1

1. Hurtado vs. People of State of California

[110 U.S. 516, 3 March 1884]
Facts: The constitution of the state of California
adopted in 1879, in article 1, 8, provides as follows:
"Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information, after
examination and commitment by a magistrate, or by
indictment, with or without such examination and
commitment, as may be prescribed by law. A grand
jury shall be drawn and summoned at least once a year
in each county." In pursuance of the foregoing
provision of the constitution, and of the several
sections of the penal Code of California, the district
attorney of Sacramento county, on 20 February 1882,
filed an information against Joseph Hurtado, charging
him with the crime of murder in the killing of one Jose
Antonio Stuardo. Upon this information, and without
any previous investigation of the cause by any grand
jury, Hurtado was arraigned on 22 March 1882, and
pleaded not guilty. A trial of the issue was thereafter
had, and on 7 May 1882, the jury rendered its verdict,
in which it found Hurtado guilty of murder in the first
degree. On 5 June 1882, the superior court of
Sacramento county rendered its judgment upon said
verdict, that Hurtado be punished by the infliction of
death, and the day of his execution was fixed for 20
July 1882. From this judgment an appeal was taken,
and the supreme court of the State of California
affirmed the judgment. On 6 July 1883, the superior
court of said county of Sacramento ordered that
Hurtado be in court on 11 July 1883, in order that a day
for the execution of the judgment in said cause should
be fixed. In pursuance of said order, Hurtado, with his
counsel, appeared in court, and upon the court's
inquiry, objected to the execution of said judgment and
to any order which the court might make fixing a day
for the execution of the same, upon the grounds (1)
that it appeared upon the face of the judgment that
Hurtado had never been legally, or otherwise, indicted
or presented by any grand jury, and that he was
proceeded against by information made and filed by
the district attorney of the county of Sacramento, after
examination and commitment by a magistrate of the
said county; (2) that the said proceedings, as well as
the laws and constitution of California, attempting to
authorize them, and the alleged verdict of the jury, and
judgment of the said superior court of said county of
Sacramento, were in conflict with and prohibited by
Amendments 5 and 14 of the constitution of the United
States, and that they were therefore void; (3) that
Hurtado had been held to answer for the said crime of
murder by the district attorney of the said county of
Sacramento, upon an information filed by him, and had
been tried and illegally found guilty of the said crime,
without any presentment or indictment of any grand or
other jury, and that the judgment rendered upon the

alleged verdict of the jury in such case was and is void,

and if executed would deprive Hurtado of his life or
liberty without due process of law. Thereupon the court
overruled the said objections, and fixed 13 August
1883, as the time for the execution of the sentence.
From this latter judgment, Hurtado appealed to the
supreme court of the state. On 18 September 1883,
the supreme court of the state affirmed the said
judgment. A review of which, by a writ of error, by the
US Supreme Court was allowed. Issue: Whether
Hurtado was denied due process by being tried and
found guilty without being presented or indicted by a
grand jury. Held: The clause of the 14th article of
amendment to the constitution of the United States,
provides that "Nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
The phrase is to be construed by the usus loquendi of
the constitution itself. The same words are contained in
the 5th amendment. That article makes specific and
express provision for perpetuating the institution of the
grand jury, so far as relates to prosecutions for the
more aggravated crimes under the laws of the United
States. It declares that "no person shall be held to
answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in
the militia when in actual service in time of war or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself." It then immediately adds:
"nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law." The natural and obvious inference is
that, in the sense of the constitution, "due process of
law" was not meant or intended to include, ex vi
termini, the institution and procedure of a grand jury in
any case. The conclusion is equally irresistible, that
when the same phrase was employed in the 14th
amendment to restrain the action of the states, it was
used in the same sense and with no greater extent;
and that if in the adoption of that amendment it had
been part of its purpose to perpetuate the institution of
the grand jury in all the states, it would have
embodied, as did the 5th amendment, express
declarations to that effect. Due process of law in the
latter refers to that law of the land which derives its
authority from the legislative powers conferred upon
congress by the constitution of the United States,
exercised within the limits therein prescribed, and
interpreted according to the principles of the common
law. In the fourteenth amendment, by parity of reason,
it refers to that law of the land in each state which
derives its authority from the inherent and reserved
powers of the state, exerted within the limits of those
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie
at the base of all our civil and political institutions, and
the greatest security for which resides in the right of

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the people to make their own laws, and alter them at
their pleasure. The 14th amendment does not profess
to secure to all persons in the United States the benefit
of the same laws and the same remedies. Great
diversities in these respects may exist in two states
separated only by an imaginary line. On one side of
this line there may be a right of trial by jury, and on the
other side no such right. Each state prescribes its own
modes of judicial proceeding. Further, any legal
proceeding enforced by public authority, whether
sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the
discretion of the legislative power in furtherance of the
general public good, which regards and preserves
these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to
be due process of law. Herein, the Court is unable to
say that the substitution for a presentment or
indictment by a grand jury of the proceeding by
information after examination and commitment by a
magistrate, certifying to the probable guilt of the
defendant, with the right on his part to the aid of
counsel, and to the cross-examination of the witnesses
produced for the prosecution, is not due process of law.
The Court found no error and thus affirmed the
judgment of the supreme court of California.
2. Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho [GR L29646, 10 Nov 1978]
Facts: On 22 February 1968, Ordinance 6537 (An
ordinance making it unlawful for any person not a
citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place
of employment or to be engaged in any kind of trade,
business or occupation within the City of Manila
without first securing an employment permit from the
mayor of Manila; and for other purposes) was passed
by the Municipal Board of Manila and signed by Manila
Mayor Antonio J. Villegas on 27 March 1968. The
Ordinance prohibits aliens from employment and trade
in the City of Manila without the requisite mayors
permit; but excepting persons employed in the
diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or
in the technical assistance programs of both the
Philippine Government and any foreign government,
and those working in their respective households, and
members of religious orders or congregations, sect or
denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.
The permit fee is P50, and the penalty is imprisonment
of 3 to 6 months or fine of P100-200, or both. On 4 May
1968, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in
Manila, filed a petition, with the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Manila (Civil Case 72797), praying for (1) the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and
restraining order to stop the implementation of the
ordinance, and (2) judgment to declare the ordinance
null and void. On 24 May 1968, Judge Francisco Arca
(CFI Manila, Branch I) issued the writ of preliminary
injunction and on 17 September 1968, the Judge
rendered a decision declaring the ordinance null and

void, and the preliminary injunction is made

permanent. Mayor Villegas filed a petition for certiorari
to review the decision of the CFI.
Issue: Whether the Ordinance, requiring aliens however economically situated - to secure working
permits from the City of Manila at a uniform fee of P50,
is reasonable.
Held: The ordinance is arbitrary, oppressive and
unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are
thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and
property and therefore, violates the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Requiring
a person, before he can be employed, to get a permit
from the City Mayor of Manila, who may withhold or
refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic
right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a
means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the
due process and equal protection clause is given to all
persons, both aliens and citizens. The ordinance does
not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the
Mayor in the exercise of his discretion, thus conferring
upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted powers. The
ordinances purpose is clearly to raise money under the
guise of regulation by exacting P50 from aliens who
have been cleared for employment. The amount is
unreasonable and excessive because it fails to consider
differences in situation among aliens required to pay it,
i.e. being casual, permanent, full-time, part-time, rankan-file or executive.
3.

Rubi, et. al. vs. Provincial Board of

Mindoro [GR 14078, 7 March 1919]

Facts: On 1 February 1917, the Provincial Board of

Mindoro adopted Resolution 25 creating a reservation /
permanent settlement for Mangyans (Mangyanes) in an
800-hectare public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan
Lake, and resolving that Mangyans may only solicit
homesteads on the reservation provided that said
homestead applications be previously recommended
by the provincial governor. On 21 February 1917, the
Secretary of Interior approved Resolution 25. On 4
December 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro
issued Executive Order 2 which directed all Mangyans
in the vicinities of the townships of Naujan and Pola
and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including
those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in
Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of
Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than 31 December 1917,
and penalizing any Mangyan who refused to comply
with the order with imprisonment of not exceeding 60
days, in accordance with section 2759 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Rubi and those living in his
rancheria have not fixed their dwellings within the
reservation of Tigbao and are prosecuted in accordance
with section 2759 of Act No. 2711. On the other hand,

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Doroteo Dabalos, was detained by the sheriff of
Mindoro by virtue of the provisions of Articles 2145 and
2759 of Act 2711, for having run away from the
reservation. Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province
of Mindoro applied for writs of habeas corpus, alleging
that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of
their liberty by the provincial officials of that province.
Issue: Whether due process was followed in the
restraint of the Manguianes liberty, either on their
confinement in reservations and/or imprisonment due
to violation of Section 2145 of the Administrative
Code .
Held: None of the rights of the citizen can be taken
away except by due process of law. The meaning of
"due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold
his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the
protection of the general rules which govern society."
To constitute "due process of law," a judicial
proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances,
even a hearing and notice are not requisite, a rule
which is especially true where much must be left to the
discretion of the administrative officers in applying a
law to particular cases. Neither is due process a
stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. Any legal
proceeding enforced by public authority, whether
sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the
discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the
public good, which regards and preserves these
principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due
process of law. Due process of law" means simply that
"first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony
with the general powers of the legislative department
of the Government; second, that this law shall be
reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be
enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be
applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all
of a class." What is due process of law depends on
circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and
necessities of the situation. The pledge that no person
shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not
infringed by a statute which is applicable to all of a
class. The classification must have a reasonable basis
and cannot be purely arbitrary in nature. Herein, one
cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly
interfered with when the degree of civilization of the
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their
own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor
can one say that due process of law has not been
followed. To go back to our definition of due process of
law and equal protection of the laws. There exists a
law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced
according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class. Action
pursuant to Section 2145 of the Administrative Code
does not deprive a person Constitutional Law II, 2005

( 3 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) of his liberty without

due process of law and does not deny to him the equal
protection of the laws, and that confinement in
reservations in accordance with said section does not
constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are
further of the opinion that Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the
police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy
of the United States. Rubi and the other Manguianes
are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their
liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.
Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro
39 Phil. 660 Political Law Delegation of Powers
Liberty and due process
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the
province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial
governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from
their native habitat and to established themselves on a
reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro,
and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if
they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in
a reservation made to that end and for purposes of
cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a
Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of very
low culture.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped
from

the

reservation

but

was

later

caught

and

was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he

escaped from the reservation. An application for
habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and other
Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of
the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro
creating the reservation, they had been illegally
deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of
Section

2145

of

the

Administrative

Code,

which

provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the
provincial governor of any province in which nonChristian inhabitants are found is authorized, when
such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of
law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up
their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to
be selected by him and approved by the provincial
board.
was challenged.

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ISSUE: Whether

or

not Section

2145

of

the

Administrative Code constitutes undue delegation.

Whether or not the Manguianes are being deprived of
their liberty.
HELD:
I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court
sustained the constitutionality of this section of the
Administrative Code. Under the doctrine of necessity,
who else was in a better position to determine whether

or not to execute the law but the provincial governor. It

is optional for the provincial governor to execute the
law as circumstances may arise. It is necessary to give
discretion to the provincial governor. The Legislature
may make decisions of executive departments of
subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed
the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.

II. No. Among other things, the term non-Christian

should not be given a literal meaning or a religious
signification, but that it was intended to relate to
degrees of civilization. The term non-Christian it was
said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to
geographical area, and more directly to natives of the

Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. In this

case, the Manguianes were being reconcentrated in the
reservation to promote peace and to arrest their
seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them
down where they can adapt to the changing times.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the

The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution

No.
25
wherein
non-Christian
inhabitants
(uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands. It is
resolved that under section 2077 of the
Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in
the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a
site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in
Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit
homesteads on this reservation providing that said
homestead
applications
are
previously
recommended by the provincial governor.
In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the
Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in
the townships of Naujan and Pola and the
Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in
the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in
Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation
on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any
Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order
shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in
sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the
revised Administrative Code.
Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro
were claimed as necessary measures for the
protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as
the protection of public forests in which they roam,
and to introduce civilized customs among them.
It appeared that Rubi and those living in his
rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the
reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.
It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally
deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of
that province. Rubi and his companions are said to
be held on the reservation established at Tigbao,
Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said
to be held under the custody of the provincial
sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away
form the reservation.

ISSUES:

provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory

nor class legislation, and stated among other things:

1.

. . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is

2.

unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization

Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative

Code deprives a person of his liberty?
Thus, whether or not Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional?

of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained

for their own good and the general good of the
Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law
has not been followed. To go back to our definition of

HELD:

due process of law and equal protection of the laws,

there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is
enforced

according

to

the

regular

methods

of

procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a

class.
RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
FACTS:

The Court held that section 2145 of the

Administrative Code does not deprive a person of
his liberty of abode and does not deny to him the
equal protection of the laws, and that confinement
in reservations in accordance with said section
does not constitute slavery and involuntary
servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that
section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a
legitimate exertion of the police power. Section
2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional.
Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for
the advancement of the non-Christian people of
the province; and (2) the only successfully method

for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them

to live in a permanent settlement. The SolicitorGeneral adds the following; (3) The protection of
the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public
forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of
introducing
civilized
customs
among
the
Manguianes.
One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is
unduly interfered without when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They
are restrained for their own good and the general
good of the Philippines.
Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is
restraint by law for the good of the individual and
for the greater good of the peace and order of
society and the general well-being. No man can do
exactly as he pleases.
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away
except by due process of law.
Therefore,
petitioners
are
not
unlawfully
imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas
corpus can, therefore, not issue.

cannot transact business with government agencies

delivering basic services to the people without the
contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse
to get this identification card for no one can avoid
dealing with government. It is thus clear that without
the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights
and enjoying his privileges. Administrative Order 308
does not merely implements the Administrative Code
of 1987, but establishes for the first time a National
Computerized Identification Reference System. An
administrative order is an ordinance issued by the
President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in
harmony with the law and should be for the sole
purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the
legislative policy. The authority to prescribe rules and
regulations is not an independent source of power to
make laws. AO 308 was beyond the power of the
President to issue.
292 SCRA 141 (1998)

4. Ople v. Torres [ GR 127685, 23 July 1998 ]

Facts: On 12 December 1996, President Fidel V. Ramos
issued Administrative Order 308, entitled "Adoption of
a National Computerized Identification Reference
System." It was published in 4 newspapers of general
circulation on 22 and 23 January 1997. On 24 January
1997, Senator Blas F. Ople, as a Senator, taxpayer and
member of the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), filed instant petition against then Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the
government agencies, who as members of the InterAgency Coordinating Committee are charged with the
implementation of Administrative Order 308.
Issue: Whether the Philippine President can issue an
Administrative Order for the adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System,
independent of a legislative act.
Held: Administrative Order 308 establishes a system of
identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects
the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign
resident, and more particularly, violates their right to
privacy. Such a system requires a delicate adjustment
of various contending state policies: the primacy of
national security, the extent of privacy interest against
dossier-gathering by government, the choice of
policies, etc. As said administrative order redefines the
parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-avis the State as well as the line that separates the
administrative power of the President to make rules
and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be
evident that it deals with a subject that should be
covered by law. The Order is a law, negating claims
that it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no
protection, and creates no office. Under it, a citizen

BLAS OPLE VS RUBEN TORRES

FACTS:

On December 12, 1996 President Fidel V. Ramos

issued Administrative Order 308 entitled Adoption
of National and Computerized Identification
Reference System. The purposes of the said order
are: (a) it will provide the Filipino and foreign
residents with the convenience to transact
businesses with basic service and social security
providers and other government instrumentalities
(b) it will reduce if not totally eradicate fraudulent
transactions and misrepresentations because it will
require a computerized system to properly and
efficiently identify person seeking basic services on
social security.
Petitioner Senator Blas Ople prays to invalidate
A.O. 308 for two vital constitutional grounds: (a) it
is a usurpation of power of Congress to legislate (b)
it intrudes the citizenrys protected zone of privacy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Administrative Order 308 is

unconstitutional for being overbreadth?

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that it is inarguable that

the broadness, vagueness and overbreadth of A.O.
308 will put the peoples right to privacy in clear
and present danger.
Administrative Order 308 does not state: (a) what
specific biological characteristics will be gathered
(b) what particular biometrics technology will be
employed (c) whether data is limited to use for
identification purposes only (d) how data will be
handled (e)who shall control and access the data.

Thus A.O 308 does not assure the individual of a

reasonable expectation of privacy because, as
technology advances, the level of reasonable
expected privacy decreases.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order
(A.O.) 308 on
December
12,
1996
NationalComputerized

entiltled

Adoption

of

Identification Reference System or commonly known

as Natioanal
ID System.
Senator Blas F. Ople filed a petition before the
Supreme Court
questioning the constitutionality of the said executive
issuance on
two important grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of
the power of
Congress to legislate,
intrudes on our

and

two,

it

impermissibly

citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the

petition for the
rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need
stronger
barriers against further erosion.

A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a

further look will show
that it does not state whether encoding of data is
limited to biological
information alone for identification purposes. In fact,
the Solicitor
General claims that the adoption of the Identification
Reference
System will contribute to the "generation of population
data for
development planning." 54 This is an admission that
the Population
Reference Number (PRN) will not be used solely for
identification but
for the generation of other data with remote relation to
the avowed
purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of
A.O. No. 308
can give the government the roving authority to store
and retrieve
information for a purpose other than the identification
of the individual
through his PRN .
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered
under A.O. No. 308
cannot be underplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant
to said

ISSUE: DOES A.0 308 VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY?

SUPREME COURT:
Yes. Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not
be the subject of
a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an
administrative
legislation because facially it violates the right to
privacy. A.O. 308 is so
vague. The vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No.
308 which if
implemented will put our people's right to privacy in
clear and present
danger. There are no vital safeguards.

administrative order, an individual must present his

PRN everytime he
deals with a government agency to avail of basic
services and
security. His transactions with the government agency
will necessarily
be recorded -- whether it be in the computer or in the
documentary
file of the agency. The individual's file may include his
transactions for
loan availments, income tax returns, statement of
assets and liabilities,
reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc.
The more frequent

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the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a
huge and

personal information which will be gathered about our

people will only

formidable information base through the electronic

linkage of the files.

be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. The

lack of proper

The data may be gathered for gainful and useful

government

safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere

with the

purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of

personal information

individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling

authorities to track

constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation

that may be too

down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous

persons to

great for some of our authorities to resist.

access confidential information and circumvent the

right against selfincrimination; it may pave the way for
"fishing expeditions" by

We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data

file will be
limited to the name, address and other basic personal
information
about the individual. Even that hospitable assumption
will not save
A.O. No. 308 from constitutional infirmity for again said
order does not
tell us in clear and categorical terms how these
information gathered
shall be handled. It does not provide who shall control
and access the
data, under what circumstances and for what purpose.
These factors
are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the
integrity of the
information. Well to note, the computer linkage gives
other

government authorities and evade the right against

unreasonable
searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and
misuse of the PRN,
biometrics and computer technology are accentuated
when we
consider that the individual lacks control over what can
be read or
placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of
the data
encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of
Rights seeks to
prevent.
Excerpts from the concurring opinion of the Supreme
Court justices:
Justice ROMERO, concur

government agencies access to the information. Yet,

there are no

So terrifying are the possibilities of a law such as

Administrative Order

controls to guard against leakage of information. When

the access

No. 308 in making inroads into the private lives of the

citizens, a virtual

code of the control

computer system is

particular

Big Brother looking over our shoulders, that it must,

without delay, be

broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty,

can make use

"slain upon sight" before our society turns totalitarian

with each of us, a

of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate

the data

mindless robot.

programs

of

the

stored within the system. It is plain and we hold that

A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that

Justice Vitug, concur

8
Administrative Order No. 308 appears to be so
extensively drawn that

particularly describing the place to be searched and

the persons or things

could, indeed, allow unbridled options to become

available to it

to be seized.

implementors beyond the reasonable comfort of the

citizens and of
residents alike.

RIGHT TO PRIVACY
CONSTITUTION

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same
within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon
lawful order of the

RECOGNIZED

THE

court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired

except in the interest of

Hereunder are the provisions in the 1987 Constitution

which recognize our

national security, public safety, or public health, as

may be provided by

Right to Privacy :

law.

Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights:

xxx xxx xxx.

"Sec. 3. (1) The privacy

correspondence shall be

of

UNDER

and

Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those

employed in the public

inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or

when public safety or

and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or

societies for purposes

order requires otherwise as prescribed by law."

not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in

various provisions of

Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness

against himself.

the Bill of Rights, viz: 34

Personal Analysis:

"Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or

property without due

A.O. 308 was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme

Court en banc for

process of law, nor shall any person be denied the

equal protection of the

reasons above stated. It bears stressing that the bulk

of discussion in the

laws. Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses,

case focused more on the issue of infringement of the

right to privacy. As

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and

seizures of

can be gleaned from A.O. 308, the provisions were so

general that there

whatever nature and for

inviolable, and no search

be

were no clear and vital guidelines to safeguard the

information stored in

warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon

probable cause to be

the Identification Card. Had President Fidel V. Ramos

issued a more

determined personally by the judge after examination

under oath or

complete and detailed guidelines providing for the

metes and bounds of

affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he

may produce, and

the ID System, the decision could have been otherwise.

any

communication

purpose

shall

Even the argument of the respondents that rules and

regulations would

9
be issued by the committee later, the court still reject
the same. The court
said.: The rules and regulations to be drawn by the
IACC cannot remedy
this fatal defect. Rules and
implement the policy of the

regulations

merely

law or order. On its face, A.O. No. 308 gives the InterAgency
Coordinating Committee (IACC) virtually unfettered
discretion to
determine the metes and bounds of the ID System.
In one press conference last month, Presidential
Spokesperson Ignacio
Bunye said that there is really no need to pass a law to
push through with
the plan of the National ID System.
issuance by the

An executive

President would suffice provided this time the said

order will now be
detailed, comprehensive and contains all the vital
safeguards. From his
statement, it can be deduced therefrom that the
reservation and
backlash by the supreme court on the on the Ople case
(A.O 308) have
been taken into consideration by Malacanang.
5.

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan [GR 148560, 19

November 2001]

Facts: On 4 April 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman

filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate
Informations, docketed as: (a) Criminal Case 26558, for
violation of Republic Act (RA) 7080, as amended by RA
7659; (b) Criminal Cases 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for
violation of Sections 3, paragraph (a), 3, paragraph (a),
3, paragraph (e), and 3, paragraph (e) of RA 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c)
Criminal Case 26563, for violation of Section 7,
paragraph (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees);
(d) Criminal Case 26564, for Perjury (Article. 183 of The
Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Criminal Case 26565, for
Illegal Use Of An Alias (Commonwealth Act 142, as
amended by RA 6085). On 11 April 2001, Joseph
Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the

case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation

with respect to Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 5 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) specification "d" of the
charges in the Information in Criminal Case 26558;
and, for reconsideration / reinvestigation of the
offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give
the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits
and other documents necessary to prove lack of
probable cause. The grounds raised were only lack of
preliminary investigation, reconsideration /
reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove
lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the
charges and the vagueness of the law under which
they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus
Motion thus indicating the explicitness and
comprehensibility of the Plunder Law. On 25 April 2001,
the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution
in Criminal Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable
cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify the
issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On
25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration
was denied by the Sandiganbayan. On 14 June 2001,
Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal
Case 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged
therein did not constitute an indictable offense since
the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for
vagueness, and that the Amended Information for
Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 9 July
2001, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to
Quash.
Issue: Whether the Plunder law, and the information,
are clear to inform Estrada of the accusations against
him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent
defense.
Held: As it is written, the Plunder Law contains
ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters
which would enable the accused to determine the
nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit
in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions
required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of
the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide
or rule that would inform those who are subject to it
what conduct would render them liable to its penalties,
its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide
the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending
one charged with its violation; and more importantly,
the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed
conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little
difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the
act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating illgotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a
series or combination of acts enumerated in Section 1,
paragraph (d), of the Plunder Law. Herein, the
amended Information itself closely tracks the language
of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the

10
various elements of the offense which Estrada is
alleged to have committed. There was nothing that is
vague or ambiguous that will confuse Estrada in his
defense. Factual assertions clearly show that the
elements of the crime are easily understood and
provide adequate contrast between the innocent and
the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions,
Estrada is completely informed of the accusations
against him as to enable him to prepare for an
intelligent defense. There is no basis for Estrada's
claim that the Supreme Court review the Anti-Plunder
Law on its face and in its entirety. A facial challenge is
allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one
which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect"
upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen
statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily
apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for
rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression is deemed to justify allowing
attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement
that the person making the attack demonstrate that
his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute
drawn with narrow specificity." This rationale does not
apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general
in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence,
and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone,
the State may well be prevented from enacting laws
against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal
law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech. The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an
act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law." The overbreadth doctrine, on the other
hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not
be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms." The doctrines of strict scrutiny,
overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free
speech Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 6 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) cases. "On its face" invalidation of
statutes has been described as "manifestly strong
medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a
last resort," and is generally disfavored.
ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYANG.R. No. 148560, November 19,
2001Facts:Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder,wishes
to impress upon the Court that the assailed law
is so defectively fashioned that itcrosses that
thin but distinct line which divides the valid
from the constitutionally infi rm. Hiscontentions
are mainly based on the eff ects of the said law
that it suff ers from the vice of vagueness; it

dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in

criminal prosecutions; and itabolishes the element of mens
rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal
Codesaying that it violates the fundamental rights of the
accused.T h e f o c a l p o i n t o f
the case is the alleged
va gu en e ss of th e l aw
in the
t e r m s i t u s e s . Particularly,
this terms
are:
combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this,
the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the
mentioned law.Issue:Whether or not the petitioner
possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the
law usingthe facial challenge. Ruling:On how the law
uses the terms combination and series does not
constitute vagueness. The petitioners contention
that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient
notice
of
what
the
lawseeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued
. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is
manifestlymisplaced under the petitioners relia
nce since ordinary intelligence can understand
whatconduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only
be invoked against that specie of legislation thatis
utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a
saving clause or construction cannot beinvoked. Said
doctrine may not invoked in this case since the
statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness
doctrine
merely
requires
a reasonable
degree
of certainty for the statuteto be upheld, not absolute
precision
or
mathematical
exactitude.On the
other hand, overbreadth
doctrine decrees
that governmental purpose
may not
bea c h i e v e d b y m e a n s w h i c h s w e e p u n n e c e s
saril y bro adly and thereby invad e the area
o f protected freedoms.Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds
that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague
statuteand to one which is overbroad because of
possible
chilling
eff ect
upon
protected
speech.Furthermore, in the area of criminal law,
the law cannot take chances as in the area of
freespeech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most
difficult challenge to mount successfullysince the challenger
must establish that no set of circumstances exists.Doctrines
mentioned are analytical tools developed for
facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases.
With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to
who application of a statute is constitutional will not be
heard to attack the statute on the ground that
impliedly itmight also be taken as applying to
other persons or other situations in which its
applicationmig ht be unconstitutiona l. On its
face invalidation of statues results in striking
them downentirely on the ground that they might be
applied to parties not before the Court whose
activitiesare constitutionally protected. It is evident
that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law ismore
imagined than real.The crime of plunder as a malum

11
in se is deemed to have been resolve in the
Congressdecision to include it among the heinous crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.Supreme Court holds
the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for
lacking merit.

connection with any government contract or

project or by reason of the office or position
of the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent
conveyance or disposition of assets belonging
to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or
government owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries;

G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting

directly or indirectly any shares of stock,
equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future
employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking;

FACTS:

The Office of the Ombudsman accuses President

Joseph Ejercito Estrada together with Jinggoy
Estrada, Charlie Atong Ang, Edward Serapio,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro Eleuterio Tan, and
Delia Rajsas of the crime of plunder defined and
penalized under R.A. No. 7080 as amended by Sec.
12 R.A. No. 7659.
During the term of President Estrada, he together
with the individuals mentioned above wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and
acquire by himself, directly or indirectly ill-gotten
wealth amounting to four billion ninety seven
million eight hundred four thousand one hundred
seventy three pesos and seventeen centavos
(4,097,804,173.17), thereby unjustly enriching
himself or themselves at the expense and to the
damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines.
Under RA 7080 An Act Defining and Penalizing the
Crime of Plunder as amended by RA 7659 Section
2, the crime of plunder is defined as an act of any
public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates
or other persons, amasses, accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or
a series of overt or criminal acts described in
Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or
total value of at least fifty million pesos
(50,000,000) and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death.
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any
asset, property, business, enterprise or material
possession of any person within the purview of
Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or
similar schemes:
(1)
Through
misappropriation,
conversion, misuse, or malversation of public
funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly,
any commission, gift, share, percentage,
kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary
benefit from any person and/or entity in

(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial

or
commercial
monopolies
or
other
combinations and/or implementation of
decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official
position, authority, relationship, connection or
influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the
damage and prejudice of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines.

Petitioner Estrada questions the validity of the law

for it is void for vagueness. He bewails the failure
of the law to provide for the statutory definition of
the terms and combination and series in the
key phrase a combination or a series of overt or
criminal acts found in Section 1 par. d, and the
word pattern in Section 4.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Plunder

unconstitutional for it suffers from the
vagueness?

Law
vice

is
of

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that a statute or act may

be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its
application.
In such instance, the statute is
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle. But the doctrine does not
apply as against legislations that are merely

12

couched in imprecise language but which

nonetheless specify a standard though defectively
phrased; or to those that are apparently
ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of
activities. The first may be "saved" by proper
construction, while no challenge may be mounted
as against the second whenever directed against
such activities. With more reason, the doctrine
cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is
clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute
is void for uncertainty is whether the language
conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice. It must be stressed,
however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to
suggest.
Flexibility, rather than meticulous
specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and
bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An
act will not be held invalid merely because it might
have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed
in its provisions, especially where, because of the
nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide
all the details in advance as in all other statutes.

Randolf David vs President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

Professor Randolf S. David, et. al. vs. MacapagalArroyo, et. al.
G.R. No. 171396

03 May 2006

OVERVIEW:
This is a case of seven consolidated petitions for
certiorari and prohibition alleging that in issuing
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order
No. 5, President Arroyo committed grave abuse of
discretion.
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP1017
declaring a State of National Emergency invoking
Section 18, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution. On the
same day, she also issued GO no. 5 AFP and PNP to
immediately carry out appropriate actions to suppress
and prevent the lawless violence by invoking Section 4,
Article 2 of the same. She did so citing the following
bases:
The elements of the elements of the Extreme Left
(NDF-CPP-NPA) and Extreme Right are now in alliance
threatening to bring down the President;
Being magnified by the media, said acts are adversely
affecting the economy thus representing clear and
present danger to the safety and integrity of the State

A week later, the President lifted PP1017 via PP1021. It

must be noted that before the said proclamations, the
following course of events ensued:
February 17, 2006 : authorities got hold of a document
entitled Oplan Hackle I detailing the plans for
bombing more particularly that which was to occur in
the PMA Homecoming in Baguio City which the
President was to attend.
February 21, 2006 : Lt. San Juan recaptured a
communist safehouse where 2 flash disks containing
information that Magdalos D-Day would be on
February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I.
February 23, 2006 : PNP Chief Lomibao intercepted
information that members of the PNP-SAF were
planning to defect. Also, it was discovered that B/Gen.
Danilo Lim and Col. Ariel Querubin were plotting to
break the AFP chain of command for a movement
against the Arroyo administration. The two were later
taken into custody by Gen. Senga. However,
statements were being released from the CPP-NPA and
NDF on the increasing number of anti-Arroyo groups
within the police and military.
The bombing of telecommunication towers and cell
sites in Bulacan and Bataan.
The effects of PP1017 and GO No. 5 are as follows:
Protest by the KMU, NAFLU-KMU despite the
cancellation of programs and activities for the 20th
celebration of Edsa I as well as revocation of rally
permits resulting in the violent disposal of the said
groups and warrantless arrest of petitioner Randolf
David and Ronald Llamas.
Raid of the Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante offices
and confiscation of news stories and various
documents
Arrest of Congressman Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis
Party) by the police showing a 1985 warrant from the
Marcos regime and attempts on the arrest of Satur
Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, et. al.
The petitioners assail that various rights stated in
Article III of the 1987 Constitution have been violated,
thus the case at hand.

ISSUES:
Whether PP 1021 in lifting PP 1017 renders the
petitions moot and academic;

13
Whether the Court may review the factual bases of
PP1017 on the petitioners contention that the said
proclamation has none of it;
Whether PP 1017 and GO no. 5 are unconstitutional for
their insofar as it allegedly violates the right of the
people against unreasonable search and seizures, the
right against warrantless arrest, the freedom of speech,
of expression, of the press, and to peaceably assemble.

HELD:
The court held that President Arroyos issuance of PP
1021 did not render the present petitions moot and
academic. During the eight days that PP 1017 was
operative, the police officers committed illegal acts
implementing it. There is no question that the issues
being raised affect the publics interest involving as
they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of
expression, of assembly and of the press. An otherwise
moot case may still be decided provided that the
party raising it continues to be prejudiced or damaged
as a direct result of its issuance (Sanlakas v. Executive
Secretary) which is applicable in the present case.
Yes, the Court may do so. As to how the Court may
inquire into the Presidents exercise of power, it must
be proven that the President did not act arbitrarily. It is
incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the
Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis as
the Court cannot undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings. This, however, was
something that the petitioners failed to prove.
Since there is no law defining acts of terrorism, it is
President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5 who has the
discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism,
without restrictions. Certainly, the effects which may
be implicated by such violate the due process clause of
the Constitution. Thus, the acts of terrorism portion of
G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional. The plain import of the
language of the Constitution provides that searches,
seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable without
a search warrant or warrant of arrest. A warrantless
arrest shall only be done if the offense is committed in
ones presence or it has just been committed based on
personal knowledge both of which are not present in
Davids warrantless arrest. This being done during the
dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU, et. al. is
also violative of the right of the people to peaceably
assemble. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to
rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that
freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right
to prevent. Revocation of such permits may only be

done after due notice and hearing. In the Daily

Tribune case, the search and seizure of materials for
publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity
of The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning
of government officials to media are plain censorship.
It is that officious functionary of the repressive
government who tells the citizen that he may speak
only if allowed to do so, and no more. When in
implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the
military and the police committed acts which violate
the citizens rights under the Constitution, the Court
has to declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal.

GR No. 126858, September 16, 2005

ONG VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:
Congressman Bonifacio Gallego executed a complaint
against petitioner Ong, a former Commissioner of the
BIR claiming that petitioner has amassed properties
worth disproportionately more than his lawful income.
The Director of the Fact Finding Committee of the office
of the Ombudsman ordered the conduct of
investigation on the matter; of which petitioner was
required to submit counter affidavit and controverting
evidence. Petitioner filed a counter-affidavit submitting
his Statements of Assets and Liabilities, income tax
return, bank certificates showing that he obtained a
loan from Allied Banking Corporation, certificate from
SGV and company and other documents explaining the
sources of funds with which he acquired the questioned
assets. Ombudsman finds and recommend for recovery
of ill-gotten wealth under Ra 1379, in relation to RAs
3019 and 6770 against Ong and all other persons
concerned.

ISSUE/S:
1.

2.

3.

WON, the right to preliminary investigation is

withheld by RA 1379 from a co-respondent Nelly
Ong, who is not herself a public officer or
employee.
WON, petitioner is correct in his contention that the
office of the Ombudsman is disqualified to file a
petition for forfeiture considering of the duality of
function, as investigator and prosecutor of the
case.
WON, petitioner is correct in the contention that
RA1379 is unconstitutional since it violates the
presumption of innocence and the right against self
incrimination.

14
HELD:
1.

2.

3.

No, even if RA 1379 appears to be directed only

against the public officer or employee who has
acquired during his incumbency an amount of
property which is manifestly out of proportion to
his salary and his other lawful income and the
income from legitimately acquired property, the
reality thst the application of the law is such that
the conjugal share of Nelly Ong stands to be
subjective to the penalty of forfeiture grants her
the right, in line with the due process clause of the
constitution, to a preliminary investigation.
No, Supreme Court declared that the office of the
Ombudsman has the correlative powers to
investigate and initiate the proper action for the
recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth.
No, the court ruled that petitioner cannot invoked
constitutional assurance against self incrimination
because such right is a prohibition against the use
of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications to the accused. In this case,
petitioners are not compelled to present
themselves as witnesses in rebutting the
presumption established by law. They may present
documents evidencing the purported bank loans,
money market placements and other fund sources
in their defense.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Algue [GR

L-28896, 17 February 1988]
Facts: The Philippine Sugar Estate Development
Company (PSEDC) appointed Algue Inc. as its agent,
authorizing it to sell its land, factories, and oil
manufacturing process. The Vegetable Oil Investment
Corporation (VOICP) purchased PSEDC properties. For
the sale, Algue received a commission of P125,000 and
it was from this commission that it paid Guevara, et. al.
organizers of the VOICP, P75,000 in promotional fees.
In 1965, Algue received an assessment from the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the amount of
P83,183.85 as delinquency income tax for years 1958
amd 1959. Algue filed a protest or request for
reconsideration which was not acted upon by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). The counsel for Algue
had to accept the warrant of distraint and levy. Algue,
however, filed a petition for review with the Court of
Tax Appeals.
Issue: Whether the assessment from the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue was reasonable.
Held: No. Taxes are the lifeblood of the government
and so should be collected without unnecessary
hindrance. Every person who is able to pay must
contribute his share in the running of the government.
The Government, for his part, is expected to respond in
the form of tangible and intangible benefits intended to
improve the lives of the people and enhance their

moral and material values. This symbiotic relationship

is the rationale of taxation and should dispel the
erroneous notion that is an arbitrary method of
exaction by those in the seat of power. Tax collection,
however, should be made in accordance with law as
any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for
government itself. For all the awesome power of the
tax collector, he may still be stopped in his tracks if the
taxpayer can demonstrate that the law has not been
observed. Herein, the claimed deduction (pursuant to
Section 30 [a] [1] of the Tax Code and Section 70 [1] of
Revenue Regulation 2: as to compensation for personal
services) had been legitimately by Algue Inc. It has
further proven that the payment of fees was
reasonable and necessary in light of the efforts exerted
by the payees in inducing investors (in VOICP) to
involve themselves in an experimental enterprise or a
business requiring millions of pesos. The assessment
was not reasonable. 53 Commissioner of Customs v.
Makasiar [GR 79307, 29 August 1989] Third division,
Cortes (J): 3 concur, 1 took no part Facts: On 7
December 1978, the then Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Manila issued Search and Seizure Warrants in
Criminal Cases 8602 and 8603 (People v. Sosis) for
violation of Section 11 (a) and/or 11(e) of Republic Act
3720, and violation of Article 188 of the Revised Penal
Code (Substituting and altering trademarks,
tradenames, or service marks; in this case, Johnnie
Walker Scotch Whisky), respectively. On 8 December
1978, a composite team from the Ministry of Finance
Bureau of Investigation and Intelligence (BII), the
Bureau of Customs and the Integrated National Police
(INP) enforced the search and seizure warrants, and
seized and confiscated 6 tanks of scotch whisky, 417
cartons of 1doz. Johnny Walker black, 109 empty
bottles, among others, found in the premises of the
Hercules Bottling at Paco, Manila. The articles seized
remained in the premises of Hercules guarded and
secured by BII personnel. On 2 January 1979, the
Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila issued a
warrant of seizure and detention and ordered the
immediate seizure and turnover of the seized items to
its Auction and Cargo Disposal Division at the Port of
Manila. Seizure and forfeiture proceedings were then
initiated against the articles for alleged violation of
Section 2530 (f) of the Tariff and Customs Code, in
relation to RA 3720. On 29 January 1979, the CFI issued
an order authorizing the transfer and delivery of the
seized articles to the customs warehouse located at
South Harbor, Port of Manila. The City Fiscal of Manila
proceeded with the preliminary investigation of the
criminal cases and the Bureau of Customs also
resumed hearing the seizure and forfeiture proceedings
over the said articles. On 11 June 1982, the Distiller Co.
Ltd. of England objected to the continuation by the
Collector of Customs of the seizure proceedings
claiming that these proceedings would hamper or even

15
jeopardize the preliminary investigation being
conducted by the fiscal. The Collector of Customs
ignored the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) objections. On 24 September 1982,
the company filed a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction and/or TRO (Civil Case 8212721) to enjoin the Hearing Officer of the Bureau of
Customs from taking further action in the seizure
proceedings of the subject goods. The petition was
heard not before the CFIMANILA which originally issued
the search warrants, but before another sala, that of
Judge Ramon P. Makasiar of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 35, Manila. The judge issued a TRO on 29
September 1982. Subsequently, a writ for preliminary
injunction was issued as well. On 20 July 1987, the
judge rendered a decision holding that the Collector of
Customs acted in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing
the warrant of seizure and detention considering that
the subject goods had already come under the legal
custody of the CFI. Hence, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, represented by the Solicitor General,
filed the instant petition on 11 August 1987. In the
meantime, Howard Sosis and company were charged
for violation of Chapter VI, Sec. 11(a) & (e) of RA 3720
(Criminal Case 88-63157) and for violation of Article
188 of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Case 8863156) before the RTC and the MTC Manila. Issue:
Whether the Regional Trial Court has the power to
review the acts of the Collector of Custom. Held: Tariff
and customs duties are taxes constituting a significant
portion of the public revenue which are the lifeblood
that enables the government to carry out functions it
has been instituted to perform. The Regional Trial
Courts (RTCs) are devoid of any competence to pass
upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture
proceedings conducted in the Bureau of Customs, and
to enjoin, or otherwise interfere with, these
proceedings. The Collector of Customs sitting in seizure
and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and determine all questions touching on the
seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The RTCs are
precluded from assuming cognizance over such
matters even through petitions of certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus. The provisions of the Tariff and Customs
Code and that of RA 1125 specify the proper fora for
the ventilation of any legal objections or issues raised
concerning these proceedings. Actions of the Collector
of Customs are appealable to the Commissioner of
Customs, whose decisions, in turn, are subject to the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA. Thereafter,
an appeal lies to the Supreme Court through the
appropriate petition for review by writ of certiorari.
Undeniably, RTCs do not share these review powers.
The rule is anchored upon the policy of placing no
unnecessary hindrance on the government's drive not
only to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon
customs, but also, and more importantly, to render

effective and efficient the collection of import and

export duties due the state.
CIR vs. Algue Inc.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Algue Inc.

GR No. L-28896 | Feb. 17, 1988

Facts:

Algue Inc. is a domestic corp engaged

engineering, construction and other allied activities

On Jan. 14, 1965, the corp received a letter from

the CIR regarding its delinquency income taxes from
1958-1959, amtg to P83,183.85

A letter of protest or reconsideration was filed by

Algue Inc on Jan 18

On March 12, a warrant of distraint and levy was

presented to Algue Inc. thru its counsel, Atty. Guevara,
who refused to receive it on the ground of the pending
protest

Since the protest was not found on the records, a

file copy from the corp was produced and given to BIR
Agent Reyes, who deferred service of the warrant

On April 7, Atty. Guevara was informed that the BIR

was not taking any action on the protest and it was
only then that he accepted the warrant of distraint and
levy earlier sought to be served

On April 23, Algue filed a petition for review of the

decision of the CIR with the Court of Tax Appeals

in

CIR contentions:

the claimed deduction of P75,000.00 was properly

disallowed because it was not an ordinary reasonable
or necessary business expense

payments are fictitious because most of the payees

are members of the same family in control of Algue
and that there is not enough substantiation of such
payments

CTA: 75K had been legitimately paid by Algue Inc.

for actual services rendered in the form of promotional
fees. These were collected by the Payees for their work
in the creation of the Vegetable Oil Investment
Corporation of the Philippines and its subsequent
purchase of the properties of the Philippine Sugar
Estate Development Company.

16

Sec. 30 of the Tax Code: allowed deductions in the

net income Expenses - All the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business, including a
reasonable
allowance
for
salaries
or
other
compensation for personal services actually rendered
xxx

the burden is on the taxpayer to prove the validity

of the claimed deduction

In this case, Algue Inc. has proved that the

payment of the fees was necessary and reasonable in
the light of the efforts exerted by the payees in
inducing investors and prominent businessmen to
venture in an experimental enterprise and involve
themselves in a new business requiring millions of
pesos.

Taxes are what we pay for civilization society.

Without taxes, the government would be paralyzed for
lack of the motive power to activate and operate it.
Hence, despite the natural reluctance to surrender part
of one's hard earned income to the taxing authorities,
every person who is able to must contribute his share
in the running of the government. The government for
its part, is expected to respond in the form of tangible
and intangible benefits intended to improve the lives of
the people and enhance their moral and material
values

Taxation must be exercised reasonably and in

accordance with the prescribed procedure. If it is not,
then the taxpayer has a right to complain and the
courts will then come to his succor

Issue: W/N the Collector of Internal Revenue correctly

disallowed the P75,000.00 deduction claimed by Algue
as legitimate business expenses in its income tax
returns

Ruling:

Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so

should be collected without unnecessary hindrance,
made in accordance with law.

RA 1125: the appeal may be made within thirty

days after receipt of the decision or ruling challenged

During the intervening period, the warrant was

premature and could therefore not be served.

Originally, CIR claimed that the 75K promotional

fees to be personal holding company income, but later
on conformed to the decision of CTA

There is no dispute that the payees duly reported

their respective shares of the fees in their income tax
returns and paid the corresponding taxes thereon. CTA
also found, after examining the evidence, that no
distribution of dividends was involved

CIR suggests a tax dodge, an attempt to evade a

legitimate assessment by involving an imaginary
deduction

Algue Inc. was a family corporation where strict

business procedures were not applied and immediate
issuance of receipts was not required. at the end of the
year, when the books were to be closed, each payee
made an accounting of all of the fees received by him
or her, to make up the total of P75,000.00. This
arrangement was understandable in view of the close
relationship among the persons in the family
corporation
The amount of the promotional fees was not
excessive. The total commission paid by the Philippine
Sugar Estate Development Co. to Algue Inc. was
P125K. After deducting the said fees, Algue still had a
balance of P50,000.00 as clear profit from the
transaction. The amount of P75,000.00 was 60% of the
total commission. This was a reasonable proportion,
considering that it was the payees who did practically
everything, from the formation of the Vegetable Oil
Investment Corporation to the actual purchase by it of
the Sugar Estate properties.

Algue Inc.s appeal from the decision of the CIR was

filed on time with the CTA in accordance with Rep. Act
No. 1125. And we also find that the claimed deduction
by Algue Inc. was permitted under the Internal
Revenue Code and should therefore not have been
disallowed by the CIR

Commissioner vs. Algue, Inc.

COMMISSIONER
v.
ALGUE,
GR No. L-28896, February 17, 1988

INC.

158 SCRA 9

FACTS: Private respondent corporation Algue Inc. filed

its income tax returns for 1958 and 1959showing

17
deductions, for promotional fees paid, from their gross
income, thus lowering their taxable income. The BIR
assessed Algue based on such deductions contending
that the claimed deduction is disallowed because it
was not an ordinary, reasonable and necessary
expense.

ISSUE: Should an uncommon business expense be

disallowed as a proper deduction in computation of
income taxes, corollary to the doctrine that taxes are
the lifeblood of the government?

HELD: No. Private respondent has proved that the

payment of the fees was necessary and reasonable in
the light of the efforts exerted by the payees in
inducing investors and prominent businessmen to
venture in an xperimental enterprise and involve
themselves in a new business requiring millions of
pesos. This was no mean feat and should be, as it was,
sufficiently
recompensed.
It is well-settled that taxes are the lifeblood of the
government and so should be collected without
unnecessary hindrance On the other hand, such
collection should be made in accordance with law as
any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for
government itself. It is therefore necessary to reconcile
the apparently conflicting interests of the authorities
and the taxpayers so that the real purpose of taxation,
which is the promotion of the common good, may be
achieved.
But even as we concede the inevitability and
indispensability of taxation, it is a requirement in all
democratic regimes that it be exercised reasonably and
in accordance with the prescribed procedure. If it is
not, then the taxpayer has a right to complain and the
courts will then come to his succor. For all the
awesome power of the tax collector, he may still be
stopped in his tracks if the taxpayer can demonstrate,
as it has here, that the law has not been observed.

his jurisdiction the disputed Warrant of

Seizure and Detention dated January 2,
1979, in Seizure Identification No. 2-79
of the Bureau of Customs, as well as all
the proceedings taken thereon are
declared NULL and VOID, and the writ
of prohibition prayed for is GRANTED.
The public respondent is ordered to
REFRAIN and DESIST from conducting
any proceedings for the seizure and
forfeiture of the articles in question
until after the Court having taken
cognizance and legal custody thereof
has rendered its final judgment in the
criminal cases which involve the same
articles. Without costs.
SO ORDERED. [RTC Decision, p. 7;
Rollo, p. 26].
The undisputed acts are as follows:
On 7 December 1978, the then Court of First Instance
of Manila (herein referred to as CFI-MANILA) issued
Search and Seizure Warrants in Criminal Case Nos.
8602 and 8603 entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Howard J. Sosis,, et al.," for violation of Section 11 (a)
and/or 11(e) of Republic Act No. 3720, * and violation
of Article 188 of the Revised Penal Code (captioned as
"Substituting and altering trademarks, tradenames, or
service marks"), respectively, and ordering the seizure
of the following:
a) Materials:
All whisky, bottles, labels, caps,
cartons, boxes, machinery equipment
or other materials used or intended to
be used, or suitable for use, in
connection with counter-feiting or
imitation of Johnnie Walker Scotch
Whisky
b) Documents:
xxx

G.R. No. 79307 August 29, 1989

under the control and possession of:

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioner, vs. THE

HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, RTC Judge, Branch
35, Manila and THE DISTILLERS CO. LTD. OF
ENGLAND, respondents.

1. Howard J. Sosis

Petitioner Commissioner of Customs seeks the reversal

of respondent judge's decision dated 20 July 1987 in
Civil Case No. 82-12821 entitled "The Distillers Co. Ltd.,
of England v. Victorio Francisco, et al.," the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, having been issued by
the Collector of Customs in excess of

2. George Morrison Lonie

3. Hercules Bottling Co.
4. Lauro Villanueva
5. Vicente Velasco
6. Manuel Esteban

18
7. Eugenio Mauricio
[Rollo, pp. 106-107].
On 8 December 1978, a composite team from the
Ministry of Finance Bureau of Investigation and
Intelligence (herein referred to as BII), the Bureau of
Customs and the Integrated National Police enforced
the search and seizure warrants, and seized and
confiscated the following articles, among others, found
in the premises of the Hercules Bottling Co., Inc.
(herein referred to as HERCULES) at Isla de Provisor,
Paco, Manila:
Six (6) Tanks of Scotch Whisky; 417
cartons each containing I doz. bottles
of "Johnnie Walker Black Label Whisky";
109 empty bottles; Empty Cartons of
"Johnnie Walker Black Label Scotch
Whisky" number 900-2044 empty
cartons. [Rollo, p. 21].
The articles seized remained in the premises of
HERCULES guarded and secured by BII personnel.
On 2 January 1979, the Collector of Customs for the
Port of Manila, after being informed of the seizure of
the subject goods and upon verification that the same
were imported contrary to law, issued a warrant of
seizure and detention, in Seizure Identification No. 279, and ordered the immediate seizure and turnover of
the seized items to its Auction and Cargo Disposal
Division at the Port of Manila. Seizure and forfeiture
proceedings were then initiated against the aboveenumerated articles for alleged violation of Section
2530 (f) of the Tariff and Customs Code, in relation to
Republic Act 3720, to wit:
Sec. 2530. Property subject to
forfeiture under Tariff and Customs law:
xxx
(f) Any article the importation or
exportation of which is effected or
attempted contrary to law, or any
article of prohibited importation or
exportation, and all other articles
which, in the opinion of the collector
have been used, are or were entered to
be used as instruments in the
importation or exportation of the
former.

1. The Commissioner of Customs is

willing to have custody of the same
and guarantees their safekeeping at all
times in the same quantity, quality,
manner and condition when the articles
shall be turned over to and received by
the Bureau of Customs in custodia
legis, subject to the further orders from
the Court;
2. No article shall be transferred
without
the
presence
of
a
representative of the applicant, the
defendants, the Commissioner of
Customs
and
the
Court;
these
representatives
to
secure
the
necessary escort as guarantee that
nothing will happen during the transfer
of the articles.
3. The Commissioner of Customs to
issue the proper and necessary receipt
for each and every article transferred
to and received by the Bureau of
Customs pursuant to this order [Rollo,
p. 22].
Meanwhile, the validity and constitutionality of the
issuance and service of the search and seizure
warrants issued by the CFI- MANILA were contested in
and upheld by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP09153-R entitled "Hercules Bottling Co. Inc., et al., v.
Victoriano Savellano, et al." HERCULES filed a petition
for certiorari in the Supreme Court but in a resolution
dated 26 November 1986 in G.R. No. 55061 captioned
as Hercules Bottling Co., Inc. v. The Court of Appeals,
the Court dismissed the petition.
Consequently, the City Fiscal of Manila proceeded with
the preliminary investigation of the criminal cases,
where private respondent, The Distillers Co. Ltd. of
England, claiming to be the owner and exclusive
manufacturer of Johnnie Walker Scotch Whiskey was
the private complainant [Rollo, p. 61], With the
dismissal of HERCULES' petition, the Bureau of
Customs also resumed hearing the seizure and
forfeiture proceedings over the said articles.
The present controversy arose when private
respondent, on 11 June 1982, objected to the
continuation by the Collector of Customs of the seizure
proceedings claiming, among others, that these
proceedings would hamper or even jeopardize the
preliminary investigation being conducted by the fiscal.
The Collector of Customs ignored the objections.

xxx
On 29 January 1979, the CFI-MANILA issued an order
authorizing the transfer and delivery of the seized
articles to the customs warehouse located at South
Harbor, Port of Manila, subject to the following
conditions:

In order to stop and enjoin the Hearing Officer of the

Bureau of Customs from taking further action in the
seizure proceedings of the subject goods, private
respondent on 24 September 1982 filed a petition for
prohibition
with
preliminary
injunction
and/or
temporary restraining order, docketed as Civil Case No.
82-12721. It must be noted at this juncture that the
petition was heard not before the CFI-MANILA which

19
originally issued the search warrants, but before
another sala, that of respondent judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 35, Manila.
Respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order
on 29 September 1982. Subsequently, a writ for
preliminary injunction was issued as well. Petitioner
filed an answer on 12 November 1982. On 20 July
1987, respondent judge rendered a decision
holding that the Collector of Customs acted in
excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the warrant of
seizure and detention considering that the
subject goods had already come under the legal
custody of the CFI-MANILA. Hence, petitioner
represented by the Solicitor General, filed the instant
petition on 11 August 1987.
In the meantime, Howard Sosis and company were
charged for violation of Chapter VI, Sec. 11(a) & (e) of
Republic Act 3720 in Criminal Case No. 88-63157 and
for violation of Article 188 of the Revised Penal Code in
Criminal Case No. 88-63156 before the Regional Trial
Court and the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
respectively [Rollo, p. 83].
In his petition, the Commissioner of Customs assigns
as errors the following:
I. RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN
ISSUING A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER AND SUBSEQUENTLY A WRIT OF
INJUNCTION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 8212721 NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT, THE
DISTILLERS CO., LTD., OF ENGLAND
HAS NO VALID CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER;
II. RESPONDENT RTC JUDGE GRAVELY
ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE
PETITION AND IN PROCEEDING TO
HEAR AND RENDER A DECISION IN
CIVIL
CASE
NO.
82-12721
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT
THE
TRIAL
COURT
HAS
NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE [Rollo,
pp. 10-11].
Petitioner contends that the authority of the Bureau of
Customs over seizure and forfeiture cases is beyond
the judicial interference of the Regional Trial Court,
even in the form of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus
which are really attempts to review the Commissioner's
actions [Rollo, p. 98]. Petitioner argues that judicial
recourse from the decision of the Bureau of Customs
on seizure and forfeiture cases can only be sought in
the Court of Tax Appeals and eventually in this Court.
Private respondent however contends that while the
law may have vested exclusive jurisdiction in the
Bureau of Customs over forfeiture and seizure cases, in
this case respondent judge had jurisdiction to enjoin
the Bureau of Customs from continuing with its seizure

and forfeiture proceedings since the articles here were

already in custodia legis, by virtue of the search
warrants issued by the CFI-MANILA. Private respondent
contends that respondent judge may properly take
cognizance of the instant case since unlike the cases
cited by petitioner, the action for prohibition was
brought not to claim ownership or possession over the
goods but only to preserve the same and to prevent
the Bureau of Customs from doing anything prejudicial
to the successful prosecution of the criminal cases
[Rollo, p. 123].
The issue thus presented is whether or not respondent
judge may enjoin the Collector of Customs from
continuing with its seizure and forfeiture proceedings
over goods earlier seized by virtue of search warrants
issued by the CFI-MANILA.
The instant petition is impressed with merit.
This Court finds that respondent-judge has failed to
adhere to the prevailing rule which denies him
jurisdiction to enjoin the Bureau of Customs from
taking further action in the seizure and forfeiture
proceedings over the subject goods.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases which have held
that regional trial courts are devoid of any competence
to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and
forfeiture proceedings conducted in the Bureau of
Customs, and to enjoin, or otherwise interfere with,
these proceedings. The Collector of Customs sitting in
seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions
touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable
goods. The regional trial courts are precluded from
assuming cognizance over such matters even through
petitions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus [See
General Travel Service v. David, G.R. No. L-19259,
September 23, 1966, 18 SCRA 59; Pacis v. Averia, G.R.
No. L-22526, November 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 907; De
Joya v. Lantin, G.R. No. L-24037, April 27, 1967, 19
SCRA 893; Ponce Enrile v. Vinuya G.R. No. L-29043,
January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 381; Collector of Customs v.
Torres, G.R. No. L-22977, May 31, 1972, 45 SCRA 272;
Pacis v. Geronimo, G.R. No. L-24068, April 23, 1974,56
SCRA 583; Commissioner of Customs v. Navarro, G.R.
No. L-33146, May 31, 1977, 77 SCRA 264; Republic v.
Bocar, G.R. No. L-35260, September 4, 1979,93 SCRA
78; De la Fuente v. De Veyra, G.R. No. L-35385, January
31, 1983, 120 SCRA 451].
It is likewise well-settled that the provisions of the Tariff
and Customs Code and that of Republic Act No. 1125,
as amended ** specify the proper fora for the
ventilation of any legal objections or issues raised
concerning these proceedings. Actions of the Collector
of Customs are appealable to the Commissioner of
Customs, whose decisions, in turn, are subject to the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax
Appeals. Thereafter, an appeal lies to this Court
through the appropriate petition for review by writ of
certiorari. Undeniably, regional trial courts do not share
these review powers.

20
The above rule is anchored upon the policy of placing
no unnecessary hindrance on the government's drive
not only to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon
customs, but also, and more importantly, to render
effective and efficient the collection of import and
export duties due the state. For tariff and customs
duties are taxes constituting a significant portion of the
public revenue which are the lifeblood that enables the
government to carry out functions it has been
instituted to perform.
Notwithstanding these considerations, respondent
judge entertained private respondent's petition for
prohibition holding that the seizure and forfeiture
proceedings instituted in the Bureau of Customs was
null and void because the subject goods were earlier
seized by virtue of the warrants issued by the CFIMANILA in Criminal Cases Nos. 8602 and 8603.
This holding is erroneous.
Even if it be assumed that a taint of irregularity may be
imputed to the exercise by the Collector of Customs of
his jurisdiction to institute seizure and forfeiture
proceedings over the subject goods because he had
accepted custody of the same under conditions
specified in the CFI-Manila order dated January 29,
1979, it would not mean that respondent judge was
correspondingly vested with the jurisdiction to interfere
with such proceedings (See Ponce Enrile v. Vinuya
supra]. It bears repeating that law and settled
jurisprudence clearly deprive the regional trial courts of
jurisdiction to enjoin the Collector of Customs from
exercising his exclusive authority to order seizure and
forfeiture proceedings over imported goods.
Moreover, there is no legal basis for respondent judge's
conclusion that the Collector of Customs is deprived of
his jurisdiction to issue the assailed warrant of seizure
and detention, and to institute seizure and forfeiture
proceedings for the subject goods simply because the
same were first taken in custodia legis.
Undeniably, the subject goods have been brought
under the legal control of the CFI-MANILA by virtue of
its search and seizure warrants and are, therefore, in
custodia legis. But this fact merely serves to deprive
any other court or tribunal, except one having
supervisory control or superior jurisdiction in the
premises, of the right to divest the CFI-MANILA of its
custody and control of the said property [Collector of
Internal Revenue v. Flores Vda. de Codinera G.R. No. L9675, September 28, 1957], or to interfere with and
change its possession without its consent [National
Power Corporation v. De Veyra, G.R. No. L-15763,
December 22, 1961, 3 SCRA 646; De Leon v. Salvador,
G.R. Nos. L-30871 & L-31603, December 28, 1970, 36
SCRA 567; Vlasons Enterprises Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 61688, October 28, 1987, 155 SCRA
186].
In the instant case, the CFI-Manila was not divested of
its jurisdiction over the subject goods, nor were its
processes interfered with by the Collector of Customs.

It, in fact, authorized the transfer and delivery of the

subject goods from the premises of HERCULES to the
Bureau of Customs warehouse/bodega at the South
Harbor, Port of Manila thereby entrusting the Bureau of
Customs with the actual possession and control of the
same.
On the other hand, since the Collector of Customs
herein had actual possession and control over the
subject goods, his jurisdiction over the goods was
secured for the purpose of instituting seizure and
forfeiture proceedings to determine whether or not the
same were imported into the country contrary to law
[See Papa v. Mago, G.R. No. L-27360, February 28,
1968, 22 SCRA 857]. This is consistent with the
principle that the basic operative fact for the institution
and perfection of proceedings in rem like the seizure
and forfeiture proceedings pursuant to the Tariff and
Customs Code, is the actual or constructive possession
of the res by the tribunal empowered by law to conduct
the proceedings [See Dodge v. US, 71 L. ed. 392
(1926); US v. Mack, 79 L. ed. 1559 (1935) citing The
Ann, 3 L. ed. 734 (1815); Fettig Canning Co. v. Steckler,
188 F. 2d 715 (1951) citing Strong v. US, 46 F. 2d 257,
79 ALR 150 (1931)].
Therefore, contrary to the import of respondent judge's
decision, the Collector of Customs was not precluded
by law or legal principle from assuming jurisdiction
over the subject goods. No legal infirmity attended the
seizure and forfeiture proceedings over the subject
goods.
The Court must emphasize at this point that the instant
case does not involve a conflict of jurisdictions.
Proceedings before the regular courts for criminal
prosecutions against Howard Sosis, et al., and seizure
and forfeiture proceedings for the subject goods
conducted by the Bureau of Customs may be
maintained simultaneously and independently of each
other. For the nature of the two proceedings are
entirely different such that a resolution in one is not
decisive of the issue in the other. The latter, which is
administrative and civil in nature, is directed against
the res or articles imported and entails a determination
of the legality of its importation. The former is directed
against those persons who may be held liable for
violating the penal laws in connection with the
importation [See Diosamito v. Balanque, G.R. No. L30734, July 28,1969,28 SCRA 836; People v. CFI, G.R.
No. L-41686, November 17, 1980, 101 SCRA 86].
Private respondent, however, argues that conflict may
arise regarding the disposition of the subject goods if
the proceedings before the Collector of Customs and
the regular courts were allowed to proceed
simultaneously. Private respondent contends that in
view of the nature of the seizure and forfeiture
proceedings, a judgment in favor of HERCULES will
result in the release of the subject goods to the
claimants thereof, while an unfavorable decision will
entail their destruction or sale. It is asserted that either
of the two outcomes will hamper or even jeopardize
the ongoing criminal prosecutions, said goods

21
comprising the substantial part of the evidence for the
People of the Philippines.
Proper adherence by both tribunals to the rules of
comity as defined in the leading case of The
Government of the Philippines v. Gale [24 Phil. 95
(1931)] will forestall the conflict feared. In that case the
Court had established the rule that where the
preservation and safekeeping of the subject matter of
an action is demanded, as it is made to appear that
these articles may prove to be of vital importance as
exhibits in the prosecution of other charges in another
proceeding, the rules for the orderly course of
proceedings in courts and tribunals forbid the
disposition or destruction thereof in one action which
would prejudice the other, and vice versa [Id. at pp. 9899].
The State in the instant case must be given reasonable
opportunity to present its cases for the proper
enforcement of the applicable provisions of the Revised
Penal Code, Republic Act No. 3720, and the Tariff and
Customs Code, and the prosecution of the violators
thereof. It follows then that the execution of any final
decision in the seizure and forfeiture case before the
Bureau of Customs, whether it requires the destruction,
sale or the release of the subject goods, should not
frustrate the prosecution's task of duly presenting and
offering its evidence in Criminal Cases Nos. 88-63156
and 88-63157.
It is apropos to note that for evidentiary purposes, it
would not be necessary to present each and every item
of the goods in question before the courts trying the
criminal cases. Thus, a representative quantity of the
goods, as may be agreed upon by the authorized
customs officials and fiscals prosecuting the criminal
cases, shall be set aside as evidence to be presented in
the above criminal cases and retained in custodia legis
until final judgment is secured in these cases. The rest
of the goods may be disposed of in accordance with
the final decision rendered in the seizure and forfeiture
proceedings pursuant to the Tariff and Customs Code.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the respondent
judge's decision dated 20 July 1987 is REVERSED. The
seizure and forfeiture proceedings involving the goods
in question before the Bureau of Customs may proceed
subject to the above pronouncements relative to the
setting aside of so much of the goods as may be
required for evidentiary purposes.

FACTS: Private Respondent YMCA--a non-stock, nonprofit institution, which conducts various programs
beneficial to the public pursuant to its religious,
educational and charitable objectives--leases out a
portion of its premises to small shop owners, like
restaurants and canteen operators, deriving substantial
income for such. Seeing this, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (CIR) issued an assessment to private
respondent for deficiency income tax, deficiency
expanded
withholding
taxes
on
rentals
and
professional fees and deficiency withholding tax on
wages. YMCA opposed arguing that its rental income is
not subject to tax, mainly because of the provisions of
Section 27 of NIRC which provides that civic league or
organizations not organized for profit but operate
exclusively for promotion of social welfare and those
organized exclusively for pleasure, recreation and other
non-profitble businesses shall not be taxed.

ISSUE: Is the contention of YMCA tenable?

HELD: No. Because taxes are the lifeblood of the

nation, the Court has always applied the doctrine of
strict in interpretation in construing tax exemptions.
Furthermore, a claim of statutory exemption from
taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from the
language of the law on which it is based. Thus, the
claimed exemption "must expressly be granted in a
statute stated in a language too clear to be mistaken."

CIR vs CA and YMCA, [298 SCRA 83]

Post under case digests, Taxation at Sunday, February
26, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: The main question in this case is: is the
income derived from rentals of real property owned by
Young Mens Christian Association of the Philippines
(YMCA) established as a welfare, educational and
charitable non-profit corporation subject to income

SO ORDERED.

tax under the NIRC and the Constitution? In 1980,

YMCA earned an income of P676,829 from leasing out a
portion of its premises to small shop owners, like

CIR vs. YMCA

CIR
GR
No.
298 SCRA 83

v.
124043,

October

14,

YMCA
1998

restaurants and canteen operators and P44k form

parking fees.

22
Issue: Is the rental income of the YMCA taxable?

Held: Yes. The exemption claimed by the YMCA is

expressly disallowed by the very wording of the last
paragraph of then Sec. 27 of the NIRC; court is dutybound to abide strictly by its literal meaning and to
refrain from resorting to any convoluted attempt at
construction. The said provision mandates that the
income ofexempt organizations (such as YMCA) from
any of their properties, real or personal, be subject to
the tax imposed by the same Code. Private respondent
is exempt from the payment of property tax, but
nit income tax on rentals from its property.

YMCA v. Collector of Internal Revenue [GR 7988,

19 January 1916]
Facts: The Young Men's Christian Association came to
the Philippines with the army of occupation in 1898.
The association is nonsectarian, it is preeminently
religious; and the fundamental basis and groundwork is
the Christian religion. All of the officials of the
association are devoted Christians, members of a
church, and have dedicated their lives to the spread of
the Christian principles and the building of Christian
character. Its building is located in Calle Concepcion,
Ermita, which was formally dedicated on 20 October
1909. The building is composed of three parts. The
main structure is three stories high and includes a
reception hall, social hall and game rooms, lecture
room, library, reading room and rooming apartments.
The small building lying to the left of the principal
structure is the kitchen and servants' quarters. The
bowling alleys, swimming pool, locker rooms and
gymnasium-auditorium are located at the large wing to
the right (athletic building). The association claimed
exemption from taxation on ground that it is a
religious, charitable and educational institution
combined, under Section 48 of the Charter of the City
of Manila. The city of Manila, contending that the
property is taxable, assessed it and levied a tax
thereon. It was paid under protest and this action
begun to recover it on the ground that the property
was exempt from taxation under the charter of the city
of Manila. The decision was made in favor of the city,
and the association appealed.

Issue: Whether the institution must be devoted

exclusive for religious purposes, or exclusively for
charitable purposes, or exclusively to educational
purposes, to be entitled to tax exemption.
Held: It may be admitted that there are 64 persons
occupying rooms in the main building as lodgers or
roomers and that they take their meals at the
restaurant below. These facts, however, are far from
constituting a business in the ordinary acceptation of
the word; as there is no profit realized by the
association in any sense; and that the purpose of the
association is not, primarily, to obtain the money which
comes from the lodgers and boarders. The real purpose
is to keep the membership continually within the
sphere of influence of the institution; and thereby to
prevent, as far as possible, the opportunities which
vice presents to young men in foreign countries who
lack home or other similar influences. There is no doubt
about the correctness of the contention that an
institution must devote itself exclusively to one or the
other of the purposes mentioned in the statute before
it can be exempt from taxation; but the statute does
not say that it must be devoted exclusively to any one
of the purposes therein mentioned. It may be a
combination of two or three or more of those purposes
and still be entitled to exemption. The YMCA cannot be
said to be an institution used exclusively for religious
purposes, or exclusively for charitable purposes, or
exclusively to educational purposes; but the Court
believed that it is an institution used exclusively for all
three purposes. As such, it is entitled to be exempted
from taxation.
Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial Board,
Ilocos Norte [GR 27588, 31 December 1927]
Facts: The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church,
represented by the Bishop of Nueva Segovia,
possesses and is the owner of a parcel of land in the
municipality of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, all four sides
of which face on public streets. On the south side is a
part of the church yard, the convent and an adjacent
lot used for a vegetable garden, containing an area of
1,624 square meters, in which there is a stable and a
well for the use of the convent. In the center is the
remainder of the churchyard and the church. On the
north side is an old cemetery with two of its walls still
standing, and a portion where formerly stood a tower,
the base of which may still be seen, containing a total
area of 8,955 square meters. As required by the
provincial board, the Church paid on 3 July 1925, under
protest, the land tax on the lot adjoining the convent
and the lot which formerly was the cemetery with the
portion where the tower stood. The Church filed an
action for the recovery of the sum paid by it to Board
by way of land tax, alleging that the collection of this
tax is illegal. The lower court absolved the Board from

23
the complaint in regard to the lot adjoining the convent
and declared that the tax collected on the lot, which
formerly was the cemetery and on the portion where
the tower stood, was illegal. Both parties appealed
from this judgment.
Issue: Whether the churchyard, the adjacent lot used
for a vegetable garden, and the old cemetery, besides
the church and the convent, are exempt from land
taxes.
Held: The exemption in favor of the convent in the
payment of the land tax (sec. 344 [c] Administrative
Code) refers to the home of the priest who presides
over the church and who has to take care of himself in
order to discharge his duties. It therefore must, in this
sense, include not only the land actually occupied by
the church, but also the adjacent ground destined to
the ordinary incidental uses of man. Except in large
cities where the density of the population and the
development of commerce require the use of larger
tracts of land for buildings, a vegetable garden belongs
to a house and, in the case of a convent, its use is
limited to the necessities of the priest, which comes
under the exemption. Also, land used as a lodging
house by the people who participate in religious
festivities, which constitutes an incidental use in
religious functions, not for commercial purposes,
comes within the exemption. It cannot be taxed
according to its former use (cemetery).
Bishop of Nueva Segovia vs. Provincial Board of
Ilocos Norte [GR 27588, 31 December
1927]
Post under case digests, Taxation at Tuesday, March 20,
2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church is the
owner of a parcel of land in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.
On the south side is a part of the Church yard, the
convent and an adjacent lost used for a vegetable
garden in which there is a stable and a well for the use
of the convent. In the center is the remainder of the
churchyard and the Church. On the north side is an old
cemetery with its two walls still standing, and a portion
where formerly stood a tower. The provincial board
assessed land tax on lots comprising the north and
south side, which the church paid under protest. It filed
suit to recover the amount.

Issue: Whether the lots are covered by the Churchs

tax exemption.
Held: The exemption in favor of the convent in the
payment of land tax refers to the home of the priest
who presides over the church and who has to take care
of

himself

in

order

to

discharge

his

duties.

The exemption includes not only the land actually

occupied by the Church but also the adjacent ground
destined to the ordinaryincidental uses of man. A
vegetable garden, thus, which belongs to a convent,
where its use is limited to the necessity of the priest,
comes under the exemption. Further, land used as a
lodging house by the people who participate in
religious festivities, which constitutes an incidental use
in

religious

functions,

likewise

comes

within

the exemption. It cannot be taxed according to its

former use, i.e. a cemetery.
Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue [GR
L-19201, 16 June 1965]
Facts: Sometime in 1957, the MB Estate Inc., of
Bacolod City, donated P10,000.00 in cash to Fr. Crispin
Ruiz then parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental,
and predecessor of Fr. Casimiro Lladoc, for the
construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality.
The total amount was actually spent for the purpose
intended. On 3 March 1958, MB Estate filed the donor's
gift tax return. Under date of 29 April 1960, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued as
assessment for donee's gift tax against the Catholic
Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental, of which
petitioner was the priest. The tax amounted to
P1,370.00 including surcharges, interest of 1% monthly
from 15 May 1958 to 15 June 1960, and the
compromise for the late filing of the return. Petitioner
lodged a protest to the assessment and requested the
withdrawal thereof. The protest and the motion for
reconsideration presented to the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue were denied. The petitioner appealed
to the CTA on 2 November 1960. After hearing, the CTA
affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue except the imposition of compromise penalty
of P20. Fr. Lladoc appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether a donees gift tax may be assessed
against the Catholic Church.

24
Held: The phrase "exempt from taxation," as employed
in the Constitution supra should not be interpreted to
mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. Section 22(3),
Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, exempts
from taxation cemeteries, churches and personages or
convents, appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings,
and improvements used exclusively for religious
purposes. The exemption is only from the payment of
taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as
property taxes, as contra-distinguished from excise
taxes. A donees gift tax is not a property tax but an
excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way
of gift inter vivos. Its assessment was not on the
property themselves. It does not rest upon general
ownership, but an excise upon the use made of the
properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of
receiving the properties. The imposition of such excise
tax on property used for religious purposes do not
constitute an impairment of the Constitution.

of the privilege of receiving the properties. The

imposition of such excise tax on property used for
religious purpose do not constitute an impairment of
the Constitution.
The tax exemption of the parish, thus, does not extend
to excise taxes.

LLADOC VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

REVENUE [14 SCRA 292; NO.L-19201; 16
JUN 1965]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic
Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Lladoc vs Commisioner of Internal

Revenue (1965)
February 15, 2013 markerwins Tax Law

Facts: Sometime in 1957, M.B. Estate Inc., of Bacolod

City,

donated

10,000.00

pesos

in

cash

to

Fr.

Facts: In 1957, the MB Estate Inc. of Bacolod City

Crispin Ruiz,

donated P10,000 in cash to the parish priest of

Victorias,Negros Occidental, and predecessor of Fr.

Victorias, Negros Occidental; the amount spent for the

construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality,m
as intended. In1958, MB Estate filed the donors gift

the

parish

priest

of

Lladoc, for the construction of a new Catholic church in

the locality. The donated amount was spent for such
purpose.

tax return. In 1960, the Commissioner issued an

assessment for donees gift tax against the parish. The
priest lodged a protest to the assessment and
requested the withdrawal thereof.
Issue: Whether the Catholic Parish is tax exempt.

On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate filed the

donor's gift tax return. Under date of April 29,
1960. Commissioner of Internal

Revenue issued

an

assessment for the donee's gift tax against the

Catholic Parish of Victorias of which petitioner was the

Held: The phrase exempt from taxation should not

parish

priest.

be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of

taxes. The exemption is only from the payment of
taxes assessed on such properties as property taxes as

Issue: Whether or not the imposition of gift tax despite

contradistinguished from excise taxes. A donees gift

the fact the Fr. Lladoc was not the Parish priest at the

tax is not a property tax but an excise tax imposed on

time of donation, Catholic Parish priest of Victorias did

the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos. It

not

does not rest upon general ownership, but an excise

constitutionalexemption for religious purpose is valid.

upon the use made of the properties, upon the exercise

have

juridical

personality

as

the

25
Abra vs Hernando (1981)
Held: Yes, imposition of the gift tax was valid, under
Section

22(3)

Article

VI

the Constitution contemplates exemption only

of
from

payment of taxes assessed on such properties as

Property taxes contra distinguished from Excise taxes
The imposition of the gift tax on the property used for
religious purpose is not a violation of the Constitution.

February 15, 2013 markerwins Tax Law

Facts: The provincial assessor made a tax assessment
on the properties of the Roman Catholic Bishop of
Bangued. The bishop claims tax exemption from real
estate tax, through an action for declaratory relief. A
summary judgment was made granting the exemption
without hearing the side of the Province of Abra.

A gift tax is not a property by way of gift inter vivos.

Issue: Whether the properties of the Bishop of
The head of the Diocese and not the parish priest is the
real party in interest in the imposition of the donee's
tax on the property donated to the church for religious
purpose.
Abra v. Hernando [GR L-49336, 31 August 1981
Facts: The provincial assessor made a tax assessment
on the properties of the Roman Catholic Bishop of
Bangued. The bishop claims tax exemption from real
estate tax, through an action for declaratory relief.
Judge Hernando of the CFI Abra presided over the case.
The Province of Abra filed a motion to dismiss, based
on lack of jurisdiction, which was denied. It was
followed by a summary judgment granting the
exemption without hearing the side of the province.
Issue: Whether the properties of the Roman Catholic
Bishop of Bangued are tax exempt. Held: Exemption
from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so
that if granted it must be strictly construed against the
taxpayer. Affirmatively put, the law frowns on
exemption from taxation, hence, an exempting
provision should be construed strictissimi juris. Herein,
the judge accepted at its face the allegation of Bishop
that the certain parcels of land owned by it, are used
"actually, directly and exclusively" as sources of
support of the parish priest and his helpers and also of
the Bishop instead of demonstrating that there is
compliance with the constitutional provision that allows
an exemption. There was an allegation of lack of
jurisdiction (contesting that the validity of the
assessment may be questioned before the Local Board
of Assessment Appeals and not the court), and of lack
of cause of action (contesting that declaratory relief is
not proper, as there had been breach or violation of the
right of government to assess and collect taxes on
such property), which should have compel the judge to
accord a hearing to the petitioner rather than deciding
the case immediately in favor of the Bishop.

Bangued are tax-exempt.

Held: The 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions differ in
language as to the exemption of religious property
from taxes as tehy should not only be exclusively but
also actually and directly used for religious
purposes. Herein, the judge accepted at its face the
allegation of the Bishop instead of demonstrating that
there is compliance with the constitutional provision
that allows an exemption. There was an allegation of
lack of jurisdiction and of lack of cause of action, which
should have compelled the judge to accord a hearing
to the province rather than deciding the case
immediately in favor of the Bishop. Exemption from
taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that
if granted, it must be strictly construed against the
taxpayer. There must be proof of the actual and direct
use of the lands, buildings, and improvements for
religious (or charitable) purposes to be exempted from
taxation.
The case was remanded to the lower court for a trial on
merits.

107 SCRA 104 Political Law Exemption From Taxes

The Church

26
The Province of Abra sought to tax the properties of the
Roman Catholic Bishop, Inc. of Bangued. Judge Harold
Hernando dismissed the petition of Abra without
hearing its side. Hernando ruled that

there is no

question that the real properties sought to be taxed by

the Province of Abra are properties of the respondent
Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. Likewise,
there is no dispute that the properties including their
produce are actually, directly and exclusively used by
the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. for
religious or charitable purposes.
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties of the church (in

this case) is exempt from taxes.

HELD: No, they are not tax exempt. It is true that the
Constitution

provides

that

charitable

institutions,

mosques, and non-profit cemeteries are required that

for

the

exemption

of

lands,

buildings,

HELD:

and

improvements, they should not only be exclusively

but also actually and directly used for religious or

charitable purposes. The exemption from taxation is
not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted it
must be strictly construed against the taxpayer.
However, in this case, there is no showing that the said
properties are actually and directly used for religious or
charitable uses.

107 SCRA 104, 1981

THE PROVINCE OF ABRA VS HONORABLE HAROLD
M. HERNANDO
FACTS:

assailing the validity of a tax assessed under this

Code until the taxpayer, shall have paid, under
protest, the tax assessed against him nor shall any
court declare any tax invalid by reason of
irregularities or informalities in the proceedings of
the officers charged with the assessment or
collection of taxes, or of failure to perform their
duties within this time herein specified for their
performance
unless
such
irregularities,
informalities or failure shall have impaired the
substantial rights of the taxpayer; nor shall any
court declare any portion of the tax assessed under
the provisions of this Code invalid except upon
condition that the taxpayer shall pay the just
amount of the tax, as determined by the court in
the pending proceeding."
The judge responded by saying there is no dispute
that the properties including their procedure are
actually, directly and exclusively used by the
Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. for
religious or charitable purposes."

In this case the provincial city assessor of Abra

filed a certiorari and mandamus against the ruling
made by Judge Harold M. Hernando of the Court of
First Instance of Abra, it was because respondent
denied a motion for declaratory relief by Roman
Catholic Bishop of Bangued desirous of being
exempted from a real estate tax followed by a
summary judgment granting such exemption
without even hearing the side of the petitioner.
Petitioner further argued that clearly the judge
ignored the pertinent provisions of the Rules of
Court and disregards the basic laws of procedure
and basic provisions of due process in the
constitution. The important argument made by the
petitioner is that the judge failed to abide by the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 464 which
states that" No court shall entertain any suit

The Supreme Court ruled that the petition be

granted since the judge would not have made such
a grave mistake if he had only made a clear
distinction between the present provisions of the
constitution to the provisions of the 1935
constitution regarding tax exemptions on land,
buildings and improvements. The main difference
is that in order for a land, building, or improvement
to be tax exempt, there must be and exclusive,
actual and direct use of the enumerated for
religious or charitable purposes. It is also a rule
that tax exemption is not favored nor presumed so
that if granted it must be strictly construed against
the taxpayer. Affirmatively put, the law frowns on
exemption from taxation, hence, an exempting
provision should be construed strictissimi juris
The petition was also justly invoked on the grounds
for the protection of due process to clearly show if
the respondents really did not violate any
constitutional provisions in regards to tax
exemption but instead, what respondent judge did
was directly ruled on the case of declaratory relief
on the basis that it was exclusive, actual, and
directly as sources of support of the parish priest
and his helpers and also of private respondent
Bishop as compared to the motion to dismiss the
case due to lack of jurisdiction since the validity of
a tax assessment may be questioned before the
Local Board of Assessment Appeals and not with a
court. There was also mention of a lack of a cause
of action, but only because, in its view, declaratory
relief is not proper, as there had been breach or
violation of the right of government to assess and
collect taxes on such property. It clearly appears,
therefore, that in failing to accord a hearing to
petitioner Province of Abra and deciding the case
immediately in favor of private respondent,
respondent Judge failed to abide by the
constitutional command of procedural due process.

27
Abra Valley College v. Aquino
Abra Valley College v. Aquino
G.R. No. L-39086 June 15, 1988
Paras, J.

Facts:

The decision of the CFI Abra (Branch I) is

affirmed subject to the modification that half of the
assessed tax be returned to the petitioner. The
modification is derived from the fact that the ground
floor is being used for commercial purposes (leased)
and the second floor being used as incidental to
education (residence of the director).
162 SCRA 106, 1988
ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE, INC. VS. HON. JUAN P.
AQUINO

Petitioner, an educational corporation and

institution of higher learning duly incorporated with the
Securities and Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a
complaint to annul and declare void the Notice of
Seizure and the Notice of Sale of its lot and building
located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real
estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31.
Said Notice of Seizure by respondents Municipal
Treasurer and Provincial Treasurer, defendants below,
was issued for the satisfaction of the said taxes
thereon.

FACTS:

The parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted

and embodied by the trial court in its questioned
decision. The trial court ruled for the government,
holding that the second floor of the building is being
used by the director for residential purposes and that
the ground floor used and rented by Northern
Marketing Corporation, a commercial establishment,
and thus the property is not being used exclusively for
educational purposes. Instead of perfecting an appeal,
petitioner availed of the instant petition for review on
certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before
the Supreme Court, by filing said petition on 17 August
1974.
Issue: Whether or not the lot and building are used
exclusively for educational purposes

Held:
Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the
then 1935 Philippine Constitution, expressly grants
exemption from realty taxes for cemeteries, churches
and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and
all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively
for religious, charitable or educational purposes.
Reasonable emphasis has always been made that the
exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to
and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the main purposes. The use of the school building or lot
for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by
law, nor by jurisprudence. In the case at bar, the lease
of the first floor of the building to the Northern
Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the
imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of
education. The test of exemption from taxation is the
use of the property for purposes mentioned in the
Constitution.

This is a case for a review or certiorari on the

decision made by the defunct Court of First
Instance of Abra Branch I, dated June 14, 1974,
rendered in Civil Case No. 656. In this case the
court decided that the seizure and sale by the
Municipal Treasurer of Bangued, Abra
and
Provincial Treasurer of the said province of the lot
and building of Abra Valley College, Inc. to be valid
since the said school was not tax exempt. What
transpired was the school was issued a Notice of
Seizure of the lot and building of the school
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. Q-83
duly registered in the name of petitioner for failure
to pay the amount of P5,140.31 back taxes by the
respondent The "Notice of Sale" was caused to be
served upon the petitioner by the respondent
treasurers on July 8, 1972 for the sale at public
auction of said college lot and building, which sale
was held on the same date. Dr. Paterno Millare,
then Municipal Mayor of Bangued, Abra, offered the
highest bid of P6,000.00 which was duly accepted.
The certificate of sale was correspondingly issued
to him.
After the sale Dr. Paterno filled a case for the
dismissal of the case and after exchange of
pleadings the court ordered the respondent
treasurers to deliver the proceeds of the auction
sale. Finally the parties involved entered into a
Stipulation of Facts administered by the court
dismissing the notice of seizure and notice of sale
in favor of Dr. Paterno and relieving him of all the
back taxes of the school upon the payment of the
auction price.
Despite the Stipulation of Facts the trial courts
found out that the school was recognized by the
government offering Primary High School and
College courses and has a population of more than
100,000 students all in all; that the school was
situated right in the heart of town of Bangued,
Abra a few meters from the plaza and about 120
meters from the Court of First Instance building;
that the elementary pupils are housed in a twostorey building across the street; that the high
school and college students are housed in the main
building; that the Director with his family is in the
second floor of the main building; and that the

28

annual gross income of the school reaches more

than one hundred thousand pesos. In light of the
evidences it was left after the courts to determine
whether the said school was exclusively for
educational purposes.
The succeeding Provincial Fiscal, Hon. Jose A.
Solomon and his Assistant, Hon. Eustaquio Z.
Montero, filed a Memorandum for the Government
on March 25, 1974, and a Supplemental
Memorandum on May 7, 1974, wherein they opined
"that based on the evidence, the laws applicable,
court decisions and jurisprudence, the school
building and school lot used for educational
purposes of the Abra Valley College, Inc., are
exempted from the payment of taxes.
The trial court disagreed because of the use of the
second floor by the Director of petitioner school for
residential purposes. He thus ruled for the
government and rendered the assailed decision.
After having been granted by the trial court ten
(10) days from August 6, 1974 within which to
perfect its appeal petitioner instead availed of the
instant petition for review on certiorari with prayer
for preliminary injunction before this Court, which
petition was filed on August 17, 1974. In the
resolution dated August 16, 1974, this Court
resolved to give DUE COURSE to the petition
Respondents were required to answer said petition.
The petitioners raised the arguments that the
courts a quo: 1. made an error in sustaining a valid
seizure and sale of the college lot and building
used for educational purpose 2. Made an error in
declaring that the college was not exclusively for
educational purposes merely because the college
president resides in it 3. made an error in declaring
the college not tax exempt from property taxes and
in ordering petitioner to pay P5,140.31 as realty
taxes. 4. made an error in ordering the confiscation
of the P6,000.00 deposit made in the court by
petitioner as payment of the P5,140.31 realty
taxes.

ISSUE: Whether Abra Valley College Inc. subject to tax

exemption as stated in the constitution that a school
should be exclusively for educational purpose despite
the proof that there are other purpose attached to the
lot and building such as a residence of the College
president?
HELD:

In the case at bar the Supreme Court used Section

22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935
Philippine Constitution, which expressly grants
exemption from realty taxes for "Cemeteries,
churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant
thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements
used exclusively for religious, charitable or
educational purposes ... Relative thereto, Section
54, paragraph c, Commonwealth Act No. 470 as
amended by Republic Act No. 409, otherwise
known as the Assessment Law, provides that
churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant

thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements

used exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific
or educational purposes
The Supreme court ruled that the exemption in
favor of property used exclusively for charitable or
educational purposes is 'not limited to property
actually indispensable but extends to facilities
which are incidental to and reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of said purposes and that
while this Court allows a more liberal and nonrestrictive interpretation of the phrase "exclusively
used for educational purposes" as provided for in
Article VI, Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935
Philippine Constitution, reasonable emphasis has
always been made that exemption extends to
facilities which are incidental to and reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the main
purposes.
While the use of the second floor of the main
building in the case at bar for residential purposes
of the Director and his family, they may find
justification under the concept of incidental use,
which is complimentary to the main or primary
purposeeducational, the lease of the first floor
thereof to the Northern Marketing Corporation
cannot by any stretch of the imagination be
considered incidental to the purpose of education.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court
correctly arrived at the conclusion that the school
building as well as the lot where it is built should be
taxed, not because the second floor of the same is
being used by the Director and his family for
residential purposes, but because the first floor
thereof is being used for commercial purposes.
However, since only a portion is used for purposes
of commerce, it is only fair that half of the
assessed tax be returned to the school involved.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Abra, Branch I, is hereby
AFFIRMED subject to the modification that half of
the assessed tax be returned to the petitioner

Abra Valley College v. Aquino [GR L-39086, 15

June 1988]
Facts: Abra Valley College rents out the ground floor of
its college building to Northern Marketing
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 4 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) Corporation while the second floor thereof is
used by the Director of the College for residential
purposes. On 6 July 1972, the Municipal and Provincial
treasurers (Gaspar Bosque and Armin Cariaga,
respectively) and issued a Notice of Seizure upon the
petitioner for the college lot and building (OCT Q-83)
for the satisfaction of said taxes thereon. The
treasurers served upon the College a Notice of Sale on
8 July 1972, the sale being held on the same day. Dr.
Paterno Millare, then municipal mayor of Bangued,
Abra, offered the highest bid of P 6,000 on public
auction involving the sale of the college lot and
building. The certificate of sale was correspondingly
issued to him. The College filed a complaint on 10 July

29
1972 in the court a quo to annul and declare void the
"Notice of Seizure" and the "Notice of Sale" of its lot
and building located at Bangued, Abra, for nonpayment of real estate taxes and penalties amounting
to P5,140.31. The trial court ruled for the government,
holding that the property is not being used
exclusively for educational purposes. Instead of
perfecting an appeal, the College availed of the
petition for review on certiorari with prayer for
preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court, by
filing said petition on 17 August 1974.

Appeals, which in turn certified the case to the

Supreme Court for the reason that the errors assigned
involved only questions of law.
Issue: Whether the Society is required to secure
municipal permit to allow it to sell and distribute bibles
and religious literature, and to pay taxes from the sales
thereof.
Held: No. Section 27 (e) of Commonwealth Act 466
(NIRC) exempts corporations or associations organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes, Provided however, That the
income of whatever kind and character from any of its
properties, real or personal, or from any activity
conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made
of such income, shall be liable to the tax imposed
under the Code. Herein, the act of distributing and
selling bibles, etc. is purely religious and cannot be
made liable for taxes or fees therein. Further,
Ordinance 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to the
Society, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise
and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship
as well as its Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 5 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) rights of dissemination of religious
beliefs. The fact that the price of the bibles and other
religious pamphlets are little higher than the actual
cost of the same does not necessarily mean that it is
already engaged in the business or occupation of
selling said merchandise for profit. Furthermore,
Ordinance 3000 of the City of Manila is of general
application and it does not contain any provisions
whatsoever prescribing religious censorship nor
restraining the free exercise and enjoyment of any
religious profession. The ordinance is not applicable to
the Society, as its business, trade or occupation is not
particularly mentioned in Section 3 of the Ordinance,
and the record does not show that a permit is required
therefor under existing laws and ordinances for the
proper supervision and enforcement of their provisions
governing the sanitation, security and welfare of the
public and the health of the employees engaged in the
business of the Society.

Issue: Whether the College is exempt from realty

taxes.
Held: No. The test of exemption from taxation is the
use of the property for purposes mentioned in the
Constitution. While the Court allows a more liberal and
non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase "exclusively
used for educational purposes," reasonable emphasis
has always been made that exemption extends to
facilities which are incidental to and reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the main
purposes. The use of the school building or lot for
commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law,
nor by jurisprudence. Herein, the lease of the first floor
of the building to the Northern Marketing Corporation
cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered
incidental to the purpose of education.
American Bible Society v. City of Manila [GR L9637, 30 April 1957]
Facts: In the course of its ministry, American Bible
Society's Philippine agency has been distributing and
selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof (since
1898, but except during the Japanese occupation)
throughout the Philippines and translating the same
into several Philippine dialects. On 29 May 1953, the
acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed the
Society that it was conducting the business of general
merchandise since November 1945, without providing
itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal
license, in violation of Ordinance 3000, as amended,
and Ordinances 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required the
Society to secure, within 3 days, the corresponding
permit and license fees, together with compromise
covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the
2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45. On
24 October 1953, the Society paid to the City Treasurer
under protest the said permit and license fees, giving
at the same time notice to the City Treasurer that suit
would be taken in court to question the legality of the
ordinances under which the said fees were being
collected, which was done on the same date by filing
the complaint that gave rise to this action. After
hearing, the lower court dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit. the Society appealed to the Court of

American Bible Society vs. City of Manila

American Bible Society vs. City of Manila

GR No. L-9637 | April 30, 1957

Facts:

American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, nonprofit, religious, missionary corporation duly registered
and doing business in the Philippines through its

30
Philippine agency established in Manila in November,
1898

City of Manila is a municipal corporation with

powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila
American Bible Society has been distributing and
selling bibles and/or gospel portions throughout the
Philippines and translating the same into several
Philippine dialect
City Treasurer of Manila informed American Bible
Society that it was violating several Ordinances for
operating without the necessary permit and license,
thereby requiring the corporation to secure the permit
and license fees covering the period from 4Q 1945-2Q
1953

To avoid closing of its business, American Bible

Society paid the City of Manila its permit and license
fees under protest

American Bible filed a complaint, questioning the

constitutionality and legality of the Ordinances 2529
and 3000, and prayed for a refund of the payment
made to the City of Manila. They contended:

a.

They had been in the Philippines since 1899 and

were not required to pay any license fee or sales tax

b.

it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles

City of Manila prayed that the complaint be

dismissed, reiterating the constitutionality of the
Ordinances in question

However, item 79 of Sec. 3 of the Ordinance

provides that all other businesses, trade or occupation
not mentioned, except those upon which the City is not
empowered to license or to tax P5.00

Therefore, the necessity of the permit is made to

depend upon the power of the City to license or tax
said business, trade or occupation.

2 provisions of law that may have bearing on this

case:

a.

Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative

Code, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila is
empowered to tax and fix the license fees on retail
dealers engaged in the sale of books

b.

Sec. 18(o) of RA 409: to tax and fix the license fee

on dealers in general merchandise, including importers
and indentors, except those dealers who may be
expressly subject to the payment of some other
municipal tax. Further, Dealers in general merchandise
shall be classified as (a) wholesale dealers and (b)
retail dealers. For purposes of the tax on retail dealers,
general merchandise shall be classified into four main
classes: namely (1) luxury articles, (2) semi-luxury
articles,
(3)
essential
commodities,
and
(4)
miscellaneous articles. A separate license shall be
prescribed for each class but where commodities of
different classes are sold in the same establishment, it
shall not be compulsory for the owner to secure more
than one license if he pays the higher or highest rate of
tax prescribed by ordinance. Wholesale dealers shall
pay the license tax as such, as may be provided by
ordinance

The only difference between the 2 provisions is the

limitation as to the amount of tax or license fee that a
retail dealer has to pay per annum

As held in Murdock vs. Pennsylvania, The power to

impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedoms
provided for in the Bill of Rights, is indeed as potent as
the power of censorship which this Court has
repeatedly struck down. It is not a nominal fee imposed
as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of
policing the activities in question. It is in no way
apportioned. It is flat license tax levied and collected
as a condition to the pursuit of activities whose
enjoyment is guaranteed by the constitutional liberties
of press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress
their exercise. That is almost uniformly recognized as
the inherent vice and evil of this flat license tax.

Further, the case also mentioned that the power to

tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or
suppress its enjoyment. Those who can tax the

Trial Court dismissed the complaint

American Bible Society appealed to the Court of
Appeals

Issue: WON American Bible Society liable to pay sales

tax for the distribution and sale of bibles

Ruling: NO

Under Sec. 1 of Ordinance 3000, one of the

ordinance in question, person or entity engaged in any
of the business, trades or occupation enumerated
under Sec. 3 must obtain a Mayors permit and license
from the City Treasurer. American Bible Societys
business is not among those enumerated

31
exercise of this religious practice can make its exercise
so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for
its maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of
engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can
close all its doors to all those who do not have a full
purse

of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter

of

the

City

of

Manila.

During the course of its ministry, plaintiff sold bibles

Under Sec. 27(e) of Commonwealth Act No.

466
or
the
National
Internal
Revenue
Code,Corporations or associations organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . . . or
educational purposes, . . .: Provided, however, That the
income of whatever kind and character from any of its
properties, real or personal, or from any activity
conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition
made of such income, shall be liable to the tax
imposed under this Code shall not be taxed

and other religious materials at a very minimal profit.

The price asked for the bibles and other religious

pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher
than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean
that American Bible Society was engaged in the
business or occupation of selling said "merchandise"
for profit

Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos.

Therefore, the Ordinance cannot be applied for in

doing so it would impair American Bible Societys free
exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and
worship as well as its rights of dissemination of
religious beliefs.

Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing

considerations, We hereby reverse the decision
appealed from, sentencing defendant return to
plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected
from it

American Bible Society vs. City of Manila, [G.R.

No. L-9637 April 30, 1957]
Post under case digests, Taxation at Wednesday, March
07, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, nonprofit,

religious,

missionary

corporation

duly registered and doing business in the Philippines

through its Philippine agency established in Manila in
November,

1898.

The

defendant

appellee

is

municipal corporation with powers that are to be

exercised

in

conformity

with

the

On May 29 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of

Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting the
business of general merchandise since November,
1945, without providing itself with the necessary
Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of

2529, 3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure,

within three days, the corresponding permit and
license fees, together with compromise covering the
period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter
of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45 (Annex A).

Plaintiff now questions the imposition of such fees.

Issue: Whether

or

not

the

said

ordinances

are

constitutional and valid (contention: it restrains the

free exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession
and

worship

of appellant).

Held: Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the

Constitution,

provides

that:

(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment

of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and
the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religion test shall be required for
the

exercise

of

civil

or

political

rights.

provisions
The provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty

32
of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, which carries with it the right
to

disseminate

religious

information.

It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked

for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in
some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost
of the same but this cannot mean thatappellant was
engaged in the business or occupation of selling said
"merchandise" for profit. For this reason. The Court
believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance
No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant,
for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and
enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as
well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.

With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the

Court do not find that it imposes any charge upon the
enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor
tax

the

exercise

of

religious

practices.

It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000

cannot

be

considered

unconstitutional,

however

inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of

the plaintiff. As to Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of
Manila,

as

amended,

is

also

not

applicable,

so

defendant is powerless to license or tax the business of

plaintiff Society.

Punsalan v. Municipal Board of Manila [GR L4817, 26 May 1954]

Facts: Ordinance 3398 was approved by the municipal
board of the City of Manila on 25 July 1950. It imposes
a municipal occupation tax on persons exercising
various professions in the city and penalizes
nonpayment of the tax by a fine of not more than P200
or by imprisonment of not more than 6 months, or by
both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of

the court. The ordinance was enacted pursuant to

paragraph (1) of section 18 of the Revised Charter of
the City of Manila (as amended by RA 409), which
empowers the Municipal Board of said city to impose a
municipal occupation tax, not to exceed P50 per
annum, on persons engaged in the various professions,
such as those were Silvestre M. Punsalan, et. al.
belong. Punsalan, et. al. (2 lawyers, a medical
practitioner, a public accountant, a dental surgeon and
a pharmacist) filed a suit in the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Manila in their own behalf and in behalf of
other professionals practicing in the City of Manila,
calling for the annulment of Ordinance 3398 of the City
of Manila together with the provision of the Manila
charter authorizing it and the refund of taxes collected
under the ordinance but paid under protest (as they
have paid their occupation tax under Section 201 of
the National Internal Revenue Code [NIRC]). The lower
court upheld the validity of the provision of law
authorizing the enactment of the ordinance but
declared the ordinance itself illegal and void on the
ground that the penalty therein provided for nonpayment of the tax was not legally authorized. Both
parties appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether professionals in Manila are being
subjected to double taxation, in light of the municipal
occupation tax imposed against them by the City of
Manila.
Held: The Legislature may, in its discretion, select
what occupations shall be taxed, and in the exercise of
that discretion it may tax all, or it may select for
taxation certain classes and leave the others untaxed.
Manila, as the seat of the National Government and
with a population and volume of trade many times that
of any other Philippine city or municipality, offers a
more lucrative field for the practice of the professions,
so that it is but fair that the professionals in Manila be
made to pay a higher occupation tax than their
brethren in the provinces.The ordinance imposes the
tax upon every person "exercising" or "pursuing" any
one of the occupations named, but does not say that
such person must have his office in Manila. There is no
distinction found in the ordinance between
professionals having offices in manila and outsiders
who have no offices in the city but practice their
profession therein. Where one tax is imposed by the
state and the other is imposed by the city, the
argument against double taxation may not be invoked,
as there is nothing inherently obnoxious in the
requirement that license fees or taxes be exacted with
respect to the same occupation, calling or activity by
both the state and the political subdivisions thereof.

33
PUNSALAN VS. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA [95
PHIL 46; NO.L-4817; 26 MAY 1954]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic
Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

double taxation may not be invoked if one tax is

imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the
city. It is widely recognized that there is nothing
inherently terrible in the requirement that taxes be
exacted with respect to the sameoccupation by both

Facts: Petitioners, who are professionals in the city,

assail

Ordinance

No.

3398

together

with the

law authorizing it (Section 18 of the Revised Charterof

the

City

of

Manila).

The

ordinance

imposes

municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various

professions in the city and penalizes non-payment of
the

same. The

law authorizing

said

ordinance empowers the Municipal Board of the city to

impose

municipal occupation tax

personsengaged in

various

professions.

on

Petitioners,

having already paid theiroccupation tax under section

201 of the National Internal Revenue Code, paid the
tax under protest as imposed by Ordinance No. 3398.
The lower court declared the ordinance invalid and
affirmed

the

validity

Issue: Whether

or

of the

Not

the

lawauthorizing

ordinance

and

it.

law

authorizing it constitute class legislation, and authorize

what

amounts

Held: The

to

double

Legislature

may,

taxation.

in

its

discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and

in

its

discretion

may

tax

all,

or select classes

of occupation for taxation, and leave others untaxed. It

is

not

for

the

courts

or municipalities should

to
be

judge

which

cities

empowered

to

impose occupation taxes aside from that imposed by

the National Government. That matter is within the
domain of political departments. The argument against

the

state

and

the

political subdivisions thereof.

Judgment of the lower court is reversed with regards to

the ordinance and affirmed as to the law authorizing it.
Physical Therapy Organization v. Municipal Board
of Manila [GR L-10448, 30 August 1957
Facts: The Physical Therapy Organization , an
association of registered massagists and licensed
operators of massage clinics in the City of Manila and
other parts of the country, filed an action in the Court
of First Instance (CFI) of Manila for declaratory
judgment regarding the validity of Municipal Ordinance
3659, Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 6 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) promulgated by the Municipal Board
and approved by the City Mayor (Enacted 27 August
1954, and approved and effective 7 September 1954).
To stop the City from enforcing said ordinance, the
Organization secured an injunction upon filing of a
bond in the sum of P1,000.00. A hearing was held, but
the parties without introducing any evidence submitted
the case for decision on the pleadings, although they
submitted written memoranda. Thereafter, the trial
court dismissed the petition and later dissolved the
writ of injunction previously issued. The Organization
appealed said order of dismissal directly to the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the license fees imposed by the
Ordinance against massage clinic operators is
unreasonable.
Held: No. The purpose of the Ordinance is not to
regulate the practice of massage, much less to restrict
the practice of licensed and qualified massagists of
therapeutic massage in the Philippines. The end sought
to be attained in the Ordinance is to prevent the
commission of immorality and the practice of
prostitution in an establishment masquerading as a
massage clinic where the operators thereof offer to
massage or manipulate superficial parts of the bodies
of customers for hygienic and aesthetic purposes. The
permit fee is made payable not by the masseur or
massagist, but by the operator of a massage clinic who
may not be a massagist himself. Compared to permit
fees required in other operations, P100.00 may appear
to be too large and rather unreasonable, but much
discretion is given to municipal corporations in

34
determining the amount of said fee without considering
it as a tax for revenue purposes. There is a marked
distinction between license fees imposed upon useful
and beneficial occupations which the sovereign wishes
to regulate but not restrict, and those which are
inimical and dangerous to public health, morals or
safety. In the latter case the fee may be very large
without necessarily being a tax. Evidently, the Manila
Municipal Board considered the practice of hygienic
and aesthetic massage not as a useful and beneficial
occupation which will promote and is conducive to
public morals, and consequently, imposed the said
permit fee for its regulation.
Tanada v. Tuvera [ GR L-63915, 29 December
1986]
Facts: Invoking the people's right to be informed on
matters of public concern (Section 6, Article IV of the
1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise
effectively promulgated, Lorenzo M. Taada, Abraham
F. Sarmiento, and the Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. [MABINI]
sought a writ of mandamus to compel Hon. Juan C.
Tuvera, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the
President, Hon. Joaquin Venus, in his capacity as
Deputy Executive Assistant to the President,
Melquiades P. De La Cruz, in his capacity as Director,
Malacaang Records Office, and Florendo S. Pablo, in
his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, to publish,
and or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of
various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter
of implementation and administrative orders. On 24
April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the
publication to the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application,
and unless so published, they shall have no binding
force and effect. The decision was concurred only by 3
justices. Tanada, et. al. move for reconsideration /
clarification of the decision on various questions. They
suggest that there should be no distinction between
laws of general applicability and those which are not;
that publication means complete publication; and that
the publication must be made forthwith in the Official
Gazette. The Solicitor General avers that the motion is
a request for advisory opinion. Meanwhile, the
February EDSA Revolution took place, which
subsequently required the new Solicitor General to file
a rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of
the Rules of Court).
Issue: Whether laws should be published in full and in
the Official Gazette only.

Held: Omission of publication would offend due process

insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the
laws that are supposed to govern it. it is not unlikely
that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a
result; and they would be so not because of a failure to
comply with it but simply because they did not know of
its existence. Publication is required, even if their
enactment is otherwise provided or effective
immediately. The term "laws" should refer to all laws
and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit
there are some that do not apply to them directly. To be
valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest
even if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the
public as a whole. Publication requirements applies to
(1) all statutes, including those of local application and
private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive
orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or directly conferred by
the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and
regulations for the purpose of enforcing or
implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation; (4) Charter of a city notwithstanding that it
applies to only a portion of the national territory and
directly affects only the inhabitants of that place; (5)
Monetary Board circulars to "fill in the details" of the
Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to
enforce. Publication requirements does not apply to (1)
interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, i.e. regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public; (2) Letters of
Instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by
their subordinates in the performance of their duties;
and (3) instructions of Ministry heads on case studies.
Further, publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws. It should be
published in the Official Gazette and not elsewhere.
Even if newspapers of general circulation could better
perform the function of communicating the laws to the
people as such periodicals are more easily available,
have a wider readership, and come out regularly, this
kind of publication is not the one required or authorized
by existing law.
TAADA VS. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision
promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was

35
not so when it was otherwise as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws
of general applicability and laws which are not as to
their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in
publications of general circulation.
HELD:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to
the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature
may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or in any other date, without its previous
publication.
Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of
general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate
to the people in general albeit there are some that do
not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing
on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of
privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of
the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably
affect the public interest eve if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of the people
only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all,
since its purpose is to inform the public of the content
of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of
laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The
Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it
impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as
soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of
the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their

dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and

rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless
their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full disclosure and give
proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless
the naked blade is drawn.
Philippine International Trading Corp. (PITC) v.
Angeles [GR 108461, 21 October 1996]
Facts: On 6 August 1973, the Philippine International
Trading Corporation (PITC) was created as a
government owned or controlled corporation under
Presidential Decree (PD) 252. On 9 May 1977, PD 1071
revised the provisions of PD 252, where the purposes
and powers of the said governmental entity were
enumerated under Sections 5 and 6 thereof. On 9
August 1976, the late President Ferdinand Marcos
issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) 444, directing, inter
alia, that trade (export or import of all commodities)
between the Philippines and any of the Socialist and
other Centrally Planned Economy Countries (SOCPEC),
including the People's Republic of China (PROC) shall
be undertaken or coursed through the PITC. After the
EDSA Revolution, or more specifically on 27 February
1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated
Executive Order (EO) 133 reorganizing the DTI
empowering the said department to be the "primary
coordinative, promotive, facilitative and regulatory arm
of the government for the country's trade, industry and
investment activities." The PITC was made one of DTI's
line agencies. Sometime in April 1988, following the
State visit of President Aquino to the PROC, the
Philippines and PROC entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) wherein the two countries
agreed to make joint efforts within the next five years
to expand bilateral trade and to strive for a steady
progress towards achieving a balance between the
value of their imports and exports during the period.
Conformably with the MOU, the Philippines and PROC
entered into a Trade Protocol for the years 1989, 1990
and 1991, under which was specified the commodities
to be traded between them. On August 1989, PITC
issued Administrative Order (AO) SOCPEC 89-08-01
under which, applications to the PITC for importation
from China (PROC) must be accompanied by a viable
and confirmed Export Program of Philippine Products to
PROC carried out by the importer himself or through a
tie-up with a legitimate importer in an amount
equivalent to the value of the importation from PROC
being applied for or 1:1 ratio. Remington Industrial
Sales Corp. and Firestone Ceramics, both domestic
corporations, organized and existing under Philippinelaws, individually applied for authority to import from
PROC with PITC. They were granted such authority.
Subsequently, for failing to comply with their
undertakings to submit export credits equivalent to the

36
value of their importations, further import applications
were withheld by PITC from Remington and Firestone,
such that the latter were both barred from importing
goods from PROC. On 20 January 1992, Remington filed
a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer
for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction against PITC in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC, Makati Branch 58). On 4
January 1993, Judge Zosimo Z. Angeles (Presiding
Judge) upheld the petition for prohibition and
mandamus of Remington and Firestone (Civil Case 92158), and declaring PITC AO SOCPEC 89-08-01 and its
regulations null, void, and unconstitutional. PITC filed
the petition seeking the reversal of Angeles decision.
Issue: Whether AO SOCPEC 89-08-01 binds Remington
and Firestone.
Held: The PITC was legally empowered to issue
Administrative Orders, as a valid exercise of a power
ancillary to legislation. Administrative Order SOCPEC
89-08-01 is not, however, a valid exercise of such
quasi-legislative power. The original AO issued on 30
August 1989, under which the respondents filed their
applications for importation, was not published in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation. The questioned Administrative Order,
legally, until it is published, is invalid within the context
of Article 2 of Civil Code. The AO under consideration is
one of those issuances which should be published for
its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and
implement an existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation, i.e., PD 1071, in relation to LOI 444 and EO
133. It was only on 30 March 1992 when the
amendments to the said Administrative Order were
filed in the UP Law Center, and published in the
National Administrative Register as required by the
Administrative Code of 1987.The fact that the
amendments to AO SOCPEC 89 08-01 were filed with,
and published by the UP Law Center in the National
Administrative Register, does not cure the defect
related to the effectivity of the Administrative Order.
Further, the Administrative Order, without force and
effect due to the lack of publication, thus cannot exact
any obligation from Remington and Firestone,
specifically, charges for the 0.5% Counter Export
Development Service.

and Firestone from importing products from China on

the ground that they were not able to comply with the
requirement

of

the

said

administrative

order.

Thereafter they filed a petition for prohibition and

mandamus against the said order of PITC in which the
trial court upheld and declared to be null and void for
being unconstitutional. The court contends further
authority to process and approve applications for
imports SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations
pursuant to LOI 144 has already been repealed by EO
133 issued on February 27, 1987. Hence, the PITC filed
a certiorari seeking the reversal of the said decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not PITCs Administrative Order 8908-01 is valid.
HELD: The

Supreme

Court

held

that

PITC

is

empowered to issue such order; nevertheless, the said

AO is invalid within the context of Article 2 of the New
Civil Code. The Court cited Tanada vs Tuvera which
states

that

all

statues

including

those

of

local

application and private laws shall be published as

condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days
after publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper
of general circulation unless a different effectivity date
is fixed by the legislature. The AO under consideration
is one of those issuances which should be published for
its effectivity since it is punitive in character.
G.R. No. 108461, October 21, 1996
Justice Torres Jr.
FACTS: The Petitioner Philippine International Trading
Corporation (PITC) issued

Administrative Order No.

SOCPEC 89-08-01, 1 under which, applications to the

PITC for importation from the People's Republic of
China (PROC, for brevity) must be accompanied by a
viable and confirmed Export Program of Philippine
Products to PROC carried out by the improper himself
or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer in an
amount equivalent to the value of the importation from

263 scra 420

PROC being applied for, or, simply, at one is to one

ratio.

Publication Administrative Orders

PITC issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01
under which applications to the PITC for importation
from

the

Peoples

accompanied

by

Republic
viable

of

and

China

must

confirmed

be

export

program of Philippine products. PITC barred Remington

Private

respondents

Remington

and

Firestone

individually applied for authority to import from PROC

with the petitioner. They were granted such authority

37
after satisfying the requirements for importers, and

which should be published for its effectivity, since its

after

purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law

they

executed

Subsequently,

for

respective

failing

to

undertakings.

comply

with

their

undertakings to submit export credits equivalent to the

pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in

relation to LOI 444 and EO 133.

value of their importations, further import applications

were

withheld

by

petitioner

PITC

from

private

respondents, such that the latter were both barred

from importing goods from PROC. As a result, the
private respondents filed a Petition for Prohibition and
Mandamus against the PITC.

The court ruled that declared the Administrative Order

to be null and void, since the same was not published,
contrary to Article 2 of the New Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether the Administrative Order issued

by PITC is null and void on the ground that it was
not published in accordance with Article 2 of the
New Civil Code.

HELD: Yes.

The

questioned

Administrative

Order,

legally, until it is published, is invalid within the context

of Article 2 of Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette
(or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines), unless it is otherwise provided. . . .
The original Administrative Order issued on August 30,
1989,

under

which

the

respondents

filed

their

applications for importation, was not published in the

Official

Gazette

circulation.

The

or
fact

in

a
that

newspaper
the

of

general

amendments

to

Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 were filed

with, and published by the UP Law Center in the
National Administrative Register, does not cure the
defect related to the effectivity of the Administrative
Order.

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no

publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws. The Administrative
Order under consideration is one of those issuances

Republic vs. Express Telecommunications Co. Inc.

(Extelcom) [GR 147096, 15 January 2002]; also
Bayan Telecommunications (Bayantel) Inc., vs. Express
Telecommunications Co. [GR 147210]
Facts: On 29 December 1992, the International
Communications Corporation (now Bayan
Telecommunications, Inc. or Bayantel) filed an
application with the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) for a Certificate of Public
Convenience or Necessity (CPCN, NTC Case 92-486) to
install, operate and maintain a digital Cellular Mobile
Telephone System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a
Provisional Authority (PA). Shortly thereafter, or on 22
January 1993, the NTC issued Memorandum Circular 41-93 directing all interested applicants for nationwide
or regional CMTS to file their respective applications
before the Commission on or before 15 February 1993,
and deferring the acceptance of any application filed
after said date until further orders. On 6 May 1993, and
prior to the issuance of any notice of hearing by the
NTC with respect to Bayantel's original application,
Bayantel filed an urgent ex-parte motion to admit an
amended application. On 17 May 1993, the notice of
hearing issued by the NTC with respect to this
amended application was published in the Manila
Chronicle. Copies of the application as well as the
notice of hearing were mailed to all affected parties.
Subsequently, hearings were conducted on the
amended application. But before Bayantel could
complete the presentation of its evidence, the NTC
issued an Order dated 19 December 1993 stating that
in view of the recent grant of 2 separate Provisional
Authorities in favor of ISLACOM and GMCR, Inc., which
resulted in the closing out of all available frequencies
for the service being applied for by Bayantel, and in
order that the case may not remain pending for an
indefinite period of time, the case was ordered
archived without prejudice to its reinstatement if and
when the requisite frequency becomes available. On 17
May 1999, Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Revive
Case, citing the availability of new frequency bands for
CMTS operators. On 1 February 2000, the NTC granted
BayanTel's motion to revive the latter's application and
set the case for hearings on February 9, 10, 15, 17 and
22, 2000. The NTC noted that the application was
ordered archived without prejudice to its reinstatement
if and when the requisite frequency shall become
available. Express Telecommunication Co., Inc.
(Extelcom) filed in NTC Case 92-486 an Opposition

38
(With Motion to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of
Bayantel's application; arguing that Bayantel's motion
sought the revival of an archived application filed
almost 8 years ago, and thus, the documentary
evidence and the allegations of Bayantel in said
application are all outdated and should no longer be
used as basis of the necessity for the proposed CMTS
service. On 3 May 2000, the NTC issued an Order
granting in favor of Bayantel a provisional authority to
operate CMTS service, applying Rule 15, Section 3 of
its 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure. Extelcom filed
with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and
prohibition (CA-GR SP 58893), seeking the annulment
of the Order reviving the application of Bayantel, the
Order granting Bayantel a provisional authority to
construct, install, operate and maintain a nationwide
CMTS, and Memorandum Circular 9-3-2000 allocating
frequency bands to new public telecommunication
entities which are authorized to install, operate and
maintain CMTS. On 13 September 2000, the Court of
Appeals granted the writs of certiorari and prohibition
prayed for, annulling and setting aside the NTC orders
dated 1 February and 3 May 2000 in NTC Case 92-486,
dismissing Bayantel's Amended Application without
prejudice to the filing of a new CMTS application.
Bayantel and the NTC, the latter being represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion
for reconsideration of the above decision. On the other
hand, Extelcom filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, praying that NTC Memorandum
Circular 9-3-2000 be also declared null and void. On 9
February 2001, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution
denying all of the motions for reconsideration of the
parties for lack of merit. Hence, the Constitutional Law
II, 2005 ( 10 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) NTC and
Bayantel filed their petitions for review on certiorari
(GR 147096, and GR 147210 respectively). In the
present petition, Extelcom contends, among others,
that the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules
which were filed with the Office of the National
Administrative Register on 3 February 1993. These
Revised Rules deleted the phrase "on its own
initiative;" accordingly, a provisional authority may be
issued only upon filing of the proper motion before the
Commission. The NTC, on the other hand, issued a
certification to the effect that inasmuch as the 1993
Revised Rules have not been published in a newspaper
of general circulation, the NTC has been applying the
1978 Rules. Issue: Whether the 1978 or 1993 NTC
Rules of Practice and Procedure should govern in the
approval of Bayantels application. Held: The absence
of publication, coupled with the certification by the
Commissioner of the NTC stating that the NTC was still
governed by the 1978 Rules, clearly indicate that the
1993 Revised Rules have not taken effect at the time of
the grant of the provisional authority to Bayantel. The
fact that the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP

Law Center on February 3, 1993 is of no moment.

There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987
which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP
Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules
force and effect. The National Administrative Register
is merely a bulletin of codified rules and it is furnished
only to the Office of the President, Congress, all
appellate courts, the National Library, other public
offices or agencies as the Congress may select, and to
other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication
and mailing or distribution costs. Still, publication in
the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general
circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes,
rules or regulations can take effect. The Rules of
Practice and Procedure of the NTC, which implements
Section 29 of the Public Service Act (Commonwealth
Act 146, as amended), fall squarely within the scope of
these laws, as explicitly mentioned in the case Taada
v. Tuvera. Administrative rules and regulations must be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only
exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely
internal in nature, or those so-called letters of
instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by
their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be published in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation before it can take effect. Even the 1993
Revised Rules itself mandates that said Rules shall take
effect only after their publication in a newspaper of
general circulation. In the absence of such publication,
therefore, it is the 1978 Rules that governs.
(Administrative Law, quasi-legislative power, proper
procedure, filing and publication)
Facts: National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
granted Bayantel the provisional authority to operate a
Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) on its
own initiative applying Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1987
Rules of Practice and Procedures.
Respondent Extelcom contends that the NTC should
have applied the Revised Rules which were filed with
the Office of the National Administrative Register
where the phrase on its own initiative were deleted
and since the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the
UP Law Center.
Issue: WON the 1993 Revised Rules which was filed in
the UP Law Center is the law in force and effect in
granting provisional authority.
Held: No. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of
1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the

39
UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules
force and effect. The National Administrative Register
is merely a bulletin of codified rules. Publication in the
Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is
a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules and
regulations can take effect.
Tanada v. Philippine Atomic Energy Commission
[GR 70632, 11 February 1986]; also Nuclear Free
Philippines Coalition v. Napocor [ GR L-68474]
Facts: The Official Philippine Atomic Energy
Commission (PAEC) pamphlet, entitled "The Philippine
Nuclear Power Plant-1" was published in 1985 when
Commissioners Manuel Eugenio, Quirino Navarro, and
Alejandro Ver Albano had already been appointed to
their present positions. Other pamphlets entitled
"Nuclear Power Safe, Clean, Economical, and
Available," and Nuclear Power Plant and
Environmental Safety were issued earlier, but the
majority of the Commissioners even then were already
occupying positions of responsibility in the PAEC.
Commissioner Eugenio was Acting Chief of the PAEC
Department on Nuclear Technology and Engineering
from June, 1980 to July, 1984; Commissioner Navarro
was PAEC Chief Science Research Specialist from May,
1980 to September, 1984; and Commissioner Albano
was PAEC Deputy Commissioner from March, 1980 to
September, 1984. These pamphlets continued to be
distributed by PAEC as late as March 1985. Their official
distribution continued after the filing of National Power
Corporation (Napocor)'s motion for conversion on 27
June 1984 and even after PAEC had issued its order
dated 26 February 1985 formally admitting the said
motion for conversion. In GR 70632, the competence of
the PAEC Commissioners to pass judgment on the
safety of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant-1 (PNPP-1)
was questioned; (2) the validity of Napocor's
motion/application for the conversion of its
construction permit into an operating license for PNPP1 was assailed, and (3) PAEC Commissioners were
charged with bias prejudgment.
Issue: Whether the PAEC Commissioner may sit in
judgment in determining the safety of PNPP-1.
Held: The PAEC Commissioners would be acting with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction were they to sit in judgment upon the
safety of the plant, absent the requisite objectivity that
must characterize such an important inquiry because
they already have prejudged the safety of PNPP-1. The
PAEC Commissioners cannot escape responsibility from
the official pamphlets, which clearly indicate the
prejudgment that PNPP-1 is safe. The official
distribution of the pamphlets continued when the
Commissioners had already been appointed to their

present positions and and even after PAEC had issued

its order dated 26 February 1985 formally admitting
Napocors motion for conversion.
Anzaldo v. Clave [GR L-54597, 15 December
1982]
Facts: In 1974, the position of Science Research
Supervisor II (Medical Research Department) became
vacant when the incumbent, Dr. Kintanar, became
Director of the Biological Research Center of the
National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST). Dr.
Anzaldo and Dr. Venzon were both next-in-rank to the
vacant position, both holding positions of Scientist
Research Associate IV. Dr. Anzaldo finished BS
Pharmacy (1950, College of Pharmacy, UP), and MS
Pharmacy (1962, CEU), Doctor of Pharmacy (1965,
CEU). Aside from her civil service eligibility as a
pharmacist, she is a registered medical technologist
and supervisor (unassembled). She started working in
the NIST in 1954 and has served for 28 years. On the
other hand, Dr. Venzon finished Medicine (1957, UST).
She started working in the NIST in 1960 and has served
for 21 years. Dr. Anzaldo is senior to her in point of
service. Dr. Quintin Kintanar recommended Dr. Venzon
for the position. Dr. Anzaldo protested against such
recommendation, to which the NIST Reorganization
Committee found such protest to be valid and
meritorious. Due to the impasse, the NIST
Commissioner, however, did not resolve the issue. The
position was not filled up. Dr. Pedro Afable, Vice
Chairman, later became OIC of the NIST. He appointed
Dr. Anzaldo to the position effective 4 January 1978,
after thorough study and screening of the qualifications
of both doctors and upon recommendation of the NIST
Staff Evaluation (88-61 votes). The Civil Service
Commission approved the appointment. Dr. Venzon
appealed to the Office of the President of the
Philippines (addressed to Presidential Executive
Assistant Jacobo Clave, who was concurrently the
Chairman of the CSC). The appeal was forwarded to the
NIS OIC Jose P. Planas, who reiterated Dr. Afables
decision. The appeal-protest was later sent to the CSC.
CSC Chairman Clave and Commissioner Jose A. Melo
recommended In Resolution 1178 dated 23 August
1979 that Dr. Venzon be appointed to the position, in
conflict with the 1978 appointment of Dr. Anzaldo
which was duly attested and approved by the CSC. The
Resolution was made in pursuance to Section 19(6) of
the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines (PD 807, 6
October 1975), which provides that "before deciding a
contested appointment, the Office of the President
shall consult the Civil Service Commission." On 5
January 1980, after denial of her motion for the
reconsideration of the resolution, Dr. Anzaldo appealed
to the Office of the President of the Philippines.
Presidential Executive Assistant Clave in his decision of
20 March 1980 revoked Dr. Anzaldo's appointment and

40
ruled that, "as recommended by the Civil Service
Commission" (meaning Chairman Clave himself and
Commissioner Melo), Dr. Venzon should be appointed
to the contested position but that Dr. Anzaldo's
appointment to the said position should be considered
"valid and effective during the pendency" of Dr.
Venzon's protest. In a resolution dated 14 August 1980,
Presidential Executive Assistant Clave denied Dr.
Anzaldo's motion for reconsideration. On 25 August
1980, Dr. Anzaldo filed in the Supreme Court the
special civil action of certiorari. Issue: Whether CSC
Commissioner Jacobo Clave can concur with the
recommendation of the Presidential Executive
Assistant, who is himself, in the appointment of Dr.
Venzon. Held: The 20 March 1980 decision of
Presidential Executive Assistant Clave implemented the
23 August 1979 Resolution (1178) of Clave (as CSC
Chairman), concurred with by Commissioner Melo,
recommending the appointment of Dr. Venzon as
Science Research Supervisor II in place of Dr. Anzaldo.
When Presidential Executive Assistant Clave said in his
decision that he was "inclined to concur in the
recommendation of the Civil Service Commission",
what he meant was that he was concurring with
Chairman Clave's recommendation: he was concurring
with himself . It is evident that Doctor Anzaldo was
denied due process of law when Presidential Executive
Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of
Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission (See
also Zambales Chromite Mining Co. vs. Court of
Appeals). Common sense and propriety dictate that the
commissioner in the Civil Service Commission, who
should be consulted by the Office of the President,
should be a person different from the person in the
Office of the President who would decide the appeal of
the protestant in a contested appointment. 74 Tumey
vs. Ohio [273 US 510, 7 March 1927] Taft (CJ): Facts:
Tumey was arrested at White Oak, and was brought
before Mayor Pugh, of the village of North College Hill,
charged with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor.
He moved for his dismissal because of the
disqualification of the mayor to try him under the 14th
Amendment. The mayor denied the motion, proceeded
to the trial, convicted Tumey of unlawfully possessing
intoxicating liquor within Hamilton county as charged,
fined him $100, and ordered that he be imprisoned
until the fine and costs were paid. Tumey obtained a
bill of exceptions and carried the case on error to the
court of common pleas of Hamilton county. That court
heard the case and reversed the judgment, on the
ground that the mayor was disqualified as claimed. The
state sought review by the Court of Appeals of the First
Appellate District of Ohio, which reversed the common
pleas and affirmed the judgment of the mayor. On 4
May 1926, the state Supreme Court refused Tumey's
application to require the Court of Appeals to certify its
record in the case. Tumey then filed a petition in error

in that court as of right, asking that the judgment of

the mayor's court and of the appellate court be
reversed on constitutional grounds. On 11 May 1926,
the Supreme Court adjudged that the petition be
dismissed for the reason that no debatable
constitutional question was involved in the cause. The
judgment was then brought to the US Supreme Court
upon a writ of error allowed by the Chief Justice of the
state Supreme Court, to which it was rightly directed.
Issue: Whether the pecuniary interest of the Mayor and
his village, and the system of courts in prosecuting
violations of the Prohibition Act, renders the mayor
disqualified from hearing the case. Held: All questions
of judicial qualification may not involve constitutional
validity. Thus matters of kinship, personal bias, state
policy, remoteness of interest would seem generally to
be matters merely of legislative discretion. But it
certainly violates the 14th Amendment and deprives a
defendant in a criminal case of due process of law to
subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a
court, the judge of which has a direct, personal,
substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion
against him in his case. Herein, the mayor has
authority, which he exercised in the case, to order that
the person sentenced to pay a fine shall remain in
prison until the fine and costs are paid. The mayor thus
has a direct personal pecuniary interest in convicting
the defendant who came before him for trial, in the $12
of costs imposed in his behalf, which he would not
have received if the defendant had been acquitted.
This was not exceptional, but was the result of the
normal operation of the law and the ordinance. The
system by which an inferior judge is paid for his service
only when he convicts the defendant has not become
so embedded by custom in the general practice, either
at common law or in this country, that it can be
regarded as due process of law, unless the costs
usually imposed are so small that they may be properly
ignored as within the maxim "de minimis non curat
lex." The Court cannot regard the prospect of receipt or
loss of such an emolument in each case as a minute,
remote, trifling, or insignificant interest. It is certainly
not fair to each defendant brought before the mayor
for the careful and judicial consideration of his guilt or
innocence that the prospect of such a prospective loss
by the mayor should weigh against his acquittal. But
the pecuniary interest of the mayor in the result of his
judgment is not the only reason for holding that due
process of law is denied to the defendant here. The
statutes were drawn to Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 13 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) stimulate small
municipalities, in the country part of counties in which
there are large cities, to organize and maintain courts
to try persons accused of violations of the Prohibition
Act everywhere in the county. The inducement is
offered of dividing between the state and the village
the large fines provided by the law for its violations.

41
The trial is to be had before a mayor without a jury,
without opportunity for retrial, and with a review
confined to questions of law presented by a bill of
exceptions, with no opportunity by the reviewing court
to set aside the judgment on the weighing of evidence,
unless it should appear to be so manifestly against the
evidence as to indicate mistake, bias, or willful
disregard of duty by the trial court. Thus, no matter
what the evidence was against him, the defendant had
the right to have an impartial judge. He seasonably
raised the objection, and was entitled to halt the trial
because of the disqualification of the judge, which
existed both because of his direct pecuniary interest in
the outcome, and because of his official motive to
convict and to graduate the fine to help the financial
needs of the village. There were thus presented at the
outset both features of the disqualification. The
judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is reversed,
and the cause remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with the present opinion.

sense and propriety dictate that the commissioner in

the Civil Service Commission, who should be consulted
by the Office of the President, should be a person
different from the person in the Office of the President
who would decide the appeal of the protestant in a
contested appointment.

Due Process Administrative Due Process

Dr Anzaldo, 55, had been working in the National
Institute of Science and Technology for 28 years. She
was holding the position Scientist Research Associate
IV when she was appointed as Science Research
Supervisor II. Her appointment was approved by the
CSC in 1978. The position was previously held by Dr
Kintanar who recommended Dr Venzon to his position.

Facts: The Science Research Supervisor II position was

Dr Venzon contested the position. Dr Afable, the one

vacant and both Dr Felicidad Anzaldo and Dr Eulalia

who

Venzon were next-in-rank for the said position. Venzon

appointment was approved by the NIST evaluation

was recommended for the position to w/c Anzaldo

Committee which gave 88 points to Anzalado and 66

protested. The position was not filled up until NIST OIC

points to Venzon. The issue was elevated to the Office

appointed Anzaldo to that position. The same was

of the president by Venzon. Clave was then the

approved by Civil Service Commission. Venzon

Presidential Executive Assistant. Pursuant to PD 807 or

contested this and appealed to the Office of the

President. This protest was sent to Civil Service
Commission and was decided in favour of Venzon by
Chairman Jacobo Clave. Anzaldos motion for
reconsideration was denied and she appealed to Office
of the President to w/c Clave is concurrently
Presidential Executive Assistant. Appeal was revoked
and ruled as as recommended by the Civil Service
Commission.

appointed

Anzaldo,

averred

that

Anzaldos

the Civil Service Decree, Clave referred the issue to the

CSC. Clave was also holding the chairmanship of the
CSC. Clave issued Res 1178 appointing Venzon to the
contested position. After the denial of her motion for
the reconsideration of that resolution, or on January 5,
1980, Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the President
of the Philippines. Since Clave was holding the office of
PEA he just affirmed his decision as the CSC chairman.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is due process in the case
at bar.

Issue: Whether or not Clave denied due process to

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Anzaldo. When PEA

Anzaldo on the ground of grave abuse of discretion?

Clave said in his decision that he was inclined to

Decision: Decision of respondent set aside and

Anzaldos appointment declared valid. Due process of

concur in the recommendation of the Civil Service

Commission,

what he

meant was

that

he was

concurring with Chairman Claves recommendation: he

law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to

was concurring with himself. It is evident that Anzaldo

Anzaldo that Presidential Executive Assistant Clave

was denied due process of law when Presidential

should decide whether his own recommendation as

Executive

Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, as to w/c

recommendation of (himself) Chairman Clave of the

doctor should be appointed for the position, should be

Civil Service Commission. Due process of law means

adopted by the President of the Philippines. Common

fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Anzaldo that PEA

Assistant

Clave

concurred

with

the

42
Clave should decide whether his own recommendation
as Chairman of the CSC, as to who between Anzaldo
and Venzon should be appointed Science Research
Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the
Philippines.

C009Tejano vs. Ombudsman

,GR 159190, 30 June 2005; Second Division, Chico-Nazario [J]
FACTS:
On 08 November 1994, Aniano A. Desierto, then the Special
Prosecutor, concurred inthe approval of his subordinates on the
filing of the proper information for violation of Section3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 against petitioner Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr.,
Juana dela Cruz andVicente dela Cruz of V&G. Afterwards, the
case was filed with the Sandiganbayan, petitioner filed with the
Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for a Period of Time to File
Motion for Reinvestigation. Sandiganbayan granted the motion
for reinvestigation and ordered the Officeof the Special
Prosecutor to conduct the reinvestigation. Upon reinvestigation,
convinced thatno probable cause existed to indict petitioner
Tejano, and spouses Juana and Vicente delaCruz, Special
Prosecutor Micael, recommended the dismissal of the case. On
10 December 1999, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto,
who earlier participated in the initial
preliminaryinvestigation as Special Prosecutor, disapproved the
recommendation for the dismissal of the
case with the marginal note
assign the case to another prosecutor to prosecute the
case aggressively.
ISSUE:
WON THE OMBUDSMAN IS JUSTIFIED IN DISAPPROVEDING
THERECOMMENDATION FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE.
HELD.
NO. Due process dictates that one called upon to resolve
a dispute may not review hisdecision on appeal. Having
participated in the initial preliminary investigation of
the instant caseand having recommended the filing of an
appropriate information, it behooved OmbudsmanDesierto to
recuse himself from participating in the review of the
same during thereinvestigation.
Tumey vs. Ohio [273 US 510, 7 March 1927]
Taft (CJ):
Facts: Tumey was arrested at White Oak, and was
brought before Mayor Pugh, of the village of North
College Hill, charged with unlawfully possessing
intoxicating liquor. He moved for his dismissal because
of the disqualification of the mayor to try him under

the 14th Amendment. The mayor denied the motion,

proceeded to the trial, convicted Tumey of unlawfully
possessing intoxicating liquor within Hamilton county
as charged, fined him $100, and ordered that he be
imprisoned until the fine and costs were paid. Tumey
obtained a bill of exceptions and carried the case on
error to the court of common pleas of Hamilton county.
That court heard the case and reversed the judgment,
on the ground that the mayor was disqualified as
claimed. The state sought review by the Court of
Appeals of the First Appellate District of Ohio, which
reversed the common pleas and affirmed the judgment
of the mayor. On 4 May 1926, the state Supreme Court
refused Tumeys application to require the Court of
Appeals to certify its record in the case. Tumey then
filed a petition in error in that court as of right, asking
that the judgment of the mayors court and of the
appellate court be reversed on constitutional grounds.
On 11 May 1926, the Supreme Court adjudged that the
petition be dismissed for the reason that no debatable
constitutional question was involved in the cause. The
judgment was then brought to the US Supreme Court
upon a writ of error allowed by the Chief Justice of the
state Supreme Court, to which it was rightly directed.
Issue: Whether the pecuniary interest of the Mayor
and his village, and the system of courts in prosecuting
violations of the Prohibition Act, renders the mayor
disqualified from hearing the case.
Held: All questions of judicial qualification may not
involve constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship,
personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest
would seem generally to be matters merely of
legislative discretion. But it certainly violates the 14th
Amendment and deprives a defendant in a criminal
case of due process of law to subject his liberty or
property to the judgment of a court, the judge of which
has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in
reaching a conclusion against him in his case. Herein,
the mayor has authority, which he exercised in the
case, to order that the person sentenced to pay a fine
shall remain in prison until the fine and costs are paid.
The mayor thus has a direct personal pecuniary
interest in convicting the defendant who came before
him for trial, in the $12 of costs imposed in his behalf,
which he would not have received if the defendant had
been acquitted. This was not exceptional, but was the
result of the normal operation of the law and the
ordinance. The system by which an inferior judge is
paid for his service only when he convicts the
defendant has not become so embedded by custom in
the general practice, either at common law or in this
country, that it can be regarded as due process of law,
unless the costs usually imposed are so small that they
may be properly ignored as within the maxim de
minimis non curat lex. The Court cannot regard the
prospect of receipt or loss of such an emolument in
each case as a minute, remote, trifling, or insignificant
interest. It is certainly not fair to each defendant
brought before the mayor for the careful and judicial
consideration of his guilt or innocence that the
prospect of such a prospective loss by the mayor
should weigh against his acquittal. But the pecuniary
interest of the mayor in the result of his judgment is
not the only reason for holding that due process of law

43
is denied to the defendant here. The statutes were
drawn to stimulate small municipalities, in the country
part of counties in which there are large cities, to
organize and maintain courts to try persons accused of
violations of the Prohibition Act everywhere in the
county. The inducement is offered of dividing between
the state and the village the large fines provided by the
law for its violations. The trial is to be had before a
mayor without a jury, without opportunity for retrial,
and with a review confined to questions of law
presented by a bill of exceptions, with no opportunity
by the reviewing court to set aside the judgment on
the weighing of evidence, unless it should appear to be
so manifestly against the evidence as to indicate
mistake, bias, or willful disregard of duty by the trial
court. Thus, no matter what the evidence was against
him, the defendant had the right to have an impartial
judge. He seasonably raised the objection, and was
entitled to halt the trial because of the disqualification
of the judge, which existed both because of his direct
pecuniary interest in the outcome, and because of his
official motive to convict and to graduate the fine to
help the financial needs of the village. There were thus
presented at the outset both features of the
disqualification. The judgment of the Supreme Court of
Ohio is reversed, and the cause remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with the present opinion.
Tumey vs. Ohio [273 US 510, 7 March 1927]
Facts: Tumey was arrested at White Oak, and was
brought before Mayor Pugh, of the village of North
College Hill, charged with unlawfully possessing
intoxicating liquor. He moved for his dismissal because
of the disqualification of the mayor to try him under
the 14th Amendment. The mayor denied the motion,
proceeded to the trial, convicted Tumey of unlawfully
possessing intoxicating liquor within Hamilton county
as charged, fined him $100, and ordered that he be
imprisoned until the fine and costs were paid. Tumey
obtained a bill of exceptions and carried the case on
error to the court of common pleas of Hamilton county.
That court heard the case and reversed the judgment,
on the ground that the mayor was disqualified as
claimed. The state sought review by the Court of
Appeals of the First Appellate District of Ohio, which
reversed the common pleas and affirmed the judgment
of the mayor. On 4 May 1926, the state Supreme Court
refused Tumey's application to require the Court of
Appeals to certify its record in the case. Tumey then
filed a petition in error in that court as of right, asking
that the judgment of the mayor's court and of the
appellate court be reversed on constitutional grounds.
On 11 May 1926, the Supreme Court adjudged that the
petition be dismissed for the reason that no debatable
constitutional question was involved in the cause. The
judgment was then brought to the US Supreme Court
upon a writ of error allowed by the Chief Justice of the
state Supreme Court, to which it was rightly directed.
Issue: Whether the pecuniary interest of the Mayor and

his village, and the system of courts in prosecuting

violations of the Prohibition Act, renders the mayor
disqualified from hearing the case. Held: All questions
of judicial qualification may not involve constitutional
validity. Thus matters of kinship, personal bias, state
policy, remoteness of interest would seem generally to
be matters merely of legislative discretion. But it
certainly violates the 14th Amendment and deprives a
defendant in a criminal case of due process of law to
subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a
court, the judge of which has a direct, personal,
substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion
against him in his case. Herein, the mayor has
authority, which he exercised in the case, to order that
the person sentenced to pay a fine shall remain in
prison until the fine and costs are paid. The mayor thus
has a direct personal pecuniary interest in convicting
the defendant who came before him for trial, in the $12
of costs imposed in his behalf, which he would not
have received if the defendant had been acquitted.
This was not exceptional, but was the result of the
normal operation of the law and the ordinance. The
system by which an inferior judge is paid for his service
only when he convicts the defendant has not become
so embedded by custom in the general practice, either
at common law or in this country, that it can be
regarded as due process of law, unless the costs
usually imposed are so small that they may be properly
ignored as within the maxim "de minimis non curat
lex." The Court cannot regard the prospect of receipt or
loss of such an emolument in each case as a minute,
remote, trifling, or insignificant interest. It is certainly
not fair to each defendant brought before the mayor
for the careful and judicial consideration of his guilt or
innocence that the prospect of such a prospective loss
by the mayor should weigh against his acquittal. But
the pecuniary interest of the mayor in the result of his
judgment is not the only reason for holding that due
process of law is denied to the defendant here. The
statutes were drawn to Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 13 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) stimulate small
municipalities, in the country part of counties in which
there are large cities, to organize and maintain courts
to try persons accused of violations of the Prohibition
Act everywhere in the county. The inducement is
offered of dividing between the state and the village
the large fines provided by the law for its violations.
The trial is to be had before a mayor without a jury,
without opportunity for retrial, and with a review
confined to questions of law presented by a bill of
exceptions, with no opportunity by the reviewing court
to set aside the judgment on the weighing of evidence,
unless it should appear to be so manifestly against the
evidence as to indicate mistake, bias, or willful
disregard of duty by the trial court. Thus, no matter
what the evidence was against him, the defendant had
the right to have an impartial judge. He seasonably

44
raised the objection, and was entitled to halt the trial
because of the disqualification of the judge, which
existed both because of his direct pecuniary interest in
the outcome, and because of his official motive to
convict and to graduate the fine to help the financial
needs of the village. There were thus presented at the
outset both features of the disqualification. The
judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is reversed,
and the cause remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with the present opinion.
People v. CA [GR 118882, 26 September 1996]
Facts: The are no preliminary facts provided regarding
CA-GR SP No. 31733, "People vs. Hon. Pedro S. Espina
et al." (in Court of Appeals), Criminal Case 93-01-38,
"People vs. Cristeta Reyes, et al.," and Criminal Case
93-01-39, "People of the Philippines vs. Jane C. Go"
(both in RTC branch presided by Judge Pedro Espina,
Branch 7, RTC, 8th Judicial Region: Tacloban) in the
present resolution; except the fact that Jane Go is the
principal accused in the killing of her husband
Dominador Go. The Office of the Solicitor General filed
a petition for review with urgent prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order to annul
and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-GR SP 31733 in so far as it denied Peoples prayer
for the inhibition of Judge Espina in hearing Criminal
cases 93-01-38 and 93-01-39, and enjoining the judge
from conducting further proceedings in such criminal
cases, before the Supreme Court. On 3 April 1995, the
Court resolved to require Cristeta Reyes and Roger
Doctora, Johny Santos and Antonio Alegro, and Jane C.
Go to comment within 10 days from notice, to issue the
temporary restraining order prayed for, and to enjoin
Judge Pedro S. Espina from taking further action in
Criminal Cases 93-01-38 and 93-01-39 until further
orders from the Court. Reyes, Doctora, Santos, Alegro,
and Go failed to file their respective comments within
the reglementary period, nor within the second
deadline. As the latter are already in detention and
that sanction relating to delay in the submission of the
comments may not amount to much, and as not to
unduly delay the disposition of Criminal Cases 93-0138 and 93-01-39, the Court resolved to dispense with
the latter's comments and to proceed with the
disposition of the petition. Issue: Whether the decision
of a Judge favorable to the accused in a different
special civil proceeding is enough basis to render the
Judge to be partial or bias in the present criminal case.
Held: One of the essential requirements of procedural
due process in a judicial proceeding is that there must
be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial
power to hear and determine the matter before it.
Thus, every litigant, including the State, is entitled to
the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The judge
must not only be impartial but must also appear to be
impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his

decision will be just. They should be sure that when

their rights are violated they can go to a judge who
shall give them justice. They must believe in his sense
of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by
requiring compliance with the rudiments of fair play.
Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal
justice where a suitor approaches a court already
committed to the other party and with a judgment
already made and waiting only to be formalized after
the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a
formal hearing. The Judge will reach his conclusions
only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments
are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the
pertinent law. Herein, Judge Pedro Espina cannot be
considered to adequately possess such cold neutrality
of an impartial judge as to fairly assess both the
evidence to be adduced by the prosecution and the
defense in view of his previous decision in
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 14 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) Special Civil Action 92-11-219 wherein he
enjoined the preliminary investigation at the Regional
State Prosecutor's Office level against Jane Go, the
principal accused in the killing of her husband
Dominador Go. Judge Espina's decision in favor of Jane
Go serves as sufficient and reasonable basis for the
prosecution to seriously doubt his impartiality in
handling the criminal cases. It would have been more
prudent for Judge Espina to have voluntarily inhibited
himself from hearing the criminal cases.
Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan [GR 103501-03, 17
February 1997
Facts: Then President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena
over the phone to pay directly to the president's office
and in cash what the Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA) owes the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to the 7
January 1985 memorandum of then Minister Trade and
Industry Roberto Ongpin. Tabuena agreed. About a
week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe RoaGimenez, then private secretary of Marcos, a
Presidential Memorandum dated 8 January 1986
reiterating in black and white such verbal instruction.
In obedience to President Marcos' verbal instruction
and memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo
G. Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, caused the release of P55
Million of MIAA funds by means of three (3)
withdrawals. On 10 January 1986, the first withdrawal
was made for P25 Million, following a letter of even
date signed by Tabuena and Dabao requesting the PNB
extension office at the MIAA the depository branch of
MIAA funds, to issue a manager's check for said
amount payable to Tabuena. The check was encashed,
however, at the PNB Villamor Branch. Dabao and the
cashier of the PNB Villamor branch counted the money
after which, Tabuena took delivery thereof. The P25

45
Million in cash was delivered on the same day to the
office of Mrs. Gimenez. Mrs. Gimenez did not issue any
receipt for the money received. Similar circumstances
surrounded the second withdrawal/encashment and
delivery of another P25 Million, made on 16 January
1986. The third and last withdrawal was made on 31
January 1986 for P5 Million. Peralta was Tabuena's cosignatory to the letter- request for a manager's check
for this amount. Peralta accompanied Tabuena to the
PNB Villamor branch as Tabuena requested him to do
the counting of the P5 Million. After the counting, the
money was loaded in the trunk of Tabuena's car.
Peralta did not go with Tabuena to deliver the money to
Mrs. Gimenez' office. It was only upon delivery of the
P5 Million that Mrs. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the
amounts she received from Tabuena. The receipt was
dated January 30, 1986. Tabuena and Peralta were
charged for malversation of funds, while Dabao
remained at large. One of the justices of the
Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of
a defense witness and of the accused themselves; the
volume of the questions asked were more the
combined questions of the counsels. On 12 October
1990, they were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Tabuena and Peralta filed separate petitions for review,
appealing the Sandiganbayan decision dated 12
October 19990 and the Resolution of 20 December
1991. Issue: Whether Tabuena and Peralta were denied
due process by the active participation of a
Sandiganbayan justice in the questioning witnesses in
the trial. Held: Due process requires no less than the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Bolstering this
requirement, we have added that the judge must not
only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial,
to give added assurance to the parties that his decision
will be just. The parties are entitled to no less than this,
as a minimum guaranty of due process. Our courts
should refrain from showing any semblance of onesided or more or less partial attitude in order not to
create any false impression in the minds of the
litigants. For obvious reasons, it is the bounden duty of
all to strive for the preservation of the people's faith in
our courts. Respect for the Constitution is more
important than securing a conviction based on a
violation of the rights of the accused. The Court was
struck by the way the Sandiganbayan actively took
part in the questioning of a defense witness and of the
accused themselves, as shown in the records. The
volume of questions hurled by the Sandiganbayan was
more the combined questions of the counsels. More
importantly, the questions of the court were in the
nature of cross examinations characteristic of
confrontation, probing and insinuation. We
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 15 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) have not adopted in this country the practice
of making the presiding judge the chief inquisitor. It is
better to observe our time-honored custom of orderly

judicial procedure, even at the expense of occasional

delays. The impartiality of the judge; his avoidance of
the appearance of becoming the advocate of either
one side or the other of the pending controversy is a
fundamental and essential rule of special importance in
criminal cases.
Facts: Luis Tabuena as General Manager of MIAA
received direct order from Marcos to pay directly to his
office sum of 55mio in cash to pay for MIAAs liability to
PNCC. He then received Presidential Memorandum
from Fe Gimenez (secretary). The money was delivered
in cash in three withdrawals, no vouchers prepared to
support the disbursement although Gimenez issued a
receipt on the third delivery for the entire amount.
Tabuena was accused and convicted of the crime of
malversation by Sandiganbayan for defrauding the
government, taking and misappropriating money when
there is no outstanding obligation between MIAA and
PNCC. Petitioner contended that he was acting in good
faith when the office of the president directed him to
deliver the said amount to his office person who acts
in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some
lawful purpose.
Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan violated due
process on the ground of departing from that common
standard of fairness and impartiality?
Decision: Sandiganbayan decision reversed and set
aside. Tabuena and Peralta are acquitted of the crime
of malversation. The majority believes that the
interference by the Sandiganbayan Justices was just
too excessive that it cannot be justified under the norm
applied to a jury trial, or even under the standard
employed in a non-jury trial where the judge is
admittedly given more leeway in propounding
questions to clarify points and to elicit additional
relevant evidence.
It is never proper for a judge to discharge the duties of
a prosecuting attorney. However anxious a judge may
be for the enforcement of the law, he should always
remember that he is as much judge in behalf of the
defendant accused of crime, and whose liberty is in

46
jeopardy, as he is judge in behalf of the state, for the

"requests" that the jurors not expose themselves to

purpose of safeguarding the interests of society.

comment about the case. Though they were

Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966)

No. 490 Argued February 28, 1966

sequestered during the five days and four nights of

their deliberations, the jurors were allowed to make
inadequately supervised telephone calls during that
period. Pervasive publicity was given to the case

Decided June 6, 1966 384 U.S. 333

Syllabus

throughout the trial, much of it involving incriminating

matter not introduced at the trial, and the jurors were
thrust into the role of celebrities. At least some of the

Petitioner's wife was bludgeoned to death July 4, 1954.

publicity deluge reached the jurors. At the very

From the outset officials focused suspicion on

inception

petitioner, who was arrested on a murder charge July

30 and indicted August 17. His trial began October 18
and terminated with his conviction December 21, 1954.
During the entire pretrial period, virulent and
incriminating publicity about petitioner and the murder
made the case notorious, and the news media
frequently aired charges and countercharges besides
those for which petitioner was tried. Three months
before trial, he was examined for more than five hours
without counsel in a televised three-day inquest
conducted before an audience of several hundred
spectators in a gymnasium. Over three weeks before

Page 384 U. S. 334

of the proceedings and later, the trial judge announced
that neither he nor anyone else could restrict the
prejudicial news accounts. Despite his awareness of
the excessive pretrial publicity, the trial judge failed to
take effective measures against the massive publicity,
which continued throughout the trial, or to take
adequate steps to control the conduct of the trial. The
petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition contending
that he did not receive a fair trial. The District Court
granted the writ. The Court of Appeals reversed.

trial, the newspapers published the names and

addresses of prospective jurors causing them to

Held:

receive letters and telephone calls about the case. The

trial began two weeks before a hotly contested election

1. The massive, pervasive, and prejudicial publicity

at which the chief prosecutor and the trial judge were

attending petitioner's prosecution prevented him from

candidates for judgeships. Newsmen were allowed to

receiving a fair trial consistent with the Due Process

take over almost the entire small courtroom, hounding

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 384 U. S.

petitioner and most of the participants. Twenty

349-363.

reporters were assigned seats by the court within the

bar and in close proximity to the jury and counsel,
precluding privacy between petitioner and his counsel.
The movement of the reporters in the courtroom
caused frequent confusion and disrupted the trial, and,
in the corridors and elsewhere in and around the
courthouse, they were allowed free rein by the trial
judge. A broadcasting station was assigned space next

(a) Though freedom of discussion should be given the

widest range compatible with the fair and orderly
administration of justice, it must not be allowed to
divert a trial from its purpose of adjudicating
controversies according to legal procedures based on
evidence received only in open court. Pp. 384 U. S.
350-351.

to the jury room. Before the jurors began deliberations

(b) Identifiable prejudice to the accused need not be

they were not sequestered, and had access to all news

shown if, as in Estes v. Texas, 381 U. S. 532, and even

media, though the court made "suggestions" and

more so in this case, the totality of the circumstances

47
raises the probability of prejudice. Pp. 384 U. S. 352355.
(c) The trial court failed to invoke procedures which
would have guaranteed petitioner a fair trial, such as
adopting stricter rules for use of the courtroom by
newsmen as petitioner's counsel requested, limiting
their number, and more closely supervising their
courtroom conduct. The court should also have
insulated the witnesses; controlled the release of leads,
information, and gossip to the press by police officers,
witnesses, and counsel; proscribed extrajudicial
statements by any lawyer, witness, party, or court
official divulging prejudicial matters, and requested the
appropriate city and county officials to regulate release
of information by their employees. Pp.384 U. S. 358362.
2. The case is remanded to the District Court with
instructions to release petitioner from custody unless
he is tried again within a reasonable time. P. 384 U. S.
363.
346 F.2d 707, reversed and remanded.

SHEPPARD VS MAXWELL,
384 U.S. 333Argued February 28, 1966Decided June 6,
1966
FACTS: Petitioner's wife was bludgeoned to death on July 4,
1954. From the outset, officials focused suspicion onpetitioner,
who was arrested on a murder charge July 30 and indicted August
17. His trial began October 18 andterminated with his conviction
December 21, 1954. During the entire pretrial period virulent and
incriminatingpublicity about petitioner and the murder made the
case notorious, and the news media frequently aired chargesand
countercharges besides those for which petitioner was tried.
Three months before trial he was examined formore than five
hours without counsel in a televised three-day inquest conducted
before an audience of severalhundred spectators in a
gymnasium. Pervasive publicity was given to the case throughout
the trial, much of itinvolving incriminating matter not introduced
at the trial, and the jurors were thrust into the role of
celebrities.Despite his awareness of the excessive pretrial
publicity, the trial judge failed to take effective measures
againstthe massive publicity which continued throughout the trial
or to take adequate steps to control the conduct of thetrial. The

petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition contending that he did

not receive a fair trial. The District Courtgranted the writ. The
Court of Appeals reversed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prejudicial publicity constitutes a
violation of the due process clause guaranteed by theFourteenth
Amendment.
HELD: Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by
an impartial jury free from outside influences. Giventhe
pervasiveness of modern communications and the difficulty of
effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial
courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is
never weighed against theaccused. And appellate tribunals have
the duty to make an independent evaluation of the
circumstances. Wherethere is a reasonable likelihood that
prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge
shouldcontinue the case until the threat abates, or transfer it to
another county not so permeated with publicity. Sincethe state
trial judge did not fulfill his duty to protect Sheppard from the
inherently prejudicial publicity whichsaturated the community and
to control disruptive influences in the courtroom, we must reverse
the denial of thehabeas petition. The case is remanded to the
District Court with instructions to issue the writ and order
thatSheppard be released from custody unless the State puts him
to its charges again within a reasonable time.
Webb v. de Leon [GR 121234, 23 August 1995],
also Gatchalian v. de Leon [GR 121245], and Lejano v.
de Leon [GR 121297] Second Division, Puno (J)
Facts: This was a highly-publicized case (dubbed as
Vizconde Massacre, and involves a son of a Philippine
Senator). On 19 June 1994, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice
(DOJ) a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert
Webb, Michael Gatchalian. Antonio J. Lejano and 6
other persons, with the crime of Rape with Homicide.
Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors
headed by Assistant Chief State prosecutor Jovencito R.
Zuo to conduct the preliminary investigation of those
charged with the rape and killing on 30 June 1991 of
Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita NicolasVizoonde, and sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home
at Paraaque. During the preliminary investigation, the
NBI presented the sworn statements of Maria Jessica
Alfaro, 2 former housemaids of the Webb family, Carlos
Cristobal (a plane passenger), Lolita Birrer (live-in
partner of Biong), 2 of Vizcondes maids, Normal White
(a security guard) and Manciano Gatmaitan (an
engineer). The NBI also submitted the autopsy report
involving Estrellita (12 stab wounds), Carmela (9 stab
wounds), and Jennifer (19 stab wounds); and the
genital examination of Carmela confirming the
presence of spermatozoa. The NBI submitted
photocopies of the documents requested by Webb in
his Motion for Production and Examination of Evidence
and Documents, granted by the DOJ Panel. Webb

48
claimed during the preliminary investigation that he
did not commit the crime as he went to the United
States on 1 March 1991 and returned to the Philippines
on 27 October 1992. The others Fernandez,
Gatchalian, Lejano, Estrada, Rodriguez and Biong
submitted sworn statements, responses, and a motion
to dismiss denying their complicity in the rape-killing of
the Vizcondes. Only Filart and Ventura failed to file
their counter-affidavits though they were served with
subpoena in their last known address. On 8 August
1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution
"finding Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 16 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) probable cause to hold respondents
for trial" and recommending that an Information for
rape with homicide be filed against Webb, et. al. On the
same date, it filed the corresponding Information
against Webb, et. al. with the RTC Paraaque. Docketed
as Criminal Case 95-404 and raffled to Branch 258
presided by Judge Zosimo V. Escano. It was, however,
Judge Raul de Leon, pairing judge of Judge Escano, who
issued the warrants of arrest against Webb, et. al. On
11 August 1995, Judge Escano voluntarily inhibited
himself from the case to avoid any suspicion about his
impartiality considering his employment with the NBI
before his appointment to the bench. The case was reraffled to branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita
Tolentino who issued new warrants of arrest against
Webb, et. al. On 11 August 1995, Webb voluntarily
surrendered to the police authorities at Camp Ricardo
Papa Sr., in Taguig. Webb, et. al. filed petitions for the
issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with application for
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
with the Supreme Court to: (1) annul and set aside the
Warrants of Arrest issued against petitioners by
respondent Judges Raul E. de Leon and Amelita
Tolentino in Criminal Case No. 95- 404; (2) enjoin the
respondents from conducting any proceeding in the
aforementioned criminal case; and (3) dismiss said
criminal case or include Jessica Alfaro as one of the
accused therein. Gatchalian and Lejano likewise gave
themselves up to the authorities after filing their
petitions before the Court. Issue: Whether the
attendant publicity of the case deprived Webb, et.al, of
their right to fair trial. Held: Pervasive and prejudicial
publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an
accused of his due process right to fair trial. Herein,
however, nothing in the records that will prove that the
tone and content of the publicity that attended the
investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness
and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. The DOJ Panel is
composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and
Senior State Prosecutors; and their long experience in
criminal investigation is a factor to consider in
determining whether they can easily be blinded by the
klieg lights of publicity. At no instance in the case did
Webb, et. al. seek the disqualification of any member

of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from

their bombardment of prejudicial publicity. Further , on
the contention of the denial of their constitutional right
to due process and violation of their right to an
impartial investigation, records show that the DOJ
Panel did not conduct the preliminary investigation
with indecent haste. Webb, et. al. were given fair
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause against
them. Still, the Supreme Court reminds a trial judge in
high profile criminal cases of his/her duty to control
publicity prejudicial to the fair administration of justice.
The ability to dispense impartial justice is an issue in
every trial and in every criminal prosecution, the
judiciary always stands as a silent accused. More than
convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent, the
business of the judiciary is to assure fulfillment of the
promise that justice shall be done and is done, and that
is the only way for the judiciary to get an acquittal from
the bar of public opinion.
Facts: Hubert Webb was one of the accused in the
high-profile case Vizconde massacre. Preliminary
investigation was provided by NBI and the case was
raffled to Judge Zosimo Escano who inhibited himself
from the case for being employed with NBI before. His
pair Judge Escano issued warrant of arrest to
defendants. The case was re-raffled to Branch 274,
presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued new
warrants of arrest. Webb and the others voluntarily
surrendered. They files before the court petition of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. They contend
that (1) respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino
gravely abused their discretion when they failed to
conduct a preliminary examination before issuing
warrants of arrest against them: (2) the DOJ Panel
likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that
there is probable cause to charge them with the crime
of rape with homicide; (3) the DOJ Panel denied them
their constitutional right to due process during their
preliminary investigation; and (4) the DOJ Panel
unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it
failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the Information as an
accused.
Issue: Whether or not the attendant publicity deprived
Webb and the others of their right to fair trial?
Decision: Petition dismissed. to warrant a finding of
prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof

49
that the judges have been unduly influenced, not
simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity.
In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that
will prove that the tone and content, of the publicity
that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally
infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel.
Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of
publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for
these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To
be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant
Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors.
Their long experience in criminal investigation is a
factor to consider in determining whether they can
easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed,
their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia
of bias for it does not appear that they considered any
extra-record evidence except evidence properly
adduced by the parties. The length of time the
investigation was conducted despite its summary
nature and the generosity with which they
accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners
speak well of their fairness. At no instance, we note,
did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member
of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from
their bombardment of prejudicial publicity.
People v. Sanchez [GR 121039-45, 18 October
2001]
Facts: (The Sarmenta-Gomez rape-slay) On 28 June
1993, Luis and Rogelio "Boy" Corcolon approached
Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez, forcibly took the two
and loaded them at the back of the latter's van, which
was parked in front of Caf Amalia, Agrix Complex, Los
Banos, Laguna. George Medialdea, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin
Brion and Pepito Kawit also boarded the van while
Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio Malabanan, who were
also with the group, stayed in the ambulance. Both
vehicles then headed for Erais Farm situated in
Barangay Curba, which was owned by Mayor Antonio
Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna. The two youngsters were
then brought inside the resthouse where Eileen was
taken to the Mayors room. Allan was badly beaten up
by Luis, Boy, Ama and Medialdea and thereafter thrown
out of the resthouse. At around 1:00 a.m. of the next
day, a crying Eileen was dragged out of the resthouse
by Luis and Medialdea her hair disheveled, mouth
covered by a handkerchief, hands still tied and stripped
of her shorts. Eileen and Allan were then loaded in the
Tamaraw van by Medialdea, et. al. and headed for

Calauan, followed closely by the ambulance. En route

to Calauan, gunfire was heard from the van. The van
pulled over whereupon Kawit dragged Allan, whose
head was already drenched in blood, out of the vehicle
onto the road and finished him off with a single
gunshot Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 17 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) from his armalite. The ambulance and
van then sped away. Upon reaching a sugarcane field
in Sitio Paputok, Kilometro 74 of Barangay Mabacan,
Eileen was gang-raped by Luis Corcolon, Medialdea,
Rogelio Corcolon, Ama, Brion and Kawit. After Kawits
turn, Luis Corcolon shot Eileen with his baby armalite.
Moments later, all 8 men boarded the ambulance and
proceeded to Calauan, leaving the Tamaraw van with
Eileens remains behind. Initially, the crime was
attributed to one Kit Alqueza, a son of a feared general
(Dictador Alqueza). Luis and Rogelio Corcolon were also
implicated therein. However, further investigation, and
forensic findings, pointed to the group of Mayor
Sanchez. Centeno and Malabanan bolstered the
prosecution's theory. On 11 March 1995, Judge Harriet
O. Demetriou of the Regional Trial Court (Pasig City,
Branch 70) found Mayor Sanchez, Medialdea, Ama,
Brion, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon and Kawit guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with
homicide, ordering them to pay Eileen Sarmenta the
amount of P50,000 and additionally, the amount of
P700,000.00 to the heirs of Eileen Sarmenta and Allan
Gomez as additional indemnity. On 25 January 1999,
the Supreme Court, through Justice Martinez, affirmed
in toto the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial
court. Antonio Sanchez, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and
Pepito Kawit seasonably filed their respective motions
for reconsideration. The Office of the Solicitor General
filed its Comment on 6 December 1999. Sanchez avers
that he is a victim of trial and conviction by publicity,
besides claims that principal witness Centeno and
Malabanan lack credibility, that the testimony of his
13- year old daughter should have been given full faith
and credit, and that the gargantuan damages awarded
have no factual and legal bases. Ama, Brion and Kawit
maintain that Centeno and Malabanan were sufficiently
impeached by their inconsistent statements pertain to
material and crucial points of the events at issue,
besides that independent and disinterested witnesses
have destroyed the prosecutions version of events. On
2 February 1999, Justice Martinez retired in accordance
with AM 99-8-09. The motions for reconsideration was
assigned to Justice Melo for study and preparation of
the appropriate action on 18 September 2001. Issue:
Whether the publicity of the case impaired the
impartiality of the judge handling the case. Held:
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right
of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial
of Mayor Sanchez, et. al., was given a day-to-day,
gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that
publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and

50
impaired his impartiality. The right of an accused to a
fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. Responsible
reporting enhances an accused's right to a fair trial.
The press does not simply publish information about
trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by
subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial
processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Our judges are learned in the law and trained to
disregard off-court evidence and on camera
performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere
exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not
per se fatally infect their impartiality. To warrant a
finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation
and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced
by the barrage of publicity. Records herein do not show
that the trial judge developed actual bias against
Mayor Sanchez, et. al., as a consequence of the
extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of
his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does
not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed position
as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of
change even by evidence presented during the trial.
Mayor Sanchez, et. al., has the burden to prove this
actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
Facts: Accused-appellant Antonio Sanchez and others
were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape with homicide. In his motion for
reconsideration, he avers that he is a victim of trial and
conviction by publicity.
Issue: Whether or not the attendant publicity deprived
Webb and the others of their right to fair trial?
Decision: We cannot sustain appellants claim that he
was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial
publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media
gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all
high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and
now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial
is not incompatible to a free press. To warrant a finding
of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and
proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not
simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity.
In the case at bar, the records do not show that the
trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a
consequence of the extensive media coverage of the
pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of
circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial
judge acquired a fixed position as a result of prejudicial

publicity which is incapable of change even by

evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the
burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
discharged the burden.
Summary Dismissal Board v. Torcita [GR 130442,
6 April 2000]
Facts: On 26 April 1994, a red Cortina Ford, driven by
C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita, with his aide, PO2 Java, in the
front seat and his wife with two ladies at the backseat,
were overtaken by a Mazda pick-up owned by
Congressman Manuel Puey and driven by one Reynaldo
Consejo with four (4) passengers in the persons of Alex
Edwin del Rosario, Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza and
Cristina Dawa. After the Mazda pick-up has overtaken
the red Cortina Ford, and after a vehicular collision
almost took place, it accelerated speed and proceeded
to Hacienda Aimee, a sugarcane plantation owned by
the congressman. The red Cortina Ford followed also at
high speed until it reached the hacienda where Torcita
and Java alighted and the Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 18 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) confrontation with
del Rosario and Jesus Puey occurred. Torcita identified
himself but the same had no effect. PO2 Java
whispered to him that there are armed men around
them and that it is dangerous for them to continue.
That at this point, they radioed for back-up.
Torcita,upon the arrival of the back-up force of PNP
Cadiz City, proceeded to the place where Capt. Jesus
Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario were. On 6 July 1994,
12 verified administrative complaints were filed against
Torcita for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer,
Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation
of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and Violation of
COMELEC Gun Ban. The 12 administrative complaints
were consolidated into 1 major complaint for conduct
unbecoming of a police officer. The Summary Dismissal
Board, however, did not find sufficient evidence to
establish that Torcita threatened anybody with a gun,
nor that a serious confrontation took place between the
parties, nor that the urinating incident took place, and
held that the charges of violation of domicile and illegal
search were not proven. Still, while the Board found
that Torcita was "in the performance of his official
duties" when the incident happened, he allegedly
committed a simple irregularity in performance of duty
(for being in the influence of alcohol while in
performance of duty) and was suspended for 20 days
and salary suspended for the same period of time.
Torcita appealed his conviction to the Regional
Appellate Board of the Philippine National Police (PNP,
Region VI, Iloilo City), but the appeal was dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction. Whereupon, Torcita filed a petition
for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City
(Branch 31), questioning the legality of the conviction

51
of an offense for which he was not charged (lack of
procedural due process of law). The Board filed a
motion to dismiss, which was denied. The RTC granted
the petition for certiorari and annulled the dispositive
portion of the questioned decision insofar as it found
Torcita guilty of simple irregularity in the performance
of duty. The Board appealed from the RTC decision, by
petition of review to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the same for the reason that the respondent
could not have been guilty of irregularity considering
that the 12 cases were eventually dismissed. The
Board filed the petition for review on certiorari before
the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether Torcita may be
proceeded against or suspended for breach of internal
discipline, when the original charges against him were
for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal
Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of
Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and Violation of
COMELEC Gun Ban. Held: Notification of the charges
contemplates that the respondent be informed of the
specific charges against him. The absence of
specification of the offense for which he was eventually
found guilty is not a proper observance of due process.
There can be no short-cut to the legal process. While
the definition of the more serious offense is broad, and
almost all-encompassing a finding of guilt for an
offense, no matter how light, for which one is not
properly charged and tried cannot be countenanced
without violating the rudimentary requirements of due
process. Herein, the 12 administrative cases filed
against Torcita did not include charges or offenses
mentioned or made reference to the specific act of
being drunk while in the performance of official duty.
There is no indication or warning at all in the summary
dismissal proceedings that Torcita was also being
charged with breach of internal discipline consisting of
taking alcoholic drinks while in the performance of his
duties. The omission is fatal to the validity of the
judgment finding him guilty of the offense for which he
was not notified nor charged. Further, the cursory
conclusion of the Dismissal Board that Torcita
"committed breach of internal discipline by taking
drinks while in the performance of same" should have
been substantiated by factual findings referring to this
particular offense. Even if he was prosecuted for
irregular performance of duty, he could not have been
found to have the odor or smell of alcohol while in the
performance of duty because he was not on duty at the
time that he had a taste of liquor; he was on a private
trip fetching his wife.
Summary Dismissal Board v. Torcita G.R. No.
130442 (April 6, 2000)

FACTS: Respondent was charged with 12

administrative complaints which were consolidated into
one major complaint, which is, conduct unbecoming of
a police officer. The Summary Dismissal Board
suspended respondent from service for 20 days, for
simple irregularity in the performance of service.
The Board later found respondent to have committed a
breach of internal discipline by taking alcoholic drinks
while on duty.
HELD: Respondent was entitled to know that he was
being charged with being drunk while in the
performance of duty. Although he was given the
opportunity to be heard on the multiple and broad
charges filed against him, the absence of specification
of the offense for which he was eventually found guilty
is not a proper observance of due process.
Summary Dismissal Board v. Torcita
G.R. No. 130442 (April 6, 2000)
FACTS: Respondent

was

charged

with

12

administrative complaints which were consolidated into

one major complaint, which is, conduct unbecoming of
a

police

officer. The

Summary

Dismissal

Board

suspended respondent from service for 20 days, for

simple

irregularity

in

the

performance

of

service. The Board later found respondent to have

committed a breach of internal discipline by taking
alcoholic drinks while on duty.

HELD: Respondent was entitled to know that he was

being

charged

with

being

drunk

while

in

the

performance of duty. Although he was given the

opportunity to be heard on the multiple and broad
charges filed against him, the absence of specification
of the offense for which he was eventually found guilty
is not a proper observance of due process.
Justice Secretary v. Lantion [GR 139465, 17
October 2000] Resolution
Facts: On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos issued Presidential Decree 1069 "Prescribing
the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have
Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". On 13
November 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M.
Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty
Between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Government of the United States of
America. "The Senate, by way of Resolution 11,
expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said
treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the

52
Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7
thereof (on the admissibility of the documents
accompanying an extradition request upon certification
by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the
requested state resident in the Requesting State). On
18 June 1999, the Department of Justice received from
the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale
0522 containing a request for the extradition of Mark
Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note
Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of
arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern
District of Florida, and other supporting documents for
said extradition. Jimenez was charged in the United
States for violation of (a) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to
commit offense or to defraud the United States, 2
counts), (b) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat
tax, 4 counts), (c) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio,
or television, 2 counts), (d) 18 USC 1001 (False
statement or entries, 6 counts), and (E) 2 USC 441f
(Election contributions in name of another; 33 counts).
On the same day, the Secretary issued Department
Order 249 designating and authorizing a panel of
attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case.
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition
documents, Jimenez (on 1 July 1999) requested copies
of the official extradition request from the US
Government, as well as all documents and papers
submitted therewith, and that he be given ample time
to comment on the request after he shall have received
copies of the requested papers. The Secretary denied
the request. On 6 August 1999, Jimenez filed with the
Regional Trial Court a petition against the Secretary of
Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, for
mandamus (to compel the Justice Secretary to furnish
Jimenez the extradition documents, to give him access
thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment
on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter
to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and
objectively); certiorari (to set aside the Justice
Secretarys letter dated 13 July 1999); and prohibition
(to restrain the Justice Secretary from considering the
extradition request and from filing an extradition
petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any
act directed to the extradition of Jimenez to the United
States), with an application for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction. The trial court ruled in favor of Jimenez. The
Secretary filed a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court. On 18 January 2000, by a vote of 9-6,
the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ordered
the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers and to
grant him a reasonable period within which to file his
comment with supporting evidence. On 3 February

2000, the Secretary timely filed an Urgent Motion for

Reconsideration.
Issue: Whether Jimenez had the right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of an extradition
process.
Held: Presidential Decree (PD) 1069 which implements
the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the time when an
extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for
extradition as well as its supporting papers, i.e., after
the filing of the petition for extradition in the
extradition court (Section 6). It is of judicial notice that
the summons includes the petition for extradition
which will be answered by the extraditee. There is no
provision in the Treaty and in PD 1069 which gives an
extraditee the right to demand from the Justice
Secretary copies of the extradition request from the US
government and its supporting documents and to
comment thereon while the request is still undergoing
evaluation. The DFA and the DOJ, as well as the US
government, maintained that the Treaty and PD 1069
do not grant the extraditee a right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of an extradition
process. It is neither an international practice to afford
a potential extraditee with a copy of the extradition
papers during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process. Jimenez is, thus, bereft of the right to notice
and hearing during the extradition process evaluation
stage. Further, as an extradition proceeding is not
criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an
extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary
investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter
do not necessarily apply to the former. The procedural
due process required by a given set of circumstances
"must begin with a determination of the precise nature
of the government function involved as well as the
private interest that has been affected Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 20 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) by
governmental action." The concept of due process is
flexible for "not all situations calling for procedural
safeguards call for the same kind of procedure." Thus,
the temporary hold on Jimenez's privilege of notice and
hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process
which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness
should he decide to resist the request for his
extradition to the US. There is no denial of due process
as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.
Secretary of Justice vs Judge Lantion GR 139465
Jan 18 2000
Facts
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received
from the Department of Foreign Affairs of the United
States requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez
for various crimes in violation of US laws. In compliance

53
with the related municipal law, specifically Presidential
Decree No. 1069 Prescribing the Procedure for
Extradition of Persons Who Have committed Crimes in
a Foreign Country and the established Extradition
Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and
the Government of the United States of America, the
department proceeded with proceeded with the
designation of a panel of attorneys to conduct a
technical evaluation and assessment as provided for in
the presidential decree and the treaty.
The respondent requested for a copy of the official
extradition request as well as the documents and
papers submitted therein. The petitioner denied the
request as it alleges that such information is
confidential in nature and that it is premature to
provide such document as the process is not a
preliminary investigation but a mere evaluation.
Therefore, the constitutional rights of the accused are
not yet available.

Issue
1.Whether or not private respondent, Mark B. Jimenez,
be granted access to the official extradition request
and documents with an opportunity to file a comment
on or opposition thereto
2.Whether or not private respondents entitlement to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of
the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition
Treaty

requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement

therein in good faith. The doctrine of incorporation is
applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted
with situations in which there appears to be a conflict
between a rule of international law and the provisions
of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts
should be done to harmonize them. In a situation,
however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a
choice has to be made between a rule of international
law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that
municipal law should be upheld by the municipal
courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules
of international law are given equal standing, but are
not superior to, national legislative enactments.
In this case, there is no conflict between international
law and municipal law. The United States and the
Philippines share a mutual concern about the
suppression and punishment of crime in their
respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States
accord common due process protection to their
respective citizens. In fact, neither the Treaty nor the
Extradition Law precludes the rights of due process
from a prospective extradite.

Secretary of Justice vs Lantion and Mark Jimenez

(private respondent)
G.R. No. 139465. October 17, 2000
Facts: On January 18, 2000, petitioner was ordered to
furnish private respondent copies of the extradition

Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled that the private respondent
be furnished a copy of the extradition request and its
supporting papers and to give him a reasonable period
of time within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence. In this case, there exists a clear
conflict between the obligation of the Philippine
Government to comply with the provisions of the treaty
and its equally significant role of protection of its
citizens of its right of due process.
The processes outlined in the treaty and in the
presidential decree already pose an impending threat
to a prospective extraditees liberty as early as the
evaluation stage. It is not an imagined threat to his
liberty, but a very imminent one. On the other hand,
granting due process to the extradition case causes
delay in the process.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and
most fundamental maxims of international law,

request and its supporting papers and to grant the

latter reasonable period within which to file his
comment with supporting evidence.
Private respondent states that he must be afforded the
right to notice and hearing as required by our
Constitution. He likens an extradition proceeding to a
criminal proceeding and the evaluation stage to a
preliminary investigation.

Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration

assailing the mentioned decision.

Issue: Whether or not the private respondent is

entitled to the due process right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process

54
Held: No. Private respondent is bereft of the right to

due, which in turn depends on the extent to which an

notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the

individual will be condemned to suffer grievous loss.

extradition process.
An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a

As aforesaid, P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-

criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the

US Extradition Treaty affords an extraditee sufficient

rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of

opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the

Rights. The process of extradition does not involve the

petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to

determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused.

know the basis of the request for his extradition is

His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of

merely moved to the filing in court of the formal

the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule,

petition for extradition. The extraditees right to know

constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine

is momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage of

the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked

the extradition process to accommodate the more

by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition

compelling interest of the State to prevent escape of

papers are still undergoing evaluation. As held by the

potential extraditees which can be precipitated by

US Supreme Court in United States v. Galanis:

premature information of the basis of the request for

An

criminal

his extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the

prosecution, and the constitutional safeguards that

extradition proceedings is the need to be more

accompany a criminal trial in this country do not shield

deferential to the judgment of a co-equal branch of the

an accused from extradition pursuant to a valid treaty.

government, the Executive, which has been endowed

in

by our Constitution with greater power over matters

character and the evaluation stage in an extradition

involving our foreign relations. Needless to state, this

proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation,

balance of interests is not a static but a moving

the due process safeguards in the latter do not

balance which can be adjusted as the extradition

necessarily apply to the former.

process moves from the administrative stage to the

As

extradition

an

extradition

proceeding

proceeding

is

is

not

not

criminal

judicial stage and to the execution stage depending on

The procedural due process required by a given set of

factors that will come into play. In sum, we rule that

circumstances must begin with a determination of the

the temporary hold on private respondents privilege of

precise nature of the government function involved as

notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due

well as the private interest that has been affected by

process which will not deprive him of fundamental

governmental action. The concept of due process is

fairness should he decide to resist the request for his

flexible for not all situations calling for procedural

extradition to the United States. There is no denial of

safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.

due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured

a party.

In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the

State, the Court stresses that it is not ruling that the
private respondent has no right to due process at all

PEOPLE V. ROBERTO ESTRADA

G.R. NO. 130487

throughout the length and breadth of the extrajudicial

proceedings. Procedural

due

process

requires

determination of what process is due, when it is due,

Accused was convicted for murder and sentenced to

and the degree of what is due. Stated otherwise, a

death. Defense interposed insanity with proof of his

prior determination should be made as to whether

history of mental illness filed for suspension of

procedural protections are at all due and when they are

arraignment

and suspension of proceedings. Both

55
were denied without subjecting accused to mental

its staff. This caused the stoppage of work in Bistros

examination.

night club and restaurant operations. Lim also refused

to accept Bistros application for a business license, as
well as the work permit applications of Bistros staff.

HELD:

Court granted preliminary injunction. However Lim

Case remanded for the conduct of a proper mental

examination

to

determine

competency

to

stand

trial. By depriving appellant of mental examination,

the trial court effectively deprived appellant of a fair

issued closure of Bistro operations and filed motion to

dissolve the injunction order.
Issue: Whether or not Lim violated due process on the

trial and the proceedings before the court are therefore

ground of failing to give Bistro the opportunity to be

nullified. He who invokes insanity as an exempting

heard?

circumstance must prove it by clear and positive

evidence. The absence of direct proof however, does

Decision: Petition denied. Lim has no authority to

not entirely discount the probability that accused was

close down Bistros business or any business

not of sound mind at that time. In passing the question

establishment in Manila without due process of law.

of the propriety of suspending the proceedings, the

Lim cannot take refuge under the Revised Charter of

test is found in the question whether the accused

the City of Manila and the Local Government Code.

would have a fair trial with the assistance which the

law secures or gives. There are 2 distinct matters to be
determined under this test (1) whether the defendant
is sufficiently coherent to provide his counsel with

There is no provision in these laws expressly or

impliedly granting the mayor authority to close down
private commercial establishments without notice and

information necessary or relevant to constructing a

hearing, and even if there is, such provision would be

defense and (2) whether he is able to comprehend the

void. The due process clause of the Constitution

significance of the trial and his relation to it.

requires that Lim should have given Bistro an

The determination of whether a sanity investigation or

hearing should be ordered rests generally in the
discretion of the trial court. In the case, the trial court

opportunity to rebut the allegations that it violated the

conditions of its licenses and permits. The regulatory
powers granted to municipal corporations must always

took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of the

be exercised in accordance with law, with utmost

accused. The trial judge however is not a psychiatrist

observance of the rights of the people to due process

or psychologist or some other expert equipped with the

and equal protection of the law.

specialized knowledge of determining the state of a

persons mental health. The court should have at least
ordered the examination of the accused, especially in
the light of the latters history of mental item.

Lim vs Court of Appeals GR 111397 12 August 2002

Facts: Bistro filed before the trial court a petition for

mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction,
against Mayor Alfredo Lim. Policemen under Lims
instructions inspected and investigated Bistros license
as well as the work permits and health certificates of

Lim vs. Court of Appeals [GR 111397, 12 August 2002]

Third Division, Carpio (J): 2 concur, 1 on leave
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 21 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) Facts: On 7 December 1992, Bistro Pigalle
Inc. filed before the trial court a petition for mandamus
and prohibition, with prayer for temporary restraining
order or writ of preliminary injunction, against Alfredo
Lim in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila. The
Bistro filed the case because policemen under Lims
instructions inspected and investigated the Bistros
license as well as the work permits and health
certificates of its staff. This caused the stoppage of
work in the Bistros night club and restaurant
operations (i.e. the New Bangkok Club and the Exotic
Garden Restaurant). Lim also refused to accept the
Bistros application for a business license, as well as
the work permit applications of the Bistros staff, for

56
the year 1993. Acting on the Bistros application for
injunctive relief, the trial court issued the temporary
restraining order on 29 December 1992, ordering Lim
and/or his agents to refrain from inspecting or
otherwise interfering in the operation of the
establishments of the Bistro. At the hearing, the parties
submitted their evidence in support of their respective
positions. On 20 January 1993, the trial court granted
the Bistros application for a writ of prohibitory
preliminary injunction. However, despite the trial
courts order, Lim still issued a closure order on the
Bistros operations effective 23 January 1993, even
sending policemen to carry out his closure order. Lim
insisted that the power of a mayor to inspect and
investigate commercial establishments and their staff
is implicit in the statutory power of the city mayor to
issue, suspend or revoke business permits and
licenses. This statutory power is expressly provided for
in Section 11 (l), Article II of the Revised Charter of the
City of Manila and in Section 455, paragraph 3 (iv) of
the Local Government Code of 1991. On 25 January
1993, the Bistro filed an "Urgent Motion for Contempt"
against Lim and the policemen who stopped the
Bistros operations on January 23, 1993. At the hearing
of the motion for contempt on 29 January 1993, the
Bistro withdrew its motion on condition that Lim would
respect the courts injunction. However, on February
12, 13, 15, 26 and 27, and on March 1 and 2, 1993,
Lim, acting through his agents and policemen, again
disrupted the Bistros business operations. Meanwhile,
on 17 February 1993, Lim filed a motion to dissolve the
injunctive order and to dismiss the case. The trial court
denied Lims motion to dissolve the injunction and to
dismiss the case in an order dated 2 March 1993. On
10 March 1993, Lim filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
against the Bistro and Judge Wilfredo Reyes. The Court
of Appeals sustained the RTC orders in a decision on 25
March 1993, and denied Lim's motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated 13 July 1993. On
1 July 1993, Manila City Ordinance 778314 took effect.
On the same day, Lim ordered the Western Police
District Command to permanently close down the
operations of the Bistro, which order the police
implemented at once. Lim filed the petition for review
on certiorari before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether
the Bistro should be given an opportunity to rebut the
allegations that it violated the conditions of its licenses
and permits. Held: From the language of Section 11 (l),
Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
and Section 455 (3) (iv) of the Local Government Code,
it is clear that the power of the mayor to issue business
licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary
power to suspend, revoke or even refuse to issue the
same. However, the power to suspend or revoke these
licenses and permits is expressly premised on the
violation of the conditions of these permits and

licenses. The laws specifically refer to the "violation of

the condition(s)" on which the licenses and permits
were issued. Similarly, the power to refuse to issue
such licenses and permits is premised on noncompliance with the prerequisites for the issuance of
such licenses and permits. The mayor must observe
due process in exercising these powers, which means
that the mayor must give the applicant or licensee
notice and opportunity to be heard. True, the mayor
has the power to inspect and investigate private
commercial establishments for any violation of the
conditions of their licenses and permits. However, the
mayor has no power to order a police raid on these
establishments in the guise of inspecting or
investigating these commercial establishments. Lim
has no authority to close down Bistros business or any
business establishment in Manila without due process
of law. Lim cannot take refuge under the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila and the Local Government
Code. There is no provision in these laws expressly or
impliedly granting the mayor authority to close down
private commercial establishments without notice and
hearing, and even if there is, such provision would be
void. The due process clause of the Constitution
requires that Lim should have given the Bistro an
opportunity to rebut the allegations that it violated
conditions of its licenses and permits.
BUDIONGAN vs DELA CRUZ

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of

Court assails the Memorandum[1] dated April 28, 2004
of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Office of the
Ombudsman,

recommending

that

petitioners

be

charged with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act

(R.A.) No. 3019 and petitioner Pedro E. Budiongan with
violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019. Also assailed
is the Resolution [2] dated October 19, 2005 denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

57

By virtue of Municipal Ordinance No. 2, series of 2001,

On July 3, 2002, private respondents Arlene P. Palgan

the Municipality of Carmen, Bohol appropriated

and Valeriano U. Nadala filed a complaint [6] against the

the

amount of P450,000.00 for the purchase of a road

petitioners

before

the

Office

of

the

Deputy

roller for the municipality. However, on November 16,

Ombudsman for Visayas alleging illegality in the

2001, the Municipal Development Council through

conduct of the bidding, award and notice to commence

Resolution No. 3 recommended that the amount of

work since there was no fund appropriated for the

P450,000.00 be realigned and used for the asphalt

purpose.

laying of a portion of the Tan Modesto Bernaldez Street.

[3]

The

proposed

realignment

was

included

in

the December 21, 2001 agenda of the Sangguniang

On July 31, 2003, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman

Bayan of Carmen but discussion thereon was deferred.

for Visayas found probable cause and recommended

the filing of an information for violation of Article
220[7] of

the

Revised

Penal

Code

against

the

On February 6, 2002, petitioner Municipal Treasurer,

petitioners. However, the complaint against Hermosila

Fulgencio V. Paa, issued a Certificate of Availability of

Logrono, Desiderio Gudia, Jr. and Herbert Malmis was

Funds for the project. Thereafter, the Office of the

dismissed for lack of merit.[8]

Municipal Engineer prepared a Program of Works and

Cost Estimates duly noted/approved by Municipal
Budget Officer Taciana B. Espejo and Mayor Budiongan.

Upon review, the Case Assessment, Review and

Reinvestigation Bureau of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, issued the assailed Memorandum dated

Bidding was conducted on March 5, 2002. The next

April 28, 2004, modifying the charge from violation of

day, March 6, 2002, Mayor Budiongan issued the

Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code to (1) violation of

Notice of Award and Notice to Commence Work in favor

Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 against petitioners for

of

and

allegedly giving unwarranted benefit to Malmis and (2)

Contractor, Inc. who emerged as the lowest complying

violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019 against

bidder. On March 22, 2002, the Sangguniang Bayan

petitioner Budiongan for allegedly directly or indirectly

passed Resolution No. 60,

series of 2002, authorizing

having financial or pecuniary interest in a contract or

Mayor Budiongan to sign and enter into contract with

transaction in connection with which he intervenes or

Malmis relative to the above project in the amount of

takes part in his official capacity.

Herbert

Malmis

General

[4]

Merchandise

P339,808.00. With such authority, Malmis commenced

with the project.
Thus, two separate Informations were filed before the
Sandiganbayan (1) for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
Thereafter, it was discovered that there was

No. 3019 against the petitioners docketed as Criminal

yet no ordinance approving the realignment of the

Case No. 28075 and (2) for violation of Section 3(h) of

funds. Thus, on May 17, 2002, the Sangguniang Bayan

R.A. No. 3019 against petitioner Budiongan docketed

passed Ordinance No. 8,

as Criminal Case No. 28076.

[5]

series of 2002, approving

the realignment of the fund. On June 14, 2002, Malmis

was paid the contract price.

58
Thereafter,

petitioners

filed

Motion

to

too

late

in

the

day

to

remand

the

case

for

Quash[9] the information charging them with violation

reinvestigation considering that Budiongan had already

of

been arraigned and the case had long been set for pre-

dated June 10, 2005, the Sandiganbayan

trial proceedings, with both parties having filed their

granted the motion to quash and remanded Criminal

respective briefs. As regards Criminal Case No. 28075,

Case No. 28075 to the Office of the Ombudsman for

the Sandiganbayan noted that although the conduct of

amendment of the Information. It held that although

the preliminary investigation was regular, petitioners

Malmis benefited from the contract, the same is not

however were not given the opportunity to seek

unwarranted

reconsideration

Sec.

Resolution

3(e)
[10]

of

R.A.

considering

No.

that

3019. In

the

project

was

implemented, executed and completed.

of

the

modified

charges.Thus,

it

granted leave to the petitioners to file with the Office

of the Special Prosecutor a motion for reconsideration
(not a motion for reinvestigation) of the said offices

On

June

Information[11] was

27,
filed

2005,
charging

an

Amended

petitioners

Memorandum dated April 28, 2004.

with

violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, alleging that

petitioners, by prematurely awarding to Malmis the

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the

project despite the absence of funds specifically

Office of the Special Prosecutor which was denied for

appropriated for such purpose, and thereafter paying

lack of merit in the Resolution dated October 19, 2005.

the contract price from the Municipal Treasury which

was originally appropriated for the purchase of a road
roller, caused

damage and undue injury to the

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

government.

Finding that the Amended Information contains

all the material averments necessary to make out a
case for the first mode of violating Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019, i.e., causing any undue injury to any party,
including

the

government,

the

Sandiganbayan

admitted the Amended Information in its Resolution

dated August 18, 2005.[12]

On even date, petitioners filed with the Sandiganbayan

a Motion for Leave of Court to File Motion for
Reinvestigation[13] arguing that the above Informations

I. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENTS

ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN REJECTING
THE
FINDINGS
AND
AMENDING/MODIFYING
THE
RESOLUTION OF THE GRAFT
INVESTIGATING
OFFICER,
OMBUDSMAN VISAYAS, AND IN
FILING THE INFORMATION FOR
VIOLATION OF SEC. 3(e) OF RA
3019 WITHOUT AFFORDING
PETITIONERS
THE
OPPORTUNITY
TO
PRESENT
THEIR COUNTER EVIDENCE IN A
RE-INVESTIGATION;

were filed without affording them the opportunity to file

counter-affidavits

to

answer/rebut

the

modified

charges. On September 20, 2005, the Sandiganbayan

issued a Resolution[14] denying the motion insofar as
Criminal Case No. 28076 is concerned. It held that it is

II. WHETHER THE REFUSAL OR FAILURE

TO
CONDUCT
A
REINVESTIGATION HAS VIOLATED
PETITIONERS' RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS;

59
a
III. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENTS
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION
IN
ISSUING
RESOLUTIONS DATED APRIL 28,
2004 AND OCTOBER 19, 2005
FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE FOR
VIOLATION OF SEC. 3(e) OF RA
3019
AGAINST
HEREIN
PETITIONERS; and

preliminary

investigation

does

not

render

the

Information invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the

court over the case, then the denial of a motion for
reinvestigation

cannot

likewise

invalidate

the

Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction over the

case.
Petitioners were not deprived of due process because
they were afforded the opportunity to refute the
charges

by

filing

their

counter-affidavits. The

modification of the offense charged did not come as a

surprise to the petitioners because it was based on the

IV. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENTS

ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN FILING THE
INFORMATION FOR VIOLATION
OF SEC.3(e) OF RA 3019
AGAINST
PETITIONERS
IN
THE SANDIGANBAYAN
DOCKETED AS CRIMINAL CASE
NO. 28075.

same set of facts and the same alleged illegal

acts. Moreover,

petitioners

failed

to

aver

newly

discovered evidence nor impute commission of grave

errors or serious irregularities prejudicial to their
interest to warrant a reconsideration or reinvestigation
of the case as required under Section 8, Rule III of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
[16]

Thus, the modification of the offense charged, even

without affording the petitioners a new preliminary

investigation, did not amount to a violation of their
Petitioners maintain that the modification of
the charge from violation of Article 220 of the Revised
Penal Code to violation of Sections 3(e) and 3(h) of R.A.
No. 3019 denied their rights to due process since they
were not given the opportunity to answer and present
evidence

on

the

new

charge

in

preliminary

investigation. Furthermore, the petitioners argue that

public

respondents

committed

grave

abuse

of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in

issuing the challenged resolutions finding probable
cause for violation of R.A. No. 3019.
The petition lacks merit.

rights.
Furthermore, the right to preliminary investigation is
deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it
before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment.
[17]

Petitioner Budiongan was arraigned in Criminal

Case No. 28076 on March 28, 2005. He was also

arraigned together with the rest of the petitioners
under the Amended Information in Criminal Case No.
28075 on December 2, 2005.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to
determine whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the

The right to a preliminary investigation is not a

person accused of the crime is probably guilty thereof

constitutional right, but is merely a right conferred by

and should be held for trial. [18] A finding of probable

statute. The absence of a preliminary investigation

cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that

does not impair the validity of the Information or

more likely than not a crime has been committed and

otherwise render the same defective. It does not affect

was committed by the suspect. Probable cause need

the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute

not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt,

a ground for quashing the Information. [15] If absence of

neither

on

evidence

establishing

guilt

beyond

60
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt. [19]
The Office of the Special Prosecutor is an

MANUEL C. ROXAS, et al. vs. CONRADO M.

VASQUEZ, et al. [G.R. No. 114944, May 29, 2002]

integral component of the Ombudsman and is under

the latters supervision and control. Thus, whatever

FACTS:

course of action that the Ombudsman may take,

whether

to

approve

or

to

disapprove

the

recommendation of the investigating prosecutor, is but

an exercise of his discretionary powers based upon
constitutional mandate. Generally, courts should not
interfere in such exercise. It is beyond the ambit of this
Court to review the exercise of discretion of the
Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint

Petitioner Roxas was the Chairman, while

Nacpil was a Member, of the Bids and Awards
Committee of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated
National Police (PC-INP). The PC-INP invited bids for the
supply of sixty-five units of fire trucks. The Bids and
Awards Committee voted to award the contract to the
Tahei
Co.,
Ltd.,
manufacturer
of
NikkoHino. Accordingly, the contract was executed between
PC-INP and Tahei Co.

filed before it, save in cases where there is clear

showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or

excess

of

jurisdiction

on

the

part

of

the

Ombudsman.[20] Absent any showing of arbitrariness on

the part of the prosecutor or any other officer
authorized to conduct preliminary investigation, as in
the instant case, courts as a rule must defer to said

The COA subsequently discovered that there

was a discrepancy in the amounts indicatedon the
disbursement
voucher
and
the
purchase
order. Consequently, the DILG Secretary fi led a
complaint
with
the
Ombudsman
against
the respondents.

officers finding and determination of probable cause,

since the determination of the existence of probable
cause is the function of the prosecutor.

[21]

In fine, certiorari will not lie to invalidate the Office of

the Special Prosecutor's resolution denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration since there is nothing to
substantiate petitioners claim that it gravely abused its
discretion in ruling that there was no need to conduct
a reinvestigation of the case.[22]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant

After preliminary investigation, the Deputy

Ombudsman for the Military recommended the
indictment of all respondents, except Ramirez. On
review,
the
Office
of
the
Special
Prosecutor r e c o m m e n d e d t h e d i s m i s s a l o f t h
e c o m p l a i n t s a g a i n s t Rox a s , N a c p i l , C o d o y
, Ka i r a n a n d Ra m i re z . Fo rm a l
c h a r g e s w e r e fi l e d w i t h t h e
Sandiganbayan against Nazareno,
F l o r e s , Tanchanco, Custodio, Osia, Espea and
Santos. Petitioners were not included in the
criminal information. Flores and

petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Memorandum of

the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Office of the
Ombudsman, dated April 28, 2004 finding probable
cause that petitioners violated Sections 3(e) and 3(h)
of Republic Act No. 3019 and the Resolution dated
October 19, 2005 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration, are hereby AFFIRMED.

Tanchanco moved for a reinvestigation,

which was granted. Thereafter, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges
against Flores and Tanchanco. In the same resolution,
however, the Special Prosecutor made a sudden turn
about as regards Roxas, Nacpil and Kairan, and ordered
their inclusion as accused.

ISSUE:

61
Whether or not the inclusion of the
petitioners as accused violated their right to due
process.
HELD:
YES. It appears that the charge against
respondents was previously dismissed. For this reason,
there being no motion or reconsideration filed by the
complainant, said respondents ceased to be parties.
Consequently, the mere filing of motions for
reconsideration by those previously indicted, without
questioning the dismissal of the charge against the
said respondents, could not and should not be made
the basis for impleading them as accused in this case
without violating their right to due process.
Furthermore, it appears that petitioners were deprived
of due process when the Special Prosecutor
reinstated the
complaint
against
them without
their knowledge. Due process of law requires that
every litigant must be given an opportunity to
be heard. He has the right to be present and defend
himself in person at every stage of the proceedings.

MANUEL C. ROXAS, et al. vs. CONRADO M.

VASQUEZ, et al.
[G.R. No. 114944, May 29, 2002]
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:
FACTS: Petitioner Roxas was the Chairman, while
Nacpil was a Member, of the Bids and Awards
Committee of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated
National Police (PC-INP). The PC-INP invited bids for
the supply of sixty-five units of fire trucks. The Bids
and Awards Committee voted to award the contract to
the Tahei Co., Ltd., manufacturer of Nikko-Hino.
Accordingly, the contract was executed between PCINP and Tahei Co.
The COA subsequently discovered that there
was a discrepancy in the amounts indicated on the
disbursement voucher and the purchase order.
Consequently, the DILG Secretary filed a
complaint
with
the
Ombudsman
against
the
respondents.
After preliminary investigation, the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military recommended the
indictment of all respondents, except Ramirez. On
review, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
recommended the dismissal of the complaints against
Roxas, Nacpil, Codoy, Kairan and Ramirez. Formal
charges were filed with the Sandiganbayan against
Nazareno, Flores, Tanchanco, Custodio, Osia, Espea

and Santos.
Petitioners were not included in the
criminal information.
Flores
and
Tanchanco
moved
for
a
reinvestigation, which was granted. Thereafter, the
Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the
dismissal of the charges against Flores and Tanchanco.
In the same resolution, however, the Special Prosecutor
made a sudden turnabout as regards Roxas, Nacpil and
Kairan, and ordered their inclusion as accused.

ISSUE: Whether or not the inclusion of the petitioners

as accused violated their right to due process.

HELD:
YES. It appears that the charge against
respondents was previously dismissed. For this reason,
there being no motion or reconsideration filed by the
complainant, said respondents ceased to be parties.
Consequently, the mere filing of motions for
reconsideration by those previously indicted, without
questioning the dismissal of the charge against the
said respondents, could not and should not be made
the basis for impleading them as accused in this case
without violating their right to due process.
Furthermore, it appears that petitioners were
deprived of due process when the Special Prosecutor
reinstated the complaint against them without their
knowledge. Due process of law requires that every
litigant must be given an opportunity to be heard. He
has the right to be present and defend himself in
person at every stage of the proceedings.
Roxas vs. Vasquez [GR 114944, 19 June 2001]
Facts: Manuel C. Roxas and Ahmed S. Nacpil were
Chairman and Member, respectively, of the Bids and
Awards Committee of the PC-INP. Sometime in
September 1990, the PC-INP invited bids for the supply
purchase of 65 units of fire trucks, and accordingly, the
public bidding was held on 14 September 1990. The
lowest bidder, Aeolus Philippines, was disqualified
since its fire trucks had a water tank capacity of only
1,800 liters, far below the required 3,785 liter capacity.
After ocular inspections made by a A Technical
Evaluation Committee, two fire trucks, namely Morita
Isuzu and Nikki-Hino, were recommended. The Bids and
Awards Committee, however, voted to award the
contract in favor of the Korean company CISC, which
offered Ssangyong fire trucks. To avoid the possibility
of failure to bid, the Bids and Awards Committee
reviewed its recommendations, and thus limited its
choice to the two brands recommended by Gen.
Tanchanco and, by majority vote, elected Nikki-Hino of
the Tahei Co., Ltd. as the lower bidder. Thereafter, the

62
Contract of Purchase and Sale of 65 units of Nikki-Hino
fire trucks was executed between Gen. Nazareno, on
behalf of the PC-INP, and Tahei Company, Ltd. The
corresponding Purchase Order was then prepared.
Pursuant to a disbursement voucher, the PNP paid
Tahei Co., Ltd. the amount of P167,335,177.24,
representing marginal deposit for the 65 units of fire
truck. The Disbursement Voucher showed that, while
the bid price of Tahei Co. was only P2,292,784.00 per
unit, the price appearing on the Purchase Order was
P2,585,562.00 per unit. Hence, there was a
discrepancy of P292,778.00 per unit of fire truck, or a
total of P19,030,570.00 for all 65 fire trucks. The
Commission on Audit discovered the irregularities in
the bidding, awarding and purchase of the 65 fire
trucks, thus prompting then DILG Secretary Rafael
Alunan III to file a complaint on 12 February 1993 for
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 before
the Ombudsman, against (1) Dir. Gen. Cesar Nazareno,
PNP, (2) Dep. Dir. Manuel Roxas, PNP, (3) Fire Marshal
Mario Tanchanco, (4) Fire B/Gen. Diosdado Godoy
(Ret.), (5) P/Sr. Supt. Ahmed Nacpil, PNP, (6) P/Supt.
Juhan Kairan, PNP, (7) Insp. Reynaldo Osea, PNP, (8)
Dep. Dir. Gen. Gerardo Flores, PNP, (9) Dir. Nicasio
Custodio, PNP, (10) Supt. Obedio Espea, PNP, (11)
Former DILG Secretary Luis Santos, and (12) Ms.
Generosa Ramirez. The Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military conducted a preliminary investigation where
the accused submitted their respective counteraffidavits. On 19 March 1993, it recommended the
indictment of all, except Generosa Ramirez. On review,
the Office of the Special Prosecutor Review Committee
recommended the dismissal of the complaints against
Roxas, Nacpil, Codoy, Kairan and Ramirez. This latter
recommendation was approved by the Special
Prosecutor and the Ombudsman in a Memorandum
dated 15 April 1993. Accordingly, the appropriate
Information was filed by the Ombudsman before the
Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case 18956), against
Nazareno, Flores, Tanchanco, Custodio, Osea, Espena
and Santos. Roxas, Nacpil, Codoy, Kairan and Ramirez
were not included among the accused. However, upon
motion of Generals Flores and Tanchanco, a
reinvestigation was conducted by the Office of the
Special Prosecutor. On 19 October 1993, without any
notice to or participation of Roxas and Nacpil, the
Office of the Special Prosecutor issued an Order,
dismissing the charges against Flores and Tanchanco,
and recommending that Roxas, Nacpil, and Kairan be
likewise indicted. Deputy Special Prosecutor Jose de
Ferrer voted for the approval of the recommendation,
while Special Prosecutor Aniano A. Desierto dissented.
Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez approved the
recommendation. Roxas and Nacpil, together with
Kairan, filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The Review
Committee of the Office of the Special Prosecutor
recommended that the Motion be granted and the

charge against the movants be dismissed. However,

Deputy Special Prosecutor de Ferrer and Ombudsman
Vasquez disapproved the recommendation in the
second assailed Order dated 10 February 1994. Thus,
on 27 March 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman filed
an Amended Information with respondent
Sandiganbayan, impleading Roxas and Nacpil as
additional accused. Roxas and Nacpil filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court.
Issue:Whether the lack of notice to Roxas and Nacpil at
the reinvestigation render the issuance of Office of the
Ombudsman null and void. Held: It is not material
either that no new matter or evidence was presented
during the reinvestigation of the case. It should be
stressed that reinvestigation, as the word itself implies,
is merely a repeat investigation of the case. New
matters or evidence are not prerequisites for a
reinvestigation, which is simply a chance for the
prosecutor, or in this case the Office of the
Ombudsman, to review and re-evaluate its findings and
the evidence already submitted. Neither do the lack of
notice to, or participation of, Roxas and Nacpil at the
reinvestigation render the questioned issuances of
Office of the Ombudsman null and void. At any rate,
Roxas and Nacpil cannot argue that they have been
deprived of due process. The rule is well established
that due process is satisfied when the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy or an opportunity to move
for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. Herein, the record clearly shows that petitioners not
only filed their respective Counter-Affidavits during the
preliminary investigation, they also filed separate
Motions for Reconsideration of the 19 October 1993
Order of the Ombudsman impleading them as accused
in Criminal Case 18956.

Marohombsar vs Judge Adiong AM RTJ 021674 22

Facts: Complainant Marohombsar was the defendant

in Civil Case No. 1670-99 for injunction with prayer for
preliminary injunction. The case was filed on March
17, 1999 by Yasmira Pangadapun, in the said
complaint, Pangadapun questioned the legality of
Marohombsars appointment as provincial social
welfare officer V of the Department of Social Welfare

63
and Development Autonomous Region for Muslim

reconsideration of the order in question, hence her

Mindanao (DSWD-ARMM). Prior to Marohombsars

right to due process was not in anyway transgressed.

appointment, Pangadapun used to occupy said position

We have ruled that a party cannot claim that he has

as officer-in-charge. Upon the filing of the said

been denied due process when he has availed of the

complaint, respondent judge issued a TRO and set the

opportunity to present his position.

hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of

preliminary injunction on April 6, 1999. Summons,
together with a copy of the complaint and a notice
indicating that a preliminary conference would be held

BAILINANG MAROHOMBSAR VS. JUDGE SANTOS

ADIONG
G.R. No.RTJ-02-1674. January 22, 2004

and was also served on both parties. During the

hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction none of the lawyers appeared.
Hence, respondent considered it submitted for
resolution and issued the preliminary injunction the
following day.

Facts: Complainant Marohombsar was the defendant in

the civil case for injunction. The case was filed by
YasmiraPangadapun questioning the legality of
Marohombsars appointment as Provincial Social
Welfare Officer of the DSWD-ARMM. Prior to his

Issue: Whether or not Marohombsar was denied due

appointment, Pangadapun used to occupy said

process of law because the preliminary injunction was

position.

issued without hearing?

Upon the filing of the said complaint, respondent judge

Decision: Administrative complaint dismissed. In

applications for preliminary injunction, the dual
requirement of prior notice and hearing before
injunction may issue has been relaxed to the point that
not all petitions for preliminary injunction need
undergo a trial-type hearing, it being doctrinal that a
formal or trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all
instances, essential to dueprocess.The essence of due
process is that a party is afforded a reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to present any evidence
he may have in support of his defense. In the present
case, complainant was able to move for a

issued a TRO and set the hearing on the application for

the issuance of the preliminary injunction. Summons,
together with a copy of the complaint and a notice,
was also served on both parties. Marohombsar filed an
ex parte urgent motion to dissolve the TRO.
Pangadapun was given the time to comment.
Respondent judge issued an order stating that a
preliminary conference had been held and that both
parties had waived the raffle of the case and reset the
hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of
injunction. The judge gave another time to file her
comment again.
During the hearing on the application for the issuance

64
of a writ of preliminary injunction, none of the lawyers

process is that a party is afforded a reasonable

appeared. Hence, respondent judge considered it

opportunity to be heard and to present any evidence

submitted for resolution and issued the preliminary

he may have in support of his defense. It is a rule that

injunction. Hence, this complaint for gross ignorance of

a party cannot claim that he has been denied due

law, abuse of discretion and conduct unbecoming a

process when he was given the opportunity to present

judge.

his position.
3) As a matter of public policy, the acts of a judge in

Issues: 1) Whether or not TRO ex parte is allowed in

his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary

the instant case.

action even though such acts are erroneous, provided

he acts in good faith and without malice. Respondent

2) Whether or not trial-type hearing is essential to due

judge, or any other member of the bench for that

process.

matter, is presumed to have acted regularly and in the

manner that preserves the ideal of the cold neutrality

3) Whether or not respondent judge erred in ordering

of an impartial judge implicit in the guarantee of due

the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.

Philcomsat v. Alcuaz [GR 84818, 18 December
1989
Held: 1) A TRO is generally granted without notice to
the opposite party and is intended only as a restraint
on him until the propriety of granting a temporary
injunction can be determined. It goes no further than to
preserve the status quo until that determination.
Respondent judge was justified in issuing the TRO ex
parte due to his assessment of the urgency of the relief
sought.
2) In applications for preliminary injunction, the dual
requirement of prior notice and hearing before
injunction may issue has been relaxed to the point that
not all petitions for preliminary injunction need
undergo a trial-type hearing, it being doctrinal that a
formal or trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all
instances, essential to due process. The essence of due

Facts: By virtue of Republic Act 5514, the Philippine

Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT)
was granted "a franchise to establish, construct,
maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places
as the grantee may select, station or stations and
associated equipment and facilities for international
satellite communications," the authority to "construct
and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver
telecommunications services from the communications
satellite system and ground terminal or terminals." By
designation of the Republic of the Philippines, it is also
the sole signatory for the Philippines in the Agreement
and the Operating Agreement relating to the
International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization (INTELSAT), as well as in the Convention
and the Operating Agreement of the International
Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), which two
global commercial telecommunications satellite
corporations were collectively established by various
states in line with the principles set forth in Resolution
1721 (XVI) of the United Nationss General Assembly.
Since 1968, It has been leasing its satellite circuits to
PLDT, Philippine Global Communications, Eastern
Telecom, Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. ITT, and
Capitol Wireless or their predecessors-in-interest. The
satellite services thus provided by PHILCOMSAT enable

65
said international carriers to serve the public with
indispensable communication services, such as
overseas telephone, telex, facsimile, telegrams, high
speed data, live television in full color, and television
standard conversion from European to American or
vice versa. It was exempt from the jurisdiction of the
then Public Service Commission, now National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC). However,
pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 196 issued on 17
June 1987, it was placed under the jurisdiction, control
and regulation of NTC, including all its facilities and
services and the fixing of rates. Implementing said
executive order, NTC required PHILCOMSAT to apply for
the requisite certificate of public convenience and
necessity covering its facilities and the services it
renders, as well as the corresponding authority to
charge rates therefor. On 9 September 1987,
PHILCOMSAT filed with NTC an application for authority
to continue operating and maintaining the same
facilities it has been continuously operating and
maintaining since 1967, to continue providing the
international satellite communications services it has
likewise been providing since 1967, and to charge the
current rates applied for in rendering such services.
Pending hearing, it also applied for a provisional
authority so that it can continue to operate and
maintain the facilities, provide the services and charge
therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for. On 16
September 1987, PHILCOMSAT was granted a
provisional authority to continue operating its existing
facilities, to render the services it was then offering,
and to charge the rates it was then charging. This
authority was valid for 6 months from the date of said
order. When said provisional authority expired on 17
March 1988, it was extended for another 6 months, or
up to 16 September 1988. Thereafter, the NTC further
extended the provisional authority of PHILCOMSAT for
another 6 months, counted from 16 September 1988,
but it directed PHILCOMSAT to charge modified reduced
rates through a reduction of 15% on the present
authorized rates. PHILCOMSAT assailed said order.
Issue: Whether the NTC is not required to provide
notice and hearing to PHILCOMSAT in its rate-fixing
order, which fixed a temporary rate pending final
determination of PHILCOMSATs application.
Held: The NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power,
is limited by the requirements of public safety, public
interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates,
which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of
a valid delegation of legislative power. The NTC order
violates procedural due process because it was issued
motu proprio, without notice to PHILCOMSAT and
without the benefit of a hearing. Said order was based
merely on an "initial evaluation," which is a unilateral
evaluation, but had PHILCOMSAT been given an
opportunity to present its side before the order in

question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the

rate reduction and the consequent deterioration of the
public service could have been shown and
demonstrated to NTC. The order pertains exclusively to
PHILCOMSAT and to no other. Reduction of rates was
made without affording PHILCOMSAT the benefit of an
explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of
the financial statements warranted a corresponding
rate reduction. PHILCOMSAT was not even afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued
the report on which NTC based its questioned order.
While the NTC may fix a temporary rate pending final
determination of the application of PHILCOMSAT, such
ratefixing order, temporary though it may be, is not
exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of
notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of
reasonableness. Assuming that such power is vested in
NTC, it may not exercise the same in an arbitrary and
confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as
temporary in nature does not perforce entail the
applicability of a different rule of statutory procedure
than would otherwise be applied to any other order on
the same matter unless otherwise provided by the
applicable law. NTC has no authority to make such
order without first giving PHILCOMSAT a hearing,
whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is
immaterial whether the same is made upon a
complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the
commission's own motion.
PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ 180 SCRA 218; GR NO
84818 18 DEC 1989 CASE DIGEST
Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set
aside an Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner
Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications
Commission
Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services
involving telecommunications. Charging rates for
certain specified lines that were reduced by order of
herein respondent Jose AlcuazCommissioner of the
National Telecommunications Commission. The rates
were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%)
due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC
the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without
prior notice and hearing.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner
was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public
Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However,
pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17,
1987, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction,
control and regulation of respondent NTC

Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.

66
Held: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service
Commission the Supreme Court said that although the
rule-making power and even the power to fix rateswhen such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all
enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippinesmay partake of a legislative character. Respondent
Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasijudicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said
order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other
The respondent admits that the questioned order was
issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It,
however, insists that notice and hearing are not
necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental
to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in
nature but the supreme court said that While
respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final
determination of the application of petitioner, such
rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not
exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of
notice and hearing
The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard
to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make
such order without first giving petitioner a hearing,
whether the order be temporary or permanent. In the
Case at bar the NTC didnt scheduled hearing nor it did
give any notice to the petitioner

PHILCOMSAT Vs. Alcuaz Case Digest

PHILCOMSAT Vs. Alcuaz
180 SCRA 218
G.R. No.84818
December 18, 1989
Facts: Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for
services involving telecommunications. Charging rates
for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of
herein respondent Jose Alcuaz Commissioner of the
National Telecommunications Commission. The rates
were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%)
due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC
the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without
prior notice and hearing.

Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.

Held: Yes. Respondents admitted that the application

of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by
administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than
quasi-legislative. But respondents contention that
notice and hearing are not required since the assailed
order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and
temporary in nature is erroneous. Section 16(c) of the
Public Service Act, providing for the proceedings of the
Commission, upon notice and hearing, dictates that a
Commission has power to fix rates, upon proper notice
and hearing, and, if not subject to the exceptions,
limitations or saving provisions.

It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing,

respondent has no authority to make such order
without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the
order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial
whether the same is made upon a complaint, a
summary investigation, or upon the commission's own
motion as in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the
order of respondents is hereby SET ASIDE.
Suntay v. People [GR L-9430, 29 June 1957] En Banc,
Padilla (J) : 9 concur Facts: On 26 June 1954, Dr.
Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16
years, filed a verified complaint against Emilio Suntay
in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City,
alleging that on or about 21 June 21954, the accused
took Alicia Nubla from St. Paul's College in Quezon City
with lewd design and took her to somewhere near the
University of the Philippines (UP) compound in Diliman
and was then able to have carnal knowledge of her. On
15 December 1954, after an investigation, an Assistant
City Attorney recommended to the City Attorney of
Quezon City that the complaint be dismissed for lack of
merit. On 23 December 1954 attorney for the
complainant addressed a letter to the City Attorney of
Quezon City wherein he took exception to the
recommendation of the Assistant City Attorney referred
to and urged that a complaint for seduction be filed
against Suntay. On 10 January 1955, Suntay applied for
and was granted a passport by the Department of
Foreign Affairs (5981 [A39184]). On 20 January 1955,
Suntay left the Philippines for San Francisco, California,
where he is at present enrolled in school. On 31
January 1955, Alicia Nubla subscribed and swore to a
complaint charging Suntay with seduction which was
filed, in the Court of First Instance (CFI) Quezon City,
after preliminary investigation had been conducted
(Criminal case Q-1596). On 9 February 1955 the
private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to
issue an order "directing such government agencies as
may be concerned, particularly the National Bureau of
Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs, for

67
the purpose of having the accused brought back to the
Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance
with law." On 10 February 1955 the Court granted the
motion. On 7 March 1955 the Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 26 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Secretary
cabled the Ambassador to the United States instructing
him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to
cancel the passport issued to Suntay and to compel
him to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal
charges against him. However, this order was not
implemented or carried out in view of the
commencement of this proceedings in order that the
issues raised may be judicially resolved. On 5 July
1955, Suntays counsel wrote to the Secretary
requesting that the action taken by him be
reconsidered, and filed in the criminal case a motion
praying that the Court reconsider its order of 10
February 1955. On 7 July 1955, the Secretary denied
counsel's request and on 15 July 1955 the Court denied
the motion for reconsideration. Suntay filed the petition
for a writ of certiorari. Issue: Whether Suntay should be
accorded notice and hearing before his passport may
be cancelled. Held: Due process does not necessarily
mean or require a hearing. When discretion is
exercised by an officer vested with it upon an
undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal
charge against the passport holder, hearing may be
dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the
cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does
not violate the due process of law clause of the
Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested
in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious
because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing
should always be held in order to comply with the due
process of law clause of the Constitution, then a writ of
preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be
violative of the said clause. Hearing would have been
proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal
or cancellation of the passport were not clear but
doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a
criminal charge in our courts and left the country to
evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign
Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion (Section 25, EO
1, S. 1946, 42 OG 1400) to revoke a passport already
issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or
capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such
passport. Suntays suddenly leaving the country in
such a convenient time, can reasonably be interpreted
to mean as a deliberate attempt on his part to flee
from justice, and, therefore, he cannot now be heard to
complain if the strong arm of the law should join
together to bring him back to justice.
Outline Topic: Due Process> Exceptions to Notice and
Hearing Requirements
Ponente: Padilla

Facts:

Case is a petition for certoriari to annul the

order of the CFI of Quezon City directing the
NBI and the DFA to take the proper steps in
order that accused Suntay, allegedly in the US,
be brought back to the Philippines, so that he
may be dealt with in accordance with law; and
of prohibition to enjoin the DFA Secretary from
canceling the petitioners passport without
previous hearing
On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of
Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16 years, filed a
verified complaint against Emilio Suntay in the
Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City,
alleging that on June 21, 1954, the accused
took Alicia Nubla, with lewd design, somewhere
near the UP compound in Diliman and had
carnal knowledge of her, and Alicia being a
minor of 16 years old
On Dec. 15, 1954, after investigation, Asst City
Atty recommended to the City Attorney of
Quezon City that the complaint be dismissed
for lack of merit. On 23 December 1954
attorney for the complainant addressed a letter
to the City Attorney of Quezon City wherein he
took exception to the recommendation of the
Assistant City Attorney referred to and urged
that a complaint for seduction be filed against
the herein petitioner.
On 10 January 1955 the petitioner applied for
and was granted a passport by the Department
of Foreign Affairs
On 20 January 1955 the petitioner left the
Philippines for San Francisco, California, U.S.A.,
where he is at present enrolled in school. On 31
January 1955 the offended girl subscribed and
swore to a complaint charging the petitioner
with seduction which was filed in the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City after preliminary
investigation had been conducted
On 9 February 1955 the private prosecutor filed
a motion praying the Court to issue an order
"directing such government agencies as may
be concerned, particularly the National Bureau
of Investigation and the Department of Foreign
Affairs, for the purpose of having the accused
brought back to the Philippines so that he may
be dealt with in accordance with law."
On 10 February 1955 the Court granted the
motion (Exhibit D). On 7 March 1955 the
respondent Secretary cabled the Ambassador
to the United States instructing him to order
the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel
the passport issued to the petitioner and to
compel him to return to the Philippines to
answer the criminal charges against him.
However, this order was not implemented or
carried out in view of the commencement of
the proceeding in order that the issues raised
may be judicially resolved. On 5 July 1955
counsel for the petitioner wrote to the
respondent Secretary requesting that the
action taken by him be reconsidered, and filed
in the criminal case a motion praying that the

68
respondent Court reconsider its order of 10
February 1955. On 7 July 1955 the respondent
Secretary denied counsel's request and on 15
July 1955 the Court denied the motion for
reconsideration. Hence this petition.
Petitioners Claim:

while the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has

discretion in the cancellation of passports,
"such discretion cannot be exercised until after
hearing," because the right to travel or stay
abroad is a personal liberty within the meaning
and protection of the Constitution and hence
he cannot be deprived of such liberty without
due process of law.

Issue: WON the cancellation of passport requires prior

hearing
Ruling:
The petitioner's contention cannot be sustained. The
petitioner is charged with seduction. And the order of
the respondent Court directing the Department of
Foreign Affairs "to take proper steps in order that the
accused . . . may be brought back to the Philippines, so
that he may be dealt with in accordance with law," is
not beyond or in excess of its jurisdiction. the
respondent Court did not specify what step the
respondent Secretary must take to compel the
petitioner to return to the Philippines to answer the
criminal charge preferred against him. True, the
discretion granted, to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs
to withdraw or cancel a passport already issued may
not be exercised at whim. But here the petitioner was
hailed to Court to answer a criminal charge for
seduction and although at first all Assistant City
Attorney recommended the dismissal of the complaint
previously subscribed and sworn to by the father of the
offended girl, yet the petitioner knew that no final
action had been taken by the City Attorney of Quezon
City as the case was still under study. And as the
Solicitor General puts it, "His suddenly leaving the
country in such a convenient time, can reasonably be
interpreted to mean as a deliberate attemption his part
to flee from justice, and, therefore, he cannot now be
heard to complain if the strong arm of the law should
join together to bring him back to justice." In issuing
the order in question, the respondent Secretary was
convinced that a miscarriage of justice would result by
his inaction and as he issued it in the exercise of his
sound discretion, he cannot be enjoined from carrying
it out.
Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the
reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the
passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the

holder of a passport is facing a criminal a charge in our

courts and left the country to evade criminal
prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the
exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already
issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or
capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such
passport. Due process does not necessarily mean or
require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an
officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as
the filing of a serious criminal charge against the
passport holder, hearing maybe dispensed with by
such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his
passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due
process of law clause of the Constitution; and the
exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be
deemed whimsical and capricious of because of the
absence of such hearing. If hearing should always be
held in order to comply with the due process of clause
of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction
issued ex parte would be violative of the said clause.
The petition is denied, with costs against the petitioner.

De Bisschop v. Galang [GR 18365, 31 May 1963]

Facts: George de Bisschop, an American citizen, was
allowed to stay in this country for 3 years, expiring 1
August 1959, as a prearranged employee of the
Bissmag Production, Inc., of which he is president and
general manager. He applied for extension of stay with
the Bureau of Immigration, in a letter dated 10 July
1959. In view, however, of confidential and damaging
reports of the Immigration Office, Benjamin de Mesa, to
the effect that the Bissmag Production, Inc., is more of
a gambling front than the enterprise for promotions of
local and imported shows that it purports to be, and
that de Bisschop is suspected of having evaded
payment of his income tax, the Commissioner of
Immigration (Emilio L. Galang), in a communication of
10 September 1959, advised him that his application
for extension of stay as a prearranged employee has
been denied by the Board of Commissioners, and that
he should depart within 5 days. Thereafter, counsel of
de Bisschop requested for a copy of the adverse
decision of said Board, but the legal officer of the
Bureau of Immigration replied that, pursuant to
immigration practice and procedure and as is usual in
such cases where the result is a vote for denial, for
reasons of practicability and expediency, no formal
decision, order or resolution is promulgated by the
Board. Thereafter, Mr. Bisschop was simply advised of
said denial as per letter dated 10 September 1959. No
request for reinvestigation was made with the Bureau
of Immigration. Instead, to forestall his arrest and the
filing of the corresponding deportation proceedings, de
Bisschop filed the case on 18 September 1959. Pending

69
resolution of the main case for prohibition, a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued ex-parte by the Court
of First Instance (CFI) Manila (with Judge Antonio
Canizares presiding, Civil Case 41477) on the same day
ordering the Commissioner of Immigration to desist
from arresting and detaining de Bisschop. During the
hearing, only documentary evidence were presented.
On 27 March 1961, the lower court granted the petition
for prohibition and ordered the Commissioner of
Immigration to desist and refrain from arresting and
expelling de Bisschop from the Philippines unless and
until proper and legal proceedings are conducted by
the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of
Immigrations in connection with the application for
extension of stay filed by de Bisschop with said Board.
The Commissioner of Immigration appealed. Issue:
Whether the right to notice and hearing is essential to
due process in administrative proceedings, and
whether the Board of Commissioners are required to
render written decisions on petitions for extension of
stay.

Immigration Act merely refers to the number of votes

necessary to constitute the decision of said Board.

Held: The administration of immigration laws is the

primary and exclusive responsibility of the Executive
branch of the government. Extension of stay of aliens
is purely discretionary on the part of immigration
authorities. Since CA 613 (Philippines Immigration Act
of 1940) is silent as to the procedure to be followed in
these cases, the Courts are inclined to uphold the
argument that courts have no jurisdiction to review the
purely administrative practice of immigration
authorities of not granting formal hearings in certain
cases as the circumstances may warrant, for reasons of
practicability and expediency. This would not violate
the due process clause as, in the case at bar, the letter
of appellant-commissioner advising de Bisschop to
depart in 5 days is a mere formality, a preliminary step,
and, therefore, far from final, because, as alleged in
paragraph 7 of appellant's answer to the complaint,
the "requirement to leave before the start of the
deportation proceedings is only an advice to the party
that unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be
compelled to take steps for his expulsion". It is already
a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a day in court is
not a matter of right in administrative proceedings.
Further, the immigration laws specifically enumerate
when the decisions of the Board of Commissioners
shall be in writing, to wit: (1) in cases of appeal from a
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry as to matters of
admission or exclusion of aliens, as provided in Section
27(c) of the Immigration Act; and (2) the decision of
the Board of Commissioners in cases of deportation
under Section 37, paragraph (a) and (c). There is
nothing in the immigration law which provides that the
Board of Commissioners must render written decisions
on petitions for extension of stay. Section 8 of the

that the Bissmag Production, Inc., is more of a

De Bisschop vs. Galang

De Bisschop vs. Galang GR L-18365, 31 May
1963; En Banc, Reyes JBL [J]
FACTS: Petitioner-appellee George de Bisschop, an
American citizen, was allowed to stay in this country
for three years, expiring 1 August 1959, as the
prearranged employee of the Bissmag Production, Inc.,
of which he is president and general manager. He
applied for extension of stay with the Bureau of
Immigration, in a letter dated 10 July 1959. In view,
however, of confidential and damaging reports of
Immigration Officer Benjamin de Mesa to the effect

gambling front than the enterprise for promotion of

local and imported shows that it purports to be, and
that de Bisschop is suspect of having evaded payment
of his income tax, the Commissioner of Immigration
advised him that his application for extension of stay
as a prearranged employee has been denied by the
Board of Commissioners, and that he should depart
within 5 days.
To forestall his arrest and the filing of the
corresponding deportation proceedings, de Bisschop
filed the present case on 18 September 1959. Pending
resolution of the main case for prohibition, a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued ex-parte by the
court a quo on the same day ordering herein
respondent-appellant to desist from arresting and
detaining petitioner-appellee unless and until proper
and legal proceedings are conducted by the Board of
Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration in
connection with the Application for extension of stay
filed by petitioner with said Board.
Appellant Commissioner raises two main issues: That
the lower court erred (a) in holding that the
Commissioners of Immigration are required by law to

70
conduct formal hearings on all applications for

on, and the order of society maintained, is purely

extension of stay of aliens, and (b) in ruling that said

executive or administrative, which is as much due

Commissioners are enjoined to promulgate written

process of law, as is judicial process. While a day in

decisions in such cases.

court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, in

ISSUE: Whether the right to a notice and hearing in

administrative proceedings, it is otherwise since they

certain administrative proceedings is essential to due

rest upon different principles. . . . In certain

process?

proceedings, therefore, of all administrative character,

HELD: No. The administration of immigration laws is

it may be stated, without fear of contradiction, that the

the primary and exclusive responsibility of the

right to a notice and hearing are not essential to due

Executive branch of the government. Extension of stay

process of law.

of aliens is purely discretionary on the part of the

immigration authorities. Since Commonwealth Act No.
613, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act
of 1940, is silent as to the procedure to be followed in
these cases, we are inclined to uphold the argument
that courts have no jurisdiction to review the purely
administrative practice of immigration authorities of
not granting formal hearings in certain cases as the
circumstances may warrant, for reasons of
practicability and expediency. This would not violate
the due process clause if we take into account that, in
this particular case, the letter of appellantcommissioner advising de Bisschop to depart in 5 days
is a mere formality, a preliminary step, and, therefore,
far from final, because, as alleged in paragraph 7 of
appellants answer to the complaint, the requirement
to leave before the start of the deportation proceedings
is only an advice to the party that unless he departs
voluntarily, the State will be compelled to take steps
for his expulsion. In Cornejo vs. Gabriel and Provincial
Board of Rizal, it was held that a day in court is not a
matter of right in administrative proceedings. The fact
should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with an
administrative proceeding and not with a judicial
proceeding. As Judge Cooley, the leading American
writer on Constitutional Law, has well said, due process
of law is not necessarily judicial process; much of the
process by means of which the Government is carried

Var-Orient Shipping v. Achacoso [GR L-81805, 31

May 1988] First division, Grino-Aquino (J): 4 concur
Facts: Var-Orient Shipping Co. Inc. and Comninos Bros.
filed a complaint with the Workers' Assistance and
Adjudication Office (WAAO), Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) against the Edgar
T. Bunyog, Vedasto Navarro, Eugenio Capalad, Raul
Tumasis, Antonio Tanio-an, Celestino Cason, Danilo
Manela and Roberto Genesis, crew members of the
MPV "Silver Reefer," for having allegedly violated their
Contracts of Employment with them, which supposedly
resulted in damages arising from the interdiction of the
vessel by the International Transport Workers'
Federation (ITF) at Kiel Canal, Germany, in March 1986.
After joinder of the issues, the case was heard on 4
March 1987 with both parties required to submit
memoranda. Only the seamen submitted memoranda.
On 10 June 1987, the seamen filed a motion to resolve,
which the companies' counsel did not oppose. Thus, on
the basis of the pleadings and memoranda, Achacoso
rendered a decision on 9 September 1987 ordering (1)
the dismissal of the case with a reprimand and against
Navarro, Capalad, Tumasis, Tanio-an, Cagon, Manela
and Genesis, against the commission of the same or
similar offense otherwise it shall be dealt with more
severe penalty; (2) exclusion of Llanes from the case;
(3) reprimanding Var-Orient Shipping Co. for failure to
comply with its obligations pursuant to POEA rules and
regulations and warning against committing the same
or a similar offense otherwise it shall be dealt with
more severely; (4) archiving the case of Arsolon, A.
dela Cruz, Montero and D. de la Cruz with their names
included in the POEA watchlist until they shall have
voluntarily submitted themselves to WAAOs
jurisdiction; (5) payment by the companies jointly and
severally, unto Navarro, Capalad, Tumasis, Tanio-an,
Cason, Manela and Genesis the amount of P1,550.59
each, representing deductions from allotments, plus
P1,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and (6) payment
by the companies jointly and severally unto Bunyog

71
the amount of US$4,680.00 or its peso equivalent at
the time of payment representing his salaries for the
unserved portion of his employment contract plus
P4,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; to be tendered
thru Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 28 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) WAAO, 10 days from receipt of the decision.
A copy of the decision was sent by registered mail and
delivered by the postman to the companies' counsel,
then Attorney Francisco B. Figura through the
receptionist, Marlyn Aquino on 21 September 1987.
Atty. Figura alleged he did not receive the envelope
containing the decision. The companies allegedly
learned about the decision only when the writ of
execution was served on them on 20 November 1987
by National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Deputy
Sheriff Rene Masilungan and Attorney Wilfredo Ong.
Previously, on 19 October 1987, the seamen filed
"Motion for Execution of Decision," the companies'
counsel did not oppose. On 23 November 1987, the
companies, through new counsel, Atty. Quintin Aseron,
Jr., filed an "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution"
on the ground that the decision had not been received
by them, hence, it was not yet final and executory. On
19 January 1988, the POEA Administrator (Tomas D.
Achacoso). In due time, the companies filed the
petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether the decision of
the POEA administrator has been received, rendering
said decision final and unappealable. Held: The
essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Herein, the parties agreed that they
would file their respective memoranda at the 4 March
1987 hearing and thereafter consider the case
submitted for decision. This procedure is authorized by
law to expedite the settlement of labor disputes. Atty.
Figura's affidavit involving that he has not received the
decision is self-serving. The companies failed to submit
an affidavit of the receptionist Marlyn Aquino
explaining what she did with the decision which she
received for Atty. Figura. Under the circumstances, the
Administrator's ruling that the decision had been
properly served on companies' counsel and that it is
now final and unappealable, should be sustained. The
issuance of the writ of execution is therefore not
premature.
Facts: Var-Orient Shipping Co filed a complaint with
POEA against crewmembers for having allegedly
violated their Contracts of Employment with the
petitioners that supposedly resulted in damages. the
case was heard and the parties agreed to submit their
respective position papers and thereafter the case
would be submitted for decision. On the basis of the

pleadings and memoranda, Tomas Achacoso, POEA

Administrator rendered decision in favour of the crew.
A copy of the decision was sent by registered mail and
delivered by the postman to the petitioners counsel.
Petitioners allegedly learned about the decision only
when the writ of execution was served on them by the
Sherriff. Petitioner filed filed an urgent Motion to Recall
Writ of Execution on the ground that the decision had
not been received by the petitioners, hence, it was not
yet final and executory.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was denied due
process of law because the respondent Administrator
resolved the case without any formal hearing?
Decision: Petition denied. Equally unmeritorious is the
petitioners allegation that they were denied due
process because the decision was rendered without a
formal hearing. The essence of due process is simply
an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain
ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. The fact is that at
the hearing of the case it was agreed by the parties
that they would file their respective memoranda and
thereafter consider the case submitted for decision.
This procedure is authorized by law to expedite the
settlement of labor disputes.