcels of land before the RTC. This
time, however, they were no longer Filipino Citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian
citizenship through naturalization. An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the
parties have presented their respective evidence, the court ruled confirming spouses title
over the lots. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether foreign national can apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which
he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has
complied with the requirements for registration under CA 141.
RULING:
Yes. The Court disagreed on the petition to seek to defeat respondent spouses
application for registration of title on the ground of foreign nationality. The Spouses do not
rely on fee simple ownership based on a Spanish grant or possessory information title under
Sec. 19 of the Land Registration Act. Spouses did not present any proof that they or their
predecessors-in-interest derived title from an old Spanish grant such as royal grant, especial
grant, adjustment title, title by purchase, or possessory information title, which could become
a gratuitous title. The primary basis of their claim is possession, by themselves and their
predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial. The Court is of the view that BP 185 does
not apply in the case since said requirements are primarily directed to the register of deeds
before whom compliance therewith is to be submitted. Said requirement does not apply
before the land registration proceedings. An application for registration of title before a land
registration court should not be confused with the issuance of a certificate of title by the
register of deeds. It is only when the judgment of the land registration court approving the
application for registration has become final that a decree of registration is issued. And that
is the time when the requirements of BP 185, before the ROD should be complied with by
the applicants. The petition is dismisses and the decision appealed from is affirmed.