Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
PER CURIAM:
What brings our judicial system into disrepute are often the actuations of a
few erring court personnel peddling influence to party-litigants, creating the
impression that decisions can be bought and sold, ultimately resulting in
the disillusionment of the public. This Court has never wavered in its
vigilance in eradicating the so-called bad eggs in the judiciary. And
whenever warranted by the gravity of the offense, the supreme penalty of
dismissal in an administrative case is meted to erring personnel.
The above pronouncement of this Court in the case of Mendoza vs.
Tiongson is applicable to the case at bar.
This is an ADMINISTRATIVE CASE FOR DISHONESTY AND
GRAVE
MISCONDUCT AGAINST
ELVIRA
CRUZ-APAO
(RESPONDENT), EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT II OF THE ACTING
TH
allegedly told complainant that a favorable and speedy decision of his case
was attainable but the person who was to draft the decision was in return
asking for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).
Complainant expostulated that he did not have that kind of money
since he had been jobless for a long time, to which respondent replied, Eh,
ganoon talaga ang lakaran dito, eh. Kung wala kang pera, pasensiya na.
Complainant then tried to ask for a reduction of the amount but respondent
held firm asserting that the price had been set, not by her but by the person
who was going to make the decision. Respondent even admonished
complainant with the words Wala tayo sa palengke iho! when the latter
bargained for a lower amount.
Complainant then asked for time to determine whether or not to pay
the money in exchange for the decision. Instead, in August of 2004, he
sought the assistance of Imbestigador. The crew of the TV program
accompanied him to PAOCCF-SPG where he lodged a complaint against
respondent for extortion. Thereafter, he communicated with respondent
again to verify if the latter was still asking for the money and to set up a
meeting with her. Upon learning that respondents offer of a favorable
decision in exchange for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was still
standing, the plan for the entrapment operation was formulated
by Imbestigador in cooperation with the PAOCC.
On 24 September 2004, complainant and respondent met for the first
time in person at the 2nd Floor of Jollibee, Times Plaza Bldg., the place
where the entrapment operation was later conducted. Patricia Siringan
(Siringan), a researcher of Imbestigador, accompanied complainant and
posed as his sister-in-law. During the meeting, complainant clarified from
respondent that if he gave the amount of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00), he would get a favorable decision. This was confirmed by
the latter together with the assurance that it would take about a month for
the decision to come out. Respondent also explained that the amount of
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) guaranteed a favorable decision only in
the CA but did not extend to the Supreme Court should the case be
appealed later.
When respondent was asked where the money will go, she claimed
that it will go to a male researcher whose name she refused to divulge. The
researcher was allegedly a lawyer in the CA Fifth (5th) Division where
complainant case was pending. She also claimed that she will not get any
part of the money unless the researcher decides to give her some.
Complainant tried once again to bargain for a lower amount during the
meeting but respondent asserted that the amount was fixed. She even
explained that this was their second transaction and the reason why the
amount was closed at One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was because on
a previous occasion, only Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00)
was paid by the client despite the fact that the amount had been pegged at
One Million Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,300,000.00).
Complainant then proposed that he pay a down payment of Seven
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P700,000.00) while the balance of Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) will be paid once the decision
had been released. However, respondent refused to entertain the offer, she
and the researcher having learned their lesson from their previous
experience for as then, the client no longer paid the balance of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) after the decision had come out.
Complainant brought along copies of the documents pertinent to his
case during the first meeting. After reading through them, respondent
allegedly uttered, Ah, panalo ka. The parties set the next meeting date at
lunchtime on 28 September 2004 and it was understood that the money
would be handed over by complainant to respondent then.
On the pre-arranged meeting date, five (5) PAOCTF agents, namely:
Capt. Reynaldo Maclang (Maclang) as team leader, SPO1 Renato Banay
(Banay), PO1 Bernard Villena (Villena), PO1 Danny Feliciano, and PO2
Edgar delos Reyes arrived at around 11:30 in the morning at Jollibee. Nuez
and Siringan arrived at past noon and seated themselves at the table
beside the one occupied by the two (2) agents, Banay and Villena.
Complainant had with him an unsealed long brown envelope containing ten
(10) bundles of marked money and paper money which was to be given to
respondent. The envelope did not actually contain the One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) demanded by respondent, but instead contained paper
money in denominations of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Five Hundred
Pesos (P500.00) and One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), as well as
TABINAS (2012-0085) Technology & The Law Cases // Page 2
newspaper cut-outs. There were also ten (10) authentic One Hundred Peso
(P100.00) bills which had been previously dusted with ultra-violet powder
by the PAOCTF. The three other PAOCTF agents were seated a few tables
away and there were also three (3) crew members from Imbestigador at
another table operating a mini DV camera that was secretly recording the
whole transaction.
Respondent arrived at around 1:00 p.m. She appeared very nervous
and suspicious during the meeting. Ironically, she repeatedly said that
complainant might entrap her, precisely like those that were shown
on Imbestigador. She thus refused to receive the money then and there.
What she proposed was for complainant and Siringan to travel with her in a
taxi and drop her off at the CA where she would receive the money.
More irony ensued. Respondent actually said that she felt there were
policemen around and she was afraid that once she took hold of the
envelope complainant proffered, she would suddenly be arrested and
handcuffed. At one point, she even said, Ayan o, tapos na silang kumain,
bakit hindi pa sila umaalis?, referring to Banay and Villena at the next
table. To allay respondents suspicion, the two agents stood up after a few
minutes and went near the staircase where they could still see what was
going on.
Headquarters.
At seven oclock in the evening of 28 September 2004, respondent
called Atty. Lilia Mercedes Encarnacion Gepty (Atty. Gepty), her immediate
superior in the CA at the latters house. She tearfully confessed to Atty.
Gepty that she asked for money for a case and was entrapped by police
officers and the media. Enraged at the news, Atty. Gepty asked why she
had done such a thing to which respondent replied, Wala lang maam,
sinubukan ko lang baka makalusot. Respondent claimed that she was
ashamed of what she did and repented the same. She also asked for Atty.
Geptys forgiveness and help. The latter instead reminded respondent of
the instances when she and her co-employees at the CA were exhorted
during office meetings never to commit such offenses.
Atty. Gepty rendered a verbal report of her conversation with their
divisions chairman, Justice Martin S. Villarama. She reduced the report
into writing and submitted the same to then PJ Cancio Garcia on 29
September 2004. She also later testified as to the contents of her report to
the Committee.
On the way to the WPD on board the PAOCTF vehicle, Banay asked
respondent why she went to the restaurant. The latter replied that she went
there to get the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).
What else?
A:
Tapos yung sabi ko pong pagpunta niya magdala siya ng I.D. or
isama niya sa kanya si Len David.
Q:
Okay, You remember having texted Zaldy Nuez on September 23,
2004 at 1309 which was around 1:09 in the afternoon and you said di me
pwede punta na lang kayo dito sa office Thursday 4:45 p.m. Room 107
TABINAS (2012-0085) Technology & The Law Cases // Page 4
Centennial Building.
A:
A:
A:
A:
A:
A:
Respondent would like this Court to believe that she never had any
intention of committing a crime, that the offer of a million pesos for a
favorable decision came from complainant and that it was complainant and
the law enforcers who instigated the whole incident.
Respondent thus stated that she met with complainant only to tell the
latter to stop calling and texting her, not to get the One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) as pre-arranged.
This claim of respondent is preposterous to say the least. Had the offer
of a million pesos really come from complainant and had she really
intended to stop the latter from corrupting her, she could have simply
refused to answer the latters messages and calls. This she did not do.
She answered those calls and messages though she later claimed she did
not remember having sent the same messages to complainant. She could
also have reported the matter to the CA Presiding Justice, an action which
respondent admitted during the hearing was the proper thing to do under
the circumstances. But this course of action she did not resort to either,
allegedly because she never expected things to end this way.
While claiming that she was not interested in complainants offer of a
million pesos, she met with him not only once but twice, ostensibly, to tell
the latter to stop pestering her. If respondent felt that telling complainant to
stop pestering her would be more effective if she did it in person, the same
would have been accomplished with a single meeting. There was no
reason for her to meet with complainant again on 28 September 2004
unless there was really an understanding between them that the One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) will be handed over to her then.
Respondent even claimed that she became afraid of complainant when she
learned that the latter had been dismissed by PAGCOR for using illegal
drugs. This notwithstanding, she still met with him on 28 September 2004.
Anent complainants narration of respondents refusal to reduce the
amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000.000.00) based on the lesson learned
from a previous transaction, while admitting that she actually said the
same, respondent wants this Court to believe that she said it merely to
have something to talk about. If indeed, respondent had no intention of
committing any wrongdoing, it escapes the Court why she had to make up
stories merely to test if complainant could make good on his alleged boast
that he could come up with a million pesos. It is not in accord with ordinary
human experience for an honest government employee to make up stories
that would make party-litigants believe that court decisions may be bought
and sold. Time and again this Court has declared, thus:
Everyone in the judiciary bears a heavy burden of responsibility for the
proper discharge of his duty and it behooves everyone to steer clear of any
situations in which the slightest suspicion might be cast on his conduct. Any
misbehavior on his part, whether true or only perceived, is likely to reflect
adversely on the administration of justice.
TABINAS (2012-0085) Technology & The Law Cases // Page 5
Respondent having worked for the government for twenty four (24)
years, nineteen (19) of which have been in the CA, should have known
very well that court employees are held to the strictest standards of
honesty and integrity. Their conduct should at all times be above
suspicion. As held by this Court in a number of cases, The conduct or
behavior of all officials of an agency involved in the administration of
justice, from the Presiding Judge to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must,
at all times be characterized by among others, strict propriety and decorum
in order to earn and maintain the respect of the public for the judiciary.
Respondents actuations from the time she started communicating with
complainant in July 2004 until the entrapment operation on 28 September
2004 show a lack of the moral fiber demanded from court employees.
Respondents avowals of innocence notwithstanding, the evidence clearly
show that she solicited the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00)
from complainant in exchange for a favorable decision. The testimony of
Atty. Gepty, the recipient of respondents confession immediately after the
entrapment operation, unmistakably supports the finding that respondent
did voluntarily engage herself in the activity she is being accused of.
Respondents solicitation of money from complainant in exchange for a
favorable decision violates Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel which took effect on 1 June 2004 pursuant to A.M. No. 03-0613-SC. Sections 1 and 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel expressly provide:
SECTION 1. Court personnel shall not use their official position to
secure unwarranted benefits, privileges or exemption for themselves
or for others.
SECTION 2. Court personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor
or benefit based on any explicit or implicit understanding that such
gift,
favor
or
benefit
shall
influence
their
official
actions. (Underscoring supplied)
It is noteworthy that the penultimate paragraph of the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel specifically provides:
INCORPORATION OF OTHER RULES
SECTION 1. All provisions of the law, Civil Service rules, and issuances of
the Supreme Court governing the conduct of public officers and employees
applicable to the judiciary are deemed incorporated into this Code.
By soliciting the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from
complainant, respondent committed an act of impropriety which
immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the judiciary and the peoples
confidence in it.
In the recent case of Aspiras vs. Abalos, complainant charged
respondent, an employee of the Records Section, Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), Supreme Court for allegedly deceiving him into giving
her money in the total amount of Fifty Two Thousand Pesos (P52,000.00)
in exchange for his acquittal in a murder case on appeal before the
Supreme Court. It turned out that respondents representation was false
because complainant was subsequently convicted of murder and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua by the Supreme
Court.
The Supreme Court en banc found Esmeralda Abalos guilty of serious
misconduct and ordered her dismissal from the service. This Court aptly
held thus:
In Mirano vs. Saavedra,[80] this Court emphatically declared that a public
servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity.
The administration of justice is a sacred task, and by the very nature of
their duties and responsibilities, all those involved in it must faithfully
adhere to, hold inviolate, and invigorate the principle that public office is a
public trust, solemnly enshrined in the Constitution.[81]
Likewise, in the grave misconduct case against Datu Alykhan T.
Amilbangsa of the Sharia Circuit Court, Bengo, Tawi-Tawi,[82] this Court
stated:
No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from
the occupant than the judicial office. Those connected with the
dispensation of justice bear a heavy burden of responsibility. Court
employees in particular, must be individuals of competence, honesty and
probity charged as they are with safeguarding the integrity of the court . . . .
The High Court has consistently held that persons involved in the
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SECOND DIVISION
RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA,
Petitioner,
- versus -
Promulgated:
text messaging shorthand, read: Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang
tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter.
Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to
the police. Under police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the
cellphone numbers he used in sending the picture and his text
messages. Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy.
Ramada, Maria Aurora, and he did. He came in a motorcycle. After
parking it, he walked towards Irish but the waiting police officers
intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and seized his Sony
Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan was being
questioned at the police station, he shouted at Irish: Malandi ka kasi!
Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology,
testified as an expert in information technology and computer graphics. He
said that it was very much possible for one to lift the face of a woman from
a picture and superimpose it on the body of another woman in another
picture. Pictures can be manipulated and enhanced by computer to make
it appear that the face and the body belonged to just one person.
Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had two
distinct irregularities: the face was not proportionate to the body and the
face had a lighter color. In his opinion, the picture was fake and the face
on it had been copied from the picture of Irish in Exhibit B. Finally,
Gonzales explained how this could be done, transferring a picture from a
computer to a cellphone like the Sony Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan.
For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He began visiting her in
Tarlac in October 2003 and their relation lasted until December of that
year. He claimed that after their relation ended, Irish wanted
reconciliation. They met in December 2004 but, after he told her that his
girlfriend at that time (later his wife) was already pregnant, Irish walked out
on him.
Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking him to
meet her at Lorentess Resort as she needed his help in selling her
cellphone. When he arrived at the place, two police officers approached
him, seized his cellphone and the contents of his pockets, and brought him
TABINAS (2012-0085) Technology & The Law Cases // Page 8
The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish
by cellphone message the picture with her face pasted on the body of a
nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation on
her in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
The subordinate issues are:
1.
Whether or not a dating relationship existed between Rustan and
Irish as this term is defined in R.A. 9262;
2.
Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the
nude picture in this case, already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of
R.A. 9262;
3.
Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained
from him in violation of his constitutional rights; and
4.
Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene
picture presented in the case.
The Courts Rulings
Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes
an act or acts of a person against a woman with whom he has or had a
sexual or dating relationship. Thus:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act,
(a)
Violence against women and their children
refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any
person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or
against a woman with whom the person has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a
common child, or against her child whether legitimate
or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which
result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
xxxx
Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against women
TABINAS (2012-0085) Technology & The Law Cases // Page 9
at times, when she could not reply to Rustans messages, he would get
angry at her. That was all. Indeed, she characterized their three-month
romantic relation as continuous.
Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture
should not be considered a form of harassment. He claims that such would
unduly ruin him personally and set a very dangerous precedent. But
Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes any act or series of acts that
constitutes violence against women. This means that a single act of
harassment, which translates into violence, would be enough. The object of
the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only violence that is
repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.
Rustan alleges that todays women, like Irish, are so used to obscene
communications that her getting one could not possibly have produced
alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional or psychological
distress. He claims having previously exchanged obscene pictures with
Irish such that she was already desensitized by them.
But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give their
testimonies was not impressed with their claim that it was Irish who sent
the obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits 2-7). It is doubtful if the woman in
the picture was Irish since her face did not clearly show on them.
Michelle, Rustans wife, claimed that she deleted several other pictures that
Irish sent, except Exhibits 2 to 7. But her testimony did not make
sense. She said that she did not know that Exhibits 2 to 7 had remained
saved after she deleted the pictures. Later, however, she said that she did
not have time to delete them. And, if she thought that she had deleted all
the pictures from the memory card, then she had no reason at all to keep
and hide such memory card. There would have been nothing to
hide. Finally, if she knew that some pictures remained in the card, there
was no reason for her to keep it for several years, given that as she said
she was too jealous to want to see anything connected to Irish. Thus, the
RTC was correct in not giving credence to her testimony.
Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced
based on Rustans low regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of todays
Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text
message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be
authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under
Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the
obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The objection
is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on
such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed
to have already waived such ground for objection.
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The
Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial
proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and
every element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 30567 dated and its resolution
dated .
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 170633 - October 17, 2007
MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. SSANGYONG
CORPORATION, respondents.
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82983 and its Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration thereof.
Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC), a domestic corporation with
office at Binondo, Manila, is engaged in the business of importing and
wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its suppliers is the Ssangyong
MCC. The invoices slightly varied the terms of the earlier pro formainvoices
(ST2-POSTSO401, ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2), in that
the quantity was now officially100MT per invoice and the price was
reduced to US$1,700.00 per MT. As can be gleaned from the photocopies
of the said August 16, 2000 invoices submitted to the court, they both bear
the conformity signature of MCC Manager Chan.
On August 17, 2000, MCC finally opened an L/C with PCIBank for
US$170,000.00 covering payment for 100MT of stainless steel coil
under Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-2.34 The goods covered by
the said invoice were then shipped to and received by MCC.35
MCC then faxed to Ssangyong a letter dated August 22, 2000 signed by
Chan, requesting for a price adjustment of the order stated in Pro
Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-1, considering that the prevailing price
of steel at that time was US$1,500.00/MT, and that MCC lost a lot of money
due to a recent strike.36
Ssangyong rejected the request, and, on August 23, 2000, sent a demand
letter37 to Chan for the opening of the second and last L/C of
US$170,000.00 with a warning that, if the said L/C was not opened by
MCC on August 26, 2000, Ssangyong would be constrained to cancel the
contract and hold MCC liable for US$64,066.99 (representing cost
difference, warehousing expenses, interests and charges as of August 15,
2000) and other damages for breach. Chan failed to reply.
Exasperated, Ssangyong through counsel wrote a letter to MCC, on
September 11, 2000, canceling the sales contract under ST2-POSTS04011 /ST2-POSTS0401-2, and demanding payment of US$97,317.37
representing losses, warehousing expenses, interests and charges.38
Ssangyong then filed, on November 16, 2001, a civil action for damages
due to breach of contract against defendants MCC, Sanyo Seiki and
Gregory Chan before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. In its
complaint,39 Ssangyong alleged that defendants breached their contract
when they refused to open the L/C in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the
remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS04011 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.
After Ssangyong rested its case, defendants filed a Demurrer to
Evidence40 alleging that Ssangyong failed to present the original copies of
the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based. In an Order
TABINAS (2012-0085) Technology & The Law Cases // Page 13
dated April 24, 2003, the court denied the demurrer, ruling that the
documentary evidence presented had already been admitted in the
December 16, 2002 Order41 and their admissibility finds support in
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000. Considering that both testimonial and documentary
evidence tended to substantiate the material allegations in the complaint,
Ssangyong's evidence sufficed for purposes of a prima facie case.42
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision43 on March 24,
2004, in favor of Ssangyong. The trial court ruled that when plaintiff agreed
to sell and defendants agreed to buy the 220MT of steel products for the
price of US$1,860 per MT, the contract was perfected. The subject
transaction was evidenced by Pro FormaInvoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1
and ST2-POSTS0401-2, which were later amended only in terms of
reduction of volume as well as the price per MT, following Pro
Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS080-1 and ST2-POSTS080-2. The RTC,
however, excluded Sanyo Seiki from liability for lack of competent
evidence. The falloof the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered
ordering defendants MCC Industrial Sales Corporation and Gregory
Chan, to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally the following:
collaborating counsel.
In their Appeal Brief filed on March 9, 2005,46 MCC and Chan raised
before the CA the following errors of the RTC:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT APPELLANTS VIOLATED THEIR CONTRACT
WITH APPELLEE
A. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT APPELLANTS AGREED TO PURCHASE
200 METRIC TONS OF STEEL PRODUCTS FROM
APPELLEE, INSTEAD OF ONLY 100 METRIC TONS.
1. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY
ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THEPRO
FORMA INVOICES WITH REFERENCE NOS. ST2POSTS0401-1 AND ST2-POSTS0401-2.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN
AWARDING ACTUAL DAMAGES TO APPELLEE.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN
AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO APPELLEE.
On August 31, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision48 affirming the ruling of
the trial court, but absolving Chan of any liability. The appellate court ruled,
among others, that Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E", "E-1" and "F") were admissible in evidence,
although they were mere facsimile printouts of MCC's steel orders.49 The
dispositive portion of the appellate court's decision reads:
3) Costs of suit.
(1) The award of actual damages, with interest, attorney's fees and
costs ordered by the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.44
On April 22, 2004, MCC and Chan, through their counsel of record, Atty.
Eladio B. Samson, filed their Notice of Appeal.45 On June 8, 2004, the law
office of Castillo Zamora & Poblador entered its appearance as their
final and executory, because MCC's motion for reconsideration was filed
beyond the reglementary period of 15 days from receipt of a copy thereof,
and that, in any case, it was apro forma motion; that MCC breached the
contract for the purchase of the steel products when it failed to open the
required letter of credit; that the printout copies and/or photocopies of
facsimile or telecopy transmissions were properly admitted by the trial court
because they are considered original documents under R.A. No. 8792; and
that MCC is liable for actual damages and attorney's fees because of its
breach, thus, compelling Ssangyong to litigate.
The principal issues that this Court is called upon to resolve are the
following:
I Whether the CA decision dated 15 August 2005 is already final and
executory;
II Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are
electronic evidence and admissible as such;
III Whether there was a perfected contract of sale between MCC and
Ssangyong, and, if in the affirmative, whether MCC breached the said
contract; and
IV Whether the award of actual damages and attorney's fees in favor of
Ssangyong is proper and justified.
-IIt cannot be gainsaid that in Albano v. Court of Appeals,58 we held that
receipt of a copy of the decision by one of several counsels on record is
notice to all, and the period to appeal commences on such date even if the
other counsel has not yet received a copy of the decision. In this case,
when Atty. Samson received a copy of the CA decision on September 14,
2005, MCC had only fifteen (15) days within which to file a motion for
reconsideration conformably with Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court,
or to file a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Section 2,
Rule 45. The period should not be reckoned from September 29, 2005
(when Castillo Zamora & Poblador received their copy of the decision)
because notice to Atty. Samson is deemed notice to collaborating counsel.
We note, however, from the records of the CA, that it was Castillo Zamora
& Poblador, not Atty. Samson, which filed both MCC's and Chan's Brief and
Reply Brief. Apparently, the arrangement between the two counsels was for
TABINAS (2012-0085) Technology & The Law Cases // Page 15
the collaborating, not the principal, counsel to file the appeal brief and
subsequent pleadings in the CA. This explains why it was Castillo Zamora
& Poblador which filed the motion for the reconsideration of the CA
decision, and they did so on October 5, 2005, well within the 15-day period
from September 29, 2005, when they received their copy of the CA
decision. This could also be the reason why the CA did not find it
necessary to resolve the question of the timeliness of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, even as the CA denied the same.
Independent of this consideration though, this Court assiduously reviewed
the records and found that strong concerns of substantial justice warrant
the relaxation of this rule.
In Philippine Ports Authority v. Sargasso Construction and Development
Corporation,59 we ruled that:
In Orata v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we held that where strong
considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the petition, this
Court may relax the strict application of the rules of procedure in the
exercise of its legal jurisdiction. In addition to the basic merits of the
main case, such a petition usually embodies justifying circumstance
which warrants our heeding to the petitioner's cry for justice in spite
of the earlier negligence of counsel. As we held in Obut v. Court of
Appeals:
[W]e cannot look with favor on a course of action which
would place the administration of justice in a straight jacket
for then the result would be a poor kind of justice if there
would be justice at all. Verily, judicial orders, such as the one
subject of this petition, are issued to be obeyed, nonetheless
a non-compliance is to be dealt with as the circumstances
attending the case may warrant. What should guide judicial
action is the principle that a party-litigant is to be given the
fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or
defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or
property on technicalities.
The rules of procedure are used only to secure and not override or
frustrate justice. A six-day delay in the perfection of the appeal, as in
this case, does not warrant the outright dismissal of the appeal.
InDevelopment Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, we
gave due course to the petitioner's appeal despite the late filing of
its brief in the appellate court because such appeal involved public
interest. We stated in the said case that the Court may exempt a
particular case from a strict application of the rules of procedure
where the appellant failed to perfect its appeal within the
reglementary period, resulting in the appellate court's failure to
obtain jurisdiction over the case. In Republic vs. Imperial, Jr., we
also held that there is more leeway to exempt a case from the
strictness of procedural rules when the appellate court has already
obtained jurisdiction over the appealed case. We emphasize that:
[T]he rules of procedure are mere tools intended to facilitate
the attainment of justice, rather than frustrate it. A strict and
rigid application of the rules must always be eschewed when
it would subvert the rule's primary objective of enhancing fair
trials and expediting justice. Technicalities should never be
used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party. Every
party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for
the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities.60
Moreover, it should be remembered that the Rules were promulgated to set
guidelines in the orderly administration of justice, not to shackle the hand
that dispenses it. Otherwise, the courts would be consigned to being mere
slaves to technical rules, deprived of their judicial discretion. Technicalities
must take a backseat to substantive rights. After all, it is circumspect
leniency in this respect that will give the parties the fullest opportunity to
ventilate the merits of their respective causes, rather than have them lose
life, liberty, honor or property on sheer technicalities.61
The other technical issue posed by respondent is the alleged pro
forma nature of MCC's motion for reconsideration, ostensibly because it
merely restated the arguments previously raised and passed upon by the
CA.
In this connection, suffice it to say that the mere restatement of arguments
in a motion for reconsideration does not per se result in a pro forma motion.
In Security Bank and Trust Company, Inc. v. Cuenca,62 we held that a
motion for reconsideration may not be necessarily pro forma even if it
reiterates the arguments earlier passed upon and rejected by the appellate
court. A movant may raise the same arguments precisely to convince the
court that its ruling was erroneous. Furthermore, the pro forma rule will not
TABINAS (2012-0085) Technology & The Law Cases // Page 16
apply if the arguments were not sufficiently passed upon and answered in
the decision sought to be reconsidered.
- II The second issue poses a novel question that the Court welcomes. It
provides the occasion for this Court to pronounce a definitive interpretation
of the equally innovative provisions of the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000 (R.A. No. 8792) vis--vis the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
Although the parties did not raise the question whether the original
facsimile transmissions are "electronic data messages" or "electronic
documents" within the context of the Electronic Commerce Act (the
petitioner merely assails as inadmissible evidence the photocopies of the
said facsimile transmissions), we deem it appropriate to determine first
whether the said fax transmissions are indeed within the coverage of R.A.
No. 8792 before ruling on whether the photocopies thereof are covered by
the law. In any case, this Court has ample authority to go beyond the
pleadings when, in the interest of justice or for the promotion of public
policy, there is a need to make its own findings in order to support its
conclusions.63
Petitioner contends that the photocopies of the pro forma invoices
presented by respondent Ssangyong to prove the perfection of their
supposed contract of sale are inadmissible in evidence and do not fall
within the ambit of R.A. No. 8792, because the law merely admits as the
best evidence the original fax transmittal. On the other hand, respondent
posits that, from a reading of the law and the Rules on Electronic Evidence,
the original facsimile transmittal of the pro forma invoice is admissible in
evidence since it is an electronic document and, therefore, the best
evidence under the law and the Rules. Respondent further claims that the
photocopies of these fax transmittals (specifically ST2-POSTS04011 and ST2-POSTS0401-2) are admissible under the Rules on Evidence
because the respondent sufficiently explained the non-production of the
original fax transmittals.
In resolving this issue, the appellate court ruled as follows:
Admissibility
Invoices;
by Appellants
of
Breach
Pro
of
Forma
Contract
- III Nevertheless, despite the pro forma invoices not being electronic evidence,
this Court finds that respondent has proven by preponderance of evidence
the existence of a perfected contract of sale.
In an action for damages due to a breach of a contract, it is essential that
the claimant proves (1) the existence of a perfected contract, (2) the breach
thereof by the other contracting party and (3) the damages which he/she
sustained due to such breach. Actori incumbit onus probandi. The burden
of proof rests on the party who advances a proposition affirmatively.95 In
other words, a plaintiff in a civil action must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence, that is, evidence that has greater weight, or is
more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it.96
In general, contracts are perfected by mere consent,97 which is manifested
by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the
cause which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and
the acceptance absolute.98 They are, moreover, obligatory in whatever
form they may have been entered into, provided all the essential requisites
for their validity are present.99 Sale, being a consensual contract, follows
the general rule that it is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the
minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.
From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance,
subject to the provisions of the law governing the form of contracts.100
The essential elements of a contract of sale are (1) consent or meeting of
the minds, that is, to transfer ownership in exchange for the price, (2)
object certain which is the subject matter of the contract, and (3) cause of
the obligation which is established.101
In this case, to establish the existence of a perfected contract of sale
between the parties, respondent Ssangyong formally offered in evidence
the testimonies of its witnesses and the following exhibits:
Exhibit
Description
Purpose
1, photocopy
E-1
E-2
conditions.
G-1
Signature
of
defendant
Gregory Chan, contained in
facsimile/thermal paper.
by defendants to plaintiff
showing
the
printed
transmission details on the
upper portion of said paper as
coming from defendant MCC
on June 00 11:12 AM
obligations.
W
W-2
Letter
from
plaintiff To prove that there was a
SSANGYONG to defendant sale
and
purchase
SANYO SEIKI dated 13 April between the parties for
2000, with fax back from tons of steel products at t
defendants
SANYO US$1,860/ton.
SEIKI/MCC
to
plaintiff
SSANGYONG, contained
in
facsimile/thermal paper with
back-up photocopy
Conforme signature
of To prove that defendan
defendant Gregory Chan, through Gregory Chan, ag
contained in facsimile/thermal sale and purchase of 220
paper with back-up photocopy of steel products at the
US$1,860/ton.
Name
of
sender
MCC To prove that defendants
Industrial Sales Corporation
conformity to the sale and
agreement by facsimile tran
X-3
DD
DD-1
DD-2
Conforme signature
defendant
Chan,photocopy
other hand, failed to account for the notation "2/2" in its Pro Forma
Invoice (Exhibit "1-A"). Observably further, both Pro Forma Invoices
bear the same date and details, which logically mean that they both
apply to one and the same transaction.106
Indeed, why would petitioner open an L/C for the second half of the
transaction if there was no first half to speak of?
The logical chain of events, as gleaned from the evidence of both parties,
started with the petitioner and the respondent agreeing on the sale and
purchase of 220MT of stainless steel at US$1,860.00 per MT. This initial
contract was perfected. Later, as petitioner asked for several extensions to
pay, adjustments in the delivery dates, and discounts in the price as
originally agreed, the parties slightly varied the terms of their contract,
without necessarily novating it, to the effect that the original order was
reduced to 200MT, split into two deliveries, and the price discounted to
US$1,700 per MT. Petitioner, however, paid only half of its obligation and
failed to open an L/C for the other 100MT. Notably, the conduct of both
parties sufficiently established the existence of a contract of sale, even if
the writings of the parties, because of their contested admissibility, were
not as explicit in establishing a contract.107 Appropriate conduct by the
parties may be sufficient to establish an agreement, and while there may
be instances where the exchange of correspondence does not disclose the
exact point at which the deal was closed, the actions of the parties may
indicate that a binding obligation has been undertaken.108
With our finding that there is a valid contract, it is crystal-clear that when
petitioner did not open the L/C for the first half of the transaction (100MT),
despite numerous demands from respondent Ssangyong, petitioner
breached its contractual obligation. It is a well-entrenched rule that the
failure of a buyer to furnish an agreed letter of credit is a breach of the
contract between buyer and seller. Indeed, where the buyer fails to open a
letter of credit as stipulated, the seller or exporter is entitled to claim
damages for such breach. Damages for failure to open a commercial credit
may, in appropriate cases, include the loss of profit which the seller would
reasonably have made had the transaction been carried out.109
- IV This Court, however, finds that the award of actual damages is not in
accord with the evidence on record. It is axiomatic that actual or
compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be proven with a
TABINAS (2012-0085) Technology & The Law Cases // Page 27
damages, but must depend on competent proof that the claimant had
suffered, and on evidence of, the actual amount thereof.113
SIZE/Q'TY:
2.8MM X 1,219MM X C
8.193MT
3.0MM X 1,219MM X C
7.736MT
3.0MM X 1,219MM X C
7.885MT
3.0MM X 1,219MM X C
8.629MT
4.0MM X 1,219MM X C
7.307MT
4.0MM X 1,219MM X C
7.247MT
4.5MM X 1,219MM X C
8.450MT
4.5MM X 1,219MM X C
8.870MT
5.0MM X 1,219MM X C
8.391MT
6.0MM X 1,219MM X C
6.589MT
6.0MM X 1,219MM X C
7.878MT
6.0MM X 1,219MM X C
8.397MT
TOTAL:
95.562MT115
List of commodities as stated in Exhibit "X" (the invoice that was not
paid):
DESCRIPTION: Hot Rolled Stainless Steel Coil SUS 304
SIZE AND QUANTITY:
2.6 MM X 4' X C
10.0MT
3.0 MM X 4' X C
25.0MT
4.0 MM X 4' X C
15.0MT
4.5 MM X 4' X C
15.0MT
5.0 MM X 4' X C
10.0MT
SO ORDERED.
6.0 MM X 4' X C
25.0MT
TOTAL:
100MT116
From the foregoing, we find merit in the contention of MCC that Ssangyong
did not adequately prove that the items resold at a loss were the same
items ordered by the petitioner. Therefore, as the claim for actual damages
was not proven, the Court cannot sanction the award.
Nonetheless, the Court finds that petitioner knowingly breached its
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